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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 13-CV-431

GEORGE W. CRAWFORD, APPELLANT,

v.

FIRST WASHINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., APPELLEES.

Appeal from the Superior Court 

of the District of Columbia 

(CAB-5890-07)

(Hon. Gregory E. Jackson, Trial Judge)

(Argued May 14, 2015 Decided July 23, 2015)

Latif Doman for appellant.

David H. Cox, with whom James N. Markels, was on the brief, for appellees

Adam Abrahams and First American Title Insurance Company.

Stephen E. Leach, with whom Stephen L. Neal, Jr., filed a statement in lieu 

of a brief, for appellees First Washington Insurance and Gerald Schaeffer, 

supporting appellees Adam Abrahams and First American Title Insurance 

Company.

Before GLICKMAN and BECKWITH, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Senior 

Judge.

NEBEKER, Senior Judge: On April 15, 2013, the Honorable Gregory E. 

Jackson ordered that appellant George W. Crawford be conditionally incarcerated 
2

after being found to be in contempt for his failure to make a “good faith effort” to 

pay $123,257.50 in imposed sanctions. Appellant argues that the trial court 

erred—as a matter of law—when it incarcerated him on account of his failure to 

pay what amounts to a money judgment, attorneys’ fees. We conclude that the

appeal is moot, and dismiss it.

I.

At the outset, we recognize that only one order from the trial court is 

properly before this court: the April 15, 2013,

1

order to incarcerate appellant. All 

other appeals from this matter have either been previously adjudicated or are not 

properly before this court. We conduct our analysis accordingly.

A full recounting of the proceedings below and the underlying litigation is 

not necessary for adjudication or germane to our discussion. What follows is a 

condensed recitation of pertinent facts. Appellant and appellees2 were embroiled 

in litigation relating to appellant’s personal guaranty of two promissory notes 

 

1

 Appellant also filed an appeal from the trial court’s December 14, 2012, 

order. This appeal was lodged, however, on April 25, 2013, well outside this 

court’s thirty-day window to file a notice of appeal. D.C. App. R. 4 (a)(1).

2

The appellees in this matter are First Washington Insurance Company, 

First American Title Insurance Company, Adam Abrahams, and Gerald Schaeffer.
3

executed to refinance two properties in the District of Columbia. On May 28, 

2010, the trial court3dismissed appellant’s motion to vacate a settlement agreement 

between the parties, and found it to be both “meritless” and “frivolous.” The trial 

court found that contempt was not “an appropriate remedy” at the time, but 

nonetheless imposed $30,517.35 in sanctions pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11. 

Appellant failed to pay the sanctions, and was found in contempt by the trial court 

on August 17, 2012. 

Appellant continued to prove unwilling to pay, and his recalcitrant posture 

led the trial court to again hold him in contempt, and finally order that appellant be 

conditionally incarcerated for his repeated failure to satisfy, or make a good faith 

effort to satisfy the sanctions imposed by the trial court. The trial court also 

imposed $123,257.50 in “additional sanctions,” and set a March 15, 2013, deadline

for payment. At a December 21, 2012, hearing, appellant made a good-faith effort 

towards paying the $30,517.35 in sanctions, and he was released. Following his 

release, however, appellant made no “showing of good faith” and did not make a 

single payment toward the $123,257.50 in additional sanctions imposed. On April 

15, 2013, the trial court found that appellant had made “no efforts whatsoever” to 

 

3 At the time, the case was assigned to the Honorable Brian Holeman. The 

docket establishes that as of the August 17, 2012 status hearing, the case had been 

transferred to the Honorable Gregory E. Jackson. 
4

pay the additional sanctions and that he “never had any communication with . . . 

the [appellees].” The trial court ordered that appellant be conditionally 

incarcerated—again—until he paid the sanctions, made a good-faith effort to pay, 

or demonstrated an inability to pay. Appellant timely appealed the April 15, 2013,

incarceration order.

On May 30, 2013, the parties again went before the trial court for a status 

hearing on appellant’s progress towards purging the contempt. At the hearing, the 

parties came to an agreement where appellant would assign $2,500 worth of 

income from his monthly retirement “as a good faith effort in payment of the 

sanctions.” This payment plan did not relieve appellant of paying the balance of 

the additional sanctions imposed by the trial court on December 14, 2012, in its 

written order. The trial court gave appellant an additional six months to pay off the 

balance of the sanctions, and the parties agreed to work towards a settlement. 

Satisfied with the current state of affairs, the trial court released appellant from 

incarceration. 

On December 11, 2013, one day before appellant was scheduled to appear 

before the trial court for a status hearing, appellant filed for protection under 

Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Appellant acknowledges that the 
5

bankruptcy court discharged the sanctions imposed by the trial court under Rule 11 

and that all “monetary sanctions [against him] have been discharged,” but contends 

that he “continues to suffer real and present injury as a result of the contempt

proceedings below.” 

II.

While not bound by the requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution, 

“this court does not normally decide moot cases.” Thorn v. Walker, 912 A.2d 

1192, 1195 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Cropp v. Williams, 841 A.2d 328, 330 (D.C. 

2004)). A case is moot when “the parties have presented no justiciable controversy 

to the appellate court.” Id. A more exact elucidation is that a case is moot when

“the legal issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or when the parties lack a legally 

cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. (citation omitted). “[I]t is well-settled 

that, while an appeal is pending, an event that renders relief impossible or 

unnecessary also renders that appeal moot.” Settlemire v. District of Columbia 

Office of Emp. Appeals, 898 A.2d 902, 905 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Vaughn v. United 

States, 579 A.2d 170, 175 n.7 (D.C. 1990)).
6

As noted supra, the only order properly before this court is the trial court’s 

April 15, 2013, order to conditionally incarcerate appellant a second time for his 

failure to pay sanctions imposed under Rule 11. Appellant was released from 

incarceration on May 30, 2013, after appellant agreed to pay the remaining 

sanctions within the next six months, and assigned $2,500 towards their payment 

as a demonstration of good faith. “It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that 

a criminal appeal becomes moot ‘when the judgment has been satisfied by the 

payment of a fine or the completion of the sentence.’” Bradley v. United States, 

107 A.3d 586, 602 n.40 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Rosenau v. District of Columbia, 147 

A.2d 445, 446 (D.C. 1959)). We have applied this principle to incarceration 

resulting from a contempt finding. In re Evans, 450 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. 1982); 

Smith v. Smith, 427 A.2d 928, 930 n.4 (D.C. 1981); In re De Neueville, 286 A.2d 

225, 227 (D.C. 1972). When there is “no possibility of collateral legal 

consequences for appellant flowing from the . . . determination now on appeal to 

us,” mootness is controlling. In re Edmonds, 96 A.3d 683, 686 n.11 (D.C. 2014) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellant argues that he will suffer “collateral legal consequences” from his 

second conditional incarceration in the form of harm to reputation, loss of 

government employment, and an inability to obtain comparable employment 
7

moving forward. We are not persuaded. The harms appellant cites to cannot be 

traced to the April 15, 2013, trial court order. Rather, appellant suffered these 

harms when he was found to be in civil contempt on August 17, 2012, when he 

remained in contempt through December 10, 2012, and when he was conditionally 

incarcerated the first time for his failure to pay sanctions imposed by the court. 

Any prospective relief by this court would not redress what was wrought by prior 

orders of the trial court not properly appealed. The trial court’s judgment was 

satisfied when appellant was released from incarceration, and when all monetary 

sanctions imposed by the trial court were discharged in bankruptcy proceedings, 

“event[s] that render[] relief impossible.” Settlemire, supra, 898 A.2d at 905 

(citation omitted). The appeal is moot.

*****

Accordingly, the appeal is

Dismissed.