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S. HRG. 111–1033 

NOMINATION OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, 

TO BE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 10, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Ranking 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

BRUCE H. ANDREWS, General Counsel 

ANN BEGEMAN, Republican Staff Director 

BRIAN M. HENDRICKS, Republican General Counsel 

NICK ROSSI, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on June 10, 2010 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Rockefeller ........................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Hutchison ............................................................................ 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Statement of Senator DeMint ................................................................................. 6 

Statement of Senator Begich .................................................................................. 27 

Statement of Senator Warner ................................................................................. 30 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 32 

Statement of Senator LeMieux ............................................................................... 35 

Statement of Senator Dorgan ................................................................................. 39 

WITNESSES

John S. Pistole, Administrator-Designate, Transportation Security Administration, and Assistant Secretary-Designate, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Biographical information ................................................................................. 10 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted to John S. Pistole by: 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 47 

Hon. Bill Nelson ............................................................................................... 47 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 48 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 49 

Hon. Tom Udall ................................................................................................ 50 

Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison ............................................................................. 51 

Hon. Olympia J. Snowe .................................................................................... 54 

Hon. Jim DeMint .............................................................................................. 59 

Hon. John Thune .............................................................................................. 59 

Hon. Sam Brownback ....................................................................................... 61 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, TO BE 

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION AND 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D. Rockefeller 

IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, everybody. This hearing comes together, and the two most important members of this committee are 

here, present, and ready to work. 

We are here today to consider John Pistole to be, at last, hopefully, almost definitely, the Administrator of the TSA. 

It’s embarrassing that such an enormous undertaking doesn’t 

have the leadership that it needs. I am convinced that you can provide that leadership on the basis of work we’ve done in the Intelligence Committee and on basis of the conversations that we’ve had 

about all of this. There’s no question in my mind about it. 

We cannot ignore the fact that for far too long we just have— 

we’ve been without one, and we paid a terrible price for one. And 

I want to talk about that in the questions. 

This country has endured an attempted Christmas Day attack 

aboard an airplane bound for Detroit; an attempted Times Square 

bombing, where the terrorist was pulled off the plane that was 

about to take off for Dubai and they pulled him off; and just this 

weekend, two men were arrested, again at JFK, as they attempted 

to board a flight to Egypt on their way to Somalia. Well, that’s a 

good combination—and they were planning on joining an international terrorist organization. We’ve got to get this all right. 

Our vast and open transportation system, which is classically 

American in its nature, is part of everybody’s lives in small towns, 

in big cities, and we understand that. They connect our communities to a wider world, which we need. The enormous reach is 

what makes our transportation system such a powerful tool for terrorists. We open ourselves, because we are that nature, and we pay 

a price for it, because they can take advantage of it. Single purVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:00 Jul 29, 2011 Jkt 067573 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\67573.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
2 

chase, cash, all the rest of it. It’s not even really that hard, but it 

is going to have to be. 

And they’re constantly looking for new ways to make attacks, to 

do things. They’re single operators. They can be less sophisticated, 

they don’t have to be as highly trained. They can get this all off 

the Internet. They can do it because they’re mad at America. They 

could be Americans; and they are, in fact, some of them. And that’s 

going to grow. Wherever people are having trouble economically, in 

the Middle East or in this country, and people get mad and frustrated, they want a way out, they want something to belong to, 

which they can say gives them identity. And, unfortunately, terrorism is one of the ways that they can do that and feel like they’re 

strong men and women. 

As I indicated, we’ve had concentrated discussions on a variety 

of things over the years, on the Intelligence Committee. That’s very 

important to me. I know what some of the stuff that they’re thinking about is, and what has been attempted and not worked, and 

what has been attempted and has worked. And it’s all very upsetting. 

So, TSA takes on this tremendously new dimension of, needing 

to make lines more efficient, to get people less angry, all up against 

a budget freeze—which we have to talk about—and, at the same 

time, be a step ahead, if possible, of terrorists. 

So, we need an experienced and skilled Administrator. And we 

need that person now, to lead the TSA and to lead the workforce, 

because people can work hard, but if they don’t have a leader, 

something happens to them eventually. And you, I think, are that 

kind of leader. Protecting our country against future attacks. We 

just need all of this, period. 

I, myself, just speaking as one Senator, am confident that you, 

John Pistole, are ready. You’re qualified to lead this agency effectively. 

As the FBI’s deputy director, Mr. Pistole is currently the Bureau’s second in command. That’s the—just to consider that—Bob 

Mueller, then John Pistole—that’s a fairly famous, large agency, 

which does things all over the world, and you’ve been deputy for 

that. And you’ve worked with it for 27 years, which is a tad more 

than a learning experience. 

You’ve been a special agent. You served in many different leadership roles, focusing on civil rights, white-collar crime, leading field 

officers, and instructing new agents. You participated in the investigative and recovery efforts for the Egypt Air Flight 990 crash off 

the coast of Rhode Island. 

And you were later appointed as an inspector to the inspection 

division, in Washington D.C., conducting evaluations and audits of 

FBI field offices and headquarters divisions. Well, that was giving 

you the run of the campus to find out what was wrong—the run 

of the Nation. 

After September 11, in 2001, Director Mueller appointed you, 

John Pistole, to the FBI’s counterterrorism division, where you testified before the 9/11 Commission. I remember that testimony. We 

all watched all of it—on a panel titled, ‘‘Preventing Future Attacks 

in the United States.’’ 

3 

With such diverse experience, such a broad investigative and national security background, and the disciplined nature of the John 

Pistole that I know—the hard worker, tough guy—I firmly believe 

that you have what it takes to impact this agency. I’m just speaking for myself and not necessarily for others. 

So, to move forward, we need to make that change. We need to 

have an effective leader at TSA. 

I think it’s one of the most difficult positions in all of Washington, because you have all of America, in magnificent sequence, 

getting mad at you for their inconveniences. And I think there are 

going to be more inconveniences. I think there are going to have 

to be more inconveniences if we’re going to really do the terrorism 

thing well. And a lot of people won’t like that. It’s just such an important job. 

Let me end up by saying that Commerce Committee has a significant role in homeland security oversight. Others don’t seem to 

want to recognize that, but we do, and we know it, and we take 

it very seriously. 

This committee is currently drafting two very important security 

bills. One is the TSA reauthorization. The other is the port security 

bill. We hope to have those ready to introduce within several 

weeks—within a week or two. 

Mr. Pistole, should you be confirmed, I very much intend to work 

with you to make sure that TSA succeeds. It’s just so important. 

It’s life and death stuff, and it’s at the heart of American traveling 

and the essence of freedom that people feel. And those things come 

in conflict at some point. I expect you and the administration to 

communicate with and work with Congress to make sure that TSA 

has the funds it needs. 

So, I thank you. I’ve read your FBI reports. They were utterly 

boring they were so clean. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I yield now to my Ranking Member, my partner, 

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate that you called this hearing so 

quickly, because there is no question that this important agency 

not having a head that has a strategy and a plan and an ability 

to manage 50,000 people across the country and the world is not 

the way it should be. And so, I appreciate that we are acting quickly. 

And, Mr. Pistole, you and I have met. And I, too, have read your 

FBI report. And I would concur with my Chairman. I’m going to 

tell you a funny story later. But, I think that, honestly, I believe 

the President has made the right decision this time. 

I’m not going to read an opening statement, but just a couple of 

points. 

As you know—and we talked about this—I am very concerned 

about this obvious pressure to allow collective bargaining by TSA 

employees. I am adamantly against that—I will ask you that question, as I told you I would—because law enforcement and security 

4 

personnel are just in a different category. And that is recognized 

from local government all the way to the FBI and others. 

You can’t have 8-hour days. You have to be able to respond to 

emergencies. And you have to be willing and want to do that. To 

take this job, as TSA inspector, you have to want to keep America 

safe. And you have to be willing to go the extra mile and not be 

a 9-to–5 type of employee. There are other jobs for you, if that is 

what you want to do. 

So, I will be asking you about that. And as we go forward, if you 

are confirmed, we’re going to ask you, down the road, what the status of that is, because you’ll have to make that decision. And I hope 

that, with your background, it is the right one. 

And the other point that I would just make is that you, having 

served in the FBI, are serving in an agency that has, what, 102 

years of history, but you’re going in to be the top of an agency that 

has been in business for 9 years. And there have been a few stumbling blocks. 

We were here when we were writing the bill that created the 

TSA. And we looked carefully at all the different ways to organize 

it, and we gave it to Homeland Security, and we made it a separate 

agency there, and we wanted to make sure that we do all of the 

right things for this important position. 

And so, there have been kinks, but largely it has worked. And 

I hope that you will be the one that sets the standards for the future, for the way the agency operates. And it has to be efficient, 

and it has to also not encroach on the traveling public to too great 

a degree. And there’s just a fine balance there. 

I want to say that, in my experience in the airports, for instance, 

the employees at TSA do a great job, and they’re friendly, and 

they’re nice, and they understand the frustrations of the passenger 

that has to be the one who is screened. And I certainly have had 

that experience myself, and it’s not fun. But, they’ve been very, 

very nice and polite and understanding. 

So, I think that it is a good agency, in the main. But, we also 

have other, besides air, issues. We have ports and will want input 

on port security, because, as I mentioned to you, in my home State 

of Texas we have the second largest chemical complex in the world 

right next to a port. And so, we need to make sure that we’re doing 

everything to secure our ports, our trains, all of the buses, all of 

the traveling modes that our people use and that are used in commerce. 

So, it’s a big job. I think you’re up to it. And I have seen nothing 

that would give me pause. And the people who really know you and 

have worked with you, which I haven’t, also give you the thumbsup. 

So, I’m looking forward to a working relationship with a no-nonsense law-enforcement-background person, like yourself, that will 

get on the job and not take no for an answer. 

Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hutchison. 

We would welcome Senator DeMint to give a very, very short 

comment, and Senator Begich to make a very short comment, and 

then we’ll go to you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchison follows:] 

5 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening today’s hearing. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) performs a vital mission at the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) in helping to protect the security of the traveling public. Yet, TSA 

has been without an Administrator since January 2009. It is important for our Committee to review the qualifications and priorities of the President’s third nominee 

to fill this critical position, and I am hopeful that the country will soon have a TSA 

Administrator confirmed and on the job. 

I want to welcome Mr. Pistole, and thank you for your willingness to serve as the 

TSA Administrator. Your 26 year career at the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) is commendable, as is your willingness to continue your career in public service. 

The job of TSA Administrator brings with it the responsibility of assuring not only 

the security of all modes of transportation, but also the economic viability of the 

country’s transportation system and the sustainment of the free flow of commerce. 

If confirmed, the job before you will be extremely challenging, and the decisions you 

make may have far-reaching effect. Given your background at the FBI, you will undoubtedly be familiar with the threats our country faces, yet your management 

skills will also be put to the test, given that you would assume the helm of an agency with over 50,000 employees scattered throughout the country. With that in mind, 

I want to mention several issues that I believe will be of importance for the next 

Administrator on day one: 

First, is the issue of allowing collective bargaining for the country’s transportation 

security officers (TSOs), or screeners. I would like to note that Federal law prohibits 

screeners from striking; and all the previous TSA Administrators have maintained 

that allowing screeners to collectively bargain would negatively impact TSA’s fundamental security mission. With your background in security, Mr. Pistole, I am sure 

you can appreciate the need for TSA to have a flexible workforce which can react 

quickly to emerging threats. While the FBI does not have unions, I wonder whether 

the FBI could do its job as effectively, if the agents had collective bargaining authority. This Committee will be extremely interested in how you address this issue. 

Second, I strongly encourage TSA to work to develop better relationships with all 

of its stakeholders. The success of the agency—and the security of our nation—is 

linked to cooperation and trust between industry and government. Over the years, 

constituents and modal industry stakeholders alike have noted that TSA too often 

pays lip-service to partnerships and frequently tries to institute policies that have 

great economic impact without first seeking industry input. A safe and effective security system is mutually beneficial to industry and government alike; properly coordinating to create a seamless and secure environment will be a daily challenge. 

The traveling public wants and deserves a security experience that is effective, but 

without being overly cumbersome or economically unrealistic. 

Third, as is the case with several other government departments and agencies, 

TSA often seems to find itself playing catch-up, fighting the last terrorist battle, and 

getting caught in the trap of spending hundreds of millions of dollars on unproven 

equipment and programs. I believe that the head of TSA needs to be willing to make 

the tough decisions about programs and projects that do not work as desired, and 

focus on making TSA an agency that is ahead of the curve, rather than behind it. 

Mr. Pistole, if you are confirmed, I hope that you will bring your leadership experience and valuable intelligence and law enforcement expertise to an agency that 

could really benefit from the unique professional background you hold. 

In this country, we are heavily dependent upon the openness and security of our 

transportation systems, which affords the free flow of goods and travelers each day. 

We place great trust in TSA, much like the FBI, to do its job effectively and efficiently. However, in order to do the job properly, TSA will need long-term leadership 

with a clear, yet flexible and nimble, strategy, to identify, address and act upon the 

threats of today and tomorrow. Unfortunately, much like our transportation systems, our threats are vast and reach across our country, and the world. While balancing those two conflicting systems will be tremendously difficult, it is paramount. 

Next month, the FBI will celebrate its 102nd anniversary. By contrast, TSA is in 

only its ninth year of existence. But, since 9/11, the FBI has had to re-invent itself 

as a more prevention-oriented, intelligence-driven agency, and you have played a 

leading role in that effort. I will want to hear how your experience managing change 

at the FBI would inform your leadership of the TSA. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again. Mr. Pistole, I look forward to your testimony. 

6 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s not very, very 

short, but it is reasonably brief, by senatorial standards. Thank 

you. 

The CHAIRMAN. This is a bad beginning. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator DEMINT. I just—— 

Senator HUTCHISON. We go by House standards over here. 

Senator DEMINT. Yes, the—— 

Senator HUTCHISON. One minute. 

Senator DEMINT.—the one minute. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator DEMINT. Mr. Pistole, it’s good to see you again. Thank 

you for coming by my office. I enjoyed our conversation. And I believe you are well qualified for this position. 

I want to make the same point to you that I’ve made to other 

nominees, that the ability of TSA to be able to quickly respond to 

threats is essential to their effectiveness. 

Abandoning the current policy that prohibits collective bargaining by transportation security officers will significantly undermine TSA’s ability to respond to threats, and protect the Nation. 

And it’s a change that I hope you will counsel the President 

against. 

I implore you to approach every policy issue at TSA with a simple question, ‘‘What will this do to improve security?’’ We all know 

the President has made a political promise to the unions, in return 

for their support, to force collective bargaining onto over 50,000 

transportation security officers, but, your promise has to be to keep 

the American people safe. 

I asked the Secretary of Homeland Security, a few months ago, 

this question, ‘‘how will collective bargaining at the TSA will improve security?’’ Her answer was, ‘‘that the two weren’t mutually 

exclusive.’’ Her answer was illustrative, because clearly she 

couldn’t come up with a good answer of why collective bargaining 

was actually going to improve security. 

When the Secretary of Homeland Security can’t tell us how a 

change to Homeland Security policy will improve security, it should 

stop us in our tracks. This should be a clear message that collective 

bargaining at the Transportation Security Administration remains 

a threat to aviation safety, and the only reason to adopt collective 

bargaining is a payback to political allies. 

Having been a career civil servant who spent his life serving the 

Nation under administrations of both parties, I hope you will provide advice to the President that turns on that single question, 

‘‘How will this improve security?’’ 

As I’ve mentioned, collective bargaining will not only not improve 

security, it will have a direct negative impact on security. 

First, it will impose a 19th-century industrial personnel management model to a 21st-century Information Age threat. The threat 

we see in the aviation sector is creative and nimble, and our response needs to be creative and nimble. We need to continually improve what we do at TSA. The men and women who protect the 

aviation sector need to be able to quickly respond to changing 

7 

counterterrorism tactics so we can thwart the tactics of our adversaries and protect passengers without having to get a signoff from 

a union boss. The Secret Service, the Coast Guard, the military, 

and the FBI, where you were second in command, realized this 

long ago, and they prohibit collective bargaining. 

Additionally, you can’t have a security workforce that has rigid, 

standardized procedures. The standardized procedures that are 

part and parcel of a collective bargaining agreement are exactly the 

kind of procedures terrorists can survey and defeat. It’s frustrating 

that the American Federation of Government Employees—on their 

website, they ask for exactly that. They ask, ‘‘How would collective 

bargaining rights—what would it mean to you?’’ The union states 

that they’re promising that workplace rules will be improved and 

standardized. This is a threat to national security, and completely 

unacceptable, and I hope you will do everything you can to ensure 

that the union demands—— 

[Chairman tapped the gavel.] 

Senator DEMINT. Yes, sir. I’ll just include the rest of this in my 

questions. 

But, I think you know your colleagues at the FBI will laugh at 

you if you ever try to make the case that security forces need thirdparty negotiations. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator DeMint. 

Mr. Pistole, we welcome you here. We would like very much for 

you to introduce your wife and two daughters, and then hear your 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATORDESIGNATE, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, thank you, Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison. 

And I would like to take that privilege of introducing my wife of 

nearly 31 years, Kathy Harp, and our daughters, Lauren and Jennifer, who are here with me today. So, thank you for that. And I 

thank them for their unwavering love and support, because without 

them it’s a very difficult job to do. So, thank you for being here. 

And to the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

today. And I appreciate your very kind opening comments, Chairman and Ranking Member, and to be here as the President’s nominee, as the Assistant Secretary for TSA. I’m honored by the President’s call to service and by Secretary Napolitano’s support. 

And I—in addition to expressing appreciation to this committee 

for what you’ve been through and are doing now for this important 

position, I’d also like to express my personal appreciation to those 

in Federal, state, local, tribal law enforcement, and in the U.S. intelligence community that I’ve had the privilege of working with 

these nearly 27 years. 

And I’d also be remiss if I didn’t acknowledge our international 

partners, with whom I’ve had the privilege of work, because it’s— 

without their help we would be unable to fully address the worldwide terrorist threats which may impact the homeland. 

8 

We know that—I—national security and counterterrorism are familiar territory for me. And during my career with the FBI, I think 

it’s—has provided me the skills and experience necessary to lead 

TSA and address the challenges of keeping the Nation’s transportation system secure. 

For example, in 1992, when I worked with Italian authorities investigating the assassination, by the Sicilian Mafia, of the two top 

anti-Mafia judges and a number of body guards killed by what 

could be described as a surface transportation bomb, and then later 

a vehicle-borne IED, a VBIED, respectively, in two different assassinations. 

In 1999, as you mentioned, I helped lead the investigation recovery efforts of Egypt Air 990, off the coast of New England, which 

killed over 230 people. 

And after the tragic events of 9/11, I was put in charge of helping 

transform the mission and focus of the FBI’s new and greatly expanded counterterrorism efforts. 

In May 2003, I led an FBI team to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, investigating the al Qaeda-affiliated vehicle-borne bombings targeting 

three Western housing compounds which killed 40 people, including eight Americans. 

And, as you noted, for the last five and a half years, I have 

served as a deputy director of the FBI, overseeing all the FBI efforts to protect the Homeland. 

These experiences, and the years I spent as a street agent in 

Minneapolis and New York, particularly on a joint FBI-NYPD— 

joint organized crime task force, and then as a field supervisor in 

Indianapolis, assistant special agent in charge in Boston, inspector, 

as you noted, and then as an instructor at the international law 

enforcement academy, in Budapest—all of these taught me the 

critically important lesson on developing key partnerships, all designed to protect our citizens from those who would cause us harm. 

Now, we know, since the creation of—after 9/11, TSA has played 

a vital role in securing our Nation’s transportation systems. Like 

the FBI, TSA relies upon a dedicated workforce, including over 

47,000 TSOs at airports and throughout the Nation. They are 

TSA’s field officers, the front line in a layered network protecting 

our aviation domain from adversaries. 

I will dedicate myself to supporting TSA’s workforce, if confirmed, in ensuring the highest standards of professionalism. And 

I—also, if confirmed, I will assess TSA’s non-aviation surface transportation efforts, in concert with state and local authorities. 

Additionally, I will work in close collaboration with all stakeholders, including other Federal agencies, state, local, tribal governments, private industry, our international partners, and, of 

course, the traveling public. 

In closing, I look forward to advancing TSA’s critical mission. 

And so, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hutchison, I thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today—distinguished 

members of the Committee—and welcome your questions, and, if 

confirmed, look forward to working with you and members of the 

Committee. 

Thank you, sir. 

9 

[The prepared statement and biographical information of Mr. Pistole follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR-DESIGNATE, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARYDESIGNATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Good Morning, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and distinguished members of the Committee. I am deeply privileged to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee as Assistant Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). I 

am honored by the President’s call to service and by the support of Secretary 

Napolitano. 

With your kind indulgence, I would like to recognize my wife of nearly 31 years, 

Kathy, and our daughters, Lauren and Jennifer, who are with me today, and thank 

them for their unwavering love and support. I would also like to express my appreciation to those in Federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement communities and 

the U.S. Intelligence Community, with whom I’ve had the privilege to work since 

becoming a Special Agent of the FBI in 1983. And to the men and women of TSA, 

I would like to say that I am eager to join your ranks and to work with you in safeguarding our Nation’s transportation system. 

National security and counterterrorism are familiar territory for me, and my 26- 

year career with the FBI has provided me with the skills and experience necessary 

to lead TSA and meet the Administration’s objective of keeping the Nation’s transportation systems secure. In 1999, while an Assistant Special Agent in Charge 

(ASAC), in Boston, I participated in the investigation and recovery efforts involving 

Egypt Air Flight 990 after it crashed off the coast of New England. After the tragic 

events of September 11, 2001, I was put in charge of helping transform the mission 

and focus of the FBI’s new and greatly expanded counterterrorism program, culminating in my appointment as the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism 

and Counterintelligence. In 2003, I led an FBI team to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, investigating the bombings of three housing compounds in which 40 people died, including eight Americans. 

In my current position as Deputy Director, I was involved in the investigation of 

the December 25, 2009, attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253 in addition to 

overseeing the investigative efforts leading to the apprehension of Najibullah Zazi 

in connection with a plot against New York City subways. Additionally, I was involved in the investigation of Faisal Shahzad related to the attempted car bombing 

last month in Times Square. In these and all other efforts during my career with 

the FBI, I have worked steadfastly to expand and improve efforts to ensure the security of the homeland. 

Since its creation after 9/11, TSA has played a vital role in securing our Nation’s 

transportation systems. I look forward to advancing TSA’s critical mission in close 

collaboration with all of our partners, including other Federal agencies, state, local 

and tribal governments, private industry, our international partners, and, most importantly, the traveling public. 

Today, we face threats from other terrorist cells around the world, and from 

homegrown terrorists who are not affiliated with a particular network, but who, 

nonetheless are inspired by the message of hatred and violence. Nearly 9 years ago, 

as I helped restructure the FBI to deal with the terrorist threat in the wake of 9/ 

11, it was evident that our success depended upon a multi-pronged approach that 

combined a variety of disciplines, including risk assessment, intelligence, and security initiatives, as well as law enforcement. In the transportation domain, TSA also 

employs a layered approach to security, including its Transportation Security Officers and advanced screening technologies at airport checkpoints, Federal Air Marshals patrolling domestic and international flights, canine patrols in both aviation 

and transit rail domains, and participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), 

to name just a few. If confirmed, I will use the lessons I learned in restructuring 

our counterterrorism efforts within the FBI to further enhance TSA’s counterterrorism efforts across all modes of transportation to keep the traveling public safe. 

The years I spent as a Special Agent in the Minneapolis and New York Divisions, 

as a field supervisor of a White Collar Crime (WCC) and Civil Rights Squad in Indianapolis, as Assistant SAC in Boston overseeing WCC and Computer Intrusion programs, and as an instructor of Organized Crime matters at the International Law 

Enforcement Academy taught me the valuable contribution of the men and women 

who work on the front line in protecting our homeland. 

10 

Like the FBI, TSA relies upon a dedicated workforce including about 47,000 TSOs 

at airports throughout the Nation. They are TSA’s field officers, the front line in 

protecting our aviation domain from our adversaries. I believe in mentoring, both 

in the field and in the classroom, and I will pursue it as one of my priorities. If 

confirmed, I will dedicate myself to supporting TSA’s workforce that continues to 

meet the highest standards of professionalism through comprehensive training, respect, and opportunity for advancement. 

My familiarity with and respect for field operations is combined with years in senior management. Following my detail to help lead the Information Security Working 

Group (ISWG) on security and vulnerability issues, I was appointed by Director 

Mueller following the tragic events of 9/11 as Deputy Assistant Director for Operations of the Counterterrorism Division, then as Assistant Director, and afterwards 

as Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence before 

being promoted Deputy Director in October 2004. I understand complex organizations and am dedicated to leading TSA to the next level. 

As part of the U.S. Intelligence Community, I understand the importance of information sharing and I am committed to building upon the Administration’s efforts 

to counter terrorism. Moreover, based upon my counterterrorism and international 

experience at the FBI, I understand that our Nation’s defenses must begin beyond 

our borders through strong international partnerships. Our aviation security also 

depends upon the commitment of our foreign partners to enhance aviation security 

measures. I look forward to building upon the progress made by Secretary Napolitano and Deputy Secretary Lute in their aggressive global outreach initiative to enhance international aviation security, particularly for international flights bound for 

the United States. If confirmed, I will build upon these efforts to make the international aviation system safer and ensure the security of our homeland. 

If confirmed, I look forward to partnering with this committee in deploying enhanced screening technologies, both at domestic airports and by our international 

partners. Advanced technologies are critical to detect evolving threats such as explosives. At the same time, TSA must remain respectful of personal privacy, dignity 

and civil rights and liberties, areas that are priorities for me. 

Finally, throughout my years of service as a law enforcement official, I have remained forever mindful of the need to identify those who wish to do us harm and 

also protect individual civil rights and liberties. We should be judged not only by 

our ability to defend our Nation from terrorism, but also by our commitment to defend the rights and freedoms we all enjoy. If confirmed, safeguarding the civil liberties and privacy interests of all Americans will remain a top priority. 

If confirmed, I would like a close working relationship with Congress and with 

this committee. I would be honored to serve with the outstanding men and women 

of TSA as their Assistant Secretary, and I applaud the work they perform each and 

every day, along with the outstanding work performed by Gale Rossides in her role 

of Acting Administrator. 

In closing, I again thank President Obama and Secretary Napolitano for their confidence and faith in my ability to lead TSA. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Hutchison, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

A. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. Name (Include any former names or nicknames used): John S. Pistole. 

2. Position to which nominated: Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. 

3. Date of Nomination: May 17, 2010. 

4. Address (List current place of residence and office addresses): 

Residence: Information not released to the public. 

Office: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20535. 

5. Date and Place of Birth: June 1, 1956; Baltimore, MD. 

6. Provide the name, position, and place of employment for your spouse (if married) and the names and ages of your children (including stepchildren and children 

by a previous marriage). 

Kathleen M. Harp, homemaker; children: Lauren E.H. Pistole, age 20, Jennifer 

A.H. Pistole, age 17. 

7. List all college and graduate degrees. Provide year and school attended. 

11 

Anderson University, B.A. cum laude, 1978. 

Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis, J.D., 1981. 

8. List all post-undergraduate employment, and highlight all management-level 

jobs held and any non-managerial jobs that relate to the position for which you are 

nominated. 

1981–1983: Attorney, Teague, Cole, Hamer & Pistole, P.C., Anderson, IN. 

1983 to present: Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Sept. 1983–Jan. 1984, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA. 

Jan. 1984–Mar. 1986, Special Agent, Minneapolis Field Office. 

Apr. 1986–Nov. 1990, Special Agent, New York City Field Office. 

Nov. 1990–Mar. 1994, Supervisor, FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC. 

Mar. 1994–July 1999, Supervisor, Indianapolis Field Office. 

July 1999–July 2001, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Office. 

July 2001–May 2002, Inspector, Inspections Division, FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC. 

May 2002–Sep. 2003, Deputy Assistant Director for Operations, Counterterrorism Division, FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC. 

Sep. 2003–Dec. 2003, Assistant Director for Operations, Counterterrorism Division, FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC. 

Dec. 2003–Oct. 2004, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and 

Counterintelligence, FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC. 

Oct. 2004 to present, Deputy Director, FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC. 

9. Attach a copy of your resume. A copy is attached. 

10. List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above, within the last 5 years: None. 

11. List all positions held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, 

agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, 

or other business, enterprise, educational, or other institution within the last 5 

years: None. 

12. Please list each membership you have had during the past 10 years or currently hold with any civic, social, charitable, educational, political, professional, fraternal, benevolent or religious organization, private club, or other membership organization. Include dates of membership and any positions you have held with any organization. Please note whether any such club or organization restricts membership 

on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, national origin, age, or handicap. 

International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), 2002 to present; Executive 

Committee member since 2004. (service in official FBI capacity). 

International Security Management Association (ISMA), 2005 to present, Government Affairs member. (service in official FBI capacity). 

Centreville United Methodist Church, member since 2002. 

13. Have you ever been a candidate for and/or held a public office (elected, nonelected, or appointed)? If so, indicate whether any campaign has any outstanding 

debt, the amount, and whether you are personally liable for that debt: No. 

14. Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, 

political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $500 or more for the 

past 10 years. Also list all offices you have held with, and services rendered to, a 

state or national political party or election committee during the same period: None. 

15. List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or 

achievements. 

Presidential Rank Award for Distinguished Executive, 2005. 

Honorary Doctor of Law degree, and Commencement speaker for Anderson University, 2006. 

Edward H. Levi Award for Outstanding Professionalism and Exemplary Integrity (DOJ), 2007. 

Outstanding Alumni award and Commencement speaker at Indiana University 

School of Law, Indianapolis, 2009. 

16. Please list each book, article, column, or publication you have authored, individually or with others. Also list any speeches that you have given on topics relVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:00 Jul 29, 2011 Jkt 067573 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67573.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
12 

evant to the position for which you have been nominated. Do not attach copies of 

these publications unless otherwise instructed. 

Published Articles: 

‘‘Safeguards are in Place,’’ USA Today (Nov. 9, 2005) (with Rachel Brand). 

‘‘Tools Against Spies and Terrorists,’’ Washington Post (Nov. 12, 2005) (with Rachel Brand). 

‘‘An FBI That Changes with the Times,’’ letter to the editor, Washington Post 

(July 8, 2005). 

Also, see attached list of speeches. 

17. Please identify each instance in which you have testified orally or in writing 

before Congress in a governmental or non-governmental capacity and specify the 

date and subject matter of each testimony. 

See attached list of testimony before Congressional committees. 

18. Given the current mission, major programs, and major operational objectives 

of the department/agency to which you have been nominated, what in your background or employment experience do you believe affirmatively qualifies you for appointment to the position for which you have been nominated, and why do you wish 

to serve in that position? 

Since 9/11, I have played a key role in the FBI’s mission of preventing terrorist 

attacks in the U.S. I am part of and intimately familiar with the U.S. Intelligence 

Community, along with Federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement, all of which 

are key drivers for carrying out this mission. I have helped lead the transformation 

of the FBI into a threat-based, intelligence-driven organization. 

It would be an honor and privilege to apply my more than 26 years of FBI experience, including the last 5 years as Deputy Director, the senior career position in the 

FBI, to the challenges of leading TSA, the agency charged with protecting the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. 

19. What do you believe are your responsibilities, if confirmed, to ensure that the 

department/agency has proper management and accounting controls, and what experience do you have in managing a large organization? 

Having served the last 9 years in the Senior Executive Service (SES) for the FBI, 

I recognize the importance of ensuring proper management and accounting controls 

are in place and adhered to rigorously. I have worked with the DOJ Office of Inspector General on a number of issues relevant to this topic, particularly in the last 5 

years as Deputy Director. I have also worked with GAO on similar issues, and was 

instrumental in establishing an ‘‘Office of Integrity and Compliance’’ at the FBI to 

identify potential issues posing a risk to the FBI’s mission, before they became an 

issue. 

As Deputy Director, I have extensive leadership and management experience 

helping lead a 34,000 employee agency with nearly a $8 billion budget. I serve as 

the rating official for all 56 Special Agents in Charge (SACS), along with 12 key 

executives at FBIHQ. I chair the bi-monthly SES Board, which reviews SES positions and makes recommendations to the Director for selection. I have represented 

the FBI domestically and internationally, briefing the President, testifying before 

Congress, participating in National Security Committee (NSC) Deputies Committee 

meetings, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Executive Committee (EXCOM) and Counterterrorism (CT) Resources meetings chaired by the 

DNI. 

20. What do you believe to be the top three challenges facing the department/ 

agency, and why? 

1. To protect the national security of the U.S. and traveling public by utilizing 

all available intelligence regarding threats and prioritizing resource allocations 

to these threats. 

2. To ensure all personnel at TSA have a personal investment in the mission 

of the agency. 

3. To ensure there is robust short-term and long-term strategic planning identifying potential threats coupled with internal controls to maximize the efficiency 

of security services TSA provides to its customers. 

B. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and 

other continuing dealings with business associates, clients, or customers. Please include information related to retirement accounts. 

13 

Upon retirement from the FBI, I will begin drawing my government pension. No 

other issues. 

2. Do you have any commitments or agreements, formal or informal, to maintain 

employment, affiliation, or practice with any business, association or other organization during your appointment? If so, please explain: No. 

3. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which 

could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been 

nominated. 

In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of 

Government Ethics and the Department of Homeland Security’s designated agency 

ethics official to identify potential conflicts of interest. Any potential conflicts of interest will be resolved in accordance with the terms of an ethics agreement that I 

have entered into with the Department’s designated agency ethics official and that 

has been provided to this Committee. I am not aware of any other potential conflicts 

of interest. 

4. Describe any business relationship, dealing, or financial transaction which you 

have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or 

acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict 

of interest in the position to which you have been nominated. 

In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of 

Government Ethics and the Department of Homeland Security’s designated agency 

ethics official to identify potential conflicts of interest. Any potential conflicts of interest will be resolved in accordance with the terms of an ethics agreement that I 

have entered into with the Department’s designated agency ethics official and that 

has been provided to this Committee. I am not aware of any other potential conflicts 

of interest. 

5. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have been engaged 

for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat, or modification of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public 

policy. 

None, except in my Federal Government capacity. 

6. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any 

that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. 

Any potential conflicts of interest will be resolved in accordance with the terms 

of an ethics agreement that I have entered into with the Department’s designated 

agency ethics official and that has been provided to this Committee. That said, I 

am not aware of any potential conflicts of interest. 

C. LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics by, or been the 

subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, 

disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, please explain. 

In June 2009, while traveling on vacation, a loose bullet was found in my briefcase during security screening in the Frankfurt airport. I had inadvertently left the 

bullet in my briefcase, and I had been unaware it was there. When I returned to 

the United States, I reported the incident to the FBI. I was reminded of the applicable rules, but received no formal reprimand or censure. 

From 2007–2010, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 

published three reports examining the FBI’s use of National Security Letters and 

‘‘exigent letters.’’ The reports criticized the FBI’s past practices, but also noted that 

the FBI had taken appropriate remedial actions beginning in 2007. OIG subsequently communicated to FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility that it found no 

misconduct on my part, and that every level of the FBI bears some responsibility 

for the problems cited. 

During my tenure as a senior official at the FBI, DOJ OIG has issued reports relating to the FBI’s operations. None of these reports were the result of complaints 

filed against me, and I have not been disciplined or reprimanded in any of the matters. These reports are available at http://wwwjustice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/ 

index.htm. 

In addition, please see the EEO matters discussed in my response to Question 3, 

below. 

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged, or held by any Federal, 

State, or other law enforcement authority of any Federal, State, county, or municipal entity, other than for a minor traffic offense? If so, please explain: No. 

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in an administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, 

please explain. 

14 

As Deputy Director of the FBI, I chair the Personnel Board and serve as the rating official for much of the FBI’s Senior Executive Service. As a result, I have been 

responsible for making hundreds of personnel decisions. In a few instances, described below, employees have filed EEO complaints related to these personnel decisions or related personnel actions. In one case, also below, an employee named me 

in a lawsuit related to a personnel decision. 

• In 2009, an employee who received a negative performance inspection brought 

an EEO complaint alleging gender discrimination. Although I had decided 

against reassigning the employee based on the inspection, the employee alleged 

that the inspection and related processes were conducted improperly. This matter is in discovery before the EEOC. 

• In 2007, an employee who had unsuccessfully sought a specific position within 

the FBI brought an EEO complaint alleging gender discrimination. The FBI 

General Counsel’s office settled the case in June 2008. 

• In 2008, an employee brought an EEO complaint alleging gender discrimination. The employee claimed to have been passed over for promotion and subject 

to disparate treatment and harassment by officials conducting a performance 

review. The employee also alleged that I had stated that the employee should 

consider retiring to avoid being removed from the employee’s position. I did not 

make such a statement; in fact, I had determined that reassignment of a particular case from the employee was a sufficient remedy, and decided against reassigning the employee. The matter is in discovery before the EEOC. 

• In 2008, an FBI employee who did not receive a performance bonus brought an 

EEO complaint alleging gender and race discrimination. Performance bonuses 

are recommended by the Executive Assistant Directors and Associate Deputy 

Director based on employee ratings. This employee was not rated highly enough 

to receive a bonus. The matter is pending before DOJ’s Complaint Adjudication 

Office. 

• In 2009, a former FBI employee brought an EEO complaint alleging gender and 

race discrimination. An inspection had revealed multiple performance issues 

and potential criminal violations on the part of the employee, and the employee 

had retired rather than face transfer. The matter is pending before DOJ’s Complaint Adjudication Office. 

• In 2006, an FBI employee brought an EEO complaint alleging discrimination 

based on reprisal when the Special Agent Middle Management Selection System 

(SAMMS) Board denied the employee’s request to participate in the Inspectorin-Place program. I concurred with the Board’s decision. The FBI’s Complaint 

Adjudication Board found no discrimination based on reprisal, and the employee 

did not appeal the ruling. 

• In 2008, a former FBI employee named me as a codefendant in a suit alleging 

civil rights violations and discrimination related to being reassigned. The plaintiff had been transferred after an OIG investigation found that the plaintiff had 

retaliated against a subordinate for being a whistleblower, and a subsequent inspection revealed additional performance issues. As Deputy Director, I made the 

decision to reassign the employee. FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility 

subsequently recommended dismissal, but the employee retired. The FBI has 

filed a motion to dismiss the case, Tabman v. FBI, which is pending in D.C. 

District Court. 

In addition, I recently became aware that during my service at the FBI, I have 

been named in two additional lawsuits: 

• Khan v. Chertoff was a mandamus complaint alleging delays in the processing 

of immigration applications. I was named as a codefendant in my official capacity, along with Michael Chertoff, Jonathan Scharfen, and Alberto Gonzalez. The 

case was dismissed on March 20, 2008. To the best of my knowledge, I had no 

personal involvement in this matter. 

• In 2006, in Godinez v. Pistole, a prisoner brought a pro se suit alleging civil 

rights violations. The case was dismissed on December 21, 2006. To the best of 

my knowledge, I was never served in this case. 

4. Have you ever been convicted (including pleas of guilty or nolo contendere) of 

any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense? If so, please explain: No. 

5. Have you ever been accused, formally or informally, of sexual harassment or 

discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, or any other basis? If so, please 

explain. 

Please see the EEO complaints described above in response to Question 3. 

15 

6. Please advise the Committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be disclosed in connection with your nomination: 

None. 

D. RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMITTEE

1. Will you ensure that your department/agency complies with deadlines for information set by Congressional committees? 

I will do everything within my power to ensure deadlines are met. 

2. Will you ensure that your department/agency does whatever it can to protect 

Congressional witnesses and whistle blowers from reprisal for their testimony and 

disclosures? Yes. 

3. Will you cooperate in providing the Committee with requested witnesses, including technical experts and career employees, with firsthand knowledge of matters 

of interest to the Committee? Yes. 

4. Are you willing to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of 

the Congress on such occasions as you may be reasonably requested to do so? Yes. 

ATTACHMENTS

BIOGRAPHY/RESUME OF JOHN S. PISTOLE

John S. Pistole began his career as a Special Agent with the FBI in 1983. He 

served in the Minneapolis and New York Divisions before being promoted to a Supervisor in the Organized Crime (OC) Section at FBIHQ. He assisted the Italian National Police in their investigations into the 1992 assassinations of two prominent 

Magistrates. He also served as an Instructor in OC matters at the FBI Academy 

for nearly 30 New Agents Classes. 

Mr. Pistole later served as a field supervisor of a White-Collar Crime (WCC) and 

Civil Rights Squad in Indianapolis, Indiana, where he created a Health Care Fraud 

Task Force and a Public Corruption Task Force. During this time, he also developed 

curricula and provided instruction at the first two sessions of the newly opened 

International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary. 

Mr. Pistole next served as Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Boston, Massachusetts, where he had oversight for WCC, Computer Intrusion Programs, and all FBI 

matters in the States of Maine and New Hampshire and WCC, especially Public 

Corruption, in Rhode Island. In 1999, he helped lead the investigative and recovery 

efforts for the Egypt Air Flight 990 crash off the coast of Rhode Island. Following 

the espionage arrest of Robert Hanssen, he was detailed to FBIHQ and helped lead 

the Information Security Working Group, addressing security and vulnerability 

issues. He was then named an Inspector in the Inspection Division in Washington, 

D.C., where he led teams conducting evaluations and audits of FBI field offices and 

Headquarters divisions. 

Following the events of 9/11, Director Mueller appointed Mr. Pistole to the 

Counterterrorism Division, first as Deputy Assistant Director for Operations, then 

as Assistant Director. Mr. Pistole was then appointed as the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence. In October, 2004, Mr. Pistole 

was promoted to Deputy Director, the number two position in the FBI. He is a recipient of the 2005 Presidential Rank Award for Distinguished Executive. In 2007, 

Mr. Pistole received the Department of Justice Edward H. Levy Award for Outstanding Professionalism and Exemplary Integrity. 

Mr. Pistole practiced law for 2 years prior to joining the FBI. He is a graduate 

of Anderson University, where he was the 2006 Commencement speaker and received an honorary Doctor of Laws; and the Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis, where he was the 2009 Commencement speaker and the recipient of the 

Outstanding Alumni Award. He is married and has two daughters. 

List of Speeches and Remarks Given by John S. Pistole 

Address and Location Date 

Norwood Policy Academy’s 12th Municipal Police Officers Graduation 

Quincy, MA 

Speech to Graduates 

7/22/2000 

New Agents Graduation 

Quantico, Virginia 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

09/10/04 

16 

Address and Location Date 

Society of Former Special Agents 

San Francisco, CA 

Islamic Militants among Us: How Real Is the Threat? 

09/15/04 

Welcoming DCI Porter Goss 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Welcome to DCI GOSS/FBI—CIA Cooperation 

10/04/04 

Hispanic Heritage Month Celebration 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Hispanic Americans and the FBI 

10/05/04 

National Disability Awareness Month 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Success Knows No Limitations 

10/06/04 

AG Ashcroft Farewell Ceremony 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

A Tribute to AG Ashcroft 

01/26/05 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Washington, D.C. 

Transnational Threats and Information Sharing 

02/15/05 

New Agents Graduation 

Quantico, Virginia 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

04/12/05 

National Executive Institute 

Quantico, VA 

Leading Today’s FBI 

04/21/05 

National Academy Graduation 

Quantico, VA 

Global Law Enforcement Cooperation 

06/10/05 

FBI Honorary Medals Ceremony 

Liberty Crossing, McLean, VA 

Honoring the FBI’S Heroes 

07/13/05 

DOD Worldwide Combating Terrorism Conference 

Arlington, VA 

Working Together to Fight Terrorism 

09/14/05 

New Agents Graduation 

Quantico, Virginia 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

09/15/05 

ANSIR Conference 

Indianapolis, IN 

Counterintelligence, National Security, and the FBI 

09/19/05 

Harvard University MBA Student Presentation 

Cambridge, MA 

Managing Change and Leading Transformation at the FBI 

10/04/05 

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 

Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany 

The FBI, Global Partnerships, and the War on Terror 

10/17/05 

Association of Former Intelligence Officers 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Intelligence at the FBI 

10/28/05 

Vance Overseas Security Advisory Council Annual Briefing Dinner 

Washington, D.C. 

The FBI: Combating Today’s Threats 

11/08/05 

New Agents Graduation—05–14 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

01/24/06 

Tokyo Press Roundtable 

Tokyo, Japan 

International Cooperation to Combat Crime 

03/07/06 

National Legal Center for the Public Interest—Day With Justice 

Great Hall, RFK Main Justice Building, Washington, D.C. 

Today’s FBI 

03/22/06 

Anderson University Commencement 

Anderson, IN 

Stepping out in Faith 

05/06/06 

New Agents Graduation—06–06 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

05/10/06 

Special Agent Memorial Ceremony 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Honoring the FBI’s Fallen Special Agents 

05/17/06 

17 

Address and Location Date 

Memorial Day Wreath Laying 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

A Tribute to America’s Veterans 

05/26/06 

New Agents Graduation—06–08 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

06/07/06 

Operation Holiday Crush Press Conference 

RFK Main Justice Building, Washington, D.C. 

Announcing Indictments in Miami Seven Terrorism Case 

06/23/06 

International Association of Police Chaplains—Luncheon Keynote 

Indianapolis, IN 

Today’s FBI, Today’s Challenges 

07/10/06 

International Association of Police Chaplains—Opening Ceremony 

Indianapolis, IN 

FBI Chaplain Program 

07/10/06 

New Agents Graduation—06–10 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

07/19/06 

New Agents Graduation—06–11 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

08/16/06 

New Agents Graduation—06–12 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

08/30/06 

Commonwealth Club of San Francisco 

San Francisco, CA 

September 11, 2006: The FBI in a Post–9/11 World 

09/11/06 

Attorney General Awards 

RFK Main Justice Building 

Honoring DOJ Leaders 

09/12/06 

New Agents Graduation—06–13 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

09/14/06 

Society of Former FBI Special Agents 

New York City, NY 

The Legacy of Former Agents 

09/21/06 

International Symposium on Agroterrorism 

Kansas City, MO 

Working Together to Protect America’s Agriculture 

09/25/06 

Chesapeake II Conference Toast 

Chantilly, VA 

Partnership Toast 

10/12/06 

New Agents Graduation—06–16 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

10/26/06 

World Economic Forum 

New Delhi, India 

The Global FBI 

11/27/06 

Media Availability 

Kiev, Ukraine 

Global Law Enforcement Cooperation 

11/28/06 

Prefetto Giovanni De Gennaro Award Ceremony 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC 

Honoring Giovanni De Gennaro 

12/08/06 

Holiday Reception 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC 

Happy Holidays 

12/15/06 

2007 

University of Pennsylvania, Department of Criminology 

Philadelphia, PA 

FBI Transformation-info Sharing and Partnership 

1/26/07 

Major County Sheriffs Association 

Washington, D.C. 

Working Together to Protect America from Crime 

01/31/07 

Council on Christian Colleges and Universities 

Washington, D.C. 

Christian Education and Public Service 

02/02/07 

18 

Address and Location Date 

National Fusion Center Conference 

Destin, FL 

The Force of Fusion: Working Together to Protect America 

03/07/07 

Indianapolis School of Law Distinguished Speaker Series 

Indianapolis, IN 

Today’s FBI: Fact Vs. Fiction 

03/20/07 

New Agents Graduation 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

03/26/07 

Hazardous Devices School Memorial 

Huntsville, Alabama 

A Tribute to Bomb Technicians 

04/16/07 

ChoicePoint Users Conference 

Arlington, VA 

Intelligence, Information-sharing, and Partnerships 

05/08/07 

Special Agents Memorial Service 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC 

Honoring the FBI’s Fallen Special Agents 

05/16/07 

Society of Former Special Agents 

South Lake Tahoe, CA 

Honoring the FBI’s Heroes 

05/22/07 

Memorial Day Wreath Laying Ceremony 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

5/24/07 

Pearls in Policing 

The Hague, Netherlands 

Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism 

06/11/07 

SOCA Meeting 

London, England 

Counterterrorism, Information Sharing, Legats 

06/26/07 

SOCA Podcast 

London Embassy, London, England 

The FBI and the United Kingdom—Working Together to Protect Our Nations 

06/26/07 

Corporate Fraud Task Force Anniversary 

Washington, D.C. 

Combating Corporate Corruption 

07/17/07 

Hispanic Heritage Month 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC 

Celebrating Diversity in the FBI 

10/10/07 

Ethics and Intelligence Seminar 

Queenstown, MD 

Ethics and Integrity in the Intelligence Community 

10/19/07 

American Bankers Association/ABA Money Laundering Conference 

Washington, D.C. 

The FBI and the Private Sector: Investigating Terrorism Financing 

10/22/07 

Legat Conference 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC 

Introductions of DNI Mcconnell, Secretary Chertoff, and CIA Director Hayden 

10/24/07 

Wreath Laying Ceremony 

Nairobi, Kenya 

Honoring the Victims of the 1998 East African Embassy Bombings 

11/05/07 

100 Club of Indianapolis 

Indianapolis, IN 

Evolution of the FBI 

11/20/07 

Native American/Alaskan/Pacific Islander Heritage Month Celebration 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC 

Celebrating Diversity in the FBI 

11/28/07 

New Agents Graduation (07–06) 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

12/07/07 

National Academy Graduation (Session 231) 

Quantico, VA 

Global Law Enforcement Cooperation 

12/14/07 

2008 

Coastal Crisis Chaplaincy Banquet 

Charleston, SC 

The Power of the Chaplaincy 

01/24/08 

19 

Address and Location Date 

Field Office Building Dedication 

San Antonio, TX 

A Modern Building for a Modern FBI 

02/19/08 

Anti-Defamation League Distinguished Service Award Ceremony 

Albuquerque, NM 

Balancing Counterterrorism and Civil Rights 

02/24/08 

2nd IACP Summit on Transnational Gangs 

Los Angeles, CA 

Working with Global Partners to Combat Transnational Gangs 

03/03/08 

New Agents Graduation (08–01) 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

03/05/08 

Kellogg Case Study Program with Int’l Security Management Association 

Chicago, IL 

FBI Update, Private Sector Partnerships, Current Threats 

03/31/08 

Domestic Security Executive Academy 

Quantico, VA 

FBI Update, Private Sector Partnerships, Current Threats 

04/10/08 

Police Officer Memorial Prayer Breakfast 

St. Louis, MO 

Police Week, Law Enforcement Line of Duty Deaths, Leadership 

04/25/08 

Special Agent Memorial Service 

FBIHQ 

Police Week, Law Enforcement Line of Duty Deaths, Sacrifice 

05/13/08 

Remarks to Vice President of Colombia and other dignitaries 

Bogota, Colombia 

Partnerships and Current Threats 

05/19/08 

National Academy Latin American and Caribbean Retrainer 

Santiago, Chile 

Power of Partnerships, Case Successes, Global Threats 

05/20/08 

Ambassador’s Reception 

Buenos Aires, Argentina 

Power of Partnerships, FBI’s 100th Anniversary 

05/21/08 

AMIA Meeting and Press Statement 

Buenos Aires, Argentina 

Power of Partnerships, Terrorism 

05/21/08 

Junior Special Agents 

Washington, D.C. 

Civic Duty, Education 

06/06/08 

International Security Management Association Conference 

Boston, MA 

Power of Partnerships, Private Sector 

06/10/08 

Community Relations Conference 

Tampa, FL 

Community Outreach, Power of Partnerships, FBI Today 

06/18/08 

Strategic Alliance Conference 

Monterey, CA 

Power of Partnerships, Global Threat 

06/23/08 

Defense Senior Leadership Conference 

Arlington, VA (Pentagon) 

Combating Radicalization/terrorist Threat 

07/15/08 

FBI DAY (Emcee Script) 

Washington, D.C. 

Celebrating a Century of Service 

07/17/08 

Dedication of William H. Webster Conference Room 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Honoring Judge William Webster 

07/17/08 

100th Anniversary International Reception 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Celebrating a Century of Partnerships 

07/17/08 

Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism 

Washington, D.C. 

WMD Threat/FBI Response 

09/10/08 

Society of Former Special Agents 

Honolulu, HI 

Update on the FBI’s Current Focus 

09/17/08 

FBI New York 100th Anniversary Commemoration 

New Rochelle, NY 

Celebrating a Century of Service 

09/18/08 

20 

Address and Location Date 

Information Technology Study Group 

Washington, D.C. 

Electronic Surveillance and Information Technology 

10/22/08 

Unveiling of Society of Former Special Agents Medallion 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC 

A Tribute to Former Special Agents of the FBI 

12/19/08 

New Agents Graduation (08–16) 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

12/23/08 

Intelligence Basic Course Graduation (09–01) 

Quantico, VA 

Intelligence in the FBI 

12/23/08 

2009 

National Security Higher Education Advisory Board 

Washington, DC 

Opening Remarks 

2/04/209 

New Agents Graduation (09–01) 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

03/11/09 

National Executive Institute 

Fredericksburg, VA 

Today’s FBI/Partnerships/importance of NEI 

03/19/09 

Indiana University School of Law—Commencement 

Indianapolis, IN 

You Can Make a Difference 

04/28/09 

EDI Leadership Conference 

Quantico, VA 

Leading Change 

05/09/09 

Society of Former Special Agents Regional Meeting 

Sun Valley, ID 

State of the Bureau 

05/19/09 

Memorial Day Wreath Laying 

FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC 

A Tribute to Fallen Soldiers 

05/20/09 

Federal Law Enforcement Memorial Service 

Phoenix, AZ 

Law Enforcement Line of Duty Deaths, Sacrifice 

05/21/09 

New Agents Graduation 

Quantico, VA 

Graduation Speech 

5/28/09 

ODNI Trade Association Meeting 

Washington, DC 

FBI Transformation-importance of Private Partnership and Domain Awareness 

5/29/09 

‘‘Pearls in Policing’’ Conference 

The Hague, Netherlands 

FBI of Tomorrow 

06/14/09 

New Agents Graduation (09–07) 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

07/09/09 

New Agents Graduation (09–10) 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

08/19/09 

New Agents Graduation 

Quantico, VA 

Graduation of New Agents Class 

9/02/09 

Cook County Crime Stoppers Awards Ceremony 

Chicago, IL 

Partnerships and Community Leadership 

09/10/09 

ISA Graduation, Ulpan Language School 

Tel Aviv, Israel 

Partnership, Intelligence, and Information Sharing 

09/16/09 

Domestic Security Executive Academy 

Quantico, VA 

Partnership, Intelligence, and Information Sharing 

09/21/09 

Ethics and Compliance Officers Association 

Chicago, IL 

Ethics and Compliance in Law Enforcement 

09/24/09 

21 

Address and Location Date 

ATAC Federal Prosecutors Conference 

Washington, D.C. 

National Security, Counterterrorism, Intelligence 

09/30/09 

Hispanic Heritage Month 

FBIHQ 

Celebrating Diversity in the FBI 

10/08/09 

AFCEA Symposium 

Chantilly, VA 

Today’s FBI and Intelligence 

10/14/09 

University of Indianapolis Lectureship 

Indianapolis, IN 

Public Service and Civic Responsibility 

10/15/09 

OSAC Winter Meeting 

Washington DC 

The FBI: Combating Today’s Threats 

11/18/09 

Baltimore Field Office Dedication in Honor of Sam Hicks 

Baltimore, MD 

Partnerships, Line of Duty Death 

11/23/09 

New Agents Graduation 09–15 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

11/24/09 

George Marshall European Center for Security Studies 

FBIHQ 

Partnerships, Intelligence, FBI Priorities 

12/08/09 

New Agents Graduation 09–17 

Quantico, VA 

Adaptability, Partnerships, and Leadership 

12/23/09 

2010 

SOCA Luncheon 

Washington, D.C. 

Organized Crime, Partnerships 

02/04/10 

FBI National Academy Associates Executive Board Conference 

Quantico, VA 

Partnerships, Intelligence, FBI Priorities 

02/17/10 

National Executive Institute Opening Banquet 

Crystal City, VA 

Partnerships, Intelligence, Leadership 

03/18/10 

FBI National Academy Associates Africa/Middle Eastern Retrainer 

Botswana 

Partnerships, Intelligence, FBI Priorities 

03/22/10 

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Distinguished Speaker Series 

Alexandria, VA 

Partnerships, Intelligence, FBI Priorities 

04/07/10 

North Texas Crime Commission 

Dallas, TX 

Partnerships, Intelligence, FBI Priorities 

04/14/10 

Testimony 

Date Committee Hearing Topic 

Open Session 

04/01/2009 HJC Proposals to Fight Fraud and Protect Taxpayers 

03/20/2009 House Committee on Financial Services Federal and State Enforcement of Financial Consumer and Investor Protection Laws 

02/11/2009 SJC The Need for Increased Fraud Enforcement in the 

Wake of the Economic Downturn 

03/28/2007 HPSCI FBI Use of National Security Letters 

01/25/2007 SSCI Implementation of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 

08/23/2004 House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 

Terrorism and Homeland Security 

Creating a National Intelligence Director 

08/03/2004 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee FBI Reforms to Meet Current Threats 

06/16/2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States 

The 9/11 Plot 

04/14/2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States 

Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community 

22 

Testimony—Continued 

Date Committee Hearing Topic 

10/14/2003 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security 

Terrorist Recruitment in Prison and the Recent Arrests Related to Guantanamo Detainees 

10/01/2003 House Select Committee on Homeland Security Fraudulent Identification Documents and the Implications for Homeland Security 

09/25/2003 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing 

and Urban Affairs 

Identifying, Tracking and Dismantling the Financial 

Structure of Terrorist Organizations 

09/24/2003 House Financial Services Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations 

The Terrorist Financing Operations Section 

09/09/2003 Senate Finance Committee The Alias Among Us: The Homeland Security and 

Terrorism Threat from Document Fraud, Identity 

Theft and Social Security Number Misuse 

07/31/2003 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Terrorism Financing: Origination, Organization and 

Prevention 

03/18/2003 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Diplomacy and the War Against Terrorism 

Closed Session* 

01/28/2010 SSCI Fort Hood Update 

01/27/2010 HPSCI Fort Hood Update 

02/12/2008 SSCI Cyber Initiative (Testimony pending) 

09/20/2007 SSCI FISA and Protect America Act 

*The transcripts for closed, classified hearings are maintained by the Committees and not made available to the FBI. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pistole, very much. 

I’m going to open the questioning by asking you to try and give 

a thumbnail sketch of how you see the terrorism threat; and the 

use of airplanes; and therefore, the use of detection equipment, and 

how satisfactory is it. How do you see the terrorism threat coming 

from overseas? How do you see it from people who come from overseas to be embedded here? And how do you see it coming from 

Americans themselves, as anger grows, which, of course, it is? And 

then how does that mesh in to how you change and amplify the 

technology that people have to go through to be searched? Because 

that is an absolute obligation, and whole-body imaging is anathema 

to a lot of people. I don’t know how you get around that. So, could 

you talk about how you see the sequencing of threats, the magnitude of the threats, where the threats are from, and how you adjust technology to try and counter that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And that actually addresses my top priority, if confirmed, in going into TSA, to ensure 

that the men and women of TSA, and all those who deal with it, 

see it as a threat-based, intelligence-driven agency with a national 

security focus answering the question of, How do we manage risk? 

We know that al Qaeda and its affiliates, including TTP, for example, associated with Shahzad, on Times Square, and a number 

of other affiliated AQ—al Qaeda-related groups—have the intent to 

commit attacks in the homeland. The question is their capability. 

And so, what I’ve been doing in my current job, as Deputy Director, is trying to work with all the interagency partners to identify 

those threads of intelligence which may help inform our actions 

here in the homeland. And I think at TSA it becomes especially 

critical. 

For example, given the Christmas Day plot, and the concealment 

technique that was used in that plot, which has to be used to help 

inform the people on the front lines as to what type of detection 

is appropriate—is the best suited to detect those type of new conVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:00 Jul 29, 2011 Jkt 067573 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\67573.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
23 

cealment methods, knowing that there was a great deal of sophistication in that device. 

And so, what it comes back to is making sure that TSA has the 

latest intelligence, the latest training, the latest techniques, and 

the latest technology to work as part of that layer of defense. 

The best scenario is if we have the intelligence through part of 

the U.S. intelligence community to say, ‘‘There are threats at this 

particular location,’’ whether it’s an airport, a port, a cargo ship. 

We know, obviously—from Madrid, in March of 2004; in London, in 

July of 2005—both July 7 and 21; from Moscow, 2 months ago, two 

female suicide bombers on the subway there; from Mumbai, in 

2007; a number of other incidents in India—that terrorists are interested in soft targets. 

So, the more we harden our targets, the more we see opportunities that the terrorists are looking for to hit us, such as in Times 

Square. Somebody can—as you mentioned, the freedoms we have 

here in the country—somebody can drive in, park a car, walk away, 

and explode a device, causing maximum carnage. So, that’s what 

we have to do, make sure we’re threat-based, intelligence-driven, 

allocating our resources to the risk. 

And I think that all factors into what is the technology that we’re 

acquiring, how do we train our people, and how do they go about 

doing their jobs as part of that layered security. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, you’re really making the security factor the 

main factor, in terms of the use of imaging and technology and 

what it is that people have to go through. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely. 

The CHAIRMAN. We started with shoes; that was because of the 

shoe-bomber. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN. You know, when we have a—more than a 3- 

ounce tube of toothpaste, and we’ve got to pitch it, people don’t like 

it. I don’t know whether that’s related to security, but it sure could 

be. 

Mr. PISTOLE. True. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, is that what rules in making decisions about 

imaging and equipment and what people have to go through? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. I mean, security is paramount, Mr. Chairman. 

The whole purpose of the agency and all the U.S. Government efforts since 9/11 have been to enhance security; obviously, trying to 

balance civil liberty and privacy issues that are attendant to being 

citizens of the United States. 

In my current job, I’ve had a lot of opportunities to do that, in 

how we investigate U.S. citizens and those—others, to make sure 

that we’re doing everything legally possible to prevent bad things 

from happening, while protecting the civil liberties and privacies of 

those who we don’t have an investigative interest in. So—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But, that leaves the Watch List. And the Watch 

List was violated recently. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, the Watch List is an important tool in the 

overall toolbox, if you will, that the U.S. Government has. It is constantly being evaluated and modified to ensure that it is the best 

information possible to provide the best tools possible to those who 

would engage with the traveling public. 

24 

So, for example, individuals who we describe as ‘‘clean skins,’’ 

those who have no terrorist affiliations, such as Abdulmutallab, 

with Christmas Day. It makes it a challenge. If that person’s not 

on a Watch List, how do we screen for that, other than through 

these enhanced techniques? 

And so, the Watch List performs a valuable function in trying to 

identify, basically, as a tipper to say, ‘‘OK. Here’s somebody you 

should take a additional look at.’’ It’s not dispositive of anything. 

But, if somebody is on a Watch List, particularly the No Fly or Selectee, then obviously additional scrutiny should be, and is, applied 

to ensure that person does not pose a threat to aviation security, 

in that instance, or to other opportunities that person may have to 

do something bad in the U.S. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pistole. 

Senator Hutchison. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I will just ask you the question, as the Ranking Member, 

if you and your agency will be available to all of the members of 

our committee, as well as our staffs on our behalf, for information 

that we need to be the oversight committee of the U.S. Senate. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely, Senator Hutchison. I look forward to 

that, if confirmed. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. Let’s talk about collective bargaining. 

We have asked nominees, before, the question about what you 

think about it, how you would respond to it. But, I’m going to ask 

you a different question, because I know that the Secretary will 

make a final decision on this. But, my question to you is, What is 

going to be your advice to the Secretary? And what factors are you 

going to use to give her advice on whether this would hurt the capability to respond, to avoid any kind of work stoppages or slowdowns or any of the ways that people use to show that they aren’t 

pleased if collective bargaining doesn’t go their way? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. Thank you, Senator. 

Secretary Napolitano did ask me to conduct a review of this 

issue, which I’ll do, engaging all stakeholders in the process. In 

terms of any big issues or decisions like that, in my leadership experience at the FBI I tried to do just that. So, it’s consistent with 

that perspective of trying to gather as much information as possible, and then making an informed judgment or recommendation. 

And so, I need more information to do that. 

My experience with the FBI is such that, of course, we don’t have 

unions or collective bargaining. And so, I’m attuned to the security/ 

safety issue. And, from my perspective, whatever the discussions 

are can’t adversely affect the safety and security of the traveling 

public. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Every previous Administrator has determined that collective bargaining is not appropriate for this particular agency. Will you consult with former heads of the TSA in 

your deliberations about what you will recommend? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I would consider that, Senator. As people who are, 

I would think, part of the stakeholders in this process, given their 

experience and everything, obviously would be open to all those 

who have valuable insights in that regard. 

25 

Senator HUTCHISON. Let me just ask you if the Secretary has indicated to you that she will take your advice or when she asked 

you to look into it, did she say that she would rely on you, or indicate that she might go a different way? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. She gave no indication. She simply asked me 

to do the review. And, from my perspective, that is an independent 

assessment that I would do with—again, engaging all the stakeholders, but that will be my assessment, and we’ve had no discussions about the outcome of that. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, we certainly are going to, as I said 

earlier, want to have a progress report and be fully informed of—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely. 

Senator HUTCHISON.—of your decision. And be able to discuss it. 

Let me ask you about your thoughts on the other issues besides 

airline security. I think that many of the focuses in this agency 

have certainly been airline—and, as they should be. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator HUTCHISON. That is a place where people are vulnerable, 

and we know that many tricks have been tried, and largely we 

have avoided having another 9/11. But, what other areas do you 

see as priorities and where you would need to put resources for 

safety? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. It—as I mentioned, given the 

interest in and successful attacks that we’ve seen in Europe and 

India, in particular, against rail networks; the attempted attack by 

Najibullah Zazi, last fall, against the New York City subways, a 

plot that was disrupted; the intelligence that’s out there that indicates, again, targeting of more soft targets, means that the rail system with, you know, the millions—the multiple or more millions of 

passengers traveling by rail every day in subways than the 2 million air passengers that we have here in the U.S., makes that one 

of the key priorities. 

Ports are also a critical area that needs to be worked as part of 

the interagency. Obviously, Coast Guard has a large responsibility 

there with helping inform and then work with the other agencies 

to address the vulnerabilities that al Qaeda and other terrorist 

groups have indicated an interest in trying to do bad things to. 

So, those two part—obviously, HAZMAT carriers those—the 

over-the-road truckers who can carry hazardous loads, the freights, 

as I mentioned, heavy rail, light rail, subways, those are all areas 

that fall within that umbrella of transportation security. And so, if 

confirmed, I look forward to working with you and the Committee 

to assess those vulnerabilities and to figure out the best way to 

manage risk by allocating resources. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hutchison. 

Senator DeMint. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pistole, the reason that some of us are making such an issue 

of collective bargaining, it’s a signal to us. There’s no doubt in my 

mind that you have the qualifications to make the Transportation 

Security Agency a better agency, to continue to improve it, that you 

know how to manage people and focus on security. But, if we see 

26 

you yielding to political pressure, that would suggest to us that the 

priorities have changed. And that’s why it’s so important to us. 

I’ve got a letter from candidate Barack Obama to John Gage, of 

the National—or the American Federation of Government Employees, promising to provide collective bargaining benefits. And so, 

that’s going to be a very difficult political pressure for you to stand 

down, but I think you probably have worked in difficult environments before. 

When we met a few weeks ago, you said you had never thought 

of having collective bargaining at the FBI. And you are one of the 

Nation’s leading counterterrorism officers. I find it instructive that 

you didn’t even think that the workforce at the FBI needed to 

unionize. 

Would it be accurate to say that implementing collective bargaining at FBI would not improve national security? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I’m sorry, Senator, if you could rephrase—or restate 

that? I apologize. In terms of the FBI—— 

Senator DEMINT. Would collective bargaining improve security— 

would it improve national security—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Oh. I—— 

Senator DEMINT.—at the FBI? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you. No, Senator. Obviously—and, from the 

FBI’s perspective, we have to have the ability to surge resources at 

any time, to be able to deploy people, not only nationwide, but 

worldwide, at a moment’s notice. And so, the perspective is one— 

again, from my experiences, is one of not collective bargaining. 

Senator DEMINT. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So, that’s why I need to—— 

Senator DEMINT. But—— 

Mr. PISTOLE.—go into it—— 

Senator DEMINT.—let me ask this, because obviously the people 

who work at the agency, the officers, are very important to us, and 

the way they’re treated—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. 

Senator DEMINT.—is very important to us. And if you assume 

the reins at the TSA, can you commit to paying the TSO—the officers an honest wage, having the highest workplace standards, ensuring the professional development of your officers? And do you 

promise not to show favoritism or discriminate in the processes 

that evaluate performance and determine promotion, overtime, 

shift bids, or health and safety? Is—would that be your commitment? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, Senator, of course what I am very focused on 

is the workforce development issues. You’ve gone into a lot of detail 

there. What I pledge to do is make sure that the—all the TSOs and 

all employees of TSA that have a voice to—that they know can be 

heard by the head of the agency, and that they can engage and can 

discuss those issues, some of which you’ve outlined, in a meaningful fashion. So, yes, I pledge to—— 

Senator DEMINT. But, you don’t think you necessarily need a 

third party to tell you to do that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. That’s something I have to withhold judgment on, 

because I don’t have the information yet. I need to conduct that review, talk to the stakeholders, and make an informed judgment. 

27 

Senator DEMINT. You don’t have the information about what 

your commitment to the employees will be? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. I know what my commitment to the employees 

would be, if confirmed. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator DEMINT. When you do your assessment, will you make 

that assessment available to this committee? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I would need to talk with the Secretary initially, 

and then, in discussions with her, make that decision. 

Senator DEMINT. So, you’re not sure whether or not you’ll give 

us your assessment. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I’m not sure. I need to talk to the Secretary about 

that. 

Senator DEMINT. OK. All right. The unions are making the case 

that if we don’t have collective bargaining, that someone in your 

position will not provide the proper workplace environment and 

fairness. I think your history shows that that’s not true—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DEMINT.—but that’s certainly something you’re capable 

of. So, again, I know we’ve made enough of this issue, but I will 

trust your judgment—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator DEMINT.—until proven otherwise. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator, appreciate it. 

Senator DEMINT. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator DeMint. 

Senator Begich. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much. It was great to see you, a couple days ago. 

I do have—I want to restate some of the questions we talked 

about, but I have to take—I wasn’t planning to ask any questions 

on this, or even make a statement on it. But, on the whole collective bargaining issue, you know, I’m hopeful that—you know, what 

I’ve learned here, in a year and a half, little issues like this suddenly become big issues because of philosophical differences, versus 

what is right and what needs to be done. 

Let me ask you, first, one basic question, then I’m going to give 

you a comment, here. 

First, the question is, In your position, you will—will you do everything possible to make sure that whatever rules, regulations, 

procedures—everything you do will ensure the safety of traveler as 

well as the highest quality of workers in TSA? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator BEGICH. That’s the ultimate question. How you get 

there—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator BEGICH.—is—you know, this is the part of the role that 

I look to administration to work on. As a former Mayor, someone 

who had to administer well over 800 police and fire, who are unionized, I saw not one diminishment of public safety, because people 

who go into this field—and correct me if I’m wrong; you’ve been in 

28 

the FBI for many years—they chose this field not because it’s 

union or nonunion. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator BEGICH. They choose this field because this is the area 

of interest to them, because they instinctively—you want to make 

this place a safer place. Is that a fair—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. That’s right. 

Senator BEGICH.—statement. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sense of mission. 

Senator BEGICH. That’s right. You don’t sit there go, ‘‘Geez, is 

this union or nonunion?’’ 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. 

Senator BEGICH. So, I have to take some exception to both minority members, and that is, I will stack the police department that 

I had against any public safety team in this country. They were 

unionized, but they never forgot their number-one mission—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator BEGICH.—which is the public safety of, in that case, our 

community there. Same thing you would see at TSA. Is that a 

fair—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator BEGICH.—statement? Under any circumstances, the goal 

is—you’re going to make sure those folks understand their numberone mission—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. That’s—— 

Senator BEGICH.—is traveling—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. And so, I want to take a—some exception. I understand there are philosophical issues, but, again, people don’t go 

into these jobs and say, ‘‘Geez, you know, if the union doesn’t do 

this, I’m not going to keep the public safe.’’ Do you have that feeling, that they would do that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I really don’t have that sense, Senator. Obviously, 

coming from my, you know, 27 years—— 

Senator BEGICH. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE.—at FBI, nonunion/collective bargaining—— 

Senator BEGICH. But, you’ve worked as an FBI agent with police—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. 

Senator BEGICH.—officers all across—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. All the time. 

Senator BEGICH.—the country. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Task forces—— 

Senator BEGICH. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE.—all across the country. 

Senator BEGICH. You can probably not tell me which ones are 

union or nonunion, correct? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I—— 

Senator BEGICH. But, you—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Some are, some aren’t. 

Senator BEGICH. Right. But, you can probably tell me who were 

the best officers. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. 

Senator BEGICH. And it’s irrelevant of—— 

29 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator BEGICH.—what—if they belong to bargain unit, or not. 

Because that never really enters the discussion. Is that fair? 

Mr. PISTOLE. That’s correct. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. I apologize. I had no interest in talking 

about this issue. Again, as a mayor who managed public safety officers, I can tell you, again, their number-one goal is to keep the 

public safe. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator BEGICH. Period. And so, I just take a little exception to 

the debate that just went on. 

But, let me get to very specific Alaskan issues, if I can, as we 

talked about. And one of them was the whole issue of the TWIC 

cards and how—the transportation issue. We talked a little about 

that; I want to just make sure we have this conversation on the 

record. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. 

Senator BEGICH. And that is, the complication for people in rural 

Alaska to get those—that next step, where they have to get the 

card personally delivered to them, which in some cases could be 

very expensive to fly to go to the next location to get that, and/or 

time commitment. 

We talked about some ideas of trying to utilize technology in this 

way, of understanding the need to make sure the safety is cleared, 

the right person gets the card. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator BEGICH. I want to reiterate the point, but also make 

sure you and I are on the same page, that you would be willing 

to look at innovative ways to ensure that they get these cards, that 

the security is there, but this expensive back-and-forth traveling— 

may be an opportunity to avoid that with some new technologies. 

Is that a fair—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. Senator, I—if confirmed, I look forward to 

working with you and the Committee on that issue, to make sure 

that the best business model’s in practice, and the latest technologies are used—again, while ensuring the safety and security of 

those guards and the workers is paramount. 

Senator BEGICH. Also, we talked about the whole issue of when 

Anchorage Airport went into a full—right after 9/11, kind of, almost volunteered to upgrade their facilities, in advance of all the 

regulation and everything put into place. But, they’re—they did it 

because they were remodeling—renovating the airport, as well as 

others around the country. And there are a few of these airports, 

similar situation, where they expended money, but the TSA, now, 

has not reimbursed them, after multiple years. Is this an area you 

would look into and help us try to figure out a resolution? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, Senator. I would look into that. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. The last one is just a general comment. 

And you and I had a conversation on this, and that is just the 

whole issue of the uniqueness of aviation in Alaska. Would it be 

fair, in our conversation we had, that there is some differences, but 

you have to see them as they lay out—but, in rural Alaska, rural 

states, having a full-blown TSA—for example—I’ll just use an example I used in—with you—was in a village, like Chevak, which— 

30 

very small—that maybe there needs to be not one-size-fits-all, but 

an understanding of rural internal state travel, and how TSA can 

be more customer friendly in that regard. Is that a fair—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. That’s fair, Senator. And, if confirmed, I look forward, again, to working with you and the Committee as to those 

issues, how we can tailor the appropriate resources at the respective airports. 

Senator BEGICH. Excellent. Last comment. And, again, I look forward—I know you’ve been to Palmer, you’ve been there for a little 

while. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator BEGICH. You went there for a short bit. I look forward 

to trying to bring you up to Alaska, and we’ll go visit one of those 

villages. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator, appreciate it. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pistole, I warn you that the Senator who just 

spoke is obsessed, and properly so, with Alaska. And you will see 

him and hear from him often. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. PISTOLE. That’s—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Warner. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m not sure my good friend and colleague is simply obsessed 

with Alaska, he’s obsessed with a lot of things. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator WARNER. So, I—you know. 

Mr. Pistole, it’s good to see you again. And let me—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Senator. 

Senator WARNER.—make a couple of—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Likewise. 

Senator WARNER.—quick comments. One, I think you’ve got the 

absolute right background for this position. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator WARNER. And I enjoyed visiting with you yesterday. And 

obviously you’ve had a history of public service. And to be willing 

to step into this breach, considering the challenges of this job, and 

the past challenges of some of the nominees, I’m, again, grateful for 

your willingness to step forward. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator WARNER. And Senator Begich already raised one of the 

issues that I was going to raise. I, too, have one of those airports 

that did the right thing, relied upon TSA assertions, that if you go 

ahead and upgrade next-generation security facilities during the 

middle of a remodeling effort, that makes good business sense. And 

then, when they came to get reimbursed, those dollars haven’t been 

there. So, I look forward to hearing the same kind of response, as 

well. And this is probably one of those ecumenical issues, I imagine. I’ve got colleagues on the other side of the aisle who’ve got this 

same issue. 

31 

Let me also reassert what I think the Chairman has mentioned, 

what I think all our colleagues believe, is that your number-one job 

is to make sure that your TSA employees ensure the safety of the 

homeland, the safety of our traveling public, both domestic and foreign, and clearly a—my conversations with you and reviewing your 

background, you’ve got that expertise. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator WARNER. But, I do believe there is another piece to this, 

and we raised this yesterday, and I want to just take another moment on it. And that is—you’ve got—you’ll have close to 50,000 employees. And in many ways, this is the—these employees are the 

first impression—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator WARNER.—that visitors coming to our country interact 

with. It’s also a required intersection with all of the domestic traveling public. And I don’t think, again, I’m going to be alone in this 

issue, but I constantly hear complaints about mistreatment of the 

traveling public by TSA officers. 

I recently received a letter from a constituent who described a incident of waiting literally 40 minutes in a screening line at Dulles. 

And he described the TSA officers as surly and inappropriate. He 

said they had no consideration of folks waiting in line. And again, 

as we discussed, I think most Americans realize that the—in—the 

privilege of flying will require the privilege—or—and the requirement of additional screening in a post-9/11 world. But, that requirement can be done in a manner that is—doesn’t have to be 

surly. I think one of the challenges you’re going to have in this requirement is making sure that customer service—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator WARNER.—not to be trumped by security. Security always has to trump. But, customer service has to be a component 

of your TSA officers. 

And what I think added insult to injury—and again, probably 

most of my colleagues have flown out of Dulles recently—we’ve 

spent literally tens of millions of dollars on a new security mezzanine, and it’s more than a bit frustrating for the traveling public 

to get carted and shuttled down to this new security mezzanine, 

with lots and lots of gates, and see, then, those gates woefully 

understaffed and—this is repeated comments—sometimes staffed 

by folks who are surly and—there’s the ‘‘surly and inappropriate 

behavior,’’ the comments of my constituent. And these folks have 

got a job to do, but they can do it in a way that, I think, both 

doesn’t mitigate their security concerns, actually would enhance 

the security concerns if they feel cooperation from the traveling 

public, as well as the role of this first impression that comes about 

with our—with many of our foreign travelers. 

So, what steps would you take to ensure appropriate staffing, to 

ensure that, as you buildup this esprit de corps at the TSA—you’ve 

got a new agency with a lot of burdens—that customer service is 

part of that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. 

Senator WARNER. Civil servants ought to act in a civil manner. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

32 

Senator WARNER. And what kind of metrics could we, as the 

oversight committee, look to you, as you get into this role, to make 

sure that we’re seeing that kind of progress, both in terms of staffing, morale, and in the customer service area? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. And I would just start off by 

saying I agree with all of your statements in terms of—customer 

service has to be part and parcel of the security mission, and that 

oftentimes you can accomplish more through better customer service than the type of conduct that you described, which, if confirmed, 

my expectation and clear direction would be to focus on those 

issues. 

I think everybody recognizes, in this room and any of the traveling public, that the TSOs have a challenging job. Some would say 

it’s very challenging, with limited reward, you know, only recognized if something bad happens, which is not a good metric. 

So, what I want to do, if confirmed, is work with the human resources people of TSA and the Department to assess what the current metrics are. I, frankly, don’t know right now. Obviously, 

throughput is one of those key issues. How many people can get 

through the screening in there—with their carry-on bags, those 

things, and what makes sense. And so, I will, if confirmed, look forward to working with the Committee, to be informed by, perhaps, 

expectations, managing those expectations, and then trying to 

work, again, through the training and retraining of TSOs and other 

TSA personnel to make sure that their role in this layered security 

apparatus that we have in the United States makes sense, that we 

don’t have undue interruptions to the commerce or free flow of 

business and of people and goods, while still maintaining that security that you mentioned. 

So, I look forward to, again, if confirmed, working with you and 

the Committee on those issues. 

Senator WARNER. Well, thank you, Mr. Pistole. And I’d, again, 

want to say thank you for being willing to step up. This is going 

to be a—I think, a bit more multidimensional challenge. You bring 

the security background, I think, and great expertise. But, as we 

discussed yesterday, I think there’s going to be a lot of management components of this challenge that I look forward to working 

with you on. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Senator Thune. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Deputy Director 

Pistole. Appreciate your willingness—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE.—and interest in serving as Administrator of the 

TSA. 

Like a number of my colleagues, I’ve been concerned, with the 

Administration’s long delay in filling what, in my view, is a very 

top position. This is even before Mr. Southers and General Harding 

withdrew their names from consideration. With your longstanding 

33 

service to our Nation at the FBI, I think you would bring an important perspective to TSA when it comes to strengthening security for 

the traveling public. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you. 

Senator THUNE. And so, we welcome your interest and willingness to serve. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you. 

Senator THUNE. There’s no question that we face a lot of challenges, going forward, when it comes to addressing the changing 

terrorist threats. A couple of challenges that I believe TSA is faced 

with include complacency from the general public, and, second, the 

need to bolster security protocols, as was witnessed by the December bombing attempt in Detroit; and the recent New York City incident, in which Mr. Shahzad almost fled the country after purchasing a one- way ticket to Dubai. 

So, clearly, there are lots of challenges still out there. It’s going 

to be always hard to—we’re always asking for some of our agencies 

to do more with less. And I wanted to get at one issue and get your 

response to it, because the budget request for TSA is $8.16 billion 

for this year, which is a 6.6-percent increase over Fiscal Year 2010. 

And I think, as you know, on Tuesday the White House issued a 

directive, to all agency heads, to trim at least 5 percent from their 

budgets. 

And the question I have has to do with an award that was recently issued by the TSA. It was an IT services contract that was 

$52 million more expensive than the lower bid from a contractor 

with almost the same technical solution ratings. Now, given the fiscal crisis that our country is facing, does this make sense for taxpayers? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. I’m not familiar with that particular contract. I was not privy to any of those dealings, yet. I am 

still dealing with the FBI budget, frankly, and all those issues. 

But, if confirmed, obviously that is one of the key areas, to make 

sure that taxpayer dollars are being wisely invested in the proper 

tools and technology to do the things that we need to do to protect 

the traveling public. So, yes, I pledge to work with the Committee 

on those issues, bring a sense of strong fiscal responsibility to this 

position. 

Senator THUNE. OK. I would appreciate, as you undertake to do 

that, looking at the procurement process. And I’ll just give you a 

little more background on this, since you’re not acquainted with it. 

I hope that it’s something you can kind of dig into. But, it’s a contract that appears to be very poorly handled. It has been going on 

for more than a couple of years. It has been the subject of at least 

two successful protests, and a third is pending with the GAO. During the course of those protests the GAO found that there were 

irregularities in the acquisition process. And in addition, due to the 

length of time that has passed since the proposal for IT services 

was first issues—issued, it’s my understanding that the scope of 

work sought by TSA may not accurately reflect its current needs. 

So, there has been a long tail on this thing. It has been in the 

works, as I said, for a couple of years. And I would hope that—it 

seems, to me at least, that, given the excess cost for the current 

contract award, and the flaws in the solicitation process, that TSA 

34 

ought to take a—undertake a fresh, independent review of this procurement, and report back to Congress on plans to address concerns about the procurement, and plans to improve that acquisition 

process. So, I hope that we can count on you. 

As I mentioned earlier, these are hard times, you know, fiscally 

for the country. We’re dealing with unprecedented levels of deficit 

spending and debt. And when you hear stories like this—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator THUNE.—it doesn’t do anything to bolster the public’s 

confidence in their government and its ability to make sure that 

they are being good stewards of America’s tax dollars. So, I appreciate your following up on that, and hope that we can continue to 

work with you and try and bring a resolution to this that’s acceptable and that’s in the best interest of the taxpayers. 

I know you don’t have extensive background when it comes to 

the aviation sector, in particular, but I’d like to know a little bit 

more about what you see as the TSA’s role when it comes to general aviation, including smaller airports in places like South Dakota and across the country. 

There is no question, I think, that these—that—you know, we 

hear this all the time from those who use airports, from a general 

aviation standpoint. And obviously we’ve got a lot of commercial 

travelers. But, how do you see the TSA interacting and dealing 

with the general aviation community and the issues that they’re 

concerned about with regard to safety? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. And I think it’s back to the— 

my early statement about TSA being a threat- based, intelligencedriven agency with that national security mission in mind, and trying to answer the daily question, How do we manage the risk? So, 

with general aviation, clearly it becomes of—What are the risks associated with general aviation? We know of a number of interests 

by terrorists of using what may be seen as a softer protective 

screen, if you will, on general aviation than commercial aviation. 

And so, it’s something that I need to review all the latest threat 

assessments to see what information—or what has already been 

done, and then try to make some informed judgments—again, with 

the fiscal restraints that you mentioned—recognizing you can’t be 

all things to all people at all times in all places. So, how do we allocate those limited resources in a meaningful fashion based on risk? 

But, I look forward to working with you and the Committee as 

to that—those issues. 

Senator THUNE. OK. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time’s expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

And when you hear of examples, like you mentioned, it’s important to tell the Committee about it, because we’re not aware of 

that. 

Senator THUNE. OK. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, that would be helpful. 

Senator THUNE. We will certainly do that, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

Senator LeMieux. 

35 

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to say, Mr. Pistole, thank you for your service; not 

just your willingness to submit yourself for this position, but your 

service with the FBI since 1983. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LEMIEUX. And I want to take a moment, if I may, to 

thank your wife and your daughters. We all—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Appreciate that. 

Senator LEMIEUX.—serve with the support of our family. And 

you’ve made sacrifices, but they’ve made sacrifices, too. So—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely. 

Senator LEMIEUX.—thank you—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Appreciate that, Senator. 

Senator LEMIEUX.—for the partnership that they have provided 

for you. 

I think you’ve got great credentials for this job. I enjoyed our 

meeting the other day. You and I spoke a lot about technology. And 

I want to echo my colleague from South Dakota’s comments about 

using technology for purposes of efficiency. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator LEMIEUX. We’ve heard about long lines in our airports 

in Orlando and Miami. And there’s a lot of concern about the modernization of the way that the TSA employees work, whether they 

are on overtime, because they’re not using, perhaps, the best technology possible. 

So, I look forward to you reviewing those contracts and systems 

and evaluations, to make sure we’re doing the best thing possible. 

And know I have your commitment to do that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely, Senator. I look forward to doing that. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Also on technology, you know, we spoke about 

this issue, and we’ve talked about it here at this committee before, 

when we were evaluating some of the folks that came before you, 

and that is—is the general frustration that the American people 

have that an 85-year-old grandmother or, you know, my 5-year-old 

child will be pulled aside for a lot of extra screening, or delayed, 

when we know that more than, you know, 90 percent of our threats 

are from Islamic extremists. And we need to do a better job of protecting against those who are going to do danger to us, and trying 

to speed other people through who pose no danger to the American 

people. 

And I know that there are laws in place that—as we discussed, 

that tie our hands, in some extent, about how we can use predictive 

modeling technology and things like that. But, I would like for you, 

just on the record, to express your commitment that we’re going to 

try to use technology, we’re going to look to what other countries, 

like Israel, are doing. They’ve got, apparently, software that they’re 

using now that checks the stress on people. They use a lot of just 

personal interaction with the folks who get on the plane, to try to 

qualify them. 

And I just want to get your commitment—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

36 

Senator LEMIEUX.—on the record, that we’re going to look for innovative ways so that the average American traveler, who presents 

no threat, is going to be able to get through quicker, but we are 

going to provide the scrutiny we need on those who might actually 

endanger our country. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, thank you, Senator LeMieux, and I appreciate 

your focus on technology. We know there’s a lot out there. It’s a 

question of the right technology with the right application at the 

right time. And with TSA being part of that layered security, my 

hope and goal is to make sure that intelligence will help inform 

those decisions and judgments as to what that right technology is— 

going back to Christmas Day, that concealment method and—that 

we discussed. 

But, clearly, I believe that technology has to inform and enable 

those functions. I had the opportunity to meet with Dr. Tara 

O’Toole from DHS S&T, the Science and Technology directorate, 

last week to have some of these discussions about what is the technology that the Department, the agency, is looking at. I had a opportunity to have a demonstration out at the integration facility, 

just south of Reagan Airport, the TSA has to do some of the testing 

of the equipment, the enhanced imaging technology, before it’s deployed, and then had the opportunity to have that demonstration. 

But, again, with all the great work that, for example, the Israelis 

do, in terms of the behavior detection, obviously TSA does that as 

part of that layered security. If there is technology that helps enable that, in terms of information—obviously, in the FBI we have 

behavioral analysis experts who focus on those type things. Again, 

all enabled by, not encumbered by, technology. So, I look forward 

to working with you on that. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I appreciate that. And I know that you have 

a focus on it. 

And it’s very important, Mr. Chairman, because we have so 

many millions of people traveling through this country every 

month, and we have to do what Senator Warner said, which is— 

these folks have to be involved in customer service, too. 

I appreciate the fact, now, that it seems like the TSA folks are 

trying to be more friendly. I appreciate the fact that, when you’re 

traveling with a family, like I did back down to Florida this week, 

with four kids, that there was a separate line for families that are 

traveling with a baby, and all those kinds of things. I appreciate 

that. 

And, you know, the balance you have is to keep us safe—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator LEMIEUX.—but to not burden our civil liberties, and to 

try to get us through the airports as quickly as possible. So—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Agreed. 

Senator LEMIEUX.—if you can continue to focus on the customer 

service aspect, on the one hand, and then going after the actual 

people who threaten us, on the other, I think that would be a great 

focus for you. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. OK. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Look forward to it, if confirmed. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Yes, sir. 

37 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Mr. Pistole, I’m going to ask the next question. I have to then 

do something. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dorgan, will be the chairman, which he 

probably ought to be anyway—— 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN.—and will carry the hearing. 

I want to just go on with what Senator LeMieux was saying, because the tradeoff, really, with the American people is that we’re 

going to put you to a certain amount of inconvenience, and that inconvenience is usually related to the last incident—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. That’s right. 

The CHAIRMAN.—as opposed to forward-looking. The tradeoff is 

that in return, we’re going to give you good service, and friendly 

service, and fast service—and especially fast service—but thorough. 

The technology helps on that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’ve been through a lot of airports where there 

have been thumbprints and other things that simply aren’t being 

used. 

I want to go to what Senator Warner said about Dulles Airport. 

It’s one of the most frustrating experiences I’ve ever been through. 

When you walk a half a mile, then take a train for half a mile to 

go up and down and all over, then you’re really confronted with, 

like, 15 or 20 different stations for people to go through, and only 

two of them are manned, and it takes 45 minutes. That’s not carrying out the bargain that you do for security. And, in fact, it probably rushes security. It may have the opposite effect. 

So, for my first question of you, is that a solvable problem? I 

mean, I don’t do a great deal of travel. I can’t talk about Los Angeles Airport or San Francisco Airport and all the rest of them. I normally deal, as does Senator Dorgan and Senator Begich, with small 

airports, and everything is fine. But, there has got to be a solution 

to that. I mean, we can’t have that Dulles syndrome. And I’m assuming, if it’s there, that it’s in other places. 

The deal is, you get tougher security—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN.—and you get tougher technology. In return for 

that, you get better service and friendly service, and that’s a fair 

deal. We’re not upholding—at least at those airports that I can 

think of—that deal. 

How do you do that with the budget cuts that may come your 

way that Senator Thune mentioned? I mean, do you have enough 

money to sufficiently staff other stations. I can’t tell you the anger 

of, not just your Chairman here, but of all the people in both lines, 

muttering as they looked in both directions, seeing all kinds of unopened lines. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You’ve obviously 

touched on a very significant issue. And, in the course of this process, I’ve had the opportunity to hear some personal—both—positive 

stories, but some very frustrating times, including one of a certain 

38 

Senator who had a 2-hour wait recently. Very frustrating. Just in 

terms of the economic impact and the inefficiencies of that. 

So, I think the staffing issue, again, has to be informed by the 

intelligence, because we have to make sure that the people who are 

doing it—making those staffing decisions are informed by the intelligence, and then have a good business model for what they’re 

doing. 

So, if confirmed, what I pledge to do is work with the Committee 

in making sure there are metrics in place, because I believe that 

what gets measured gets done. And if we’re not paying attention 

to those type of things, such—what’s the throughput rate—and I 

believe those things are—but, I just don’t have enough information 

at this point, other than to say it is one of my top priorities to look 

at, because the customer service has to be positive to keep the 

American public engaged while keeping the security at the forefront. 

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. 

I’m going to ask one more question, which you can answer, and 

one more that you can think about. 

You go to another part of Dulles Airport, which is where general 

aviation lands—Senator Thune brought this up—and there’s nothing. There are no waiting lines. Nobody is checking identity. You 

just carry whatever you have. You walk out. You walk on. There 

are no scanners that you walk through. That is the majority of airplanes in the air at any given time. 

I’m not talking about crop dusters, I’m talking about, some kinds 

of King Airs, and certainly jets. And they are the majority of the 

flights that are using our antiquated, air traffic control system as 

we try to build a new one. They don’t participate in this. They’ve 

done little things, but, they’re a very tight group, and it’s very easy 

for them to make phone calls to the Finance Committee and to this 

committee and shut down any effort to make them spend more 

money. Now, they’re doing a little bit more this year, but not much. 

Are you ready to take that on, because nobody else has been? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, if confirmed, I would look forward to engaging the general aviation community, in terms of what they see as the best approach, in terms 

of risk management, recognizing that they have a vested interest 

in a certain process, but also recognizing that threats can come 

from general aviation aircraft, such as we saw in February, with 

the IRS building in Austin, Texas. We know of other, well, terrorist 

groups who have expressed interest, as you mentioned, in crop 

dusters, different things. So, if it’s a vulnerability that’s not being 

addressed, that’s what I want to make a determination of and then 

look forward to working with you and the Committee to find ways 

forward to address those issues. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, that is a strong yes—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is—— 

The CHAIRMAN.—answer? 

Mr. PISTOLE.—a yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. You will not, years from now, have failed to address that and change the behavior of general aviation? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes—— 

39 

The CHAIRMAN. Remember they can make phone calls. And, boy, 

when they make phone calls, everybody just bows down, except me 

and a few others here. And it’s unfair, it’s an unjust matter. 

I’ll leave my other question and turn the chair over to Senator 

Dorgan. 

And I thank you. I will certainly be voting for you. And I’d, incidentally, say, out of turn perhaps, that we’ll be having an off-thefloor markup on your nomination, next week. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA 

Senator DORGAN [presiding]. Mr. Chairman, thank you very 

much. 

And, Mr. Pistole, I’m going to be supporting your nomination. I 

think you have a—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator DORGAN.—set of credentials that is sorely needed at 

TSA. And I think all of us on this committee would believe that 

that has been vacant far too long, for a number of circumstances. 

But, it is a critically important position. 

You know, decades ago, you used to just go to the airport and 

walk onto an airplane when they told you it was time. A lot of 

younger Americans have never experienced that. But, you just 

boarded an airplane. And then they began to hijack airplanes, particularly to Cuba, but some other locations, as well. And pretty 

soon they started screening passengers to make sure they didn’t 

have a weapon when they got on. And the screening has become 

more intensive and more intrusive. 

And nowadays, of course, the challenges of screening are pretty 

substantial. All of us have watched a 6-year-old child be wanded 

at an airport someplace, or a Catholic nun being intensively 

screened. You know, and so you watch those things, and you just 

shake your head. 

On the other hand, we understand we want to get on an airplane 

that is free of weapons—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN.—and that is not likely to be commandeered or 

hijacked or threatened. 

So, there is this issue of inconvenience. Screening is an inconvenience. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN. The question is how much. And can we do the 

job that’s necessary for screening, while—and protect the American 

people and protect the traveling public—while reducing the inconvenience to the extent possible? 

And, as Senator Rockefeller indicated, we traditionally protect 

against the last attack and the last mode of attack. You know, we 

found out that you could put a bomb in a shoe, and so we start taking off our shoes. Not until then did we start taking off our shoes, 

but then we did. We found that they can put a bomb in underwear; 

that has not resulted in specific actions. But, you know, we’re continuing to—I wasn’t trying to be funny there—— 

[Laughter.] 

40 

Senator DORGAN.—I was—as I was thinking about it. We’re—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. I think minds were wondering somewhere—— 

Senator DORGAN. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator DORGAN. And bottles of—3 ounces of—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN.—liquid. And we’re—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. That’s right. 

Senator DORGAN.—continuing to try to address the things we 

now see can happen. 

So, I want to ask you a series of questions. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, sir. 

Senator DORGAN. Number one, you said that you were involved 

in the investigation of Northwest 253, which occurred at Christmastime, with a man that boarded an airplane destined for the 

United States with a bomb in his underwear. And I want to ask 

you, as you looked at that, tell me what you think the failings 

were. I have a notion of a fair number of failings. But, what did 

you sense—as someone who was involved in the investigations, 

what were the failings? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, Senator, I think there were—there was a lot 

of information that was out there, in terms of the intelligence-community collection. Unfortunately, none of it was dispositive or specific enough to say, ‘‘This individual is currently posing a threat.’’ 

And so, the challenge that—which I think has been reviewed and 

discussed at some length—is, How do we ensure, as a U.S. Government, that all those holdings of information—even including, perhaps, the misspelling of a name, as has happened with 

AbdulMutallab, or the timely sharing of information to the decisionmakers who have to ensure—for example, should a visa be revoked, on the one hand, should the person be on a No Fly or Selectee list, on the other hand? What is the other intelligence about 

their—about the origin? Is there any intelligence about the type of 

device? 

So, those are three key areas that I think that the U.S. Government identified and is working at addressing. 

Senator DORGAN. Well, let me just ask more specifically. This is 

a potential terrorist whose father went to American authorities and 

pointed at his son—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN.—and said, ‘‘This guy is potentially troublesome’’—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN.—‘‘hanging around with people that are difficult, probably terrorists.’’ 

Mr. PISTOLE. He’s concerned about him, right. 

Senator DORGAN. So—that’s right. A father points to his son—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN.—and tells American authorities, ‘‘Watch this.’’ 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN. As a result of that, he is not put on a No Fly 

List. He does not have an open visa that is revoked. So, those are 

two major failures, it—— 

41 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN.—seems to me. And it might have been spelling, 

it might have been something else, it might have been people 

asleep at the desks, up and down the line. But then, in addition 

to that, in addition to somebody saying, ‘‘Here’s the guy. Watch 

him,’’ and we don’t watch him, then he gets to an airport with a 

bomb in his underwear. So, how does he get through a screening 

at an airport with a bomb in underwear? 

Mr. PISTOLE. As we know, Senator, from going back over all of 

the information we have, and through the debriefings of Mr. 

Abdulmutallab, of course, who has cooperated since that time, he 

was able to get through the screening in Amsterdam, Schiphol Airport. He went through a screening, but, because of the concealment 

technique that was used, where he had never touched it, so explosive trace detection equipment, even if they’d done it on his hands, 

would not have picked up any explosives, because he had not 

touched it, and there were no metallic parts, obviously—this was 

a chemical TAP—TATP/PETN combination—— 

Senator DORGAN. Tell us what those letters mean. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. Triacetone triperoxide is the initiator. And 

when the passengers on the plane heard what they described as 

firecrackers, that was actually—there’s actually a precursor, glycol—it’s a—KMNnO is the chemical composition—initiator that 

goes into the TAPT. That was what—when people described firecrackers, that’s what the—it was the TAPT initiating. And then the 

main charge is a PETN—and I don’t recall what all that stands 

for—but, it’s a common explosive device, not dissimilar to C4, for 

example, for—— 

Senator DORGAN. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE.—military use. So, it was—we were very, very fortunate that the main charge of PETN, which was nearly double the 

amount that Richard Reid had in his shoe, that you mentioned, 

shoe bomb from December of 2001. We did some testing, afterwards, of Richard Reid, and—on an unpressurized fuselage of a 

plane, would have blown a hole about this big in the side of the 

fuselage, unpressurized. And, of course, you know, pressurized— 

Abdulmutallab had nearly twice that amount. And so, obviously, 

the damage would have been much more significant, probably causing catastrophic failure to that aircraft. 

So, that is the challenge of, How do we work with our international partners to make sure that they have the latest technology, techniques, and training, that, if flights are going to come 

into the U.S., that they apply the same standards that we have? 

And I know Secretary Napolitano and the Deputy Secretary Jane 

Lute have been engaged in a worldwide effort in that regard, to engage our foreign partners, to ensure that those standards are similar, if not better than the U.S. standards for anybody coming in. 

And so, that’s been one of the challenges since Christmas Day. 

And, if confirmed, I look forward to working with our international 

partners, both in the security and law enforcement services, but, 

obviously, the aviation industry, to make sure those screening 

standards are up to the U.S. standards. 

Senator DORGAN. All right. I have additional questions, but I’ll 

wait and ask in another round. 

42 

Senator Hutchison. 

Senator HUTCHISON. No further questions. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Begich, do you have additional questions? 

Senator BEGICH. No further questions. 

Senator DORGAN. Well, then let me continue on this issue of the 

screen. Because, again, a father says, ‘‘Here’s the guy.’’ 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. Yes. 

Senator DORGAN. And we miss a bunch of opportunities to revoke 

a visa and put on a No Fly List this person that’s been identified, 

reasonably so, for us. And then he gets through a screen because 

he’s done whatever he has done with this concealed bomb to mask 

its image on a screen and to not have metal parts to it. 

Let me ask about the prevalence of the capability of the screening devices at most airports, both here and abroad, to detect exactly what went through a screen undetected at Christmastime. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure, Senator. Obviously, the X-ray machines, the 

typical ones that you see at most airports, would not pick up the 

type of device he used, because there are no metal parts to it. The 

new advanced imaging technology machines would give a much 

better opportunity, because there would be an anomaly identified 

in—hopefully—that’s one of the things that—need to make sure 

that the training is up to speed, so if an anomaly is detected, then 

a further patdown or other additional screening would be appropriate. It—again, it’s a—— 

Senator DORGAN. But, those are not in use, largely, at this point. 

Mr. PISTOLE. There are—have been a number of the enhanced— 

the AIT machines deployed through U.S. airports. There’s a plan 

for, I believe, 450 by the end of the year. But—I have to check my 

numbers on that—but, it’s something that—there is a plan to do 

that, all the while addressing whether that it is focusing on yesterday’s threat, and they’ve now developed a new threat. And so, we 

have to make sure the intelligence is helping inform the latest 

R&D, research and development, for the best technology to defeat 

other types of threats. 

Senator DORGAN. But, some of the 9/11 conspirators, terrorists, 

they went to a small airport in Maine to board an airplane, never 

again then to have to go through a screening process. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN. And when you talk about deploying 400, the 

question is, Will the entrance into the system, from a small airport 

in a remote area, detect or catch that circumstance? 

Mr. PISTOLE. You’re absolutely right, Senator. Obviously, Muhammad Atta and his three coconspirators, who flew from Portland, Maine, to Boston Logan the morning of 9/11, had considered, 

we believe, the greater possibility, not necessarily from a screening 

perspective, but from the suspicious-activity-behavior perspective. 

As opposed to having a larger group flying from Boston Logan on 

two flights, they decided to have four go from Portland, Maine, to 

look less suspicious. But screening’s a key part of this, Senator. 

Senator DORGAN. And let me ask you about screening, and especially the issue of body imaging. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

43 

Senator DORGAN. Have you seen the examples of the most sophisticated body imaging? And give me your evaluation of that, in 

the context of being a husband, a father, a citizen—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. 

Senator DORGAN.—and then also in the context of being someone 

who wants to see everything about anybody that goes on an airplane, in order to keep a weapon off that plane. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, that’s right. I mean—and you’ve hit on that 

tension, that dynamic that we—that TSA and the government is 

dealing with. 

Yes, I have had a demonstration of the screening equipment and 

the privacy steps that are currently employed. Obviously, having 

screener, who never sees a person, reviewing the image in a separate room; the person who is physically engaging the passenger 

never sees that image; and that image is deleted immediately after 

that person is cleared. So, there are privacy issue—or privacy safeguards built in. That being said, some people are concerned 

about—you know, they’re modest and would not want that. At this 

point, that type of an enhanced—or the AIT screening, the enhanced imaging technology, is optional. So, people, if they don’t 

want to go through that, they can go through the traditional metal 

detector, wanding, patdown, as appropriate. 

So, I think it’s the best technology available, for right now, trying 

to balance the security with the privacy issues. But, if confirmed, 

I look—would look forward to working with the Committee, in 

terms of, Are we using the best approach?—again, both from a 

training, techniques, and technology perspective. 

Senator DORGAN. You’re going to be confronted with that issue 

a lot, I think, as we try to determine, What is it we implement that 

further strengthens our ability to detect a weapon? 

Let me ask the issue of trying to move frequent flyers through 

these lines. As you know, there was a company that was called 

Clear that started up and was established. Are you familiar with 

that at all? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I’ve had some briefings on it. 

Senator DORGAN. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I have a little bit of information about it. 

Senator DORGAN. That company took applications from people, 

measured their—they got their background, and measured their— 

the iris of their eyes, took their fingerprints, and so on, and that 

way, when that person who signed up paid a fee, went through the 

screening line, with their fingerprints and so on, immediately they 

determined, ‘‘All right. We know that person. That person is in the 

system. That person’s a Presbyterian minister from Herreid, South 

Dakota, or whatever. We know this person.’’ 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, 

Senator DORGAN. Fingerprints, iris, and so on. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN. That company, however, I believe, went bankrupt. And do you know whether there are other efforts in the private sector or public sector to try to address the question of someone who flies twice every week, that’s their job, as a—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

44 

Senator DORGAN.—salesperson or representative, and who perhaps we can know much better and move through much more 

quickly? I’m not talking about—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. 

Senator DORGAN.—Members of Congress, here. I’m talking 

about—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. No. Understood. 

Senator DORGAN.—people who are salesmen and others that fly 

all the time. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. Yes. I understand there are some efforts underway in the private sector to replicate that business model and 

to make sure that the messaging is accurate so it’s—people realize 

that they’re still going to through screening—— 

Senator DORGAN. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE.—it more a concierge service, if you will, of being 

able to go—with that trusted ID and identification system to expedite that process. So, if confirmed, I would obviously look into that 

and see if there are viable ways of doing that—again, ensuring the 

safety of the traveling public. 

Senator DORGAN. One last question, if I might. Let’s assume that 

you are confirmed, in a matter of days, and you, at long, long last, 

assume this role, because it has been vacant far too long. What is 

your most immediate and urgent concern as you turn your attention to running this agency? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. So, one of the first things I did 

when I was nominated was to meet at TSA headquarters and get 

a threat briefing, an intelligence briefing. So, my top priority is 

making sure that TSA has the latest intelligence, threat information, and is making informed judgments as to how to allocate their 

resources. So, that’s the top priority, followed very closely by addressing workforce development issues, as I mentioned; and then, 

third, engaging all stakeholders in the business of TSA to make 

sure that they know that their voice can be heard and that all the 

issues that they are dealing with will be addressed by TSA. 

Senator DORGAN. And I said one last question. Let me ask one 

more, if I might. Could you submit to us—I’ll submit a question 

in—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. 

Senator DORGAN.—writing on the issue of soft targets. Terrorists, 

obviously—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN.—take a look at the target opportunities to commit an act of terrorism in our country, and they see what we would 

consider hard targets—that is, the targets we are now protecting 

very substantially—and then they see soft targets, where our attention is not there, because we’ve not experienced the same threat 

there. And I’d like to ask if you might—from the standpoint of 

transportation—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. 

Senator DORGAN.—give us your estimate of, What are the lists 

of soft targets that concern you, and that are going to require your 

attention? I think—I won’t ask that publicly here. I think I’ll ask 

that you submit that to us—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

45 

Senator DORGAN.—in writing, if you would. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Be glad to do that, Senator. I’ve seen a number of 

classified reports, as you indicate, both by the DHS and the Intelligence Analysis Group, also by—within the FBI and the National 

Counterterrorism Center—have all done collaborative work in that 

regard. And, as you know, there are a number of soft targets out 

there. 

Senator DORGAN. All right. Well, let me join others who have 

thanked your family for lending you for some public service here 

for a while. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. Much appreciated. 

Senator DORGAN. And I—as I said, I will be a strong supporter 

of your nomination. Hope that we can move this with great speed, 

because it is long overdue. 

The deadlines for questions to be submitted for the record for 

this nomination will be 6 p.m. on Friday. 

And—anything, finally, Senator Hutchison? 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you very much, Mr. Pistole. 

Senator DORGAN. If not, we thank you, Mr. Pistole, for being 

with us today. 

This hearing is—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you very much, Senator. Appreciate your 

support. 

Senator DORGAN. This hearing’s adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(47) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. As you are aware, almost everyone who flies has experienced, or 

knows someone who has experienced, an unpleasant encounter with TSA employees. 

Yet, while security should be TSA’s top priority, it may not be necessary to treat 

any and every traveler as a security threat. What quality measures do you propose 

to take to insure higher vigilance of TSA inspection teams, in order to curtail these 

often-recounted ‘‘horror stories’’? 

Answer. While security will always remain our top priority, if confirmed, I am 

fully committed to ensuring that TSA takes into account the needs of travelers and 

businesses on all modes of transportation. If confirmed, I will make it clear throughout the agency that all TSA employees must ensure the respectful treatment of the 

traveling public while fulfilling their critical duties of protecting the Nation’s aviation system. I will also work with TSA’s human capital leadership to assess ways 

in which TSA can improve its customer service—through enhanced training, drills, 

and strengthened oversight, among other strategies. 

Question 2. Hawaii has the distinction of being the most isolated group of islands 

in the world. It is 6 hours behind us here on the East Coast, and 3 hours behind 

the West Coast. Given its distance from other states and the high volume of travelers from diverse countries we welcome every day, how do you propose maintaining 

the service TSA provides for Hawaii in the event that a threat occurs? 

Answer. I understand that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently 

issued its Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which identified ensuring the 

Nation’s resilience to terrorist attacks, natural disasters and other threats, as a critical mission of the agency. If confirmed, I will work with DHS, TSA’s program offices and stakeholders to incorporate resilience and protection throughout the Nation’s transportation networks, including in Hawaii. 

Question 3. If given the opportunity, how would you propose expanding TSA’s 

focus from reactionary (in response to the threat of a shoe bomb, we are now asked 

to send our shoes through TSA’s X-ray machines; similarly, in response to the threat 

of liquid bombs, we are asked to limit our carry-on liquids to under three ounces), 

to proactive? Is such a thing possible within the limits of TSA’s scope and duties? 

Answer. I understand that the technology experts at TSA, the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate, and their counterparts at 

the Department of Energy and its National Laboratories are currently working together to ensure that we have the best technology available to respond to new and 

emerging threats. If confirmed, I will work with these and other officials within 

TSA, DHS, the Department of Energy, and other Federal Government agencies to 

evaluate our existing systems to ensure we remain ahead of our adversaries in anticipating potential future vulnerabilities. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BILL NELSON TO

JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. How do you feel about registered traveler programs? If you support 

them, will you work with the industry to facilitate a safe, thorough, expedited way 

for pre-screened travelers to go through airport security going forward, and for their 

personal information to be protected? 

Answer. At this point, I have not yet had the opportunity to fully evaluate the 

registered traveler programs. However, if confirmed, I will review these programs 

in depth. My goal is to ensure that intelligence informs decisions, so we can enhance 

our focus on the threat, while protecting the privacy of the American public. 

48 

Question 2. When implementing safety and security rules and policies for general 

aviation, will you continue to work with the GA community to ensure that those 

rules are appropriate and feasible? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely and continuing TSA’s 

collaboration with the general aviation community regarding security requirements. 

Question 3. I would also like to echo Sen. Warner’s and Sen. Begich’s concerns 

about airports that have still not been reimbursed appropriately for in-line EDS systems. I look forward to working with you, Sen. Warner, Sen. Begich and others to 

rectify this situation. 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the issue and would welcome the opportunity 

to work with you, Senator Warner, and Senator Begich on this matter. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Worldwide, mass transit and passenger rail have been frequent targets of terrorist attacks. Compared with aviation, the 9/11 Commission stated that, 

‘‘opportunities to do harm are as great or greater in surface transportation.’’ Yet our 

transportation security efforts—both resources and personnel—have largely focused 

on aviation. As TSA Administrator, how will you better protect the millions of 

Americans who travel by mass transit and passenger rail? 

Answer. Rail security is of vital importance to our economy, and identifying and 

implementing capabilities to further reduce the risk of terrorism to mass transit and 

passenger rail is a key goal of the TSA. From my experience with the FBI, I believe 

that training and information sharing are important components of a robust security system. I was closely involved in the disruption of the plot by Najibullah Zazi 

and others to detonate bombs in the New York City subway system, and I fully understand the challenges involved in protecting the mass transit system. If confirmed, I would conduct an in-depth review of mass transit security needs. I understand that significant efforts are already underway, such as the Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment and the continued distribution of grant funds 

for surface transportation security to transit providers. 

Question 2. The TSA has missed many of the deadlines outlined in the 9/11 Act 

for securing our surface transportation. For example, TSA has only completed a portion of the risk assessment and national security strategy for our Nation’s rail system that was due in 2008. What specific steps will you take to promptly complete 

overdue items and meet all future Congressional deadlines for surface transportation security? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will make it a Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) priority to continue working as expeditiously as possible toward completion 

of any 9/11 Act requirements that are not yet met. 

Question 3. In January, a man intentionally breached a secure airport exit lane 

at Newark Airport, shutting down a busy terminal for over 6 hours and forcing sixteen thousand passengers to be re-screened. No matter how much money we spend 

on technology to screen passengers, it’s useless if someone can just slip through the 

back door. What changes will you make to secure exit lanes, especially at our busiest airports? 

Answer. I understand that ensuring the security of sterile areas of airports 

through exit lane control is an important responsibility of the Transportation Security Administration and its airport partners. If confirmed, I will conduct a thorough 

review of existing protocols and explore appropriate methods through staffing and 

technology to ensure that proper exit lane controls exist and are enforced. 

Question 4. In the Newark Airport breach, the security of a busy, heavily traveled 

exit was left to just one TSA guard. A man was able to sneak in when that lone 

guard was distracted. Will you examine TSA staffing levels at Newark Airport so 

that critical homeland security responsibilities are not left to just one individual? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the level of staffing at exit lanes at Newark 

International Airport (EWR) and I will take steps to ensure that those Transportation Security Officers who are assigned to exit lanes are appropriately trained and 

focused on their responsibilities. I will also work to ensure that the exit lane design 

provides the proper control to best protect sterile areas of airports 

Question 5. The GAO recently found that the TSA’s behavioral detection program 

resulted in over one thousand arrests in our Nation’s airports, but none of these arrests were for terrorism. However, sixteen individuals later identified as terrorists 

were able to pass through airport security, including one at Newark International 

Airport. As Administrator, what actions will you take to reform this program? 

49 

Answer. As a career FBI officer with extensive experience in counterterrorism and 

counterintelligence, I believe behavior analysis can add a critical layer to transportation security. If confirmed, I intend to work with TSA and the leadership of the 

Department of Homeland Security to ensure that TSA’s behavioral detection program is an effective, science-based program that enhances transportation security. 

Question 6. After the Moscow subway attack that killed forty people and injured 

dozens more, a number of transit agencies across the country visibly increased their 

security presence. However, we heard very little from the TSA. After a major terrorist attack on a mass transit system, what role should the TSA play in communicating with the public? 

Answer. One of the best ways to promote transportation security awareness 

among the public is to engage both industry and the public in developing and implementing security initiatives. Homeland security is a shared responsibility for all 

Americans. The traveling public and individual citizens are critical partners in our 

security efforts, as demonstrated by the effectiveness of the ‘‘See Something, Say 

Something’’ efforts that proved so critical to averting the attempted bombing in 

Times Square. If confirmed, I would conduct an in-depth review of information sharing with our transportation security partners and the general public. From my 26 

years of experience with the FBI, including my current position as Deputy Director, 

I appreciate the necessity of proactively communicating appropriate information to 

stakeholders, including the general public. If confirmed, I will bring that experience 

to my position at the Transportation Security Administration. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. During your testimony, you mentioned that TSA intends to deploy 450 

full-body scanners over the course of this year. What is your understanding of the 

effectiveness of the new full-body scanning technology? 

Answer. I believe Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) is an effective technology 

that provides important detection capabilities—serving as one of TSA’s many layers 

of security. If confirmed, I will further review the technology and the deployment 

plans to ensure threat-based intelligence continues to inform the agency’s efforts to 

defeat existing and future threats to aviation security. 

Question 2. How will you work to ensure that TSA operators use these scanners 

to their maximum efficiency? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that TSA personnel receive the training and resources necessary to maximize AIT’s capabilities to effectively screen and 

detect threats to aviation security. I will also review TSA’s use of the industry recognized Staffing Allocation Model to effectively allocate staffing levels to meet traffic 

volumes. 

Question 3. How will you work to ensure that we continue to evaluate and improve upon this screening technology to meet evolving threats? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with TSA’s technology and operational experts 

in evaluating AIT, in both laboratory and operational settings, to improve the technology itself processes for utilizing it, and training for those operating it to maximize screening capabilities. Moreover, I intend to work very closely with the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate to maximize research and development capabilities. 

Question 4. Since 2008, TSA has been conducting a procurement process for an 

information technology (IT) contract to maintain a secure, nationwide network linking TSA headquarters, regional offices and airport locations and provide IT and 

communication equipment. During this time period, the process has been subject to 

three protests. The first two of these protests were upheld by the GAO and the third 

is currently pending with the GAO. During the course of the protests, the GAO has 

found that there were irregularities in the acquisition process. Do you have plans 

to undertake a fresh review of this procurement to assess whether the contract has 

been fairly awarded? 

Answer. While I am not aware of the specifics of this particular procurement, it 

is my understanding that this acquisition has been conducted utilizing best value 

procurement techniques under which technical performance is measured against 

cost in order to ensure the government obtains the best value for required supplies 

or services. 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that TSA’s procurement policies reflect current 

security requirements while prioritizing fiscal responsibility. 

50 

Question 5. If confirmed, will you conduct a review of TSA’s procurement process 

to ensure that taxpayer dollars are being wisely invested? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question 6. Under current TSA policy, luggage checked at appropriately cleared 

Canadian airport facilities must be rescreened before it is transferred to a U.S.- 

based connecting flight. This requirement frequently causes delayed-connections for 

passengers as well as significant logistical problems for U.S. airlines and airport operators, particularly the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport. It is my understanding that 

TSA has been working with stakeholders and Canadian authorities for well over a 

year to reach an agreement on this issue. When do you think an agreement might 

be reached that would negate the need for such rescreening of baggage while ensuring that aviation security standards are fully met? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Canada on ways to minimize 

delays and logistical difficulties, while ensuring we uphold U.S. laws for screening 

all checked bags on international flights entering the United States that are subsequently transferred to domestic connecting flights. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. TOM UDALL TO

JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Members of the general aviation community have expressed concerns 

about TSA’s Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP) proposed rulemaking. My understanding is that TSA plans to respond by issuing a supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to address some of these concerns. Could you share how 

TSA under your leadership will engage and work with the general aviation community when developing and promulgating aviation security requirements? 

Answer. I understand that TSA has been involved in extensive work to strengthen 

general aviation security while also recognizing the importance that general aviation serves in our economy. I also understand that TSA is moving forward with a 

Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and is working diligently to release 

a rulemaking that is reasonable and feasible for industry to implement, while at the 

same time maintaining an effective level of security. If confirmed, I look forward to 

working closely with the general aviation community regarding security requirements. 

Question 2. To enhance aviation security, the TSA began initial testing in October 

2003 of its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program. Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) carry out SPOT’s mission to identify persons who 

pose a risk to aviation security by focusing on behavioral and appearance indicators. 

GAO was asked to review the SPOT program and issued a report in May on its lack 

of effectiveness. 

The SPOT program costs $200 million per year. However, the GAO study shows 

that at least 16 known terrorists travelled through 8 different U.S. airports 23 

times, where the program was implemented. If confirmed, do you plan to continue 

the SPOT program, and if so, what changes will you make? 

Answer. As a career FBI officer with extensive experience in counterterrorism and 

counterintelligence, I believe behavior analysis can add a critical layer to transportation security. If confirmed, I intend to work with TSA and the leadership of the 

Department of Homeland Security to ensure that TSA’s behavioral detection program is an effective, science-based program that enhances transportation security. 

Question 3. On December 25, 2009, a passenger on Flight 253 en route to Detroit 

attempted to detonate a small explosive device shortly before landing. The flight had 

278 passengers and eleven crewmembers on board. In March 2010, TSA began deploying 450 advanced imaging technology (AIT) units, which were purchased with 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds. The machines cost about 

$175,000 each. What is the likelihood than an AIT unit would have detected the 

bomb on the Christmas Day suspect? 

Answer. While there is no silver bullet technology, based on my knowledge of the 

type of device used and the information I have received on AIT capabilities, I believe 

AIT can be an effective tool against the type of threat used on Northwest Flight 253. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that TSA continues to develop, evaluate and deploy technology, processes, and training to maximize the probability of detecting threats such 

as the one seen on Christmas Day. 

Question 4. When using AIT units, how will TSA protect passengers’ privacy 

rights while also ensuring that passengers are properly screened? 

Answer. Based on the initial briefings I have received on AIT and a demonstration of AIT at Reagan National Airport, I understand that TSA employs strict guideVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:00 Jul 29, 2011 Jkt 067573 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67573.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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lines to protect passenger’s privacy rights and to ensure proper screening. The TSA 

officer who views the image of a passenger being screened is located remotely from 

the passenger and never interacts directly with the passenger to preserve anonymity . No cell phones, cameras, or other recording devices are permitted in the room 

where the TSA officer views the image. AIT also employs privacy filters on the images themselves to conceal the identity of passengers. Additionally, AIT units cannot 

store images, as the image storage functions are disabled by the manufacturer before the AIT equipment is placed in an airport. 

Moreover, passengers may opt out of AIT screening and undergo alternative 

screening—TSA has placed signs at screening checkpoints advising passengers of 

this option. I understand that these privacy protections are reflected in the publicly 

available Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). If confirmed, I look forward to working 

with the Committee to ensure we are using the best possible approach to securing 

the traveling public while respecting their privacy. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON TO

JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. When taking on new positions and challenges, people often rely heavily on their past experience. In your case, that would be law enforcement and counterintelligence matters, both critical areas. However, TSA was created to make our 

transportation system secure, while also ensuring the free movement of people and 

commerce. Maintaining a balance between these two directives will be a difficult 

task. If confirmed, how do you intend to approach this challenge? 

Protecting the traveling public from threats is and will continue to be TSA’s top 

priority. Implementing effective security procedures and facilitating the flow of people and commerce are not mutually exclusive. It is my firm belief that the best security programs take into account the needs of travelers and businesses on all modes 

of transportation. If confirmed, I am committed to engaging industry leaders and 

the public to hear their views and concerns on the best ways to both secure our 

transportation systems and streamline the movement of people and commerce. 

Question 2. According to your questionnaire, in 2009, you indicate you were briefly 

stopped in Frankfurt, Germany, prior to boarding an aircraft, for inadvertently having a spare bullet in your briefcase. While the German screening system did catch 

the stray bullet, the security process in the U.S. failed to detect the bullet when 

you departed. While you obviously pose no threat, does it concern you that you easily passed through U.S. security with the bullet and, if confirmed, what improvements to our detection capabilities will you focus on? 

Yes, it concerns me. If confirmed, I’ll focus efforts on improving training. developing more advanced techniques, and deploying the latest technologies to further increase our Nation’s security and bolster our abilities to detect threats. 

Question 3. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently issued a report 

on TSA’s ‘‘Screening Passengers By Observation Techniques’’ or ‘‘SPOT’’ program, 

in which the GAO highlighted that TSA failed to detect at least 16 terrorists, who 

had passed through eight different airports where TSA screeners are trained in behavior detection. In fairness, it is unclear whether the behavior detection officers encountered any of these terrorists. Nevertheless, GAO expressed concern that TSA 

does not have sufficient metrics to validate SPOT’s effectiveness, or a strategic plan 

for the program, upon which it has spent hundreds of millions of dollars, with only 

tenuous results. While aspects of a similar program may work in Israel, the U.S. 

aviation system is much different; therefore, would you discuss your thoughts on 

such an inexact science, and how it might be used from a law enforcement perspective? 

As a career FBI officer with extensive experience in counterterrorism and counterintelligence, I believe behavior analysis can add a critical layer to transportation security. If confirmed, I intend to work with TSA and the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that TSA’s behavioral detection program is 

an effective, science-based program that enhances transportation security. 

Question 4. Following the attempted Christmas Day bombing, TSA announced 

that it planned to purchase over 1,000 whole-body imaging machines, also known 

as AIT. Although the GAO and other investigative entities have expressed concern 

about the ability of the technology to detect strategically placed explosives, the agency seems intent on moving forward with implementation. Therefore, if confirmed, 

will you plan to review this technology and modify its deployment, if necessary? 

52 

If confirmed, I will review the effectiveness of TSA’s advanced imaging technology’s detection capabilities and work to ensure that the agency’s deployment 

plans are consistent with strategic transportation security objectives. 

Question 4a. Will you consider deferring implementation until the next generation 

of machines is ready, with automated software to detect suspicious items, rather 

than using the very labor intensive system that is currently required? 

I have received preliminary briefings on Advanced Imaging Technology (A17). If 

confirmed, I will further evaluate AIT to ensure that the technology employed by 

TSA provides effective detection capabilities and that its continued deployment will 

be in the best interests of aviation security. 

Question 4b. Will you evaluate TSA’s implementation plan, which has already encountered cost issues and space constraints at airports, resulting in the installation 

of only about 17 percent of this year’s targeted number of machines? 

If confirmed, I will review TSA’s deployment plans for AIT and ensure that TSA 

works closely with airport stakeholders to design configurations that meet local 

needs. I will also support the continuation of ongoing dialogue with stakeholders on 

the national deployment of AIT. 

Question 5. As Chair of the FBI’s Personnel Board, you have been responsible for 

making countless personnel decisions; however, in the past 4 years, you have been 

the subject of six Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, including gender and race discrimination complaints. Have these cases been resolved? 

In each of these cases and in all my work throughout my career at the FBI, I 

acted in good faith and without bias. My understanding is that several of these 

cases are pending resolution, while the others are closed. There has been no adverse 

finding against me. 

Question 5a. Would you care to elaborate on any of these complaints? 

As I stated, I acted in good faith and without bias in each of these matters, which 

comprise a small percentage of the hundreds of personnel matters I have been involved with in my role as a senior manager at the FBI and the chair of the SES 

hoard. 

Question 6. Mr. Pistole, over the past several months, you have been involved in 

the investigations of at least two transportation security incidents, the Christmas 

Day attempted bombing and the Time Square attempted bombing. In both cases, the 

accused perpetrators were read their legal rights. In your view, why should suspected terrorists, especially non-U.S. citizens, like the accused Christmas Day bomber, be Mirandized? 

The first priority in any terrorism investigation is the protection of the American 

public. In both cases, prior to the issuance of Miranda warnings, agents first engaged in vigorous questioning of the suspects under the public safety exception to 

Miranda, as recognized in the Quarles decision. If confirmed, I will continue to work 

on ways to utilize all lawful means to protect the American public. 

Question 7. After the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the FBI’s use of National 

Security Letters (NSLs) to demand records in terrorism cases greatly increased. 

More concerning, as revealed in a series of reports by the DOJ Office of Inspector 

General, the FBI also began using so-called ‘‘exigent letters’’ to request information 

from telecommunications carriers on the basis of claimed emergencies, with a promise that a NSL or subpoena would soon follow. In some cases, however, there was 

no emergency and the follow-up legal process did not materialize. While you were 

not accused of any wrongdoing, the Inspector General named you as one of the senior officials who should have been more aware of the conduct of your subordinates. 

Would you please inform the Committee of your involvement with NSLs and ‘‘exigent letters’’ and what changes you made to the FBI’s policy following the Inspector 

General’s report on this matter in 2008? 

I never signed or approved an NSL or ‘‘exigent letter.’’ I learned of their misuse 

after the DIG informed me and other senior leaders following its first audit. Once 

advised, I, along with the FBI Director and General Counsel, led the efforts to address these problems by issuing several directives: (1) we eliminated the use of exigent letters altogether; (2) we instituted a rigorous review and approval protocol for 

the issuance of NSLs, coupled with an extensive audit and evaluation follow-up; and 

(3) we directed our Inspection Division to conduct follow-up audits to ensure compliance. 

Question 8. TSA has spent many years and billions of dollars developing namebased vetting programs, such as Secure Flight and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC); however, the disturbing trend of so-called ‘‘home-grown 

terrorists,’’ who may have clean backgrounds but who have become inspired by radical organizations or individuals such as the cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, seems to expose 

53 

vulnerabilities in the government’s systems. Given your intelligence background, 

what suggestions would you offer for mitigating any unintended loopholes in these 

programs which constitute the Nation’s last lines of defense? 

Secure Flight and TWIC are two of the multiple, layered security tools employed 

by the U.S. Government in our fight against terrorism—ranging from personnel to 

technology to information sharing efforts. If confirmed, I look forward to working 

with the Committee to ensure any loopholes in these two important programs are 

addressed expeditiously. 

Question 9. TSA’s mandate is to ensure the security of all modes of transportation, 

including pipelines and aspects of the maritime sector that are critical to my home 

state of Texas. The Port of Houston, for example, contains valuable energy and commodity facilities, which are vital to the state’s and the Nation’s economies, and 

which merit greater security protection. As Deputy Director of the FBI, you have 

much experience in prioritizing agency needs, yet at TSA, you may be faced with 

too many priorities and limited resources. How do you intend to improve the working partnership between TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard in the maritime security 

arena and assure Federal efficiency? 

I understand that TSA currently enjoys a strong working relationship with the 

U.S. Coast Guard. Both agencies have worked closely on strengthening the security 

of the Nation’s maritime ports through a number of cooperative efforts, including: 

the Port Security Grant Program, which is administered in close cooperation with 

FEMA; a joint TWIC pilot program designed to deploy biometric readers; and a joint 

program designed to secure passenger ferries and cruise ships. If confirmed, I look 

forward to working with Commandant Papp and the Coast Guard team to further 

explore ways to collaboratively improve maritime security. 

Question 10. After an FBI sting operation, last week a Texas man was arraigned 

on charges that he tried to aid al-Qaeda. As part of the operation, the FBI reportedly gave the suspect a falsified TWIC, a TSA security card for transportation workers in the maritime sector. The suspect allegedly intended to use this card to board 

a ship bound for the Middle East. While this card was invalid, it highlights the disturbing situation created by TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard, whereby TWIC cards 

are currently used as flash passes, with no card reader system in place to verify 

whether the cardholder merited access to secure areas of our Nation’s ports. If confirmed, will fixing TWIC be a top priority for you? 

If confirmed, continuing to refine and improve the TWIC program, including the 

completion of the reader pilot program, will be a priority for me. I understand that 

the U.S. Coast Guard is a key partner in the TWIC program, and as I noted above, 

if confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Coast Guard to further improve port 

security. 

Question 11. U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan is accused of shooting 13 people and 

injuring 32 others at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009. Reportedly, prior to 

the incident, the FBI had monitored e-mail communications between Major Hasan 

and an Islamic radical cleric, known to be an al-Qaeda sympathizer. Following the 

shooting, the FBI determined that Major Hasan was not part of a larger terrorist 

plot. In the aftermath of the incident, it appears that there may have been a communications breakdown between the FBI and the Army, and had this not happened, 

this tragic event might not have occurred. While FBI Director Robert Mueller has 

ordered an independent review of the case, what lessons learned, about sharing intelligence and other matters, could you highlight for the Committee? 

While an independent review is currently ongoing, 1 previously led an internal 

review which identified several areas of improvement, which Director Mueller and 

I later implemented. These included: 

• Information Sharing with the Department of Defense. The FBI has formalized 

a process for notifying the Department of Defense of FBI investigations involving military personnel in order to streamline the process for information sharing and coordination between our agencies. 

• Supplemental Review in Significant Cases. We established a supplemental 

Headquarters-level review process in significant national security cases to limit 

the risk of human error in analysis and to broaden the perspective of analysis 

in these cases, all based on ‘‘high-risk’’ targets identified by NCTC. 

• Technology Improvements. We are making specific technology improvements in 

handling sensitive information to strengthen the ability of our Agents and analysts to automatically detect intelligence connections that are critical to understanding and uncovering threats. (Details are classified.) 

• Training for Joint Terrorism Task Force Members. We expanded and strengthened training for members of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces on the use of 

54 

data bases and legal dissemination of sensitive information to maximize access 

to all available information to all relevant partners across the Federal Government. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE TO

JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. As you well know, both the no-fly and selectee lists have their own 

minimum derogatory criteria requirements which are considerably more stringent 

than the Terrorist Watchlist’s ‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ standard. In order to be placed 

on the no-fly list, ‘‘a known or suspected terrorist must present a threat to civil aviation or national security.’’ Consequently, the no-fly list is a very small subset of the 

Terrorist Watchlist which, according to DHS, contained approximately 4,000 people 

on September 30, 2009, of those approximately 170 were U.S. persons. In your opinion, are the current requirements for placement on the selectee list and no-fly list 

too stringent? 

Answer. The President has ordered a review of the entire watchlist system. I fully 

support that review, and if confirmed, will work closely with TSA and Federal Government leadership to implement any changes suggested from that review. 

Question 1a. What changes would you make to the existing requirements to prevent incidents like Christmas Day from occurring again? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the criteria for inclusion on the terrorism 

watch lists is the product of a government-wide process. If confirmed, I will work 

with my counterparts to review the existing watch list system, offer recommendations based on my best judgment and experience, and support the implementation 

of any changes based on that review. 

Question 1b. Why didn’t the Watch Lists have the names of individuals like 

Shahzad and Farouk, which could have prevented the former from purchasing a 

ticket and boarding an aircraft, or stopped Farouk from boarding the aircraft in Amsterdam on its way to the U.S.? 

Answer. It is my understanding that in the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 

insufficient information was presented under the procedures then in existence to 

place him on the No Fly or Selectee lists. Furthermore, Faisal Shahzad had in fact 

been placed on the watchlist—which resulted in his apprehension by U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection. 

Question 1c. Is the threshold for requiring a foreign visitor to undergo special 

scrutiny upon arrival in the United States considerably lower than the criteria for 

preventing that individual from boarding an aircraft overseas? If so, why? How often 

does the Transportation Security Administration audit international airports to ensure that the security apparatuses in place are compliant with U.S. security standards? 

Answer. TSA does not conduct passenger screening overseas. With respect to 

international airport inspections, it is my understanding that TSA applies a riskbased prioritization to its Foreign Airport Assessment Program, inspecting s international airports to ensure they meet international standards for aviation security. 

Question 2. With the implementation, at least domestically, of the Secure Flight 

program this August, what impacts do you believe that program would have had 

on the recent incidents on Christmas Day and in Times Square? Had that program 

been in place, would it have stifled those potential attacks before they got underway? Or prevented Shahzad from ever passing through security at Kennedy Airport? 

Answer. It is my understanding that Secure Flight is now fully implemented for 

100 percent of domestic flights, and will be implemented for all direct international 

flights to the U.S. by the end of 2010. I also understand that issues of comparison 

of passenger information to the most current version of the watchlist can be mitigated through cutover to the Secure Flight program. 

Question 3. Deputy Director Pistole, one of the issues I discussed with Secretary 

Napolitano in her appearance late last year before this Committee, was screening 

of air cargo on passenger aircraft. I have long advocated for a much more intense 

screening regimen for commercial airline cargo. This concern has only been reinforced by the number of foiled terrorist plots to attack transatlantic airliners in the 

last 2 years—most recently efforts made on Christmas Day. It is obvious terrorist 

elements still seek to use commercial aviation as their primary weapon for attacking 

Western interests. With the passage of the 9/11 Recommendations in late 2007, Congress mandated this loophole be closed. And considerable progress has been made 

toward achieving one hundred percent screening, both under the previous adminisVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:00 Jul 29, 2011 Jkt 067573 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67573.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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tration’s watch and your own. Yet, concerns remain, evidenced by the recent Government Accountability Office’s report released at the end of March. 

It is my understanding that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently published an interim final rule intending to make the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) mandatory for all shippers. Yet the Inspector General’s report 

indicates there is a lack of personnel necessary to meet the 100 percent screening 

requirement. How would you plan on certifying all aspects of CCSP-approved facilities, if the Inspector General’s report is correct? 

Answer. I understand that TSA has the ability to certify all entities who have currently applied to the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). TSA has 450 

Transportation Security Inspectors-Cargo (TSI–C) currently on board with an additional 50 expected later this year. If confirmed, I will review the CCSP program and 

the IG report to ensure that appropriate oversight procedures are in place. 

Question 3a. According to the Inspector General’s report, the TSA is ‘‘ineffective’’ 

in ensuring both compliance, and by extension, the security, of that cargo screened 

by private entities. While the Department has ‘‘agreed’’ with the Inspector General’s 

assessment, I am concerned that will the extent of the action taken. What changes 

to the oversight process, either for Known Shippers or for CCSP participants, do you 

envision to ensure these facilities are complying with TSA requirements? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the CCSP and the Inspector General’s report 

and take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with the program and the effective screening of air cargo on passenger aircraft. 

Question 4. In order to achieve the 100 percent screening threshold by next summer, it seems to me that the network of approved CCSP facilities capable of scanning cargo must be enlarged to meet the obvious need, given that 12 million pounds 

of cargo travel in commercial aircraft every day. Last fall, this Committee discussed 

a report by the Homeland Security Inspector General suggesting the dearth of available screeners would make what Congress has mandated in the 9/11 Recommendation legislation—that is, the 100 percent screening requirement—unattainable. Last 

week’s GAO report echoed those same concerns. Do you know the current total of 

TSA personnel dedicated to monitoring air cargo screening protocols? Do you believe 

that figure is robust enough to guarantee the entirety of this cargo is being 

screened? 

Answer. I understand that TSA is confident that industry is capable of attaining 

the 100 percent mandate in the U.S. on August 1, 2010. I am told that industry 

has already achieved over 75 percent, well in advance of the deadline. The Certified 

Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) locations are screening over 45 percent of the 

total cargo, and recent surveys have indicated that sufficient capacity exists at carriers, Indirect Air Carriers (IAC), and Independent Cargo Screening Facilities 

(ICSF) to meet the overall mandate. 

As noted above, TSA currently has 450 Transportation Security Inspectors-Cargo 

(TSI–C) on board with an additional 50 expected later this year. I understand that 

there are over 730 CCSP participant locations and almost 500 of them are already 

regulated IACs, who are currently inspected by Transportation Security InspectorsCargo (TSI–C). 

Question 5. That 9/11 Recommendations law included a term that would make air 

cargo inspections commensurate with screening levels that luggage receives. I believe that even in the broadest of legal interpretations, I think we can all agree the 

Known Shipper Program and the CCSP Program are not ‘‘commensurate’’ with the 

kind screening luggage is subject to. It is not even clear to me that this so-called 

pre-cleared material is subject to random screening or explosive detection. Do you 

envision a program that will require at least random screening of material, even if 

it is being shipped from an entity on the Known Shipper list or a participant in the 

CCSP Program? 

Answer. I understand that TSA requires that all cargo screened through the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) undergo screening commensurate with 

screening levels that luggage receives. A strict chain of custody process for transfer 

is also enforced, and all cargo screened is subject to random inspection by TSA, including TSA and Law Enforcement canine teams. If confirmed, I look forward to 

participating in further reviews of the CCSP and air cargo security measures. 

Question 6. We have heard numerous estimates of the cost of implementing a 

comprehensive screening regime for air cargo. My understanding is that an internal 

study conducted by the Department indicates such a screening regime could cost as 

much as $100 billion. That is an absolutely stunning figure. Does the Department 

have a current estimate in terms of dollars as to how much such a massive and 

widespread technology deployment would cost? 

56 

Answer. From what I understand, the expected costs to industry are significantly 

less than the amount you mention. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in 

further reviews of this program leading to the issuance of a final rule that will include a full economic analysis of the cost of complying with the requirements of the 

9/11 Commission Act. 

Question 7. I’m certain that, given your background, you are familiar with certain 

cargo screening technologies such as explosive trace detection and X-ray portals that 

TSA is advocating for use by its partners to meet the 100 percent mandate. However, according to GAO, the effectiveness of those technologies has not been tested 

in an operational environment, but are already being used by industry to screen 

cargo to seem to be ‘‘in compliance’’ with the 100 percent screening requirement. If 

these technologies are not effective, why are they being used to fulfill the Congressional mandate on screening? 

Answer. I have only had preliminary briefings on TSA’s air cargo security program and the technology that is used to screen cargo. If confirmed, I will ensure 

that TSA and the Department’s Science and Technology Directorate continue to collaborate on identifying and testing the effectiveness of cargo screening technologies 

to be used to secure our Nation’s ports. 

Question 8. Of course, one of the most hotly-debated issues concerning the TSA 

today is the claim that, in the very near future, Whole Body Imaging (WBI) devices 

will become the first line of defense when airline passengers are seeking access to 

secure areas. The TSA Director at O’Hare, one of America’s busiest airports, was 

recently quoted as saying she believes WBI devices will be mandatory in the very 

near future. As the Administration has proposed, 450 new scanners will be distributed to an indeterminate number of airports by the end of 2010. To what extent 

do you believe this increase in deployment will secure the aviation network? 

Answer. I support the use of advanced imaging technology (AIT) equipment as an 

important tool to protect the traveling public from evolving threats. If confirmed, I 

will further review the technology and deployment plans to ensure that threat-based 

intelligence continues to inform the agency’s efforts to defeat existing and future 

threats to aviation security. 

Question 8a. Being from a state with no major hub airports, I am concerned that 

this effort will simply encourage potentially dangerous passengers to avoid larger 

airports that possess the WBI technology, instead choosing smaller facilities like 

those in Bangor, Maine by which to enter our domestic aviation network. Can we 

expect all commercial airports to have this technology in the very near future? 

Answer. I appreciate your concerns about the potential for terrorists to target 

smaller airports to avoid detection; however, AIT is just one of TSA‘s many layers 

of security—including Federal Air Marshals and other trained aviation security personnel; canine teams; information sharing with our international and private sector 

partners; and many among other aviation security tools. 

From the briefings I have had thus far, I understand TSA’s nationwide plan to 

deploy 1,000 AIT units through FY11 will include a range of airports. 

Question 9. The GAO recently indicated that staffing and training costs for the 

deployment of the additional 450 WBI scanners could add an additional $2.5 billion 

to the costs associated with the rollout of these newly purchased scanning devices. 

Is that cost-effective when very apparent gaps will remain at smaller, less traveled 

airports even if all of the new scanners are deployed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review and evaluate TSA’s staffing models and deployment and operational procedures to ensure that risk-based and cost-effective 

screening measures are implemented nationwide. 

Question 9a. Do you believe that the WBI devices procured by the Department 

of Homeland Security would have been triggered by the explosives carried on the 

aircraft by Mr. Farouk on Christmas Day this past year? 

Answer. While there is no silver bullet technology, based on my knowledge of the 

type of device used and the information I have received on AIT capabilities, I believe 

MT can be an effective tool against the type of threat used on Northwest Flight 253. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that TSA continues to develop, evaluate and deploy technology, processes, and training to maximize the probability of detecting threats such 

as the one seen on Christmas Day. 

Question 10. With the enormous national debt in mind, do you believe there is 

another, more effective way we can employ the increasingly scarce resources we 

have to improve our aviation security regime? 

Answer. Based on a preliminary briefing and demonstration of AIT capabilities, 

I believe AIT is an effective technology that provides important detection capabiliVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:00 Jul 29, 2011 Jkt 067573 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67573.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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ties. If confirmed, I will review TSA’s technology and operations to optimize use of 

scarce resources while maximizing security effectiveness. 

Question 11. Late last year, the GAO published a report included some very pertinent information regarding TSA’s inability to secure sensitive areas at our transportation facilities. One program cited as failing was the lethargic pace of deploying the 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Card—now, the roll-out of 

the program, which was intended to be completed at the beginning of this year, remains unfinished. While the TWIC Card has taken considerable steps forward in 

the last 6 months, having enrolled nearly all of the 1.5 million port workers across 

the country, right now the biometric card is little more than a glorified identification. To fulfill its purpose, it must be employed in conjunction with a card reader. 

TSA spokesmen have cited ‘‘technical difficulties’’ as the reason behind past delays 

in the deployment of the card readers; I think you’ll agree that without these devices, the whole point of the biometric identifier cards is rendered moot. Now we 

have begun a series of pilot programs at seven ports across the country, which is 

intended to culminate in a new final rule for use of the card readers. Can you elaborate further on what technical difficulties this crucial element of the program is facing? Have the failings of card readers been the result of poorly designed specifications at the Department of Homeland Security, or mistakes by the vendors? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess this issue in detail. I also will work closely 

with the U.S. Coast Guard and all key stakeholders, including port security directors, to fully identify and resolve issues affecting the full deployment and operational performance of the TWIC card reader program. 

Question 11a. It is my understanding that during previous testing, the TWIC 

Card Readers were unable to withstand water, as well as temperature extremes, 

among other problems that suggest it is unworkable in the maritime environment. 

This would seem to be a major failing if the Card is initially intended to be distributed to port workers. Have these problems been resolved to the satisfaction of the 

TSA, given that we have begun the pilot programs utilizing the card readers? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard and all key 

stakeholders, including port security directors, to fully identify and resolve all technical issues to ensure adequate environmental operating performance of TWIC Card 

readers. 

Question 11b. Given that the program is already costing well over $100 million 

and has been plagued by delays and missteps, when can we assume these readers 

ready to be deployed? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will undertake a full assessment of the TWIC reader pilot 

program to ensure its effective completion. 

Question 12. Throughout its various incarnations, the prescreening program now 

known as Secure Flight has been plagued with delays, privacy concerns, and worries 

about opportunities for appeals by incorrectly detained passengers. Now, as the program is on the cusp of being implemented system-wide, there is growing consternation among the traveling public as to what is required by the TSA and the commercial carriers in order to travel without fear of being detained. 

My constituents, and individuals across the country, are confused as to exactly 

what TSA is requiring for travelers as to what they have to provide in order to travel. For example, one individual who spoke to the New York Times sought to disclose 

his full name as it appears on his driver’s license, which is what he believed was 

required, but when booking his plane ticket, that particular carrier did not offer either a field for his middle name, nor the fact that he was a ‘‘Junior,’’ which places 

the name on his boarding pass in direct conflict with his identification. Such conflict 

could result in significant uncertainty for passengers, as, according to the article, 

‘‘travelers may or may not incur significant delays.’’ That ambiguity epitomizes the 

problems with this program’s implementation. If the airlines are not complying with 

the requirements laid out by the Homeland Security Department, what assurances 

can you offer them that they will not be detained or prevented from getting aboard 

their aircraft? What exactly is expected of travelers by the Department and the 

TSA? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Secure Flight program, giving careful consideration to the important issues you have raised to ensure that passenger data 

is accurately collected and that TSA clearly and effectively communicates what is 

expected from passengers under the program. 

Question 13. To switch gears for a moment, I am certain you are aware of November’s report out of Chicago that a number of TSA screening checkpoints were compromised at both O’Hare and Midway Airports. Astonishingly, individuals posing as 

passengers were able to enter secure areas of O’Hare and Midway with just a credit 

card—which a number of security experts are claiming is one of the easiest forms 

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of identification to falsify. This particular problem was specifically identified by the 

9/11 Commission in their report to Congress. Can you explain to the Committee 

what steps are being taken, if any, to prevent these sorts of security failures—particularly at one of America’s busiest airports? 

Answer. I understand that TSA has a specific list of acceptable identification documents, posted to TSA’s public website, that can be used to access the sterile area 

and are checked by TSA Travel Document Checkers. A single credit card is not an 

acceptable form of identification. TSA has implemented the Identification 

Verification Call Center (IVCC) process to further verb the identity of an individual 

and ensure their names are properly vetted if the person does not have an acceptable form of identification. If the IVCC process cannot confirm a person’s identity, 

he or she will be denied access to the sterile area. If confirmed, I will ensure TSA 

continues to focus on enhancing airport security by effectively verging the identities 

of individuals prior to granting them access to the sterile area. 

Question 14. The concept of pushing our borders out has been the primary thematic aspect of our port security plan, and it is one that I wholeheartedly support. 

My interest is the advancement of the Secure Freight pilot program and the willingness or even capability of our trading partners to meet the kind of standards we 

are imposing on the global supply chain. With over 700 ports that ship to the U.S., 

meeting those standards is a tall order for nearly all of our trading partners. According to the GAO, one of the failings in the implementation of Secure Freight program, and really, in the entire litany of port security programs, has been an inability of CBP and their partners to define methods of assessing any increases in security, and efficiently collecting and examining that data if it is collected. In short, 

we have resources and manpower dedicated to a host of programs that we suspect 

are enhancing our security, but we have no certainty in terms of data that our ports 

are any more secure. 

The Administration at one point indicated that it hoped to reduce the number of 

ports shipping to America from over 700 to 100. This minimizes the potential areas 

of risk, which is admirable conceptually. But is it practicable? 

Does restraining the number of ports available to foreign shippers engaging in 

trade with the U.S. at the same time restrain movement in the supply chain? How 

can we be assured that, by eliminating more than 75 percent of the available ports 

to minimize risk, we are not inadvertently creating choke points for cargo shipments? 

The Belgian government, for example, has suggested that configuring the port of 

Antwerp, a massive international facility, to meet the requirements of our 100 percent screening regime could cost the port over a billion Euros! If one of our trading 

partners determines that it is not worth it to meet the criteria and end that aspect 

of their relationship with the U.S., what affect does that on our global economy? On 

the American economy? What alternatives can the U.S. offer these nations to sustain a high level of security while permitting certain trading relationships to continue? 

Some of our European trading partners believe a complete deployment and operation of total scanning technology could only occur if a new international agreement 

is reached. Do you agree with this assessment, and if so, would protecting the global 

supply chain and ensuring that the program is improving security require new 

agreements with the entire host of nations who ship to American ports? How long 

could such a process take? 

Do we have, either in development or in testing phases, scanning portals capable 

of handling transshipment cargo? If not, do we fall back to a more risk-based screening approach in dealing with transshipment traffic? 

Answer. I understand that the Secure Freight Program and the screening of maritime cargo is the responsibility of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 

Question 15. Since the attacks of 9/11, the General Aviation community appears 

to have been a partner in the enhancement of security by developing and implementing a large number of workable and effective security measures. These include 

an Airport Watch program, the monitoring of aircraft financing transactions, a new 

requirement for government issued, tamper-proof photo-IDs for pilots, and guidelines for security at general aviation airports. As you probably know, the Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP) proposed late last year by TSA raises several concerns for the General Aviation community in my state. It appears to ‘‘cut-and-paste’’ 

security measures specifically designed for commercial operations on to general 

aviation operations. This fails to recognize the vast differences between commercial 

and GA operations. The proposal also would apply to smaller, personal aircraft, not 

just large ones as the title implies. 

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I’ve been told that TSA is making changes to the original proposal, and will have 

Supplementary Proposal of Rulemaking released sometime this year. What requirements do you envision will be placed on general aviation as a result of this new 

rulemaking effort? 

Answer. I understand that TSA has been involved in extensive work to strengthen 

general aviation security while also recognizing the importance that general aviation serves in our economy. I also understand that TSA is moving forward with a 

Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and is working diligently to release 

a rulemaking that is reasonable and feasible for industry to implement, while at the 

same time maintaining an effective level of security. If confirmed, I look forward to 

working closely with the general aviation community regarding security requirements. 

Question 15a. Do you expect that taxes will rise dramatically to pay for this new 

program—which in its previous incarnation included all manner of new requirements, most overseen by TSA-approved contractors paid for by general aviation, particularly taxes on general aviation airports, owners and operators? 

Answer. I have not been involved in a review of the economic analysis of any new 

proposed regulation addressed security for general aviation. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in a review of the draft rule and ensuring that this and all 

rulemaking efforts provide effective increases in security and are reasonable for regulated parties to implement. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. JIM DEMINT TO

JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question. Mr. Pistole, you indicated during your confirmation hearing that you 

would have to consult with the Secretary to see whether you will be able to provide 

the Committee with a copy of your review and recommendation regarding whether 

collective bargaining will be allowed at the TSA. Have you been able to discuss the 

matter with the Secretary and will you be able to provide the Committee with a 

copy of your analysis and recommendation? 

Answer. While I have not yet discussed post-assessment procedures with the Secretary, I understand that the Department will share information from the review 

with the Committee. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN THUNE TO

JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Mr. Pistole: As you know, on Tuesday the White House issued a directive to all agency heads to trim at least 5 percent from their budgets. The TSA recently awarded an IT services contract that was $52 million more expensive than 

a lower bid from a contractor with almost the same technical solution ratings. Given 

the fiscal crisis facing our Nation, does this make sense for taxpayers? 

Furthermore, the procurement for this contract appears to have been poorly handled. It has been going on for more than 2 years and has been the subject of at 

least two successful protests and a third is pending with GAO. During the course 

of those protests, the GAO found that there were irregularities in the acquisition 

process. In addition, due to the length of time that has passed since the proposal 

for IT services was first issued, it is my understanding that the scope of work 

sought by TSA may not accurately reflect its current needs. 

It seems to me that given the excess cost for the current contract award and the 

flaws in the solicitation process, TSA should undertake a fresh, independent review 

of this procurement and report back to Congress on plans to address concerns about 

this procurement and plans to improve TSA’s acquisition process. Given the Federal 

Government’s budget crisis, we certainly want to ensure that TSA is procuring only 

those services that accurately reflect its needs at the most advantageous price. 

Answer. While I am not aware of the specifics of this particular procurement, it 

is my understanding that this acquisition has been conducted utilizing best value 

procurement techniques under which technical performance is measured against 

cost in order to ensure the government obtains the best value for required supplies 

or services. 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that TSA’s procurement policies reflect current 

security requirements while prioritizing fiscal responsibility. 

Question 2. While you don’t have extensive background when it comes to aviation, 

I would like to know more about what you see as TSA’s role when it comes to general aviation—including smaller airports in South Dakota and across the country? 

60 

Answer. I understand that TSA has been involved in extensive work to strengthen 

general aviation security while also recognizing the importance that general aviation serves in our economy. I also understand that TSA is moving forward with a 

Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and is working diligently to release 

a rulemaking that is reasonable and feasible for industry to implement, while at the 

same time maintaining an effective level of security. If confirmed, I look forward to 

working closely with the general aviation community regarding security requirements. 

Question 3. I pose this question because a number of general aviation users in 

South Dakota have inquired about recent actions by TSA when it comes to what 

they believe are controversial Security Directives that mandate commercial airports 

conduct security threat assessments on all general aviation users that have access 

to the airport. While I can understand the need to conduct threat assessments to 

improve security at commercial airports, what balance would you strive for to ensure that general aviation users aren’t impeded when it comes to the freedom they 

currently enjoy when traveling from one airport to another? 

Answer. As I noted above, I understand that, after extensive coordination with the 

general aviation community, TSA is moving forward with a revised rulemaking that 

recognizes the issues you highlighted If confirmed, I look forward to actively participating in this process. 

Question 4. What do you see when it comes to the future of Security Directives, 

especially as it relates to the manner in which they are issued and whether or not 

you believe that such measures should be subject to public comment and review? 

Answer. I believe that security directives should continue to be used to address 

security threats that require an expedited response, but should only be issued where 

warranted If confirmed, I will work to balance the need for prompt and effective response with public comment and review. 

Question 5. Should airports be reimbursed for costs related to implementation of 

security directives? 

Answer. While the Federal Government has a significant role in aviation security, 

I believe that there are shared responsibilities with regulated parties. 

Question 6. Seeing that only 17 percent or approximately 80 out of 450 Advanced 

Imaging Technology screening machines have been installed across the country from 

funding provided under the stimulus bill, are you comfortable with this pace of deployment? 

Answer. From briefings I have had, I understand that TSA expects to deploy all 

450 units by the end of this calendar year. 

Question 7. In a February 2009 report to Congress on the effectiveness of TSA’s 

surface transportation security inspectors (STSIs), the DHS Inspector General noted 

that TSA reorganized its inspector force to have surface-focused inspectors report to 

aviation-focused supervisors, rather than surface- focused supervisors. Two-thirds of 

the inspectors hired after the reorganization had no rail or mass transit experience. 

The IG concluded that, ‘‘The current TSI command structure inhibits TSI effectiveness’’ and recommended—3 times—that TSA place surface inspectors under the 

authority of a TSA headquarters official responsible for surface transportation. TSA 

rejected the recommendation each time, and the IG’s office ultimately backed off the 

proposal. If confirmed, can you assure us you will reassess this policy? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will review TSA ‘s organizational structure and processes 

to ensure the agency can effectively respond to current and future security threats 

in all modes of transportation. 

Question 8. Aviation aside, what do you think are the greatest security threats 

to the Nation’s transportation systems? 

Answer. The U.S. faces an ever-evolving terrorist threat aimed at exploiting perceived vulnerabilities in each of our transportation systems. If confirmed, I will ensure that TSA continues to work with the intelligence community, our Federal, 

state, local and international partners and industry to detect and disrupt current 

threats and further strengthen security across all modes. 

Question 9. If confirmed, what strategies and actions will you implement to enhance the security of our rail, highway, and pipeline networks? 

Answer. I understand that TSA just completed a Freight Railroad Security Risk 

Assessment. If confirmed, I will conduct an in-depth review of surface transportation security needs that will employ risk assessments and utilize current intelligence. From my experience with the FBI, I believe that training, information-sharing with state, local, tribal, international and private sector partners, and extensive 

use of drills and exercises are important components of a robust security system. 

61 

Question 10. There are over 2 million miles of pipeline across the country, including over 6,000 miles in South Dakota, carrying oil, natural gas, and other products. 

Given that a threat to our Nation’s pipelines could have grave economic consequences, how should TSA use risk management to recalibrate its attention to critical threats to the Nation’s pipelines (and energy supply)? 

Answer. Although I have not had an opportunity to receive in-depth briefings on 

the methods the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has employed to reduce risk to our pipeline system, I support a risk-based approach. I do understand 

that TSA’s primary focus has been on those pipeline systems that have the highest 

energy throughput and potentially the highest impact in the event of a disruption. 

If confirmed, I will review the progress made to date and assess the strategy for 

future efforts. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. SAM BROWNBACK TO

JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. The Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was introduced by the TSA at the end of the last Administration 

and elicited more than 7,000 negative public comments because it did not address 

security issues in an effective, practical manner. Since then, the staff at the TSA 

has worked toward a new Supplemental NPRM which would take into consideration 

the comments filed to the original proposal as well as through direct TSA engagement with industry. Unfortunately, TSA missed a self imposed deadline to issue the 

Supplemental NPRM by the end of last year, and it’s not clear when it will be released. 

Are you committed to moving forward on this Supplemental NPRM and issuing 

it as soon as possible? Can you also discuss the general approach that you would 

take with respect to engaging constructively with industry on new security requirements? Would you ensure these proposals are targeted toward specific risks and 

fully consider the practical implementation of these proposals? 

Answer. I understand that TSA is moving forward with a Supplemental Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking for the Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP). If confirmed, Hook forward to working closely with the general aviation community to ensure that the rulemaking effort reflects reasonable and feasible standards for industry to implement, while ensuring an effective level of security. 

Question 2. The 2003 FAA reauthorization bill required the TSA to conduct security audits of all FAA certificated foreign repair stations. However, the TSA never 

fulfilled this requirement, and as a result Congress again required an audit in the 

9/11 Recommendations bill and prohibited the FAA from certifying any new stations 

until the rule was finalized. TSA missed a 2008 deadline for completing the rule 

and as a result maintenance providers have been unable to open any new foreign 

repair stations. TSA is now in the process of finalizing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on the foreign repair station security rule, having sent it to OMB 

for review. 

Are you familiar with this issue? Will you work to get this NPRM through OMB 

as quickly as possible when you are confirmed? Will this be a priority for you? Will 

you allow for adequate stakeholder input and FAA coordination to ensure effective 

implementation of the final rule? 

Answer. I understand that TSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding Aircraft Repair Station Security in December 1009 and that industry comments 

have been received and are under review. Recognizing the value of partnership and 

coordination, I can assure you that if confirmed, I will ensure that TSA will continue its efforts to seek input from its government and industry partners as the 

agency works toward completion of the Final Rule. 

Question 3. We have seen the TSA repeatedly use Security Directives (SD) to vastly expand existing requirements without a compelling emergency security threat. 

TSA needs to do a better job of identifying immediate threats that require emergency action, and whether those actions should be implemented through rulemaking. The most recent example involves the expansion of security credentialing 

requirements to tens-of-thousands of pilots and employees at airports and aviation 

manufacturers without due consideration and process of the Administrative Procedures Act. This resulted in SD–1542–8F (followed by –8G) which was developed last 

summer. When should TSA use Security Directives instead of rulemaking under the 

APA? What criteria would you use to make these decisions? 

Answer. I believe that security directives should be used to address security 

threats that require an expedited response, but only where warranted. If confirmed, 

62 

I will work to balance the need for prompt and effective response with public comment and review. 

Question 4. Under President Obama, OMB has issued guidance outlining agency 

and department heads’ duty to carefully consider contractor policies to ensure the 

government does not ‘‘spend more than it should to get the job done’’ and that in 

this economic climate the government has ‘‘a responsibility to make sure every dollar collected from taxpayers is spent wisely,’’ The Office of Federal Procurement Policy has called on agencies to fully consider the agency’s actual needs in order ‘‘to 

minimize risk and maximize the value of Government contracts.’’ 

As you know, on Tuesday the White House issued a directive to all agency heads 

to trim at least 5 percent from their budgets. The TSA recently awarded an IT services contract that was $52 million more expensive than a lower bid from a contractor with almost the same technical solution ratings. Given the fiscal crisis facing 

our nation, does this make sense for taxpayers? 

Furthermore, the procurement for this contract appears to have been poorly handled. It’s been going on for more than 2 years and has been the subject of at least 

two successful protests and a third is pending with GAO. During the course of those 

protests, the GAO found that there were irregularities in the acquisition process. 

In addition, due to the length of time that has passed since the proposal for IT services was first issued, it is my understanding that the scope of work sought by TSA 

may not accurately reflect its current needs. 

It seems to me that given the excess cost for the current contract award and the 

flaws in the solicitation process, TSA should undertake a fresh, independent review 

of this procurement and report back to Congress on plans to address concerns about 

this procurement and plans to improve TSA’s acquisition process. Given the Federal 

Government’s budget crisis, we certainly want to ensure that TSA is procuring only 

those services that accurately reflect its needs at the most advantageous price. 

Answer. While I am not aware of the specifics of this particular procurement, it 

is my understanding that this acquisition has been conducted utilizing best value 

procurement techniques under which technical performance is measured against 

cost in order to ensure the government obtains the best value for required supplies 

or services. 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that TSA’s procurement policies reflect current 

security requirements while prioritizing fiscal responsibility. 

Question 5. I’ve heard multiple stories about the ability of first responders to communicate efficiently and effectively with other first responders. Whether it is TSA 

officers working with local law enforcement, fire or other Federal agencies, having 

the technical capability to talk to each other is critical. 

Throughout the various TSA security programs and DHS funding streams, we see 

an immediate need to address and solve the problem of interoperability with security technologies that are currently deployed. We would like to see TSA and DHS 

apply interoperability requirements to all funding streams from direct grants to 

agency procurements. If you are confirmed, will you please provide this committee, 

in the first 30 days, a procurement action plan and issue specific guidance to the 

TSA’s procurement officers and program leaders that requires an interoperability 

standard or criteria be included in all future and, possibly, ongoing procurement activities? 

Answer. I agree that communications interoperability between first responders is 

a key requirement for the effective management of security incidents. If confirmed, 

I will work with Transportation Security Administration leadership and our security 

partners across the country to further the development and application of interoperable communications standards in the transportation security environment and I 

will be certain to keep both you and the Committee updated. 

Question 6. One of the serious issues with airport security is the fact that there 

are several systems used to secure the facility which are managed by different organizations or agencies within the airport. What are your plans to unify the multiple 

security systems and leverage them more effectively within an airport to provide 

better situational awareness, thus improving passenger safety and airport efficiency? 

Answer. Although I have not had an opportunity to engage in an in-depth discussion on this issue, I understand that each airport operates under an Airport Security Program that details the specific roles and responsibilities of each entity involved in the security of that airport’s unique operating environment and describes 

how these entities work together. If confirmed, I will review the systems and procedures currently used to secure airport facilities to determine if there are opportunities to implement security improvements and efficiencies that could be applied nationwide. 

63 

Question 7. What was the total dollar amount paid to Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) in overtime salary in FY 2009? Answer. I understand that TSA paid its Officers $61.4 million in overtime in FY 

2009. 

Question 8. What systems are currently in place to track overtime payments to 

TSOs? 

Answer. I am told that the National Finance Center (NFC) Payroll system is the 

official system of record for pay information, including overtime. The NFC is supported by Time and Attendance data recorded and certified in the WebTA system 

by supervisors. 

I further understand that TSA is able to extract reports on pay, hours worked and 

other information from the NFC system and uses this information to manage pay 

activity. 

Question 9. Does the TSA have an authorized budget for overtime for TSOs? 

Answer. From my initial briefings, I understand that TSA has the authority to 

incur overtime and budgets for it accordingly. 

Question 10. What is the nominee’s view on sole source contracting for projects over $5 million? 

Answer. While sole source contracting may be necessary in some instances, it is 

my view that these acquisitions, regardless of value, should be limited, adequately 

justified, approved by senior acquisition officials, and transparent to industry and 

the public. 

Question 11. How often are sole source contracts reviewed to ensure satisfactory 

delivery of products and services? 

Answer. While I do not have specific knowledge of TSA’s current procedures for 

reviewing sole source contracts, I understand that all TSA contracts are reviewed 

on a continual basis based upon overall size and risk to ensure satisfactory delivery 

of products and services. 

Question 12. What systems does the TSA have in place to protect against identity 

theft of TSOs personal information, such as ID cards? Are biometric systems being 

used on the work sites? 

Answer. While I do not have specific information on current steps that TSA has 

taken to protect its employees from identity theft, I take this issue very seriously. 

Identity theft is not only a financial crime but can be a major security issue when 

it comes to identification documents of those who serve in critical security positions. 

If confirmed, I will take appropriate steps to protect the personal information of all 

TSA employees including its Officers to ensure our aviation systems remain safe. 

Question 13. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has noted that standard 

dry-chemical fire extinguishers pose a threat to airplanes if they are discharged on 

the plane and therefore bars them on commercial aircraft. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recognizes this threat and therefore, prohibits passengers 

from carrying them through the security checkpoint. A basic fire extinguisher can 

cause tremendous damage if discharged on an airplane because it is corrosive to 

electronic equipment and can cause tremendous visual and respiratory impairment 

to the pilots. However, once through security, airport concourses are lined with unsecured and unmonitored dry chemical fire extinguishers that can be removed without any central detection and carried onto an airplane and deployed into the cockpit. 

Are you aware of the danger posed by unsecured fire extinguishers in airport concourses? 

Answer. I am not specifically familiar with this issue. If confirmed, I will review 

this matter. 

Question 14. What measures would you take as Administrator to ensure that fire 

extinguishers are not carried onto airplanes? 

Answer. I am not specifically familiar with this issue. If confirmed, I will review 

this matter. 

Question 15. Do you plan to require airports to address how they are dealing with 

the concourse fire extinguisher threat? 

Answer. I am not specifically familiar with this issue. If confirmed, I will review 

this matter. 

Question 16. The benefits of the DCA Access Standard Security Program (DASSP) 

in terms of numbers of General Aviation aircraft operating in/out of DCA continue 

to be limited due to the relatively few airports approved as DASSP gateways. Many 

key airports for general aviation operations lack airline service and therefore a local 

TSA presence and are unable to gain DASSP gateway approval due to insufficient 

TSA resources. For these airports, a third party screener, funded by the airport and 

its tenants could be used to mitigate the impact on TSA staffing, however this is 

64 

not currently allowed under the DASSP. If confirmed as TSA Administrator, would 

you support the inclusion of third party screeners as part of the DASSP and overall 

growth in the number of airports approved as DASSP gateways? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will look into the accessibility of general aviation flights 

into Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport to ensure that the program operates effectively for potential users while maintaining the necessary level of security. 

Question 17. Under what circumstances should sole source contracting be used? 

Answer. While sole source contracting may be necessary in some instances, it is 

my view that these acquisitions, regardless of value, should be limited, adequately 

justified, approved by senior acquisition officials, and transparent to industry and 

the public. 

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