MEGACITIES AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 

PREPARING FOR A COMPLEX AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE 

June 2014 

Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group 

Megacities Concept Team: 

Colonel Marc Harris, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Dixon, Major Nicholas Melin, 

Command Sergeant Major Daniel Hendrex, Sergeant Major Richard Russo 

and Mr. Michael Bailey 

a
2 
3 

C ities with populations of ten million or more are 

given a special designation: megacity. There 

are currently over twenty megacities in the 

world, and by 2025 there will be close to forty.1 The 

trends are clear. Megacities are growing, they are becoming more connected, and the ability of host nation 

governments to effectively deal with their explosive 

growth and maintain security is, in many cases, diminishing. Megacities are a unique environment that the 

U.S. Army does not fully understand. 

Megacities are growing so fast that it is becoming 

increasingly difficult for host nation governments to 

keep up with infrastructure and resource requirements. Drivers of instability are already present and in 

many places are growing by the day. It is inevitable 

that at some point the United States Army will be 

asked to operate in a megacity and currently the Army 

is ill-prepared to do so. 

 The scale and connectedness of megacities lend 

gravity to events within them, which can quickly capture international attention and compel military commitment. Accurate predictions of where unrest will 

occur will likely continue to elude analysts in the future as it has in the past. Monitoring megacities, however, may provide decision makers with effective predictors of looming instability with global impact. The 

problems found in megacities (explosive growth rates, 

vast and growing income disparity and a security environment that is increasingly attractive to the politically 

dispossessed) are landpower problems. Solutions, 

therefore, will require boots on the ground. 

By increasing its appreciation of megacities, the 

U.S. Army can better understand how it might operate 

within them as part of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) team. Leaders 

who appreciate the complexity of these environments 

will provide options to the National Command Authority that more closely match the objectives set forth in 

current and future National Security Strategies. 

The process of building understanding of each 

unique megacity will be neither quick nor easy. Only 

through a methodical, relentless approach to appreciating complexity will the Army of the future be able to 

meet the demands put upon it. 

This document is a first effort to explore the 

megacity challenge. The strategic significance of these 

places is explored, as well as the gap in both the 

Army’s and, more broadly, the Joint Community’s understanding of them. An approach for strategically appreciating megacities is offered, and case study vignettes from cities across the globe illustrate unique 

challenges posed by megacities. Finally, a series of 

first-order questions about the way forward are posed 

to provoke thought about how the Army might lead 

the effort to address the challenges posed by megacities. 

“Crowded megacities, beset by poor living conditions, periodic rises in the price of commodities, 

water shortages, and unresponsive municipal services, will be fertile petri dishes for the spread 

of both democracy and radicalism, even as regimes will be increasingly empowered by missiles 

and modern, outwardly focused militaries.” 

- Robert Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate 

Executive Summary

The urban sprawl of the developing megacity in Lagos, Nigeria. b
4 

Strategic Significance 

18.4 The cities that grow the fastest will be the most 

challenged. Urban areas are expected to grow by 1.4 

billion in the next two decades, with that growth occurring almost entirely in developing world. 5

 As resources become constrained, illicit networks could potentially fill the gap left by over-extended and undercapitalized governments. The risk of natural disasters 

compounded by geography, climate change, unregulated growth and substandard infrastructure will magnify the challenges of humanitarian relief. As inequality between rich and poor increases, historically antagonistic religions and ethnicities will be brought into 

close proximity in cities. Stagnation will coexist with 

unprecedented development, as slums and shanty 

towns rapidly expand alongside modern high-rises. 

This is the urban future. 

 To ignore megacities is to ignore the future. The 

growing significance of these places will naturally 

make their stability critical for U.S. policy objectives 

and global equilibrium. Failure to focus attention on 

Megacities are rapidly becoming the epicenters of 

human activity on the planet and, as such, they will 

generate most of the friction which compels future 

military intervention. Yet, even as megacities receive 

more study amongst military practitioners, the question of relevance still often arises: “Why would the 

U.S. Army go to one of these places?” Underlying that 

question is an understanding that current Army doctrine and historic military judgment advocates avoiding urban areas in general for reasons of practicality 

and risk. Fundamentally, questions of relevance and 

current doctrine regarding megacities all assume the 

U.S. military will have complete control over the location and circumstance of its next engagement. Examining previous surprises, like the Japanese attacks on 

Pearl Harbor or Al Qaeda on New York City, should 

disabuse military planners of these notions. Both 

events were not predicted by decision makers of the 

time and led to unanticipated military commitments. 

Flawed assumptions aside, it is important to view the 

megacity through the lens of national interest. Understanding how these environments may become magnets for international attention and demand military 

intervention will aid military planners in avoiding future strategic surprises. This is an important distinction; it is less of a question of why the U.S. Army would 

go than a question of what conditions would draw the 

Army into a megacity. 

 World-wide, an historic transition is underway. 

Over half of all people currently live in cities, and the 

rate of migration is accelerating. By 2030, cities will 

account for 60% of the world’s population and 70% of 

the worlds GDP. 2 Each day, an estimated 180,000 

people across the globe migrate to cities. 3 In the next 

century, the urban environment will be the locus 

where drivers of instability will converge. By the year 

2030, 60% of urban dwellers will be under the age of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Crowded South Asian megacity with population roughly equivalent to that of Afghanistan. c

"Failing to prepare for military operations in dangerous megacities could leave a future president without the means to do something that he or she considers to be in the national interest." 

- Steven Metz, Strategic Horizons: How the U.S. Military Might Get Involved in a Megacity 
5 

these places today will create strategic 

vulnerability for the U.S. tomorrow. 

Megacities will continue to occupy 

key strategic terrain, making their stability necessary for global connectedness and order. Megacities like Cairo, 

Egypt and Karachi, Pakistan occupy 

unique positions in relative proximity 

to the global commons. These urban 

epicenters will evolve into a connected 

network of economic hubs which will 

drive the global economy. Tokyo, Japan 

and Shanghai, China will be among the 

top five cities with the highest GDP in 

the world by 2025.6 Some megacities 

will be conduits for access to critical 

natural resources, like petroleum. Nigeria, for example is the largest oil producing country in Africa, and the fourth 

leading exporter of liquefied natural 

gas in the world.7 Lagos is the deep water port and 

essential hub through which most of Nigeria’s oil exports flow. 

Megacities may also offer safe haven for threat 

groups who wish to strike the U.S. home land while 

simultaneously megacities’ links to national interest 

only grow stronger over time. This dichotomy of threat 

conjoined with growing criticality will produce a complex security environment which will challenge policy 

makers and military planners. These places offer several benefits to discrete threat networks. Large migratory populations reduce the transnational signature 

normally associated with terrorists, criminal, and espionage activities. Operating from megacities allow 

hostile actors relative freedom of maneuver as they 

blend in with the local population. 

It is highly likely that megacities will be the strategic key terrain in any future crisis that requires U.S. 

military intervention. Population, urbanization, and 

resource trends contributing to the rise of megacities 

show no signs of abating or reversing. The increasing 

importance of the megacity does not translate into 

resilience or a lack of fragility. In fact, in most megacities, fragility and a lack of capacity are the norm. The 

growing significance of these places coupled with their 

fragility and lack of resilience creates a proposition 

fraught with strategic risk. It is clear that megacities 

are becoming more important while at the same time 

presenting increased security risks. Ignoring these cities can create strategic vulnerability if there exists 

within them a stressor which exceeds the city’s ability 

to cope. Such conditions would likely call for some 

form of outside intervention. If the demand signal or 

threat poses enough risk to U.S. national interest, military intervention is a likely scenario - in which case 

failure to understand these places will produce operational and tactical vulnerability as well. 

The Chief of Staff of the Army directed his Strategic Studies Group to undertake a one-year research 

project to add greater depth to the Army’s understanding of the implications of megacities to the future. A multi-faceted approach was used to understand past urban operations, current thinking on the 

subject, and what the Army can do today to prepare 

itself for the enormous challenges it may face in megacities in the future. 

The growing global population is becoming increasingly urbanized. d, e
6 

The Chief of Staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group (SSG) is comprised of a diverse set of military and civilian fellows who come together for one year to explore and develop strategic concepts for the United States Army. 

The 2013-2014 SSG sought to imagine a profoundly different Army, able to deal with the complexity of future operating environments. It self-selected into five Concept Teams, one of which focused exclusively on the unique 

opportunities and challenges associated with megacities in the deep future. 

The Megacities Concept Team reviewed historical examples of urban operations and Army and Joint doctrinal 

publications relevant to urban conflict. It also carried out an extensive literature review on past military interventions in urban settings and current thinking on the implications of the global trends that are driving urbanization. 

The team engaged with senior leaders across the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, industry and academia. Because appreciation of megacity environments is difficult to achieve solely through academic research, 

the team also conducted a series of case studies that included field work in Dhaka, Bangladesh; Lagos, Nigeria; 

New York City; Bangkok, Thailand; and Mexico City, Mexico. A virtual case study was completed on Rio de Janeiro 

and Sao Paulo, Brazil. 

The results of the team’s research were briefed to the Chief of Staff of the Army, and to a group of trusted 

agents. This publication is a summary of that work, and fuller treatments of each of the subjects discussed here is 

available by request from the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Strategic Studies Group. 

 

Methodology 

The SSG Megacities Concept Team employed a combination of theoretical research and practical fieldwork to produce their report. 
7 

Megacities are not only an international phenomenon. The Iconic skyline of New York City is universally recognizable. g

Field work in international megacities was essential to understanding the military implication of these emerging 

environments. Lagos, Nigeria. f
8 

U rban fighting is not, in itself, a new challenge 

for the Army. From the streets of Aachen to 

the markets of Baghdad, Soldiers have defeated enemies who attempted to 

use urban terrain to their advantage. Urban conflict is ingrained 

deeply in the Army’s history. 

 The approaches derived from 

this history are, however, insufficient to address the challenges 

posed by megacities. The Army’s 

largest and most recent example of 

urban operations is small in comparison to the challenges ahead. In 

Baghdad, the Army fought for almost a decade in an urban environment with a population of 6.5 million people.8

 By 2030, there will be 

37 cities across the world that are 

200-400% larger than Baghdad. 9 

 A gap exists in the Army’s doctrinal understanding 

of large cities. Moreover, megacities are not treated 

as units of analysis for study and intelligence collection 

or featured in planning scenarios. 

The Army, and the DoD community 

more broadly, neither understands 

or prepares for these environments. 

DOCTRINE: Current Army doctrine on urban operations, as outlined in FM 3-06, Urban Operations, 

visualizes cities as elements of larger areas of operation. It provides 

considerations for commanders as 

they apply the fundamental tenets 

of maneuver in a different terrain. 

While cautioning against the employment of linear, systematic 

ground operations that allow an urban adversary to attrit friendly 

forces, the traditional forms of offensive maneuver are 

nevertheless presented. 10 The critical task associated 

with shaping the environment is isolating the city by 

exerting control around its perimeter, as well as decisive points within it. The conduct of offensive operations within the urban environment proceed from the 

periphery inwards, enveloping or 

turning the adversary if possible 

and penetrating or infiltrating the 

city if necessary. 11

 The fundamental assumptions 

implicit to these approaches are 

the ability to isolate and shape 

the urban environment and to 

utilize ground approaches from 

the periphery into the city. For 

megacities, both of the assumptions are flawed. By virtue of their 

scale, megacities cannot be physically or virtually isolated. Physically 

controlling a urban population consisting of tens of millions of people 

spread over hundreds of square miles with military 

forces numbering in the tens of thousands not only 

ignores the force ratios recommended in doctrine but 

actually inverts them. Virtual isolation is even more 

improbable given cell phone saturation in urban environments worldwide and global 

interconnectedness through the 

World Wide Web. Ground maneuver from the periphery is also unrealistic. The congestion of ground 

avenues of approach, combined 

with the massive size of the 

megacity environments, makes 

even getting to an objective from 

the periphery questionable, let 

alone achieving an operational effect. 

 The scale of megacities, in essence, defies the military’s ability to 

apply historical methods. The Army’s 

doctrinal and operational approaches 

to urban environments seek to shape them in order to 

yield conditions that allow the use of traditional techniques. This will not work in a megacity. It is a fundaThe Gap

Army Urban Doctrine assumes the ability to isolate 

and shape Cities in order to Set Conditions for Operations. h 

Urban Doctrine, exemplified by the Small City 

surrounded by Maneuver Graphics, is insufficient 

for Megacities. i
9 

mentally new operating environment to which the 

Army must shape itself and discover new approaches. 

CITY AS A UNIT OF ANALYSIS: Megacities are 

emerging environments that potentially pose significant military risks. They require concerted and continuous intelligence, academic, and operational focus. 

This emphasis does not currently exist within the Army 

or the Department of Defense (DoD). 

Analytical portfolios in the DoD Intelligence Community are not focused on cities. Efforts focus on 

countries, regions, adversaries and a variety of trends 

of concern to decision makers. While efforts are underway to develop collection capabilities focused on 

remotely characterizing cities, there does not exist (as 

of the writing of this paper) any analytical arm dedicated to understanding cities to support the war 

fighter. 12

Military Studies Programs both within the institutional Army and at civilian institutions currently provide long term academic focus for various topics of 

military interest. While a large body of knowledge 

exists on how urbanization and megacities impact politics, economics and the environment, there is no academic effort focused on researching the military implications of these environments. 

Regional alignment efforts are underway to 

strengthen or establish habitual relationships between 

combatant commands, allocated units, and partner 

nations. These engagements are done at the behest of 

the Geographic Combatant Commanders as part of 

their security cooperation initiatives to support engagement and pre crisis activities. These efforts are 

not furthering institutional understanding or operational proficiency in the megacities found in their respective regions.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS PRODUCTS: Support to 

Strategic Analysis products, such as Defense Planning 

Scenarios, DoD/Joint Staff Planning Scenarios and approved force sizing scenarios are all designed to allow 

the Joint Force to consider future contingencies and 

test capabilities against them. Though cities are featured in many of the current planning tools, they all 

fail to incorporate complex urban terrain within the 

context of a megacity. Cities, depicted with defined 

perimeters, are all modeled as division or brigade-level 

objectives that can be isolated, shaped and operated 

on from the periphery. No scenario challenges current 

doctrinal approaches or even incorporates the challenges faced by the Army in Baghdad over the last decade. 13

 Taken together, the insufficiency of doctrine, lack 

of emphasis on cities as units of analysis and absence 

of large cities in force planning scenarios combine to 

yield both a lack of understanding of the challenges 

posed by these environments and a lack of preparedness to operate within them. 

 The framework for strategically appreciating large 

urban environments, as presented in the next section, 

begins the process of examining megacities as units of 

analysis and confronting the challenge they pose to 

military operations. 

Dhaka, Bangladesh, has an estimated 1.4 million buildings and covers 590 square kilometers. kMuscatatuck Urban Training Center, DoD’s Largest Urban Training Facility, has 68 Buildings and covers 4 square kilometers. j
10

W hen asked how to approach a complex 

problem, General Creighton Abrams famously quipped that “when eating an elephant take one bite at a time.” 14 The cognitive approach behind the “one bite” method of thinking underpins most military doctrine and can be classified as 

reductionist in nature. Reductionist approaches to 

systems seek to identify, isolate and analyze system 

components as separate entities. Once critical or 

dominant “nodes” in the system are analyzed they are 

then examined with respect to the relationship between each entity, thereby revealing a picture of the 

system as a whole. 

Though reductionist methods can be effective for 

describing and understanding mechanical systems 

with linear causal relationships, they fall short when 

dealing with complex systems. Complex systems act 

as entities in their own right, independent of the nature of its parts. Army doctrine, while referring to urban terrain as a “complex environment,” simultaneously espouses the use of a reductionist approach to 

gain understanding. 15 

The scale of megacities, 

the multiplicity of relationships at play within them, 

and their global connectedness defy efforts to map or 

fully understand them. Application of reductionist approaches espoused in current doctrine both fail to 

account for all the variables 

at play and the behavior of 

the city as a whole. Different approaches to modeling 

cities must be considered. 

The nature of each megacity’s complexity makes it 

unique. No two cities exhibit the same emergent 

properties, or are connected (internally or externally) 

in the same way. This means that every endeavor in 

an urban environment requires a novel approach and 

a unique understanding: no template or checklist of 

reconnaissance targets will reveal the nature of the 

city. Instead, commanders wishing to achieve strategic ends in a megacity must appreciate each city as a 

unique whole, with a unique context and nature and 

must operate in concert with this nature. 

As a tool for guiding strategic appreciation, the use 

of a systems-theory based typology helps focus commanders and planners on the city as a whole. This approach reveals options for commanders that are remarkably different than those determined through 

reductionist means, and are more likely to lead to 

positive strategic outcomes. 

Thus, simply understanding the behavior of individual parts of a complex system is insufficient. One 

must develop an appreciation for the whole of the 

system to comprehend 

the behavior of its subcomponents. Here we 

propose a method to 

achieve strategic appreciation that involves consideration of characteristics including context, 

scale, density, connectedness, flow and a threat 

profile. The unique cityspecific interplay between 

these characteristics, 

combined with unique 

combinations of driv-

“Wholes” and “heaps” are not mysterious metaphysical notions but clearly, even mathematically, definable states of complex entities. The decisive difference is that wholes are not the 

simple sum of their parts, and heaps are. 

―Ervin Laszlo, The Systems View of the World 

Strategic Appreciation

The megacity must be understood as more than the sum of its parts. l
11

ers of instability and capacity reveals a typology that 

can be useful for categorizing megacities and thinking 

about what the Army might, and might not, have to do 

if called on to operate within them. 

CHARACTERISTICS 

C ontext, scale, density, connectedness and flow 

are characteristics that, when studied in the 

context of a megacity, can lead to a greater 

strategic appreciation of the operational environment. 

Ultimately, this increased appreciation will allow the 

Army to operate more effectively in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) 

environment. 

CONTEXT: Every megacity is unique and must be 

understood within its own historical, cultural, local, 

regional and international context. Knowledge of the 

rate and characteristics of a megacities' growth may 

enrich contextual understanding, as will knowledge 

about certain drivers of instability. There are major differences 

between cities that are growing 

steadily out of consistent, opportunity-based processes and 

those that are growing explosively out of processes based 

on dependency and exploitation. It may not be possible to 

expect the similar levels of host

-nation capability in contextually diverse megacities. The 

Army will be forced to shape 

itself to the environment, not 

the other way around. 

SCALE: The relative size of 

megacities differentiates 

them from other urban environments and presents a fundamental challenge to 

the Army’s doctrine and force structure. Density, connectedness, flow and context can be studied in any 

environment, but understanding these elements at 

scale is what makes megacities a different problem 

set. Re-thinking force-sizing constructs might be a requirement in megacity environments. 16 

DENSITY: Population, infrastructure, and signals all 

pose significant challenges with regard to density. 

Population density can, intentionally or unintentionally, disrupt flows on fixed capacity lines of transportation and communication in and around the urban environment. 17 Structural density limits maneuverability 

and places limitations on a formation’s ability to mass, 

which disaggregates combat power. Electronic signal 

density presents problems with bandwidth congestion 

and signal-based targeting. 

CONNECTEDNESS: It is obvious today that cities 

don’t exist in isolation. Attempting to isolate one, as 

recommended by current doctrine, will be difficult and 

likely lead to unforeseen consequences. Instantaneous 

information transfer, robust international surface and 

air shipping, and mass migration (legal and illegal) connect the cities around the world in ways undreamed of 

only a decade ago. Robust and redundant external 

connectedness makes isolating a modern city nearly 

impossible. Indeed, recent attempts at shutting down 

social media in Turkey,18 Egypt and Libya 19 illustrate 

how resilient modern communications systems are 

becoming. This robust connectedness 

can be used to great advantage see 

and understand the city’s systems, 

even from remote locations. 

FLOW: Flow is the movement of 

people, resources or things into or out 

of a megacity. Just as a living organism 

relies on flows in (food, air and water), 

and flows out (waste) to stay alive, a 

city also requires flows. Vast amounts 

of energy and other vital goods must 

flow into the megacity, these goods 

must circulate throughout the urban 

space, and waste must flow out if the 

megacity is to remain healthy. Doctrinal approaches in the future must 

prioritize the preservation of key 

flows in order to maintain the health 

of the population. In so doing the Army will reduce the 

requirement for reconstruction efforts that inevitably 

follow major urban conflicts.

THREATS: Megacities are constantly challenged by 

threats to their stability. The nature of these environments manifest multiple dynamics of observable friction which operate against the city or emanate from 

within it. These manmade and natural threats contribute significantly to the complexity of the megacity.

While each megacity is unique and must be understood in 

its own context, megacities share some fundamental characteristics which contribute to their complexity. 
12

T ipping points and triggers are analogies which 

describe the cumulative effect of various inputs 

or stressors, on or within a megacity, whose 

massing precipitates a dramatic shift in a system, or 

systems, from a state of equilibrium to a state of relative imbalance. There is no set, universal measure for 

these tipping points: each city has its own equilibrium 

which must be understood in its own unique context. 

In some mega cities this equilibrium is a delicate condition (fragility); in others, order, security, and solvency 

are robustly maintained with heavy investment in redundancy and contingency management (resilience). 

Regardless of the fragility or resilience of the city, 

their stable functioning is dependent on systems of 

finite capacity. When these systems, formal or informal, real or virtual experience demand which surpasses their capacity, the load on the city’s systems 

erode its support mechanisms, increasing their fragility. These systems are then more vulnerable to triggers 

which can push the city past its tipping point and render it incapable of meeting the needs of its population. 

20

 

Some dynamics of friction are observable in all 

megacities to varying degrees. Population growth and 

migration, separation and gentrification, environmental vulnerability and resource competition, and 

hostile actors are all present in some fashion within 

every megacity. 

POPULATION GROWTH AND MIGRATION: 

One of the hallmarks of megacities is rapid hetero and 

homogeneous population growth that outstrips city 

governance capability. Many emerging megacities are 

ill-prepared to accommodate the kind of explosive 

growth they are experiencing. 21

SEPARATION AND GENTRIFICATION: Radical 

income disparity, and racial, ethnic and sub cultural 

separation are major drivers of instability in megacities. As these divisions become more pronounced they 

create delicate tensions, which if allowed to fester, 

may build over time, mobilize segments of the population, and erupt as triggers of instability. 

ENVIRONMENTAL VULNERABILITY AND 

RESOURCE COMPETITION: Unanticipated 

weather events and natural disasters can be powerful 

catalysts which can devastate city systems, interrupting governance and service delivery. While natural 

cataclysms occur across the globe, and have throughout human history, these events will affect larger 

populations, densely packed into urban centers in 

ways and on a scale never before seen. Environmental 

disasters and resource scarcity (real or perceived) can 

produce relative resource disparity, competition, and 

instability which can rapidly exceed the capability of 

local authorities to address. 22

HOSTILE ACTORS: If internal or foreign actors 

conducted offensive operations which exceeded a 

“In both revolutions and earthquakes it is useful to distinguish the structural conditions 

(pressures, which build up slowly) from triggers (sudden releasing events, which immediately 

precede a social or geological eruption.”

- Jack Goldstone, Modeling Social Pressures Toward Political Instability 

Dynamics of Instability & Capacity

Megacities are subject to frictions, such as disruptive acts by hostile actors, which can exceed their capacity. m
13

city’s capacity to contain or defend against them, external intervention could be required to return the 

city to its previous state. 23 This would be especially 

true if the city is in an allied country or the threat is 

preparing to extend its hostilities to the U.S. homeland or its citizens abroad. 

Should any of these frictions arise and become 

disruptive to the international system they will demand outside intervention to restore some semblance 

of order. This order may not resemble previous conditions, but some likeness of equilibrium must be present in the “new normal.” This ability of the city to 

reconstitute its systems or adapt to a new normal is a 

measure of the city’s capacity for resilience. 

CAPACITY: Every city has a unique way of organizing, equipping and connecting the resources required 

to maintain its systems. Understanding the systems 

that keep the city functioning is an essential component of understanding the nature and logic of the city 

itself. Similarly, understanding the surge capacity of 

the city (the emergency response capability, the extent of planning and exercising emergency procedures, the material resources and reserve or mobilization capability, etc.) is essential to forecasting the 

city’s ability to return to steady-state and how much 

external assistance may be necessary to help it do so.

ANTI-FRAGILITY AND RESILIENCE: Cities differ widely on their ability to adapt to volatility and 

stress. Some cities respond poorly to adversity, making bad situations worse. Others return quickly to a 

normal state, expending resources to minimizing the 

impact of the adversity. These characteristics are fragility and resilience respectively. Many cities learn 

and grow from adversity, a characteristic that is coming to be known as antifragility. 

24

There is a strong correlation between highly integrated systems and antifragility. In large urban environments, a highly-integrated city like New York exhibits antifragile characteristics when it learns from 

setbacks and then designs systems that prevent future 

disruptions from similar events. 25 Loosely integrated 

cities, on the other hand, show little or no improvement in the aftermath of adverse events. Unless a city 

learns and evolves from adverse events, it is not antifragile and future events can overwhelm it. Even the 

most resilient cities will eventually wear down under 

constant and increasing pressure.

NATIONAL INTEREST: Both the stressors on a city 

and its capacity to absorb or recover from them must 

be understood in context. Stressors which exceed the 

capacity of the city will create a gap or a delta of risk. 

Military intervention may be required if this delta adversely affects national interest in a way which cannot 

be managed by other elements of U.S. national power. 

 This model is a gross oversimplification of an extraordinarily complex dynamic. There are no absolute 

measures to quantify stress or capacity. Stressors and 

capacity must be understood in context of the specific 

city. The same stressor may exist in two different cities, but the scope of the stressor may be completely 

different, as might the capacity of the city or approach 

to responding to the stressor. The model is not intended to be all inclusive; rather it is meant to provide 

a framework for organizing the various dynamics in 

play which may precipitate military intervention in a 

megacity. An Army that has ignored the importance of 

megacities will be unable to offer national leaders strategic options. 

COMPARING MEGACITIES: The ability of 

megacities to withstand and recover from expected or 

unexpected stressors is largely based on the city’s degree of integration. Some megacities are more integrated than others and, when compared to one another, this degree of integration can be used to categorize megacities into a basic typology. 

Friction which exceed the capacity of megacities cause an imbalance. Intervention will occur where and when this imbalance 

coincides with US national interest.
14

A typology of megacities is emerging. It ranges 

from cities that are highly integrated (e.g. New 

York City or Tokyo) with hierarchical governance and security systems, to cities that are loosely 

integrated (e.g. Lagos, Nigeria or Dhaka, Bangladesh) 

with alternatively governed spaces and security systems. Some cities exhibit a combination of the two . 

Highly integrated systems are characterized by 

strong formal and informal relationships among its component parts. 

These relationships manifest as highly ordered hierarchical structures 

with formalized procedures and 

norms, and 

open communication 

among its various parts. 

Highly integrated 

systems are inherently 

stable, show high degrees 

of resilience (ability to absorb 

stress) and manage growth 

in a relatively controlled 

manner. 

Loosely integrated cities, on the other hand, lack 

many of the formal relationships that keep highly integrated cities stable. Weak control and communications systems, and lack of consistent rules for interaction amongst component parts lead to low resilience 

and unregulated growth. This growth, in turn, contributes more component parts that aren’t formally integrated into the system, creating a downward spiral of 

instability. Loosely integrated cities are largely incapable of dealing with the challenges presented them today and there should be little expectation of their ability to meet the growing challenges of tomorrow. 

Moderately integrated cities show some characteristics of highly and loosely integrated megacities. In 

these environments formal governments may be able 

to control portions of the city and episodically control 

other less integrated parts of the city. These conditions 

are brought about by rapid, unplanned growth, compounded by separation. 

Some megacities, particularly highly integrated 

cities, are capable of coping relatively well when instability arises, while others will have their service and 

security capabilities quickly overwhelmed. 

Where vital US interests are at stake, the 

Army may be called on to conduct operations in and 

around megacities to 

achieve strategic 

goals that protect those interests. Lacking relevant 

historical examples on 

which to base 

training, education and planning, we believe the 

Army is not prepared for 

operations in these unique 

operational environments. Entirely new concepts are needed 

to prepare the Army to conduct operations in the 

megacity environment. 

The preceding strategic appreciation provides a 

framework to begin understanding these environments. The following case studies illustrate the characteristics common to all megacities, as well highlight 

the interplay between dynamics of friction and capacity within these megacities which may compel U.S. intervention. The typology defined here provides a basic 

ordinal categorization to compare cities based on their 

degree of systemic integration. Viewed through this 

typology, New York is highly integrated. Bangkok, Rio 

de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo show moderate degrees of 

integration, while Lagos, Nigeria and Dhaka, Bangladesh appear far less integrated. 

An Emerging Typology of Megacities

Some megacities can be typified based on their degree of integration.
15

Summary: Founded in 1624, New York City 

(NYC) is relatively young by global standards, 

yet it has undoubtedly become one of the 

most iconic and important cities in human 

history. As the home for the United Nations, 

it is the world’s hub for international diplomacy and conflict resolution. The city is internationally renowned as a wellspring of 

modern American culture and home to some 

of the most recognizable structures in the 

world. 26

Typology: NYC is the epitome of the Highly 

Integrated city. Its redundant systems, hierarchical structure, robust resources and connectedness make this one of the most resilient cities in the world. Military operations in 

environments like NYC would likely have a 

prescribed function, integrated into the cities already 

robust response framework. 26

Key Findings: 

 Keeping NYC functioning is of national and global 

importance, and, in terms of capacity, the city sets 

the world standard for integration, antifragility and 

resilience. The city is densely instrumented and 

richly resourced. 26

 As an example of cities eclipsing states or nations in 

importance, NYC’s $1.13 trillion GDP ranks 13th in 

the world (comparable to Canada and ahead of 

South Korea and Australia). 27 NYC has its own foreign policy and its own State Department. 26

 New York has a mixture of different cultures unmatched in the United States. With 600 separate 

cultural institutions, as well as over 51 million domestic and foreign tourists each year, agencies that 

provide services and security within the city must be 

able to understand and serve over 100 

different nationalities often living in 

tightly knit Diaspora communities.26

 New Yorkers are globally connected. 

physically, socially, and technologically. 

The city enjoys a rich history of assimilation and integration, which contributes 

to its diverse demography, and is made 

possible by NYC’s transportation infrastructure. NYC houses three international airports and a seaport which is the 

largest on the eastern seaboard and third 

largest in the nation. Virtual connectedness permeates the city and typifies the 

density of handheld communications and 

web enabled devices in highly integrated 

cities. This connectedness limits opportunities for tactical or operational surprise. 26

 The city’s heterogeneous population, while connected and integrated into the city, maintains 

unique sub-cultural identities with strong ties to 

various countries of origin. These ties are virtually 

supported through state of the art telecommunications and on-line social networks that enable monetary remittance flows to their families abroad.26

 The robust flow systems allow the population in 

Manhattan to fluctuate between 4 million people 

during the weekday to 1.6 million on weeknights. 

These same networks move 6 million people every 

day throughout the entire metropolitan region. 28

 The city exhibits anti-fragility. When an attack or 

natural disaster occurs and a critical flow is disrupted, supporting infrastructure is not simply rebuilt; it is rebuilt stronger and able to withstand 

more. 29

CASE STUDY: New York City, United States 

View of New York City Skyline 

from Brooklyn. o

n 
16

SUMMARY: Recent unrest in Bangkok 

has resulted from the struggle between 

a rural poor majority that has been underrepresented in Thailand’s government, and an urban elite that has 

worked to maintain its power and influence.30 The struggle between the so 

called “Reds and Yellows” does not appear to be diminishing and is likely to 

remain a feature of the political landscape in Thailand for the foreseeable 

future. It is not the kind of problem 

that the US Army can reasonably hope 

to influence or shape if it were called 

on to operate in Bangkok. It is simply a 

reality that would have to be dealt with. 

Risk of natural disaster is also a major driver of instability. Bangkok sits on the Gulf of Thailand, an area 

that experts believe is at increasing risk as sea levels 

rise due to climate change.31 Recent floods put an area 

the size of Kuwait under water after four feet of rain 

hit the country in a single week. Thus far, the country 

and city have been able to deal with natural disasters 

like this, but a more severe event, or series of events 

will surely strain the capacity of the nation to maintain 

order and security. 

TYPOLOGY: Bangkok is a Moderately Integrated city. 

It exhibits many aspects of a highly integrated city, 

with a functioning government and security apparatus. 

But, Thailand underwent a coup, and it is beset by several significant drivers of instability. Infrastructure is 

generally good, and better than other Southeast Asian 

countries due to significant investment during the 

Vietnam era.32 It is an intriguing case-study in what 

megacities of the future may look like, with both positive and negative features relevant to military planners. 

KEY FINDINGS: 

 Water flow in the canal systems alternately presents major risks and opportunities in Bangkok. Severe flooding is not 

uncommon. But a robust riverine capability would enhance any military operation.

 Vehicle density and associated traffic 

congestion on the roadways pose a significant challenge to maneuver in Bangkok, but a robust canal system is a significant opportunity.33

 The Royal Thai Army (RTA) is an important contextual feature of Bangkok. Such a highly 

equipped and capable force would likely reduce the 

requirement for direct foreign military assistance.34

 Food distribution is the most fragile sustaining flow 

in and around the city. Large stocks of food are 

rarely kept on hand and significant portions of the 

population eat out regularly. 

Military relevance. Thailand is a valuable partner to 

the United States. In the future the U.S. Army’s most 

likely mission in a place like Bangkok would likely be 

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief. But it is not 

unreasonable to expect that a counter-terrorism mission may arise at some point which would require 

Army assistance to host-nation forces. There are 

unique aspects to Bangkok that may require the Army 

to re-think how it goes about accomplishing these missions, particularly a canal system that could greatly 

enhance maneuver in the city, if the Army works to 

upgrade its riverine capabilities, and a strong hostnation Army that could facilitate Army efforts by reducing the need for large numbers of boots on the 

ground. Understanding and maintenance of key flows 

will also reduce the impact on local populations. 

CASE STUDY: Bangkok, Thailand 

Typical Canal in Bangkok, Thailand. q

p 
17

SUMMARY: Rio is an aspiring world city, struggling 

to address the consequences of historical failure to 

integrate its vast slum communities (favelas) into 

the city’s formal governance and support systems. 

Even as the city touts its economic achievements 

and hosting the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer 

Olympics, it is engaged in a violent struggle to gain 

control of its slums. 

The over 600 favelas that dot the city now hamper 

its aspirations and may pose an existential threat 

due to the numerous militias and criminal gangs that 

now govern them.35 They have the ability to paralyze 

the city through coordinated, city wide attacks, as 

occurred in November 2010 when over 3,000 police 

officers and military personnel were required to end 

city-wide violence emanating from a single favela. 

36

Typology: Rio de Janeiro is a Moderately Integrated 

city, possessing sufficient resilience to maintain the 

city’s function despite the threat posed by criminal 

gangs and militias. It is capable of marshalling resources to address the challenge of the favelas, and 

receives robust support from a national government 

that oversees the eighth largest economy in the 

world.37

Key Findings:

 The network 

of formal, 

informal and 

illicit security 

structures in 

Rio is complex. Rio has 

four separate 

levels of police ranging from elite units to pacification police tasked 

to garrison favelas for 25 years.38 Hundreds of local militias dot the city, competing with criminal gangs for control. All these groups have records of human rights 

abuses. To be successful, military action in megacities 

may require non-standard partnerships. 

 Increasing city integration is a long-term, expensive 

process. Rio, Brazil’s most famous and best resourced 

city, has launched a pacification program to make itself 

better integrated. Even with its significant resources, 

success is by no means certain. The implications for 

loosely integrated cities are profound: it seems unlikely 

that cities with extensive challenges and limited resources will reverse ongoing trends. 

 Alternately governed space in cities can pose unanticipated threats. The 2010 city-wide attack shut down a 

global city and required heavy weapons, armored vehicles and aviation assets to quell. Fueled by lucrative illicit trade and entrenched in the local population, criminal gangs in Rio developed into a hybrid threat capable 

of challenging a national government. The reach of illicit 

and criminal networks operating from slums in megacities is limited only by their ambitions, and can be anticipated to take on global implications in the future.39

The U.S. Army has a great deal to learn from the challenges posed by the drug gangs of Rio de Janeiro. 

Utilization of combined arms maneuver against a hybrid threat in a megacity is a challenge Brazil is addressing now. Military-police partnership lies at the 

heart of the Brazilian approach, with extensive mapping and leveraging of local governance and security 

networks. 

CASE STUDY: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 

Rocinha Favela. 

s

r 
18

SUMMARY: São Paulo is a city defined by rapid 

growth and separation. It is a dual-built environment, 

where the over 30,000 millionaires that inhabit the 

developed core and southwest suburbs of the city 

travel in armored cars or private helicopters over an 

impoverished periphery composed of over 1,600 informal communities (favelas) and 61,000 boarding 

houses (cortiços). 40 The proximity of extreme wealth 

and poverty in this city has generated instability, and 

rapid growth has outstripped the city’s ability to manage. 41

 

The city’s function is threatened by illicit networks 

emanating from its slums. In May 2006, over 1,300 

attacks were launched across the city by people loyal 

to the First Command of the Capital (PCC) drug gang. 

Simultaneously, riots occurred in 73 of the region’s 

prisons.41, 42 Coordinated attacks shut down the city, 

and forced the government to enter negotiations with 

the prison drug gang. More disturbing than its emergence is the fact that a nation possessing the world’s 

eighth largest economy has been unable to uproot the 

gang despite building an enormous police force.34

TYPOLOGY: Like Rio, São Paulo is a moderatelyintegrated city. It exemplifies 

what future megacities could resemble: economically vibrant and 

vital while at the same time internally unstable. 

Key Findings:

 The confluence of alternately 

governed areas, illicit networks 

and cellular connectivity creates an environment where 

non-state actors can challenge 

city and national authority. A prison drug gang, 

through use of cellular telecommunications, was 

able to manage illicit drug networks in São Paulo’s 

prisons and in its favelas without government detection. Its 2006 coordinated attacks across the city 

and its prisons is an example of how non-state actors can pose a strategic threat.43

 Despite being in the same country, Rio and São 

Paulo are distinct from each other and may require 

different approaches. Though both cities face 

threats from criminal drug gangs, their histories and 

patterns of growth are distinct from each other. Rio, 

the historical capital of Brazil, is peppered with 

favelas that grew in undesirable areas and were 

eventually surrounded by urban development. São 

Paulo’s century of meteoric growth resulted in a developed core and deliberately neglected periphery. 

One “city system” cannot capture the complexity of 

each of these environments sufficiently.40

While drivers of instability within cities (such as 

separation between rich and poor) do not at first appear to be strategic threats to US interests, the dramatic emergence of a criminal network empowered by 

cellular connectedness illustrates how 

non-state armed groups capable of 

threatening national interests or the 

homeland can emerge. The PCC, 

which formed in a single prison in 

2001, was able to paralyze Brazil’s 

largest city only five years later. 44 This 

example of a hostile actor disrupting a 

megacity is but one model of the potential for hostile groups to project 

power from within these environments, contest local governance, and 

foment instability. 

CASE STUDY: São Paulo, Brazil 

Moinho Favela. 

u 

t 
19

SUMMARY: Lagos is one of the 

fastest growing cities in the 

world. Its population has exploded; from 270,000 in the 

1950’s, to 2.7 million in the 

1960’s to over 20 million today. By next year the population is expected to exceed 25 

million.45 The population surpassed the city’s infrastructure 

capacity long ago and current 

urban planning efforts, while 

ambitious and thoughtfully conceived, appear to have 

a low probability of effectively increasing security and 

stability in the foreseeable future. While terrorist organizations like Boko Haram have not yet infiltrated 

Lagos, it is a concern in the future. 

Nigeria is a regional economic juggernaut and has the 

potential to be an incredibly important partner on the 

continent, both in terms of economic capacity and security cooperation.46 The opportunities in Lagos are 

every bit as significant as the risks. 

TYPOLOGY: Lagos is a Loosely Integrated megacity. 

Governance and security structures exist at the federal, state and local levels, however their ability to enforce regulations to alleviate pressure on infrastructure and resources is problematic. 

KEY FINDINGS: 

 Massive population migration is far beyond the government’s ability to monitor or control and drives 

system demands far beyond the government’s capacity. Authorities encourage vertical densification 

to mitigate horizontal sprawl and accommodate the 

mass immigration.45

 The scale of Lagos is daunting. Mainland Lagos (3,400 km2

, 

25% larger than Rhode Island) 

is composed of continuous urban sprawl primarily made up 

of buildings and informal structures of 1-3 stories, the majority of which are connected by 

informal dirt roads and large 

swaths of slums and shanties 

that are alternately governed. 

 The Makoko slums are one of the poorest areas not 

only in Nigeria, but in the world. Most of the slums 

float in the Lagos lagoon, and consist of shacks built 

to no construction standard. Yet, they have a school 

system, medical facilities, and even cell towers. Alternatively governed spaces will be more common 

in developing megacities in the future.47

Military relevance. The security of Nigeria is important 

for maintaining the fragile security of all of West Africa. Lagos, however, is not yet a major focus of military planners due to its ability to maintain relative security. If Lagos experienced a major natural disaster, or 

significant social unrest because of Lagos’ glaring 

wealth disparity, it’s unlikely that the extant security 

forces would be able to deal with the situation. This 

increases the likelihood that foreign assistance would 

be required, and, considering America’s significant 

economic stake in Nigeria, some US military assistance 

might be offered. Lagos is also interesting as a future 

case study because of the significant presence of Chinese. Is it possible that in the future the US and China 

could partner militarily to aid Nigeria? 

CASE STUDY: Lagos, Nigeria 

Makoko Floating Village. w

v 
20

SUMMARY: As a rapidly growing 

state with poor governance and 

a high risk from natural disasters, Bangladesh is representative of many developing nations 

facing rapid urbanization challenges. Dhaka’s strained flow 

systems (transportation, electrical , water, sewage, communications, etc.) and failing infrastructure will exacerbate the challenges this, the world’s densest 

city, already present. 

TYPOLOGY: Dhaka is a LooselyIntegrated city. As such it has significant instability 

drivers and insufficient resiliency capacity. 

KEY FINDINGS: 

 Widespread corruption keeps Dhaka from developing resilience. The city lacks the connectedness, 

redundancy, feedback loops, diversity, and ability 

to swarm and mass resources needed for resilience. Corruption at nearly every level interferes 

with every one of these characteristics. 

 Untracked, unregulated, and rapid growth is 

driven by governance, geography and climate challenges unique to the region. It is estimated that 

over 20 million climate refugees to Dhaka will be 

generated by sea-level rise by 2030.48

 Dhaka is the nation’s cultural, economic and 

population center. This leads the national government to focus closely on city operations, often at 

the expense of national concerns. It is widely acknowledged that as goes Dhaka, so too goes Bangladesh. 49

 Dhaka is a fragile city, where 

there is real potential for a 

large-scale natural disaster that 

dwarf’s the 2011 Haiti Earthquake. Lack of elected city government and widespread corruption have resulted in a capability vacuum between the 

neighborhood and nationallevel. Unregulated construction 

has resulted in a large proportion of the multistory buildings 

in the city being vulnerable to 

collapse. USAID and the Bangladesh Department 

of Disaster Management estimate that a minimum 

of 76,000 buildings will likely collapse during an

earthquake of 7.0 or higher. 50

The critical partner for the US Army in Dhaka is the 

Bangladesh Army. It is the most revered institution in 

the country, and one that regularly conducts crisis response in the city. The Army has divided the city into 

eight division-sized areas, and conducts regular liaison 

with local leadership. Moreover, military officers are 

embedded in key national and city agencies to ensure 

their functionality. 51

The Army, as currently configured, will struggle to 

deploy to a megacity like Dhaka and sustain itself 

within it. Existing logistical and transport infrastructure does not support large-scale, container-based 

shipping. Ground movement within the city is highly 

restricted in many areas for military vehicles, complicating efforts to apply current methods for tactical maneuver or resupply. Over 15 million people already 

rely upon the overburdened transport infrastructure. 

CASE STUDY: Dhaka, Bangladesh 

Korail Basti. y

x 
21

Conclusions

“Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies. It is therefore crucial to find a 

way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination. Doing so requires more 

than finding an expert who can imagine that aircraft could be used as weapons.” 

- 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report 

A megacity is not the only environment where a land force can be tasked to operate, but it is potentially the most 

challenging. Moreover, it is the locale where the Army’s contribution to landpower is uniquely relevant. This work, 

which can be reviewed fully in the Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group Cohort II Final Report, comprises a 

first effort to appreciate the strategic significance of this environment and its implication to the Army. It is the assertion of this group that megacities are unavoidable, the Army must lead the national response , and the institution is 

currently unprepared. 

Megacities are Unavoidable. The accelerating migration of humanity to cities is undeniable. They are the centers 

of gravity for the human domain were drivers of instability converge. In a world made smaller by global connectedness, threats emanating from distant megacities will have the capability to threaten US interests, its allies and the 

homeland itself. If landpower is the tool to achieve strategic objectives in the human domain, then it will certainly be 

employed in this environment. 

The Army must Lead. The Army is entrusted with the Title 10 responsibility to prepare forces for sustained operations on land. It is the agent that must take responsibility for the Megacity challenge, build and empower a community of interest focused on these places, and formulate new strategic, operational and tactical approaches to large urban environments. 

The Army is currently Unprepared. Although the Army has a long history of urban fighting, it has never dealt with 

an environment so complex and beyond the scope of its resources. A decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan has 

taught the Army that it must shape itself to the complex environments in which it is called to operate. This is the process that must begin now with megacities. 

As of now, megacities are blindspots from which a strategic surprise could emerge. It is plausible that the Army 

could be called to act in one of these places tomorrow. As their size and importance grows, it becomes probable. To 

succeed in each unique megacity, adaptability will not be enough. Now is the time for the Army to begin the process of 

understanding of these places and challenging itself across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF). Building a force for the future requires imagination and a willingness to make bold 

choices. It is the institution’s responsibility to prepare itself to provide the right tool to the Nation when contingencies

arise. 
22

The National response to a threat emanating from a megacity will be joint and inter-agency. Congress, under Title 10, 

has tasked the Army to organize, train, and equip primarily for prompt and sustained operations on land. Consequently, the Army must take the lead in preparing our Nation to execute this probable, if not unavoidable mission. 

As the Army assumes the lead to provide the Nation military options to achieve strategic objectives, the following 

questions, among others, deserve study: 

 Is the current Regional Alignment of Forces construct effectively developing the regional expertise needed to 

achieve strategic objectives in a megacity? 

 Is the megacity an environment where Landpower needs to be strategic? Can it serve as a relevant future challenge for the Strategic Landpower narrative? 

 How might the Army institutionalize a community of interest focused on megacities that incorporates the intelligence community, academia and the operational force? 

 What institutional paradigms need to change to prepare the Army to succeed in this emerging environment? 

 What partners (Special Operating Forces, State Partnership for Peace, international partners, etc.) can the Army 

leverage to better understand the environment? 

 How might the institution leverage Professional Military Education (PME) at all levels to study and educate itself 

on the science of cities and the complexities of the megacity environment? 

 How does the Army build civil-military partnerships to facilitate training, testing and experimentation in large U.S. 

cities? 

Our Army must take ownership of the megacity challenge. The Army knows the mandate; The Army knows the community involved; The Army knows this is an environment for which it is currently unready. Given the task, the Army 

must prepare now to ensure that when the time comes, the Nation has military options the Army has thought through 

and is prepared to execute. 

A Way Forward

z 
23

How many Soldiers does this require? bb 

How does the Army operate here? aa 
24

End Notes and References 

Endnotes

1. United Nations. 2011. World Urbanization Prospects, 2011. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. New York. http://

esa.un.org/unup/pdf/WUP2011_Highlights.pdf

2. United Nations. 2011. World Urbanization Prospects, 2011. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. New York. http://

esa.un.org/unup/pdf/WUP2011_Highlights.pdf

3. United States Agency for International Development, USAID Policy. October 2013. Sustainable Service Delivery in an Increasingly Urbanized World. 3 

4. United Nations. 2012. Harnessing the Dual Global Trends of Urbanization and the Demographic Youth Bulge, 2012. UN Habitat. 

New York. http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/julyhls/pdf13/hls_issue_note_un_habitat.pdf

5. United States Agency for International Development, USAID Policy. October 2013. Sustainable Service Delivery in an Increasingly Urbanized World. 1 

6. McKinsey Global Institute. 2011. Urban World: Mapping the economic importance of cities, 2011. http://www.mckinsey.com/

insights/urbanization/urban_world

7. U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2013. Nigeria, 2013. http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ni

8. United Nations. 2011. World Urbanization Prospects, 2011. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. New York. http://

esa.un.org/unup/pdf/WUP2011_Highlights.pdf

9. Demographia. Demographia World Urban Areas (Built-Up Urban Areas or World Agglomerations). http://demographia.com/

db-worldua.pdf

10. U.S. Army. 2006. FM 3-06: Urban Operations. Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, par 6-

31.

11. U.S. Army. 2006. FM 3-06: Urban Operations. Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, par 7-

27 to 7-33.

12. Strategic Studies Group. February to May 2014. Engagements with intelligence officials within the National Capital Region. 

13. Strategic Studies Group. March 2014. Engagements with Army Force Designers and Planners. 

14. This quote is attributes to General Creighton Abrams, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Date Unknown.

15. U.S. Army. 2006. FM 3-06: Urban Operations. Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Ch 1. 

16. Goode, Steven. 2009-2010. A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency. Carlisle : US Army Strategic Studies 

Institute 

17. U.S. Army. 2008. FM 2-91.4: Intelligence Support to Urban Operations. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 

18. 1. Rawlinson, Kevin. 2014. Turkey blocks use of Twitter after Prime Minister attacks social media site. The Guardian. http://

www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/turkey-blocks-twitter-prime-minister

19. Kilcullen, David. 2013. Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Theoretical & Mathematical History 4, no. 2: 241. 

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Journal of Criminology and Sociology, 2, 397.

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25. Zolli, Andrew, and Ann M. Healy. 2013. Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. 

26. Strategic Studies Group. March 2014. Engagements with Police and Fire Departments of New York. 

27. Florida, Richard. 2011. If US cities were countries how would they rank. The Atlantic On-line. http://www.theatlantic.com/
25

business/archive/2011/07/if-us-cities-were-countries-how-would-they-rank/241977/. 

28. Moss and Quing. 2012. The Dynamic Population of Manhattan. http://wagner.nyu.edu/files/rudincenter/

dynamic_pop_manhattan.pdf

29. Consolidated Edison Company of New York. 2013. Post Sandy Enhancement Plan. http://www.coned.com/publicissues/PDF/

post_sandy_enhancement_plan.pdf 

30. BBC News Asia-Pacific. July 13, 2012. Profile: Thailand’s reds and yellows. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific13294268 

31. Discovery News. November 7, 2011. Floods Show What Lies Ahead for Sinking Bangkok. http://news.discovery.com/earth/

floods-in-sinking-thailands-future-111107.htm

32. Strategic Studies Group. January, 2014. Engagement with US Army Defense Attaché. 

33. Lila, Muhammad. April 7, 2013. Touring the Canals, Life Blood of Bangkok. ABC news. http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/touringcanals-life-blood-bangkok/story?id=18889690

34. Strategic Studies Group. January 2014. Engagement with Member of Parliament. 

35. Stahlberg, Stephanie Gimenez. The Pacification of Favelas in Rio de Janeiro: Why the program is working and what are the 

lessons for other countries. The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Standford University. http://iisdb.stanford.edu/evnts/6716/Stahlberg,_Stephanie - Pacification_of_Favelas_in_Rio_de_Janeiro_(Work_in_Progress).pdf, 1.

36. Domit, Myrna. 28 November 2010. Brazilian Forces Claim Victory in Gang Haven. The New York Times, 

www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/americas/29brazil.html , 1. 

37. Central Intelligence Agency. 20143 CIA World Factbook, Country Comparison: GDP (Purchase Power Parity).

38. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html. 

39. Martin, Molly. Spring 2012, Mega-Cities & Mega-Events: Lessons from Favelas for the Future. The Foreign Military Studies 

Office, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/universities/Mega-Cities.pdf , 24. 

40. Gay, Robert. 2009. From Popular Movements to Drug Gangs to Militias: an Anatomy of Violence in Rio de Janeiro. Pages 29-51 

in Mega-Cities: The Politics of Urban Exclusion and Violence in the Global South, edited by Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, Zed 

Books, London and New York, 38. 

41. Fix, Mariana. The Case of São Paulo. The Laboratory of Human Settlements, Architecture and Urbanism College of the University of São Paulo, 8. 

42. United Nations Human Settlements Programme. Sau Paulo: A Tale of Two Cities. http://www.unhabitat.org, xi. 

43. Dias, Camila Nunes and Fernando Salla. 2013. Organized Crime in Brazilian Prisons: The Example of the PCC. International 

Journal of Criminology and Sociology, no 2: 397. 

44. Langewiesche, William. April 2007. City of Fear. Vanity Fair, http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/04/

langewiesche200704. 

45. Winter, Bryan. 7 November 2012. Brazil Struggles to Halt Murders of São Paulo Police, reuters.com, http://www.reuters.com/

article/2012/11/07/us-brazil-crime-idUSBRE8A61MV20121107. 

46. Strategic Studies Group. April 28, 2014. Engagement with Lagos State Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban Development. 

47. Strategic Studies Group. April 29, 2014. Engagements with Lagos State Police and 81 Division, Nigerian Army. 

48. Strategic Studies Group. April 30, 2014. Engagements with University of Lagos Department of Urban and Regional Planning. 

49. Strategic Studies Group. 25 March 2014. Engagements with Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies. 

50. Strategic Studies Group. 22 March 2014. Engagements with the Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Embassy, Bangladesh. 

51. Strategic Studies Group. 23 March 2014. Engagements with Office for Food, Disaster and Humanitarian Relief, USAID.

52. Strategic Studies Group. 25 March 2014. Engagements with Bangladesh Fire Service and Civil Defense Directorate. 

Images

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commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Saopaulo_copan.jpg (accessed May 15, 2014). 

b. Strategic Studies Group, 2014, Lagos, Nigeria. 

c. Strategic Studies Group, 2014, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
26

d. The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, 2012, Median Age of Country level 

Populations in 2030, National Intelligence Estimate 

e. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs / Population Division, 2011, World Urbanization Prospects: The 

2011 Revision. 

f. Strategic Studies Group, 2014, Lagos, Nigeria. 

g. Strategic Studies Group, 2014, New York City, USA. 

h. U.S. Army. 2006, FM 3-06: Urban Operations. Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Figure 

7-11.

i. U.S. Army. 2006, FM 3-06: Urban Operations. Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Figure 

7-4.

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27

City street in Dhaka, Bangladesh. cc 

City street in Dhaka, Bangladesh. dd 
28

Acknowledgements 

Dr. David Johnson and Dr. Christopher Rice, Director and Deputy Director of the Chief of Staff of the Army’s 

Strategic Studies Group (SSG) for valuable guidance and review and to our colleagues in the other SSG Concept 

Teams for their input and ideas. This work was done as part of a one year fellowship at the SSG during which 

Fellows seek to provide the Chief of Staff of the Army with Independent, Innovative and Unconstrained ideas. 

MEGACITIES AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 

PREPARING FOR A COMPLEX AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE 

Comments regarding this report should be directed to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic 

Studies Group, Megacities Concept Team, The Taylor Building, 2530 Crystal Drive, 13th Floor, Rm. 132194, 

Arlington, VA, 22202-3950. 

New York City Skyline and Strategic Appreciation Graphics. ee