This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A23-0838

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Brent William Kruse,

Appellant.

Filed April 1, 2024

Affirmed

Cochran, Judge

Benton County District Court

File No. 05-CR-22-506

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Karl Schmidt, Benton County Attorney, Kathleen L. Reuter, Assistant County Attorney, 

Foley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public 

Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and 

Klaphake, Judge.

∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for receiving stolen property, 

appellant argues that his guilty plea is unconstitutional because he was not aware of the 

rights he was waiving or the direct consequences of the plea. Because appellant’s guilty 

plea was intelligently entered, we affirm.

FACTS

On March 21, 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Brent William 

Kruse with one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, in violation of Minnesota 

Statutes section 609.52, subdivision 2(a)(17) (2020), based on allegations that he 

knowingly drove a motor vehicle valued at $1,000 to $5,000 without the owner’s consent. 

On November 14, 2022, Kruse pleaded guilty to unauthorized use of a motorized vehicle, 

pursuant to a plea agreement with the state. Kruse later withdrew that plea and pleaded 

guilty to the lesser charge of receiving stolen property.

To support his first guilty plea, Kruse signed a plea petition consistent with 

Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15. The plea petition provided that Kruse had 

sufficient time to discuss his case with his attorney; was satisfied with his representation; 

was not under the influence at the time he committed the offense; was not pleading guilty 

to “get the thing over with”; understood the prosecutor’s case against him; waived his right 

to a pretrial suppression hearing; waived his right to trial; waived his right to call and 

cross-examine witnesses; waived his right to testify at trial; and did not receive any 

promises in exchange for his guilty plea, apart from those outlined in the plea agreement. 
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The plea petition also provided that, in exchange for his guilty plea, Kruse would receive 

a stay of execution, 15 days of jail time, and a chemical assessment.

Kruse pleaded guilty with the understanding that he would receive a 17-month 

stayed prison sentence. During his plea hearing, Kruse stated that he had heard and 

understood the terms of the plea agreement; had time to review the agreement with his 

attorney; and wished to plead guilty under the agreement. Kruse also stated that he was 

satisfied with his attorney; had enough time to discuss his case with his attorney; had

reviewed the plea petition before signing it; did not have any questions about his trial rights; 

understood that he was giving up his right to trial; was not under the influence of controlled 

substances or undergoing psychiatric treatment; and had not been coerced into pleading 

guilty. The district court determined that Kruse’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary; ordered a presentence investigation; and scheduled the matter for sentencing.

Following the presentence investigation, the parties realized that they had 

miscalculated Kruse’s criminal-history score and that the correct score would result in an 

executed prison sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the state informed the district court 

that it was willing to honor the original plea agreement by reducing the charge to receiving 

stolen property, which carried a presumptive 17-month stayed prison sentence. Kruse

initially declined the state’s offer but later accepted the offer.

On March 13, 2023, Kruse pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property in exchange 

for a 17-month stayed prison sentence. During the plea hearing, the state explained that 

the terms of the agreement were “the same terms that [the parties] had agreed to [in 

November 2022].” Kruse stated that he had heard and understood the terms of the plea 
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agreement; had enough time to discuss the agreement with his attorney; and wished to 

plead guilty under the agreement. Kruse also stated that he was satisfied with his attorney; 

had enough time to discuss his case with his attorney; understood his trial rights; and

understood that, by pleading guilty, he was waiving those rights. Kruse then confirmed 

that he did not have any questions about his trial rights; was not under the influence of 

drugs or undergoing psychiatric treatment; and had not been coerced into pleading guilty. 

The district court again determined that Kruse’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary. The district court convicted Kruse of receiving stolen property, in violation of 

Minnesota Statutes section 609.52, subdivision 3(3)(a) (2020), and sentenced him to a 

17-month stayed prison sentence.

Kruse appeals.

DECISION

Kruse challenges the validity of his guilty plea. “An appellant may challenge a 

guilty plea’s validity in the first instance on direct appeal.” State v. Lawrence, 

982 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Minn. App. 2022). The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law,

which we review de novo. State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017).

“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and 

intelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citing North 

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 

(Minn. 1983)). If a guilty plea does not satisfy each of these requirements, the plea is 

invalid. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2007). The appellant bears the burden 

of proving that his guilty plea is invalid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. 
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Kruse argues that his guilty plea is invalid because it was neither voluntary nor 

intelligent when entered. Voluntariness and intelligence are distinct requirements. As the 

supreme court has explained:

The purpose of the voluntariness requirement is to insure that 

the defendant is not pleading guilty because of improper 

pressures. The purpose of the requirement that the plea be 

intelligent is to insure that the defendant understands the 

charges, understands the rights he is waiving by pleading 

guilty, and understands the consequences of his plea.

Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251. The consequences of a guilty plea “refer to [the] plea’s direct 

consequences, namely the maximum sentence and fine.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.

Kruse contends that his guilty plea was involuntary and unintelligent “because he 

was not informed of the maximum sentence and fine he faced, all the rights he was waiving, 

and all the consequences of pleading guilty.” Each of these factors relate to whether 

Kruse’s plea was intelligent—not whether it was voluntary. See id.; Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 

251. We therefore consider only whether Kruse’s plea was intelligent without addressing 

whether it was voluntary.

Kruse asserts that his guilty plea was unintelligent because (1) “[t]he record does 

not show that anyone ever informed Kruse of the maximum sentence or fine that he faced”;

(2) Kruse neither acknowledged nor waived his right to confront his accusers or the 

privilege against self-recrimination; and (3) the district court did not ensure that Kruse 

understood the “additional consequences of pleading guilty and other crucial matters” 

specified in rule 15.01, subdivision 1. We are not persuaded.
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To begin, the record reflects that Kruse understood the charges against him, the 

rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, and the consequences of his guilty plea. During 

his first plea hearing, Kruse pleaded guilty pursuant to a signed rule 15 plea petition, which

confirmed his understanding of his trial rights, his waiver of those rights, and the 

consequences of pleading guilty. Kruse later withdrew his first guilty plea due to an error

in calculating his criminal-history score, but he reached a new plea agreement with the 

state a few months later. Kruse’s second plea agreement contained the “same terms” as 

the first. In addition, at each plea hearing, Kruse was represented by the same counsel and

appeared before the same district court judge. At each plea hearing, the district court 

questioned Kruse about his understanding of the plea agreement, his trial rights, and the 

consequences of pleading guilty. And at each plea hearing, the district court specifically 

asked Kruse if he had any questions about his trial rights, to which Kruse responded, “No.” 

Lastly, the record shows that Kruse had an extensive criminal record at the time of his plea 

hearing, which “makes it unlikely that he did not understand the proceedings.” 

State v. Bryant, 378 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 

1986). Because the circumstances surrounding Kruse’s second guilty plea show that he 

understood the charges against him, the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, and the 

consequences of his guilty plea, we conclude that Kruse’s second guilty plea was 

intelligent.

Furthermore, we are not convinced that the guilty plea is invalid because the district 

court did not strictly follow rule 15.01 when Kruse entered his second guilty plea. Our 

caselaw does not require perfect compliance with rule 15.01. To the contrary, we have
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“recognize[d] the demanding circumstances in which district court judges function and 

have rejected arguments that district courts must comport with rule 15’s lists of questions 

and advisories verbatim.” State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Minn. App. 2011); see 

also State v. Doughman, 340 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. App. 1983), rev. denied (Minn. 

Mar. 15, 1984). Likewise, we have held that “a [district] court is not required to inform a 

defendant of all his constitutional rights before accepting the guilty plea.” 

Hernandez v. State, 408 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 1987). As long as “the record 

reveals careful interrogation by the [district] court and the defendant had [a] full 

opportunity to consult with his counsel before entering his plea, the court may safely 

presume that the defendant was adequately informed of his rights.” Id. As discussed 

above, the record shows the district court carefully interrogated Kruse and that Kruse had 

a “full opportunity to consult with his counsel before” pleading guilty. See id. Kruse’s 

demand for strict compliance with rule 15.01 is therefore unavailing.

We are also unpersuaded by Kruse’s attempt to distinguish his case from our 

decision in Doughman. In Doughman, we held that a defendant’s failure to sign a rule 15 

plea petition and the district court’s failure to question the defendant in the manner set forth 

in rule 15.01 did not render his guilty plea unintelligent because (1) the defendant waived 

the filing of a plea petition to expedite sentencing; (2) the district court “had before it two 

additional criminal files in which the [defendant] had [pleaded] guilty and signed a plea 

petition stating that he understood his rights”; and (3) neither the execution of a plea 

petition nor detailed questioning by the district court were specifically required by 

rule 15.01. 340 N.W.2d at 351. Kruse argues that Doughman is inapposite because, in that 
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case, the district court’s inquiry was more thorough and the record contained evidence that 

does not exist here—namely, testimony about the defendant’s discussions with his attorney 

about his rights. See id. at 353. We disagree.

Contrary to Kruse’s assertion, the facts of this case bear a striking resemblance to 

Doughman. For instance, in Doughman, this court concluded that Doughman’s guilty plea 

was intelligent in part because he had submitted signed plea petitions in other matters 

before the same district court and with the assistance of the same counsel. Id. at 353. 

Likewise, here, Kruse submitted a signed plea petition to the district court with the 

assistance of the same counsel who aided him in entering his second guilty plea. Indeed, 

the facts here are more favorable to the conclusion that the relevant guilty plea was entered 

intelligently; while Doughman’s signed plea petitions were submitted in different matters, 

Kruse’s signed plea petition was submitted in the same matter only four months prior to 

his second guilty plea and contained the “same terms” as Kruse’s second plea agreement.

Id. Accordingly, Kruse’s attempt to distinguish Doughman is unpersuasive.

In sum, Kruse has not met his burden to show that his guilty plea is invalid. We 

therefore conclude that Kruse is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.

Affirmed.