[Cite as Woods v. Marcano, 2018-Ohio-4324.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

Nos. 106710, 106711 and 106712 

DOUG WOODS D.B.A. WHAT A LOVELY HOME

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

CIERA MARCANO, ET AL. 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED; REMANDED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Garfield Heights Municipal Court 

Case Nos. CVG1702100, CVG1702342 and CVG1703011 

BEFORE: E.A. Gallagher, A.J., E.T. Gallagher, J., and Jones, J.

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 25, 2018 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Jazmine R. Greer 

4208 Prospect Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 441143 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE MONIQUE WILLIS

Brian W. Sharkin 

Law Office of Brian W. Sharkin 

P.O. Box 770824 

Lakewood, Ohio 44107 

FOR APPELLEE CIERA MARCANO 

Ciera Marcano, pro se 

495 Janette Drive 

Richmond Heights, Ohio 44143 

FOR APPELLEE ANNETTE KELLOM

Annette Kellom, pro se 

5250 Theodore Street 

Maple Heights, Ohio 44137 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J.: 

{¶1} This appeal involves three separate eviction actions plaintiff-appellant Doug Woods, 

d.b.a. What a Lovely Home (“Woods”), filed in the Garfield Heights Municipal Court against 

defendant-appellees Ciera Marcano (Appeal No. 106710), Annette Kellom (Appeal No. 106711) 

and Monique Willis (Appeal No. 106712). In each case, the trial court dismissed Woods’ claims 

for damages on the ground that Woods “was not the owner of the subject property” and the 
property was “titled in a fictitious name.” For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s 

judgment in each of these cases and remand the matters for further proceedings. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶2} In July 2017, Woods, pro se, filed a forcible entry and detainer action (Garfield 

Heights M.C. No. CVG1702100) to evict Willis from a house on Brunswick Avenue in Maple 

Heights, Ohio (the “Brunswick Avenue property”) and to recover damages for “unauthorized 

persons living at property,” “unauthorized change of locks,” “destruction of property” and 

“non-payment of water bill” (the “Willis case”). In August 2017, Woods, pro se, filed a forcible 

entry and detainer action (Garfield Heights M.C. No. CVG1702342) to evict Kellom from a house 

on Theodore Street in Maple, Heights, Ohio (the “Theodore Street property”) and to recover 

damages for “non-payment of utilities” and “destruction of property” (the “Kellom case”). In 

each case, the parties reached an agreement regarding restitution of the premises and hearings 

were set on Woods’ claims for damages. 

{¶3} A hearing was scheduled in September 2017 in the Willis case. At the hearing, 

Willis raised the issue of whether What A Lovely Home was a legal entity that could hold title to 

real property and sue and be sued. Willis asserted that she had wanted to file a counterclaim but 

could not do so because What A Lovely Home was a fictitious name. The magistrate continued 

the hearing and ordered the parties to brief the issue. 

{¶4} On September 22, 2017, Willis filed a motion to dismiss Woods’ damages claim on 

the ground that What a Lovely Home was not a legal entity. Willis asserted that because What A 

Lovely Home was a fictitious entity, the deed granting title to the Brunswick Avenue property to 
What A Lovely Home was void.1

 She further asserted that because Woods was not the “owner” 

of the property and was “only the registrant of the name” What A Lovely Home, he lacked 

standing to pursue a claim for damages.2 

{¶5} Woods opposed the motion to dismiss. He argued that “a fictitious name is a legal 

entity” that can hold title to real property and has standing to sue or be sued “as long as it is 

registered properly with the Ohio Secretary of State.” He further asserted that he and What A 

Lovely Home were one and the same, that he had properly reported his use of the fictitious name 

What A Lovely Home to the Ohio Secretary of State, and that, both at the time the subject lease 

was executed and the complaint was filed, the property was properly titled in the name of What A 

Lovely Home as his “d.b.a.”3

 

{¶6} On September 25, 2017, hearings were held in the Willis and Kellom cases regarding 

Woods’ damages claims and Willis’ motion to dismiss. 

{¶7} On October 13, 2017, Woods filed a forcible entry and detainer action (Garfield 

Heights M.C. No. CVG1703011) to evict Marcano from the Brunswick Avenue property and 

recover damages for “unpaid rent plus any lease violations or damages” (the “Marcano case”). 

As in the other cases, the parties reached an agreement regarding restitution of the premises and 

the case was set for a hearing on Woods’ damages claim. 

 

1

At that time, both the Brunswick Avenue property and the Theodore Street property were titled in the name of “What 

A Lovely Home, a fictitious filing name registered in the state of Ohio by Doug Woods (single).” 

2

 In support of her motion, Willis attached copies of Doug Woods’ March 17, 2014 fictitious name filing for What A 

Lovely Home, a quit claim deed dated February 24, 2016 from What A Lovely Home, L.L.C. to “What A Lovely 

Home, a fictitious filing name registered in the state of Ohio by Doug Woods (single)” for the Brunswick Avenue 

property and a printout of search results, property data and tax information relating to the Brunswick Avenue property 

from the Cuyahoga County Auditor’s website. 

3

 In support of his opposition, Woods attached copies of the lease executed by Willis, his fictitious name filing for 

What A Lovely Home, the quit claim deed from What A Lovely Home, L.L.C. to “What A Lovely Home, a fictitious 

filing name registered in the state of Ohio by Doug Woods (single)” for the Brunswick Avenue property and search 
{¶8} On October 31, 2017, the magistrate issued the following ruling in the Kellom case: 

Issue: Can a registered fictitious name hold title to real estate the same being a non 

entity? This magistrate rules that this is not an entity and as same has no corpus 

or body. The name alone is not an entity as set forth by any statute creating a 

corporation, LLC or partnership. Logically, if it does not exist it has no standing 

to file suit using a dba. There being no entity as recognized by the statute or the 

court it would require an attorney at law to bring an action on its behalf if one 

would legally exist. Following this reasoning until further order of this court 

“What a lovely home” is an improper party to bring an action and therefore the 

second cause of action is dismissed in this case and others pending at plaintiff’s 

cost. 

{¶9} That same day, the magistrate issued an order in the Willis case stating that “[u]nder 

the reasoning as set forth in CVG 17023470 [sic][,] plaintiff has no standing to sue and therefore 

second cause of action is dismissed.” In the Willis and Kellom cases, Woods thereafter filed a 

request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, a motion for a determination as to whether the 

magistrate’s October 31, 2017 rulings should be considered findings of fact and conclusions of 

law and objections to the magistrate’s October 31, 2017 rulings. He also filed a request to 

supplement the record in each case with select documents from other case, “transcripts” from 

hearings in the Willis and Kellom cases and a third case that is not part of this appeal 4

 and other 

“evidence that may not have been available or allowed to be presented at the time of the subject 

hearings.”5

 

results from the Cuyahoga County Auditor’s website listing What A Lovely Home as the “owner” of the property. 

4 Doug Woods dba What a Lovely Home v. Broadway Care Center, et al. , Garfield Heights M.C. No. CVF 1701906 

(the “Broadway Care Center case”). 

5

 This “evidence” included: (1) documentation related to the damages he sought to recover from Kellom; (2) an 

affidavit from Jacqueline Whitmore, the statutory agent for and sole member of What A Lovely Home, L.L.C., 

regarding the distinction between What A Lovely Home, L.L.C. and the business operated by Doug Woods under the 

fictitious name What A Lovely Home; (3) the leases executed by Willis and Kellom; (4) a magistrate’s decision and

judgment entry dated May 5, 2016 in the case Doug Woods dba What A Lovely Home v. Tawonia Hudson, Garfield 

Heights M.C. No. CVG1600431, in which a money judgment was entered in favor of Woods; (5) a motion to 

disqualify the magistrate filed in the Marcano case; (6) printouts of “frequently asked questions” and a list “filings in 

progress” for Doug Woods from the Ohio Secretary of State’s website; (6) a “transcript” of a conversation between 

Doug Woods and a representative of the Ohio Secretary of State’s office; (7) December 2015 correspondence from 
{¶10} On November 29, 2017, the magistrate issued findings of fact and conclusions of 

law in the Willis case. The magistrate found that What A Lovcly Home is a fictitious name Doug 

Woods “registered” in the state of Ohio and that the Brunswick Avenue property was deeded to 

“What A Lovely Home, a fictitious filing name registered in the state of Ohio by Doug Woods” in 

February 2016. Based on these facts, the magistrate issued the following conclusions: 

1. Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the current cause of action as Doug Woods is 

not the owner of the premises in question. The premises are owned by “What a 

Lovely Home.” While Plaintiff Doug Woods registered the fictitious name with 

the state of Ohio, the deed is not made out to “Doug Woods, doing business as 

What a Lovely Home,” but rather to “What a Lovely Home.” 

2. What a Lovely Home lacks standing in this case as a fictitious entity cannot 

hold title to real property in the state of Ohio. “A deed to a person not in being or 

to a fictitious person is void.” Ohio Jur. 3d § 33, citing Transcontinental Ins. Co. 

of New York v. Mining, 135 F.2d 479 (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1943): Thomas v. City of 

Columbus, 39 Ohio App. 3d 53, 528 N.E.2d 1274 (10th Dist.1987). 

3. As Plaintiff — both as Doug Woods and as What a Lovely Home — lacks 

standing in this case, Plaintiff’s second cause of action is dismissed. There is no 

just reason for delay. 

{¶11} At the December 5, 2017 hearing in the Willis case, the trial court agreed that 

Woods lacked standing to bring to the action because title to the Brunswick Avenue property was 

held in a fictitious name. The trial court then issued judgment entries overruling Woods’ 

objections in the Willis case and dismissing Woods’ damages claims in all three cases, concluding 

that “Defendant [sic] is not the owner of the subject property” and that “[t]he property is titled in a 

fictitious name.” 

{¶12} Woods appealed, raising the following four assignments of error for review: 

 

Woods to Whitmore regarding correction of the quit-claim deeds to reflect that the fictitious name is registered by 

Doug Woods; (8) an affidavit by Doug Woods in which he attests that he is the owner and lessor of the properties at 

issue and the registrant and user of the fictitious name “What A Lovely Home” and (9) a filing by Doug Woods, dated 

November 9, 2017, reporting his use of the fictitious name “Doug Woods dba What A Lovely Home” with the Ohio 

Secretary of State. 
First Assignment of Error: The trial court’s ruling that appellant did not have 

standing because he was not the owner of the subject property since the property 

was titled to a fictitious name was erroneous, contrary to law, an abuse of 

discretion and against the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence. 

Second Assignment of Error: The trial court erred and abused its discretion by 

failing to allow appellant to have standing upon both his registration with the state 

and transfer of property ownership to “Doug Woods dba What a Lovely Home.” 

 

Third Assignment of Error: The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing 

to allow appellant to have standing as the real party in interest. 

Fourth Assignment of Error: The trial court erred by allowing appellees to use the 

issue of standing as an affirmative defense since it was not previously raised in any 

pleading. 

Law and Analysis 

{¶13} In his first assignment of error, Woods challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his 

damages claims for lack of standing based on its determination that he was not the owner of the 

properties and that the properties were improperly titled in a fictitious name. Whether a party has 

standing to bring an action before the court presents a question of law, which we review de novo. 

Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 20. 

{¶14} Under R.C. 1329.01(A)(2), a “fictitious name“ is “a name used in business or trade 

that is fictitious and that the user has not registered or is not entitled to register as a trade name.” 

R.C. 1329.01(D) provides, in relevant part: 

Any person who does business under a fictitious name and who has not registered 

and does not wish to register the fictitious name as a trade name or who cannot do 

so because the name is not available for registration shall report the use of the 

fictitious name to the secretary of state, on a form prescribed by the secretary of 

state, setting forth all of the following: 

(1) The name and business address of the user * * *: 

(2) The fictitious name being used; 

(3) The general nature of the business conducted by the user. 
R.C. 1329.10(B) further provides, in relevant part: 

No person doing business under a trade name or fictitious name shall commence or 

maintain an action in the trade name or fictitious name in any court in this state or 

on account of any contracts made or transactions had in the trade name or fictitious 

name until it has first complied with section 1329.01 of the Revised Code * * *, 

but upon compliance, such an action may be commenced or maintained on any 

contracts and transactions entered into prior to compliance. 

See also Oldendick v. Crocker, 2016-Ohio-5621, 70 N.E.3d 1033, ¶ 64-67 (trial court did not err 

in entering a judgment in favor of the landlords on their counterclaim and allowing them to set off 

damages against the tenant’s security deposit where although landlord’s use of fictitious name had 

not been reported to the secretary of state at the time they filed their counterclaim, the name was 

registered prior to final judgment); Ebner v. Caudill, 93 Ohio App.3d 785, 639 N.E.2d 1231 (10th 

Dist.1994) (where landlord entered into a lease using a fictitious name, landlord was prohibited 

from bringing an action based on the lease until he reported use of the name under R.C. 1329.01). 

{¶15} The relevant facts are not in dispute. The record reflects that “What A Lovely 

Home” is a fictitious name used by Doug Woods and that Doug Woods reported his use of that 

fictitious name to the Ohio Secretary of State in March 2014. The record further reflects that 

“Doug Woods dba What A Lovely Home” was the “lessor” under the leases executed by Willis 

and Kellom and that the Brunswick Avenue and Theodore Street properties were titled in the 

name of “What A Lovely Home, a fictitious filing name registered in the state of Ohio by Doug 

Woods (single)” at the time the eviction actions were filed by “Doug Woods dba What A Lovely 

Home.” 

{¶16} In this case, the trial court dismissed Woods’ claims for money damages because it 

believed that title to real property could not be held in a fictitious name. However, as the Tenth 

District explained in Thomas v. Columbus, 39 Ohio App.3d 53, 528 N.E.2d 1274 (10th 
Dist.1987), there is a difference between a conveyance to a nonexistent or wholly fictitious 

grantee and a conveyance to a person using or operating under an assumed or fictitious name: 

[T]he sometimes stated “general rule” that a deed which names a fictitious person 

as grantee is void is based on the physical nonexistence of any grantee. However, 

care must always be taken to distinguish between a deed to a nonexistent being and 

a deed to a person in existence who is described by an assumed, fictitious, trade, or 

inaccurate name. 

Id. at 1276-1277, citing 23 American Jurisprudence 2d, Deeds, Sections 28 and 38, at 95, 101 

(1983). In Thomas, the plaintiff sued the city of Columbus, alleging that the city had improperly 

demolished a building on a piece of real estate he owned. Thomas at 1275. After the plaintiff 

purchased the property, title to the property was placed in the name “Kim-Lynn-Shawn, Inc.” 

The articles of incorporation necessary to form a corporation named “Kim-Lynn-Shawn” were 

prepared but never filed. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, 

concluding the plaintiff was not the owner of the property and that the corporation did not have 

capacity to sue because its articles of incorporation were never filed. Id. On appeal, the Tenth 

District held that it could not be ascertained from the record if Kim-Lynn-Shawn, Inc. was a 

fictitious name or a trade name and that, if the plaintiff was the owner of the property under an 

assumed name, he would have standing to sue. Id. at 1277. Because reasonable minds could 

come to different conclusions regarding the issue, the court held that the trial court had erred in 

granting summary judgment. Id.; see also 1 Ohio Real Property Law and Practice, Section 

6.09[7] (2017) (“A deed is valid between the parties when from or to a person acting under an 

assumed or fictitious name, but not to a completely fictitious person. * * * A conveyance to a 

fictitious person is void. * * * There is a distinction, however, between conveying a deed to a 

fictitious, nonexistent being and a person in existence who is described by a fictitious name. 

Thus, a conveyance to a person doing business under a fictitious name is valid, but a conveyance 
to a person not in being, or a fictitious entity is a nullity.”); 9 Thompson on Real Property, Section 

82.08(a)(2), (Thomas Ed. 2018), fn. 221 (“A deed conveying land to a nonexistent or wholly 

fictitious grantee is treated differently than a conveyance to a person or business operation or 

using an ‘assumed name.’ In the former case, the deed is void * * * ; in the later case the 

requirement of a having a ‘grantee’ has been met. * * * [T]he assumed name ‘is sufficient.’”), 

quoting Roeckl v. F.D.I.C., 885 P.2d 1067 (Alaska 1994) (“transfers to grantees under assumed 

names — as opposed to transfers to wholly fictitious or nonexistent entities — are not generally 

barred”). 

{¶17} What A Lovely Home is not a nonexistent, fictitious person; it is a properly 

reported, fictitious name. As these authorities make clear, a person can enter into a contract, sue 

and be sued and hold title to property under a properly reported fictitious name. Doing business 

under another name does not create an entity distinct from the person operating the business. 

See, e.g., Oldendick, 2016-Ohio-5621, 70 N.E.3d 1033, at ¶ 68, citing Patterson v. V & M Auto 

Body, 63 Ohio St.3d 573, 574-575, 589 N.E.2d 1306 (1992); see also Herschell v. Rudolph, 11th 

Dist. Lake No. 2001-L-069, 2002-Ohio-1688, ¶ 28 (“When ‘d.b.a.’ (doing business as) is used, 

there is no legal distinction between the individual and the business entity since it is merely a 

descriptive of the person who does business under some other name.”). The real person that uses 

the fictitious name when entering into a contract is the actual party to the contract. Likewise, a 

deed to a fictitious name is really a deed to the person operating under the fictitious name. 

{¶18} The evidence demonstrates that Doug Woods reported his use of the fictitious name 

What A Lovely Home to the Secretary of State before taking title to the properties at issue and 

before filing the actions at issue in this case. As such, Doug Woods has the right to operate under 

the fictitious name What A Lovely Home, to take title to property in that name and to sue to 
enforce contracts entered in that name. See, e.g., Shafron Enterprises Defined Benefit Pension 

Plan v. Midland Title Security, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 60922, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3301, 

3-4 (June 22, 1992) (rejecting claims of defendant title company that plaintiff pension plan lacked 

standing to sue because used a fictitious name when it purchased the property at issue). 

{¶19} Further, the fact that What A Lovely Home was a fictitious name and that Doug 

Woods was the “real person” behind What A Lovely Home (and owner of the properties at issue) 

was clear from the face of the deeds themselves. At the time the eviction actions were filed, 

“What A Lovely Home, a fictitious filing name registered in the state of Ohio by Doug Woods 

(single)” was the grantee on the deeds.6

 

{¶20} Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing Woods’ claims for damages. 

Woods’ first assignment of error is sustained. Based on our resolution of Woods’ first 

assignment of error, his remaining assignments of error are moot. 

{¶21} Judgments reversed; cases remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellees the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to Garfield Heights Municipal Court to carry 

this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules 

of Appellate Procedure. 

 

6

 On November 9, 2017, Doug Woods executed quit claim deeds transferring the subject properties from “What A 

Lovely Home, a fictitious filing name registered in the state of Ohio by Doug Woods (single), the Grantor” to “Doug 

Woods dba What A Lovely Home (single), the Grantee.” However, it appears that copies of these deeds were not 

filed until after the trial court issued the judgment entries dismissing Woods’ damages claims. Therefore, they are 

not considered by this court on appeal. 
____________________________________________________ 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR