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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 11-1922 (BAH)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, 

for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 8]. For the reasons discussed below, the defendant’s motion will 

be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff prevailed in a race discrimination suit against the Navy, and “the gross 

amount of the damages . . . was $ 121,706.64.” Compl. ¶ 4. The Navy “ha[d] the statutory 

authority to collect taxes . . . in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code,” id. ¶ 5, and “paid 

the bulk of the monies ordered to be paid . . . via check drawn on the Treasury [o]f [t]he United 

States dated 7 April 1988 . . . in the amount of $80,839.30,” id. ¶ 2.1 In addition, the Navy 

 1 The Court entered a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, ordered the Navy to “install [him] 

as a Management Analyst, GS-11, as of December 27, 1982,” and awarded “him . . . 

compensation equal to the difference between what he would have earned if he had held that 

position from that date until October 1, 1987, and what plaintiff, in fact, earned from any 

government and private employment.” Brown v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, No. 86-1582, 1987 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 13263, at *14 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1987). “In April, 1988 the defendant provided the 

plaintiff with detailed computations indicating that the gross amount of damages from CA 86-

VICTOR IVY BROWN, :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

RAYMOND EDWIN MABUS, JR., :

Secretary of the Navy, :

:

Defendant. :
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withheld $2,727.00 in Social Security taxes for tax year 1988. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. This amount was 

reflected in written notices from the Social Security Administration in November 1997 and 

November 2001, id., but the plaintiff’s “W-2 Wage and Tax Statement for the tax year 1988 

[did] not reveal that any Social Security taxes were withheld from any of the monies due and 

payable to the plaintiff” from the damages award. Id. ¶ 9. 

According to the plaintiff, from December 27, 1982, through December 31, 1988, he 

“was covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (‘CSRS’) which entailed the payment of 

monies into the CSRS and not into the general Social Security Fund . . ., also known as [t]he 

Federal Insurance Contribution Act (‘FICA’).” Id. ¶ 12. He thus was not obligated to pay Social 

Security taxes for tax year 1988, id. ¶¶ 10-11, and in September 2004, the Navy acknowledged 

that “money was erroneously deposited into funds of the [FICA],” id. ¶ 13. The plaintiff since 

has attempted, without success, to recover $2,727.00 from the federal government through the 

Office of Personnel Management, id. ¶¶ 21-22, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 

id. ¶ 23, and the Internal Revenue Service, id. ¶ 24. In addition, in 2003, the plaintiff submitted a 

written request to the Navy for reimbursement. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to 

Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”), Ex. 6 (Letter to plaintiff from Joel M. Rosen, Senior Associate 

Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Department of 

Defense, dated December 3, 2003) at 1. After “an exhaustive search” for relevant pay records, 

the plaintiff’s request was denied. Id., Ex. 6 at 1.

In this action, plaintiff again demands reimbursement of the $2,727.00 erroneously 

withheld from him in 1988. He alleges that the Navy has improperly “seized monies due and 

 

1582 was $121,706.64.” Compl. ¶ 4.
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payable . . . in violation of the Constitution, Amendment IV,” Compl. ¶ 26, and has, in effect, 

“assessed” a tax on him “in the amount of $2,727.00, in violation of Art. I, Sec. 8 of the 

Constitution,” id. ¶ 27, and in violation of the Constitution, Amendment XVI,” id. ¶ 29. In 

addition to a declaratory judgment, the plaintiff “asks that this Court order the defendant to 

return the sum of $2,727.00 to [him], with accrued interest, compounded monthly and retroactive 

to 1 January 1989.” Id. at 7 (Prayer for Relief, Count I); see id. at 8-9 (Prayer for Relief, Counts 

II, III and IV). 

The plaintiff has sought reimbursement previously in this Court. In 1990, the plaintiff 

filed a civil action “based on defendant’s alleged retaliatory actions against [him] stemming from 

his successful Title VII suit,” and he demanded “$121,706.64 in damages, the amount which was 

awarded to him in his original Title VII suit,” notwithstanding the plaintiff’s acknowledgment 

“that this amount was previously paid by the defendant as ordered.” Brown v. Garrett, No. 90-

1003, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13062, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 1990). The complaint, which the 

Court described as a “long and rambling” document of “29 pages and . . . over 80 paragraphs, 

some of which [were] more than a page long,” was dismissed for its failure to comply with Rule 

8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.

On August 16, 2002, the plaintiff filed a motion in his long-closed Title VII case to cite 

the Navy for contempt because of its alleged failure to comply with the September 30, 1987 

Order “award[ing] back pay for the position [the plaintiff] was denied, less any amount that he 

actually earned” during the relevant time period. Memorandum, Brown v. Dep’t of the Navy, No. 

86-1582 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 11, 2003) at 1. The Court denied the plaintiff’s motion, see Order, 

Brown v. Dep’t of the Navy, No. 86-1582 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 11, 2003), and explained its 

decision as follows:
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The evidence submitted by [plaintiff] does raise the possibility that 

$2,727.00 might have been deducted from his back pay amount. 

However, [he] has not produced the ‘clear and convincing’ 

evidence needed to hold the Navy in contempt for non-compliance 

with the Order. Specifically, three essential facts have not been 

established: (1) whether the back pay amount actually paid out to 

[plaintiff] fell short of the expected amount; (2) whether the 

$2727.00, if it was in fact deducted, was taken from the back pay 

amount, or from [his] regular salary for 1988; and (3) whether 

Form 7005, which refers to “estimated Social Security taxes paid,” 

is an accurate reflection of actual Social Security taxes paid.

Memorandum, Brown v. Dep’t of the Navy, No. 86-1582 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 11, 2003) at 3-4

(emphasis in original). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 

summarily affirmed this decision. Brown v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, No. 03-5290, 2004 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 5442 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 22, 2004). 

II. DISCUSSION

The defendant moves to dismiss and argues that the doctrine of res judicata bars the 

plaintiff from relitigating issues that have been raised or that could have been raised in prior 

proceedings. See generally Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5-8.2

 The 

plaintiff responds that “[t]he actual cause of action as set forth in the Complaint stems from the 

notification by the Social Security Administration (‘SSA’) that the Defendant assessed the 

Plaintiff taxes which he was not obligated to pay, thereby violating the Plaintiff’s rights under 

the Constitution.” Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of his Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss or, in the 

Alternative, for Summ. J. [Dkt. #9] at 1. He characterizes his claim as one for “misappropriation 

of the monies in question.” Id. at 2. Because the plaintiff “has never litigated an issue of 

Constitutional law in the Court,” he asserts that res judicata does not apply. Id. at 8.

 2 Because the only matters outside the pleadings considered by the Court are those of 

which it may take judicial notice, the Court does not treat the defendant’s motion as one for 

summary judgment.
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Generally, a plaintiff is expected to “present in one suit all the claims for relief that he

may have arising out of the same transaction or occurrence.” U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Blake Constr.

Co., Inc., 765 F.2d 195, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting 1B J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶

0.410[1] (1983)). Under the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion), a final judgment on the

merits in a prior suit involving the same parties bars subsequent suits based on the same cause of

action. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 

439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). “Whether two cases implicate the same cause of action turns on 

whether they share the same ‘nucleus of facts.’” Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 393 F.3d 210, 217 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (quoting Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). Parties are thus prevented 

from relitigating in a separate proceeding “any ground for relief which they already have had an 

opportunity to litigate[,] even if they chose not to exploit that opportunity,” and regardless of the 

soundness of the earlier judgment. Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 

1981); I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear Mfg.Co., 723 F.2d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 

(noting that res judicata “forecloses all that which might have been litigated previously” (citation 

omitted)).

Without question, the plaintiff’s claim to $2,727.00 arises from the judgment entered in 

his favor in the prior Title VII suit against the Department of the Navy. The plaintiff’s 

opportunity to litigate the amount owed to him pursuant to that judgment – and the $2,727.00 

allegedly withheld from him and erroneously paid in Social Security taxes on his behalf in 1988

– has come and gone. Indeed, the plaintiff’s 2002 contempt motion was denied after plaintiff 

had an opportunity to prove that the defendant did not comply with the judgment in the Title VII 

suit. Here, the plaintiff merely recharacterizes his claim as one for “misappropriation” of funds

in violation of the United States Constitution. He alleges “no new facts,” and instead “simply 
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rais[ed] a new legal theory. This is precisely what is barred by res judicata.” Apotex, 393 F.3d 

at 217-18.

The Court concludes that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

See Peters v. District of Columbia, _ F. Supp. 2d _, _, 2012 WL 1255139, at *9 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 

2012) (applying res judicata even though “the causes of action here are not identical to the 

causes of action in the prior suit” because “[t]he factual allegations underpinning [plaintiff’s] 

current claims mirror those in the dismissed action”); Ramos v. Dominican Republic, No. 12-

0481, 2012 WL 1067562, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2012) (stating that plaintiff “cannot avoid 

application of the doctrine [of res judicata] by adding . . . a new party defendant or by presenting 

a new legal theory”); Duma v. JP Morgan Chase, 828 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding 

that, because the issue of lender’s right to initiate foreclosure proceedings “necessarily was 

decided by [the bankruptcy judge’s] order” relieving lender of automatic stay, “[a]ny challenge 

to the validity of [lender’s] Proof of Claim could have – and should have – been raised in the 

bankruptcy court”). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted.

An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

 /s/ Beryl A. Howell

BERYL A. HOWELL

United States District Judge

DATE: September 21, 2012