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The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

Guided by its service-specific strategy to “integrate air and space and be 

simultaneously prepared for offensive and defensive operations,” which was 

approved in 20041 , the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force (PLAAF) is 

pursuing an ambitious path of modernization to transform itself from an inwardfocused homeland air defense force to a world-class “strategic air force”2

 capable 

of playing a decisive role in China’s national security and military strategy.3 To 

this end, over the past decade the PLAAF has fielded increasingly modern and 

more capable equipment and weapon systems. Its likelihood to achieve victory, 

however, in informatized, high-intensity combat in a complex electromagnetic 

environment (CEME) is contingent on more than equipment modernization. 

Success in modern warfare also necessitates highly trained personnel who can 

adapt to tactical scenarios in a combat environment and perform sustained combat 

operations at their home bases and in deployed locations. 

After taking power in late 2012, Chinese President and Central Military 

Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping put forth a vision for building a strong 

China, known as the “Chinese Dream” (中国梦). The modernization of China’s 

military is essential to the success of this strategy, as a strong PLA is viewed 

as a prerequisite for “building a well-off society” and “rejuvenating the Chinese 

nation.”4 In April 2014, Xi urged the PLAAF to speed up its transformation into 

a strong air power with an integrated air and space capability, emphasizing that 

the PLAAF must focus on training that boosts combat capability.5 Xi’s remarks 

allude to the difficulty of developing a truly combat-capable force, a longstanding 

challenge for the PLAAF. Indeed, historically PLAAF training was characterized 

by highly scripted scenarios that did not reflect the realities of modern combat. 

Introduction

Jana Allen is a Lt Col in the USAF Reserve and a CASI Associate.

Kenneth Allen is the Research Director for CASI and a retired USAF Officer. He has

 focused on China and PLA issues for years and has published extensively on the subject.
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

The PLAAF’s desire to advance its strategic transformation through qualitative 

changes is evidenced by its development of what it calls the “four key training 

brands”6 (四大品牌).7 These include: the Golden Helmet (金头盔) military 

competition; the Golden Dart (金飞镖) military competition; the Blue Shield (蓝

盾) exercise, which includes the Golden Shield (金盾) competition; and the Red 

Sword (红剑) exercise.8 This report provides an overview of these annual training 

events, which are described by the PLAAF as its “four main actual-combat 

oriented training series.”9

The four key training brands increasingly serve as an important platform to 

test and further develop the PLAAF’s operational capabilities, and also present an 

opportunity to assess the PLAAF’s progress toward becoming a modern “strategic 

air force.” Although they cannot be considered impartial sources, the frequent 

reports in Chinese media and commentary by key personnel and military experts 

about these annual training events provide some insight on PLAAF developments. 

In 2016 and 2017, Chinese official media published several reports detailing the 

success of the four key training brands, which form the basis for this report. The 

official PLAAF newspaper, Air Force News (空军报), is an especially useful source 

of reporting on PLAAF training. Its more official descriptions and commentaries 

provide a starting point for analysis of the four key training brands, despite the 

lack of transparency regarding some details. These training events have evolved in 

complexity as the PLAAF took concrete steps to reduce the gap between training 

scenarios and what is expected under actual-combat conditions. 

Key observations on the four key training events include: 

• The primary focus of the four key training brands is on preparing for actual 

combat under unknown (unscripted) conditions in a CEME. The PLAAF 

has gradually increased the complexity of each of the four key training 

brands since their inception and will likely continue to include more complex 

components in the future, as it moves incrementally toward completely 

unscripted training. 

• The competitions and exercises conducted under the four key training 

brands provide a platform for the PLAAF to assess existing tactics and 

combat methods and to make recommendations for adjustments or creating 

new ones. They are also used to help the PLAAF identify shortcomings 

in equipment and pilot capabilities. The PLAAF is taking concrete steps, 

albeit incremental, to raise training to the next level. This has likely led to 

a corresponding increase in capabilities, such as improved pilot autonomy. 
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

• Evaluation criteria for the four key training brands were developed to 

emphasize the actual effects of each engagement rather than simply focusing 

on scores and who wins. Furthermore, evaluation criteria are intended to 

guide the forces toward studying “real enemies” and identifying areas 

of weakness. This indicates the PLAAF is making some progress toward 

providing personnel with accurate and impartial feedback, which it has been 

hesitant to do in the past. As a deputy chief of staff of an Eastern Theater 

Command Air Force (TCAF) air regiment noted in 2016, “The real point 

of Golden Helmet is not to rack up glories for the unit, but to uncover and 

fix mistakes.”10

• Overall, the PLAAF is increasingly including key components of the 

surface-to-air missile (SAM) and radar branches, and communications 

specialty units, as well as each component of the aviation branch, including 

fighter, attack, bomber, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), 

refueling, and airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, in these competition 

and exercise events. Of note, however, no references have been found to the 

antiaircraft artillery (AAA) branch or the airborne branch. 

• Although the overall number of individual components in each event is 

growing, there were no reports found in Chinese media of multiple aircraft, 

SAMs, and radar units training together in a joint engagement zone ( JEZ). 

For example, although fighter and SAM units train separately on a regular 

basis against “enemy” aircraft, no information was found concerning any 

training that involves a PLAAF aircraft taking off, being vectored to an 

air engagement by a controller in the control tower or an airborne early 

warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, engaging an “enemy” aircraft, and 

then having a SAM fire at the “enemy” aircraft at the same time that the 

PLAAF aircraft is in the air. Furthermore, although the PLAAF has official 

definitions for a missile engagement zone (MEZ) and a fighter engagement 

zone (FEZ), it does not appear to define a JEZ, where aircraft and SAMs 

engage the enemy in the same airspace (see Appendix A).

• The four key training brands are developed by and for the PLAAF. As 

such, they focus on honing PLAAF core competencies, rather than joint 

interoperability. The one exception was in 2017, when three Naval Aviation 

pilots from the South Sea Fleet (SSF) air brigade participated in the Golden 

Helmet competition for the first time.11 They did not win any awards; 

however, their inclusion provided an opportunity for valuable individual and 

joint training, and may be an indication of more to come.
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

• Although the Dingxin Test and Training Base in the Gobi Desert in Gansu 

Province has been the primary location for the four key training brands, 

some events have taken place in Eastern China, the Bohai Gulf, and over 

water off the east coast of China.

• The PLAAF has given personnel who excelled during the four key training 

brands opportunities to participate in international military competitions, 

such as Aviadarts.12 This competition was held in Russia from 2014 to 2016 

and in China in 2017.
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

Since 2016, the evolution of the four key training brands has occurred against 

the backdrop of massive organizational reforms being implemented across the 

PLA writ large. Within the PLAAF, major organizational reforms have included: 

1) the shift to a Base-brigade structure13 that began in 2012 from the 

traditional command post-division/regiment structure for the aviation, SAM, 

airborne, and radar branches, as well as communications brigades; 

2) the consolidation and upgrading of flight colleges and their restructuring 

into training brigades that began in 2011;14

3) the change from seven Military Region Air Forces (MRAF) to five Theater 

Command Air Forces (TCAF) in early 2016; 

4) changes in the headquarters and staff organizations that began above the 

corps level in early 2016 and were implemented at the corps level and below in 

2017; and 

5) a division of responsibilities between the PLAAF Headquarters, which 

is responsible for “construction” functions, such as organizing, manning, and 

equipping units, and the five TCAF Headquarters, which are responsible for 

combat operations. 

In addition to these organizational changes, as of the 19th Party Congress 

in November 2017, the PLAAF commander, along with the other service 

commanders, is no longer on the CMC.15 Despite these extensive and likely 

disruptive organizational reforms, the PLAAF leadership remained focused on 

its mandate to accelerate the building of the force. In January 2016, the Air Force 

Party Committee emphasized that “in times of reform and tackling tough issues, it 

is particularly essential to unswervingly push forward realistic combat training.”16

The Four Key Training Brands

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

Table 1 below provides a brief overview of the four key training brands, 

including their name, type, when they began, where they occur, and the types 

of units that participate. Each brand is discussed separately in the sections that 

follow. Regarding terminology, it is important to note that although the PLAAF 

generally refers to them as the “four key training brands” (四大品牌),17 Chinese 

official media is not consistent in how it identifies these events in Chinese or 

English (see Appendix B). For purposes of this report, the term “competition” will 

be used for Golden Helmet and Golden Dart and the term “exercise” will be used 

for Blue Shield and Red Sword, even though since 2017 the Blue Shield exercise has 

included the Golden Shield competition. When discussing all four together, they 

will be referred to as the “four key training brands”.

Table 1: Four Key Training Brands

Event Type First Time Location Participants

Golden Helmet Competition 2011 Dingxin Test & 

Training Base

PLAAF and Naval aviation 

fighters and attack aircraft 

Golden Dart Competition 2014

Different locations: 

Dingxin Test & 

Training Base, East 

China, and over 

water

PLAAF attack aircraft and 

bombers

Blue Shield

includes Golden 

Shield

Exercise includes 

competition 2002

Bohai Gulf and 

Dingxin Test & 

Training Base

PLAAF fighter and attack 

aircraft, and SAMs

Red Sword Exercise 2009 Dingxin Test & 

Training Base

PLAAF fighters, attack aircraft, airborne early warning 

(AEW), and reconnaissance 

aircraft, radars, ECM units, 

and SAMs

2
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands 3

Golden Helmet 

(金头盔) Competition

Established in 2011, the Golden Helmet competition has been held for 

seven consecutive years. It is an air-to-air combat competition designed to 

“improve and assess pilots’ skills and capabilities in combat conditions,” and 

it features “one-on-one” and “two-on-two” engagements between similar and 

dissimilar aircraft as well as three-aircraft close-quarters combat (三机近

战).18 The Golden Helmet competition is normally held for about ten days 

during November and/or December in the Gobi Desert at the PLAAF’s 

Dingxin Test and Training Base in Gansu Province. The one exception was 

in 2014, when the Golden Helmet competition was held in September and 

was immediately followed by the inaugural Golden Dart competition. The 

competition results in a few outstanding individual pilots winning the Golden 

Helmet award and the top unit receiving the Skyhawk Cup (天鹰杯) award. 

According to Chinese media reports, this competition represents the highest 

standards of the Chinese Air Force’s air battle training, and winning the 

competition is considered the highest honor for PLAAF fighter and attack 

pilots.19 At least one Golden Helmet winner has been chosen to represent 

the PLAAF in the Aviadarts international competition.20 This competition 

was held in Russia from 2014 to 2016 and in China (in Changchun, Jilin 

Province) in 2017.

From 2011 to 2016, participation in the Golden Helmet competition ranged 

from 108 to 170 pilots selected from approximately 15 to 20 air regiments and 

brigades per year.21 The criteria and timeline for selecting individual and unit 

participants is unclear, though one source from 2014 indicated that for the 

first time the pilots were selected at random by PLAAF Headquarters, rather 
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

than by individual units, which ensured that half of the selectees were firsttime participants.22 One Northern TCAF air brigade, currently commanded 

by Xu Liqiang (许立强), has participated in all seven competitions.23 Another 

air brigade from the Eastern TCAF has had six pilots win the Golden Helmet

award and four win the Golden Dart award, which indicates this particular unit 

has both air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities.24 In the most recent Golden 

Helmet competition in November 2017, a total of only 100 pilots from 16 air 

brigades competed. The lack of participation by any air regiments in 2017 is 

likely explained by the PLAAF’s shift to a brigade structure, which began 

in 2012. By mid-2017, all PLAAF fighter and ground attack air divisions 

had been abolished and all subordinate regiments were either upgraded to 

brigades, merged into brigades, or abolished.25 Of the 100 participants, six 

pilots received Golden Helmet awards and one unidentified Northern TCAF 

air brigade received the Skyhawk Cup award.26

Three Naval Aviation pilots from a SSF air brigade participated in the 

Golden Helmet competition for the first time in 2017, though Naval Aviation 

pilots had apparently observed earlier iterations.27 Additionally, prior to 2017, 

Naval Aviation pilots had engaged Golden Helmet winners in at least one other 

training event. In August 2014, two pilots from the East Sea Fleet’s (ESF) 

“Blue Force” unit equipped with Su-30MK2s conducted the first-ever joint 

free-air combat opposition-force training over water with the Air Force.28

The PLAAF pilots were Golden Helmet winners flying J-11s. Chinese media 

reported that after training for five months, the Naval Aviation pilots won the 

two-minute competitions, which involved “one-on-one” and “two-on-two” 

engagements. This could indicate that the Naval Aviation pilots “trained for 

the test” during the five months leading up to this event, a problem that has 

also characterized PLAAF training, rather than focusing on actual training 

requirements under the revised Outline for Military Training and Evaluation 

(OMTE), i.e. pilots spend much of their time training for a particular event.

Table 2 provides information about each of the seven Golden Helmet

competitions. According to one unconfirmed report, as of 2017 a total of 63 

awards have been presented, including three pilots who have won the award 

more than once.29

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The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

Table 2: Golden Helmet Competition

Year/Month Competition Number of ParticipantsNumber of Units Number of Winners

2011/Nov 1st Unknown Unknown 10

2012/Nov 2nd 108 10+ brigades & 

regiments

11

2013/Nov 3rd 123 Unknown 9

2014/Sep 4th 170 20 brigades & 

regiments

6

2015/Nov-Dec 5th 160 Unknown 12

2016/Dec 6th 150 Unknown 6

2017/Nov 7th 100 16 brigades 6

TOTAL 60

The Golden Helmet competition has evolved in a few key respects since 

its first iteration in 2011. Reflecting the PLAAF’s aim to make training 

more reflective of actual-combat air battles, the rules of the Golden Helmet

competition have expanded to include not only air battles between aircraft 

of the same model but also those between different models; “one-on-one” 

aircraft confrontation as well as formation-to-formation confrontation; and 

scorekeeping competition as well as “hit-to-bring-down fight.”30 Over the 

past seven years, the competition has gradually eliminated restrictions that 

were discordant with conditions expected during actual combat and increased 

autonomy so that pilots could focus on sharpening their skills and end 

“nanny-style” preparations (“保姆式”准备).31 In 2011, the first competition 

incorporated “free-air combat”32 and eliminated the difference in altitude 

for horizontal maneuvers in aerial combat, which is considered an advanced 

training level by the United States Air Force.33

In 2015, the competition incorporated dissimilar aircraft confrontations, 

breaking with the practice of organizing similar aircraft confrontations for 

small team competitions.34 This represented a significant step toward more 

realistic air combat training. In 2016, for the first time, the “Red Force” was 

officially designated as the offensive side and the “Blue Force” as the defensive 

side, whereas previously the colors were only used to differentiate between 

the two sides. This change led the participants to shift their mission objective 

from “shooting down the opponent” (击落对手) to “completing the mission” (

完成任务).35 Finally, in 2017 the competition included an evaluation of fouraircraft close-quarters air combat, a reduction in unencrypted commands, an 

emphasis on the role of the lead aircraft, an elimination of restrictions on 

5
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

what some aircraft can carry externally, as well as limitations on jamming by 

those aircraft.36 Chinese media reported that these changes greatly reduced 

the gap between the competition and actual combat. According to Sun 

Mingxing, director of the PLAAF Staff Department’s Training Bureau, the 

Golden Helmet competition has “become a model for combat-realistic Air 

Force military training, as well as an important guide for improving the 

capabilities needed for victory in the new era.”37

Regarding the training value of the competition, Golden Helmet provides 

a platform for assessing existing tactics and combat methods and for making 

recommendations for adjustments or creating new ones. China’s development 

and employment of an air combat maneuvering instrumentation (ACMI) 

system has propelled the PLAAF’s tactical training forward over the past 

decade. The PLAAF has utilized monitoring systems, such as the Flight 

Parameter Recording System or “feican” (飞参), on aircraft and in control 

towers to measure and record information about the aircraft since the early 

2000s.38 These systems enable more realistic air combat training by providing 

a safer training environment for pilots and accurately documenting a training 

event in its entirety. Such a detailed account of who did what and when 

enables a factual, constructive assessment of pilot performance and leads to 

improved capabilities. This technology is particularly useful for evaluating 

training events like Golden Helmet. According to one media report, the Golden 

Helmet evaluation process resulted in a series of shifts in thinking on aerial 

combat, and repeated aerial confrontations taught numerous tactics and 

combat methods, which assisted the PLAAF in its move toward becoming 

“an all-area operation modernized strategic service.”39

The PLAAF’s implementation of free-air combat has been a gradual 

process and has apparently not yet reached the point where pilots are allowed 

to maneuver at will. However, the PLAAF appears to be moving toward more 

pilot autonomy. For example, Chinese media reported that after a major loss 

in air-to-air combat, Ji Chao (季超), a Southern TCAF air brigade deputy 

chief of staff, concluded that without proficient flying capability and the 

most effective tactics and combat methods, the advanced capabilities of the 

aircraft do not guarantee success.40 According to Ji, it was like “driving a race 

car on a road with a speed limit.”41 In 2016, Ji completed his flight transition 

for a new domestically manufactured aircraft and was selected to participate 

in the Golden Helmet competition. To prepare for the competition, Ji created 

a few sets of new tactics and combat methods, and despite incomplete radar 

intelligence, used his deductions to identify the targets and switched his 

6
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

tactics while engaged with his rival. He won with a score of 22:0 and 32:0 

and was awarded a Golden Helmet.

42

This report indicates that in some cases pilots are being given more 

latitude to make adjustments to set tactics and combat methods. Historically, 

when pilots received a new tactic or combat method that were incorporated 

in a set of regulations, they were not allowed to make any changes without 

prior approval. Although Ji “created” a new set of tactics and combat methods 

that he used during the competition, it does not necessarily mean they were 

officially sanctioned for use throughout the force. Typically, if a new maneuver 

is successful, it is then assigned to either an operational unit or one of the 

Test and Training Bases for further review and approval before it is written 

into a regulation and distributed to all units for implementation. This process 

can take several months to a year, or more in some cases.

In addition to assessing and developing tactics and combat methods, the 

competition helped the PLAAF identify shortcomings in equipment and 

pilot capabilities. One article reported that during Golden Helmet-2016, gaps 

were identified in the performance of the aircraft radar, electronic warfare, 

missile, and intelligence systems, which directly affected the formulation 

and implementation of tactics and combat methods. When discussing these 

problems, Wang Wei (王玮), the assistant to the chief of staff of an aviation 

division in the Eastern TCAF, asserted that combat methods should not be 

developed merely by studying an opponent and idealizing capabilities, without 

taking into account each aircraft’s strong points and weaknesses, as this does 

not assure success in actual battle.43 The same article indicated the following 

pilot shortcomings were observed during the competition: the inability to 

devise stratagems and a lack of innovation or initiative; the inability to study 

and grasp the performance features of the weaponry and equipment, which 

caused some individuals to implement tactics in a haphazard manner without 

sufficient flexibility and adaptability; and weakness in psychological qualities, 

which negatively affected some pilots’ performance during the contest, 

although they can keep their performance stable under “normal conditions.”44

Golden Helmet-2017

Golden Helmet-2017 commenced on 1 November and concluded on 10 

November 2017. Sixteen Air Force air brigades and nearly 100 pilots from 

the five TCAFs competed in air combat confrontations for six Golden Helmet

awards and one Skyhawk Cup. One article indicated that participating units 

sent new and younger pilots to participate, focusing on the training value 

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

of the competition rather than the final results.45 Chinese media reported 

that several types of Chinese designated “third-generation”46 fighter jets, 

including J-10s, J-11s, and JH-7s, participated in the competition.47 Although 

second-generation fighters, including J-7s and J-8s, participated in earlier 

competitions, they apparently no longer participate. According to one source, 

the J-20 fighters will join the competition in the future, when their number 

in service increases.48 It typically takes two years to achieve initial operational 

capability (IOC) after the first aircraft are assigned to an operational unit.49

According to Sun Mingxing, director of the PLAAF Staff Department’s 

Training Bureau, Golden Helmet-2017 was the first test of PLAAF aviation 

units since the organizational reforms, and for some aviation brigades, it was 

their first important mission since the reorganization.50 The competition 

examined coordinated combat actions among teams as well as weapons and 

equipment performance during unknown situations and under unknown 

electromagnetic conditions.

One Chinese media report advised that Golden Helmet-2017 aimed 

to evaluate the following skills, which are viewed as necessary combat 

capabilities: pilot’s ability to conduct dissimilar-aircraft confrontations; win 

a war under unknown situations and unknown electromagnetic conditions; 

take coordinated combat actions between a formation, AEW aircraft, and 

a command post in the control tower; and carry out information-firepower 

integrated operations.51 Another commentary on the competition discussed 

how future aerial combat is likely to take place over a maritime battlefield or 

in a CEME, which could result in battles being fought with no or interrupted 

information from the aircraft’s data link. Therefore, it is necessary to study 

and solve “difficult questions,” including how to self-reliantly search targets, 

close in on enemy aircraft, engage in a dogfight, and dodge attacks without 

timely and adequate data support.52

One article noted that the competition had shifted its training mentality, 

emphasizing that “winning against the enemy is more important than winning 

against teammates” and shifting away from “observing teammates practice” to 

“observing the enemy’s practice.”53 In addition, Xu Liqiang, commander of 

a Northern TCAF air brigade that has participated in every Golden Helmet

competition, stated that, “If one wishes to avoid defeat, one must constantly 

research the battlefield environment, operational opponents, and equipment 

performance.”54 These reports did not specifically refer to potential foreign 

“enemies” or “opponents”; however, another commentator noted that 

dissimilar-aircraft confrontations in the Golden Helmet competition were 

8
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

designed to train Chinese fighter pilots to gain experience against aircraft 

such as Su-30 and US-made F-15 fighters.55 This indicates the PLAAF is 

studying potential foreign competitor aircraft, but it is unclear if foreign 

tactics are being incorporated into dissimilar aircraft training. 

To increase the intensity and difficulty of the competition in 2017, 

close-air battle confrontation was added, in addition to medium-range air 

combat confrontation.56 In addition, the pilots reportedly received fewer 

orders from the ground-based command posts, enabling them to make more 

independent decisions during the competition.57 The role of AEW “airborne 

command posts” during the competition, however, is unclear. Restrictions 

on some fighter jets' external payload and their jamming capabilities were 

lifted, enabling units to freely determine the amount of payload based on 

their tactical needs.58 Chinese media reported that the focus of the exercise 

had shifted from determining success or failure in the air to emphasizing 

victory through system-of-systems operations. Additionally, the combat 

teams participating in the 2017 competition reportedly received “strong rear 

support” from an improved operational command information system, an air 

combat post-assessment system, and a “highly effective” equipment support 

mechanism.59

The winners of Golden Helmet-2017 were selected from the three units 

that made it to the final round and were determined by the overall scores 

of the formation and the completion of tasks.60 This featured “two-on-two” 

engagements between fighters of the same type or different types, which 

reportedly required “teamwork” to win.61 In the end, a total of six pilots 

each from the Southern, Northern, and Western TCAFs, respectively, won 

Golden Helmet awards and a Northern TCAF air brigade won the Skyhawk 

Cup for the top performing brigade.62 Golden Helmet award winners included 

Liu Zhankun (刘占坤), a deputy chief of staff of a Western TCAF aviation 

brigade.63

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The Golden Dart competition, which was first held in 2014, is another 

high-profile military contest designated as one of the PLAAF’s four key 

training brands. Both the Golden Dart and Golden Helmet competitions 

are described as “‘one-on-one’ competitive tactical and technical exams.”64

However, unlike the Golden Helmet competition, which focuses on air-to-air 

engagement, the Golden Dart competition focuses on air-to-ground attack by 

attack and bomber aircraft.65 According to the PLAAF Headquarters’ Staff 

Department’s Training Bureau, the Golden Dart competition aims to improve 

troops’ offensive air war-fighting capabilities.66 The competition integrates 

information on attack and defense, system confrontation, electromagnetic 

environment and other elements.67 The PLAAF awards the highest honor 

of the competition, the Golden Dart award, to the top aircrews who excel in 

“defense-line penetrating and shock attack operations.”68 One Chinese media 

report defines the assessment criteria for the Golden Dart competition as 

“aiming only once, firing only once, and zero mark if the first attack misses 

the target.”69

Although often compared to the Golden Helmet competition in terms of 

status and prestige, the Golden Dart competition has not received as much 

coverage by Chinese media. Based on the limited information available, it 

appears that the timing of the competition varies each year. Whereas the first 

competition was held around September 2014, immediately following the 

Golden Helmet competition, in 2016 the competition was held in July, prior 

to the Golden Helmet competition, which was held in December. The most 

recent iteration was held in April 2018. It also appears that the competition 

10

Golden Dart 

(金飞镖) Competition
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

changes location each year. Thus far it has been held in the Western, Eastern, 

and Northern TCs. According to one report, the Golden Dart competition 

“takes place on a ‘battlefield’ that ranges from desert to the hills and sea.”70

In 2014, it was held at the Dingxin Test and Training Base. In 2015, it was 

held for the first time over water off the east coast of China. In 2016, it was 

held somewhere in east China, likely in Zhejiang.71 In 2018, it was held in 

Changchun in Jilin Province.72 Finally, it is not clear how many aircrews 

have won the Golden Dart award. Conflicting information indicates a total of 

between 17 to 25 crews won during 2014 and 2015;73 and some pilots, such as 

Chen Quanlong (陈权龙) and Wang Li (王立) from an unidentified Eastern 

TC (formerly Nanjing MRAF) air regiment, have won both the Golden Dart

and Golden Helmet award.74 Information concerning Golden Dart-2016 and 

Golden Dart-2018 is detailed below. No further information was found for 

the 2014, 2015, or 2017 competitions. 

Golden Dart-2016

The Golden Dart-2016 competition kicked off on 21 July 2016 in east 

China.75 Chinese media reported that “this defense and assault military 

competition featured hundreds of pilots from dozens of air brigades and 

regiments from all five TCAFs.”76 The Golden Dart competition likely serves 

similar purposes as the Golden Helmet competition, namely serving as a 

training platform to assess and refine tactics and combat methods for bomber 

and assault aircraft, as well as an opportunity to evaluate equipment and 

personnel capabilities in an environment that more closely resembles what is 

expected during combat operations. It was reported that Golden Dart-2016

incorporated live ammunition and the application of new weapons, as well 

as surveillance and strike drones, early warning aircraft, jammers, and other 

air support troops, including security police, ground navigation, electronic 

warfare, radar, meteorology, air traffic control, and battlefield engineering 

units.77 This likely reflects the PLAAF’s desire to utilize training events to 

develop integrated system-of-systems capabilities that focus on operating in 

informatized conditions, not just on honing individual aircrew skills. 

Golden Dart-2018

Over 200 fighter pilots from “dozens” of combat units participated in 

Golden-Dart 2018, which began on 19 April 2018 in the Northern TC in 

Changchun, Jilin Province. According to Chinese media reports, PLAAF 

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attack aircraft and bombers participated in the competition, including J-7, 

J-8DF, J-10A, Su-30, J-10C, and J-20 fighters and H-6H bombers.78 The 

competition aimed to test the pilots’ defense penetration and assault tactics 

while flying at low altitudes as well as their abilities to quickly locate targets 

in complex environments and conduct continuous attacks with different 

weapons.79 An officer with the PLAAF training bureau advised that during 

the competition, participating pilots first broke through enemy air defense 

systems (penetration) and then launched attacks with live ammunitions 

against enemy land/sea targets (assault).80 To simulate a more realistic wartime 

environment, Golden-Dart 2018 was held both during the day and at night 

and featured information defense and offense and confrontations between 

systems in an electromagnetic environment. According to one report, the 

competition tested the functions of fighter aircraft under extreme conditions 

and improved pilots’ abilities to control their weapons.81

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The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

The Blue Shield (蓝盾) exercise is designed to test the capabilities of the 

PLAAF’s ground-based air defense forces, specifically SAMs and supporting 

radar and information systems. First held in 2002, the exercise has evolved 

over the years from the training of firepower elements via target shooting, to 

the training of tactical units via base-focused exercises, to the present training 

of a combat operations system via live-forces, live-fire confrontations at 

deployed locations.82 According to Senior Colonel Shen Jinke (申进科) who 

is the PLAAF’s news spokesman, the Blue Shield exercise is “an actual-combat 

air defense antimissile training mode formulated for the ground-based air 

defense force to adapt to new threats in the air and space and to changes 

in the modes of operation, and it has become one of the four key brands in 

actual combat training of the Air Force.”83 Based on the requirements for a 

combined air defense antimissile campaign that focuses on reconnaissance, 

strikes against incoming threats, protection, and other complex integrated 

training topics, the Blue Shield exercise is an important platform to test and 

enhance the PLAAF’s air defense and anti-missile operational capabilities.84

Of note, although the PLAAF’s antiaircraft artillery (AAA) branch has 

historically been considered a key component of the PLAAF’s air defense 

force along with SAMs and radar units, it does not appear that this branch 

has been included in any of the competitions. Furthermore, there is little 

mention of AAA forces in the PLAAF’s official newspaper, Air Force News. 

During the late 1980s, the PLAAF’s goal was to combine at least some of 

its SAM and AAA regiments into air defense composite divisions (防空混

成师), but the program apparently did not move forward in the 1990s.85 As a 

result, it appears that today the PLAAF has only one composite air defense 

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Blue Shield (蓝盾) Exercise and

Golden Shield (金盾) Competition
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

division located near Tianjin. The composite division has subordinate SAM 

and AAA regiments, each of which have subordinate battalions. Although 

a few separate AAA brigades exist, such as one in the Eastern TCAF,86 it 

appears that, while some AAA companies are being incorporated into SAM 

brigades or air defense brigades,87 most AAA units are being abolished. 

The lack of AAA participation in Blue Shield and the lack of coverage in 

the media, combined with the increasing number of shoulder-fired SAMS 

(MANPADS) and other low-altitude SAMs, seems to indicate that the 

AAA branch is rapidly disappearing, though a small number of AAA units 

continue to exist.88 

While it appears that in previous years the Blue Shield exercise was held 

only once per year, in 2017 there were two iterations. The first was held in the 

spring at the PLAAF’s training base near the Bohai Gulf, and the second was 

held in the fall at the Dingxin Test and Training Base. Furthermore, in 2017 

the Blue Shield training brand expanded to include a military skills contest 

called the Golden Shield (金盾) competition, with the top battalion earning 

the Golden Shield award.89 Both iterations of Blue Shield-2017 received more 

coverage in the Chinese media than in previous years, likely due to the new 

Golden Shield competition. 

Golden Shield Competition

As with the Golden Helmet award for fighter and attack pilots, the Golden 

Shield award is described as the “top honor” for PLAAF SAM units. The 

inaugural Golden Shield competition was based on the international Keys to the 

Sky competition model, which China had participated in as part of Russia’s 

2016 International Army Games. 

Held from 30 July to 13 August 2016, the games featured 23 field, air, and 

sea training competitions at 20 training grounds across Russia.90 China was 

one of 19 countries to participate, and Chinese media reported that this was 

the first time PLAAF SAM crews went abroad to participate in the “military 

Olympics.”91 Such international military competitions provide the PLAAF with 

an opportunity to learn from other militaries, and insights gained from these events 

shape the PLAAF’s combat training reforms. Chinese news media reported that 

during the Keys to the Sky competition, one member of the Chinese delegation, 

Zhan Shaojie (战少杰), who was the commander of a Northern TCAF SAM 

battalion, was specifically tasked to “watch and learn,” and he “shuttled back 

and forth carefully observing every little detail of the competition.” 92

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The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

According to Yang Xuefeng (杨学锋), director of the PLAAF 

Headquarters’ Staff Department’s Ground Air Defense Bureau, the PLAAF, 

with the approval of the Air Force Party Committee and senior officers, 

developed the Golden Shield competition by taking five events from the Keys 

to the Sky competition, increasing their difficulty and expanding them to 

include 12 actual-combat type events focused on improving the modern air 

raid operations capabilities of SAM units.93 The 12 events included nighttime 

maneuvers and operations and live-fire counter strikes, which were described 

as “closely linked to core capabilities and areas of weakness in [the PLAAF’s] 

air and missile defense.” 94 The Golden Shield competition emphasized 

operations in a CEME, reflecting the difficulty of confrontations in unknown 

conditions. According to Yang, the competition “uses training with live 

munitions to develop first-class equipment, cultivate first-class personnel, 

and temper a first-class military.”95 Unlike the Golden Dart competition, the 

aviation units that participate in the Golden Shield competition serve only as 

the “Blue Force” opposition force and as targets. They do not compete for 

any awards. 

Interestingly, Chinese media reported that early in the planning of the 

Golden Shield competition, the Air Force staff decided to solicit bids to supply 

equipment for the event on the open market rather than via internal military 

channels. As a result, several civilian high-tech enterprises won bids to supply 

equipment, including infrared night vision equipment, equipment to ensure 

“communication while on the move” for battlefield command, and advanced 

drones simulating various kinds of targets executing air raids.96 After the 

exercise, one regiment commander commented that “military use of civilian 

equipment played a crucial, materially supportive role in units breaking the 

bottleneck of night training and night combat operations.”97

Blue Shield-2017

There were two iterations of Blue Shield in 2017, the first of which 

was held in April at the PLAAF’s training base near the Bohai Gulf. Six 

SAM units and several aviation units from three TCAFs participated in the 

exercise, which focused on carrying out air-ground confrontation drills and 

lasted over ten days.98 Participating units competed in 12 events designed 

to “test the units’ actual combat-oriented training results and enhance their 

capabilities for “system-vs-systems” operations.99 These included operational 

command, air-ground confrontation, nighttime maneuver, live-ammunition 

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

counterstrike, driving special vehicles (e.g. transporter erector launchers / 

TELs), firing of small arms and light weapons, military physical fitness, and 

others. The top missile battalion received the Golden Shield award. In addition, 

seven combat logistics groups and four individuals received the PLAAF’s 

Blue Shield Elite Troop award. This was the first time the PLAAF gave these 

awards. The winner of the first Golden Shield award was a battalion from the 

Central TCAF commanded by Qiu Lianlong (邱连龙).100

Chinese media reported that Blue Shield-2017 had increased in difficulty 

from previous exercises. Specific aspects of increased difficulty included 

changing how the SAM units moved from one location to another, which 

required setting up the SAMs in a timely manner before the air attack began. 

In addition, flight paths, directions and time of attacks, as well as the total 

number of attacking aircraft organized into flight formations and their 

altitudes, were all unknown, which increased the difficulty of counterstrike. 

Finally, the exercise was held in an area unfamiliar to the participants and was 

conducted “fully back-to-back,” which typically means both the “Red Force” 

and the “Blue Force” were operating independently with no knowledge of 

what the other side had been told.101

According to the Chinese media, multiple types of Chinese designated 

third-generation combat aircraft equipped with jamming equipment comprised 

the “Blue Force” formation, which carried out a low-altitude assault on the 

“Red Force” missile position. Furthermore, in order to practice penetration 

and assault, each formation of attack aircraft independently planned their 

approach and conducted attacks against each SAM site, applying the 

appropriate tactics for each attack. Operational tasks for the ground-based 

air defense forces centered on maneuvering to lay ambushes and organizing 

counterstrikes. As such, various “Red Force” SAM units closely cooperated 

to quickly acquire targets and implement simulated attacks.102 Given that at 

least some of the SAM units had just moved to a new location and both sides 

were maneuvering at the same time without knowledge of the other side in 

advance (i.e., unscripted), exercise participants had to make rapid decisions 

in order to complete their tasks.103

According to one military news program, the training objectives of Blue 

Shield-2017 were to standardize and unify operational procedures, train and 

improve the commanders’ command and strategizing skills, and enhance 

the entire SAM units’ overall cooperation and coordination capabilities of 

the “whole battalion acting as one rifle.”104 The exercise emphasized honing 

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The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

ground-based air defense units’ overall capabilities for “system-of-systems” 

confrontation. According to spokesman Yang Xuefeng, when preparing for 

the exercise, prominence was given to capabilities, system-of-systems drills, 

verification of equipment capabilities and innovation, as well as requirements 

for the opponents and targets in the exercise. Tactical drills, drills covering 

high-, medium-, and low-altitude airspaces, and all-aspect assaults from 

various directions were conducted to hone the ground-based air defense units’ 

overall capabilities for ‘system-of-systems’ confrontations.105 

Blue Shield-2017S

The second iteration, Blue Shield-2017S, was held in the late fall of 2017 

at the PLAAF’s Dingxin Test and Training Base and lasted 20 days. Six 

missile units from the Eastern, Northern, and Central TCAFs competed 

in Blue Shield-2017S for the Golden Shield Award. As in the first iteration, 

the competition featured 12 events, including air-ground confrontations, 

nighttime maneuvers and operations, and live-fire counter strikes. 

Participating units utilized railway transportation and motorized maneuvers 

to travel 1,000 kilometers to an unfamiliar environment in Gansu,106 where 

they carried out live-fire strikes soon after arriving at the exercise field.107

Chinese media reported that this part of the competition, referred to as 

“striking upon deployment,” was designed to test the forces’ capabilities for 

long-range maneuvers and operations and handling contingencies.108

Chinese media reported that during the competition, the six missile 

battalions were divided into three groups of two that competed to strike 

the same airborne target. The objective was to live-fire FN-6 shoulderfired missiles (MANPADs)109 against drones simulating armed helicopters 

launching surprise attacks.110 This event was meant to assess the SAM 

battalions’ key abilities to use FN-6 missiles for air defense in times of war. The 

“Blue Force” consisted of aviation units with multiple aircraft that conducted 

attacks at low altitudes from multiple directions and in several waves of flight 

formations both during the day and at night. Intervals between waves of 

targets were very short, reportedly less than one minute. During the training, 

the “Red Force” had to prioritize and engage targets, which tested the SAM 

battalions’ ability to counter saturation attacks from multiple targets and in 

multiple directions.111 

The final round of the Blue Shield-2017S competition featured one SAM 

unit from the Northern TCAF and one from the Central TCAF, which 

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

faced target drones simulating cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, and Chinese 

designated third-generation combat aircraft conducting a saturation attack 

from multiple directions and in multiple waves in a CEME. At the conclusion 

of the competition, the SAM battalion from the Central TCAF was awarded 

the Golden Shield.

112

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The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

Since at least 2009, the PLAAF has conducted the Red Sword exercise 

annually in November at the Dingxin Test and Training Base in the Gobi Desert; 

as of yet, it has not overlapped with the Golden Helmet competition, which has 

also been held at Dingxin. Unlike the three other brands, which are based on 

competitions and awards, it does not appear that any units participating in Red 

Sword, which is solely an exercise, receive any comparable awards. Red Sword

is a campaign-level113 system-of-systems confrontation exercise conducted in a 

complex, multidimensional battle space that involves PLAAF fighters, attack 

aircraft, AEW, reconnaissance aircraft, radars, and SAMs. 

The PLAAF has been tasked to build a force that is capable of not only 

fighting but also winning wars. To make this goal a reality, and ensure units are 

prepared for the challenges of modern warfare, training events must move beyond 

heavily scripted scenarios. This is a key factor behind the PLAAF’s efforts to 

increase the level of realism in Red Sword, which is aimed at “solving key and 

difficult problems of actual combat.”114 Chinese media reported that Red Sword

exercises have continually advanced in their level of realism, accomplishing a 

transformation from tactics to campaigns, from a single branch or aircraft type 

to multiple branches and multiple types of aircraft, and from traditional training 

to informatized training.115 One article reported that, over time, the exercise has 

evolved from a pattern of “confrontation drills with one type of aircraft under 

simple conditions” to that of “confrontation drills with multiple types of aircraft 

and multiple arms in a CEME” to the current pattern of “system-of-systems 

confrontation drills involving all elements under unknown conditions.”116 Red 

Sword has become the PLAAF’s “signature actual-combat training that contains 

19

Red Sword 

(红剑) Exercise
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

the most elements of war,”117 combining Golden Helmet opposition-force air 

combat, Golden Dart assault and penetration and Blue Shield air defense and antimissile operations.118

As of 2016, the Red Sword exercise has followed the new Base-brigade structure 

instituted for organizing and commanding operations, which allows for the 

implementation and exploration of regional air defense organizations.119 During 

the reorganization, the PLAAF’s shift to an air brigade structure for fighter and 

ground attack aircraft required significant shifts of personnel, which impacted the 

PLAAF’s command, control, and coordination structure. The Red Sword exercise 

allows the PLAAF to build trust within and between unit components and test 

the effectiveness of the new structure across multiple branches. 

Red Sword-2016

Red Sword-2016 was held in November in the Gobi Desert, where dozens 

of PLAAF units and nearly 100 combat aircraft from two TCAFs engaged 

with each other in a live-fire system-of-systems confrontation drill.120 During 

the exercise, combat aircraft of various types, land-based radar, and SAM units 

worked together in a coordinated manner to test combat patterns, which included 

joint reconnaissance, fire strikes, and joint air defense operations.121 Chinese 

media reported that J-10 fighters, JH-7 fighter bombers, KJ-200, KJ-500, and 

KJ-2000 AEW aircraft participated in the exercise. Notably, no reference to 

participation by any AAA units was found. Red Sword-2016 was described as a 

“joint122 exercise of the largest scale ever conducted by the PLAAF, representing 

its highest simulated actual-combat standard,”123 and “the first campaign-level, all 

key elements system-of-systems confrontation under unknown conditions that 

PLAAF units have organized since the new leadership and command structure 

went into operation in early 2016.”124

According to Chinese media reports, Red Sword-2016 provided the 

opportunity to test several new training and combat methods suited for 

informatized conditions in an environment that closely resembled actual combat. 

These included joint reconnaissance, defense penetration and shock attack, and 

air defense and anti-missile operations.125 During the exercise, different types of 

combat elements, such as aviation forces, SAM troops, and radar troops, were 

assigned to the Red and Blue Forces in balanced proportions.126 One example 

of increased realism in Red Sword-2016 was that units were no longer provided 

intelligence information that would not be provided in wartime, meaning that 

when a unit entered an “enemy occupied area,” it had to fight in an environment 

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The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

with no ground intelligence support.127 According to Jing Jianfeng (景建峰),128

who was the overall director (总导演) for the exercise, the exercise emphasized 

“mission, system-of-systems, electromagnetic conditions, unknown scenarios, 

confrontation, and assessment. There was no play script, no rehearsal, and no 

provision to the troops of intelligence and information, because that will never 

be available in wartime. The drill was conducted “back-to-back,” based on actualcombat conditions, to comprehensively test and verify the troops’ operational 

command capability and training standards.”129

Yu Yunfei, who was the director of combat operations in the exercise, advised 

that Red Sword-2016 was organized based on actual-combat training, with an 

exercise flow of “explanation, research, action, and practice,” whereby:130

• Explanation of theory: relevant experts from academic institutions went to 

the TCAFs where the Red and Blue Forces were stationed and presented 

tailored lectures on theory

• Tactical research: the two sides used group training to conduct tactical 

research, focusing on training to proficiency

• Setting up situations: participants utilized simulation training resources of 

academic institutions and various training bases and deployed forces online 

to conduct simulations and wargaming confrontations

• Training exercises by echelon and category: participants conducted focused 

training, such as exams in mobility and setting up in the field, and finally, 

they conducted exercises with live, opposition forces.

Chinese media reported that when planning for Red Sword-2016, the exercise 

directorate analyzed over 20 ‘local wars’131 fought by foreign armed forces and 

researched topics on actual-combat training to identify the mechanisms by which 

to win informatized warfare. Furthermore, the exercise incorporated the testing 

and measurement of weapons and equipment, to evaluate their performance in an 

environment similar to actual combat. Red Sword-2016 represented a joint effort 

by PLAAF Headquarters, academic institutions, units, bases, and manufacturers, 

which reportedly formed a cycle in campaign training that integrated operations, 

testing, and training, and drove an overall improvement in generation of PLAAF 

combat power.132

According to one media report, unlike a “one-on-one” competitive tactical 

and technical exam, such as the ones for Golden Helmet (pilot skills) and Golden 

Dart (penetration of defenses to attack a target), the Red Sword exercise is 

organized to evaluate more than just “winning and losing” and “point scores."133

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

Based on the idea that actual-combat training should be used to identify problems 

and develop capabilities, scoring rules were reportedly established to ensure that 

accomplishing a combat task weighed more heavily than shooting down one or 

two “enemy” aircraft. For example, during Red Sword-2016, one air brigade, which 

was widely known for its strong abilities in air combat, did not receive a high 

point score after shooting down “enemy aircraft” during a multi-wave saturation 

attack by the Red Force, because a key location had been attacked and the brigade 

had failed in its mission. The grading system demonstrated that in system-ofsystems confrontations, rather than focusing on shooting down individual “enemy 

aircraft”, it is important to select high-value targets, such as successfully attacking 

the opponent’s combat support aircraft or knocking out a surface-to-air missile 

site.134

Chinese media also reported that during the exercise there were specific time 

periods set aside for the process of self-evaluation and peer evaluation. According 

to Gu Shengdong (顾盛冬), from the PLAAF Headquarters’ Staff Department’s 

Training Bureau, for the first three days of the exercise, at the conclusion of each 

day, both the Red and Blue sides organized “self-critical discussion and reflection” 

sessions.135 This review process reportedly enabled participating units to fully 

digest problems encountered and further revise and improve their combat plans 

for the next part of the exercise. It was further reported that midway through the 

exercise, both sides withdrew from the battlefield to their respective camps where 

they conducted additional self-critique and received feedback from the evaluation 

team. This indicates the PLAAF is making some progress toward providing 

personnel with honest and impartial feedback, a necessary step to improve combat 

effectiveness and an area where the PLAAF has struggled in the past. The second 

half of the exercise featured more live-forces confrontations, where a combat task 

was assigned and then the exercise proceeded for two days and nights per the 

course of combat operations. It was reported that through the evaluation process 

“participants advanced a step with every battle fought,” which “gradually led to the 

generation of capabilities.”136

Red Sword-2017

The Red Sword-2017 confrontation training exercise was held in the Gobi 

Desert beginning 28 November 2017. It involved nearly 100 combat aircraft of 

various types, including KJ-2000, KJ-500 and KJ-200 AEW and reconnaissance 

systems, J-11 fighter jets, H-6K bombers, as well as various branches, including 

radar units, SAM units, and electronic countermeasure units, which carried 

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The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

out combat-realistic “system-of-systems” confrontations between Red and Blue 

forces.137 One pilot commented, “it is not a battle of individual soldiers but rather 

of system-of-systems operations. We are integrated into a system and we use the 

system to strike enemy targets.”138 Chinese media reported that during the exercise, 

forces carried out operations in real time to explore new models for confrontations 

between regional air defense bases under the new organizational structure.139 

Leading up to the exercise, one air brigade specifically prepared to operate 

in an electromagnetic environment and in complex weather operations, while 

focusing on the importance of information in system-of-systems combat and 

integrating different systems.140 Additionally, Hou Chao (侯超), a staff officer 

from a Southern TCAF regiment that participated in the exercise, described 

combat data as “the ‘blood’ to keep the system operating smoothly” and “the key 

to success.”141 Hou further noted that the selection of tactics, combat methods, 

targets for strikes, evaluations for battlefield situations or logistics support, the use 

of weapons and ammunition, and the evaluations of combat performance were all 

based on combat data.142

One report indicated that Red Sword-2017 saw early warning and command 

“move from the ground to the sky,” which resolved issues pertaining to intelligence 

acquisition and command and control, as well as reinforcement and support in 

long-range operations.143 This likely referred to a shift away from ground-based 

radar and control platforms to AEW&C. According to Liu Jie, a JH-7 pilot and 

commander of a “Blue Force” detachment, the command and control system was 

equipped with new early warning and command platforms, which played a crucial 

role in the exercise, enabling pilots tasked with protecting strategic places to use 

data links established by the early warning systems to be aware of battlefield 

situations in real time.144 Meanwhile, under the command and guidance of 

airborne early warning systems, the Red Force's assault group coordinated efforts 

with jamming aircraft and ground-based air defense forces to breach the Blue 

Force's air-ground defense net.145

The use of AEW&C systems in Red Sword-2017 represents an important 

advancement in PLAAF training. Historically, PLAAF air combat training was 

limited to highly scripted scenarios that were directed by the unit commander 

from the control tower. Personnel in AEW&C aircraft were not allowed to 

communicate directly with a pilot. This began to change around 2011 when 

the PLAAF began using the term “free-air combat.” Although pilots were still 

required to follow the training guidance set forth in their various regulations, they 

engaged in aerial intercepts that were not completely pre-scripted.146 Another key 

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

change occurred in late 2012 when the PLAAF began allowing controllers on the 

KJ-200 and KJ-2000 AEW&C aircraft to interact directly with combat pilots 

in the air.147 Furthermore, once an engagement began, pilots no longer received 

step-by-step instructions from a flight controller in the control tower, command 

post, or AEW&C aircraft; although flight controllers could provide pilots initial 

guidance and vectoring into the engagement zone.148

Chinese media reported that electromagnetic jamming was integral to the 

exercise and reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, jamming and counterjamming occurred throughout.149 Furthermore, commanders of both the Red and 

Blue Forces used their command information systems to give commands and 

guidance to various armed branches and multiple types of aircraft. Depending on 

developments of the confrontations, combat elements launched feigned attacks 

against airborne targets or carried out attacks against ground targets. According 

to Wang Zhuoping, “Blue Force” commander, during the exercise commanders 

and participating forces “improved a great deal in terms of combat planning, 

operational control, consolidating elements, coordinating different teams, as well 

as handling situations.”150 Of note, Chinese media also reported in 2017 that the 

Red Sword exercise had introduced a “third party” to simulate the enemy.151 If this 

“third party” enemy force employed foreign tactics, as opposed to simply using 

PLAAF tactics, it would be a notable evolution in PLAAF training. 

According to Li Yan, head of the evaluation team for attack impacts, during 

Red Sword-2017 evaluators “paid more attention to the percentage of accomplished 

missions, the effective rates of fired weapons, the forces’ casualties and damages in 

battle, and the efficiency of weapons carriage.”152 Furthermore, evaluators utilized 

“big data processing” to identify points affirming combat capabilities and used 

objective data to provide feedback in real time.153 Finally, rather than focusing on 

which side won, the evaluation process guided the forces to shift from studying 

their opponents in confrontations to studying “real enemies” and focusing on areas 

of weakness rather than on outcomes and scores.154 This is further evidence of the 

PLAAF’s efforts to improve constructive feedback during training events. 

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The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

Over the past decade, the PLAAF has fielded increasingly modern and capable 

equipment and weapon systems. However, its ability to prevail in informatized, 

high-intensity combat in a CEME is not a foregone conclusion. A world-class air 

force requires not only modern equipment but also highly-trained personnel who 

can adapt to tactical scenarios in a combat environment and perform sustained 

combat operations at home and in deployed locations. Historically PLAAF 

training consisted of heavily scripted events that provided opportunities for units 

to perform in front of senior leadership but did not adequately prepare the force 

for the challenges of modern combat. In contrast, present training is expected to 

be oriented toward “actual combat” and result in the ability to “fight and win.” 

Recent improvements in PLAAF training have focused primarily on reducing 

the gap between training scenarios and what is expected under actual combat 

conditions, as well as developing “system-of-systems” capabilities that would 

enable truly joint combat operations.

The annual PLAAF training events described in this report each serve a 

different purpose and were designed with specific components and training goals 

in mind. As described above, the Golden Helmet competition focuses on air-toair combat, featuring “one-v-one” and “two-v-two” engagements between similar 

and dissimilar aircraft, which are designed to improve and assess pilots’ skills and 

capabilities in combat conditions. The Golden Dart competition focuses on air-toground attack by attack and bomber aircraft and aims to improve troops’ offensive 

air war-fighting capabilities. The Blue Shield exercise, which as of 2017 includes 

a competition for the Golden Shield award, is designed to test the capabilities of 

the PLAAF’s ground-based air defense forces, specifically SAMs and supporting 

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Conclusion
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

radar and information systems. Finally, the Red Sword exercise is a campaign-level, 

system-of-systems confrontation drill conducted in a complex, multidimensional 

battle space that involves PLAAF fighters, attack aircraft, AEW, reconnaissance 

aircraft, radars, ECM units, and SAMs. It provides a platform to test training 

and combat methods suited for informatized conditions in an environment that 

closely resembles actual combat and is formulated to comprehensively test and 

verify the troops’ operational command capability and training standards. 

The frequent reports in Chinese media and commentary by key personnel and 

military experts about the success of the four key training brands underscore the 

value the PLAAF places on these training events. One report in 2017 went so far 

as to state that the “four key actual combat-oriented training brands epitomize 

the PLAAF’s strategic transformation.”155 Furthermore, according to the PLAAF 

Chief of Staff, after five years of development, the four key training brands are not 

“only similar to actual combat, but have also paved a road of victory in training for 

war.”156 Given their growing prominence, the four key training brands present an 

opportunity to assess the PLAAF’s progress along the path toward becoming a 

modern “strategic air force.” The PLAAF has gradually increased the complexity of 

each of the four key training brands since their inception and will likely continue 

to include more complex components in the future as it moves toward completely 

unscripted training. It has also developed new evaluation criteria that emphasize 

achieving actual effects and identifying areas of weakness and has improved the 

process for providing constructive feedback during training events. The PLAAF is 

taking concrete steps, albeit incremental, to raise training to the next level, which 

has likely advanced the PLAAF’s operational effectiveness. 

The evolution of the four key training brands in recent years reflects the 

PLAAF leadership’s commitment to remedy longstanding training deficiencies. 

One question that remains, particularly as it relates to the Golden Helmet, Golden 

Dart, and Golden Shield competitions, is whether the units involved are spending 

a majority of their time each year “training for the test” so that they can win an 

award, as opposed to focusing on actual training requirements under the revised 

OMTE. Additionally, as the PLAAF further professionalizes its training, a 

key test of its future combat capability will be how well it integrates with other 

components in the joint arena. In their current form, the four key training brands 

emphasize specific PLAAF core competencies, but do not provide opportunities 

to develop joint interoperability. The PLAAF’s ability to develop and execute 

realistic training that truly boosts combat capability across the joint force will 

determine, at least in part, both the pace of its modernization and the extent of its 

role in China’s future national security and military strategy.

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The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

A review of available PLAAF and PLA dictionaries, encyclopedias, journals, 

books, and media reports indicates that the PLA and PLAAF will engage enemy 

aircraft in defense zones and air defense zones. According to the PLA’s military 

dictionary:

• A defense zone is an area in which units with defensive combat missions are 

responsible for safeguarding against or resisting enemy offensives.157

• An air defense zone is the space where aviation and air defense forces 

conduct their air defense missions.158

The PLAAF conducts what it calls “tactical coordination” within the air 

defense zone between its aviation and air defense forces and with Navy and Army 

air defense forces. According to the PLAAF’s encyclopedia, 

Air force combined-arms tactical coordination consists of separating 

airspace, targets, altitude, directions, and time. Airspace separation is the 

primary means, with the others serving as secondary means. Air force joint 

tactical coordination with the Navy and Army consists of establishing a joint 

command organization and separating forces by combat phases, combat missions 

or tasks, and combat direction or area.159 

As early as 2003, the PLAAF began creating “tactical training coordination 

zones” with other services in at least the Jinan and Nanjing Military Regions. 

PLAAF units reportedly use the zones to conduct combined-arms training 

between PLAAF aircraft and SAMs/AAA, as well as joint training with naval 

vessels and ground force air defense units.160

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Appendix A:

Air Defense Zones
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

Although the PLA and PLAAF have apparently created air defense zones, a 

review of PLA and PLAAF media reports do not provide any specific information 

about how the PLAAF’s aviation and air defense forces coordinate with each 

other or with the other services in these zones.

28
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands 29

Appendix B: 

Terminology

Chinese official media is not consistent in how it identifies each of the four key 

training brands (四大品牌) in Chinese or English, as shown below. It should be 

noted that Golden Dart and Golden Helmet are considered competitions or contests, 

while Blue Shield and Red Sword are considered exercises. Additionally, the PLAAF 

has generically referred to them in English as the “four large exercises.”161

• Golden Helmet (金头盔)

o Chinese:162 自由空战比武; 自由空战竞赛性考核; 争夺战; 对抗空战

竞赛性考核; 比武竞赛/比武; 自由空战对抗比武; 空战比武

o English:163 Golden Helmet freestyle fighting exercise

• Golden Dart (金飞镖)

o Chinese:164 突防突击竞赛性考核; “金飞镖”之战; 

o English: land attack exercise165; offense and assault military 

competition;166 military competition167

o English: freestyle fighting exercise168; air battle contest and competitive 

air battle contest169; air battle tactics competition170; competition171; 

contest172; air combat examination contest173

• Blue Shield (蓝盾)

o Chinese: 金盾牌比武; 金盾牌比武竞赛; 蓝盾演习

o English: aircraft and missile defense exercise174; Golden Shield

Competition; Blue Shield exercise175

Red Sword (红剑)

• Chinese:176 空军红剑体系对抗演习; “红剑”体系对抗; 体系对抗演练

o English: advanced aerial combat exercise177 ; systemic (i.e., system-vssystem) confrontation exercise178
30 Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

1 In May 2004, the CMC adjusted the PLA’s “Military Strategic Guidelines.” During this process, the 

CMC authorized the PLAAF to have its first-ever service-specific strategy as part of the PLA’s “Active 

Defense” strategy within the “Military Strategic Guidelines.” The announcement coincided with the First 

Plenum of the PLAAF’s 10th Party Congress. The CMC approved the strategy at the same time that 

it authorized the first PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery commanders to be added to the CMC as 

“policy promotions.” See “Science of air force strategy” [“空军战略学”] in Yao Wei, ed., Chinese Air Force 

Encyclopedia [中国空军百科全书]; Beijing, Aviation Industry Press, November 2005, Volume 1, p. 57. 

According to Hong Kong press reports, the CMC’s approval was timed to coincide with the First Plenum 

of the PLAAF’s 10th Party Congress in May 2004. See “From Supportive Service to Strategic Air Force: 

Major Change in China’s Air Force Buildup Thinking,” Hong Kong Feng Huang Wang, 28 June 2004.

2 According to Chase and Garafola, “Some of the most important changes propelling the PLAAF’s 

transformation into a ‘strategic air force’ concern its strategy and missions. See Endnote 2 for further 

information.

3 Michael S. Chase and Cristina L. Garafola, “China’s Search for a ‘Strategic Air Force’,” Journal of Strategic 

Studies, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2015. According to Chase and Garafola, “Some of the 

most important changes propelling the PLAAF’s transformation into a ‘strategic air force’ concern its 

strategy and missions. Chinese sources indicate that the PLAAF began informal work on its strategy in 

the mid-1990s, presumably after recognizing that the lack of a service-specific strategy and its limited 

offensive capabilities prevented it from moving beyond its traditionally subordinate role. According to 

the Chinese Air Force Encyclopedia, in a 1999 speech to commemorate the PLAAF’s 50th anniversary, 

Jiang Zemin called for the PLAAF to ‘prepare struggle to build a powerful, modernized air force that is 

simultaneously prepared for offensive and defensive operations’. In 2004, this idea was incorporated into 

the PLAAF’s first ever service-specific strategic concept, which called on it to ‘integrate air and space 

and be simultaneously prepared for offensive and defensive operations.’ The term ‘strategic air force’ had 

already been in use for several years when it appeared for the first time in a Chinese defense white paper in 

2008.” Zhu Hui, ed., Strategic Air Force [战略空军], Beijing: Lantian Press, July 2009. Kenneth Allen and 

Jana Allen, “Chinese Air Force and China Security” in Lowell Dittmer and Maochun Yu, eds., Routledge 

Handbook of Chinese Security, London: Routledge Press, May 2015.

4 Meng Xiangqing, “Chinese Dream Includes Strong PLA,” China Daily in English, 8 October 2013, p. 9, 

accessed at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-10/08/content_17012886_2.htm.

5 “Chinese President Urges Stronger Air Force,” Xinhua Wang [新新新] in English, 14 April 2014, accessed at 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/14/c_133261588.htm.

6 This can sometimes be translated as “trademark” or “brand name”. The exact translation may not matter 

much, but seems to signify the unique nature of these events, compared with typical training.

Endnotes
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

7 “Military representatives talk about the Air Force’s actual-combat training,” [“军队代表畅谈空军实战

化训练”], Xinhua Wang [新华网], 11 March 2018, accessed at http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-

03/11/c_129827188.htm.

8 CASI has already published the following papers that address some aspects of the four key training 

brands: Michael S. Chase, Kenneth W. Allen, and Benjamin S. Purser, III, “Overview of PLA Air 

Force ‘Elite Pilots’,” RAND, 2016, and Cristina L. Garafola and Timothy R. Heath, “The PLAAF’s 

First Steps Toward Becoming an Expeditionary Air Force,” RAND, 2017. See also Nathan BeauchampMustafaga, “The Four Key Training Brands’ Framework: Aligning PLAAF Training to the 2014 Military 

Strategic Guideline,” paper presented to the Fifth Global International Studies Conference of the World 

International Studies Committee (WISC) in Taipei, Taiwan, April 2017.

9 From “Military Report” [新新新新], Beijing CCTV-7, 12 November 2016.

10 Lu Donghui [陆冬辉], “‘Golden Helmet’ pilot opposition air combat experience” [“金头盔飞行员对抗

战斗经验”], Air Force News [空军报], 12 July 2016, p. 3.

11 Peter Kay, “For the first time, the naval air force sent pilots to participate in the air force contest,” 

China Military Online micro letter public, 12 December 2017, accessed at http://www.sangbe.com/

article/152295.html.

12 Golden Helmet winner Wang Zhonghua (王仲化), who is a Su-30 pilot assigned to the Cangzhou Test 

and Training Base's "Blue Force," participated in the 2014 Aviadarts competition. No author, “中国

飞行员训练水平高技术过硬获俄军大将点赞,” 27 July 2104, accessed at http://mil.news.sina.com.

cn/2014-07-27/1357792382.html.

13 See CASI’s “Brigadization of the PLA Air Force,” May 2018 for more information.

14 Kenneth Allen, “PLA Air Force Organizational Reforms: 2000-2012,” in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth 

Allen, eds., The PLA as Organization v2.0, Defense Group Inc., 2013.

15 In 2004, the PLA added the commanders of the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery (now Rocket 

Force) as members of the CMC. At that time, the four General Departments served as the Army 

Headquarters. Prior to the 19th Party Congress in November 2017, the PLAAF commander, Ma 

Xiaotian, and Navy commander, Wu Shengli, were replaced as Commanders but both remained on the 

CMC. However, when they retired at the time of the 19th Party Congress, neither of their successors 

were added to the new CMC, which now has two vice chairmen and only four members. In addition, 

the former commander of the Rocket Force, Wei Fenghe, became the Defense Minister and remained 

as a CMC member, but his successor as Rocket Force commander was also not added to the new 

CMC. Finally, in early 2016 the PLA created a new PLA Army (PLAA) Headquarters, but the new 

commander was not added to the CMC.

16 Xu Tongxuan [徐同宣], “It Is Particularly Essential to Step Up Military Training and Combat Readiness 

in Times of Reform and Tackling Tough Issues – Sidelights on the PLA Air Force’s 2016 Military 

Training Conference” [“越是改革攻坚越练兵备战 – 空军2016年度军事训练会议侧记”], Air Force 

News [空军报], 6 January 2016, p. 1.

17 Zhao Lei, “PLA Air Force making exercises more realistic,” China Daily in English, 5 May 2017, 

accessed at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-05/05/content_29211275.htm.

18 Michael S. Chase, Kenneth W. Allen, and Benjamin S. Purser, III, 2016. Lu Donghui [陆冬辉], 2016.

19 Zhang Yuqing [张玉清] and Zhang Mimi [张汨汨], ‘‘‘Golden Helmet’ Competition Pushes for Air 

Force’s Combat-Realistic Military Training Ahead Into a New Age” [“‘金头盔’比武推动空军实战化军

事训练迈进新时代”], Xinhua Wang [新华网], 12 November 2017, accessed at http://www.xinhuanet.

com/mil/2017-11/12/c_1121943126.html. Michael S. Chase, Kenneth W. Allen, and Benjamin S. 

Purser III, 2016.

20 Golden Helmet winner Wang Zhonghua (王仲化), who is a Su-30 pilot assigned to the Cangzhou Test 

and Training Base's "Blue Force," participated in the 2014 Aviadarts competition. No author, “中国

飞行员训练水平高技术过硬获俄军大将点赞,” 27 July 2104, accessed at http://mil.news.sina.com.

cn/2014-07-27/1357792382.html.

21 The number of participants identified to date include: 2011 (Unknown), 2012 (108), 2013 (123), 2014 

(170), 2015 (160), 2016 (150), and 2017 (100). 
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

22 Chen Xiang [陈翔] and Xu Dongliang [徐东亮], "PLA Air Force's 2014 Annual Fighter Unit 

Competitive Air Combat Confrontation Evaluations Successfully Completed: Six Pilots Win 'Golden 

Helmets;' 5 Air Regiments Assessed as Superior Air Combat Units; Seven Personnel Assessed as 

Outstanding Air Combat Pilots" [“2014年度空军歼击机航空兵部队对抗空战竞赛性考核圆满结束, 

6名飞行员赢得”金头盔”, 5个航空兵团被评为空战优胜单位, 7人获评空战优秀飞行员”], Air Force 

News [空军报], 22 September 2014, p. 1.

23 Zhang Yuqing [张玉清] and Zhang Mimi [张汨汨], 2017.

24 Zhang Hao [张浩], Zhang Haishen [张海深], Ding Yibo [丁一波], “Training for Combat – An Eastern 

Theater Command Air Force air brigade focuses on readiness training at the grassroots level” [“向战而

练砺锋刃 - 东部战区空军航空兵某旅坚持扭住战备训练抓基层纪实”], Air Force News [空军报], 28 

August 2017, p. 3.

25 See CASI’s “Brigadization of the PLA Air Force”, May 2018 for more information.

26 Huang Panyue, ed., “Splendid moments in Golden Helmet – 2017 competition,” China Military Online 

in English, 21 November 2017, accessed at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2017-11/21/content_4797924.

htm. Guo Hongbo and Hao Maojin, “PLAAF kicks off ‘Golden Helmet 2017’ air battle contest,” China 

Military Online in English, 3 November 2017, accessed at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-

11/03/content_7811945.htm. Xu Yi [许毅] and Wang Zehua [王泽华], “‘Golden Helmet’ Air Combat 

Confrontation Competition Assessment” Air Force News [空军报], 15 November 2017, p. 1.

27 Peter Kay, 2017.

28 Zhao Haitao [赵海涛] and Zhang Heng [张恒], “Lay Firm Foundation for Joint Training, Deepen 

Degree of Joint Operation, and Raise Joint Combat Capability; Navy Will Jointly Organize with Air 

Force Free-Air War Confrontation Drill” [“海军将与空军联合组织自由空战对抗演练”], Renmin 

Haijun [人民海军], 20 August 2014, p. 1. Yin Kunze [殷坤泽], Zhang Heng [张恒], and Zhao Haitao 

[赵海涛], “A Duel of Heroes -- Eyewitness to the First Navy and Air Force Free Aerial Warfare 

Confrontation Drill” [“双雄对决,目击海,空军首次自由空战对抗演练”], Renmin Haijun [人民海军], 

1 September 2014, p. 1. Liu Wenping, Zhao Haitao, and Ju Zhenhua, “Flying against a ‘Golden Helmet’,” 

China Armed Forces magazine in Chinese and English, No. 32, Vol 2, 2015, p. 80-83. Information about 

the Heroic Eagle Regiment was accessed at www.baike.com/wiki/海空雄鹰团. Yin Kunze [殷坤泽], Xu 

Xiaosai [许小赛], Zhang Heng [张恒], and Zhao Haitao [赵海涛], “Freestyle Air Combat, In Pursuit 

of the Real Meaning of Fighting Winning Wars – Record of Contemplations on a Certain Regiment of 

East Sea Fleet Navy Aviation Holding Live Combat Oriented Training” [“自由空战,寻求大胜仗的真

谛:东航某团开展实战化训练问思录”] Renmin Haijun [人民海军], 16 September 2014, p. 2.

29 “Games Boosts PLAAF Combat-oriented Military Training,” China Military Online in English, 14 

November 2017. Unfortunately, no single, authoritative list was found for the 63 awards. Three personnel 

who have won more than one award: Jiang Jiaji (蒋佳冀) has won the award three times, while Xu 

Liqiang (许利强) and Yan Feng (颜峰) have won the award twice.

30 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 30 December 2016.

31 Xu Yi [许毅], “Flying Toward a Strong Brand for Actual Combat – Observing ‘Golden Helmet-2017’ 

and Thoughts on Group Training Principles of Actual Combat” [“飞向实战强品牌-观战 ‘金头盔-2017’ 

暨实战化组训规律思考], Air Force News [空军报], 24 November 2017, p. 3.

32 As early as 2003, the PLAAF began to consider breaking away from scripted air-to-air engagements 

and allowing pilots to at least make recommendations for adjustments. It was not until 2011 that the 

PLAAF implemented what it calls “pilot autonomy” and “free-air combat.” See Endnotes for more 

details.

33 As early as 2003, the PLAAF began to consider breaking away from scripted air-to-air engagements 

and allowing pilots to at least make recommendations for adjustments. Specifically, a Jinan Military 

Region Air Force (MRAF) air division equipped with new aircraft [Su-27s] began implementing 

new combat methods throughout the unit in July 2003, and, over a three-month period flew 100 

sorties using the new methods that had already been tested and approved for implementation by the 

highest level in the PLAAF (Air Force News [空军报], 9 October 2003, p. 1). It was not until 2011 

that the PLAAF implemented what it calls “pilot autonomy” and “free-air combat.” Previously, flight 

commanders in the tower commanded pilots for “each step and each movement.” Now, each pilot has 

the autonomy from creating their own flight plans to takeoff to landing, including free-air combat, 

which allows them to conduct actual combat training by having a better understanding of every aspect 
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

of their aircraft and weapon systems (Wang Jun [王军] and Yue Dechen [岳德臣], “Visit to Shenyang 

MRAF Air Brigade 3rd Flight Group” [“访问沈空航空兵某旅三飞行大队”], Air Force News [空军

报], 29 December 2011, p. 2).

34 Zhang Yuqing [张玉清] and Zhang Mimi [张汨汨], 2017.

35 Xu Yi [许毅], 24 November 2017.

36 Zhang Yuqing [张玉清] and Zhang Mimi [张汨汨], 2017.

37 Ibid.

38 Xue Wenhai and Wang Gang, “Clicking on the Battlefield in the Air,” China Air Force magazine [中国

空军], No.4, 2005, p.36-37.

39 Ibid.

40 Lei Yu [雷雨] and Yang Wenhui [阳文辉], “Vowed to ‘Become the Toughest Steel’” [“誓做‘最咬人的

钢’”], Air Force News [空军报], 8 November 2017, p. 3.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Wang Wei [王玮], "Full Assurance of Success Is Based on Painstaking Study and Deep Reflection" [细

研方可稳操胜券], Air Force News [空军报], 8 February 2017, p. 3.

44 Ibid.

45 Xu Yi [许毅], 24 November 2017.

46 While western states tend to describe fighter jet generations in terms of capabilities (See John Tripak’s, 

The Sixth Generation Fighter, http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/October%20

2009/1009fighter.aspx for examples), the Chinese tend to define them based on year reaching initial 

operating capability. I.E.. 1st Gen 1950-60s, e.g. J-5, J-6; 2nd Gen 70’s-80’s, e.g. J-7, J-8; 3rd Gen 

90’s-2000’s, e.g. J-10. J-11; 4th Gen 2010’s+, e.g. J-20.

47 Huang Panyue, ed., 2017.

48 "Focus Today" (近日关注), Beijing CCTV-4, 6 November 2017.

49 Based on a survey of articles in PLA Air Force Daily, and People’s Navy, the PLA usually introduces new 

aircraft by creating a unit from "seasoned pilots" (i.e. with 1,000 flight hours or more). The unit then 

has to create, from scratch, its Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE) and all relevant 

regulations. That process takes about a year, and sometimes more, to accomplish. It typically takes a unit 

with new aircraft an additional year to reach IOC, meaning that it can sit strip alert and scramble for an 

operational mission against an adversary, not just a training event.

50 Zhang Mimi [张汨汨] and Guo Hongbo [郭洪波], "Sixteen Elite Air Force Aviation Units Compete 

for 'Golden Helmet' in Gobi Desert of Northwestern China" [“空军16支航空兵劲旅西北大漠角遂‘金

头盔’”], Xinhua [新华], 01 November 2017.

51 "Focus Today" (近日关注), Beijing CCTV-4, 06 November 2017.

52 Wang Wei, 2017, p. 3.

53 Liu Jinyang [刘锦洋] and Li Jianwen [李建文], “‘Four Key Brands’ Training Renowned the Aerospace 

Battlefield” [“‘四大品牌’训练亭誉空天战场”], PLA Daily [解放军报], 20 May 2017.

54 Zhang Yuqing [张玉清] and Zhang Mimi [张汨汨], 2017.

55 "Focus Today" [近日关注], Beijing CCTV-4, 06 November 2017.

56 Zhang Mimi [张汨汨] and Guo Hongbo [郭洪波], 2017.

57 No author, “PLAAF kicks off Golden Helmets 2017,” Asian Defense News in English, 4 November 

2017, accessed at http://asian-defence-news.blogspot.com/2017/11/plaaf-kicks-off-goldenhelmets-2017-2017.html.

58 Zhang Mimi [张汨汨] and Guo Hongbo [郭洪波], 2017.

59 Zhang Tao, “Golden Helmet Games Boosts PLAAF Combat-oriented Military Training,” China 

Military Online in English, 13 November 2017, accessed at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-

11/14/content_7823318.htm.
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

60 Zhang Yuqing [张玉清] and Zhang Mimi [张汨汨], 2017.

61 Zhang Tao, 2017.

62 Zhang Yuqing [张玉清] and Zhang Mimi [张汨汨], 2017.

63 Ibid.

64 Xu Yi (许毅), Wei Jiangtao (魏江涛), and Liang Xianglong (梁相龙), “Thoughts on Chinese PLA 

Air Force ‘Red Sword-16’ System-of-Systems Confrontation Exercise” [“顺势而‘变’谋战力”], Air Force 

News [空军报], 29 November 2016, p. 1.

65 Michael S. Chase, Kenneth W. Allen, and Benjamin S. Purser III, 2016.

66 Huang Panyue ed., “PLA Air Force unveils ‘Golden Dart-2016’ military competition,” China 

Military Online in English, 22 July 2016, accessed at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2016-07/22/

content_4699080.htm.

67 Liu Jinyang [刘锦洋] and Li Jianwen [李建文], 2017.

68 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 30 December 2016.

69 Ibid.

70 Liu Jinyang [刘锦洋] and Li Jianwen [李建文], 2017. “Golden Helmet” [“金飞镖”], accessed at 

https://baike.baidu.com/item/金飞镖. Li Qing [李清] ed., “PLA Air Force held its first ground 

target shooting ‘Golden Dart’ Competition” [“中国空军首次举行对地攻击 ‘金飞镖’ 大赛”] Xinhua 

Wang [新华网], accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2014-10/07/c_127069612.htm. No 

Author, “PLAAF Four Key Training Brands: Red Sword, Blue Shield, Golden Helmet, Golden Dart,” 

[“中国空军 ‘四大品牌’: 红剑, 蓝盾, 金头盔, 金飞镖”], 12 May 2017, accessed at http://news.ifeng.

com/a/20170512/51084986_0.shtml.

71 Lu Guanqiong [卢冠琼], “PLA Air Force 2015 ‘Golden Dart’ Competition will be held over water for 

the first time” [“中国空军2015 ‘金飞镖’ 比武将首次在海上方向组织”], China Youth Net, 9 September 

2015, accessed at http://news.youth.cn/gn/201509/t20150909_7094102.htm.

72 Yao Jianing, ed., “PLA Air Force pilots chase ‘Golden Dart’”, China Military Online in English, 19 April 

2018, accessed at http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-04/19/content_8009028.htm.

73 Li Jianwen [李建文], “’Golden Helmets’ and ‘Golden Dart’ pilots of the Chinese Air Force” [中国空军

飞行员涌现一批 ‘金头盔’ ‘金飞镖’”], PLAAF website [中国空军], 8 September 2015, accessed at http://

kj.81.cn/content/2015-09/08/content_6671958.htm. “PLA Air Force made great strides in actual-combat 

training,” 7 May 2017, accessed at http://news.163.com/17/0507/03/CJQ7CDG600018AOP.html.

74 Niu Ruili [牛锐利] and Lu Hui [卢辉], “‘Golden Helmet:’ the Ultimate Competition,” [“巅峰对决 ‘金头

盔’”] PLAAF website [中国空军], 30 December 2015, accessed at http://kj.81.cn/content/201512/30/

content_68371 63.htm.

75 Huang Panyue, ed., 2016.

76 Yang Chenxiu [杨宸琇], “‘Golden Dart- 2016’: Combat Aircraft carried out precision strikes at low 

altitude despite the fog” [“金飞镖-2016”: 战机低空穿雾实施精准火力打击], CCTV Military, 25 July 

2016, accessed at http://military.cnr.cn/jstp/jstph/20160725/t20160725_522775812.html.

77 Huang Panyue, ed., 2016.

78 Huang Panyue ed., “Camera records moments of Golden Dart - 2018 competition,” China Military Online 

in English, 27 April 2018, accessed at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2018-04/27/content_4811595.

htm; “The Chinese Air Force's recent annual exercise ‘Golden Dart 2018’ honed pilots’ real combat 

capabilities,” CCTV video, accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lmzKvhAGz-M.

79 Yao Jianing, ed., 2018.

80 Yao Jianing, ed., 2018.

81 “The Chinese Air Force's recent annual exercise ‘Golden Dart 2018’ honed pilots' real combat 

capabilities,” CCTV video, accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lmzKvhAGz-M.

82 Xu Yi [许毅], “What Is the Gold Content of the ‘Golden Shield’ Award? On-the-Scene Report from 

the First Round of Competition in Air Force Exercise ‘-17’ (Part 1)” [“‘金盾牌’含金几何:空军‘蓝盾-17’

演习首期比武竞赛观战报告(上篇)”], Air Force News [空军报], 24 April 2017, p. 3a.
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

83 Zhang Yuqing [张玉清] and Zhang Lei [张雷], “Chinese Air Force Accelerates Air-Defense Antimissile 

Capability Construction, Forms Combat System That Integrates Long, Medium and Short Ranges 

With High, Medium and Low Altitudes” [“空军地面防空兵在创新驱动发展中形成了远中近程,高

中低空相结合的作战体系”], Xinhua [新华], 28 August 2016.

84 Zhang Yuqing [张玉清] and Zhang Lei [张雷], 2016. From “Military Report” (新新新新), Beijing CCTV-7, 

30 December 2016.

85 China Air Force Encyclopedia (中国空军百科全书), Vol 1, p. 239. Interview with the PLAAF commander 

in 1989. Yu Xuelin [于学林], “Air Defense Composite Division” [“防空混成师”], PLAAF Website [

中国空军], 9 December 2012, accessed at http://kj.81.cn/content/2012-12/09/content_5133418.

htm. Li Jianwen [李建文] and Zhang Lei [张雷], “A mixed division of the PLA Air Force called into 

assistance for the traumatic Tianjin explosion” [“现场惨烈: 空军混成师官兵救援天津爆炸”] Xinhua 

Wang [新华网], 13 August 2015, accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2015-08/13/c_128125593.

htm. No author, “The PLA Air Force” [“中国人民解放军空军”], accessed at http://blog.renren.com/

share/258202258/620581832.

86 Zhu Xiaobing [朱笑冰] and Ding Yibo [丁义波], “Eastern Theater Command Air Force Certain Base 

Establishes a Long-term Grassroots Mechanism” [“东部战区空军某基地建立帮建基层长效机制”], 

Air Force News [空军报], 7 December 2017, p. 1.

87 Wang Chenpeng [王晨鹏] and Wen Chen [文晨], “Northern TCAF Radar Brigade Organizes Billet 

Training for Newly-transferred Personnel” [“北部战区空军雷达某旅组织转录人员岗前集训”], Air 

Force News [空军报], 26 July 2017, p. 2 for information concerning a Northern TCAF AAA brigade. 

Guo Yuanlin [郭源霖] and Shao Lei [邵蕾], “Central TCAF SAM brigade provides personnel training” 

[中部战区空军导弹某旅引导官兵明责知进缩短适应期], Air Force News [空军报], 15 June 2017, p. 2, 

concerning a AAA company subordinate to a Central TCAF SAM brigade.

88 Zhu Xiaobing [朱笑冰] and Ding Yibo [丁义波], 2017.

89 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 15 April 2017.

90 Ria Novosti and Evgeny Biyatov, “Russia, China teams leading after 6 days of Army Games 2016,” 

5 August 2016, accessed at https://www.rbth.com/news/2016/08/05/russia-china-teams-leading-aftersix-days-of-army-games-2016_618359

91 Ria Novosti and Evgeny Biyatov, 2016. Xu Yi [新新], 24 April 2017.

92 Xu Yi [新新], 24 April 2017.

93 Ibid.

94 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 29 October 2017.

95 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 27 October 2017.

96 Xu Yi [许毅], 24 April 2017.

97 Ibid.

98 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 04 May 2017. The event was also identified 

simply as Blue Shield-17.

99 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 15 April 2017.

100 Xu Yi [许毅], 24 April.

101 From “Military Report,” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 15 April 2017.

102 From “Live News,” Beijing CCTV-Xinwen, 16 April 2017.

103 Ibid.

104 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 15 April 2017.

105 Ibid.

106 PLAAF units normally train at the same training area near their home unit. When a unit deploys to a 

different location to conduct training, even if they have been there before, then the term “unfamiliar” is 

typically used in Chinese media reports. In most cases, even if some personnel in the unit have been to 

the location before, it is still “unfamiliar” to most new personnel.

107 From “Live News,” Beijing CCTV-Xinwen, 13 October 2017.
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

108 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 27 October 2017.

109 The FN-6  or Feinu-6 is a third-generation passive infrared homing (IR) man portable air defense 

system (MANPADS).

110 Accessed at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/fn-6.htm.

111 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 27 October 2017.

112 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 29 October 2017.

113 It is assessed that Red Sword is most likely a Theater Command level exercise but it is not managed by 

the TCs. It is most likely managed by PLAAF HQ because it crosses boundaries and involves multiple 

units from different TCAFs.

114 Xu Yi (许毅), Wei Jiangtao (魏江涛), and Liang Xianglong (梁相龙), 2016. From “Military Report” 

(军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 29 November 2016. Red Sword-2016 is also noted as Red Sword-16 in 

some articles.

115 Xu Yi (许毅), Wei Jiangtao (魏江涛), and Liang Xianglong (梁相龙), 2016.

116 Guo Yunfei [郭云飞], “Combat Drums and Bugles Sound Again over the Vast Desert - Accounts 

of Involvement in the ‘Red Sword-16’ System-of-Systems Confrontation Exercise by Exercise 

Participants” [“大漠又闻鼓用声; ‘红剑-16’体系对抗演习参演手记”], Air Force News [空军报], 2 

December 2016, p. 3.

117 Ibid.

118 Yang Jun [杨军] and Yao Chunming [姚春明], “’Direct the Blue Force and Practice the Red,’ focus 

on system-of-systems opposition-force combat all the way through – the Air Force ‘Red Sword-2017’ 

system-of-systems opposition-force exercise explores the way to integrate forces for combat” [“‘导蓝练

红’, 注重体系, 全程对抗- 空军 ‘红剑-2017’ 体系对抗演习探索作战融合之道”], Air Force News [空

军报], 5 December 2017, p. 4.

119 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 29 November 2016.

120 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 17 November 2016; Li Guowen [李国文] and 

Deng Lekun [邓乐坤], “PLAAF ‘Red-Sword 16’ Exercise Model Fires Off ” [“空军‘红剑-16’体系对抗

硝烟浓”], Air Force News [空军报], 27 November 2016, p. 1.

121 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 30 December 2016.

122 It appears the Chinese use of the term “joint” in this context refers to what the U.S. would call ‘combined 

arms,’ rather than two or more services.

123 Ibid.

124 Xu Yi [许毅], Wei Jiangtao [魏江涛], and Liang Xianglong [梁相龙], 2016.

125 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 12 November 2016.

126 Ibid.

127 Xu Yi [许毅], Wei Jiangtao [魏江涛], and Liang Xianglong [梁相龙], 2016.

128 It is not clear what Jing Jianfeng’s permanent billet was at the time of the exercise; he was, however, 

the commander of the 29th Fighter Division in Quzhou, Zhejiang Province, in 2015. He received 

a rank promotion from senior colonel to major general in January 2017. Zhang Jiansong and Zhu 

Zhanghu, “The PLA Air Force holds rank promotion ceremony for new generals,” Kongjun  Bao, 

18 January 2017, p. 1.

129 From “Military Report” [军事报道], Beijing CCTV-7, 12 November 2016.

130 Xu Yi [许毅], Wei Jiangtao [魏江涛], and Liang Xianglong [梁相龙], 2016.

131 In the PLA lexicon, ‘local war’ (局部战争) refers to a limited war in which the purpose, means, and 

scale take place in a local area, as opposed to ‘world war’ (世界大战) or ‘total war’ (全面战争). See PLA 

Military Terminology (中国人民解放军军语), Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, December 

2011, p. 46. 

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid.
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.

137 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 28 November 2017. Photo report by Yang 

Jun, “PLA Air Force Holds ‘Red Sword-2017’ in Deep Desert,” China Military Online in English, 29 

November 2017.

138 From “Military Report,” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 29 November 2017.

139 Ibid.

140 Liao Qirong [廖启荣] and Wang Boqian [王博仟], “Apply the principles, reinforce the mindset of 

system-of-systems combat – an Eastern TCAF air brigade explores the principles for opposition-force 

combat training” [“运用规律, 强化体系作战思维 - 东部战区空军航空兵某旅探索体系对抗演训规

律纪实”] Air Force News [空军报], 5 December 2017, p. 3.

141 Zeng Ke [曾科] and Xie Ruofei [谢若飞], “Overcome the data adaptability problem – a Southern 

TCAF air regiment complies with the principles and uses combat data to improve its system-ofsystems combat capability” [“克服数据的 ‘水土不服’ - 南部战区空军某团遵循规律善用作战数据提

升体系作战能力”], Air Force News [空军报], 5 December 2017, p. 3.

142 Ibid.

143 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 29 November 2017.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid.

146 PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces, CASI, 2017, 

http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/CASI_Primer%20

2017.pdf.

147 Cheng Fuming, Fu Xuecheng, and Guo Huarong, “Airborne ‘Command Post’,” China Air Force, 2013-

01, p. 39-43.

148 PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces, CASI, 2017, 

accessed at http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/CASI_

Primer% 202017.pdf.

149 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 29 November 2017.

150 Ibid.

151 Liu Jinyang [刘锦洋] and Li Jianwen [李建文], 2017.

152 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 28 November 17.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.

155 From “Military Report” (军事报道), Beijing CCTV-7, 4 May 2017.

156 Liu Jinyang [刘锦洋] and Li Jianwen [李建文], 2017.

157 Military Terminology of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Beijing: Academy of Military Science 

Publishing House, September 1997, p. 88.

158 Military Terminology of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Beijing: Academy of Military Science 

Publishing House, September 1997, 24. Li Chao, “Air Defense Zone,” in Yao Wei, ed. China Air Force 

Encyclopedia. Beijing, Aviation Industry Press, November 2005, p. 173.

159 Du Jinwang, “Air Force Tactical Coordination,” in Yao Wei, ed. China Air Force Encyclopedia. Beijing, 

Aviation Industry Press, November 2005, p. 116.

160 “Jinan MRAF Air Division and Naval Flotilla Conduct Joint Training,” Air Force News [空军报] 

in Chinese, 27 May 2003, p. 1. Wei Liping, “Nanjing MRAF Units Organize Multi-Service and 

Branch Joint Opposition-Force Exercise,” Air Force News [空军报] in Chinese, 2 September 2004, p. 

1. Chen Minglin and Xu Tongxuan, “Jinan Military Region Air Force Division Conducts Integrated, 

Opposing-forces Joint Training with Neighboring Units,” Air Force News [空军报], in Chinese, 19 

September 2006.

161 Zhao Lei, 2017.
The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands

162 “Hundreds of Elite Pilots participated in the competition in the desert, Jiang Jiaji won the ‘Golden 

Helmet’ for the third time” [“空军上百精英飞行员大漠对抗 蒋佳冀三夺金头盔”], 1 February 2016, 

accessed at http://military.china.com/important/gundong/11065468/20160201/21386349.html. 

Niu Ruili [牛锐利] and Lu Hui [卢辉], 2015. No author, “2015 PLA Air Force ‘Golden Helmet’ 

competition concluded, elite division used Su-30 to win the competition” [“2015空军金头盔争夺

战落幕 王牌师用苏30夺冠(图)”], 29 December 2015, accessed at http://www.wokeji.com/military/

zgjd/201512/t20151230_2102183.shtml. Li Jianwen [李建文], 2015.

163 Zhao Lei, 2017.

164 No author, “PLA Air Force ‘Golden Dart’ Competition began, Q-5 competed alongside Su-30” [“中国空

军金飞镖大赛开战 强5与苏30同场竞技”], 25 July 2016, accessed at http://mil.sohu.com/20160725/

n460832855.shtml. Yang Chenxiu [杨宸琇], 2016. Li Jianwen [李建文] and Yang Weike [杨伟科], 

“PLA Air Force Five Theater Commands’ dozens of aviation regiment competed for ‘Golden Helmet’” 

[“五大战区空军数十个航空兵旅团争夺‘金飞镖’”], 21 July 2016, Xinhua Wang [新华网], accessed at 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2016-07/22/c_129169599.htm.

165 Zhao Lei, 2017.

166 Huang Panyue, ed., 2016.

167 Ibid.

168 Zhao Lei, 2017.

169 Li Jiayao, “PLAAF kicks off ‘Golden Helmet 2017’ air battle contest,” China Military Online in English, 

3 November 2017, accessed at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-11/03/content_7811945.htm.

170 Huang Panyue, ed., 2017.

171 No author, “Air Force Held Golden Helmet 2015 Competition” [“空军展开2015年度金头盔比武竞

赛”], CCTV, 5 December 2015, accessed at http://v.ifeng.com/mil/mainland/201512/01d2cb3e-9c18-

433c-bf7d-d46ae4d0d6c1.shtml. Hu Xiaoyu and Yang Jin, “The Inspiration of a Two-Time Winner,” 

China Armed Forces in English and Chinese, No. 1, Vol. 19, 28 February 2013.

172 Hu Xiaoyu and Yang Jin, 2013.

173 Zhang Xuefeng, “Aiming Higher in Combat,” China Armed Forces in English and Chinese, No. 28, 

Vol. 4, 2014.

174 Zhao Lei, 2017.

175 Huang Panyue ed., “Surface-to-air missile system in ‘Blue Shield-2017’,” China Military Online in English, 

19 April 2017, accessed at http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-04/19/content_7568698.htm.

176 No author, a blog “PLA Air Force ‘Red Sword’ System of Systems Opposition-Force Exercise” [“解放军

空军红剑体系对抗演习”], 17 January 2017, accessed at http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_12421037_1.html.

177 Zhao Lei, 2017.

178 Liu Xin, ed., “In pics: Air Force conducts ‘Red Sword-2016’ training exercise,” Xinhua Wang in English, 

18 January 2018, accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2017-01/18/c_135993253.htm.
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute