The PLA’s Unmanned 

Aerial Systems

New Capabilities for a 

“New Era” of Chinese 

Military Power

Elsa Kania
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by the China Aerospace Studies Institute

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for her dedication to this and other CASI topics.
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to work diligently 

on all aspects of their aerospace forces. This includes areas not only of traditional 

aircraft, but also in more modern, and some cutting edge, technologies. The UAV 

is one area in which the People’s Republic of China, and the PLA in specific, has 

invested significant time and effort. While we recognize that the term “unmanned” 

is the common and official term, it is rather misleading in the fact that humans, at 

least up until today, still play a critical role in their operations.

Nonetheless, we will not buck convention at this moment, and continue to 

use “unmanned” for the ‘U’ in UAV, for this paper. The PRC is the world’s largest 

producer of UAVs at this time, and captures a vast portion of the commercial 

market, as well as the military one. While it is important to keep the commercial 

aspects in mind, this particular paper will focus on military UAVs, their 

development, deployments, and current and potential uses on the battlefield of 

today and tomorrow. The paper seeks to serve as a starting point to understand 

this growing field, and to give analysts a common baseline from which to work, 

and from which to judge growth, both rapidity and complexity, in the future.

We hope you will find this foundational paper useful and timely, and 

welcome any feedback on its contents, or suggestions for further or future 

research in this field.

Dr. Brendan S. Mulvaney

Director, China Aerospace Studies Institute

Foreword
2 Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is actively advancing its 

employment of military robotics and “unmanned” (无人, i.e., uninhabited)a

systems.1 To date, the PLA has incorporated a range of unmanned aerial vehicles 

(UAVs) (AKA “drones” or remotely piloted aircraft, RPA) into its force structure,2

while also starting to experiment with and, to a limited extent, field unmanned 

underwater vehicles (UUVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), and unmanned 

surface vehicles (USVs).b The PLA’s history with unmanned systems dates back 

to its initial acquisition a basic target drone from the Soviet Union in the 1950s. 

Today, in its quest to advance military innovation, the PLA is engaged in cuttingedge research and development to create high-end unmanned, and increasingly 

intelligent or autonomous, systems for all domains of warfare, ranging from 

swarms of UAVs and USVs to hypersonic space planes.c, 3 This analysis first 

provides an overview of the PLA’s history with UAVs, next describes their likely 

missions, then surveys the current unmanned aerial systems in service with the 

PLA, and lastly reviews the use of UAVs in relevant exercises (演习). Looking 

forward, the PLA is actively developing these capabilities to enhance its military 

power, anticipating that future warfare will be “unmanned, intangible, and silent” 

(“无人,无形,无声”).4

a The use of the term “unmanned,” while common, is technically inaccurate, given the critical role of 

humans in their operation. Thanks to Paul Scharre for suggesting the alternative terminology of “uninhabited,” which is more appropriate. However, this paper will use “unmanned” as the translation of the Chinese 

phrase “无人,” since it typically rendered as such. However, “无人” could also be translated as “un-human-ed” or 

“human-less” (i.e., since 人 does not imply gender).

b Given CASI’s focus and mission, this paper looks primarily on the use of aerial (not ground, surface, or 

underwater) vehicles by the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force. As such, 

this analysis is not comprehensive, and the author recognizes that the development of unmanned ground, 

surface, and underwater vehicles by the PLA is also a major trend meriting further study and consideration.

c The PLA’s research and development of next-generation unmanned systems is the subject of a future 

CASI paper based on ongoing research.

3

The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial 

Systems – New Capabilities 

for a “New Era” of Chinese 

Military Power
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

PLA UAVs in Historical Perspective:

The PLA’s history with the development and employment of unmanned 

systems dates back decades. China acquired its first UAV, the Lavochkin La-17, a 

basic radio-controlled target drone, from the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Initially, 

these 20 La-17s were primarily used by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) as targets, 

such as for tests of and training with weapon systems.5 After the Sino-Soviet split 

and subsequent withdrawal of Soviet Union military support in the early 1960s, 

the PLAAF decided to develop its own unmanned systems, since the initial La17s were being rapidly used up without a viable replacement.6

 This motivated 

the development, starting in 1965, of the PLA’s first notionally indigenous UAV, 

the Chang Kong – 1 (“Vast Sky,”长空一号, CK-1) UAV. The CK-1 was a radiocontrolled target drone based on a reverse engineering of the La-17, which was 

initially developed by the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 

under the oversight of the former Commission for Science, Technology and 

Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).7 The introduction of the CK1, which was first successfully tested around December 1966,8

 facilitated PLA 

testing and training, including for surface-to-air to missiles (SAMs), air-to-air 

missile targeting, and air defense force training.9

The La-17 and the CK-1 Launching

During this timeframe, the PLAAF’s early testing and development of UAVs 

took place at the PLAAF’s Dingxin Test and Training Base’s 2nd Test Station 

in the Gobi Desert.10 The researchers involved in this process included PLAAF 

special technical officer/cadre Zhao Xu (赵 煦), who has been hailed as China’s 

‘father’ of UAVs.11 Leading the Chang Kong research group, Zhao Xu pioneered 

early breakthroughs, resolving basic problems in its performance. At that point, 

China’s technical backwardness rendered progress very slow, but this development 

of China’s first indigenous drone is celebrated as a milestone that established an 

initial foundation for the future development of unmanned systems.

Also in the 1960s, the PLA recovered a number of U.S. AQM-34 Firebee 

drones, used for surveillance,12 of which eleven were shot down in North Vietnam 

by PLAAF J-6 fighter jets starting in late 1964.13 The Firebee was later reverse 

4
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

engineered to develop the Wu Zhen – 5 (无 侦-5, WZ-5), created by Beihang 

University (the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics), which had 

entered service with the PLA by 1981, primarily for military reconnaissance.14 Its 

export version was known as the Chang Hong – 1 (长虹-1 号). In 1979, the WZ-5 

was reportedly employed for reconnaissance in China’s “self-defensive counterstrike” (自 卫反击) against Vietnam.15

The AQM-34 and WZ-5

By the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the PLAAF sought to develop target 

drones with performance similar to that of combat aircraft to test new weapon 

systems. These were created from decommissioned Soviet MiG-15 aircraft in 

what was known as the Wu Yi target (靶—五乙) drone, tested successfully in 

1984, which was then used as a target for weapons tests, particularly of air defense 

systems.16 China’s J-6 (歼-6) fighter jet also appears to have been converted for 

use as a drone, to serve either as a target or potentially for combat purposes, 

particularly since its large-scale retirement.17 The PLA likely continues to convert 

certain fighter jets to drones as it retires them.

At that point, Chinese military research and development was already starting 

to focus on advanced capabilities in target drones. As early as the 1960s, China 

was funding the development of a supersonic unmanned drone as a target for 

tests, particularly of air-to-air missiles.18 Although initial efforts were unsuccessful, 

after Zhao Xu took the lead on this project, his team was able to overcome major 

obstacles, including the lack of a full digital control system, to control and stabilize 

these supersonic target drones with an analog system.19 By April 1995, the test 

flight of this supersonic target drone was reportedly a success, making China the 

third country in the world, after the U.S. and Russia, to have developed such a 

system.20

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

China’s Supersonic Target Drone

Subsequently, Zhao Xu turned his attention to the development of a ‘newtype’ UAV capable of autonomous (自主) navigation and flight and automatic 

(自动) return for landing, before continuing in the development of further multipurpose UAVs.21

Zhao Xu

Zhao Xu, who remains actively involved in UAV R&D as of 2018 as an 

academician with the Chinese Academy of Engineering,22 has highlighted that 

the future direction of PLAAF UAV development will enable their emergence as 

a “second air force” for China.23

Over the next several decades, China’s development of unmanned aerial 

systems continued based on a combination of reverse engineering and indigenous 

development.d For instance, the Cai Hong series of UAVs, developed by the China 

Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) starting in the 1990s, 

has since progressed considerably. CASC’s CH-3 and CH-4 have primarily been 

exported as unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) to militaries worldwide, 

including Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Myanmar, and the United Arab Emirates.24

d For more details on current trends in research and development, please see the next paper in this series. 

The subsequent sections of this paper also discuss the process of development for particular systems.

6
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

The CH-4 in Iraq

In the meantime, a range of UAVs has entered service throughout the PLA 

for a number of missions that enable and support military capabilities.

Primary Missions of PLA Unmanned Aerial Systems:

Today, the PLA is focused on leveraging UAVs to engage in and support a 

wide range of missions and operations across all domains of warfare, informed 

by its history and early concentration on their development.e On the future 

battlefield, military robotics and unmanned, increasingly autonomous systems 

could become pervasive.

PLA Cartoon with Options for the Employment of UAVs

Weapons Testing and Training

The PLA’s early history with drones focused on their utility as targets for 

weapons testing and training, and this application remains relevant to this day as 

the PLA seeks to enhance the sophistication of its training.25 For instance, in 2018, 

the PLA Navy has used target drones in drills in the South China Sea, seeking 

e Please note that this section is not intended to be comprehensive but rather provides a quick overview 

of prevalent missions at present and in recent history. As its development of unmanned systems progresses 

further, the PLA will continue to explore further applications for them.

7
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

to enhance its actual combat capability through a simulated missile attack drill.26

The target drones, which had reportedly been employed several hundred times 

in over 30 previous exercises and training missions, were reportedly intended to 

“precisely simulate the feasibility and effectiveness to ensure a close simulation 

of an aerial attack target,” while exploring more innovative approaches to actual 

combat (实战) training.27

Surveillance and Reconnaissance:

The PLA’s employment of unmanned aerial systems will support its 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, from tactical 

drones used for battlefield reconnaissance to systems that are more sophisticated 

in supporting long-range surveillance. In this regard, these systems will enhance 

PLA situational awareness in complex environments.28

Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment:

The PLA will use UAVs to enable targeting and battle damage assessments, 

including in directing artillery or enabling over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting of 

missiles.29 Increasingly, certain UAVs have even been integrated with the PLA’s 

command information systems.30 From tactical fires to precision strikes, UAVs 

have the potential to ensure greater precision and thus enhance PLA firepower 

capabilities.

Data Relay and Communications Support:

The PLA will likely utilize multiple models of UAVs for data relay, including 

to support communications.31 In a scenario in which space-based capabilities were 

compromised, the PLA might utilize UAVs to replace that capability, at least at a 

localized level, which could facilitate its operations in a denied environment.

Information Operations:

The PLA will leverage UAVs in information operations, especially to 

undertake electronic countermeasures to gain advantage on an “informatized” 

(信息化) battlefield,32 including within a joint force information operations 

group (信息作战群).33 In particular, information operations are believed to be 

developing in the direction of unmanned technologies, since UAVs have become 

a “multipurpose electronic warfare platform capable of executing a variety of 

electronic warfare tasks,” which include electronic reconnaissance, electronic 

jamming, and anti-radiation attacks, according to influential Academy of Military 

8
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems 9

Science information warfare theorist Ye Zheng (叶征).34 UAVs may also be used 

as ‘bait’ or decoys in order to confuse enemy forces.35

Suppression (or Saturation) of Enemy Air Defenses:

The PLA could employ anti-radiation UAVs, such as the Harpy and the 

indigenous ASN-301 adaptation of it, in support of the suppression of enemy 

air defenses.36 In addition, the mass of swarms of ‘suicide drones’ could also be 

leveraged to overwhelm air defenses or high-value weapons platforms. The PLA 

has seemingly converted its retired J-6 fighters into drones that have been massed 

and likely remain at bases in Fujian Province near Taiwan.37, 38 There are concerns 

that these drones could be used to overwhelm Taiwan’s defenses in a conflict 

scenario.39 In an exhibit on future warfare, China’s Military Museum in Beijing 

also includes an image of a “swarm combat system” going up against an aircraft 

carrier.40

A Depiction of the PLA’s Future Swarm Combat System

Integrated Reconnaissance and Precision Strike:

Some of the PLA’s advanced UAVs are optimized for integrated reconnaissance 

and strike (察打一体), capable of carrying multiple types of precision weapons. 

These capabilities might be utilized in conventional conflict or counterterrorism 

scenario.41 For instance, a PLA strategist from the Academy of Military Science 

has argued that advanced UAVs could be used for power projection in “long 
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

distance operations,” in order to enable the PLA’s “long-arm counterattack” 

capabilities.42 The PLA Navy might employ ship-based and carrier-based UAVs,43

including to strike an adversary’s aircraft carrier or to assault an enemy-occupied 

island or reef.44

Logistics Support:

The PLA will likely use UAVs for logistics support, particularly for scenarios 

requiring rapid response, given their advantages of speed, accuracy, and flexibility. 

In some cases, the leveraging of commercial partnerships may be a major enabler. 

For instance, the PLAAF Logistics Department has developed a strategic 

cooperation agreement through which the commercial UAVs from SF Express 

and Jingdong were used for rapid delivery of medical supplies and equipment for 

rapid repairs in a trial exercise in January 2018.45

A Commercial UAV in Action

10
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

The PLA has fielded a range of UAVs across all four services, the PLA Army 

(PLAA), Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), and Rocket Force (PLARF/former 

Second Artillery Force); as well as the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF).f In 

addition, the former General Staff Department Intelligence Department (情报部), 

now the CMC Joint Staff Department ( JSD) Intelligence Bureau (情报局), used 

to operate UAVs for reconnaissance and intelligence.46 There are some indications 

that this unit (61135 部队) has since been transferred to the PLAAF,g seemingly 

re-designated as Unit 95894 in the process,47 but the JSD may continue to operate 

a limited number of UAVs.h

Although a high proportion of the UAVs in service with the PLA are smaller, 

tactical models, the PLAAF and PLAN have also started to introduce growing 

numbers of advanced, multi-mission UAVs. Certain PLA UAVs appear to be 

strikingly similar to comparable U.S. models, which may reflect mimicry or 

cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property in some cases.48 At the same time, for 

smaller or less specialized unmanned systems, such as those used for logistics or 

tactical reconnaissance, the PLA is seeking to take advantage of the strength and 

dynamism of China’s commercial drone industry, pursuant to a national strategy 

of military-civil fusion (军民融合).49 Given the robust and extensive research 

f Please note that this is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of all of the UAVs that the PLA 

operates but rather a review of representative models. This listing is not comprehensive, and it does not include 

those systems currently in development but not known to be fielded.

g Specifically, these UAVs were assessed to be operated by the Tactical Reconnaissance Bureau (战术侦察局), 

also seemingly referred to as the Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau (航天侦察局), which appeared to oversee this 

operational UAV unit located in Shahe, Beijing. (Ian Easton and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities,” 

Project 2049 Institute, March 11, 2013, https://project2049.net/documents/uav_easton_hsiao.pdf.)

h For instance, the 55th Research Institute, which is involved in UAV development, may remain under the 

Joint Staff Department.

11

UAVs Across the PLA Today
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

and development underway, a range of advanced, next-generation unmanned 

systems, including those that are solar, stealthy, supersonic, and/or increasingly 

autonomous, will enter into service with the PLA in the future.50 

PLA Army:

The PLA ground forces employ a range of UAVs that are primarily smaller, 

more tactical models, often utilized for battlefield reconnaissance and targeting 

artillery fire to enhance precision strike. To date, a significant proportion of these 

UAVs has come from a series produced by the Xi’an Aisheng (ASN) Technology 

Group, Ltd., which is subordinate to Northwestern Polytechnical University in 

Xi’an.51 This organization has reportedly delivered thousands of UAVs to the PLA 

in the past several decades and claims to hold as much as 90% of the Chinese 

UAV market.52 In the PLAA, a range of units and organizations incorporate 

UAVs controlled by operators and supported by military technicians. The PLAA 

has equipped reconnaissance UAVs in brigade-level (旅) units. For instance, the 

Northern Theater Command sent several UAV fendui (分队)i that were assigned 

to brigade-level forces to undertake OTH reconnaissance training.53 There are 

also a number of dedicated UAV battalions (无人机营) and a variety of lower-level 

organizations with UAVs (i.e., fendui, 分队, or ‘teams,’ 队) across all five theater 

commands (战区), often subordinate to group armies.

As of the mid-1990s, the JWP-01 (ASN-206) was introduced as a multipurpose UAV with a range of about 150 kilometers.54 It was used primarily in 

support of artillery, enabling reconnaissance and assisting in targeting. The 

information, such as video imagery, captured by the UAV, could be transmitted 

to ground stations, where the command team could use the information with 

the capability to direct and position targeting, including artillery fire.55 There 

also appear to have been several variants of it, such as the RKL-165, which was 

reportedly developed as a “false target drone” used as a decoy to draw enemy fire, 

and the TK-J226, seemingly employed for communications relay.56

i The term fendui is typically used to describe platoon to battalion-sized subunits, whereas units include 

regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps-level organizations.

12
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

The ASN-206

The successor to that model, the ASN-207 (or JWP-02),j features an improved 

range, reportedly up to 600 kilometers, and overall greater performance.57 Featured 

in China’s 2009 National Day Parade,58 it has likely also been adapted for several 

different variants.k The ASN-207 can be readily distinguished by its mushroomshaped receiving antenna.

ASN-207 on Parade

In China’s August 2017 military parade, a PLAA UAV was displayed as part 

of a UAV formation (无人机方队) within the information operations group (信

息作战群). 

j There is some confusion and inconsistency in how the designations JWP-01 and JWP-02 are applied to 

the ASN-206, ASN-207, and other ASN-series UAVs in open-source analyses and reporting. These models 

can also be difficult to distinguish (and are often mislabeled) in available imagery. I try to differentiate these 

models to the best of my ability, relying upon authoritative sources as much as possible.

k According to some sources, which cannot be fully verified, the variants of the ASN 206/207 include: 

the RKT-164/RKT-167 communication jamming variants; the TK-J226 for communications relay; the 

RKL-165 as a decoy and false target; the DCK-006 for reconnaissance; and the RKZ-167 for electronic 

countermeasures.

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

UAV Formation in the Information Operations Group 

This parade displayed a number of ‘new-type’ UAVs for radar and 

communications interference, intended to disrupt adversary command 

information systems.59 The PLAA UAVs participating in the parade came from a 

Central Theater Command Army Infantry Division’s Electronic Countermeasures 

Battalion.60

UAVs on Parade in August 2017

Increasingly, the PLA’s UAVs have started to be integrated with its command 

information systems to enable their use to guide firepower (i.e., kinetic) strikes.61

For instance, as of August 2016, the former Central Theater Command’s 20th 

Group Army (decommissioned as of 2017), which was experimenting with the 

use of a new type of command information system, engaged in exercises in which 

it demonstrated the successful application of firepower targeting based on footage 

sent back from an ASN-series UAV.62 Through such employment of UAVs, units 

have the ability to undertake damage assessments of targets and decide which 

require another wave of strikes.63

The PLA has also leveraged UAVs for surveying and mapping of operational 

geography, transmitting data and imagery to enhance situational awareness on the 

battlefield.

In addition, certain PLAA units, including special forces and armored brigades 

have been provided with smaller, hand -held and -launched variants, including the 

CH-802 for localized reconnaissance.64, 65

14
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

CH-802 with PLA Army Special Forces

PLA Navy:

The PLAN possesses not only smaller tactical UAVs but also a limited number 

of sophisticated reconnaissance UAVs. Notably, the PLAN operates the mediumaltitude long endurance (MALE) BZK-005 or Chang Ying (长鹰), which has a 

maximum range of 2,400 kilometers and a maximum endurance of 40 hours.66 The 

BZK-005, designed by the Beihang University’s UAV Institute and the Harbin 

Aircraft Industry Group is thus roughly comparable to the U.S. Global Hawk.67

The BZK-005’s development dates back to 2000, under the leadership of chief 

designer Xiang Jinwu (向锦武),l and it underwent testing and verification 2006, 

ahead of being finalized and delivered around 2007.68, 69

BZK-005 on parade and in flight

The BZK-005 has been operating in the vicinity of the East China Sea since 

at least 2013, when, according to Japanese media, the BZK-005 entered Japan’s 

ADIZ in the East China Sea and was intercepted by Japanese fighter jets.70 Based 

on satellite imagery, there were at least three BZK-005 UAVs stationed at the 

PLAN airfield on Daishan Island in Hangzhou Bay in the East China Sea as of 

mid-2015.71 In addition, by mid-2016, there were also reports that the PLAN had 

deployed at least one BZK-005 UAV to Woody Island in the South China Sea, 

l In both 2009 and 2018, the team responsible for its design received a first place in the National Science 

and Technology Progress Award for their accomplishments.

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

based on satellite imagery,72 though it has not been clear whether or not it may be 

stationed there permanently in the future.73

The PLAN has also operated a medium-altitude, medium-endurance 

(MAME) UAV, a variant of the ASN-209 known as the “Silver Eagle,” (银鹰), 

fielded since at least 2011, which has been used for long-distance communications 

support and electromagnetic confrontation.74 In a scenario in which satellite 

communications were compromised, the PLA might utilize UAVs to replace that 

capability, at least at a localized level. The PLAN might also use these UAVs, 

which have a range of 200 kilometers and maximum endurance of 10 hours, as 

guidance for targeting missiles. While PLAN UAVs may be especially prevalent 

in the Eastern Theater Command Navy, all three theater command navies appear 

to have fielded at least a limited number of UAVs.75

The ‘Silver Eagle’ Launching

PLAN vessels are also known to operate UAVs and unmanned helicopters 

for use in support of maritime ISR capabilities. The S-100, purchased in 2010 

from the Swedish company Schiebel, has been observed operating off of PLAN 

surface combatants, including the Type-054 frigate.76 Going forward, the PLAN 

will likely continue to field and integrate further UAVs and unmanned helicopters 

into its fleets, including the WZ-6B unmanned helicopter, developed indigenously 

by the former General Staff Department’s 60th Research Institute,m which has a 

range of 200 kilometers and maximum endurance of 6 hours.77

m This institute is also known as the Nanjing Research Institute of Simulation Technology, and it has likely 

shifted under the CMC Equipment Development Department since the reforms.

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The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

As of early 2018,n the Xiang Long (“Soar Dragon,” 翔龙), which was initially 

seemingly designated the EA-03 but now apparently referred to as the WZ-9 (无

侦-9), has also been fielded with the PLAN.78 The Xiang Long is a high-altitude 

long endurance (HALE) UAV, with a range of 7,000 kilometers and maximum 

endurance of 10 hours, which was designed by AVICs Chengdu Aircraft Design 

and Research Institute and produced by AVIC’s Guizhou Aviation Aircraft 

Corporation.79 So far, according to available reporting, the Soar Dragon has been 

tested in the Southern Theater Command Navy (former South Sea Fleet),80 and it 

has been spotted at the Lingshui Naval Airbase on Hainan Island, where it could 

be used in support of airborne early warning.81

The ‘Soar Dragon’

The Xianglong was initially revealed in 2006 at the Zhuhai Airshow.82 In 

2011, a prototype of it was photographed at an airfield in Chengdu, and its first 

successful flight occurred in 2013.83 As of the summer of 2016, photos online 

appeared to indicate that the Xianglong had entered production,84 and by late 

2016, there were reports in state media that it was undergoing final testing and 

could soon enter service with the PLA.85

PLA Air Force:

The PLAAF has fielded the GJ-1 (Gongji-1, 攻击-1,) variant of the 

Pterodactyl (or Yilong, 翼龙), a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV 

with a range of 4,000 kilometers and maximum endurance of 20 hours, developed 

by China Aviation Industry Corporation’s Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute. 

The GJ-1, which is roughly analogous to the U.S. Predator, is capable of carrying 

at least ten forms of precision weapons, including air-toground missiles, precisionguided rockets, and precision-guided bombs.86 Equipped with an optical turret, 

infrared and photoelectric sensors, and laser target pointers, the GJ-1 can guide 

n It is quite possible that this UAV may have been fielded sooner, but these initial reports of its fielding and 

detection date back to that timeframe.

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

the targeting of anti-tank missiles that it launches and also provide targeting 

instructions for other aircraft or ground weapons.87

The GJ-1

The GJ-1 is known for its integrated reconnaissance and strike capabilities, 

but it can also be used for electronic warfare, to guide targeting, or as an antiradiation missile.88, 89 According to Li Yidong (李屹东), chief designer for this 

series of UAVs, the initial model underwent development from 2005 onward,90

completed its first flight in 2007, underwent further testing through 2008 and 

2009, and was first exported in 2011.91

UAV Pilot Li Hao

The PLAAF’s establishment of the first unit equipped with the GJ-1 illustrates 

the timeframe and requirements inherent in such a process.92 Starting in 2010, the 

PLAAF started to select drone pilots, chosen so far from among former activeduty fighter pilots, perhaps since the requirements for operating such a high-end 

unmanned system are seen as similarly demanding.93 Some of the pilots selected 

had reached their mandatory age to be ‘grounded’ from manned aircraft yet were 

able to leverage their experience with these “unmanned” systems.94

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The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

As 2011, the PLAAF’s first UAV unit (95835 部队) was formally established 

under a command post in the Nanjing Military Region Air Force.o Next, in 2012, 

this unit was transferred to an aviation division in the former Jinan Military 

Region Air Force, and in 2014, it was again transferred to a base of the former 

Lanzhou Military Region Air Force. Subsequently, Unit 95835 was relocated to 

the Air Force Dingxin Test and Training Base in the Gobi Desert, and its location 

remains Bazhou, Xinjiang as of mid-2018.95

GJ-1 pilots in action

Unit 95835 has progressively increased the sophistication of its training 

with the GJ-1, working towards integrating it into the PLAAF’s overall combat 

system.p As of 2014, the GJ-1 had participated in all-military exercises, and, in 

2016, it appeared in training alongside multiple types of manned aircraft.96 Since 

then, the unit in question has continued to engage in live fire training exercises 

under actual combat (实战) conditions using laser-guided weapons, progressively 

increasing the sophistication of these training exercises.97

For instance, in late 2017, the unit engaged in its first “large-scale day and 

night continuous attack drill,” performing, for the first time a “combined target 

overall fatality assessment.”98 In this drill, the unit demonstrated their capability 

in nighttime precision attacks with laser-guided weapon against enemy targets, 

in a drill involving coordination among several UAVs.99 Through 2018, the unit 

is continuing to focus on improving the difficulty of training to enhance combat 

capabilities, including through operating under adverse weather conditions.100

Within the near future, the PLAAF is likely to start increasing the number 

of GJ-1 units, while also introducing more advanced models to succeed it. At the 

2016 Zhuhai Airshow, the second generation of this series, the Wing Loong or 

o The unit was given this MUCD by 2015, if not earlier. In a notice for recruitment at the time, it was 

characterized as a “technology-intensive force that mainly engages in scientific research, experiments, and 

training tasks.” There are researchers in the same unit working on algorithms for route planning, swarm optimization, etc.

p This is the only unit to which the GJ-1 has been fielded about which there is clear media reporting. It is 

possible that other units may also have the GJ-1 at this point, but that cannot yet be confirmed.

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

Yilong –2 systems was introduced, which is larger in size, capable of faster speeds, 

and with greater maximum weight, roughly analogous to the U.S. Reaper.101 As 

a likely successor to the Yilong-1 (GJ-1), it might also enter service with the 

PLAAF as the GJ-2.q

Wing Loong 2

The PLAAF has also, seemingly more recently, introduced the BZK-005 into 

service, presumably for reconnaissance, though details about which units may 

operate it have not yet been forthcoming.102

With regard to more advanced UAVs, an important acquisition for the PLA 

has been the Harpy,r which the PLA purchased from Israel in 1994 and had 

reportedly acquired about 100 by 1999.103 The Harpy, an anti-radiation drone that 

acts as a loitering munition designed to attack radar systems, which is characterized 

as an autonomous weapon by its manufacturer, is intended for the suppression of 

enemy air defenses.104 Although the initial purchase agreement had included an 

upgrade to China’s Harpy drones, in 2004, the United States called for Israel to 

nullify that agreement.105

As of 2017, the PLA unveiled a reverse-engineered version of the Harpy, 

the ASN-301 anti-radiation loitering munition, which appears to be a nearcopy of the original.106 The ASN-301,s

 developed by the Xi’an ASN Technology 

Group, was featured in the August 2017 parade that marked the 90th anniversary 

of the PLA’s establishment, where it was shown in a fire unit that can consist 

of 54 drones.107 The ASN-301 been initially fielded with a PLAAF electronic 

countermeasures regiment.108

q The Caihong-5 appears to be a comparable and perhaps competing model, but this series does not appear 

to have entered service with the PLA to date, despite the frequency of its export.

r It does not appear that China purchased production rights at the time. Although China reverse engineered the technology, there are no public reports of complaints from Israel that are readily available.

s According to available reporting, the ASN-301 has endurance of 4 hours, a top speed of 220 kilometers 

per hour, and a range of 288 kilometers. It targets radar frequencies in the 2016 GHz range, with a radar homing device that has a search range of 25 kilometers.

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The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

ASN-301 on parade

The PLAAF has also deployed the ‘Soar Dragon’ WZ-9 (无侦-9) to several 

locations as of early to mid-2017.109 There were three WZ-9s spotted at the 

Western Theater Command’s Shigatse airfield in Tibet around August 2017,110

around the time of the Sino-Indian border standoff that fall.111 The WZ-9 has also 

been fielded in the Northern Theater Command, near the North Korean border, 

at Yishuntun airbase in Jilin Province.112 The fact that its confirmed locations are 

strategic flashpoints seems unlikely to be a coincidence, perhaps indicating the 

value and operational capability of these units in providing strategic reconnaissance 

and intelligence for the PLA.t

The EA-03 might be used for missions including electronic warfare and longrange reconnaissance, such as perhaps to track and monitor U.S. aircraft carriers.113

Relative to the BZK-005, it has a greater range and greater endurance, as well as 

more advanced command communications and electronic interference systems. 

For instance, according to one report, its GPS interference pods can be used to 

interfere with GPS devices at a radius of up to 400 kilometers.114

At the tactical level, certain PLAAF airborne regiments also operate the 

CH-802 for reconnaissance.115

CH-802

t To date, there have not been details revealed in official media or adequately authoritative sources about 

the units with which these UAVs have been fielded, and there are not yet available accounts of their training 

and the exact timeframe of their establishment.

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PLA Rocket Force:

The PLARF appears to have fielded a number of UAVs across various units. 

The JWP-02 (ASN-207), which was delivered to artillery forces around 2013, 

has improved capabilities in tactical intelligence and reconnaissance, as well as 

artillery firing correction and damage assessment,116 supporting the long-range 

precision firepower capabilities.117, 118

JWP-02 with Artillery Units

For instance, the PLARF’s Base 52 in Anhui Province, which could cover 

the East China Sea and Taiwan, and also Base 53 in Yunnan Province, which can 

cover multiple potential targets, including locations in India and Southeast Asia, 

may have deployed UAVs to subordinate missile brigades.119 It may also employ 

UAVs to provide OTH guidance for advanced missiles,120 such as the DF-21D.121

The PLARF seems to focus upon the use of UAVs, primarily from the ASN 

series, largely for battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance, target positioning, and 

damage assessment. For instance, these UAVs can help determine the coordinates 

or correct targeting for artillery, rocket launchers, and missiles at the tactical and 

operational levels.122 As of 2013, the former Second Artillery had fielded and 

undertaken training with ASN-series UAVs for these purposes, and these drones 

may be in service with a range of units. The PLARF has been characterized as 

using UAVs as a “telescope” to allow for “real-time control” and more accurate 

decision-making,123 implying a highly tactical use of UAVs.124

PLA Strategic Support Force:

The PLA’s new Strategic Support Force will likely field UAVs for 

reconnaissance and electronic countermeasures. The PLASSF has incorporated 

into its force structure core elements, such as electronic warfare brigades,125 that 

were subordinate to the former GSD Fourth Department (4PLA),u the Electronic 

u However, the headquarters of the former 4PLA has since been shifted under the Joint Staff Department 

as the JSD Network-Electronic Bureau (网络电子局) or the Network-Electronic Countermeasures Dadui (网电对

抗大队, 31003 部队)

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The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

Countermeasures and Radar Department, which had previously acquired 

UAVs.126 Not unlike the PLA’s four services, the PLASSF will also leverage UAVs 

to provide reconnaissance capabilities in support of their missions.v For instance, 

in one training exercise, in which the PLASSF had to repair communications 

networks that had been damaged, UAVs were used to provide imagery in support 

of that activity.127 Although the available information remains fairly limited, a 

video that was released regarding PLASSF training included a shot of a small 

four-rotor drone.128

A Small SSF UAV

PLA Training with Unmanned Systems:

The PLA’s operational capability with UAVs will depend upon the realism and 

sophistication of its training with them. The PLAAF has started to incorporate 

UAVs into its major, ‘brand-name’ training exercises, such as Red Sword (红剑). 

The incorporation of UAVs into the PLA’s high-level joint exercises, which involve 

confrontations between “Red” (China) and “Blue” (enemy) Forces, appears to have 

become more common in recent years.

Red Sword (红剑):

The PLAAF’s GJ-1 was first introduced into the “Red Sword” exercise in 

2012. During that exercise, the GJ-1 successfully completed high-altitude aerial 

photography, target detection, and picture transmission missions.129

Peace Mission (和平使命):

In Peace Mission 2014, a counter-terrorism drill organized through the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the PLAAF used the GJ-1 for integrated 

reconnaissance and strike.130 In this exercise, the GJ-1 discovered the blue force’s 

v Although the UAV unit with the former General Staff Department Intelligence Department appears 

to have been transferred to the PLAAF, it is unknown at this point whether UAVs from the former GSD 

Informatization Department (信息化部), which has since been reorganized into the JSD Information and 

Communications Bureau (信息通信局), may have been transferred to the PLASSF or not.

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

(adversary) command vehicle, shared intelligence successfully, and succeeded in 

destroying it with a precision strike.131

Stride (跨越):

There are multiple references to the deployment of UAVs, primarily for 

purposes of reconnaissance and electromagnetic interference, in certain of 

the PLA’s major exercises, especially since at least 2014,w with increasingly 

sophisticated uses of UAVs by red and blue forces alike.132, 133 For instance, in 

the 2015 Stride exercise, a UAV team from the PLAA’s former Southern Theater 

Command 47th Group Army (decommissioned in 2017) contributed a “battlefield 

reconnaissance capability” that would have been “unthinkable” previously.134

Firepower (火力):

Beyond reconnaissance, the use of UAVs to engage in electromagnetic 

countermeasures appears to have become more prevalent as the PLA prepares 

for “informatized warfare” and seeks to train on an “informatized battlefield.” 

For example, in 2015, a former 1st Group Army (now 72nd Group Army) UAV 

battalion took part in training exercises in which its UAVs were characterized as 

the “electromagnetic trump card” for winning on the information battlefield (制

胜信息战场的“电磁王牌”), through engaging in electromagnetic interference.135

Notably, in Firepower (Huoli) 2015, the first phase included a PLAAF Blue Force 

attacking Red Force air defense units through over 200 sorties that included 

multiple forms of aircraft and also UAVs within a complex electromagnetic 

environment.136

w It is possible that the participation of UAVs in these exercises could predate the available media references, 

so the timing of the initial use of UAVs in joint exercises is difficult to pinpoint.

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The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

The PLA has also progressed towards formalizing and standardizing its 

approach to training with UAVs. In 2001, the PLA drafted the first “UAV Outline 

of Military Training and Evaluation” (UAV OMTE, 无人机训练与考核大纲).137

Although there are no details available about the contents of this OMTE, PLA 

OMTE generally offer guidance for training, including goals, principles, and 

content, as well as implementation phases and procedures, and often require 

several years to draft and revise.138 The development of a formal curriculum for 

UAV training at that time appears to be an indication that the PLA as a whole 

was already starting to focus on advancing its UAV capabilities through more 

systematic training. Since PLA updated most of its OMTE around 2009, this 

UAV OMTE may have been revised at that time or remain pending revision.

As China has progressed in the development and fielding of UAVs, the PLA 

has also started to establish educational and training programs for UAV operators, 

researchers, and technicians across the services, reflecting recognition of the 

importance of personnel.139 In 1994, the PLA created its first course for cadets 

at the Army Artillery Academy to train as UAV operators and technicians, who 

could go on to leverage UAVs for battlefield reconnaissance, target positioning, 

and damage assessment.140 Since then, a growing number of PLA academic 

institutions have started to provide education and training for future UAV officers 

and enlisted specialists, particularly in engineering.141 For example, the Air Force 

Engineering University has established a discipline of “Unmanned Aircraft 

Combat Systems and Technology” (无人飞行器作战系统与技术) to train students 

at the master’s and doctoral level.142 The Naval Aviation Engineering Academy 

has instructed a technical officer cadre for assault UAVs.143

Institutionalization of Training 

and Education

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

It is difficult to determine the level of sophistication of the instruction that 

students in these programs receive, which likely varies across programs and 

specialties. At the PLAAF’s Ordnance Engineering College, students have 

engaged in training with UAVs that included launch, remote control, and realtime image acquisition.144 In addition to formal educational programs, there 

are also specialized courses available to officers and enlisted personnel within 

different UAV units.145 Going forward, the PLA will likely continue to step up its 

recruitment of officers and enlisted personnel for this discipline.

26
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

As the PLA enters a “new era,” the operationalization of these new forces 

and capabilities could enhance Chinese military power, perhaps even impacting 

the future military balance. The PLA will be influenced by its history with 

the development and employment of UAVs as it continues to introduce more 

advanced systems and integrates them into its combat system. Beyond the active 

research and development underway, the immediate challenge for the PLA will 

continue to be the creation of new units to introduce such new models of UAVs, 

which will require selecting and training their pilots and operators, creating new 

frameworks for training and education, and integrating them into more complex 

and realistic training exercises. At this point, it is clear that the PLA envisions 

leveraging UAVs to enable and support a range of missions and operations 

throughout all domains of warfare. There may continue to be a high degree of 

variety and variability across services, informed by their cultures and priorities, 

with regard to how these systems are fielded and utilized. As the PLA looks ahead 

to future “unmanned” and “intelligentized” warfare, UAVs will become an integral 

element of Chinese aerospace power.

Conclusion

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

Endnotes

1 This paper builds upon research that dates back to the author’s testimony to the U.S.-China Economic 

and Security Review Commission in February 2017. See: Elsa B. Kania, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Chinese Advances in Unmanned Systems and the Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence—the PLA’s Trajectory towards Unmanned, “Intelligentized” 

Warfare,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 23, 2017, https://www.uscc.

gov/sites/default/files/Kania_Testimony.pdf

2 See also prior analyses of Chinese unmanned systems, including: Michael S. Chase, Kristen A. Gunness, 

Lyle J. Morris, Samuel K. Berkowitz, and Benjamin S. Purser III, “Emerging Trends in China’s Development of Unmanned Systems,” RAND Corporation, 2015, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/

research_reports/RR900/RR990/RAND_RR990.pdf.

Ian Easton and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities,” Project 2049 Institute, March 11, 2013, 

https://project2049.net/documents/uav_easton_hsiao.pdf.

Kimberly Hsu, Craig Murray, and Jeremy Cook, “China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,” 

U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 13, 2013, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/

default/files/Research/China%27s%20Military%20UAV%20Industry_14%20June%202 013.pdf

Ian Burns McCaslin, “Red Drones Over Disputed Seas: A Field Guide to Chinese UAVs/UCAVs Operating in the Disputed East and South China Seas,” Project 2049, August 28, 2017, https://project2049.

net/2017/08/28/reddrones- over-disputed-seas-a-field-guide-to-chinese-uavs-ucavs-operating-in-thedisputed-east-and-south-china-seas/

3 For instance, see: “China launches record-breaking drone swarm,” Xinhua, June 11, 2017, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/11/c_136356850.htm

4 Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Research Department [军事科学院军事战略研究部] (ed.), 

The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013, p. 97-98.

5 “Remarks by Academician Zhao Xu of the Chinese Academy of Engineering on the Road of Research 

and Development for UAVs” [记中国工程院院士赵煦的无人机研制之路], Science Times, September 9, 2011, 

http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2011/9/252239.shtm

6 For more historical context, see, for instance: Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, Princeton University Press, 2008.

7 “Remarks by Academician Zhao Xu of the Chinese Academy of Engineering on the Road of Research 

and Development for UAVs” [记中国工程院院士赵煦的无人机研制之路], Science Times, September 9, 2011, 

http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2011/9/252239.shtm See also: Chang Kong -1 UAV [长空一号无人

机], https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E9%95%BF%E7%A9%BA%E4%B8%80%E5%8F%B7%E6%97%

A0%E4%BA% BA%E6%9C%BA/280214?fromtitle=%E9%95%BF%E7%A9%BA%E4%B8%80%E5%

8F%B7%28CK- 1%29%E9%AB%98%E9%80%9F%E6%97%A0%E4%BA%BA%E6%9C%BA&fromid=6286338

28
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems 29

8 Remarks by Academician Zhao Xu of the Chinese Academy of Engineering on the Road of Research 

and Development for UAVs [记中国工程院院士赵煦的无人机研制之路].

9 “Military UAV Expert Explains China’s Chang Kong – 1 UAV” [军方无人机专家详解中国长空一号无人机], 

http://www.gf81.com.cn/second_link/gfkj/70.html

10 “The Cradle of China’s Unmanned Target Drones: A Certain Air Force Training Base’s Number Two 

Station [中国无人靶机摇篮— 空军某试验训练基地二站],” Anhui News, June 19, 2002, http://mil.anhuinews.com/

system/2002/06/19/000041806.shtm

11 “China’s Father of UAVs” [中国无人机之父”逐梦九天], China Air Force, October 8, 2013, http://kj.81.cn/

content/2013-10/08/content_5692763.htm

12 “AQM-34 Ryan Firebee (USA),” PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/spiesfly/uavs_09.html

13 “Military History: PLA J-6 in Four Years Shot Down 22 U.S. Aircraft Without Any Damage” [军史: 解放

军歼6 四年曾内击落美机22 架 自身无一受损], PLA Daily, February 5, 2013, http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/

tp/content_5862548.htm

14 “WZ-5: Our Nation’s First Independently Researched and Developed UAV” [无侦-5: 我国自主研制的第一代

无人机], PLA Daily, December 28, 2009, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/42963/52991/10660031.html

15 “WZ-6: Bridging Unmanned Reconnaissance Vehicle” [无 -6:无无无无无 无无无无], China News, September 27, 

2009, http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2009-09/27/content_18610106.htm This operational employment of the WZ-5 reportedly occurred prior to its full or official fielding, or the dates that are available 

from official media sources may reflect inconsistencies in reporting.

16 “Manned Aircraft “Transformed” into Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, the “Target Wu-Yi”” [有人机“变身”无人机“

靶五-乙”], Chinese Air Force, November 12, 2013, http://kj.81.cn/content/2013-11/12/content_5698748.

htm

17 See, for instance: “Our Military’s 3,000 J-6s Changed into UAVs [我军3 千架歼6 改无人机], Sina Military, 

December 9, 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2016-12-09/doc-ifxypipt0654560.shtml

18 “Remarks by Academician Zhao Xu of the Chinese Academy of Engineering on the Road of Research 

and Development for UAVs” [记中国工程院院士赵煦的无人机研制之路], Science Times, September 9, 2011, 

http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2011/9/252239.shtm

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid

22 In the Depths of the Desert, Pursuing One Lifelong Dream” [大漠深处, 一生追寻一个梦], PLA Daily, May 

14, 2018, http://www.cae.cn/cae/html/main/col36/2018-05/15/20180515095941267864834_1.html

23 “Remember Chinese Academy of Engineering Academician Zhao Xu’s UAV R&D Road” [记中国

工程院院士赵煦的无人机研制之路], Science Times, September 9, 2011, http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2011/9/252239.shtm

24 “High-End UAVs Researched and Developed by Our Country Exported to Over Ten Countries” [我国研

制的高端无人机出口到十余个国家], China Military Online, April 5, 2017, http://www.81.cn/bqtd/2017-04/05/

content_7550634.htm

25 “A Fighter Jet Outwits a UAV” [战斗机斗法无人机], People’s Daily, March 18, 2003, http://www.people.com.

cn/GB/junshi/192/3615/5679/20030318/946058.html

26 “Chinese navy deploys drones in South China Sea missile drills,” South China Morning Post, 

June 15, 2018, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2150957/chinese-navy-deploys-drones-south-chinasea-missile

27 “In the South China Sea, the Navy Engages in a Simulated Missile Attack Exercise” [海军在南海进行模拟导

弹攻击演练], Observer, June 15, 2018, http://www.guancha.cn:8080/military-affairs/2018_06_15_460242.

shtml 2018-06-15

28 “The Explosive Development of China’s UAVs” [中国无人机井喷发展], China Youth Daily, January 23, 2015, 

http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2015-01/5481399.html
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

29 See, for instance: Liang Yong [梁勇] and Zhou Shaolei [周绍磊], “UAV Over-the-Horizon Guidance 

Methods” [无人机超视距引导方法], Missile and Aerospace Vehicle Technologies [导弹与航天运载技术], 2010. 

Qin Zhilong [秦志龙] and Wang Hua [王华], “The Tentative Idea of Using UAVs to Assist Anti-Ship 

Ballistic Missile Strikes against Aircraft Carriers” [利用无人机协助反舰弹道导弹打击航母的设想], Winged Missiles

[飞航导弹], 2010.

30 “PLA New-Type Command Information Systems Can Use UAVs to Guide Firepower Strikes” [解放军新

型指挥信息系统可用无人机引导火力打击], PLA Daily, September 2, 2016, http://webcache.googleusercontent.

com/search?q=cache:fghwSm69GwsJ:military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0901/c1011-28682320.html+&cd=14&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au

31 “The Chinese Navy Fielded the Silver Eagle UAV” [中国海军列装银鹰无人机], China News, July 18, 2011, 

http://www.china.com.cn/photochina/2011-07/12/content_22968947.htm

32 “The ‘Electromagnetic Condor’ Winning on the Informationized Battlefield” [驭“电磁神鹰”制胜信息战场], 

PLA Daily, May 5, 2015, http://nj.81.cn/content/2015-05/05/content_6473197.htm.

33 “UAV Formation: Important Forces for Our Military’s New-Quality Combat Power” [无人机方队: 我军新质

战斗力的重要力量], Xinhua, July 30, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-07/30/c_1121402330.htm

34 Ye Zheng [叶征], Lectures on the Science of Information Operations [信息作战学习教程], Military Science 

Press [军事科学出版社], 2012, p. 94

35 Ibid.

36 For a discussion of the importance of (and global developments in) the use of anti-radiation drones, see, 

for instance: “Anti-Radiation Drones: Radar's Deadly Killer” [反辐射无人机: 雷达的夺命杀手], People’s Daily,

July 10, 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0710/c172467-27281442.html

37 John Reed, “Meet China’s new-old killer drones,” Foreign Policy, January 8, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.

com/2013/01/08/meet-chinas-new-old-killer-drones/

38 “Unmanned J-6 fighter jets put on Fujian air base,” January 7, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/

aipl/201301070015.aspx

39 Thousands of J-6 fighters Changed into Drones?” [数千架歼6 战机被改无人机?], December 28, 2017, http://

webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_jps_QnzdFwJ:new.qq.com/omn/20171228A0J51S.

html+&cd=19&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au

40 The author observed this exhibit in the summer of 2017.

41 For instance, the use of GJ-1 in the “Peace Mission” exercise of Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

involved the scenario of a strike against a terrorist organization: [空军演中方火炮发射电视悬浮侦察弹监视攻击效

果], PLA Daily, September 1, 2014, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2014/0830/c1011-25570050.html

42 Jiang Yamin [蒋亚民], China’s First: On Long-Arm Counterstrike [中国的拳头: 论张臂反击], Military Science 

Press [军事科学出版社], 2014.

43 “Indigenous UAVs in the Future Will Be on Aircraft Carriers” [国产无人机未来可上航母?], People’s Daily, 

December 7, 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1207/c1011-28931888.html

44 Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], National Defense University Press [国防大

学出版社], 2015.

45 “For the First Time, Our Military Used UAVs To Implement Joint Resupply Exercises” [我军首次运用无人

机实施联合补给演练], Xinhua, January 28, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-01/27/c_1122325334.htm

46 Ian Easton and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities,” Project 2049 Institute, March 11, 2013, 

https://project2049.net/documents/uav_easton_hsiao.pdf.

47 Thanks to Mark Stokes for raising this point.

See also: “Beijing Fifth Construction and Engineering Group Co., Ltd. versus PLA Unit 95894 Construction and Engineering Contract Dispute Case” [北京市第五建筑工程集团有限公司诉中国人民解放军95894 部

队建设工程合同纠纷一案], June 20, 2016, http://www.panjueshu.com/wenshu/a90d2ed7e238b140.html

30
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

48 For prior accounts of Chinese intellectual property theft targeted at drone technology, see, for instance: 

Edward Wong, “Hacking U.S. Secrets, China Pushes for Drones,” New York Times, September 20, 2013, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/world/asia/hacking-us-secrets-china-pushes-fordrones.html?_

r=0&pagewanted=all.

49 “Military-Civil Fusion Development Committee Established”[军民融合发展委成立], Xinhua, January 23, 

2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2017-01/23/c_129458492.htm

Authoritative Persons’ Interpretation of the ““Thirteenth Five-Year” Science and Technology Military-Civil Fusion Development Special Plan” Points of Interest” [权威人士解读(“十三五”科技军民融合发展专项规

划) 热点问题], Xinhua, August 24, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-08/24/content_5219965.htm

50 See the author’s next CASI paper for further details on this.

51 “Xi’an Aisheng (ASN) Technology Group.” [西安爱生技术集团], http://aisheng.nwpu.edu.cn/index.htm

52 See: Xi’an ASN Technology Group website, “About ASN,” http://www.asngroup.com.cn/english/About.

asp?id=8., http://www.everychina.com/buy/c-zbaad5d/pxi_an_asn_technology_group_co_ltd.html

53 “Northern Theater Command Army Certain Brigade Accelerates New-Quality Combat Forces Creation” 

[北部战区陆军某旅加速新质战斗力生成], PLA Daily, December 11, 2017, http://military.china.com.cn/2017-

12/11/content_41980201.htm

54 “Drones Going Through Tiananmen Square” [走过天安门广场的无人机], September 12, 2015, People’s Daily, 

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:SOn58Njvup8J:paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/

html/2015-09/12/content_1611388.htm+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au

55 Ibid.

56 This information is based on several blog posts that alluded to these variants but cannot be fully confirmed.

57 “The UAVs Going Through Tiananmen Square” [走过天安门广场的无人机], People’s Daily, September 12, 

2015, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2015-09/12/content_1611388.htm

58 “UAV: the Ambition to Cast Splendor in National Defense” [无人机: 志在国防铸辉煌], Northwestern Polytechnical University, http://z.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1246/6571.htm

59 “UAV Formation: Important Forces for Our Military’s New-Quality Combat Power” [无人机方队: 我军新质

战斗力的重要力量], Xinhua, July 30, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-07/30/c_1121402330.htm

60 Ibid.

61 “PLA New-Type Command Information Systems Can Use UAVs to Guide Firepower Strikes” [解放军新

型指挥信息系统可用无人机引导火力打击], PLA Daily, September 2, 2016, http://webcache.googleusercontent.

com/search?q=cache:fghwSm69GwsJ:military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0901/c1011-28682320.html+&cd=14&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au

62 Ibid.

63 “Nanjing Military Region Drone Team” [南京军区某无人机队], June 8, 2012, http://www.china.com.cn/

military/txt/2012-06/08/content_25595878.htm

64 “Sergeant Wang Wei Intensely Studied Unmanned Reconnaissance Aerial Vehicles, Became the “Authority”” [上士王伟潜心钻研无人侦察机 成了“大拿”] China Military Online, April 23, 2016, http://www.81.cn/

jwgz/2016-04/23/content_7019518.htm.

65 “New-Type Hand-Thrown UAV Fielded” [新型手抛无人机列装], Observer Network, May 17, 2016, 

www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2016_05_17_360653.shtml+&cd=26&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au

66 “Beihang Successfully Researches and Develops Our Nation’s First Chang Ying Large Long-Endurance 

UAV” [北航成功研制我国首款长鹰大型长航时无人机], Sina, September 13, 2011, http://mil.news.sina.com.

cn/2011-09-13/1345665189.html

67 “Drone to Soar on Market,” China Daily, April 5, 2017, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/05/content_28793243.htm

68 “Beihang Successfully Researches and Develops Our Nation’s First Chang Ying Large Long-Endurance 

UAV” [北航成功研制我国首款长鹰大型长航时无人机], Sina, September 13, 2011, http://mil.news.sina.com.

cn/2011-09-13/1345665189.html

31
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

69 “On the National S&T First Prize Two-Time Winning Beihang UAV Team” [记两获国家科

技进步一等奖的北航无人机团队], Beihang University, January 9, 2018, http://webcache.

googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wpnuob7nrssJ:news.buaa.edu.cn/info/1002/42164.htm+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au

70 Ankit Panda, “Meet China's East China Sea Drones,” The Diplomat, June 30, 2915, https://thediplomat.

com/2015/06/meet-chinas-east-china-sea-drones/

Chris Biggers, “Satellite Imagery Reveals China’s New Drone Base,” Bellingcat, June 29, 2015, 

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2015/06/29/satellite-imagery-revealschinas-new-dronebase/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report&utm_campaign=SitRep0630

71 “Satellite Imagery Reveals China’s New Drone Base,” Bellingcat, June 29, 2015, https://www.bellingcat.

com/news/rest-ofworld/2015/06/29/satellite-imagery-reveals-chinas-new-dronebase/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2ASituation Report&utm_campaign=SitRep0630

72 Ankit Panda, “South China Sea: China's Surveillance Drones Make it to Woody Island,” The Diplomat, 

June 1, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/south-china-sea-chinas-surveillance-drones-make-it-towoody-island/

73 Fox News, “Update 2: New Satellite Imagery Shows Chinese Drone on Woody Island,” May 27, 2016, 

https://seasresearch.wordpress.com/2016/05/27/update-2-new-satellite-imagery-shows-chinese-droneon-woodyisland/

74 “The Chinese Navy Fielded the Silver Eagle UAV” [中国海军列装银鹰无人机], China News, July 18, 2011, 

http://www.china.com.cn/photochina/2011-07/12/content_22968947.htm

75 “UAV Flight Controller Fei Tao” [无人机飞控师费涛], PLA Daily, May 9, 2017, http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/

jlrw/content/2017-05/09/content_7594140.htm

76 “Schiebel Camcopter S-100 operated from Chinese frigate,” Flight Global, May 19, 2012, https://

www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pictures-schiebel-camcopter-s-100-operated-from-chinese-frigate-372045/

See also: “The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century,” Office of Naval Intelligence, April 9, 2015, http://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_

NAVY_PUB_Print.pdf?ver=2015-12-02-081247-687

77 “WZ-6B Stealth Helicopter” [WZ-6B 隐身无人直升机], February 3, 2017, http://www.81uav.cn/

uavnews/201702/03/22580.html

78 “Our Military’s WZ-9 Stealth Long-Distance UAV Exposed for the First Time” [我军无侦-9 隐形长程无人

机首度曝光], Observer, June 12, 2018, https://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2018_06_12_459825.shtml

79 “'Soar Dragon' drone to strengthen PLA aerial capabilities,” China Daily, December 6, 2016, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-12/06/content_27591837.htm

80 “South Sea Fleet Tests Xiang Long Unmanned Reconnaissance Aerial Vehicle” [南海舰队试用翔龙无人侦察

机], Sina, April 18, 2018, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2018-04-18/doc-ifzihnep2775237.shtml

81 “Xianglong UAVs spotted on China’s Hainan Island,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 2, 2018, 

http://www.janes.com/article/78751/xianglong-uavs-spotted-on-china-s-hainan-island

82 Zhuhai Airshow’s High-Altitude Unmanned Reconnaissance Vehicle, the Soaring Dragon [珠海航展的高空

无人侦察机翔龙], Sina, November 2, 2006, http://jczs.news.sina.com.cn/p/2006-11-02/1234409245.html

83 “AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research Institute Suspected Soar Dragon UAV’s First Flight Successful” [中航成都所疑似“翔龙”无人机首飞成功], China Broadcast Network, January 24, 2013, http://military.

cntv.cn/2013/01/24/ARTI1358990934232852.shtml

84 Andrew Tate, “China’s Xianglong HALE UAV to enter service shortly, says report,” IHS Jane's Defence 

Weekly, December 21, 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/66431/china-s-xianglong-hale-uav-to-enterservice-shortly-saysreport

85 “New drone to beef up PLA aerial skills,” China Daily, December 7, 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/

china/2016-12/07/content_39866858.htm

32
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems 33

86 “Attack-1 UAV Fills the Chinese Air Force’s Integrated Reconnaissance and Strike Gap” [攻击-1 无人

机填补中国空军察打一体无人机空白], Xinhua, November 14, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2014-

11/13/c_1113239224.htm

87 Ibid.

88 “‘Pterodactyl’ UAV, the Backstabbing Killer in Counterterrorism Operations” [“翼龙”无人机, 反恐行动中的“暗

箭杀手”], China Youth Daily, December 18, 2015, http://kj.81.cn/content/2015-12/18/content_6821963.

htm

89 Experts: “Yilong” UAV is at an International First Class Level” [专家: “翼龙”无人机处于国际一流水平], 

November 14, 2012, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2012/11-14/4329485.shtml

90 For a more detailed case study of its development, see also: Andrew Erickson, Hanlu Lu, Kathryn Bryan, 

and Samuel Septembre, “Research, Development, and Acquisition in China’s Aviation Industry: The 

J-10 Fighter and Pterodactyl UAV,” SITC Research Briefs, January 2014, http://escholarship.org/uc/

item/0m36465p

91 “Attack-1 UAV Fills the Chinese Air Force’s Integrated Reconnaissance and Strike Gap” [攻击-1 无人

机填补中国空军察打一体无人机空白], Xinhua, November 14, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2014-

11/13/c_1113239224.htm

92 The majority of these details come from profiles of Li Hao. See: “Air Force Certain Test and Training 

Base UAV Pilot Li Hao” [空军某试验训练基地无人机飞行员李浩], Science and Technology Daily, May 24, 2017, 

http://www.stdaily.com/zhuanti01/zt/sdxflihao.shtml

See also: https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1572056897684146&wfr=spider&for=pc

93 “Air Force First-Batch UAV Pilot Li Hao” [空军首批无人机飞行员李浩], People’s Daily, May 23, 2017, 

http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0523/c1011-29295213.html

94 In addition, PLAAF UAV pilots include: Chen Yongchao (陈永超), Ying Xia (应侠), Xiao Yuming (肖育

明), Jiang Wei (蒋伟), Lu Donghui (陆冬辉), and Lv Junming (吕军明),. Lu Donghui had won the PLAAF’s 

prestigious “Golden Helmet” (金头盔) award.

95 For references to this unit, see: “Wang Jinguo, Head of Unit 95835 Troops in Bazhou” [驻巴州95835 部队首

长王进国], February 11, 2015, http://xj.ts.cn/2015-02/11/content_11013192.htm

“PLA Unit 95835 Training Zone Construction and Engineering Tender Announcement,” [中国人民解放军

95835 部队训练区建设工程招标公告], http://www.bjtccn.com/d-zb-2663221.html

96 “Air Force First-Batch UAV Pilot Li Hao” [空军首批无人机飞行员李浩], People’s Daily, May 23, 2017,

http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0523/c1011-29295213.html

97 “Air Force UAV Forces” [空军无人机部队], China Military Online, November 26, 2017,

http://www.81.cn/jskj/2017-11/26/content_7843837.htm

98 “The Air Force’s UAV Forces For the First Time Launched Attacks Throughout the Night” [空军无人机

部队首次昼夜连续出击], China Air Force Network [中国空军网], November 27, 2017, http://kj.81.cn/content/2017-11/27/content_7843669_3.htm

99 Ibid.

100 “UAVs Start Training With High Degrees of Difficulty” [无人机开训就来高难度], China Air Force Network 

[中国空军网], February 9, 2018, http://kj.81.cn/content/2018-02/09/content_7939334.htm

101 “Deciphering the World Class Pterodactyl UAV” [解码世界一流的“翼龙”无人机], Xinhua, December 9, 2016, 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2016-12/09/c_135892371.htm

102 “The New Treasure Chest Has Secrets Inside, a Great Power Air Force Is Just This Way” [新胸标里有秘

密, 大国空军就是这个范儿!], China Military Online, May 27, 2016, http://www.81.cn/jwsj/2016-05/27/content_7255408_17.htm

103 Yitzhak Schichor, “The U.S. Factor in Israel’s Military Relations with China,” China Brief, June 2005, 

https://jamestown.org/program/the-u-s-factor-in-israels-military-relations-with-china/

104 “Harpy NG,” Israel Aerospace Industries, http://www.iai.co.il/2013/36694-16153-en/Business_Areas_

Land.aspx

105 “Don't Return Drones to China, U.S. Tells Israel,” Haaretz, December 22, 2004, https://www.haaretz.

com/1.4840795
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

106 “China Unveils a Harpy-Type Loitering Munition,” Israel Defense, January 3, 2017, http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/28716

107 “UAV Formation: Important Forces for Our Military’s New-Quality Combat Power” [无人机方队: 我军新质

战斗力的重要力量], Xinhua, July 30, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-07/30/c_1121402330.htm

108 Ibid.

109 “Our Military’s WZ-9 Stealth Long-Distance UAV Exposed for the First Time” [我军无侦-9 隐形长程无人

机首度曝光], Observer, June 12, 2018, https://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2018_06_12_459825.shtml

110 “China’s Shigatse Gets New Infrastructure,” November 28, 2017, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/

rest-ofworld/2017/11/28/chinas-shigatse-gets-new-infrastructure/

111 “Chinese Xianglong UAVs Already Operationalized for Actual Combat” [中国翔龙无人机已实战化部署], Sohu, 

October 9, 2017, http://www.sohu.com/a/196933176_614127

112 See the satellite imagery as described here: “Soar Dragon UAVs Deploy to Yishuntun Airbase,” Bellingcat, 

March 23, 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2018/03/23/soar-dragon-uavs-deployyishuntunairbase/

113 Ibid.

114 “Chinese Xianglong UAVs Already Operationalized for Actual Combat” [中国翔龙无人机已实战化部署], Sohu, 

October 9, 2017, http://www.sohu.com/a/196933176_614127

115 “New-Type Hand-Thrown UAV Fielded” [新型手抛无人机列装], Observer Network, May 17, 2016, http://

www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2016_05_17_360653.shtml

116 “China's New-Type Shooting Correction and Reconnaissance UAVs Fielded in a Large Batch” [中国新

型校射侦查无人机大批量列装], Sina, June 20, 2013, http://slide.mil.news.sina.com.cn/slide_8_34780_24496.

html#p=1

117 “PLA Artillery Forces Comprehensively Fielded New-Type Reconnaissance and Shooting Correction 

UAVs” [解放军炮兵部队全面列装新型侦察校射无人机], July 4, 2013, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-07-

04/0802730330.html

118 “ASN-209,” http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:mFQZJfLUBpkJ:aisheng.nwpu.

edu.cn/info/1013/1022.htm+&cd=13&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au

119 Ian Easton and Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities,” Project 2049, March 11, 2013, 

https://project2049.net/documents/uav_easton_hsiao.pdf

120 The available publications on the topic include: Liang Yong [梁勇] and Zhou Shaolei [周绍磊], “UAV 

Over-the-Horizon Guidance Methods” [无人机超视距引导方法], Missile and Aerospace Delivery Technologies

[导弹与航天运载技术], 2010. The authors are affiliated with the Naval Aeronautical Engineering Institute’s 

Control Engineering Department.

121 There have been online rumors and reports in Russian media, repeated in Chinese media, that the 

Xiang Long (Soar Dragon) UAV might be used to guide the DF-21D. See, for instance: “Russian 

Media Claimed the “Soar Dragon” UAV Could Guide the DF-21D Anti-ship Ballistic Missile” [俄

媒称“翔龙”无人机可引导DF21D 反舰弹道导弹本], UAV Network, July 5, 2011, http://www.81uav.cn/uavnews/201107/05/904.html

122 For further description of uses, see: “PLA Artillery Forces Fully Equipped With New-Type Reconnaissance and Shooting-Correction UAV” [我军炮兵部队全面列装了新型侦察校射无人机], July 4, 2013, http://mil.

cnr.cn/zgjd/201307/t20130704_512967870_1.html

123 Xu Bing [徐兵], “A Certain Brigade of the Rocket Force: UAV Clairvoyance Technology” [火箭军某旅: 无人

机似“千里眼”助力应急处突演练].

124 “UAV Commander: Forcing the Enemy Military into a Skynet” [无人机指挥官: 凭微操将“敌”军揽入天网], 

China Military Online, May 3, 2016, http://youth.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-05/03/content_7032295.

htm

125 John Costello, “The Strategic Support Force: Update and Overview,” China Brief, December 21, 2016, 

https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-support-force-update-overview/.

34
The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems

126 “Six-Rotary Winged Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Public Bidding Announcement [六旋翼无人机公开招投标公

告], All-Military Weapons Equipment Purchasing Information Network [全军武器装备采购信息网], December 11, 2015, http://www.weain.mil.cn/cggg/zbgg/512788.html.

127 “Certain Department of the SSF: Complex Environment Exercises Communications Support” [战略支援

部队某部: 复杂环境演练通信保障], China Military Online, January 5, 2018, http://webcache.googleusercontent.

com/search?q=cache:ulBe22qYSJMJ:www.js7tv.cn/news/201801_127107.html+&cd=30&hl=en&ct=-

clnk&gl=au

128 China Xinhua News, Twitter, https://twitter.com/XHNews/status/982948729329074176

129 “Air Force First-Batch UAV Pilot Li Hao” [空军首批无人机飞行员李浩], May 23, 2017, http://webcache.

googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:fo-hWnej2foJ:military.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0523/c1011-

29295213.html+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au

130 “China’s ‘Pterosaur,’ tailored UAV for global counter-terror action,” China Military Online, 

November 4, 2014, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-11/04/

content_6210989.htm.

131 Ibid. “Secret Air Force First Model Integrated Strike and Reconnaissance UAV” [揭秘空军首款察打一体无人

机].

132 “Our Military’s First Group of UAV Specialty Graduates Li Changyong, Five Records Achieved” [我军首

批无人机专业毕业生李长勇 5 创纪录”].

133 Wan Xuelin [万学林], “How To Carry Out the Current Reform, Look to See How the Older Generation 

Does It” [改革当前怎么干, 看看前辈怎么做], China Military Online, December 8, 2015, http://nj.81.cn/content/2015-12/08/content_6804903.htm

134 “The UAV Lacks a Rival to Confirm its Efficacy, Why Not Seek Out the Missile Battalion Next Door To 

Try” [, 何不找隔壁导弹营试].

135 “The “Electromagnetic Condor” Winning on the Informationized Battlefield” [驭“电磁神鹰”制胜信息战场], 

PLA Daily, May 5, 2015, http://nj.81.cn/content/2015-05/05/content_6473197.htm

136 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic 

of China 2016,” April 26, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20

Military%20Power%20Report.pdf

137 “Military-Use UAV “Golden Launcher” Ju Xiaocheng” [军用无人机"金牌发射手"巨孝成].

138 Thanks to Ken Allen for his explanation of OMTE. OMTE might be characterized as roughly equivalent to the U.S. Marine Corps Training and Readiness Manual. Thanks to Olivia Garard for raising this 

analogy. See: http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/NAVMC%203500.44C%20Infantry%20

TR%20Manual%20(secured).pdf?ver=2017-03-09-080222-740

139 This section draws from my article in the Strategy Bridge’s #WarBots series.

140 “PLA NCO Taught 80% of the Whole Military’s UAV Specialty Cadre” [解放军士官为全军80%无人机专业干

部授过课], Xinhua, May 26, 2009, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2009-05-26/1328552994.htm

141 The full list is available upon request. Since the PLA has been restructuring its military educational 

institutions pursuant to the ongoing reforms, there may be changes to existing educational programming 

in this domain.

142 “Interview with the 18th Party Congress Representative, Professor Huang Changqiang of Air Force Engineering University” [记党的十八大代表, 空军工程大学教授黄长强], Ministry of Education, November 8, 2012, 

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Yzkk_17PR2YJ:old.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s6715/201211/144208.html+&cd=7&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au,

143 “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Naval Aviation Engineering Academy Undergraduate Specialties” [中国人民解放军海军航空工程学院本科专业], June 27, 2014, http://www.gk169.com/news90094/

144 “Information on Ordnance College’s “Real Explosion, Real Fly” Exercises” [军械学院“实爆, 实飞”演练见闻], 

China Army Network, May 5, 2015, http://army.81.cn/content/2016-05/05/content_7036848.htm

145 See, for instance: “Guangzhou Military Region Explores Multiple Models of UAVs’ Cooperative Operations Under Informatized Conditions” [广州军区多型无人机协同 探索信息化条件下作战], PLA Daily, April 13, 

2015, http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2015-04/6168892.html

35