UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4151

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

ANDRES MORALES, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States. 

(S. Ct. No. 07-8902) 

Submitted: October 28, 2008 Decided: December 1, 2008 

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Barron M. Helgoe, VICTOR VICTOR & HELGOE LLP, Charleston, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States 

Attorney, Joshua C. Hanks, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 On November 13, 2007, this court affirmed Andres 

Morales’s conviction and sentence. See United States v. 

Morales, 253 F. App’x 287 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 07-4151). On 

June 9, 2008, the Supreme Court granted Morales’s petition for a 

writ of certiorari, vacated this court’s judgment and remanded 

to this court for further consideration in light of Gall v. 

United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). Having reconsidered 

Morales’s sentence in light of Gall and this court’s decisions 

interpreting Gall, we find no reversible error. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

Andres Morales was convicted by a jury of one count of 

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 846 (2000). The Presentence Investigation Report 

recommended an offense level of forty-two, which included a drug 

weight of between 9.92917 and 11.430 kilograms (net weight) as 

well as enhancements for possession of a firearm, aggravated 

role in the offense, and obstruction of justice. See U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) §§ 2D1.1(a)(3), (b)(1), 

(c)(2); 3B1.1(c); 3C1.1 (2006). Morales was assessed three 

criminal history points, placing him in criminal history 

category II. The resulting advisory Guidelines range was 360 

months to life imprisonment. See USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A (2006) 

(sentencing table). 

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While Morales agreed with the probation officer’s 

calculations, he objected generally to the basis upon which they 

were found. The district court, however, overruled Morales’s 

objections to the drug weight and enhancements based on a 

finding that they were supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence. After discussing the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) factors, the court sentenced Morales to 360 months’ 

imprisonment. 

On appeal, Morales first contends that the district 

court erred in admitting expert witness testimony. We review 

the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. 

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Before 

permitting expert testimony, the district court must determine 

that the testimony is both reliable and relevant and will assist 

the trier of fact in understanding or determining a fact in 

issue in the case. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 

509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). 

 Prior to his qualification as an expert witness, Minh 

Dang testified that: he was employed for approximately ten years 

as a forensic chemist with the Drug Enforcement Administration 

(“DEA”); he received a Bachelor of Science degree in 

biochemistry from California Polytechnic University and a Master 

of Science degree in chemical toxicology from George Washington 

University; he completed a nine month training course for the 

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analysis of controlled substances, including methamphetamine, 

and a course on investigating clandestine methamphetamine 

laboratories; during his term of employment with the DEA, he has 

chemically analyzed substances to determine whether they contain 

a controlled substance, including between 700 and 800 tests 

specifically involving methamphetamine; and he has testified 

approximately thirty times in prior criminal cases. 

 Dang’s testimony, which was subjected to vigorous 

cross-examination, included the tests used as well as the 

protocols performed to assure accuracy. His inability to 

respond to some of the detailed questions proffered on crossexamination is relevant to the weight of Dang’s testimony rather 

than to its admissibility. See United States v. Moreland, 437 

F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2006). Thus, we conclude the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dang’s 

testimony. 

 Morales next contends that several of the district 

court’s rulings on evidentiary issues were improper. We review 

a district court’s decision regarding the admission or exclusion 

of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 744 (4th Cir. 1996). Such discretion is 

abused only when a district court has acted “arbitrarily or 

irrationally.” United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 974 (4th 

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

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However, evidentiary rulings based on erroneous legal 

conclusions are “by definition an abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Turner, 198 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 1999). 

 The evidence presented at trial established that 

Morales supplied methamphetamine to several distributors in the 

southern portion of West Virginia. On one occasion, a 

cooperating witness aided investigators by placing a monitored 

call to Morales’s cell phone in an effort to schedule a 

controlled buy. The buy was ultimately scheduled, and a date 

and location were appointed. Dannie Fraley, a co-conspirator, 

arrived at the chosen location in Morales’s girlfriend’s 

vehicle. Two packages of what was determined to be 

methamphetamine were retrieved by officers from the vehicle. 

Fraley testified that he was sent by Morales to execute the 

deal. 

 Morales argues that the district court erred by: 

(1) excluding testimony regarding Fraley’s niece’s alleged 

methamphetamine addiction; (2) admitting testimony from Fraley’s 

girlfriend regarding whether Fraley would hide his drug use from 

her; (3) admitting a photograph of the interior of Morales’s 

girlfriend’s vehicle in which a child’s car seat was visible; 

and (4) admitting testimony regarding Morales’s personal life. 

He further argues that the district court erred in denying his 

post-trial motion for a new trial in light of the cumulative 

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effect of these errors. When viewed in the context of the 

trial, the district court’s rulings were neither arbitrary nor 

irrational. Moreover, even if the rulings were erroneous, such 

error would nevertheless be harmless in light of the evidence 

adduced at trial to establish Morales’s guilt. 

 Finally, Morales contends that the imposition of a 

sentence within the calculated Guidelines range is unreasonable. 

When determining a sentence, the district court must calculate 

the appropriate advisory Guidelines range and consider it in 

conjunction with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596. Appellate review of a district court’s 

imposition of a sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or 

significantly outside the Guidelines range,” is for abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 591. Sentences within the applicable 

Guidelines range may be presumed by the appellate court to be 

reasonable. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th 

Cir. 2007). 

The district court followed the necessary procedural 

steps in sentencing Morales, appropriately treating the 

Sentencing Guidelines as advisory, properly calculating and 

considering the applicable Guidelines range, and weighing the 

relevant § 3553(a) factors. Furthermore, we may presume 

Morales’s sentence, which is at the low end of the applicable 

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Guidelines range and below the statutory maximum, to be 

reasonable. 

To the extent Morales continues to maintain his 

innocence and argue that his objections to the sentencing 

enhancements should have been sustained, the district court 

properly found each sentencing factor to be supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Morris, 429 

F.3d 65, 72 (4th Cir. 2005). Morales’s challenge to the 

testimony presented at sentencing is likewise unavailing, as 

witness credibility is the sole province of the factfinder and 

will not be reassessed on appeal. See United States v. 

Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989). Thus, we conclude 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 

the chosen sentence. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED