DESIGN

NEW

LEARN MORE ON PAGE 2

The Naval Safety Center Magazine for Surface, Submarine and Diving Operations 2016 Vol. 6, No. 1

USING

TO SHAPE SAFETY CULTURE

POWER
ON THE COVER: The cover is a photoIllustration representing leadership, which 

is the ability to influence others to do what 

you want or need them to do. In order to 

influence people you must understand and 

learn the effective use of power. As safety 

leaders, you should strive to improve 

familiarity with and develop the effective 

use of power and influence tactics. 

(Photo Illustration by Michael J. Morris)

EDITORIAL STAFF

Head, Media Division Evelyn Odango

Editor Michael J. Morris

Art Director Allan Amen

Graphics and Design John W. Williams

Webmaster Darlene Savage

Social Media Manager Christopher Jones

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Commander, Naval Safety Center

Attn: Sea Compass

375 A Street

Norfolk, VA 23511-4399

MEDIA DIVISION

Telephone: 757-444-3520, ext. 7870 (DSN 564) / Fax: 757-444-6791

General email: safe-seacompass@navy.mil

Editor's email: michael.j.morris@navy.mil

AFLOAT SAFETY PROGRAMS

To contact a safety analyst by phone, call the main number 757-444-3520 and dial 

the extension at any time during the greeting.

Telephone: 757-444-3520 (DSN 564)

Surface Division ext. 7831

safe-afloat@navy.mil

Submarine Division ext. 7838

safe-submarines@navy.mil 

Report a Mishap: (757) 444-2929 (DSN 564)

ABOUT SEA COMPASS

Sea Compass (ISSN 1550-1434) is published twice yearly (spring-summer and 

fall-winter). The editorial content of this magazine is edited and approved by the Naval 

Safety Center Public Affairs Office. Sea Compass is an authorized publication for 

members of the military services and distributed to ships, submarines, diving commands, shore-based commands, and DoD agencies. Contents and opinions expressed 

are not necessarily the official views of the U.S. Government, the Department of 

Defense or the U.S. Navy and do not imply endorsement thereof. Unless otherwise 

noted, photos and artwork are for illustrative purposes only. Reference to commercial 

products or links to non-DoD resources do not imply Department of the Navy endorsement. Unless otherwise stated, material in this publication may be reprinted without 

permission; please credit the magazine and author.

SUBMISSIONS

Submit your stories or news items to safe-seacompass@navy.mil. Email letters to: 

michael.j.morris@navy.mil or write to: Commander, Naval Safety Center, Attn: Sea 

Compass, 375 A Street, Norfolk, VA 23511-4399. We reserve the right to edit all 

submissions for grammar, clarity, applicability, and length.

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To get on our distribution list, email safe-seacompass@navy.mil or download and fill 

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Sea Compass is published by Commander, Naval Safety Center, at 375 A Street, 

Norfolk, VA 23511-4399. Periodical postage paid at Norfolk, Va. 

Postmaster: Send address changes to Commander, Naval Safety Center, Attn: Sea 

Compass, 375 A Street, Norfolk, VA 23511-4399.

Commander, Naval Safety Center RDML Christopher J. Murray

Deputy Commander Col. Matthew Mowery, USMC

Director, Afloat Safety Programs CDR J. Lee Bennett, USN

Department Head, Media and Public Affairs Maggie Menzies

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EDITOR’S note

Welive and work within the 

confines of a malleable 

environment, where 

change is inevitable and 

a commonality for us all. With that said, I 

would like to introduce myself to the Sea Compass audience. 

My name is Michael J. Morris and I have the privilege 

of being the new editor for Sea Compass and Decisions 

magazines. I am a 20-year veteran of the Department of 

Defense, serving with the U.S. Army for five years and as 

a civilian employee for the last 15 years. My experience 

has varied during that time, working for such agencies as 

the Joint Multinational Training Command, Naval Network 

Warfare Command, United States Africa Command, and Naval 

Information Forces. My path has now led me to the Naval 

Safety Center, where I‘ve been given the task of reimagining 

the publications in my charge. 

With that said, you’ll notice that this issue of Sea Compass 

has a new streamlined uniform look to it. My goal is to 

create a modern product with a layout that the reader enjoys. 

These changes are all about the reader and are an attempt to 

create a more effective means of conveying the information 

found within Sea Compass in an effort to enhance the reading 

experience for our audience.

This issue of Sea Compass revolves around safety culture 

and risk management. Our cover story, “Using Power to Shape 

Safety Culture” written by FLTCM Paul Kingsbury, reviews 

the eight power bases safety leaders can draw from to help 

shape safety culture. Other stories within this issue highlight 

safety program development, unforeseen risks, and safety 

hazard trends. It is my hope that you enjoy this issue and offer 

feedback to improve future issues.

Sea Compass magazine is in the process of evolving and can 

only do so with input from its readers. Please email us with 

comments or recommendations of what you like or dislike 

about the new format, or tell us what you would like to see in 

future issues. Send your comments and recommendations to 

safe-seacompass@navy.mil.

Editor Sea Compass Magazine

2016

VOLUME 6|No. 1
SHIPBOARD 

A

F

E

T

Y

Hazard 

Trends

HIDDEN DANGER

 STOPPING A MISHAP BEFORE IT HAPPENS

NOW YOU

SEE ME

Armbands Reflect Command's 

Commitment to Risk Mitigation 

CONTENTSVOLUME 6|No. 1 

SUCCESSFUL SAFETY PROGRAM

ESSENTIALS

SAFETY OFFICER TOOLBOX

This comprehensive toolbox offers command safety officers and collateral 

duty safety officers the resources and training material necessary to start, 

improve and/or run a command safety program.

USING

TO SHAPE SAFETY CULTURE

POWER

6

2

10

16 18

22 25

page

THE HIDDEN RISKS OF VAPING
USING

TO SHAPE SAFETY CULTURE

FLTCM Paul Kingsbury

Withthe release of the fleet safety campaign, 

senior Navy leadership has recommitted 

to improving risk management efforts to 

“move our command culture to being more 

proactive and predictive within the realm of operational and occupational safety.” 

This leadership focus has been the catalyst for a variety of recent changes in safety 

policy and promotion, but there is plenty that safety leaders at all levels of the chain 

of command can do to help shape their safety culture. 

POWER

2 SEA COMPASS

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Too often, we associate safety with discussions of statistics, risk matrices, and personal protective 

equipment (PPE) while failing to think about how to use power bases and influence tactics toward 

improving safety culture. Leadership is the ability to influence others to do what you want or need them 

to do, and in order to influence people you must understand and learn to effectively use power. As safety 

leaders, we should care about improving our familiarity with the development and use of power and 

influence tactics. Developing a firm understanding of power will improve you and your command’s ability 

to achieve safety objectives that may include developing commitment to safety goals, ensuring compliance 

with safety standards or overcoming resistance while implementing safety culture change. Unfortunately, it 

appears that many naval leaders are unfamiliar with the power and influence theory and cannot effectively 

reflect on how well they use power bases and influence tactics. Perhaps our advancement and success in the 

organization reaffirms that we know how to effectively leverage power bases, but not using them to their full 

potential. Many of our leadership development courses do not provide a practical education of power and 

influence applications. Therefore, as you work to develop your competencies as a safety leader you’ll find it 

useful to learn how to utilize them to influence safety culture and outcomes. 

1. Legitimate/Positional Power.

This is the power that leaders possess due to their position within the organization. Increased 

positional power is given when you have successfully wielded the power afforded to you in your 

current position. This rewarding of increased legitimate power increases your influence scope and 

potential within the organization. As a safety leader your role provides you more access to senior 

leaders who can influence safety culture and it is your responsibility to guide, educate, train, and 

motivate in ways that you didn’t do before. Take advantage of the opportunities to influence that 

your position provides! 

2. Expert Power.

Expert power is defined by your level of experience in something, in the realm of safety it’s often 

captured as safety competence. You’ve attended some initial training as a safety leader so your 

command expects that you have some level of competence in safety programs and policies. You 

should be increasing your safety competence due to exposure to administrative processes, from 

practical experience applying safety policies and by reading literature on safety initiatives and best 

practices. You also have valuable life experience that contributes to your expert power base and 

can help you influence behavior at your command. Expert power is the responsibility of the person 

who is expected to possess it. When you fail to engage in continual learning, your expert power 

base erodes and your reputation and effectiveness as a competent safety leader can decline. 

 There are eight power bases safety leaders can draw from to influence behavior:

3. Personal/Referent Power.

Personal power is a reflection of the personal traits you possess such as charisma, integrity, 

attitude, personality, core values, and beliefs that make people want to follow you. One could 

say that personal power is a reflection of one’s character. Role modeling the behaviors you want 

emulated is an effective technique to capitalize on for those leaders who are well liked and have 

high referent power. Personal power is one of your two strongest power bases and you should 

spend a considerable amount of time reflecting on and developing this power base. To put personal 

power into context, I think it’s useful to think about those leaders who left the biggest positive 

and negative impressions on you and why. Typical responses that describe leaders who were high 

in personal power include; “They had integrity,” “They did what they said they were going to,” 

“They’re reliable,” “They genuinely cared about my progress,” “Honest and forthright.” On the 

other hand, responses that indicate leaders with a low personal power base include; “They were 

never around,” “They were a walking double standard,” “Unapproachable and not trustworthy.” 

The best way to determine your personal power is to get candid feedback from the people who 

work for and with you by using tools such as 360-degree feedback.

3 2016

VOLUME 6|No. 1
POWER BASES

4. Information Power.

This power base is derived from your access to information that others need to do their jobs 

or fulfill a personal desire. Safety leaders have access to reporting systems such as the Web 

Enabled Safety System (WESS), the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), and the 

Navy Lessons Learned Information System (NLLIS) and other information sources such as the 

Naval Safety Center website that can help you manage or evaluate the health of your command’s 

safety culture and risk management efforts. Although this power base used to rest extensively 

with those in leadership positions, the advent of social media and information technology has 

empowered all levels of the organization with information power. Strong leaders socialize those 

resources within their commands to help raise general knowledge regarding safety management.

5. Connection Power.

Connection power is the power you have through personal networks that in turn expand your 

expert and information power bases. Connection power may increase other power bases as well. 

You may have personal connections that provide resources and opportunities to increase your 

reward power or through great connection power you can increase personal power due to the 

positive relationships you develop with people. Make it a point to socialize with other safety 

leaders including safety officers and managers, and professional organizations that can increase 

your connection power base. You should also look for opportunities to attend appropriate safety 

seminars and symposiums. 

6. Reward Power.

This is your authority to reward appropriate behaviors and achievements that deserve them. 

Reward power can be used as an incentive to help or reinforce positive safety behaviors. 

Commanding officers can offer rewards to incentivize mishap and near-miss reporting or for the 

demonstration of safety behaviors consistent with those you want in your organization. Commands 

can take time to recognize a Sailor who intervened to prevent a mishap at command quarters 

or award the safety petty officer who submitted the largest number of relevant hazard reports 

(HAZREPS). With all that said, caution should be taken when rewarding safety behavior. There 

are many examples of how safety-related awards related to reducing mishaps actually drive 

reporting behaviors down. 

7. Ecological Power.

This is the power you have to shape the environment in order to help achieve safety objectives. 

I think this is the one that most people associate with safety and which tends to give safety a bad 

reputation. Think of safety signs, markings, chains, guardrails, or PPE, these are all examples 

of using ecological power toward mishap prevention. Policies that influence ship’s cleanliness, 

working hours and culture are other ways your command can leverage ecological power.

8. Coercive Power. 

Coercive power is listed last because it’s the last power base to be used for shaping safety behavior. 

Coercive power is the leveraging of threats to get people to do what you want them to do. Incorrect 

use of coercive power can drive reporting behaviors underground, especially when a just culture is 

lacking. Use coercive power only for the most egregious and deliberate safety violations that are 

counter to your safety culture and expectations. 

4 SEA COMPASS

HTTP://WWW.PUBLIC.NAVY.MIL/NAVSAFECEN
1. Each power interaction has an agent and target.

2. Your targets can be an individual or a group.

3. You must know your target, objective and timelines.

4. You should consider potential obstacles to your power/influence application.

5. You should understand that using power and influence results in dynamic interactions.

Knowing your power bases is one thing, 

understanding the effective use of them is another.

Before you can begin to effectively leverage your power bases and influence tactics, 

you should understand some relationship fundamentals related to power and influence:

Additionally, safety leaders should be mindful how lower level safety leaders use power and influence. 

For example, division safety petty officers and work center supervisors should be observing and training 

subordinates while advising their division leadership on weaknesses and strengths of divisional safety 

culture. I recommend you take time with new safety leaders to discuss:

•	 How their power bases will change (expand or decline) in their new role as safety leaders?

•	 What new influence tactics do they need to learn for this position?

•	 Who are their targets? Objectives? Timelines?

•	 What new opportunities will they have to influence outcomes?

•	 Will there be new barriers to their use of power and influence?

The best leaders use all their power bases 

and apply them as each situation demands. 

There are no mass-produced leaders, 

because everyone is different. Personalities, 

personal backgrounds and your leadership 

“audience” affect your power bases. Learn 

to recognize your weak and strong power 

bases and strive to improve them. Each 

of us has a responsibility to reflect on our 

power bases, how we use them, and the impact we have on our people and organizations. Once you have a 

sound inventory of your power bases, you will be armed to execute the variety of influence tactics available. 

You’ll understand when a rational persuasion approach is more appropriate and effective than the use of 

a pressure tactic. There are many books and articles that discuss the various aspects of power and most 

college leadership/management courses cover power theory and its application. By investing the time to 

learn, you’ll find that your ability to develop commitment, ensure compliance, or overcome resistance to 

organizational goals will be enhanced and your ability to positively influence your people will improve. 

Safety leaders should 

be mindful how lower 

level safety leaders use 

power and influence.

5 2016

VOLUME 6|No. 1
LT Jesse J. Rond

6 SEA COMPASS

HTTP://WWW.PUBLIC.NAVY.MIL/NAVSAFECEN

SUCCESSFUL SAFETY 

ESSENTI

Asmy second sea tour comes to a close, I can’t help but reflect 

upon the two ship safety programs I helped develop and 

manage over the years. It began on my first ship, USS John 

Paul Jones (DDG 53), when I was assigned to be the assistant 

safety officer. It continued into my second tour as well aboard USS Germantown 

(LSD 42) when I was given the same duty due to my previous safety experience. 

After working in afloat safety for over four years, I have done everything one 

would expect of such a position. I built a safety program from scratch, prepared 

for industrial hygiene (IH) surveys, safety assessments, Board of Inspection and 

Surveys (INSURV), and submitted more Web Enabled Safety System (WESS) 

reports than I can count.
U.S. Navy Photo

I can still remember when my 

operations officer ... assigned 

me to the collateral duty of 

assistant safety officer. 

7 2016

VOLUME 6|No.2

Y PROGRAM

IALS

If you are like most division officers, or even 

some department heads, safety is being assigned 

to you as a collateral duty. You have little to no 

training, you may be starting with a broken or 

non-existent program, and the only guidance you 

have is to fix it before INSURV. If this sounds 

like your situation, then I hope this article helps. I 

wanted to reflect back on my own lessons learned, 

my struggles in learning what to do, and give some 

simple guidance to the bewildered assistant safety 

officers in our fleet.

OPS: “Rond, congratulations. 

You are now the assistant safety 

officer.”

Rond: “OPS, I can’t. I don’t know 

anything about safety.”

OPS: “You will figure it out.”

Rond: “Okay, what do I need to 

do?”

OPS: “You will figure it out.”

Rond: “Well, does the ship have 

any safety binders I can look at?”

OPS: “See, I knew you would 

figure it out! You’ve been the 

assistant safety officer for 10 

seconds and you figured out your 

first project. Go put together 

some safety binders.”

Rond: “Well what goes in the 

binders?”

OPS: “You will figure it out.”

I can still remember when my operations officer 

(OPS) on my first ship assigned me to the collateral 

duty of assistant safety officer. It went something 

like this:
8 SEA COMPASS

HTTP://WWW.PUBLIC.NAVY.MIL/NAVSAFECEN

STEP

ONE

Conduct Program Assessments

OPNAVINST 5100.19E, section A0303 reads:

Self-assessments of all safety programs applicable to 

the afloat unit will be conducted at least annually as 

part of the annual workplace safety inspection. These 

may be conducted as a single project or staggered 

throughout the year. Copies of self-assessment results, 

hard copy or electric, will be retained by the safety 

officer for at least two years.

Take a look at the Naval Safety Center website 

via http://www.public.navy.mil/navsafecen/Pages/

Afloat/surface/Checklists.aspx and find all of the 

INSURV and safety survey checklists that apply 

to your ship. Download them, figure out who is 

responsible for each checklist and inform them 

you will be assessing their program soon. Create a 

timeline for yourself and supply it to the program 

leads so they know when their program will be 

reviewed. As is stated above, you can do them all 

at once or stagger them out over time. It doesn’t 

matter as long as each program is assessed annually.

A few things will naturally start to happen as you 

conduct these assessments. First, you will begin 

to learn a lot. When you are new to anything, the 

best thing to do is simply learn. Believe me when 

I say that doing safety program assessments is the 

most efficient way to learn safety. You will come to 

understand each individual program that falls under 

your jurisdiction, the regulations that govern each 

program and how each program manager organizes 

his/her program. You will start to develop the big 

picture of safety on your ship by learning each 

individual component first.

Each individual program manager will be more 

inclined to fix the discrepancies that fall under 

their responsibility. Many safety programs fall 

apart simply because no one regularly inspects 

the program. The managers begin to think, and 

rightfully so, that their program must be irrelevant 

if no one ever bothers to take a look at it. However, 

if the program is regularly assessed, their hard work 

gets the proper recognition it deserves.

STEP

TWO

Discuss Assessment Results at Safety Meetings

OPNAVINST 5100.19E, section A0303 continues:

The safety officer will advise the safety council and 

safety committee, as applicable, of the results of these 

self-assessments and status of corrective actions.

In addition, section A0203h reads:

The safety council shall meet at least quarterly and 

develop agendas and action items based on the afloat 

unit’s scope of operations and hazard or mishap 

experiences... Specifically, the safety council shall 

establish program improvement plans based on 

mishap experience, program deficiencies, and other 

information.

There are various topics you are required to 

cover at your council meetings. However, of all 

the topics, I have found the most valuable to be the 

results of your assessments. This is because it gives 

your chain of command a very quick picture of 

how safety is doing on the ship and what corrective 

actions need to take place. You can cover the 

programs you have assessed and recognize the ones 

that are doing exceptionally well. You can discuss 

serious discrepancies you’ve found that pose safety 

hazards, areas that may need a little more focus, and 

your recommended solutions.

Many of the department heads present at the 

meeting have safety programs that fall under their 

cognizance. Considering the huge workload of 

every department head, they often lack the time to 

personally assess the status of their safety programs. 

If you help them out by doing the leg work in 

identifying the problem, they can easily apply the 

appropriate pressure from their level to ensure their 

programs get back up to speed. You will notice a 

vast improvement in efficiency once you begin to 

get this department head support. 

I recommend you encourage the program lead 

to attend the council meeting when their program 

is being discussed. If a program is doing well, 

recognize that program lead in front of the captain 
U.S. Navy Photo

9 2016

VOLUME 6|No. 1

STEPTHREE

Track Discrepancies

your next safety committee meeting, ask for a 

volunteer who is looking to help out more with ship 

safety. I think you will find some very enthusiastic 

personnel who are eager to do more if simply told 

what you need them to do.

In my opinion, these are the three essential first 

steps to developing a highly efficient ship safety 

program. You may be thinking that only three steps 

in managing something as complex as safety is a bit 

simplistic. I agree, but keep in mind there will be 

more steps you learn along the way. This is merely 

where I would start if I had to do it all again.

My goal as the prior assistant safety officer aboard 

USS John Paul Jones and USS Germantown is 

to help the bewildered assistant safety officer, or 

possibly even safety officer, get off on the right foot. 

Whether you already have a functioning program or 

you inherited a non-existent program as I did, these 

three steps will guide you in the right direction. 

Always remember that your hard work is essential 

in keeping your Sailors safe and I wish you all the 

as you develop your own program.

and department heads. If programs are struggling, 

use tact in identifying the problems and discussing 

solutions. This will show all managers that their 

programs do matter and if they fix discrepancies, 

their hard work will be recognized by the entire 

chain of command.

OPNAVINST 5100.19E, section A0404d reads:

The safety officer shall retain or maintain 

documentation of those hazards identified through 

inspections, surveys, or as reported by individuals. A 

log, notebook, electronic spreadsheet, or other means 

may be used as documentation of hazards awaiting 

correction or resolution.

Make an Excel file to track all the safety 

discrepancies on your ship. At the very least, your 

tracker should have all discrepancies found during 

the assessments. However, why stop there? Use 

it to track issues found during zone inspections, 

division in the spotlight, and safety-related 

organizational maintenance management system 

jobs. Have columns that show when the problem 

was identified, what the discrepancy is, who is 

responsible for fixing it, recommended solutions, 

and when it was corrected.

Make this excel file accessible to your program 

managers and divisional safety petty officers 

(DSPOs). This will give them clear guidance on 

what they should be working on. Add discrepancies 

you find while walking the ship and tell the DSPOs 

it is their responsibility to regularly check the 

tracker. Let division officers know they can use 

the tracker to keep tabs on the work their DSPO is 

doing. They can even use information in the tracker 

when writing evaluations. Discuss the tracker at 

safety committee and council meetings. Recognize 

the proactive DSPOs so that they know their hard 

work is being noticed.

This tracker can be tedious work, but it pays 

great dividends in management and correction 

of discrepancies. I highly recommend assigning 

upkeep of the tracker to one of your DSPOs. At 

Sailors of USS GERMANTOWN (LSD 42) stand at the rails with their 

PPE, ready to conduct a line handling evolution and enter their home 

port in Sasebo, Japan. 
SHIPBOARD 

A

F

E

T

Y

Hazard 

Trends

The13 subject matter experts of the Naval Safety Center’s Surface Ship Division 

bring over 285 years of fleet experience to two primary roles in support of 

safety in the fleet. The first role is the one we are best known for, conducting 

afloat operational safety assessments on the deckplate. We are the only 

organization that sends a single team to assess every surface ship in the Navy, whether 

they are a part of the surface, submarine or aviation domains, which gives us a very 

unique perspective on the fleet. We travel to every homeport in the Navy to conduct 

both inport and underway assessments on ships, where we provide them with an 

“outside set of eyes” on safety issues. We not only assess compliance with safety 

instructions and other directives, but we pass along lessons learned on previously 

identified safety hazards while simultaneously trying to identify new ones.

NAVSAFECEN Photo

CDR J. Lee Bennett

10 SEA COMPASS

HTTP://WWW.PUBLIC.NAVY.MIL/NAVSAFECEN
 

The second role of our personnel is to be safety 

analysts. When we are home from our travels 

in Norfolk, Va., we gather data from the Navy’s 

Web Enabled Safety System (WESS) to identify 

additional hazards that we may not have noted on 

the deckplates. Every ship is required to submit a 

WESS report on any mishap that happens onboard 

the ship or to assigned personnel. In addition, 

ships are encouraged to submit WESS reports of 

hazards they identify in the fleet that could have 

led to a mishap. We sort through the thousands 

of reports that we receive annually to identify 

common root causes that we can address with the 

designers to get the system changed or procedures 

updated, or with the fleet to get the hazards 

addressed on the deckplates.

Over the past year, our team has identified 

numerous hazards and deficiencies which we are 

working to resolve in the fleet. We need your help 

in resolving four of the major hazards that we are 

repeatedly seeing both in WESS and during our 

assessments before more Sailors get hurt. 

Electrical equipment improperly grounded on non-structural bulkheads

All fixed electrical equipment needs to be 

grounded to the ship’s hull. Electricity likes to take 

the lowest resistance path to ground — or in the 

case of a ship, the ocean. If a piece of electrical 

equipment should suffer a short circuit then the 

electricity inside of it is now trying to find the “easy 

path” to complete a circuit to ground. Should the 

short circuit allow electricity to reach the surface 

of the equipment, then anyone who touches that 

equipment will very likely become that “easy path” 

to ground. We have seen a number of cases where 

equipment mounted to non-structural bulkheads is 

not properly grounded.

First, what is a non-structural bulkhead? 

It’s a bulkhead that is non-load bearing, and used 

solely to make a separation within a compartment. It is 

not grounded to the ship’s hull. 

Second, what is equipment grounding? 

Equipment grounding intentionally connects the 

non-current-carrying conductive parts of electrical 

equipment, such as the enclosure, frame, or chassis, 

to ground (the ocean via the ship’s hull) through a lowresistance path.

Third, why is it needed?

 If an energized electrical conductor comes in 

contact with the enclosure due to a fault or mechanical 

damage, the equipment ground provides the lowest 

impedance path of electrical current to ground, and 

so it shunts the current away from a possible human 

contact/shock.

http://www.public.navy.mil/navsafecen/pages/wess/wess.aspx

Here are four critical hazards, along with an explanation of the requirements 

and applicable references for you to help us address them on the deckplates:

11 2016

VOLUME 6|No. 1
The references requiring electrical equipment on 

non-structural bulkheads to be grounded to the ships 

are the MIL-STD-1310(H) and the MRC 3000/001 

A-5, which are discussed below.

MIL-STD-1310(H) 5.1.2.2.5 states: 

All electrical equipment mounted on a joiner/false/

honeycomb bulkhead must have a separate green 

ground wire, or conductor identified with a wire label/

tag as the ground wire, which connects to ship’s 

ground plane. The current carrying capacity of the 

ground wire/conductor shall be equal or greater than 

the source conductor.

Measurement of equipment grounding circuit 

resistance on non-structural bulkheads is done IAW 

MRC 3000/001 A-5.

1. Measure the voltage between exposed metal 

surfaces of equipment case and ship’s electrical 

ground; reading should be zero volts. If voltage is 

detected, de-energize the equipment and notify 

your work center supervisor. The equipment 

should be tagged “out of commission” 

in accordance with the shipboard tag out 

instruction until repaired. 

2. Measure resistance between exposed metal 

surfaces of the equipment case to ship’s electrical 

ground; resistance should be less than 1.0 ohm. 

If resistance is 1.0 ohm or more than de-energize 

the equipment and notify your work center 

supervisor. The equipment should be tagged “out 

of commission” in accordance with the tag out 

instruction until repaired.

Oil/Hazmat Spill Abatement

Over 50 percent of ships assessed last year 

either had incomplete oil spill kits, were not 

current with the new AEL 2-550024006 updated 

(October 2013), were not maintaining the shipboard 

spill contingency plan, or were not conducting 

or documenting training and PQS properly. In 

many cases there was confusion as to who was 

responsible for maintaining the oil spill response kit 

and hazardous material spill response kit since they 

are two separate and distinct kits. 

In accordance with OPNAVINST 5100.19E, under 

the damage control assistant responsibilities: DCA 

shall maintain both the hazardous material spill 

response kit and the oil spill response kit. The DCA 

should inspect OHS spill kits monthly, and replenish 

material as required. Other DCA responsibilities 

are: to develop and implement a spill contingency 

plan (SCP) using the Navy’s shipboard oil and 

hazardous substance (OHS) spill contingency plan 

guide; to train and supervise ship’s damage control 

teams (and fire department, if used aboard) in 

combating spills of HM and oil; to provide training 

to divisions regarding reporting, initial handling, 

and cleanup of HM and oil spills; to ensure that 

HM and oil spills are handled per appendices B3-A 

and B3-B of the OPNAVINST 5100.19E; and to 

maintain an OTTO fuel spill kit (AEL A006350027) 

to respond to OTTO Fuel Spills. 

Chapter 35-38 of the OPNAV M-5090.1 is the 

reference for the requirement that each surface 

ship shall maintain a minimum of one oil spill 

response kit, (AEL 2-550024006) for onboard and 

overboard oil and hazardous substance (OHS) 

spill response. OPNAVINST 5100.19E is the 

reference for the requirement that every ship also 

maintain a minimum of one hazardous material spill 

response kit (AEL 2-550024007 for surface ships, 

2-50024008 for small craft, or 2-50024009 for mine 

countermeasures vessels) discussed in for hazardous 

substance (HS) spills that occur onboard the ship. 

In addition, the OPNAVINST 5100.19E requires the 

cognizant shore activity commanding officer, shore 

Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC), or fleet 

NOSC to provide appropriate assistance and direct 

response efforts if the response to a Navy ship spill 

is considered beyond the ship’s limited capability.

Over 50 percent of ships assessed 

last year either had incomplete Oil 

Spill Kits, were not current with the 

new AEL 2-550024006...

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The OPNAVINST 5100.19E requires that Navy 

and MSC surface ships develop and implement 

a spill contingency plan (SCP) for responding 

to spills of hazardous material. In addition, 

the OPNAVINST 5100.19E also requires Navy 

and MSC ships to develop a shipboard oil spill 

contingency plan (SOSCP) for responding to oil 

spills. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 

will provide a sample of a SOSCP format upon 

request. Ships may consolidate the SOSCP with 

the hazardous material SCP, but this combined 

plan shall address the unique procedures for spills 

over the side and use of the oil spill response kit. 

The plan(s) shall contain procedures for reporting, 

containment, control, recovery, and disposal of 

spilled material, protective clothing, and spill cleanup materials; information sources for oil and HM; 

and names and telephone numbers of fleet as well 

as shore side NOSCs. 

Guidance on maintaining the programs: 

Drills: Ships shall conduct training initially at 

indoctrination and annually thereafter, and document 

at least one OHS spill response drill for each duty 

section annually. These drills shall include deployment 

of the oil spill response kit or hazardous material spill 

response kit and exercising notification practices, 

including simulated telephone calls and the drafting of 

“do not release” messages to higher authority. Ships 

may take credit for responding to actual spills, when 

such spills meet drill objectives. 

Training: The ship shall train all in-port watch 

standers and command duty officers on in-port OHS 

spill response procedures, the ship’s SCP, and local 

notification requirements prior to assignment. One 

petty officer in each in-port fire party and each repair 

party shall qualify on watch station 304, oil/hazardous 

material (substance) spill response scene leader, 

in the Hazardous Material/Environmental Protection 

Programs Afloat PQS, NAVEDTRA 43528-A, within six 

months of PQS assignment. 

Life-lines and Guard-lines

The number one safety discrepancy for deck 

departments during safety assessment by the Naval 

Safety Center is the life line/guard line systems on 

board the ship. The Kevlar life lines (synthetic/

chain life-lines and guard-lines) are one of the 

single most important and overlooked safety devices 

on board the ship.

The openings in steel life rails can be either closed 

with synthetic line, or close-linked steel chain 

as directed by the ship’s drawings. In general, 

chain will last longer, but can pose a significant 

electromagnetic interference (EMI) hazard topside. 

Chain shall not be used on weather deck areas 

subject to EMI or intermodulation interference 

(IMI) requirements.

For access and hatch guard openings within the 

ship, 1/4 inch close-linked steel chain is used. 

In the access ways for jet engines, in areas 

exposed to gun or missile blast, and in high heat 

areas then 7/16 inch CRES wire with CRES endfittings is used for lifelines or hatch guard openings.

Synthetic lines are required to be made of 5/8 inch 

line with a 5/16 inch anchor shackle and a 4 5/8 

inch snap hook with a weight test of 5,000 pounds. 

The length of the line should be no greater than six 

feet, with no more than 3/4 inch slack per linear 

foot. This will allow the proper catenary for ease 

of removing the snap hook when required. Either 

5/8 inch diameter polyester line (per MILSPEC 

MIL-G-30500) or 3-strand nylon line (per 

MILSPEC MIL-R-17343) shall be used.

Access, guard-line, or hatch guard assemblies 

and other fastening applications requiring easy 

attachment and detachment shall be made up with 

5/16 inch anchor shackle, screw pin, type 4, class 1, 

in accordance with Fed. Spec. RR-C-271 at one end 

and a 4 inch galvanized steel snap hook with safety 

guard at the other end. The snap hook shall have a 

5/8 inch diameter eye, a 3/4 inch throat opening, and 

shall withstand a proof-load of 5,000 pounds.

Access guards of chain shall incorporate a 3/8 

inch connecting link, type II, grade C, on each end 

and a 1/4 inch galvanized steel chain type I, grade 

C, conforming to Fed. Spec. RR-C-271 in addition 

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VOLUME 6|No. 1
to the above. Access guards of synthetic or wire 

line shall use a terminating eye piece at each end 

in addition to the above, with a 3/8 inch anchor 

shackle, screw pin.

These assemblies shall be made up so that when 

installed in the opening, the sag at any mid-span of 

line or chain is not greater than 3/4 inch per foot of 

span between the supporting stanchions or structure. 

When employing synthetic line, the length of 

line necessary to achieve minimum sag shall be 

measured only after the line has been subjected to 

a minimum of six initial pulls of not less than 30 

percent of the rated breaking strength of the line 

in order to assure that the “construction stretch” is 

imparted prior to fitting the line. Maximum length 

of openings protected by line or chain shall not 

exceed 72 inches.

Clearing Barrel Procedures

The number one weapon’s department safety 

discrepancy identified during AOSAs is improper 

clearing barrel procedures. This procedure should 

be utilized several times a day, and is basis for 

establishing a safe weapon condition.

NTRP 3-07.2.2 is the governing reference 

for clearing barrel procedures. The procedures 

it contains should be printed out posted at the 

clearing barrel. We have noted commands that 

are using local procedures, and not the procedures 

of the NTRP 3-07.2.2. No other procedures are 

authorized. 

NTRP 3-07.2.2 states:

At every duty station, written clearing barrel procedures 

shall be posted near the clearing barrel. The clearing 

barrel supervisor shall read each command slowly and 

clearly while closely monitoring the process. 

The NTRP also states in paragraph 1.3 — which 

most Sailors have overlooked — that “Watch 

standers shall repeat all commands from the 

supervisor during clearing procedures.”

Naval Safety Center assessors inspect electrical equipment (left) and an oil spill kit. (NAVSAFECEN Photos)

The number one safety discrepancy 

for deck departments during safety 

assessment by the Naval Safety 

Center is the life line/guard line 

systems onboard the ship. 

 Why are these requirements so important? If the 

guard line is not maintained IAW PMS, NSTM 600 

and GSO 612, one of our Sailors, or even you, could 

possibly become a “man overboard.” If these guard 

lines (chain or synthetic) are around hatches and 

ladders have the wrong fittings, have fittings that are 

excessively corroded, or not installed at all, a Sailor 

can easily be hurt. A best practice is to walk your 

ship daily and verify all life lines and guard lines 

are IAW all instructions and that the maintenance is 

being done properly. 

As you are constructing the synthetic life lines and 

guard lines always refer back to the NSTM 600 v3 

and GSO612D for proper construction pull. Do not 

rely on tribal knowledge and the infamous phrase 

“this is how we always do it.” These are both the 

foundation for setting yourself up for failure and 

teaching our new Sailors bad habits. The right 

process might take a little longer, but will prevent 

injury or possible rework in the future. The long 

lasting benefits to you and your shipmates will 

always outweigh any possible short cuts!

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An example of how this should be performed with an 

M9 is:

1. Clearing barrel supervisor, reading aloud from 

the posted procedure: “With trigger finger along 

receiver, insert the weapon into the clearing 

barrel.” 

2. Watch stander, repeating aloud: “With trigger 

finger along receiver, insert the weapon into the 

clearing barrel.” 

3. Clearing barrel supervisor, reading aloud: “Correct. 

Proceed.” 

4. The watch stander performs the action that was 

instructed. The clearing barrel supervisor should 

visually confirm that the watch stander performed 

the correct actions. 

5. The clearing barrel supervisor should continue 

with the next step, reading it aloud from the posted 

procedure in the same manner as above.

We have received numerous MISHAP reports 

regarding negligent discharges. The following is an 

example of how a negligent discharge happened and 

how many steps that could have stopped it was not 

followed and allowed it to happen. 

“A Sailor reported to the Armory at 0730 to be 

armed up for a watch that required both an M16 and 

an M9. The clearing barrel supervisor handed the 

Sailor, a SRF-A graduate, a magazine and told him 

to put his M16 into condition 3. The Sailor, failing 

to notice that the M16 bolt was locked to the rear (it 

should have been forward), went ahead and inserted 

the magazine. While walking out to assume his 

post, he stated that he heard the rifle make a noise 

but did not see anything wrong with the rifle. We 

can only assume that it was the bolt being released 

and now chambering a round. Once he was in 

position which he admitted was one leg against 

the wall while leaning back, he started to doze off 

which caused him to jump; since his finger was on 

the trigger, a round was discharged.” 

In this mishap, there were multiple failures at 

several different points in the procedure that should 

have been observed and addressed. 

The causes for this mishap:

1. Clearing barrel supervisor did not mandate use of 

the NTRP procedures.

2. The watch stander did not understand weapon 

conditions, and failed to release the bolt forward 

prior to inserting a loaded magazine. Instead of 

putting the weapon into condition 3 as ordered, he 

now had a condition 1 weapon.

3. The watch stander did not stand a proper watch, 

staying in one place and not roving as required. 

4. The watch stander having his finger on the trigger. 

(Placing a finger on the trigger should be the last 

step before squeezing the trigger to discharge 

the weapon. Never rest your trigger finger on the 

trigger.) 

5. The watch stander failed to investigate or ask for 

assistance when the M16 made “a sound.”

Naval Safety Center staff assess clearing barrel procedures (left) and life-line/guard-line systems. (NAVSAFECEN Photos)

15 2016

VOLUME 6|No. 1
STOPPING A MISHAP BEFORE IT HAPPENS

HIDDEN DANGER

ENS Keegan Hoey

At the start of every ship’s major maintenance availability comes 

the requisite safety standdown. Each safety standdown habitually 

covers a predetermined list of topics such as electrical safety, 

personal protective equipment (PPE), heat stress or general safety 

on barge life. While these subjects are important, safety personnel should be 

always cognizant that covering predetermined safety topics does not guarantee the 

crew’s complete safety. Many dangers do not cleanly fit within a predetermined 

category but can still cause a threat to Sailors’ lives. It is often these hidden 

dangers that can cause the most harm because they are never considered. 

Therefore, it is important for safety personnel to think outside the box in unearthing 

and dealing with these hidden hazards. 

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USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) had recently 

finished her deployment and was now preparing 

for a yard period. It was the middle of spring and 

a good time for Sailors to relax while the ship 

received some much-needed repairs. Once the 

ship was successfully moored in the shipyard, the 

familiar routine of yard life began. 

At the time, USS Winston S. Churchill was not 

the only ship in the yards. As a result, the majority 

of the ship’s crew had to park in overflow parking. 

The overflow parking is roughly two blocks from 

the yard’s entrance. It is located in an area of 

Norfolk that is not frequented by residents. Word of 

many near-miss car crashes started filtering through. 

At first, it was not clear why so many Sailors were 

having issues. Initial reports were that Sailors 

were not being cautious while driving through the 

area. Upon closer inspection, it was discovered that 

there was only one stop sign present at a four-way 

intersection.

The solution was obvious:

GET MORE 

STOP SIGNS

However, that would mean getting the City 

of Norfolk’s Transportation Division to act. As 

assistant safety officer, I reached out to the City 

of Norfolk’s information line and spoke with a 

representative. I informed her of the issue and 

asked that additional stop signs be installed at that 

intersection. The representative pulled up a satellite 

image of the intersection and remarked that it was 

the city’s impression that the area was abandoned. I 

informed her that this particular 

yard was not abandoned and 

that military and civilian 

personnel working there 

used the area as overflow 

parking. The representative 

stated she would forward 

the information on to the 

Transportation Division 

and assured me the division 

would act quickly. 

Driving in the next week I noticed that where 

there used to be one stop sign at the intersection, 

there was now none. I asked the security guards 

if they had seen anyone take the sign and they 

informed me it was the police. 

I reached out again to Norfolk’s information 

line. Upon reaching another customer service 

representative, I informed her of the update and 

asked if she could check the progress on our 

original request. She said she did not see the 

original request in the system, but would forward 

the issue to the division. Before hanging up, I asked 

for the direct line and contact information for the 

department, in order to follow up individually. 

After hanging up the phone with this second 

representative, I left a detailed message at the 

provided transportation division number stating 

that I would be following up every day until 

resolution of the issue. I understood that the 

situation had escalated greatly with no stop signs 

at the intersection and if the issue were not quickly 

resolved, someone would be injured, or worse.

To my surprise, driving through the intersection 

the next day, two stop signs were now present; the 

original and a new one on the opposite side. Bravo 

Zulu City of Norfolk! After the stop signs were 

added to the intersection, reports of near-miss car 

crashes disappeared.

While putting up stop signs at an intersection 

is a small feat, it can greatly affect the safety of 

military and civilian personnel. This situation is 

a great example of how safety personnel should 

look outside the normal safety categories when 

performing their jobs. Safety hazards do not 

confine themselves to predetermined categories nor 

do they confine themselves to the skin of the ship. 

As such, it is important to keep an open mind when 

it comes to the safety of the crew.

While putting up stop signs at 

an intersection is a small feat, it 

can greatly affect the safety of 

military and civilian personnel. 

17 2016

VOLUME 6|No. 1
Wikimedia.org Photo 

CDR Jason Garrett

Two Sailors from USS Nimitz (CVN 68), Operational 

Specialist Second Class Katie Wright and Operational 

Specialist Second Class Daniel Geary made a trip to 

the local smoke shop to purchase a new vape. After 

considering several options, Geary made his selection, added a set of lithium ion 

batteries and a charger to his purchase and paid the cashier. Moments later, he 

walked out of the store, ready to charge the batteries and try out the new Mod. After 

getting situated in the passenger seat of the car, Geary inserted the batteries into the 

charger and plugged it in to the car’s USB port. 

18 SEA COMPASS

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THE HIDDEN RISKS OF VAPING
File Photo

As the Sailors drove from the 

shop Wright decided to pull into 

a nearby drive-thru for lunch. 

While she completed their order, 

Geary was busy unscrewing the 

Mod’s battery compartment to 

load the newly charged batteries. 

Geary slid the last of the 

batteries into the Mod cylinder 

and as he screwed the cap in 

place, he noticed the battery 

contacts turning red hot. It 

took only a moment before 

the batteries exploded with a 

deafening “BANG.” 

The flaming batteries went 

flying from the Mod with one 

landing on the floor, setting the 

vehicle’s passenger side floor mat 

and carpeting ablaze. 

Startled by the explosion 

and the flames, Wright quickly 

accelerated out of the drive-thru 

and into an empty parking spot. 

Once parked, she frantically 

grabbed a water bottle in an 

attempt to extinguish the flames 

as they began to burn Geary’s 

leg. After a few panicky 

moments, she was able to douse 

the flames and extinguish the fire.

A silent moment passed as the 

shocked Sailors looked at each 

other in dismay, then at the burnt 

flooring and Geary’s burnt jeans. 

That’s when they noticed smoke 

beginning to billow out from 

behind the dashboard. They 

quickly realized that something 

was still burning. One of the 

flaming batteries had jumped 

onto the dash and fallen in the 

gap between the windshield and 

the vent ducting. Moments later 

they saw flames rising out of the 

dash. With no way for them to 

fight the fire, they opened the 

doors and ran for help.

Today there are many 

concerns regarding the safety 

of vaping. While the health 

implications of using personal 

vaporizers is not yet known, 

there is clear evidence that the 

lithium ion batteries that power 

personal vaporizers (to include 

e-cigarettes of all sizes, vape 

pens, twists, mods and advanced 

personal vaporizers) can overheat 

and catch fire or explode, 

sometimes with catastrophic 

results. 

Lithium ion batteries can 

overheat if they are mishandled. 

Using an incompatible charger 

or damaging the batteries by 

exposing them to excessive cold, 

heat or even direct sunlight, are 

19 2016

VOLUME 6|No. 1
common mistakes that can cause 

them to overheat and explode. 

Even storing batteries in areas 

where they can contact metal 

objects or other loose batteries, 

such as in a desk drawer, under 

a rack or even in a pocket with 

loose change, can cause them to 

overheat and burst into flames. 

Simply mishandling a lithium ion 

battery can create the potential for 

disaster.

However, even when the user 

does everything right, a battery 

can still explode. This is because 

some batteries and chargers 

are built with inferior quality 

standards in order to sell them at a 

lower cost. By leaving out safety 

features, such as overcharge 

and over-discharge protection, 

or choosing not to acquire 

the restriction of hazardous 

substances (RoHS) certification, 

manufacturers lower the cost 

to you, but increase your risks. 

Cheaper products usually mean 

an increased danger to the user. 

YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR.

Decrease the risk of your batteries exploding by following a few simple rules:

1. Always carry loose batteries in a battery case that is designed to prevent contact with metal 

objects or other batteries. 

2. Charge your batteries at the proper rate by using the appropriate and compatible battery 

charging device. (Remember, the power available from USB ports varies. You must use the 

correct one for charging your batteries.)

3. Buy high-quality batteries and chargers that have the RoHS certification. (Batteries are exempt 

from RoHS regulation; however, the safest batteries will have the RoHS certification and should 

be sought out.)

4. Do not use damaged batteries or let your batteries be damaged by exposing them to excessive 

heat, cold or direct sunlight. 

5. Do not let your batteries be exposed to water. 

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File Photo
While following these 

guidelines will not guarantee 

you a safe vaping experience, 

they may reduce the risk of 

a battery explosion and the 

resulting damage. While we’ll 

never know what caused Geary’s 

batteries to explode in his new 

Mod, we learned firsthand just 

how damaging such a fire can be. 

Geary received first-degree burns 

on his leg that required medical 

attention and Wright lost her 

vehicle to the ensuing flames. 

While our Sailors were 

unfortunate to have had such an 

incident happen to them, they 

were lucky it wasn’t worse. 

Imagine what would have 

happened if the batteries had 

exploded while in their home, the 

barracks or even onboard their 

ship. The loss of property and 

potential loss of life could have 

been catastrophic. 

While many argue that this 

type of mishap is statistically 

rare, we are seeing it 

occurring more frequently. 

This rise is due to a dramatic 

increase in the use of 

personal vaporizers. It is now 

commonplace to see nonsmokers of traditional tobacco 

taking up the habit. 

With more Sailors vaping, 

more of these lithium ion 

batteries are being brought 

on our bases, in our facilities, 

and onboard our ships, 

submarines and aircraft. This 

dramatically increases the 

risk of an explosion and a fire 

with disastrous consequences. 

All it takes is for one careless 

Sailor to mishandle a lithium 

ion battery, or to buy a cheap 

battery for their vape, and a 

statistically rare event can 

become a reality. 

21 2016

VOLUME 6|No. 1

File Photo
NOW YOU

SEE ME

Armbands Reflect Command's 

Commitment to Risk Mitigation

Falland winter 

nights are 

long in the 

Pacific 

Northwest (PACNORWEST). Our nights 

are often more than 15 hours long, but it 

stays dark much longer than that. In the 

fall and winter we also have to contend 

with fog, an overcast sky, incessant 

drizzle and the low angle of the sun. 

It’s no exaggeration to say that in the 

winter we live in complete darkness 

or an uninspiring twilight pretty much 

24/7. What’s surprising though is 

that the vast majority of folks in this 

area still prefer to wear dark clothing 

outdoors, shunning the idea of wearing 

bright reflective gear that can help 

drivers identify them in the darkness. 

This includes those of us in uniform, as well. CDR Jason Garrett

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For all the ridicule our Navy Working Uniform (NWU) has gotten regarding their ability to provide 

camouflage in the work environment, they do an excellent job of hiding our Sailors in the dark and gloom 

of the PACNORWEST. Several thousand Sailors on the mile-long trek between the parking garage and the 

USS Nimitz (CVN 68) are nothing more than scant shadows on the sidewalks, parking lots and streets. 

For those driving their privately owned vehicles (POV), or the bus drivers bringing contractors to and 

from the ship, these shadows are a constant concern. It would seem only a matter of time before a Sailor 

gets hit or run over, except for one important piece of risk mitigation implemented by the commanding 

officer of USS Nimitz. Captain John Ring has required each Sailor on the ship to wear a reflective armband 

during hours of darkness. That little bit of reflectivity on an otherwise dark uniform can ensure our Sailors 

are visible to motorists on the road.

Now as you can imagine, getting more than 3,100 Sailors to consistently wear these reflective armbands 

is quite a challenge. It takes foresight, a tremendous communication effort, and patience. In short, what it 

takes is a good old fashioned safety campaign. 

Last September, just as summer transitioned to fall, and the shortening of days was painfully obvious to 

us all, Ring asked the Safety Department to start just such a campaign to get reflective armbands on the 

crew. Understanding the urgent need as the days rapidly got shorter; the USS Nimitz Safety Department 

developed a simple three-step process to achieve this. 

Draft the Order: The Safety 

Department drafted a USS 

Nimitz Note that would alert 

the Sailors onboard of the 

new requirement. A simple 

note outlined the following: 

“Reflective armbands are 

required to be worn while 

transiting on base and in the 

shipyard areas. Reflective 

armbands will be worn from dusk 

until dawn, and must be worn 

on the left arm, approximately 

four inches above the elbow. 

They will be worn regardless of 

civilian or military attire.” 

Obtain 3,100 armbands: 

We knew in advance that it was 

unrealistic to expect the Navy 

Exchange, or even local area 

stores, to have 3,100 armbands 

already on the shelves for 

our Sailors. So the Safety 

Department put in a requisition 

to obtain the armbands through 

the supply chain. In just over a 

week, the new armbands were 

onboard, ready for distribution. 

Once they were received, the 

safety team issued them in 

bulk to each department. Each 

department was then responsible 

for handing them out to their 

Sailors. Within two weeks from 

the initial request, every Sailor 

onboard had an armband.

Get the Sailors to wear them: 

Once the Order was released and 

the armbands distributed, we still 

needed to consistently remind our 

Sailors to wear them. After all, it 

takes time to instill a habit. First 

we hung posters at the quarterdeck 

and throughout the hangar bay 

to promote the importance of 

being seen in the dark. Next, the 

Safety Department aggressively 

championed the subject at every 

opportunity, to include all hands 

emails, enlisted safety committee 

and safety council meetings, 

safety standdowns and one-on-one 

engagement with Sailors. 

But the greatest effect was caused 

by those Sailors who took the 

habit of wearing their armbands 

in earnest, and then encouraged 

their shipmates to do the same. 

Sometimes peer pressure can be a 

good thing.

That little bit of reflectivity on an 

otherwise dark uniform can ensure 

our Sailors are visible to motorists 

on the road.

23 2016

VOLUME 6|No. 1

STEPTHREE

STEP

ONE

STEP

TWO
Within a month, just as seemingly perpetual night 

settled in, the vast majorities of the crew had their 

armbands on and were highly visible wherever 

headlights shined upon them. The occasional Sailor 

who forgot the armband at home would stick close 

to fellow shipmates, seeking safety in numbers. By 

walking in groups with those who were wearing 

their reflective gear, shipmates were protecting 

shipmates in the dark.

Eventually, as spring approached and the days got 

longer again, the USS Nimitz team abandoned their 

armbands. With daylight hours almost 16 hours 

long, it’s been rare that a Sailor will walk to or from 

work in the dark. But here it is, late summer again 

and already we are noticing the days getting shorter. 

It’s time for the USS Nimitz Safety Department to 

start thinking about implementing the three-step 

process to get armbands on our Sailors again. It’s 

also a great time for you to consider if this idea is a 

good one for your ship and your shipmates.

Sailors from the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) are seen here wearing reflected armbands. 

The reflective bands are part of an important risk mitigation effort implemented by

the commanding officer of USS Nimitz to prevent injuriesof personnel during hours of 

darkness. (US Navy Photo)

We want to 

hear from you!

We do our best to cover stories, articles and information that 

may be helpful or necessary to manage your safety program 

and/or promote safety awareness on and off duty. If you have a 

question or opinion about anything you read in Sea Compass, 

send us your comments. 

Calling All Public Affairs Specialists and MCs

We welcome public affairs and mass communication 

specialists as fleet correspondents or guest editors. We want 

to hear about your ship’s safety programs, best practices and 

risk-management success stories. Send your press releases to 

safe-seacompass@navy.mil.

Letters to the Editor

We want to hear what you think about something you read in 

Sea Compass magazine. Letters must include your name, email 

or phone number (for verification). Letters may be published 

anonymously. Write to michael.j.morris@navy.mil.

BZs and Attaboys

Nominate an individual or a group from your command/unit for 

a job well done. Write a brief narrative (500 words) including 

name(s) of the nominee(s) and reason for the nomination. 

Please include your name and contact information.

Lessons Learned and Safety Culture

Help us preserve combat readiness and save lives by sharing 

your lessons-learned story in Sea Compass. Perhaps you’ve 

experienced a personal mishap or a near-miss at work. How 

did that shape your behavior and/or your command’s safety 

culture? Send articles (450 words minimum,1,500 words 

maximum) to safe-seacompass@navy.mil.

Submit Seasonal Off-Duty Story

Do you have a story about a mishap or near-miss that occurred 

while off duty during the warmer days? Send your submission 

for the spring-summer issue. We’ll take any topic as long it 

demonstrates risk-management and lessons learned.

Information

Download the detailed article submission guidelines from 

http://www.public.navy.mil/navsafecen/documents/

media/magazines/Submission_Guidelines.pdf

Contact us at safe-seacompass@navy.mil for more 

information.

24 SEA COMPASS

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Oversight Inspection Checklists

Checklists are in Excel format so they can be modified locally. Master copies are at the 

Naval Safety Center. Send requests for changes to safe-oshfdbk@navy.mil.

This comprehensive toolbox offers command safety officers and collateral duty safety 

officers the resources and training material necessary to start, improve and/or run a 

command safety program. 

If you can’t find what you’re looking for and need help, please email us at 

safe-oshfdbk@navy.mil. Your email will be answered within one working day.

Naval Safety Center Resources

Mishap Reporting, Investigating and Recordkeeping

Technical Guidance

Training

Training Materials, Links and Resources

Afloat and Aviation Safety Course Prerequisites

Safety and Health Management Evaluation Comprehensive Workplace Inspection Checklist

Selecting Personal Protective Equipment

Products developed by the DON PPE Working Group. 

Chemical Eye & Face Protection Training

Chemical Hand Protection Training

ISEA Chemical Hand Protection Training

Chemical Eye & Face Protection Matrix

Chemical Resistant Gloves Matrix

25 2016

VOLUME 6|No. 1
PREVENTING MISHAPS, SAVING LIVES 

& PRESERVING RESOURCES

http://www.public.navy.mil/navsafecen