Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 2, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00160-CR

NO. 14-12-00161-CR

ROWENA MANUELA KLINKER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 400th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 09-DCR-051626, 09-DCR-052114

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Rowena Manuela Klinker was indicted for two counts of

aggravated sexual assault of a child alleged to have occurred on July 1, 2007; she 

pleaded guilty. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and heard 

arguments on punishment. On January 19, 2012, the trial court sentenced the 

appellant to 20 years’ confinement for each offense, with the sentences to run 

concurrently. In two issues, the appellant challenges her punishment on appeal. 
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We affirm.

ANALYSIS

I. Community Supervision

In her first issue, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to 

place her on community supervision when evidence in the record showed that such 

placement was in the best interest of the complainant.

We defer to the factfinder’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in 

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic 

facts to ultimate facts. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010). Further, we review a sentence imposed by the trial court for abuse of 

discretion. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); 

Buerger v. State, 60 S.W.3d 358, 363 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. 

ref’d). Generally, if the trial court assesses punishment within the statutorily 

prescribed limits, the punishment will not be disturbed on appeal. Jackson, 680 

S.W.2d at 814; Harris v. State, 204 S.W.3d 19, 29 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). 

A defendant charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child may be placed 

on community supervision “only if the judge makes a finding in open court that 

placing the defendant on community supervision is in the best interest of the 

victim.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp. 2012). 

Absent such a finding, a trial court is bound to enter a sentence of imprisonment 

for life or for a term of between 5 and 99 years. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32 

(Vernon 2011); Young v. State, No. 01-09-00790-CR, __ S.W.3d __, 2012 WL 

668927, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] March 1, 2012, pet. ref’d).

The appellant’s argument relies on two paragraphs from a letter by the 
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complainant written to the trial court:

Every one [sic] has a storm in their life, some big some small. I will 

tell you one thing that might have been on [sic] of my biggest storms I 

will ever have in my life. Out of the biggest storm came the biggest 

blessing! By God’s grace and mercies I am living here today drug 

and razor free. I came out pretty strong with a good head on my 

shoulders. If it was not for all this mess I would not have started 

going to church, I would not have started dancing or playing 

volleyball! So through all of the mess you have created I realized I 

am stronger and better than ever.

As far as punishment and what I would like to see happen. Is up to 

God I just ask one thing please, That she has to get some help from 

some one [sic] who is trained to help her. To see that this never 

happens again to another kid.

The appellant construes these paragraphs as evidence that it was in the best interest 

of the complainant that the appellant be placed on community supervision. The 

trial court reached a different conclusion: “This Court has heard not one shred of 

evidence that would support such a finding. Everything I’ve heard has been about 

[the appellant], and not about the victim.” A review of the record confirms the trial 

court’s assessment that all of the evidence presented pertained solely to the 

appellant.

The trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that community 

supervision is not warranted in this case. The complainant neither asked for 

community supervision nor advocated a prison sentence. Her request that the 

appellant “get some help” is likewise ambivalent as to the issue of a prison 

sentence. In the supervision plan at the conclusion of the PSI report, the 

appellant’s community supervision officer made it clear that counseling programs 

were available both inside and outside of prison:

Should the Court sentence [the appellant] to the Texas Department of 
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Corrections Institutional Division, the following recommendations are 

respectfully recommended:

1. Attend, participate, and successfully complete sex offender 

counseling as offered by the Texas Department of Corrections 

Institutional Division.

* * *

Should the Court decide to place [the appellant] on probation, the 

following conditions of probation are respectfully recommended:

1. Per the psychological evaluation by Dr. Gollaher, attend, 

participate, and successfully complete sex offender counseling at her 

own expense and abide by all special conditions of probation in the 

Sex Offender Addendum.

The appellant does not contend that she would lack access to effective counseling 

programs in prison.

In any event, it is the trial court’s responsibility to weigh the evidence, and 

our role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a 

factfinder does not act rationally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 633. Here, the trial court 

acted rationally in determining that the record contained no evidence that placing 

the appellant on community supervision was in the victim’s best interest. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err by refusing to consider community 

supervision, nor did it abuse its discretion in sentencing the appellant to 20 years’ 

confinement on each count. See Jackson, 680 S.W.2d at 814; Harris, 204 S.W.3d 

at 29.

We overrule the appellant’s first issue.

II. Arbitrariness

In her second issue, the appellant contends that the trial court’s assessment 
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of 20 years’ confinement was arbitrary or unreasonable because it was not based 

upon the evidence, but rather the “number of chances the court had given [the 

appellant].”

The appellant did not raise this issue below and has thus failed to preserve it 

for appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).

We overrule the appellant’s second issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of the appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

/s/ William J. Boyce

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Boyce and Donovan.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).