J-A28028-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

IZEK TUGGLE

Appellant No. 218 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of December 16, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-46-CR-0006944-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2014

Izek Eugene Tuggle appeals his December 16, 2013 judgment of 

sentence, which was imposed following a nonjury trial that resulted in 

Tuggle being found guilty of: person not to possess a firearm, attempting to 

obtain a controlled substance (Percocet) by fraud, manufacture of a 

controlled substance (marijuana), possession of marijuana with intent to 

deliver, and possession of Percocet with intent to deliver.1 We affirm.

In 2011, Tuggle was the target of an investigation into the distribution 

of controlled substances and usage of fraudulent medical prescriptions in 

Montgomery County. The Montgomery County Detective Bureau gathered 

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), and 901 (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(12)); 

and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), respectively.
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information about Tuggle through confidential informants, reports from other 

police departments, surveillance, and controlled purchases of controlled 

substances. Based upon the probable cause established by this information, 

police applied for and received a search warrant for Tuggle’s residence on 

August 18, 2011. Upon the execution of that warrant and the recovery of 

evidence obtained therefrom, Tuggle was arrested and charged with, inter 

alia, the above-referenced crimes. Prior to his trial, Tuggle filed a motion to 

suppress a statement that he provided after his arrest, and the trial court 

held a hearing on Tuggle’s motion on July 15, 2013. 

The trial court has summarized the relevant facts and detailed the 

testimony provided at Tuggle’s suppression hearing as follows:

During the course of [Tuggle’s] suppression hearing, Detective 

[James] Vinter testified that, on August 19, 2011, at 

approximately 6:20 a.m., he participated in the execution of a 

search warrant at [Tuggle’s] apartment on Corson Street in 

Norristown, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Various items 

were discovered during this search, including: Percocet, 

marijuana, blank prescription pads, and a handgun. [Tuggle] 

was immediately taken into custody and was transported to the 

headquarters of the Montgomery County Detectives, arriving 

there at approximately 8:30 a.m., and was taken to a “holding 

facility” within the building.

Detective Vinter testified that, at some point—either at the 

Corson Street apartment or in the holding facility—he engaged 

[Tuggle] in a very brief conversation, during the course of which 

he asked [Tuggle] if he wanted to cooperate and give a 

statement. The detective testified that [Tuggle] replied that he 

did want to make a statement. The detective described [Tuggle] 

as being “very cooperative at that time.”
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On cross-examination by [defense counsel], Detective Vinter 

readily acknowledged that he had not informed [Tuggle] of his 

rights under Miranda v. Arizona[2] prior to asking [Tuggle] if he 

was willing to cooperate with the police. Detective Vinter further 

acknowledged that, if the conversation had taken place in the 

holding facility at the Montgomery County Detectives building, 

[Tuggle] would have been handcuffed and “secured” at the time 

of the conversation.

Asked by [defense counsel] if his conversation with [Tuggle] had 

“included your concern” over a handgun that was discovered 

during the search of [Tuggle’s] apartment, Detective Vinter 

testified that he could not recall having any discussion with 

[Tuggle] concerning the handgun. The detective testified:

I don’t know if I ever said anything about a handgun, Your 

Honor. I know I didn’t ask him anything about what was 

found in his residence, other than asking him if he would 

supply a statement and cooperate. He said he would. But 

what was found in the house I never asked him.

As the [trial court] stated on the record in denying [Tuggle’s] 

motion to suppress, [the] court fully credited Detective Vinter’s 

testimony in its entirety.

Detective [Michael] Reynolds testified that he took [Tuggle’s] 

statement in an interview room in the Montgomery County 

Detectives building. The detective testified that, prior to taking 

the statement, he read [Tuggle] his rights under Miranda v. 

Arizona, and [Tuggle] then executed a written waiver of those 

rights. The waiver on its face explicitly advised [Tuggle] that: 

he had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could 

and would be used against him; that he had a right to consult a 

lawyer before being questioned and to have a lawyer present 

during questioning; that if he could not afford a lawyer, a lawyer 

would be provided to him without cost prior to questioning; and 

that he had the right to refuse to answer any questions and to 

stop talking at any time.

After [Tuggle] executed the waiver, Detective Reynolds 

conducted an interview of [Tuggle], beginning at 11:00 a.m. and 

____________________________________________

2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ending at 11:50 a.m. The detective testified that [Tuggle] was 

cooperative, and that at no point did the conversation become 

contentious or heated, and at no point did [Tuggle] ask to stop 

the interview or ask for a lawyer.

Detective Reynolds then typed [Tuggle’s] statement and gave it 

to him to review and make any changes he wanted. A copy of 

the typed statement was entered into evidence at [Tuggle’s] 

suppression hearing. The statement on its face contains 

[Tuggle’s] explicit acknowledgment that no threats or promises 

had been made to him to induce him to talk to Detective 

Reynolds, and [Tuggle’s] explicit acknowledgment that his 

decision to provide a statement . . . was a product of his own 

free will.

As the [trial court] stated on the record, [the] court fully credited

the testimony of Detective Reynolds in its entirety.

[Tuggle] testified on his own behalf at the suppression hearing. 

[Tuggle’s] testimony did not contradict, in any material way, the 

testimony of Detective Reynolds. [Tuggle’s] testimony was, 

however, at odds with that of Detective Vinter in regard to the 

conversation between the two men during which [Tuggle] agreed 

to provide a statement to the police.

In contrast to Detective Vinter, [Tuggle] testified:

That conversation was mainly about the firearm that was 

recovered in the apartment, more or less. Questioning me 

about was anything on it, which would refer to like it being 

a dirty gun or I guess a body or so being on it.

[Tuggle] further testified:

I was telling him that I’m not sure if anything’s on it. I 

was telling him it’s not my firearm. But I was just mostly 

like a little timid because he was like more persistent with 

trying to like more or less put it on me or so, or what I 

would say would be to try to scare me.

[Tuggle] stated:

I felt intimidated because I wasn’t sure. I had no idea if 

anything would come up on the firearm. So I was 

intimidated. I was kind of scared.
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[Tuggle] testified that he was concerned that the handgun—

which he denied owning—might have been used in a crime that 

the police would try to “pin it on me” because the gun was 

discovered during a search of his residence. [Tuggle] testified 

that this concern “played a major role” in his decision to waive 

his Miranda rights and give a statement, testifying that he 

thought that “if I give him a statement then maybe he would 

stop asking me about the firearm or so.” 

On cross-examination by the attorney for the Commonwealth, 

[Tuggle] testified that no threats or promises were made to him 

to induce him to make a statement, but he asserted that he 

nonetheless felt “intimidated.” Asked to explain exactly what 

Detective Vinter said that made him feel intimidated, [Tuggle] 

testified:

He said that I better hope nothing came back on the 

firearm. He intimidated me by saying that a lot of things 

that’s going on in Norristown as far as the unresolved 

murders or pertaining to crimes, things of that nature, that 

if something’s on that firearm then it will reflect on me. 

That’s what was intimidating to me.

Asked directly if Detective Vinter had told him that giving a 

statement would help him, [Tuggle] replied: “No.”

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 3/11/2014, at 2-6 (citations to notes of 

testimony omitted; some punctuation modified).

In the statement that Tuggle provided to Detective Reynolds, Tuggle 

admitted to stealing blank prescription forms, to filling out these prescription 

forms and forging doctors’ signatures, to growing marijuana plants, and to 

selling marijuana and Percocet. Tuggle denied ownership of the handgun, 

however, and stated that it belonged to a woman that left it in his 

apartment. 

In his motion, Tuggle sought to suppress the statement that he 

provided during the interview with Detective Reynolds. The trial court 
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denied Tuggle’s suppression motion because the court credited the 

Detectives’ testimony over that provided by Tuggle and determined that 

Tuggle’s statement had been preceded by a knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. T.C.O. at 8, 9. On July 16, 2013, 

Tuggle proceeded to a nonjury trial, and he was convicted on the following 

day. On December 16, 2013, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing, 

after which it imposed an aggregate sentence of not less than seven and one 

half years nor more than fifteen years’ incarceration, to be followed by a two 

year period of probation. 

Tuggle filed a timely notice of appeal on January 15, 2014. On 

January 21, 2014, the trial court directed Tuggle to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), to be 

served upon the court no later than February 11, 2014. Tuggle filed a timely 

concise statement on February 7, 2014. On March 11, 2014, the trial court 

issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Tuggle raises the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in denying [Tuggle’s] Motion to 

Suppress his statements in that such statements were not 

preceded by a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of 

Miranda rights as the alleged waiver was preceded by coercive 

questioning by Detective James Vinter of [Tuggle] relating to the 

gun found in the premises and wanting him to cooperate with 

law enforcement authorities, which tainted the voluntariness of 

the subsequent Miranda waiver?

Brief for Tuggle at 4. 
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When reviewing a trial court’s order denying a suppression motion, our 

standard of review is well-settled:

In reviewing a suppression ruling, we are bound by the 

suppression court’s factual findings, unless they are without 

support in the record. We may reverse the legal conclusions 

reached by the suppression court, however, if they are in error. 

Thus, our standard of review of the legal conclusions reached by 

the suppression court is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant 

is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we consider only 

the evidence of the prosecution, and so much of the evidence for 

the defense which remains uncontradicted when fairly read in 

the context of the [suppression] record.

Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 A.2d 783, 795 (Pa. 2009) (citations 

omitted). Additionally, “[i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province as 

fact finder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 

their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (citation omitted). With regard to our scope of review in the 

context of an order denying a suppression motion, we are limited to 

reviewing only the evidence that was presented at the suppression hearing, 

and may not consider testimony adduced at trial. See In re L.J., 79 A.3d 

1073, 1083–87 (Pa. 2013). 

Tuggle argues that, although he executed a waiver of his Miranda 

rights prior to the interview with Detective Reynolds, his waiver was not 

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because it was influenced by Detective 

Vinter’s allegedly coercive questioning. Specifically, Tuggle asserts that 

Detective Vinter questioned him about the firearm that was discovered in his 

apartment, and that the detective intimidated him by implying that Tuggle 
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may be implicated in any crimes in which the firearm was previously used. 

Brief for Tuggle at 22. Detective Vinter contradicted Tuggle’s testimony, 

asserting that he only asked Tuggle if he was willing to cooperate and 

provide a statement, and that he did not question Tuggle about anything 

that was found in the apartment. On review of a ruling denying suppression, 

we consider only the evidence of the prosecution, and so much of the 

evidence for the defense which remains uncontradicted when fairly read in 

the context of the entire record. Galvin, 985 A.2d at 795. As Tuggle’s 

testimony was contradicted at the suppression hearing, we may not consider 

it on appellate review.

The trial court fully credited Detective Vinter’s testimony, and found 

Tuggle’s testimony to be incredible and unpersuasive. T.C.O. at 8. “As we 

believe that credibility at a suppression hearing is an important 

determination best resolved through the court’s personal observations, we 

will not reverse a suppression court’s assessment of credibility absent clear 

and manifest error.” Commonwealth v. Camacho, 625 A.2d 1242, 1245 

(Pa. Super. 1993). The record provides us no reason to believe that the trial 

court committed a clear and manifest error in making its credibility 

determinations. Thus, even if we are to consider Tuggle’s testimony 

concerning his interaction with Detective Vinter, we are bound by the trial 

court’s credibility determinations.

While our standard of review is highly deferential with respect to the 

suppression court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, we afford 
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no deference to the suppression court’s legal conclusions, and review such 

conclusions de novo. In re L.J., 79 A.3d at 1080 n.6. With regard to the 

validity of a waiver of Miranda rights, our Supreme Court has described the 

law of our Commonwealth as follows: 

In determining whether a defendant’s waiver of his Miranda

rights is valid, a trial court must consider: (1) whether the 

waiver was voluntary, in the sense that the waiver was not the 

result of governmental pressure; and (2) whether the waiver 

was knowing and intelligent, in the sense that it was made with 

full comprehension of both the nature of the right being 

abandoned and the consequence of that choice. The 

Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a 

defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 

Factors to be considered in determining whether a waiver is valid 

and a confession is voluntary include: the duration and means of 

interrogation; the defendant’s physical and psychological state; 

the conditions attendant to the detention; the attitude exhibited 

by the police during the interrogation; and any other facts which 

may serve to drain one’s powers of resistance to suggestion and 

coercion.

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 76 (Pa. 2014) (citations 

omitted).

Tuggle was apprised fully of his Miranda rights before his interview 

with Detective Reynolds, and he signed a waiver form, which indicated that 

he was aware of his rights and was willing to give a voluntary statement. 

Tuggle does not allege that Detective Reynolds coerced him, but rather that 

his prior interaction with Detective Vinter “intimidated” him. Notes of 

Testimony, Suppression Hearing, (“N.T.”), 7/15/2013, at 66. As to the 

duration of this alleged interaction with Detective Vinter, Tuggle testified 

that it was approximately five minutes. Id. at 65. Tuggle testified that he 
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was interviewed in a room that the detectives called a “holding room.” Id. 

at 59. While the record does not provide a detailed description of the 

“holding room,” Tuggle did not testify that the room itself was particularly 

intimidating or oppressive.

Tuggle noted that he had been consuming marijuana from 

approximately 2:30 a.m. until 5:00 a.m. on the morning of his arrest. N.T. 

at 67. The interview with Detective Reynolds during which Tuggle executed 

the waiver of his Miranda rights began at 11:00 a.m., approximately six 

hours after he had stopped smoking marijuana. While the fact that Tuggle 

had consumed marijuana prior to executing the waiver is relevant to 

Tuggle’s physical and psychological state, Tuggle testified that, at the time 

that he gave the statement to Detective Reynolds, he was not impaired to a 

degree that would prevent him from giving a statement. Id. at 69. 

The most pertinent factor to be considered in determining whether 

Tuggle’s waiver is valid is the attitude exhibited by the police during the 

interrogation, because Tuggle’s argument is premised upon the alleged 

intimidation that he felt after interacting with Detective Vinter. However, as 

we discussed above, Tuggle’s testimony about the interaction was 

contradicted by Detective Vinter’s testimony. Furthermore, the trial court 

appropriately exercised its discretion in crediting Detective Vinter’s 

testimony over Tuggle’s—a determination that we will not disturb on appeal.

The trial court summarized the basis for its legal conclusions as 

follows:
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Stated directly, this court heard no evidence indicating that any 

improper coercive or intimidating tactics were employed to 

induce the defendant to waive his Miranda rights and provide 

his statement to Detective Reynolds. The evidence this court 

heard rather supports the determination that the defendant’s 

waiver of Miranda rights and his statement to the detective 

were voluntary, and a product of the defendant’s own free will. 

N.T. at 101. We have analyzed the relevant factors, and have determined 

that Tuggle’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and 

intelligent. As such, his waiver was valid, and the trial court’s conclusions of 

law were not erroneous. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2014