alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                         552,568
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               14,376,630
<ALLOWANCES>                                   185,000
<INVENTORY>                                 19,009,784
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            35,404,356
<PP&E>                                      13,570,010
<DEPRECIATION>                               7,262,286
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              41,712,080
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       15,201,520
<BONDS>                                        100,001
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       451,514
<OTHER-SE>                                  25,311,745
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                41,712,080
<SALES>                                     75,757,322
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            75,774,040
<CGS>                                       45,108,546
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               69,069,752
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               310,457
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             186,338
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              6,207,493
<INCOME-TAX>                                 2,483,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          3,724,493
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 3,724,493
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .83
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .80


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32        Section 1350
Certifications.

---

Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, the Chief Executive
Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of First Capital Bank Holding Corporation (the
Company), each certify that, to his knowledge on the date of this
certification:

| | 1. | The quarterly report of the Company for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed
          with the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date (the
          Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| |  | /s/ Michael G. Sanchez
Michael G. SanchezChief
Executive OfficerAugust 15, 2005
| |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| |  | /s/ Timothy S. Ayers;
Timothy S. AyersChief Financial OfficerAugust 15, 2005
| |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A19A1171. JAVARIOUS DAVIS v. THE STATE.

In 2009, a jury convicted Javarious Davis of possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony and five counts each of armed robbery and aggravated

assault. The trial court sentenced Davis to fifteen years to serve in confinement for

the armed robberies and five years suspended for the firearm count. His convictions

were affirmed on appeal. Davis v. State, 331 Ga. App. 585 (771 SE2d 232) (2015). 

In 2017, Davis filed a “Motion to Modify Void Sentence Based on Court’s

Misapprehension of Fact,” asserting that the trial court’s oral sentence of fifteens

years to serve with eligibility for parole after ten years is an illegal and void sentence

because a person convicted of armed robbery is not eligible for parole pursuant to

OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (c) (4). The trial court denied the motion and Davis filed this

direct appeal.

Under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), a court may modify a sentence during the year

after its imposition or within 120 days after remittitur following a direct appeal,

whichever is later. Frazier v. State, 302 Ga. App. 346, 348 (691 SE2d 247) (2010). 

Once, as here, this statutory period expires, a trial court may modify only a void

sentence. Id. A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does

not allow. Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 SE2d 483) (2004). When a sentence

falls within the statutory range of punishment, it is not void and is not subject to

modification beyond the time provided in § 17-10-1 (f). See id. Moreover, a direct

appeal does not lie from the denial of a motion to modify a sentence filed outside the

statutory time period unless the motion raises a colorable claim that the sentence is,

in fact, void. Frazier, 302 Ga. App. at 348.

February 06, 2019
Pretermitting whether the trial court made an incorrect statement at the

sentencing hearing, “[a]n oral declaration as to what the sentence shall be is not the

sentence of the court; the sentence signed by the judge is.” Young v. State, 328 Ga.

App. 91, 92 (761 SE2d 504) (2014) (punctuation omitted); see also Bell v. State, 294

Ga. 5, 8-9 (2) (749 SE2d 672) (2013) (“It is the sentence signed by the judge, not his

oral declaration, that is the sentence of the court.”). Here, the written sentence of

fifteen years in confinement for the armed robberies is within the statutory range of

punishment. OCGA § 16-8-41 (b). Because Davis’s sentence is not void, the trial

court’s denial of his motion is not subject to direct appeal. Accordingly, this appeal

is hereby DISMISSED. 

 

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

02/06/2019
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Home                 > Browse by Title > The Migratory Labor Problem in Delaware

              																	United States. Women's Bureau					 and 	Sutherland, Arthur T. (Arthur Theodore). 						*The Migratory Labor Problem in Delaware : Women's Bureau Bulletin, No. 185*,												Washington: 								Govt. Print. Off., 										1941,									https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/5458,			accessed on September 25, 2024.						    

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Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 December 14, 2016

Order 

Clerk

December 14, 2016

154776(51)

VANESSA OZIMEK, Plaintiff-Appellant, SC: 154776

v COA: 331726

Wayne CC: 13-109046-DC

LEE J. RODGERS, Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the joint motion of the Michigan Coalition of 

Family Law Appellate Attorneys and the Legal Services Association of Michigan to file a 

brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on December 7, 2016, is 

accepted for filing.
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Home                 > Browse by Title > Conditions in the Millinery Industry in the United States

              																	United States. Women's Bureau					 and 	Nienburg, Bertha M., 1890-. 						*Conditions in the Millinery Industry in the United States : Women's Bureau Bulletin, No. 169*,												Washington: 								Govt. Print. Off., 										1939,									https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/5442,			accessed on September 25, 2024.						    

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THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-22-00211-CV

Chris Holt

v.

Kim Grigg

On Appeal from the

117th District Court of Nueces County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2020-DCV-4566-B

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal 

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion. Each party shall bear their own costs 

relating to this appeal.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

February 2, 2023
#### Kralik v. Kaeslin

*William M. Kahanowitz,*and *R. Herbert*Buchman, for plaintiffs.

*Smith, Best & Horn,*for defendants.

November 18, 1958.

Keim, J.,

This matter is before the court on preliminary objections filed by defendant to plaintiffs’ complaint in the above entitled case on the ground that the complaint violates rule 1044(a) of the Westmoreland County Rules of Civil Procedures.

The complaint contains two counts, the first being a suit by the wife plaintiff, Ann M. Kralik v. William Kaeslin, trading and doing business as Winters Beauty Salon, and the second count, a suit by the husband plaintiff, Edward B. Kralik v. William Kaeslin, trading and doing business as Winters Beauty Salon. Each of the counts provide in the ad damnum clause as follows, “demands judgment against the defendant in a sum in excess of five thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars.”

The first paragraph of the complaint in trespass provides as follows: “And now, to wit, this 28th day of June 1958, comes ANN M. KRALIK and EDWARD B. KRALIK, plaintiffs herein, by their attorneys, WM. M. KAHANOWITZ and R. H. BUCHMAN, and claim of the defendant, WILLIAM KAESLIN, trading and doing business as WINTERS BEAUTY SALON, *286sums in excess of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars, upon a cause of action whereof the following is a complaint” :

It appears that plaintiff totaled the sum in each count, and erroneously used the figure “in excess of ten thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars” instead of the sums in excess of $5,000 as provided by Westmoreland County Rule of Civil Procedure 1044(a). In other words, each of the ad damnum clauses complies with the rule, but plaintiff erred in totaling the sums in the first paragraph or general description of the matters before the court in their complaint in trespass.

Rule 1044(a), Westmoreland County Rules of Civil Procedure, provide as follows: “The ad damnum clause in any pleading in trespass shall state whether the damages are more or less than Five Thousand ($5,-000.00) Dollars, and if the sum claimed is Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars, the complaint shall so state.”

To permit plaintiff to state any sum or sums in the introductory paragraph contrary to those permitted in the ad damnum clause, would be permitting plaintiff to violate the very purpose of and reasoning for this particular rule.

We are of the opinion that the preliminary objection is with merit, and must be sustained, for the reason that a portion of the complaint defeats the purpose of rule 1044(a). We do not believe this complaint should be stricken, but that it should be amended accordingly.

*Order*

And now, November 18, 1958, after argument and after due and careful consideration, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the preliminary objections be and the same are herewith sustained, and counsel for plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint in conformance with this opinion, and upon failure to do so within 20 days from the date of the filing of this opinion, judgment shall be entered for defendant.
§ 2550.407d-6 Definition of the term “employee stock ownership plan”. ( a ) *In general* — ( 1 ) *Type of plan.* To be an “ESOP” (employee stock ownership plan), a plan described in section 407(d)(6)(A) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (the Act) must meet the requirements of this section. See section 407(d)(6)(B).
( 2 ) *Designation as ESOP.* To be an ESOP, a plan must be formally designated as such in the plan document.
( 3 ) *Retroactive amendment.* A plan meets the requirements of this section as of the date that it is designated as an ESOP if it is amended retroactively to meet, and in fact does meet, such requirements at any of the following times: ( i ) 12 months after the date on which the plan is designated as an ESOP;
( ii ) 90 days after a determination letter is issued with respect to the qualification of the plan as an ESOP under this section, but only if the determination is requested by the date in paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section; or
( iii ) A later date approved by the Internal Revenue Service district director.
( 4 ) *Addition to other plan.* An ESOP may form a portion of a plan the balance of which includes a qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan which is not an ESOP. A reference to an ESOP includes an ESOP that forms a portion of another plan.
( 5 ) *Conversion of existing plan to an ESOP.* If an existing pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan is converted into an ESOP, the requirements of section 404 of the Act, relating to fiduciary duties, and section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code), relating to requirements for plans established for the exclusive benefit of employees, apply to such conversion. A conversion may constitute a termination of an existing plan. For definition of a termination, see the regulations under section 411(d)(3) of the Code and section 4041(f) of the Act.
( 6 ) *Certain arrangements barred* —(i) *Buy-sell agreements.* An arrangement involving an ESOP that creates a put option must not provide for the issuance of put options other than as provided under § 2550.408b-3 (j), (k) and (l). Also, an ESOP must not otherwise obligate itself to acquire securities from a particular security holder at an indefinite time determined upon the happening of an event such as the death of the holder.
( b ) *Plan designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities.* A plan constitutes an ESOP only if the plan specifically states that it is designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities. Thus, a stock bonus plan or a money purchase pension plan constituting an ESOP may invest part of its assets in other than qualifying employer securities. Such plan will be treated the same as other stock bonus plans or money purchase pension plans qualified under section 401(a) of the Code with respect to those investments.
( c ) *Regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury.* A plan constitutes an ESOP for a plan year only if it meets such other requirements as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe by regulation under section 4975(e)(7) of the Code. (See 26 CFR 54.4975-11).
[42 FR 44388, Sept. 2, 1977]
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 153 (Tuesday, August 9, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48840-48841]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-20048]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[ Project No. 739-000]


Appalachian Power Company; Notice of Authorization for Continued 
Project Operation

    On June 29 2009, The Appalachian Power Company, licensee for the 
Claytor Hydroelectric Project, filed an

[[Page 48841]]

Application for a New License pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA) 
and the Commission's regulations thereunder. The Claytor Hydroelectric 
Project is located on the New River in Pulaski County, Virginia.
    The license for Project No. 739 was issued for a period ending June 
30, 2011. Section 15(a)(1) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 808(a)(1), requires 
the Commission, at the expiration of a license term, to issue from 
year-to-year an annual license to the then licensee under the terms and 
conditions of the prior license until a new license is issued, or the 
project is otherwise disposed of as provided in section 15 or any other 
applicable section of the FPA. If the project's prior license waived 
the applicability of section 15 of the FPA, then, based on section 9(b) 
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 558(c), and as set forth 
at 18 CFR 16.21(a), if the licensee of such project has filed an 
application for a subsequent license, the licensee may continue to 
operate the project in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
license after the minor or minor part license expires, until the 
Commission acts on its application. If the licensee of such a project 
has not filed an application for a subsequent license, then it may be 
required, pursuant to 18 CFR 16.21(b), to continue project operations 
until the Commission issues someone else a license for the project or 
otherwise orders disposition of the project.
    If the project is subject to section 15 of the FPA, notice is 
hereby given that an annual license for Project No. 739 is issued to 
the Appalachian Power Company for a period effective July 1, 2011 
through June 30, 2012, or until the issuance of a new license for the 
project or other disposition under the FPA, whichever comes first. If 
issuance of a new license (or other disposition) does not take place on 
or before June 30, 2012, notice is hereby given that, pursuant to 18 
CFR 16.18(c), an annual license under section 15(a)(1) of the FPA is 
renewed automatically without further order or notice by the 
Commission, unless the Commission orders otherwise.
    If the project is not subject to section 15 of the FPA, notice is 
hereby given that the Appalachian Power Company is authorized to 
continue operation of the Claytor Hydroelectric Project, until such 
time as the Commission acts on its application for a subsequent 
license.

    Dated: July 29, 2011.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-20048 Filed 8-8-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
**EXHIBIT32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

**Bysigning below, each of the undersigned officers hereby certifies pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that (i) this report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934 and (ii) the information contained in this report fairly represents, inall material aspects, the financial condition and results of operations ofLiberty Homes, Inc.**

 

** **

**Signedthis 30th day of March, 2004.**

 

** **
| **/s/ Edward J. Hussey**  |   | **/s/ Marc A. Dosmann**       |
|---------------------------|--------|-------------------------------|
| **Edward J. Hussey, CEO** |   | **Marc A. Dosmann, VP - CFO** |

 

 

**Thiswritten statement is being furnished to the Security and Exchange Commission asan exhibit to this report.  A signedoriginal of this written statement has been provided to and retained by LibertyHomes, Inc. and will be furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission orits staff upon request.**

** **

**1**

----
§ 5.31 Meeting wage determination obligations. ( a ) A contractor or subcontractor performing work subject to a Davis-Bacon wage determination may discharge their minimum wage obligations for the payment of both straight time wages and fringe benefits by paying in cash, making payments or incurring costs for “bona fide” fringe benefits of the types listed in the applicable wage determination or otherwise found prevailing by the Secretary of Labor, or by a combination thereof.
( b ) A contractor or subcontractor may discharge their obligations for the payment of the basic hourly rates and the fringe benefits where both are contained in a wage determination applicable to their laborers or mechanics in the following ways: ( 1 ) By paying not less than the basic hourly rate to the laborers or mechanics and by making contributions for “bona fide” fringe benefits in a total amount not less than the total of the fringe benefits required by the wage determination. For example, the obligations for “Laborer: common or general” in § 5.30, figure 1 to paragraph (c), will be met by the payment of a straight time hourly rate of not less than $21.93 and by contributions of not less than a total of $6.27 an hour for “bona fide” fringe benefits; or
( 2 ) By paying in cash directly to laborers or mechanics for the basic hourly rate and by making an additional cash payment in lieu of the required benefits. For example, where an employer does not make payments or incur costs for fringe benefits, they would meet their obligations for “Laborer: common or general” in § 5.30, figure 1 to paragraph (c), by paying directly to the laborers a straight time hourly rate of not less than $28.60 ($21.93 basic hourly rate plus $6.27 for fringe benefits); or
( 3 ) As stated in paragraph (a) of this section, the contractor or subcontractor may discharge their minimum wage obligations for the payment of straight time wages and fringe benefits by a combination of the methods illustrated in paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section. Thus, for example, their obligations for “Laborer: common or general” may be met by an hourly rate, partly in cash and partly in payments or costs for fringe benefits which total not less than $28.60 ($21.93 basic hourly rate plus $6.27 for fringe benefits).
[88 FR 57746, Aug. 23, 2023]