### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ma y 6, 200 4 S es sio n


### JU DY KES TERSO N v. BRUCE VAR NER
Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Williamson County No. II-26072 Russ Heldman, Chancellor

No. M2003- 00743-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Janu ary 27, 2005

Br uce V arne r see ks review of the trial c ourt’s dismissal of his Petit ion to Modify Custody

. The trial court dismissed the petition at t he close of the petitioner’ s proof, holding that petitioner had f ailed to car ry his burden of pr oof that a c hang e of c ustody was in the be st interest of the child. The trial
c ou rt a sse sse d atto rn e y ’s fe e s a ndc os ts t o th e pe tit ion e r. We af fi rm the de c isi on of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed and Rem anded

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined.
Penny Har ring ton, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, B ruce Varner.
P. Edward Sche ll, Fra nklin, Tennessee , for the a ppellee, Judy

Kester son.
OP IN ION

Father, B ruce Varner, a nd Mother, JudyVarner (now Kesterson), were divorced in Pulaski Cou nty , A rk a ns a s in Se pte mbe r of 19 90

. Th e div or c e de c re e a wa rd e d M oth e r c us tod y

of the on ly child born to the marria g e, J .V., a male child born on April 5, 1988. The Ar kansas divorc e dec ree was domesticated in Wil liamson County , Tenne ssee by consent order of September 16, 1999. The order provided for

a modi fication of custody , but the m odification of custody did not affe ct Mother’ s status as primary

custodian.

On J anuary

11, 2002, Father filed his “ Petition for Chang e of Custody ” in the Chanc ery Court for Williamson C ounty

asserting that a chang e of circ umstances had occur red since the entry

of the divorce decr ee and that a chang e of c ustody was in the c hild’s best interest. The petiti on alleg ed that sin c e the div or c e de c re e J.V. ha d exhib ite d seriou s men ta l and e mot ion a l pro ble ms ev ide nc e d b y his diag nosis in 1993, when he wa s five y ear s old, of Attention Defic it Hypera ctivity Disorder ; that at the time of the filing of the pe tition J .V. was suf fering f rom Bipolar Di s o rd er and Oppositional De fi a nt D iso rd e r; a ndthat J.V . h a d b e e n h os pit a lize d s e ve ra l ti me s fo r t re a tme nt o f m e nta l pr ob le ms, ha d b e e n u na

ble to a dju st t o sch oo l di sc ipl ine , andha d s e ve re hu ma n r e la tio ns pr ob le ms b othwi th his pe e rs a ndwi th a

uth ority fi g ur e s.-2-

On Fe bruary

15, 2002, Mother answe red the Petition for Chang e of Custody admitting the serious mental problems aff licting J .V., but de ny ing that any chang e of circ umstances ha d occur red and further de ny ing that a cha ng e of c ustody would be in the best intere st of J .V.

On June 11 , 2 00 2, Fath er fi le d a mot ion fo r a

pp oin tme nt o f g ua

rd ia n a d li te m a sse rt ing in pa rt :
13. A Guar dian ad litem wo uldbe able to r e vie w r e c or ds ,

talk to psy chiatrists and psy cholog ists and school personnel fo r t he sole purpose of

discovering what is the be s t i n t ere st of the subject child and without any

conce rn on the pa

rt of medica l or educ ational pe rs o n n e l t h a t t h e i r r e m ark s o r r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s m i g h t b e u s e d to
a dv a nc e the int e re sts of

a pa re nt r a the r tha n th e c hil d an d, thu s, wo uld be able to m ake a

re po rt to the Cou rt

that w a s b a se d u po n f

ull di s cl o s u re o f t h e r ec o rd s , d i agn o s i s , trea tments, and rec ommendations of pr of e ssi on a ls. 14. Statements in Mothe r’s deposition r evea l that she has contin u i ng bitterness towar d Father a bout matters re lating to the divorce and that s h e an d step-father may have a lifesty le pre dicated in part on the $1,300 pe r month child support paid by Father. 15. For

the af oreme nti o n ed re asons, Petitioner/Father pray s that this Honorable Court will g rant h i s Motion for the appointment of a Guardian ad litem for [J .V.] in this cause, a nd that the Guar dian ad litem be instructed to obtain information conce rning [J.V. ]’s plan o f t

re a tme nt andthe app ro pria te faci lit ie s a va ila ble in Mother’s c ommunityand in Fat h er’s communityincluding the educational o p p o rtunities provided by the local sc hool boards for a child with [ J .V.]’s situation. 16

. Pe tit ion e r/

F a the r f urthe r p ra

y s that a ll c os ts i n connec tion with thi s cause , including attorney fee s and Gua

rdian ad litem fe e s, be ta xedto M oth e r fo r the ne c e ssi ty of ha vin g to f

ile thi s p le a d in g to p r o te c t th e in te r e s t o f h is mi n o r

s o n , [J. V

. ].

Re sp on din g to this pe tit ion the c ou rt e nte re d a n o rd e r o n Jun e 20 , 2 00 2 te mpo ra ri ly postponing the a

ppointment of a Gua

rdian ad litem b u ts t at i n g:
The Court i s inclined to g rant the Motion for the appointment of a g uardia n ad litem based i n p art upon the assuranc es of the Petitioner’s counsel that the Petitioner will bear r esponsibilityfor the pay ment of a g uardia n ad litem’s fe e. Specifi cally , counsel for Mr. Varner indicated that her c lient would be willing to pay a g uardia n ad litem’s fee as l ong as t he fee did not exceed $2,500. I n the eve nt the Cou rt app oin ts a

g ua rd ia n a d li te m, M r. Va

rn e r w ill be re quir e d to pay the g uardia n ad litem up to $2,500, and, at the a ppropriate time,-3- the Court w ill conside r whether pay ment of the g uardia n ad l i tem’s fe e sh ou ld b e app ortio ne d b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.

B y or de r of July 26 , 2 00 2, R. R e id S tr e e t w a s a pp oin te d w ith ins truc tio ns fr om the c ou rt to “obtain informat ion conce rning the plan of tre atment for [J .V.]’s psy chiatric condition. Such information shall include the a ppropriate fac iliti es available in the petitioner’s community and in the responde nt’s community , particula rly the edu ca t i onal opportunities provided by the local sc hool boards f or a c hild with [ J .V.]’s situation.”
Non-jury trial was he ld Febr

u ar y 1 0 an d Fe bruary

13, 2003 on the issues draw n by the pleading s, “upon the testimony of witnesses, the r eport of the g uardian ad litem , Ro g e r Re id S tr e e t, Jr., the e vid e nti ary

de po sit ion s f

ile d b y the pa rt ie s, the argum ents of

c ou ns e l a ndthe re c or d a s a wh ole .” Th e c ou rt

he ld i n p e rt ine nt p art :
2. Th e Pe tit ion e r, B ru c e Va rn er, fa ile d to pr ov e that a substantial and material chang e in circ umstances ha s occur red w hich is sufficient to war

rant a chang e of c ustody

in this case. 3. The Petitioner, Br uce Varner, f

ailed to prove that the b e s ti n t e r e s t s o f

t h e c h i l d r e q u i r e a

c h a n g e o f

c u s t o d y. 4. Th e Cou rt fi nd s tha t th e be st i nte re st o f the c hil d require that he continue to be under the ab s olute car e, custody and control of the Re spondent, J u d y Kester son, and that there is no
c re dib le e vid e nc e in the re c or d to su pport a find ing that Ms

. Ke ste rs on ’s pa

re nti ng sk ill s h a ve con tr ibute d to the pr ob le ms experience d by

the minor child, J ason Va rner

. 5. The Petition to chang e custody is dismi ssed. 6. The Responde nt, J udy Kester son, is grante d a jud g me nt a g a ins t the P etiti on e r, B ru c e Va rn e r, fo r r e a so na

ble attorney ’s fe es she incurre d in this matter in the amount of $25,160. The Court appr oves and a dopts the Affida vit f or Attorney ’s Fe es filed by Re sp on de nt’ s c ou ns e l. 7. The Petitioner, Bruce Varner, is order ed to pay all of t h e G u ar d i an ad litem’s fee in the amount of $7,975.50. The c ourt
app ro ve s a nda do pts the Af fi da vit fi le d b y Mr . St re e t.

Th is o rd e r w a s e nte re d o n F e br ua ry 19 , 2 00 3 a ndF a the r f

ile d a tim e ly app e a l.

The issues stated on a

ppeal by Father a re:
Whe the r the Tri a l Co urt e rr e d in g ranti ng Ap pe lle e ’s Mo tio n to Dismiss at the conclusion of the Appellant’s case when th e s t ated ba sis fo r th e di sm iss a l w a s a “ be st i nte re sts of

the c hil d” a na ly sis althoug h the Court had not made f indings of f

act a s to the exis tence of a material c hang e in circ umstance.-4- W hether the Trial Court er

red by failing to make finding s of fa ct underlying the custody determination a s require d by Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 36- 6-101.

Whether the Trial Court err ed by failing to order the implementation of a Pare nti ng Pla n p ur su a nt t o § 36 -6 -[4 01 ] an d b y faili ng to consider the require ments of a Par enting Plan pursuant to § 36-6-404.

Whe the r the Tria l Court er re d by faili ng to f

inda ma te ri a l c ha ng e in
c ir c ums t a n c e h a s o c c u rr e d w h e n a c h i l d i s d i a g n o s e d b y

m u l t i p le psy chiat ri s ts and psy cholog ists as suffering f rom a major me ntal ill n e s s a n d r e q u ir e s lo n g te r m h o s p it a li za ti o n a n d tr e a tm e n t a nd tr e a tin g ps y c ho log is t te sti fi e s th a t c hil d c ou ld i mpr ov e wi th Ap pe lla nt.

Wheth e r a T r ia l Co u r t may o r d e r a p ar ty to li ti g a ti o n to p a y the
a tto rn e y fe e s a nd cos ts of

the op po sin g lit ig a nt w ith ou t sp e c if ic statutory authorization for the orde r.
Whether a Trial Court may order a party

to liti g ation to pay

the entire fee s and costs of a

Guar dian ad litem appointed by ag ree ment of the parties a nd without the o pportunity for a hearing on the submitt ed
a f f i d a v i to r o n t h e r e l a t i v e ab i l i t y o f

t h e p ar t i e s t o p a y. Whether the lang uag e of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36 -6 -1 01 a s it exis ted at the time of f

ilin g o f t he Petition is controlling or whe ther the lang uag e of the amende d statute in ef fe ct at t he time of the h ea ri n g i s co n tro l l i n g.
A. Change of

Circum stances
At trial, Mother asserted the applicability of the rule in Mu sse lm an v . A c uff , 826 S.W .2d 920 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991) and W all v . W all , 907 S.W .2d 829 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995) that in order to e ffe ct a chang e of c ircumstance s the non-custodial pa rent must show that “c ontinuation of the adjudicated custody will substantiallyharm the c hild.” W all , 907 S.W .2d at 834. Father asserted that Chapter 859 of the Public Ac ts of 2002, eff ective J uly 15, 2002, and codified as Tenn. Code An n

. § 3 6 -6- 1 0 1 (a) (2)( B) alters the Mu sse lm an /W all rule in that by

the terms of the statute “a materia l ch an ge of circ umstance doe s not require a showing of a substantial risk of ha rm to the child.”

As we a d d re ssed these issues in deta il quite rece ntly in Laurie Ann Searcy v. Sandy Lee S e a r cy , No. M2003-00036-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 2866973 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 13, 2004), w e re ite rate the a na ly sis :
Whil e thi s modification of custodyand visitation Petit ion was

makin g its way

thr ou g h th e tr ia l c ou rt , th e sta nd ardto b e applie d in-5- determining whe ther or not a chang e of circ umstances ha d occur red
wa s u nd e rg oin g bo th a co mmo n law a nd a statut ory me ta mor ph os is,
a s Kendrick v . Shoemake , 90 S.W .3d 566 (Tenn. 2002) , Cranston v. Combs , 106 S.W .3d 641 (Tenn. 2003) , and the leg islative enac tment of C h ap t e r 8 5 9 o f t h e P u b l i c A c t s o f

2 0 0 2 w e r e ru n n i n g e s s e n t i a lly sim ult a ne ou s a ndpa

ra lle l c ou rs e s wi th the tr ia l c ou rt pr oc e e din g s in thi s c a se . T he tr ia l cour t app lie d a va ri a tio n o f the “ su bs ta nti a l r isk of harm” standar d in its November 20, 2002 dismissal of this P etition for modification. W e will discu s s the metamorphosis of the r ule at the ou tse t. Ap pe llate de c isi on s in re c e nt y e ars re fl e c t mu c h c on tr ov e rs y as to what “ chang e of c ircumstance s” mea ns in the context of a petition to modi fy an ex isting custodyorder . Whil e ther e has ne ver been any question but that the burden of proof in such a

proce eding
re sts up on theno n- c us tod ia l pa re nt t o p ro ve that a

c ha ng e in circ umstances ha s occur

red, the controve rsy

cente rs ar ound what one must prove in order

to establish a cha ng e of c ircumstance s. I n Dailey v. Dailey , 635 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1981) this Court observe d:

W e agre e that it is a we ll- se ttl e d p ri nc ipl e in this jurisdi cti o n t h at where a n awa rd of c ustody

of a minor is ma de which has no restric tions or limitations it will support a p l ea of re s ju dic ata a n d t o j u s t i f y a petition for a chang e in custody there must have be en such a c hang e in c ircumstance s as will directly aff ect the welf are of the minor.

I n 1991, howeve r, this Court held:
The pa ramount consider ation in a custody proce eding is the best interest of the child. When the issue befor e the Court is whether to modify a prior custody

order , it need not repe at the compar ative fitness ana ly sis that is appropriate at the time of the orig inal custody deg ree

. See e .g., Bah v. Bah , 668 S.W .2d 663 (Tenn.A pp. 1983). I nstead, in a modification p ro ce ed i n g, t h e tri al j u d ge m u s tfi n d a m at er i al ch an ge in circumstanc es that is c ompelling enoug h to warr ant the dramatic reme dy of chang ed custody

. See , Tenn. Cod e An n. § 3 6- 6- 10 1( a ); W oo da rd v . W oo da rd , 783 S.W. 2d 18 8 ( Te nn .A pp . 1 98 9) ; Dailey v . Dailey , 635 S.W .2d 391 (Tenn.A pp. 1981). Moreove r, the burde n-6- is on the non-custodi al pare nt to prove cha ng ed
c ir c ums ta nc e s.

Mu sse lm an v . A c uff

, 826 S.W .2d 920, 922 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991).

There afte r, in a number of ca ses, this Court has followed the lead of Mu sse lm an v . A c uff in establ i s h i n g that chang e of
c ir c ums ta nc e s requ ir e s p ro of that su c h a

c ha ng e is n e c e ssa

ry to preve nt substantial harm to the child.

I n o rd e r t o b e c omp e lli ng e no ug h to wa rr a nt the dr a ma tic
reme dy of cha ng ed custody , the cha ng e of c ircumstance s must be
su c h th a t “ c on tin uatio n of the a dju dic a te d c us tod y

wi ll s ub sta nti a lly harm the c hild.” W

all v. W all , 907 S.W .2d 829, 834 (Tenn.A pp. 1995). W hen the reque sted modification is based on the behavior of the custodial par ent, such be havior must clearly posit or cause dang er to the mental or em otional well-being of the c hild. Musselman v

. Ac uff , at 924. We a lso a

re mindful that c ustody decisions should not be desig ned to punish one par ent or to rew ard the other. W all v . W all , 907 S.W .2d 829, 834 (Tenn.A pp. 1995). I nstead, our paramount
conce rn re mains the welfa re a nd best interest of the minor child. In re Parsons , 914 S.W .2d 889, 893 (Tenn.A pp. 1995).

Th is c ou rt ha s dis c us se d “ c ha ng e d c ir c ums ta nc e s” a s f oll ow s: This decision [reg arding cus t ody ] i s not
c ha ng e able exce pt f

or “ c ha ng e of

c ir c ums ta nc e s” wh ich is defin e d a s th a t w hic h r e qu ir e s a c ha ng e to preve nt substantial harm to the child. Custody is not chang ed for

the welfa re or pleasure of either

pare nt or to punish either parent, but to preser ve the we lfare of the child. Custody

is not c hang ed bec ause one pare nt is able to furnish a mor e commodio us or pleasa nt environment than the other, but where continuation of the adjudica ted custody

will substantiallyharm the child.

W all v . W all , 907 S.W .2d 829, 834 (Tenn.A pp. 1995).

T homson v. Thomson , N o

. 0 3 A 0 1

- 9 8 0 9

- C H

- 0 0 3 0 8 , 1 9 9 9 WL 894446, at *8 (Te nn.Ct.App. Oct. 18, 1999).

This same ana ly sis was app l i ed by this Court i n Brown v. Br own , No

. 02A01-9709-CV- 00228, 1998 WL 760935, at *8 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 2, 1998) . This c ourt said: “I n the abse nce of any competent testimony

t h at a continuation of the curr ent custody-7- arr ang ement pre sents a dang er of substantial harm to Chandler, w e decl ine to disturb the trial court’ s decision to deny a chang e of
c us tod y .” Th e re a ft e r, the Cou rt sa id i n f oo tno te : The principle enunciated in W all v . W all , s up ra , is not at odds with the traditional “be st interests” test. Ping- pong custody adjudications ar e not in a c h i l d ’s best interests. This problem ha s b e e n a d d r e s s e d w i t h u n a n i m i t y b y Aaby, Musse lman , and Contreras , a s w e l l a s b y W

all

. Aaby , a

pa re nta l r e loc a tio n c a se , s pe c if ic a lly he ld that “Te nnessee allows custody to be chang ed if the behavior of the
cus to dia l pa

re nt clearly posits a danger to the phy sical, mental or
e mot ion a l w e ll -bei ng of

the c hil d [c itatio n o mit te d].” [Emp ha sis supplied]. Aaby v . Strange , 9 2 4 S.W .2d 623, 629 (Tenn. 1966)

. Musselman , ci t i n g Ba lla rd v . B all ar d , 434 So. 2d13 57 , 1 36 0 ( Mis s. 1983), held: “It is only that behavior of a pa rent whic h c le ar ly po sit

s or causes dange r

to the mental or emotional well-be ing of a child . . . which is sufficie nt basis to seriously consider the drastic leg al ac tion of cha ng ing c ustody .” [Emphasis su p p lie d]. Mu sse lm an v . A c uff , 826 S.W .2d 920, 924 (Tenn.A pp. 1991). Contreras , q u o t i n g Sartoph v. Sartoph , 31 Md.App. 58, 354 A.2d 467, 473 (Md.App. 1976), stated:

“ Th e c us tod y

of c hil dr e n sh ou ld no t be dis tur be d u nle ss the re is s ome strong rea son aff

e c tin g the we lfa re of t

he c hil d

. T o j u s t i fya c h an ge in c us tod y , th ec h an g e in c on dit ion s must have oc curred wh ic h a ff e c ts t h e we l fa re of the child and no t th at o f th e pa re nts

. ” [E m p h a s is supplied]. Con tre ra s v . W ar d , 8 3 1 S.W .2d 288, 290 (Tenn.A pp. 1991). These case s are all in acc o rd wit h the lang uag e of W all v. W all , s up ra , t h at, once a valid custody determination is m ade, suc h custody is not subj ec t to chang e unless ther e is a “ chang e of circ umstances . . . whic h require s a cha ng e to pre vent su b s t anti al h arm to t he child.” W

all v . W all , 9 0 7 S. W. 2 d 8 2 9 , 8 3 4 ( Tenn.App. 1995). “In sho rt, when a ll goe s well with children, stability , not
c h a n g e , is in th e ir b e s t in te r e s ts.” Con tre ra s v . W ar d, su pr a , citing Sartoph v. Sartoph

.
Br own , 1998 WL

760935, at *8 n.3.

I n Richardson v. Richardson , No. W2000-02374-COA-R3- CV, 2001 WL

687074, (Tenn.Ct.App. June 1 4 , 2001), the Western Section of this Court ag ain followed the Musselman and W all ru le relative to substant i al harm to the child. I n a prophe tic concur ring opi n i o n, J udg e F arme r questioned the c ontinued viabilityof the Mu sse lm an -W

all st an d ard a sserting that: “I am conc erne d that we have c reated too harsh a

standard by

holding that a chang e of c ustody will be g rante d on ly upon a s h owing that a continuation of the-8- a dju dic a te d cu sto dy

wi ll su bs tan tia lly ha rm the child.” Richardson , 2001 WL 687074, at *7 (F arme r, J., concurring ).

I n 2002, the supremecourt, in Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 137 (Tenn. 2002) , in the contex t of a c ustody case betwee n a par ent and a non- pare nt, observed: “[A] trial court should a pply the standar d ty pic a lly app lie d inpa

re nt- vs -p a

re nt m od if

ic a tio n c a se s: that a
ma te ri a l c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s h a s o c c ur re d, wh ic h ma

ke s a chang e in custody in the child’s best interests.” Bl air , 77 S.W .3d at 148.

L a te r i n 2 00 2, th e su pr e me c ou rt e xpa nd e d u po n it s Bl air observation in Kendrick v . Shoemake , 90 S.W .3d 566 (Tenn. 2002) , h o l d i n g: The princ ipal issue in this case con cerns the proper standard to be applied to a pe tition t o m odify
c us tod y fr om on e pa

re nt to the oth e r pa

rent. Th is iss ue is l arg e ly

re so lve d b y

ou r r e c e nt d e c isi onin Blair v

. B a denhope , 77 S.W .3d 137 (Tenn. 2002)

. Bl air involved a custody dispute betwee n a par ent and a non-pa rent. We c oncluded that once a valid orde r of
cu s t ody has bee n issued, subsequent custody modification proce eding s should apply the “standa

rd typically applied in par ent-vs-pa rent modification
case s: that a materia l chang e in cir cu mstances ha s occur red, w hich make s a chang e in custody in the child’s best intere sts.” Id. a t 14 8. As e xpla ine d in Bl air , the “thre shold issue” is w hether a m aterial chang e in circ umstances has occur red after the initial custody determination. Id. at 150. While “[t ]here ar e no hard and fast rules for de termining when a child’s
c ir c ums ta nc e s h a ve c ha ng e d s uf fi c ie ntl y to w arr a nt a
c h a n g e o f h is o r h e r c u s to d y , ” th e f

o ll o w in g f

a c tors have formed a sound basis for de termining whether a materia l chang e in circ umstances ha s occur red: the chang e “ha s o cc u rred afte r the e ntry of the orde r soug ht to be modified,” t h e ch ange “ is not one that was known or

rea sonably

anticipated w hen the or der
was e n tere d,” and the chang e “is one that aff ects the child’s well-bei n g in a meaning ful way .” Id. (c itatio ns omi tte d) . We no te that a pa re nt’ s c ha ng e in
c i r c u m s t a n c e s m a y b e a m a t e r i a l c h a n g e in circ umstances f

or the purpose s of modify ing c ustody i f s u ch a c h an ge a ff

ec t s t h e c h i l d ’s we l l -b ei n g.-9- Kendrick , 90 S.W .3d at 570.
Finally , in 2003, the s upreme court laid to re st any linge ring doubt a bout the demise of the Mu sse lm an -W all rule. In Cranston v. Combs , 1 06 S.W. 3d64 1 ( Te nn 20 03 ) that c ou rt he ld:
We g rante d r e vie w t o d e te rm ine wh e the r the Cou rt of Ap p e a ls
err ed in determining that the a ppellant (fat h er) in this post -divorce
case failed to pre sent evidenc e of a materia l chang e of circ umstances justify ing a

chang e of c ustody

of the pa rties’ two minor childre n. The Chance llor g rante d a chan ge in custody from the a

ppellee ( mother) afte r finding that there was a materia l chang e in circ umstances that prese nted a substantial risk of harm to the c hildren. A majority of the C o u rt o f A p p ea l s re v er s ed , h o l d i n g t h at t h er e wa s n o m at er i al ch an ge of c i rcumstanc es that pre sented a threat of substantial harm to the children. A fter r eviewing the rec ord and apply ing our rec ent dec ision in Kendrick v . Shoemake , 90 S.W .3d 566 (Tenn. 2002) , we c onclude that a materi al chang e of c ircumstance s occur red a fter the initial custody determination and that the m odification of custody was in the best interest of the children. Although the Chance llor and the Court of Appea ls did not ha ve the benef it o f Kendrick

in this case, and the re fo re app lie d an in c orr e c t le g a l st a nd ard , w e a ff ir m th e re su lt
rea ched by

the C h an cery

Court. Accor dingly , the judg ment of the Court of Appea ls is reve rsed, and the judg ment of the Chanc ery Court is reinstated.

. . . .
A m aj o ri ty

of the Court of Appe als reve rsed the Cha ncery Court’s chang e of c ustody ruling , concluding that C ra n s ton and Combs “bickering ” ove r visitation did not consti tute a material
c ha ng e of c ir c ums ta nc e s that pr e se nte d a thr e a t of su bs ta nti a l ha rm to the c hil dr e n. I nd e e d, the ma jority de te rm ine d th at Co mbs f a ile d to pre sent evidenc e “rising to the leve l of substantial harm” to his son and “no a c tu a l e v id e n c e o f a n y h ar m a t a ll ” to h is d a u g h te r

. The
m a j o r i t y t h e r e f

o r e c o n c l u d e d t h ati tw a s u n n e c e s s ar y t o ap p l y a comparat i v e fitness analy sis. Special J udg e Ash dissented, concluding that the Chancery Court properly

found that a material chang e in circu m s t an ce s ex i s t ed an d p ro p er l y ap p l i ed t h e c o m p arative fi tne ss ana ly sis

.
Cranston , 106 S.W .3d at 642, 643.
So it was that, in Cranston v. Combs , the controlling issue was place d direc tly

befor e the supreme c ourt contra sting the Musselman--10- W all ru l e , a s r e l i e d o n b y

t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h i s C o u r t , w i t h t h e l e ss stringe nt rule asse rted in dissent by Special Judge D on Ash.

Th e su pr e me c ou rt

le ft lit tle do ub t a s to th e c on tr oll ing ru le relative to “cha ng e of c ircumstance s.”

The a ppellant, Combs, a

rg ues that a finding of “harm” is not a p r e r e q u is it e to c h a n g in g a n in it ia l c u s to d y d e te r mi n a ti o n under Tenne ssee law . The a

ppellant also arg ues that eve n if a finding of “harm” is require d, the Chance ry Court’s cust o d ydetermination should be reinstated beca

use it found a “substantial risk of ha rm” a nd conclude d that a chang e of c ustody was in the be st i n t er es t s of the children.

The a ppellee, Cranst o n , argue s that the trial cour t must find “harm” bef

ore e ng ag in g i n a compa rative f itness analy sis for the pu rp os e of

a c ha ng e in cu sto dy de te rm inatio n. Th e app e lle e a sse rt s that the Court of Appeal s’ majority corr ectly determined that there had bee n no evidenc e of a material chang e in circumstances c reating a risk of ha

rm to the children and reve rsed th e Chanc ery Court’s
ru l i n g.
Our re cent de cision in Kendrick v. Shoemake , 90 S.W .3d 566 (T e nn. 20 02 ), re so lve s th e iss ue s b e fo re thi s Co urt. We he ld i n Kendrick that the modification of a valid order o f custodymust be based on the “ ‘standa rd ty pically applied in par ent-vs-pa rent modification ca ses: that a mater ial cha n ge in circ umstances ha s oc c ur re d, wh ic h ma

kes a c ha ng e in c us tod y

in the c hil d’ s b e st interests.’ ” Id

. at 5 7 0 (q u o t i n g Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 137, 148 (Tenn. 2002) ).

W e c l ar i f i e d t h a t t h i s s t a n d ar d r e q u i r e s t h e tr i a l c o u rtto eng ag e in a two-step proce ss to make its final custody determination. F ir st, the c ou rt

mus t de te rm in e whe the r a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in circ umstances ha s o cc urre d afte r the initial custody determination. Although the re a

re no bright- line rules for determining whe n such a chang e has oc curr ed, ther e ar e s ev er al rele vant consider ations: (1) wh e the r a c ha ng e ha s o c c ur

re d a ft e r the e ntry of

the or de r s ou g ht t o be mod if ie d; ( 2) wh e the r a

c ha ng e was no t know n o r r e a so na bly
a nti c ipate d whe n th e or de r w a s e nte re d; and(3 ) w he the r a c ha ng e is
o n e t h a ta f

f e c t s t h e c h i l d ’ s w e l l

- b e i n g i n a m e a n i n g f

u l w a y. Kendrick , 9 0 S. W.3 d at 57 0; se e als o B lai r , 77 S.W .3d at 150.
Second, af

ter finding that a materia l c hang e in circ umstances has occ urre d, the trial court must determine whether modification of-11- c us tod y is i n th e c hil d’ s b e st i nte re sts us ing the fa c tor s e nu me rate d in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 36-6-106 (2001).

Cranston , 106 S.W .3d at 643-44.
Running a

para llel course t o th e eve nts in Kendrick, Cranston , and the c ase at ba

r was a leg islative initiative that culminated in the
enac tment of Chapter 859 of the Public Acts of 2002 ef fec tive as of J uly 15 , 2002. This Act was not e ffe ctive as of the J une 26, 2002 hearing in the c ase at bar. It was, howev er, effe ctive prior to the dispositi ve Or der of

the trial court of Novembe r 20, 2002.

Kendrick and Cr a n s ton b oth acknowle dg ed this leg islative act, which was c odified as Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 36-6- 101(a) (2)( B) . I n footnote, it is observed in Cranston :

As the parties have note d, the leg islature has
enac ted Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 36-6- 10 1( a )( 2) (B ) ( 20 01 & Sup p. 20 02 ), wh ic h p ro vid e s:

I f the issue be fore the court i s a m odification of the court’s p ri or dec ree perta ining to custody or a re sid e nti a l pa

re nti ng arr a ng e me nt, the pe tit ion e r mus t prove by a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e a material chang e in circ ums t an ce. A material change of

c irc um sta nc e do e s n ot re qu ire a sh owi ng of a sub stantial risk of harm to the child. A material chang e of c ircumstance may include, but is not li mi te d to , f

a il u r e s to a d h e r e to th e p ar e n ti n g plan or circ umstances whic h make the pa renting p l an no lon g e r i n th e be st i nte re st o f the c hil d. (E mph a sis added)

. Although the statute did not become e ffe ctive un t i l J uly 15, 2002, i.e. , afte r the proc eeding s in this case, it ref lects that the leg islature has likewise c larified that a substantial risk of harm to a child is not require d to find a material chang e in circ umstances for t he purpose of modify ing a

custody decr ee. See Ke ndrick , 90 S.W .3d at 57 0 n. 5 (discussing the enactment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101( a)( 2)(B )).

Cranston , 106 S.W .3d at 644 n.1.
Thus, both by

common law deve lo p m en t and by leg islative
enac tment, Mu sselman v. A c uff , W all v . W all , a nda ll o f the ir respe ctive prog eny

as to this issue have bee n overr uled.-12-

Laur ie Ann Searcyv. Sandy Lee Searcy , No. M2003-00036-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 2866973, **1-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 13, 2004).

B. Stand ard of Review of Involu ntary Dism issal Und er Te nn. R. Civ. P. 41.02.

The trial c ourt dismissed this petition at the close of petitioner’ s proof on the g rounds that Father ha d shown no rig ht to relief

. I n arg ument befor e that court Fathe r asse rted, “ y ou must take [the te sti mon y

be fo re the c ou rt ] i n the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to the pe tit ion e r o n th e mot ion to d ism iss at the conc lusion of the plaintiff’s proof .”

Th e ru le pr ov ide s:

Af te r the plaint if

f, in an a c tio n trie d b y

the cou rt wi tho ut a jury , has complete d the pre sentation of plaintiff’ s evi d ence, the defe ndant, without waiving the rig ht to offe r evidence in the event the motion is not gr anted, may move for dismissal on the g round that upon the fa cts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to re lief. Th e c ourt sh a ll r e se rv e ru lin g un til a ll p art ie s a lle g ing fa ult a g a ins t any other pa rty h ave presente d their re spective pr oof-in-c hief. The court a s trier of the fac ts may then determine t h em an d rende r judgme nt ag ainst the plaintiff or may decline to rende r any judgme nt until the close of all evide nce; in the e vent j udg ment is render ed at the
c los e of plaint if f’ s e vid e nc e, th e c ou rt

sh a ll m ake fi nd ing s o f f

a c t if reque sted in writing w ithin three (3) day s afte r t he announc ement of the court’s decision.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2).

S h o rt ly afte r adoption of the T ennesse e Rules of Civil Procedure , this Court assessed the sta nd ardapp lic able to a

ru lin g on a

mot ion to d ism iss a t th e c on c lus ion of the plaint if

f’ s p ro of :

We are of the opinion , h o we ver, that in passing upon the motion of defendant t o d i s miss at the conclusion of complaina nt’s proof, the c hance llor is not relieve d of the duty of looking to a ll of the evidenc e and of taking the strong est leg itimate view of it in favor of the opponent of the motion, allowing all rea sonable infere nces f rom it in his favor

.
Bu tts v . B ird

we ll , 503 S.W .2d 930, 937 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1973).
This interpretation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4 1

. 02(2) in Bu tts v . B ird we ll was re pudiated by

the Tenne ssee Supre me Court in City of Col umbia v. C.F.W . Const. C o. , 557 S.W .2d 734 (Tenn. 1977)

. Th e mot ion a uth orize d b y thi s rule is no t to be c on fu se d w ith a motion for d i rec ted ver dict which is authorized by Rule 50,-13- Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure

. Motions for a dire cted ve rdict
are neither nece ssary nor proper i n a case which is being tried without a jury

. Motions for dismiss al in non-jury case s under Rule 41.-02( 2), Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re , a ndmot ion s f o r d i r e c t e d v e rd ic ts in jury case s under Rule 50, Tenne ssee Rul es of Civil Procedure , are somewhat similar, but , there is a fundame ntal differ ence betwee n the tw o mo tio ns , in that, i n th e jury c a se , the jud g e is n ot the tr ie r o f f a c ts wh ile in the no n-

jury c a se he is the tr ie r o f the fa c ts. I n th e jury c a se he must consider the evidenc e mos t favor ably for the plaintiff, allow
a ll r e a so na

ble inference s in plaint if f’ s f a vo r anddis re g arda ll counter acting evidenc e, an d , s o considere d, if there is any materia l evidenc e to support a ve rdict for plaintiff, he must deny the motion. Bu t in the non-jury

case , when a

motion to di smiss i s made at the
c los e of plaint if f’s case un de r R ule 41 .0 2( 2) , th e tr ia l ju dg e mus t impartially

weig h and eva luate the e vidence in the same manne r as though he were making finding s of fa ct at the c onclusion of all of the evidenc e for both pa

rties, determine the fac ts of the case , apply t he law to those fa cts, and if the plaintiff’s case has not be en made out by
a pr e po nd e ranc e of

the e vid e nc e , a

jud g me nt ma y be re nd e re d a g a ins t the plaintiff on the merits, or, the trial ju d ge, in his discretion, may decline to r ender

judgme nt until t he close of al l t he evide nce. T he
a c tio n s ho uldbe dis mis sed i f o n th e fa c ts f ou nda ndthe app lic able law the plaintiff ha s shown no rig ht to relief.
City of Col umbia v. C.F.W . Const. C o. , 557 S.W .2d at 740.

C. Stand ard of Review as to the F acts

No rm a lly , r e vie w o f the fa c ts o n a pp e a l of a no n- jury c a se is g ov e rn e d by Te nn . R. App . P. 13(d). The finding s of fa ct of the tria l court ar e p re s u m ed to be cor rec t unless the evidenc e preponde rate s otherwise. See Ber r y Hi l l v. Rhode s , 2 1 S. W.3 d 1 88 , 1 90 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; se e als o Farrar v. Farrar , 553 S.W .2d 741, 743 (Tenn. 1977) . I n case s such as the ca se at ba r whe re the trial
c ou rt ha s ma de no fi nd ing s o f f a c t, r e vie w o f the fa c ts i s de n ovo o n t h e re co rd before the court without any

presumption of cor

rec tness. Brooks v. Brook s , 982 S.W .2d 403, 404 (Tenn. 1999) . The
rea son for such rule is “ since the tria l court made no finding s of fa ct, there is nothing in this recor d upon which the pr esumption of corr ectne ss c ontained in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) can attach.” Ke lly
v . Ke lly , 679 S.W .2d 458, 460 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1984).

D. The Pe titioner’ s Burden

The burde n of proof

is on the petitioner to establish that a material chang e of circumstanc es h as o cc u rr ed ; t hat he or she is compar atively

more fit than the pa

rty with custody

under the
c ha lle ng e d c us tod y

de c re e ; and that it wo uld be in the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st f or the mov ing pa

rt y to become the custodial par ent. See Hoalcraft v. Smithson , 19 S.W .3d 822, 830 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). The re levant conside rations i n determining whe ther or not a chang e of c ircumstance s has occ urre d-14-

are : (1) whe ther a

chang e has oc curr ed af

ter the e ntry

of the orde r soug ht to be modified; (2) whe ther
a c h an ge w as k n o wn o r r ea s o n ab l y an t i ci p at ed wh en t h e or d er wa s en t er ed ; an d (3 ) w h et h era c h an ge i s o n e t h at affec ts the child’s well-be ing in a meaning ful way

. Kendrick , 9 0 S. W. 3 d a t 5 7 0, Cranston , 1 06 S.W. 3da t 64 4; se e als o Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 137, 150 (Tenn. 2002)

. After the orig inal custod y d ec re e wa s entere d in this case, the c hild was diag nosed in the ensuing y ear s to be suffe ring from Attention De fi ci t Hy pera ctive Disorde r, Oppositional Def iant Disorder , Depr essive Disorde r and Bipolar Disorder . No evidenc e in the re cord indicates that at the time of the orig inal custody decr ee e ith er o f t h e p arties we re a war e of a ny potential for the developm e n t o f th e s e s e r io u s me n ta l p r o b le ms

. T h e b e h a v io r o f J. V

. , e xh ib it e d in s c h o o l a nd oth e rw ise , a nde sta

bli sh e d b y

the e xpe rt

te sti mon y

to b e c on sis tent

wi th h is m e nta l di so rd e rs , obviouslyaff

ects the c hild’s well-being in a meaning ful way

. The preponde ranc e of the e vidence clea rly establishes a c hang e of c i rc u m s t ance since the e ntry of the orig inal custody

decr ee. T he determinative question is whether or not Petitioner Br uce Varne r has established by a pre pondera nce of the e vidence that a chang e of c ustody is in the best interest of J.V.

At the outset of the he aring Petitioner called R. Reid Street, c o u rt -appointed g uardia n ad lit e m, a s a

wi tne ss. Th e re c or d d isc los e s:

T H E C O U R T : I t m i g h t b e g o o d f o r t h e C o u rt to a sk this preliminarily

. Ms. Har ring ton, do y ou have any

objection to the Guar di an-Ad-Litem report be ing a dmitted into evidence a s an e vid e nti ary

ite m? MS. HARRI NGTON : No, I do not. I n fac t - - TH E CO UR T: Mr . Sc he ll? MR. SC HELL : No, objection. TH E CO UR T: B e mark e d a s E xh ibi t N o. 1. An d I wi ll le t the c le rk

re c ov e r i t f

ro m th e fi le a ndthat w ill be mark e d a s E xhibi t No. 1 for e vidence

. The re cord r efle cts that the thoroug hness and c ompleteness of the report of the g uardia n ad litem did not go unnoticed by the parties or the court.
Q. Did y ou try t o follow the cour se of tre atment that [J .V.] followed beg inning in the f all of 2001? A. What I

di d , I g ot all the rec ords - - the rec ords wer e provided to me by

y ou, Ms. Harrington, a nd Mr. Schell. And I pa rt ic ipated in so me of

the de po sit ion s. An d th e n I ob ta ine d s ome rec ords on my

own from the pr esent phy sician that he ha s. And since

- - y ou want me to g o throug h the treatment, w hat’s take n place since fall of 2001? Q. I thi nk y ou ’r e be ing ve ry

he lpf ul t o th e Cou rt

. A. Well myreport - - Q. I t would save us a little time? A. My

re po rt de ta ils that in the his tory

a ndI wi ll h a ve to
re fe r t o it

.-15- THE C OURT: You m ay . I t is a very g ood report, very thoroug h, Mr. Street. The Court is very please d with y our work.

Th e re po rt

of the g ua rd ia n a d li te m pr ov ide s, in p art : Following the di vorce , Ms. Kester son (Varner) was re marrie d on J anuary

12, 1990, to Dr. Robert Ke sterson and Mr . Varner w as rema rried on F ebrua

ry 24, 1990, to L aura Varner. Ms. Kesterson ha s had continuous custody

of [J .V.] since her r emar riage with the
e xce pti on of

a thr e e (3 ) m on th peri od fr om D e c e mbe r, 20 00 , to Marc h, 2001, when [J .V.] l i v ed wi th Mr. Varner in Chicag o. [J .V.] was ini ti a ll y d ia g n o s e d a s A D H D in 1 9 9 3

. Si n c e th a t ti me h e has bee n t re ated by

a number

of phy sicians, psy cholog ists and psy ch i atrists. During the period of time from 1993 to 1998 [J .V.]
c on tin ue d to ha ve pr ob le ms at sc ho ol andat home , a nddu ri ng thi s period of time va

rious medications wer e used with Rit alin being the most prevalent. During this pe riod of time f rom 1993 to 1998, there
we re periods of summer visitation with Mr. Varne r and pe riods of Christmas visi tation; however , no spring brea k visitation i s ever exercised by Mr. Varner. I n the fall of 1998, [J .V.] beg an attending Gr a ssl a ndMid dle Sc ho ol andhe be g a n e nc ou nte ri ng pr ob le ms w hil e at the school. Until Christmas 2000, [J .V.] wa s involved in a number of instance s of i n ap propriate behavior which cr eate d signific ant problems. During this period of time [J .V.] wa s under the treatment of Dr. V edavy ara

B. B iliy ar, M.D. and it was whi l e under the tr e a tme nt o f D r. B ili y ar that he su g g e ste d [J.V .] g o to liv e wi th h is fathe r f or a pe ri od of

tim e . T he pa

rt ie s d isc us se d th e situatio n a ndit
wa s a g re e d th a t in De c e mbe r, 20 00 , [J.V .] w ou ld l ive in C hic a g o w ith his fathe r. Whil e liv ing in C hic a g o [J.V .] ma de on e (1 ) v isi t to Fr anklin af

t er which he ( [J .V.]) acc used his step-father, Robert Kester son, of abusing him after r eturning to Chicag o. [J .V.] remained in Chicag o until spring brea k 2001, when he returne d to Fra nklin for
a vis it. F oll ow ing thi s v isi t Ms. K e ste rs on re fu se d to a llo w [J.V .] to return to C h i ca go

. I t was her position and opinion t hat [J .V.]’s
c on dit ion ha d d e te ri or a te d wh ile in Chi c a g o a nd that it wa s in his be st int e re st t o r e ma in i n T e nn e sse e . D uring the pe ri odof tim e Ap ri l to Se pte mbe r, 20 01 , [J.V .] li ve d w ith his mothe r andste p- fathe r b ut h is cond it io n ap p ar e n tl y

c o n ti n u e d to g o d o w n h il l u n ti l l a te Se p te mber wh e n M s. Ke ste rs on a dmi tte d [J.V .] to Va nd e rb ilt Psy c hiatr ic Ho sp ita l. I mme diate ly prior to thi s a dmi ssi on [J.V. ] h a d be e n s e nt t o the Will iamson County Alternative L earning Center. F urther, [J .V.] had bee n threatening his br other and acc ording to Ms. Ke sterson wa s do ing oth e r “ biza

rr e thi ng s. ” Whi le in Va nd e rb ilt Psy c hiatr ic Ho sp i t a l [J

. V

. ] w a s tr e a t e d b y D r

. C h ar l e s C o r b i n w h o g a v e h im a dia g no sis of : ( 1) B ipo lar D iso rd e r, Ma nic ; ( 2) At tent ion De fi c it-16- Hy pera cti vity

Disorder , and, (3) Oppositional Defiant Disorde r. Also, Dr. Corbin noted that [J .V.] was “continuously manipulative, impulsi ve and dif

ficult to guide and tre at.” Dr . Corbin further
rec ommended a long -term r esidential treatment ce nter. How ever , afte r his rele ase from Vande rbilt Psy chiatric Hospital [J .V.] was sent back to the Wil liamson County schools’ Alternative L earning Ce nter wher e he r emained for approximately the next three (3) wee ks. [J .V.] continued to have problems at the AL C and it was re commended that he re ceive inpatient hospitaliz at ion at Tenne ssee Christian Medica l Center ( TCMC). TCMC was c hosen appa rently beca use Dr. B iliy ar w a s th e me d ic a l d ir e c tor

. D r

. B il iy ar p r e v io u s ly

h a d g iv e n [J. V

. ] a diag nosis of: (1) Atten tion Deficit Hy pera ctive Disorde r; (2) Oppositional Defiant Dis o rd er -M i l d ; an d , (3 ) D ep re s s i v e Disorder not otherwise spe cified. A fter a one (1) wee k stay

at TCMC, [ J .V.] was transfe rre d to Peninsula Village T reatment Center in L ouisvill e, Te nn e sse e for app ro xima te ly nin e (9 ) w e e ks . Wh ile a t Pe nin su la Villag e [J .V.] was g iven a d iag nosis of:(1) B ipolar Disorde r - Not Ot h e r w is e Sp e c if

ie d , M o s t R e c e n t P h a s e M ixe d ; ( 2 ) O p p o s it iona l De fi a n tD i s o r d e r , a n d , ( 3 ) R u l e o u tP ar e n t / C h i l d R e l a t i o n s h ip P ro b l em s

. I t s u b s eq u en t l y wa s d et er m i n ed b y t h e P en i n s u l a V i l l age sta ff that thi s fa c ili ty wa s no t a n app ro pria te pla c e for in div idu a ls with problems such as [J .V.]s. Ac cording ly , Ms. Kesterson a nd her h u s b a n d b e g a n s e ar c h i n g f o r a n o t h e r f a c i l i t y. The De vere ux Florida

Treatment Fac ilityin Viera , Florida was de termined to be a n appropriate plac ement an d [ J .V.] was transfe rre d to that fac ilityon J anuar y 12, 2002. [J .V.]’s diag nosis at the tim e of

a dmi ssi on wa s: ( 1) Dy sth y mia ; ( 2) At te nti on De fi c it Hy pera ctivity

Disorder , Combined Type; (3) O ppositional Defiant Disorder , and, (4) Ruleout Psy chiatric D is o r d e r N O S. [J .V.] remained at this facility

until May

31, 2002, when he wa s d i s charg ed with a discharg e diag nosis sim ilar to the admitting dia g nosis. Also, at the time of dischar g e [J .V.] was on two (2) medic ations, R italin and Tag amet, and he was discharg ed to the ca re of Ms. Kesterson. U pon his return t o T ennesse e [J .V.] was ref err ed to Youth Villag es for followup counseling following his inpatient treatment. [J .V.] beg an his freshman y ear

at Fr anklin Hig h School in August, 2002, a nd has now completed his fir st semester at Fra nklin. Further , s i n ce J une, 2002, [J .V.] has been unde r the tre atment of Dr . Gilbert Raulst on, M.D. Dr. Raulston initially stated that [J .V.] met the criteri a f or ADHD - Combined Ty

pe as well as Oppositional Def iant Disorder

. I n J u n e, 2 0 0 2 , he stated that he was a “bit retice nt” to make a dia g no sis of

B ipo lar D iso rd e r, ho we ve r, on Oc tob e r 2 8, 20 02 , it appea rs from his tre atment notes that a diag nosis of Bipolar Disorder - Mix ed wa s made.-17-

Review of the rec ord and the depositions of all of the e x pert medic al witnesses e stablishes that the g uardia n ad litem has succ inctly and ac curately portray ed the history of a ve ry brig ht y oung man with serious mental proble ms. Both B ruce Varner a nd his present wife, L aura Varner, on the one side, a nd J udy

Kester son and her husband, Dr. Robert Kester son on the other f eel strong ly

that they provide the be st hope for the future of J .V. The recor d, howeve r, i s replete with evidence that
a ve ry int e lli g e nt c hil d is ma nip ulativ e to the e xtre me a ndwi ll res ort t o p ra c tic a lly a nythi ng to
a c c omp lis h h is d e sir e s. Dr. James Guy

Wellborn, a pract i ci n g clinical psy cholog ist in W illiamson C ounty , beg an working with J .V. on J une 20, 2001, there afte r m eeting with both J .V. and the K esterson f amily and by telephone w ith Mr. Varne r. When counsel f or Mr. Va

rner venture d an obser vation that the Kester sons were simply“worn out” with the child, Dr. Wellborn re sponded:

Wha t I wo uldsa y

abo ut [J.V .] is it i s d if fi c ult fo r m e to ima g ine a pa re nt w ho wo uldno t be exhaus te d by thi s kid r e g ard le ss o f t h ei r v i ew ab o u t fe i s t i n es s b ei n g a d es i ra b l e t h i n g o r h i gh en er gy or that ki ndof

bu sin e ss in the e xpe ri e nc e that I ’v e ha d w ith him bo th i n t h e s c h o o l s e t t i n g a n d i n d i v i d u a l l y a n d w i t h t h e f a m i l y.
Dr. Wellborn furthe r testified on c ross-examination:

Q. I n y our treatment of [J .V.], did y ou find him to be manipulative? A. Ye s. Q. Con fr on ta tio na l? A. He’ s remar

kably succe ssful in it be ca use he’ s very brig ht and so . . . Q. Di d y ou g e t th e imp ression that he wa s p la y ing his pare nts off of one ag ainst eac h other? A. Ye s. Q. Meaning Mr. Varner a nd Ms. Kesterson. A. Everyb o dy . He play ed eve ry body . He play ed the Ke ste rs on s o ff

e a c h oth er. He play e d h is m om andste pd a d a g a ins t his dad and stepmom. He play ed the tea cher s. Oh, y eah, this is like - - this is e xpe c ta

ble ; th a t’ s n ot u nu su a l. Q. And when it was r eporte d to y ou that [J .V.]’s behavior in Illi no is w a s e sse nti a lly the s ame a s it

wa s w he n h e wa s h e re , d id that su rp ri se y ou to h e ar that? A. Oh, no. Q. Would y ou have been surprised if it were otherwise? A. Ye s. I t w ou ld have be e n u ne xpe c te d g ive n my diag nosis, and g iven my own understanding in my mind about what I considere d to be g oing on, it would have surprised me.-18-

Dr. Vedavy asa Biliy ar, a treating psy chiatrist for J .V., defined his behavior in terms similar to Dr. Wellborn.
Q. [J .V.] tends to be verba l l yag g ressive in y our

experience ? A. Well, periodically . Ag ain, he c an be very swee t too. He’ s a master

manipulator. Q. Th a t wa s my ne xt q ue sti on

. Do e s he te nd to
ma nip ulate situatio ns ? A. (Moves he ad up and dow n.) Q. An d is it y ou r i mpres sio n th e n th a t he te nd s to manipulate both his mother and his father, Mr. V arne r? A. Ye s. Q. Does he tend to tell eac h of t hem what he thinks they want to hea

r? A. Cor

re c t. Or wh a t he wa nts ou t of the m, w hat he wa nts them to think at that tim e. Q. Yo u f

ou ndhim to b e a y ou ng man wh o te nd s to exagg erate? A. Ve ry

dr a ma tic . T hat’ s why I pu t hi m in the his tr ion ic p e r s o n a l i t y. Q. And sometimes his ex ag g erations are to the p oint of untruths, in y our opinion? A. Ye s, y e s. Q. I s it po ssi ble to te ll whe the r som e of [J.V. ]’s pr ob le ms are g e ne tic a s o pp os e d to le arn ing be ha vio rs ? A. Ye s, y e s. Q. Can y ou tell us what of his problems y ou believe a re g enetic? A. The impulsivity- - y ou know, ac tually b ip o la r d is order is a g e n e ti c d is o r d e r

. B u t I r e me mb e r d a d s a y in g th a t h e ’ s just like [J .V.], therefor e, I

believe that he had AD HD. B ut I reme mber mother saying that she was hy pera ctive too. He possibly g ets it from both sides, the impulse control pro b l em

. Now, the bipolar , I don’t kn ow , th e e mot ion a l in te ns ity , I do n’ t kn ow wh e re he g ot i t f ro m. Q. I s [J .V.] the k i n d of child who tends to nee d more supervision and g uidance than y our ave rag e child? A. Oh , y e s.
When J .V. entered P en i n s ula Villag e Tre atment Fa cility on November

9, 2001, he wa s treated by Dr. Gr eg ory

Gass, staff

psy chiatrist. Dr. G ass testified:
Q. Can y ou g ive me some spec ific examples of beha vior
or c on du c t on [J.V. ]’s pa

rt that w a s th ou g ht t o b e ina pp ro pria te wh ile he wa s there?-19- A. Okay . He wa s quite demanding

. I can’ t r emember a specific what it was he wanted, but I do reme mber that ther e we re some - - I ’m pretty sure there we re some phy sical re straints that had t o d o wi t h s i m p l y

h i s n o t u n d er s t an d i n g t h at at a c er t ai n t i m e t h i n gs d o n ’ th ap p e n o r

t h a tyo u c a n n o ta l w a ys h a v e yo u r w a y. I know at the time, we ha d a smaller unit that we had to m ov e a g ro up of

patie nts that w e re ina

pp ro pria te fo r t

re a tme nt i nto
- - a s they wer e disrupting the unit so b ad l y wi t h things like tempe r ta ntr ums , a ndI

kn ow [J.V. ] te nd e d to do that. He wa s h a vin g qu ite
a fe w t a ntr ums

. Q. Did [J .V.]’s behavior im p ro v e at all while he w as at yo u r f a c i l i t y? A. No. Actua lly , it f

luctuated. With the confrontational sty le we ha ve wi th simp ly try ing to und e rs ta nd that th e re are ru le s to life and c onsequenc es with rules, he would g et very frustrated. When he ca me in, he rea lly wasn’t de monstrating any fluctuation in mood state. And I was questioning the diag nosis from the beg inning, of the bipolar disorder. I t was more ba sed on historical
re po rt s a ndthe tr a ns fe r d ia g no sis

.

So, I had initiated some medication tape rs, and the Z ypr e xa sp e c if

ic a lly is a n a nti -p sy c ho tic a g e nt th at is use d a lso in bip ola r dis or de r fo r moo d s ta

bil iza tio n. Whe n I

a tte mpt e d to tape r h is Z ypr e xa, we saw a re a l de te ri or a tio n in [J.V. ]. H e no t on ly wo uld become easie r just to reac t to the environment and be frustrated, but his interpretation of it was not quite acc urate

.

I re me mbe r s pe c if

ic a lly him po int ing ou t th a t th e re st of the world was misperce iving it, he was the only o n e t h at was corr ect. Those are n’t his exact words, but that was his per ception,
wa s that we we re a ll m ist ake n a ndhewa s th e on ly on e c or re c t in his i n t e rp r e t a t i o n o f

r e a l i t y. Q. So, if I un de rs ta nd y ou r te sti mon y c or re c tly , h is l e ng th of stay the re a t Peni ns ula Vi lla g e wa s n ot, or wa s it , a ty pic a l le ng th of stay ; is that c or

re c t? A. No, it was an aty

pical. We are a long -term tre atment fac ili ty

. O u r

p a ti e n ts a v e r a g e e ig h t m o n th s h e r e

. A f u ll c o u r s e of treatment is more like a y ear , as it has to do wi th simpl y behavior s a n d p e r s o n a l i t y.
[J .V.] demonstrated some thoug ht disorders. He wasn’t willing to attac h to other people . His - - An d wh en y ou look at the
su pp le me nta l tes tin g , he wa s org a nize d at a ps y c ho tic le ve l in te rm s of the way

he interpr eted the w orld. He was functioning totally - - not totally , but he was f

unct i oning primarily

with an interna l world as op po se d to re a c tin g fr om c ue s in his e nv ir on me nt.-20- We can’ t treat a

patient l i k e that her e. Ac tually , our confr ontational sty le could potentially make a patient like that worse

. And when w e rec og nize we are dealing with that, w e g ener ally ref er to a more tra ditional psy chiatric setting that works more with thought dis or de rs a ndc a n g ive mor e ind ivi du a lize d a tr e a tme nt a s o pp os e d to
we do mor e of

a g ro up tr e a tme nt.

On Janu ary

22 , 2 00 2, J.V. wa s tr a ns ferred from Pe nin su la Vi lla g e Re sid e nti a l Psy c hiatr ic Fa cility to the Children’s Service s Center at Deve reux, Viera. A t this facility he wa s treate d by

Dr. Manal S oliman, chief psy chiatrist for Children’s S ervic es. The testimony of Dr. Soliman deviate s very littl e from the testimony of the other profe ssionals. I n response to a question by the g uardia n a d l i t e mh e s e tf

o r t h w h a tap p e ar s t o b e t h e c o n tr o l l i n g p r o b l e mr e l a t i v e t o c u s t o d y. Q. I f [J.V .]’ s c us tod y wa s c ha ng e d f

ro m his mothe r t o h is f a th e r a n d h e w e n t to Ch ic a g o to li v e , ar e y o u s a y in g that when he had disag ree ments wit h h i s natura l father and his stepmother, he would start idealizing his mother a nd stepfathe r in Tenne ssee? A. I thin k th a t w ou ld h app e n w he re ve r h e liv e d. He c ou ld have a disag ree ment with either set of parents wher ever he lived and, he w o u ldth e n id e a li ze th e s e t o f p ar e n ts th a t h e w a s n ’ t d is a g r e eing with at the moment. He isn’t a malicious person, but the norma l - - this norma l pitting of one pa rent a g ainst another during this phase of de ve lop me nt is exag g e rate d w he n th e pa re nts are ph y sic a lly

no t a ble to b e in the sa me c ommun ity

. Th a t’ s w hy it r e a lly - - it w ou ld b e in [J .V.]’s best interest for the pare nts to talk to one another more

. Q. When y ou wer e involved in this c ase, did y ou find that the pa re nts did n’ t ta lk t o e a c h o the r r e g ard ing [J.V. ]’s be st i nte re sts or just didn’t talk to each othe r? A. I found that they

wer e very

reluc t an t to talk to each other. The y

avoided ha ving any

conjoint, that is simult aneous se ssi on s, wh e rethe y woul d a ll b e pr e se nt t og e the r. An d th a t is beca use they ’re human being s and they wer e ang ry at o n e a nother. I t’ s u nf a ir , I be lie ve , to e xpe c t the m to be ta lki ng to o ne a no the r w ith [J .V.] unless they can first resolve their own issues with eac h other, and that may

mean just ag ree ing to talk to eac h other re g ularly on the phone.

As a petitioner seeking the chang e of custody , Br uce V arne r’s major dif

ficulty is the burden of proof to the best interest c onsideration. He ag ree s that J .V. is an extraordinarily difficult child. When the p ar ents ag ree d for J.V. to go to Chicag o and try living with his father

this behavior continued. J.V. was suspended from Hadley Middle School f or disruptive behavior

. The c ontinuing behavior and suspension do nothing to bear the burde n of proof

. The g uardia n ad litem made a car eful investig ation of al l of the parties in this case in the
c ou rs e of wh ic h h e un de rt oo k a

tr ip t o Ch ic a g o a ndthe Gl e n- El lyn su bu rb of Chi c a g o to inv e sti g a te-21-

school conditions, housing a nd neig hborhood conditi ons around the home of Br uce Varne r. During the cour se of the g uardia n’s testimony , the trial court inquired as to w hether or not he ha d formulated an opinion as to which pa rent should assume the primary pare nting r ole.

THE COURT: My ori gi n al question is y es or no; do y ou have an opinion on that issue? THE WI TNESS: Yes, I have an opinion. T H E CO U RT : Al l r ig h t. D o th e a tt o r n ey s have any ob je c tio n to the Cour t a sk ing the Gu ard ia n- Ad -Lite m w hat hi s op ini on is o n th a t qu e sti on a lon e ? Mr . Sc he ll? MR. SC HELL : No objection. THE COURT: Ms. Harrington? MS. HARRI NGTON : No objection. T H E C O U R T : Al l rig ht, t h e n I ’ mg o i n g t o a sk thi s Gu ard ia n- Ad -Lite m w hat y ou r o pin ion is. THE WI TNESS: Ba sed on what I ’v e s ee n

. Ba sed on what I ’ve studied, it would be my opinion that [ J .V.] should s tay here

. And that’s base d on th e fact that he is doing be tter in school now. Ba sed on the fact that I fee l Ms. Kester son addre sses the issues - - ha s be e n a dd re ssi ng the iss ue s o f the me dic a l pr ob le ms that [ J .V.] ha s. An d I do n’ t th ink

Mr . [V arn e r] f

ull y a dd re sse d t ho se is su e s o r t ru ly
came to the conclusion there wer e medica l p ro b l ems until very
r e c e n t l y. THE COURT: So in order to g et a dire ct answe r, the direc t answer

is the mother? THE WI TNESS: The mother, y es, sir.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fa c e d a ve ry dif fi c ult de c isi on inv olv ing a

ve ry dif fi c ult c hil d. Th e me nta l, ps y c ho log ic a l a nde mot ion a l pr ob le ms of thi s ve ry g if te d c hil d de fy a de qu a te so lut ion

. B othpa re nts
are g e nu ine ly int e re ste d in J.V. a nd in the ir dif fe ri ng way s e a c h s e e ks to d o w hat is in the c hil d’ s b e st interest. The preponde ranc e of the evidenc e supports the de cision of t h e trial judg e in leaving custody with the mother. Mr. Va

rner has simply

failed to c arry his burden of proof to esta blish that his care for J.V. as primary residential pare nt w ould w ork any more for the best interest of J.V. than leaving primary

residential c ustody

with Mrs. Kester son.

Mr. Varner c omplains of t he allowance by the t rial court of attorney ’s fe es for Mrs. Kester son and further in ta x ing the g uardia n ad litem f ee entirely to Mr

. Varner. Under Tenne ssee Co de Annotated § 36- 5-103(c ) the a war d of attorne y ’s fees is in the discretion of the trial court. Sherrod
v . W ix , 8 49 S.W. 2d78 0 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp . 199 2) . T he a llo wa nc e , a s w e ll, of g ua rd ia n a d li te m f

e e s is discretionary

with the trial court. Te nn. R. Civ. P . 54.04. Mr. Varner a rg ues that he did not re ceive “a r easona

ble opportunity

to prepa re his de fense s and objections” befor e the court assessed the GAL fee s and opposing counsel’s attorney fee s ag ainst him. For Au t h ority , the Mr. Va rner relies upon the fo llo wi ng dis c us sio n f ro m Oster v. Yat es :-22- Emplo y e r n e xt i ns ist s th a t it sh ou ld n ot h a ve be e n ta xedwi th employ ee' s trial prepa

ration expenses, consisting of $84.00 for the costs of transc ribing Dr. Allen' s deposition, $35.00 f or a c opy of the
em p l o y ee 's d i s co v er y

d ep o s i t i o n , $ 1 0

. 0 0 fo r aco p y o f D r. Al l en 's medical r ecor ds and $2.69 for a copy of the fir st injury

report from the Depa rtment of L abor.

Te nn . R. Civ . P. 54 .0 4( 2) pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: (2 ) A p art y

wh o d e sir e s to re c ov e r d isc re tio na ry c os ts or any rec overa ble costs not included in t h e b ill of
cos ts pr e pa

re d b y the c le rk

of the tr ia l c ou rt

sh a ll move the court to assess discretionary costs and attac h the r e to a n it e mi ze d a n d v e r if ie d b il l o f c o s ts

. The
a ff i d a v i t s h a l l b e m a d e b y t h e p ar t y o r h i s d uly authorized attorney

or age nt having knowledg e of the fa c ts, cert if

y ing that su c h it e ms o f c os ts a re a c c ur a te and we re r easona

ble and ne cessa

ry to prepa ration and trial of the c ase a nd that the servic es for whi ch such fee s have been char g ed wer e actua lly perf ormed. The mot ion sh a ll b e fi le d a s a

po st t ri a l mo tio n p ur su a nt t o Rule 59.01.

The rule was cited with appr oval in Lock v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of PA, 809 S.W .2d 483 (Tenn.1991) , in which ca se a post trial motion was filed in strict c ompliance with Rule 59.01, as r equire d. I n t h e p re s en tca s e, at t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e h ea ri n g, em p l o y ee 's attor n e y o r a ll y mo v e d to h a v e d is c r e ti o n ar y c o s ts ta xe d a g a in s t the empl o y er . No af

fidavits wer e filed a nd no hearing r elative to the
rea sonablene ss or nece ssity of the claimed expenses was h el d

. The matter wa s not treated a s a post trial motion. I n short, employ er w as not give n a re asonable opportunity to prepa re a nd prese nt its defenses and o b j ections to the motion. Under these circ umstances, we are persua ded that the a llowance of discre tionary costs was a n abuse of discretion.

Os te r, a D iv . o

f Su nb e am Cor

p. v . Yate s, 845 S.W .2d 215, 217 (Tenn.1992)

.
Oster invol v e d a

w o rk e r ’ s c o mp e n s a ti o n c laim in w h ic h th e p lain ti f

f, a t th e c lo s e o f

the hearing ma de an or al motion for discre tionary costs without accompa ny ing a ffidavits. I n this respec t the ca se is distinguishable on its fac ts from the ca se at ba r. Mr. Va rner reque sted the appointment of t he guar dian ad litem. The court in its order disposing of the motion put Mr. Varner on notice of the possibilit y

of paying the entirety of those fee s. The tra nscript re veals the f ollowing a dditional
e xch a ng e re g ard ing the e ntry of Mr . Stre e t’ s f

e e a ff ida vit :-23- TH E CO UR T: With th at r e g a r d , M r

. S t re e t, I ’l l e xcu se y ou from the r est of the pr ocee di n gs

. I f something comes up requiring y our coming back, w e’ll let y ou know. [MR

. STREET] : I prepa red an aff idavit of my time and
e xpe ns e s. THE COURT: Any objection to it being submitted? MR. SCH EL

L : No , s ir , I ’v e se e n it

. MS. HA RRING TO N: No , s ir , I ’v e se e n it

. THE COURT: All rig ht it will be Exhibi t 2.

The a lbeit unusual form of e ntry did not prohibit counsel form interposing an objec tion as to the admissibili ty

or propriety

of the e x hibit, or attempting to re serve the rig ht to cross-examine the witness at a dif

fer ent point in the proce eding s. From a re v i ew of the g uardia n’s re port and testimonythe fe es cha

rg ed we re quite r easona

ble.

As for the attorney ’s fe es, Mr. Sche l l l ikewise pre pare d an af fidavit of fe es and e x penses which the tria l court requested in making its ruling . Contrary to his assertion in his brief, the re cord
reve als no eff

ort made on the part of Mr. Varner to obje ct to those fee s, or bring any challeng e to the trial court a lleg ing e rror

in its consideration of the a ffidavit. See T e n n

. R

. C

. V

. P

. 5 9

. 0 4 ; 6 0

. 0 2

. In light of this fa ilure to aff

ord the trial c ourt an opportunity to c orre ct any alleg ed er

ror a rg ued her e, we a re disinclined to sec ond g u es s t h e t ri al court’s e x erc ise of its discretion. See Tenn. R. App. 13(d), see also Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W .2d 443, 456 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). W oo dla wn M

e m’ l. Pa rk , I nc . v . Ke ith , 70 S.W .3d 691,698 (Tenn. 2002)

. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is in all respec ts affirme d and the case is rema nded to t he trial court for further proce eding s. Costs of the cause a re ta x ed ag ainst the appe llant, Bruc e Va rner

.

_____________________________________ W I LL I A M B

. C A I N , J.