23-711 

Handsome, Inc. v. Town of Monroe 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on 

or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 

and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this 

court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation 

“summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not 

represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 29th day of May, two thousand twenty-four. 

PRESENT: John M. Walker, Jr., 

Steven J. Menashi, 

Circuit Judges, 

Nusrat Jahan Choudhury, 

District Judge.*

 ____________________________________________ 

Handsome, Inc., Todd Cascella, Mona Cascella, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. No. 23-711 

Town of Monroe, Planning and Zoning 

Commission of the Town of Monroe, Scott H. 

Schatzlein, Karen Martin, Steven Vavrek, Patrick 

O’Hara, Michael Parsell, Joel Leneker, Richard Zini, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

 ____________________________________________ 

* Judge Nusrat Jahan Choudhury of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of New York, sitting by designation. 
2 

For Plaintiffs-Appellants: ALEXANDER T. TAUBES, New Haven, CT. 

For Defendants-Appellees: JONATHAN C. ZELLNER, Ryan Ryan Deluca 

LLP, Bridgeport, CT.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District 

of Connecticut (Chatigny, J.). 

Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Handsome, Inc., is a Connecticut corporation owned 

and operated by Plaintiffs-Appellants Todd and Mona Cascella. The individual 

defendants are members of the Planning and Zoning Commission for the town of 

Monroe, Connecticut. The plaintiffs allege that the Commission’s actions over the 

course of several years with respect to a property they owned and were 

developing violated their due process, First Amendment, and equal protection 

rights. This action was originally filed in Connecticut state court in July 2011 and 

subsequently removed to federal court. The district court granted summary 

judgment on March 31, 2023, and this appeal followed. We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal. 

I 

Handsome acquired the land at issue—a ten-acre parcel located at 125 

Garder Road in Monroe—from Todd Cascella via a quitclaim deed in 2001. The 

zoning regulations in effect at the time required all uses within the relevant zone 

to obtain a special exception permit (“SEP”) from the Commission. Handsome 

submitted an initial SEP application in February 2003 that stated its intention to 

construct a total of three industrial buildings at the site. However, it sought a 

permit only for the first building, which it wished to construct immediately “in 

order to avoid permitting delays, get the project going and produce a source of 
3 

income.” App’x 33. The project required excavation and grading at the site prior 

to construction. The Commission granted the SEP for a period of five years on 

March 20, 2003. The SEP included a number of special conditions that required 

Handsome, inter alia, to provide periodic progress reports on grading work, post 

a bond in an amount to be determined by the Commission, and complete 

construction of the first building by March 20, 2005. 

The project fell behind schedule, and only about half of the excavation and 

grading was completed by January 2008. Handsome applied for an SEP extension 

in April 2008, just before the original SEP was set to expire. The Commission held 

a hearing on the extension request on April 24, 2008. The hearing addressed “the 

lack of progress at the site,” “whether the special permit authorized the 

excavation-related activities,” “Handsome’s failure to file progress reports,” and 

“frustration ... regarding laxity in the enforcement of zoning regulations by Town 

officials, especially with regard to excavations.” Id. at 35-36. The chairman 

expressed the view that the project was “nothing but a mining operation.” Id. at 

36. The Commission voted unanimously to deny the extension, and Handsome 

sought review in Connecticut state court. On September 10, 2010, the Connecticut 

Superior Court sustained Handsome’s appeal, holding that the Commission was 

required to grant the extension because Handsome was not in violation of any 

applicable statute or regulation (“Handsome I”). 

Prior to the April 2008 hearing on the extension, Handsome had submitted 

a plan to build a 32-unit affordable housing complex on another property on 

Garder Road. This proposal was denied in August 2008. Handsome appealed, and 

the parties ultimately entered into a settlement agreement in July 2009 that 

allowed Handsome to build a 28-unit complex. Meanwhile, during the pendency 

of the appeal from the denial of the 125 Garder Road SEP extension, a judgment of 

strict foreclosure on that property was entered in favor of MD Drilling and 

Blasting, Inc., which held a mechanic’s lien on the property. Title passed to MD 

Drilling and Blasting on June 10, 2010. However, the new owner agreed to let 

Handsome continue to use the property in exchange for installment payments. 
4 

Handsome renewed its request for an extension following Handsome I, but 

the Commission did not hold a hearing on the matter until May 5, 2011. In the 

meantime, members of the Commission made an unannounced visit to 125 Garder 

Road, where they informed Todd Cascella of resident complaints regarding 

blasting; falsely accused him of continuing work in violation of a cease-and-desist 

order that had been issued—but was withdrawn—by the town planner; and 

threatened to require a $100,000 restoration bond. Prior to the public hearing on 

May 5, the Commission convened in executive session. At the hearing, the 

Commission voted to extend the SEP but backdated the effective date of the 

extension to March 2008, when the original SEP would have expired. The 

Commission also added new conditions to the permit and required Handsome to 

post a $100,000 restoration bond. Handsome appealed this decision as well. When 

Handsome resumed work at the site without posting the bond, the town issued a 

cease-and-desist order and then brought a zoning enforcement action, which was 

later dropped pending the resolution of Handsome’s appeal. 

On December 21, 2012, the Connecticut Superior Court sustained 

Handsome’s second appeal (“Handsome II”). The court held that the executive 

session prior to the public hearing was illegal; that the Commission had no 

discretion to impose additional conditions when it approved the extension; and 

that the five-year time limit on the original SEP should have been tolled pending 

the resolution of the first appeal, and for that reason the extension’s effective date 

should not have been backdated. The Connecticut Supreme Court subsequently 

vacated Handsome II on the ground that “Handsome had no standing to bring the 

appeal because, having lost title to the property, it was not aggrieved by the 

commission’s decision to impose conditions in connection with the permit 

extension.” Handsome, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Monroe, 317 Conn. 515, 

530 (2015) (“Handsome III”). Justice Palmer dissented because “Handsome was 

aggrieved by the commission’s decision,” which affected the “valuable interest in 

the property” Handsome retained through “[t]he agreement with MD Drilling.” 

Id. at 554 (Palmer, J., dissenting). The majority decided that Handsome had waived 
5 

this argument because the plaintiffs “did not rely on the agreement as evidence of 

a possessory interest in the property in support of their claim of aggrievement” 

earlier in the litigation and “did not adequately brief” the issue on appeal. Id. at 

532 n.7. Mona Cascella and Handsome filed for bankruptcy in 2017 and 2018, 

respectively. 

The plaintiffs originally filed this action in the Connecticut Superior Court 

in July 2011, in the wake of the cease-and-desist order from the Commission. They 

asserted claims under the First Amendment and the Due Process and Equal 

Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and sought compensatory 

damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. The defendants moved for 

summary judgment on October 5, 2015, and the district court requested 

supplemental briefing on several issues. On March 31, 2023, the district court 

granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The district court held 

that the plaintiffs had Article III standing notwithstanding the Connecticut 

Supreme Court’s decision in Handsome III.1 It then held that the claims based on 

the denial of the SEP in April 2008 were time-barred and would have failed on the 

merits even if timely. The district court also held that the defendants’ actions 

following Handsome I did not violate the plaintiffs’ due process or First 

Amendment rights. Finally, the district court held that summary judgment was 

appropriate on the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim because their proposed 

comparator was not similarly situated. This appeal followed. 

II 

“Summary judgment is warranted when, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Garcia v. Heath, 74 F.4th 

44, 47 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Romano v. Ulrich, 49 F.4th 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2022)). 

1 The defendants do not challenge the plaintiffs’ standing on appeal. In any event, we 

conclude that the district court was correct that the plaintiffs have Article III standing. 
6 

“We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, 

resolving all ambiguities and drawing all permissible factual inferences in favor of 

the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Id. at 47-48 (quoting Burg 

v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2010)). 

III 

The plaintiffs raise four arguments on appeal. First, they argue that the 

district court erred in holding that their First and Fourteenth Amendment claims 

related to the denial of the SEP extension in 2008 were time-barred. Second, they 

argue that the district court erred in holding that, even if those claims were not 

time-barred, summary judgment for the defendants would have been appropriate 

on the merits. Third, they argue that the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment for the defendants on the merits with respect to their First and 

Fourteenth Amendment claims related to the defendants’ actions following the 

Connecticut Superior Court’s decision in Handsome I. Fourth, they argue that the 

district court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants with respect 

to their equal protection claim on the ground that Handsome was not similarly 

situated to its proposed comparator, Monroe Land Holdings (“MLH”), as a matter 

of law. We affirm the judgment of the district court. 

A 

Because this action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the applicable 

limitations period is the general statute of limitations for tort actions under the law 

of the state in which the district court sits—in this case, Connecticut. See Owens v. 

Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). Under Connecticut law, the general statute of 

limitations for tort actions, which we apply here, is three years. See Conn. Gen. 

Stat. § 52-577 (“No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three 

years from the date of the act or omission complained of.”); see also Clark v. Hanley, 

89 F.4th 78, 91 (2d Cir. 2023) (applying Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577 to a § 1983 claim).

The time at which a cause of action accrues under § 1983, however, is “a question 

of federal law that is not resolved by state law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 
7 

(2007). The Commission denied Handsome’s application for an extension on April 

4, 2008, and Handsome filed this action in May 2011, more than three years later. 

The district court held that claims based on the initial denial of the extension were 

time-barred. 

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that these claims were timely pursuant to the 

“continuing violation doctrine.” Ordinarily, a cause of action accrues under § 1983 

“when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis 

of his action.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980)). The continuing 

violation doctrine is an exception to this rule, and it applies when the defendant 

engages in a continuous pattern of wrongful behavior that “cannot be said to occur 

on any particular day” and no single instance of which is “actionable on its own.” 

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002); see also Sherman v. 

Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 567 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying the continuing violation 

doctrine to a takings claim that was “based on an unusual series of regulations and 

tactical maneuvers that constitutes a taking when considered together, even 

though no single component is unconstitutional when considered in isolation”).

The district court correctly held that the continuing violation doctrine does 

not apply to the plaintiffs’ claims based on the April 2008 extension denial. The 

doctrine does not apply to a series of discrete, though related, unlawful acts, each 

of which is actionable on its own. See DeSuze v. Ammon, 990 F.3d 264, 272 (2d Cir. 

2021) (“Where ... plaintiffs complain of ‘discrete acts’ separated in time, the usual 

limitations rule applies.”) (quoting Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 

2015)). The plaintiffs in this case allege a series of discrete unlawful acts, the first 

of which was the denial of the extension in 2008. Moreover, according to the 

plaintiffs, after Handsome applied for permission to construct an affordable 

housing development, the Commission became “[i]mmediately [h]ostile” to them, 

and this hostility was “blatant” at the meeting on the extension on April 4, 2008. 

Appellants’ Br. 6, 8. If the Commission denied Handsome’s SEP extension in 

retaliation for the affordable housing project, and the plaintiffs knew this, the 
8 

plaintiffs would at that time have had a “complete and present cause of action.” 

Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 554 (2015) (quoting Graham Cty. Soil & Water 

Conserv. Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 418 (2005)). The district 

court correctly determined that the plaintiffs’ claims became time-barred when 

they failed to bring those claims within three years of the denial of the SEP 

extension. 

B 

The plaintiffs’ claims regarding the Commission’s actions following the 

decision of the Connecticut Superior Court in Handsome I, on the other hand, are 

timely. Nonetheless, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the 

merits with respect to these claims. 

A substantive due process claim based on a zoning board’s denial of a 

permit requires the plaintiff to make two showings. First, there must be “a 

demonstration that [the plaintiff] had a clear entitlement to the permit under state 

law.” Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999). 2 “Usually, 

entitlement turns on whether the issuing authority lacks discretion to deny the 

permit, i.e., is required to issue it upon ascertainment that certain objectively 

ascertainable criteria have been met.” Natale, 170 F.3d at 263. However, it is not 

enough to “prov[e] that someone did not obtain what he or she is entitled to under 

state law. For state action to be taken in violation of the requirements of 

substantive due process, the denial must have occurred under circumstances 

warranting the labels ‘arbitrary’ and ‘outrageous.’” Id. at 262. This two-step 

2 We note that, in other cases, a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause 

may be based on a source other than state law. See Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 

638 (2023) (“[S]tate law cannot be the only source [of protected property interests]. 

Otherwise, a State could ‘sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property 

interests’ in assets it wishes to appropriate.”) (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 

U.S. 156, 167 (1998)); see also S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Orange Cnty. Transp. Auth., 96 F.4th 1099, 

1104 (9th Cir. 2024).
9 

framework applies to the plaintiffs’ claims based on the Commission’s actions 

following Handsome I. 

We conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to 

the defendants because no reasonable jury could have decided that the 

Commission’s conduct was “so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross 

abuse of governmental authority.” Id. The record shows that Handsome was 

behind schedule on the project, had failed to comply with conditions of the initial 

SEP, and was experiencing financial difficulties. Given these circumstances, the 

Commission’s decisions following Handsome I—even if those decisions were 

contrary to Connecticut law, as the Superior Court subsequently held in Handsome 

II—were not “‘conscience-shocking,’ or ‘oppressive in the constitutional sense,’” 

as opposed to “merely ‘incorrect or ill-advised.’” Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 

363, 370 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Lowrance v. C.O. S. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 

1994)). “Substantive due process is an outer limit on the legitimacy of government 

action. It does not forbid governmental actions that might fairly be termed 

arbitrary and capricious and for that reason correctable in a state court lawsuit 

seeking review of administrative action,” as the Commission’s actions were 

corrected here. Natale, 170 F.3d at 262. 

The district court also correctly granted summary judgment for the 

defendants on the plaintiffs’ non-time-barred First Amendment retaliation claim.

“If an official takes adverse action against someone” for engaging in protected 

speech, “and ‘non-retaliatory grounds are in fact insufficient to provoke the 

adverse consequences,’ the injured person may generally seek relief by bringing a 

First Amendment claim.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (quoting 

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)). The official’s retaliatory motive “must 

be a ‘but-for’ cause, meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would 

not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Id. 

We agree with the district court that “[o]n this record, a jury could not 

reasonably find that any of the individual defendants acted with [a] retaliatory 
10 

motive” or that “retaliatory animus was the but-for cause of the challenged 

actions.” App’x 99. The plaintiffs have failed to offer any “particularized evidence” 

that suggests a retaliatory motive, such as “expressions by the officials involved 

regarding their state of mind, circumstances suggesting in a substantial fashion 

that the plaintiff has been singled out, or the highly unusual nature of the actions 

taken.” Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1084 (2d Cir. 1995). In addition, the record 

indicates that the alleged adverse actions—the Commission’s delay in acting on 

the extension request following Handsome I and the imposition of the new 

conditions—would have been taken regardless of the plaintiffs’ decision to seek 

relief from the Connecticut Superior Court. As the district court explained, “the 

Commission did not act on the extension until after the tax foreclosure proceeding 

was resolved; and the new requirements were consistent with the original 

conditions of approval.” App’x 97. The record indicates that the Commission 

delayed the hearing and the decision on the extension because the property might 

have gone into foreclosure. It also indicates that the Commission imposed the new 

conditions because of its concern about the lack of progress at the site rather than 

retaliation against the plaintiffs for availing themselves of the Connecticut courts. 

Because “non-retaliatory grounds are in fact []sufficient” to explain the 

Commission’s conduct, Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 

U.S. 250, 256 (2006)), the plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim fails. 

C 

Finally, the plaintiffs brought an equal protection claim based on the

Commission’s issuance of the cease-and-desist order against Handsome and the 

requirement to post a restoration bond. The plaintiffs claim that the town did not 

take similar actions with respect to MLH, which was also conducting extensive 

excavation on a 74-area parcel of land in the same zoning district. The district court 

granted summary judgment on this claim because Handsome and MLH are not 

similarly situated. 
11 

The Supreme Court has recognized “class of one” equal protection claims 

based on selective enforcement of laws and regulations “where the plaintiff alleges 

that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated 

and there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. 

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). However, “[i]n order to succeed in a ‘class of one’ 

claim, the level of similarity between plaintiffs and persons with whom they 

compare themselves must be extremely high.” Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 

105 (2d Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138 (2d 

Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must show, first, that “no rational person could regard the 

circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a degree that 

would justify the differential treatment on the basis of a legitimate government 

policy”; and, second, that “the similarity in circumstances and difference in 

treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendant acted on the 

basis of a mistake.” Id. We have recently reaffirmed this “stringent similarity 

standard” for “class of one” claims. Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 

2019). 

The district court identified several relevant differences between Handsome 

and MLH that could lead a rational person to conclude that the differential 

treatment was justified by legitimate government interests, including Handsome’s 

record of noncompliance with permit conditions, its financial difficulties, and the 

fact that work was resumed at the site without posting the bond required by the 

extended SEP. Based on these differences, the district court correctly concluded 

that Handsome and MLH were not similarly situated. 

* * * 

We have considered the plaintiffs’ remaining arguments, which we 

conclude are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the district court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court