alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS
EASTLAND , TEXAS
JUDGMENT

In re Rius Rentals, LLC * Original Mandamus Proceeding and Franklin Pohlmann

No. 11

- 2 1

- 00 211

- C V * November 4 , 2021

* Per Curiam Memorand um Opinion (P anel consists of: Bailey , C.J., Trotter , J. , and Williams, J.

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that Relators ’ petition for writ of mandamus should be conditionally granted in part

. Th erefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, we grant the petition for writ of mandamus, in part, and direct the Honorable John Shrode to vacate the orders that he signed on May 11, 2021, in which he denied Relators’ motions to compel

. A writ of

mand amus will issue only if Judge Shrode fails to act by November 15, 2021 . We deny the petition for writ of mandamus to the extent that Relator s request that we direct Judge Shrode to grant the motions to compel.
#### FLORIDA ELECTRIC LIGHT & SUPPLY, INC. et al. v GTE PRODUCTS CORP.

Case No. 85-084 AP

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Appellate Division, Dade County

January 26, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Allan M. Stein for appellants.

No appearance for appellee.

Before SIMONS, BARAD, GOLDMAN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FREDERICK N. BARAD, Judge.

Appellant [Defendant below] noticed Appellee [Plaintiff below] for a deposition in response to which Appellee filed a Motion for Protective Order. An agreed order was entered granting Appellee’s motion for a protective order and ordering Appellee to make its witness available for deposition on the day before the scheduled trial. Prior to the court-ordered deposition, the Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant filed a Motion to Strike/Postpone the Motion for *166Summary Judgment. Said motion was denied and Appellee’s motion for summary judgment was granted. It is from the court’s order granting summary judgment that this appeal was taken.

On the state of the record, it was premature for the trial court to enter a summary judgment prior to the deposition of Appellee’s representative by the Appellant. *Commercial Bank of Kendall v. Heiman,*322 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) and *Societe Euro-Suisse v. Citizens and Southern International Bank,*394 So.2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The matter is returned to the trial court for further proceedings, which may include subsequent motions for summary judgment after all discovery is completed.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Simons and Goldman, JJ., concur.
#### Cochran *vs.*Carrington and Prall.

A *tenant in common*may maintain *assumpsit*against his co-tenant, to recover his share of a gross sum received by the latter, for the use or hire of property field in tenancy in common ; it is not necessary in such case that he should resort to the action of *account,*or to a *bill in equity.*

Assumpsit by a tenant in common against his co-tenants. The parties in this case were joint owners of a schooner navigating Lake Ontario. The defendants, in 1839, chartered the vessel to a third person for §1100, and received most of the money. The plaintiff brought assumpsit against them for money had and received, to recover his moiety, the cause was heard by referees; and after the proofs were closed, the counsel for the defendants objected that an action for money had and received would not lie, the remedy of the plaintiff being by an action of *account*or *bill in equity.*The referees sustained the objection; and *on that ground,**made a report in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff moves to [ *410 ] set aside the report.

*W. Duer & L. Babcock,*for the plaintiff.

*A. P. Grant & W. F. Allen,*for the defendants.

*By the Court,*

Nelson, C. J.

The only question in this case, is, whether a remedy exists at law. It is contended that the plaintiff must resort to the action of account, or bill in equity, to recover the money claimed by him.

It 'has been frequently held in this court, that on a sale of a chattel by the joint owner, and receipt of the money, the co-tenant may recover his moiety in the action for money had and received. 2 *Caines,*166 ; 15 *Johns. R.*159; *Wheat. Selw.*79. The principle, I think, may well govern the present case. The one is the sale of the whole interest in the chattel, the other a virtual sale of the interest for a year: if the remedy be appropriate in the one ease, it seems equally so in the other. The doctrine has been repeatedly applied in Massachusetts, 9 *Mass. R.*538; 3 *Pick.*420*; Wheat. Selw.*79, and comes fairly within the reason and principle upon which this action is founded. The money claimed is the money of tho plaintiff: it was received by the defendants for the use of his property, and in honesty and conscience should be paid over.

In the case of partnership dealings, Lord Ellenborough said, in *Robson v. Curtis,*1 *Stark. R.*63, that if only *one item*remained unadjusted, the difficulty as to partnership would disappear.

The action of account, as well as the proceeding by bill in chancery, is *314dilatory and expensive ; and though appropriate and necessary in complicated accounts between partners and tenants in common, the reason for a resort to one or the other of these remedies does not exist here. The item in dispute can be readily adjusted in the action of assumpist. The motion to set aside the report of the referees should be granted.

Ordered accordingly.
§ 502.3 Discrimination prohibited. ( a ) No person shall intimidate, threaten, restrain, coerce, blacklist, discharge, or in any manner discriminate against any person who has: ( 1 ) Filed a complaint under or related to sec. 218 of the INA or these regulations;
( 2 ) Instituted or caused to be instituted any proceedings related to sec. 218 of the INA or these regulations;
( 3 ) Testified or is about to testify in any proceeding under or related to sec. 218 of the INA or these regulations;
( 4 ) Exercised or asserted on behalf of himself or others any right or protection afforded by sec. 218 of the INA or these regulations; or
( 5 ) Consulted with an employee of a legal assistance program or an attorney on matters related to sec. 218 of the INA, or to this subpart or any other Department regulation promulgated pursuant to sec. 218 of the INA.
( b ) Allegations of discrimination against any person under paragraph (a) of this section will be investigated by the WHD. Where the WHD has determined through investigation that such allegations have been substantiated, appropriate remedies may be sought. The WHD may assess civil money penalties, seek injunctive relief, and/or seek additional remedies necessary to make the employee whole as a result of the discrimination, as appropriate, and may recommend to ETA debarment of any such violator from future labor certification. Complaints alleging discrimination against U.S. workers and immigrants based on citizenship or immigration status may also be forwarded by the WHD to the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices.
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I Informacija

Komisija

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Europos bendrijų galutinė metinė finansinė atskaitomybė – 2003 finansiniai metai – Konsoliduotos biudžeto vykdymo ataskaitos ir konsoliduotos finansinės ataskaitos

(2004/C 294/01)

Europos bendrijų galutinė metinė finansinė atskaitomybė – 2003 finansiniai metai – Konsoliduotos biudžeto vykdymo ataskaitos ir konsoliduotos finansinės ataskaitos nebuvo išverstos į [latvių, lietuvių, estų, lenkų, vengrų, čekų, slovakų, slovėnų, maltiečių] kalbas. Originali atskaitomybė anglų kalba yra prieinama elektroniniu formatu EUR-Lex portale. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en, 2004 m. lapkričio 30 d. Oficialiajame leidinyje Nr. C 294.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0089

IN THE MATTER OF:

H.R., 

A Youth.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including November 30, 2022, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

October 24 2022

10/24/2022

Case Number: DA 22-0089
<PAGE>

                                 ITEM 11 - CONTINUED

                                     ITEM 401(l)

                                  PERFORMANCE GRAPH

                                       1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996
                                       ----   ----   ----   ----   ----   ----

Class A Common Stock                   100    155    199    202    279    305
Class B Common Stock                   100    193    242    236    329    358
Dow Jones Equity Index                 100    109    119    120    166    206
Dow Jones Home Construction Index      100    129    164    111    166    159


Assuming that the value of the investment in Liberty Homes, Inc. Class A and
Class B Common Stock and each index was $100 on December 31, 1991 and all
dividends were reinvested.


                                          35
#### § 500.71 Utilization of only registered farm labor contractors.

The Act prohibits any person from utilizing the services of a farm labor contractor to supply migrant or seasonal agricultural workers without first taking reasonable steps to determine that the farm labor contractor possesses a valid Certificate of Registration, issued pursuant to the Act, which authorizes the activity for which the contractor is to be utilized. This prohibition also applies to a farm labor contractor who wishes to utilize the services of another farm labor contractor (see § 500.41). In making the determination about a contractor's registration status, a person may rely upon the contractor's possession of a Certificate of Registration which on its face is valid and which authorizes the activity for which the contractor is utilized. A person has the alternative to confirm the contractor's registration through the central registry maintained by the United States Department of Labor.
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S a s k a t c h e w a n S a s k a t c h e w a n

Created by the Malta Field Office in December 2012 Albers Equal Area, NAD83, Meters

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

HiLine District

Renewable Energy - Wind

Alternatives A & E

¬

Map shows the Development

Potential for Wind Energy and the

avoidance or exclusion areas for

development under Alternatives A

& E. Proposed closures and

restrictions apply only to BLMadministered lands.

Exclusion Areas

Avoidance Areas

High Potential

Moderate Potential

Low Potential

Not Analyzed

RMP Boundary

County Line

Interstate

Highway or State Route

Town

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Glacier

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Shelby

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Fort Benton

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0 25 50

Miles

Alternative A

(Current Management)

This map is intended for display purposes. No warranty is

made by the Bureau of Land Management as to the

accuracy, reliability, or completness of these data for

individual or aggregate use with other data, or for

purposes not intended by the BLM. This map may not

meet National Map Accuracy Standards. This poduct was

developed through digital means and information may be

updated without notification.

1:1,750,000

Alternative E

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Map 2.11
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, December 27, 2019 

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A20A0619. MICHAEL JASON MCHAN v. THE STATE.

In December 2015, Michael Jason McHan pleaded guilty to three counts of

child molestation. After he was sentenced, McHan filed a motion to correct a void

sentence in which he argued that the trial court was required to impose a split

sentence for his convictions under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b). The trial court agreed and

in January 2017 resentenced McHan to 20 years, to serve 19, on Count 1, 20 years on

probation on Count 3, to run concurrently to Count 1, and 20 years on probation on

Count 4, to run consecutively to Counts 1 and 3. McHan then filed another motion

to vacate void sentence, this time arguing that the sentence was void because the trial

court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment above the five-year mandatory

minimumset byOCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b). The trial court denied the motion and McHan

filed a direct appeal. This Court dismissed the appeal concluding that because

McHan’s sentence fell within the statutory range of punishment, he did not raise a

colorable argument that his sentence is void. See Case No. A18A0022 (decided

September 19, 2017).

In April 2019, McHan filed a “Motion to Amend Previous Claims” in which

he again asserted that the trial court failed to impose a split sentence under OCGA §

17-10-6.2 (b). The trial court denied the motion, and McHan filed a timely notice of

appeal. We, however, lack jurisdiction. 

McHan’s present appeal is another void sentence claim that is identical to the

claim McHan raised prior to his resentencing in 2017. And as we noted in his prior

appeal, McHan’s 20-year sentence falls within the statutory range of punishment. See

OCGA § 16-6-4 (b) (1) (sentence for child molestation for a first-time offender is “not
less than five nor more than 20 years”). The sentence is also in compliance with

OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) (requiring a split sentence for persons convicted of a sexual

offense that includes a probated sentence of at least one year). 

Accordingly, McHan has not raised a colorable argument that his sentence is

void, and the trial court’s denial of his motion is not subject to direct appeal. See

Frazier v. State, 302 Ga. App. 346, 348 (691 SE2d 247) (2010). This appeal is

therefore DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta, December 27, 2019

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.
# App C.Zoo
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GERARDO GARCIA LOPEZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 10-72658

Agency No. A089-958-122

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 17, 2012** 

Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Gerardo Garcia Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying his application for cancellation of removal

and his motion for a continuance, and denying his motion to remand. We have

FILED

JUL 23 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-72658

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the

agency’s continuous physical presence finding. Landin-Zavala v. Gonzales, 488

F.3d 1150, 1151 (9th Cir. 2007). We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a

request for a continuance and the denial of a motion to reopen or remand.

Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam);

Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). We review de novo

due process claims. Cruz Rendon v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010). 

We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Garcia Lopez failed

to establish the requisite ten years of continuous physical presence for cancellation

of removal at the time he was served with his Notice to Appear. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(b)(1)(A), (d)(1).

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia Lopez’s motion

for a continuance for failure to show good cause. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. Garcia

Lopez also failed to show he was prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. See

Cruz Rendon, 603 F.3d at 1109-11 (to prevail on due process claim that he was

denied full and fair hearing, alien must show prejudice).

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Garcia Lopez’s motion to

remand for failure to demonstrate that the evidence submitted with the motion was
3 10-72658

previously unavailable, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Guzman v. INS, 318 F.3d 911,

913 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (affirming denial of motion to reopen where

“new” information was available and capable of discovery prior to hearing), and

for failure to submit sufficient evidence to establish prima facie eligibility for

cancellation of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Mendez-Gutierrez v.

Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006) (prima facie eligibility is

demonstrated by a showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the statutory

requirements for relief have been satisfied).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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#### § 4281.31 Plan amendment.

The plan sponsor of a plan described in § 4281.31 shall amend the plan to eliminate those benefits subject to reduction in excess of the value of benefits that can be provided by plan assets. Such reductions shall be effected by a pro rata reduction of all benefits subject to reduction or by elimination or pro rata reduction of any category of benefit. Benefit reductions required by this section shall apply only prospectively. An amendment required under this section shall take effect no later than six months after the end of the plan year for which it is determined that the value of nonforfeitable benefits exceeds the value of the plan's assets.
§ 2571.2 Definitions. For section 521 proceedings, this section shall apply in lieu of the definitions in § 18.2 of this title: ( a ) *Adjudicatory proceeding* means a judicial-type proceeding before an administrative law judge leading to an order;
( b ) *Administrative law judge* means an administrative law judge appointed pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3105;
( c ) *Answer* means a written statement that is supported by reference to specific circumstances or facts surrounding the temporary order issued pursuant to 29 CFR 2560.521-1(c);
( d ) *Commencement of proceeding* is the filing of an answer by the respondent;
( e ) *Consent agreement* means a proposed written agreement and order containing a specified proposed remedy or other relief acceptable to the Secretary and consenting parties;
( f ) *Final order* means a cease and desist order that is a final order of the Secretary of Labor under ERISA section 521. Such final order may result from a decision of an administrative law judge or of the Secretary on review of a decision of an administrative law judge, or from the failure of a party to invoke the procedures for a hearing under 29 CFR 2560.521-1 within the prescribed time limit. A final order shall constitute a final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 704;
( g ) *Hearing* means that part of a section 521 proceeding which involves the submission of evidence, either by oral presentation or written submission, to the administrative law judge;
( h ) *Order* means the whole or any part of a final procedural or substantive disposition of a section 521 proceeding;
( i ) *Party* includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party to a section 521 proceeding;
( j ) *Person* includes an individual, partnership, corporation, employee welfare benefit plan, association, or other entity or organization;
( k ) *Petition* means a written request, made by a person or party, for some affirmative action;
( l ) *Respondent* means the party against whom the Secretary is seeking to impose a cease and desist order under ERISA section 521;
( m ) *Secretary* means the Secretary of Labor or his or her delegate;
( n ) *Section 521 proceeding* means an adjudicatory proceeding relating to the issuance of a temporary order under 29 CFR 2560.521-1 and section 521 of ERISA;
( o ) *Solicitor* means the Solicitor of Labor or his or her delegate; and
( p ) *Temporary order* means the temporary cease and desist order issued by the Secretary under 29 CFR 2560.521-1(c) and section 521 of ERISA.