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S. Hrg. 111–1032 

NOMINATION OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT A. 

HARDING, USA, RET. 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 24, 2010 

NOMINATION OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT A. HARDING, USA, RET., 

TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Professional Staff Member 

KRISTINE V. LAM, Professional Staff Member 

ELYSE F. GREENWALD, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Director for Homeland Security Affairs 

JENNIFER L. TARR, Minority Counsel 

LUKE P. BELLOCCHI, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 2 

Senator Burris .................................................................................................. 12 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 21 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 23 

WITNESS 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2010 

Major General Robert A. Harding, USA, Ret., to be Assistant Secretary, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 25 

Biographical and financial information .......................................................... 27 

Letter from the Office of Government Ethics ................................................. 37 

Responses to pre-hearing questions ................................................................ 38 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT 

A. HARDING, USA, RET. 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2010 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Burris, and Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning and welcome to this hearing on the nomination of Major General Robert A. Harding to be 

the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security in charge of the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Of all the changes 

in American life since September 11, 2001, TSA is probably the 

most visible and, over the course of time, also one of the most effective. 

The TSA Administrator oversees an agency that has grown literally from nothing to be very large, all around the country. You 

would oversee, if confirmed, General Harding, an agency of 50,000 

employees, approximately, with an $8 billion annual budget and, of 

course, a very important mission, which is to protect the safety of 

passengers and cargo traveling by air, rail, or road. 

We were reminded again just how crucial the purpose of the 

agency is and why getting a first rate administrator on the job soon 

is critical by the attempted Christmas Day bombing on Northwest 

Flight 253 as it was approaching Detroit. 

General Harding, I really appreciate your 33 years of service to 

our country in the U.S. Army. And I am particularly pleased that 

you have agreed to accept this call to serve your Nation, again, in 

such an important position at such an important time. 

As the Director of Operations at the Defense Intelligence Agency 

(DIA), which is one of the positions you held toward the end of your 

career in the Army, you oversaw the intelligence collection programs used by military commanders and the civilian leadership to 

guide their decisions, very important, and involving the expenditure of billions of dollars of tax payer money. 

While at DIA, General Harding also managed about 5,000 employees, including more than 200 attaches stationed abroad, which 

probably will be valuable experience you can bring to TSA, if conVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:44 Aug 02, 2011 Jkt 56894 PO 00000 Frm 000005 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06633 P:\DOCS\56894.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
2 

firmed, because it works so much more closely now with the international aviation community. 

General Harding also commanded a U.S.-based counterintelligence group that was responsible for infrastructure protection at 

every Army camp, post, and station in the United States. As part 

of his duties in that post, General Harding worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and with local law enforcement 

on-base security experts. 

After leaving the Army, the nominee worked in the private sector 

on intelligence issues, at one point forming his own company, Harding Security Associates, which, in addition to other work, as is 

known, did business with the Federal Government. 

Questions have been raised as part of the nomination and confirmation process about a particular contract Harding Security Associates had to provide interrogators for the Defense Intelligence 

Agency. 

I am sure the Committee will explore these issues in more detail 

during the hearing, and I know, General Harding, you are prepared to respond to questions and speak at length about exactly 

what happened in that matter. 

If confirmed, you will take charge of an agency that has really 

made enormous strides in the last 7 years to strengthen the security of the aviation sector. But as I said, the Christmas Day attack 

reminds us that this is a tough assignment and that our homeland 

defenses still can be breached. I have a series of questions that, at 

this point, I will put in the record at the completion of my opening 

statement, but I will get to them with you when we get to that 

point in the hearing. 

For now, I thank you for your willingness to serve, for your cooperation with the Committee in our pre-hearing inquiries, and I 

look forward to your testimony. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join 

the Chairman in welcoming General Robert Harding as the nominee to be Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration. 

The attempted bombing on Christmas Day reminds us that terrorists remain committed to attacking our Nation. Whether on an 

airline or in other modes of transportation, TSA performs a critical 

role in protecting us from those attacks. 

While progress clearly has been made in improving our security, 

the fact that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was able to board a 

flight with a bomb demonstrates flaws in our Nation’s system of 

layered security. TSA must do more to ensure that U.S.-bound passengers who are potential threats receive more effective screening 

before they board planes. Terrorists will continue to devise new 

strategies to penetrate our defenses. Armed with that knowledge, 

the TSA cannot be caught flat-footed by focusing only on the techniques that terrorists employed in the last attack. Our defenses 

must be forward-looking and nimble, and TSA must foster a culture of continuous improvement to anticipate new challenges. 

3 

TSA plans to install more than 1,000 Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines in our Nation’s airports by the end of fiscal 

year 2011. This effort, along with the use of more canine teams and 

the deployment of additional behavioral detection officers, represent steps that will increase aviation security in the wake of the 

Christmas Day bombing attempt. 

I am concerned, however, by a recent statement from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that ‘‘TSA does not yet have a 

written policy requiring operational testing prior to deployment.’’ 

Those of us who travel a lot are very aware of TSA’s previous 

roll-out of expensive screening technologies, such as the ‘‘puffer’’ 

machines, which took place prior to the completion of operational 

testing, resulting in stalled deployments and wasted taxpayer dollars. Given that experience, it is encouraging that TSA has completed operational testing on the imaging machines currently being 

deployed to U.S. airports. 

But I would like General Harding’s assurance that, if confirmed, 

he would ensure that successful operational testing is completed on 

all new screening technologies prior to installation. In the military, 

we call this fly before you buy, and I am sure General Harding is 

very familiar with that concept. 

Aviation, however, is not the only sector of transportation that 

merits TSA’s vigilant efforts. The agency’s mission extends to other 

modes of transportation as well, including our system of mass transit. We cannot focus all our resources on terrorist threats to aviation alone, as the threat does not stop there. 

General Harding, as the Chairman has pointed out, has more 

than 30 years of experience in support of our Nation’s military and 

intelligence efforts. He finished his military career as second in 

command at the Defense Intelligence Agency. As a result, he knows 

first-hand the importance of using intelligence to guide operations, 

which will be a critical skill should he take the helm at TSA. 

The nominee appears to have many strengths for this position. 

One area of concern, however, is the finding by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) that General Harding’s former company overbilled the government by more than $860,000 on a contract in 2004. I will be asking a series of questions on that issue 

unless the Chairman has covered my concerns. 

I also want to give General Harding the opportunity this morning to clarify the role that interrogators from his former company 

played and whether or not there were any allegations of wrongdoing related to the work of these interrogators. 

I look forward to discussing these and other important matters 

with General Harding today. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. General Harding 

has filed responses to a biographical and financial questionnaire, 

answered pre-hearing questions submitted by the Committee, and 

had his financial statements reviewed by the Office of Government 

Ethics. 

Without objection, this information will be made part of the hearing record with the exception of the financial data, which are on 

file and available for public inspection in the Committee offices. 

4 

1The prepared statement of General Harding appears in the Appendix on page 25. 

Our Committee rules require that all witnesses at nomination 

hearings give their testimony under oath. So General Harding, I 

ask you please to stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give to 

this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth, so help you, God? 

General HARDING. I do. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you and please be seated. 

General, we welcome your opening statement now and, as you 

choose, the introduction of any family and friends who are with you 

today. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT A. HARDING, USA, 

RET.,1 TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

General HARDING. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking 

Member Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It 

is a privilege to appear before you today as the President’s nominee 

for Assistant Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration. I am deeply honored by the President’s call to service and by 

the support I have received from Secretary Napolitano. 

With your kind indulgence, I would like to recognize my wife, 

Connie, who is behind me, and my three daughters; Michelle, 

Anita, and Alex, who could not be here. It is their love and support 

that has sustained me through the years. 

I also want to express my deep appreciation to those I met in the 

course of my 33-year career in the U.S. Army who helped shape my 

ideals, character, and vision. Who I am today is very much a product of my time in the U.S. Army. Last, but not least, I want the 

men and women of TSA to know that I am eager to join their ranks 

and to lead them in safeguarding our Nation’s transportation system. 

The December 25, 2009, attack on Northwest Flight 253 reminded us of the ever-evolving threat our Nation confronts as terrorists seek new and inventive ways to defeat the security measures the global community put into place since September 11, 2001. 

Since its creation following the tragic 9/11 terrorist attack, TSA 

has played a vital role in securing aviation and other modes of 

transportation. If confirmed, I look forward to working in close collaboration with our partners in the intelligence and international 

communities; Federal, State, and local governments; private industry; and, most importantly, the traveling public to continue to meet 

the challenge of keeping our Nation’s complex transportation system secure. 

I believe I am uniquely qualified to lead TSA in advancing its 

mission. I have spent over 30 years in the Intelligence Community. 

I have served as the U.S. Army’s Deputy G2 for Intelligence at the 

time of my military retirement in 2001 and as the Director for Operations at the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

At the Defense Intelligence Agency, as the Department of Defense’s Senior Human Intelligence Officer, I managed intelligence 

collection program requirements and supervised the Department of 

5 

Defense’s Defense Attache ́s in over 200 embassies and offices 

around the world. I also commanded a Human Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence Battalion in Korea and the Army’s premier 

Counterintelligence Group, the 902nd, at Fort Meade. 

Since my retirement from the U.S. Army, I have served as Chief 

Executive Officer of Harding Security Associates, the company I 

founded with my wife in 2003 and sold in July 2009. I built the 

company into a workforce of highly trained professionals providing 

strategic security solutions to the U.S. Government and the intelligence and defense communities. 

I have no current financial or ownership interests in the company and I have entered into an ethics agreement with the Department’s designated agency ethics official, which has been provided 

to this Committee, to ensure no conflicts of interest arise. 

I know the importance and value of coordinated efforts between 

Federal agencies. As the Director of Intelligence for the Army’s 

U.S. Southern Command, I coordinated efforts between the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Customs on sensitive interagency counter-drug operations. 

My knowledge of counterterrorism challenges, sensitive intelligence programs, and technological advances against the threat 

have equipped me to meet the current and future challenges of 

TSA. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that TSA continues to work closely 

with and receives necessary intelligence from the Intelligence Community and that this information is applied across all transportation modes. I believe that the TSA should work closely with our 

partners in the Intelligence Community to improve the kinds of information needed from the watchlist system; and if confirmed, I 

will continue the effort begun from the President’s review to work 

with our interagency partners to examine and, where necessary, 

modify the criteria and process used to build the Terrorist Screening Database and nominate names for the No-Fly and Selectee 

Lists. 

Given the global dimensions of aviation security, I will support 

Secretary Napolitano’s historic effort to bolster international aviation security by working with our partners around the world to enhance information collection and sharing, increase cooperation of 

technological development, and modernize global aviation security 

standards. 

Additionally, I will encourage the use of enhanced screening 

technologies, both at domestic airports and by our international 

partners, while remaining respectful of privacy and civil rights and 

liberties. Our objective in using these technologies is clear: To 

strengthen our abilities to find dangerous materials and to stop 

dangerous people. 

From my military experience, I know the importance of a well 

trained workforce. You have my commitment to enhance training 

opportunities and invest in developing TSA’s employees. If confirmed, I look forward to a close working relationship with Congress and this Committee. I welcome your oversight, your suggestions, and appreciate your dedication to ensuring our Nation’s security. 

6 

In closing, I again thank President Obama and Secretary 

Napolitano for their confidence and faith in my ability to lead TSA. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to answering 

your questions and, if confirmed, undertaking the challenges that 

lie ahead. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, General. I am 

going to start my questioning with the three standard questions we 

ask all nominees. First, is there anything you are aware of in your 

background that might present a conflict of interest with the duties 

of the office to which you have been nominated? 

General HARDING. No. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Second, do you know of anything personal 

or otherwise that would in anyway prevent you from fully and honorably discharging the responsibilities of the office to which you 

have been nominated? 

General HARDING. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And finally, do you agree without reservation to respond to any reasonable summons to appear and testify 

before any duly constituted Committee of Congress if you are confirmed? 

General HARDING. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. We will start with 

a first round of questions limited to 7 minutes each. 

Let me give you a sort of a broad opening question, a little bit 

like what I said when I had the honor to greet you in my office. 

I hope if you are confirmed that you will, in really what I take to 

be the classic mode of operating of our military, take a fresh top 

to bottom look at the way TSA is fulfilling its mission. 

As I said in my opening statement, I think by and large it has 

really done a good job. Obviously, if you just judge the results by 

terrorist attacks or attempts—there are obviously successful attacks—they have done very well. But every time I go through the 

security system and watch with everyone else as we take our shoes 

off, as we do the various other things we do to get through, and 

as I watch the TSA officers doing the same repetitive work over 

and over again, I ask myself, is this the best way to do it? Well, 

so far it has worked. But I wanted to just put that before you and 

ask you if you have any thoughts about that. 

I think any system, particularly one with this much responsibility, can benefit from a fresh look, and I guess I am asking you 

if you are prepared to do that. 

General HARDING. Mr. Chairman, you and I discussed that, and 

I agree with you. It is a 9-year-old organization with a very important mission, doing great work, and I agree with you. It has 

worked so far. I think a fresh look is necessary; I absolutely agree 

with you for two reasons. Because I think any agency like this can 

benefit from a fresh look. But the other reason, as you and I discussed, is that ever-evolving threat—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General HARDING. And to stay ahead of that ever-evolving threat 

a fresh look and then a continuous process to address that evolving 

threat is important. 

7 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you two related questions. 

Both come from the statement that we repeat often here from the 

9/11 Commission Report, which is that one of the reasons why the 

attack on us on September 11, 2001, was successful was a ‘‘failure 

of imagination,’’ which is to say that we failed to imagine that people would possibly do what the terrorists did to us on September 

11, 2001. 

So I wanted to ask you two things that I do not know that I have 

asked previous TSA administrators. The first is whether, to the 

best of your knowledge, there is an adequate connection between 

TSA and our intelligence community so that beyond imagination 

you have a baseline of what is happening, to put it as directly as 

I can, among the enemy forces. 

The second is whether on a systematic basis the TSA tries to 

imagine—even beyond intelligence where this is a sort of standard 

military Red Team, Blue Team idea—how the terrorists might 

come at us next time so that they are better able to defend against 

it. 

General HARDING. Mr. Chairman, I will take the connection 

question first. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. 

General HARDING. I think it can be improved. TSA, as a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), benefits 

from the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at DHS. That office is, 

in fact, a member of the larger body of the Intelligence Community, 

the 16 agencies, and I think benefits from that. 

But I believe the connection can be improved. If confirmed, that 

will be a very high priority of mine. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So that makes sense. Of course, the Intelligence and Analysis Division at DHS is the main point of contact 

between the broader Intelligence Community and TSA. 

General HARDING. Yes, Mr. Chairman. And TSA, as a very important proactive member of the Intelligence Community in the 

sense that we are part of DHS, I think, needs to continue to aggressively task that intelligence system—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General HARDING [continuing]. For the kinds of actionable intelligence that would benefit TSA and the 10,000 folks that we are 

hoping to clear. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. 

General HARDING. To your point on imagination, I think that is 

very important, and you beat me to the term, Red Teaming. I think 

to the extent that I can carry that from the Intelligence Community into TSA, we can do some more Red Teaming internally. I 

know TSA has started some of that, but I would like to do more. 

I would like to bring to TSA, if confirmed, experts who think like 

bad guys and bring them inside the thought process of what we are 

doing presently within TSA and where we would like to go to try 

to get a cycle going of understanding and staying ahead of the 

threat. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. I have a little more 

than a minute left, so I am going to leave the questions about Harding Security to Senator Collins, but I do want to focus on something that is a little more brief, which has been a longstanding conVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:44 Aug 02, 2011 Jkt 56894 PO 00000 Frm 000011 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06633 P:\DOCS\56894.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
8 

cern of mine. This is about the extent to which TSA carries out rail 

and transit security. 

And particularly, to focus on security training for workers in rail 

and transit sectors, which is one of the activities that Congress 

mandated in the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, there was a GAO 

report issued last July that concluded that several key requirements have not been implemented despite clear deadlines and requirements set by contracts. I know some rail and transit systems 

have developed their own training programs for frontline employees, but a lot have not. And I worry that TSA’s delay in issuing 

final regulations for public transportation and railroad training 

programs has allowed some transportation agencies to ignore security vulnerabilities and avoid providing training to their employees 

in these transit lines, in which literally millions of Americans travel everyday. 

So I wanted to ask you, if confirmed, if you will make issuing 

final regulations for rail and transit training programs a priority 

and also if you would speak just generally about the priority you 

will give to security on non-aviation modes of transportation in the 

United States. 

General HARDING. Mr. Chairman, I would make that a priority. 

The Administrator is responsible for all transportation modes. The 

resources and budget would suggest that more is in aviation, which 

some would suggest would have been appropriate based on both 

the original threat and the threat as it evolved. 

I think it is very important that the Transportation Security Administration look at all modes, be informed by intelligence across 

all modes, and I would make that a priority, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. And of course, we know 

from tragic experience in other countries—London, Spain, and 

India—that terrorists have attacked non-aviation modes of transportation with bad consequences. 

Thank you very much. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As the Chairman 

suggested, I would like to ask you some questions about the firm 

that you founded. I think it is Harding Security Associates (HSA). 

First, I want to clarify a very important issue about the interrogators that your company provided to the Defense Department. In 

response to the Committee’s questions, you stated that HSA contractors were based at Camp Slayer in Iraq. We have learned, however, that the contractors also performed interrogations and 

debriefings at Camp Cropper. 

Now the reason that is significant is Camp Cropper, as opposed 

to Camp Slayer, has been cited as being the subject of numerous 

reports on detainee abuse and mistreatment, including reports 

from the International Red Cross. For example, the Red Cross documented severely harsh living conditions, mistreatment by guards, 

and apparently even the death of several detainees while they were 

at Camp Cropper. 

So, let me ask you a series of questions. First, were any of the 

contract interrogators that you provided ever accused of engaging 

in unlawful or inappropriate interrogations at Camp Cropper? 

General HARDING. No, Senator they were never accused of anything like that. 

9 

Senator COLLINS. Were your firm’s interrogators’ actions at all 

times consistent with the standards of the Geneva Convention? 

General HARDING. Yes, Senator they were. 

Senator COLLINS. Were they trained to abide by those standards 

in conducting interrogations? 

General HARDING. Yes they were, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. Was DIA ever concerned about any of the 

debriefings that were conducted by your interrogators? 

General HARDING. No, DIA was not. 

Senator COLLINS. Are you aware of any concerns expressed by 

the Red Cross or any human rights organizations about the interrogators that you provided? 

General HARDING. Not concerning my interrogators, no Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I would now like to turn to the 

issue of the contract that was audited by DCAA. 

The Defense Contract Audit Agency audited the amounts that 

your company billed the Federal Government under the contract 

that we have discussed, and the DCAA contract audit found that 

approximately $860,000 were for questionable or duplicative billing. 

Could you explain the background of how these billing errors occurred? 

General HARDING. Thank you, Senator, for that opportunity. I 

would like to give some context and then go to your specific question. 

In December 2004, the Defense Intelligence Agency issued an urgent requirement for 40 interrogators/debriefers to be deployed to 

Iraq. DIA’s urgent requirement was driven by an insufficient number of trained and qualified in-house government interrogators. The 

contract was for 1 year with an option to renew up to 4 years. The 

contract was valued at $49.2 million if fully exercised. HSA won 

the contract in January 2004 and within 60 days had started placing intelligence debriefers on the ground at Camp Slayer, Iraq. 

However, because of DIA’s reduced interest to only a few highvalue detainees, they decided to terminate the contract for the convenience of the government. This was within 4 months of HSA 

starting work. 

HSA, as a matter of course, billed the government for termination costs. Because the termination costs were more than 

$100,000, the Department of Defense also, as a matter of course, 

initiated an audit. The audit concluded that DIA paid too much 

and that HSA owed the government money. After HSA appealed 

the decision, the government and HSA reached a negotiated settlement in July 2008, by which HSA repaid DIA approximately $1.8 

million. 

The Department of Defense IG had opened and closed an investigation concerning this settlement without any finding of wrongdoing by HSA. Additionally, DIA monitored contract performance 

and provided Congress with assurances that there were no indications of any alleged abuses by HSA interrogators and upon contract 

termination praised HSA’s work. 

With your indulgence, Senator Collins, I would like to give some 

lessons learned. 

10 

Senator COLLINS. Well, before you do that, I need to establish 

some facts. It is my understanding that HSA was paid approximately $6 million for the work in total. Is that accurate? 

General HARDING. That is approximately correct. 

Senator COLLINS. It is important that we understand that to 

place it in context. 

General HARDING. Absolutely. 

Senator COLLINS. Because, although the contract potentially, if the options had been exercised, would have been worth over $50 

million—— 

General HARDING. Correct. 

Senator COLLINS [continuing]. In fact, it was terminated for the 

convenience of the government in the first year, and HSA was paid 

a little over $6 million. 

Now, it is my understanding that of that amount, DCAA questioned the $1.6 million that you billed to terminate the contract, 

plus questioned an overpayment of $860,000. In other words, it appears to me that of the $6 million that HSA was paid, $2.4 million 

was questioned. That is a pretty high percentage. The White 

House, in talking to me about this issue, compared it to $53 million, but that is not what was at stake here at all, and I thought 

the White House’s comparison was pretty misleading. 

Now, after the $1.8 million settlement, HSA actually ended up 

netting about $4 million. 

General HARDING. The revenue was approximately $4 million. 

Senator COLLINS. So I just want to put that out to make sure you 

agree with those general numbers. 

General HARDING. I think that is perfect context, Senator, and it 

describes to the best of my knowledge the accounting. 

Senator COLLINS. So since $2.4 million is a large percentage of 

$6 million, more than a third obviously, I need to better understand how it happened that there was a dispute over so much of 

the payment. 

General HARDING. I can capture that with an example of one of 

the largest chunks, I believe about $800,000. 

Because DIA needed interrogators and needed interrogators in 

an urgent manner, and because I was a Human Intelligence Officer, I went out and found the best interrogators I could find. I 

found the best interrogators I could find across the world. They 

used to work for me, many of them. I hired the best Warrant Officer-Interrogator, I think, not just in the U.S. Army, but in the Department of Defense. I brought him in as my Program Manager. 

We set up to provide the Defense Intelligence Agency with what 

they needed in a very expedited manner, and I think we did that 

by putting people on the ground within 60 days. 

I had brought interrogators that I had worked with, and that my 

Chief Warrant Officer had worked with, into our headquarters and 

rapidly trained them. Even though they were already certified in 

Geneva Conventions and interrogations, I put them through additional training in both Geneva Conventions as well as cultural 

training. We deployed them 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, just 

to make sure that they got through all of the training that they 

needed to include pre-deployment training, to get downrange, to get 

to Iraq, and we did that in an urgent manner. 

11 

I was focused on that as the CEO of the company when within 

3 months of executing this contract DIA decided to change the 

scope of the contract and as you pointed out correctly, Senator, terminated for the convenience of the government. I then faced 40 individuals, because 22 were deployed but there were 18 just about 

to deploy, who were now without work within 3 months of leaving 

the ‘‘the Farm.’’ I use the Farm because I remember one of my interrogators I talked off of the Farm to come back and go downrange 

and do what they did so well when they were in uniform. 

I personally discussed with the 40, either on the phone or in a 

collective meeting, that I would take care of them and that I would 

negotiate and work with the government to provide severance payments. The total severance payments came to about $800,000, 

which I paid and they dispersed. 

When I went to claim it from DIA, the DCAA recognized that I 

did not have a policy on that—that I had not negotiated with the 

government for severance, and I had not provided the government 

my plan for severance for these individuals that I had taken away 

from wherever they were in the world and sent them back home. 

Therefore, it was not allowed, that $800,000. That is just one example. 

What you will see in the report from DIA is that because it was 

a fixed price contract, certain things were allowed under the contract, but even DIA admitted that when they did the audit, they 

did it as a time and materials contract. So DIA even admits to 

some degree there was mistakes on both sides. 

I accept, Senator Collins, the mistakes that I made. As a matter 

of fact, as a small business owner, I am convinced that I made a 

mistake. 

This was our largest and, in my opinion, our most important contract, and in an effort to stay engaged with my client, in an effort 

to stay engaged with my employees and take care of them, and in 

an effort to take care of my stakeholders, which is the Iraq Support 

Group, I lost sight of the fact that I also had to be cognizant of 

what was going on in my backroom, in the accounting shop, in the 

contract shop. 

And so, what did I do? I hired the best chief financial officer. I 

increased accountability within my organization, starting with me. 

I purchased state-of-the-art accounting systems and upgraded twice 

within 3 years. I emphasized the importance of internal controls, 

again, starting with me and everybody else in my company. 

The result was that HSA grew from approximately 60 people, 

when I had this DIA contract, to more than 400 by the time I sold 

my company, in no small measure from the lessons learned very 

early on in my first year of business from this DCAA audit. The 

most important result—it never happened again. 

If confirmed, I believe that this private sector management lesson learned would benefit me in my new post. I take the need to 

protect taxpayer dollars seriously and would look forward to working with this Committee to collectively ensure that we continue to 

maintain that standard within TSA. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. Senator Burris, good morning. 

12 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Harding, 

that was very interesting. I appreciate your forthrightness in your 

testimony with reference to your business. I am a former banker, 

and I financed startup companies. And if a startup company receives a contract and they have to gear up for these emergency situations, there is a great deal of outlay and confusion and rushing 

because you want to make an impression on the contract. 

Being a former banker, I never lent money to companies that are 

doing that. I very well understand exactly what your company was 

going through, especially with a contract the size of $48 million because you are now trying to gear up, you are trying to hire, you 

are trying to work under these time constraints that have been put 

on you. So even though there were mistakes made, I am glad to 

see that you have come forward and understand it was a learning 

experience. 

And I tell you, your comment about the fact that you have not 

done that again proves it. So, I appreciate your forthrightness and 

candidness. 

General HARDING. Thank you. 

Senator BURRIS. General Harding, I travel quite a bit through 

these airports and deal with the TSA, if not daily, almost weekly. 

General Harding, it is a major process, and the rules, regulations, 

and procedures that have to take place for the security of our travel are a little mind-boggling when you figure what that screener 

has to deal with. 

General Harding, if you are confirmed, do you see any options for 

improvement in the processing and the responsibility facing screeners and TSA employees? 

I chat with them all of the time. I try to encourage them because 

a lot of people are upset when they have to go through the screening and when they have to go back because their watch or their 

keys or their loose change was setting off the alarm. Do you have 

any ideas for helping these screeners and employees who I am sure 

are trying to do their best? 

General HARDING. That is a great question, Senator, and a great 

comment. As I began my process here, as the Chairman knows, I 

think I had the great opportunity and honor to speak to no less 

than 25 Senators, personally. 

Clearly, the majority had very positive anecdotes about the 

Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) and their experiences because you travel quite often. And I took that to heart, and so, Senator, my first response to you is that the TSOs need to know and 

need to hear from somebody like me, whether confirmed or not, 

that the Senators I have spoken to speak very highly of them, feel 

very confident in their abilities, and want somebody to help their 

morale, and that is to your point. 

Senator, I have worked with large organizations, and I have 

worked with organizations from battalion size to the Director of 

Operations of DIA, and morale is something that we have always 

learned that we need to keep an eye on. And if confirmed, Senator, 

I guarantee you that the experiences that the Senators had, that 

I have heard some great things about those TSOs, will be shared 

13 

with the TSOs. I think they will, if confirmed, be a well-trained 

force. They will be well led and well-motivated. 

Senator BURRIS. General Harding, tell me, how will your military 

experience in the Intelligence Community translate into operating 

the TSA? 

General HARDING. Senator, it is not as exotic as it may sound. 

It was hard work, and I know you appreciate that. I believe that 

TSA across all modes of transportation, as I said earlier, can benefit by intelligence and being part of the process. I know that process very well because I have lived it, to your point. I know how to 

task the intelligence system; I know how robust it is. I know it has 

great leaders with innovative and creative ideas, and I need to tap 

into that, and I am hoping my experience will benefit TSA, if confirmed. 

Senator BURRIS. General Harding, there was a leak of the TSA 

manual. How do you plan to control that and what would you do 

to prevent something like that from happening under your watch? 

General HARDING. That release was a mistake. I know TSA went 

to great pains to review their process, and they have made corrections. I would systematically review processes like that and hold 

people accountable, Senator, for the kinds of the things that are 

readily available to the public. 

We are using, I believe, a good system that protects information 

within TSA right now, and I would reinforce that system. 

Senator BURRIS. General Harding, if you are confirmed, what 

would be your three top priorities for TSA? 

General HARDING. Identifying and neutralizing the threat, I believe, has to be the top priority. I think to your earlier point, taking 

care of the workforce. And then finally, an outreach to stakeholders, and those stakeholders would include folks in the technology industry, the research and development industry, our international partners as well as the airline and transportation industry, as well as privacy rights groups. I think reaching out to stakeholders would be very important. 

And getting back to the workforce, I would like to close my answer here with the comment that a well-trained, well-equipped, 

well-motivated, and well led workforce needs to be increasingly sophisticated, and I think I need to work on that. I appreciate what 

TSA is currently doing with their workforce in developing them, 

but I would reinforce that, if confirmed. 

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I just make one comment? 

Before I have to go preside, I would like to have permission to 

make one comment. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. 

Senator BURRIS. I just want this story to be on the public record. 

I told you in our meeting the other day about the experience I had 

with TSA in Chicago. I want you all to know that I showed up at 

the airport without my ID, but they know who I am at the Chicago 

Airport. There is no question. I did not even show it at the ticket 

counter because I was running late, and they gave me my boarding 

pass, and I reached the TSA checkpoint there, and I did not even 

have my wallet with me. So the gentleman called the supervisor, 

and the supervisor called another supervisor. 

14 

They knew who I was, but they went through every step in that 

manual to verify my identity before I got on that plane. General 

Harding, those employees have to be commended. We have to make 

sure that they understand that by carrying out their duties in that 

fashion—even though they could have said, ‘‘Senator, go ahead. 

You are a Senator.’’ They did not. And I am glad that they did not 

because we do not want that one person who would try to use that 

to get by and then may cause damage to some of our travelers. 

So please pass that on when you are confirmed. Thank you, General Harding. 

General HARDING. Thank you 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Burris, for telling that story, and I must say thank you for being the kind of person who would not pull rank at that moment. [Laughter.] 

Senator BURRIS. Two supervisors came, and they verified my address. I had no identification; I had nothing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It was a good story. Thanks for telling it. 

General HARDING. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. General Harding, we will do one more 

round. 

In the aftermath, and you referred to this briefly in your opening 

statement, of the Detroit bombing attempt, our Committee has 

been reviewing the processes the Federal Government and TSA 

employ in developing and utilizing the numerous terrorist 

watchlists—not only TSA, but obviously, the Terrorist Screening 

Center. 

One of the things that has perplexed me is that, as you know, 

there are over 400,000 individuals who have been identified as 

known or suspected terrorists. And a lot of it is suspected, I understand that. And they are on the consolidated Terrorist Screening 

Database, the so-called TSDB. 

But only a small subset of those people, about 12,000, currently 

meet the standards for the so-called Selectee List and face enhanced physical screening measures at our airports. There is the 

ultimate list, the No-Fly List, which is a list of the really bad folks 

that get pulled off and do not get on the plane. 

So it just seems to me and I would bet it would seem to most 

travelers that if we have this 400,000 TSDB list, even though it is 

not conclusive that these are terrorists, it is at least worth running 

the name of every passenger going on a plane through the computers to see whether there is a match and at least to pull them 

aside for a secondary screening. I know there is a review of this 

going on, and I want to ask you for some initial thoughts on that 

and, if I can put it this way, on what criteria you think TSA should 

apply as it does this review of the use of the Terrorist Watchlist. 

General HARDING. Senator, I think it is an excellent question. As 

you pointed out, the President directed a review, I believe, that is 

being headed up by John Brennan, and I think they should be coming to some recommendations here pretty soon. I would look forward, if confirmed, to being informed by that exhaustive review 

that John Brennan owes the President. 

15 

To your point, the 400,000 or so individuals on the Terrorist 

Screening Database, and looking at those individuals against how 

we receive within TSA the No-Fly List and the Selectee List, and 

also the Secure Flight process that we are working—I think this 

is something that I would like to look at if confirmed. I would like, 

one, to be informed by the process that John Brennan is leading, 

and then, two, to use the applications, conclusions, and recommendations to look at your discussion point on how do we best 

use the Terrorist Screening Database. 

Yes, there are fragments within that TSDB. It is not a bunch of 

information. It may just be one name. But how can we better use 

that to your point, Mr. Chairman, to protect the traveling public? 

I would look into that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that answer. Let me move to 

another subject, which is providing collective bargaining rights to 

the Transportation Security Officers. I know that this was discussed, I gather from newspaper accounts, at your hearing yesterday at the Commerce Committee and that you did not, if I understood the articles, state a particular position. 

I support collective bargaining rights for TSOs, although I understand any contract that was negotiated would have to put their security responsibilities first. As you know, we have done that quite 

successfully in a whole variety of law enforcement and intelligence 

and security rated organizations. In other words, they have been 

given collective bargaining rights, but it has not affected their ability to carry out their functions. 

President Obama has previously stated his support in general for 

the collective bargaining rights for these TSOs. The President has 

nominated you, but the article in the paper made it sound like you 

were neutral. I wanted to ask, since the President has taken this 

position, what you understand to be the position of the Administration as well as your own position on collective bargaining rights for 

the Transportation Security Officers. 

General HARDING. Mr. Chairman, my understanding of the position of the Administration is exactly the same as yours. I also understand—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Meaning that they are in favor of collective bargaining? 

General HARDING. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

General HARDING. My understanding also of the Administration 

is, and especially listening to my colleagues, that this Administration is informed by recommendations from, and in the case of my 

colleagues, flag officers. Whether it be on the closing of Guantanamo or ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’’ and I think the focus, which I 

would believe you would agree is very important, would be on the 

implementation if that is the decision. 

If confirmed, I think it is very important that the implementation of such a policy, if that is the direction both the Administration and the Secretary choose to go, should be part and parcel of 

working the decision. It may sound like I am being neutral, I think 

it should come across as being thoughtful, and I think I owe both 

to the Secretary and to the President the implications on if that 

policy was implemented. 

16 

And if confirmed, I guarantee you, Mr. Chairman, my recommendations would be very unbiased, they would be very factual, 

and I think that is what I would owe the Secretary and the President. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate the analogy to the ‘‘Don’t 

Ask, Don’t Tell’’ repeal because it is in our minds. 

In other words, and it is comparable, the President has stated a 

position there as here. Secretary Gates is doing a review; Admiral 

Mullen is doing a review, which in my opinion is geared to how 

best to implement the decision of the Commander-in-Chief. Am I 

right that is essentially what you are saying you are going to do 

here? 

General HARDING. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and make a recommendation then to the Secretary and the President. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very good. My time is up. I would just 

add this, and I think I may have mentioned this to you in my office. 

As you said, we travel a lot and we see a lot of TSOs, and on 

two occasions now I have had TSOs sort of, in a friendly way, follow me out and ask me for a moment and say they were concerned 

that promotions within TSA were being done on what they described as a political basis. They did not mean Democrat/Republican. I think they meant in the classic organizational sense of internal politics. 

Now look, for all I know these two people had sought promotions 

and felt that they were unjustifiably denied. You come from organizations that are highly organized in your background. But I know 

certainly based on your HSA story you understand the importance 

of having the best people brought to the top. So, I know it is a big 

organization now, about 50,000 employees, but I think part of what 

will be important in not only improving effectiveness but morale is 

to make sure you do a double check to make sure that the people 

being promoted are really the best that can be promoted. 

General HARDING. Mr. Chairman, I totally understand your message, and I agree with it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I want to 

follow up on an issue that I raised in my opening statement about 

the importance of operational testing. We have seen the waste of 

taxpayer dollars by TSA because of new technology which worked 

great in the lab, but failed to work in a real life environment in 

the airport. I would think that one way to ensure that we always 

have operational testing is for TSA to have a written policy requiring operational testing. 

Could you give me your thoughts on that issue, please? 

General HARDING. Senator, I agree with you. I agree with, I believe it was, a GAO report. I believe that with the operational testing of equipment, especially when you are talking the amount, the 

size, the footprint, and most importantly the cost of this equipment, 

we are dealing with stakeholders who have to implement and put 

into practice the policies attendant to that equipment. The equipment needs to be tested. We need to provide stakeholders a chance 

to comment, even on the testing, and I believe the process should 

17 

look more like what I think you and I discussed, which is more like 

what we see in the Department of Defense. 

And I think I can bring that to the table, Senator. And I absolutely agree with your point, and if confirmed, I would reinforce, 

as you pointed out, the process that TSA currently put in place 

with the AITs, but I think we can reinforce that with all of the 

technologies going forward. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I want to bring up the privacy concerns that have been raised with regard to whole body imaging 

technology. We recently had the Acting TSA Administrator testify 

before us, and she said that TSA has done a great deal to implement measures from a privacy standpoint to protect the traveling 

public. 

Have you had the opportunity to look at this issue? 

General HARDING. I did, Senator, and I will share with you that 

in my visit to Reagan Airport that was upmost in my mind. I had 

read the reports, like many. I had seen Acting Administrator Gale 

Rossides’ testimony. 

I visited Reagan National Airport. I saw the Millimeter Wave 

Machine, the one that goes around. I went to the booth, which was 

a distance away from the actual AIT machine, and inside the 

booth, before I got in, my phone was taken away. I got in the booth. 

I did talk to the TSO. I looked at the screen. I asked questions 

about what it was, how he is able to store or not store. It turns 

out he could not store the image. 

I did get to see a live scan where a woman on the line did walk 

through and had something in her left pocket that was identified 

on the screen. The TSO identified that to the person on the line. 

The woman went back through; it was removed. 

Two things on privacy. I can assure you there was no way for 

that TSO to store that information. I had no way to record the information because my phone was taken away from me as reported. 

And more importantly, I could not even leave the booth, Senator, 

until that woman had cleared the area. 

The policies and procedures that TSA put in place are being followed. I think they are very thoughtful, and I think they are made 

with privacy in mind, and I felt very comfortable that day with 

that experience, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. That is very helpful. I want to follow up on, for 

my final questions, two issues that the Chairman raised. Both the 

Chairman and I have spent a great deal of time looking at why 

Abdulmutallab was not stopped in light of the fact that there were 

credible intelligence reports about him from his own father. And 

that information, had it been linked to information from Yemen, 

would have been sufficient to put him on the Terrorist Watch List 

or perhaps even the No-Fly List, which is the highest list. 

Do you think that TSA needs to make better use of intelligence 

data, even if it is fragmentary, to screen airline passenger data 

overseas and require perhaps additional screening or questioning of 

passengers? 

General HARDING. I do, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. One of the reasons that I think your background is so ideal for this job is you do bring an intelligence backVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:44 Aug 02, 2011 Jkt 56894 PO 00000 Frm 000021 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06633 P:\DOCS\56894.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
18 

ground, and I think that is going to be very helpful, should you be 

confirmed, not only to TSA, but throughout DHS. 

DHS is always reminding us that they are a consumer not a producer of intelligence. Having someone who has been on the producer end, the collection end, I think will be very helpful to the Department. 

General HARDING. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. Finally, let me end my questioning by going to 

the collective bargaining issue that you discussed with the Chairman. 

As you know from our discussion, I believe that we should be focused on ensuring that individuals at TSA have the right to appeal 

to the Merit Systems Protection Board, or to some other unbiased 

body, adverse personnel actions. I think that is really the issue 

here rather than full collective bargaining rights. 

In order to perform its critical mission, the TSA has to be able 

to shift resources, including people, on very short notice. We saw 

that in the summer of 2006 in response to the liquids bombing plot 

from Great Britain where TSA was able to change the nature of its 

employees’ work and even the location of that work in response to 

that emergency. I think we have to be extremely careful as we proceed in this area that we do not take away the absolutely critical 

authority that the head of TSA must have to respond to threats, 

to respond to an emergency, and to respond even to a severe snowstorm such as happened in December 2006 when severe blizzards 

hit the Denver area and TSA officers were not able to get to the 

airport. They had to be ferried in from Las Vegas to cover shifts. 

If we lose that flexibility because those changes in location or duties or the nature of the work have to be bargained, that is going 

to undermine our security, and I am asking today for your commitment to ensuring that TSA continues to have those vital flexibilities that allow a quick reaction to ever-changing circumstances, to 

new threats, to everything from a terrorist plot to a blizzard. 

And that is my question for you today. 

General HARDING. Senator, you have my commitment that, if 

confirmed as the Administrator, I would never negotiate away the 

authorities for the flexibility and the urgency that you described. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Thanks to you, 

General Harding. 

Maybe I will just mention one other thing that I want to put on 

your screen. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 included a requirement that TSA regulate the 

transportation of the most dangerous rail cargos, including toxic inhalation hazard gas, explosives, and radioactive cargo, in the language of the statute, using ‘‘the safest and most secure routes.’’ Unfortunately, from what I have heard, that provision seems to have 

been implemented in a way that, at least in some cases, has had 

the opposite effect with, for instance, materials that come under 

that statutory description going through High Threat Urban Areas. 

So I wanted to ask you to take a tough look at that issue to make 

sure that we are protecting the public in densely populated areas. 

19 

General HARDING. I am familiar with that. I can tell you, Mr. 

Chairman, I will look forward to working with you and your Committee on that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. Thank you. I want to note the presence and welcome an unexpected guest, Congresswoman Sheila 

Jackson Lee, who I would guess is here both personally and in her 

capacity as Chair of the Transportation Security Subcommittee of 

the House Homeland Security Committee. This is one of those 

happy examples of bipartisan and bicameral cooperation. It is an 

honor to have you here. 

General Harding, thanks for your answers to our questions. We 

are going to keep the record open for 5 days for additional questions or statements. It is probably going to be hard with everything 

going on for the Commerce Committee and this Committee to complete work on your confirmation before the recess. But our staffs 

are going to work on it over the recess, and it will certainly be my 

hope to have a business meeting right after we get back so we can, 

assuming there are no problems, and I hope and trust there will 

not be, get you on the job as quickly as possible. 

General HARDING. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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