[Cite as State v. Fantauzzi, 2012-Ohio-1136.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HENRY COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 7-11-16 

 v. 

ALEXIS FANTAUZZI O P I N I O N 

 APPELLANT-DEFENDANT. 

 

Appeal from Henry County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 11CR0043 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: March 19, 2012 

 

APPEARANCES: 

William F. Hayes for Appellant 

John H. Hanna for Appellee 
CASE NO. 7-11-16 

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SHAW, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Alexis Fantauzzi (“Fantauzzi”), appeals the 

September 6, 2011 judgment of the Henry County Court of Common Pleas 

sentencing him to three years of community control and ninety-eight days in the 

Correctional Center Northwest Ohio with credit for ninety-eight days served upon 

his plea of guilty to R.C. 2913.51, receiving stolen property, a felony of the fourth 

degree. 

{¶2} On June 1, 2011, Fantauzzi was arrested on the charge of criminal 

mischief. On June 28, 2011 Fantauzzi was indicted on the charge of receiving 

stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A), a felony of the fourth degree as 

the property was a motor vehicle. 

{¶3} On July 11, 2011, the day of the scheduled arraignment, Fantauzzi 

entered a written negotiated plea whereby Fantauzzi would plead guilty to R.C. 

2913.51, receiving stolen property, a felony of the fourth degree. In exchange the 

State agreed to recommend a sentence of community control with local 

incarceration. Under the terms of the deal, Fantauzzi would stay in the local jail 

until sentencing which was set for September 6, 2011 and then he would be 

released with credit for time served. 
CASE NO. 7-11-16 

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{¶4} After negotiations the court went through the required Criminal Rule 

11 dialogue and accepted Fantauzzi’s guilty plea. The court then ordered a 

presentence investigation and set sentencing for September 6, 2011. 

{¶5} At sentencing on September 6, 2011 the court imposed a period of 

community control of three years and ordered as a condition of the community 

control that Fantauzzi serve 98 days in jail. He was then given credit for 98 days 

served. On September 21, 2011, the court filed a judgment entry terminating 

Fantauzzi’s community control due to the fact that he had moved out of state. 

{¶6} Fantauzzi filed this appeal and asserts one assignment of error for our 

review. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

APPELLANT’S PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, 

INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE 

DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 

RIGHT TO A TRIAL. 

{¶7} Fantauzzi alleges that the court failed to comply with Criminal Rule 

11(C)(2)(a) during the plea colloquy by not informing him of the possibility of 

post-release control. Because of this, Fantauzzi argues, his plea was not entered 

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Specifically, Fantauzzi claims that he 

was not informed that if he was immediately sent to prison, that upon his release 

he may be subject to a period of post-release control. 
CASE NO. 7-11-16 

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{¶8} “Pursuant to Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(a), a trial court is required to inform an 

offender of a number of nonconstitutional issues, including the maximum penalty 

involved, before accepting a defendant’s guilty plea.” State v. Fleming, 6th Dist. 

No OT-07-024, 2008-Ohio-3844, ¶ 10 (analyzing post-release control as one of 

those issues) citing State v. Harrington, 2d Dist. No. 06-CA-29, 2007-Ohio-1335, 

¶ 11. Nonconstitutional aspects of the plea colloquy are subject to review under a 

standard of substantial compliance. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-

Ohio-4415, ¶ 12 citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107 (1990). “Substantial 

compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant 

subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” 

State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). 

{¶9} Failure to adequately inform a defendant of his nonconstitutional 

rights at a plea hearing will not invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby 

suffered prejudice. Griggs at ¶ 12 citing Nero at 107. For Fantauzzi to establish 

prejudice, he would have to demonstrate that his plea would not have been made 

otherwise. Id. 

{¶10} In his Criminal Rule 11 dialogue Fantauzzi was informed that if he 

violated community control and was sent to prison, he could be placed on postrelease control upon his release from prison. Nevertheless, he now argues that he 

was not advised that if he were to be sent to prison immediately without 
CASE NO. 7-11-16 

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community control, that he might be subject to post-release control upon being 

released from prison. 

{¶11} First, we observe that even if the plea dialogue was not in strict 

compliance with Crim. R. 11, the trial court was in substantial compliance as 

Fantauzzi was subjectively aware of the implications of his plea related to postrelease control. Fantuazzi was specifically informed that he could be subject to 

post-release control if he was sent to prison. Fantauzzi signed a written plea 

agreement alerting him to that fact. The pertinent portion of the written plea 

agreement reads, 

[a]fter prison release, I may have up to (3) years of post-release 

control.1

 The parole board could return me to prison for up to 

nine months for each violation of those conditions, for a total of 

50% of my stated term. If the violation is a new felony, I could 

receive a new prison term of the greater of one year or the time 

remaining on post release control. 

(Doc. No. 7). 

{¶12} Fantauzzi was also informed at the plea hearing that if sent to prison, 

he could be subject to post-release control. 

THE COURT: If in fact you were referred or sentenced to any 

prison term as a result of the violation you’re not entitled to 

good time if you’re serving a prison term as a violation of 

Community Control and after you’re released you could be 

placed upon post-release control for up to three years, that is a 

may. The Parole Authority could return you to prison for up to 

nine months if you violate the conditions of post-release control 

 

1

 The sentence as typed in the written plea agreement has ‘may/will’ with ‘will’ scratched out and ‘3/5’ 

with ‘5’ scratched out so that it reads as written above. 
CASE NO. 7-11-16 

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to a maximum of fifty percent of any additional prison time. If 

the violation would be a new felony, you could receive a new 

prison term of the greater of one year or the time remaining on 

the post-release control. Now that is kind of complicated but did 

you follow that. 

Mr. Fantauzzi: Yes. 

(July 11, 2011 Tr. at 11-12). Furthermore, the plea dialogue covers the fact that 

Fantauzzi read and claimed to have understood the written plea agreement and that 

his attorney had gone over it with him. (July 11, 2011 Tr. at 9). 

{¶13} The Sixth District Court of Appeals found that a defendant was 

sufficiently notified of non-mandatory post-release control where he had read and 

signed a similar written plea agreement and the trial court had the defendant 

acknowledge that he had read and signed the written plea agreement. Fleming, 

supra at ¶¶ 9-24. Here the trial court went a step further than the court in Fleming

and addressed the possibility of post-release control in the plea dialogue with 

Fantauzzi. In sum, Fantauzzi was aware of the possibility of being subject to postrelease control following any potential prison term prior to entering his plea. 

{¶14} Moreover, Fantauzzi concedes in his brief that post-release control is 

not mandatory in his case. All of the cases that Fantauzzi cites in support of his 

argument that his plea should be vacated stand for the principle that if Fantauzzi 

was not advised at all of a mandatory term of post release control then his plea 

should be vacated. See State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86 (2008) at syllabus; 
CASE NO. 7-11-16 

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State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, ¶ 10. That is simply not 

the case here. Fantauzzi was clearly informed that he may be subject to postrelease control after any prison term and that any post-release control was not 

mandatory. 

{¶15} Furthermore, Fantauzzi is unable to establish any prejudice. 

Ultimately Fantauzzi was not sentenced to any period of post-release control. 

Thus, the record is devoid of how any further notification regarding post-release 

control would have altered Fantauzzi’s decision to plead guilty. Fantauzzi’s plea 

was given in exchange for local incarceration and credit for time served—a 

sentence that found him in a local jail for just over three months on a charge that 

could have resulted in an 18 month prison sentence. Though at sentencing 

Fantauzzi tried to negotiate with the trial court to lessen the amount of community 

control he would receive, he originally entered his plea knowing the implications 

as evidenced by his written plea agreement and the plea dialogue at the hearing. 

As it turns out, Fantauzzi only served 15 days of the three years of community 

control before the court terminated the community control due to his relocation out 

of state. 

{¶16} There is no indication that Fantauzzi would have made a different 

decision had he been informed that if he was somehow sent to prison immediately 

without community control he could eventually be subject to post-release control 
CASE NO. 7-11-16 

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upon release from prison, especially in light of the fact that a prison sentence was 

not imposed. Moreover, at this point, Fantauzzi has no possibility of going to 

prison or being placed on post-release control as his community control has been 

terminated. 

{¶17} For these reasons, Fantauzzi’s assignment of error is overruled and 

the judgment is affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI and ROGERS, J.J., concur. 

/jlr