SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1699-18T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RON D. SANDERS, a/k/a 

TRYSHAWN RACCO, DESMOND

MADISON, DESMOND MASISON,

DARELL NELSON, ZYRON

NELSON, JASMIRE NELSON,

DYRELL OVERTON, ROGEA

OVERTON, DESMOND PARHAM, 

TARIQ PARHAM, RON SANDER, 

TRISHAWN SANDERS, and ZYRON

SANDERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted October 22, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Fisher and Accurso.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Indictment No. 13-12-1011.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 29, 2019
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Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Rochelle Mareka Amelia Watson, Deputy 

Public Defender II, of counsel and on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Adam David Klein, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

We are asked in this appeal to consider the constitutionality of a search of 

a residence when only one of two occupants consents. In such instances, 

constitutional benchmarks have been established. In Georgia v. Rudolph, 547 

U.S. 103, 121 (2006), the Court held that when "a potential defendant with selfinterest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant's permission 

does not suffice for a reasonable search." In a later case, the Court determined 

that a lawfully arrested and detained co-occupant stands in the same place as an

absent occupant. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 303 (2014).1 Guided 

by these principles, we examine whether police were obligated to seek the 

 

1 Our Supreme Court, in State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 338 (2014), restated these 

principles, concluding that "when faced with the circumstances of a present and 

objecting co-occupant, it is objectively unreasonable for police to rely on the 

consenting occupant." The Court then also held that "police responsibility for 

[an] unlawful detention or removal of a tenant who was prevented from being 

present at the scene to voice [an] objection to the search is not equivalent to 

other neutral circumstances causing the defendant's absence." Id. at 340.
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consent of defendant, who was arrested and detained but physically nearby; we 

also consider whether defendant actually objected to the search.

This is not the first time we have reviewed the denial of defendant's

motion to suppress evidence seized from a residence he shared with M.P. In an 

earlier appeal, we expressed uncertainty about the trial judge's determination 

that M.P.'s consent was sufficient "because of the lack of findings about the 

impact of the principles outlined" in Randolph and Coles and, so, we remanded 

"for further findings." State v. Sanders, No. A-2431-16 (App. Div. Mar. 16, 

2018) (slip op. at 2). In expounding on the information critical to the 

determination, we stated that the record largely revealed only that defendant was 

arrested and seated in a police car outside his apartment building – apparently 

at the same time police requested and obtained M.P.'s consent to search. The 

record did "not reveal whether defendant was asked for consent or given an 

opportunity to object," nor "whether defendant actually objected" from his 

nearby location. Id. at 5.

Following our remand, the trial judge heard the testimony of both the 

arresting officer and defendant. The judge found the officer credible when he 

testified that defendant was arrested outside the apartment and seated in a patrol 

car when consent was sought from M.P.; it was also confirmed that the police 
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did not seek defendant's consent. The judge found as well that defendant was 

not credible when he asserted that he objected by telling the police at that time

"not [to] go in [his] apartment."

In light of the constitutional framework described above, we conclude that 

the search was lawful without defendant's consent because, having been lawfully

arrested and detained – there being no argument that the arrest or detention was 

unlawful – defendant was, for the purpose of securing consent, absent from the 

scene. Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 303; Coles, 218 N.J. at 340. Police had no 

obligation in this situation to seek defendant's consent. And, based on 

credibility findings, the judge determined that defendant did not in fact object 

to the search of his residence. 

The judge's fact findings, which are entitled to our deference, State v. 

Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2008), support the conclusion that the police acted 

reasonably in these circumstances when seeking only M.P.'s consent to search 

the residence. We, thus, affirm the order denying defendant's suppression 

motion.

In deciding the earlier appeal, we expressly declined to consider 

defendant's argument that the sentence imposed was excessive. Sanders, slip 

op. at 2. Following the denial of his suppression motion, defendant entered into 
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a plea agreement and pleaded guilty in one indictment to: third-degree 

distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

7; third-degree CDS possession with the intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

5(a)(1) and -5(b)(3); and second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b). The 

judge sentenced defendant on the first of these convictions to an eight-year 

prison term, subject to a forty-two-month period of parole ineligibility, and a 

concurrent five-year prison term on the eluding conviction; on the other CDS 

conviction, the judge imposed a seven-year prison term, which was ordered to 

run consecutively to the eight-year term. Pursuant to the plea agreement, as to 

another indictment, defendant also pleaded guilty to third-degree CDS 

possession with the intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and -5(b)(3), and 

on that conviction, the judge imposed a five-year term, concurrent to the 

aggregate sentence imposed in the other indictment. In imposing these prison 

terms, the judge found aggravating factors three, six, and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(3), (6), (9), and no mitigating factors.

In his appeal, defendant contends that the sentence was excessive because 

the judge failed to find and apply mitigating factors that apply when 

imprisonment would cause hardship to the defendant or dependents, N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-1(b)(11), and when the defendant has substantially cooperated with law 
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enforcement, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(12). We find insufficient merit in defendant's 

arguments about his sentence to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.