[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 101 (Wednesday, May 24, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33537-33541]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-13008]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. EL00-75-000]


Notice of Interim Procedures To Support Industry Reliability 
Efforts and Request for Comments

May 17, 2000.
    As the electric industry prepares for another summer of potentially 
high peak demands, the Commission believes it is important to identify 
practical steps the Commission and others can take to support the 
industry's efforts to ensure the continued reliability of the electric 
power system.\1\ Accordingly, the Commission hereby announces a number 
of specific actions it will implement on an interim basis this summer, 
and requests comments on these and other actions the Commission could 
take to assist others in their efforts to address system reliability 
this summer.
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    \1\ We note that other governmental and industry sources share a 
heightened awareness to current reliability issues. See, e.g., 
Report of the U.S. Department of Energy's Power Outage Study Team, 
Findings and Recommendations to Enhance Reliability from the Summer 
of 1999, at S-1, S-2 (March 2000) (``the reliability events of the 
summer of 1999 demonstrated that the necessary operating practices, 
regulatory policies, and technological tools for assuring an 
acceptable level of reliability were not yet in place''); 
Investigation Into The Adequacy and Availability of Electric Power 
(Pub. Util. Comm. of Ohio, Case No. 00-617-EL-COI, April 10, 2000) 
(Ohio Commission notes that ECAR is predicting a tight capacity 
situation this summer); High Temperatures & Electricity Demand: An 
Assessment of Supply Adequacy in California Trends & Outlook (July 
1999) (California Energy Commission staff report showing decreasing 
reserve margins); Northwest Power Planning Council, Pacific 
Northwest Power Supply Adequacy/Reliability Study (February 2000) 
(24 percent probability of being unable to serve winter loads by 
2003).
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Background

    While the Commission does not have direct responsibility over 
reliability matters, its consistent policy has been to assure that the 
exercise of its ratemaking and other jurisdictional responsibilities 
supports and facilities the continued high degree of reliability that 
has existed in the U.S. Indeed, transmission system reliability is one 
of the principal issues sought to be addressed by the Commission's 
recent rulemaking on Regional Transmission Organizations. \2\ The 
Commission has also been monitoring the functioning of electricity 
markets and has been encouraging good utility practices through its 
Enforcement Hotline and other programs.
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    \2\ Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 FR 
809 (2000), FERC Stats. and Reg. para. 31,089 at 30,997-99 (1999), 
order on reh'g, Order No. 2000-A, 65 FR 12,088 (March 8, 2000), FERC 
Stats. and Regs. para. 31,092 (2000).
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    Our objective is not to become involved in the day-to-day operation 
of the electric grid or to duplicate or supplant the efforts of others 
in the industry that are engaged in inquiries about electric 
reliability issues. However, it is important that the Commission 
exercise its regulatory mandate in a manner that supports, and does not 
impede, efforts to enhance reliability throughout the industry. The 
Commission has identified five actions that it can take, in exercising 
its regulatory responsibilities, that may provide such support this 
summer by, for example, supporting efforts to increase generation 
supply, supporting efforts to implement demand-side management, and 
supporting efforts to maximize the amount of Available Transmission 
Capability (ATC) this summer. In addition to these actions, the 
Commission will be expediting individual cases affecting reliability 
planning for this summer which are pending before the Commission in 
other dockets.

Actions Commission Will Implement During the Summer of 2000

    The Commission hereby announces the following actions that it will 
implement to support the electric industry's efforts in dealing with 
reliability issues this summer. Although these actions are within the 
Commission's authority to implement on an immediate basis and will be 
in effect on an experimental basis from the date of this Notice through 
September 30, 2000, we invite comments on them.
    1. There are many businesses that have installed generators at 
their business location to meet a portion of their own demands or to 
serve as a backstop to their purchase of electricity from the local 
grid. These generators may provide a ready source of generation 
capacity during periods when power markets are facing a temporary 
generation shortage. Indeed, we recently approved a tariff under which 
the owners of such generation could sell electricity to a power 
marketer in InPower Marketing Corporation.\3\ In order to facilitate 
the use of existing on-site generators to meet demand, the Commission 
will adopt a streamlined regulatory procedure to accommodate sales from 
such facilities to any entity engaged in sales of electric energy. 
Owners of generating facilities located at business locations and used 
primarily for back-up for self-generation, who would become subject to 
the Federal Power Act by virtue of sales of power from such 
facilities,\4\ will be permitted to sell power at wholesale from such 
facilities to non-affiliated entities without prior notice under 
section 205 of the FPA. Pursuant to FPA section 205(d), we find good 
cause to waive the prior notice requirements for such sales. Further, 
the Commission hereby grants waiver of its regulations consistent with 
our recent orders on market-based rates,\5\ and authorizes market-based 
rates during the identified time period, subject to the following 
requirements: The wholesale purchasers

[[Page 33538]]

of power from such facilities must report to the Commission the names 
of each such seller from whom power was purchased, the aggregate amount 
of capacity and/or energy purchased from each seller, and the aggregate 
compensation paid to each seller.\6\ To minimize the number of required 
reports, the purchaser may make one report for all purchases through 
September 30, and, if it otherwise files quarterly transactions 
summaries with the Commission, may include this report as a separate 
section of its transaction summary for the third calendar quarter of 
2000. If the purchaser does not otherwise file quarterly transactions 
summaries, it should file this report with the Commission by October 
31, 2000.\7\
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    \3\ Order Accepting For Filing Proposed Market-Based Rate 
Schedule And Granting Waivers, 90 FERC para. 61,329 (2000) 
(InPower).
    \4\ We note that while entities become ``public utilities'' 
subject to the Federal Power Act when they commence the sale of 
electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce, they cease to 
be public utilities when such sales cease (assuming they engage in 
no other activities that would make them public utilities) without 
further Commission action. See Century Power Corporation, 72 FERC 
para. 61,045 at 61,279 (1995).
    \5\ See, e.g., InPower, 90 FERC at 62,105; Reliant Energy, Inc., 
et al., 91 FERC para. 61,073 at Appendix B (2000). The Commission 
has generally waived for such sellers the following parts of its 
regulations in 18 CFR: most of Subparts B and C of Part 35 
(documentation), Part 41 (accounting verification), Part 101 
(prescribed Uniform System of Accounts), and Part 141 (annual 
reports). In addition, where requirements are statutory, the 
Commission has allowed such sellers to make shortened filings to 
satisfy Part 33 (disposition of facilities) and Part 45 
(interlocking positions), and has granted blanket authorizations for 
issuances of securities (Part 34).
    \6\ Although we are asking all wholesale purchasers who seek to 
take advantage of these special procedures to file these reports, it 
is not our intent to assert jurisdiction over any wholesale 
purchaser who is not otherwise subject to our jurisdiction, and the 
submission of such reports will not alter a purchaser's 
jurisdictional status.
    \7\ These streamlined procedures are offered as an option. Any 
jurisdictional seller may also follow standard filing requirements 
if desired.
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    2. There may be opportunities during the upcoming summer for public 
utilities to make demand-side arrangements with their wholesale 
customers. For example, some wholesale requirements customers may have 
the ability to enter arrangements with their own retail customers to 
reduce load or obtain power from an industrial generator. Or, a partial 
requirements customers may have access to generating capacity on its 
own system. We want to ensure that public utilities will be able to 
work with their customers to negotiate mutually beneficial arrangements 
on short notice should the need arise during periods of peak summer 
demand or should other events occur that affect system reliability. 
Since time may be of the essence as these opportunities are discovered 
and negotiated, we find good cause to waive the FPA's prior notice 
requirement for any rate schedule amendments that may be required to 
effect these types of arrangements. Thus, to the extent a mutually 
agreeable DSM alternative changes the terms and conditions of a 
contract within our jurisdiction, we will grant waiver of the filing of 
prior notice of the change. By October 31, 2000, the public utility 
supplier must amend the filed rate schedule. The filing must consist of 
a report containing the following information: the FERC rate schedule 
numbers, the load reduction negotiated under the DSM arrangement (MW/
MWh), total compensation, and the name of each affected wholesale 
customer.
    3. While most power sales are currently transacted under market-
based rates, there are occasions when utilities continue to operate 
under cost-based rates. Often, these cost-based rate incorporate 
formulas that are intended to track the actual out-of-pocket (i.e., 
incremental) cost that was incurred to generate or purchase the energy. 
During periods of generation shortage, some utilities may be in a 
position to engage in DSM transactions with their wholesale and retail 
requirements customers in order to free up capacity for resale to 
neighboring utilities. These transactions will not take place unless 
any DSM expenditures can also be recovered under the rate formula, as 
are all other out-of-pocket costs. However, most rate schedules define 
out-of-pocket or incremental cost in terms of expenses incurred to 
generate power, rather than costs incurred to compensate a preexisting 
customer to reduce load. A few jurisdictional utilities have amended 
their cost-based pricing formulas to recognize the fact that DSM costs 
are a form of out-of-pocket or incremental cost.\8\ In order to 
eliminate any disincentive to rely on DSM as a source of supply during 
generation shortages, we clarify that DSM costs should be treated 
consistently with all other types of incremental and out-of-pocket 
costs.
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    \8\ See, e.g., Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket No. 
ER99-2180-000.
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    4. In prior orders, we have noted that the deductions from ATC to 
reflect reliability needs (Capacity Benefit Margin or CBM) can often be 
reduced in the near-term as the transmission provider gains certainty 
as to whether the assumptions underlying the CBM computation have, in 
fact, materialized.\9\ The Commission takes this opportunity to remind 
transmission providers that they are required to reassess CBM 
assumptions for the current period and determine whether they have, in 
fact, materialized, e.g., load, temperature and generation outages.\10\ 
Another element of the ATC calculation is the Transmission Reliability 
Margin (TRM), i.e., transmission capacity that is set aside to account 
for the inherent uncertainty in system conditions and the need for 
operating flexibility to ensure reliable system operation as system 
conditions change.\11\ Since the assumptions underlying TRM 
calculations similarly become more certain in the near-term, we expect 
transmission providers to engage in the same periodic reassessment of 
TRM needs. Any changes in CBM and TRM must, of course, be reflected in 
recalculated ATC. By keeping both CBM and TRM set-aside values up to 
date, OASIS postings will be more accurate. Accurate ATC is crucial to 
facilitating power sale transactions that can relieve stresses on the 
Nation's electric systems.
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    \9\ Capacity Benefit Margin in Computing Available Transmission 
Capacity, 88 FERC para. 61,099 (1999) (CBM Order).
    \10\ CBM Order at 61,237.
    \11\ NERC White Paper, Transmission Capability Margins and Their 
Use in ATC Determination, 4 (June 17, 1999).
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    5. The Commission will be responsive throughout the summer period 
to suggestions and questions regarding actions that relate to electric 
system reliability. The Commission is directing its staff to assist 
with regulatory questions related to practical ideas about what the 
Commission can do to support the electric industry's efforts with 
respect to reliability issues. The Commission staff, including the 
Hotline staff, will be available to respond to questions and 
suggestions in this regard.

Actions Others Could Take

    There are likely other actions that could be taken, either by 
industry participants or state regulators, that could alleviate 
potential reliability problems during this summer. These include using 
demand-side management and applying market mechanisms to stimulate 
demand-side response; eliminating any regulatory disincentives to 
customers' integrating on-site supply and demand solutions; promoting 
energy efficiency; and improving coordination and preparation for 
electricity emergencies.\12\ Where the Commission does not have a 
direct role in such matters, we seek suggestions from state authorities 
and industry organizations as to how we could assist in these, or 
other, areas.
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    \12\ We also understand that the National Association of 
Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) Staff Subcommittee on 
Electric Reliability has various projects underway that are looking 
into such matters as distribution system vulnerability to summer 
heat and peak loading, and interconnection of distributed 
generation.
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Request for Comments

    The Commission seeks the views of industry participants, 
organizations, and state regulatory authorities on the actions 
identified herein and on identifying what other short-term measures the 
Commission and others could take to alleviate reliability stress during 
peak periods.
    For example, in the short term, are there any Commission 
regulations that

[[Page 33539]]

the Commission should consider waiving to facilitate electricity 
commerce during periods when electricity markets are stressed? Can the 
Commission do more in the short-term to facilitate interconnections? We 
note that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio has opened an inquiry 
into the readiness of its electric utilities to respond to higher 
demands for electricity this summer.\13\ Is there anything the 
Commission should do to support such efforts?
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    \13\ See supra note 1.
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    In addition, while our request for comments is directed primarily 
toward interim initiatives to alleviate reliability concerns for this 
summer, would it be useful for the Commission to convene a public 
conference later in the year to discuss longer-term initiatives 
relating to electric system operation during peak demand periods? Are 
there longer-term initiatives that the Commission should consider, such 
as initiating a review of regional market rules with the goal of 
clarifying aspects that are ambiguous? The Commission is interested in 
hearing from such organizations as state regulatory authorities, trade 
groups, independent system operators, and the North American Electric 
Reliability Council as to what longer-term measures they or the 
Commission should consider to deal with reliability stresses.
    We request that any comments on short-term interim measures be 
submitted to us by June 2, 2000. Such comments should be concise and 
specifically focused on either the specific actions implemented in this 
Notice or other specific actions capable of being accomplished in the 
short term. We request that any comments on longer-term initiatives or 
actions be submitted to us by June 30, 2000. Interested persons should 
submit an original and 14 copies of any comments to the Office of the 
Secretary, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, 
Washington, DC 20426, and should reference Docket No. EL00-75-000.

The Commission orders:

    (A) For entities meeting the qualifications set forth in Paragraph 
1 of this Notice, and who satisfy the reporting requirements set forth 
in that Paragraph, the following advance waivers and authorizations are 
hereby granted for the period beginning the date of this Notice until 
September 30, 2000:
    (1) The prior notice requirement of section 205 of the Federal 
Power Act is hereby waived.
    (2) Waiver is hereby granted for Parts 35, 41, 101, and 141 of the 
Commission's regulations.
    (3) Authorization is hereby granted to issue securities and assume 
obligations and liabilities, provided that such issue or assumption is 
for some lawful object within the corporate purposes of the eligible 
entities, compatible with the public interest, and reasonably necessary 
or appropriate for such purposes.
    (4) The full requirements of Part 45 of the Commission's 
regulations, except as noted, are hereby waived with respect to any 
person now holding or who may hold an otherwise proscribed interlocking 
directorate involving any eligible entity. Any such person instead 
shall file a sworn application providing the following information:
    (a) full name and business address; and
    (b) all jurisdictional interlocks, identifying the affected 
companies and the positions held by that person.
    (B) The prior notice requirement for rate schedule changes 
described in Paragraph 2 of this Notice is hereby waived, conditioned 
on the public utility complying with the filing requirements set forth 
in that Paragraph.

    By direction of the Commission. Commissioner Hebert concurred 
with a separate statement attached.
Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.

Notice of Interim Procedures To Support Industry Reliability Efforts 
and Request for Comments

[Docket No. EL00-75-000]
Issued May 17, 2000.

HEBERT, Commissioner, concurring

    I certainly agree with my colleagues that the Commission's 
actions should promote the continued reliability of the electric 
power system. And I agree that the Commission should take 
affirmative steps, to the extent consistent with its jurisdictional 
authority, to enhance the reliability of the system this summer and 
future summers. Because today's notice does not appear to hurt our 
reliability efforts, and might offer some slight marginal benefit, I 
concur with its issuance.
    But I write separately to lament the lost opportunity this 
notice represents. Unfortunately, the Commission today offers little 
that will significantly enhance the reliability of the electrical 
grid. The Commission could be doing so much more to address the 
perceived problem. All today's notice actually accomplishes is to 
announce that the Commission is doing its job, and deflect blame for 
any disruptions this summer to Congress. In my judgment, any blame 
should be directed at this Commission for not taking decisive action 
last summer and two summers ago, and in all previous seasons, to 
promote capital investment in our energy infrastructure and new 
entry into emerging competitive markets.
    I find peculiar the timing of today's notice. In the 2\1/2\ 
years I have served as Commissioner, the Commission has refrained 
from moving too ambitiously and directly into the reliability arena. 
I have admired the Commission's restraint. For example, the 
Commission admirably resisted the temptation to demonstrate its 
regulatory muscle in responding to the Midwestern ``price spikes'' 
during the summer of 1998. Despite pleas from some that temporarily 
high prices suggested a system on the verge of collapse, the 
Commission resisted the urge to intercede into emerging competitive 
wholesale markets by, among other things, developing reliability and 
financial integrity standards.
    Rather, the Commission historically has left matters of 
reliability to the true experts in the field--the North American 
Electric Reliability Council, the various regional reliability 
councils around the country, and all affected industry participants. 
Realizing that the issue of reliability is complex and requires 
intimate familiarity with local facilities and institutions, the 
Commission historically has left this matter to industry-led groups, 
working in concert with all affected stakeholders. The Commission 
has interceded only when its review of reliability-based practices 
was necessary to ensure the availability and quality of open access 
transmission service. Recent orders, such as those addressing the 
issue of ``tagging'' customer requests for service and the 
circumstances in which utilities may invoke line loading (i.e., 
curtailment) procedures when the system is oversubscribed, attest to 
the Commission's limited role.\1\ Another order, involving the 
Western Systems Coordinating Council, attests to the Commission's 
willingness to support regional industry and stakeholder efforts to 
promote mandatory compliance

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(through contracts) with reliability standards.\2\
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    \1\ See, e.g., Coalition Against Private Tariffs, 83 FERC para. 
61,015, reh'g denied, 84 FERC para. 61,050 (1998); North American 
Electric Reliability Council, 85 FERC para. 61,353 (1998), order on 
reh'g, 87 FERC para. 61,161 (1999).
    \2\ See Western Systems Coordinating Council, 87 FERC para. 
61,060 (1999).
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    In my opinion, little operationally has changed to motivate the 
Commission to take a more activist role on reliability. I suspect 
the real reason for the Commission's enhanced interest is politics 
and public opinion. Today's newspapers are ablaze with headlines 
screaming of looming energy crises and impending blackouts and 
brownouts. Much of this hysteria, unfortunately, has been fed by the 
Clinton/Gore Administration. Indeed, in a front page article in the 
Wall Street Journal, dated May 11, 2000, captioned ``Gloom and Doom: 
New Rules, Demands Put Dangerous Strain on Electricity Supply,'' the 
Secretary of Energy is quoted as saying that the United States has 
``the grid of a Third World nation.'' \3\
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    \3\ A Department of Energy report, providing documentation for 
the Secretary's opinion, is cited in footnote 1 of today's notice.
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    I am not so pessimistic. The United States long has enjoyed the 
most reliable electrical delivery system in the world. The advent of 
competitive markets and increasing reliance on competitive forces--
rather than command and control regulatory policies--to regulate 
energy markets do not alter this judgment.
    It is true that increased competition, and the emergence of a 
myriad of market participants and offerings, is placing strains on a 
electrical network that was not designed for such competitive 
forces. I agree with the rest of the Commission, as well as 
Secretary Richardson, that something more should be done to enhance 
reliability and to avoid unexpected outages. I simply disagree as to 
the means to accomplish this result.
    Today's notice offers various measures intended to promote 
supply, enhance deliverability, and temper demand. My personal 
opinion is that offering market-based rates to the owners of on-site 
generation will introduce precious few megawatts into the interstate 
grid. Demand-side measures to conserve energy are almost entirely 
within the purview of the states.\4\ Transmission providers already 
have an obligation to update periodically their calculation and 
posting of available transmission capability. And Commission staff, 
identified to ``assist with regulatory questions related to 
practical ideas'' about reliability, will have limited ability to 
offer any real help.
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    \4\ My experience as a state commissioner shows the difficulty 
of creating effective DSM programs. I am skeptical of the hasty 
decision the notice makes on guaranteeing DSM cost recovery.
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    My strong preference would be for the Commission, if now 
inclined to act on reliability, to take decisive action in an area 
that clearly lies within its existing jurisdiction--the pricing of 
wholesale power and transmission services. As I have been advocating 
ever since I first came to the Commission, the Commission has within 
its jurisdiction the ability to promote reliability--if it really 
means what it now states. For starters, if the Commission is serious 
about increasing generation supply, it should act immediately to 
withdraw all price caps in generation markets. I have, 
unfortunately, written in dissent on many occasions as to the 
harmful supply effects of price caps.\5\ They distort price signals 
and inhibit entry into competitive markets. By facilitating efforts 
to minimize short-term price disruptions, and placing regulatory 
shackles on what should be competitive markets, the Commission is 
inhibiting precisely the type of investment in the grid that it 
claims it is now supporting--and that is crucial to assuring true 
electrical reliability.
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    \5\ See ISO New England, Inc., 88 FERC para. 61,316 at 61,973-74 
(1999); California Independent System Operator Corporation, 89 FERC 
para. 61,169 at 61,513-15 (1999); ISO New England, Inc.; New England 
Power Pool, 90 FERC para. 61,170 at 61,555-57 (2000).
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    Another important means of enhancing reliability is to give 
transmission providers an incentive to provide reliable, efficient 
service. Conventional pricing methods provide no such incentive. It 
is my strong preference to afford utilities some type of 
performance-based measure of accountability to their customers and 
their regulators. Consistent with its existing authority, the 
Commission could--and should--tie earnings and profits to 
reliability-based and performance-based criteria (such as the number 
and duration of service interruptions, customer satisfaction, and 
throughout).
    Despite my urgings, the Commission has refused to adopt 
performance-based pricing measures. I was tremendously gratified 
when the Commission made its first tentative moves in this direction 
when it adopted its Order No. 2000 rulemaking on the development of 
regional transmission organizations. As the Commission explained, a 
RTO that meets the enumerated characteristics and functions--and 
that has demonstrated a commitment to promote grid reliability and 
efficiency--will be eligible for a number of incentives. These 
incentives include performance-based rates, accelerated 
depreciation, and return on equity enhancements (formula and risk-
based).
    While I appreciate the Commission's baby steps on performance-
based pricing, it will take awhile for RTOs to develop, win the 
Commission's approval, and qualify for innovative pricing. If it 
were up to me, I would adopt pricing measures now that would give 
both regional and individual transmission providers an incentive to 
minimize or eliminate service disruptions this summer and future 
summers.
    I can think of numerous other measures the Commission can adopt 
to promote reliability, without delay and without additional 
authority conferred by Congress. The Commission could afford 
transcos an additional incentive to build transmission facilities by 
providing a higher rate of return on transmission assets. The 
Commission could articulate greater receptivity to proposals to 
build and invest in merchant transmission facilities. The Commission 
could pique additional interest in investment and corporate 
restructuring by allowing acquisition adjustments on the sale of 
transmission assets that confers benefits on ratepayers.
    In addition, the Commission could greatly advance the cause of 
reliability by indicating its support for stand-alone transmission 
companies. (In another order on today's agenda, I express serious 
concern as to the Commission's rejection of the proposed ownership 
structure for the proposed Alliance transco.) \6\ As I have oft-
stated, a transco--much more so than any other type of regional 
institution--has a strong economic incentive to provide reliable and 
efficient service. I wish the Commission would give a transmission 
company the chance to operate--and give an unequivocal green light 
to other utilities that might be considering participation in 
similar for-profit ventures.
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    \6\ See Alliance Companies, et al.,  91 FERC para. ___ (2000).
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    And the Commission--if truly committed to providing supply 
alternatives--could do much more to promote the development of 
hydroelectric facilities and the construction of natural gas 
transmission facilities.\7\ The answer to our nation's energy 
reliability needs lies not in the development of additional 
regulatory bodies and responsibilities--as the Administration, with 
the acquiescence of a majority of this Commission, now argues. 
Rather, the answer lies in

[[Page 33541]]

promoting policies that encourage capital investment in all types of 
energy technologies and that allow competitive markets to operate as 
they should.
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    \7\ See, e.g., Independence Pipeline Company, et al.,  91 FERC 
para. ___ (2000) (dissenting statement).
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    I recognize that certain of my suggestions, to some, might fall 
into the category of ``long-term'' measures that, even if 
implemented immediately, would not help this upcoming summer. Of 
course, if the Commission had adopted such reliability-based 
measures in prior years, it would not have realized the urgency to 
issue today's notice. And further delay merely exacerbates the 
conditions identified in the notice. For this reason, I do not see 
the advantage of differentiating between short-term and long-term 
fixes, or awaiting the filing of comments on the subject. Nor do I 
see any value in convening a ``public conference'' on the subject of 
reliability initiatives. The Commission held such a conference in 
February of 1998, and has since received numerous comments and 
pleadings on the topic.
    In short, there's not need to await further action by Congress. 
The Commission already has all the authority it needs to effect real 
reform that will promote reliable and efficient utility service. And 
there is no need to delay to allow for further grandstanding by 
industry participants. By this point, after several summers of 
experience under competitive markets, we all know the way to promote 
reliability and efficiency--by encouraging investment and by 
allowing competitive markets to operate.

    Therefore, I respectfully concur.
Curt L. Hebert, Jr.,
Commissioner.
[FR Doc. 00-13008 Filed 5-23-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M