Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access
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Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report assesses China’s global expansion by military and nonmilitary means, implications of 

China’s activities, and the U.S. response, as mandated by Section 1259b, “Assessment on United States 

Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access,” of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Public Law 115-91. 

China’s Global Expansion 

The report describes China’s expansion by a range of means, including military access and engagement; 

the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) and Digital Silk Road initiatives; technology acquisition; and a 

growing economic footprint; with a focus on areas of military expertise. 

The Chinese Communist Party’s foreign policy reflects its strategic objectives. The U.S. National 

Security Strategy states that China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand 

the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor as the preeminent 

power. China’s most substantial expansion of its military access in recent years has occurred in its 

near-abroad, where territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas persist, but China has also 

expanded its military operations further from the Chinese mainland. China seeks this presence based 

on its changing military focus and expanding international economic interests, which are increasing 

demands for the PLA to operate in more distant maritime environments to protect Chinese citizens, 

investments, and critical sea lines of communication. 

China in 2018 indicated interest in establishing bases in Cambodia and Vanuatu. Although both 

governments have publicly stated they are not willing to host a Chinese military base, Phnom Penh in 

the last two years has agreed to receive new military aid from Beijing and participate in bilateral 

exercises with the PLA.

In 2017, China’s leaders said OBOR, which at first included economic initiatives in Asia, South Asia, 

Africa, and Europe, now encompasses all regions of the world, including the Arctic and Latin America, 

demonstrating the scope and reach of Beijing’s ambition. While some OBOR projects appear to be 

motivated by economic considerations, OBOR also serves a greater strategic purpose. China intends 

to use OBOR to develop strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with 

China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to or stance on sensitive issues. 

President Xi has promoted the “21st Century Digital Silk Road” alongside OBOR. Chinese stateowned or state-affiliated enterprises, including China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile, Huawei, 

and ZTE, have invested or submitted bids globally in areas such as 5G mobile technology, fiber optic 

links, undersea cables, remote sensing infrastructure connected to China’s Beidou satellite navigation 

system, and other information and communications technology infrastructure. While providing 

benefits to host countries, these projects will also facilitate China’s efforts to expand science and 

technology cooperation, promote its unique national technical standards, further its objectives for 

technology transfer, and potentially enable politically-motivated censorship. Data legally acquired via 

some of these projects may also contribute to China’s own technological development in areas such 

as artificial intelligence. 

China is also pursuing global leadership in strategic industries through state-backed investment, as 

outlined in its Five-Year Plans, “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy, and other national 
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

documents. China seeks to be the world leader in artificial intelligence by 2030, for example. Many 

of the key technologies China is targeting are integral to the rapid technological change occurring in 

multiple industries. These capabilities are key not only to economic growth, but to the United States’ 

ability to maintain its military advantage. The report identifies a wide range of efforts China has 

undertaken to achieve its national technology goals. 

Implications of China’s Activities

The Department has not viewed every one of these activities as a problem, and U.S. policy supports 

principles under which countries determine their own economic interests and needs. However, the 

Department is concerned by actions China’s government has taken that are out of step with 

international norms, diminish countries’ sovereignty, or undermine the security of the United States, 

our allies, or our partners. 

China’s expanding global activities in some of the areas listed above present military force posture, 

access, training, and logistics implications for the United States and China. The PLA’s first overseas 

military base in Djibouti and probable follow-on bases will increase China’s ability to deter use of 

conventional military force, sustain operations abroad, and hold strategic economic corridors at risk. 

The PLA’s expanding global capabilities provide military options to observe or complicate adversary 

activities in the event of a conflict. 

Some OBOR investments could create potential military advantages for China, should it require access 

to selected foreign ports to pre-position the necessary logistics support to sustain naval deployments 

to protect its growing interests in waters as distant as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and 

Atlantic Ocean. 

China’s wider global activities could also be leveraged to exert political influence. While many of 

China’s generous investment financing offers benefit their host nations, they often come with strings 

attached. The report provides 17 examples of cases in which Chinese investment and project financing 

that bypasses regular market mechanisms has resulted in negative economic effects for the host 

country; in which economic deals have carried costs to host country sovereignty; or in which China 

has employed economic incentives or economic coercion to achieve specific political objectives. 

China’s attempts to gain veto authority over other countries’ decisions, and its coercion directed at 

U.S. allies and partners in particular, will likely threaten U.S. posture and access if not addressed.

U.S. Response

The Department has responded to these implications in line with the U.S. National Defense Strategy

(NDS) and in support of whole-of-government action. The NDS identifies long-term strategic 

competitions with China and Russia as the principal priorities for the Department. The Department 

is implementing four strategic ways: building a more lethal force to gain military advantage, 

strengthening allies and partners to generate robust networks that can advance shared interests, 

reforming the Department to realize greater performance and affordability, and expanding the 

competitive space to create U.S. advantages and impose dilemmas on competitors. Importantly, 

competition does not mean conflict is inevitable, or preclude cooperation with China on areas of 

mutual interest. The NDS sets the U.S. military relationship with China on a path of transparency 

and non-aggression. 
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

DoD also supports a whole-of-government response as China’s expanding global activities are not 

primarily or exclusively a military issue. The report lists several select interagency initiatives DoD has 

supported including 1) aligning the NDS with the U.S. National Security Strategy, which identifies 

growing competition with China as a long-term challenge and prompts a whole-of-government focus; 

2) the U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, which emphasizes a vision for a “free and open IndoPacific” that provides security, stability, and prosperity for all; 3) continuing to fly, sail, and operate 

wherever international law allows; 4) confronting China over its market-distorting policies and 

practices, forced technology transfers, failure to respect intellectual property, and cyber intrusions into 

U.S. commercial networks; and 5) working with the executive branch and Congress to maintain U.S. 

competitiveness and protect the U.S. national security innovation base. 

DoD will continue to assess the military implications of China’s expanding global access in support 

of these actions, and ensure the Department provides combat-credible military forces needed to fight 

a war and win, should deterrence fail. 
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................ 1

II. CHINA’S GLOBAL EXPANSION.............................................................................. 1

A. China’s Strategic Intent................................................................................................. 1

B. Expansion by Direct Military Means........................................................................... 3

Military Access................................................................................................................. 3

Military Engagement....................................................................................................... 4

C. Expansion by Non-Military Means............................................................................ 12

Infrastructure Investment: The One Belt, One Road Initiative .............................. 12

Infrastructure Investment: The “Digital Silk Road” Initiative ................................ 13

Broader Economic Trends........................................................................................... 13

Technology Acquisition................................................................................................ 15

Media and Influence Operations................................................................................. 16

Tourism........................................................................................................................... 17

III. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S ACTIVITIES....................................................... 19

A. Posture and Access...................................................................................................... 19

B. Training and Logistics................................................................................................. 20

C. Opportunities for Influence ....................................................................................... 21

IV. U.S. RESPONSE........................................................................................................... 23

National Defense Strategy............................................................................................ 23

Support for Whole-of-Government Action............................................................... 24
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I. INTRODUCTION

Section 1259b, “Assessment on United States Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global

Access,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Public Law 115-91, provides 

that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall assess the foreign 

military and non-military activities of the People’s Republic of China that could affect the regional and 

global national security and defense interests of the United States. 

This report fulfills this requirement and addresses its specific elements, including discussing China’s 

expansion by military and nonmilitary means (tourism, media, influence campaigns, investment 

projects, infrastructure, and access to foreign ports and military bases); implications of these activities 

for the military force posture, access, training, and logistics of the United States and China; and U.S. 

strategy and policy for mitigating the harmful effects resulting from such means, where applicable to 

the Department.

II. CHINA’S GLOBAL EXPANSION

A. China’s Strategic Intent

Primary Objectives. Since 2002, China’s leaders – including President Xi Jinping – have 

characterized the initial two decades of the 21st century as a “period of strategic opportunity.” They 

assess that during this time international conditions will facilitate domestic development and the 

expansion of China’s “comprehensive national power,” which outside observers believe will serve 

what they assess to be the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) overriding strategic objectives:

 Perpetuate CCP rule; 

 Maintain domestic stability; 

 Sustain economic growth and development; 

 Defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity; 

 Secure China’s status as a great power and, ultimately, reacquire regional preeminence; and 

 Safeguard China’s interests abroad. 

The CCP has distilled these objectives into President Xi’s “China Dream of national rejuvenation.” 

The concept, first articulated by Xi shortly after the 2012 leadership transition, encapsulates a longstanding national aspiration of establishing a powerful and prosperous China. President Xi and other 

leaders also link the China Dream to two high-profile centenary goals: achieving a “moderately 

prosperous society” by the 100th anniversary of the CCP in 2021, and building a “prosperous, strong, 

democratic, civilized, harmonious, and beautiful modernized socialist strong country” by the 100th 

anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2049. At the 19th Party 

Congress in October 2017, President Xi also enumerated objectives for the “basic realization of 

socialist modernization” by 2035, which included China becoming one of the most “innovationoriented” countries, significant enhancement of the country’s soft power, and continued economic 

prosperity. China has also established plans to achieve global leadership in strategic industries and 

advance its military modernization, as discussed under “Technology Acquisition” later in this report. 
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Foreign Policy Objectives. The CCP’s foreign policy reflects its strategic objectives. The U.S. 

National Security Strategy states that China, as a revisionist power, is actively competing against the 

United States and our allies and partners, in a fundamentally political contest between those who favor 

repressive societies and those who favor free societies. China specifically seeks to displace the United 

States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder 

the region in its favor as the preeminent power. The U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) adds that 

China wants to shape a world consistent with its authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over 

other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. 

Strategic competition does not mean conflict is inevitable, nor does it preclude cooperation on areas 

of mutual interest. The National Defense Strategy seeks to set the United States’ military relationship 

with China on a path of transparency and non-aggression. However, a realistic assessment of China’s 

strategy and intent inform the U.S. government’s understanding of – and actions to address – China’s 

expanding global activities and influence. 

Expanding International Role. As China’s foreign interests and power have expanded in pursuit 

of these objectives, it has become a more prominent player in the international community. In his 

speech to the CCP’s 19th Party Congress in October 2017, President Xi advocated the construction 

of an international “community of common human destiny,” highlighting China’s willingness to work 

with people of all countries, while stressing that China will defend its core interests and territorial 

sovereignty and is not afraid to respond to provocations.

Xi’s remarks underscore a trend in China’s foreign policy in which it seeks a higher-profile role in 

existing regional and global institutions, while selectively pursuing the establishment of new 

multilateral mechanisms. For instance, China launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 

(AIIB) in January 2016, with 57 founding members, to promote infrastructure development in Asia. 

China’s global trade and investment footprint has also grown rapidly, featuring infrastructure projects 

funded and implemented by Chinese state banks and firms. Beginning in 2013, China has attempted 

to reconceptualize its overseas infrastructure investment under its “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) 

Initiative (which China has since renamed the “Belt and Road Initiative” in English, although the 

name remains unchanged in Chinese). However, OBOR projects have not been funded through AIIB,

as of the writing of this report. China’s plans are indicative of its intention to use economic means to 

advance its interests and enhance its global role by integrating hard infrastructure development with 

trade and financial architecture.

China continues to regard stable relations with its neighbors, and the United States, as key to its 

development. China sees the United States as the dominant regional and global actor with the greatest 

potential to either support or disrupt China’s rise. China seeks to depict itself as pursuing a peaceful 

development strategy in the region, conscious that if its neighbors view it primarily as a threat, they 

may try to more actively hedge against China’s growing power. At the same time, China portrays itself 

as resolute in defending its interests. 

Military Role. China’s attention to missions guarding its overseas interests and outward shifts in its

military emphasis have increasingly propelled the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) beyond China’s 

borders and its immediate periphery. 

In 2015, China outlined eight “strategic tasks,” or types of missions the PLA must be ready to execute: 

safeguard the sovereignty of China’s territory; safeguard national unification; safeguard China’s 
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interests in new domains such as space and cyberspace; maintain strategic deterrence; participate in 

international security cooperation; maintain China’s political security and social stability; and conduct 

emergency rescue, disaster relief, and “rights and interest protection” missions. International security 

cooperation and emergency rescue, disaster relief, and “rights and interest protection” reflect China’s 

new overseas interests and expanding requirements to protect these interests.

China’s military emphasis has also shifted outward. The PLAN’s evolving focus – from “offshore 

waters defense” to a mix of “offshore waters defense” and “open seas protection” – reflects the PLA 

leadership’s expanding interest in a wider operational reach. China’s military strategy and ongoing 

PLA reforms reflect the abandonment of its historically land-centric mentality. Similarly, doctrinal 

references to “forward edge defense” that would move potential conflicts far from China’s territory 

suggest PLA strategists envision an increasingly global role, which they are actively implementing. 

China officially opened its first military base in Djibouti in August 2017 and will likely seek to establish 

rotational presence, dual-use access, or additional military logistics facilities in countries in which it 

has interests at play, those that offer critical accesses, and those with which it has friendly relationships.

China’s pursuit of expanded global military access is thus driven both by new PLA missions to protect 

overseas interests and by a shifting approach to potential contingencies along its maritime periphery. 

Based on China’s doctrine and current behavior, the United States should anticipate Beijing’s

continued efforts to enhance its military access overseas.

B. Expansion by Direct Military Means

Military Access

Near-Abroad. China’s most substantial expansion of its military access in recent years has occurred 

in its near-abroad, where territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas persist. China continues 

to exercise low-intensity coercion to advance its claims in the East and South China Seas and uses an 

opportunistically-timed progression of incremental but intensifying steps to attempt to increase 

effective control over disputed areas while avoiding escalation to military conflict. 

China’s Spratly Islands outpost expansion is currently focused on building out the land-based 

capabilities of its three largest outposts – Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs – after completion of 

its four smaller outposts early in 2016. China has not undertaken substantial land reclamation at any 

of the Spratly Islands outposts it occupies since adding over 3,200 acres of land to the seven features 

in late 2015. Major construction at the largest outposts include new airfields – all with runways at least 

8,800 feet in length – large port facilities, and water and fuel storage. As of late 2016, China was 

constructing 24 fighter-sized hangars, fixed-weapons positions, barracks, administration buildings, and

communication facilities at each of the three outposts. China has since completed key operations and 

support infrastructure at each of these outposts, enabling the deployment of combat aircraft. China 

now has the capacity to house up to three fighter units in the Spratly Islands. 

China has also completed shore-based infrastructure on its four smaller outposts in the Spratly Islands: 

Johnson, Gaven, Hughes, and Cuarteron Reefs. Since early 2016, China has installed fixed, land-based 

naval guns, fixed and mobile anti-aircraft missile batteries, and improved communications 

infrastructure on each outpost. 
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Global. China has also expanded its military operations further from the Chinese mainland. China’s 

approach includes PLA visits and in some cases, requests for military access, logistics, or basing 

agreements, typically in countries where China has provided economic investment in civilian ports, 

and especially in strategic locations such as key maritime “chokepoints.” In Greece and Sri Lanka, for 

example, Chinese investment in civilian ports has been followed by deployments or visits of the PLA. 

In some cases, the PLA is seeking a greater presence for contingency use or a permanent presence. 

China seeks this presence based on its changing military focus and expanding international economic 

interests, which are increasing demands for the PLA to operate in more distant maritime environments 

to protect Chinese citizens, investments, and critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs). These 

demands require logistics and intelligence support, including in the Indian Ocean and more distant 

areas. China is expanding its access to foreign ports to pre-position the necessary logistics support to 

regularize and sustain deployments in the “far seas.” A robust overseas logistics and basing 

infrastructure will allow China to project and sustain military power at greater distances. China’s 

leaders may judge that a mixture of military logistics models, including preferred access to overseas 

commercial ports and a limited number of exclusive PLA logistic facilities – probably collocated with 

commercial ports – most closely aligns with China’s overseas military logistics needs. The PLAN 

ultimately seeks to be able to operate across the greater Indo-Pacific region in high-intensity actions

over a period of several months, in pursuit of the missions discussed under “Strategic Intent” above. 

In August 2017, China officially opened its first overseas military base at Doraleh, Djibouti, which 

started with an expansion at Doraleh port in 2013. China claims its Djibouti base supports PLA 

counterpiracy, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and Peace Keeping Operations 

(PKO). The base includes barracks, an underground facility, a tarmac and eight hangars for helicopter 

and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations. A PLA Navy Marine Corps mechanized infantry 

company with at least eight infantry fighting vehicles arrived in July 2017. The unit is capable of 

supporting future noncombatant evacuation operations, search and seizure in the Gulf of Aden, 

hostage rescue, and small-scale combat actions. In July 2018, China began constructing a 450-meter 

pier, which could be capable of berthing at least four ships as early as mid-2019. This base, along with 

regular naval vessel visits to foreign ports, extend the reach of China’s armed forces, reflecting China’s 

growing influence. 

China may seek to establish additional military bases in countries with which it has a longstanding 

friendly relationship and similar strategic interests, such as Pakistan, and in which there is a precedent 

for hosting foreign militaries. However, China’s overseas military basing will be constrained by the 

willingness of countries to support a PLA presence. In 2018, China indicated interest in establishing 

bases in Cambodia and Vanuatu. Although both governments have publicly stated they are not willing 

to host a Chinese military base, Phnom Penh has agreed to receive new military aid from Beijing and 

participate in bilateral exercises with the PLA in the last two years.

Military Engagement

China’s military and defense industry additionally contribute to promoting its interests abroad through 

arms sales, military diplomacy, and international exercises. 

Arms Sales. China’s arms sales are conducted via state-run organizations that primarily seek to 

generate profits and offset defense-related research and development costs. Arms transfers are also a 
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component of China’s foreign policy, used in conjunction with other military cooperation, economic 

aid, and development assistance to support broader foreign policy goals. These include securing access 

to natural resources and export markets, promoting political influence among host country elites, and 

building support in international forums.

Between 2012 and 2016, China was the fifth largest arms supplier in the world, completing more than 

$20 billion in sales including $8 billion in military equipment sales to Indo-Pacific countries, primarily

to Pakistan (many funded via loans), Bangladesh, and Burma. China’s second largest arms sales were 

to the Middle East and North Africa, likely due to the demand for armed UAVs – a niche market

where China is one of the world’s few suppliers. China’s ability to remain among the top five global 

arms suppliers largely hinges on continued strong sales to Pakistan and demand for its armed UAVs.

Chinese arms are lower quality and less reliable than those offered by the top international arms 

suppliers, but many have advanced capabilities. Most of China’s customers are developing countries 

that prefer less expensive Chinese arms. These arms generally come with few end-use restrictions, 

which is attractive to customers who may not have access to other arms sources for political or 

economic reasons. Key developments and examples include the following:

 Submarines are becoming a more prominent Chinese export to countries along China’s 

periphery. In 2015, China signed an agreement to sell Pakistan eight YUAN-class submarines; 

the first four submarines will be built in China and the remaining four in Pakistan. China 

delivered two MING-class diesel attack submarines to Bangladesh in late-2016 and continues 

to market a variety of submarine options at international trade shows. In May 2017, China 

finalized a $390 million contract with Thailand for one Chinese-built S26T diesel-electric 

submarine to be delivered in 2023. 

 China has sold armed UAVs to several Middle East and North African states, including Iraq, 

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. China faces little competition for sale of 

such systems, as most countries that produce armed UAVs are restricted from selling the 

technology as signatories of the Missile Technology Control Regime and/or the Wassenaar 

Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 

Technologies. 

 In March 2018, state-owned China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) signed an MOU 

with the Royal Thai Armed Forces to collaborate on unspecified military equipment and 

technologies. CSIC claimed the deal contributed to Xi Jinping’s “going out” strategy to 

expand China’s defense industry presence in key foreign markets. 

 In June 2018, China finalized contracts with Pakistan and Bangladesh for conventional arms. 

The Pakistan contract is for delivery of two Type 054A multi-role frigates valued at $500 

million, which Pakistan anticipates receiving before 2021. The Bangladesh contract is 

reportedly valued at more than $200 million for the sale of an additional 23 K-8W intermediate 

jet trainers. Bangladesh currently operates K-8W aircraft it bought from China in 2014. 

 In July 2018, China’s defense attaché announced Beijing would donate a frigate to the Sri 

Lankan Navy. The donation came three weeks after the Sri Lankan Navy announced its plan 

to shift its Southern Command HQ to Hambantota Port to reinforce sovereignty over the 
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port, which the PRC leased for 99 years and a Chinese state-owned enterprise owns and 

operates. The PLA is also constructing facilities at the Sri Lankan military academy.

Military Diplomacy. Senior-level visits and exchanges provide China with opportunities to increase 

military officers’ international exposure and advance foreign relations through military assistance 

programs and personal relationship development. Expanded PLA travel abroad enables PLA officers 

to observe and study foreign military command structures, unit formations, and operational training. 

Furthermore, PLA senior leaders are beginning to actively shape the methods by which shared security 

concerns are addressed during their participation in multilateral coordination mechanisms. For 

example, in August 2016 then-Chief of the Joint Staff Department Fang Fenghui participated in the 

inaugural meeting of the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism, a military 

counterterrorism pact between Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. In a more recent 

example, the PRC hosted Defense Ministers from multiple Western Hemisphere nations to participate 

in the fourth Sino-Latin American Defense Forum in October and November 2018. 

Professional military education exchanges are another tool of Chinese military diplomacy. Many Latin 

American and Caribbean countries send officers to the strategic-level College of Defense Studies at 

the National Defense University; some of these countries also send officers to the PLAA and PLAN 

command schools. China’s professional military education exchanges will increase in South America 

with countries that cut diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which could limit U.S. professional military 

education exchanges due to strained defense relations. 

The PLAN conducted numerous port calls from 2008-2017, as shown in the graphic on page 7. In 

2017, a trio of PLAN ships conducted the PLAN’s longest-ever goodwill deployment, visiting 20 

countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, and Oceania.

The PLAN’s hospital ship “Peace Ark” conducted the goodwill cruise HARMONIOUS MISSION 

in mid to late 2018, with stops in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, Venezuela, Grenada, 

Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Chile, along with a Panama 

Canal Transit. 
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International Exercises. The PLA’s participation in international military exercises continued to 

expand in 2017 and 2018 as the PLA exercised with countries outside of the Indo-Pacific region. 

Many of these exercises focused on counterterrorism, border security, PKO, and disaster relief; 

however, some included conventional ground, maritime, and air warfare training.

 Chinese military personnel participated in a bilateral exercise with Nepal for the first time in 

April 2017. The exercise focused on counterterrorism operations and was preceded by a visit 

by China’s Minister of Defense, Chang Wangquan, the first visit by a Chinese defense minister 

in 15 years. 

 China conducted naval exercises with Russia in the Baltic Sea in July and in the Sea of Japan 

and the Sea of Okhotsk in September 2017. The two navies exercised submarine rescue, joint 

air defense, and anti-submarine operations. This was the PLAN’s sixth exercise with Russia 

since 2012 and the first to occur in the Baltic Sea.

 China hosted the sixth iteration of the SHAHEEN exercise series with Pakistan in September 

2017. The exercise aims to develop closer ties between both countries’ air forces. This year’s 

exercise included live-fire target practice, night warfare, close air support training, and 

participation by PLAN aircraft for the first time. 

 The PLA in March 2018 held its second joint military drill with the Cambodian Armed Forces

since 2016. GOLDEN DRAGON 2018 included 216 PLA personnel and focused on 

counter-terrorism and HA/DR. Chinese and Cambodian participants conducted a live-fire 

exercise simulating military intervention involving hostages. The Cambodian Defense 

Minister and the Chinese ambassador observed the exercise.

 A PLAN guided-missile destroyer and a guided-missile frigate participated in KOMODO 

2018, a multilateral naval exercise hosted by the Indonesian Navy, in May. Assets from the 

United States, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, and Thailand participated in the six-day 

exercise, which comprised a harbor phase, a sea phase, and a civic mission phase. The U.S. 

participated in exercise task groups that did not include Russian or Chinese assets or personnel.

 The PLA participated for the first time in Russia’s annual VOSTOK military exercise in 

Russia’s far east in September 2018. The PLA contributed 3,200 troops, 600-900 pieces of 

military equipment, and 30 aircraft and helicopters. The exercise was Russia’s largest since 

1981. 

 The PLAN participated for the first time in KAKADU, Australia’s largest maritime exercise, 

in September 2018. A total of 27 countries participated, including the United States. 

PLA exercises with foreign countries from 2008-2017 are shown in the graphic on pages 9-11 (note: 

2018 PLA exercises will be addressed in the next China Military Power Report).
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C. Expansion by Non-Military Means

Infrastructure Investment: The One Belt, One Road Initiative

China’s OBOR initiative, publicly released in 2013, aims to expand economic and commercial ties to 

China by developing transportation infrastructure, natural gas pipelines, hydropower projects, 

technology and industrial parks. China views OBOR as a way to enhance its trade connectivity, reduce 

surplus domestic industrial capacity, develop poorer interior provinces, promote energy security, and 

internationalize Chinese industrial and financial standards, to include the yuan.

While some OBOR projects appear to be motivated by economic considerations, OBOR also serves 

a greater strategic purpose. China intends to use OBOR to develop strong economic ties with other 

countries, shape their interests to align with China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s 

approach to or stance on sensitive issues. Countries participating in OBOR can develop economic 

dependencies from over-reliance on Chinese capital and labor. Some OBOR investments could create

potential military advantages for China, should it require access to selected foreign ports to preposition the necessary logistics support to sustain naval deployments to protect its growing interests 

in waters as distant as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean. 

Ports operated or constructed by a Chinese entity that were also visited by the PLAN from 2008-2017 

are shown in the graphic on page 7, demonstrating instances in which OBOR has intersected with 

China’s military diplomacy. 

In 2017, China’s leaders said OBOR, which at first included economic initiatives in Asia, South Asia, 

Africa, and Europe, now encompasses all regions of the world, including the Arctic and Latin America, 

demonstrating the scope and reach of Beijing’s ambition. China also released a “Vision of Maritime 

Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative” in 2017, which lays out three maritime corridors and 

the importance of maritime security cooperation. One identified corridor is from China through the 

Indian Ocean to Africa and the Mediterranean Sea. Another corridor is designated from China to 

Oceania and the South Pacific, and the last corridor from China to Europe through the Arctic Ocean.

China’s government has taken other actions to centralize OBOR within its foreign policy and pursue 

these objectives:

 China’s National Development and Reform Commission is the lead agency for OBOR, and 

five Politburo members participate in a leading small group on “advancing the development 

of the Belt and Road.” 

 In January 2018, China announced the formation of two courts based in China to adjudicate 

disputes regarding OBOR projects. There is debate whether the courts will operate in 

accordance with international rules and standards or adhere to Chinese laws and practices. 

 In March 2018, China established the International Development Cooperation Agency to 

coordinate international aid, integrating responsibilities previously undertaken by the 

Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs, to better align foreign aid with China’s 

diplomatic strategy, including OBOR. 
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

13

 In September 2018, China hosted leaders from 53 African countries at the 2018 Beijing 

Summit of the Forum on China-African Cooperation. President Xi used the forum to 

promote OBOR, called for a “China-Africa community with a shared future,” and pledged 

$60 billion in additional financing. 

Infrastructure Investment: The “Digital Silk Road” Initiative

President Xi has promoted the “21st Century Digital Silk Road” alongside OBOR. Although China’s 

government has revealed few details, President Xi has stated the initiative should involve cooperation 

and development in “frontier areas” including digital economy, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, 

and quantum computing, as well as areas such as big data, cloud computing, and “smart cities.” 

President Xi has also linked the initiative to building information and communications technology 

infrastructure, particularly in developing countries, and to promoting cybersecurity and global internet 

governance reform. 

Chinese state-owned or state-affiliated enterprises, including China Telecom, China Unicom, China 

Mobile, Huawei, and ZTE, have invested or submitted bids globally in areas such as 5G mobile 

technology, fiber optic links, undersea cables, remote sensing infrastructure connected to China’s 

Beidou satellite navigation system, and other information and communications technology 

infrastructure.

While providing benefits to host countries, these projects will also facilitate China’s efforts to expand 

science and technology cooperation, promote its unique national technical standards, further its 

objectives for technology transfer (discussed under “Technology Acquisition” on page 15 of this 

report), and potentially enable politically-motivated censorship. Data legally acquired via some of 

these projects may also contribute to China’s own technological development in areas such as artificial 

intelligence. 

As China promotes the initiative it may also seek to protect its firms from global competition, as when 

China declined to grant regulatory approval for U.S.-based Qualcomm to acquire Dutch counterpart 

NXP after all eight other relevant jurisdictions approved. 

In July 2018, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission denied a license application by China 

Mobile to operate in the United States, based on an executive branch recommendation which noted 

“concerns about increased risk to U.S. law enforcement and national security interests were unable to 

be resolved.” In August 2018, the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 

prohibited U.S. federal government procurement of Huawei or ZTE telecommunications equipment, 

as well as telecommunications and video surveillance equipment from certain Chinese companies, 

among other provisions. 

Broader Economic Trends

China’s global trade, investment, and lending footprint is growing rapidly as Chinese state policy banks 

and Chinese firms have financed and implemented hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of major 

infrastructure projects throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Europe 
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

14

since 2006. The AIIB serves as a new multilateral development bank that promotes infrastructure 

building in Asia, although it has not funded OBOR projects. 

For example, while U.S. outbound FDI significantly exceeded that of China from 2006-2017, the gap 

has narrowed.

Outbound Foreign Direct Investment Flows from China and the United States

(in Billions of USD, According to OECD)

China’s investment has been global in scope. According to the China Global Investment Tracker 

(compiled by the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, and tracking 

investments over $100 million) from 2006-2017 China invested roughly $299 billion in Europe, $223 

billion in North America, $120 billion in East and Southeast Asia, $98 billion in South America, $91 

billion in Australia, $85 billion in West Asia (South Asia, Central Asia, and Russia), $77 billion in SubSaharan Africa, and $31 billion in the Middle East and North Africa. In the absence of a direct 

comparison, data from the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis indicates 

U.S. FDI was likely higher in each of these regions with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa and West 

Asia (but significantly higher in India), with over half in Europe. 

Construction contracts from 2006-2017 measured by the Tracker totaled an additional $205 billion in 

Sub-Saharan Africa, $163 billion in West Asia, $130 billion in the Middle East and North Africa, $122 

billion in East and Southeast Asia, $52 billion in South America, $38 billion in Europe, $15 billion in 

Australia, and $10 billion in North America. Most of China’s construction contracts, and some of its 

investments, have occurred under the OBOR label since the initiative was announced in 2013. 

232.7

405.0

321.0 309.3 296.3

415.3

338.4

321.9

347.7

279.5

304.6 316.5

23.9 17.2

56.7 43.9 58.0 48.4

65.0 73.0

123.1

174.4

216.4

101.9

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

United States China
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

15

Technology Acquisition 

China’s expanding global access has provided new opportunities to develop and acquire military and 

dual-use technologies, through both legitimate and unlawful means. 

Military. China continues to supplement indigenous military modernization efforts through the 

acquisition of targeted foreign technologies and the know-how pertaining to their development, 

including engines for aircraft, tanks, and naval vessels; solid-state electronics and microprocessors, 

and guidance and control systems; enabling technologies such as cutting-edge precision machine tools; 

advanced diagnostic and forensic equipment; and computer-assisted design, manufacturing, and 

engineering. China often pursues these foreign technologies for the purpose of reverse engineering. 

China seeks some high-tech components and major end-items from abroad that it has difficulty 

producing domestically – particularly from Russia and Ukraine. China has purchased advanced 

Russian defense equipment such as the SA-X-21b (S-400) surface-to-air missile system and Su-35 

fighter aircraft, and is pursuing a Sino-Russian joint-design and production program for a heavy-lift 

helicopter and diesel-electric submarines. China is partnering with Russia to purchase electronic 

components as well as creating joint production facilities located within Russia. In addition, China 

has signed significant purchase contracts with Ukraine in recent years, including contracts for assault 

hovercraft and aircraft engines.

Dual-Use. China is pursuing global leadership in strategic industries through state-backed 

investment, as outlined in its Five-Year Plans, “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy, and other 

national documents. China seeks to be the world leader in artificial intelligence by 2030, for example. 

China is also actively pursuing an intensive campaign to obtain critical, dual-use technologies through 

imports, foreign direct investment, industrial and cyberespionage, and establishment of foreign 

research and development (R&D) centers. China additionally employs joint venture and licensing 

requirements that pressure companies into transferring technology, while Chinese companies do not 

face the same barriers abroad. In an effort to gain sensitive knowledge, Beijing is increasingly looking 

to recruit and relocate talent to China. These efforts are illustrated in the graphic on page 16.

In 2016, China adopted the 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020), which, among other provisions, sets 

focus areas for research, development, and innovation. Several of these have defense implications, 

including aerospace engines – including turbofan technology – and gas turbines; quantum 

communications and computing; innovative electronics and software; automation and robotics; 

special materials and applications; nanotechnology; neuroscience, neural research, and artificial 

intelligence; and deep space exploration and on-orbit servicing and maintenance systems. Other areas 

where China is concentrating significant R&D resources include nuclear fusion, hypersonic 

technology, and the deployment and “hardening” of an expanding constellation of multi-purpose 

satellites. China’s drive to expand civil-military integration and international economic activity 

supports these goals. 

Many of the key technologies China is targeting are integral to the rapid technological change 

occurring in multiple industries. These capabilities are key not only to economic growth, but to the 

United States’ ability to maintain its military advantage. Advantage in this competition will go to those 

who not only create the best technologies, but also best protect and field them in creative operational 

ways that provide significant military advantages. If not hardened against Chinese legal and illegal

pursuits, these actions could erode the U.S. National Security Innovation Base.
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

16

Media and Influence Operations

China has made substantial investments in foreign language media over the past decade. For example, 

Xinhua News Agency, China’s official state-run news agency, launched 40 new foreign bureaus and 

doubled the number of overseas correspondents between 2009 and 2011. Xinhua counted 162 total 

foreign bureaus in 2017 and aims to have 200 by 2020. China’s expanding official media presence 

reflects a concerted effort on the part of its leadership to shape opinions about the country and 

promote China’s view on key topics. President Xi Jinping urged China Global Television Network, 

Xinhua’s international media service, to “tell the China story well” and “spread China’s voice.”

China has made both direct and indirect investments in news media organizations abroad. China’s 

official investments in the U.S. media market remains primarily focused on expanding Chinese staterun media organizations. For example, Xinhua and the state-run newspaper China Daily launched 

operations in the United States in 2011 and 2009, respectively. Similarly, in 2012, China Central 

Television expanded into the United States with CCTV America. However, China has also obscured 

its investments in media in the United States and other countries. For example, a 2015 Reuters report 

revealed that China Radio International (CRI), a Chinese state-owned entity, was using subsidiaries to 

mask its control over 33 radio stations in 14 countries, including the United States. These radio 

stations broadcast pro-China content but have not registered as agents of a foreign government under 

the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). The Chinese government also methodically cultivates 
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

17

relationships with private media owners and journalists to encourage them to depict China in a positive 

light. These efforts demonstrate China’s growing desire to shape public opinion on the international 

stage.

China also seeks to influence global public opinion through other means. For example, China has 

established and funded Confucius Institutes, affiliated with its Ministry of Education, at over 500 

foreign university campuses. The stated goals of these Institutes are to promote the Chinese language 

and a positive image of China, inspire students to learn more about China, provide support and 

resources for educators and school systems to incorporate Chinese language and knowledge in their 

curriculum, and educate the public about Chinese culture and society. 

Tourism

Outbound tourism from China has increased significantly over the past decade, becoming a reliable 

component of revenue for many countries in Asia. China’s leadership has demonstrated its willingness 

and ability to restrain tourism as an economic tool to influence countries in order to promote China’s 

interests. For example, during the 2012 standoff between China and the Philippines over the 

Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea, China actively restricted tourism to the Philippines. 

Similarly, from 2016 to 2017, China backed tourism restrictions and public boycotts on South Korea 

following its deployment of a U.S. missile defense system.

China may seek to use tourism-related construction by Chinese construction firms in strategic areas 

(e.g., Guam or Tinian) to monitor DoD activities. In addition, Chinese construction workers often 

remain in host nations illegally, creating a security vulnerability for nations who have limited 

enforcement means.

Most Popular Destinations Outside Mainland China for Chinese Tourists in 

2017 (according to Nielsen)
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

18

Outbound Journeys of Chinese Tourists (in Millions of Tourists, according to 

World Bank)

International Expenditure by Tourists from China while Abroad (in Billions 

USD, according to UN World Tourism Organization)

45.84 47.65

57.39

70.25

83.18

98.19

116.59

127.86 131.13

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

36.2 43.7

54.9

72.6

102

128.6

234.7

249.8

261.1

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

19

III. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S ACTIVITIES

China’s expanding global activities in some of the areas listed above present military force posture, 

access, training, and logistics implications for the United States and China. More broadly, they provide 

opportunities for political influence. 

A. Posture and Access

Expanded Power Projection Capabilities. China’s efforts to enhance its presence abroad could 

enable the PLA to project power at greater distances from the Chinese mainland. The establishment 

in Djibouti of the PLA’s first overseas military base – which hosts a deployed company of Marines 

and equipment – and probable follow-on bases at other locations signal a turning point in the 

expansion of PLA operations in the Indian Ocean region and beyond. These bases, and other 

improvements to the PLA’s ability to project power during the next decade, will increase China’s 

ability to deter the use of conventional military force, sustain operations abroad, and hold strategic 

economic corridors at risk.

Growing PLA mission areas and enhanced presence abroad may also lead to an increase in the demand 

for the PLA to protect China’s overseas interests and provide support to Chinese personnel. China’s 

increased presence also introduces the possibility that the PLA could play a more prominent role in 

delivering global public goods in the future. 

Expanded Options in Regional Conflicts. Importantly, while China’s expanding power projection 

capabilities are applicable to both regional and global missions, China’s military strategy remains 

focused on developing the capability to dissuade, deter, and if ordered, defeat a potential third-party 

intervention in regional conflicts. This strategy, as outlined in China’s 2015 White Paper titled 

“China’s Military Strategy” and further delineated in the latest iteration of the PLA National Defense 

University’s “Science of Strategy,” is to build strong, combat-effective armed forces capable of 

winning regional conflicts employing integrated, real-time command and control networks. In early 

2017, China promulgated a “White Paper on China’s Policies on Asia Pacific Security Cooperation,” 

placing this strategy in the context of China’s wider development interests. It stresses the need for a 

PLA able to conduct expeditionary operations and other activities to defend and secure growing 

Chinese national interests overseas from “destabilizing and uncertain factors.” The PLA’s eight 

strategic missions, outlined on page 2, include both regional and global components. 

Examples of the regional areas on which China’s military strategy is focused include the following: 

 China has unresolved land border and maritime boundary disputes – including the ongoing 

territorial and maritime disputes in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and along the ChinaIndia border. Some of these disputes involve U.S. allies with whom there exist long-standing 

cooperation and security treaty commitments or strategic partners with whom there is a rapidly 

growing security relationship. China continues to exercise low-intensity coercion to advance 

its claims in the East and South China Seas.

 The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, 

compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely preparing for 

a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously deterring, 
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

20

delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf. Taiwan’s national 

defense report released in 2017 cited concerns that increased PLA military activity near Taiwan 

pose an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan Strait,” and that Taiwan requires a 

“multiple deterrence strategy,” to include an emphasis on developing asymmetric warfare 

capabilities to counter PLA advances.

The PLA’s expanding global capabilities to secure Beijing’s overseas interests provide military options 

to observe or complicate adversary activities in the event of a conflict. China’s wider global activities 

could also be leveraged to exert political influence. 

Evolving Force Structure. The PLA’s force structure is evolving in line with these missions. 

 China’s modern naval platforms will strengthen the force’s core warfighting competencies and 

enable credible combat operations beyond the reaches of land-based defenses. The expansion 

of naval operations beyond China’s immediate vicinity will provide China with a diverse set of 

capabilities for striking targets across the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions as well as exercising 

control of SLOCs. Improving blue water capabilities will extend China’s maritime security 

buffer to protect China’s near- and far-seas interests more effectively.

 China’s current aircraft carrier and planned follow-on carriers will extend air defense umbrellas 

beyond the range of coastal systems and help enable task group operations in far seas. Seabased land attack probably is an emerging requirement for the PLAN. Chinese military experts 

argue that to pursue a defensive strategy in far seas, the PLAN must improve its ability to 

control land from the sea through development of a long-range land-attack cruise missile.

 The PLA’s land-based missile and air forces enable other military assets to focus on conducting 

offensive missions, such as blockades and sovereignty enforcement, as well as defensive 

operations farther from China’s shores. China also focuses on enhancing the PLA’s 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, which will enable improved targeting 

and timely responses to perceived threats.

B. Training and Logistics

Improved Training. The PLAN’s ability to perform missions beyond the first island chain is modest 

but growing as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more 

advanced platforms. China’s experience in extended range operations primarily comes from extended 

task group deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. In 2017, the PLA

began implementing revised Military Training Regulations and a new Outline of Military Training, 

focusing on realistic training for modern warfare and preparations for joint combat operations.

 In 2017, the PLAN continued to conduct deployments into the Western/Southern Pacific and 

Indian Oceans, and for the second time in 2017, the Bering Sea. A trio of PLAN ships 

conducted the PLAN’s longest-ever goodwill deployment, visiting 20 countries in Asia, 

Europe, Africa, and Oceania. Three other PLAN ships sailed to the Baltic Sea to conduct a 

joint exercise with the Russian Navy, part of their JOINT SEA exercise series; the two navies 

exercised air defense and anti-submarine operations and submarine rescue operations.
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

21

 China sustained its three-ship task group in the Gulf of Aden in 2017, continuing a nine-year 

effort to protect Chinese merchant shipping from maritime piracy. This operation is China’s 

first enduring naval operation beyond the Asia-Pacific region. The PLAN also continued 

submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, demonstrating its increasing familiarity with 

operating in that region and underscoring China’s interest in protecting sea lines of 

communication beyond the South China Sea.

 Chinese intelligence-gathering ships (auxiliary general intelligence ships or AGIs) operated well 

beyond the first island chain in 2017; one Type 815A DONGDIAO-class AGI deployed to 

the Coral Sea in July to collect against a Australian-U.S. naval exercise and another 

DONGDIAO AGI sailed to a position off Alaska, likely to monitor a live test of the Terminal 

High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile defense system. 

Improved Logistics. Logistics and intelligence support remain key obstacles for the PLA despite 

ongoing naval ship construction, particularly in more distant areas from China. China’s first naval 

base in Djibouti may alleviate some logistics challenges for Indian Ocean operations, and China may 

establish additional logistics facilities over the next decade. 

The PLA has made great progress in logistics reform during the past two decades, enhancing the 

PLA’s ability to mobilize rapidly and project support along internal lines of communication for large 

operations (mostly disaster responses and exercises). Since 2016, the PLA has implemented structural 

reforms to improve command and control, procedural reforms to improve civil-military integration, 

and oversight mechanisms to eliminate waste and inefficiencies that stem from longstanding corrupt 

practices within the logistics sector. The PLA’s expanding global activity will provide opportunities 

to gain experience and further improve logistics capabilities. 

C. Opportunities for Influence

China’s wider global activities could also be leveraged to exert influence. 

Investment and Project Financing. Although many of China’s generous investment financing 

offers benefit their host nations, they often come with strings attached. In some cases, Chinese 

investment and project financing that bypasses regular market mechanisms results in negative 

economic effects for the host country, including lower standards, reduced opportunities for local 

companies and workers, and significant debt accumulation challenges. Several examples arose in 2018: 

 Malaysia has suspended or canceled several OBOR projects since August 2018, noting one 

could have been built by a local company for half the cost. 

 Pakistan announced a review of Chinese-financed projects associated with the $62 billion 

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in September 2018. An advisor to Prime Minister Khan 

told reporters the previous government “gave away a lot” to China and argued for 

renegotiation. The government later backpedaled, claiming the statement was taken out of 

context. 

 The Maldives’ finance minister stated in November 2018 that China is building infrastructure 

projects in the country at significantly higher prices than previously agreed. 
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

22

 China’s announcement of $60 billion in additional aid and loans for Africa occurred despite 

the International Monetary Fund’s early 2018 warning that sub-Saharan African nations are at 

a growing risk of debt distress. 

In other cases, unfair economic deals may provide near-term benefits but also carry costs to host 

country sovereignty. 

 In 2009, China used economic incentives, including a currency swap agreement to stabilize 

Argentina’s currency, to negotiate a 50-year, rent-free lease of nearly 500 acres for a satellite 

tracking facility in Argentina. 

 In 2011, China reportedly agreed to forgive an undeclared amount of Tajikistan’s debt and 

received over 1,000 square kilometers of disputed territory in exchange. 

 China has also assumed control over infrastructure as a form of compensation when projects 

have failed. For example, China financed a roughly $2 billion deal between Sri Lanka and a 

Chinese state-owned enterprise to develop Hambantota Port. In 2017, following the 

commercial failure of the port, Sri Lanka signed a 99-year lease for the operation of the port 

to the Chinese state-owned enterprise.

 China currently has claims to nearly 90 percent of Ecuador’s oil reserves through 

commodities-backed loans. 

 In his December 13, 2018 speech announcing the Administration’s new Africa Strategy, U.S. 

National Security Advisor Bolton noted Zambia currently owes China $6 to $10 billion, and 

China is poised to take over Zambia’s national power and utility company to collect on 

Zambia’s financial obligations. 

Other Forms. China has also employed economic incentives or economic coercion to achieve

specific political objectives. This has affected a wide range of countries.

 In 2004, after China pledged $122 million in assistance to Dominica, Dominica cut official ties 

with Taiwan. 

 In 2010, China stopped exports of rare earths, a critical technology input, to Japan in response 

to a maritime collision and subsequent detention of a Chinese fishing boat and its captain, 

claiming that Japan had reached an export quota.

 In 2010, China reduced salmon imports from Norway and suspended diplomatic relations and 

trade discussions, after Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo won the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize.

 In 2011, after China restructured between $4 billion and $6 billion of Cuba’s debt, Havana 

reportedly agreed to extend an existing development credit to China to modernize the Santiago 

de Cuba port. 
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

23

 In 2012, China restricted Filipino banana imports and restricted tourism to the Philippines, 

following clashes over the disputed Scarborough Reef.

 In 2016, China halted group tourism to Taiwan in response to the election of President Tsai 

Ing-wen, who Beijing perceives to harbor a pro-independence agenda.

 In 2016, after the visit of the Dalai Lama to Mongolia, China suspended talks on a major 

assistance loan, worsening Mongolia’s fiscal challenges and eventually driving it to seek an 

IMF bailout. China also increased fees on imports of mining products from Mongolia and 

temporarily closed an important border crossing. 

 In 2016, China tried unsuccessfully to dissuade South Korea from deploying a missile defense 

system by restricting tourism, cutting imports, and closing nearly 90 Korean-owned 

supermarkets in China. 

 The Dominican Republic switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC in May 2018, and El 

Salvador did so in August 2018. China may use these changes to incentivize other states in 

the region to follow this example.

IV. U.S. RESPONSE

The Department of Defense will continue to assess the military implications of China’s expanding 

global access and ensure the Department provides combat-credible military forces needed to fight a 

war and win, should deterrence fail. 

Importantly, the Department has not viewed every one of China’s expanding global activities as a 

problem. Many countries have genuine economic development needs, particularly for infrastructure. 

The Asian Development Bank has assessed that developing countries in the Indo-Pacific will need 

$26 trillion for infrastructure investment by 2030, for example. In addition, trade and investment 

often provide long-term economic benefits, including for the United States. U.S. policy does not 

oppose China’s investment activities as long as they respect sovereignty and rule of law, use sustainable 

financing, and operate in a transparent and economically sustainable manner. The principles of a “free 

and open Indo-Pacific” should be paramount, under which countries can determine their own 

economic interests and needs. 

The Department is concerned by actions China’s government has taken that are out of step with

international norms, diminish countries’ sovereignty, or undermine the security of the United States

or that of our allies and partners. The Department has responded in line with the U.S. National Defense 

Strategy and in support of whole-of-government action. 

National Defense Strategy

The NDS directs the Department to maintain favorable balances of power in three key theaters: the 

Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. The Department is advancing this objective by 

implementing four strategic ways: building a more lethal force to gain military advantage, 
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

24

strengthening allies and partners to generate robust networks that can advance shared interests, 

reforming the Department to realize greater performance and affordability, and expanding the 

competitive space to create U.S. advantages and impose dilemmas on competitors. 

More specifically, a combat-credible, rapidly innovating Joint Force, suitably postured and executing 

creative, multi-domain operations – coupled with the access and complementary capabilities of a 

robust alliance and partnership network – will renew U.S. and allied military advantages in key potential 

warfights. Several representative actions discussed in the unclassified summary of the National 

Defense Strategy are furthering this effort.

Building a More Lethal Force. Noting the scope and pace of our competitors’ ambitions and 

capabilities, the NDS outlines plans to invest in modernization of key U.S. capabilities including

nuclear forces; space and cyberspace capabilities; C4ISR; missile defense; capabilities to strike diverse 

targets inside adversary air and missile defense networks; smaller, dispersed, resilient, and adaptive 

basing; and autonomous systems. 

The NDS also discusses investment in resilient and agile logistics related to this challenge. The 

Department is prioritizing prepositioned forward stocks and munitions, strategic mobility assets, 

partner and ally support, and non-commercially dependent distributed logistics and maintenance, in 

order to ensure logistics sustainment while under persistent multi-domain attack.

Strengthening Alliances and Attracting New Partners. The NDS notes that mutually beneficial 

alliances and partnerships provide a “durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor can 

rival or match.” U.S. allies and partners specifically “provide access to critical regions, supporting a 

widespread basing and logistics system that underpins the Department’s global reach.” China’s

attempts to gain veto authority over other countries’ decisions, and its coercion directed at U.S. allies 

and partners in particular, will thus likely threaten U.S. posture and access if not addressed. 

Accordingly, the NDS states the Department will work “by, with, and through our allies and partners 

to secure our interests and counteract this coercion.” Specifically, DoD is working to uphold our 

commitments while encouraging allies and partners to modernize their defense capabilities and 

contribute to collective security. DoD is also working to expand collaborative planning, prioritize 

requests for U.S. military equipment sales in conjunction with the State Department and Congress to 

deepen interoperability, and train to high-end combat missions in alliance, bilateral, and multilateral 

exercises.

Reforming the Department for Greater Performance and Affordability. The NDS recognizes 

the challenges presented by rapid technological advancements in dual-use areas, and China’s blurring 

of the lines between civil and military goals. Accordingly, it discusses efforts to organize Department 

structures to promote innovation, protect key technologies, and to harness and protect the national 

security innovation base to maintain the Department’s technological advantage. DoD’s support to 

whole-of-government actions also contributes to this response. 

Support for Whole-of-Government Action 

Importantly, the NDS also states that DoD will “support U.S. interagency approaches and work by, 

with, and through our allies and partners” to counter coercion and subversion by revisionist powers. 
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

25

This is because China’s expanding global activities are not primarily or exclusively a military issue. The 

Department will continue to support an interagency-led, whole-of-government response. For 

example, DoD has supported several U.S. interagency initiatives:

1) The National Security Strategy states that the United States faces growing political, economic, and 

military competition with China, and that this is a long-term challenge demanding sustained 

national attention, prompting a whole-of-government focus on this issue. The National Defense 

Strategy aligns with this strategic direction. 

2) The United States government has outlined its Indo-Pacific Strategy, emphasizing a vision for a “free 

and open Indo-Pacific” that provides security, stability, and prosperity for all. Key aspects of this 

vision includes open access to seas and airways, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the ability 

for nations to protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries. The Department of 

State, in cooperation with other U.S. government agencies and partner countries, has taken several 

steps to promote market economics and private-sector finance, support good governance, and 

build partner capacity to ensure a peaceful and secure rules-based order. 

3) The United States continues to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. The 

Freedom of Navigation Program provides for operational assertions of navigation rights and 

freedoms, in conjunction with U.S. diplomatic representations, to further the recognition of the 

vital national need to protect maritime rights throughout the world. 

4) The United States has taken action to confront China over its market-distorting policies and 

practices, forced technology transfers, failure to respect intellectual property, and cyber intrusions 

into U.S. commercial networks. The United States has encouraged China to respond by 

undertaking necessary reforms to end its unfair trade practices and honor its promises to open its 

markets. Regardless, U.S. actions will place the United States in the best position to defend itself 

from unfair trade practices and achieve greater fairness and reciprocity in the U.S. trade 

relationship with China. 

5) The executive branch, in conjunction with Congress, has worked to update key foreign investment 

review and export control authorities to keep pace with rapid technological change and China’s 

ambitious technology transfer strategies. Other actions have addressed telecommunications 

procurement and licensing. These policies do not seek to cut off all trade and investment 

exchanges with strategic competitors but to maintain U.S. competitiveness and protect the U.S. 

national security innovation base via robust, national security-based best practices. Ultimately, 

this is a global challenge the United States is addressing in conjunction with ally and partner 

governments and industry. 

The Department will continue supporting these and other whole-of-government actions to address 

the implications of China’s expanding global access, and per the National Defense Strategy will continue 

to field a Joint Force that can compete, deter, and win in the increasingly complex security 

environment.
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

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Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access

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The estimated cost of this report for the Department of Defense is 

approximately $25,000 in Fiscal Years 2018-2019. This includes $0 

in expenses and $25,000 in DoD labor.

Generated on 2018 Dec 20 RefID: 6-6B48CD8