### RE VISED F ebruary 13, 2020

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19

- 50477 Summary Calendar

T. ANTHONY GUAJARDO,

Plaintiff

–

Appellant,

v. STATE BAR OF TEXAS; STATE OF ARIZONA; ARIZONA SUPREME COURT; R OBERT B RUTINEL, Chief Justice, In his Official Capacity; STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

Defendants

– Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5 :1 8

- CV

- 1320

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and SOUTHWICK and WILLETT, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM: * T. Anthony Guajardo sued the State of Arizona, the Arizona Supreme Court, the State Bar of Arizona, the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED February 13, 2020 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 19-50477 Document: 00515310338 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/13/2020No. 19

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2 Court in his official capacity, and the State Bar of Texas, seeking to overturn his disbarment in both Arizona and Texas as well as challeng ing Arizona rules governing the practice of law. The district court dismissed his lawsuit. We affirm.
I Guajardo was an attorney in Arizona and Texas. W hen Guajardo filed a complaint against an Arizona state judge for judicial misconduct, the judge allegedly retaliated and filed his own complaint against Guajardo with the Arizona bar. This complaint against Guajardo led to sixteen different disciplinary proceedings before an Arizona presiding disciplinary judge (PDJ)

. Guajardo consented to disbarment, asserting that he f ear ed the consecutive proceedings would induce enough stress to “cause a heart attack [or] stroke

. ” Guajardo’s disbarment in Arizona led to his disbar ment in Texas . Guajardo subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, seeking money damages, injunctive and declaratory relief , and an order invalidat ing and vacat ing these disbarments

. The district court dismissed his claims for lack of juri sdiction. This appeal followed. Guajardo alleges a series of claims against the defendants

. Specifically,
he contends:
1. T he defendants deni ed him due process and equal protection in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including , among other allegations , that the Arizona bar PDJ was unconstitutionally appointed and had conflicts of interest

. 2. The defendants intentional ly discriminat ed against Guajardo on the basis of his age and national origin in the state proceedings

. 3. Because the PDJ was allegedly unconstitutionally appointed, the Arizona defendants committed mail fraud when they mailed out his judgments as those of a court

. 4. T he Chief Justice of the A rizona Supreme Court failed to supervise the PDJ in the state proceedings against Guajardo and discover that he was allegedly a “fake judge

. ” Case: 19-50477 Document: 00515310338 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/13/2020No. 19

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3 5. T he Arizona defendants violated Guajardo’s federal and state constitutional rights by retaliatorily charging him with misconduct when he filed a complaint of judicial misconduct

. 6. T he Arizona defendants denied him equal access under Title II of the ADA because the planned scheduling of the state bar disciplinary proceedings could have caus ed Guajardo enough stress to induce a heart attack or stroke

. 7. The state bar disciplinary proceedings conducted by the defendants constituted illegal takings of his law licenses

. 8. The state bar disciplinary proceedings conducted by the defendants levied an excessive fine contrary to the Eighth Amendmen t. 9. By requiring Guajardo to be a member of the bar to practice law, t he Arizona defendants are denying him rights under the First Amendment and the Arizona Constitution

. Guajardo also asserts that the district court erred in denying him discovery
relevant to its subject matter jurisdiction

. In reviewing the district court’s dismissal of Guajardo’s claims, “ [we] may affirm the district court on any grounds supported by the record and argued in the court below.” 1

I I The district court was powerless to grant Guajardo any relief on the first eight claims because of the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine. Under the Rooker

Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack sub ject matter jurisdiction over “cases brought by state

- court losers complaining of injuries caused by state

court judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. ” 2 The Rooker

- Feldman doctrine recognizes that federal district

1 Maria S. ex rel. E.H.F. v. Garza , 912 F.3d 778, 783 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med. Alliance, Inc. , 123 F.3d 301, 307 (5th Cir. 1997)).
2 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Case: 19-50477 Document: 00515310338 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/13/2020No. 19

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4 courts do not sit as appellate courts to review state court judgments

. 3 Therefore, “[a]bsent specific law otherwise providing, that doctrine directs that federal district courts lack [subjec t matter] jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments

. ” 4 This fact remains true “even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.” 5 The doctrine also deprives federal district courts of subject matter jurisdiction when “allegations are inextricably intertwined” with the decision of the state

c ourt s

. 6 The Rooker

- Feldman doctrine specifically applies to state bar disciplinary proceedings. 7 We have noted that “[i]f a state trial court errs[,] the judgment is not void, it is to be reviewed and corrected by the appropriate state appellate court. Thereafter, recourse at the federal level is limited solely to an application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.” 8 Here, most of Guajardo’s claims are barred by the Rooker

- Feldman
doctrine. Guajardo’s first eight claims are all “ inextricably intertwined” with
the decision s of the state proceedings. 9 In each instance, Guajardo “seeks relief that directly attacks the validity of an existing state court judgment.” 10 T he district court correctly dismissed each of these claims. Guaja rdo should have sought review of the state bar disciplinary proceedings through the state courts
and , if necessary, presented his cla i ms to the Supreme Court of the United States. 11

3 Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); see also D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983).

4 Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex

. , 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994).
5 Feldman , 460 U.S. at 486.
6 Id.
7 Id

. at 482 n.15; Liedtke , 18 F.3d at 3 17

- 18.
8 Liedtke , 18 F.3d at 317.
9 Feldman , 460 U.S. at 486.
10 Weaver v. Tex

. Capital Bank N.A. , 660 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 2011).

11 See Liedtke , 18 F.3d at 317. Case: 19-50477 Document: 00515310338 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/13/2020No. 19

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5 Nevertheless, Guajardo contends that the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine is inappli cable for two reasons. First, Guajardo contends that the state proceedings themselves were fraudulent since the defendants engaged in a criminal conspiracy to retaliate against him for reporting judicial misconduct.
But there is no “fraud exception ” to the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine. 12 Second, Guajardo contends that “federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
a collateral attack on a state

- cour t judgment if the trial courts of that state would have jurisdiction to hear the collateral attack

. ” He contends that his case is just such an instance. But he is mistaken. I n Arizona , “a judgment [of the state courts] may not be collaterally attacked u nless the absence of jurisdiction appears from the record.” 13 Here, nothing in the record shows that the Arizona court lacked jurisdiction . Although Guajardo argue s the PDJ lacked jurisdiction because the Arizona bar failed to prove all the elements of

a bar rule he was charged with violating , Guajardo’s allegation speaks only to the merits of the charge , not the jurisdiction of the PDJ. Thus, because the
Rooker

- Feldman doctrine applies to these claims , t he district court correctly
dismissed his first eight claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I II Next, we consider Guajardo ’s claim that Arizona’s rule “requiring a person practicing law in Arizona [to] be an ‘active member of the state bar’ is unconstitutional” because it violates both t he First Amendment and the Arizona Constitution

. A Generally, a state itself has immunity from private suit

— including for money damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief

— unless Congress has

12 Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 717 F.3d 377, 384 n.6 (5th Cir. 2013).
13 Ariz

. Pub. Serv. Co. v. S. Union Gas Co. , 265 P.2d 435, 438 ( Ariz. 1954). Case: 19-50477 Document: 00515310338 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/13/2020No. 19

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6 validly abrogated that immunity or the state has consente d to suit. 14 Additionally, “ a claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the [s]tate that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment.” 15 However, w hen acting in an enforcement capacit y , neither a state supreme court nor a state bar association have Eleventh Amendment immunity from injunctive or declaratory relief for violating federal law. 16 State officials in their official capacity also do not possess
Eleventh Ame ndment immunity against prospective injunctive relief to prevent them from violating federal law

. 17 Here, t he Eleventh Amendment bars the district court from giving monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief against the State of Arizona

. 18 T he Eleventh Ame ndment also bars the district court from deciding whether the Arizona Supreme Court, the State Bar of Arizona, or the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court violated the Arizona Constitution in carrying out Arizona’s law. 19 Guajardo’s use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not disturb th ese

14 See Alden v. Maine , 527 U.S. 706, 729

- 31 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fl orida , 517 U.S. 44, 55

- 58 (1996).
15 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).
16 See LeClerc v. Webb , 419 F.3d 405, 414 (5th Cir. 2005) (“ When acting in its enforcement capacity, [a state supreme court] , and its members, are not immune from suits for declaratory or injunctive relief. ” (citing Supreme Court of V a. v. Consumers Union of the U.S. , 446 U.S. 719, 736 (1980) ) ) ; Lewis v. L a. State Bar Ass’n , 792 F.2d 493, 497

- 98 (5th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity a state bar association enjoys is derived from being its state supreme court’s agent).
17 See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins , 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law

. ”); Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 159

- 160 (1908); Agu ilar v. Tex

. Dep’t of Criminal Justice , 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998).
18 See Alden , 527 U.S. at 729

- 31; Seminole Tribe , 517 U.S. at 55

- 58

. 19 Pennhurst , 465 U.S. at 121 (“[A] claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment

. ”). Case: 19-50477 Document: 00515310338 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/13/2020No. 19

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7 conclusion s

. 20 However, t he Arizona Supreme Court , the State Bar of Arizona , and the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, acting in his official capacity, do not possess Eleventh Amendment immunity against this First Amendment claim because Guajardo is seeking a prospective injunction against their enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional rule. 21 Guajardo also contends that Arizona has waived its immunit y and
consented to suit based on Garcia v. Arizona

. 22 But in Garcia , the court merely held that Arizona had consented to suit in state court , not in federal court. 23 The Ninth Circuit has recognized this same conclusion , and has continued to bar suits agai nst Arizona in federal court because of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 24 Therefore, the district court rightly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction , dismissing th e entire claim against the State of
Arizona as well as t he claims based on state law against the other Arizona defendants

. B Because venue in the district court was improper for t he Arizona Supreme Court, the State Bar of Arizona, and the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, the district court was allowed to dismiss this First Amendment claim against the m . Venue must be proper for each claim that a plaintiff brings against a defendant. 25 When venue is improper, the district

20 Will v. Mich. Dep’t. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 65

- 68 (1989) (“Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity

. . . . ”); Quern

v. Jordan , 440 U.S. 332, 343

- 44 (1979).
21 See Frew , 540 U.S. at 437 ; LeClerc , 419 F.3d at 414.
22 768 P.2d 649 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)

. 23 See Garcia , 768 P.2d at 653.
24 Ronwin v. Shapiro , 657 F.2d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1981) (“ [T] here is no indication

. . . that Arizona intended to consent to anything more than suit in its own courts

. ”); see also A riz. Students’ Ass’n v. A riz. Bd. of Regents , 824 F.3d 858, 864

- 65 (9th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that Ronwin ’s conclusion is still good law).
25 See In re Rolls Royce Corp. , 775 F.3d 671, 680 n.40 (5th Cir. 2014) ; Bredberg v. Long , 778 F.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1985); Worley v. Desoto C ounty , MS, No. 2:05CV214

- D

- D, 2006 Case: 19-50477 Document: 00515310338 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/13/2020No. 19

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8 court “has discretion to either dismiss the suit, or ‘if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.’” 26 Generally, venue is proper only in (1) “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the
district i s located;” (2) “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated;” or (3) “any judicial district in which any defe ndant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action , ” but only if “there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in [ 28 U.S.C. § 1391 ] .” 27 Here, for this claim, the first possibility make s venue proper in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona but not in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The second possibility is inapplicable for conc luding that venue is proper in Texas because the rules being challenged are Arizona rules and, conceivably, their effect would be substantially felt only in Arizona. The third possibility is also inapplicable for concluding that venue is proper in
Texas s ince venue would be proper in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona . Therefore, the district court was within its discretion when
it dismissed this First Amendment claim against the Arizona Supreme Court, the State Bar of Arizona, a nd the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court

.

WL 2590616, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 8, 2006) (“[V]enue must be proper as to each such claim

. ”); 14D C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT & A RTHUR R. M ILLER F ED ERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 3808 (4th ed. 2019 ) (“[I]f the plaintiff asserts multiple claims against the defendant, venue must be proper for each claim

. ”).
26 McClintock v. Sch. Bd. E. Feliciana Par. , 299 F. App ’ x 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)).
27 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Case: 19-50477 Document: 00515310338 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/13/2020No. 19

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9 C Insofar as Guajardo seeks to enjoin the State Bar of Texas from enforcing
Texas rules requiring bar membership to practice law , he does so for the first time in his reply brief and thus forfeit s his claim

. 28
I V Lastly, we consider Guajardo ’s contention that the district court erred
when it denied him discovery relevant to its subject matter jurisdiction. Generally, “ a party is not entitled to jurisdictional discovery if the record shows that the reque sted discovery is not likely to produce the facts needed to withstand” a motion to dismiss. 29 Here, as outlined above, the district court

was able to dismiss all of Guajardo’s relevant claims. No amount of discovery would change that result

. 30 Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Guajardo discovery relevant to subject matter jurisdiction.

* * * For the forgoing reasons, t he district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, all pending motions are DENIED as moot.

28 United States v. Ponce , 896 F.3d 726, 728 (5th Cir. 2018) (“ [H]e ha s forfeited that argument by raising it for the first time in his reply brief” (citing Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993) ) ).
29 Freeman v. United States , 556 F.3d 326, 342 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Williamson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. , 815 F.2d 368, 382 (5th Cir.1987)).
30 See Freeman , 556 F.3d at 342. Case: 19-50477 Document: 00515310338 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/13/2020