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21-597-cv

Ferrarini v. Irgit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY 

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST 

CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION 

“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON 

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

31st day of May, two thousand twenty-two.

Present:

DENNIS JACOBS,

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

WILLIAM J. NARDINI,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

MARIA SOLANGE FERRARINI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 21-597-cv

IPEK IRGIT, an individual, KIINI, LLC, a New 

York limited liability company,

Defendants-Appellees.

_____________________________________

For Plaintiff-Appellant: JACK M. RUTHERFORD, Rutherford Law, Los 

Angeles, CA.

For Defendants-Appellees: MARK A. BERMAN (Robin D. Fineman, on the 

brief), Hartmann Doherty Rosa Berman & Bulbulia, 

LLC, New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Lorna G. Schofield, Judge).
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant Maria Solange Ferrarini appeals from a judgment entered by the district 

court on February 17, 2021, granting Defendants-Appellees Ipek Irgit and Kiini, LLC’s (together, 

“Defendants”) motion for summary judgment on Ferrarini’s copyright claim on statute of 

limitations grounds and Defendants’ motion to dismiss Ferrarini’s state law claims. We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the record.

This case centers on the copyright to a colorful crocheted bikini. In her amended 

complaint filed on April 11, 2019, Ferrarini asserted a claim against Defendants for, as she framed

it, copyright infringement. On summary judgment, the district court agreed with Defendants that 

the gravamen of Ferrarini’s copyright claim was one for ownership, not infringement, and the 

relevant statute of limitations inquiry was therefore when Ferrarini had notice of the ownership 

dispute. The district court concluded that there was no genuine dispute that Ferrarini had notice 

of Defendants’ assertion of ownership by November 8, 2015. Because the applicable statute of 

limitations requires that an action be brought within three years of the accrual date, the district 

court concluded that Ferrarini’s claim was time barred. See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (“No civil action 

shall be maintained . . . unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”). 

Ferrarini now appeals, arguing that ownership is not in dispute, and the district court therefore 

applied the wrong framework to the statute of limitations inquiry. We disagree.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “drawing all factual 

inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Kwan v. Schlein,

634 F.3d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In a copyright infringement case,

the plaintiff must show: (i) ownership of a valid copyright; and (ii) unauthorized copying of the 

copyrighted work.” Sohm v. Scholastic Inc., 959 F.3d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up); see 17 

U.S.C. § 501.

Ferrarini’s argument is foreclosed by our decision in Kwan. There, we held “that a timebarred ownership claim will bar a claim for copyright infringement where, as here, the 

infringement claim cannot be decided without adjudication of a genuine dispute as to the plaintiff’s 

ownership of the copyright.” Kwan, 634 F.3d at 226. Defendants have made clear that

ownership is in dispute. See, e.g., Appellees’ Br. at 15 (stating that “Defendants do not concede 

that Plaintiff owns the copyright”); Joint App’x at 260 (arguing that “Plaintiff cannot show that 

she owns a valid copyright”); id. at 272 (asserting an affirmative defense that the “Ferrarini Bikini 

design is not entitled to protection under the Copyright Act”). Ferrarini filed her amended 

complaint on April 11, 2019. For her copyright claim to be timely, she must have been put on 

notice of Defendants’ assertion of ownership no earlier than April 11, 2016. See Horror Inc. v. 

Miller, 15 F.4th 232, 257 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Generally, an ownership claim accrues only once, when 

a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have been put on inquiry as to the existence of his right in the 

work.” (cleaned up)). Ferrarini’s November 8, 2015, Facebook post makes clear that she had 

actual notice of Defendants’ claim to ownership by at least that date. Indeed, Ferrarini protested 

that Kiini claimed to be the “creator of bikinis,” which were her “creation since 1998.” Joint 
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App’x at 230. There is thus no genuine dispute of material fact that Ferrarini’s copyright claim

turns on ownership and is therefore time-barred under § 507.

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We have considered Ferrarini’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk