Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 16-1209 (TSC) 

LISA NILES,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. CAPITOL POLICE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Lisa Niles, a former police officer with the U.S. Capitol Police (“USCP”), has 

sued the USCP, claiming that her termination constituted disability discrimination under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and race and sex discrimination under Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964. USCP has moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 52. For the 

reasons stated below, the court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

In reciting the relevant facts, the court relies mainly on the undisputed material facts set 

forth by Defendant, along with Plaintiff’s responses thereto. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Statement of 

Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 55-1 (“Pl.’s Resp. to SUMF”). At the outset, a word about 

the meaning of “undisputed” facts is in order. The party seeking summary judgment bears the 

“initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying 

those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To dispute a fact, “the non-movant must rely on evidence—i.e., its opposition must 
Page 2 of 15

consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by 

affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Rochon v. Lynch, 139 F. Supp. 3d 394 (D.D.C. 2015)

(quotation omitted), aff’d, 664 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Where Defendant has stated certain 

facts and supported them with evidence, therefore, the court treats those facts as undisputed if 

Plaintiff’s only response is to deny them without counter evidence or to raise generic protests 

against them that are unrelated to the facts’ veracity. 

Accordingly, the following facts are undisputed: On May 30, 2014, Amtrak contacted 

Defendant to report two incidents in which Plaintiff—who is a Black woman—“boarded an 

Amtrak train as a passenger and did not pay her fare.” Pl.’s Resp. to SUMF ¶¶ 68–69. 

According to the Amtrak Police Department (APD), the first incident occurred on February 26, 

2014 and Plaintiff “not only did not pay for a ticket,” but also “sought to avoid getting 

discovered by a conductor by moving to another car or going to the bathroom while the 

conductor collected tickets.” Id. ¶ 70. The conductor also said that “he observed Plaintiff 

remove a seat check from another passenger’s seat” and then claim that another conductor had 

given it to her, which the other conductor denied. Id. ¶ 86. An APD officer’s report states that 

when he confronted Plaintiff about her lack of ticket or payment, she “explained that she did not 

realize she could not take Amtrak Trains.” Id. ¶ 77. The officer explained to her Amtrak’s 

policy that non-Amtrak law enforcement officers “are required to have a ticket to ride.” Id.

¶¶ 77–78. 

The second incident occurred on May 17, 2014. An Amtrak conductor said she 

encountered Plaintiff on the station platform at Wilmington, Delaware, asked if Plaintiff had a 

ticket, and Plaintiff answered that she did. Id. ¶ 82. But when the conductor asked Plaintiff to 
Page 3 of 15

show the ticket after she boarded the train, “Plaintiff appeared to search for a ticket but then 

stated ‘Well, I don’t actually have a ticket-ticket.’” Id. The conductor, who later told Defendant 

that “other conductors had previously had issues with Plaintiff riding Amtrak without paying,” 

id. ¶ 84, once again summoned APD officers, id. ¶ 94. An officer stated that she escorted 

Plaintiff to the APD office and explained “that this was not the first time she had stopped 

Plaintiff,” and that Plaintiff “had committed a crime.” Id. ¶ 96.

Defendant appointed an Investigator in its Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) 

to review Amtrak’s complaint against Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 76. The Investigator spoke with the 

Amtrak conductors and APD officers involved in the two incidents. Id. ¶¶ 77–78, 80, 85, 93. 

The Investigator also interviewed Plaintiff twice, and in both interviews she acknowledged her 

obligation to answer all questions truthfully. Id. ¶ 100. During the interviews, Plaintiff denied 

that she was stopped by APD on February 26, 2014, or that she had been informed of Amtrak’s 

policy requiring non-Amtrak law enforcement officers to purchase tickets. Id. ¶¶ 102, 112–13. 

Plaintiff did recall being stopped by APD on May 17, 2014 but denied that she had told a 

conductor that she had a ticket before boarding. Id. ¶ 102, 106. Plaintiff claimed that she had 

asked a male conductor whether it was “okay for [her] to ride, and he nodded his head . . . as to 

mean yes.” Id. ¶ 111. Later, Plaintiff said, she “was told to get off the train by a female 

conductor and did not resist” paying for the ticket “because APD asked her to pay.” Id. ¶¶ 109–

110. But she admitted that “she continued to ride the train without paying even after being 

stopped on May 17, 2014 and told by APD that from then on she needed to purchase a ticket 

before she boarded any Amtrak train.” Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Ex. 4 at 8, ECF No. 

52-6.
Page 4 of 15

Based on his review, the Investigator “sustained”—that is, “found sufficient evidence that 

a violation of [Defendant’s] Rules of Conduct occurred,” Pl.’s Resp. to SUMF ¶ 37—charges 

against Plaintiff for “Conduct Unbecoming” and “Truthfulness,” id. ¶ 116. The Investigator’s 

report was approved by OPR officials and submitted to Disciplinary Review Officer (“DRO”) 

Scharon Ball for assignment of a recommended penalty based on “the nature and seriousness of 

the offense, the employment history of the employee, any mitigating factors, and penalties issued 

in similar cases.” Id. ¶¶ 122, 46. 

Ball recommended a penalty of demotion for the Conduct Unbecoming charge, and 

termination for the Truthfulness charge. Id. ¶ 123. Specifically, she found that “Plaintiff’s 

conduct was extremely serious” because it “was technically a crime,” because Plaintiff had 

repeated the conduct even after having been stopped by APD Officers on February 26, because 

Plaintiff apparently attempted to mislead Amtrak conductors during both incidents, and because 

Plaintiff (as a Sergeant) was a “supervisory law enforcement officer.” Id. ¶ 125. Ball found

“that Plaintiff’s version of events was not credible” given the “multiple witness statements and 

police reports” contradicting it. Id. ¶ 126. Ball considered Plaintiff’s otherwise good 

employment history, but concluded that it did not warrant a penalty reduction. Id. ¶ 127. Ball 

also noted as a potential mitigating factor that some Amtrak conductors apparently allowed 

Plaintiff to ride the train without paying, which “could have confused Plaintiff into believing that 

an Amtrak policy entitled law enforcement to courtesy rides.” Id. ¶ 128. However, Ball 

reasoned that any confusion “should have [been] cleared up on February 26, when the policy was 

explained to her,” and that in any event the confusion “could not explain her attempts to deceive 

the Amtrak conducts” during both incidents. Id. Ball did not find any similar recent cases 
Page 5 of 15

involving “supervisors making untruthful statements during OPR investigations or being stopped 

multiple time[s] by an external police agency for unlawful conduct.” Id. ¶ 129.

After Plaintiff was presented with the charges, she appealed them to USCP’s Disciplinary 

Review Board Panel. Id. ¶¶ 131, 134. During the appeal proceedings, Plaintiff admitted that 

APD Officers had in fact told her that riding without a ticket was unlawful. Id. ¶ 137. She also 

presented evidence from a neurologist, Dr. Reed. Id. ¶ 134. Based on “Plaintiff’s past medical 

records, an old MRI, and Plaintiff’s representations to him that she did not remember the 

February 26, 2014 incident,” Dr. Reed characterized that lack of recollection as a “[l]ong 

amnesic episode . . . that could have represented transient global amnesia” and may have been 

related to Plaintiff being “under a lot of stress, depression, anxiety, and poor sleep” at the time. 

Id. ¶ 160. Ultimately, the Panel upheld both the charges against Plaintiff and the penalties 

recommended by DRO Ball. Id. ¶ 138–39. In addition to the grounds set forth in Ball’s 

recommendation, the Panel also noted that Plaintiff’s admission that APD Officers had warned 

her that ticketless riding was a crime meant that she had not been truthful in telling the 

Investigator that she had never received any such warning. Id. ¶ 141.

Plaintiff then appealed her penalty recommendation to USCP Chief of Police Kim C. 

Dine. Id. ¶¶ 8, 142. She did not contest the charges themselves but argued that the 

recommendation and the Panel “failed to properly consider evidence of [her] mental condition” 

and otherwise did not properly account for all four relevant factors. Id. ¶¶ 143–44. Chief Dine 

denied the appeal for reasons similar to those in the penalty recommendation and Panel decision. 

Id. ¶¶ 146–51. In particular, he noted Plaintiff’s untruthfulness to the Investigator about APD 

warning her, and stated that he “did not believe that Plaintiff was truthful when she told OPR that 

she had no recollection” of the February 14, 2014 incident. Id. ¶ 148. Chief Dine likewise did 
Page 6 of 15

not credit Plaintiff’s claim that she suffered from amnesia, noting that all the doctors who had

examined Plaintiff found that “her neural examination was ‘from head to toe normal’ and her 

supervisors did not observe any memory difficulties,” including on February 14. Id. He also 

declined to consider Plaintiff’s statement in her appeal that she “had not taken the train without 

paying since May 17, 2014” as a mitigating factor because it “was contradicted by Plaintiff’s 

Statements to [the] Investigator.” Id. ¶ 149. Chief Dine therefore recommended to the Capitol 

Police Board that Plaintiff be terminated, and the Board agreed and approved the termination 

effective August 24, 2015. Id. ¶¶ 154–56.

After her termination, Plaintiff submitted requests for Counseling and Mediation with the 

Office of Compliance pursuant to Section 402 of the Congressional Accountability Act, alleging 

that she was terminated based on race, sex, national origin, color, disability, and age, and denied 

FMLA leave. Id. ¶ 157. That mediation ended on March 28, 2016, and Plaintiff brought this suit 

on June 20, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 157–58; see Compl., ECF No. 1. In 2019, the court granted in part and 

denied in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. See Order, ECF 

No. 27; Amended Order, ECF No. 30; Niles v. U.S. Capitol Police, 2019 WL 1858503 (D.D.C. 

Apr. 25, 2019). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no disputed genuine issue of material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 322–23. “A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence, ‘viewed in a light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party,’ could support a reasonable jury’s verdict for the non-moving 

party.” Brooks v. Grundmann, 748 F.3d 1273, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Hampton v. Vilsack, 

685 F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 “mandates the entry 

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who 
Page 7 of 15

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

Thus, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s 

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Disability discrimination

The Congressional Accountability Act extends certain ADA protections to legislative 

branch employees, including USCP officers. See 2 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The court evaluates ADA 

claims under the burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792 (1973). To make a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff 

must show that (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she was qualified for 

the position at issue with or without a reasonable accommodation, and (3) she suffered an 

adverse employment action because of her disability. Giles v. Transit Emp. Fed. Credit Union, 

794 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A person is disabled under the ADA if she has a physical or 

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities, has a record 

of such an impairment, or has been regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102(1)(A)–(C).

Plaintiff’s prima facie case of disability discrimination fails at the first step: She has 

failed to present sufficient evidence that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 

Plaintiff cites only to the three doctors’ reports she solicited in 2014 through 2016. See Pl.’s 

Opp. to Def.’s MSJ at 9, ECF No. 55. But none of the reports show that Plaintiff has or had an 

impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities, much less that she 

has been regarded as having that impairment or has a record of it. Dr. Reed’s report only 

speculated that Plaintiff’s inability to recall the events of February 26, 2014 “could have 
Page 8 of 15

represented transient global amnesia” without reaching that conclusion, specifically noting that 

further episodes would necessitate “differential diagnoses,” ECF No. 58-19 at PDF p. 6—that is,

gathering additional information to ascertain the medical cause of the memory loss, see 

Diagnosis and differential diagnosis, 3 Mod. Sci. Evidence § 21:40 (2022-2023 Edition). 

Likewise, Dr. Geary only noted that any potential “differential diagnosis would include transient 

global amnesia; short-term memory loss related to severe stress, depress, anxiety; [and] 

nonconvulsive status epileptics”—without determining whether Plaintiff actually suffered from 

any of those conditions. ECF No. 58-20 at PDF p. 4. And Dr. Porter similarly went only as far 

as stating that Plaintiff “may have suffered from episodic problems with her recall” that “are 

notable in patients with cognitive impairments such as dementia, but are also seen in normal 

individuals,” especially those experiencing “stress, depression, and sleep deprivation.” ECF No. 

58-23 at PDF p. 3.

Moreover, all three doctors’ reports confirm that Plaintiff had only one claimed instance 

of memory loss, and that she was otherwise in good physical and neurological health. See ECF 

No. 58-19 at PDF p. 6; ECF No. 58-20 at PDF p. 5–6; ECF No. 58-23 at PDF p. 2–3; see also 

Pl.’s Resp. to SUMF ¶ 148 (Chief Dine “noting that Plaintiff’s doctors said that her neural 

examination was ‘from head to toe normal’ and her supervisors did not observe any memory 

difficulties”). At the motion to dismiss stage, the court liberally construed Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint as alleging “more than one occasion” of memory loss, which could constitute an 

impairment to major life activities like “reading, concentrating, thinking, and communication.” 

See Niles, 2019 WL 1858503 at *4. “The burden at the summary judgment stage and at trial is 

different and substantially more onerous than the pleading burden.” Nanko Shipping, USA v. 

Alcoa, Inc., 850 F.3d 461, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Because Plaintiff has failed to meaningfully 
Page 9 of 15

substantiate any such impairment, she has failed to meet her burden of establishing at least a 

material dispute of fact as to whether she was disabled. Without that essential element, her claim 

of disability discrimination cannot succeed, and the court will grant summary judgment to 

Defendant. Accordingly, the court need not reach Defendant’s additional arguments regarding 

whether Plaintiff’s termination was “because of” her disability. See Def.’s MSJ Memo at 26–31, 

ECF No. 52-1. 

B. Age and race discrimination

The Congressional Accountability Act also extends Title VII’s protections to legislative 

branch employees like Plaintiff, and here, too, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework applies. 2 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1); see Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 

248, 252–53 (1981) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in Title VII case). But in this 

case, Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff has made out prima facie cases for race and sex 

discrimination, instead arguing that “it has presented a valid business reason for its decision to 

terminate” Plaintiff—her Rules of Conduct violations—and that she has not demonstrated that 

that reason was a pretext for discrimination. Def.’s MSJ Memo at 31–32; Niles, 2019 WL 

1858503 at *6. A plaintiff may show that an employer’s stated reason for the employment action 

is a pretext for discrimination by either: (1) producing evidence suggesting that the employer 

treated other employees of a different race or sex “more favorably in the same factual 

circumstances”; or (2) producing evidence suggesting that “the employer is making up or lying 

about the underlying facts that formed the predicate for the employment decision.” Brady v. Off. 

of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff attempts to make the first kind of showing by identifying other USCP employees 

of a different race or sex who, she argues, were treated more favorably despite being similarly 

situated. To be similarly situated, the plaintiff and the potential comparator must be “charged 
Page 10 of 15

with offenses of comparable seriousness,” and “all of the relevant aspects of [their] employment 

situation [must be] nearly identical.” Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 301 

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). “Factors that bear on whether someone is an appropriate 

comparator include the similarity of the plaintiff’s and the putative comparator’s jobs and job 

duties, whether they were disciplined by the same supervisor, and, in cases involving discipline, 

the similarity of their offenses.” Id. As the court has already noted, the plaintiff “bears the 

burden of coming forward with affirmative comparator evidence.” Niles, 2019 WL 1858503 at 

*7. 

Plaintiff contends that she has identified twelve comparators, to whom the parties refer 

anonymously by abbreviated titles and numbers:

(1) PFC29: a white male Private First Class charged with Conduct Unbecoming and 

given a 14-day suspension after being evasive with another police department during 

a traffic stop, Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts in Dispute ¶¶ 2–7;

(2) PFC17: a white female Private First Class charged with Conduct Unbecoming and 

given a 3-day suspension after yelling at another driver and breaking their door 

handle after a traffic accident, id. ¶¶ 8–14;

(3) PFC22: a white male Private First Class charged with Conduct Unbecoming and 

given a 14-day suspension after being investigated for taking items from a 

convenience store despite his credit card being declined, and resisting direction from 

the store employees and another police department for him to properly pay for the 

items, id. ¶ 15–25;
Page 11 of 15

(4) DC01: a white male management official charged with Conduct Unbecoming and 

demoted after failing to disclose a romantic relationship with a subordinate officer, id.

¶¶ 26–33;

(5) PFC13: a Black male Private First Class charged with Conduct Unbecoming and 

given a warning after a dangerous traffic violation, id. ¶¶ 34–40;

(6) PFC15: a Black male Private First Class charged with Conduct Unbecoming and 

given a 1-day suspension after deliberately shouldering into another officer in the 

hallway, id. ¶¶ 41–47;

(7) PFC26: a white male Private First Class charged with Conduct Unbecoming and 

given 10-day and 7-day suspensions, plus removal from a certain detail, for 

threatening, demeaning, and aggressive behavior with his team and multiple 

unauthorized vehicle stops, id. ¶¶ 48–53;

(8) SGT03: a white female Sergeant charged with Truthfulness in 2003 after lying about 

attending a meeting, whose recommended penalty of termination was reduced 

pursuant to a settlement, and who was charged with Conduct Unbecoming and 

demoted in 2015 after providing a photo of a firearm left in a bathroom in the Capitol 

Visitor’s Center to the media, id. ¶¶ 54–63;

(9) LT01: a Black male Lieutenant charged with Conduct Unbecoming and given a 7-day 

suspension after getting into a confrontation with another officer, id. ¶¶ 64–70;

(10) CPT01: a white female Captain charged with Conduct Unbecoming and given a 

7-day suspension after keeping unauthorized copies of documents from a prior OPR 

investigation, id. ¶¶ 71–78;
Page 12 of 15

(11) LT03: a white female Lieutenant charged with Conduct Unbecoming and given a 

3-day suspension after disclosing details of an OPR investigation through 

unauthorized channels, id. ¶¶ 79–86;

(12) PFC27: a white male Private First Class charged with Conduct Unbecoming and 

given 30 days of suspension over 6 months after failing to disclose a previously 

unreported DUI, id. ¶¶ 87–92.

Plaintiff argues that these “comparators that show a pattern and practice of the Department to 

give lenient punishments for similar activity to employees outside of Plaintiff’s protected 

classes.” Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ at 10. 

In denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court noted that Plaintiff may have 

“difficulties . . . [in] locating appropriate comparators,” and that prediction has proved prescient. 

See Niles, 2019 WL 1858503 at *7. While the twelve disciplined USCP employees Plaintiff 

proffers as comparators share some commonalities with her, each is meaningfully distinct in one 

or more of “the relevant aspects of [their] employment situation”—including their “jobs and job 

duties, whether they were disciplined by the same supervisor, and . . . the similarity of their 

offenses.” Burley, 801 F.3d at 301. Consequently, none of the twelve other employees were 

similarly situated enough to be an appropriate comparator for the discipline Plaintiff received 

here. Id.

Courts in this district have routinely recognized that “employees and supervisors 

necessarily possess different job functions and responsibilities” and are therefore not similarly 

situated. Clarke v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 904 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 

2012), aff’d, 540 F. App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013); White v. Tapella, 876 F. Supp. 2d 58, 71 (D.D.C. 

2012). In addition, Defendant reports that “generally speaking, supervisors are held to [a] higher 
Page 13 of 15

standard” than other USCP employees. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUMF ¶ 47. That makes all of the 

non-supervisor, Private First Class comparators—seven of the twelve employees identified—

differently situated from Plaintiff by virtue of her supervisory position as a Sergeant.

Plaintiff has also failed to show that any of the twelve comparators were disciplined by 

the same supervisor as her. She points to “no record evidence whatsoever” that they share “the 

same chain of command.” Anyaso v. United States Capitol Police, 39 F. Supp. 3d 34, 43 

(D.D.C. 2014). At most, Plaintiff notes that the DRO assigned to recommend the charge and 

penalty against her, Scharon Ball, was also assigned to five of her proposed comparators: PFC22, 

PFC15, SGT03, CPT01, and LT03. See Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ at 12–14. But DROs do not 

supervise USCP officers, or even have the power to impose disciplinary penalties; their role is 

limited to making a recommendation which must then be approved by the Deputy General 

Counsel and Bureau Commander. See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUMF ¶¶ 43, 46, 51–53. As a result, 

the common DRO does not demonstrate that the “individuals involved in [the] disciplinary 

process with the power to grant or deny a [penalty]” were the same. Burley, 801 F.3d at 295, 

302; see Ladson v. George Washington Univ., 204 F. Supp. 3d 56, 67 (D.D.C. 2016) (concluding 

that a fellow police officer was not “a comparator to Plaintiff because he was not supervised by 

[the same] Chief”). In other words, Plaintiff has not identified a common supervisor with any of 

her proposed comparators.

Beyond the different institutional positions held by Plaintiff and her proposed

comparators, the conduct underlying their respective penalties is also different. The offenses 

need not match exactly, of course, so long as they are of comparable seriousness. Burley, 801 

F.3d at 301. But even framing Plaintiff’s charges in general terms—(1) repeated failure to pay 

for services (2) despite having been warned about its illegality, plus (3) untruthfulness with the 
Page 14 of 15

personnel investigating those incidents—none of the proposed comparators’ conduct is a 

sufficient match. Many of the other officers’ offenses, like PFC13’s traffic violation or PFC15’s 

bumping into another officer in the hallway, were not “of even arguably comparable 

seriousness.” Id. at 302. Only one of the other officers, SGT03, also faced a Truthfulness 

charge, and that was for an incident more than a decade removed from her Conduct Unbecoming 

charge. Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts in Dispute ¶¶ 54–63. And only one 

other officer, PFC22, had conduct involving taking something without paying for it, but that was 

a single instance and he was not also charged with a Truthfulness violation. Id. ¶¶ 15–25.1 In 

sum, although some of the twelve other officers were charged with some offenses comparable to

some of Plaintiff’s charges, none were charged with all. Accordingly, none is an appropriate 

comparator, and Plaintiff has not met her burden to supply evidence calling into question 

whether Defendant’s otherwise valid reasons for terminating her were pretexts for 

discrimination. 

1 Plaintiff asserts that several of the other twelve officers could have been charged with 

untruthfulness but were not—presumably because of their favored race or sex. Pl.’s Opp. to 

Def.’s MSJ at 12–14. But OPR’s investigators only sustain charges against officers when they 

find that “a preponderance of the evidence shows that a violation occurred.” Pl.’s Resp. to 

Def.’s SUMF ¶¶ 34–37. Plaintiff does not identify such a finding for any of the other officers. 

See Def.’s Reply at 6 n.5, 9–10, 12, 14–15. 
Page 15 of 15

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown that there is a genuine disputed issue of material fact 

with respect to essential elements of both her ADA and Title VII claims. Consequently, the 

court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 52. An Order will 

accompany this Memorandum Opinion. 

Date: June 8, 2023 

Tanya S. Chutkan

TANYA S. CHUTKAN

United States District Judge