J. S71033/14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

R.D., :

:

Appellant :

: No. 944 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered May 14, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County 

Civil Division No(s).: 2002-1621

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED DECEMBER 18, 2014

Appellant, R.D.,1appeals from the order entered in the Centre County 

Court of Common Pleas committing him to inpatient treatment at the 

Meadows Psychiatric Center with subsequent transfer to Danville State 

Hospital or another facility approved by his treatment team and Centre 

County Mental Health and Intellectual Disabilities (“MH/ID”) for a period not 

to exceed 180 days.2 Appellant contends the evidence presented at the 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant is represented in this appeal by the Public Defender’s Office.

2 Appellant purported to appeal from both the May 14, 2014 order 

involuntarily committing him for impatient treatment and from the May 16, 

2014 order denying his petition for review of certification to involuntary 

inpatient treatment. We note that the appeal properly lies from the May 
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mental health commitment hearing was insufficient to compel his involuntary 

commitment for psychiatric treatment. We affirm.

Appellant has a history of prior commitments in Centre County. On 

July 5, 2002, Appellant was committed to a psychiatric facility for a period 

not to exceed ninety days. Order, 7/5/02. On December 13, 2010, 

following a Section 73033 hearing, Appellant was committed to inpatient 

 

14th order and have amended the caption accordingly. See In re W.A., 91 

A.3d 702, 703-04 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Although Appellant’s commitment pursuant to the instant order 

expired on October 1, 2014, 

we note that this case presents a live controversy . . . . 

This is so “because involuntary commitment affects an 

important liberty interest, and because by their nature 

most involuntary commitment orders expire before 

appellate review is possible.” “[W]ere we to dismiss such 

appeals as moot, the challenged procedure could continue 

yet its propriety would evade our review.” 

See In re Woodside, 699 A.2d 1293, 1296 (Pa. Super. 1997). Thus, the 

instant appeal is properly before us. Id.

3 Section 7303 provides:

Extended involuntary emergency treatment certified 

by a judge or mental health review officer─not to 

exceed twenty days

(a) Persons Subject to Extended Involuntary 

Emergency Treatment.─Application for extended 

involuntary emergency treatment may be made for any 

person who is being treated pursuant to section 302 

whenever the facility determines that the need for 

emergency treatment is likely to extend beyond 120 hours. 

The application shall be filed forthwith in the court of 
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treatment for a period not to exceed twenty days. Order, 12/13/10. On 

March 4, 2013, following a Section 73044 hearing, the court ordered 

Appellant to be committed to inpatient treatment for a period not to exceed 

ninety days. Order, 3/4/13. On January 29, 2014, following a Section 7303 

hearing, the court ordered Appellant to be committed to inpatient treatment 

for a period not to exceed twenty days. Order, 1/29/14. On February 24, 

 

common pleas, and shall state the grounds on which 

extended emergency treatment is believed to be 

necessary. The application shall state the name of any 

examining physician and the substance of his opinion 

regarding the mental condition of the person.

50 P.S. § 7303 (footnote omitted).

4 Section 7304 provides:

Court-ordered involuntary treatment not to exceed 

ninety days

(a) Persons for Whom Application May be Made.─(1) 

A person who is severely mentally disabled and in need of 

treatment, as defined in section 301(a), may be made 

subject to court-ordered involuntary treatment upon a 

determination of clear and present danger under section 

301(b)(1) (serious bodily harm to others), or section 

301(b)(2)(i) (inability to care for himself, creating a 

danger of death or serious harm to himself), or 

301(b)(2)(ii) (attempted suicide), or 301(b)(2)(iii) (selfmutilation).

50 P.S. § 7304(a). Section 7301(a) provides: “A person is severely mentally 

disabled when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise selfcontrol, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social 

relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a 

clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.” 50 P.S. § 

7301(a).
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2014, following a Section 7304 hearing, the court ordered Appellant to be 

committed for a period not to exceed ninety days. Order, 2/24/14. 

On May 8, 2014, Meadows Psychiatric Centre filed a petition for an 

additional period of court-ordered involuntary treatment pursuant to 

Section 7305 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”) for 180 days.5 

A hearing was held on May 9, 2014. Muhammad Qamar, M.D., a staff 

psychiatrist for The Meadows and treating psychiatrist for Appellant, 

testified as an expert in the field of psychiatry. N.T., 5/9/14, at 5-6. Dr. 

Qamar opined that Appellant was a danger to himself and others. Id. at 7. 

Appellant is loud, angry, and paranoid such that he refuses to speak with 

staff members and does not want to take his medication. Id. Appellant 

takes Risperdal and Lithium. Id. at 9. Dr. Qamar explained that Appellant 

 

5 Section 7305 provides, in pertinent part:

At the expiration of a period of court-ordered involuntary 

treatment under section 304(g) or this section, the court 

may order treatment for an additional period upon the 

application of the county administrator or the director of 

the facility in which the person is receiving treatment. 

Such order shall be entered upon hearing on findings as 

required by sections 304(a) and (b), and the further 

finding of a need for continuing involuntary treatment as 

shown by conduct during the person’s most recent period 

of court-ordered treatment. The additional period of 

involuntary treatment shall not exceed 180 days . . . .

50 P.S. § 7305(a). Section 7304(g) provides, in pertinent part: “(g) 

Duration of Court-ordered Involuntary Treatment.─(1) A person may 

be made subject to court-ordered involuntary treatment under this section 

for a period not to exceed 90 days . . . .” 50 P.S. § 7304(g).
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did not want to take any other medications and controls his treatment 

himself. Id. Appellant does not have a place to live. Id. Dr. Qamar opined 

Appellant’s “diagnosis is bipolar type 2.” Id. He responded in the 

affirmative when asked whether there would be a reasonable probability if 

Appellant did not have treatment, “it would lead to death, disability or 

serious physical debilitation within 30 days[.]” Id. at 7-8. Appellant was 

not cooperating at Meadows and Dr. Qamar opined that the only facility that 

could help him was a state hospital and he would be transferred as soon as a 

bed became available. Id. at 8. He opined that Appellant was “psychotic, 

delusional, paranoid, unable to care for himself and risk (sic) of hurting 

himself and others.” Id. at 14. 

Appellant testified that he did not want to take any medications other 

than Risperdal and Lithium and that he believed he could live independently. 

Id. at 17.

On May 14, 2014, following a Section 7305 hearing, the court entered 

an order directing that Appellant “be committed to inpatient treatment at 

Meadows Psychiatric Center with subsequent transfer to Danville State 

Hospital or other facility approved his treatment team and Centre County 

MH/ID for a period not to exceed one hundred eighty (180) days.” Order, 

5/14/14. On May 16th, Appellant filed a Petition for Review of Certification 

to Involuntary Inpatient Mental Health Treatment. The court denied the 

petition. Order, 5/16/14. This timely appeal followed. Appellant filed a 
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court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on 

appeal and the trial court filed a responsive opinion.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

1. Whether the trial court lacked clear and convincing 

evidence from which it could conclude that Appellant 

suffered from a mental illness and presented a danger to 

himself or others so as to compel his involuntary treatment 

and loss of liberty under the [MHPA]?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to compel him to 

undergo involuntary psychiatric treatment because the evidence did not 

show that within the past 30 days he was a clear and present danger to 

others or to himself, pursuant to Sections 7301(b)(1)6and (b)(2).

7

 Id.

 

6 Section 7301(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

Clear and present danger to others shall be shown by 

establishing that within the past 30 days the person has 

inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on 

another and that there is a reasonable probability that 

such conduct will be repeated. . . . For the purpose of this 

section, a clear and present danger of harm to others may 

be demonstrated by proof that the person has made 

threats of harm and has committed acts in furtherance of 

the threat to commit harm.

50 P.S. § 7301(b)(1).

7 Section 7301(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part:

[T]he person has acted in such manner as to evidence that 

he would be unable, without care, supervision and the 

continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for 

nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-
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at 13 (emphasis added). Appellant argues there was no clear and 

convincing evidence that he was a danger to himself or others. He reasons, 

“The doctor’s concerns that he might be homeless, might stop taking even 

the Lithium (which is helping him, but also might be causing his hand 

tremors)[8]and will not speak with psychiatric staff, does not establish that 

he is such a danger to himself . . . .” Id. at 15-16.

In Commonwealth v. Romett, 538 A.2d 1339 (Pa. Super. 1988), 

this Court addressed the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

period of additional involuntary psychiatric commitment pursuant to Section 

7305. In Romett, the patient argued the evidence “was insufficient in that 

it did not establish that [she] had, within thirty days before the hearing, 

inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily injury on another” pursuant to 

Section 7301(b). Id. at 1341 (emphasis added). This Court found the 

patient’s reliance on Section 7301 was “misplaced.” Id. 

The Romett Court held the evidence was sufficient and opined:

Section 7305 provides that, at the expiration of a period 

of court-ordered involuntary treatment, the court may 

 

protection and safety, and that there is a reasonable 

probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious 

physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless 

adequate treatment were afforded under this act[.]

50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2).

8 We note that Dr. Qamar testified he wanted to reduce Appellant’s Lithium 

dosage because of the tremors, but Appellant did not agree to reduce the 

dosage. N.T. at 10.
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order treatment for an additional period. This order must 

be entered upon a hearing on the findings required by § 

7304(a) and (b) and on the “further finding of a need for 

continuing involuntary treatment as shown by conduct 

during the person's most recent period of court-ordered 

treatment.” [50 P.S. § 7305(a)]. The applicable 

paragraph of § 7304(a) referred to in § 7305 provides as 

follows:

“(2) Where a petition is filed for a person already 

subject to involuntary treatment, it shall be sufficient to 

represent, and upon hearing to reestablish, that [(1)] 

the conduct originally required by section [7301] in fact 

occurred, and that [(2)] his condition continues to 

evidence a clear and present danger to himself or 

others. In such an event, it shall not be necessary 

to show the reoccurrence of dangerous conduct, 

either harmful or debilitating, within the past 30 

days.”

[50 P.S. § 7304(a)(2)] (emphasis added).

Thus, in order for a person to be recommitted for 

an additional period of treatment, it need not be 

established that the person has inflicted or 

attempted to inflict serious bodily harm upon 

another within the past thirty days, as required for the 

original commitment. The Act specifically states that on 

recommitment it is not necessary to show that the patient 

committed an overt act within 30 days of the hearing. It 

is necessary however for the court to find that within the 

patient’s most recent period of institutionalization, the 

patient’s conduct demonstrated the need for continuing 

involuntary treatment, Section 7305(a); i.e. his condition 

continues to evidence a clear and present danger to 

himself or others, Section 7304(a).

Thus, under the Act, in order to assess the patient’s 

condition, a patient’s overall conduct, diagnosis and 

prognosis may be considered. Recommitment does not 

require that the patient do specific acts within 30 days of 

the hearing that show he was a danger to himself or to 

others. The Act specifically provides, “it shall not be 

necessary to show the reoccurrence of dangerous conduct 
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...” section 7304(a). The proper question is not whether 

appellant’s recent assaults involved an attempt to inflict 

serious bodily harm. The proper question which the 

trial court did address was whether appellant’s 

condition continued to evidence clear and present 

danger that such acts could occur.

The Act also requires that upon recommitment it “shall 

be sufficient to represent, and upon hearing to reestablish, 

that the conduct originally required, under Section [7301-

initial commitment] in fact occurred.” Section 7304(a). 

We do not read this provision as requiring that the grounds 

for the original commitment must be relitigated at each 

recommitment hearing. Such a requirement would be an 

enormous waste of resources and would create 

redundancy. We find that this provision is satisfied as long 

as the patient’s commitment history shows that the 

requisite behavior occurred in the past . . . .

Id. at 1341-42 (citations omitted and some emphases added).

Instantly, the trial court opined:

The [c]ourt was required to determine “whether 

[A]ppellant’s condition continued to evidence clear 

and present danger that such acts could occur.” To 

do so, the Court listened to the recording of the May 9, 

2014 hearing held at The Meadows in Centre County, 

Pennsylvania. The staff psychiatrist of The Meadows 

testified credibly that he has been treating Appellant since 

February 2014, and that since that time, Appellant has 

continued to be a danger to himself and others. Further, 

Appellant is paranoid, psychotic, and delusional. He 

isolates himself, refuses to speak to others to take his 

medication, refuses to cooperate with his treatment, and 

cannot provide for his basic care without the help of 

others. Appellant requires inpatient treatment as the least 

restrictive possible form of treatment in order to prevent 

him from harming himself or others.

Trial Ct. Op., 6/24/14, at 2 (citation omitted). We agree.
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Instantly, Appellant, like the appellant in Romett, argued the evidence 

for his continued involuntary commitment was insufficient because Sections 

7301(b)(1) and (2) were not satisfied. This is not the proper inquiry for 

continued commitment under Section 7305. Romett, 538 A.2d at 1341-42. 

The trial court addressed the proper inquiry and determined Appellant’s 

conduct demonstrated the need for continuing involuntary treatment. See 

id. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/18/2014