Docket No . 104289.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

BRI AN LOMA

N et al ., Appel

lees, v. DAVID E. FREEMA N, A pp el l an t.
Opinion filed April 17, 2008.

JUSTICE GARMA

N del iv ered t he j udg m

en t of th e c our t, w ith op inion. Chi ef Justice Thomas an d Justice s Fi

tzgerald, and K

armei er co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. Justice Freem an di ssen ted, with opin

ion, j oined by

Justice Burke. Jus t ice Kilbride diss ent ed, wit hou t op inion.

OPINION

Pla int ffs are th

e owners of

a rac e h orse, M aster D avi d Lee. Defend ant Da

vi d E. F ree man , D. V.M ., a

m em be r of the f ac ul ty of t he Coll ege of V eteri

na ry Me di ci ne at th e U ni ve rs ity of Ill in ois, perf ormed surg ery on the horse. Plai

ntif fs al lege that one of the surgic a l pro cedures pe

rf orm ed b y Fr eeman wa s un auth ori

ze d a n d that i t rendered the hor se l ame a nd

un su itab l e f

or ra ci ng . Th ei r cl ai m s of negl ige nce and conversi on were dis missed by the ci rcu it court of Cham pai gn County an

d they appeal ed. The appel

la te court reversed. 375 Il l. A

pp. 3d 445. We granted def endan t’s petition f

or leave t o appeal under Suprem

e Court Rule 315 (21 0 Il l. 2d R. 315 ). Fo r t he
re as on s th

at f ol l ow, we af f i rm th e j ud gm

en t of th e a pp el l ate cou rt.-2- BACK GROUND In 200 1, plaint iff

s bro ught t he ir h o r se , Ma st er Da vid Lee, t o t he Large A ni mal Cl ini c a t the Un ive rs ity of Il l inoi s C oll eg e of

Veteri na ry Med icine f or e v al ua ti on an d trea tm en t. Defend ant was employed by t he Col l ege a s a profe ssor of

equi ne surg ery . As su ch , h e w as not requi red to be l

ic ensed as

a veterin arian in Ill in ois. See 225 ILC S 115/4(3) (Wes t 20 00) . H is dut ies include d t eac hing and t ra ining
ve teri na ry stu de nts i

n th e di agno sis and t re at ment o f hor ses. In t he
cour se o f his t ea ching du t ies, he e xamine d, t re at ed , a nd p er fo r me d surgery on horses. Pla int iffs al

le ge that they gav

e defe ndan t per miss io n to perf

orm two procedures o n t he animal: su rg er y on t he left car pal bo ne and dr aining of

f l ui d f rom t he r igh t st ifle. ( T he st ifle is the joint in a h or se’s hi nd l eg an al ogous to the h

um an knee.) They

further al lege that they sp ec ifica lly

for bade him to per for m any ot her pr oc edu re s o n t he r ight stif le

. No t wit hst anding this express prohib iti on, defen dant perform

ed surg ery on t he r ight st ifl

e. Plaint iff

s claim tha t , a s a r esu lt, t he horse has been rui

ned f or future racing. Plai ntif fs’ ame nd ed co mp l ai

nt con tainstwo counts. In c ount I, negl ige nce, pla in tif fs al lege that defen

da nt owe d a

du ty to th em to ex erci se re ason ab l e ca

re in h i s tre atm en t of the horse “i

n com pli ance wi th t he st anda rd s o f a qu alifi

ed ve t er inarian, ” and that he perform ed unauthorized

an d un nece ss ary su rge ry on t he an imal’ s r igh t st ifle “in vi ol ati on of t he st anda rd of c ar e o f a vet er ina ri an .” In coun t II,
co nver sion, pla

in tif fs al lege that the p er form

ance of unauthorized surg ery by de f en da nt “ con sti tutes an un au thor i ze d a ss um

pti on of t he right t o p os sess ion o r o wner ship o f the hors e,” ca us ing an “ al tera ti on of the condi

tion” of the h

orse. In addi tion to t he tort cl ai

ms fi led in t he c irc uit co ur t , p laint iffs fi led an ac ti on ag ai n st th e Un iv er si ty of Il li nois Departmen

t o f Cl in ic al Veteri na ry Med i ci ne (adep ar t ment w ithin t he Col l ege of Veteri na ry Medi ci ne) in the Court

of Cl ai m s. T ha t ac ti on has be en st ayed p ending t he o ut co me of t he circ uit co ur t act ion. De fendant f

i l ed a h y br i d m oti on to d

i sm i sspur su an

t to se cti on 2–619 .1 of th

e Code of C ivi l Procedu re (Code ) (735 IL

CS 5/2 – 619.1 (West 20 04 )). In

th e p orti

on of th e mo ti on i

nv oki ng se cti on 2–619(a)(9) of the C ode (735 ILCS 5/2 –619(a)(9) (West 2004)-3- (invo lunt ary

di sm i ssa l ba sed upon c ertai

n de f ects or de

f en ses )), defend ant argued that plai ntif fs ’ negl ige nce cl ai m is barred

by Ill in ois’
ec o no mic l oss, or Moorman , doctr in e. See Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. , 91 Il l . 2d 69, 73 ( 198 2). In

the porti on of t he motion i

nvoki ng section 2–615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2004 ) ( mot ions w ith r esp ect t o t he plea dings) ), defend ant argue d th at p l ai

nti f f s f ai l ed to pl ead a ca us e of ac ti on f orcon ve rs i on becausethey

did n ot al lege that he pe rm an

en tl y depri ved them of possessi on of the horse. The tria l court gra

nted d efenda nt ’s mot ion and dismissed t he
am ended com pl ai n t wi th pr eju dic e. Pla int iffs a pp ea led

. As a t hr es ho ld
ma tt er, the appel

la te court comm

ented that defen

dant’s m ot ion wa s not properly designateda h

y b ri d m oti on purs ua n t to sec tion

2–619 .1 and treat ed i

t as a section 2–615 m

ot ion. 375 Il

l. A pp. 3d at 448. No is sue is rais ed o n th is point, so we shall accept the ap pellate cou rt ’s characteri zation of the procedural posture o f the ca se. As t o t he ne glig en ce cla im, t he ap pellat e co ur t fou nd t hat pla int iffs al le geda b rea ch of duty im pos ed by the com m on l aw , i nd ep en de nt of defendant’s state empl

oym ent. 375 Ill . App. 3d a t 454 -5 5. The
app ell ate court f urth er r ul ed tha t pl ai nti f f s’ negl i ge nc e c l ai

m i s n ot b arred by the Moorman do ct r ine be ca us e u na ut ho r ize d s ur ge r y is a sudden and d ange ro us o ccu rr ence . 3 75 I ll. App. 3d a t 458 . As t o t he
con ve rs i on claim, t he appell ate court f ound that the a

ll eged ha rm – t he per manent incapa cita t ion o f hor se fo r r acing – is sufficient, if pro ven, to state a cause of action f or co nve rsion. 375 Il

l. A pp. 3d at 458.

ISSUES PR

ESENTED Defend ant ra

i se s th re e i ss ue s bef

ore thi s c our

t: (1) whether plai ntif fs’ negl ige nce cl ai m is barred by the Moorman doctri ne ; (2 ) whether t he Co ur t o f Cla ims has excl usiv e juri sdiction over plai

ntif fs’ cla ims because the Uni

versity of Ill in ois i s t he re al

pa rty in in ter es t; and ( 3) wh et he rde fen da nt is imm une fr om any l

i abil ity in c onn ec ti on wi th his treat men

t o f the horse beca

us e h e i s exe m pt f rom al l term s of the Veterina

ry M edi ci ne an d Surgery Practic e Act

of 1994 (Practice Act) (225 ILCS 115/1 et seq . (We st 2000 )).-4- STAN DA RD OF REVIEW A m oti on to dism iss under section 2–615 o f the Code (735 I LCS 5/2–615 (West 2004)) chal le nges onl y the legal suf fi ci en cy o f t he
com pl ai n t. Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc ., 201 Il l . 2d 81, 8 5 (200 2). As su ch , an ap pe al fr o m an ord er grant in g such a motion presents a que sti on of l aw, whi

ch we rev ie w de novo

. Wakulich v. Mraz , 203 I ll. 2d 223, 228 (2003). The proper inqui ry is whether the wel

l-pl eaded f ac ts of the complai

nt, t aken as true and co nst rued i n a l igh t most fav o r ab le to the pla

in tif f, are suf fi ci ent to st ate a ca

us e of ac ti on upon wh i ch rel i ef may be gran ted. Jarvis , 201 Ill . 2d at 86.

AN AL YSIS (1) Whether Pl

ai ntif fs ’ Tort Cl ai

ms Are Barred by

the Moorman Do ct rine In Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. , thi s court he ld the purchaser of

a defective

product ma

y n ot sue t he
ma nuf acturer in to rt t o recover solel

y economi

c l osses cau sed by

t he de f ec t. Moorman , 91 I ll. 2d a t 88 ( “When t he de fect is of a q ualit at ive
na ture and the harm rel

ates to the consum

er ’s exp ec tati

on th at a product is o f apa r t icu lar qu alit y s o th at it i s f it f or o rdinary us e, con tract, ra th er th an tort, law pr ovid es t he ap propri ate set of rul es f or recov ery ”). In Anderson Electric, Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp. , 115 Ill . 2d 146 (1986), t hi s court extended the Moorman doctr in e t o co n tra

cts f orservi ces, whi ch would seem

to in cl ude the veteri

nary care at iss ue in the present case. The exce pti on to the doctr in

e upon whi

ch pl ai ntif fs rely was ar t iculat ed in Moorman itsel f. This court not ed that “[ t ] o r t t he o r y is ap pr o pr iat ely sui

ted for personal

in jury or pro perty dam

age re sult ing f rom a sudden or dangerous occurrence ** *. Th e re m ed y f or ec o no mic l oss, l

oss rel ating to a p urc ha ser ’s disa ppo inted expe ct at ions due to de teri

orati on, inte rn al br ea kdown or non ac ci de nta l ca us e, on t he other han d, l

i es i n c ontract.” Moorman , 91 I ll. 2 d a t 86

. T his court had in mi nd f ires , expl osions, or ot her

ca l am itous occur re n ce s d ue to t he f ai l ureof a produ ct a

nd the resul ting ri sk of ha rm to pers ons

or property

. Moorman , 91 Ill . 2d at 84-86.-5- The ci rcuit court co ncl

uded that count I o f the am en de d
com pl ai n t, negligenc e, was bar re d by t he Moor man do ct rine. The appel la te court reversed. With r es pe ct t o t he ne gli gence co unt , t he ap pellat e co ur t fou nd that l ac er ati

on wi th a scal pel is “sudden ,” as compared to the gradual de teri orati on of the grai

n storage tank that wa s a t iss ue in Moorman

. 375 Ill . App. 3d at 458. T he appell ate co urt also reaso ned t hat t he
occurrence was “d an gerous ,” because surgery i s i nhe rently dangerous
an d becaus e pl

ai nti f f s al l ege that thi s pa

rtic ul ar proce dure w as “

ve ry risky .” 375 Ill . App. 3d at 458. We not e t hat app licatio n of t he “su dde n and da ng erou s” exce

pti on to the Moorman do ct rine t o t he co nduc t of o ne who has contracted to prov i de a s erv i ce , as oppos ed to the f ai l ure o f a p r o du ct , is awkw ard at best. We al so observe thatt he app ellate co ur t ’s r eas oning
co uld lead t o inco nsist ent resul ts in si mi la rcas es. If ve teri na ry surg ery is “sudden

and dan ger ous,” the owner of an a ni ma l c ould seek a remedy in t o rt if he alle ge d m al pra cti ce in th e p erf orm an ce of vet er inary

su r ge r y, bu t he wo ul d b e lim it ed by Moorman to a contractual re medy if he

al legedthat t he veterinari

an m is dia gnosed a disease or condi

tion or fa il ed to re nder t he proper nonsurgi cal tre atm en t. Neverthel ess , we f

ind i t unn ece ssa ry t o r eview t he appe ll ate court ’s reasoni

ng on thi s i ssue. Defendant’s petition for leave to appeal lists “ Moorman Doctr in e”
as one of the poin

ts reli edupo n for re ver sal. H ow ever , t he do ct r ine is
o nly bri efl y ref erred to in

the r ema in der of t he pe t itio n. D efenda nt wonders ho w, if

vet er inary sur ger y is sudd en and dang er ou s, it can be expected to be perf ormed in a professi onal ma nne r. He concludes

that he “f i rmly bel ie ves that the Moorman Doc tri ne ap pl i es to this s et of facts. Veteri

na ry surg ery is not sudden nor dangerous to t he poi nt that it f al l s w ithi n th e a m bi t of t he r eco gnized exce pt ion t o t he Doctri ne .” In d ef en da n t’s b ri ef to th i s c our t, he d i d n ot prov i de

argu m en t i n supp ort of

these conclusory remarks. Ind eed , t he so le mentio n of t he Moorman doctr in

e i s a statemen

t t hat plaint iff s have re co ur se t o t he Cou rt of Clai ms, “[w]hether or not the Moorman Doctri ne appl i es.” Co unsel fo r d efe nda nt mad e no ment io n o f Moorman at or al
argu m en t. “A r ev iew ing co ur t is e nt it led t o ha ve iss ue s c lea r ly defi ned wi th
re levant authority ci

ted.” In re Marriage of Bates , 212 Ill . 2d 489,-6- 517 (2004). Defenda

nt men tioned the Moorman iss ue, but nei ther cle ar ly de f in ed it n or argued its m

erits. We, theref

ore, fin d the is sue forfe ited. See Bates , 212 Ill . 2d at 517 (a ll owing th

e app el l ate court judg ment t o s t and wh er e t he pe t it io ne r“fa il[e d] t o giv e t his court an adeq uate b asis to gran

t her re l i ef on this i ssu e”).
(2) Whether the Court of Cl ai ms Has Excl usi ve Juri sdiction Over Pl ai nti f f s’ Clai m s i n Tort Defend ant cl ai

ms the prot ection of the doctrin e of soverei

gn immu nit y. Our state co nsti tut ion a bolished thi s traditiona

l doctrin e, “[e] xc ept as t h e G en

er al A ss em b l y may pr ov i de b y l aw .” Il l . C on st. 1970, art. XII I, §4. The

Courtof Cl

ai m s Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5 05/1 et seq . (W es t 200 4)) i s th e l eg i sl ature’ s exe

rcise of tha t gra nt of
au t ho r it y. The Act establi shes the Court of Clai ms t o s er ve as t he forum f or cl ai m s ag ai ns t the state , provi

di ng, inter al ia , that the

“c ourt sha ll ha ve excl us i ve j urisd i cti ont o he ar and d et er mine

** * [ a] ll cla ims against the Stat e for dam

ages i n cases sou n di n g i n tort, if a li ke cause of act ion wo uld lie aga inst a pr iva te p er so n o rco r po r at io n in a civ il sui t.” 705 IL CS 50 5/8(d) (We st 2004 ). T his court ha s h ad n

um erous occ asi

ons to con si

der wh ethe r a particularto rt act ion is “agai nst the State” a nd , t her efo re , mus t be bro ught in t he Co ur t o f Cla ims. As a r es ult , t he r ule s g o ve r ning t his inqu i ry are wel l e stabl ished

. See, e.g. , Fritz v. Johnston , 209 Ill . 2d 302 (20 04) ; Jinkins v. Lee , 209 Ill. 2d 3 20 ( 200 4); Currie v. Lao , 148 Ill. 2d 1 51 ( 199 2); Healy v. Vaupel , 133 Il l . 2d 295 (1990 ). Wh ether an ac ti onis one aga inst t he st at e do es no t dep end o n t he i de nti f i ca ti on of t he parti

es b ut, rathe r, on t he “issue s involved and t he reli ef sought.” Thus, plai

ntif fs cann ot evade the j urisdi

ct io n of t he Courtof Cl ai m s b y n am in g a se rv an t or agen t of

th e s ta te as t he nomina ldefendan t wh en t he St at e o f I llino is is t he r ea l pa r t y in intere st. Healy , 133 Ill . 2d at 308. Wh en t he “issue invo l v ed ” i s th e a l l eg ed n eg l i ge n ce of a s tate em ploy ee, the me

re f ac t th at he wa s a ct ing wit hin t he sc o pe o f his employment is

not suff icie nt to ma ke the s tatet he r ea l pa r t y in in ter es t. Curr ie , 148 Ill . 2d at 15 8. T he pr o pe rinq uir y is t o d et er mine the source of the duty the state em ploy ee i s charged

with b reachi ng. Wh ere the al le ged negl

ige nce is t he br eac h of a dut y im po sed on t he-7- em ploy ee solely by vi rtue of hi s s tate em pl oym en t, th e C ourt of Cla ims has ex

cl us ive jur isd ict io n. I f, ho we ve r , t he du t y t ha t he is
a ccused of breachi

ng i s im

posed independently

of hi s st at e em pl oy m en t, t he claim may be

he ard i n c i rcui t court. Curr

ie , 14 8 I ll. 2d at 159. Thus, this court concluded that a “State e mp loyee w ho breach es a duty h

e owes regardles s of h

is Stat e employment is no
m ore entitl ed to imm

uni ty than i s a private individua

l wh o breaches that same duty .” Curr

ie , 148 Ill . 2d at 160. As to the “

re li ef s ought,” an action na

mi ng a state empl

oyee as defend ant wil

l b e found to be a cl

ai m a gai nst the state “where a jud gme nt fo rt he pla int iff co uld operate to con trol the ac ti ons of t he Stat e or subj ect it to liab

il ity .” Curr ie , 148 Ill . 2d at 158. We m us t, th ere f ore, de term

ine wh eth er a ve teri na ri an em pl oy e d
as a member o f the facult y at a st at e univer sity is bo und by a duty of
care th at a ri se s i n de pe n de n tl y of h i s s tate empl oym ent. We must

also det er mine whether a j udgme

nt agai nst such a de fendant coul d op er ate t o co nt r o l t he ac t io ns o f t he st at e o rsu bje ct it t o liab ilit y.
(a) Source of Duty Defendant Is Alleged to Have Breached The appell ate court h

el d tha t when one “und

ertake s to re nde r ve teri na ry se rvi ce s, th e c om

m on l aw im pos esup on

th at p er son

a d uty t o use t he sa me skill and kno wledg e no rmally poss esse d by
ve t er ina r ia ns in good st andi ng i n si mi la r comm uni ties, unl ess that pers on repre sen ted h e or sh

e h ad gre ater or l

ess ski ll or knowl edge .” 375 Ill . App. 3d at 454. Th e app el l ate court concl uded, therefore, that de f en da n t’s du ty to plai ntif fs di d not arise

solel y f rom hi s position as a m em be r of the facul

ty at the uni

versi ty, whi ch “ me rely provid[ed] t he occasion f

or his i ncurri ng a duty toward t hem .” As such , he was not performi ng a un iqu ely g o ve r nme nt al fu nc t io n. 37 5 I ll. App. 3d at 455. In r ea ch ing t his c o nc lus io n, t he ap pe llat e c o ur t r elie d o n t his
cou rt ’s dec isions in Curr ie a nd Jinki ns . In

Curr ie , a n Il l in oi s S tate Poli ce t r o o pe r , La o , wa s o n d ut y pa t r o ll in g In terstate 80 . He h

eard and responded to a cal

l regardi ng a dist ur bance in the ne ar by Ci ty of Jo lie t. He activ ated hi s l igh ts and si ren, exi ted the in terstat e, an d headed for t he loc at ion o f the dist ur bance . Aft er he missed a t ur n, he
made a U-turn tha t resul ted in h i s tra ve l ing the wron g w ay on a one--8- way street. Wh

en h e m ade a left t ur n t o lea ve t he o ne- way st re et , he coll ided with the pl

ai n ti f f ’s pickup truck. Curr

ie , 148 Ill . 2d at 155. T his cou rt c on cl ud ed th at th e d uty the tro oper had al

legedl y b reached “d id not arise as a

resul t o f h is em ploy me nt as a State t roo per, but rather arose as a resul

t of hi s s tatus as the dri ve r of an au tom obi l e on a publ ic roadway.” Curr

ie , 148 I ll . 2d at 161-62. Thus, he “ wa s n ot pe r for ming

a uniqu ely gove rnment al funct ion” a t t he t ime of t he
co llision. Currie , 14 8 I ll. 2 d a t 16 2. Be ca us e it wa s no t wit hin h is “normal an d of f i ci al ” role a s a sta te t ro op er t o r esp ond t o po lice ca lls in a n ea rb y j urisd i cti on with i ts ow n p ol

i ce depa rtm en t, h e w as not prot ected by sove re ign imm unit y andpla

in tif f’ s cl ai m wa s not a matter f ort he excl

usiv e juri sdiction of the Court of Clai ms. Curr ie , 14 8 I ll. 2d at 162 . Whe n he cho se t o r esp ond t o t he ca ll, he “was p er for ming t he nong ove rnment al act ivity of dr iving a mot or vehicle in a ro ut ine
ma nne ron a publ ic street” ( Curr

ie , 148 I ll . 2d at 164), and, thus, he
ow ed “ the

sa m e d uty owe d by al l au tom obi l e d ri ve rs to the i r f el l ow motorists” ( Curr

ie , 148 Il l . 2d at 16 3). We dis tinguis he d L ao ’s sit ua t io n fr o m t ha t o f t he o ffice rin Campbe ll v. White , 207 Ill . App. 3d 541 (1991), who was invo lve d in
a high-sp eed chas e. In t he co ur se o f the chas e, he str uck t he suspect ’s veh ic le , cau sing t he suspe ct’s death. We observ ed that although Off ic erWh ite “w as ope

rati ng a m otor vehic l e, he wa s do ing so in a
ma nne rin wh i ch on l y a g ov er n m en tal of f i ci al i s a uth ori ze d to act,” and the duty he

was al leged to have breach

ed“arose so lely a s a r es ult of [his] State em

ploym en t.” Curr ie , 14 8 I ll. 2d a t 164 , c iting Campbe ll , 207 Ill . App. 3d at 555. Defend ant cites Curr

ie , bu t o nly t o no t e t ha t t his court ci ted Camp bellt her ein. Re lyi

ng o n Campbe ll , he ar gue s t hat , like t he off ic erin volv ed i n a h igh -speed chas e, an y ac t io ns h e t o o k w hile t re at ing pl ai

nti f f s’ hors e we

re un i qu el y re l ate d to h

i s s tate em pl oy m en t. At oralargumen

t, co unsel for the def

endan t represented that at t he t ime defenda nt pe r fo r med su r ge r y o n t he an imal, stu de n ts were present and h

e was teachi

ng. (Counsel

expl ai ned that these f ac ts have not b een pl ea de d b ec au se

de f en da n t re sp on de d to t he co mplaint by fil ing a m otion to dis m i ss ra ther th an a respons ive

pl eadi ng.) Counsel also ar gue d t hat t ro op er Lao ’s ac t ions we re n ot un i qu e to his sta te em pl oy m en t b ec au se h e w asn ot on

du ty and he owe d a duty of-9- r ea so na ble care as a ci

tizen , whi le tro oper Wh

ite was on d ut y, dr iving his squad car f or a purp ose un i qu el y re l ate d to h

i s s tate em pl oy m en t. Defend ant is mis t ake n. I n bot h Curr ie and Campbe ll , t he defend ant poli

ce off ic ers were on duty at the tim e they were in volv ed in autom obi l e ac ciden ts. In Curr

ie , the on -duty officer was per for ming t he “nongovernm

ental ac ti vi ty ” of dr iv in g th e wron g w ay dow n a c ity street on hi s way

to a l ocation at whi

ch h i s j ob di d n ot re qu i re h im to be. Curr ie , 148 Ill . 2d a t 16 4. In Campbe ll , the on-duty off ic er was per for ming

the gov ern m en tal ac tivi ty of pursui n g a

f l eein g s us pe ct. Campbe ll , 207 Ill . App. 3d at 555. Even if we accept d efendan

t’s as ser t ion t hat he wa s t eac hing stu de n ts at the tim

e he perf ormed t he alle ge dl y un au t ho r ize d s ur ge r y, his ac ti ons

are m ore l i ke thos e of Of f i ce r L ao th an

thos e of o ff ic er Wh ite. Li ke both off

ic ers, defen

dant was “on duty .” That is, h e was pr ese nt at h

i s p l ac e of sta te e m pl oy m en t, e n gage d i

n h i s s tate f uncti on of t eac hing students. When

he perf ormed a proce dure that the own

ers of the ani ma l h ad forbi dden, his conduct was l

ike tha t of Of f i ce r L ao, who was acting out side h is authority as a st at e t ro op er when he
caus ed an ac cid en t

. T hu s, like Offic er La o , wh o se du t y “t o r efr ain f rom th es e n eg l i ge n t ac ts is th

e sa me d ut y o we d b y all a ut o mo bile driv er s to their f

el low m ot orists” ( Curr

ie , 14 8 I ll . 2d

at 1 63) , defend ant o we d a du t y t o “p erform onl y those n

onem ergency surgeries to whi ch the own er h as c onse

nted .” 375 Ill . App. 3d at 455. The ap pe ll ate

court al so rel i ed on ou r d ecisio n in Jinkins , where we he ld t ha t a p syc hia t r ist an d a lice nse d c linica l profes si onal
cou ns el orem ploy ed at a state mental

heal th faci li ty owed a d ut y of
care to thei r pat ient that ar ose from their statu s as professional s, rather t ha n fr o m t he ir s t at e e mplo ym en t. Jinkins , 209 Ill . 2d at 334. We rejected the defen

dants’ argu m en

t th at t heir o nly dut y to t he pat ient arose fro m thei

r st ate empl

oym en t beca us e th ey wou l d not have come i

nto contact with h

im “b ut for” their em

ploy me nt at a s tate fac il it y. Jinkins , 2 09 I ll. 2d a t 333 . We held t hat beca use t he de f en da n ts “wer e us ing t heir p ro fessio nal judgment *** , t he sou rce of t he irduty wasthei r m en tal he al th prof ess i onal status.” Jinkins , 209 I ll. 2d at 335. Defend ant responds by com m en tin g tha t whi l e heal th-ca re pr ovid er s have a du t y to t heir p at ients t hat “exist s abo ve and be yond-10- any duty uni que to st ate empl

oym ent,” the “duty owed

[ in this case] involv ed prope rty, n ot people.” The appell

ate co urt iden

tifi ed several sources o f a comm on la w du ty of veteri

nari ans: (1) the status of veteri nar y medi cin e as a “l earned professi on,” wh ich sets c ertai

n s tand ardsf

or itsm em be rs (375 Ill . App. 3d at 452-53), ( 2) num erous cases f

rom other jurisd ictio ns that hav e reco gni zed a com m on l aw du ty of care ap plic ab le to veterin

arian s (375 I ll. A

pp. 3d a t 453 -54 ), (3 ) ca se s f

rom our own appel

la te co u rt t hat hav e a ss ume d t he e xist enc e o f a veterin ary s tandard of care (375 Ill . App. 3d at 454 ), and (4) se cti on 299A of t he Re st at ement (S eco nd) of T or t s, d efining the standard of cond uct f or profe ssi

ons or trad

es (3 75 Il l . App. 3d a

t 454). Defend ant argues that he owed no du ty of ca re to p l ai nti f f s or t he iran imal . He rej ec ts th e f i rs t sou rce l i ste d b as ed

on h i s exe m pti on f rom t he li cense requi rem en t of the Veteri na ry Med i ci ne an d Surge

ry Practice A

ct, which we di scuss bel ow. As t o t he se co nd so ur ce , he ar gu es t ha t t his c o ur t sho uld give no weight t o t he de cisions of t he man y othe r s tate s that i

m pos e a duty of
care on ve t er ina

r i an s b eca

use those states m

ay not ha ve ve teri na ry coll eges. We do not fi

nd thi s argum

ent persuasi

ve. Defend ant does not co mmenton t he t hird so ur ce, but we find t he appe ll ate ca se s c ited

to be of l im ited va l ue beca us e th e d uty que sti on was not addressed

directl y. See Nikolic v. Seidenberg , 242 Ill . App. 3d 96 , 102 (19 93) (adopti on c ontr ac t wi th a ni mal sh el ter d i d not waive ri ght to sue

ass oci ated veteri

na ri an f or neg l i gen ce); Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hospital, Ltd. , 157 I ll . App. 3d 818, 821 (1987) (damage s for loss of compani onsh i p w er e n o t pr o pe r ly aw ar de d in
ac ti on against ani

ma l hos pit al and ve t er inarian fo r ne gligent ly causing t he deat h of pl aintiff’s dog) ; Spilotro v. Hugi , 93 Ill . App. 3d 837 (1981 ) (tri al

courter re d by exclud ing cert ain testimony of plai ntiff ’s
ex pert wit ness in malpr act ice ac t ion ag ainst vet er inarian) . W e note, howeve r, that t hese cases are not new and they are not no vel . See C. Ba iley, An

notati on, Vete r inarian’s Liability for Malpractice , 71 A.L .R.4th

811 (1 989) (l

i sti ng c ase s). Defend ant d oes notrespond to the a ppe ll ate court’ s rel

i an ce on se cti on 299A of the Restatem ent (S eco nd) of T or t s. T his sect ion, entitled “Un

dert akin g in Pro fessi on or Trade, ” pro vi

des:-11- “U nle ss he represen

ts that he has greater or less s kill o r knowledge, one who un dertake s to ren der s ervi ce s in the practice o f a p r o fes sio n o r t ra de is r equ ired t o e xer cise t he sk ill and k now ledge nor mally po sses sed by members o f tha t prof es si on o rt r ad e in go od st anding in s i m il ar com m uni tie s.” Res tatem en t (Secon d) of

Torts §299A , at 73 (19 65). Co mment a to section 299A notes that the word “ski

ll,” as used here, re f er s to a “sp ecial for m of co mpet ence which is no t par t of t he ordinary equi pme nt of the reasonable

ma n, but whi ch is the resul t of acqui red learn ing , a nd ap t itu de d evelo ped by spec ial tr aining and
ex peri ence.” Fur t her , “[ a] ll prof ess i ons, a

nd m ost trades , are ne cess ar ily

ski ll ed, and the word is

used to refer to the special competence

whi ch they requi re.” Res tatemen

t (Se cond ) of

Tort s §29 9A, Com

m en t a , at 73 ( 196 5). It ca

nn ot be di sp ute d th at a

doc tor of vet er inary medicine is sk ill ed. It is also beyond dispu t e t hat t he practice of ve t er inary medicine an d s urg ery i s a “ prof es si on or trade” (R es ta t eme nt (Secon

d) of Tort s § 29 9A , C om

m en t b , at 73 (19 65))
an d t hat t he medica l or sur gical t re at ment o f an animal, wit h o r withouta contract for such servi

ces, i s an “unde rt aking” (Re st at ement (Secon d) of Tort s § 29 9A , C om

m en t c , at 73-74

(1965 )). As t he ap pe llat e c o ur t o bs er ve d, t his co ur t ha s p r ev io us ly c i ted
se cti on 299A of th e Re statem

en t with approva

l . In Pur till v. Hess , 111 Ill . 2d 229, 242 (1986), we discu ssed t he bur de n o n t he p laint iff in a m edi ca l mal pra cti ce ac ti on to est abl i sh

“th e stan dard of care against which t he def

en dan t phy si ci an ’s al l eged ne gl i gen ce i s j udge d.” We ci ted com m en t e t o se ct io n 2 99 A fo rt he “simil ar lo ca lit y” rule, “wh ic h requi re s a p hy si cian to pos se ssan

d to a ppl y tha t de gre e of knowledge, sk ill, an d care whi ch a reasona

bl y w el l-qual if ied phy sici an in the sam e or sim il arcomm uni ty would b

rin g to a si mi la r case under si mi la rci rcum stan ces .” Purtill , 111 Ill . 2d at 242 , c iting Re st at ement (Secon d) of Tort s § 29 9A , C om

m en t e , at 74-75 (1965 ). In Advincula v. United Blood Services , 17 6 I ll. 2d 1, 23 (1996 ), t his cou rt c ited sec t ion 2 99A in su ppo rt of a st at ement t hat t he standard of ca r e fo rall p r o fes sio na ls is “t he us e o f t he sa me de gre e of knowledge, ski

ll and abil ity as an o r din ar ily

ca r efu l pr o fes sio na l wo uld exercise under si mi la rci rcu m sta nc es .” W e noted tha t sta nd ard of care “is ut ili zed t o mea sur e t he co ndu ct o f a wide vari ety of bot h m

edi cal and no nme di ca l p r o fe ss io ns , ” in clu di ng po di at r y an d d en t ist r y.-12- Advincula , 176 Ill . 2d at 23 (citi ng Dolan v. G alluzzo , 77 Ill . 2d 279, 281 (1 979 ) ( po diat ric p ra ct itio ner ), and Rosenberg v. Miller , 24 7 I ll. App. 3d 10 23, 102 8-29 (1 993) (d en tists)). We co nclude t hat sec t ion 299 A of the Re sta tem en t (Se con d) of Tort s i s a n a cc ura te s tate m en t of the com m on la w of Il l in oi s w ith respect to the

duty of ca re ow ed by m em be rs of prof es si ons ortrad es, and we , there f

or e, agre e w ith

th e a pp el l ate cou rt’ s h oldi n g that a veterin arian owes a d uty

of car e. See C. Bailey, Anno t at ion, Vet erinarian’sLiabi lit

y for Malpractice , 71 A.L.R.4th 811, §2(a) (1989) (noting that “the gr avam en o f su ch an ac t io n is t ha t in pr ovid ing veterin

ary ca r e, the veterin

arian fai led to use such
r ea so na ble ski

ll, dil ige nce, and a t t ent ion as might o rd inarily havebeen expected o f c ar ef

ul , sk illfu l, an d t r us t wo r t hy per so ns in the prof ess i on”). T hu s, t he du t y o we d b y de fen da nt ar ise s ind ep en de nt ly of his e mplo yment by t he st at e a nd he wa s no t pe r fo r ming a “ un iqu ely governm ental fun ction” (Jinkins , 209 Ill . 2d at 335) when he treated pla in tif fs ’ horse. Defend ant pr ote st s t hat t he a pp ellat e c o ur t ’s r ec o gnit io n o f a
co mmo n la w d ut y o f ve t er ina r ian s “r ais es all an imal s– f rom do mes t ic pets t o inves t ments suc h as r ace hor ses– t o t he sam e level or plane a s hum an bei ngs.” W e note, h owev er , th at c om m en t c to section 299A states that “[i]n

the ordinary

case, the unde

rtaki ng of one who ren

ders servi ces in the practice of a

professi on or t rade is a matter of contract between the part ies, and t he terms of the un dertaking are e

ither s tated
ex pr es sly, or im

pli ed as a m atter of unde

rstan di ng.” (Em pha si s added.) Rest at ement (Secon

d) of Tort s §2 99 A , C om

m en t c , at 73-74

(1965 ). T his statement i

mpl ic ates the Moorman doctri ne . In the typi cal case, a vet er inarian will be pr ovid ing care to an ani ma l a fter hav in g form ed
a co nt ra ct ual r elat ionshi p w it h the owner of the an im al . Thus, even though the

ve teri na ri an i s s ub j ec t to a du

ty of car e, t he ow ner may be li mi ted to a c ontrac tua

l rem ed y f or an y br ea ch of dut y. The appe ll ate courtin t he pr es en t ca se he ld t ha t pla int iffs’ cla im comes withi

n an exce pti on to the Moorman doctr in

e so that t hey

are not l im ited to a breach of contract clai

m. F or t he reasons

expl ai ned previ ously , we express n o opini on on this is sue.-13- (b) Whether the Relief Sought Would Operate to Control the Actions of the S

tate or S ubject It to

Liability The r elie f so ug ht by p laint iffs is mone y da mag es f or two ty pe s of loss: th e red

uc ti on in th e f ai r m ar ket v al ue of th e ho rse and t he
revenue lost as a re sult of t he horse’s i nabil ity to race. Plai

ntif fs argue that a ju dg men t in t he ir fa vo rwill not co nt ro l the a ct ions o f the sta te an d w ill no t su bje ct t he st at e t o liab ilit y. At oral argu m

en t, c oun sel

f or d ef en da n t av er re d that i

f th e defend ant we

re to b e f oun d l i abl e i n tort a n d i f th e plaint i f

f were awardedsuc h damag es, t he Un ive rsi ty w oul d i nde m ni f y def en dan t. In Jinkins , the defe

ndan t stat e em ploy ees di d not argue that the st ate ’s statutory du ty to in demn if y them (see 5 ILCS 350 /2(a) ( West2004) (Ind em ni f i cation A ct)) wo uld make t he st at e liable for any judgment against t he m. Ne ve r t he les s, t his c o ur t r ema r ke d, in a foo t not e, t hat t he appe ll ate court had, i

n two prev ious cas es, re ject ed t his arg ument “b ased on t he dist inctio n bet wee n liabil ity and ind emnif

i cati on.” Jinkins , 2 09 I ll. 2d a t 336 n.2 (c iting Janes v. Albergo , 25 4 I ll. App. 3d 951, 965-66 (1993), and Kiersch v. Ogena , 23 0 I ll . App. 3d 57, 63-64 (1992 )). In the pr e sent case, the appel la te court ci

ted Jinkins , Janes , a nd Kiersch in su pp ort of its c on cl us i on th at a j ud gm en t ag ai n st d ef en da n t, “i n i tself , would not subj ect the stat e to lia bi li ty.” 375 Il

l. A pp. 3d at 456. We agree. In Kiersch , t he de fendant was being prov i de d l eg al rep res en tati on and in dem ni fi cation by h

is em ploy er, Ill in ois State Uni ve r sit y, in kee ping wit h t he Univer sity’s p olicy and t he I ndemnificat ion Act . T he appe ll ate court rejected de f

en da n t’s argu m en t th at a stat e university’s pr ovid ing l eg al

repres en tati on an d i n de m n i f i ca ti on to i ts em ploy ees t ransf ormed all suits aga inst u niversit y employees in their indivi dua l capaci ties in to suits again st the s tate. Kiersch , 230 Ill . App. 3d at 63. Ind emnifi cat ion, which is t he sta

tutory or con tractua l obl i ga ti on of t he ind em ni tor to rei m bu rs e th e i nd em ni tee f orhi s l oss , i s n ot the sam e as liab ilit y, which i s a legal

obli gation or responsi bilit y enfo rc eable by ci v i l re m ed y or c ri m in al pu n i sh m en t. The statutory du ty to i n de m n i f y ru n s f rom th e s tate em pl oyer to t he sta te em pl oyee . In con tra st, l i abil ity i s i m pos ed on th e tortf ea sor himself, n ot up on

th e p ar ty wh o i n de m n i f i esh im . A s th

e a pp el l ate-14- c ourt obs er ved in Janes , “the State’s obli gation to indem

nify it s em ploy ees for l ia bi li ty i ncurred by

them does not const itut e the S tat e’s
ass um pti on of di rect l i ab il ity.”Janes , 254 Ill . App. 3d at 965. T his dis t inc t io n is fu r t he ren fo r ce d b y t he la nguag e o f the In de m ni f i ca ti on Act i tself , which provides in section 2(d) that “unless the court or jury f

inds t hat t he co nduc t or inact ion which g ave rise to t he claim or cau se o f act ion wa s int en t io na l, wi lf ul or wa nton misconductand wa s n

ot intend ed t o s er ve o r be nefit int er est s o f the Stat e, the State shal l ind em ni f y the State em pl oy ee f orany dam ages awardedan

d c our t cos ts a n d a tt orney s’ fees asse ssed as p ar t of a ny fi nal and unreversed judgm ent, o r shall

pay su ch j udgm

en t.” (Em pha si s added.) 5 ILCS 350/2 (d) (W est 200 4). Ju ry tri al s a re n ot av aila ble in

the Cour t o f Cl

aim s. Kiersch , 230 Ill . App. 3d at 64. See also Seifert v. Standard Paving Co. , 6 4 I ll. 2d 1 09, 120 (1 976 ) ( t he la ck of a p rov i si on f or j ury tri al s b ef ore th e C ourt of

Cl ai m s d oes not
v i ol ate the s tate cons tituti

onal guara ntee of th e ri ght to tri al

by j ury). Thus, the In de m ni f i ca ti on Act antici pates that there wil

l b e cases tri ed in t he cir cu it co ur t in

whi ch a state empl

oyee wi ll be f ound li abl e and, unl ess t he co ur t o rjur y find s t ha t his actions were wi lf ul or want on, he wil l b e i ndem ni fi edby the s tate. If

the av ai l abil ity of ind em ni f i ca ti on were suff ici ent to confer excl

usiv e juri sdiction i

n the Court of Clai

ms, there woul d be no rol e f or a j ury
. Janes , 254 Ill . App. 3d at 966. We ag r ee wit h t he ap pe ll ate cour t t hat a judgmen t against de fe nd an t wo ul d n o t su bje ct t he st at e t o liab ilit y. The appel

la te court al so rejected the prem is e t ha t a judg ment ag ai n st d ef en da n t in ci rc ui t cou rt w oul d op er ate to co nt ro l the state. “Su rel y ,” the appel

la te co urt rem

arked , “th

e Col l ege of Veteri na ry Med icine does not have a poli cy of perf ormi ng una uthorized surgeries .” 375 Ill . App. 3d at 455. In Jinkins , w e c on si

de re d w h eth

er a j ud gm

en t ag ai n st a psych iatrist an d a cou ns el orem ploy edb y a s tate m en tal h ea l th f ac il ity wo uld operate t o contr ol the acti ons of the stat e. Th e def en da n ts asserted th at a

j ud gm en t f or th e p l ai n tif f , th e ad minist ra t or of t he
es tate of a dec ea se d p ati

en t, m i gh t ca us e th e s tate to ch an ge its po li ci es so t h at h ea l th -c are prof

es si on als w oul

d b e req ui re d to invo lun t ar ily

adm it i ndi vi dual s to st ate men

tal he al th faci li ties as a preca uti onary me as ure, e ven i

f adm issi on was not necessary . This, they argued, could i

ncrease the n

um ber of lawsu its br ou ght by-15- invo lun t ar ily

adm itted patien

ts and pl ace a strain

on scarceresour ces. Jinkins , 209 Ill . 2d at 336. We found the argum

ent “specu lative” and w itho ut basis in t he record. And, in a ny eve nt , w e no t ed t hat jud gme nt fo r t he p laint iff
wo uld merely have had t he eff ect of rein forci ng the poli

cy , expressed in sta te l aw , th at r eq ui re s “ b oth sta te a n d p ri v ate in sti tuti on s to de v ote resources an d f

ash i on pol i cy to adhe re to the s tand ard

o f c are.” Jinkins , 209 Il

l . 2d at 33 7, ci

tin g 20 IL CS 17 05/4.1 (We st 1996 ). We concl udedt hat a ju dg ment fo r t he p laint iff woul d n ot ope ra te to con trol the actions of

the Stat e, whi

ch would continue

to ma ke poli cy dec isions an d e xp en d r es o ur ce s in keepi ng wi th “the goal

of meet ing t he sta n dard of care al

ready di rected by exi stin g state law.” Jinkins , 209 Ill . 2d at 337. I n Fritz , we fo r mu lat ed t he “o pe r at e t o co nt r o l” in qu ir y a s whether a v er dic t fo rt he pla i n ti ff i n circu it co ur t “ ‘wo uld limi t t he employee’sab

i l ity to enga ge in lawful ac t ivity on be half of t he State.’ ” Fritz , 209 Ill . 2d at 315, quot in g Wozniak v. Conry , 28 8 I ll. App. 3d 1 29, 133 (1 997 ). We concl uded that if

the al legedl y tortious
ac ts of a state empl

oyee “cann

ot properly

be characterized” as

la wful act ions on behal

f of the state, t hen

a ci rcui t court jud gme nt t ha t wo uld t en d t o cu r b s uc h a ct io ns do es no t vio lat e s o ve r eig n immu nit y. We agre e w ith

th e a pp el l ate cou rt that a judgm

ent against defend ant will not op er at e t o c ont ro l the s t at e o r limi t t he abil ity of a me mb erof th e v eteri na ry f ac ul ty of th e Univ er si

ty of Il li nois to engage in la wf ul ac t ivit y. Thus, the C ourt o f C l ai

m s d oes not h

ave e xc l us ive j urisd i cti on overa c laim

th at a vet er inarian emplo yed by the st at e has bre ache d t he du ty of care applicabl

e to veterinari ans because that duty arise s f rom t he com m on l aw , i n de pe n de n tl y of sta te em pl oy m en t, and a judg ment against su ch

a v ete ri n ar i an wi ll n ei th er ope ra te to con trol the sta te nor su bje ct t he st at e t o liab ilit y.
(3 ) W h eth er De f en da n t Is Im m un e F rom Li ab il ity Defend an t ar gue s t hat not wit hst anding a ny dut y that might be im posed upo n ve t er in ari

an s u nd er s tate l aw , h e i s i

m m une f rom l i ab i l ity be ca us e h e is “c o mple t ely and ut t er ly exempt fr om t he pro vi sions” of

the Practice

A ct. S pe ci

f i ca ll y , h e p oints

to se cti on 4 of-16- t he Practice A

ct, which states that “Nothi

ng i n thi s Act sh al l appl y to *** (3 ) V et er inarians em

pl oy ed by col l eg es orun

iv er si ti esor by sta te agencies , whi

le engaged i

n the perf ormance of th ei r off i ci al duties.” 225 I LC S 1 15 /4 ( 3) ( We st 20 00 )

. T his pr ov i si on , a cc ordin g to de f en da n t, ev inc es a l

eg i sl ati ve inte nt to e xe m pt pr of es sor s of
ve teri na ry medi cin e not o nl y f rom the li cense requirem

ent (225 I LCS 115 /3 (b) (Wes t 200 0) ), and t he co nt inuing edu cat ion r equ irement (225 ILC S 1 15/ 16 ( West 200 0) ), but fro m even for ming a “veterinari

an cl ie nt-patient rel ationsh

ip”as that t erm is def

in edin the statute (22 5 ILC S 115/3(a)(G ) (We st 2000 )). Pla int iffs r es po nd t ha t t he Pr ac t ice Ac t is a licensing sta tute, not a to rt imm uni ty act. T he exem

ption in s ection 4(3) is, in pl ain tiff s’ vi ew, “ inte nd ed to al l ow Il l inoi s u ni ve rs iti es to attra

ct a nd em pl oy le arned pr o fes sio na ls in v et er ina r y sc ien ce , wit ho ut im pos ing t he addi tional burden of acqui rin g an Il l in oi s l i cen se , or b

ei n g s ub j ec t to a regu l atory agen cy .” We agree . Defendant ’s argument is, in eff ect, t hat the onl

y s ource of duty f or a m embe r of

a l i ce ns ed an d re gul ate d pr of es si on or occ upa ti on is the governi

ng statute an d t ha t , t he r efo r e, o ne wh o is
exem pt f rom the sta tute c an not be he ld t o a st anda rd of c ar e in the pr act ice o f his pro fessio n or oc cup at ion. The Pr ac t ic e Ac t is c o difie d in ch ap t er 22 5 o f t he I llino is Compi led St at ut es, which is t it l ed “ Prof ess i ons a nd O ccup ati ons.” T his chapter codif

ie s the l ic ensi ng an d r eg ula t io n of

a m ul titude of
oc cup at ions incl

udi ng ac upuncture (225 ILCS 2/ 1 (W est 200 4)), fun erald i rectors a nd e m ba l m ers (2 25 ILCS 41 /1–1 (W est 200 4)), professi onal boxers and wrestlers (225 ILCS 105/1 (W est 2004), as
we ll as physici ans (225 ILCS 60/1–1 (W es t 20 04 )), an

d d en ti sts (225 ILCS 25/1 (West 2004)). If we were to accept de f en da nt’ s readi ng of t he Pract ice A

ct, we would also ha ve t o co nc lud e t ha t t he o nlydu ty that may ap pl y to an y m em be r of an y of the regulated

oc cup at ions a nd professi ons ari ses through the statute. For example, sec t ion 1 7 o f the Ill in ois Den talPractice A

ct li sts 10
se pa ra te ac ts that constitute t he practic e of denti stry. 225 ILCS 25/17 (West 2004) . Secti

on 17 f urthe r provi des that the

practi ce of den tis try by a cl in ic al instruc tor in

the course of hi s or her teachi ng duties in an approved dental

school or coll

ege is “ex em

pt f rom the operati on of t his Act” i f ei therof two conditions i s met. 225 ILCS 25 /17(d) (West-17- 2004). Under

de f en da nt’ s rea son

ing , a c l ini ca l instruc tor of

den tis try who is exem pt from the l

ic ensi ng provi si on of the Dental Practice A

ct wo uld owe

n o duty to hi s den

tal pa ti en ts to exerci se the sam

e degree of sk i ll an d kn owl ed ge as l i ce ns ed m em be rs of t he pr ofe ssio n. Su ch a resul t would be ab surd. Defend ant ask s this court to inf er a legislat ive

inten t to grant tort im m un ity to acertai n class of people in the absence of express sta t utory langua ge g ra nt ing suc h imm unit y. Ou r r ese ar ch r evea ls no
auth ori ty for m aki ng such an i nf erence an d defen dant ci tes none. Our
co nst itu t ion, how ever , c ont ains a g ua ran tee tha t “ [e] ve ry pers on sha ll find a c erta in r em ed y in th e l aw s f orall injuries and wr ong s which he receives to his p ers on, pri

va cy , property

orre put at ion. He sha ll o bt ain jus tice b y l aw , f re el y , c om pl etel y , a n d p rom ptl y .” Il l . C on st. 19 70 , a

rt. I, §12. Wh en the l egi slaturein ten

ds to co n f er im m un ity fr o m t o r t liab ilit y, it is l i ke l y to do so ex

pres sl y . See, e.g. , 225 IL

CS 25 /36 (W

est 200 4)) (g ra nt ing im

m un ity f rom ci v il or c ri m in al l i ab il ity f or g ood- f

ai th
re po rt ing of any

vi olation of the Dental

Practice Act); 225 ILCS 60/30 (Wes t 200 4) (g ra nt ing imm unit y from civil li

ability to physician who provides em erg en cy ca re und er th e G ood Samari

tan Act); 620 I LCS 20/3 (West 2004) (extendi ng i mmunity unde r Lo cal Go ver nmenta l and Governm ental Em pl oyee s T ort I m

m un ity Ac t to airport em

ployees). Because o f t he co nst it ut io na l gu ar an t ee o f a c er t ain remedy f or eve ry le gal wrong, we wil

l n ot im ply to rt imm uni ty in the absence of su c h express l anguage. We, th eref

ore , c on cl ud e th at s ec ti on 4( 3) of th e P ra cti

ce Ac t is in tendedto exem

pt cer t ain vet er inarians fr om t he license r equ irement
an d other r eq ui rem en ts of the ac t, b ut not to prov

i de im m un ity f rom l i ab i l ity in tort f or th ose exem pte d. D ef en da nt is n ot im m une f rom liab ilit y.
(4) W he the r Pl ai nti f f s H ave Sta

ted a C l ai m f or Con ve rs i on Under its anal ys is of the Moorman is sue, the appel la te co urt considered bot h t he neg ligence c ou nt and th e c on v er si on coun t. W ith respect t o t he co nve r sio n c o un t ( wh ich wa s d ismis se d b y t he cir cu it courton ot her grounds), the appel

la te court reasoned

that defendant’s

“ du ty to ref rai n” f rom operati ng on th e h ors e’ s r i gh t sti f l e “ di d not-18- arise ex clu sive ly

from the servi ce contract.” 375 I ll . App. 3d at 457. Because defendan

t per formed the su r ge r y in violation of an express instruc ti on

from the pla in tif fs , it was out side the scope of the part ies’ contract and, theref

ore, not bar re d by Moorman . The appell ate court con cl ud ed th at: “Contract or no c ont ra ct , if one cuts, carves, lacerates, in cises,
orot herwise al

ters so me one el se’s property ex cept as authorized

by that p erso n, o ne comm

its a cl assi c tor t: either trespa ss to ch at t els or con ve rs i on, depe nd

ing on th e e xte nt of the al terat ion.” 375 Il

l. A pp. 3d at 458. As noted above, defendant has forfe i t ed c ons ider at ion o f the Moorman i ssu e b ef

ore t his co ur t , so we t ur n t o t he question wh ether plaint iff s have st at ed a cau se o f act ion fo r c onve rsio n. “To prove conversi

on, a plai ntif f m ust establi

sh that (1) he has a right t o t he pr op er t y; (2) he h asan ab sol ute an d u n con di ti on al ri gh t to the im m edi ate pos se ss i on of

the prop erty ; ( 3) h

e m ad e a de man d f or poss e ssio n; and (4) the def endan t wro ngf

ull y a nd wi thout
au thor i za ti on as sum ed con tr ol, do mini

on, or ow ner ship o ver t he propert y.” Cirrincione v. Johnson , 184 Il l . 2d 109 , 114 (1 998). In co un t I I o f t he iram

ended compl ai nt, plai ntif fs al leged that they
were the owners of the h

orse with the “ absol

ute a nd u ncondi

tional right t o immed ia te p oss es si on of the hor se ,” a nd tha t a d em an d f or po ss es sio n

of t he ho rse wo uld have been “u seless ” bec aus e t he defend ant co uld not

ha ve r et ur ne d t he ir p er so na l pr o pe r t y t o t he m “in it s un alt er ed st at e. ” W it h reg ard to the el em en t of as su m pti on of
co nt r o l, do mini

on, or o wnersh

ip, the plaintiff

s all eged t hat de fendant’s per for ming

u n au th orized surger y, i n vi olation of their express in structions, constituted “ an un au thor i ze d a ss um

pti on of th e r i gh t to posse ssi on or ownersh

i p of the h orse.” Defendant’s mot ion t o d ismi ss ar gue d t hat co unt II fai led to ple ad
a ca us e of ac ti on f or con ve rs i on because pla in tif fs did n ot al lege that he h ad “perm

anen tly depriv ed them of p osse ssi

on of the h orse.” The cir cu it courtgr an t ed t he mo t io n, dis miss ing t he co nve r sio n c laim wi th prejudi ce. The appe ll ate

cou rt re v er se d, r el yin g on se cti on 226 o f the Rest at ement (Secon

d) of Torts, wh

i ch pro vi des: “ ‘One w ho int en t io na lly

de st r o ys a ch at t el o rso mat er iall y a l ters its phy sical-19- con di ti on as to change

its i de n ti ty or ch ara cte r i s s ub j ec t to li abil

ity f or con ve rs i on to another who is

in possessi on of the ch a tt el

or entitled to it s imme dia t e p o ss es sio n. ’ ” 37 5 I ll. A pp
. 3d at 45 8, qu o t in g Rest at ement (S ec on d) of

Tort s § 22 6, a

t 43 9 ( 19 65 ). C om

m en t d to th is section suggests t hat a clai m f or co nversi

on of a horse on th e ba sis of p hysical inj ur y to t he animal is not unhea rd of a nd t hat one mayindeed be l

ia bl e for the convers ion of a horse wi

thout permanen tl

y depriv in g the owner of possessi on: “ ‘If a horse i s pe r man en t ly

la med, it rema

in s a h or se , t he o wn er may s t ill be in possession, and the horse ma y have val ue to a glue works, but it has be co me us ele ss f

or the or dinary purposes o f a h orse. In such a case there is a co nve r sio n. ’ ” 37 5 I ll. App. 3d at 458 , q uo t ing Res t at ement (S eco nd ) o f T orts§2 26 , C om m en t d , a t 440 -4 1 ( 196 5) . T hus, t he appe ll ate co ur t co nc lud ed , t he cla im fo rco nve r sio n w as pr o pe r ly ple aded. In the port ion of

their b rief addressi ng the M

oorm an is sue, pla int iffs argue that the doct rin e d oes n ot bar a claim for t he in tentional to rt o f conv

ersi on. They

argue, f ur th er , th at th

e a pp el l ate court was correct t hat

their am ended com

pla in t did state a cl

ai m f or co nver sion. T he y als o po int o ut t ha t de fen da nt fail ed t o r aise any is sues rel at ed

to th e c on v er si

on cl ai m in h i s p eti ti on f or l ea v e to ap pe al. Nevertheless, we hav e a du ty to con si

der sua sp onte whet her t he Court of Cl ai m s has excl

us ive j urisd i cti on with r

es pe ct to th e con ve rs i on cl ai m
. Eastern

v. Canty , 75 Ill . 2d 566, 570 (19 79) (ex pl ai ni ng th at a court h asa d uty to exam in e i ts jur isd ict io n, ev en if no que sti on i s raised

by the p arti es). Secti on 8( d) o f t he Ac t co nfers e xclusive jur isdict ion u po n t he Courtof Cla ims “i n cases soundin

g in to rt. ” 705 ILCS 505 /8(d) ( West 2004)

. Th

i s prov i si on i s n ot l im ited to cl ai m s of n eg l i ge n ce . B y

its pla in la nguage, thi s secti on appl ie s to all to rt clai ms , in cl udin g intent ional t or t s su ch as t re spa ss t o c hat t el and c onve rsio n. We not ed in Healy , 133 Ill . 2d at 309, that an act ion i s again st t he sta te when there is “ ‘n o all egation[ ] that an

ag en t or employee of t he Sta te acted bey ond the sc ope of hi s authori

ty th rough wrong f ul acts.” The esse nce o f a claim for c onve rsio n is an allegat ion t hat t he de f en da n t en gage d i n an in ten ti on al , w rongf

ul ac t.-20- Fur t her , r ega rd ing t he r elie f so ug ht , ho ldin g t he de fen da nt liable f or t he intent ional t or t of c onve rsio n canno t op er at e t o c ont ro l the act ions of the state because the Un iv ersi ty si mpl y c ann ot have a poli

cy re quir ing its e mployees t o c ommit t he inten tion al tort of c onve rsio n. Furth er, as n ot ed ab ov e, th e S tate ’s in de m n i f i ca ti on of de f en da n t, sho uld he be fo un d lia ble for co nver sion, wi ll not op era

te to c ontr

ol the actions of

the Stat e. We therefore, concl

ude, that plai

ntif fs ’ clai m f or co nve r sio n sh oul d n ot h av e b een di sm i ss ed b y th e c i rc ui t cou rt.

CONCLUSION For the forego in

g reasons, we af

f i rm th e j ud gm

en t of th e a pp el l ate cou rt, wit ho ut ha ving r ea ch ed t he qu es t io n w he t he rpla i ntif fs’ negl ige nce cla im is barred by the Moorman doctr in

e, whi ch reve rsed t he dismissal of bo t h co unt s o f the amende d co mplaintand rem anded the cause t o t he ci

rcuit cou rt for further pro ceedings.
Aff irmed.

JUSTICE FREEMAN, di ssen ting: I canno t join in the court’ s op ini on be ca us e it do es no t ad eq ua t ely address the i ssues that hav e been rais ed wi th respect t o c ou nt I. One of t he main rea so ns why this i s s o i s b ec au se the court ca nn ot decide whether co un t I , o st en sibly for “n

egl ige nce,” i s real

ly a contract cla im. The court appears to t reat it as both. Sli p op. at 4, 6, 12

. S pe cif

ica lly, in sec t ion ( 1) o f it s anal

ys is , the court states that t he Moorman do ct rine appl

ie s to service c ontract s, “wh ic h would s eem

to in cl ude t he vet er inary car e at issue in t he pr es en t case.” Sl

ip op. at 4. Two pages l ater, however, the court, in addressi ng the j urisdi

ctional is sue, sp ea ks o f t he an alys is use d i n de term ini ng “ whethe r a par ticul ar tort action i s ‘ agai

ns t the State’ ***.” ( E mph as is a dd ed

. ) Slip op. at 6. If t he cou rt b el i ev esth at t he parties’ rel

ationsh ip is that of a servi

ce con tract, as allu de d t o o n p ag e 4 , t he n w hy is t he court talki ng ab out a t or t act ion o n pag e 6? T his same t ype o f co nt r ad ic tion contin ues throughout t he opini

on. On page 12, f

or exampl e, the court holds

that t he duty of ca r e in this

case ari ses f

rom notions f

ounded i n tort la w, b ut, l ate r, th e sam e pa ge it st at es t hat t he r elat ionship be t wee n t he1 I stron gl y d isagre e th at it is “unne

ce ss ar y” for t he court to review the appe ll ate cou rt ’s ap pli ca tio n of t he Moormando ctrin e to thi s case. Sl

ip o p. at 5. T he Moormanissu e impact s on the jurisdictional quest ion, as is apt ly demons tr at ed

in the court’s opi

ni on . See sli p op. at 12. Indeed, the c onfu sed
na ture of th e c ourt’s t reatme

nt of c ount I i s attributa ble to the court’s unj us tifieddecis ion t o hold t he Moormanissue forfeit ed. By so doing, t he
co urt is, in actuality , refusi

ng to ad dre ss wh eth er co unt I actually

states a valid cause of acti on fo r ne gl ig en ce . It m ust be poi nte d o ut th at the circuit
co urt ruled that count I did not stat e a caus e of actio n be cause under Moorman , the economic damages being sought un de r th e ne gl ig e nc e th e or y we re ba rr ed. T he

appe ll ate co urt re ve rse d, h ol di ng th at an exception t o the doctr ine w as sa tisf

ie d, an d re in state d th

e c oun t. In so d oi ng , the appe ll ate
co urt cor rec tly rec ogniz ed

that Moormanis p ro per ly a ss ert ed under s ection 2–615 of the Code of Civil P rocedur e and not , as an aff ir mat ive defen se, und er section

2–61 9(a) (9) . 375 Il

l. A pp. 3 d at 448. I no te in pas sing tha t the
co urt toda y i s s atisfied

to sim ply “acce

pt the appe

llate c ourt’s char act eriza tion of the pr ocedu ra l po st ur e of t he ca se” beca us e the p ar ties have not bothered to make it an issue here. Slip op. at 3. R egar dless of wh et he r the parti esmake

it an i ssue , Iwoul d su bmit tha t p ro per pro ce du re is not a ma tter of for a cour t’s acqu iescenc e. Since the mi slabeli ng o f a motion is gen erally no t ca us e for rev ers al ab sent pr ejud ice ( Scott W etzel Services v. Regard , 271 Ill. Ap p. 3d 47 8, 481 (199 5)), there is s imply no
rea son wh

y the court could no

t have clarifie d the propriety of the motion pr ac tic e below.
-21- pa r t ies is a “c o nt r ac t ua l” o ne
. Slip op. at 12. These types of i nternal in consi stenci

es in dic ate to me

that we need

to mor e ca re fully

examine t he nature of the clai

m a ll egedin c o un t I

. T he be st wa y t o do t his, in my vi ew, is to ident ify

t he pr ecise na t ur e o f the relati onshi p between the part ies. The reward of such an anal ys is would be an opi ni on that cle an ly r es o lve s t he ce nt r al is su es –t he jur isd ict io na l qu es t io n, as we ll
as the ap pl i ca ti on of the Moorman doctr in

e. 1 I , t he r efo r e, r es pe ct fully di ss en t. An un fo rt unate byproduc t o f the cou rt ’s beli ef that defendant’s bri ef do es no t ade qua t ely addr ess t he Moorman is sue (sl ip op. at 5-6) is t hat t he r eins t at eme nt o f co unt I is left standi ng. Th i s is s o de sp ite th e f ac t th i s court has n

ev er add ress ed the que sti on of

whethe r a general negl ige nce cl ai m is the pr oper leg al

v eh i cl e to c om pe n sa te ani ma l owners such as plai

ntif fs. Thi s is par t icular ly disappo inting-22- becausenei

therthe jurisdictional

question n

or t he Moorman que sti

on can b e f ul l y re sol v ed wi th out f i rs t ide nt ify ing th

e n ature of

coun t I. Nevertheless, t he court in si sts on answeri ng the j urisdi

ctional que sti on withoutfirst add re ssing th e v i ab il ity of count I in

general . In so doing, t he opini on seem in gly endorses a ne glig ence t heo ry o f rec ove ry by
re co gnizing a prof

ess i onal standard

of car e w ith

re sp ec t to veterinari ans. Sl

i p op . a t 12 . I do n ot b el

i ev e th at a general negl ige nce cla im is the appropriate remedy

to compen sate ani

ma l owne rs such as plai ntif fs. Rat her , g iven the r ela t io nsh ip bet wee n t he animal ow ner and t he ve t er ina r ian an d t he cla ss ific at io n o f a nima ls a s p er so na l p r o pe r t y, t he proper theory

of recove ry i s a con tractua l cl ai m ba se d on b ai l m en t. Theref ore, altho ugh t he circ uit co ur t co rr ect ly reco gnized t hat co unt I was sub ject to dis missal , I would a ll ow p l ai n tif f s th e oppor tun ity replea d count I as a contract cl ai m, specif ic al ly a breach of b ai l m en t. A ba il m en t consti tutes the del ive ry of pers ona l prop erty “ f ort he
acc omp lishm

ent of som e p urp ose , up on

a contract, express or i

mpl ied, that after the pur pose has be en fulfil led, it sha ll be red elivered t o t he pers on wh o de liver ed it , o t he r wis e d ea lt wit h a cc o r din g t o his di re ct ions or kept until

he recl ai ms it.” Smalich v. Westfall , 440 Pa. 409, 413 , 26 9 A .2d

476 , 48 0 (1 970 ); se e a l so 8 A Am . Jur. 2d Bailments

§1 (19 97). A b ailm

ent is a “contractual arran

gem ent” and,
as su ch , is g o ve r ne d b y t he sa me rules o f law t ha t go ve r n c o nt r ac t s in ge ne r al. 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bailments §29 (1997). A bai

lm ent contract ma y be oral or wri

tt en. 19 Wi

ll is to n on Contracts §53:1, at 10 (20 01). Ge ne r ally, th

re e c ate gor

i esof b ai l m en ts exi st. Bail

me nts can be m ade f or th e s ol e b en

ef it of the ba il or, f orthe sol e b en ef it of the ba il ee , or for the m utualben efi t o f b ot h. 8A

Am . Jur. 2d Bailments

§1 (19 97). One for m of mut ual bene fit ba ilment is t he “hire o f labor and
serv i ces .” J. Sto ry, Com

me ntaries on the Law of Ba il

m en ts with Illust ra t ions from

the Ci vi l a nd Foreign Law §421, at 381 ( 9 th ed. 1878) (her ei naf

ter, Comm

entaries on the Law of Bail men ts). Those unde rt aking the perform

ance of servi ces under a bailment a gr eement are ob l i ge d to “do th

e w ork ; to do i

t at the tim

e a gr ee d o n; t o do it
we ll; to em

ploy the ma terial s f urni shed b

y the em ploy er in a proper man ne r; an d l as t ly, to exerci se the proper degree of care an d dil ige nce about the work.” Co mm

entaries on the Law of Ba il me nts §428, at 389. The bai

lee’s du ties arise f

rom the natur e of the part ies’ agre em en t, butthe “l

aw fi xes the standard o f care that t he bai lee m ust-23- exercise in the perform

ance of the fun ct ions

the bai lee has und ertaken.” 19 Wi ll

i sto n on Con tracts §53:5, at 2 1- 22(2 00 1) . W ith respect to bai

l m en ts f or m utu al benefit, gene ra lly, t he bailee w ill be liable for loss es t hat ar e pr oxi m ate ly the resul t o f the b ailee’s own negl ige nce. 19 Wi

ll is to n on Contracts §53:5, at 22 ( 2001). Al though standards of care i

ncl uded i n a b ailme nt co nt r ac t “mo r e n ea r ly appr ox imate

t he law o f to rt s t han t hat of c ont ra ct s, t he r ight s and obligat ions of the partiesund er a co nt ra ct of ba ilm

ent may incl

ude , by impli cat ion, righ

ts and duties i

mposed upon the b aile e by la w.” 19 Wil l i ston on Cont racts § 53:5, at 23-24 ( 2001). See also St. PaulMercury Indemnity

Co. v. City

of Hughes , 231 Ark. 530, 331 S.W.2d 106 (1 960 ) ( hold ing th at a

cti on ca n b e m ai n tai n ed ag ai n st m un i ci pa l ity de sp ite to rt im

mun ity of the bai lee mun icip alit y). “Whe r e s kill, as we ll
as c ar e, is req uire d in per for ming t he und er t aking, t her e, if the pa rty purp ortst o ha ve sk ill in

t he bus iness, and he unde rt ake s for hire, he is bo und, not o nl

y to ordinary

care and di

li gence i n securi ng a n d pr ese rving t he thi

ng, b ut al so to the ex

erci se of due a nd ord ina ry sk ill in th e e m pl oym en t of hi s a rt or b us ine ssab out i

t.” C om m en tari es on t he La w of Ba i l m en ts § 431 , at 3 92. Under th e l awof b ai l m en ts , dam ages will lie aga inst t he pa rt y under t aking t he work if “h e appl ie s less [skil l] than the occ as i on r

eq ui res .” C om

m en tari es on the La w of Ba i l m en ts §431, at 393. T his is so be ca us e “ wh er e a pe r so n is
em ploy edin a work of s ki ll , the e m ploye r buys both his l

abor and his judgment .” (Emph asi s added.) Comm entaries on the Law o f

Ba il m en ts §431, at 393. I llino is juri sprudence has long recognized the operat ion of these princi ples. T his courthas h

el d that, in order to establ

ish a b ailor-bai

lee r ela tionsh ip, “there m

ust be ei ther an ex

press agreem

ent *** or a n agr eement by imp lic at ion, which may be ga t her ed fr om t he ci rcums tances sur ro unding t he t ra nsac t ion, suc h as t he bene fits t o be received by the part ies, the

i r i nte nti ons , th e k ind of propert y i

nvol ved, and t he oppor

tun iti es of ea ch to exerc i se

con trol over th e proper ty.” Wall v. Airport Parking Co. of Chicago , 41 I ll. 2d 506, 50 9 (196 9). Under th e b ai l m en t, t he ba il ee

ha s a duty to ex erc i se the sk ill or knowledge pert ain in g to the “nature of the busi ness .” Mayer v. Brensinger , 180 Ill . 110, 113-14 (1899) ( recogniz in g in br ea ch of contract ac ti on on

a bai lm ent that “[t]he obl

iga tion to discharge such du ty is im pli ed from the relati

on between

the par ties”); see al so-24- Saddler v. National Bank of Bl oomington , 403 Ill . 218, 22 9 (1 949) (st at ing sam

e pri nc i pl e); Schaefer v. Washington Safety Deposit Co. , 281 I ll. 4 3, 48 ( 19 17 ) ( sa me)

. Ba ilee s w il l be lia bl e for losses that
r es ult f rom th ei r ne gl i gen ce or, more prec i sel

y , f or th ei r f ai l ure to exercise the ski ll or knowledge p ert ain ing t o t he na t ur e o f t he ir bus ine sse s. Saddler , 403 Il l . at 229. In l i gh t o f t hese pr inciples, w hen an a nimal or p et is left wit h a veterin arian f or care, i t is part and p ar cel o f the co nt ra ct itse lf that t he veterin arian wi ll ex erci se h

i s or her s pe cia liz ed med ical skill and judg ment in

treat in g the ani ma l. Such a rule recogni

zes the notion that
a bai lor does not just

hi re the ba il ee f or hi s lab or, but for his judgment
as well. Co mmentar ies o n t he Law of Bai lm ents §431, at 393. In ot her word s, t he bailor expe ct s, a s pa rt of t he barga in, t ha t t he ba ilee will
use the requis ite ski

ll and j udgme

nt pe rtai ning t o t he nat ur e o f the busi ness. Ac co r di ng ly, I se e t he relati onshi p between an

ani ma l ow ner and
a ve teri na ri an , suc h as t hat des cr ibed in co unt I, as a bailment relati onshi p. In de ed , p laint iffs in

count I all

eged that they

“en trust ed” t he irh ors e to d

ef en da n t f or c are a n d trea tm en t. Th ey “ con se n ted ” to defendant’s perf

orm ing a s pe ci f i c s urg ery on th e l ef t ca rpel bon e of t he ir h o r se an d “ co nse nt ed ” s pe cific ally t o d efenda nt ’s dr aining fluid f rom the horse ’s righ

t stifl e. Plai ntif fs speci fi cal ly “i nstructed” defend ant “ not t o perform surgery ” on the righ

t stifl e becaus e such surg ery “i s very risky .” Accordin

g to the c om

pl ai n t, d ef en da n t “ in
v i olation of [plaintif

fs’] express instructions ” (emph asi s added) p erforme d surgery on the h

orse’s righ

t stifl e, whi ch “ ruin ed ” the ani ma l f or“fu t ur e u se in

racin g. Plai ntif fs al leged that defen

dant owed them a d ut y t o ex er cis e “ r ea so na ble ca r e” in hi s “ ca re an d trea tm en t” of t he horse and to “render” suc h care an d treat me nt “i n com pli ance wi th the standards of a qual

if ied ve teri na ri an .” According to plainti ff s, defendan t fail ed to do so wh en he ( i) fa iled “t o ad he r e t o t he sp ec ific in struct ions” of

pl ai n tiff s “as t o t he sc op e o f the sur ger y to be performed on t he ho rse by per for ming sur ger y on t he r igh t st ifle” ; ( ii) performed a su

rgery on the hors e t ha t “w as un ne ce ss ar y”’ an d ( iii) performed a su rg er y on t he horse t hat “was in vio latio n of t he standard of ca re of a v ete ri n ar i an .” A cc ordin g to th e c om pl ai n t, defendant’s negl

ige nce was the proxim

ate cause of the dam

ages pla int iffs suf

fered i n that the surgery on the

horse’s ri ght stif le “rui ned2 Thi s o f c ou rse al so di sti ng ui she s v ete

rin ari an malp ra ct ice f

ro m other typ es of prof es sio nal malpracti

ce , such as attorney malpr act ice and
-25- t he horse for future use i

n raci ng.” Pl ai ntif fs al legedda mag e t o t he ir personal prop erty “ in th e a m oun t of t he diffe r en ce be t we en t he [ fair
ma rket va l ue] of the property

im m ediatel y bef ore t he o ccu rr ence and its [f ai r m arket v al ue] i m m ediatel y af ter the occ

urren ce.” Th e thrust o f thes e al

legations i s that defen

dant perform

ed a surg ery on t he ho rse th at w assp ec i f i ca ll y f orb ade b y th e prop er

ty owner at t he t ime o f t he pr o pe r t y’s de live r y. The all egations also ma

ke clear t ha t de fe nd an t pu r po r t ed ly did not e xe rcise the sk ill or knowledge that plai

ntif fs expected as pa r t o f t he irbargai n. In m y v ie w, these t ypes o f allegat ions p re sent a class ic brea ch- of- bailment situ at ion. I nd ee d, ba ilm

e nts for m

utual be nef it hav e l ong been
re co gni zedas be ing par t icular ly amenable to situ at ions invo lving ani ma l care. See Co mmentar ies o n t he Law of Bai lm ents §431, at 393 (a ckno wledg ing that “if a f arrier un dertakes the cureof

a di se as ed

or l am e h ors e, h e i s b ound to a

ppl y a re as ona

bl e e xe rcise of skill to t he cure; and if

thro ugh hi s ign

orance o r bad management, the horse dies, he wi ll be l i ab l e f or the l oss” ). Rec og nizing plai

ntif fs’ a ll egati

ons a s con

tractual in nature el im in ates t he pr oblems inher ent in a t t emp tin g to recove

r un der a
ne gl ig en ce t he o r y. Indeed, plain tiff s, in their b rief , acknowledge that
no Illinois co ur t has e xpr essly held t hat a ca use of a ct ion exis t s fo r ve teri na ry mal pract ice. Thi s scarcity of case l awowe s n

ot to any la ck of sy mpa thy f or anim al owners but, rat he r, to the legal reali ties that exi st with respect to the relati onshi p between the parties. As

an i ni tial
matter, t he vic t im o f ve t er ina r y malp r ac t ice is incapa ble of br inging a cause of a

cti on ag ai ns t the v eteri

na ri an
. Obersch lake v . Veterinary AssociatesAnimal Hospital , 15 1 O hio App. 3d 741, 745, 785 N.E.2d 811, 814 (20 03) ; Price v. B ro wn , 545 Pa. 216, 228, 680 A.2d 1149, 1155 (1 996 ) ( Cast ile, J. , d issent ing). Und er Il l inoi s law, an

imal s are recogniz edas personal

propert y. See Jank

osk i v. P reiser An ima l Hospita l, Ltd. , 157 Ill . App. 3d 818 (1 987 ). As personal propert y, an ani ma l cannot bring sui

t against a veterinarian . Rather, the owner must in stitute the suit, and the owner is le ga lly not t he dir ect victim o f the
ma lpracti ce. 2 Addi tional ly, the clas si

fi cation of an

im al s as personalacc ount ant malpracti

ce
.

3 It is c ri tic al to di st ingu ish thi s c as e, wh ich i nvolves a ba ilment and the at tendant duties a ris ing directly f rom the ba ilment relat ionship, from the line of cases which recognize duties arising outs id e o f co ntr act rel at ions hip s– somet imes referr ed to as being dutie s ex co ntract u See Congregationof the P

assion, Holy Cross P

rovince v. ToucheRoss & Co ., 159 Ill . 2d 137, 163 (199 4) (d iscuss ing cas es). The la tter cas es do not involve ba ilments and, as s uch, t heir analyses a re inapp licable to ca ses like thi s one. -26- pr ope rty li mi ts the amount of dam

ages that are avai

la bl e. Anim als have l ong been de si gn ate d a s p ers ona

l prop erty under th e c om

m on la w. See G . Ei ch

inge r, Vet erinary Medic ine: E

x ternal Pres

sures on an Insular Prof

ession and How Those Press uresThreaten to Change Current Malpr actice Jurisprudence , 67 Mont. L. Rev. 231, 242 ( Su mme r 2 00 6) ( t r ac ing cla ss ifica t io n o f an imals )

. Be ca us e o f t his classificat ion, damag es r esu lting from the negl ige nce are l im ited t o t he
an imal ’s f ai r m arket v al ue, or “ economi

c dam ages ,” whi

ch ge ne r ally
means the dif

feren ce i n the f ai r market value o f the animal befor e and after inj ury . 67 Mon

t . L. Rev. at 242 . T hus, t her e is litt le if any fi nan ci al inc en ti ve to s ue for i

nj uries and the ty

pes of dam

ages av aila ble ar e o fte n inadeq uat e t o a ddr ess t he injury to t he an imal or i ts owne r. W . R oot, “Man’s Best

Frie nd”: Property or Family Memb er? An Examination of the Legal Class ification of Compan ion Animals and Its Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their W rongful Deat

h or Injury , 47 Vi

ll . L. Re v. 42 3, 442 ( 2002)

. Havi ng prope rl

y f ram ed the rel ati onshi p of the pa rties as one

of bailment and t he co mplained o f co nduc t as a bre ach o f the b ai l m en t, t he que st ions t hat ar e pr ese nt ed in t his app eal ca n be addressed in the proper context. Gi ven

the above, especi

al ly the dif feren ces between t he docto r-pa ti ent relati

onshi p and the veterinari

an-ani ma l owne r relati onshi p, it woul d a ppe ar th at e conom

i c d am ag es f ordam age to or loss of personal

propert y a

risi ng f rom m al practice wo uld be bar re d by t he Moorman doctr in

e. See Ander

son El ectr ic, In c. v. Ledbetter Erec tion Cor

p. , 11 5 I ll . 2d

14 6 ( 19 86 ) (h

oldi n g that Moorman do ct rine appl

i es to se rvi ce c ontracts ). 3 Under a b ai l m en t the ory of-27- r ec o ve r y, the Moorman doc tri ne wou l d h ave n

o ap pl i ca ti onsi nce t he
ec on om i c d am ag esb ei n g s oug h t ar

e rec ov er abl e i

n con tract. T ha t lea ve s o nly

t he jur isdict ional qu est ion. Befo re t ur ning to i t, some addi tional procedural detail

s that have b

een i gnored in to day’s opi ni on need add re ssing. The compl ai nt we address today

is pl ain tiff s’
sec ond ame nd ed co mpla int

. Whe n p laint if fs f il ed thei r origi nal
com pl ai n t, defend ant moved for di sm is sal on th e b as i s that j urisd

i cti on rested in the C ou rt of Claims and no t in t he cir cu it co ur t

. T he cir cu it courtrejected the a r gu me nt, ruli ng that defen

dant was a l

ic ensed vet er inarian. Defend ant the rea f ter s ough t rec ons i derati

on in the trial
cou rt, and w hen t hat pr ove d uns ucc essfu l, he sough t an i nterl ocutory appeal under Rul

e 308(c). The appel

la te c our t dec lined t o he ar t he
case unde r Ru le 308 , a nd th e c as e th en pr oce eded

in th e c i rc ui t cou rt. Wh en th e c i rc ui t cou rt u l ti mat ely dis missed the com pla in t at issue here, pla int iffs a pp ea led

. De fen da nt , as t he ap pe llee , t he n r en ew ed his juri sdictional

ar gument by moving t o d ismi ss t he ap pea l in the appe ll ate co ur t Defend ant ar gue d t hat t he Co ur t of Claims wa s t he appr opr i ate t ribuna l for t he litigat ion bas ed o n t he fact t hat defend ant was ac tin g i n the cours e of

hi s em ploym en t as a profe ssor at the Un i v er si ty of I lli nois C ollege of V et er inary Med icine. At t ache d t o t he
m oti on we re f our af f i da v its, tw o fr om d efenda nt , o ne fro m the
as soci ate cou nsel of the University’s Off ic e of Le gal Co unse l, and another fr o m t he he ad o f t he De pa r t men t o f Ve t er in ar y Cli ni cal Me di cin e a t t he Un ive r sit y. De f en da n t, in his affi

davit , st at ed t hat he had

been e mployed a t t he Coll ege of V eteri

na ry Me dic in e at the Uni

versi ty of Il li nois si nce 1994, when

he w as first hired as a n assist ant pr ofe sso r “t o t eac h, in str uc t, and train students, as wel l a s to do r es ea rc h an d e du ca te stu de n ts through cli

ni cal servi ce, a

ll at the C oll

ege of Veteri na ry Med i ci ne .” At the tim

e of his treatment of plai

ntif fs ’ horse i n 2001, defend ant wasan

ass oci ate prof

ess or. Defend ant did no t enga ge in t he pr i v ate pr ac t ice o f v eterinar y medicine while employed at t he Un ive r sit y, a nd , at no t ime, did he h old “ hi ms el f out to the publ

ic as an equine su

r ge on or p ri v atel y pr ac ti ci n g vete ri n ar i an .” In f ac t, defend ant had not been

in priv ate practice si

nce 1973. Defend ant further st at ed t hat he “do es no t ho ld a l i cen se to practic e v eteri

na ry m edi ci ne wi th th e Sta te of I llino is a nd ha s no t he ldany such l ic ense” due t o his be ing ex

em pt, as a pr ofe sso r o f vet er inary medicine at t he-28- Un ive r sit y, f

rom Ill in ois l ic ensi ng laws. Sin

ce 19 94 , de

f en da n t tau gh t, in structed, an

d tra ined v ete ri na ri an stu de nts “ f or pu rpos es of
ex am ina ti on an d treatm ent of horses b

rought t o t he Large A

ni ma l Clinic at th

e U ni ve rs ity of I llino is. ” D efe nd an t st at ed t ha t it wa s “w hile he was em

ploy ed as an in str uc tor te ac h in g vete

ri n ar i an stu de n ts at t he Un ive r sit y” and w hile he “was in pe rfo rmance of hi s d uti es of employment while o ffi cia lly employed wit h t he Univer sity” t hat he “treated and ex am

in ed the horse brought by t he plaint iff s t o t he Un i ve rsi ty.” Prof es sor Wa rwi ck A . Ard

en , depa rtme nt h ead of Veteri na ry Cl in ic al Medi ci ne at the Uni

versi ty, stated in h

is aff ida vi t t hat sinc e Ap r il 1994, defen

dant “had been

em ploy ed as an in str uc tor, f ac ul ty me mb erand Profess or” at t he Un iv ersi ty. Def en da n t’ s duties throughout t he tim

e of hi s em ploym en t in cl uded “tea ch ing v eteri na ry stu de n ts and e xamining and t re at ing ho rse s bro ught t o t he Un iv er si ty of Ill in ois L ar ge An imal C linic. ” W hile in t he co ur se o f his performa nce of of f i ci al du ti esasan

in str uctor an d f

acul ty m em be r, defen dant “was e

xem pt” from the n

eed for a ve

terinari an l ic ense. A ss oci ate univer sity co unse l of t he Off ic e of Legal

Counsel Mark D. Hens s st at ed in his affidavi t th at th e Un iv er si

ty , th rou gh its Un i v er si ty Office o f R isk

Ma nag eme nt cu rr ent ly had in pla ce a s elfin surance pr og ra m under which de fendant “is ent itled t o p ro t ect ion, provided he is emplo yed byt he Un ive r sit y and ac t ing wit hin the scope of hi s Uni versity duties. Plai ntif fs, in their objection to t he m ot ion to dism

iss , di d not di spute the f acts a s se t forth in th e af f i dav its. R a ther, they ass erted that de f en da n t coul d n

ot s eek t o “t ur n” a r egu lato ry and licensing sta tute in to an im m un ity ac t. Secti on 8(b) of the Court of Clai ms Act stat es tha

t the Cou rt of Cla ims shall have exc lusive jurisd ictio n t o he ar “[a] ll claim s ag ainst t he Sta te f ou nd ed upon an y con tract en tere d i nto with th

e Sta te of Il l inoi s.” 705 IL

CS 50 5/8(b ) (W es t 2 004 ). Whet her a claim is one “agai nstt he Sta

te” doe s n

ot de pe n d upon

th e s tate bei ng nam ed as a pa r t y. Healy v. Vaupel , 1 33 I ll. 2d 2 95, 308 (1 990 ). Rat her , t he de term ina ti on dep end s th

e i ss ue s i n v ol v ed an d th e rel i ef sou gh t. Healy , 133 Ill . 2d at 308. The p roh i b iti on “‘a ga in st m ak in g th e S tate of Illinois a p ar t y to a su it ca nn ot be ev ad ed by mak ing an ac ti on no minally one aga inst t he servan ts or agents o f the State when the real-29- cla im i s a ga inst the State of Illinois itse lf and

wh en t he St at e o f I llino is is the party vi

tall y i nterested.’ ” Healy , 1 33 I ll. 2d a t 308 , q uo t ing Sass v. Kramer , 72 Il

l . 2d 485 , 491 (1 978). Sov ere i gn im m un ity i s n ot implic ated, ho we ve r , by alle ga t io ns t ha t t he st at e’ s a ge nt ac t ed in vi ol ati on of statuto ry or constitutional la w or in ex

cess o f his
au t ho r it y, and, in tho se inst ance s, t he ac t ion ca n be he ar d in t he cir cu it court. Healy , 133 Ill . 2d at 308. An ac t io n t ha t is b rou gh

t n om in al l y ag ai n st a st at e e mplo yee in his in div idua l cap acit y, but “co uld o per at e t o c ont ro l the a ct ions of t he Sta te o rsu bje ct it t o liabil ity,” i s co nsider ed a n act ion ag ainst t he Stat e. Curr

ie v. Lao , 148 Ill . 2d 151, 158 (1992). T hus, an in div idua l defend ant will be pro t ect ed by so ver eign im mun it y o nly if t he su it against t he ind ivid ua l is t r uly agai nst the state. See Currie, 148 Ill . 2d at 15 8- 59

. T his courthas h el d that an action agai

nst a state empl

oyee is cons i dered

one a gai ns t the state

when (1) the re are no a llegat ions t hat an emplo yee o r a gent of th e s tate ac t ed be yo nd t he sc o pe o f his
au thor i ty through wrongful

acts; (2) the duty al

leged to have been breach edwa s n ot owed by

th e em pl oyee in de pe n de n tl y of h i s s tate em pl oy m en t; and (3) the compl

ai ned- of ac tion s i

nvolv e m atters o r din ar ily wi thi n th at em ployee’s norm al an d of f i ci al f unction s. Jinkins v. Lee , 209 Il

l . 2d 320 , 330 (2 004). The cou rt holds toda

y th at t he source of th

e duty involv ed h ere arose indepe ndent fro m the d ut ies o f the sta te em pl oy m en t. Sli p op. at 12 . N ot ev

en on e p ar agra

ph l ate r, h owev er , th

e c our t cl oud s th i s hold ing by

acknowl edgi ng that the Moorman doctr in e hasan i mpa ct on the question b ecause, in t he “t ypic al” ca se , a v et er ina r ian “w ill be pr ovid ing ca re t o an a nimal aft e r havi ng f ormed a contractual
r ela t io nsh ip wi

th the own er of the ani ma l.” Sl ip op. at 12. What does t his me an?

I do not understand what ex ac tl y i s b ei ng he l d b ec au se , on t he one han

d, it appears that the court is recogni zi ng that the duty that is in depen de nt of

sta te e m pl oym en t arise s f rom noti ons of com m on la w re lating t o p ro fessio nal st anda rd s o f car e. On t he o t he rha nd , it also se ems t o co nc ed e t ha t t his in dependen t dut y i s a contractual one. Howth e c ontractu al

du ty sq ua re s w ith th e s tate empl oym ent issue i s, ap pa r en t ly, a q ue st io n le ft fo ran o t he rda y. I r em in d my coll eagues th at, b ec au se

we are th e h igh est court in

the state, t he l

egal
com m un ity reli es on ou r opi ni ons “ to mapthe

ev olvi ng cours e of t he l aw.” Peo

p le v. Jung , 192 Il

l . 2d 1, 17 (2000 ) (McM orrow, J.,4 Indeed, the complaint speaks consist ently in terms s uch a s “ consent” a nd “i nst ru ct ions ” yet the c ompla int does n ot r efer to a cons ent f or m or wr itt en in structions. No

suc h p rin ted d oc um e nt s are attache d as e xhi bits. Given the all egatio ns , it is clea r th atsome consult at ion had to occu r a t the uni ve rsity clinic be fo re th e e qui ne proc ed uresde scrib ed

in the com plai nt could ha ve been s chedu led. Clea rl y, thi s wa s not a “ wa lk-i n” p ro cedu re. -30- sp ec ially concurrin

g, joi ned by Mil ler and Fre eman, JJ. ). The cou rt ’s
an alys is wi

th r es pe ct to the j urisd

i cti ona l que sti on ce rtainl y raises m ore question s tha

n a ns wers
. Not surpris in gly, I bel ie ve the j urisdi

ctional que sti on s hou ld be approacheddifferent ly i

n lightof t he bai

lm ent relati onshi p that exi sted between th e p ar ti es a nd the Uni

versi ty of Il li nois . I have al

ready dem onstrated t hat t he duties assumed b y def endant in this case arose f rom a bailment r elat ionship t hat exist ed be t wee n him and th e plaint iff s–t his much wa s clear fro m the lim ited fact s su rr ou nding t he horse ’s t r ea t men t co nt ain ed in th e c om pl ai n t. 4 Ho weve r, t he af

f i da v its attached to t he mot ion t o d ismi ss make clear t he ba ilment r ela t io nsh ip between pla in tif fs and def endan t “would not have had

a source out side t he employment st at us o f the def en dan t[ ].” Healy , 133 Ill . 2d at 313. Wh atever duti es aros e f rom t he r ela t io nsh ip exi sted because of status of t he de fendant as a p rof

es sor at th e U ni ve rs ity of Il l inoi s’ Col l eg e of Veteri na ry Me di cin e. De fe nd an t co ul d o nly a ccep t t he bailment a nd t he duties im

pos ed b y it so l el y b ec au se of h i s s tate em pl oy m en t. Wi thout that empl

oym ent, defen dant was not authorized

to practice
ve teri na ry med icine in I llino is an d w o uld no t ha ve be en ab le t o leg ally perf orm the surgery a

t a veterina

rian hospi tal. See 22 5 ILCS 11 5/5 (West 2004 ) (P roh ibiting t he “pr act ice [o f] vet er inary medicine and surg ery in a ny of its b ran ch es wi thou t a va l i d l i cen se to do so”). Defend ant was , at the ti m e of the b ai l m en t and the s urgery, a prof ess or at the C oll

ege of Veteri na ry Med icine of t he Un

ive rs ity of Ill in ois. His duties as a

professor consi sted of p er for ming rese ar ch and training students by operat ing on ani mals in the Colleg e’s largeani ma l cl in ic . Defen dant was not li

censed at the tim

e to pr actice
ve teri na ry sur ger y in Ill

inois. He w as no t i n pr iva t e p r ac t ice an d d id not possess a vet er

in ar y l i cen se b ec au se , a s a

pr of es sor at a sta te un ive r sit y, he was exem pt from Ill

in ois’ l icen sin g requirements. Defend ant di

d n ot car r y malp r ac t ice insu r an ce an d h as no t be en in5 Given the la ck of a lice nse , it i s no

t surpri sin

g th at the Un iversi ty pr ovided for in

de mn ificatio n fo r any li ability arising from de fen dant’s
em plo ym en t. Although I exp ress no opinion on how th e i nd em ni ty i ssue impact s on the jur isdict ional ques tion, I must point ou t th atthe issu e is not nearly as cut a

nd dr y a s th e co urt makes it out to be. Slip op. at 1 3-14 . While acknowledging de

cision s such

as Janes v. Albe rgo , 254 Ill . App. 3d 951 (19 93) , a nd Kiers ch v. Ogena , 230 Ill . App. 3d 57 (1992) (slip o

p. at 13), the co urt igno res Oppe v. State

of Missouri , 171 Ill . App. 3d 491 (19 88) , a decision wh

ich takes a de

cide dly diff e ren t view on the ef fect of ind

em ni ty upon the doctr ine of

so ve rei gn im m un ity

. Oppe was cit ed

with appr oval in Currie . S ee Currie , 148 Il l. 2 d at 167.
-31- pr i v ate practice si

nce 19 73. 5 De fen da nt t he r efo r e w as ac t ing in his normal and off ic ia l rol e as a p rof

es sor of at th e C oll eg e of

Veteri na ry Med icine when he acc ept ed t he bailment an d p er fo r med t he su r ge r y. I note t hat, in

2000, there was “n

early one pe t for every

two Am ericans”an d t ha t , in 2 00 1, “a pp r o ximat ely 124 mil lion do gs a nd
ca ts live in Am

er ican ho use hold s.” 47 V ill . L. Rev. at 423 . I n a soci ety that in creasi ngl y val ues an imals an d h o us eh o ldpe t s, t he iss ue s in t his
case de se rv e m ore th an the sh ort sh ri f t gi ve n to th em by a m aj ori ty of t he co ur t . E ver ything abo ut t od ay’s o pinion, fro m its ac kno wledg ment that th e a pp el l ate cour t’s Moorman anal

y sis is “ awkw ard a

t b es t” ( slip op. at 5 ) to i

ts n onc ha l an t rec ogn iti on of a prof es si ona l sta nd ard of
care su gg es t s t ha t my co lleague s have failed t o u nder st and t he
r amific at io ns it s o pin io n w ill hav e t he de ve lo pme nt o f t he law in t his
area. Fo rt his r ea so n, I ca nno t jo in inth e o pin io n a nd r es pe ct fully di ss en t.

JU STI CE BURK E j oi n ed in thi s d i ss en t.

JUS TI CE KILB RID E a lso d issent s, w itho ut op inion.