Affirmed as Modified a nd Opinion Filed March 13, 2014 

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In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-01693-CR VINICIO JESUS GARCIA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F11-57569-S 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Francis, Lang-Miers, and Fillmore Opinion by Justice Francis Vinicio Jesus Garcia drove to the home of his business partner, Rene Emerson Gonzalez, after Gonzalez refused to answer his calls. Arme d with a .44-caliber revol ver, appellant parked in Gonzalez’s driveway and fata lly shot Gonzalez in his front yard. Gonzalez was not armed. Hours after the shooting, appellan t contended the gun accidentally disc harged. Later at his trial, he contended both that the shooting was accide ntal and that he acted in self-defense. After hearing the evidence, the jury was instructed on self-defense, murder, and manslaughter. Appellant was convicted of murd er and assessed a life se ntence. On appeal, appellant complains of charge er ror relating to the self-defense instruction, insufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and court costs, and admission of certain evidence. He also asserts the judgment should be co rrected to reflect the proper pr osecuting attorneys. We sustain–2– the last issue but conclude the re maining issues are without merit. We reform the judgment as requested and, as reformed, affirm the trial court’s judgment. On July 14, 2011, Gonzalez was standing in front of his house with his wife, Eva, and their three children buying ice cream from a street vendor. Eva went into the house with one of the children and heard two or three gunshots. When she went back outside, she saw her husband lying face down on the ground making sounds lik e he was choking. A ppellant, a friend and business associate of her husband’s, was standing in the middle of her yard. She realized her husband had been shot and called out to appellant , who she said told her “he lied to him.” Appellant got in his car, which was parked in he r driveway, and tried to leave. The car would not start, and appellant got out and began pounding on the hood, sayi ng something to the effect of “why did I do it.” Eva then testified to an incident involving appellant that occurred a few days before the shooting. She was in the garage at her home, and the door was closed. Appellant opened the door, startling her, and asked for Gonzalez. When she said he was not home, appellant left. She told Gonzalez about the incident, and he changed the combination lock so that appellant could not open the door. She also testified that a couple of days before the shooting, Gonzalez told her he was upset because appellant was repeatedly call ing him. Eva said Gonzalez appeared agitated or upset. Candida Don, who lived next door, testifie d she saw Gonzalez buying ice cream for his children on the evening of the shooting. She was in side her house when she heard a gunshot. As she was coming up the hallway to see what had happened, she heard a second gunshot. She estimated nine seconds passed between the two shots. She looked out of her living room window and saw appellant holding a gun. Don watche d as appellant threw the gun on the seat of the car and began hitting the hood. She called 911. Once the police arrived, Don went outside–3– and saw appellant was lying on the grass next to the car. Don heard the police ask appellant why he did it, and appellant replied “because he lied to me.” Detective Tim Stewart led the investigation in to Gonzalez’s death. When he arrived at the scene, appellant had been placed under arrest and was seated in the back of a squad car. Appellant was taken to Dalla s Police Department headquart ers, where he waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk to Stewart about the shooting. The interrogation was recorded, and the DVD was admitted into evidence. In the interview, appellant told Stewart that Gonzalez owed him m oney. Earlier in the week, he said he went to Gonzalez’s house to get a payment on the loan. He walked into the garage and startled Gonzalez’s wife, which ups et Gonzalez. He tried calling Gonzalez “probably 70 times” that week, but Gonzalez woul d not answer his calls. On the day of the incident, he said he called at l east fifteen times and then decided to drive to Gonzalez’s house. Appellant was “fooling around” with his gun when Gonzalez came around the corner and said, “Don’t ever come over.” Appellant said G onzalez “surprised” him and the gun “went off.” Appellant said he was outside the car when the shots were fired. Although appellant said Gonzales looked mad as he came around the corn er, he did not shoot him for that reason. Rather, he said the gun had a “hair trigger” and “j ust went off.” After the first shot, appellant said he was surprised because Gonzalez “came fo rward” instead of falling backward. Appellant said people were “everywhere” within seconds of the shooting. Appellant denied going to Gonzalez’s house to shoot him but admitted he was “pissed off.” He said his intent was only to “scare him.” Appellant was “was going to tell [Gonzalez] to give me my money,” but he did nothave a chance because the incident “happened real fast.” He said he had “just barely gotten out” of his car when the first shot went off. He said he “didn’t need a gun to harass him” but was “fooling around” with the gun.–4– According to appellant, Gonzalez “talked tough” but was not a “tough guy.” At one point, he described Gonzalez as “husky” and saidhe “intimidated” people: “I guess when he came toward me, maybe for a split second, maybe th at’s what I thought.” After the shooting, he said he sat in his car and put the gun back in a box he kept on the front seat. Then he got out and pounded on the car. He said he may have tried to start the car and leave, but the key would not go into the ignition. Appellant explained to Detectiv e Stewart that all he wanted was Gonzalez to give him a “couple hundred dollars.” But, he said, Gonzalez “thought it was a joke” to repay him the money, and it “just got out of hand.” Appellant wanted Gonzalez to “be honest” with him and tell him he was going to repa y him; instead, Gonzalez “wouldn’ t say nothing.” He said he should not have gone over to Gonz alez’s house, but his intention was to tell him, “don’t threaten me.” He added that Gonzalez had done “that,” but he did not take any threat “to heart, because [Gonzalez] didn’t seem like that kind of fellow” but was “a big dude.” During the interview, appellant repeatedly told Detec tive Stewart about the numerous calls he made to appellant’s cell phone. Other evidence at trial included appellant’s cell phone records, which showed a “bunch of phone contact” from appellant’s cell phone to Gonzalez’s cell phone on th e day of and in the days leading up to the shooting. Almost all of the ca lls were brief, about thirty seconds. The last call was made about thirty mi nutes before the shooting. Evidence also showed that appellant’s gun did not have a “hair trigger.” April Stowe, a firearms examiner for SWIFS, tested the tr igger pull force on appell ant’s gun, a .44 magnum caliber revolver. She explained that trigger pull is the amount of force necessary to move the trigger so that it will release the hammer and th e cartridge will be fired. Appellant’s weapon could fire in two different actions, single and doubl e. She said it takes more force to fire in–5– double action. Her testing showed that in si ngle action, it took approximately 3.248 to 3.556 pounds to fire appellant’s gun; in double action, it took approximately 10.907 to 11.113 pounds. Stowe testified she was familiar with the slang term, “hair trigger,” which she said refers to a trigger pull that is “ver y light.” She determined appellant’ s gun did not have a “hair trigger” when fired in either single or double action; rather, the trigger pull was within the “normal range.” Finally, Dr. Joni McLain, deput y chief medical examiner, testified Gonzalez sustained a gunshot wound that entered the right side of the chest and perforat ed the heart, liver, stomach, and spleen before exiting the left side of the ch est. The bullet then re-entered the left upper arm and exited the left upper arm. McLain said the bu llet trajectory was from right to left, slightly downward, and slightly front to back on his b ody. McLain said stippling around the entrance wound indicated the barrel of the gun was one to three feet away when fired. She agreed the body “would almost have to [have] be[en] perpe ndicular to the shot.” She also agreed that Gonzalez’s arm was up or “out” when he was shot because there was stippling on the inside part of his arm. While she could not say what positi on Gonzalez was in when shot, she did say he was not facing his shooter because the bullet went “straight through on the side.” The autopsy report showed Gonzalez was 31 years old, was 5’ 9, and weighed 263 pounds. Detective Stewart testified appellant was approximately 5’5, weighed about 160 pounds, and was older than Gonzalez. Appellant testified in his defense. He said he and Gonzalez were friends who went into business together. Gonzalez was a body work m echanic, and appellant believed he did good work. After a couple of months , appellant suggested they go in to business together with appellant receiving a percentage of the money derived from busin ess he referred to Gonzalez. Just as the business was starting, appellant said he loaned Gon zalez money. Gonzalez repaid–6– part of the loan but then stoppe d taking appellant’s calls. To annoy Gonzalez, appellant said he started calling him “all the time.” Appellant knew Gonzalez was “not happy” about all of the calls. This continued up until the day of the shoo ting when appellant said he called Gonzalez “a lot.” Appellant testified he went to Gonzalez’s home to end the business relationship and give him back a truck title appellant ha d taken as security for the loan so Gonzalez “couldn ’t just say, well, you got my title.” Appellant said he took hi s gun, which he carried with him all of the time because he had previously been attacked in south Dallas. He kept the gun in a box on the front seat. When he arrived at Gonzalez’s home, appellant said he was “going through the car” looking for the title and the gun fell out of the box. Appellant said he “had to put it back in” and grabbed a camera and moved it. As he is doi ng all this, he heard Gonzalez say, “Don’t come – don’t come over here like that.” Appellant then testified: And then he says it again, and at that -- and he sounds pret ty -- this time he sounds pretty serious, you know, so I'm thinking -- and then I look up and so I push the box, and the gun’s th ere, and I look around and he’s running. He’s not – he’s not walking towards -- and so the door is open. The problem is -- now, I'll be honest, I don’t remember the sequence of events. This is not something you want to go through. The key breaks, and then he runs and he comes around -- anyway, so when [he] comes to the doorway, I can see he’s – he’s pretty intense. I have been in several situations where you have to react very quickly to live. But -- so when I see him run down – he runs at -- but he -- so he runs around, because the door’s like this (indicating), he runs around like this, and I want to tell him stop. And I – I’m not going to lie, I don’t remember the sequence of events. I don’t remember if I went -- I tried to get up but I couldn’t because when the key broke, the -- because I tried to grab it like this (indicating), the metal part stuck in the ignition, so the steering wheel would not retract. So I try to get up like this (indicating) and I fall back, and I don’t remember if -- if that’s when the first s hot goes off, and -- but that’s when comes arou -- and he comes around to the door like -- like this, and I don’t even have a chance to say, hey -- I don’t even have a chance -- you know, I don’t know the definition of a hair trigger, but to me it fe lt like I -- I mean, like, I didn’t even -- I didn’t even feel like I pulled it, but, you know, it could have been the -- the adrenaline.–7– The thing is, he -- he was just rush ing me. I mean, you know, he was not there to -- he wasn’t there to talk to me . If you ever want to be in a situation, you don’t have much time to think. That’s why sometimes innocent people die. Appellant described Gonzalez as “a pretty st rong guy” and described himself as “out of shape” and “short” but also as a “healthy guy” who carried a twenty-pound tool kit. He said he believed Gonzalez was going to “p ummel” him when he was runni ng toward him. When asked if he was “fearful” at that moment, appellan t said he did not like being “pummeled.” He explained that he had been “mugged” before and if he had reacted quicker, he would have gotten away. So, he said, “you don’t have much time. You don’t have a -- you have split seconds to react. If you make the wrong decision, you could wind up in the hospital or dead. You never know at that instance.” Appellant said he was inside his car when th e gun went off. He denied getting out of the car with the gun either before or after he shotGonzalez. He also denied going to Gonzalez’s house to kill him or hurt him. He said the ev ents after the shooting were “blurry.” He remembered pounding the car, and saying, “It doe sn’t matter now,” when the police officer asked him why he did it. On cross-examination, he testified he did not have a concealed handgun permit to carry the gun. He said he carried th e loaded .44-caliber gun in a FedEx box in his car. He “didn’t remember” shooting the gun twice but did remember Gonzalez was “really close.” He said he “never got out of the car,” so if he shot twic e, “it must have happened fairly quickly.” He remembered telling the detective that “after the first shot, he kept coming,” then adding that Gonzalez was so close he did not “understand how” he missed him and did not “remember if the first or second shot hit him.” When asked if he was claiming Gonzalez threat ened him, appellant said that in the days before the shooting, Gonzalez to ld him, “I’m going to fuck you up.” Even so, he went to–8– Gonzalez’s house because Gonzalez had said that once before and did not do anything. He knew Gonzalez was mad at him for “scaring” his wife a fe w days earlier. He also admitted he told the police he was “pissed” and his in tention was to “scare” Gonzalez. In issues one and two, appell ant contends that although th e jury was charged on selfdefense, the instructions were not complete. Specifically, he argues the trial court erred in omitting instructions regarding the “presumption of reasonableness” and the “lack of a duty to
retreat.” The State makes five arguments in response, th e first being that appellant was not entitled to any instructions on self-defense and therefor e cannot complain of incomplete instructions which benefited him even if incomplete. Because it is dispositive, we first address whether appellant was entitled to a self -defense instruction at all. We use a two-step pr ocess in reviewing jury charge error. Ngo v. State , 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). First, we determine whether error exis ts in the charge; if error did not occur, our analysis ends. Id . If error does exist, we review the record to determine whether the error caused sufficient harm to require reversal of the conviction. Id . When the defendant fails to object, as is the case here, we will not reverse for jury charge error unless the record shows “egregious harm” to the defendant. Id . at 743–44. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on self-defense if the issue is raised by the evidence, whether that evidence is strong or we ak, unimpeached or contradicted, and regardless of what the trial court may think abou t the credibility of the evidence. Ferrel v. State , 55 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). On the other hand, if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, does not establish self-defense, the de fendant is not entitled to an instruction on the issue. Id . Whether a defense is supported by the evidence is a sufficiency–9– question reviewable on appeal as a question of law. Shaw v. State , 243 S.W.3d 647, 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. T EX
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. § 9.31(a) (West 2011). A person is justified in using deadly force against another if the actor would be ju stified in using force against another under section 9.31 a nd when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Id . § 9.32(a)(1), (2)(A). Deadly for ce is “force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.” Id . § 9.01. A reasonable belief is one held by an ordinary prudent person in the same ci rcumstances as the actor. Id . § 1.07(42) (West Supp. 2013). To be entitled to a self-def ense instruction, a defendant is required first to admit the conduct charged in the indictment and then to offer evidence ju stifying the conduct. See Jackson
v. State , 110 S.W.3d 626, 631 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’ d). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, has said that “admitting the conduct” does not always mean admitting the commission of every statutory elemen t of the offense; rather, the defendant must “sufficiently admit to the commission of the offense.” See Martinez v. State , 775 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). 1 In addition, the statute necessari ly contemplates that the fo rce used by a defendant must be reasonable as contemplated from the defendant’s point of view. Reed v. State , 703 S.W.2d

1 In Martinez, the defendant admitted to pulling a gun, firi ng into the air, and having his finger on the trigger when the fatal shot was fire d. 775 S.W.2d at 647. But, he denied the element of “intent to kill.” Id. The Court held he had “sufficiently admit[ted] to the commission of the offense.” Id . Since then, the court noted it has treated Martinez as “little more than a legal anomaly” and has “re-emphasized the applicability of confession and avoidance to self-defense,” at least as it related to misdemeanor assault. Cornet v. State , 359 S.W.3d 217, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).–10– 380, 384 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d) (per cu riam). The record therefore must contain some evidence of the defendant’s state of mind or observable manifestations of the defendant’s state of mind at the time of th e alleged act of self-defense. Id . at 385. And, that evidence must show the defendant was “in some immediate apprehension or fear of being the re cipient of the unlawful use of force by the complainant.” Smith v. State , 676 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). When the force used is deadly force, as in this case, the defendant must show he believed he was in immediate apprehension or fear that the deceased was about to kill or seriously injure him. Here, after reviewing the record in the lightmost favorable to appellant, we cannot conclude appellant was entitled to a self-defense instruction. In an in terview with police two hours after the shoo ting, appellant said he drove to appellant’s hous e with a gun and was “pissed” because appellant owed him money and would not return his phone calls. He pulled into Gonzalez’s driveway and was “fooling around” with the gun, which he said had a “hair trigger,” when Gonzalez “surprised” him and the gun accidentally discharged. Appellant said he “had just barely gotten out” of his car when the first shot “went off.” At trial, appellant essentially continued with th at version. He testified he was seated in his car, rummaging through items in the front seat , when the gun fell out of the box. As he was moving things around, appellant heard appellant te ll him not to come to his home. Appellant said he looked up and saw Gonzalez “running” toward the car. Gonzal ez came around to the door, and appellant said he tried to get out of the car, but fell back could not remember “if that’s when the first shot goes off.” He said he did not feel like he pulled the trigger, although it “could have been the . . . adrenaline.” As in his statem ent to the police, he suggested the gun had a “hair trigger.” But, during cross-examination, the St ate asked whether he pulled the trigger, and–11– appellant said yes. Assuming appellant adm itted the conduct by this testimony, there is no evidence showing that appella nt feared for his safety. At most, the evidence showed Gonzalez did nothing more than “rush” or “run” at appellant while telling him in a “pretty serious” voi ce not to come to his home. Appellant shot Gonzalez from one to three feet away. Gonzal ez was not armed, and there is no evidence he made any verbal threat. Although there was evidence that Gonzalez was younger and larger, there was no evidence in the record that appellant was ever afraid of G onzalez because of prior dealings. In fact, appellant told Detective Stewart Gonzalez “t alked tough” but was not a “tough guy.” And while he said Gonzalez had threatened him before, he also said he did not take the threat “to heart” because Gonzalez “di dn’t seem like that kind of fellow.” At no time did appellant ever testify that he was “in some immediate apprehension or fear” that appellant was about to kill him or serious ly injure him or testify to any facts that would lead to a reasonable belief that he was in fear. Even when give n the direct opportunity to say so, appellant did not. When appellant testified he believed Gonzalez was “there to pummel” him, defense counsel asked, “You were fearful at that moment?” Instead of pr oviding a direct answer, appellant responded, “I don’t like being pummeled,” recounted previous instances in his life when he had been beaten up, and noted that a person has only “split seconds” to react and could “wind up in the hospital or dead” if he makes the “wrong decision.” Considering the record, we c onclude self-defense was not ra ised by the evidence and the charge should not have included an y instructions on the issue at a ll. Consequently, there is no error in failing to provide the two instructions of which appellant now complains. We overrule the first and second issues. In his third issue, appellant contends th e trial court abused its discretion by allowing testimony concerning whether, duri ng the encounter with Gonzalez, appellant violated the statute–12– prohibiting unlawfully carrying a weapon, section 46.02 of the pe nal code. He argues the “timing and methodology” confused the jury, a nd the trial court should have excluded the testimony “at least until a time in the trial af ter [a]ppellant had ra ised self-defense.” During the State’s case in chief, after De tective Stewart testif ied about appellant’s statement regarding the shooting, th e prosecutor began to ask quest ions regarding the offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon. Defense counsel gene rally objected. In a discussion outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor indicated she wanted to show appellant violated the prohibition against unlawfully carrying a weapon, which was relevant to self-defense if appellant later requested it in the charge . The trial judge responded that the questions were “not timely” because the evidence did not raise self-defense. In response to the judge’s question, defense counsel said he believed self-defense had been raised and then objected only on the basis that the detective was being asked for a legal conclusi on on the issue of whethe r appellant violated section 46.02. The trial cour t overruled the objection. The complaint on appeal must comport with th e complaint made in the trial court or the error is forfeited. Lovill v. State , 319 S.W.3d 687, 691–92 (Tex. Crim . App. 2009). That is, the complaint must be “essentially the same.” On appeal, appellant does no t address the only issue raised below – whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the detective to testify to a “legal conclusion.” Because hi s complaint on appeal does not comport with the only objection below, we overrule the third issue. In his fourth issue, appella nt contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for murder because the State failed to prove he had the requisite intent to commit murder. He argues he was onl y “reckless” with respect to handling the gun, and there was no evidence that he deliberately shot Gonzalez or in tended to shoot him. He therefore argues the–13– judgment should be reformed to reflect a convi ction for manslaughter and the cause remanded for a new punishment hearing. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to de termine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979). This standard gives full play to the respons ibility of the trier of f act to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to dr aw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319; Blackman v. State , 350 S.W.3d 588, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Thus, when performing an evidentiar y sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of th e evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.
Isassi v. State , 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Rather, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Sorrells v. State , 343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Circumstantial evidence is as pr obative as direct evid ence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and the standard is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases.
Isassi , 330 S.W.3d at 638; Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In this case, the mens rea element of the offense of murder – as charged in the indictment – required proof that appellant intentionally or knowingly cause d the death of Gonzalez by shooting him with a firearm or that appellant inte nded to cause serious bodily injury to Gonzales and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life, shooting Gonzalez with a firearm, that caused Gonzalez’s death. See T EX
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. § 19.02(b)(1),(2) (West 2011). Murder is a “result of conduct” offense, which requires that th e culpable mental state re late to the result of the conduct – causing the death. Id . The requisite element of intent may be inferred from acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App.–14– 1991). The specific intent to kill may be in ferred from the use of a deadly weapon. Cavazos v.
State , 382 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Als o, while motive is not an element of the offense of murder, it may be ci rcumstantial evidence of intent. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Within this issue, appellant relies on his claims that the shooting was an accident and that he denied any intent to harm Gonzalez, much less kill him. He argues the evidence showed the gun “just went off” when Gonzalez “came charging up to him” and that the weapon had a “hair trigger.” The medical examiner testified Gonzalez diedof a single gunshot wound to the side of his chest and left arm. Forensic testing showed Gonzalez was one to three feet from the barrel of the gun when shot and, according to the medical examiner, was not facing appellant. Rather, given the entrance wound, Gonzalez’s side was to appellant. The trajectory of the bullet was slightly downward, which casts doubt on appellant’s story that he was sitting in the car at the time the gun when “went off.” As for the claim that his gun just “went off” because it had a “hair trigger,” a firearms expert testified to the contrary. She tested appellant’s gun and said it was within the “normal range” and did not have a “hair trigger.” Moreove r, a neighbor testified she heard two shots, fired nine seconds apart. In addition to the forensic and medical ex aminer testimony, appellant admitted he was “pissed” at Gonzalez because he owed him m oney and Gonzalez would not answer his calls, which suggest a motive in the case. When he dr ove to Gonzalez’s home, he was armed with a gun. Immediately after the shootin g, he told Gonzalez’s wife that Gonzalez “lied” to him. Similarly, the next door neighbor heard appellant give the same explanation to the police when they asked why he did it. Although appellant te stified he did not intend to hurt appellant, the jury was not required to believe him or his expl anation for how the shooting occurred. Given the–15– evidence in the case, we concl ude it is sufficient to show appe llant had the intent to commit murder. We overrule the fourth issue. In his fifth issue, he asserts the judgment s hould be corrected to reflect the proper State’s attorneys at trial. This Court has the authority to correct a judgment of the court below to make the record “speak the truth” when when we have the necessary data and information to do so. Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Here, the judgment lists the attorney for the state as Melinda Edwards. The reporter’s record, however, reflects the attorneys for the stat e were Melinda Lehman and Marc Moffitt. We therefore modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect Melinda Lehman and Marc Moffitt as attorneys for the State. In his sixth issue, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s judgment that he pay $24 4 in court costs because the clerk’s record does not contain a bill of costs. The record before us contains a bill of costs. Appellant’s complaints have been previously ad dressed and rejected. See Johnson v. State , No. PD-0193-13, 2014 WL 714736, at *4–8 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2014); Coronel v. State , 416 S.W.3d 550, 555–56 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. ref’d). We overrule appellant’s sixth issue. We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflec t the proper State’s attorneys and affirm as modified.

Do Not Publish T EX
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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
VINICIO JESUS GARCIA, Appellant No. 05-12-01693-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F11-57569-S. Opinion delivered by Justice Francis; Justices Lang-Miers and Fillmore participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this da te, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: To reflect the Attorneys for the State as Melinda Lehman and Marc Moffitt.
As MODIFIED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered March 13, 2014

/Molly Francis/ MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE