alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 44 (Friday, March 6, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Page 12247]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-05269]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 9053]

Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``T[ecirc]te-a-T[ecirc]te: Three Masterpieces From the 
Mus[eacute]e d'Orsay''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 
1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 
Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of 
Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, and Delegation of Authority No. 
236-3 of August 28, 2000 (and, as appropriate, Delegation of Authority 
No. 257 of April 15, 2003), I hereby determine that the objects to be 
included in the exhibition ``T[ecirc]te-a-T[ecirc]te: Three 
Masterpieces from the Mus[eacute]e d'Orsay,'' imported from abroad for 
temporary exhibition within the United States, are of cultural 
significance. The objects are imported pursuant to loan agreements with 
the foreign owners or custodians. I also determine that the exhibition 
or display of the exhibit objects at the Norton Simon Museum of Art, 
Pasadena, California, from on or about March 26, 2015, until on or 
about June 22, 2015, and at possible additional exhibitions or venues 
yet to be determined, is in the national interest. I have ordered that 
Public Notice of these Determinations be published in the Federal 
Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the imported objects, contact the Office of the Legal Adviser, 
U.S. Department of State, SA-5, L/PD, Fifth Floor (Suite 5H03), 
Washington, DC 20522-0505.

    Dated: February 25, 2015.
Kelly Keiderling,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2015-05269 Filed 3-5-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
```
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 7 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.J.Res.7

                       One Hundred Tenth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday,
            the fourth day of January, two thousand and seven

                            Joint Resolution

 
Providing for the reappointment of Roger W. Sant as a citizen regent of 
          the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That, in accordance with 
section 5581 of the Revised Statutes (20 U.S.C. 43), the vacancy on the 
Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, in the class other 
than Members of Congress, occurring because of the expiration of the 
term of Roger W. Sant of Washington, D.C., is filled by the 
reappointment of Roger W. Sant, for a term of 6 years, effective 
October 25, 2007.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
Supreme Court

No. 2018-33-Appeal.

(NC 09-142)

Karen F. Carroll :

v. :

Lisa Rodriques et al. :

O R D E R

The Court being evenly divided, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 

Chief Justice Suttell did not participate. 

Entered as an Order of this Court this _______ day of February, 2020. 

By Order,

____________________________

 Clerk

28th

/s/
SU-CMS-02B (revised November 2016)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

ORDER COVER SHEET

Title of Case Karen F. Carroll v. Lisa Rodriques et al.

Case Number No. 2018-33-Appeal.

(NC 09-142)

Date Order Filed February 28, 2020

Justices Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ. 

Source of Appeal Newport County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Brian Van Couyghen

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiff:

Christopher A. Anderson, Esq.

For Defendant:

Lauren E. Jones, Esq.

Evan S. Leviss, Esq.

Robert S. Thurston, Esq.
###### Editorial Note on Part 6

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 6 appear at 61 FR 19984, May 3, 1996.

#### § 6.42 Amendments to pleadings.

At any time prior to the closing of the hearing record, the complaint (Administrator's findings) or answer (response) may be amended with the permission of the Administrative Law Judge and upon such terms as he/she may approve. Such amendments shall be allowed when justice and the presentation of the merits are served thereby, provided there is no prejudice to the objecting party's presentation on the merits. When issues not raised by the pleadings are reasonably within the scope of the original complaint and are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings, and such amendments may be made as necessary to make them conform to the evidence. The presiding Administative Law Judge may, upon such terms as are just, permit supplemental pleadings setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened a since the data of the pleadings and which are relevant to any of the issues involved. A continuance in the hearing may be granted or the record left open to enable the new allegations to be addressed.
###### Editorial Note on Part 4

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 4 appear at 61 FR 19984, May 3, 1996.

#### § 4.155 Employee coverage does not depend on form of employment contract.

The Act, in section 8(b), makes it plain that the coverage of service employees depends on whether their work for the contractor or subcontractor on a covered contract is that of a service employee as defined in section 8(b) and not on any contractual relationship that may be alleged to exist between the contractor or subcontractor and such persons. In other words, any person, except those discussed in § 4.156 below, who performs work called for by a contract or that portion of a contract subject to the Act is, per se, a service employee. Thus, for example, a person's status as an “owner-operator” or an “independent contractor” is immaterial in determining coverage under the Act and all such persons performing the work of service employees must be compensated in accordance with the Act's requirements.
#### William Cohn, App’lt, *v.*Moses Anathan *et al.,*Resp’ts.

*(City Court of New York,*

*General Term,,*

*Filed February 26, 1889).*

Discontinuance—When leave to discontinue granted—Code Civ. Pro., § 412, AS AMENDED.

A plaintiff may, at any time, discontinue his action on paying the defendants’ taxable costs to the date of discontinuance, nor does the fact that the defendant may have pleaded a counter-claim preclude the plaintiff from having his application granted.

Appeal from order denying motion made by the plaintiff for leave to discontinue action on payment of costs.

*David Tim,*for app’lt; *Horwitz & Hirschfield,*for resp’ts.

Per Curiam.

A party should no more be compelled to continue a litigation, than to commence one, except where the substantial rights of other parties have accrued, or injustice would be done by permitting a discontinuance, and we have failed to discover any substantial reason why the plaintiff’s motion to discontinue on payment of the defendant’s costs, should not .have been granted. It seems to have been denied upon the ground that the defendant pleaded a counter-claim, but there is nothing in thi's circumstance which precluded the plaintiff from having his application granted.

There are reported cases holding that a discontinuance should not be allowed where a counter-claim was interposed, but these were owing to peculiar circumstances. Some held that the discontinuance should not be allowed where the counter-claim was admitted by the plaintiff, or where the application for leave to discontinue was made after the time to reply had expired, or in cases where the statute of limitations would run against the counter-claim, in case the discontinuance was allowed, and in order to prevent this result, it was deemed inequitable to allow a discontinuance, but the objection, last suggested, has been obviated by an amendment to section 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure, *296which saves such counter-claim, from the operation of the statute. So that it may now be laid down as a rule applicable to all cases, that the plaintiff may, at any time, discontinue his action, on paying the defendant’s taxable costs to the date of discontinuance.

See cases cited in 2 Rumsey’s Pr., 155; *Matter of Butler, 101*N. Y., *307.*It follows that the order appealed from should be reversed, with costs, and the motion for leave to discontinue, on payment of costs, granted.
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, David B. Swank certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Diomed Holdings,
Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by
this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of the internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: May 14, 2007                  /s/ DAVID B. SWANK
                                    ----------------------------------------
#### §§ 536.1-536.2 [Reserved]
§ 551.7 Finding. ( a ) A finding by the Administrator under paragraph (b) of § 551.6 that a wage payment plan has the purpose and effect required for exemption of employees under section 13(b)(11) and this part shall be effective in accordance with its terms upon notification to petitioners as provided in § 551.6(b). The finding shall include such terms and conditions and such limitations with respect to its application as the Administrator shall deem necessary to ensure that no exemption will be based thereon in the event of any significant change in any of the essential supporting facts.
( b ) A finding made pursuant to this part may be amended or revoked by the Administrator at any time upon his own motion or upon written request of any interested person setting forth reasonable grounds therefor. Before taking such action, the Administrator shall afford opportunity to interested persons to present their views and shall give consideration to any relevant information that they may present.
### Electrical-analog analysis of hydrologic data for San Simon Basin, Cochise and Graham Counties, Arizona

By: Natalie D. WhiteW. F. Hardt

                            https://doi.org/10.3133/wsp1809R

#### Links

-                                                                                                                             Document:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  **Report**                                                                                                     (pdf)                                                                                                                                     
- Plates:                               - **Plate 1**                            (pdf)
  - **Plate 2**                            (pdf) 
- Download citation as:  RIS                         |                         Dublin                            Core

#### Abstract

Part or all of this report is presented in Portable Document Format                        (PDF). For best results viewing and printing PDF documents, it is recommended that you download                        the documents to your computer and open them with Adobe Reader. PDF documents opened from your                        browser may not display or print as intended. Download the latest version of Adobe Reader, free of charge. More information                        about viewing, downloading, and printing report files can be found at the common download problems FAQ.
# Eiropas Savienības C 205A/2004

| | ISSN 1725-5201 |
| --- | --- |
| Eiropas Savienības
  Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 205A |
| | |
| Izdevums latviešu valodā | Informācija un paziņojumi | 47. sējums2004. gada 13. augusts |

ISSN 1725-5201

Eiropas Savienības

Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 205A

Izdevums latviešu valodā

Informācija un paziņojumi

47. sējums2004. gada 13. augusts

---

| Paziņojums Nr. | Saturs | Lappuse |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | III   Paziņojumi |
| | Inteliģentas enerģētikas izpildaģentūra |
| 2004/C 205A/1 | Aicinājums uz konkursu | 1 |

Paziņojums Nr.

Saturs

Lappuse

III   Paziņojumi

Inteliģentas enerģētikas izpildaģentūra

2004/C 205A/1

Aicinājums uz konkursu

1

| LV | |
| --- | --- |

LV

---

III Paziņojumi

Inteliģentas enerģētikas izpildaģentūra

| 13.8.2004 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | CA 205/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.8.2004

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

CA 205/1

---

AICINĀJUMS UZ KONKURSU

(2004/C 205 A/01)

Inteliģentas enerģētikas programmas izpildaģentūra meklē pieredzējušus kandidātus dažādiem amatiem. Detalizēta informācija par vakancēm, aģentūras uzdevumiem un procedūru, kura jāievēro, lai sagatavotu pieteikumu, ir publicēta tīmekļa vietnē http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/intelligent/index_en.html.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Form 10-Q
and is qualified in its entirety to such financial statements (in thousands,
except per share data)
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                                                      <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                            9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                        DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                           JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                             SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                                        56,077
<SECURITIES>                                                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                  5,495
<ALLOWANCES>                                                    (506)
<INVENTORY>                                                    1,090
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                              71,532
<PP&E>                                                        18,042
<DEPRECIATION>                                                (8,081)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                               271,121
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                         34,087
<BONDS>                                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                              0
<PREFERRED>                                                        0
<COMMON>                                                         266
<OTHER-SE>                                                   236,768
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                 271,121
<SALES>                                                       25,297
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                              25,297
<CGS>                                                         14,920
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                 76,024
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                   0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                               937
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                              (63,069)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                          (63,069)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                    0
<CHANGES>                                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                                 (63,069)
<EPS-BASIC>                                                    (4.74)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                  (4.74)



</TABLE>
#### Ram Island Homeowners Association et al., Appellants, v Hathaway Realty et al., Respondents.

[697 NYS2d 662]

—In an action, *inter alia,*to permanently enjoin the defendants from violating zoning restrictions on certain property, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Kitson, J.), dated June 15, 1998, as granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiffs Matthew Bonora and John Loconsolo on the ground that they lacked standing to bring the action, and denied that branch of their motion which was for a preliminary injunction.

Ordered that the appeal by the Ram Island Homeowners Association and Richard Demarest from so much of the order as dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiffs *197Matthew Bonora and John Loconsolo is dismissed, as they are not aggrieved by that part of the order; and it is further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed, with costs.

The instant action arose out of, *inter alia,*alleged zoning violations on property owned by the defendants on Shelter Island in Suffolk County. During the course of the action, the plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin the defendants from committing the alleged violations during the pendency of the action. The defendants cross-moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing, *inter alia,*that the plaintiffs did not have standing to maintain their private action to enjoin the alleged violations. The Supreme Court properly found that the plaintiffs Matthew Bonora and John Loconsolo did not have standing.

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for a preliminary injunction. It is well settled that in order to prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the movant must show a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, that it will suffer irreparable injury absent the preliminary injunction, and that the balance of the equities is in its favor *(see, Aetna Ins. Co. v Capasso,*75 NY2d 860; *Northside Studios v Treccagnoli,*262 AD2d 469). The plaintiffs failed to show that they would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction, or that the equities balanced in their favor.

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit. Thompson, J. P., Joy, McGinity and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.
O O

1-Propenyl Glycidyl Ether Chemical Formula: C6H10O2 Exact Mass: 114.07 M o l e c u l ar W e i g ht : 1 1 4 . 1 4
#### Lukely RILEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 86-5353

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 23, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1987.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Dept, of Legal Affairs, Susan A. Maher, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for defendant-appellant.

Peter M. Siegel, Florida Justice Institute, Inc., Randall C. Berg, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

*1007Before GODBOLD, VANCE and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The defendant seeks to appeal from the denial of his motion for summary judgment. No appeal is available. 10 Wright, Miller and Kane, *Federal Practice and Procedure,*§ 2715 (1983); *Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre,*701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir.1983); *In re Smith,*735 F.2d 459, 461 (11th Cir.1984). Nor does this case fall within any of the narrow exceptions to the rule of nonappealability such as the collateral order doctrine. *See Smith,*735 F.2d at 461. The appeal is DISMISSED.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM:

*Mitchell v. Forsyth,*472 U.S. 511,530,105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) held that “a district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” In the present case the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment did not turn on an issue of law; the court denied defendants’ claim of qualified immunity because the case required substantial factual development before it could be determined with finality whether Riley had been subjected to constitutional deprivation and, if so, whether some or all of the defendants were entitled to the benefit of qualified immunity. The district court’s order is therefore not a final appealable decision.

In addition, the Supreme Court in *Mitchell v. Forsyth*specifically noted that it was expressing no opinion regarding the appeal-ability of a denial of qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s action involves claims for injunctive relief that will have to be adjudicated regardless of the resolution of any damage claims. *Id.*105 S.Ct. at 2812 n. 5. Because Riley requested injunctive relief as well as damages, this case is not clearly controlled by *Mitchell v. Forsyth.*

Wainwright’s petition for rehearing is DENIED.