NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

TRENT DREXEL HOWARD,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-30012

D.C. No. 4:19-CR-06036-SMJ 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Salvador Mendoza, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 27, 2023**

Seattle, Washington

Before: NGUYEN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,*** District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the 

District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 17 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Trent Howard was convicted on child pornography charges. He argues that 

the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial and his motion to suppress evidence seized in a 

search of his residence pursuant to a search warrant. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

1. Howard was indicted on June 18, 2019, while he was on a work 

assignment in Kazakhstan. When Howard did not return to the United States as 

scheduled, the government instituted its first-ever criminal extradition request to 

Kazakhstan. Extradition was not approved until August 14, 2020, during the peak 

of the COVID-19 pandemic, and Howard, who had appealed the initial order 

granting extradition, returned to the United States on November 11, 2020. His trial 

was originally scheduled for October 4, 2021.

Howard contends that the delay between indictment and the trial date 

violated the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee. We hold that the district 

court, applying the Barker factors, correctly found no Sixth Amendment violation. 

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

a. The first Barker factor is the length of the delay. Delays approaching one 

year are presumptively prejudicial. See United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 

1161–62 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, twenty-eight months elapsed between the 
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indictment and the scheduled trial date. The length of delay thus weighs in 

Howard’s favor.

b. The second factor, the reason for the delay, weighs in the government’s

favor. The district court held that the government acted reasonably during the 

pretrial period. Howard failed to return voluntarily, forcing the government to 

resort to extradition. Given the complexity of arranging an extradition from 

Kazakhstan, a country with which the United States has no extradition treaty, 

especially amid a global pandemic, ample evidence supports the district court’s 

conclusion.

c. The third Barker factor, the timing of the defendant’s assertion of his 

speedy trial right, weighs in favor of the government. Howard obtained American 

counsel no later than June 27, 2019 and was aware of his indictment by September 

14, 2019, but did not assert his speedy trial rights until June 10, 2020.

d. The fourth Barker factor, actual prejudice, weighs against Howard. We, 

like the district court, are “sympathetic to the anxiety and concern [Howard] must 

have suffered while detained in a foreign, non-English speaking jurisdiction during 

a global pandemic.” See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (setting forth the interests of 

defendants to consider in assessing prejudice). Nonetheless, we agree that Howard 

“failed to make the requisite showing of actual prejudice” because he provided no 
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evidence that the pretrial incarceration impaired his ability to prepare a defense, 

nor evidence that the incarceration was oppressive.

2. The district court also did not err by denying Howard’s motion to 

suppress. It correctly found that several typographical errors in the affidavit 

supporting the application for a warrant, while “sloppy,” did not affect the showing 

of probable cause. The particularized description of the single-source pornography 

downloads from Howard’s IP address was sufficient to establish probable cause. 

See United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2013). Moreover, 

the affiant’s observation, based on his experience in law enforcement, that child 

pornography offenders typically retain the illicit materials for years provided 

“good reason” to believe that the items to be seized would still be on the premises, 

even though five months passed between the January 5, 2019 download and the 

execution of the search warrant. United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745–46 (9th 

Cir. 1997).

3. Finally, we affirm the district court’s denial of a Franks hearing. A 

defendant seeking a Franks hearing must (1) allege specifically which portions of 

the warrant affidavit are claimed to be false; (2) allege that the false statements or 

omissions were deliberately or recklessly made; (3) make a detailed offer of proof, 

including affidavits, to accompany the allegations; (4) challenge the veracity of 

only the affiant; and (5) show that the challenged statements are necessary to find 
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probable cause. United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 894–95 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Howard made only conclusory allegations that the typographical errors were 

deliberate or reckless and did not adequately explain why excision of the errors 

would defeat probable cause. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978).

AFFIRMED.