U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–233 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE GLOBAL 

THREAT TO FREE SPEECH 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 26, 2018 

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

( 

Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Senate House 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

GARY PETERS, Michigan 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey, Cochairman 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

TIM WALZ, Minnesota 

TED LIEU, California 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Not yet appointed 

ELYSE B. ANDERSON, Staff Director 

PAUL B. PROTIC, Deputy Staff Director 

(ii) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS

Page 

Opening Statement of Hon. Marco Rubio, a U.S. Senator from Florida; Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China ...................................... 1 

Statement of Hon. Christopher Smith, a U.S. Representative from New Jersey; Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China .................. 4 

Cook, Sarah, Senior Research Analyst for East Asia and Editor, China Media 

Bulletin, Freedom House ..................................................................................... 6 

Hamilton, Clive, Professor of Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University (Australia) and author, ‘‘Silent Invasion: China’s Influence in Australia’’ ............. 8 

Lantos Swett, Katrina, Ph.D., President, Lantos Foundation for Human 

Rights & Justice ................................................................................................... 11 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Cook, Sarah .............................................................................................................. 37 

Hamilton, Clive ........................................................................................................ 47 

Lantos Swett, Katrina ............................................................................................. 51 

Smith, Hon. Christopher ......................................................................................... 53 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Letters from Members of the Internet Freedom Coalition to the State Department, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and Members of Congress, 

submitted by Katrina Lantos Swett ................................................................... 56 

Letter from Senators Daines, Gardner, Kaine, Markey, Rubio, and Warner, 

to Secretary of State Pompeo, submitted by Chairman Rubio ......................... 85 

Witness Biographies ................................................................................................ 87 

(iii) 

(1) 

DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE 

GLOBAL THREAT TO FREE SPEECH 

THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2018 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA, Washington, DC. 

The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in 

room 301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Senator Marco 

Rubio, Chairman, presiding. 

Present: Representative Smith, Cochairman, and Senator Steve 

Daines. 

Also Present: Sarah Cook, Senior Research Analyst for East Asia 

and Editor, China Media Bulletin, Freedom House; Clive Hamilton, 

Professor of Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Canberra, and 

author, ‘‘Silent Invasion, China’s Influence in Australia’’; Katrina 

Lantos Swett, President, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights & 

Justice. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Chairman RUBIO. Welcome to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. The title of this hearing is ‘‘Digital 

Authoritarianism and the Global Threat to Free Speech.’’ 

We will have one panel testifying today. It will feature Sarah 

Cook, who is the senior research analyst for East Asia and editor 

of the China Media Bulletin, Freedom House; Clive Hamilton, who 

is a professor of public ethics at Charles Sturt University in Canberra, and author of ‘‘Silent Invasion: China’s Influence in Australia’’; and Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett, president, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights & Justice. 

I want to thank all of you for being here. 

I understand that Professor Hamilton has a speaking engagement at the State Department immediately following this hearing, 

so once the testimony has concluded, commissioners will take a few 

minutes to ask him any questions they have and then we will return to the rest of the Q & A. 

The topic, of course, of today’s hearing is freedom of expression 

and China’s pervasive and unrelenting efforts to stifle speech at 

home and now increasingly abroad. And so it’s timely and it’s important. 

We have long known of the Chinese Communist Party’s massive 

censorship regime and suppression of free speech and expression 

within its own borders. The Commission’s political prisoner dataVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:25 Dec 16, 2018 Jkt 081003 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\USERS\DSHERMAN1\DESKTOP\VONITA TEST.TXT DAVID
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base testifies to the human toll of the Chinese Communist Party’s 

repression in this regard. But now the party is increasingly exporting its authoritarianism abroad, trying to suppress speech, stifle 

free inquiry, and seeking to control narratives around the world. 

America and other like-minded nations must contend with this 

long arm of China and the growing threat it poses to our open 

democratic systems. 

With the conclusion of last month’s 2018 National People’s Congress, the Chinese president and Communist Party general secretary emerged newly empowered and emboldened, no longer tethered by term limits, and overseeing a noteworthy expansion of 

Communist Party control over every aspect of China. These institutional developments reinforce his directives to Chinese media outlets to exhibit absolute loyalty to the party and his declaration in 

2016 that all media must be surnamed ‘‘Party’’ and convey positive 

news about China in conformity with the party’s ideology. 

China’s vast censorship regime is without parallel. Freedom 

House’s 2017 ‘‘Freedom on the Net’’ report named China the 

world’s worst abuser of internet freedom for the third consecutive 

year. And the Commission’s most recent annual report noted ‘‘the 

increased tension and criminal prosecution of citizen journalists 

who are a key source of information on labor protests, petitioning 

the government for redress of grievances, and other rights defense 

efforts.’’ 

These detentions hinder the ability of those of us outside of 

China to know what is happening inside the world’s most populous 

nation. Foreign journalists face restrictions and harassment, including physical abuse, physical and online surveillance, denying or 

threatening to deny reporters’ visas, restricting their access to certain areas of the country, and harassment of sources and news assistants. 

Restrictions on expression are not limited to journalists. A State 

Department travel advisory that was issued in January of this year 

warned of the following: ‘‘Security personnel have detained and/or 

deported U.S. citizens for sending private electronic messages critical of the Chinese government.’’ The latter point underscores China’s surveillance efforts, which feature prominently in any discussion of government censorship or curbs on free expression. 

The Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region is an incubator of sorts 

where authorities have pursued invasive and involuntary collection 

of personal data that includes DNA and fingerprints from individuals. And it has all been implemented—the widespread use of facial recognition systems—all set against the backdrop of the detention of thousands of Muslims in political re-education centers. 

Nationwide, the Chinese government is in the process of implementing a social credit system which, if successful, will track and 

compile data on every Chinese citizen and possibly even rank them 

based on their behavior, including their online speech. In fact, 

there was an open-source report yesterday about an individual, the 

first one banned from traveling because of his ‘‘score’’ or profile. 

Made possible by the massive collection of citizens’ data and a 

growing network of hundreds of thousands of surveillance cameras, 

as well as voice and facial recognition capabilities, experts anticiVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:25 Dec 16, 2018 Jkt 081003 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\USERS\DSHERMAN1\DESKTOP\VONITA TEST.TXT DAVID
3 

pate the system will be used to punish those viewed insufficiently 

loyal to the Communist Party. 

Any discussion of censorship and surveillance invariably turns to 

technology. Foreign technology firms, many of them household 

names here in America, are clamoring, begging to have access to 

the vast Chinese market or, for those already there, are increasingly willing to make Faustian bargains in pursuit of their bottom 

line. 

Consider, for example, Apple. In February, it transferred its 

cloud data in China to servers inside of China that are run by a 

state-owned Chinese firm in order to comply with last year’s cybersecurity law. And yet, we see its CEO at international forums basically touting the great partnership with China and thanking them 

for their openness while sometimes being critical of our own country. And when this sort of compliance to these sorts of laws leads 

to complicity and rights abuses, it cannot simply be business as 

usual. 

Look beyond China. It seems that not a week goes by without 

some story of China’s long arm threatening free and open society, 

as Professor Hamilton can no doubt attest. 

A key element in the Chinese government’s long-arm efforts is focused on information technology and the internet and internet governance or sovereignty. They assert national control of the internet 

and social media platforms, not only in recent domestic cyber legislation and development plans, but also at international gatherings. 

Additionally, there are growing examples of attempts by the Chinese government to guide, buy, or coerce political influence and 

control discussion of what they deem sensitive topics. 

China’s Great Firewall, grave rights violations in ethnic minority 

regions, arrests of citizen journalists and rights lawyers, suppression of speech—these are the familiar markings of an authoritarian 

one-party state. But to the extent that the same authoritarian impulses animate the Chinese government and Party’s efforts abroad, 

including inside the United States, it directly threatens our most 

deeply held values and our national interests. 

So I look forward to today’s testimony. I regret that a previously 

scheduled witness, Mr. Roy Jones, an American worker who was 

fired from his job at Marriott for inadvertently ‘‘liking’’ a tweet 

posted by a pro-Tibet group, is unable to join us. 

His story, which has now been well documented, is a painful and 

poignant reminder of the Chinese Communist Party’s long arm, of 

their ability to coerce and get witting or unwitting cooperation from 

American corporations and companies who are interested in protecting their market status in China, even if it means firing an 

American worker the way Marriott did because he ‘‘liked’’ a tweet 

or a post about Tibet. 

There are very real costs involved if we fail to confront China’s 

pernicious authoritarianism at home and increasingly, abroad. And 

if we fail to address it, Americans here at home and those of us 

who love democracy and freedom around the world, including many 

of our allies in Europe and Australia and the Asia-Pacific region, 

could find ourselves living in a world where we work somewhere 

or live somewhere where we cannot speak freely without losing our 

job or some other benefit, because who we work for or who controls 

4 

us is not ourselves but a foreign government that uses the leverage 

of access to its market in order to reach here and impact one of our 

most cherished principles. 

At this time, I would like to recognize the Cochairman for his 

comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Cochairman SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman Rubio, and 

thank you for your leadership and a very powerful statement and 

for convening this extremely important and timely hearing. 

China, as we all know, has the world’s largest number of internet 

users as well as the most sophisticated and aggressive internet censorship and control regime. 

I would remind my colleagues that back on February 15, 2006, 

I convened a hearing, the beginning of a series of hearings. This 

one was called ‘‘The Internet in China: Tool for Freedom or Suppression?’’ Well, the jury’s in—it’s not a tool for freedom, it’s a tool 

for suppression. 

Yes, some people are able to communicate and bypass some of 

the regulators, the people who are ubiquitous in trying to uncover 

and to, unfortunately, hurt the human rights movement there. But 

it has become, especially under Xi Jinping, a tool for massive suppression. 

The Chinese government spends $10 billion on maintaining and 

improving their censorship apparatus. The U.S. Government has 

an annual internet freedom budget of $55 million. And Congress 

still has little idea as to how this money is being spent. And I know 

Ms. Lantos Swett is shaking her head because we and she have 

raised this issue so many times in the past. 

Over the past year or so, Chinese companies were ordered to 

close websites that hosted discussions on the military, history, and 

international affairs, and crack down on illegal VPNs. Apple was 

forced to remove VPNs from China’s app store. 

New regulations were announced restricting anonymity online. 

And the Chinese government rolled out impressive new censorship 

technologies censoring photos in one-to-one WeChat discussions 

and disrupting WhatsApp. 

Beijing has also deployed facial—as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman—and voice recognition, artificial intelligence and other surveillance technologies throughout the country but particularly targeting the Uyghur ethnic minority where between 500,000 and a 

million Uyghurs have been detained arbitrarily. 

The Chinese government and the Communist Party’s attempt to 

enforce and export a digital authoritarianism poses a direct threat 

to Chinese rights defenders and ethnic minorities and poses a direct challenge to the interests of the United States and the free 

international community. 

The U.S. must recognize that we are engaged in a battle of ideas 

and a revitalized dictatorship—online, in the marketplace, and 

elsewhere—and we need to up our competitive strategies and our 

game to meet this very, very serious challenge. 

5 

The administration’s national security strategy says quite clearly 

that the Chinese government and the Communist Party, along with 

Russia, seek to ‘‘challenge American power, influence and interests, 

attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their 

militaries and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence. The Chinese government and 

Communist Party are using economic inducements and penalties, 

influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade 

other states to heed their political and security agenda. China 

gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use 

of surveillance.’’ 

The Chinese government and the Communist Party want to 

shape a world that is antithetical to U.S. values and interests and 

to export their economic, political and censorship models globally. 

In response, the U.S. and like-minded allies must stand resolutely for freedom of religion, fairer and freer trade, labor rights, 

an end to the coercive population control programs, freedom of 

navigation, the rule of law and freedom of expression, including online. 

A coherent and engaged internet freedom strategy must be a critical part of the U.S. diplomatic toolbox. This strategy should have 

at its core a commitment to protect fundamental freedoms, privacy, 

and promote the free flow of news and information. But it is not 

a matter of just having a strategy—it should be the right one. The 

Bush and Obama administrations pursued cyber diplomacy, yet 

internet freedom has declined around the world, privacy is increasingly under threat, and the free flow of information has become 

more endangered. 

The right strategy must start with some humility. Cyberspace is 

a place to spread democratic ideals and a place where criminals, 

extremists, corporations, traffickers, and governments exploit 

vulnerabilities with impunity. Online communication can convey 

our highest ideals and our worst fears. It can shine a light on repression and be the source of hatred, manipulation, fake news, coercion, and conflict. It can bring people together or it can push us 

apart. 

Despite all of this, I agree with the NSS’s conclusion which says, 

‘‘The internet is an American invention and it should reflect our 

values as it continues to transform the future for all nations and 

all generations. A strong, defensible cyber infrastructure fosters 

economic growth, protects our liberties and advances our national 

security.’’ 

Central to a revitalized U.S. internet freedom strategy should be 

a priority to open gaping holes in China’s Great Firewall. As we 

remember with Radio Free Europe years ago, it was not soundproof. I remember those ads when I was a kid growing up. Well, 

the Great Chinese Firewall can be penetrated, but it has to be a 

very focused and aggressive and smart strategy. 

I am not confident that the policy of the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors or the State Department has met that test at all. I think 

there are certain goals we should prioritize in our internet freedom 

strategy, which would include, one, China’s netizens require easy, 

6 

reliable, and free access to uncensored information through 

anticensorship technologies so that anybody can freely access information regardless of their technical ability. Reliable solutions 

should work all the time, regardless of intensified crackdowns or 

major events like Party congresses or the June 4th anniversary of 

Tiananmen Square. 

Solutions should also present difficult choices for the Chinese authorities. If the authorities want to disrupt these solutions, then 

they must disrupt many online services which they would normally 

be hesitant and unlikely to block. 

Access to solutions should also come at no cost to Chinese 

netizens. The Chinese authorities often block access to payment 

providers, so even if Chinese can afford a circumvention solution, 

they cannot get past the censorship by their payment provider. 

Holistic anticensorship solutions should be encouraged, including 

not just technical circumvention but also distribution of those 

tools—getting around Google Play being blocked and censorship in 

the Apple app store—helping others share anticensorship tools as 

well as content through messaging apps, social networks, and QR 

codes. 

These are just a few examples. I could say to my colleagues that 

in years past, I introduced the Global Online Freedom Act. We’re 

going to be reintroducing that shortly, updated and hopefully responsive. Unfortunately, it has been sent to several committees. 

While we have gotten it out of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in 

the past, Ways and Means and Financial Services on the House 

side have been reluctant because of the pressure coming from the 

industries that weren’t for it. 

I would note parenthetically as well that Google used to be 

against it and then midstream a couple of years ago came out in 

favor of it. So there is hope that we’ll get some support there. But 

above all, I think we just need to pass that or something like it in 

the very near future. 

I yield back and I thank you. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you. 

Let us begin with the panelists. 

Ms. Cook, if you want to begin with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF SARAH COOK, SENIOR RESEARCH ANALYST 

FOR EAST ASIA AND EDITOR, CHINA MEDIA BULLETIN, 

FREEDOM HOUSE 

Ms. COOK. Chairman Rubio, Cochairman Smith, thank you for 

inviting me. And it’s really an honor to testify before you today. 

The number of internet users in China reached an estimated 772 

million people as of the end of 2017. This figure puts the issues we 

are discussing today in perspective. They affect a group more than 

double the size of the population of the United States. 

Alongside this increased access to internet services, China’s ruling Communist Party has developed a robust apparatus of censorship, manipulation, and surveillance. Although this system has 

long been the most multilayered and sophisticated control apparatus in the world, recent years have seen new waves of tightening. 

Over the past year and particularly since a new cybersecurity 

law came into effect last June, online censorship and surveillance 

7 

have expanded dramatically alongside increasing arrests of Chinese citizens, particularly for content shared on the mobile instant 

messaging platform WeChat. 

Technical and regulatory innovation and experimentation is constantly under way. It is thus worth considering what the costs are 

of this tightening for various actors inside and outside China. 

Well, for Chinese netizens, the space for ordinary Chinese to obtain and share information on a wide range of political and even 

apolitical topics has noticeably shrunk. The risk of punishment for 

even facetious comments deemed unacceptable to the authorities 

has risen. These shifts affect hundreds of millions of users in 

China. 

For target populations, like activists or members of religious and 

ethnic minorities, the consequences are especially dire. Numerous 

lawyers, bloggers, Tibetan monks, Uyghur Muslims, Christians, 

and Falun Gong practitioners have been jailed for sharing, 

downloading, or accessing information online or via their mobile 

phones. 

For Chinese tech companies—well, Chinese technology companies try to serve their customers, but they are also required to 

monitor and delete massive amounts of user-generated content in 

an ever-changing and arbitrary regulatory environment. 

Over the past month, popular applications providing news or enabling the sharing of humorous content to tens of millions of users 

have been suspended or shut down for failing to ‘‘rectify’’ their content sufficiently. These apps are now planning to hire thousands 

more internal censors. 

For foreign tech firms, as you know, many of the world’s top 

technology and social media companies are restricted from providing services to Chinese users. Foreign companies that do operate 

in China or work with Chinese firms are forced to comply with censorship demands. 

LinkedIn restricts users from accessing profiles or posts by people outside China that contain politically sensitive information. 

Apple removed more than 600 applications from its mobile phone 

store that enabled Chinese users to access blocked websites. 

But foreign companies are also increasingly at risk of being 

complicit in politicized arrests or violations of user privacy. It’s not 

only Apple that has transferred users’ data to servers in China 

under data localization provisions in the cybersecurity law. 

Evernote is another U.S. company that has done so, in its case not 

with a company that is owned by the government, but with 

Tencent, which has been known to pass information to police in the 

past. 

Airbnb China recently alerted its hosts that it ‘‘may disclose your 

information to Chinese government agencies without further notice 

to you.’’ 

And one of the biggest investors in the artificial intelligence firm 

SenseTime, which provides facial recognition to local police and at 

least one prison in China, is none other than U.S. chipmaker 

Qualcomm. 

Now for the Communist Party. Now, the Communist Party is 

leading the drive for increased internet controls to protect its hold 

on power, shield itself from criticism, and stop organized political 

8 

opposition. But this project also comes with costs for the party in 

terms of legitimacy and even the effectiveness of censorship efforts. 

A new academic study found that after Instagram was blocked 

in 2014, users were more motivated to seek out tools to circumvent 

censorship and reach the platform. But along the way, they encountered a wide array of censored content they might not otherwise have seen. 

More broadly, with each announcement of new restrictions that 

negatively affect millions of users, signs of public backlash are evident. The constitutional changes enacted last month that removed 

term limits for President Xi Jinping are a case in point. The sheer 

scale of censorship points to a sizeable contingent of Chinese citizens who disagreed with the move, and much of the dissent 

emerged in the form of ridicule aimed directly at Xi. 

The situation provoked many Chinese citizens who might otherwise consider themselves apolitical to begin expressing their worries about China’s direction and looking for ways around censorship. 

Despite these costs and periodic concessions to public outcry, it 

is hard to imagine any voluntary loosening of restrictions in the 

coming years. On the contrary, we are likely to see more tightening, more government demands for companies’ cooperation, and 

more arrests of innocent users. 

The international community should be ready to respond to these 

trends. There are recommendations specifically for the U.S. Government included in my written testimony. But despite the Chinese 

government’s ever-escalating efforts to censor and monitor internet 

use, steps by the United States and others can have a real impact. 

And I would like to conclude with a quotation from an anonymous Chinese reader of our China Media Bulletin. ‘‘I am a lowerclass worker in Chinese society and I don’t speak English. An independent Chinese media like you that does in-depth reports about 

the situation in China gives me a better understanding of China’s 

current situation and future development. I think the flow of information and freedom of speech are very important to China’s future 

development. Birds in cages long to fly. Even if we can’t fly out 

now, hearing the chirping of birds outside can still give us hope 

and faith.’’ 

Thank you. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you. Mr. Hamilton, thank you for being 

here. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thanks, Chairman Rubio, Cochairman Smith—— 

Chairman RUBIO. Can you press the button for the microphone, 

please? Thank you. 

Mr. HAMILTON. This one? 

Chairman RUBIO. There we go. 

STATEMENT OF CLIVE HAMILTON, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC 

ETHICS, CHARLES STURT UNIVERSITY, CANBERRA, AND AUTHOR, ‘‘SILENT INVASION: CHINA’S INFLUENCE IN AUSTRALIA’’ 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thanks, Chairman Rubio and Cochairman Smith. 

I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Commission. 

9 

Australia, as perhaps you know, is at the forefront of Beijing’s 

influence and interference efforts, with a view to breaking Australia away from the American alliance. If it can achieve that—so 

what happens in Australia is of crucial importance to us all. 

Last November, as the finished manuscript of my book ‘‘Silent 

Invasion’’ was about to go to the typesetter, my publisher, Allen & 

Unwin, notified me that it was pulling the book. The CEO wrote 

saying that, based on advice it had received, the company was reacting to ‘‘potential threats to the book and the company from possible action by Beijing.’’ He went on to write, ‘‘The most serious of 

these threats was the very high chance of a vexatious defamation 

action against Allen & Unwin and possibly against you personally 

as well.’’ 

The company’s defamation lawyer had pointed out that it would 

not be possible to make further textual changes to the book that 

would protect the company from vexatious legal actions by Beijing’s 

proxies in Australia, legal actions that would tie up the company 

in expensive legal action for months or even longer. The company 

had been spooked by recent defamation actions taken against 

major news organizations by so-called ‘‘whales,’’ a reference, I believe, to legal action taken by Chau Chak Wing, a Chinese-Australian billionaire resident in Guangdong, and Huang Xiangmo, a 

wealthy Chinese citizen residing in Sydney. 

Australia’s domestic intelligence agency, ASIO, has warned the 

major political parties that they should not accept donations from 

these men because of their suspected links to the Chinese Communist Party. 

The defamation actions launched by these billionaires have had 

a chilling effect on reporting by news outlets in Australia and now 

on the book publishing industry. And I note that an editorial in 

The People’s Daily a couple of months ago in effect endorsed the 

use of lawfare abroad, another instance of the Chinese Communist 

Party exploiting the institutions of democracy to undermine democracy. 

Allen & Unwin’s decision to drop ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ was a deeply 

worrying affirmation of the argument of the book. No actual 

threats were made to the publisher, which, in a way, is more disturbing. The shadow cast by Beijing over Australia is now dark 

enough to frighten a respected publisher out of publishing a book 

critical of the Chinese Communist Party. 

The shadow has also frightened off the rest of the publishing industry. Even though the spiking of the book attracted headlines 

around the world, none of the major publishers showed any interest in publishing what would be ‘‘Silent Invasion.’’ 

I worry about the message that has now been sent to China 

scholars in Australia. The message is: If you write a book critical 

of the Chinese Communist Party, you will have trouble finding a 

publisher. Already, China scholars have told me that they censor 

themselves in order not to jeopardize their visas to do research in 

China and so protect their careers. 

Recently, we have seen major Western publishers compromise 

academic freedom by censoring their publications at the insistence 

of Beijing. They did so to maintain access to the Chinese market. 

In the ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ case, the fear was not about what the CCP 

10 

could do in China—cut off access to markets—but what the CCP 

could do in Australia—sponsor legal actions. 

The spiking of ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ represents perhaps the starkest 

attack on academic freedom in Australia in recent times. It attracted intense media interest and strong support from the public. 

However, throughout the saga, one sector remained silent: the universities. 

No representative organization or prominent vice chancellor, that 

is, president of the university, made any kind of statement supporting me, a professor apparently being targeted by a powerful 

foreign state because of his work. Yet three months later, in March 

of this year, in a submission to a parliamentary inquiry into the 

proposed new foreign interference laws, Universities Australia, the 

peak body representing universities in Australia, complained about 

the threat posed by the new laws to academic freedom. These are 

laws designed explicitly to prevent foreign powers from suppressing 

free speech in my country. 

Australian universities are now so closely tied into monetary 

flows and research links with China that they have forgotten the 

founding principles of the Western university and none more so, I 

might add, than the University of Sydney. 

In my written statement I’ve outlined Beijing’s attempts to intimidate me and punish those associated with ‘‘Silent Invasion’s 

launch, notably Mr. John Hu, a prominent Chinese-Australian citizen who helped the Sydney launch of the book. The condemnations 

of me and my book are but a small part of a much larger strategy 

to emerge in recent times. Beijing is ramping up its rhetoric 

against Australia in a calibrated campaign of psychological warfare. 

Last week, the PLA navy challenged three Australian warships 

sailing through the South China Sea simply for being there, for 

being in open international waters. Beijing has scaled up its 

threats of economic harm unless Australia changes its anti-China 

policy. This psychological warfare is but stage one, with real punishments to follow, if needed. 

So, for Australia, this is what pushback feels like, at least in its 

early stages. When Australia stands up for its independence and 

democratic values and tells Beijing it will no longer tolerate interference in our domestic affairs, we expect it to react. 

For some in Australia, a mere expression of displeasure by the 

CCP is enough for them to buckle at the knees. There is no shortage of Beijing sympathizers and appeasers among Australia’s elite, 

calling on Australian politicians, scholars, and commentators to 

tone down their rhetoric, as if the current strain in the relationship 

between the two nations were our fault rather than due to Beijing’s 

campaign of subversion, cyber intrusion and harassment on the 

high seas. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has recently joined 

in this blame-shifting with his criticisms of the Turnbull government for standing up to Beijing. 

The next two years in Australia are vital. At present, the political will exists to respond to the CCP’s influence and interference 

operations, notably through the new foreign interference legislation 

now before Parliament. 

11 

The CCP is mobilizing its proxies. And some among the elites are 

fighting back on its behalf. Business leaders are saying we must 

do nothing to upset Beijing. Elements of the Australian Labor 

Party, now in opposition, are attempting to have the proposed new 

laws blocked. And Beijing-friendly intellectuals and commentators 

are writing articles and open letters saying that there is no problem and that the criticisms of the CCP are in fact driven by racism. 

So the situation hangs in the balance. If we fail now to put up 

defenses against the CCP’s subversion, then the opportunity will 

probably not arise again because the influence in the party will 

have penetrated too deeply. 

Thank you. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you. Dr. Lantos Swett, thank you for 

being here. 

STATEMENT OF KATRINA LANTOS SWETT, PRESIDENT, 

LANTOS FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & JUSTICE 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Thank you. Good morning. I want to thank 

Senator Rubio and Congressman Smith for the invitation to participate in this hearing. And I want to commend you both for convening a hearing on such an important topic. 

I would ask that my full testimony, including relevant correspondence between the Internet Freedom Coalition that I am 

part of, and the State Department, BBG, and members of Congress, be included as part of the hearing record. 

The French have a wonderful saying, ‘‘Plus c ̧a change, plus c’est 

la meˆme chose,’’ the more things change, the more they remain the 

same. I could not help but think of this phrase as I prepared my 

remarks for today’s hearing. 

Over 10 years ago, my late father, Tom Lantos, then chairman 

of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, held a hearing that crystallized the sad truth about the devastating moral compromises so 

many major companies and countries, including, at times, our own, 

are willing to make in order to appease the Chinese government 

and gain access to its vast markets. 

And I think perhaps that, Congressman Smith, you might have 

been at that hearing with my father. 

At that time, the chief executive of Yahoo, Jerry Yang, was in my 

father’s crosshairs that day over his company’s cooperation in giving up the identity of a dissident journalist, Shi Tao, to the Chinese 

authorities. After Yahoo disclosed his identity to the government, 

Mr. Shi was sentenced to prison for 10 years for the crime of engaging in pro-democracy activities. 

As these high-tech billionaires and technological whiz kids sat 

before him, my father, who came to this country as a penniless 

Holocaust survivor from Hungary, said, ‘‘While technologically and 

financially you are giants, morally you are pygmies.’’ 

On that memorable occasion, Jerry Yang felt so ‘‘called out’’ by 

my father’s words that he actually turned around and publicly 

bowed in apology to Mr. Shi’s weeping mother, who was seated behind him. It was a dramatic moment, to be sure, but most of the 

episodes of cowardly kowtowing and quiet collaboration with the 

bullies, the censors, and the persecutors within the Chinese Communist Party occur without public comment or scrutiny. 

12 

Furthermore, as today’s hearing demonstrates, China is not content with censoring and controlling its own citizens. It is using the 

immense power of its financial resources to reach every corner of 

the world in an effort to intimidate businesses, universities, publishers, hotel chains, religious institutions, human rights and democracy activists, and even governments. 

It pains me to have to say this, but right now, China is succeeding in this effort to a shocking degree. Even more shocking, 

later in my remarks I will expose why I feel our government is 

doing far too little in the way of internet freedom to truly help the 

people of China and those imprisoned in other repressive regimes 

around the world. 

One of my fellow witnesses this morning, Mr. Hamilton, has had 

personal experience with the long arm of the Chinese government 

and their intimidation, and his testimony is a cautionary and 

chilling tale. 

Just as my father did back in 2007, we must use the power of 

public naming and shaming to try and restrain the worst impulses 

of businesses, other organizations, individuals, and even our own 

government agencies who seem all too willing to sell their precious 

birthright of free speech and democracy for a mess of Chinese pottage. 

To be clear, I think we all recognize that the internet is not an 

unalloyed good when it comes to spreading ideas and expanding 

the borders of freedom and democracy. As Shakespeare memorably 

penned, ‘‘The web of our life is of a mingled yarn, good and ill together.’’ 

It is analogous to our intricate system of modern transportation. 

While we recognize that it contributes to pollution, congestion, disrupts the environment and, of course, makes possible terrible accidents involving injuries and fatalities, nonetheless, it is the indispensable circulatory system that makes possible our modern world 

of travel and commerce. 

Similarly, the internet, despite its ability to spread hate, disrupt 

elections, and propagate fake news, is indispensable to our modern 

system of global communication. And as such, it is central to freedom of expression everywhere in the world. 

That is why there was so much enthusiasm and energy eight 

years ago when then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered 

a landmark speech on internet freedom. I was sitting in the audience that day and felt the surge of optimism as our nation’s top 

diplomat laid out a robust vision of America’s central role in tearing down what Secretary Clinton referred to as ‘‘the Berlin Wall of 

our digital age.’’ 

Remember, I am the daughter of the only member of Congress 

who personally experienced the horrors of living under fascism of 

the right, the Nazis, and the totalitarianism of the left, the Communists. It is in my DNA to resist these authoritarian efforts to 

control free, uncensored access to knowledge. And I’m pretty sure, 

Senator Rubio and Congressman Smith, that it is in your DNA, 

too. 

The year after that speech, the Lantos Foundation played a leading role in redirecting a good part of our government’s spending on 

internet freedom to the BBG. Prior to that, almost all funding was 

13 

inside the State Department, and frankly, it led to situations where 

China was able to deftly use the U.S.’s efforts to open the internet 

and circumvent their ‘‘Great Firewall’’ as a diplomatic bargaining 

tool. 

Clearly, as a human rights organization, we believe that access 

to the internet is a modern human right that should not be bargained away, so we sought a ‘‘safer’’ home for the funding and felt 

the BBG had enough independence to play a leading role in opening the internet across the globe. 

In the early years of this adjustment in the way our government 

funded anti-censorship tools, internet freedom initiatives were not 

perfect, but our government was funding a number of technologies 

to provide open access and we were moving in the right direction. 

Today, it pains me to sit before you and express my deep disappointment and frustration with the actual results and the current commitment of our country’s internet freedom policy. I have 

heard it said that if China herself had been in charge of America’s 

internet freedom policy, it could hardly have been more favorable 

to China’s interests. That is an extraordinarily harsh assessment, 

perhaps harsher than I myself would subscribe to, but let me tell 

you why I think it is not far off the mark. 

Perhaps the single most stunning example of the lengths to 

which China will go to create an information prison is the ‘‘Great 

Firewall,’’ a massive government censorship apparatus that has 

been estimated to cost billions of dollars annually and to employ 

some 2 million people to police the internet use of its citizens. For 

this reason, many of us have long believed that firewall circumvention technologies must be a key component of any effective internet 

freedom strategy. 

Since 2011, the Lantos Foundation, as part of a broad internet 

freedom coalition, has urged Congress to direct the State Department through DRL and the BBG to provide robust funding to fieldtested, scalable circumvention technologies. Recognizing that these 

technologies have the potential to provide safe and uncensored access to the internet for literally hundreds of millions of people in 

China and in other closed societies, Congress has responded. 

In every recent appropriations bill, Congress has included language directing that not less than $50 million be spent to fund 

internet freedom programs, including, specifically, firewall circumvention technology. This simply has not happened. Call it willful ignorance, call it bureaucratic intransigence and obfuscation, 

call it what you will, but, in my view, both the State Department 

and the BBG have failed to faithfully implement the clearly expressed intent of Congress, that significant resources be dedicated 

to these large-scale firewall circumvention technologies, the ones 

China fears most. 

They have funded freedom festivals and training and small-scale 

technologies that are more directed to driving traffic to their own 

platforms, in the case of the BBG, than giving free, unfettered access to the vast world of the internet for the hundreds of millions 

of people trapped behind the digital curtain. They fund privacy and 

security apps that are very important for safety while on the net, 

but they forget that many cannot even access the internet. 

14 

Meanwhile, some of the most effective, proven technologies, the 

ones China fears the most, technologies that provide unfettered access to all, have received only modest funding and have had curious barriers placed in their paths, making it difficult, if not impossible to qualify for different grant proposals. 

The cost to U.S. interests of these failures at the BBG and DRL 

were on vivid display during January of this year when protests 

broke out in Iran. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians took to the 

streets to protest economic hardship and the oppressive rule of the 

theocratic dictators. Among other repressive responses to this popular uprising, the Iranian government acted to block access to the 

internet. Sadly, because the BBG had earlier cut off all funding to 

some of the most effective circumvention technologies, our ability 

to help provide access to the outside world for those brave Iranians 

was greatly limited. 

Only a single U.S. government-funded large-scale circumvention 

technology was available at this moment of crisis. I consider this 

an inexcusable dereliction of duty. Certainly, the single for-profit 

vendor who was funded at the time did valuable work, but how 

many more people could have been helped had the BBG done the 

job Congress directed them to do? 

I confess I am baffled by the failure of both the State Department and the BBG to faithfully execute the directives that Congress has given them. When I have met with representatives at 

both agencies, they reassure me of their deep commitment to the 

goal of broadening access to internet freedom and of the intensity 

of their efforts to do so. The rhetoric is pleasant enough, but their 

words are not matched by their deeds. 

When our coalition has attempted to drill down and get real facts 

about where they are directing their resources and why they are 

not funding proven technologies, we are most often met with obfuscation, opacity, and unfulfilled promises. 

During the midst of the Iranian protests, I met with the top leadership at the BBG and they personally pledged to me at that time 

that within three to four weeks at most, funding would be granted 

for technologies that could make access available to vastly increased numbers of users around the world. More than three 

months have passed since those meetings, and not only has no 

funding been approved, but the latest indications are that no funding will be approved. In fact, they just now issued a letter saying 

they will be issuing no funding at this time. 

I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the bureaucrats at 

DRL and the BBG are relying on what they think is Congress’s inadequate attention span and limited expertise to get away with 

this pattern of ignoring your clearly expressed intent. What arrogance! 

I am hoping and praying that you will prove them wrong. 

This issue, internet firewall circumvention, desperately needs 

champions in Congress. We need leaders who will be vigilant and 

vigorous in demanding accountability from the agencies responsible 

for executing our government’s internet freedom policies, leaders 

who will not be beguiled by soothing words and, rather than accept 

heartfelt protestations of good intentions, will demand results. 

15 

Above all, we need leaders who know that we must not pacify the 

oppressors but instead fortify and strengthen the brave dissidents 

and ordinary Chinese citizens who are risking everything in their 

pursuit of freedom. 

In other words, we need leaders who are not moral pygmies, but 

rather moral giants. I know that both of you are that kind of leader. And the Lantos Foundation, along with our internet freedom coalition partners, stands ready to assist you in any way possible. 

Thank you. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you all for being here. As promised, we 

are going to start with Professor Hamilton. 

Let me just set the stage briefly because people watch this issue 

and I think it’s important to understand this context so they understand why it is that we are focusing on this issue. 

You know, 25, 30 years ago as China began to emerge as a participant in the global economy, the widespread conventional wisdom was that the more prosperous they became, the more they 

would behave like a democracy and be open to some of the ideas 

and notions of the West and certainly of freedom of expression and 

the like. 

But they knew that history, too. They knew, they understood 

that as nations became more prosperous, their people demanded 

more political liberties, and so they have figured out a way to craft 

a system, given the sheer volume and size of their economy, to basically have a Communist Party at the center of their daily lives, 

a central, powerful government that—by the way, they link back 

to its thousands of years of history as part of their values and their 

success—but allowing free market activity, though not identical to 

ours. 

In essence, if you are a prosperous Chinese corporation, you may 

be independently owned, but when the government comes calling, 

you’re going to do what they tell you, even if you don’t want to do 

it, or you will be charged with corruption or you won’t be in business for long. 

In that context, they view the world, they view these things like 

notions of freedom of expression and speech not just as a threat. 

Their number-one priority, above everything else, is to maintain 

the Communist Party in charge. They view all these principles in 

the West and all these things that we’re talking about as threats 

to that. 

But broader than that, they don’t view it as their rules. They 

didn’t write these rules, so why should they follow them? And 

they’re trying to redraw all the global order along the principles 

that they argue for. And you start to see that exercise itself. They 

are beginning now to link their economic influence and power to 

their political gains and goals. 

And we hear your story, Professor Hamilton, and we start thinking, boy, that’s far-fetched, it sounds like a movie. We really aren’t 

that far from that happening here in the United States if you start 

to think about it. Perhaps it’s already happened, just not—and we 

certainly know that an individual working for the Marriott hotel 

was fired because he ‘‘liked’’ a tweet, which he says he did by mistake, by the way; but he was fired for that. We wish he could have 

testified here today. 

16 

That said, a couple things I would point to. And the first is, just 

to be abundantly clear, you had an opportunity to publish a book 

and ran into impediments because publishers came to you and basically said I know we have a contract, but we’re not going to go 

forward because, number one, they are going to get really rich billionaires acting as agents of the Chinese government to sue us and 

tie us up in courts here in Australia. And number two, we’re worried about what it might imply to our access as a company, beyond 

your book, to that 1 billion-plus population market that they have. 

And you have seen that play out now in academia as well where 

you have university presses and even others here in the United 

States where you have speeches canceled because universities have 

a program over there and they feel that they are going to pull the 

plug on that and/or on the lucrative business of attracting Chinese 

students to travel and study here at exorbitant tuition rates. All 

those things are threatened, they feel those things are threatened, 

if they publish a book or they invite a speaker on campus. 

That is clearly what you have experienced and what we’ve seen 

replicated here. Is that an accurate description? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, indeed, Senator, it is. I would point out that, 

as I said in my testimony, the disturbing thing about the spiking 

of ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ was not that Allen & Unwin felt that its market in China would be threatened, because it doesn’t have a market 

in China, but that the CCP would interfere in Australian domestic 

politics through the use of the legal system to stop Australians 

hearing from another Australian about a concern, a threat to our 

democratic values. That was the most disturbing aspect of it. 

And as I have tried to stress in my statement to the Commission, 

universities are exceptionally important because intellectuals, academic scholars, they set the tone, they are the experts on whom we 

rely for information about China and the meaning of what’s happening. 

And now that in Australian universities, as in universities 

around the world, but particularly in Australian universities—because the number of Chinese students at Australian universities is 

proportionately five times higher than in the United States, and so 

the financial dependency is very heavy indeed. And money can buy 

silence. Money can buy compliance. 

And one thing that has disturbed me tremendously in the writing of this book and even more so since publication is the way in 

which the defenders of fundamental democratic rights, particularly 

the right to free speech, can be bought off. I mean, of course, they 

don’t see it that way. They have all sorts of excuses and arguments 

about, We have to balance the various interests of the university. 

As I’ve said to those who have argued this to me, who’ve tried 

to persuade me not to criticize their university too heavily in my 

book, I said, well, no, it is not a question of trading off academic 

freedom against income from China. You know, academic freedom 

trumps other factors. You are not a commercial enterprise, and 

even if you were we would expect you to have an attachment to 

basic democratic values. 

And yet the commercialization of universities in Australia has 

been so strong and they have become so heavily dependent, not 

only on money from Chinese students but from a whole network of 

17 

research and other relationships with Chinese universities, that 

the senior executives of those institutions are always worrying 

about what might happen on their campuses that could jeopardize 

that relationship. And I think this is deeply concerning for the future of the Western university if we are going to maintain that 

unique institution. 

Chairman RUBIO. Well, again, I am certainly not an expert on 

the Australian laws, but I do know we come from a common-law 

tradition, so there is probably something similar to what I am 

about to cite. 

And your case, as you outline it, is something that I hope we will 

examine in Federal law here in the United States because I think 

it falls within the context of something called intentional interference with a business agreement or intentional interference with 

a contractual relation. The elements of it—I have pulled them up 

here just to make sure—here are the elements, and I think you fulfill every single one of them. 

• The existence of a contractual relationship or a beneficial business relationship between two parties—that could be a job with a 

company or, in your case, a contract with a publisher. 

• Knowledge of that relationship by a third party—obviously, the 

Chinese government and/or its agents where it had knowledge. 

• Intent of the third party—in this case, the Chinese government 

and others—to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. 

• The lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. In essence, there is no privilege for them to 

be able to do that. It’s not like they are violating a contract with 

them, they are simply doing it because they want to silence your 

voice. 

• The contractual relationship is breached and damage to the 

party against whom the breach occurs. 

I mean, it seems to me as if—I don’t know if there is a similar 

statute under Australian law—but it seems to me that the case 

you’ve described fits these criteria. And it would be interesting to 

examine—I confess I haven’t done so before this hearing today— 

how such a scenario, if it played out in the United States, whether 

it’s an employee that worked somewhere and is fired because of 

that interference or whether it’s a book deal or a speech for compensation or the like—if in fact there is evidence and someone can 

go to court and prove that actions on behalf of a government and/ 

or its agents caused a breach in that sort of contract, whether there 

shouldn’t be a cause of action and damages. And if you cannot collect against the Chinese government, then collect against the party 

that you had the contract with and who violated it out of fear. 

And again, I think some of the things that get people’s attention 

is when suddenly there is a civil cause of action for this. And this 

is going to require a lot more work and I have got to think about 

it, but we cannot allow this to continue as far as our laws here are 

concerned. 

And I for one intend to look at and see whether or not there are 

changes to be made in Federal law so that if what happened to you 

happens to someone here, whether it’s a book deal or employment 

at Marriott, and then is fired by interference, that person now has 

18 

a cause of action to pursue against the employer or the book contractor if they can’t collect against the Chinese government, and 

maybe both. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, it could be a very powerful counter-use of 

the legal system to resist this kind of intimidation. 

There have been cases in Australia where Australians of Taiwanese heritage have been fired from their jobs because when their 

bosses asked them if they supported Taiwanese independence they 

said yes—and they were fired. And this is clearly contrary to employment law in Australia. You can’t fire someone for their political 

opinions. And yet, the situation is such that no one has taken it 

upon themselves to defend these people. So it’s clearly contrary to 

employment law. 

The difficulty in the case of my book is that one would need to 

be able to demonstrate in a court of law that a litigant against 

Allen & Unwin who might be mentioned in the book was acting on 

behalf of a foreign power for political reasons rather than out of a 

genuine concern for the damage to their reputation. 

I suspect that if the new foreign interference law is passed in 

Parliament—and it should be, although, I mean, it is likely to be, 

albeit with some amendments—then we will find that the intelligence agencies in collaboration with the Australian Federal Police, the enforcement body that would be responsible for enforcing 

the laws, would be able to—sorry, the intelligence agency ASIO 

would be able to provide its secret intelligence information establishing those links between a litigant and the Chinese Communist 

Party, which would be a basis under the new foreign interference 

laws for a prosecution. And those acts of foreign interference, which 

are there defined, carry very heavy penalties indeed. 

And so many of us are looking forward, not only to the passage 

of the legislation, but the first prosecutions under the new laws because we feel as though that will be a watershed in which the intelligence agencies and the law enforcement agencies come together 

to make an example of Beijing’s proxies attempting to undermine 

the democratic rights of Australians, including the right to free 

speech by publishing a book like this. 

Chairman RUBIO. Well, my final point before I turn it over to the 

Cochair—and I thank you for being here. I really want what you’ve 

said here today to be heard by the State Department. 

Two final points. One, it’s amazing what people admit to and/or 

what you can find under subpoena or what they admit to when 

they’re under oath and facing perjury. And so, again, that’s why I 

think the legal system is created—for protecting people. 

The other is something you mentioned, how one of the reactions 

now has been to cite this as xenophobic measures and the like. 

It’s interesting. I didn’t get there, but I just did an interview a 

few minutes ago with a major news outlet talking about Confucius 

Institutes. And one of the questions in there was, isn’t this just 

scaremongering? As if to imply this is anticommunist scaremongering, and perhaps you can see how that could be extended. 

It is one of the arguments that some of the schools that continue 

to fight us on Confucius Institutes are making. 

It’s an absurd one since this Commission every year publishes 

long lists of Chinese citizens who are detained, since much of the 

19 

information that we get about what’s happening are abuses against 

Chinese citizens. 

And then as far as scaremongering is concerned, I think if there 

has been a positive development on this front, it is that just in the 

last six to eight months there is a growing awareness across the 

whole of government about the scale and the scope of what we are 

up against here. 

And it has not yet—and we are going to get to Dr. Lantos Swett 

in a moment—but it has not yet potentially translated all the way 

there, but we are on our way there. And we are going to make it 

a part—and we are going to talk about that in a moment. 

But thank you for being here. 

I want to go to the Cochair. 

Cochairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

I will just first direct my questions and then later on go to our 

other two distinguished witnesses. 

Let me just say, Professor Hamilton, thank you for your very 

clear testimony and your leadership. I mean, it is so absolutely 

needed. You are rare and it’s so great to have your voice here at 

this Commission today. 

You know, the shameful complicity and the cowardice of many in 

our academic community, some of the biggest and most prestigious 

universities, not just in this country, but around the world, is not 

new. 

I would remind my colleagues that back in 1979, a guy by the 

name of Steven Mosher, who was with Stanford, spent a full year, 

went to Guangdong, published a book called ‘‘Broken Earth’’—and 

I have read it because I was elected along with Frank Wolf, who 

is here today—in 1980, the same year Ronald Reagan got elected. 

And it had a profound impact in exposing the barbarity of the onechild-per-couple policy, forced abortion. 

And for anyone who does not think that the consequences have 

been lifelong, the Washington Post just did a piece a few days ago 

called ‘‘Too Many Men’’ and pointed out that there are the missing 

girls, that we have raised in this Commission over and over again. 

Last year, we documented some 62 million missing females 

exterminated through sex-selection abortion in part because of the 

child/boy preference coupled with a child limitation imposed by the 

government. 

But Mosher broke that story and Stanford, to its everlasting 

shame, threw him out of the university. The Wall Street Journal 

did a piece called ‘‘Stanford Morality’’—immorality is what it really 

was—and they defended Steven Mosher and said, how could they? 

Now, the Chinese government threatened Stanford and said if, in 

the future, people want to come here and do their work, they might 

find it a lot harder to have access. But where is, as you said, Professor, the academic freedom, the idea of robust inquiry so that you 

leave no stone unturned in telling the unfettered truth? 

Stanford brought shame to itself and we’re seeing the consequences of what they and so many others, including some in the 

human rights community, have done over the years in disregarding 

that issue, but also being willing, as the good chairman said, you 

know, the Confucius Centers. We have a GAO report that will be 

coming out soon. We have had a number of hearings on it, both in 

20 

the Commission and in my Subcommittee on Human Rights. NYU 

and others who all have a presence in China get huge amounts of 

money from the government. If you think that doesn’t stifle free 

speech and academic inquiry, I’ll sell you the Brooklyn Bridge. 

And I know you would think that. 

So maybe you can—my belief is that this is still getting worse. 

You know, that goes back to 1979 with Stanford. 1980, 1981, 1982, 

we have seen this grow. And now it’s even worse. All over Europe, 

Confucius Centers are all over Africa. I just had a hearing on that, 

myself and my Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights 

Committee. It’s happening everywhere. They want to transform the 

world. And what they want as their vision is a totalitarian dictatorship where the people serve the government and not the other way 

around and they do so with huge amounts of repression. 

So if you could respond to that, how it’s getting worse. It has not 

gotten better, it’s only gotten worse. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, thank you, Congressman. It is indeed getting worse and it’s getting worse because of the growing confidence 

of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist 

Party rulers there and President Xi Jinping’s determination to see 

the fulfillment of his China dream, the great rejuvenation of the 

Chinese people, which has a benign interpretation, but I think 

those of us who understand the more hawkish attitudes of the dominant factions within the Chinese Communist Party see that as effectively a blueprint for global domination. 

I think now we can say with reasonable confidence that in their 

quiet moments the CCP leaders envisage that the PRC in 20 or 30 

years’ time will be the dominant global power. And when that happens, we should all be afraid because they have no respect for basic 

democratic rights that we cherish so much. 

But as you have indicated, Congressman, and which I strongly 

endorse and have detailed in ‘‘Silent Invasion,’’ they can only get 

away with it if they have collaborators in Western countries like 

the United States and Australia, if they can buy off substantial 

segments of the elite who are willing to forgo essential democratic 

rights, such as free speech, in pursuit of other objectives. 

And as I indicated, one of the things that has disturbed me most 

in the process of writing this book, and then watching subsequently 

after it has come out, is the truly tenuous commitment of some of 

my nation’s leaders to the concept of free speech. It seems to be a 

tradeable commodity for those people. 

And it’s only when some of us are willing to take a risk. And, 

you know, in the case of, I think, all of us, it is often a personal 

risk to our own security and our own employment to say, no, we 

believe that free speech and other democratic rights come before all 

else. 

And it has been—it was Senator Rubio who alluded to this—very 

disturbing to see the way in which some Australian opinionmakers, 

including some of my own academic colleagues, have turned on me 

and people like me as being motivated by xenophobia. I actually 

have a very good record on antiracism over the decades in Australia. I come from the political left, which makes it more difficult 

for them. 

21 

But I tell you what—this book was launched in Sydney by Chinese Australians, a group of Chinese Australians, the Australian 

Values Alliance, who came to my country to escape the clutches of 

Beijing. They went to Australia to enjoy the privileges and freedom 

of a democratic nation. 

But they live in fear because they know that the Chinese Communist Party has its agents all across Australian society who will 

punish them, which happened to Mr. John Hu, whom I mentioned, 

the Chinese Australian who helped launch this book, who, a week 

after he helped organize that launch event, arrived in Shanghai 

with his 80-year-old mother in order to scatter his father’s ashes 

because he grew up in Shanghai. He was detained at the airport 

and put on the next plane back to Australia. And when he asked 

why, they said, You know why you are being detained; you’re getting off lightly. If we allowed you into the country and then detained you, then you would really be in trouble. 

This doesn’t send a new message to Chinese Australians. This is 

a message they all understand. If they step out of line, if they criticize the Chinese Communist Party or act in a way which the party 

perceives as against its interests, they will be punished. And that 

is a tragedy. 

Cochairman SMITH. I do know you have to go. But I’ll just conclude with this comment. You know, the concern that we have is 

not just with universities, as you would expect, organizations. I 

mean, Chairman Rubio and I and this Commission fought very 

hard with the ABA when Teng Biao, his manuscript, which originally was going to be published by the American Bar Association, 

they reneged on that. 

We raised it repeatedly. We asked them to come and testify, to 

hold them to account. They did, however, allow Gao Zhisheng’s 

manuscript to be published, so that’s a good thing. But why does 

it take pressure with a group like the ABA that should be walking 

point and not backpedaling because of pressure? 

The other point is that the business community in this country 

has always been easy pickings. I’ll never forget—and this has bipartisan complicity written all over it. Under Bush Sr., we had the 

problem where they thought that MFN was okay for the People’s 

Republic of China. We had Tiananmen Square, of course. 

And then Bill Clinton talked tough and said, Let’s do an executive order, lays out markers. And then one year later—Mr. Wolf, 

who’s here with us today, and I worked very hard on this—one 

year later, he completely reneged, he ripped up his executive order 

and gave MFN in May of 1994 with no human rights conditionality. And the Chinese looked at us and said, They care more about 

profits than they do about human rights. And that was a gamechanger in the negative for the world, but especially for the Chinese people. 

We have been trying ever since—ever since—to do our best to reclaim all of that lost ground, which subsequent presidents— 

Obama, Bush W.—did not, in my opinion, in any way faithfully 

promote the human rights of the people of China. This Commission 

will continue to try. 

22 

I’m looking forward to reading your book. I haven’t read it yet. 

But I thank you so much for your contribution and for your leadership. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you. 

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you. Thank you for being here. We appreciate it very much. 

Dr. Lantos Swett, I will start with you on this one. And I think 

your testimony is very compelling. 

I, too, am concerned about the lack of more progress on breaking 

down internet firewalls. And I did want to share with you—we received late last night a letter from the CEO and director of the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors, Mr. Lansing, and here’s what he 

cites—and I wanted to give you a chance to respond. Because I 

don’t know if you have even seen the letter. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. I have not. 

Chairman RUBIO. It says, ‘‘In fiscal year 2017, Congress appropriated $50.5 million to promote internet freedom globally.’’ 

And then ‘‘BBG receives approximately a quarter of these funds, 

$15 million. The law makes clear that BBG funds should be available for tools and techniques to securely develop and distribute 

BBG digital content, facilitate audience access to such content on 

websites that are censored and coordinate the distribution of BBG 

digital content to targeted regional audiences and to promote and 

distribute such tools and techniques, including digital security 

techniques. To meet our statutory mandate, our annual appropriations act requires that BBG’s primary goal in funding these technologies is to secure safe and secure access to BBG content.’’ 

And it goes on to say ‘‘a significant secondary benefit is that once 

users reach a BBG platform, they then have means to access the 

internet writ large.’’ 

So I just wanted to give you a chance to respond to that. The fundamental argument he is making is they only get $15 million and 

it is primarily supposed to be to open up access to BBG content, 

not to the internet at large. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Well, it’s my understanding that that provision was added into only the most recent appropriations bill. That 

is new language that was inserted, it is my understanding, through 

the intense lobbying efforts of BBG. And while I have no objection 

to the BBG wanting to promote access to their content, I think that 

it is a very flimsy excuse for not funding technologies that enable 

vast numbers of people to access the internet freely. 

I know of a number of other, sort of circumvention tool providers 

who would be quite happy to structure their technologies so that 

the first place they land is a BBG landing page. And then from 

there, they are able to go into the wide internet. 

But I think—and this is the bottom line—they are spending not 

$15 million on firewall circumvention technologies, they are spending a small fraction of that, it is my understanding, and this is 

where I hope that your Commission and that you as individual 

leaders in Congress can drill down and compel them to give you the 

answers. Because our internet freedom coalition gets, you know, 

frankly, blocked and diverted and stymied and sort of pushed off 

when we try to drill down and get the actual answers. 

23 

But it is my understanding that of that $15 million, less than $3 

million is actually being given in grants to vendors who are doing 

the work that Congress wants to see done. They are expending it 

in a variety of ways, as I indicated in my testimony, for small-scale 

research and development, small-scale tools, VPNs, which are important, but do not have the ability to resist the large-scale attacks 

launched by China or other repressive regimes. 

And at the end of the day, the numbers simply aren’t there. And 

it is more than a little disingenuous for BBG to come back and say, 

Well, we are required by law only to promote our content, when 

that is a new provision in the law inserted there by the BBG. You 

know, it’s sort of a different version of the person who throws 

themselves on the mercy of the court as an orphan when they are 

being charged with the murder of their parents. 

BBG sought that provision in the latest appropriations bill. It 

has not been there previously. 

I don’t have a huge objection to the notion of wanting to encourage people to access BBG content, but I am a little troubled by the 

idea that we use internet freedom dollars that Congress has appropriated to force them to read only the material produced by the 

BBG. It somehow doesn’t sit right with this notion of free access. 

And I think, you know, I don’t want to pick a fight with the BBG. 

I love much of what the BBG does. 

As I mentioned, my father, you know, grew up first suffering 

under the depredations of the Nazis during the Holocaust, and 

then experienced what it was to live under communism. Radio Free 

Europe, Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, Radio Martı ́, these are 

valuable services. I want the BBG to continue doing that. 

But it is also a reality that increasingly people are seeking out 

information digitally on the internet. They are not restricted and 

nor should they be restricted to, sort of, the information that we 

are providing through those mechanisms. 

So I would say—and again, you know, some of my language I 

know is tough, but I feel so passionate about this because we’ve 

been so frustrated and so stymied for so long and there is no good 

explanation as to why that should be the case. So be very careful 

when they show you numbers or when they come back with a 

seemingly very reasonable response. Compel them to provide the 

actual facts behind the matter. 

And I would really encourage you and your staffs—talk to the developers of these circumvention technologies. Find out from them, 

What is the problem? What are you being told? Why are you being 

cut off from funding? 

Right now, BBG is funding one technology, to the best of my 

knowledge. It happens to be a commercial technology, not one developed by dissidents, not one being offered free of charge, but a 

commercial technology. 

There should be—you know, let a thousand flowers bloom, was 

that Mao’s phrase? If we were doing what we should be doing, if 

we were offering on an annual basis not $15 million, but $30 million or $50 million, as Congress has indicated, as funding for this 

kind of technology, you wouldn’t have a handful of five or six or 

seven developers, most of whom are on the verge of shutting down 

because they have no funding. These are dissidents who are proVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:25 Dec 16, 2018 Jkt 081003 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\USERS\DSHERMAN1\DESKTOP\VONITA TEST.TXT DAVID
24 

viding this at no financial benefit to themselves in order to help 

their brethren and their sisters left behind in China. And they cannot stay alive as their funding is cut off. 

If we were doing 20 or 30 or 40 or 50 million dollars of grant 

funding for these kinds of groups, we wouldn’t have five, four of 

which are struggling to stay alive. We’d have 25 or 30 or more— 

and that’s what we want. 

Chairman RUBIO. Well, just a couple of points. One, to the broader issue of BBG and the like, we have to understand these entities 

were—the world has changed much since they were created. 

The one I am most familiar with, of course, are the Martı ́s, TV 

and Radio. And these were set up in a time when we had limited— 

three major networks and a handful of local, state, and national 

newspapers. Today, you literally are overwhelmed with news. I 

mean, there’s just so much content. 

And so one of the things I have begun to argue—this is among 

our top priorities. I happen to be both on the Subcommittee on Appropriations that deals with this budget and on the Foreign Relations Committee. So I’m all over this. And it’s a big priority on two 

fronts. The first is the question of whether or not we should continue to be primarily content providers and producers versus access 

providers and producers. And I do think I want us to become more 

access producers. 

Now, as far as whether or not we can deal with that language 

that they fought to get in there, it’s very simple, that could just be 

the splash page that you go up—the BBG site could just be the site 

that comes up when you go on and then you could go from there. 

But the notion that you have argued, that what we want to be 

able to do is have multiple technologies, as many as possible available, so that people all over the world—this is not just China—people all over the world will be able to circumvent government censorship to get accurate news and information—and to connect with 

one another. To have access to social media that allows them to 

connect with one another is invaluable. 

I have often said that the Castro regime in Cuba has been able 

to hold on despite embargoes and the Cold War and everything 

else. The one thing they cannot survive is an open and free internet. Because once Cubans are able to talk to each other, they are 

able to organize action and also it lowers barriers of entry to free 

enterprise and the like. And so I’m a big believer in that and to 

continue to move in that direction, but we are dealing here with 

entrenched bureaucracies. 

And I would add one more point. In terms of the State Department, I do not believe it is helpful when we have someone as our 

acting secretary of state in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs and now the nominee—which I hope will not continue—who 

I think is unfriendly to these efforts, and not just this effort, but 

the broader efforts that we’re discussing here today. And that’s another matter which is a top priority of ours and that we are working on as well. So you have my commitment on that to make this 

thing work. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Thank you. 

Chairman RUBIO. Congressman. 

25 

Cochairman SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you. I’ll be very brief. And I thank you again. 

Let me just ask you, if I could, on an issue, Dr. Lantos Swett— 

I know the Lantos Foundation recently joined the Uyghur community in protesting in front of the Chinese embassy to ask about information about family members in the Autonomous Region who 

have disappeared and many are believed to be in re-education 

camps or even worse. Among those family members are the relatives of six Radio Free Asia journalists based in Washington and 

family members of Rebiya Kadeer. I’m wondering, did you get any 

response back from the embassy from that? 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. No, we did not get any response back from 

the embassy, but I must tell you it was a very moving experience 

for me. We stood there in the rain with over a hundred members 

of the Uyghur community. And what was most heartbreaking was 

person after person came to me with pictures of their relatives, 

their uncles, their aunts, their parents, their spouses, their children. It was truly heartbreaking. 

And I think this is—and I want to commend you, Congressman 

Smith, and you, Senator Rubio, because I know you have written 

about this yourselves—this is the most massive incarceration of a 

minority population in the modern era, you know, certainly since 

the Second World War. It is staggering. It is absolutely staggering. 

And it just passes by. 

And if I may, it speaks to, I think, a broader problem that I as 

a human rights activist feel we are dealing with when we are contending with China, and that is that everybody gives China a pass. 

China does things that are so outrageous and does them on such 

a scale and the world sort of ‘‘tsks’’ and moves on, moves on to the 

deals, moves on to the business, moves on to the commerce. 

And it is wrong. It is morally wrong, but it is also dangerous because—and I think you referenced this, Senator Rubio, as did you, 

Congressman—they are very consciously trying to say to a whole 

lot of other countries out there, We have a different model, we have 

another way and we are ready and we are loaded to challenge the 

United States as the model for the world going forward, and we are 

going to use our incredible, sort of, economic might and every tool 

at our disposal to put this alternate model out there. 

You know, I mentioned that my father was a Holocaust survivor 

from Hungary. It wasn’t that long ago that Hungary—Hungary, a 

country in the very center of Europe—spoke about wanting to pursue a model of illiberal democracy. 

Well, that’s a pretty disturbing kind of language to hear from the 

heart of Europe. And we could look at lots of other examples. 

If we do not confront China on the ways in which it is trampling 

the international standards related to human rights and democracy 

and free access to information, to say nothing of the way in which 

they may be abusing the international financial and economic system—if we do not challenge them, they will continue down this 

road of saying to a very troubled and very chaotic world, we have 

another way, we have a way that, yeah, maybe it can lead to greater prosperity, yes, maybe it can achieve the laudable goal of bringing large numbers of people out of poverty, but at a price. And it 

is a price we should not be willing to pay. 

26 

I referenced that biblical story of selling a birthright for a mess 

of pottage. Our birthright, our values, our profound commitment to 

our fundamental freedoms, they are what make our society worth 

defending. They are for us individually what make life worth living. 

And what a shame it would be, and what a shameful thing it 

would be were we to not be vigilant in standing up against this effort to, as I say, sell our precious human rights birthright for a 

mess of economic pottage. 

Cochairman SMITH. Last year, a Chinese student’s commencement speech at the University of Maryland—she praised the fresh 

air of free speech found in the United States and was praising that, 

and that went viral. She and her parents in China, however, were 

subsequently targets of harassment. 

How can our universities do a much better job in protecting these 

students? Because self-censorship, it seems to me, will become, has 

already become, the norm. I think it becomes even more so where 

everybody just, you know, gags themselves because why deal with 

all of that consequence? 

And then, obviously, the messages of the dictatorship become 

even more profound in the hearts and minds of their own people. 

So they do not come here and get liberated and find a whole new— 

I mean, I know a number of people studying in Europe right now 

who tell me that the government, you know, feels they own these 

Chinese students. They monitor them, they keep track of them, and 

at any university anywhere in Europe, same way here. What 

should our universities do to say, hey, you are free, at least when 

you are here, and to push back with the Chinese government on 

how they are mistreating their students who happen to be Chinese? 

Ms. COOK. Well, I would actually say I think one of the first 

things would actually be for the U.S. government to take action. A 

lot of this intimidation comes directly from Chinese diplomatic missions. These Chinese embassy officials have also been known to intimidate Chinese journalists here, intimidate advertisers, people 

who advertise in the Chinese community with media that are considered critical of the Chinese government. And that may go to 

Senator Rubio’s question earlier about, you know, third-party interference and certain contractual agreements. 

I only know about this anecdotally, but I certainly know that it 

has happened, where people, advertisers, have been pressured by 

Chinese officials to withdraw advertising from critical news outlets. 

There was at least one case I wrote about in testimony I’d given 

to the USCC last year where an RCN executive was threatened by 

Chinese officials. I believe he was actually of Indian origin and 

there was some kind of pressure applied to him when he was trying to arrange for New Tang Dynasty Television to be aired in the 

Washington, DC area. Again, I don’t know if that was before there 

was a contract or after a contract. 

But, you know, in conversations with other democracy activists 

here in the United States, it just seems like the Chinese embassy 

and consular officials are becoming more arrogant and more aggressive. And so I think that’s something to perhaps take up with 

the State Department when these incidents happen. 

27 

If you were to declare just one Chinese official persona non grata 

for these kinds of violations and, you know—and today when the 

Chinese government has talked about, Do not interfere in our internal affairs, but here they are interfering in our internal affairs— 

or some other kind of diplomatic demarche, I think that would send 

a very strong signal. And that’s something that I think the U.S. 

government is wholly in the right position to do, and I think that 

that would actually counter some of the pressure on Chinese students. 

For universities there are a number of different things. I mean, 

one of the challenges is that often, for example, for Chinese student 

associations, the charters in Chinese are very different than what 

it says in English. And so, you know, there are university administrators who may not be aware of certain things that are happening 

in the Chinese student community. With more media coverage of 

this, I think they should be more aware. 

And there would be various—you know, I’m not an expert on student affairs—but various steps that could be taken to make sure 

Chinese students know about counseling services, about legal services, about other forms of support at a university so that when 

something like this happens, the students feel that there is someone at the university they can go and talk to about this. 

And then for the university to be equipped to also know with regard to, whether it is members of Congress who are aware of this 

or whether it’s others within the State Department or the U.S. 

Government, of who they should turn to, because a lot of these universities themselves don’t know. 

But to the extent that the universities are made aware of what 

would be the best ways for them, who they should contact and any 

strong diplomatic response that can come from the U.S. Government to this interference, and then for students to know that they 

have a resource at the universities. 

I would just, you know, if it’s all right to comment on this issue, 

on the circumvention tools and some experiences we’ve had disseminating the China Media Bulletin in Chinese. We actually work 

with a number of tools who help, you know, post it on their landing 

pages. And it’s quite effective in terms of informing Chinese readers, who are coming to these pages, of these options. And I know 

that a lot of the content from BBG, in some cases because it is especially popular, is also on those landing pages. 

But one of the challenges that happens in this realm, you know, 

and I would say it would happen in China, but also in places like 

Iran, there’s a certain dynamism as certain events unfold and as 

authorities shift their resources to blocking certain tools, to removing VPNs. 

And so one recommendation I would urge considering is that, besides a certain amount of set funding for a diversity of tools, because that allows more flexibility in response, that if one tool gets 

blocked and users go somewhere else, it is supported, but some 

type of rapid response fund for emergency moments, for moments 

of political crisis. 

I have seen from the tool developers, it spikes. I mean, and in 

China, you know, it can range from—you know, it does not have 

to be mass protests like you saw in Iran. In China, it was when 

28 

Bo Xilai’s chief of police fled to the U.S. embassy—a spike. Chen 

Guangcheng fled to the U.S. embassy—a spike. Things like this example with regard to Instagram. Instagram gets blocked during the 

protests in Hong Kong—a spike, people want to access beyond. 

And so some kind of rapid response that would allow a quick 

stream of funding to be released to the tools that can demonstrate 

that, look, we are getting more demand, we are getting more requests from China or from Iran. I think that might be a way to also 

be able to respond quickly to the dynamism. 

And it has so much, you know, it has so many implications. It 

is not just about people being able to access information; this is 

how people post information, this is how they post videos. 

And these tools developers, it’s not just about the number of 

users, it is also about the bandwidth they are able to supply. If 

they are only able to supply people with enough to read a couple 

of news articles, that’s not really enough. If you have a YouTube 

video of something, a policeman beating up a protester, you can’t 

upload that if you don’t have enough bandwidth, if your circumvention tool developer doesn’t have enough bandwidth. And those 

kinds of videos become so important, both internationally, but also 

domestically. 

And so I think that’s where, again, at these particularly critical 

political moments, that’s when we should be better set up to be 

able to infuse the tools that can demonstrate that they are in demand in order to meet the supply. Because otherwise, I know from 

some of the developers with regard to what happened in Iran, they 

could have helped millions more people, but they just didn’t have 

enough money and, therefore, not enough bandwidth. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. If I can just—I think that’s a really excellent 

suggestion, that idea of sort of an emergency fund that can be rapidly deployed as situations arise. 

But I did want to respond to one part of your question, Congressman Smith, because, of course, at the end of the day, we cannot 

entirely protect, we can’t basically protect people in China or in 

any other country where they are being brutally repressed. And we 

know that the progress of freedom requires courage, it requires 

people in extraordinarily difficult circumstances who are willing to 

put their safety, their well-being on the line. 

What is inspiring to me again and again and again is how many 

people in societies are willing to do that, but they are not willing 

to do it if it appears hopeless. And that is one reason why countries 

like China are so eager to create this information prison, to cut 

people off from the knowledge of what their fellow citizens are 

doing, of what’s happening outside, of the criticism of their government, of what’s happened in the past, of all of that information, because that sort of knowledge is where people find the courage and 

the strength to say no, I will not put up with this. I am going to 

take a stand. I am willing to take this risk. 

They are inspired when they know about, you know, the story of 

Liu Xiaobo or Chen Guangcheng or Gao Zhisheng, some of the 

other extraordinary people who are sacrificing so much. And that’s 

why information, as you said, Senator Rubio, the free sharing of information among people within a country as well as with those outside, is the thing they fear the most. 

29 

So we can’t protect them, but we can give them enough access 

to what is really happening that they are strengthened and 

emboldened. 

You know, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 

adopted, Eleanor Roosevelt had a wonderful phrase. And I won’t be 

able to quote it perfectly, but she said that she hoped that through 

a curious grapevine, news of this document, this extraordinary document that laid out this breathtaking bill of rights for all people 

everywhere simply by virtue of being human, that through a curious grapevine it would find its way through walls and barbed wire 

to people in imprisoned nations. 

I love that notion of a curious grapevine and the internet is a 

great big curious grapevine. And we need to open it up for those 

who do not have free access to it. 

Cochairman SMITH. I thank you both for that answer. 

And, you know, I’ll never forget—very briefly—when Frank Wolf, 

who was here earlier, and I, were in Perm Camp 35 in the 1980s, 

filled to overflowing with political prisoners, they all knew the Helsinki Final Act and could quote it verbatim. There they are being 

tortured, abused, starving, I mean, they had almost no—they were 

all gaunt beyond words, and yet they can quote different—so it 

gave hope, just like you said with the Universal Declaration. 

So, you know, it says in the Bible without hope the people perish, 

and I think hopefully we can bring some hope and some tangible 

assistance to these individuals. Thank you. 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Thank you. 

Cochairman SMITH. Appreciate it. 

Chairman RUBIO. Senator Daines. 

Senator DAINES. Chairman Rubio, thank you. And thanks for 

holding this important hearing. And thanks to the witnesses for 

coming here today and providing perspective and expertise on a 

very important topic. 

You know, I spent more than half a decade working in China. In 

fact, I had two children born in Hong Kong. I’ve led CODELs to 

China the last three years, just came back three weeks ago in fact. 

I’ve had a chance to travel across the country. I have taken delegations to U ̈ ru ̈mqi and seen the prominent Uyghur-Muslim population. I have visited Tibet with a group, seen the Buddhist monks. 

In fact, just recently we were in Dandong there on the Yalu River 

in a part of China that doesn’t get a lot of attention, visits, and to 

see what is going on, certainly on the North Korean border. 

It’s critically important, I believe, that we, as a nation that was 

founded on freedom and the rule of law, are clear-eyed about the 

challenges and the opportunities that China brings, especially in 

its relationship with the United States, a relationship I see as perhaps the most important and consequential relationship between 

any two countries in the 21st century. 

Ms. Cook, in your testimony, you highlight the recent developments where the Chinese government removed Bibles from e-commerce websites in China. I was very aware of that when that happened, saw that. And while the sale or distribution of Bibles has 

always been restricted in China, I think this serves as yet another 

example of the hollowness of the claims the government is making 

of respecting religious freedom. 

30 

You indicate that the removal of President Xi’s term limits and 

other actions have resulted in some level of increased dissent. Have 

you seen any other similar responses to the removal of Bibles from 

e-commerce sites from the Christian community in China? 

And the second part of that question is, what are the prospects 

that this restriction might cause Chinese Christians, who have otherwise been apolitical, to become more engaged? 

Ms. COOK. Thank you, Senator. I have to admit I haven’t had an 

opportunity to look closely at the particular reaction to that beyond, I think, some of the comments by people in the United States 

who are in regular touch with Christians there. 

But another research report that I wrote that was published last 

year was actually about religious revival, repression, and resistance in China. And in general, what we found across religious 

groups, including in the Christian community, is that it is precisely 

these kinds of actions by the government to believers, places of 

worship and leaders of Christians who, you know, don’t necessarily 

belong to the underground church movement, but are, you know, 

worshipping at or leading state-approved churches, that does bring 

a backlash, that actually begins to blur the line more between the 

underground church movement and the state-sanctioned church 

movement. 

And one of the things that you see is that, in general, as the Chinese government, in terms of various regulatory moves, squeezes 

the space for the spread of Christianity and other religions as well, 

more people are seeking out alternative opportunities. So, for example, with regard to leadership training, they limit the number 

of people who can go study at seminaries, so you have people actually studying through radio station opportunities based out of Hong 

Kong, through online courses. 

And so I think something like this restriction on being able to 

purchase Bibles may very well, though I haven’t had a chance to 

see specific data, have the exact effect of this Instagram example 

from 2014 where a new academic study found that when there 

were protests happening in Hong Kong, the Chinese government 

blocked Instagram and more people jumped the firewall to seek out 

information, to seek out the platform and came across all kinds of 

other uncensored information. 

And my sense would be that, actually, this can have a counterproductive effect for the Chinese government, because instead of 

Christians purchasing Bibles on the Alibaba platform and other ecommerce platforms that are above ground, now you’ll have more 

people seeking out circumvention tools, seeking out other ways of 

obtaining Bibles that will encourage them to maybe look more 

broadly at other forms of information. 

Senator DAINES. I think one of the other statistics that might be 

surprising to many in the United States is, if you look at the top 

10 internet companies in the world, five of them are now Chinese. 

Look at the top six internet companies in the world, three of them 

are Chinese. 

The U.S. still is number one, measured by revenues, but we’ve 

got Chinese internet companies now that are exceeding market 

caps of $500 billion. We’ve got Amazon and Google Alphabet, 

31 

there’s one and two, but then you get to JD.com, Alibaba, Tencent. 

And it’s, I think, pretty eye-opening. 

So when we see this censorship of Bibles in e-commerce, these 

aren’t just small backwater companies, these are huge, leading, 

top-five companies in the world related to e-commerce and can 

have a profound impact, certainly on not only China, but, frankly, 

extending their influence around the world. 

Ms. COOK. Absolutely. 

Senator DAINES. I want to shift gears to Dr. Lantos Swett. 

In your testimony, you raised the fact that China is not satisfied 

with simply censoring its own population, but also is seeking to influence speech and actions abroad, whether it’s the self-censorship 

of scholars, foreign publishers, businesses, or sometimes academic 

journals related to doing work in or about China. 

What are the long-term effects of such actions? And what could 

be done to maintain academic integrity and the principle of free expression in the face of such pressures? 

Ms. LANTOS SWETT. Well, I think the long-term implications are 

obviously very, very disturbing. And I think that we have to do a 

better job of sort of shining a very unflattering light on those institutions that are increasingly compromising their own commitment 

to, as Mr. Hamilton said, the founding principles of the Western 

university in order to ease their access to China, whether it’s access for their scholars, whether it’s access to their wealthy, full-tuition-paying students, whether it’s access to business opportunities. 

At the moment, these insidious, sort of, infiltrations of Chinese 

censorship influences into some of our most cherished institutions 

are not yet widespread, but it is spreading. 

And I think, you know, frankly, it’s something that the Congress 

needs to think about. I don’t know whether this would be appropriate and within the brief of this Commission, but I think it would 

be fascinating to have a hearing with some of the university presidents whose universities have major programs that involve China 

and ask them some of the tough questions about the compromises 

they have been making. 

I think it was before you joined us, Congressman Daines, but 

Clive Hamilton spoke about what he was more fearful of, which is 

the self-censorship, not the obvious, evident, seen hand of China, 

but the decision by institutions and organizations to preemptively 

censor themselves, to preemptively make decisions that avoid the 

issue ever arising because they think that that sort of hides it from 

public scrutiny. I think in many ways he’s right, that that is almost 

the graver threat. 

I did want to say one thing, if I may, about the issue of religious 

freedom in China. I previously had the great privilege of serving 

as the chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom. And obviously, China is a world-class abuser of religious 

freedom rights. 

And I agree with Sarah that their efforts in that regard run the 

risk of backfiring, but I also think there, too, we have an area 

where our government has not spoken out assertively, proactively 

enough about the importance of defending religious freedom in 

China. The reality is that so often when it comes to human rights 

32 

causes, the most significant weapon we have to wield is the voice 

of our top leadership. It still has an influence. 

And I am concerned that this administration does not seem to 

have a particularly active sense of the role that defending human 

rights and defending fundamental freedoms should play in a wholeof-government approach to advancing our interests, whether it be 

in relation to China or other countries. 

So we need to lean forward, we need to understand that when 

we play from our strengths, we win. And what are our greatest 

strengths? It is not our economic might, it is not our military 

might. They are indispensable, they are awe-inspiring, but they are 

not our greatest strength. Because guess what? Other countries, 

other adversaries, if you will, of ours have great economic strength, 

have great military might. 

What has distinguished us, what has made us extraordinary in 

the world was the way that we grew from values, profound values. 

And that’s where our strength came from. And I would like to see 

us remember that and integrate these principles and these tools in 

a whole-of-government approach in every aspect of our foreign policy. 

Senator DAINES. Thank you, Dr. Lantos Swett. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman RUBIO. Well, I thank you both for being here. I appreciate the time you have given us. I think this has been an informative hearing. I think from it we take a number of ideas, particularly the expansion and ensuring that we can get in there and figure out, number one, is $15 million enough? And number two, is 

the $15 million, why isn’t all of it, if it’s not, being spent on broader 

access to additional tools that are constantly being reinvented as 

governments figure out how to block those? And number three, the 

ability and contingencies to surge up if, for example, what happened in Iran were to happen again. It is a time where we know 

there will be high demand by people to find out in the news what’s 

actually going on. And there may be times where we might be able 

to surge access. 

I would also say that, in some particular parts of the world, and 

this probably applies a lot less to China, but just since we are talking about that concept, you know, one of the things, there are 

places where the internet itself is nonexistent or denied to people. 

And I know for a fact that satellite technology is used in remote 

parts of the world and in other places to provide people content, access to the internet. Why can’t that be used to apply access to a 

free internet, for example, on the island of Cuba where the government doesn’t want them to have access to the internet? 

And so in that case, it isn’t just—what is blocking internet access 

is not just the firewall, it is the fact that it literally does not exist, 

and when it does it is very expensive. So there is a lot to work on 

in terms of the information flow. 

And then just in terms of the long arm—I mean, one of the functions of this Commission is to raise awareness. I still think that 

what we have discussed here today has been reported, but the vast 

majority of people are just largely unaware of what is happening. 

And if we take what happened in Australia, we can begin to see 

the edges of it occurring here. 

33 

We are so used to living in a world where we had all the leverage 

and all the influence, that the notion that it somehow has been 

turned back on us, and it isn’t just attacking our economic interests 

but our basic fundamental principles, is just lost on people. And we 

cannot allow that to continue. 

And we need to look for creative ways to go about it. Some real 

good suggestions here, some of which we have already begun to 

work on, some of which the authorities already exist under Global 

Magnitsky to go after individuals responsible for these sorts of activities, but then also potentially causes of action against people 

who lose contracts or are fired because of interference by a foreign 

government, not just China. And I think companies like Marriott 

and others would be, I think, very reticent or be more careful about 

how they would approach this. 

As I close, I wanted to read from something here that was in our 

opening memo because I thought it was stark in comparison to the 

apology that Congressman Lantos was able to get years ago. I have 

it here in the notes. And it goes back to—this is a statement from 

the chief of Marriott, Arne Sorenson. And this has to do—when the 

Chinese authorities blocked Marriott International’s websites and 

apps for a week in China because they listed Tibet, Hong Kong, 

Macau, and Taiwan as separate countries in a customer survey. 

They demanded an apology and they demanded that they seriously 

deal with the people responsible. And it was as a result of some 

of this that we saw some of these actions. 

But Marriott issued a formal apology, unlike the one issued to 

the mother of that gentleman who was jailed. They issued a formal 

apology. Here is what Marriott’s chief, Arne Sorenson, said. ‘‘We 

don’t support anyone who subverts the sovereignty and territorial 

integrity of China and we do not intend in any way to encourage 

or incite any such people or groups. We recognize the severity of 

the situation and sincerely apologize.’’ 

Well, again, I would say to you that there are people living in 

Taiwan who have a very different, a strong difference of opinion 

with Mr. Sorenson and with the Communist Party about sovereignty and territorial integrity. And so this is an American company benefiting from the freedom and the opportunities in this nation, who come up here and lobby for tax cuts and deregulation, everything that benefits them, basically openly apologizing and firing 

an American in order to be able to continue to operate in that marketplace. 

We see this trend repeated over and over and over and over 

again. And when I read about the CEO of Apple at an internet conference, an internet freedom conference in China talking about, on 

the one hand, attacking a rival for selling off data and information 

and on the other hand turning over the entire cloud in China to 

a government server, the hypocrisy is unbelievable. Unbelievable. 

And yet, somehow, they get away with this. They are held up as 

these heroes. And we need to continue to call that out and shame 

it for what it is. You cannot be representing yourself here in this 

country as a defender of freedom and openness and yet complicit 

and accomplices of repressive regimes under the guise of, We have 

to follow their laws because their markets require it. It goes to 

show that the bottom line and the ability to look good in front of 

34 

shareholders and return profits is more important than the supposed universal values that these companies have no problem touting here at home where they have the freedom to do so without retribution—and all we can do is talk about it. 

We are going to continue to do that. We are not going to allow 

what happened in Australia to happen here. I promise you that. 

And we are going to help Australia deal with it as well. 

So I thank you, because what you have provided us here today 

is invaluable. And I am grateful for the time you have given us, 

for your insight. We look forward to continuing to work with you. 

The record for the hearing will remain open for 48 hours. 

Dr. Lantos Swett, the totality of your prepared statement will be 

entered into our record without objection. 

And with that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m. the hearing was concluded.] 

A P P E N D I X 

(37) 

PREPARED STATEMENTS


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• Censorship seeks to restrict users' access to information that the party-state deems 

undesirable either by blocking websites or forcing deletion of sites, articles, social media 

accounts, and individual posts. 

• Manipulation aims to insert the party's perspective into online public debate and news 

consumption. This is achieved by dictating the headlines on popular news sites or 

aggregator apps or by paying commentators to distract netizens from government 

criticism. 

• Surveillance and restrictions on anonymity serve to monitor communications, track the 

true identity of users even when they use pseudonyms, and facilitate arrest and 

imprisonment of those who cross the party's "red lines." It also encourages selfcensorship among online journalists, bloggers, and ordinary users. 

The Chinese authorities often claim that the content being targeted for censorship, 

monitoring, or punishment involves violence, pornography, or other information that might 

be recognized internationally as legitimately restricted. However, time and again, from 

individual incidents to broad research studies, it is evident that massive amounts of 

information vital to the public interest are systematically restricted. Freedom House analysis 

of leaked censorship and propaganda directives issued from 2015 through 2017 found that 

CCP manipulation not only targets coverage of the "usual suspect" topics of official 

wrongdoing, historic crimes, and human rights violations against ethnic and religious 

minorities. Restrictions also routinely encompass areas like public health and safety, foreign 

affairs, the economy, and the censorship system itself.2 

Although China has long been home to the most multi-layered and sophisticated internet 

control apparatus in the world, recent years have seen new waves of tightening in areas of 

free expression or dissemination channels that were previously tolerated. For the past three 

years, China has thus been the worst abuser of internet freedom among 65 countries 

assessed in Freedom House's annual Freedom on the Net report.3 

Over the past year alone and particularly since a new Cybersecurity Law came into effect in 

june 2017, online censorship and surveillance have expanded dramatically alongside 

increasing arrests of Chinese citizens, particularly for content shared on the popular instant 

2 Sarah Cook, "Chinese Journalism, Interrupted," Foreign Policy, january 6, 2016, 

http· I {forejgnpolicy.corn /2016 /01 /06 /chinese-journalism-interrupted-what -~myernmeot-censored-jn2..Q.l5.; Sarah Cook, "All the News Unfit to Print: What Beijing Quashed in 2016," Foreign Policy, December 16, 

2016, http· //foreignpolicy,com /20 16/12/16/al!-the-news-unfit-to-priot·what-bejjjng-quashed-jn-20 161· 

Sarah Cook, "The News China Didn't Want Reported in 2017," The Diploma~ january 27, 2018, 

https: I /thediplomat.com /2018/01 /the-news-chi na-didnt-want -reported-in-20 17/. 3 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2017, November 2017, httj;!s://freedomhouse.org/reportlfreedomnet/freedom-net-20 17, 
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messaging platform WeChat Technical and regulatory innovation and experimentation is 

constantly underway. Additions to the censorship and surveillance toolbox from the past 

year include: large-scale shuttering of social media accounts rather than just deleting posts 

and particularly influential accounts, developing the ability to automatically scan images for 

subversive text rather than relying solely on human censors, forcing the removal ofhundreds 

of mobile phone apps that enable users to reach blocked websites, and requiring residents 

of Xinjiang to install an app on their mobile phones that sends copies of their photos and 

other files back to the authorities.4 

What are the costs of this tightening for various actors and individuals 

inside and outside China? 

For Chinese netizens - The space for ordinary Chinese to obtain and share information on 

a wide range of both political and apolitical topics has noticeably shrunk, while the risks of 

punishment for even facetious comments deemed unacceptable to the authorities have risen. 

These shifts have affected hundreds of millions of users in China. Although not all may be 

aware of the full set of changes, many have been forced to alter their online habits due to 

increasing censorship and real-name registration requirements. For target populations like 

activists, religious believers, or members of ethnic minorities, the consequences have been 

more dire. Lawyers, bloggers, and website administrators who have for years been 

publishing information about human rights abuses, protests, or worker strikes have been 

imprisoned and tortured. Numerous Tibetan monks, Uighur Muslims, and Falun Gong 

practitioners have been jailed for expressing birthday greetings to the Dalai Lama in WeChat, 

viewing videos about Islam on their phones, or downloading information from blocked 

websites about rights abuses to share with fellow citizens.s Christians recently discovered 

that they will no longer be able to purchase Bibles via e-commerce websites.6 

For Chinese society - On a daily basis, vital information on health, public safety, and the 

judicial system is kept from the Chinese public, while people's ability to discuss the current 

and future direction of their country has been severely constrained. This was especially 

evident in the run-up to the 19th Party Congress in October and constitutional changes last 

4 Freedom House, China Media Bulletin, No. 121, September 11,2017, httl)s:/!freedomhouse.org/chjnamcdia/china-media-bulletin-part;y-congrcss-ccnsorship-ypn-crackdown-suryeillance-upgrades-no-121; 

Freedom House, China Media Bulletin, No. 127, March 23, 2018, https.j/freedomhouse.org/chinamedia /china-m edia-bulletin-rjsks-of-xis-power-grab-npc-censorshjp-xjnjjan!if·reprjsals-jssue-no-12 7. 5 Sarah Cook, The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance under Xi]inping, 

Freedom House, February 28, 2017, https·//freedomhouse.org/report/chjna-religjous-freedorn. 6 James Griffiths, "Bibles pulled from online stores as China increases contra! of religion," CNN, AprilS, 2018, 

https: //www.cnn com /2018/04105/asja/chjna-bible-online-chrjstianjt;y-intl /index html. 
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month. As the country underwent some of the most significant political events in its recent 

history, deletion of social media posts and accounts spiked. The vast majority of Chinese 

citizens were not only shut out of the conversation, but also risked severe punishment should 

they even try to take part from afar. 

For Chinese tech companies -Chinese technology companies operate between a rock and 

a hard place. On the one hand, they try to innovate and serve customers in a competitive 

domestic market. At the same time, they are required to monitor and delete massive amounts 

of user-generated content in an ever-changing and arbitrary regulatory environment. In just 

the past month, several extremely popular applications providing news or enabling the 

sharing of humorous content to tens of millions of users have been suspended or shut down 

for failing to "rectify" their content sufficiently. One such live-streaming app Kuaishou is now 

seeking to hire 3,000 more internal censors alongside an existing team of 2,000 to monitor 

user content.7 As Chinese tech firms come under increased pressure to cleanse their 

networks and communities of "harmful" information, recent weeks have also featured a 

spate of new cases involving users punished or interrogated by police for communications 

that were ostensibly shared privately with friends. Many of these cases involved Tencent's 

WeChat platform. a 

For Foreign tech firms - Many of the world's top technology and social media companies 

are banned or extremely constrained in their ability to provide services to Chinese internet 

users. Notably, the websites of Facebook and Twitter are blocked, while restrictions on 

Coogle have expanded from its search engine to its email client, translation services and 

more. Foreign companies that do operate in China or work with Chinese firms are 

increasingly forced to comply with censorship demands. Linkedln restricts users in China 

from accessing profiles or posts by people based outside the country that are deemed to 

contain politically sensitive information.9 Earlier this year, Apple removed more than 600 

applications from its mobile store that facilitated Chinese users' ability to access blocked 

websites.1° 

7 Emma Lee, "Kuaishou is hiring more people to filter content after crackdown on "vulgar" content," Tech node, 

AprilS, 2018, https: 1/technode.com /2018/04/08/kuaishou-content-patro!s/. 8 Sarah Cook, "China's Ever-Expanding Surveillance State," Diplomat April25, 2018, 

https: I /thediplomat.com /20 18/04/chjnas-eyer-expanding-survemance-state /. 9 Paul Mozur and Vindu Goel, "To Reach China, Linkedln Plays by Local Rules,' New York Times, October 5, 

2014, https· //www.nytjmes com /2014/1 0/06/technology/to-reach-chjna-linkedjn-plays-by-!ocalrules html. 10 Letter from Cynthia C. Hogan, Apple Vice President for Public Policy in the Americas to Senators Patrick 

Leahy and Ted Cruz, November 21, 2017, 

https: //www.leahy.senate.goylimo /medjafdoc /Apple%20 112120 17.pdf. 
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Foreign companies operating in China also increasingly risk accusations of complicity in 

politicized arrests or violations of user privacy. Last year's Cybersecurity Law stipulates that 

foreign companies must store Chinese users' cloud data on servers located in China. To meet 

this requirement, Apple announced in january that iCloud data would be transferred to 

servers run by Guizhou on the Cloud Big Data (GCBD), which is owned by the provincial 

governmentll Apple and GCBD now both have access to iCloud data, including photos and 

other content. In February, the U.S.-based note-taking app company Evernote similarly 

announced that Chinese users' data would be transferred to Tencent Cloud by mid-2018 to 

comply with data localization rules in the Cybersecurity Law.12 Airbnb recently alerted its 

hosts that starting on March 30, "Airbnb China may disclose your information to Chinese 

government agencies without further notice to you."13 And one of the biggest investors in 

the artificial intelligence (AI) firm SenseTime, which provides facial recognition technologies 

to some local police and at least one prison in China, is U.S. chipmaker Qualcomm.14 

For the Chinese Communist Party - The CCP is leading the drive for increased internet 

controls, in large part in order to protect its hold on power and shield itself from criticism 

and organized political opposition. Yet this project does not come without its own costs for 

the party, be it in terms of legitimacy or in trying to discourage users from exploring content 

beyond the Great Firewall. An academic study published this month found that after 

Instagram was blocked in 2014, users were more motivated to seek out tools to circumvent 

censorship and reach the platform, encountering a much wider array of otherwise censored 

content along the way. The authors conclude that such sudden censorship "can politicize 

previously apolitical citizens, and can accumulate collective action potential that it often 

seeks to suppress."15 Indeed, even as censors work vigorously to scrub voices of dissent from 

the internet, with each monthly announcement of new restrictions that negatively affect 

millions of users, signs of public backlash are evident. 

11 BBC, "Apple: Chinese firm to operate China iCioud accounts," January 10, 2018, 

http·//www bbc.com/news/business-42631386. 12 Freedom House, China Media Bulletin, No.l26, February 27,2018, https://freedomhouse,org/chjnamedia /china-medja-bulletin-resistjng-bejjim:s-jnfluence-new-year-eala-metoo-in-chjna-jssue-no-126#a4. 13 Twitter post by Bill Bishop with screenshot of AirBnb notice, March 28,2018, 

https: //twjtter.com /njubi /status /978945772971614209. 14 Reuters, "Qualcomm invests in Chinese AI facial recognition startup SenseTime," November 14,2017, 

https· I /www.reuters.com /article /us~sensetime~fundra jsinfi~qualcomm /qualcomm-j nvests-in-chinese-ajfacial-recognitjon-startup-sensetime-jdUSKBN1DFOHE. 

15 William R. Hobbs and Margaret E. Roberts, "How Sudden Censorship Can Increase Access to Information," 

April 2, 2018, https: //www cambrjdge.org/core/journais/american-po!itical-science-reyjew/article/howsudden-censorship-can-increase-access-to-inforrnatjon/A913C96E2058A602F611DFEAC43506DB. 
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The constitutional changes enacted last month that removed term limits for President Xi 

jinping are a case in point. The sheer scale of the censorship and the content deleted points 

to a sizeable contingent of Chinese citizens who disagreed with the move. On February 25, 

when the pending change was first announced, data from Hong Kong University's 

Weiboscope project showed a spike in deletions on the popular Sina Weibo microblogging 

platform.l6 Much of the dissent emerged in the form of ridicule aimed directly at Xi. The 

combined weight of the term-limit announcement and the related censorship provoked 

concerns and resentment among a wide swath of Chinese citizens who might otherwise 

consider themselves apolitical. These people began expressing their worries about China's 

direction to acquaintances and looking for ways around censorship. Numerous foreign and 

Chinese observers noted the stunned reaction of many ordinary people to the news, using 

words like "shock," "betrayal," and "regression."17 A statement by overseas students 

describes how "even the least politically savvy people among our friends started to express 

their doubt, disapproval, and anger on social media."l 8 

A 2015 Freedom House report on the first two years of Xi's rule noted his early steps to 

dispense with various "survival strategies" and adaptations made by the party in the 

aftermath of prodemocracy protests and their violent suppression in 1989,19 Political 

scientists have credited those very strategies for the CCP's political longevity to date. Among 

them were forms of "containment" in which the party sought to limit both the scope of its 

repression and the blame for any abuses. For example, by decentralizing and diversifying 

policymaking via more collective leadership within the CCP, the party was able to blame 

shortcomings and even systemic abuses on lower-level officials or individual scapegoats, 

preserving its overall legitimacy. As Xi amasses personal power and the party increases 

control over state agencies as part of a government shake-up, however, the space for such 

plausible deniability shrinks. If (or perhaps when) a serious crisis erupts-in the economy, 

the environment, public health, or security-Xi and the party as a whole are more likely to 

be blamed by the public. Similarly, as the scope of repression and censorship expand to affect 

more and more people, the number of those feeling disillusioned, disempowered, or 

resentful toward the party is also likely to increase. 

16 Weiboscope, Hong Kong University, accessed April24, 2018, htqr //wejboscQpe jmsc.h!rn.hk/. 17 joanna Chiu, "Chinese grumble about 'emperor' as congress fetes Xi," Agence-France Presse, March 6, 2018, 

https: //sg.news,yahoo com/chinese-grumble-emperor-congress-fetes-xj-064458540.htm!. 18 Xi's Not My President, "The Future Lasts Forever," Medium, March 12, 2018, 

https://medjum.com/@xjsnotmypresjdent/the-future-lasts-foreyer-566b2cd?dtb7. 

19 Sarah Cook, The Politburo's Predicament: Confronting the Limitations of Chinese Communist Party 

Repression, Freedom House, january 2015, 

https· //(reedomhouse.org/sites/defaultlfiles/12222014 FH ChinaReport2014 E!NAL.pdf 
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Despite these costs and periodic Chinese government or tech company concessions to public 

outcries, it is hard to image any voluntary loosening of restrictions in the coming years. On 

the contrary, we are likely to see more tightening, more government demands for companies' 

cooperation, and more arrests of innocent users. 

Meanwhile, as China's global influence rises, the impact of CCP censorship, propaganda and 

the nuanced contestation surrounding it is also being felt beyond the borders of Mainland 

China.20 Alongside increased pressure on overseas media to self-censor, the Chinese 

government has also invested billions of dollars over the past decade to expand state media 

entities and state-affiliated educational institutes to dozens of countries around the world, 

actively attempting to influence global information flows and public discourse, particularly 

about China and how it is governed. Similar trends are affecting academia, the technology 

sector, and the performing arts, entertainment, and literary worlds. 

In the realm of surveillance, there are initial signs that some advanced technology and 

innovations are being shared with other undemocratic governments. On April 13, Reuters 

reported that Yitu, a Chinese artificial intelligence firm, recently opened its first international 

office in Singapore, and is preparing a bid for a government surveillance project that will 

include facial recognition software deployed in public spaces.21 Last week, Nikkei reported 

that Yitu had supplied "wearable cameras with artificial intelligence-powered facialrecognition technology to a local law enforcement agency" in Malaysia.22 Both countries are 

rated only Partly Free in Freedom House's global assessment of political rights and civil 

liberties, and their governments have a long track record of suppressing political opposition 

and peaceful protesters.23 

Recommendations 

The U.S. government and international community should be ready to respond to recent 

events and future trends. Earlier this week, as part of our China Media Bulletin project, 

20 Sarah Cook, The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party's Media Restrictions Affect 

News Outlets Around the World, The Center for International Media Assistance, National Endowment for 

Democracy, October 22, 2013, http:/lwww.citna,ned,org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CIMAChjna Sarah%20Cook,pdf, 21 Aradhana Aravindan and john Geddie, 'Singapore to test facial recognition on lampposts, stoking privacy 

fears," Reuters, April13, 2018, https·/lwww,reuters,com (article/us-sjngapore-surveillance/sjngapore-totest-facial-recognjtion-on-lampposts-stokinfi·prjyacy-fears-jdUSKBN1HKORV. 

22 CK Tan, "Malaysian police adopt Chinese AI surveillance technology," Nikkei, April18, 2018, 

https: //asja.njkkei,com /Business /Companjes /Chinas-startup-supplies-A!-backed-wearab!e-cameras-toMalaysian-police. 

23 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, january 2018, https: 1/freedomhouse,org/report/freedomworld/freedom-world-2018. 
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Freedom House launched a new resource section, which includes a comprehensive set of 

recommendations for the Chinese government, foreign governments, and societal actors like 

tech firms, media companies, philanthropists, and educators on how to support and advance 

free expression in China,24 The following are a few select recommendations most relevant to 

the" U.S. government: 

Public Policy and Diplomacy 

• Bilateral engagement: 

o Consistently raise the issues of press freedom and internet freedom in China 

publicly and in private meetings with Chinese counterparts, including at the 

highest levels. Stress that universal rights like free expression apply to China; 

o Note the negative impact of certain policies or laws on foreign companies and 

China's World Trade Organization commitments; 

o Urge the release of imprisoned journalists and free expression activists (see here 

for sample list); 

o Highlight the harm done to Chinese citizens when reporting on topics of public 

concern-like health, safety, and corruption-is constrained. 

• Responding to violations: 

o React with strong and immediate diplomatic action (press statements, phone 

calls, meetings, letters) to any violations of media freedom or free expression 

involving U.S. citizens or media outlets, including detentions in China, violence 

against journalists, restrictions on media access, blocking of websites, and efforts 

by Chinese diplomats to interfere with press freedom within the United States. 

o Press allies to take similar actions. 

• Targeted sanctions: 

o Impose targeted sanctions, such as travel bans and asset freezes, on individual 

Chinese officials involved in serious abuses against those who have exercised 

their right to free expression. 

• Role of the business community: 

o Press companies doing business in China to do no harm, whether it be turning 

private citizen data over to the Chinese government or providing surveillance or 

law enforcement equipment used by Chinese authorities to violate individual 

rights. 

Funding 

• Countering censorship: 

24 Freedom House, "China Media Bulletin Resources: Recommendations for policymakers, media, donors, nad 

others," accessed April24, 2018, https· !/freedom house org/contept/china-media-bulletinrecommendatjons-poljcymakers-and-medja. 
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o Support groups that develop and disseminate tools to enable Chinese users on a 

large scale to access blocked websites, including from mobile phones. 

o Create an emergency fund that can be activated quickly during moments of crisis 

or political turmoil to rapidly enhance the server capacity of circumvention tools 

facing increased demand from China as periodically happens when the number of 

Chinese people seeking uncensored information spikes. 

o Support efforts to monitor, preserve, and recirculate censored content within 

China, including news articles and social media posts that have been deleted by 

censors. 

• Overseas Chinese media: 

o Support independent or critically minded diaspora Chinese media and other 

offshore initiatives that aim to provide uncensored news and diverse political 

analysis to readers, viewers, and internet users inside and outside China. Such 

support can take the form of trainings, cybersecurity protections, or other forms 

of capacity building that are typically provided to independent media within 

foreign countries. 

o Ensure that such outlets are eligible for funding aimed at media freedom inside 

China, or consider allocating dedicated resources for these outlets. 

• Awareness raising: 

o Support research and outreach initiatives that inform Chinese audiences about 

the censorship and surveillance apparatus, imprisoned journalists and online 

activists, the regime's human rights record overall, and how democratic 

institutions function. Existing studies and surveys have shown that netizen 

awareness of censorship often yields a greater desire to access uncensored 

information, assist a jailed activist, or take steps to protect personal 

communications. 

Conclusion 

Despite the Chinese government's ever escalating efforts to censor and monitor citizens' 

access to information, steps like those cited above by the United States and other 

international actors can have a real-world impact, a dynamic Freedom House has observed 

repeatedly in our work. I have personally interviewed several prisoners who were the 

subject of rescue campaigns and testified to better treatment, less torture in custody, and 

sometimes early release thanks to international pressure. 

In addition, as part of the China Media Bulletin project, we have been working with partners 

who run circumvention tools like GreatFire's Free Browser or overseas Chinese outlets who 

gain traffic via tools like FreeGate and Ultrasurf. These channels garner millions of 
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impressions each month and bring tens of thousands of readers from inside China to the 

bulletin, many of whom stay on the page for long periods to read the content or subscribe to 

the newsletter directly. This is just one example of the eagerness with which a notable 

contingent of Chinese people are actively seeking out uncensored, credible information 

about their country and the media controls in place. 

Earlier this year, we conducted a survey among Chinese readers of the bulletin. The impact 

on their own behavior of gaining a better understanding of censorship and surveillance in 

China was palpable. Significantly, 55 percent of Chinese respondents reported being more 

careful when using Chinese social media applications after reading the bulletin and over 45 

percent reported making a greater effort to seek out uncensored information. In addition, 18 

percent of Chinese readers reported deciding to take some action to support free expression 

or an individual activist. 

From that perspective, I would like to conclude with a quotation from one of those readers 

as a testament to the importance of international support for free expression and access to 

information in China. 

lam a lower class worker in Chinese society and l don't speak English. An independent 

Chinese media like you, that does in-depth reports about the situation in China, gives me 

a better understanding of China's current situation and future development. And it also 

helped my personal life and work. On a macro scale, China is the largest authoritarian 

country in the world, the Chinese Communist Party oppresses its citizens, blocks 

information flows, and also threatens the existing world order. I think the flow of 

information and freedom of speech are very important to China's future development 

Birds in cages long to fly, even if we can't fly out now, hearing the chirping of birds 

outside can still give us hope and faith! 
47 

1 Australian journalists hold important information about the activities and Communist Party 

links of agents of influence in Australia that cannot be published without significant legal risk. 2 Nick McKenzie, Chris Uhlmann, Richard Baker, Daniel Flitton, ‘‘ASIO warns parties that 

taking China cash could compromise Australia,’’ Sydney Morning Herald, June 5, 2017. 3 Clive Hamilton, ‘‘Silent Invasion,’’ p. 78. 

4Peter Hartcher, ‘‘ ‘Icebreakers’: How Beijing seeks to influence the West,’’ Sydney Morning 

Herald, December 5, 2018. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CLIVE HAMILTON

My background is not in China studies but in politics and public policy. I decided 

to write ‘‘Silent Invasion: China’s Influence in Australia’’ in 2016 when it became 

obvious from newspaper reports that interference by the Chinese Communist Party 

in Australian politics is a serious issue that demands greater public awareness. 

Conversations with China experts soon established that the threat is more serious 

and deep-rooted than I had realised. Nevertheless, the scale and nature of the 

threat is one lay people need to understand. Since publication of ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ 

on February 26th of this year, it has become clear to me that many Australians 

have had an intimation that something is wrong and want it explained to them. 

When I formulated the idea of the book, Allen & Unwin, a highly respected independent publisher that had published eight previous books by me, could immediately see its importance and commercial appeal and we soon signed a contract. 

However, last November, as the finished manuscript was about to go to typesetting, 

Allen & Unwin notified me that it would not proceed with publication. The CEO 

wrote saying that, based on advice it had received, the company was reacting to ‘‘potential threats to the book and the company from possible action by Beijing.’’ He 

went on to write: ‘‘The most serious of these threats was the very high chance of 

a vexatious defamation action against Allen & Unwin, and possibly against you personally as well.’’ 

The company’s defamation lawyer had pointed out that it would not be possible 

to make textual changes to the book that would protect the company from vexatious 

legal actions by Beijing’s proxies in Australia, legal actions that would tie up the 

company in expensive legal action for months or longer. Compared to those of the 

United States, Australia’s defamation laws favor the litigant.1

Allen & Unwin believed that in addition to punitive legal actions, Beijing may retaliate by shutting down the company’s website with denial-of-service cyberattacks 

and by blocking access to printeries in China, where many books are printed. 

Why was Allen & Unwin so nervous? The company had been spooked by recent 

(and still current) defamation actions taken against major news organisations by 

‘‘whales,’’ a reference, I believe, to legal action taken by Chau Chak Wing, a Chinese-Australian billionaire resident in Guangdong, and Huang Xiangmo, a wealthy 

Chinese citizen residing in Sydney. (Both are discussed in ‘‘Silent Invasion.’’) Australia’s domestic intelligence agency, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), has warned the major political parties that they should not accept donations from these men because of their suspected links to the Chinese Communist 

Party.2

Chau Chak Wing claims that he was defamed in a 2016 story published in the 

Sydney Morning Herald and again in 2017 in a ‘‘Four Corners’’ television documentary program produced by the ABC and Fairfax (publisher of the Sydney Morning 

Herald). In their defense against Chau Chak Wing’s statement of claim, the ABC 

and Fairfax Media told the court there are reasonable grounds to believe that Chau 

Chak Wing ‘‘betrayed his country, Australia, in order to serve the interests of a foreign power, China, and the Chinese Communist Party by engaging in espionage on 

their behalf.’’ 3

Huang Xiangmo was for several years the president of the Australian Council for 

the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China, the peak United Front body in 

Australia, and in 2017 was at the center of the political scandal that led to the resignation of Senator Sam Dastyari. The Prime Minister has described Mr. Huang as 

‘‘an agent of a foreign country.’’ 4 He took legal action against the Herald-Sun newspaper (a News Corp outlet). 

It is difficult to know whether the defamation actions launched by these billionaires had political motives, but there is little doubt that they have had a chilling 

effect on reporting by news outlets in Australia, and now on the book publishing 

industry. It’s worth noting that in December 2017 an editorial in the People’s Daily 

in effect endorsed the use of lawfare abroad, another instance of the Chinese Communist Party exploiting the institutions of democracy to undermine democracy. 

Allen & Unwin’s decision to drop ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ citing fear of reprisals from 

Beijing was a spectacular vindication of the argument of the book. No actual threats 

were made to the publisher, which in a way is more disturbing. The shadow cast 

48 

5Phila Sui, ‘‘What’s the ‘dirty secret’ of Western academics who self-censor work on China?,’’ 

South China Morning Post, April 21, 2018. 6 In 1987 Sandy Grant was the publisher at Heinemann who defied the British government 

to publish ‘‘Spycatcher,’’ an expose ́ of MI6, by Peter Wright. In the celebrated court case, won 

by the publisher, Heinemann’s barrister was a young Malcolm Turnbull. 

by Beijing over Australia is now dark enough to frighten a respected publisher out 

of publishing a book critical of the Chinese Communist Party. (It’s worth remembering that for all the opprobrium heaped upon it, Allen & Unwin is a victim too.) 

My dismay was compounded as I realised that the shadow and Allen & Unwin’s 

fear of it had frightened off the rest of the publishing industry. Big publishers like 

Penguin, HarperCollins, and Hachette did not come knocking on my door, even 

though the spiking of the book had attracted headlines around the world. 

I worry about the message that has now been sent to China scholars: ‘‘If you write 

a book critical of the CCP you will have trouble finding a publisher, so censor yourself or play safe and write about Ming dynasty architecture.’’ China scholars have 

told me that they censor themselves in order not to jeopardise their visas to do research in China, and so protect their careers.5

Two independent publishers did express strong interest in ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ but 

pulled out, citing the same fear of payback. One was Melbourne University Press, 

the nation’s most prominent university publisher, a company of the University of 

Melbourne, by some measures Australia’s top-ranked university. Its Board took the 

unusual step of overruling its chief executive on a publishing decision. Sources close 

to MUP have told me that a factor in the Board’s decision was the anxiety of senior 

university executives about the potential impact of publication on the university’s 

lucrative revenue flows from Chinese students. 

Clearly, the situation is dire when a university press will not publish a scholarly 

book about the Chinese Communist Party for fear of punishment by the Party. 

Along with other instances of universities sacrificing intellectual freedom to ingratiate themselves with Beijing (detailed in the media and in my book), it is no exaggeration to say that Australian universities now tiptoe over eggshells to avoid any 

action that may offend Party bosses in China. 

If not for the courage and commitment to free speech of Sandy Grant, the principal of Hardie Grant, ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ may well have gone unpublished, which 

would have been a comprehensive victory for the Chinese Communist Party.6

# # # # # 

Recently, we have seen major Western publishers (Cambridge University Press 

and Springer) compromise academic freedom by censoring their publications at the 

insistence of Beijing. (CUP reversed its decision after an outcry.) They did so to 

maintain access to the Chinese market. In the ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ case the fear was 

not about what the CCP could do in China (cut off access to markets) but what the 

CCP could do in Australia (sponsor legal actions). As I detail in the book, the tentacles of the Party now reach into all of the important institutions in Australia. 

The spiking of ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ represents perhaps the starkest attack on academic freedom in recent Australian history. It attracted intense media interest and 

strong support from the public. As I searched for a publisher, some members of Parliament proposed publishing the manuscript in Hansard, both as a statement in 

defence of free speech and to give it legal protection under the laws of parliamentary 

privilege. 

However, throughout the saga one sector maintained a studied silence—the universities. No representative organisation (notably, Universities Australia and the 

Group of Eight) or prominent vice-chancellor made any kind of statement supporting me, a professor apparently being targeted by a powerful foreign state because of his work. Yet three months later, in a submission to a parliamentary inquiry into the proposed new foreign interference laws, Universities Australia bleated 

about the threat posed by the new laws to academic freedom. These are laws designed explicitly to prevent foreign powers from suppressing free speech, yet the 

universities were concerned about how they might harm the well-being of their 

international students and jeopardize their research collaborations. These collaborations presumably include the plethora of research links that Australian universities 

have with Chinese scientists doing military-related research in universities linked 

to the People’s Liberation Army, a phenomenon uncovered by my researcher Alex 

Joske and detailed in newspaper articles by us and reprised in ‘‘Silent Invasion.’’ 

Australian universities are now so closely tied into monetary flows and links with 

China that they have forgotten the founding principles of the Western university. 

The University of Sydney, for example, last year enrolled 25,000 international students, the majority from China. Numbers had doubled over four years and last year 

49 

7Matt Wade, ‘‘Degrees of risk: inside Sydney’s extraordinary international student boom,’’ 

Sydney Morning Herald, March 2, 2018. Compared to last year, enrollments from China at Australian universities have surged by 18 percent in 2018, totaling 173,000 (Tim Dodd, ‘‘Chinese 

defy warnings and flock to Australian universities,’’ The Australian, April 18, 2018). 8 Andrew Clark, ‘‘Sydney Uni’s Michael Spence lashes government over ‘Sinophobic 

blatherings,’ ’’ Australian Financial Review, January 28, 2018. 9https://www.policyforum.net/an-open-letter-from-concerned-scholars-of-china-and-thechinese-diaspora/. The organizer of the letter was Dr. David Brophy, a lecturer at the University of Sydney, who had just written a scathing review of ‘‘Silent Invasion.’’ He denounced it 

as a ‘‘McCarthyist manifesto’’ and a ‘‘paranoid tome’’ that adds to ‘‘our all-too-rich library of 

Asian invasion fantasies.’’ Many of his arguments and expressions were reproduced in the letter. 10This claim is all the more extraordinary when made by David Brophy, whose work concentrates on the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, including their brutal suppression. His writings suggest 

that his anti-Americanism overwhelms his judgement. 11This claim, propagated by the CCP, is often repeated by elites, notably former prime minister Paul Keating, perhaps the foremost Australian apologist for CCP rule. Yet, as I write in 

‘‘Silent Invasion,’’ the Communist Party did not lift 600 million people out of poverty; it kept 

600 million people in poverty. It was only when the CCP lifted its foot off the neck of the Chinese people and permitted basic economic rights—the rights to own property, to set up a business, to move one’s residence, to work for whoever one liked—that the Chinese people could lift 

themselves out of poverty. 12https://m.huanqiu.com/r/MV8wXzExNzA5NjE0XzEzOF8xNTIyMjY3MjAw?pcl 

url=http%3A%2F%2Fworld.huanqiu.com%2Fexclusive%2F2018–03%2F11709614.html. 13https://www.policyforum.net/chinas-influence-australia-maintaining-debate/. 

generated Australian $752 million (US $570 million) in revenue.7 The University of 

Sydney’s Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Michael Spence, has claimed there is no evidence for 

Chinese government interference on his campus and labeled the mounting warnings 

by the government, based largely on ASIO reports, as ‘‘Sinophobic blatherings.’’ 8

Chau Chak Wing last year donated $15 million to the university, which will be used 

for a building named after Chau at the university’s front gates. 

# # # # # 

Publication of ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ has prompted an intense and at times rancorous 

debate within the community of China scholars in Australia. Some 50 ‘‘China scholars’’ (many of whom have no expertise in PRC politics) have signed an open letter 

in which they characterise expressions of concern about PRC influence as ‘‘the creation of a racialised narrative of a vast official Chinese conspiracy.’’ 9 They reject 

the proposed foreign interference laws because they ‘‘see no evidence . . . that China 

is exporting its political system to Australia.’’ Although no one has said that the 

CCP is exporting its Leninist party governing system to Australia, the evidence 

from a range of sources that the CCP is extending the operations of its influence 

and propaganda system to Australia is now overwhelming.10

There are none so blind as those who will not see. But why will they not see what 

Beijing is doing in Australia? One can only speculate. For the most part, I don’t believe they have been captured or are agents of any kind. They express their genuine 

convictions. They see Communist Party rule through rose-tinted glasses because 

they believe that, for all its faults, ‘‘the Party has lifted 600 million people out of 

poverty,’’ 11 or that the first priority must be to shield people of Chinese heritage 

in Australia from xenophobia, or that Australia’s institutions are too robust to be 

influenced in the ways suggested. For some, China is still seen through the lenses 

of a romantic Maoism; for others a visceral anti-Americanism makes them welcome 

a global challenger. 

The Global Times, the CCP’s nationalistic tabloid, warmly welcomed the intervention of these China scholars as proof that the debate over CCP influence in Australia is only ‘‘fanning the flames’’ of racial animosity.12

Those who signed the open letter divided themselves sharply from many other 

China scholars, some of whom composed a rival letter rejecting their substantive 

claims. Those in the second group ‘‘strongly believe that an open debate on the activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in this country is essential to intellectual freedom, democratic rights, and national security.’’ 13 They reject claims the 

debate is characterised by racism and note that it is led by a number of ChineseAustralian scholars. The letter then describes the kinds of subversive activities practiced in Australia by the CCP. 

Predictably, the Global Times wrote that those who signed the second letter are 

only stirring up trouble by supporting the government’s foreign interference legislation. 

# # # # # 

50 

14http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-21/australian-outspoken-about-communist-partydenied-entry-to-china/9573830. 15 Bill Birtles, ‘‘China cites Australian critics to trash Clive Hamilton’s controversial new 

book’’, ABC News online, March 2, 2018. 16Phila Sui, ‘‘What’s the ‘dirty secret’ of Western academics who self-censor work on China?,’’ 

South China Morning Post, April 21, 2018. 17Perhaps the leading exponent is mining billionaire Andrew Forrest, who seems to be on a 

one-man mission to ‘‘broker peace’’ using his top-level contacts in the Chinese Communist Party 

(see Michael Smith, ‘‘China ramps up anti-Australia talk as tensions surface,’’ Australian Financial Review, April 21–22, 2018). It’s not clear which element of Australian society he has appointed himself to acting for. In 2013 John Garnaut pointed out that Forrest had been targeted 

as a potential agent of influence by a PLA Liaison Department operation. An innocent abroad, 

Forrest’s key contact in Beijing turned out to be a lieutenant general in the PLA (‘‘Chinese military woos big business,’’ Sydney Morning Herald, May 23, 2013). 18Philip Matthews, ‘‘PM to follow up break-in at house of academic studying China’s power,’’ 

Stuff Politics, February 20, 2018. Australia’s foremost expert on United Front activity, Gerry 

Groot, has suggested that the burglaries may have been the work of triads acting on Beijing’s 

instructions (Martin McKenzie-Murray, ‘‘Inside China’s ‘united front,’ ’’ The Saturday Paper, 

March 3, 2018). The Communist Party’s use of criminal gangs is well known in Hong Kong and 

Taiwan. 

In March, the Australian Values Alliance, a group of Chinese-Australians opposed 

to Communist Party interference in Australia, organised a launch event for ‘‘Silent 

Invasion’’ at NSW Parliament House in Sydney. (It’s not clear how those accusing 

me of stoking anti-China sentiment explain away the enthusiastic support for the 

book from some segments of the Chinese-Australian community.) The organisers’ 

WeChat messages were censored from Beijing. A week after the launch one of the 

group’s leaders, John Hu, was deported from China when he arrived at Shanghai 

airport with his 80-year-old mother to scatter the ashes of his father.14 He was told 

he was getting off lightly; it would be much worse for him if he were allowed in 

and then taken into custody. The message to Chinese Australians was unambiguous. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman was asked by a Global Times journalist whether ‘‘Silent Invasion’’ was guilty of ‘‘inventing stories for malicious sensationalism, condemning the author for poisoning Australia-China relations for achieving fame.’’ 15 She duly trashed the book as ‘‘slander’’ and ‘‘good for nothing.’’ The 

Embassy in Canberra issued a similar spray, calling the book ‘‘racist bigotry’’ and 

a ‘‘malicious anti-China mentality.’’ 16

The condemnations of me and my book are but a small part of a much larger 

strategy to emerge in recent times. Beijing is ramping up its rhetoric against Australia in a calibrated campaign of psychological warfare. Beijing knows that it cannot bully the United Sates—in the current environment the consequences would be 

unpredictable and probably counterproductive—so it is instead pressuring its allies. 

Last week the PLA Navy challenged three Australian warships sailing through the 

South China Sea, simply for being there. It has scaled up its threats of economic 

harm unless Australia changes its ‘‘anti-China’’ path. This psychological warfare is 

only Stage 1, with real punishment to follow if needed. 

Yet there is no shortage of Beijing sympathisers and appeasers among Australia’s 

elite, calling on Australian politicians, scholars and commentators to ‘‘tone down the 

rhetoric,’’ 17 as if the current strain in the relationship were our fault rather than 

Beijing’s campaign of subversion, cyber intrusions and harassment on the high seas. 

Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has recently echoed this view. This self-criticism (reminiscent of the self-abasement sessions of the Cultural Revolution) looks 

like the 21st century’s version of kowtowing. When China’s Foreign Ministry calls 

for a return to ‘‘mutual trust,’’ it means a return to compliance. 

My New Zealand counterpart Professor Anne-Marie Brady has faced a harder 

time, as she is virtually alone in exposing CCP influence operations in that nation. 

In recent months both her office at the University of Canterbury and her home have 

been burgled, with the thieves ignoring valuables in favor of laptops and a passport.18 The government has asked its intelligence service to investigate. 

Expose ́s of United Front work, including Brady’s and my own, highlight something essential to understand about the CCP’s foreign influence and interference 

strategies. Their secretiveness and subtlety lend them a high level of deniability. 

Beijing’s strident and at times hysterical public commentary can obscure this fact. 

Shining a light on its tactics and activities makes it uncomfortable and liable to 

react with fury. 

# # # # # 

As a coda to this statement, it might be worth adding that after the Allen & 

Unwin story broke in November and reinforced by news of the Anne-Marie Brady 

51 

burglaries in February, I have had to take extensive measures to step up my personal security. The measures have been based on advice from top-level law enforcement and surveillance experts. The following are among the concerns and measures 

taken: 

• A suspicious stranger arrived outside my office building and sat for some hours 

using what a surveillance expert later suggested may have been a ‘‘sniffer’’ phone, 

a device capable of picking up Wi-Fi and mobile transmissions. She also entered the 

building before suspicions were aroused. 

• This incident and one or two others led to the installation of CCTV cameras and 

a permanent ‘‘lock-down’’ of the office building. 

• Malware was found in ‘‘every nook and cranny’’ of my computers, requiring a 

scrubbing of hard drives, reinstallation of operating systems and adoption of advanced cyber protections. 

• People believed to be Chinese students were confronted after they were caught 

checking the contents of my unmarked pigeon-hole in a secure area of the National 

Library of Australia. 

• I have been provided with countersurveillance advice by experts, and security 

guards have been provided at my public appearances. 

I do not seek sympathy. But I am a citizen of a democratic nation that prizes free 

speech. It offends me that as a result of exercising my right to free speech by writing a book, it has been necessary to take these steps to protect myself from an authoritarian foreign power. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATRINA LANTOS SWETT

Good morning. I want to thank Senator Rubio and Congressman Smith for the 

invitation to participate in this hearing and I want to commend you both for convening a hearing on such an important topic. I would ask that my full testimony, 

including relevant correspondence between the Internet Freedom Coalition and the 

State Department, BBG, and Members of Congress be included as part of the hearing record. 

The French have a wonderful saying, ‘‘Plus c ̧a change, plus c’est la meˆme chose’’; 

the more things change, the more they remain the same. I could not help but think 

of this phrase as I prepared my remarks for today’s hearing. 

Over ten years ago, my late father, Tom Lantos, then Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, held a hearing that crystallized the sad truth about the 

devastating moral compromises so many major companies and countries, including 

at times, our own, are willing to make in order to appease the Chinese government 

and gain access to its vast markets. 

The Chief Executive of Yahoo, Jerry Yang, was in my father’s crosshairs that day 

over his company’s cooperation in giving up the identity of a dissident journalist, 

Shi Tao, to the Chinese authorities. After Yahoo disclosed his identity to the government, Mr. Shi was sentenced to prison for 10 years for the crime of engaging in prodemocracy activities. As these high tech billionaires and technological whiz kids sat 

before him, my father, who came to this country as a penniless Holocaust survivor 

from Hungary, said, ‘‘While technologically and financially you are giants, morally 

you are pygmies.’’ 

On that memorable occasion, Jerry Yang felt so ‘‘called out’’ by my father’s words 

that he actually turned around and publicly bowed in apology to Mr. Shi’s weeping 

mother, who was seated behind him. It was a dramatic moment, to be sure, but 

most episodes of cowardly kowtowing and quiet collaboration with the bullies, the 

censors, and the persecutors of the Chinese Communist Party occur without public 

comment or scrutiny. Furthermore, as today’s hearing demonstrates, China is not 

content with censoring and controlling its own citizens. It is using the immense 

power of its financial resources to reach every corner of the world in an effort to 

intimidate businesses, universities, publishers, hotel chains, religious institutions, 

human rights democracy activists, and even governments. It pains me to have to 

say this, but right now, China is succeeding in this effort to a shocking degree. Even 

more shocking, later in my remarks I will expose why I feel our government is doing 

far too little in the way of Internet freedom to truly help the people of China and 

other repressed regimes around the world. 

Two of my fellow witnesses this morning have had personal experiences with the 

long arm of Chinese government intimidation and their testimony is a cautionary 

and chilling tale. Just as my father did back in 2007, we must use the power of 

public naming and shaming to try and restrain the worst impulses of businesses, 

other organizations, individuals, and even our own government agencies who seem 

52 

all too willing to sell their precious birthright of free speech and democracy for a 

mess of Chinese pottage. 

To be clear, I think we all recognize that the Internet is not an unalloyed good 

when it comes to spreading ideas and expanding the borders of freedom and democracy. As Shakespeare so memorably penned, ‘‘The web of our life is of a mingled 

yarn, good and ill together.’’ It is analogous to our intricate system of modern transportation. While we recognize that it contributes to pollution, congestion, disrupts 

the environment, and of course, makes possible terrible accidents involving injuries 

and fatalities; nonetheless, it is the indispensable circulatory system that makes 

possible our modern world of travel and commerce. Similarly, the Internet, despite 

its ability to spread hate, disrupt elections, and propagate fake news, is indispensable to our modern system of global communication. And as such, it is central to 

freedom of expression everywhere in the world. 

That is why there was so much enthusiasm and energy eight years ago when then 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a landmark speech on Internet freedom. 

I was sitting in the audience that day and felt the surge of optimism as our nation’s 

top diplomat laid out a robust vision of America’s central role in tearing down what 

Secretary Clinton referred to as ‘‘the Berlin Wall of our digital age.’’ Remember, I 

am the daughter of the only member of Congress who personally experienced the 

horrors of living under fascism of the right, the Nazis, and the totalitarianism of 

the left, the Communists. It is in my DNA to resist these authoritarian efforts to 

control free, uncensored access to knowledge and I’m pretty sure, Senator Rubio and 

Congressman Smith, that it is in your DNA too. 

The year after that speech, the Lantos Foundation played a leading role in redirecting a good part of our government’s spending on Internet freedom to the BBG. 

Prior to that, almost all funding was inside the State Department, and frankly, it 

led to situations where China was able to deftly use the U.S.’s efforts to open the 

Internet and circumvent their ‘‘Great Firewall’’ as a diplomatic bargaining tool. 

Clearly, as a human rights organization, we believe that access to the Internet is 

a modern human right that should not be bargained away, so we sought a ‘‘safer’’ 

home for the funding and felt the BBG had enough independence to play a leading 

role in opening the Internet across the globe. 

In the early years of this adjustment in the way our government funded anti-censorship tools, Internet freedom initiatives were not perfect, but our government was 

funding a number of technologies to provide open access and we were moving in the 

right direction. Today, it pains me to have to sit before you and express my deep 

disappointment and frustration with the actual results and current commitment of 

our country’s Internet freedom policy. I’ve heard it said that if China herself had 

been in charge of America’s Internet freedom policy, it could hardly have been more 

favorable to China’s interests. That is an extraordinarily harsh assessment, perhaps 

harsher than I myself would subscribe to, but let me tell you why I think it is not 

far off the mark. 

Perhaps the single most stunning example of the lengths to which China will go 

to create an information prison is the ‘‘Great Firewall,’’ a massive government censorship apparatus that has been estimated to cost billions of dollars annually and 

to employ some two million people to police the Internet use of its citizens (Foreign 

Policy Magazine, July 2017). For this reason, many of us have long believed that 

firewall circumvention technologies must be a key component of any effective Internet freedom strategy. Since 2011 the Lantos Foundation, as part of a broad Internet 

freedom coalition, has urged Congress to direct the State Department through DRL 

and the BBG to provide robust funding to field-tested, scalable circumvention technologies. Recognizing that these technologies have the potential to provide safe and 

uncensored access to the Internet for literally hundreds of millions of people in 

China and in other closed societies around the world, Congress has responded. In 

every recent appropriation bill, Congress has included language directing that not 

less than $50 million be spent to fund Internet freedom programs including specifically, firewall circumvention technology. This simply has not happened. Call it willful ignorance, call it bureaucratic intransigence and obfuscation, call it what you 

will, but in my view, both the State Department and the BBG have failed to faithfully implement the clearly expressed intent of Congress, that significant resources 

be dedicated to these large-scale firewall circumvention technologies that China 

most fears. They have funded freedom festivals and trainings and small-scale technologies that are more directed to driving traffic to their own platforms (in the case 

of the BBG) than giving free, unfettered access to the vast world of the Internet for 

the hundreds of millions of people trapped behind the digital curtain. They fund privacy and security apps that are very important for safety while on the Internet, but 

they forget that many cannot even access the Internet. Meanwhile, some of the most 

effective, proven technologies, the ones China fears the most, technologies that proVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:25 Dec 16, 2018 Jkt 081003 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\DSHERMAN1\DESKTOP\VONITA TEST.TXT DAVID
53 

vide unfettered access to all, have received only modest funding and have had curious barriers placed in their paths, making it difficult, if not impossible to qualify 

for the different grant proposals. 

The cost to U.S. interests of these failures at BBG and DRL were on vivid display 

during January of this year when protests broke out in Iran. Hundreds of thousands 

of Iranians took to the streets to protest economic hardship and the oppressive rule 

of the theocratic dictators. Among other repressive responses to this popular uprising, the Iranian government acted to block access to the Internet. Sadly, because 

the BBG had earlier cut off all funding to some of the most effective circumvention 

technologies, our ability to help provide access to the outside world for those brave 

Iranians was greatly limited. Only a single U.S. government-funded large-scale circumvention technology was available at this moment of crisis. I consider this an inexcusable dereliction of duty. 

I confess—I am baffled by the failure of both the State Department and the BBG 

to faithfully execute the directives that Congress has given them. When I have met 

with representatives at both agencies, they reassured me of their deep commitment 

to the goal of broadening access to Internet freedom and of the intensity of their 

efforts to do so. The rhetoric is pleasant enough, but their words are not matched 

by their deeds. When our coalition has attempted to drill down and get real facts 

about where they are directing their resources and why they are not funding proven 

technologies, we are most often met with obfuscation, opacity, and unfulfilled promises. During the midst of the Iranian protests, I met with the top leadership at the 

BBG and they personally pledged to me that within three to four weeks at the most, 

funding would be granted for technologies that could make access available to vastly 

increased numbers of users around the world. More than three months have passed 

since those meetings, and not only has no funding been approved, but the latest indications are that no additional funding will be granted for the foreseeable future. 

To say that our Internet freedom coalition is frustrated by this pattern would be 

an understatement. 

I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the bureaucrats at DRL and the 

BBG are relying on what they think is Congress’s inadequate attention span and 

limited expertise to get away with this pattern of ignoring Congress’s clearly expressed intent when it comes to funding robust firewall circumvention technologies. 

What arrogance! I am hoping and praying that you will prove them wrong. 

This issue, Internet firewall circumvention, desperately needs champions in the 

Congress. We need leaders who will be vigilant and vigorous in demanding accountability from the agencies responsible for executing our government’s Internet freedom policies; leaders who will not be beguiled by soothing words, and rather than 

accept heartfelt protestations of good intentions, will demand results. Above all, we 

need leaders who know that we must not pacify the oppressors but instead fortify 

and strengthen the brave dissidents and ordinary Chinese citizens who are risking 

everything in their pursuit of freedom. In other words, we need leaders who are not 

moral pygmies, but rather moral giants. I know that both of you are the kind of 

leaders we need. The Lantos Foundation, along with our Internet freedom coalition 

partners, stand ready to assist you in any way possible. 

Thank you. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH

China has the world’s largest number of internet users as well as the world’s most 

sophisticated and aggressive internet censorship and control regime. The Chinese 

government, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, views digital controls as necessary 

for its political stability and control of core digital technologies as necessary for its 

economic future. 

The Chinese government spends $10 billion on maintaining and improving their 

censorship apparatus. The U.S. government has an annual internet freedom budget 

of $55 million and Congress still has little idea how this money is spent. 

Over the past year or so, Chinese companies were ordered to close websites that 

hosted discussions on the military, history, and international affairs, and crack 

down on ‘‘illegal’’ VPNs (in response, Apple was forced to remove VPNs from the 

China app store). New regulations were announced restricting anonymity online and 

the Chinese government rolled out impressive new censorship technologies, censoring photos in one-to-one WeChat discussions and disrupting WhatsApp. Beijing 

has also deployed facial and voice recognition, artificial intelligence, and other surveillance technologies throughout the country, but particularly targeting the Uyghur 

ethnic minority, where between 500,000 and 1 million Uyghurs have been detained 

arbitrarily. 

54 

The Chinese government and Communist Party’s attempts to enforce and export 

a digital authoritarianism pose a direct threat to Chinese rights defenders and ethnic minorities and pose a direct challenge to the interests of the U.S. and the international community. 

The U.S. must recognize that we are engaged in a battle of ideas with a revitalized authoritarianism—online, in the marketplace, and elsewhere—and we need to 

up our ‘‘competitive game’’ to meet the challenge. 

The Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) says quite clearly that the 

Chinese government and Communist Party (along with Russia) seek to ‘‘challenge 

American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security 

and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to 

grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies 

and expand their influence.’’ 

The NSS also states that ‘‘China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its 

political and security agenda. . . . China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled 

scale and spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the 

use of surveillance.’’ 

The Chinese government and Communist Party want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests and to export their economic, political, and censorship models globally. 

In response, the U.S. and like-minded allies must stand resolutely for freedom of 

religion, fairer and freer trade, labor rights, freedom of navigation, the rule of law 

and freedom of expression—including online. 

A coherent and engaged internet freedom strategy must be a critical part of the 

U.S. diplomatic toolbox. This strategy should have at its core a commitment to protect fundamental freedoms and privacy, and promote the free flow of news and information. 

But it is not a matter of just having a strategy—it should be the right one. The 

Bush and Obama Administrations pursued cyber diplomacy, yet internet freedom 

has declined around the world, privacy is increasingly under threat, and the free 

flow of information has become more endangered. 

The right strategy must start with some humility. Cyberspace is a place to spread 

democratic ideals and a place where criminals, extremists, corporations, traffickers, 

and governments exploit vulnerabilities with impunity. Online communication can 

convey our highest ideals and our worst fears. It can shine a light on repression and 

be the source of hatred, manipulation, fake news, coercion, and conflict. It can bring 

people together or push us apart. 

Despite all this, I agree with the NSS’s conclusion which says, ‘‘The Internet is 

an American invention, and it should reflect our values as it continues to transform 

the future for all nations and all generations. A strong, defensible cyber infrastructure fosters economic growth, protects our liberties, and advances our national security.’’ 

Central to a revitalized U.S. internet freedom strategy should be a priority to 

open gaping holes in China’s Great Firewall. I’m just not confident that this is the 

policy of the Broadcasting Board of Governors or the State Department right now. 

I think there are certain goals we should prioritize in our internet freedom strategy regarding China: 

(1) China’s netizens require easy, reliable, and free access to uncensored information through anti-censorship technologies, so that anybody can freely 

access information regardless of their technical ability. Reliable solutions 

should work all the time, regardless of intensified crackdowns or major 

events (Party Congress, June 4th anniversary) taking place in-country. 

(2) Solutions should also present difficult choices for the Chinese authorities. If the authorities want to disrupt these solutions, then they must disrupt many online services which they would normally be hesitant and unlikely to block. 

(3) Access to solutions should also come at no cost to Chinese netizens. The 

Chinese authorities often block access to payment providers, so even if Chinese can afford a circumvention solution, they cannot get past censorship 

by their payment provider. 

(4) Holistic anti-censorship solutions should be encouraged, including not 

just technical circumvention but also distribution of those tools (getting 

around Google Play being blocked, and censorship in the Apple App Store) 

as well as helping users share anti-censorship tools, as well as content, 

through messaging apps, social networks, and QR codes. 

55 

These are just a few starting principles. I am open to a conversation about these 

goals with experts and allies. But given the stakes and possible outcomes, moving 

quickly to fund and distribute anti-censorship technologies should be a priority. 

The future safety and prosperity of our grandchildren—in the U.S. and China 

alike—may very well depend on ‘‘open, interoperable communications online, with 

minimal barriers to the global exchange of information, data, ideas, and services.’’ 

56 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

LETTERS SUBMITTED BY KATRINA LANTOS SWETT


30233.011
57 


30233.012

In that regard, we cite the Conference Report for the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 

1999, covering its decision to sunset the United States Information Agency. In so doing, the Conference 

Report described the imperative need to separate the government's policy making and information 

dissemination functions and to assign them to different agencies. Congress thus created the Board of 

Broadcasting Governors to assume the information dissemination function while properly leaving policy 

making and public diplomacy responsibilities to the State Department, and we believe that this policy 

should be implemented in the present circumstance. We further believe that the current arrangement 

which makes the State Department responsible for digital information dissemination while the BBG is 

responsible for radio wave information dissemination impairs efficiency, accountability, and oversight. 

Today's bifurcation of responsibility between overlapping modes of information transmission should be 

ended. For these reasons, we hope that the USIA policy precedent will be implemented at Congress's 

first opportunity; the fact that the Department has not complied with the FY I 0 mandate and earlier 

Internet freedom appropriations makes this implementation critical. 

That said, we wish to associate ourselves with Secretary Clinton's two major Internet freedom addresses 

and to note that there are Internet freedom policy initiatives beside firewall circumvention that the United 

States should pursue and that the State Department is best equipped to pursue. We would encourage 

Congress to work with senior State Department officials to achieve rapid support for other major 

initiatives to advance Internet freedom in the world's closed societies. 

We commend the House and Senate for their leadership actions taken in calling for the transfer ofFY I 0 

Internet ti·eedom funds from the State Department to the BBG. In particular, we applaud the Senate 

Appropriations Committee's recent decision in the FY II Continuing Resolution which provided that 

·'not less than $15,000,000" of the FY 10 Internet freedom appropriation "shall be" transferred from the 

State Department to the BBG. Particularly because the State Department can and already hastransferred prior Internet freedom appropriations to BBG as an act of policy discretion, we hope that 

Congress will call upon the Department to transfer these funds immediately without waiting for further 

negotiations. Prompt action will empower millions of citizens in closed societies to have uncensored 

access beyond the "digital curtain" they currently live behind. 

We stand ready to discuss this urgent matter with you at your earliest convenience. 

Sincerely, 

~:;;;# Katrina Lantos Swett 

President, Lantos Foundation 

Ammar Abdulhamid (Syria) 

Founder and Executive Director, Tharwa Project 

Aung Kyaw Oo (Burma) 

Director, Free Burma Federation 
58 


30233.013

Frank Calz6n (Cuba) 

Executive Director, Center for a Free Cuba 

Ambassador James Cason (Cuba) 

President, Centerfor a Free Cuba 

Amir Abbas Fakhravar (Iran) 

Secretary General, Confederation of Iranian Students 

President, Iranian Freedom Institute 

Abolfazl Eslami (Iran) 

Iranian Defected Diplomat, Board Member of Green Embas.sy Campaign 

Fang Zheng (China) 

Student, I989 Tiananmen Democracy l'vfovement 

Feng Congde (China) 

Founder, 64memo.com 

Angel De Fana (Cuba) 

Director, Plantados (Planted Until Freedom and Democracy in Cuba) 

Bob Fu (China) 

President, China Aid 

Hu Ping (China) 

Editor in Chief, Beijing Spring 

Huang Liping (China) 

Director, Foundation for China in the 2 r' Century 

Rebiya Kadeer (Uyghur) 

President, World Uyghur Congress 

Sa ghar Erica Kasraie (I ran) 

Spokesperson, Confederation of Iranian Students 

Sam Kim, Esq. (Korea) 

Executive Director, Korean Church Coalition for North Korea Freedom 

Lin Muchen (China) 

President, Chinese Democracy Education Foundation 
59 


30233.014

Huber Matos (Cuba) 

Center for a Free Cuba 

Wong Min (China) 

General Secretary, Alliance for a Democratic China 

DL Binh Nguyen (Vietnam) 

President, International Federation for the Protection of Prisoners of Conscience 

Committee to Support the Non- ViolenT Movement for Human Rights in Vietnam 

Dr. Nguyen Dinh Thang (Vietnam) 

Executive Director, Boat People SOS 

Helen Ngo (Vietnam) 

Chair, Committee for Religious Freedom in Vietnam 

Richard Saisomorn (Laos) 

Pres idem, Laotian New Generation Democracy Movement 

Yang Kuanxing (China) 

Editor in Chief, Yibao £-Magazine; Charter 08 Co-Author 

Yan Jiaqi (China) 

Former President, Federation for a Democratic China; Charter 08 Original Signatory 

II I on the Chinese government's Tiananmen 21 wanted list 

Dr. Yang Jianli (China) 

President, Initiatives for China; Charter 08 Signatory 

Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School of Government 

Zhang Xiaogang (China) 

Director, Initiatives for China; Charter 08 Original Signatory 

Chai Ling (China) 

President. Janzabar, Inc 

Tiananmen 21 wanted list 

Zhou Fengsuo (China) 

Co-founder, Humanitarian China 

Tiananmen 21 wanted list 

Zhang Qianjin (China) 

Pastor. San Francisco Bay Area Reformed Church 

Zhou Jian (China) 

President, Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars 

Wang Youcai (China) 

Co-President, China Democratic Party 
60 


30233.015

(:ongress of tl)e ltntteb ~tates 

lrltlas1Jinqton. i:ll£ 20510 

Strategy and Budget Committee 

Broadcasting Board of Governors 

330 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20237 

To the Committee: 

April 10,2013 

Attention: Committee Members Meehan and Ashe 

As senior Members of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, we 

write to express our concern with the Board's anti-Internet censorship determinations. 

Specifically, we believe that the current fiscal year's post-sequester allocation ofless than 

2% of the BBG budget for this function represents a underinvestment in one of the most 

cost-effective means of satisfying BBG statutory obligations and peacefully advancing 

United States national interests. In our view, one that is repeatedly confirmed by the 

expressions and actions of the world's closed society regimes, the BBG's failure to 

adequately support field tested Internet firewall circumvention systems or invest in antiInternet censorship research and development, will allow closed society regimes to 

enhance their security and isolate hundreds of millions of people from each other and the 

outside world. 

The BBG's failure in this regard also ignores the repeated views of Congress, first 

expressed in report language of the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Appropriations Act of 2008, that "ensuring the freedom of Internet communication in 

dictatorships and autocracies throughout the world is a high and critical national interest 

priority of the United States." 

Further, we agree with the statement on the BBG website that "[y]ounger 

demographics, the availability of new technologies, and increased competition are 

collectively driving significant changes in audience behavior and media consumption." 

In sum, we believe that the Internet is the ultimate instrument of freedom, and thus 

believe that the BBG should vigorously challenge efforts of closed society regimes to use 

the Internet to deny it. We also understand that the development of firewall 

circumvention systems provoke asymmetric expenditures on the part of regimes seeking 

to maintain Internet firewall systems, which is yet a further basis of our concern on the 

Board's seeming low priority as it relates to Internet circumvention. 

For these reasons, we believe the BBG budget for anti-Internet censorship 

activities should be no less than 10% of its overall budget, divided equally between 

expanded operational support for what previous Appropriations Acts have defined as 
61 


30233.016

"Held tested programs that provide unmonitored and uncensored access to the Internet for 

large numbers of users living in closed societies with acutely hostile Internet 

environments," and for research and development purposes. 

We also note that past BBG funding decisions, and comments by Board Members 

and senior BBG staff, indicate that modest increases in anti-Internet censorship 

allocations could permit breakthrough Internet freedom developments before the end of 

the current fiscal year. Specifically, we note that such developments could include safe 

and unmonitorcd town hall meetings with the participation of large numbers of Iranians 

inside and outside the country, and comparably safe participation in worship services by 

house church members in China. We further note indications that increased support 

might also allow participation in those events via mobile device technology. If true, these 

developments could be of a historic character and would satisfy the congressionally 

expressed view that "the [Appropriations] Committee supports [BBG] efforts to counter 

Internet censorship imposed by China and Iran." They would also fulfill the President's 

2012 Nowruz pledge to challenge "the electronic curtain that is cutting the Iranian people 

off from the world," and his pledge to advance "a basic freedom for the Iranian people: 

the freedom to connect with one another and the rest of the world." In addition, they 

would give meaning to Secretary Clinton's finding that "connection technologies like the 

internet and social networking sites should enhance individuals' ability to worship as they 

see tit, come together with people of their own faith, and Jearn more about the beliefs of 

others." 

We await an expression from the Board ofits readiness to rapidly and 

significantly increase its anti-Internet censorship allocation so as to bring its operations 

into line with 21st century technologies and imperatives. 

Thank you for your consideration of this request. 

cc: Richard Lobo, Director of the International Broadcasting Bureau 

Jeffrey Trimble, Deputy Director of the International Broadcasting Bureau 

Libby Liu, Chair, The Open Technology Fund 

Andres Mendes, Director of the Office of Technology, Services and Innovation 
62 


30233.017

June 5, 2013 

Chairwoman Barbara Mikulski 

Senate Appropriations Committee 

503 Hart SOB 

Washington, DC 20510 

Ranking Member Richard Shelby 

Senate Appropriations Committee 

304 RSOB 

Washington, DC 20510 

Chairman Harold Rogers 

House Appropriations Committee 

2406 Rayburn HOB 

Washington, DC 20515 

Ranking Member Nita Lowey 

House Appropriations Committee 

2365 Rayburn HOB 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Senate and House Appropriations Committee Members, 

We write in strong support of the Internet freedom initiatives described in the attached 

April 10 letter sent by Senator Roy Blunt and Congressman Frank Wolf to the Board of 

Broadcasting Governors [BBG], The Wolf-Blunt letter calls for peacefully advancing the 

interests of freedom throughout the world by modestly readjusting BBG budget priorities 

to provide greater support for programs permitting closed society residents to circumvent 

the Internet firewalls of their regimes. 

The BBG's current allocation of less than 2% of its budget to anti-Internet censorship 

activities represents a significant underinvestment of its resources all the more so 

because we know that existing firewall circumvention systems have achieved field tested 

success despite the lack of support they have thus far received. That such systems lack 

servers or sufficient numbers of dynamic lP addresses to allow their scalable designs to 

rapidly serve tens of millions of closed society residents is for us a matter calling for 

immediate remediation- as the Wolf-Blunt letter does. 

In taking this position, we are pleased to associate ourselves with the words of former 

Secretary of State Clinton, who noted that "connection technologies like the internet and 

social networking sites should enhance individuals' ability to worship as they see fit, 

come together with people of their own faith, and learn more about the beliefs of others." 

We likewise identify ourselves with the goal announced last April by President Obama, 

when he noted that "[t)he United States will continue to draw attention to the electronic 

I 9 Pleasant ~treet, Concord, NH O:'B01 Phone: 60.1.226.3636 Fax 603.226.3638 

\v\vw.lantosfoundation.org 
63 


30233.018

curtain that is cutting the Iranian people off from the world," and when he spoke of the 

need to "advance a basic freedom for the Iranian people: the freedom to connect with one 

another and with their fellow human beings."The goals set forth by the President and 

former Secretary Clinton are rapidly achievable, and we urge you to do so by adopting 

the modest yet far reaching steps called for in the Blunt-Wolfletter. 

As occurred when the Berlin Wall came down, we believe that a comparable chance to 

make history can occur by permitting the bypass of the Internet firewalls on which the 

world's dictatorships rely to isolate their people and, by their open admission, remain in 

power. The fact that this can be done without computer hacking like that now practiced 

against the United States by agencies of closed society regimes only makes the case for 

the Blunt-Wolf letter all the stronger. 

We respectfully and urgently request your support for the letter's recommendations. 

Very truly yours, 

rf1l dJ.:zr 

Katrina Lantos Swett 

President, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice 

Dr. Yang Jianli 

President. Citizen Power for China/Initiatives for China 

Hu Ping 

Editor, Be~iing 5'pring 

Sheng Xue 

President, Federation for a Democratic China 

Zhang Xiaogang 

Editor, China-£-Weekly 

Bob Fu 

Chairman, China Aid Association 

Fengsuo Zhou 

Past President, Chinese Democracy Education Foundation 

Ammar Abdulhamid 

President, Tharwa Foundation 

Ambassador James Cason 

President, Center for a Free Cuba 
64 


30233.019

Angel De Fana 

Director, Plantados Until Freedom and Democracy in Cuba 

Dr. Congde Fcng 

Founder, Dr. Sun Academy 

Chen Guangcheng 

Chinese Human Rights Advocate 

Sam Kim 

Executive Director, Korean Church Coalition for North Korea Freedom 

Binh N"guyen 

Senior Advisor, Human Rights for Vietnam 

Huber Matos 

President, Cuba Independiente y Democratica 

Richard Saisomorn 

President, Laotian New Generation Democracy Movement (LNGDM) 

/\lim A. Seytoff 

President, Uyghur American Association 

Hadi Ghaemi 

Executive Director, International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran 
65 


30233.020

ccHouse Appwprintions Cornmiltec Memhcrs 

Congressman C.W. Bill Young. Horida 

Congressman Frank R. Wolf. Virginia 

Congressman Jack King~ton. Georgia 

Congressman Rodney P. Frelinghuysen. New Jersey 

Congressman Torn Latham, hl\va 

Congrl.!ssman Rohcn B. Aderholt, Alabama 

Congresswoman Kay Granger. Texas 

CongreSsman Michael K. Simpson, Idaho 

Congressman John Abney Culberson, Texas 

Congressman Ander Crenshaw, Florida 

Congressman John R. Carter, Texas 

Congressman Alexander. Louisiana 

Congressman K{~ll Cali forma 

Congrcs:-.man .lt) Honncr. A!abama 

Congressman Torn Cole, Oklahmna 

Congressman Mario DJ<Iz-Balart. f;lorida 

Congressman Charles W. Dent. Pennsylvania 

(\lngrcssman Tom Graves, Georgia 

Congressman Kevin YoUer, Kansas 

Congressman Steve \Vomack. Arkansas 

Congressman Alan Nunnclcc. Mississippi 

Congres:-;man Nebraska 

Congressman Tom Rooney. 

Congres.'>man Chuck Fleischmann, Tennessee 

Congresswoman Jaime ffcrrcra Beutler. Washington 

Congressman David Joyce. Ohio 

Congressman David Valad.ao, California 

Congressman Harris, MD. Maryland 

Congresswoman Kaptur, Ohio 

Congressman Peter J. Visc!osky, Indiana 

Congressman Jose E. Serrano. New York 

Congresswoman Rosa I •. Dci.auro. Connecticut 

Congressman James P. Moran. Virginia 

Congressman Ed Pastor. Arizona 

Congressman David E. Price. North Carolina 

Congresswoman l.ucillc Roybal-Allard. California 

Congressman Sam Farr, California 

Congressman Chaka Fattah. Pennsylvania 

Congressman Sanford D. Bishop. Jr., Georgia 

Congresswoman Barhara I.cc, California 

Congressman Adam B. Schiff, California 

Congressman Michael M. Honda, Califomia 

Congresswoman Hetty McCollum, Minnesota 

Congressman Tim Ryan. Ohio 

Congress\:voman Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida 

Congressman Henry Cuellar. Texas 

Congresswoman Chellic Pingree, Maine 

Congressman Mike Quigley, ll1inois 

Congressman Bill Owens. New York 

Senate Appropriation Committee Members 

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Vermont 

Senator Tom Harkin, iowa 

Senator Patty Murray. ~'ashington 

Senator Dianne Feinstein. California 

Senator Richard J. Durhin. Illinois 

Senator Tim Johnson. South Dakota 

Senator Mary L Landricu, Louisiana 

Senator Jack Reed. Rhode Island 

Senator Frank R. Lautenherg. New Jersey 

Senator Mark Pryor, Arkansas 

Senator Jon Tester, Montana 

Senator Tom Udal!, New Mexico 

Senator Jeanne Shaheen. New Hampshire 

ScnatorJeiT Merkley. Oregon 

Senator Mark Begieh. Alaska 

Senator Thad Cochran. Misslsslppi 

Senator Mitch McConneL Kentucky 

Senator I .a mar Alexander, Tennessee 

Senator Susan Collins, Maine 

Senator Lisa Murkowski, Alaska 

Senator Lindsey Graham, South Carolina 

Smator Mark Kirk. Illinois 

Senator Dan Coats. lndiana 

Senator Roy Blunt, Missouri 

Senator .JeiTY Moran, Kansas 

Senator John Hocvcn, :'-lonh Dakota 

Senator Mike Johanns, Nebraska 

Senator John Boozman, Arkansas 
66 


30233.021

1Jlnitcd ~tatcs ~rnatc 

Broadcasting Board of Governors 

330 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20237 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510 

Apri19, 2014 

Dear Chairman Shell and Members of the Board: 

We write to follow up on an April 10,2013, letter to your Strategy and Budget 

Committee regarding internet firewall circumvention priorities at the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors (BBG). As signers to the original letter and additional members of Congress who 

have become stakeholders in this matter, we emphasize the critical need for the BBG to act 

quickly on the clear directives provided by Congress in PL113-76, the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of2014. 

As you know, PL 113-76, states that" ... up to $41,734,000 of the amount appropriated 

under this heading may remain available until expended for satellite transmissions and Internet 

freedom programs, of which not less than [emphasis added] $25,500,000 shall be available to 

expand unrestricted access to programs funded under this heading and other information on the 

Internet through the development and use of circumvention and secure communication 

technologies ... " 

Further, the accompanying report language requires the BBG to detail amounts planned 

for firewall circumvention in FY20 14, as well as to prepare a required spend plan. As noted in 

the report, the required plan would specifically outline the Board's use of funds to promote 

internet freedom globally. We urge the Board to quickly fulfill the requirements ofPL 113-76 

and take priority action offering the best prospect for major closed society firewall 

circumvention breakthroughs to take place before the end of2014. As an indication of the timesensitive action the Omnibus Act intended to achieve, we request a response from the Board 

indicating the BBG's timeline for implementing the law in this matter and notice if, for any 

reason, the Board would delay issuing firewall circumvention grants later than July 15, 2014. 

With respect to Congressional intent for use of funds, we strongly recommend that, of the 

allocation provided to the Board in support of internet circumvention technologies, no less than 

$20 million should be dedicated to support for scalable, field-tested operational systems, and no 

less than $5.5 million allotted to firewall circumvention research and development. Our view is 

in part based on the acknowledgement by senior Board officials that a grant of$20,000,000 

would be very likely to allow historic breakthroughs to take place this year. If additional funds 

are needed to achieve these breakthroughs, we note the Omnibus Act's "not less than $25.5 

million" allocation for that purpose. The Omnibus expressly dedicates "not less than" $25.5 

million to support of internet firewall circumvention. Those funds shall not be used for broadcast 

activities, and we expect Board compliance with this policy. 
67 


30233.022

The BBG's statutory mandate is to provide free and uncensored information to 

individuals living in closed societies. Congress has clearly made this issue a priority. Amnesty 

International U.S.A., the Lantos Foundation, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, the 

Southern Baptist Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, and the Religious Action Center for 

Reform Judaism have all written to Congress to clearly indicate their strong support. We urge 

you to take action on this critical matter and look forward to continuing to work with the Board 

to expand the free flow of information world-wide. 
68 


30233.023

June 8, 2016 

Speaker Paul Ryan 

United States House of Representatives 

1233 Longworth House Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi 

United States House of Representatives 

233 Cannon House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Congresswoman Kay Granger 

Chairwoman 

State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee 

1026 Longworth House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Congresswoman Nita Lowey 

Ranking Member 

State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee 

2365 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Esteemed Members of Congress, 

Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 

United States Senate 

317 Russell Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Minority Leader Harry Reid 

United States Senate 

522 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Senator Lindsey Graham 

Chairman 

State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee 

290 Russell Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Senator Patrick Leahy 

Ranking Member 

State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee 

437 Russell Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Today's closed society regimes openly acknowledge that Internet firewalls are the equivalent of 

the Berlin Wall and its barbed wire borders. It is currently within the power of the United States 

Congress, working through the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and the State 

Department's Economic Support Fund (ESF), to tear down the 21" Century's Berlin Wall and 

rapidly change the lives of millions of people. 

Leaders of authoritarian governments use cyber walls to isolate their people, limit free press, and 

deny political, cultural, and religious freedom. Furthermore, Internet controls are increasingly 

being used as a barrier to trade. Indeed, the United States Trade Representative recently labeled 

China's Internet restrictions a trade barrier that keeps US firms out of Chinese markets, 

providing a multibillion dollar protectionist advantage for Chinese companies. 
69 


30233.024

In the near future this can change and tens of millions of people could begin to have daily 

censor-ship free access to the Internet without additional dollars being spent. It is a matter of 

acting quickly to mandate that already approved BBG and State Department funds are allocated 

to support existing, field-tested Internet firewall and censorship circumvention technology. It 

should be noted that such technologies are currently being used by hundreds of thousands of 

individuals in China, Iran, Vietnam, and elsewhere to defeat efforts by their leaders to limit their 

freedom. However, lack of allocated funding for this technology means that only hundreds of 

thousands, rather than tens of millions, are able to take advantage of these vital freedom tools 

each day. 

Please consider these facts: 

• Key Members of Congress have called on the BBG to allocate "no less than I 0% of its 

overall budget" for anti-Internet censorship activities; 

• The BBG has admitted that fewer and fewer individuals access programming via shortwave 

radio, instead opting for the Internet. Estimated smartphone use in China and Russia is 58% 

and 48% respectively; 

• Because radio broadcasts are increasingly accessed using Internet platforms, it is critical to 

the BBG's core mission to increase its allocated spending for anti-Internet censorship 

activities so that BBG programming can reach its intended audience; and yet 

• The BBG's FY17 budget submission continues a baffling pattern of decreases in proposed 

spending for anti-Internet censorship activities: 

• FYI5: $17.5M out of$737M (2.4%) 

• FY16: $15M out of$749M ((2.0%) 

• FYI7 (proposed): $12.5M out of$777M (1.6%); 

• The BBG and State Department spending allocations for anti-Internet censorship activities 

have failed to reflect Congress' declaration that "ensuring the freedom oflnternet 

communication in dictatorships and autocracies throughout the world is a high and critical 

national interest priority of the United States"; 

• BBG and State Department spending has also failed to honor the repeated expressed intent of 

Congress, most recently in the "Consolidated Appropriations Act of2016", that "no less than 

$50,500,000 shall be made available for programs to promote Internet freedom globally." 

• Out of the funds that the State Department spends on "Internet Freedom," it is 

estimated that less than $3 million was spent on Internet firewall and censorship 

circumvention technology. 

• In FY17, the BBG is only requesting $12.5 million for its "Internet Freedom" and 

"Anti-Censorship" activities, and less than this amount is proposed for actual Internet 

firewall and censorship circumvention technology. 

It is very important that spending for Internet Freedom be directed towards the proven field 

tested Internet firewall and censorship circumvention technology that is responsible for the actual 

opening of the Internet in closed societies. We are confident this allocation of funds can be 

achieved without compromising any of the vital operations the BBG or the State Department are 

currently engaged in. This conclusion is supported by a GAO study which found that nearly 20% 

of the BBG budget is spent for "inefficient and duplicative" purposes, mainly from overlapping 

language services between various networks. 
70 


30233.025

We believe the historic expansion of uncensored access to the Internet in fulfillment of the intent 

of the US Congress is within reach. The following mandate added to the FY 17 State/Foreign 

Operations Appropriations Act would ensure the needed mandatory funding without spending 

additional dollars or compromising current programing. We recommend that Congress include 

language in FY 17 State/Foreign Operations Appropriations Act mandating that: 

• No Jess than 10% ($77 million) of the BBG's requested budget should be allocated for the 

express purpose of supporting Internet firewall & censorship circumvention activities; and 

• The State Department shall transfer from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) no Jess than 

$38.5 million to support the BBG in fulfilment of this mandate; and 

• No Jess than $20 million of the mandated ($77 million) sum should be let as contracts by the 

BBG in FY 2017 to increase the system capacity and blocking resilience of existing field 

tested Internet firewall & censorship circumvention systems to achieve order of magnitude 

increases in closed society Internet access during calendar year 2017. 

Mandatory yearly budget allocations at these levels have the very real potential to provide safe 

uncensored access to the Internet in closed societies for 25 million users per day. These estimates 

are confirmed by senior technology staff at the BBG as well as the developers of the most 

successful censorship circumvention software currently contracting with the BBG. 

In recognition of and respect for America's historic role in expanding freedom and with a 

profound hope that America will continue to fulfill this role in the future, we earnestly ask that 

you act without delay to take the steps necessary to dismantle the Berlin Wall of the 21" Century. 

We look forward to meeting with you and other Congressional leaders to discuss this and the 

related work needed to bring about this crucial change. 

CHINAaid 

)(1 if<~ li}J 1#} ~ 

Respectfully, 

~d)(:;llr 

Katrina Lantos Swett 

President, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice 

BobFu 

Chairman, China Aid 

Randel Everett 

President, 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative 

Honorable Frank Wolf 

Former Member of Congress; Distinguished Sr. Fellow, 21st Century 

Wilberforce Initiative 
71 


30233.026

Co-Signing Organizations: 

ii'BUA 

The Commi"~UI' for 

H11mon Rlghh in North Korea 

~~r;:J~~i-i':!~l 

Ayaan Hirsi Ali 

Founder, AHA Foundation 

Chai Ling 

Founder, All Girls Allowed 

Dr. Rene Maciel 

President, Baptist University of the Americas 

Chen Guangcheng 

Founder and Executive Director, Chen Guangcheng Foundation 

Zhang Mingxuan 

President, China House Church Alliance 

Chinese Christian Citizen Journalist Association 

(Name withheld for security purposes) 

Chinese Christian Human Rights Lawyers Association 

(Name withheldfor security purposes) 

Greg Scarlatoiu 

Executive Director, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) 

Dr. Robert Cochran 

Executive Director, District of Columbia Baptist Convention 

James C. Denison, Ph.D 

President, Denison Forum on Truth and Culture 
72 


30233.027

~TBU Dr. Blair Blackburn VA . . President, East Texas Baptist University EAST TFXAS SAT'T!ST U 1\ ! v ~ R ) ! l Y 

0 

'" first baptist 

HOTEL RWANDA 

lnitiatives/iJr 

,. .. , 

Dr. Russell Moore 

President, Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern 

Baptist Convention 

Dr. Andy Davis 

Pastor, First Baptist Church, Belton, TX 

Paul Rusesabagina 

Founder, Hotel Rwanda Rusesabagina Foundation 

Dr. Yang Jianli 

President, Initiatives for China 

IIIII'NSTITUTEOF MODERN RussiA Pavel Khodorkovskiy 

President, Institute of Modern Russia 

Rebiya Kadeer 

President, International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy 

Foundation; 

President, World Uyghur Congress 

Irshad Manji 

Founder, Moral Courage Project 

Dr. Yang Sen-Hong 

President, Taiwan Association/or China Human Rights 

OmerKanat 

Vice-President, Uyghur American Association 
73 


30233.028

Alim A. Seytoff, Esq 

Director, Uyghur Human Rights Project 

th :~~~i: d ., t Dr. Bruce Webb 

e woo 1an s 11rs . . A , r c 11 u c 11 Pastor, The Woodlands F1rst Baptist Church. Houston, Texas 

Co-Signing Individuals: 

Mort Abramowitz 

Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation 

Dr. George Bullard 

General Secretary, North American Baptist Fellowship 

Lisa Colacurcio 

Advisor, Impact Investments 

Rabbi Abraham Cooper 

Associate Dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center 

Dr. Nicholas N. Eberstadt 

Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute 

Getaneh Getaneh 

Founder, Watch & Pray Ministries 

Katharine Gorka 

President, Council on Global Security 

Dr. Rick Grant 

Pastor, First Baptist Church, Benton, AR 

Kevin Jessip 

President. Global Strategic Alliance, Inc. 

Dr. Byron Johnson 

Distinguished Professor of the Social Sciences, Baylor University 

Dr. Douglas Johnston 

President, International Center for Religion & Diplomacy 
74 


30233.029

Ambassador Winston Lord 

Former Assistant Secretary for East Asia, Department ofState; former US. Ambassador to 

China; former President of the Council on Foreign Relations; former Chairman of the National 

Endowment for Democracy 

David S. Maxwell 

Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program, 

Georgetown University; Colonel, US. Army (Ret.) 

Kevin McCann 

General Counsel ofStrataScale, Inc. and Counsel to SHI International Corp. 

Faith McDonnell 

Director, Religious Liberty Program, Institute on Religion and Democracy 

Rabbi Ralph Mecklenburger 

Beth-El Congregation, Fort Worth, TX 

Andrew Natsios 

Former Administrator of USAID; Director of the Scow croft Institute of International Affairs; 

Executive Professor, The Bush School of Government & Public Service, Texas A&M University 

Rev. Brian O'Connell 

President & CEO, REACT Services 

Dr. Timothy Shah 

Associate Director, Religious Freedom Project, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World 

Affairs 

Dr. Gregory Stanton 

Founding President, Genocide Watch 

Joan Trew 

CRS, GRJ, SRES, Fort Worth, TX 

Dr. Darin Wood 

Pastor, First Baptist Church, Midland, TX 
75 


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CC: 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Committee on Appropriations, State and 

Foreign Operations Subcommittee 

Members: 

Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart 

Congressman Charlie Dent 

Congressman Ander Crenshaw 

Congressman Tom Rooney 

Congressman Jeff Fortenberry 

Congressman Chris Stewart 

Congresswoman Barbara Lee 

Congressman C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger 

Congresswoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz 

Congressman Jose Serrano 

U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Appropriations, State and Foreign 

Operations Subcommittee Members: 

Senator Mark Kirk 

Senator Roy Blunt 

Senator John Boozman 

Senator Jerry Moran 

Senator James Lankford 

Senator Steve Daines 

Senator Barbara Mikulski 

Senator Richard Durbin 

Senator Jeanne Shaheen 

Senator Christopher Coons 

Senator Jeff Merkley 

Senator Chris Murphy 
76 


30233.031

August 22, 2016 

Chairman Jeff Shell 

Broadcasting Board of Governors 

330 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20237 

Dear Chairman Shell, 

I appreciated the opportunity to speak with you last week. I was encouraged by our fruitful discussion 

about the central importance of expanding Internet freedom globally. 

With the close of the fiscal year approaching, it has come to our attention that the BBG may have a 

budgetary surplus and will soon decide how to distribute these surplus funds to its various projects and 

activities. Considering our shared conviction that a free Internet is fundamental to the fulfillment of the 

BBG's mission, we strongly urge the BBG to use any excess funds to further its support of Internet 

freedom technology. 

As you are well aware, the mission of the BBG is "to inform, engage, and connect people around the 

world in support of freedom and democracy." While this mission was effectively advanced by ensuring 

the free flow of radio transmissions in the 20'h Century, 21" Century communication norms demand that 

the BBG's mission include robust support for free access to news and information through independent 

online sources. Without uncensored access to the Internet, the BBG's mission to inform and engage 

people is compromised. Authoritarian countries, such as Russia and China, have long restricted access to 

the free and open Internet. By allocating supplemental year end funds to further the BBG's Internet 

Freedom initiatives, you will be advancing your entire mission by enabling increased access to internal 

programming and to other, independent news sources. 

The BBG should also use this opportunity to double down on its revitalized commitment to strengthen 

Internet freedom. Establishing the Office of Internet Freedom last December was an important step, and 

we look forward to working with Dr. Nnake Nweke to help ensure the success of the Office's mission. 

However, the fact remains that authoritarian countries around the world are outpacing the United 

States in their efforts to control the flow of information. Allocating surplus budget funds to the BBG's 

AIC account will be a good next step to help strengthen America's ability to counter the ever-evolving 

efforts of authoritarian regimes to block the free flow of information. 

To give one related example, China recently launched the world's first quantum communications 

satellite. Though this satellite is experimental, it gives that country an advantage when it comes to 

pioneering new forms of encrypted communication. Likewise, China is investing massive sums in 
77 


30233.032

Internet surveillance and censorship activity; the last confirmed budget, in 2003, was $800 million- it is 

undoubtedly much larger today. Clearly, China will pursue its anti-Internet freedom initiatives with 

increasingly sophisticated technologies. 

This is why the BBG's renewed focus on Internet freedom must be matched with increased funding for 

internet freedom technology, including a substantial portion for successful, field tested initiatives to 

counter authoritarian censorship. Given the magnitude of the challenge, the $12.5 million allocated for 

Internet freedom activities is clearly not enough. 

Countries such as Russia and China are determined to restrict the free flow of information to their 

respective citizens, but their propaganda can only work if they are successful in controlling the whole 

message. The BBG plays a vital role in ensuring that citizens in these countries are exposed to real and 

independent news, and we applaud you for your indispensable work. A key component of ensuring your 

continued success in this mission will be increasing the resources dedicated to the battle for freedom 

and human rights, which is being fought out on the Internet. 

For these reasons, and for the reasons outlined in our enclosed June 81etter to Congress, we 

respectfully request that the BBG budgetary surplus be allocated to the AIC account to support field 

tested technologies that will provide secure and free access to the Internet for millions of people living 

in closed societies. We are heartened by your strong support for this cause and look forward to your 

response. 

Sincerely, 

r{;trtJ~ 

Katrina Lantos Swett 

President, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice 

On behalf of members of the Internet Freedom Coalition 

Internet Freedom Coalition Co-Chairs: 

Randel Everett 

President, 21" Century Wilberforce Initiative 

Bob Fu 

Chairman, China Aid 

Katrina Lantos Swett 

President, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice 

Enclosure: Internet Freedom Coalition Letter 
78 


30233.033

February 22, 2017 

Congressman Harold Rogers 

Chairman 

State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee 

2406 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Congresswoman Nita Lowey 

Ranking Member 

State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee 

2365 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Esteemed Members of Congress: 

Senator lindsey Graham 

Chairman 

State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee 

290 Russell Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Senator Patrick Leahy 

Ranking Member 

State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee 

437 Russell Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Today's closed society regimes openly acknowledge that Internet firewalls are the equivalent of the Berlin 

Wall. It is currently within the power of the United States Congress, working through the Broadcasting Board 

of Governors (BBG), to tear down the 2151 Century's Berlin Wall and rapidly change the lives of millions of 

people. 

Leaders of authoritarian governments use cyber walls to isolate their people, limit free press, and deny 

political, cultural, and religious freedom. Furthermore, Internet controls are increasingly being used as a 

barrier to trade. Indeed, the United States Trade Representative recently labeled China's Internet restrictions 

a trade barrier that keeps US firms out of Chinese markets, providing a multibillion dollar protectionist 

advantage for Chinese companies. 

In the near future this can change and tens of millions of people could begin to have daily censorship free 

access to the Internet without additional dollars being spent. It is a matter of acting quickly to mandate the 

already approved BBG funds be allocated to support existing, field-tested Internet firewall and censorship 

circumvention technology. It shall be noted that hundreds of thousands of individuals in China, Iran, Vietnam, 

and elsewhere are currently using such technologies. However, lack of allocated funding means that only 

hundreds of thousands, rather than tens of millions, are able to take advantage of these vital freedom tools 

each day. 
79 


30233.034

Please consider these facts: 

Key Members of Congress have called on the BBG to allocate "no less than 10% of its overall budget" for 

anti-Internet censorship activities; 

The BBG's FY17 budget submission continues a pattern of decreases in proposed spending for antiInternet censorship activities: 

FY15: $17.5M out of $737M (2.4%) 

FY16: $15M out of $749M ((2.0%} 

FY17 (proposed): $12.5M out of $777M (1.6%); 

The BBG spending allocations for anti-Internet censorship activities have failed to reflect Congress' 

declaration that "ensuring the freedom of Internet communication in dictatorships and autocracies 

throughout the world is a high and critical national interest priority of the United States." 

We believe the historic expansion of uncensored access to the Internet in fulfillment of the intent of the US 

Congress is within reach. The following mandate added to the FY 17 State/Foreign Operations Appropriations 

Act will ensure the needed funding without spending additional dollars or compromising current programing: 

No less than 5% ($38 million) of the BBG's requested budget shall be allocated for the express purpose 

of supporting Internet firewall & censorship circumvention activities; and 

No less than $25 million of the mandated ($38 million) sum shall be let as contracts by the BBG in FY 2017 

to increase the system capacity of existing field tested Internet firewall & censorship circumvention 

systems; 

• The BBG shall hold a competition open to systems able to demonstrate an ability to achieve rapid, historic 

levels of closed society access to the Internet within the first months of the new Presidential appointee. 

Mandatory yearly budget allocations at these levels have the very real potential to provide safe uncensored 

access to the Internet for 25 million users in closed societies per day. These estimates are confirmed by 

senior technology staff at the BBG as well as the developers of the most successful censorship circumvention 

software currently contracting with the BBG. 

In recognition of America's historic role in expanding freedom, we earnestly ask that you act without delay 

to take the steps necessary to dismantle the Berlin Wall of the 21st Century. 

We look forward to meeting with you and other Congressional leaders to discuss these and the related work 

needed to bring about this crucial change. 

Respectfully, 

94$;;;;2-

Randel Everett 

President 

21" Century Wilberforce Initiative 

rpLd)tdlr 

Katrina Lantos Swett 

President 

Lantos Foundation for Human 

Rights and Justice 
80 


30233.035

August 7, 2017 

John F. Lansing 

CEO of the Board of Broadcasting Governors 

330 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20237 

Dear Mr. Lansing, 

We are part of a broad coalition of over 40 organizations who have previously advocated for a greater 

focus on Internet firewall circumvention technologies. With the recent news of increased global 

restrictions on Internet freedom, those of us signed have become increasingly concerned that the BBG is 

pursuing policies that could result in an ill-timed gap of access to currently used Internet firewall 

circumvention technologies. 

We are aware that late last year, Congress passed and President Obama signed a new law that 

substantially restructures the Broadcasting Board of Governors. This bi-partisan reform is aimed at 

streamlining BBG operations and empowering the agency responsible for our nation's crucially important 

civilian broadcasting operations, to more effectively fulfill its important mission in the digital age. 

As part of an updated 21" century mission, Congress has repeatedly urged the BBG to allocate an 

appropriate percentage of its funding to Internet freedom initiatives including firewall circumvention 

technologies. For some time this Congressional directive has been part of appropriations bills, most 

recently, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of2016 which called for "no less than $50,500,000 "to be 

made available for programs to promote Internet freedom globally. In addition, over the years, key 

leaders in Congress have reached out to the BBG to underscore the importance of adequate resources 

being directed to these purposes. 

Despite this clear congressional intent, the BBG has failed to allocate more than $17.5 million dollars (FY 

20 15) towards Internet freedom efforts and its most recent budget proposal lowered that paltry amount even 

further to $12.5 million for FY 2017. This pattern of ignoring Congress' guidance for nearly a decade is 

~oncerning to say the least. 

Most recently, our coalition has learned that the BBG is also making questionable decisions about how to 

1ward the meager Internet freedom grants they are presently making. In the current cycle it appears that the 

BBG is not seeking proposals for technologies that include dynamic firewall circumvention. It is our 

understanding that instead it is primarily requesting grants that utilize significantly less effective Web Proxy 

1nd VPN technologies. This at a time when it has been widely and credibly reported that China is moving 

1ggressively to shut down all VPN networks in the country. We are baffled and troubled by the decision to 

tocus almost exclusively on Web Proxy and VPN technologies when there are other technologies that have 

:eceived previous BBG and State Department funding and have proven to be much more effective. 
81 


30233.036

China is tightening the censorship noose around Internet freedom and it is vital that our government pursue 

an "all of the above" strategy to support a range of technologies and strategies that enable citizens in closed 

societies to freely and safe access the Internet. 

Our coalition is requesting that the BBG pursue an independent, outside review of their budgeting and 

contracting process at the BBG in order to clarifY how funding decisions are being made and to determine 

whether there are any institutional biases or patterns that might be leading to the flawed outcomes recounted 

above. Some of the questions that such an inquiry could answer include; who are the parties involved in the 

grant process; what criteria are being employed to determine how grants are awarded; what measures are 

in place to ensure compliance with Congressional intent; what evaluative procedures are used to assess the 

effectiveness of the work of different grantees. It is unrealistic to expect that BBG could properly answer 

these questions about its own performance. The GAO could conduct such an inquiry, or perhaps an 

organization like the congressionally chartered National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), 

which has experience with such inquiries and might bring a fresher perspective to the issues. In the interim, 

the BBG should continue to fund existing firewall circumvention grants, which have a proven track record 

of results. 

The work of the BBG and its various broadcasting entities remains vitally important. As just one example, 

Radio Free Asia and its Mandarin service has done an outstanding job of bringing uncensored news and 

perspectives to literally tens of millions of listeners in China. Nonetheless, the BBG must adapt to a new 

century and a new world in which growing numbers of people turn to the Internet as the most important 

source for unfiltered and uncensored information. As repressive societies seek to wall off their citizens 

behind so-called "great firewalls," it is up to the United States to help tear down these "Berlin Walls" of 

the 21" century by making unfettered access to the Internet a reality for millions around the world. With 

the right priorities and practices, the BBG can make this hopeful vision a reality and we believe an objective 

review of the Agency will help it to achieve this noble goal. 

Sincerely, 

Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett 

President, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice 

Dr. Randel Everett 

President, 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative 

CHINAaifl 

:x1$ltl llJJib- 0 

I ~h' Chen Gu:mgc:hcng h>w~ci,Hwn 

Initiatives/in· 

11\iM\WMI 

BobFu 

Chairman, China Aid 

Chen Guangcheng 

Founder and Executive Director, Chen Guangcheng Foundation 

Dr. Yang Jianli 

President, Initiatives/or China 
82 


30233.037

0 

Dr. Yang Sen-Hong 

President, Taiwan Association for China Human Rights 

Dr. Russell Moore 

President, Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern 

Baptist Convention 

Jubilee Campaign USA 

Sue Taylor 

Church ofScientology National Affairs Office 

Dr. Elijah Brown 

General Secretary, North American Baptist Fellowship 

Fang Zheng 

President, China Democracy Education Fund 

Zhou Fengsuo 

Founder and President, Humanitarian China 

Hu Ping 

Editor in Chief,' Beijing Spring Magazine 
83 


30233.038

April 30, 2018 

Senator Marco Rubio 

Chairman, Congressional Executive Commission on China 

Washington, DC 20515 

Congressman Christopher Smith 

Co-Chairman, Congressional Executive Commission on China 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Senator Rubio and Congressman Smith, 

I would like to thank you tor the opportunity to respond to a letter written by John Lansing, CEO of the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors, in response to my prewritten remarks for last Thursday's hearing. 

\Vhile the broadcast reach of the BBG may have extended under the leadership of Mr. Lansing, I must 

say that I tcmnd his rebuttal to be lacking in any tangible engagement or proof on the BBG 's part when it 

comes to the mission oftrue Internet Freedom. 

Mr. Lansing spends the bulk of his response providing data on audience share and page views for BBG 

services and reciting what he understands to be the BBG's Congressional mandate. Audience share has 

virtually nothing to do with Internet Freedom efforts. and page view numbers are almost irrelevant unless 

there is irrefutable proof that those page views were in fact generated inside the country in question. For 

instance, when he states that views of the VOA Persian service tripled to 1.2 million views during the 

early 2018 protests, can he tell you how many of those views were from inside Iran and how many were 

generated outside from the diaspora? The same question could be applied to the VOA Mandarin traffic 

he quotes during the announcement of the removal of Presidential term limits- were those hits inside 

China or in the international diaspora? 

Furthermore, Mr. Lansing proudly states that "30,000 new Iranian users to our intemet circumvention 

tools were added every day, fueling this digital audience gro'-"'th." First and foremost, his statement 

makes clear that his biggest point of pride is growth of the digital audience not increased access to the 

Internet for those in the midst of a national crisis. Second, our data from just one circumvention provider 

the BBG reti.Ises to fund indicates that their traffic jumped 20 times in 3 days, with daily users escalating 

from 80,000 to over 2,000,000, and daily requests jumping to over 1 billion before system capacity was 

overloaded and traffic had to be limited. Between those two scenarios, do you believe it was our 

government or struggling independent technologies that were actually doing more to further access to the 

internet in Iran during those critical days? Do you believe that the BBG 's !.2 million page views to 

VOA Persian (which may or may not have originated in Iran) or the independent technology's 1 billion+ 

in-country requests to communicate via smartphone and social media had a bigger on the ground impact? 

Could you even realistically compare the social impact of the two in today's world? With support from 

our government's Internet Freedom Funds, this tool and several others could have provided access to 

millions of additional users. 

Regarding the claims that the BBG is simply following the Congressional mandate that their funds 

should be available tor "tools and techniques to securely develop and distribute BBG digital content." 

6 Dixon Avenue, Suite 100- Concord, NH 03301- (603) 226-3636 

www.lantosfoundation.org 
84 


30233.039

I would like to bring up three key points: 

First, I would be curious to know how long the average BBG funded circumvention user actually stays 

on the BBG landing page before diverting to another site- those numbers have never been addressed 

publically by the BBG. And knowing those metrics would be a useful tool to evaluate the efficacy of this 

language and new direction. 

Second, I would like to draw your attention to the evolution of the US government's mandate language 

regarding Internet Freedom funding. When all IF funds were housed inside the State Depattment in 2009, 

the mandate was listed under the "Democracy Promotion" heading and was written to "expand access to 

information and communications through the Internet, and shall be used for programs that provide 

unmonitored and uncensored access to the Internet for large numbers of users living in closed societies 

that have acutely hostile Internet environments." (Public Law 111-117, Dec 16,2009, 123 Stat. 3363). In 

2017, the BBG's Internet Freedom mandate is addressed in the ''International Broadcasting Operations'' 

section and reads that these funds arc "made available only for tools and techniques to securely develop 

and distribute BBG digital content; facilitate audience access to such content on Web sites that are censored; coordinate the distribution ofBBG digital content to targeted regional audiences." (HR 1625-613). 

Third. I find it hard to imagine that Congress suddenly believes its original intent oflnternet Freedom 

funds is truly being meet through the international broadcasting operations of the BBG and only its 

wehsites. Under Mr. Lansing's leadership. the BBG has clearly lobbied to shift toward this more content 

centered mandate. This shift coincides with efforts to discredit and ultimately defund effective 

circumvention tools that are struggling to continue their work. 

This new focus begs the question of whether or not Congress knowingly intended to condition its 

delivery oflnternet Freedom technologies into closed societies on the premise that a US government 

funded news source be the required landing page. While it is certainly legitimate to want to encourage 

page views of important content. we must be sensitive not to engage in actions that we might condemn as 

propaganda were it done by the Russians or Chinese. I am not in any way calling the BBG · s content or 

journalist's propagandist; in fact our family's love and respect for the United States started with the hope 

that streamed trom Radio Free Europe during the horrors of World War 1!. But the point remains that 

true Internet freedom allows the end user to start, browse, and finish anywhere on the Internet, just as we 

are free to do here in the United States. While the BBG may he interested in upping its page views, I 

firmly believe that when the US Congress appropriates precious tax dollars to help open the internet, 

increased page views on a specific site are the last thing it intends. 

I thank you again tor the opportunity to address these vital issues oflnternct Freedom. The Lantos 

Foundation looks forward to working with you to ensure that our government's spending on this vital21 51 

Century human right is properly directed. 

Sincerely, 

KAT~NALANTOSSWETT 

President, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights & Justice 
85 

LETTER SUBMITTED BY HON. MARCO RUBIO


30233.040

'Jl:lnitcd ~rates ~mate 

The Honorable Michael R Pompeo 

Secretary of State 

U.S. Department of State 

2201 C Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20520 

Dear Secretary Pompeo, 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510 

July 26, 2018 

We write to express our urgent concern about an alarming situation affecting six U.S.-based 

journalists with Radio Free Asia's (RFA) Uyghur Service. As you may know, RFA is one of five 

media networks under the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the U.S. agency responsible 

tor international media. Its Uyghur-language news service provides roughly 12 million of 

China's mostly Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghur population with trustworthy, accurate news on 

the deteriorating human rights situation in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

(XUAR). 

RF A's Uyghur Service journalists, most of them U.S. citizens and residents of Virginia, have 

relatives in China-including elderly parents-who have been detained, jailed, or forcibly 

disappeared in what appears to be an act of direct retaliation against these U.S. journalists for 

their work in exposing the deteriorating human rights situation in the XUAR. We are deeply 

concerned that these cases illustrate that a foreign nation is pursuing extreme measures in an 

attempt to interfere with Radio Free Asia's congressionally mandated mission of bringing free 

press to closed societies. 

Most relatives are believed to be held in re-education centers or camps that began appearing in 

the XUAR in the spring of2017, but have greatly expanded since then. Media and think tank 

reports estimate that hundreds of thousands of individuals-men and women of all ages-have 

been arbitrarily detained in these facilities that operate much like open-air prisons under the 

ostensible purpose of rehabilitation. In recent months, reports and first-hand accounts have 

surfaced about their cramped, over-crowded and gulag-like conditions, and poor medical care. 

Radio Free Asia's in-depth journalism has provided some of the world's most effective reporting 

about the XUAR, a region increasingly restricted to outside news organizations, diplomats, and 

NGOs. RF A's journalists understand that their work carries risks, but they also know that they 

are providing an important service through their work at RF A. It is an unfortunate irony that 

these same journalists who have already endured great risk and sacrifice have now become part 

of the stories that they report on. The fact that they have been targeted while living and working 

in the United States is even more troubling. 

In your capacity as the United States' senior diplomat, we urge you, at every opportunity, to raise 

this urgent issue in your diplomatic communications with your Chinese counterparts, seek 

answers as to the whereabouts and well-being of these missing, detained, and jailed relatives, and 
86 


30233.041

appeal for these individuals to be unconditionally released. We ask you to make clear to the 

Chinese government that these cases are a priority for the U.S. Government. We also ask that 

you brief our ot1ices within the next few weeks with an update on their cases, to include specifics 

about your engagement with the Chinese government to-date, and your plan for future 

engagement. 

Thank you in advance tbr your consideration, and most of all, for your action. 

Sincerely, 

/lf!.J 

Mark R. Warner 

£ 4/~ United States Senator 

United States Senator 

~,~·~ United States Senator 

ez~ 

;;ii''L 

Marco Rubio 

United States Senator 

~~D~ Steve Daines 

United States Senator 
87 

Witness Biographies 

Sarah Cook, Senior Research Analyst for East Asia and Director of the 

China Media Bulletin, Freedom House 

Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House. She directs the China Media Bulletin, a monthly digest in English and Chinese providing 

news and analysis on media freedom developments related to China. Cook is also 

the author of several Asian country reports for Freedom House’s annual publications, as well as three special reports about China: The Battle for China’s Spirit 

(2017), The Politburo’s Predicament (2015), and The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship (2013). Her comments and writings have appeared on CNN, in the Wall 

Street Journal, in Foreign Policy, and before the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Before joining Freedom House, Ms. Cook co-edited the English 

translation of ‘‘A China More Just,’’ a memoir by prominent rights attorney Gao 

Zhisheng, and was twice a delegate to the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva for an NGO working on religious freedom in China. She received a B.A. in International Relations from Pomona College, and as a Marshall 

Scholar, completed Master’s degrees in Politics and International Law at the School 

of Oriental and African Studies in London. 

Clive Hamilton, Professor of Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University (Australia), and author, ‘‘Silent Invasion: China’s Influence in Australia’’ 

Clive Hamilton is an Australian public intellectual and author. He founded, and 

for 14 years directed, Australia’s leading progressive think tank, the Australia Institute. He has held a number of visiting academic appointments, including at Yale 

University, the University of Oxford, and University College London. He is the author of a number of books, including ‘‘Requiem for a Species,’’ ‘‘Earthmasters,’’ and 

‘‘Growth Fetish.’’ His controversial book, ‘‘Silent Invasion: China’s Influence in Australia,’’ was published in February 2018. His articles have appeared in the New 

York Times, The Guardian, Scientific American, and Nature. 

Katrina Lantos Swett, Ph.D., President, Lantos Foundation for Human 

Rights & Justice 

Katrina Lantos Swett serves as President of the Lantos Foundation for Human 

Rights & Justice, established in 2008 to continue the legacy of her father, the late 

Congressman Tom Lantos, who served as Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 

Committee and was a co-founder of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. Under 

her leadership, the Lantos Foundation has rapidly become a distinguished and respected voice on key human rights concerns ranging from advancing the rule of law 

globally and fighting for internet freedom in closed societies to combating the persistent and growing threat of anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial. Dr. Lantos Swett 

is the former Chair and Vice-Chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and teaches Human Rights and American 

Foreign Policy at Tufts University. She currently serves as Co-Chair of the Board 

of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and the Budapestbased Tom Lantos Institute. Dr. Lantos Swett also serves on the Advisory Board 

of UN Watch, the annual Anne Frank Award and Lecture, the Warren B. Rudman 

Center for Justice, Leadership, and Public Policy, and the Brigham Young University Law School. Lantos Swett has a B.A. in political science from Yale University, 

a J.D. degree from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, and 

a Ph.D. in history from the University of Southern Denmark. 

Æ