LARGE-SCALE COMBAT

OPERATIONS SERIES

Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Edited by Christopher M. Rein

Army University Press
Cover image: The Trojan horse, the subterfuge that the Greeks used to enter the city 

of Troy - Gravure Collection privee ©Isadora/Leemage via Agence France Presse 

Original tear graphic: Designed by Layerace/Freepik, freepik.com 

Original paper texture: Created by Freepik, freepik.com

Composite cover design: Arin L. Burgess and Michael P. Serravo, Army University Press
This book is part of The US Army Large-Scale 

Combat Operations Series, which includes:

Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception in 

Large-Scale Combat Operations

Bringing Order to Chaos: Historical Case Studies of Combined Arms Maneuver in Large-Scale 

Combat Operations

Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case 

Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in 

Large-Scale Combat Operations

The Long Haul: Historical Case Studies of Sustainment in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Into the Breach: Historical Case Studies of Mobility Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Perceptions Are Reality: Historical Case Studies 

of Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat 

Operations

Weaving the Tangled Web 

Edited by

Christopher M. Rein

Army University Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Military Deception in LargeScale Combat Operations
iv

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Rein, Christopher M., editor. | Army University Press (U.S.), 

 publisher.

Title: The tangled web : military deception in large-scale combat operations / edited by Christopher M. Rein.

Other titles: Tangled web (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.) | Military deception 

in large-scale combat operations | US Army large-scale combat operations 

series.

Description: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas : Army University Press, 2018. | 

Series: The US Army large-scale combat operations series | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018033519 | ISBN 9781940804415

Subjects: LCSH: Deception (Military science)--History--20th century. | 

Deception (Military science)--History--Case studies. | Combat 

sustainability (Military science)--History--20th century. | Combat 

sustainability (Military science)--History--Case studies.

Classification: LCC U167.5.D37 T36 2018 | DDC 355.4/1--dc23 | SUDOC 

D 110.20:LC record available at Caution-https://lccn.loc.gov/2018033519

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to use the Army University Press’ official seal on any republication 

without the express written permission of the Director of the Army 

University Press.

2018

Editor

Michael L. Hogg
v

Foreword

Since the Soviet Union’s fall in 1989, the specter of large-scale 

ground combat against a peer adversary was remote. During the years 

following, the US Army found itself increasingly called upon to lead 

multinational operations in the lower to middle tiers of the range of military operations and conflict continuum. The events of 11 September 

2001 led to more than 15 years of intense focus on counterterrorism, 

counterinsurgency, and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An 

entire generation of Army leaders and Soldiers were culturally imprinted by this experience. We emerged as an Army more capable in limited 

contingency operations than at any time in our nation’s history, but the 

geopolitical landscape continues to shift and the risk of great power conflict is no longer a remote possibility.

While our Army focused on limited contingency operations in the 

Middle East and Southwest Asia, other regional and peer adversaries scrutinized US military processes and methods and adapted their own accordingly. As technology has proliferated and become accessible in even the 

most remote corners of the world, the US military’s competitive advantage 

is being challenged across all of the warfighting domains. In the last decade, we have witnessed an emergent China, a revanchist and aggressive 

Russia, a menacing North Korea, and a cavalier Iranian regime. Each of 

these adversaries seeks to change the world order in their favor and contest 

US strategic interests abroad. The chance for war against a peer or regional near-peer adversary has increased exponentially, and we must rapidly 

shift our focus to successfully compete in all domains and across the full 

range of military operations. 

Over the last two years, the US Army has rapidly shifted the focus of 

its doctrine, training, education, and leader development to increase readiness and capabilities to prevail in large-scale ground combat operations 

against peer and near-peer threats. Our new doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 

3-0, Operations, dictates that the Army provide the joint force four unique 

strategic roles: shaping the security environment, preventing conflict, prevailing in large-scale combat operations, and consolidating gains to make 

temporary success permanent.

To enable this shift of focus, the Army is now attempting to change 

its culture shaped by over 15 years of persistent limited-contingency operations. Leaders must recognize that the hard-won wisdom of the Iraq 

and Afghanistan wars is important to retain but does not fully square with 
vi

the exponential lethality, hyperactive chaos, and accelerated tempo of the 

multi-domain battlefield when facing a peer or near-peer adversary.

To emphasize the importance of the Army’s continued preparation for 

large-scale combat operations, the US Army Combined Arms Center has 

published these volumes of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations 

Series book set. The intent is to expand the knowledge and understanding of the contemporary issues the US Army faces by tapping our organizational memory to illuminate the future. The reader should reflect on 

these case studies to analyze each situation, identify the doctrines at play, 

evaluate leaders’ actions, and determine what differentiated success from 

failure. Use them as a mechanism for discussion, debate, and intellectual 

examination of lessons of the past and their application to today’s doctrine, 

organization, and training to best prepare the Army for large-scale combat. 

Relevant answers and tangible reminders of what makes us the world’s 

greatest land power await in the stories of these volumes. 

Prepared for War!

Michael D. Lundy

Lieutenant General, US Army

Commanding General 

US Army Combined Arms Center
vii

Table of Contents

Foreword...............................................................................................v

List of Figures......................................................................................ix

Introduction—Multi-Domain Deception

by Christopher M. Rein.........................................................................1

Chapter 1—The Belfort Ruse: The American Deception Plan for the Battle of 

St. Mihiel, 1918

by Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. Grotelueschen.....................................9

Chapter 2—From Beersheba to Megiddo: British Deception Operations 

during the Palestine Campaign, 1917-1918

Major Brian J. Dohan..........................................................................27

Chapter 3—Operation BERTRAM: British Deception at El Alamein

by Gary W. Linhart .............................................................................49

Chapter 4—Operations BARCLAY, CASCADE, and MINCEMEAT: Allied 

Deception in the Mediterranean, 1943

by Gregory S. Hospodor...............................................................................63

Chapter 5—Operation KREML: German Strategic Deception on the 

Eastern Front in 1942

by Alan P. Donohue.............................................................................79

Chapter 6—Red Star Resurgent: Soviet Deception Operations at Stalingrad, 

1942-1943

by First Lieutenant Kyle B. Vautrinot.................................................97

Chapter 7—Operation BAGRATION: Maskirovka at its Height, 

Summer 1944

by Curtis S. King...............................................................................115

Chapter 8—Deceive, Divert, and Delay: Operation FORTITUDE in 

Support of D-Day

by Scott C. Farquhar .........................................................................137
viii

Chapter 9—Chinese Deception and the 1950 Intervention in the Korean War

by Joseph G.D. Babb ........................................................................155

Chapter 10—From Maneuvers to War: The Egyptian Deception Plan 

on the Eve of the 1973 War

by Tal Tovy ...........................................................................175

Chapter 11—Target San Carlos: British Deception during the 

Repossession of the Falkland Islands

by Steven Paget.................................................................................193

Chapter 12—Deception in the Desert: Deceiving Iraq in Operation 

DESERT STORM

by Donald P. Wright..........................................................................215

Conclusion—The Future of Military Deception Operations

by Conrad C. Crane.................................................................................231

About the Authors ...................................................................................235
ix

Illustrations

Figure 1.1. Strategic features influencing the selection of the Lorraine 

front for the American Army...............................................................10

Figure 1.2. The combined order of battle of the St. Mihiel Operation.....14

Figure 1.3. Sectors held by American divisions in the Vosges region .....19

Figure 2.1. Canal defenses in the first battle of Gaza, 26 March 1917 ....28

Figure 2.2. The third battle of Gaza and the capture of Jerusalem .....30

Figure 2.3. Dispositions and Order of battle in the Battle of Megiddo, 

19 September 1918 .............................................................................36

Figure 2.4. Battle of Megiddo and the pursuit to Damascus, 19-25 

September 1918 ..................................................................................39

Figure 3.1. North Africa, 1940-1942 ..................................................50

Figure 3.2. Operation BERTRAM: The Initial Deception..................54

Figure 3.3. A tank under a sunshield...................................................55

Figure 3.4. Quads................................................................................56

Figure 3.5. Operation BERTRAM: The Final Deception ...................58

Figure 4.1. The Mediterranean basin, 1943 ........................................67

Figure 5.1. German intentions and Soviet expectations, 1942 ...........80

Figure 5.2. Army Group Center, 1 June 1942.....................................85

Figure 5.3. Army Group Center (Corps), 1 June 1942........................87

Figure 6.1. German Advance to Stalingrad, 24 July-18 

November 1942..........................................................................103
x

Figure 6.2. Soviet Winter Offensive, Operations 19 November-12 

December 1942 .................................................................................107

Figure 6.3. Soviet Winter Offensive, Operations 13 December 1942–15 

February 1943 ...................................................................................108

Figure 7.1. Operation BAGRATION: Deployments and Soviet Plan,

June 1944 ..........................................................................................119

Figure 7.2. German intelligence picture of Soviet deployment, 

June 1944 ..........................................................................................128

Figure 7.3. Actual Soviet deployment, June 1944 ............................129

Figure 8.1. ETO Chain of command.................................................139

Figure 8.2. Allied invasion force and German disposition, June 1944.....141

Figure 8.3. Operation chart ...............................................................147

Figure 9.1. Members of the 24th Division’s Task Force Smith deploying 

to Korea.............................................................................................159

Figure 9.2. Situation 28 September 1950 and Operations Since 15 

September .........................................................................................160

Figure 9.3. Situation 28 October 1950 and Operations Since 

7 October ...................................................................................163

Figure 9.4. Chinese soldiers crossing the Yalu River in

November 1950.................................................................................165

Figure 9.5. Soldier in the snow.........................................................170

Figure 10.1. The Egyptian crossing and reinforcement phase, 

October 1973.....................................................................................177

Figure 11.1. The Falklands................................................................194

Figure 11.2. The Falklands, 14 May-8 June 1982.............................197
xi

Figure 12.1. Preparing for the ground war, January-February 1991.....218

Figure 12.2. Operation Desert Storm, 24-25 February 1991 ...........222

1

Introduction

Multi-Domain Deception

Christopher M. Rein, General Editor

Throughout the recorded history of warfare, military planners and 

commanders have sought to deceive their adversary as to the size, timing, or location of an attack, in order to gain a decisive advantage. From 

the famous “Trojan Horse” to modern efforts to use the electromagnetic 

spectrum to “spoof” or “jam” sensors, deception in some form remains 

an essential component of military operations. Whether attacking an unsuspecting enemy on Christmas morning, as Washington did at Trenton, 

or emplacing “Quaker guns” (logs painted black to resemble cannon) to 

provide the impression of strength, US forces have successfully built on 

a long legacy of military deception (MILDEC) in order to prevail in the 

nation’s wars. While technology continues to advance at a dizzying pace, 

threatening to render previous lessons obsolete, MILDEC operations have 

successfully withstood previous developments and even incorporated 

new technologies continue to form an important part of combat operations. While potentially capable, in some cases, of enabling military forces 

to prevail without a fight, as the theorist Sun Tzu postulated, more often 

MILDEC confers an advantage that helps the side that successfully harnesses it prevail, often at a much lower cost that it would have otherwise. 

Thus, MILDEC, and its long and successful history, remain an important, 

even vital, tool for any future leader.

1. See David Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Routledge, 1989); Mark Lloyd, The Art of Military Deception (London: 

Pen and Sword, 1999); Barton Whaley, ed., Practise to Deceive: Learning 

Curves of Military Deception Planners (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2016); John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter, eds., Military Deception and Strategic 

Surprise (London: Routledge, 2007); Jon Latimer, Deception in War: The Art 

of the Bluff, the Value of Deceit, and the Most Thrilling Episodes of Cunning in 

Military History, from the Trojan Horse to the Gulf War (New York: Woodstock, 

2001); James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi, Victory and Deceit: Deception 

and Trickery at War (San Jose, CA: Writers Club Press, 2001); Thaddeus Holt, 

The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (London: 

Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004); and Mary Katherine Barbier, D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion (Mechanicsburg, PA: 

Stackpole, 2007).
2

Given the voluminous, and excellent, body of literature currently 

available on military deception, it is certainly worth asking why we need 

another volume on the topic.1

 This volume is not intended to displace, 

even if it could, the deeply-researched and lengthy treatises on the long 

history of military deception operations. Rather, it is intended as a primer, 

and a thought piece, for how strategists, operational planners, staff officers 

and, ultimately, commanders, have historically integrated military deception into large-scale combat operations, focusing on the last 100 years of 

conflict. The individual chapters, while certainly excellent stand-alone 

treatments of the deception aspects of the operations and campaigns considered, likewise are of insufficient length to become the definitive works 

on their individual topics. Instead, they build upon the extensive secondary literature, and, in several cases, primary sources in order to provide a 

comprehensive but accessible understanding of how military deception 

has successfully enabled victory on the battlefield.

If principles of war can be sifted out of military history, as the master, Carl von Clausewitz, attempted to do with Napoleon’s campaigns, then 

these twelve case studies also ought to provide us with some “universal 

truths” regarding deception operations.2

 Admittedly, considering successful 

deceptions, primarily in operations involving the US Army and its principal allies and antagonists, for less than half of its operational life may omit 

a number of relevant examples. But these cases are sufficient to provide 

several enduring threads of continuity in successful operations which, most 

importantly, remain relevant for current and future practitioners. One of the 

first is the importance of coordination in deception campaigns, especially 

since the addition of warfare in the third dimension, which coincides with 

the beginning of this volume. While many thought that the airplane, and 

later radar and satellite imagery, marked the end of successful deception 

by pulling back the veil that had shielded terrestrial armies for millennia, 

instead deception remained a key, if significantly more complicated aspect 

of many campaigns. While previously deception had to be coordinated between the military and political instruments of national power, now it also 

had to be practiced in multiple domains simultaneously. In what could be 

labeled “Multi-Domain Deception,” these plans required close and careful 

coordination across the warfighting domains, to ensure that lapses in one 

did not undo efforts in other areas. A heavy bombing campaign focused exclusively on Normandy would have undone the ruse of an Allied landing at 

2. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(1832-4; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
3

the Pas de Calais, just as belligerent rhetoric from Egyptian political leaders 

would have undermined efforts to “lull” the Israelis to sleep prior to the 1973 

Yom Kippur/October War. With the proliferation of warfare into space and 

cyberspace, the difficulty of coordinating a successful deception campaign 

has expanded exponentially and greatly complicated the efforts of its architects, but it has not made their task impossible.

Another “principle” that emerges from the narrative is that of the “Magruder Principle,” the idea that it is easier to convince an adversary to 

hold on to a pre-existing belief that to convince them of a new one. This 

obviously depends heavily on both intelligence collection, to understand 

an opposing commander’s estimate of the situation, as well a cultural competency, to understand what key assumptions commanders, militaries, and 

nations are likely to hold most dear. Once planners have accurately divined an enemy’s strongly-held beliefs, they can then use this knowledge 

to achieve their goals. Just as a practitioner of the Japanese martial art 

of jiu-jitsu uses the momentum of an opponent’s punch or lunge to continue movement in a certain direction, but well past the intended point, 

deception campaigners can use an adversary’s assumptions against them, 

by reinforcing that belief while simultaneously planning an unexpected 

operation that catches them off-balance or out of position. While difficult 

to successfully accomplish, this remains the closest thing to an enduring 

principle in military deception operations, and forces planners to “mirror 

image” themselves, and ask what preconceived notions they have that an 

adversary might turn against them. One of the most famous of the humorous “Murphy’s Rules of War” postulates that “The enemy diversion 

you are ignoring is his main attack,” accurately describing the successful 

campaign in Normandy.3

Careful readers of the accounts in this volume will notice that weaker powers tend to favor the use of deception to overcome a stronger opponent. Just as jiu-jitsu enables a smaller fighter to use a larger or more 

powerful adversary’s strength against them, successful deception operations can enable a weaker force or nation to prevail against a stronger, 

by dispersing effort or creating a tempo of operations to which a less agile opponent is unable to respond. Smaller nations, or those with smaller 

manpower reserves, such as the British Empire, thus became one of the 

most successful developers and employers of deception in order to achieve 

decisive effects. Deception might also enable the forces of casualty-averse 

3. For just one example of this list, see http://www.s2company.com/files/readings/murphy.htm, accessed 29 May 2018.
4

nations to succeed at a much lower cost, preventing an adversary from 

using attrition to achieve strategic aims. Through long experience, some 

nations and cultures, from China to Russia to the United Kingdom have 

become especially skilled at military deception and thus offer a wealth of 

talent and insights for potential allies or warnings for adversaries. Stronger 

nations that have typically relied on overwhelming force or less-sophisticated assaults to achieve military objectives would do well to leverage this 

expertise in their own campaigns and operations.

But these observations are not the sum total of insights within these 

pages. Readers may identify concepts that escaped the authors or editors, 

or find new inspiration from the efforts of earlier campaigns. While the 

speed, range, lethality, and scale of warfare are constantly increasing, military theorists argue that its fundamental nature is not, though they often 

engage in spirited on debate on what exactly comprises the nature of war. 

Future practitioners must study their craft, in order to first gain, and then 

share their own insights, and the authors hope this volume will provide a 

useful roadmap for the journey.

The book begins with the US Army’s first successful deception operation in a major conflict. As Mark Grotelueschen convincingly argues, 

the “Belfort Ruse” successfully enabled American, and therefore Allied 

battlefield success in the First World War by influencing German troop 

dispositions in France. While relying heavily on its European allies, the 

US Army demonstrated it was a quick study and incorporated deception 

operations in future combat operations in almost all of its subsequent conflicts. Brian Drohan continues the focus on the First World War by examining British forces in Palestine, that leveraged deception operations to first 

outflank Ottoman dispositions on a weakened flank, and then used their 

adversary’s tendency to expect a repeat of this tactic to drive through a 

weakly-held coastal sector. The two operations, at Beersheeba and Megiddo, remind planners that, like poker players and baseball pitchers, they develop their own “tells” and tendencies, and, by identifying these and then 

varying their plans, they can successfully catch their opponent off guard.

Gary Linhart keeps our focus on the shores of the Mediterranean, but 

shifts forward in time to examine the intricate British deception campaign 

at the Battle of El Alamein that enabled Montgomery’s defeat of Rommel’s vaunted Afrika Korps. While exploring in detail the technical aspects of the campaign, Linhart’s analysis of Operation BERTRAM also 

reveals British efforts to use Rommel’s tendencies against him. Knowing 

that the “Desert Fox” would both use, and therefore expect, a flank attack 

through the desert, Montgomery fed this belief while developing a strong 
5

attack on the most likely avenue of approach that enabled him to break 

the Axis cordon. The episode reveals the continued British expertise in 

deception that significantly enabled the Allied victory in the west. Gregory 

Hospodor extends this analysis to subsequent campaigns in the Mediterranean, demonstrating how an elaborate, theater level deception enabled 

construction of a fictitious order of battle that far exceeded in scale the 

forces actually available, forcing the Axis powers to distribute forces all 

along their threatened shore and ensuring that a strong landing at any one 

point had a much better chance of success. While the famous, if macabre, 

efforts of “The Man That Never Was,” inspired books and motion pictures, 

Hospodor reminds us that it succeeded only because it was part of a layered, detailed, and well-coordinated deception campaign that continually 

evolved to maintain a position of relative advantage for the western Allies.

Alan Donohue shifts our focus to the Eastern Front to one of the most 

significant theaters of ground combat in World War II. By successfully 

reinforcing Soviet perceptions that Moscow remained the focus of German attacks in 1942, Operation KREML facilitated a German drive that 

extended well into the Caucasus and might have cut off Soviet oil supplies 

had Hitler not become first distracted by, and later obsessed with the city 

of Stalingrad. Kyle Vautrinot’s analysis of that detailed operation demonstrates that tactical, operational and strategic deception played an important role in the counterattack that rescued the city and destroyed Germany’s offensive capability for the remainder of the war. Soviet deception, 

known as maskirovka, continued to evolve through the remainder of the 

war, most significantly, as Curt King points out, in Operation BAGRATION, when successive, and overlapping deception operations kept the 

Germans constantly off guard and unable to respond to sequential Soviet 

thrusts, resulting in the destruction of the German Army Group Center and 

the liberation of Soviet territory taken by the Germans in 1941. But Scott 

Farquhar’s analysis of the D-Day deception plans reveals that the Soviets 

were not the only masters of deception in the Second World War. By 1944, 

the Allies had developed the staff and, most importantly, the expertise, to 

successfully execute an intricate and large-scale campaign that ensured the 

safety of the Normandy landings and the following breakout and liberation 

of France. During the course of the war, Germany went from deceiver to 

deceived, largely as a result of deficiencies in its intelligence apparatus 

and vulnerability through codebreaking, demonstrating the importance of 

superiority in the information domain to enable ground combat.

In Chapter Nine, Joseph “Geoff” Babb welcomingly provides both 

an example from an “Eastern” adversary, and a case in which a western 
6

coalition succumbed to deception, with catastrophic consequences. Babb’s 

account of Chinese deception on the Korean peninsula offers a stark warning for future commanders of how their pre-existing beliefs and notions, 

if unchallenged, can lead them to disaster. Tal Tovy follows with another 

successful case of deception, spanning the military and diplomatic arenas that successfully delayed Israeli awareness of the impending Arab 

attack and impacted that nation’s response, though, fortunately, without 

disastrous consequences. It also offers a connection to previous chapters, 

demonstrating how Soviet sponsors successfully exported maskirovka to 

client states, and the successful use of a massive training exercise as cover 

for an invasion, a still-favored tactic in the post-Soviet world.

Steven Paget’s account of the British liberation of the Falkland Islands 

brings the study forward into a compelling case of multi-domain operations requiring both a high degree of coordination among the military 

domains as well as synchronization with the media and other instruments 

of national power. Operating in an environment with a ubiquitous media 

presence, some of which may be hostile, presents a new challenge for military commanders, whether that media is state-based or “nationless” entities 

such as Wikileaks that collect and publish sensitive military information 

electronically.4

 Maintaining a successful deception campaign may require 

the active support of sympathetic media and exclusion of hostile media, 

presenting a further challenge in democracies where freedom of the press 

has been enshrined in their founding documents. Donald Wright’s account 

of the First Gulf War, Operation DESERT STORM, brings the volume 

into the current operating environment, highlighting how air, land, and naval forces successfully cooperated to conceal, or at least delay recognition 

of the bold Coalition strategy to liberate Kuwait. While the Coalition was 

certainly strong enough to overwhelm Iraqi forces in a frontal assault, the 

deception plan’s key contribution was to spare Coalition lives,maintaining 

popular support.

In his conclusion, Conrad Crane reminds us that much has transpired in the quarter-century since Desert Storm including leaps forward 

in technological capabilities that significantly increase the difficulty of a 

deception planner’s mission. Seemingly innocuous advances in personal 

4. “WikiLeaks Website Publishes Classified Military Documents from Iraq,” http://

www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/22/wikileaks.iraq/index.html, accessed 29 May 2018.

5. “US Military Reviewing Security Practices after Fitness App Reveals Sensitive Info,” https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/28/politics/strava-military-bases-location/index.html, accessed 29 May 2018.
7

electronics now have the ability to reveal the location of clandestine military operating sites.5

 Coordination challenges have increased exponentially, while the proliferation of social media makes it difficult to control 

a popular narrative, and therefore public and global opinion. At the same 

time, commanders and staffs have become highly reliant on systems subject to denial or, worse, false injects, leading to the potential for paralysis 

or action based on false information, potentially easing the deceiver’s task. 

He makes clear that military deception will continue to be a vital part of 

military operations and an essential area of study for leaders at all levels.

This collection of essays seeks to highlight current thinking and areas 

of doctrinal development in order to stimulate the study and development 

of military deception operations. The authors and editor hope this volume 

will provide a jumping-off point for professionals new to the topic and a 

resource for instructors educating and training the next generation of practitioners of military deception. While not a comprehensive treatment of 

the subject, the twelve excellent essays and thought-provoking conclusion 

provide ample grist for the mills or those who design military deception 

efforts and for all who guard against the many would-be deceivers weaving their tangled webs.

9

Chapter 1

The Belfort Ruse

The American Deception Plan for the Battle of St. Mihiel, 1918

Mark E. Grotelueschen

Introduction

When the American Expeditionary Forces’ (AEF) First Army attacked 

the St. Mihiel salient in September 1918, it was, by a wide margin, the 

largest American battle in US military history to date, with over 500,000 

Americans engaged in the offensive, along with over 100,000 Frenchmen, 

and even a number of British and Italian airmen. The offensive also served 

as the inauguration of large-scale modern warfare for the US Army, with 

over three thousand artillery pieces firing, more than a thousand aircraft 

and hundreds of tanks engaged, all supported by vast electronic and electrical networks of communications and intelligence gathering systems.1

While these facts suggest that General John J. Pershing and his key staff 

officers and military planners—to include Major General James W. 

McAndrew, Brigadier General Fox Conner, and Colonel Arthur L. Conger—were dealing with many new elements of warfare, they were wise 

enough to incorporate the ancient element of deception into this massive, 

high-tech, multi-domain operation.

Unwilling to rely solely on the routine yet essential elements of operational security to obscure the enemy’s understanding of the upcoming attack, they created an elaborate scheme to convince the German Army that 

the next American offensive might occur not along the St. Mihiel salient, 

where it was expected, but some 150 miles to the south, emanating from 

the area around the town of Belfort near the Swiss border and driving towards the German held town of Mulhouse. The deception campaign, often 

referred to as the “Belfort Ruse,” was an important part of the American 

plan to keep the Germans guessing as to when and where the next American attack would occur in the fall of 1918. While it is difficult to assess 

the exact degree to which the Belfort Ruse confused the German Army, 

the evidence is clear that, in the end, the German Army was not prepared 

for the Allied attack that struck at both sides of the St. Mihiel salient on 12 

September. While the Germans knew that an attack was likely somewhere 

along the salient, they were unable to predict its size, scope, or timing. 

Nor could they afford to discount the possibility of an attack in the Belfort-Mulhouse sector, and therefore had to augment their forces there. This 
10

uncertainty, to at least some extent, helped make the St. Mihiel Offensive 

one of the most successful American campaigns of the entire war.2

Strategic Context

The First World War is famous for the stalemate along the Western 

Front, where between late 1914 and early 1918 the frontline trenches 

rarely moved more than a few hundred yards in either direction despite 

massive offensives and enormous casualties. But beginning in March 

1918, this tactical and operational stalemate began to crack. On 21 

March, the German Army caught the Allies by surprise and smashed 

Ardennes



 Luxemburg

Treves

Longwy

IRON

MINES COAL MINES

France

N

 







Sedan

Toul

Chalons-sur-Marne

Chaumont

to Paris

Neufchâteau

Saar River



Belgium

Lux.

Luxemburg Longwy



Treves

Germany

Metz

Briey

St. Mihiel

 



 



Basel Vesoul Belfort

Switz.

Mulhouse

Nancy

Fortified City

Forest

Coal and Iron Mines

Line of June 1917

International Boundary

Railroad

Strategic Features Influencing Selection

of the Lorraine Front for the American Army 0 25 50 miles

Colmar

Epinal

Thionville

Verdun

Saarbrücken

Strasbourg

Figure 1.1. Strategic features influencing the selection of the Lorraine front for the 

American Army. Graphic created by CSI Press Staff.
11

through the British lines near Albert, France. The Germans gained more 

than 3,000 square kilometers of terrain, inflicted 250,000 casualties on 

the Allies, and captured a thousand artillery pieces. Within a couple of 

weeks, the Allies had contained Operation MICHAEL, but at a great 

cost. In April, the Germans struck the British again, this time near Ypres, 

Belgium, and they achieved impressive tactical results for the second 

time in as many months. If anyone doubted whether the Germans had 

discovered some important solutions to the tactical challenges of the 

Western Front, their third spring offensive must have settled the case. 

On 27 May the Germans crashed through the French positions along the 

Chemin des Dames between Soissons and Reims. By the end of the first 

day the leading German units had driven south more than a dozen miles 

from their jump-off positions, making it the most successful attack of the 

war on the Western Front since 1914. Finally, in early June, the German 

offensive began to stall, due to the exhaustion of their attacking units, 

the determination of French reinforcements, and some timely assistance 

from the soldiers and marines from the American 3rd and 2nd Infantry 

Divisions at Château-Thierry and Lucy-le-Bocage (near Belleau Wood).3

One of the keys to the German Army’s tactical successes in 1918 was 

its ability to catch the Allies unprepared at the point of each attack. The 

Germans achieved surprise by employing a number of new tactics and techniques all designed to obscure their intentions until the last possible minute. 

These included employing new “scientific firing” methods that eliminated 

the need for extensive artillery registration firing, while at the same time dispensing with the days-long (and even occasionally weeks-long) preliminary 

artillery bombardments. According to historian David Zabecki, the German 

spring offensives also “included a number of well-planned and intricate deception operations” which were “extensive and elaborate,” and contributed 

to the surprise they achieved in March, April, and May.4

While the Germans clearly had developed some impressive new 

methods of attack, their troop losses were still heavy (more than 430,000 

casualties in the first three offensives), and their strategic situation was 

changing dramatically by the week.5 Between 1 March and 1 June more 

than 400,000 Americans had landed in France, and the pace of arrival was 

increasing.6 Realizing that a clock was ticking—soon so many American 

soldiers and marines would be on the Western Front that a decisive German victory would be inconceivable—the Germans rushed their fourth 

offensive, in June, against the French lines in Picardy. While they achieved 

some minor tactical success, the ground gained was much less impressive, 

and the attack had to be ended more quickly.
12

In mid-July, the Germans initiated their fifth, and ultimately final offensive of 1918 along the Marne River. This massive attack, which struck 

along a front of over 70 miles on both sides of Reims, is often considered 

to be the beginning of what became known as the Second Battle of the 

Marne. While the Germans achieved some minor successes west of Reims, the attack met abject defeat east of Reims, due in large part to having 

not achieved the same degree of surprise they had in the first three spring 

offensives. In fact, the Allies not only discovered where the Germans were 

going to attack, but exactly when the offensive was going to begin.7 This 

critical information gave the Allies the chance to make important defensive adjustments, such as preparing a deep defensive organization and 

planning a smothering counter-barrage that struck the German front lines 

just when they were packed with assault troops, both of which helped 

make the fifth German offensive the least successful of all the major German attacks of 1918.8

Even before the Germans struck along the Marne, the presence of fresh 

American troops (and the promise of many hundreds of thousands more) 

along with an awareness that the recent German advances had placed them 

in vulnerable tactical positions, encouraged General Ferdinand Foch, the recently appointed Allied commander-in-chief, to direct the French and American forces to prepare a counter-attack in mid-July aimed at the northern 

shoulder of the great salient created by Germany’s third offensive (sometimes called the Aisne-Marne salient, after the major rivers in the region).9

However, when the Germans attacked first along the Marne, the Commander of the French Army, General Philippe Pétain, wanted to call off the Franco-American counterattack being prepared by the French Tenth Army near 

Soissons so he could focus on crushing the German assault. Foch rightly 

sensed that the moment was perfect for an Allied counterattack that would 

change the momentum of the war. Basing the attack on surprise more than 

any other factor, the French and American divisions employed tanks, rolling 

barrages, and a remarkable degree of élan to shatter the German lines and 

force a German withdrawal from the entire Aisne-Marne salient.

The Allies followed up this dramatic success, often referred to the 

“turning point of the war,” with an equally impressive attack by the British at Amiens in early August.10 Again, surprise, tanks, aircraft, and close 

infantry-artillery coordination provided the keys to success. Ludendorff 

famously called the first day of this British attack—8 August—“the Black 

Day of the German Army,” because thousands of overwhelmed, worn-out, 

and ill-prepared German troops chose surrender over stiff resistance and 

timely counter-attacks.11
13

In June, July, and August the strategic situation on the Western Front 

changed for good. In those three months the Germans experienced the 

failure of their massive Marne offensive, the shocking Allied successes 

at Soissons and Amiens, and perhaps most significantly, the arrival of 

more than 800,000 more American soldiers onto French soil.12 The only 

questions remaining were whether the fresh, but partially trained and 

largely inexperienced, American forces would be able to form a competent field army, and when and where the new American units would 

strike. The only reasonable German hope was putting up such stiff resistance in their fortified defensive positions that the Allies would agree to 

a compromise peace settlement.

At the Bombon Conference of 21-22 July, Foch informed Pershing 

that it was time to begin assembling the dispersed American divisions into 

an American field army.13 Nothing could have pleased Pershing more. On 

24 July, Pershing issued an order creating the First Army, to take effect 

on 10 August, with headquarters at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, 40 miles east 

of Paris, and with himself in personal command, while still holding the 

position of Commander-in-Chief of the AEF as a whole.14 By 9 August the 

Allies had agreed that the new First Army should make a major attack in 

the Woëvre region, which included the St. Mihiel salient, and that it should 

be ready to strike in early September. Pershing moved his headquarters to 

Neufchâteau by 16 August (then subsequently to Ligny-en-Barrois), and 

the First Army staff began developing detailed plans for the first major 

American-led offensive of the war. Assembling the massive First Army 

proved to be a substantial challenge, especially stationing the constituent 

army corps and divisions along the front lines of the salient without making it obvious to the defending Germans that the next great Allied attack 

would come in that sector.

The Plan for St. Mihiel

Lieutenant Colonel George C. Marshall, just recently assigned to the 

First Army G-3 after serving with the 1st Infantry Division, earned the 

job of developing the St. Mihiel attack plan.15 The extraordinarily fluid 

operational and strategic situation in the summer of 1918 forced Marshall 

to re-write the plan several times to account for significant changes in the 

number of divisions available and even the most basic goals for the offensive.16 After a final argument between Foch and Pershing that nearly led 

to the cancellation of the St. Mihiel offensive altogether (and according to 

Pershing’s account, nearly to a physical altercation between the two senior 

commanders as well!), Marshall was finally able to develop a relatively 

final plan that involved more than a dozen American divisions assigned 
14

to three army corps, supported by four French divisions and one French 

corps.17 Colonel Billy Mitchell assumed responsibility for developing the 

air support for the offensive, while Colonel George S. Patton prepared 

the tank forces. Other officers worked the critical issues related to transportation, food, ammunition, intelligence gathering, radio and telephone 

networks, and a range of other elements of modern war, some completely 

unforeseen just a couple decades prior when the US Army was still just 

a frontier constabulary. In the end, more than 600,000 American, French, 

British, and Italian soldiers, marines, and airmen participated in the attack.

Assembling these forces in the region without alerting the Germans 

proved to be a nearly impossible task, not only for the inexperienced staff 

officers in the Army, corps, and divisions, but also for the even more inexperienced officers and men that had to execute the plan to concentrate 

along the salient and be ready to attack on time. The staff officers and commanders took all reasonable precautions. Combat and support units moved 

into the attack sector only at night, while artillery, air, and radio operations 

AMER

35th Div

AMER 91st Div

AMER 3rd Div

FR 39th COL

AMER 89th DIV

AMER 90th DIV AMER 82nd DIV

AMER 2nd DIV

AMER 1st DIV

AMER 42nd DIV

AMER 5th DIV

(*less 8th Bde)

AMER

4th Div*

France

N

Verdun















 

















 

 

  



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Haudainville

Braquis

Fresnes-en-Woevre

Moulotte

Hannonville-sous-les-Côtes

Mars-la-Tour Ars-sur-Moselle

Recourt

Les Eparges

Corny

Gorz

Lorry devant la Pont

Pont-à-Mousson

Vandieres Cheminot

Thiaucourt

Heudicourt Pannes

Vigneulles

Varvinay

St. Mihiel

Lacroix-sur-Meuse

Fresnes-au-Mont

Apremont

Sampigny

Lignieres

St. Aubin sur Aire

Commercy Boucq

Void

Gironville

Pagny-sur-Meuse

Beaumont

Royaumeix

Domèvre-en-Haye

Dieulouard

Gondreville-sur-Moselle

Aingeray

Liverdun

Custines

Jump-Off 12 Sep (a.m)

Jaillon

Limey

GER 86th Div

GER

195th Div

GER

SAX 123nd Div

8th Bde

(AMER 4th Div)

AMER 26th Div GER V Chambley COMBRES Group

FR 15th COL

FR 2nd CAV

(Dismounted)

FR 26th COL

GER 5th Ldw

GER 10th Div

GER 77th Div

GER 255th Div

GER 31st Ldw Bde

GER 13th Ldw

GER 8th Ldw

GER 35th KuK

(Austro-Hungarian)

SAX 192nd Div

BAV GENKDO 57 GORZ Group

SAX XII R MIHIEL Group

METZ Group

IV

I

AMER FIRST ARMY

FR II COL

ARMY DET C

Combined Order of Battle St. Mihiel Operation

12 September 1918 (a.m.)

0 3.1 6.2 miles

0 5 10 km

Genicourt-sur-Meuse

Landremont

AMER

78th Div

Lachaussee

GER 31st Div

Figure 1.2. The combined order of battle of the St. Mihiel Operation. Graphic created 

by CSI Press Staff.
15

had their movements tightly regulated to accomplish required preliminary 

tasks without changing the overall activity in the region.

Despite these efforts, it appears nearly all of France was abuzz with rumors of an upcoming American attack, and all too often, these rumors included surprisingly accurate details about its location and size. Pershing did 

not receive Foch’s final official instructions to make preparations for the St. 

Mihiel offensive until 10 August. Colonel Hugh A. Drum, the newly appointed First Army chief of staff, did not issue his formal instructions to the GHQ 

and First Army staffs to begin detailed planning until 13 August.18 But already 

by 17 August officers on Petain’s headquarters staff—which had administrative control of the new American First Army—were so concerned about the 

widespread information leaks and general lack of operational security that it 

told its American liaison officer, Colonel Paul H. Clark, that Pershing needed to be notified of the security problems. Soon after this, the chief of the 

American mission at Foch’s headquarters, Colonel T. Bentley Mott, informed 

Fox Conner at First Army HQ that “I have heard it repeatedly stated about 

these headquarters that ‘everybody was talking of a projected attack in the 

Woevre’...One officer said, ‘I heard in Paris that the Americans were going 

to make an attack in the Woevre with 14 divisions.’”19 In time, even young 

American soldiers noticed the lack of secrecy. Elmer Sherwood, a member of 

the 42nd Division that was soon to participate in the attack, wrote in his diary 

that “it seems to me everybody in France surmises that we are going to fight to 

flatten the St. Mihiel salient. Even the French peasants spoke of it as we came 

up to this front.”20 Clearly something had to be done.

Petain didn’t wait long. On 19 August he wrote Pershing a note warning of the problem:

I hear from everywhere, and especially from the armies and civil 

authorities of the east, that, in their generous enthusiasm on account of the prospect of a great success over the enemy, numerous American officers and soldiers have talked in a public way of 

the projects of the High Command in the Woevre. This is a fact 

which must be accepted at the present time and...it remains that 

the troops and the civil population of the east are all informed as 

to the offensive actions which are being considered. Under the 

conditions it is impossible that the enemy should not be forewarned, but we can attempt to mislead him (emphasis added).21

He then proposed a specific approach to mitigating the problem:

To this end, if you are in accordance with me on this point, you 

could send American officers to make reconnaissances in the dif-
16

ferent sectors of Lorraine, of the Vosges, and of Upper Alsace, 

which are occupied by French troops. I would give to the French 

Seventh and Eight [sic] Armies instructions which would lead 

them to believe that an offensive action by American forces is 

under consideration in these sectors. Thus the enemy’s attention would be to a certain extent taken away from the Woevre. 

I would be much obliged to you if you would inform me if this 

suggestion is approved by you and what officers you would send 

to the Seventh and Eight [sic] Armies and on what dates.22

Pershing replied to Petain’s letter on 23 August, noting that “the considerations which you have set forth relative to the necessity for secrecy in 

all operations had not escaped me,” and that he “keenly” regretted “that indiscretions may have been committed.” He agreed that “we must attempt 

to mislead the enemy upon the actual directions of the attack” and stated 

that he had already “given instructions with this in view to my general 

staff.” He closed his reply by informing Pétain that he would soon ask 

for a private audience to discuss “all that concerns the execution” of this 

deception plan. The Belfort Ruse was born.23

The Ruse

In fact, Pershing not only employed Petain’s suggestions, he went far 

beyond them. He initiated an elaborate deception campaign, echoed in 

future operations in the next global war, involving an entire ghost army 

corps, led by a real corps commander and staff, and supported by delegations from seven combat divisions that went about energetically planning 

for a real offensive near Belfort because they themselves were unaware 

that they were part of a ruse. At first, Pershing discussed the scheme only 

with his chief of staff at GHQ, Brigadier General James McAndrew, and 

his top G-2 staff officer, Colonel Arthur Conger. After telling Conger that 

only the three of them knew that the attack near Belfort was “not real,” he 

asked Conger if anyone else needed know. Conger replied that Brigadier 

General Fox Conner, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 at GHQ, would have 

to “issue certain orders.” Pershing accepted this, stating, “very well, then 

there will be just four, you, General Conner, General McAndrew, and myself and I do not want any other soul to know that this attack will not actually be carried out except for us four.”24 It was a very small circle of trust.

The next step was a pair of press conferences, one held by Pershing 

on 26 August, and another the following day by a Captain de Viel Castel, 

the French liaison officer assigned to the American press headquarters. 

Pershing simply announced that he had set a date for a major American 
17

attack in the near future. De Viel gave more information, suggesting that 

the Americans might be planning an important offensive in Alsace, and 

stating that Captain Gerald Morgan, the American press censor “would 

pass carefully worded dispatches.”25

With the press now engaged, it was time to get the American military 

forces involved. On 28 August, Conner sent secret instructions to Major 

General Omar Bundy, the former commander of the 2nd Infantry Division 

who had just been appointed to command the new VI Corps (which at that 

time existed more or less only on paper). The subject was “Operations in 

Upper Alsace,” and because of its importance to the Belfort Ruse, this 

order is included in its entirety:

The Commander-in-Chief directs that you proceed, with 

such members of your Staff as you may consider absolutely 

necessary, to Belfort and prepare detailed plans for an attack 

in that region.

In preparing these plans you will consider the front of attack 

as extending from Altkirch to Thann. The objective is Mulhouse and the line of heights extending to the southeast from 

that place. It is intended by the occupation of this line to insure the destruction of the Rhine bridges and eventually to 

establish our line along the river itself.

It is believed that the enemy has been misled by the massing 

of our troops around Neufchateau and that the attack can be 

conducted by seven divisions in first line. In addition to the 

29th Division now in the Belfort sector, the 80th, 35th, 78th, 

91st, 79th, and 36th Divisions have been designated as first 

line divisions. A reconnaissance party of three officers from 

each of these divisions is being ordered to Belfort to report to 

you on August 30. You will be informed later as to arrangements for artillery and special services. In order, however, that 

the feature of surprise may be utilized to the full, it is intended 

to reduce the artillery to the minimum.

Divisions for the relief of the first line divisions will, in order 

to avoid massing troops and thus attracting the attention of the 

enemy, be sent to arrive at least two days after the beginning 

of the attack.

All troop movements will be ordered by these headquarters, 

your duties being limited for the present to the reconnaissance 

and the preparation of the preliminary plan. This work must 
18

be expedited as it is desired that the attack be launched not 

later than 8 September.

The Commander-in-Chief expects to take command of the operations in person. Suitable buildings for the accommodation of the 

Headquarters, First Army, have already been leased in Belfort.

Colonel A. L. Conger has been directed to report to you at 

once. Colonel Conger is the immediate representative of GHQ 

as well as of G-2 GHQ, and is fully informed as to the Commander-in-Chief’s plans. You will consult Colonel Conger in 

any case of doubt. Frequent telegraphic reports are desired, 

the operations code being used.

You will, of course, appreciate the necessity for secrecy.26

At the time of this order, the front line of the Western Front ran southeast from the eastern edge of St. Mihiel salient at Pont-à-Mousson, through 

Lorraine, and into Alsace. In Alsace the lines ran due south through the 

hills and woods of the Vosges mountains for dozens of miles. Then, from 

the southern edge of the Vosges the front lines ran through a flat, open 

stretch of country for nearly 20 miles before entering the foothills of the 

Jural Alps along the Swiss border. This twenty mile section of flat terrain, 

approximately 150 miles southeast from the St Mihiel salient, was one 

of the historic invasion routes between France and Germany, and it was 

known as the Belfort Gap. In 1918, it had been an inactive sector since 

the end of the war’s opening campaigns. But it was flat enough and wide 

enough to conduct division and even corps-sized operations. Pershing’s 

staff selected it as the site of the diversion effort for just these reasons.

No doubt with a great deal of pride and excitement, Bundy replied immediately that he and “selected members” of his staff would leave his headquarters in Bourbonne-les-Bains at 0800 the next morning. They were not 

alone in their unwitting subterfuge.27 On the same day that Conner sent Bundy his orders, he sent a set of identical instructions to the generals commanding each of the six American divisions listed in Bundy’s message (a seventh 

division, the 29th Division, was already in the front lines near Belfort):

The Commander-in-Chief directs that you send by automobile a reconnaissance party to consist of one officer from your 

headquarters and one from each of your infantry brigades to 

report to Major General Bundy at the Grand Hotel du Tonneau 

d’Or at Belfort before noon on 30 August.

Your Chief of Staff will not be one of the officer sent.
19

The Commander-in-Chief directs that you personally warn 

these officers as to preserving silence as to their mission while 

in Belfort.28

Soon, Bundy, his small staff, the division reconnaissance contingents, and Colonel Conger assembled in Belfort to develop the deception 

campaign. Of the small but active team gathered at Belfort, only Conger 

Charmes

Germany

France

N

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Metz

Sectors Held by American Divisions

In the Vosges Region

0 10 20 30 40 miles

Mount

Donon

Ballon

d’Alsace

Le Grand

Couronné

SCHLUCHT PASS

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

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Jura

Mountains Alps

Morhange

Château-Salins

Bathelémont

Sarrenbourg

Strasbourg

Toul

Nancy

Luneville

Epinal

Remiremont

to Neufchâteau

Baccarat

Colmar

Basel

Gérardmer

Rougemont le Château

Montreux Château

Belfort 32 29

35

6 35

5

92

1

42

Krüth

Forêt

de Campenoux

Ballon

de Guebwiller

Mulhouse



Port-sur-Seille

Montreux Vieux

88

5 81

37

42

Fortified City

American Division

Forest

International Boundary

Sector

Named Sector

5

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77

St. Die

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BONHOMME PASS

St. Die Frapelle

Figure 1.3. Sectors held by American divisions in the Vosges region. Graphic 

created by CSI Press Staff.
20

knew that the whole operation was a ruse. On 1 September, Conger reported back to AEF GHQ that “the instructions given me personally by 

the Commander-in-Chief have been executed.” Bundy’s staff had completed its preliminary plan for the never-to-be-executed attack towards 

Mulhouse, and the divisional reconnaissance teams had already completed their work and were heading back to their respective units. Conger was fully satisfied with the intensity and thoroughness of Bundy’s 

team, reporting that they “have taken the work very seriously and have 

worked hard and in dead earnest.”29

Bundy’s initial report, enclosed with Conger’s message, included a 

general description of the terrain features and enemy fortifications to be 

overcome in the sector. He noted that “at the present time” any potential 

difficulties due to “streams, lakes, ponds and wet marshy ground, are reduced to a minimum.” He insisted that “now is a most propitious time for 

launching an attack in this region. The country is now as dry perhaps as 

it ever gets, the enemy is weak and conditions otherwise favorable for a 

surprise attack that would, in my opinion, attain the desired objectives 

and offer opportunities for an exploitation, to the north, of the success 

gained.” He did report that “the most serious difficulty to be encountered 

is believed to consist of the large quantities of wire, existing in ‘No Man’s 

Land’,” along with “the enemy’s defensive organization.” To overcome 

these, the attacking force would “require the employment of either a large 

quantity of artillery or of tanks and artillery in smaller quantity but still 

sufficient to support the advancing infantry.”30

In his report, Conger also noted that the French staffs in the sector 

“have been very polite and helpful.” However, he added that they gave 

him “the impression by their attitude of feeling: ‘You Americans are very 

simple minded indeed if you think you can fool either us or the Germans 

by any such game as this.” But Conger was not simple minded at all. After 

noting that “as to the results of this reconnaissance work on the enemy’s 

plans, I believe, from all sources, that he is now fully acquainted with all 

that has been done here,” he added that “I do not believe, however, that the 

enemy takes this reconnaissance very seriously; he has too good a check 

on every car load and truck load of ammunition and supplies brought into 

Belfort to be deceived by any mere paper work demonstration or reconnaissance of officers unaccompanied by actual preparations of guns, munition, materiel and subsistence.”31

In fact, while the Germans did not fall hard for the Belfort Ruse, they 

continued to struggle in determining exactly when, where, and how large 

the next American offensive would be, and Bundy’s ghost corps caused 
21

them more difficulty than Conger suspected. In part this was because the 

Allies added other, more real components, to the deception campaign, including more artillery registration in the sector, increased air activity, and 

heavier radio traffic.32 Allied units in the front lines increased their raiding activities, most notably the American 29th Division, which conducted 

violent raids on 31 August and 7 September.33 Conger himself directly 

contributed to the deception by intentionally providing false information 

to the German spy network in the area. In one case, he used a “perfectly 

fresh sheet of carbon paper” when he wrote Pershing a report from his 

hotel room describing Bundy’s attack plans. After making sure the carbon 

paper “was perfectly legible” he crumpled it up, threw it in his waste basket, and took a short walk around the hotel. When he returned to his room, 

the carbon paper had disappeared.

The German Confusion

While senior German commanders—from General Georg Fuchs who 

commanded all German forces in the St. Mihiel salient (called Army Detachment C), to the local army group commander, General Max von Gallwitz, all the way to the de facto head of the German Army, General Erich 

Ludendorff—all suspected a Franco-American attack somewhere near the 

St. Mihiel salient, they proved unable to determine exactly where the attack would hit, how large it would be, what its goals were, or when it 

would come. Part of this confusion came naturally from the fact that, while 

many American officers (and no doubt many French soldiers and civilians 

too) might have openly discussed their thoughts about the next American 

attack, the American First Army was constantly adjusting the actual details 

of the offensive, and the Allied High Command even debated whether the 

attack should be made at all. As late as 31 August Foch made certain strategic proposals to Pershing that could have led to the complete cancellation of the attack at St. Mihiel. Finally on 2 September Foch, Pétain, and 

Pershing resolved their disagreements and re-authorized a slightly scaled 

down offensive along the salient.34 The new plan still involved a huge 

collection of American and French resources, as well as British and Italian bombers. When the American planners learned that important French 

heavy artillery assets could not arrive in time, they slipped the start of the 

offensive to 12 September. Conner promptly informed Bundy that the start 

of his phantom attack had to be postponed, and that he should spend the 

extra time expanding his attack plans—widening the potential frontage 

and going into greater detail about the depth of the advance, even to the 

point of selecting “the bridgeheads on the Rhine which it would be advantageous to secure.”35
22

Nevertheless, Fuchs and Gallwitz increasingly suspected an attack 

on the south face of the salient, speculated whether an attack would also 

come from the western face, and regularly discussed with Ludendorff 

how and even whether to meet an attack. They even considered launching a spoiling attack on the southern face of the salient, but ultimately 

dismissed this option due to a lack of available resources to pull it off. 

While it is not possible to know for sure, it is possible, perhaps even 

likely, that one of the reasons that Fuchs did not receive the resources 

required to conduct the spoiling attack was because the German High 

Command had to spread its declining reserve forces to other threatened 

sectors along the Western Front. And in early September, that included 

the Belfort Gap.

Despite Conger’s doubts of the efficacy of the ruse, the Germans 

were not only well aware of the American activities around Belfort, 

they were concerned enough about the possibility of a real attack there 

that they undertook substantial defensive measures. Diplomats in Switzerland reported “great activity” across the German border, including 

evacuation of entire villages (they prepared the entire city of Mulhouse 

for evacuation), the filling up of munitions depots with ammunition and 

Austrian artillery, the reinforcing of Rhineland fortresses with new, longer-range artillery, and the construction of a “complex system of trenches...between the Ill and Rhine rivers.”36 Finally, and most significantly, the Germans moved three precious divisions into the area around 

Mulhouse to meet a possible attack through the Belfort Gap. After the 

armistice, Conger reported meeting a German colonel who had been a 

staff officer charged with tracking the American activities near Belfort. 

According to Conger, this German colonel notified Ludendorff of the 

need to send reinforcements to the Mulhouse sector, and in his recommendation he stated, “I recognize quite fully that all these preparations 

being made for attack may perfectly well turn out to be a ruse de guerre 

intended to mislead us as to the real point of the attack. However, there 

is nothing to indicate that it is not the real point of attack and our danger 

there is so great that I deem it imperative to have these divisions.”37 No 

doubt, Fuchs would have preferred to have had those divisions available 

for the direct defense of the salient, and their relocation away from the 

sector of the actual attack is the clearest sign that the Belfort Ruse bore 

at least some fruit.

The Belfort Ruse and Allied Success

On 12 September, the American First Army attacked the St. Mihiel 

salient, catching the German defenders by surprise. Within two days it 
23

had killed, captured, or driven off Fuchs’ Army Detachment C in its entirety. The First Army liberated some two hundred square miles of French 

territory that had been occupied by the Germans for nearly four years, 

capturing more than 15,000 enemy soldiers, over 400 artillery pieces, as 

well as massive stocks of other military supplies, at the cost of just 7,000 

American casualties.38 Most significantly, the offensive frustrated German 

plans to remove the entire French male population from the salient and to 

methodically destroy every village, road, railroad, bridge, and well in the 

salient. It was an extraordinary victory for a brand new field army filled 

with partially trained officers and men, as well as a number of whole divisions that had never seen combat before. It also served as a welcome introduction to the methods of deception more familiar to European warfare, 

but practiced less-often by Americans. Many factors contributed to this 

remarkable American victory, and the innovative, and ultimately successful, Belfort Ruse appears to have been one of them.
24

Notes

1. No scholarly study of the battle has ever been written. The only monograph-length work is James Hallas, Squandered Victory: The American Army at 

St. Mihiel (Praeger, 1995), and it is not based on archival research. In his memoir, Pershing claimed the American First Army contained 550,000 American and 

110,000 French soldiers during the St Mihiel attack, and the American Battle 

Monuments Commission’s (ABMC) American Armies and Battlefields in Europe gives these figures as the numbers “involved in the offensive.” In his introduction to the US Army’s reprint of the official history, David Trask states that 

Pershing assembled approximately 500,000 men for the battle. John Pershing, 

My Experiences in the World War (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 

1931), 2: 261; ABMC, American Armies, 110; United States Army in the World 

War, 1917-1919 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990 reprint), 1: xvii. For information 

on signals intelligence at St. Mihiel, see William A. Morgan, “Invasion on the 

Ether: Radio Intelligence at the Battle of St. Mihiel, September 1918,” Military 

Affairs, vol. 51, no. 2 (April 1987): 57-61.

2. For a piece that discusses the success and importance of the St. Mihiel 

offensive, see Grotelueschen, “The Doughboys Make Good: American Victories 

at St. Mihiel and Blanc Mont Ridge,” Army History (Spring 2013): 6-18.

3. The best analysis of the German spring offensives is in David T. Zabecki, 

The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War

(London: Routledge, 2006); for a discussion of the American role in the first 

four German offensives, see Mark E. Grotelueschen, Into the Fight; April-June 

1918 (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 2018).

4. Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives, 39. For detailed discussion of the 

changes in German artillery methods, see Zabecki, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg 

Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery (Praeger, 1994).

5. For statistics on the German offensives, see Zabecki, The German 1918 

Offensives, 160, 199, and 226.

6. ABMC, American Armies and Battlefields in Europe (Washington, D.C.: 

GPO, 1995 reprint), 502.

7. Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives, 261.

8. For more on the Second Battle of the Marne, see Michael S. Neiberg, Second Battle of the Marne (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008); for the key American 

contribution at the Second Marne, see Douglas V. Johnson, II, and Rolfe L. Hillman, Jr., Soissons, 1918 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999).

9. Foch was not appointed a Marshal of France until August 2018.

10. For the Second Marne, or what the Americans called the Aisne-Marne Offensive, as the turning point of the war, see Robert L. Bullard, American Soldiers 

Also Fought (New York: Longmans, 1936), 13; in his memoirs, Pershing called 

it “the counterblow that was destined to change the entire aspect of the war,” and 

“the turning of the tide,” My Experiences in the World War (New York: Stokes, 

1931), 2: 158, 161); Hindenburg said the same thing, in more words, as did German Chancellor von Hertling, see Pershing, My Experiences, 2: 162.
25

11. Ludendorff is quoted in Hew Strachen, The First World War (New York: 

Penguin, 2003), 316.

12. ABMC, American Armies, 502.

13. The documents announcing Foch’s and Pétain’s agreement that it was 

time to form an American army are included in the American official history, 

United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990 

reprint), 8: 4-8.

14. The first discussions regarding an American field army called for an 

American First Army to be created in the Aisne-Marne region, which was still 

active at that time, while an American Second Army was to be assembled more 

gradually in the St. Mihiel sector. However, by 9 August the Aisne-Marne sector 

had stabilized enough that the Allies decided to create the First Army in the St. 

Mihiel sector and to have it complete preparations to attack the salient there. 

The Second Army was not created until mid-October. See documents in United 

States Army in the World War, 8: 6-18. For Pershing’s discussion of this, see his 

memoir, My Experiences in the World War, 2: 171-176.

15. Marshall was officially assigned to work under Fox Conner in the AEF 

GHQ’s Operations section, but Conner loaned Marshall to Colonel Hugh Drum, 

the new First Army chief of staff, to help plan the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne 

operations. See George C. Marshall, Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 

1917-1918 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1976).

16.Marshall, Memoirs, 124-125.

17. Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Indiana UP, 1986), 

176. In his memoirs, Pershing only relates that during the heated discussion “we 

both rose from the table where we sat.” Pershing, 2: 247.

18. United States Army in the World War, 8: 127-128.

19. Donald Smythe, “The Ruse at Belfort,” Army 22, no. 6 (June 1972): 38.

20. Smythe, “The Ruse at Belfort,” 38.

21. Petain’s letter to Pershing is included in United States Army in the World 

War, 8: 21-22.

22. Petain’s letter to Pershing is included in United States Army in the World 

War, 8: 21-22.

23. United States Army in the World War, 8: 27. Rod Paschall, “The Belfort 

Ruse.” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 15, no. 1 (Autumn, 2002): 24-29.

24. These comments come from Conger’s post-war recollections when he 

was a military attaché to Berlin, included in United States Army in the World 

War, 8: 62-64.

25. Hallas, Squandered Victory, 39.

26. United States Army in the World War, 8: 34-35.

27. United States Army in the World War, 8: 35.

28. United States Army in the World War, 8: 34.

29. United States Army in the World War, 8: 44.

30. United States Army in the World War, 8: 45.

31. United States Army in the World War, 8: 44.
26

32. Smythe, “Ruse,” 36.

33. ABMC, American Armies, 423.

34. United States Army in the World War, 8: 47.

35. United States Army in the World War, 8: 51.

36. United States Army in the World War, 8: 65.

37. United States Army in the World War, 8: 63.

38. Different sources offer various figures for the number of German troops 

and guns captured, and US casualties suffered: The narrative portion of the 

official history claims “15,000 prisoners, 257 guns” United States Army in the 

World War, 1: 43. The ABMC history states that American casualties were “less 

than 9,000, yet more than 15,000 prisoners and about 450 cannon had been 

captured,” ABMC, 112; in his memoir, Pershing states: “Nearly 16,000 prisoners 

were taken and some 450 enemy guns had fallen into our hands. Our casualties numbered about 7,000.” Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, 2: 

270; George C. Marshall writes that the numbers were “in the neighborhood of 

15,000 prisoners and 400 guns,” and just 5000 US casualties. Marshall, Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 146. In his biography of Pershing, Donald 

Smythe claims that the First Army “had captured 450 guns ad 16,000 prisoners, 

at a cost of only 7,000 casualties,” Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies, 

185. The German official history, Der Weltkrieg, claims that German losses 

were somewhat smaller, approximately 17,000 men, including “at least” 13,000 

POWs, and just 150 artillery pieces. Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. 

Die militärischen Operationen zu Lande (14 vols. Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1925-

44), vol. 14: 602.
27

Chapter 2

From Beersheba to Megiddo

British Deception Operations during the Palestine Campaign, 

1917-1918

Major Brian J. Drohan

Deception operations are often romanticized in the sense that some 

dramatic ruse can appear as a stroke of genius that single-handedly wins 

the battle, as in the famous story of the Trojan Horse. However, the enduring value of deception operations is the integration of deception efforts into the concept of operations. During World War I in the Palestine 

Theater, the thorough integration of deception measures into the overall 

concept of operations played a significant role in the success of two major 

campaigns—the battles of Beersheba-Third Gaza in 1917 and the 1918 

Megiddo offensive.

Deception was a key part of operational planning on all sides during 

the First World War. This is because offensives required massive concentrations of supplies and troops—so much so, that adversaries generally 

knew when the opposing army was preparing for an offensive. Thus, the 

point of deception operations prior to an offensive was not to disguise 

preparations entirely, but to prevent the enemy from accurately estimating 

the precise timing, scale, and location of an offensive.

At both Beersheba and Megiddo, British deception planners sought to 

strengthen their adversaries’ inaccurate assumptions about the location of 

upcoming British offensives. They deliberately intended to make enemy 

leaders more certain of their (incorrect) assessment of the situation. To 

employ these measures effectively, deception planners must have an accurate understanding of the adversary’s expectations and situational awareness. In these two cases, British intelligence officers understood enough 

about the enemy to know where the Turks and Germans believed the next 

offensive would occur. These insights proved vital in developing effective 

deception plans that British commanders fully integrated into the concept 

of operations and scheme of maneuver.

The Palestinian Campaign and the Road to Beersheba

With the outbreak of war in July 1914, the Ottoman Empire (today’s 

Turkey) signed an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. In October, Turkey gave refuge to two German ships that the British Royal Navy 
28

chased into Turkish waters. Later that month, Turkey attacked the Russian 

Navy, prompting Russia, France, and Britain to declar war on Turkey in 

early November.1 Contingents from across the British Empire—Australians, New Zealanders, and Indians—soon joined the British forces in the 

Middle East. In 1915, Britain suffered a series of setbacks; the amphibious landings at Gallipoli, designed to force the Dardanelles, failed and 

the British offensive in Mesopotamia also stalled. To make matters worse, 

Turkish forces drove from Palestine into the Sinai Peninsula, threatening British-occupied Egypt.2

 The return of British troops from Gallipoli 

allowed Britain to strike back in the Sinai. By the end of 1916, the Sinai 

Peninsula was under British control and British leaders prepared a new 

offensive into Palestine.

However, the British offensive soon ran into difficulties. Two assaults on the fortified city of Gaza, along the Mediterranean coast, failed 

to capture the city. After the second Gaza offensive, General Sir Edmund Allenby took command of the British forces. A cavalryman by 

background and an experienced commander who led a field army on the 

Western Front earlier in the war, Allenby instituted a series of reforms, 

such as a rigorous training regimen on new tactics such as rolling artilDead

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lery barrages and an improved system for regulating water consumption, 

which became a key consideration in heat of southern Palestine. Notably, 

however, Allenby also ensured that his staff included deception operations in every battle plan. This approach to deception planning paid off 

during Allenby’s first offensive.3

Meanwhile, Germany deployed the Asia Korps—a force of military 

advisers and combat troops—to support Turkey. In July 1917, the Turkish government placed German General Erich von Falkenhayn in command of the newly established Yildirim Army Group, which consisted of 

two field armies—the Seventh and Eighth. Turkish General Mustafa Kemal—the future founder of the Republic of Turkey—led Seventh Army 

until Mustafa Fevzi took command in early October.4

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British offensive, Seventh Army had only just taken responsibility for 

the inland sector of the front stretching from Tel el Sheria in the center 

to Beersheba in the east. The Turkish Eighth Army, commanded by German General Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein, held the coastal sector 

between Tel el Sheria and Gaza. Eighth Army consisted of three corps: 

XXII Corps covered the Gaza sector, XX Corps held the center, and III 

Corps held Beersheba, which anchored the Turks’ left flank in the Negev 

Desert.5

 The Turks and Germans had 33,000 infantry, 1,400 cavalry, and 

about 300 artillery pieces at their disposal.

Against this force, the British mustered 60,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and approximately 450 artillery pieces.6

 Allenby organized British 

forces into three corps: XXI Corps, which held the Gaza sector, and 

XX Corps were infantry formations, while the Desert Mounted Corps 

consisted of cavalry, New Zealand mounted riflemen, and Australian 

“light horse.” Additionally, the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, a separate unit of camel-borne infantry designed for desert mobility, enhanced 

the mounted component.7

Beersheba: The Concept of Operations

One of Allenby’s corps commanders, Lieutenant General Sir Philip 

Chetwode devised (or inspired) the plan for the British offensive that has 

since become known as the battles of Third Gaza and Beersheba. Having 

witnessed the failure of the first two assaults on Gaza, Chetwode thought it 

better to strike further inland where Turkish defenses were weaker. Many 

other senior officers agreed with the idea.8

 In June 1917, Chetwode wrote 

to Allenby, suggesting that the main effort of the next offensive focus on 

the town of Beersheba, which was approximately 50 kilometers inland 

from Gaza. Apart from its position on the far left of the Turkish line, Beer-
30

sheba contained several water wells. Once in British hands, Beersheba’s 

wells could be used to keep British troops supplied, as the availability of 

water remained a major logistical constraint of desert warfare. Beersheba 

could then serve as a jumping-off point for further attacks behind enemy 

lines, with the aim of driving north and west to the Mediterranean in order 

to cut off Turkish forces in Gaza.9

Allenby liked the idea and ordered his staff to plan for the Desert 

Mounted Corps and XX Corps to attack Beersheba. Both units would have 

to march through the desert without the Turks discovering the move, then 

seize Beersheba quickly so that the Desert Mounted Corps could lead a 

rapid exploitation of the breakthrough. The main attack on Beersheba enabled a supporting attack on Gaza to fix Turkish forces there and divert 

their attention from the main attack. Planners chose the night of 30-31 

October 1917 to launch the offensive.10

The Deception Plan

Allenby, his staff, and his subordinate commanders also agreed on the 

importance of convincing the Turks and their German advisers that the 

main thrust of the British offensive would strike Gaza, not Beersheba, in 

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Figure 2.2. The third battle of Gaza and the capture of Jerusalem. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
31

order to keep the defenders fixed there and prevent any fatal reinforcement 

of Beersheba. Moving two corps—a total of 56,000 men in four infantry 

and two mounted divisions, along with 200 artillery pieces—from one end 

of the front to the other presented a difficult task under any circumstances, 

but the need for secrecy required a thorough deception plan.

Deception planners knew that the Turks believed the British would 

attack Gaza a third time and used this to their advantage. British forces 

had decoded enemy communications in which Turkish and German commanders discussed how an attack on Gaza was easier to support logistically due to the city’s proximity to the Mediterranean Sea and railways. The 

British also knew that Turkish and German leaders were worried about the 

possibility of an amphibious landing. The enemy was not particularly concerned about the chances of a major offensive against Beersheba. British 

planners therefore did not have to change their enemy’s assessments—

they sought to reinforce preexisting beliefs.11

The deception plan had three objectives. First, planners sought to reinforce the Turks’ preexisting belief that the British offensive would target 

Gaza. Second, because British planners knew that Turkish ground and air 

reconnaissance patrols would discover at least some of the British troops 

as they repositioned toward Beersheba, the deception had to convince the 

Turks that an attack on Beersheba was only a feint. Finally, the British 

believed that the four or five Turkish divisions in Syria formed a strategic 

reserve that could be deployed to Gaza. The third part of the plan intended 

to fix these units in Syria and prevent them from reinforcing Turkish forces 

in Palestine.12

Objective 1: Gaza as the Main Effort

To support this objective, Allenby’s planners coordinated with the 

Royal Navy, sent false radio messages, arranged for the intentional “loss” 

of fake documents, and prepared a massive artillery barrage targeting 

Gaza. Taken together, these efforts reinforced the Turkish belief that Gaza 

was the main effort of the impending offensive.

The Royal Navy aided the deception effort by simulating preparations for an amphibious assault. Naval officers collected small boats (in 

the days before amphibious assault vehicles, rowboats and dinghies were 

used to shuttle soldiers from large troopships to the shore) from the surrounding area and massed them on shore near the British frontline positions. In another potential sign of an amphibious attack, naval vessels 

took soundings off the Gaza coast to measure the depth of the sea and 

the beach gradient.13
32

The British also sent false radio messages that included information 

meant to disguise the exact timing of the offensive. For example, one message stated that General Allenby was going to be away from the front lines 

from 29 October-4 November. Because no army would launch an offensive 

while its commander was away from the front, the obvious implication of 

this information was that an offensive would not occur during that period.14

In what has since been termed the “Haversack Ruse,” planners also 

arranged for false documents to fall into Turkish hands by having a reconnaissance patrol intentionally drop a haversack after making contact 

with Turkish cavalry patrols. The Turks were certain to capture the haversack and analyze its contents. These contents included fake planning 

documents indicating that the British planned to attack Gaza by land and 

sea. Meanwhile, the fake documents claimed, a feint would be launched 

against Beersheba.15 Opposing forces frequently captured enemy documents during raids and patrols, so the fact that the haversack seemingly 

contained important documents was not out of the ordinary.16 The idea 

for this ploy is often mistakenly attributed to a single British intelligence officer, MAJ Richard Meinertzhagen, who later claimed that the 

ruse was the key in deceiving Turkish forces. Instead, the haversack ruse 

formed only one part of the overall deception plan. British deception 

planners did not rely on a singular, “brilliant” ruse, but on the cumulative 

effects of multiple deception ploys that all reinforced the same message, 

demonstrating the high level of coordination required in any successful 

deception plan.17

Lastly, planners arranged for a massive preparatory bombardment 

against Gaza using artillery and naval gunfire. This began on 27 October, three days before the scheduled attack on Beersheba. During the First 

World War, both sides regularly used days-long preparatory barrages prior 

to an offensive to “soften up” the enemy positions. By targeting Gaza, 

British planners intended to convince Turkish and German commanders 

that Gaza was the target of the upcoming offensive.18

Objective 2: Disguise the Deployment Toward Beersheba

Because they believed that Turkish reconnaissance would discover at 

least some signs of the increased British presence near Beersheba, British 

planners sought to deceive the Turks as to the size of the deployment rather 

than the deployment itself. Therefore, British planners focused their deception efforts on counter-reconnaissance and operational security measures.

British planners recognized that overhead surveillance, in this case 

enemy aircraft, posed the greatest danger to the success of the deception. 
33

Throughout 1917, the Turks and Germans had more aircraft in theater than 

the British. This superiority gave the Turks and Germans a marked advantage in aerial reconnaissance. To counter this advantage, British troops 

increased their air defense capabilities by building additional machine gun 

positions, and Allenby received additional aircraft sufficient for two air 

wings of 72 aircraft. Allenby sent many to the Beersheba sector, where 

they flew counter-reconnaissance missions. In addition to attempting to 

blind enemy air reconnaissance, British planners slowly increased the 

number of patrols in the Beersheba sector so that the Turks grew accustomed to seeing increased British activity in the area well before the offensive began.19

British troops also followed strict operational security procedures. 

Soldiers spent daylight hours hidden in wadis so that enemy aircraft could 

not spot them. Engineers constructed a railway line and water pipeline 

extension toward Beersheba to facilitate the movement of supplies for the 

offensive, but this worked only at night. During the day, they camouflaged 

the railroad and pipeline to prevent observation from the air. To further 

disguise the deployment, troops marched in stages from one concealed 

position to another and did so only at night.20 Ultimately, Turkish and German forces discovered the movement of additional British forces to the 

Beersheba sector, but they incorrectly assessed the size of the force, believing it contained a maximum of two divisions—one infantry and one 

mounted—due to the logistical difficulties of moving and supplying forces 

in the interior.21

Objective 3: Fix Turkish Reserves in Syria

The third part of the deception plan—fixing Turkish reserves in 

Syria by creating the impression of a planned amphibious landing at 

Iskenderun—occurred on the British-occupied island of Cyprus, less than 

200 kilometers away and the nearest British base to Iskenderun. British 

radio traffic simulated the arrival of new forces. Naval personnel laid out 

buoys in Cypriot harbors to direct troop transports and engineers began 

construction of new troop camps. Planners intended for these preparations 

to create the impression that Cyprus was to be the staging area for an 

amphibious assault on the Syrian or Turkish coast. Turkish intelligence 

sources soon heard about the preparations. On October 17, a Turkish air 

reconnaissance mission flew over Cyprus, but found no evidence of a 

large-scale amphibious assault.22 Ultimately, this part of the British deception plan failed to convince the Turks. Even so, this failure had little 

effect on the overall deception effort. Turkish and German commanders 

continued to believe that the offensive targeted Gaza and were more con-
34

cerned about an amphibious landing there, rather than near Syria. Turkish 

High Command deployed some of its reserves to Palestine, but only two 

divisions reached the front by the time the British offensive began. One 

of those was in reserve north of Gaza while the other remained in reserve 

behind the center of the line. The Turks sent only one brigade of reinforcements to oppose the feint at Beersheba.23

The Battle

On the evening of 30 October, the Desert Mounted Corps left its bivouacs around Khalasa and Asluj, where it had assembled for the attack. 

The mounted troops then rode through the night in a wide flanking movement designed to have them ready to attack Beersheba from the east at 

dawn. Meanwhile, XX Corps crossed a series of wadis to reach their start 

positions where they could attack Beersheba from the south and southwest. 

The battle began with a short but intense artillery bombardment at 0555 

on 31 October. By 0830, XX Corps’ advanced troops had captured a key 

Turkish strongpoint. This opened the path for the main attack, which began at 1215. East of the town, the Desert Mounted Corps assaulted another 

strong hilltop stronghold, and by 1500, they had captured the position, 

enabling next phase of the operation, the seizure of the town of Beersheba 

itself. In late afternoon, with only a few hours remaining before darkness, 

Australian Light Horse swept into the town. Beersheba had fallen.24

On the Gaza flank, the attack began on November 1, spearheaded 

by XXI Corps, with 11,000 infantrymen and 148 cannon. The Turks 

defended with 116 guns and 4,500 infantrymen—a force that grew to 

8,000 men as the battle dragged on. By November 5, British troops had 

captured some of the front-line Turkish positions, but the Gaza fortress 

remained in Turkish hands. But British successes in the Beersheba sector 

meant that the Turks would be encircled if they remained at Gaza. Over 

the night of 6-7 November, with the Desert Mounted Corps rolling the 

Turkish left flank back, the Turks abandoned Gaza, and British troops 

entered the city the following morning. With the Turks in full retreat, 

Allenby switched his main effort from the Beersheba flank to the more 

easily supported Gaza flank.25

The capture of Beersheba crushed the Turkish left, but Turkish forces 

withdrew in good order, occupying strong positions on high ground at 

Hareira, Tel el Sheria, and Tel Khuweilfe. The Turks managed to hold 

Tel Khuweilfe for five days, which allowed the Turks to regroup.26 Turkish forces quickly occupied a new defensive line centered on the town of 

Huj. For the next few weeks, British forces slowly drove the Turks farther 
35

north, with Turkish troops executing a series of well-organized withdrawals. By early December, British forces reached the outskirts of Jerusalem. 

After several days of fierce fighting, the Turks withdrew from the city. On 

11 December, Allenby victoriously entered Jerusalem’s Old City through 

the famous Jaffa Gate.27 Allenby’s offensive had succeeded in breaking the 

Gaza-Beersheba line, but he had not managed to surround and destroy the 

Turkish army. Even so, it was a significant victory, especially considering 

the stalemate that characterized the fighting in many other theaters during 

the First World War.

Assessment

The Turks and Germans identified some British deceptions and some 

troop movements, but it was too late. On 25 October, Turkish intelligence 

realized that many British camps near Gaza were empty. The Turks also 

identified several British mounted brigades southwest of Beersheba.28 After the war, Kress von Kressenstein claimed in his memoirs that he correctly identified the haversack documents as fake and had accurately determined that the additional British reconnaissance near Beersheba indicated 

an attack was imminent.29 His actions, however, suggest otherwise. Kress 

prioritized the improvement of fortifications in the Gaza sector over Beersheba. He also deployed the bulk of his reserves and reinforcements in the 

Gaza and central sectors of the line. Only one brigade reinforced Beersheba, which suggests that he believed that the main British attack would be 

against Gaza. His superior, von Falkenhayn, approved these troop dispositions. This meant that the Turks had only one infantry and one cavalry 

division holding Beersheba.30 On 29 October, only two days before the 

offensive began, a message from the Turkish High Command noted that 

“an outflanking movement on Beersheba, with about one infantry and one 

cavalry division, is indicated; but the main attack, as before, must be expected on the Gaza front.”31 Senior German and Turkish commanders in 

theater did not take any concrete actions to suggest that they expected the 

British main effort to strike Beersheba.

Of the three deception objectives, only the first two succeeded. The 

third objective—fixing Turkish reserves in Syria through the Iskederun 

amphibious landing ruse—failed. But the arrival of Turkish reinforcements had little effect. Turkish and German commanders expected the 

main attack to come at Gaza with a feint directed toward Beersheba, and 

British deception operations successfully reinforced this belief.32 The British skillfully disguised the fact that Beersheba was the target of the main 

attack and prevented the enemy from discovering the size of the force 

involved. This success did not stem from any single officer’s genius; it 
36

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H

Jaffa

Ramleh 

Mediter

Se

0415 Ho

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El Faluja

Situ

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1800 Ho

20 Sep

El Tire

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Battle of Megiddo

Dispositions and Order of Battle

19 September 1918

0 10 20 Miles

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Railroad

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Jericho

XX

Composite

XX

46

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Figure 2.3. Dispositions and Order of battle in the Battle of Megiddo, 19 September 

1918. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
37

was instead the product of a collective effort from Allenby’s staff and commanders through a planning process that integrated military deception into 

all aspects of British operations.

Megiddo: The Concept of Operations

Between winter 1917 and spring 1918, Allenby ordered limited attacks into the Jordan Valley that proved inconclusive, but still intended 

to mount a major offensive in the fall. In the summer of 1918, Allenby’s 

troop dispositions included XXI Corps with four divisions in the west, 

while XX Corps and its three divisions occupied the Samaria Hills 

in the center. Reinforcements arrived for the Desert Mounted Corps, 

bringing their strength to four mounted divisions. Allenby placed three 

divisions on the eastern flank in the Jordan Valley but kept the fourth 

in reserve near the coast.33 On the other side, the Turkish Eighth Army 

held the coastal sector, with the Asia Korps to their left, while Seventh 

Army dug into the Samaria Hills, and Fourth Army deployed in the 

Jordan Valley to the east. These units also had a new commander—

German General Otto Liman von Sanders.

The original plan for the Megiddo offensive—named for the ruins of 

an ancient city that lay along the planned British avenue of approach—

was cautious, but in late August 1918 Allenby selected a more audacious 

option.34 The main effort occurred on Allenby’s left, near the Mediterranean coast, where XXI Corps hoped to break through the Turkish lines 

before wheeling east and advancing on Sebustiye and Nablus. This would 

create space for the Desert Mounted Corps to ride through the breach and 

seize Afule before turning east to strike Beisan, thus cutting the Turkish 

lines of retreat out of the Jordan Valley and, hopefully, trapping the Turkish army.35 It was essentially the opposite of the third Gaza-Beersheba 

plan; this time, the main attack struck the Turks on the coastal flank rather 

than the inland one.

In the center, XX Corps used two infantry divisions to fix the Germans 

and Turks north of Ramallah. On the right, a mounted division, an Indian 

infantry brigade, and four infantry battalions formed a makeshift element 

named “Chaytor’s Force” after the commanding officer. They served as 

a diversion, meant to convince the Turks that the main offensive would 

come across the Jordan River toward Amman.36

Ultimately, the operational plan relied on overwhelming force at 

the point of breakthrough, followed by rapid exploitation by the Desert 

Mounted Corps. With a three-to-one advantage in artillery over the Turks, 

Allenby had the largest artillery concentration in the Middle East Theater. 
38

On top of this, he could call upon naval gunfire from two Royal Navy 

destroyers. Such a massive offensive required significant preparation such 

as stockpiling ammunition, food, and water as well as massing combat 

power. Just carrying the army’s water required over 7,000 camels.37

The Deception Plan

As at Beersheba, Allenby’s staff prepared a thorough deception plan 

and fully integrated it into the maneuver plan, in order to strengthen 

their enemy’s preexisting beliefs as to the location of the next offensive. British intelligence knew from captured documents and prisoners 

that the Turks and Germans expected a British offensive and believed it 

would target the Jordan Valley. Turkish intelligence officers had come 

to this conclusion based on the pattern of British activity throughout 

1918, including the British capture of Jericho in February. Throughout 

the spring, Arab irregular forces under Prince Feisal and British LTC 

T.E. Lawrence, the famed “Lawrence of Arabia,” conducted raids behind Turkish lines. The Desert Mounted Corps also made two limited 

incursions into the Jordan Valley, which further reinforced the Turkish 

perception of a British attack there.38 Consequently, the Megiddo deception plan had two objectives: strengthen the enemy’s belief that the next 

offensive consisted of a main attack in the Jordan Valley toward Amman 

rather than in the west along the Mediterranean coast; and, if possible, 

convince the Turks and Germans to deploy additional forces in the Jordan Valley.

Objective 1: The Jordan Valley as the Main Effort

This was the primary objective. To strengthen the German and Turkish perception that the Jordan Valley formed the main objective for the 

offensive, British planners used rumor-spreading, operational security 

measures to hide the Desert Mounted Corps’ actual location, counter-reconnaissance, and planned diversionary attacks.

Deception planners spread several rumors designed to support the notion that the offensive targeted the Jordan Valley. These rumors included 

scheduling a fake horse race in Jaffa for 19 September—the planned day 

of the offensive. A morale event such as a horse race suggested to the 

Turks and Germans that the British had not planned a major operation 

near the coast (where Jaffa is located). The date of the fake horse race 

also served to conceal the timing of the offensive. Deception planners also 

arranged for British forces to take over one of the most luxurious hotels in 

Jerusalem. They installed military communications equipment, hung signs 

on several rooms depicting staff positions and office titles to simulate a 
39

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Beirut

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Acre

Haifa

Safed

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Nazareth

Dera

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Jericho Jerusalem

Bethlehem

Hebron

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Sea

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Galilee

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8 October

Arab raids to

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1 October

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Battle of Megiddo

Situation 19–25 September 1918 and

Pursuit to Damascus

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Figure 2.4. Battle of Megiddo and the pursuit to Damascus, 19-25 September 

1918. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
40

General Staff headquarters, and spread the rumor that the hotel served as 

Allenby’s headquarters.39

Disguising the Desert Mounted Corps’ location was necessary because the Turks expected this corps to form the main strike force. Allenby 

had used his mounted forces as his main strike force ever since the breakthrough at Beersheba. Turkish and German intelligence officers believed 

that wherever the mounted troops went, an attack would follow. The British therefore had to ensure that their adversaries continued to believe that 

the Desert Mounted Corps remained in the Jordan Valley. This also meant 

that the British had to prevent enemy intelligence from identifying the 

Desert Mounted Corps’ true location after it redeployed toward the coast, 

and used several measures to keep the move hidden.40

When the rest of the corps relocated to the coastal flank, they left one 

Australian and New Zealand division behind as part of Chaytor’s Force 

along with a small detachment of radio communications personnel. These 

troops erected fake encampments with dummy horses made from blankets 

and wood. They built a total of 15,000 dummy horses, along with dummy 

straw men to populate the camps.41 During the day, the men used mules 

to pull sleds that kicked up large clouds of dust—enough dust to simulate 

a corps-level cavalry concentration and to obscure the fact that only a division remained. At night, they lit extra camp fires indicative of a much 

larger force. Meanwhile, the detachment of radio operators remained behind to continue sending the usual message traffic as if the headquarters 

had never moved.42

The British disguised the Desert Mounted Corps’ redeployment by 

marching at night to cantonment areas hidden from view in orange groves. 

Troops inhabiting these assembly areas had to stay under the cover of the 

orange trees during daylight and were ordered not to light fires. Cooking 

could only be done with smokeless alcohol so as not to give away their 

size or position.43 The groves were thick enough to conceal the men and 

horses from enemy aircraft, while British guards made sure to keep civilians—and spies—far away.44

British aircraft played their part as well. The newly formed Royal 

Air Force (RAF) flew counter-reconnaissance missions to screen British 

camps from enemy aircraft. The RAF had been considerably reinforced 

since Beersheba. Over the intervening months, the RAF gained air superiority, which enabled far more effective counter-reconnaissance patrols 

against enemy aircraft than during the previous campaign. The idea was 

to prevent enemy reconnaissance in the west and center of the front line, 
41

while allowing only high-level reconnaissance (14,000 feet or above) in 

the east so that enemy aircraft could still spot the dummy camps but not 

come close enough to them to realize that they were fake.45 In addition 

to severely restricting enemy aerial reconnaissance, the RAF attacked 

Turkish ground troops. A few days before the offensive began, the RAF 

bombed Turkish positions north and east of the Jordan Valley to convince 

the Turks of an offensive in the Jordan Valley.46

Other diversionary attacks came from ground forces. On 16 September, Arab guerrilla units under T.E. Lawrence and Prince Feisal 

raided the Hejaz railway between Daraa and Amman.47 On 17 September, XX Corps launched a feint against the left flank of the Turkish 

Seventh Army. Both of these moves drew more attention to the Jordan 

Valley sector.48

Objective 2: Draw Additional Enemy Forces Toward the Jordan Valley

A secondary British objective involved drawing as many enemy forces toward the Jordan Valley as possible so that they could be enveloped by 

the advancing Desert Mounted Corps. Several deceptions that supported 

the first objective also supported the second. The Jerusalem hotel rumor, 

fake radio transmissions, and dummy camps suggested a Desert Mounted 

Corps attack in the Jordan Valley and hoped to convince the Turks to deploy more troops there. In addition to these deceptions, two infantry battalions from Chaytor’s Force simulated the arrival of reinforcements. Engineers constructed several new camps along the Jerusalem-Jericho Road. 

Upon completion, the infantry marched to the camp in daylight, then departed in trucks after nightfall. The following day, the infantry marched 

to another camp and repeated the process.49 The movements intended to 

make the Turks think that the British were busily reinforcing the inland 

sector, drawing additional Turkish forces in that direction. British planners believed that if they strengthened their positions, Turkish and German 

commanders would follow suit.

The Battle

The Megiddo offensive began at 0430 on 19 September with a short but 

intense artillery barrage followed by British XXI Corps’ assault. Along the 

20-kilometer front planned for the breakthrough, Allenby massed 35,000 

infantry, 9,000 cavalry, and 400 artillery pieces against an entrenched 

Turkish force of 10,000 infantry and 120 cannons. By mid-morning, British infantry completely overran the front-line Turkish defenses, capturing 

over 7,000 men in the process.50
42

XXI Corps quickly breached the front line, which allowed the Desert 

Mounted Corps to rapidly exploit the breakthrough. On 20 September, 

one cavalry division advanced 70 miles—an unheard-of distance by First 

World War standards. On the 21st, the Australian Mounted Division captured Jenin after advancing 11 miles in less than an hour and a half.51 The 

speed stunned the Turkish and German forces, leaving them with little situational awareness and even less time to react. The Yildirim Army Group 

commander, General Liman von Sanders, did not even realize the extent of 

British success until over 24 hours into the offensive. Turkish and German 

commanders not only had the wrong idea of what the British intended to 

do, but also found it difficult to learn what the British were actually doing. 

British pre-battle deceptions as well as the speed and ferocity of the offensive created confusion among enemy commanders.52

The momentum of the breakthrough carried Allenby’s troops forward 

for over a month. British forces seized Damascus on 30 September, Beirut 

on 8 October, and Aleppo on 25 October.53 In addition to the territorial gains, the British captured 75,000 Turkish soldiers over the course of 

the campaign. These defeats convinced the Turks to sign an armistice at 

the city of Mudros on 30 October 1918, which effectively ended the war 

between the Entente powers and Turkey. Germany continued fighting in 

Europe for only a few more days, until the 11 November 1918 armistice.54

 Assessment

Some evidence suggests that Turkish and German commanders anticipated an attack along the coast. For example, the Turks had concentrated 

most of their heavy artillery in the western sector. Three out of six heavy 

artillery battalions supported Eighth Army near the coast. On the surface, 

this troop disposition indicates General Liman von Sanders knew or at 

least anticipated where the British offensive would come.55 But there are 

other explanations. For example, the terrain in the Samaria Hills and the 

Jordan Valley were well-suited to defensive operations, whereas the flat, 

open ground near the coast was not. Rather than having identified the location of the offensive, it is more likely that Liman deployed more artillery 

near the coast to compensate for the lack of defensible terrain.

In fact, German and Turkish intelligence reports demonstrate that Liman did not realize that the British had redeployed the bulk of their forces 

from the eastern to the western flank. On 17 September, just two days before 

the battle began, German and Turkish intelligence reported that the British 

had deployed three mounted divisions and one infantry division in the east. 

They also assessed that the Desert Mounted Corps headquarters remained 
43

in its original location. The templated presence of an infantry division suggests that the ruse of infantry reinforcements arriving in camps during the 

day and being trucked out at night also succeeded. However, German and 

Turkish intelligence had accurately assessed that a British cavalry division 

was stationed in reserve near the coast.56 This intelligence picture suggests 

that the British had successfully prevented the Desert Mounted Corps’ redeployment from being discovered. Turkish and German commanders did not 

know that Allenby’s strike force moved to the other end of the line. British 

planners had achieved their first objective of ensuring that the enemy continued to believe that the main offensive intended to strike the Jordan Valley.

Furthermore, the deployment patterns of Turkish and German reinforcements suggest that the British achieved their second objective of 

drawing enemy forces into the Jordan Valley. Between March and September, most reinforcements took position in the eastern and central sectors, 

not to the western sector. In his memoirs, Liman notes that he sent four 

infantry battalions to Fourth Army in the Jordan Valley, while assigning an 

additional four battalions arriving in September to the Seventh Army, in 

the center.57 When the 2nd Caucasian Cavalry Brigade arrived in March, it 

took a position near the coast, but, by 15 September, relocated to the eastern sector.58 In August, Liman ordered three German battalions to move 

from the coast to the center to rejoin the rest of the Asia Korps. He also 

deployed the Turkish 24th Division on the left flank of Seventh Army, 

where the Samaria Hills descend into the Jordan Valley. These decisions 

suggest that Liman believed that he needed to reinforce his eastern flank.59

Another event just two days prior to the offensive further emphasized 

the importance that Liman placed on protecting the eastern flank. On 17 

September, Turkish troops captured a deserter from one of Britain’s Indian units. The deserter informed his captors that the British planned to 

attack near the coast.60 Upon receiving this report, Turkish Eighth Army 

commander Ҫevat Pasha asked Liman for permission to withdraw from 

his forward positions and redeploy on better ground, but Liman refused to 

authorize a withdrawal.61

The deserter had alerted the Turks to the possible timing and location 

of the offensive, but even if Liman believed the deserter’s information, he 

still did not know if an attack on his western flank would comprise the main 

effort or a feint. Liman certainly knew that the British had enough forces in 

theater to launch attacks on both of his flanks. After the war, Liman wrote 

that he had to expect an attack near the coast, but the more important sectors 

were further east. “The situation of the Army Group would become critical,” 

Liman insisted, “if we were beaten on the Jordan, or east of the Jordan.”62
44

The Daraa-to-Amman railroad was the key line of communication that kept 

his men supplied. Protecting it was therefore a top priority. Consequently, 

after T.E. Lawrence’s Arab troops raided the railway on the night of 16-

17 September, Liman ordered an emergency reserve force of two German 

companies to Daraa to secure the railway. Liman was more concerned with 

the attacks on the railroad than the Indian deserter’s tale, later writing that “I 

realized at once that these attacks on our only line of communications were 

the beginning of serious fighting.”63 Liman was correct that serious fighting 

had begun, but he had focused on the wrong flank.

Conclusion

At both Beersheba and Megiddo, British deception operations sought 

to reinforce the Turks’ and Germans’ false assumptions about their operational plans. The British also built multiple deceptions into the plan 

to further reinforce the Turks’ and Germans’ incorrect assessments. Most 

importantly, military deception was not merely an afterthought or a just 

a simple addition to an existing plan. Rather, British planners fully integrated the deception plan into the concept of operations and scheme of 

maneuver, coordinating all preparations for the offensives, and ensuring 

that British forces did not give away vital information that might allow the 

enemy to discover British intentions.

Although the deceptions were important factors, they were not decisive in-and-of themselves. Victory in both offensives still required astute tactical and operational decisions during the course of the campaigns. 

Pre-battle deception operations did increase the likelihood of success by 

luring enemy forces into reinforcing the wrong sections of the line, giving 

British forces an advantage in the attack. Ultimately, deception operations 

made a vital contribution to the Allied victory in Palestine.
45

Notes

1. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The First World War in the Middle East (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2014), 29.

2. Ulrichsen, 103-106.

3. Michael J. Mortlock, The Egyptian Expeditionary Force in World War I: 

A History of the British-Led Campaigns in Egypt, Palestine and Syria (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2011), 84-90; James E. Kitchen, The British 

Imperial Army in the Middle East: Morale and Military Identity in the Sinai and 

Palestine Campaigns, 1916-18 (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 54-55; and Matthew Hughes, “General Allenby and the Palestine Campaign, 1917–18,” Journal 

of Strategic Studies 19, no. 4 (1996): 59-88.

4. Edward J. Erickson, Palestine: The Ottoman Campaigns of 1914-1918

(Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2016), 90-93.

5. Erickson, 103. On October 28, von Falkenhayn reorganized the front, 

placing III Corps under Seventh Army with XV Corps. See Erickson, 107.

6. Yigal Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement: 

Allenby’s Campaigns in Palestine,” Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 

(1990): 174.

7. Jean Bou, Australia’s Palestine Campaign. Australian Army Campaigns 

Series – 7. (Sydney: Big Sky Publishing, 2010), 14-19.

8. Jonathan Q. C. Newell, “Learning the Hard Way: Allenby in Egypt and 

Palestine, 1917–19,” Journal of Strategic Studies 14, no. 3 (1991): 370-371.

9. Bou, Australia’s Palestine Campaign, 41-43.

10. Bou, 41-43.

11. Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 181-182.

12. Sheffy, 181-182.

13. Sheffy, 191-193.

14. Sheffy, 189.

15. Erickson, Palestine, 104.

16. Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 

234 fn61.

17. On Meinertzhagen and the “haversack ruse,” see Brian Garfield, The 

Meinertzhagen Mystery: The Life and Legend of a Colossal Fraud (Washington, 

DC: Potomac Books, 2007) and Barton Whaley, “Meinertzhagen’s False Claim 

to the Haversack Ruse (1917)” in Hy Rothstein and Barton Whaley, eds., The 

Art and Science of Military Deception, (Boston: Artech House, 2013), 57-58.

18. Mortlock, The Egyptian Expeditionary Force in World War I, 99 and 

Bou, Australia’s Palestine Campaign, 43.

19. Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 

189, 191-2; H.S. Gullett, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 

1914-1918. 10th edition. The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-

1918, Volume VII – Sinai and Palestine. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1914), 

375-6; and John Mordike, “General Sir Edmund Allenby’s Joint Operations in 

Palestine, 1917-1918,” Air Power Review 5, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 18.
46

20. Gullett, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 377-378 and 

Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 189, 191-192.

21. Erickson, Palestine, 104.

22. Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 

188 and Gullett, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 374.

23. Gullett, 373 and Sheffy, 188, 196.

24. Gullett, 373-403. For a detailed recent account of the battle, see David 

W. Cameron, The Charge: The Australian Light Horse Victory at Beersheba

(Sydney: Penguin Random House, 2017).

25. Erickson, Palestine, 112-113.

26. Bou, Australia’s Palestine Campaign, 52-53, 58-61.

27. Bou, 63-69.

28. Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 195-196.

29. As quoted in Sheffy, 195.

30. Erickson, Palestine, 105-106.

31. As quoted in Gullett, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 375.

32. Erickson, Palestine, 109.

33. Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 199.

34. Newell, “Learning the Hard Way,” 378-379.

35. Cyril Falls, Armageddon, 1918: The Final Palestinian Campaign of 

World War I (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott, 1964; reprint, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 36.

36. Falls. 45-46.

37. Falls. 37-41.

38. Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 

200, 203.

39. Falls, Armageddon, 40-41.

40. Bou, Australia’s Palestine Campaign, 110-112.

41. David R. Woodward, Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle 

East (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 192-193.

42. Falls, Armageddon, 40-41 and Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and 

Perception Reinforcement,” 210.

43. Bou, Australia’s Palestine Campaign, 110-112.

44. Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 

208 and Falls, Armageddon, 41.

45. Mordike, “General Sir Edmund Allenby’s Joint Operations in Palestine,” 30.

46. Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 213-214.

47. Bryan Perrett, Megiddo 1918: The Last Great Cavalry Victory (Oxford: 

Osprey Publishing, 1999), 33-34.

48. Erickson, Palestine, 161.

49. Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 210.

50. Erickson, Palestine, 161, 167 and Perrett, Megiddo 1918, 30.

51. Ulrichsen, The First World War in the Middle East, 116.

52. Falls, Armageddon, 58-59.
47

53. Erickson, Palestine, 174-176.

54. Ulrichsen, The First World War in the Middle East, 116.

55. Edward J. Erickson is the main proponent of the view that the Turks and 

Germans anticipated an attack on the coast. See Erickson, Palestine, 159-160 

and Edward J. Erickson, Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I: A Comparative Study (London: Routledge, 2007), 135.

56. On this point, Yigal Sheffy’s analysis is thorough and convincing. See 

Sheffy, “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement,” 219-223.

57. Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 

1927; reprint, Uckfield, UK: The Naval and Military Press Ltd, 2012), 271-272.

58. Erickson notes that the 2nd Caucasus Cavalry Brigade was assigned to 

the Eighth Army sector, but he does not account for its subsequent move to the 

eastern flank. See Erickson, Palestine, 159-160; Erickson, Ottoman Army Effectiveness, 135; and Liman, Five Years in Turkey, 271.

59. Liman, 266.

60. Falls, Armageddon, 48.

61. Erickson, Ottoman Army Effectiveness, 133.

62. Liman, Five Years in Turkey, 261.

63. Liman, 274.

49

Chapter 3

Operation BERTRAM

British Deception at El Alamein

Gary W. Linhart

 Well, there it is. You must conceal 150,00 men with a thousand guns 

and a thousand tanks on a plain as flat and hard as a billiard table, and the 

Germans must not know anything about it, although they will be watching 

every moment, listening for every noise, charting every track. You can’t do 

it of course, but you’ve bloody well got to!

—Brigadier Freddie De Guingand, British Eighth Army Chief of Staff1

Blitzkrieg. The word immediately elicits thoughts of mobile 

German combined arms forces returning maneuver to the battlefield 

during World War II. The Germans perfected this approach against 

Poland and France. However, this so-called “lighting war” was executed in its most pure form in the campaigns of North Africa, between the German-Italian force of Panzerarmee Afrika (PAA) and 

the British Eighth Army. The flat terrain and lack of natural obstacles 

allowed for near perfect command and control in the attack, with the 

only tactical limiting factor being the top speed of the tanks. Open 

fields of vision allowed for engagements to occur at maximum ranges, bringing tank and anti-tank guns to the fore in importance on the 

battlefield. Open flanks to the south led to never ending envelopments being conducted by both sides. Thus, these campaigns witnessed a series of victorious maneuvers followed by long pursuits 

across the open desert. Both sides traded victories, moving back and 

forth across the desert, much like two coiled springs attached to each 

other. While one side lost power as it stretched its lines of communication (LOC) to a breaking point, the other simultaneously increased 

in power with shortened LOCs. This see-saw warfare of maneuver 

finally came to an end at the small village of El-Alamein, located 

only 160 miles west of Cairo. It was here that restrictive terrain to the 

south forced the adversaries to exchange blitzkrieg for static warfare. 

Both sides now faced a situation reminiscent of the trenches of World 

War 1. They had to find a way to break the enemy lines that no longer 

relied on the “end runs” that had proven so successful in the last two 

years. While both sides attempted to break the stalemate, the British 
50

turned to a proven strategy which greatly assisted them in achieving 

victory at the Battle of El-Alamein: deception.

The Situation

Beginning on 26 May 1942, PAA, commanded by Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, attacked and defeated the British Eighth Army at the Battle 

of Gazala, resulting in yet another pursuit east. The Eighth Army withdrew 

back toward the Egyptian border, losing large quantities of supplies and 

the port of Tobruk to the advancing Germans. The pursuit continued until the Eighth Army reached El-Alamein, where they established a strong 

defensive line. Here, the British were able to secure their right flank with 

the Mediterranean Sea and their left flank with the Qattara Depression (an 

area in western Egypt that was covered with salt marshes and deep sand 

dunes which severely limited the mobility of tanks, or any other vehicle). 

Rommel attempted to break this short, 30-mile line in the south (near the 

Depression) during the Battle of Alam Halfa from 30 August to 5 September 1942 but difficult terrain, well established British positions and lack 

of fuel resulted in a German defeat.2

 This tactical defeat greatly attrited 

the German panzer forces and once again PAA had reached a culminating 

point. Rommel established defensive positions between the same secure 

terrain features the British used to stop him. September witnessed the two 

exhausted armies racing to rebuild themselves and break the static line 

they had created.

Rommel, being the ever-aggressive commander, spoke of resuming the 

attack and seizing Egypt, but several factors made it almost inevitable that 

the initiative shifted to the British. First, the United States had entered the 

war, allowing this key ally to open a massive logistical spigot and provide 

the Eighth Army with much-needed supplies and equipment. One of the 

most important assets the Americans delivered was the Sherman tank, which 

N Mediterranean Sea

 











Egypt

Benghazi

Derna

Gazala Tobruk

Bardia

Salum El

Alamein

Libya

 El Agheila

Wavell (Dec 1940–Feb 1941)

Rommel (Mar–May 1941)

Auchinleck (Nov–Dec 1941)

Rommel (Jan–Jul 1942)

North Africa

1940–1942

0 30 60 90 120 Miles

International Boundary

Elevation 600m

Elevation 1,500m

Elevation over 3,000m

Figure 3.1. North Africa, 1940-1942. graphic created by CSI Press staff.
51

was superior to the German’s main battle tank, the Panzer III.3 This infusion 

of equipment (along with much needed personnel reinforcement from Great 

Britain) allowed the British to reorganize and reequip the X Corps, which 

contained the majority of the Eighth Army tanks. Second, the British had 

gained naval and air superiority at this time. The Royal Navy and Air Force 

were sinking Italian ships and harassing the German ground supply routes 

at a rate that prevented Rommel from properly rebuilding his forces.4

 The 

most critical shortage for PAA was the lack of fuel, which directly affected 

how the Germans deployed their forces in the upcoming battle. The final 

factor that brought the initiative back to the British Eighth Army was a new 

commander: Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery. His personality and leadership brought new life to a defeated army. He declared: “We 

must regard ourselves as having been born for this battle.” He visited all of 

his units to personally convey this message and then created a plan to implement his vision.5

 This plan, however, would have to overcome a German 

defensive position, the likes of which had not been previously encountered 

in these last two years of desert warfare.

PAA spent September and October of 1942 creating a defense that 

rivaled their trench systems of World War I in depth and complexity, 

reaching five miles deep in some areas. Their defense in depth began with 

almost a half million mines stretching between their secure flanks on the 

Mediterranean Sea and the Qattara Depression. Behind this almost unimaginable barrier, their main line was a patchwork of both German and 

Italian infantry units and anti-tank guns that covered these mines. Finally, 

Rommel placed the panzers of the Afrika Korps, the German portion of 

PAA, behind the main line as a counter attack force, prepared to defeat 

any penetration of the main line. While this defense in depth was formidable, it was not as flexible as it could have been. PAA had only enough 

fuel reserves to move the Afrika Korps once for any possible counterattack 

scenario. Since Rommel had limited knowledge of the British intent, he 

was forced to position the 21st Panzer Division in the south and the 15th 

Panzer Division in the North (each of them also had a less powerful Italian 

Armored Division co-located).6

 Had the Germans known the direction of 

the expected Eighth Army attack, they would likely have weighted the 

appropriate flank with a majority of the Afrika Korps.

The British Plan: LIGHTFOOT and BERTRAM

The Eighth Army plan, codenamed “Lightfoot” (a cynical name based 

on the immense number of mines the British would be forced to breach), 

to penetrate and defeat the German line had three separate missions for 

its three corps. The XXX Corps, located in the north, would initially be 
52

the main effort, infiltrating through the minefields and engaging the Axis 

main defensive line near the coastal roads before engaging in an attritional 

battle that Montgomery called “crumbling.” Once the engineers had created corridors, the tank-heavy X Corps would conduct a passage of lines 

through the XXX Corps and establish a strong defensive position. British 

gunners would then destroy the Afrika Korps as it attempted to counter-attack. Finally, the XIII Corps scheduled a demonstration in the south that 

would appear to be the main attack in order to fix the German southern 

forces, specifically the 21st Panzer Division, enabling X Corps to defeat 

the Afrika Korps piecemeal.7

There was, however, a major problem with the plan. LieutenantColonel Charles Richardson, Eighth Army’s main planner, described 

LIGHTFOOT’s main attack in the north as, “horribly obvious.”8

 The 

British would have to mass X Corps and all the supporting artillery and 

supplies in their assault and firing positions just prior to the attack. Like 

a poor boxer who telegraphs his punches, German reconnaissance could 

easily identify this massing in the open desert. Early detection would allow PAA to reposition and reinforce their northern sectors, making a successful breakthrough extremely costly at best. Montgomery, thus, turned 

to Richardson and Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Barkas, the Director of 

Camouflage at General Headquarters Middle East, to create a deception 

plan.9

 While the Eighth Army had conducted deception operations in the 

past, most had been on a small scale, and designed only to misdirect air 

attacks.10 Montgomery now envisioned an operation on a much grander 

scale. The Eighth Army Chief of Staff asked Barkas: “what Camouflage 

could do to assist the following objects:

First: Conceal the true nature of the preparations in the north.

Second: Suggest that an attack was being mounted in the south.

Third: Seeing that all the preparations in the north could probably not be hidden indefinitely, minimize their apparent scale.

Fourth: Slow down the apparent rate of the build-up so that when 

everything was ready, the enemy would think that he still had at 

least two or three days before the attack could be launched.”11

Montgomery realized that the Eighth Army would have to deceive the 

Germans as to the location, timing and scale of their attack for LIGHTFOOT to succeed.

The planners created Operation BERTRAM, which Montgomery 

issued on 14 September.12 The main objective was to deceive the Ger-
53

mans as to when and where the Eighth Army would attack. Montgomery desired Rommel to believe that the when would be at least two 

weeks past the actual date of LIGHTFOOT which was scheduled to 

begin on 23 October. The intent was to lull PAA into a false sense of 

security. If the Germans did not expect an attack until mid-November, they might be less vigilant on the night of the British assault. Additionally, they might assume that they had more time to build their 

defenses and thus be less diligent with their October preparations of 

the battlefield. As for the where, Montgomery wanted the Germans to 

believe that the attack would come in the south (XIII Corps sector) and 

force them to commit unnecessary forces there.13 This second objective 

was the more resource intensive of the two since that meant somehow 

concealing the intentions and movement of an entire Corps. Luckily, 

Barkas had the 85th Camouflage Company from South Africa and three 

additional pioneer companies attached to create the materials needed to 

support the operation.14

Details of Operation BERTRAM

Operation BERTRAM consisted of several sub-operations (SO) to accomplish the overall tasks. Each SO had to be greatly detailed since widely dispersed units had to execute at different times and support the same illusion of an attack in the south which was to occur in early November. All 

of these sub-operations had to be stand-alone sentences that, when read 

together by the PAA intelligence personnel, created a coherent paragraph 

and thus produced the illusion. If any of these SOs were out of sync with 

the others, the picture would not make sense. Even the Middle East Command assisted in the illusion by creating background stories supporting an 

attack in early November. It extended both the Cairo hotel reservations 

for some high-ranking officers, and a major exercise in the Haifa Staff 

College. It announced a fake conference between Generals Alexander and 

Wavell scheduled for 26 October and developed a program of radio traffic 

that supported a southern attack.15 Finally, it barred the Desert Air Force 

from attacking the enemy defenses on the days immediately prior to the 

scheduled attack, much to their dismay. They did conduct attacks on the 

Luftwaffe in October that resulted in the prevention of enemy air reconnaissance over the British attack positions.16

What follows are the specifics of BERTRAM’s sub-operations using 

Figures 3.2: The Initial Deception and 3.5: The Final Deception. Although 

the Eighth Army did not phase these operations, it is helpful to visualize 

the picture given to PAA by breaking them into these two groups. 
54

Possibly the most important SO was MARTELLO. Concealing X 

Corps’ equipment and supplies presented the greatest challenge to the success of BERTRAM. With two corps already forward deployed, X Corps 

had to be moved close to the front lines just prior to the attack. Finding 

this corps in its assault positions would tell the Germans the exact timing 

and location of the British main attack. Thus, one of the main problems the 

Eighth Army had to solve was how to hide it all. Luckily, Lieutenant Colonel Barkas had been developing techniques on how to conceal vehicles 

in an open desert for the last two years.17 Obviously, without any foliage, 

standard camouflage was not an option. In fact, the standard camouflage 

covering used effectively in Europe to break up the silhouettes of the UK 

vehicles failed in North Africa. The covering made the artillery and vehicles stand out more, giving the enemy an easier target for their artillery 

and aircraft. Therefore, the objective was not to hide the vehicles, but to 

make them look like something other than what they were. A brain child of 

General Wavell (the Middle East Commander in 1940-41), the British had 

developed a device called the “Sunshield.”18 Sunshields could either make 

a truck look like a tank (presenting the illusion of strength) or in the case 

of those used in Operation BERTRAM, to make tanks look like trucks, 

thus presenting an illusion of weakness (see Figure 3.3). The key to MARN

Egypt

XXX

XX

Littorio (It.)

XX

Ariete

(It.)

XX

15

(Ger.)

XX

21

(Ger.)

XIII

XXX

(G.B.)

X

XXX

(G.B.)

XXX

XXX

(G.B.)

Operation Bertram

The Initial Deception

September–October 1942

0 10 20 30 40 Miles

Martello

Diamond

Munassib

Brian

Melting Pot

Murrayfield

North & South

El Alamein

Station

Allied Front

Line

Phantom

Attack

Mediterranean Sea

Qattara Depression

Railway to

Tobruk/Tripoli

Railway to

Alexandria

Fake

Pipeline

Fake

Supplies

Supplies Stacked in

Shape of Lorries

Real Lorries and

Empty Sunshields

Real

Tanks

Detectable

Fake Guns

N

Axis

Front

Line

Cannibal 1

Cover Guns in Shape of Lorries

Figure 3.2. Operation BERTRAM: The Initial Deception. Graphic created by CSI 

Press staff.
55

TELLO’s success was to create a large area of non-threatening trucks that 

remained stationary for a long period of time. British forces deployed it 

in early October so that the Germans became conditioned to its existence 

and did not suspect that it was part of the build-up for an imminent attack. 

After the war, Barkas recalled, “In this way the enemy would become accustomed to seeing it and, when nothing further seemed to happen, might 

be expected to relax his vigilance.”19

MARTELLO contained three versions of “vehicles:” (1) 700 empty 

sunshields that looked like trucks and were awaiting the tanks that would 

eventually occupy the space under them. (2) Boxes of the real supplies 

(mostly food) needed for the attack, stacked in the shape of trucks or under 

side tents were the “crew slept.” (3) Real trucks (to be used for the main 

attack) and crew members that provided activity in the area.20 The only 

supplies not covered up by this scheme were the fuel that X Corps needed. 

Luckily for the British, El-Alamein Station held a number of preexisting slit trenches. Logisticians realized that they could conceal hundreds 

of 4-gallon cans of fuel along the masonry walls of these slit trenches 

(basically just “thickening” the walls). Several tests with their own reconnaissance aircraft proved that the shadows of the trench naturally covered 

the fuel, allowing 2,000 tons of fuel to be hidden in plain sight.21

Figure 3.3. A tank under a sunshield. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
56

While SO MARTELLO concealed X Corps, SO CANNIBAL disguised another element of the Eighth Army build-up. One of the most 

recognizable vehicles in theater, for either side, was the British 25-Pounder Field Gun and its associated prime mover, known as a “Quad.” Each 

25-pounder had a limber in between the prime mover and the piece (reminiscent of horse drawn artillery) that gave it a highly distinctive profile. 

Air reconnaissance could positively spot these vehicles from great distances and, since large artillery concentrations were yet another positive 

indicator of an upcoming attack, planners needed to conceal them as 

something other than artillery. CANNIBAL1 became yet another ingenious deception. It broke the Quads away from the limber and covered 

them with canvas tarpaulins, making them look like ordinary 3-ton supply trucks (see Figure 3.4). Similarly, the disconnected 25-Pounders and 

their limbers also received a similar tarpaulin to represent even more 

trucks. As with Martello, the 360 guns of CANNIBAL 1 stood motionless for a month, taking away any suspicion that this was a buildup of an 

upcoming attack in the north.22

While MARTELLO and CANNIBAL 1 intended to divert the German gaze away from the north, several other SO’s intended to capture the 

Figure 3.4. Quads. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
57

German attention in the south. Like CANNIBAL, SO MUNASSIB was 

designed to hide “artillery.” But this effort was even more complicated 

and took the deception effort to the next level of trickery. The British established three regiments of dummy artillery in assault positions but poorly camouflaged them. They allowed the covers to deteriorate over time, 

facilitating German identification of the dummy positions and indicating 

a British attack in the north. However, MARTELLO was actually a “double-bluff” designed for use when the actual attack came. Once the attack 

started in the north, artillerists replaced the dummy guns with real ones 

(see figures 3.2 and 3.5) making the Germans think the dummy gun positions had been created to conceal a main attack in the south.23

Two more SOs, DIAMOND and BRIAN, hoped to demonstrate a false 

buildup of logistical support in the south. SO DIAMOND was a fake water 

pipeline. Laborers dug up to five miles of trench each day and installed 

a “pipeline,” made of discarded 4-gallon fuel cans, inside the trench. At 

night, the same crews pulled up the “pipeline” and displaced it forward, 

alongside the next length of trench. Finally, they filled the open trench just 

prior to sunrise, presenting the illusion of a newly-buried pipeline. As a 

final touch, work crews added dummy pumping stations and reservoirs for 

realism. This effort not only indicated that the Eighth Army was preparing 

to support a major effort in the south, but also assisted in the timing deception. The British rate of construction indicated that the pipeline could 

not possibly be completed until the beginning of November.24 SO BRIAN 

was a reverse of MARTELLO. While planners worked to disguise real 

supplies as fake trucks in the north, they built massive fake supply dumps 

appearing to hold 7,000 tons of supplies in the south.25

Finally, Montgomery kept X Corps in three separate assembly areas 

far from the front: Murrayfield North, Murrayfield South and Melting Pot. 

These areas were along tracks that generally lead to the south. As long as 

the X Corps remained in these assembly areas, the Germans were confident that the British had no immediate plans for attack and, when the 

time for movement came, they appeared poised to use the tracks leading 

south. X Corps did eventually move forward, beginning on 18 October 

and in daylight, to assembly areas in the XIII Corps sector. This move 

gave the Germans the final and most convincing indicator that the British 

were coming south.26

While British planners spread all the previous efforts over a lengthy 

time period designed to lull the Germans into a false sense of security, the 

final shell game occurred in the days just prior to the 23 October attack. 

(see figure 3.5) X Corps tanks that had previously moved into assembly 
58

areas in the south during the day changed course on 20-22 October and 

moved north at night to occupy the empty sunshields in MARTELLO. The 

British put great effort into this portion of the plan. As each tank left the 

false assembly area in the south, a dummy tank took its place. At MARTELLO, each tank occupied a designated and pre-identified sunshield. 

To further conceal the movement, crews wiped away the tracks that they 

made exiting and entering the two areas. Complementing the effort in another domain, false radio traffic completed the ruse that X Corps remained 

in the south. Finally, the artillery from CANNIBAL 1 moved at night to 

their firing positions in CANNIBAL 2, but remained concealed as 3-ton 

trucks.27 Thus, the British positioned their main effort, XXX Corps and X 

Corps in areas that the Germans (hopefully) had ignored for the last month. 

Montgomery had successfully placed the vast strength of the Eighth Army 

in position to attack in the north, while erecting a vast phony army to bluff 

the Germans in the south.

Evaluation of Operation BERTRAM

The British executed Operation BERTRAM exactly as planned. Although a dust storm damaged some of the dummies and sunshields on 

16-17 October, troops managed to quickly repair them.28 XXX Corps 

and X Corps emerged from the phony story built by BERTRAM and sucXXX

XX

Littorio (It.)

XX

Ariete

(It.)

XX

15

(Ger.)

XX

21

(Ger.)

X

XXX

(G.B.) XXX

XXX

(G.B.)

Operation Bertram

The Final Deception

October 1942

0 10 20 30 40 Miles

Martello

Cannibal 2

Munassib

Melting Pot

Murrayfield

North & South

N

XIII

XXX

(G.B.)

El Alamein

Station

Axis

Front Line

Allied

Front

Line

Phantom

Attack

Night

Movement

Fake

Tanks

Real Guns Replaced

Fake Guns After

North Attack Began

Mediterranean Sea

Qattara Depression

Railway to

Tobruk/Tripoli

Railway to

Alexandria

Real

Attack

Egypt

Supplies Stacked in Shape of Lorries

Fake Tanks

Left Behind

Real Tanks Move

Under Sunshields

Figure 3.5. Operation BERTRAM: The Final Deception. Graphic created by CSI 

Press staff.
59

cessfully executed Operation LIGHTFOOT. The battle lasted from 23 

October to 11 November 1942 and resulted in the penetration of Rommel’s defense in depth, forcing PAA to retreat. Eighth Army continued 

the pursuit across Egypt and Libya as far as the Tunisian border. Eventually, PAA and the reinforcing Fifth Panzer Army, inserted to block Allied 

forces landed during Operation TORCH and now converging from the 

west, surrendered to a combined Anglo-American Force in May 1943. 

The defeat rivaled the loss of the German Sixth Army in Stalingrad, concluded just a few months earlier inflicting two near-simultaneous defeats 

on Hitler’s now overstretched forces.

Effectiveness of BERTRAM

Winston Churchill, in a speech to the House of Commons, said of the 

Battle of El-Alamein: “By a marvelous system of camouflage, complete 

tactical surprise was achieved in the desert. The enemy suspected – indeed 

knew-that an attack was impending, but when and where and how it was 

coming was hidden from him.”29 While this was certainly a stirring account of Operation BERTRAM by the victorious Prime Minister, it may 

be a bit exaggerated.

We may never know the exact effect BERTRAM had on the Germans, 

as there are many contradictory accounts of what they did and did not 

know or expect. However, we can examine several indicators that point 

to success.

No positive identification of the main effort. PAA report of 10 October: “The British may launch an offensive soon...Pz. Army thinks that 

the main weight of the enemy attack will be south of Ruwiesat (the center 

of the 30-mile line), and perhaps also on either side of the coast road.”30

A follow on report on 16 October refined the dates of an attack to “20–25 

October.”31 While the Germans seem to have identified the British when, 

they appear to be unsure of where the main attack would fall (they indicate 

the south, but “perhaps” the north) This inability to accurately identify 

the British main effort is reinforced by their continued separation of their 

counter attack forces in the north and the south.

Negative reports by German Reconnaissance. The same report of 

10 October sheds some light on the German reconnaissance posture: “As 

assembly of the attacking troops and artillery will take at least one or two 

days, our own troops cannot be taken by surprise provided they keep their 

eyes open and make use of every means of observation.”32 However, the 

Germans never spotted the specific indicator they were looking for. Panzerarmee Afrika’s 23 October report to their higher headquarters stated: 
60

“Enemy situation unchanged.”33 Colonel Richardson was pleased that intercepts from the Luftwaffe in the week prior to LIGHTFOOT all stated 

“Nothing to Report”. The Desert Air Force’s remarkable feat of not allowing even one German reconnaissance flight to penetrate Eighth Army 

sectors after 18 October prevented the collection of accurate aerial intelligence and served to enhance the ruse.34

Delayed movement of the Afrika Korps. While few PAA officers 

admitted that they had been deceived by the British deception effort, one 

notable exception was General von Thoma, the commander of the Afrika 

Korps at the time of the battle. Upon capture, he stated that German reconnaissance had failed to notice any changes in the Eighth Army’s posture 

in the weeks prior to the battle. He was of the opinion that the main effort 

would come in the south, even after LIGHTFOOT began.35 This thought is 

reinforced by the fact that the 21st Panzer Division did not move north until 26 October. This would indicate that even Rommel was not convinced 

of the actual main attack until four days after it began.36

The Germans had the date of the attack but remained postured to 

receive that attack equally in the north and the south. Since they never 

weighted their counter-attack posture, we can conclude that BERTRAM 

succeeded in assisting the Germans to believe what they wanted to believe. As stated by their 10 October report, they could not possibly be 

surprised if they did not observe the building of forces necessary to execute a major attack. Thus, the Germans sat idle while the British conducted their elaborate shell game. British victory was hiding under the 

sunshades of MARTELLO.
61

Notes

1. Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (Guilford CT, The Lyons Press, 

1975), 117-118.

2. Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht (Lawrence KS: University 

Press of Kansas, 2007), 217-220.

3. Niall Barr, Pendulum of War (Woodstock & New York: The Overlook 

Press, 2004), 266.

4. Jon Latimer, Alamein (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 

162 and Barr, 222-225.

5. Barr, 302.

6. Latimer, Alamein, 136-137 and Barr, 270-271.

7. Glyn Harper, The Battle for North Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 

University Press, 2017), 128-129.

8. Charles Richardson, Flashback, A Soldiers Story (London: William Kimber, 1985), 115.

9. Barr, Pendulum of War, 299.

10. Latimer, Alamein, 154, 160.

11. Geoffrey Barkas, The Camouflage Story (London: Cassell and Company, 

1952), 191.

12. Barr, Pendulum of War, 299.

13. Barkas, The Camouflage Story, 191.

14. Barkas, 107,156, 201

15. Latimer, Alamein, 156.

16. Barr, Pendulum of War, 303-304.

17. Barr, 303-304. and Latimer, Alamein, 299.

18. Barkas, The Camouflage Story, 202-203.

19. Barkas, 202.

20. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (New York, Oxford 

University Press, 1979), 31. and Barkas, 198-199.

21. Latimer, Alamein, 156. and Barkas, 198.

22. Barr, Pendulum of War, 300. and Barkas, 200-201.

23. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 30-31.

24. Cruickshank, 30. and Latimer, Alamein, 157.

25. James Lucas, War in the Desert (London: Arms and Armour Press, 

1982) 124 and Cruickshank, 30.

26. Latimer, Alamein, 159. and Barkas, The Camouflage Story, 207.

27. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 31-32; and Barkas, 211-212 

and Barr, Pendulum of War, 300-301.

28. Barr, 300.

29. Barkas, The Camouflage Story 215-216.

30. Barr, Pendulum of War, 305.

31. Hans-Otto Behrendt, Rommel’s Intelligence in the Desert Campaign, 

1941-1943 (London: William Kimber, 1985) 198.

32. Behrendt, 198.
62

33. Glyn Harper, The Battle for North Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 

University Press, 2017), 131.

34. Richardson, Flashback, 117.

35. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, 33.

36. Lucas, War in the Desert, 126. and Barr, Pendulum of War, 353.
63

Chapter 4

Operations BARCLAY, CASCADE, and MINCEMEAT

Allied Deception in the Mediterranean, 1943

Gregory S. Hospodor

During early July 1943, German and Italian forces across the Mediterranean theater awaited the inevitable Allied follow-up to the Axis catastrophe in Tunisia. The critical problem was determining where the blow 

would fall. The seizure of the Italian islands of Pantelleria, Lampedusa, 

Linosa, and Lampione during early June as well as geo-strategic common 

sense suggested strongly that invading Sicily was the next logical Allied 

move. Yet when the assault on Sicily, codenamed HUSKY, occurred on 

10 July 1943, an Italian garrison with only two reinforcing German divisions—15. Panzergrenadier-Division and Fallschirm-Panzer-Division 

Nr.1 Hermann Göring—stood ready to respond to the 180,000 men of the 

Allied assault echelon.

The invasion was no cakewalk, but it could have been much worse. 

Italian losses in North Africa and faltering morale meant that German units 

would be the primary bulwark of any defense. Between 9 March and 10 

July, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the German military high command 

(OKW), sent one division to Sardinia and one to Corsica. The Balkans saw 

the number of German divisions rise from eight to eighteen. Greece received 

the most attention; seven German divisions joined the normal garrison of 

one.1

 Had OKW correctly divined Allied intentions and prioritized Sicily, 

the result of the invasion clearly might have been different.

Why the Axis, specifically the Germans, failed to prepare better for 

what seems obvious with the benefit of hindsight is the focus of this chapter. The simplest answer, although by no means the only one, is that the 

Allies deceived Axis leaders as to their intentions, which caused the Germans to misallocate the increasingly scarce resources of the Wehrmacht, 

the only forces truly capable of responding effectively to an Allied incursion by this point of the war. This, then, is the story of Operation BARCLAY, the Allied deception plan for the Mediterranean in 1943. BARCLAY, which included many subsidiary lines of effort, such as Operation 

MINCEMEAT that aimed to mislead the enemy as to Allied plans through 

so-called special means and Operation CASCADE, a comprehensive order-of-battle deception, played a key role in setting the conditions for the 

invasion of Sicily to succeed.
64

Organizations

The first requirement for effective military deception—the “end” of 

surprising the enemy (of misleading and thus causing them to act in such a 

way as to multiply the effectiveness of one’s follow-on military efforts)—

is a commitment to it. Institutions manifest commitment through resource 

allocation and the creation of organizations. Deception organizations are 

the “means” by which the “way,” deception, is achieved.

The road to Operation BARCLAY began in the Middle East with 

General Sir Archibald Wavell’s establishment of “A” Force on 28 March 

1941. “A” Force grew from small beginnings—initially, one handpicked 

leader, Lieutenant Colonel (eventually Brigadier) Dudley W. Clarke, two 

officers, and ten enlisted men. Although Clarke would direct thousands in 

all manner of deception activities, including temporarily assigned regular 

army units, the core of “A” Force was never more than a few hundred 

men. Even within these few, security demanded that only a handful were 

ever “in the know” about the entire scope of “A” Force’s undertakings. As 

the scale of “A” Force’s efforts and resources expanded, its organization 

changed: Control dealt with plans, policy, and administration; Operations 

handled physical employment and tactical deception in the field; and Intelligence directed deception schemes through channels controlled by intelligence or security authorities.2

The Middle East and the broader Mediterranean basin were difficult 

environments within which to practice deception. Indeed, historian Michael Howard has described this complex region as “an intelligence officer’s paradise and a security officer’s hell.”3

 The area contained almost 

limitless conduits through which to collect information and to transmit 

disinformation, and this situation worked both ways. Thus, months of assiduous effort on a deception operation could be compromised easily as 

it was impossible to discover, detain, eliminate, or turn all enemy agents. 

Simply put, balancing the scale of deception activity with the vital importance of security was difficult at best in a region where political, familial, 

and ethnic relationships might extend back a millennia and many did not 

appreciate the British presence.

Initially, Clarke’s “A” Force, headquartered in Cairo, operated more 

or less independently, subject only to the directives of the Commander-in-Chief Middle East (today’s equivalent is the commander of a Combatant Command). By 1943, as Allied fortunes improved and their military 

efforts broadened, Clarke synchronized “A” Force’s strategic, if not always 

tactical, deception efforts through and with various intelligence entities in 
65

Great Britain, most notably the London Controlling Section (LCS) under 

Lieutenant Colonel John H. Beven, which in December 1942 formally took 

responsibility for strategic deception in Europe, North Africa, the Middle 

East, and India.4

 Within its realm and subject to the guidance and approval 

of the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff, the LCS had nearly unlimited authority for the execution of strategic deception; it was also a super-secret 

group within the broader intelligence community. Clearly, as the scope of 

the Western Allies’ military operations increased, the imperative for coordinating strategic efforts across theaters also increased. So, too, did the LCS 

take measures to continue to build upon the successes of the previous years, 

providing continuity for as well as coordination across previously disparate 

sub-organizations and operations. Finally, the LCS coordinated and cooperated with other intelligence and operational organizations to ensure synchronization.

Operation BARCLAY manifested this new degree of coordination and 

direction in many ways. First, high-level cooperation meant that deceivers had access to ULTRA intelligence; cryptologists broke the Abwehr

(German military intelligence service) Enigma (mechanically encoded) 

cypher at Bletchley Park in December 1941. This intelligence source allowed carefully vetted deceivers unparalleled insight into the Axis intelligence network to determine and play upon fears and expectations and 

to assess the effectiveness of deception schemes.5

 Second, clear direction 

from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the theater commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, guaranteed that distinct deception operations, 

such as MINCEMEAT and CASCADE, all served a common operational 

purpose. Finally, inter-theater coordination meant that discrete activities 

dovetailed operationally. Personnel of MI5 Section B1B and Naval Intelligence Division Section 17M were jointly responsible for MINCEMEAT.6

“A” Force’s Cairo-based, order-of-battle deceivers, responsible for CASCADE, were largely unaware of London-based Section B1B and Section 

17M’s existence (although Dudley Clarke was), a fact that did not matter 

provided there was a coordinating administrative bridge. The effects of the 

organizational maturation of the British deception enterprise were greater 

efficiency and effectiveness compared to their Axis counterparts.

The Axis intelligence services were the first-line “receptors” for 

Allied deception “signals.” They interpreted the information collected 

for the senior decision-makers who were the ultimate targets of Allied 

strategic deception. Adolf Hitler, the commander-in-chief of the German armed forces, controlled operations through Oberkommando der 

Wehrmacht (OKW). Within OKW, the Wehrmachtsführungsstab, the 
66

operational staff of OKW, relied upon Fremde Heere West (FHW), Foreign Armies West, to manage operations and intelligence in the western 

theater to include the Mediterranean. FHW intelligence officers drew 

upon many sources for their assessments. Surprisingly, because it was 

part of the Wehrmacht, Abwehr was FHW’s least-trusted German source 

for accurate information, but its size and encompassing activities made 

skeptical reliance upon it necessary. Only the Italian intelligence services stood lower in German eyes, although the British paradoxically 

and correctly regarded the Italians highly.7

Possession of Abwehr’s Enigma cypher, Abwehr’s size and mission, 

and dysfunction within the organization made it a focus of British deception operations. Reading the German’s mail made it possible to play 

upon senior leaders’ fears and expectations. It also made judging the effectiveness of deception activities possible. Competition reigned between 

Abwehr’s overseas stations. This combined with an absence of close, critical oversight meant that Abwehr operators were often rewarded for the 

number of agents they recruited and the amount of intelligence they generated no matter how dubious. The result was that Abwehr served as willing, 

if unknowing or cynical, broadcasters of Allied deception to FHW.

For its part, FHW, which was increasingly fearful of the scale of military resources drawn into the meat-grinder in the Soviet Union, was disposed to passing along overestimations of Allied strength and aggressive 

intent in the Mediterranean to Hitler. Operation CASCADE played upon 

FHW’s tendency to exaggerate the Western Allies’ strength. Knowledge 

of OKW’s and thus Hitler’s fears and expectations in the Mediterranean 

gained through ULTRA decrypts formed the basis of Operation MINCEMEAT. Operation BARCLAY, guided by a mature and effective administrative apparatus, synchronized the two efforts as well as others.

Theory and Practice

If British deceivers held the organizational upper hand, they had also 

learned hard operational lessons. By 1943, Dudley Clarke, “A” Force’s 

leader, possessed a clear vision of how to conduct deception, a vision tempered by his wartime experience. Clarke’s ideas represent the theory and 

practice that permeated the broader British approach to deception and informed the conception of, planning for, and execution of Operation BARCLAY. As such, a brief review is useful:8

1. The purpose of deception, as opposed to cover, is to make the enemy do something that assists our plans and prejudices his. Cover induces 

non-action; deception induces action. They are related but different. What 
67

the enemy thinks is significant only for what it causes him to do. Thus, an 

operational commander should tell his deceivers what it is that he specifically wants the enemy to do at a place and time. The deceivers, in collaboration with the intelligence staff, should decide what the enemy needs to 

made to think to cause the required action. Violating this principle rests 

at the root of many deception failures. Furthermore, deceivers should not 

deceive merely because they can; deception should have a specific object.

2. Control of deception operations should rest with an operational 

commander rather than the intelligence staff. The operational commander 

tells the deceivers what he specifically wants the enemy to do at a place 

and time, which sets the tempo for deception operations. He or she also 

decides when to replace the deception plan, to alter it, or to end it.

3. Deception works best when all planning and execution is concentrated under one commander. This applies equally to tactical and strategic 

deception. One cannot institutionalize deception—making responsibility 

for deception a regular staff duty is a mistake, doing so hinders effectiveness and security. The same specialized organization and commander 

should be responsible for tactical and strategic deception.

4. Deception works best when it plays on real fears and expectations. 

It is uneconomical to try to induce fear or expectation where there is none. 

Egypt

(G.B.)

Mediterranean Sea



Morocco

(Fr.) Algeria

(Fr.)

Tunisia

(Fr.)

Portugal

Spain

Turkey

Italy

France

Greece

Austria Hungary

Romania

Yugoslavia

Albania

Switz.

Germany Czechoslovakia

Bulgaria

Soviet Union Poland

Tyrrhenian

Sea

Atlantic

Ocean

Ionian

Sea

Aegean

Sea

Mediterranean Sea

Strait of Gibraltar

Huelva

Black

Sea

Pantelleria

Balearic Islands

Corsica

Sardinia

Sicily

Crete

Libya

(It.)

Cyrenaica

Sea of

Marmara

Bosphorus

Strait

Mediterranean Basin

1943 0 100 200 300 400 Miles

Malta

Cairo

Spanish Morocco

Tunis

Atlantic

Ocean

Egypt

(G.B.)

Mediterranean Sea



Morocco

(Fr.) Algeria

(Fr.)

Tunisia

(Fr.)

Portugal

Spain

Turkey

Italy

France

Greece

Austria Hungary

Romania

Yugoslavia

Albania

Switz.

Germany Czechoslovakia

Bulgaria

Soviet Union Poland

Tyrrhenian

Sea

Atlantic

Ocean

Ionian

Sea

Aegean

Sea

Mediterranean Sea

Strait of Gibraltar

Huelva

Black

Sea

Pantelleria

Balearic Islands

Corsica

Sardinia

Sicily

Crete

Libya

(It.)

Cyrenaica

Sea of

Marmara

Bosphorus

Strait

Mediterranean Basin

1943 0 100 200 300 400 Miles

Malta

Cairo

Spanish Morocco

Tunis

Atlantic

Ocean

Figure 4.1. The Mediterranean basin, 1943. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
68

Knowledge of enemy fears and expectations is a critical information requirement. Order-of-battle deception is particularly useful in playing upon 

both. The enemy’s belief in the truth of a deception operation is not required; acceptance of its plausibility is.

5. Deception works best when it is given time to work. Specialized deceivers in consultation with intelligence staff members are best equipped to 

determine the time required. “At once” deception orders from an operational commander almost never succeed. Tactical deception generally takes less 

time than strategic deception. More time is better where strategic deception is 

concerned.

6. Deception works best when it uses several methods. Never rely on one 

method. Special means work best when at a distance from the enemy. Physical 

means work best when in close proximity.

These, then, were some of the theories and methods that informed the 

success of Operation BARCLAY. It is to this story we now turn.

Operation BARCLAY

On the fourth day of the Casablanca Conference, 18 January 1943, the 

British and Americans decided to invade Sicily (Operation HUSKY) as a 

follow-up to success in Tunisia. Thereafter, deception planning progressed 

quickly. The LCS began work on a general framework to achieve the following ends: first, to pose credible threats to the south of France and Balkans; second, to weaken the garrison of Sicily and deter reinforcements, 

especially German ones; and, finally, to minimize attacks on the shipping 

assembling for HUSKY.9 After approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 

the LCS sent “A” Force its outline plan, which it received on 27 February. 

“A” Force finalized the BARCLAY plan on 21 March, which received Eisenhower’s approval on 10 April and was issued by the LCS on 24 April.

The overarching story to accomplish the stated objectives was complicated. A fake army, British Twelfth, would invade Greece and Crete from 

the Middle East around 25 May, bringing Turkey into the war. Turkish 

and other Allied forces would then attack Bulgaria and into Yugoslavia. 

One and a half weeks later, an assault would be mounted against southern 

France. American forces under Lieutenant General George Patton would 

take Corsica and Sardinia to cover the main effort against southern France 

by General Sir Harold Alexander’s forces, British Eighth Army and a 

French one. The Anglo-French army group would then advance up the 

Rhône River valley. Allied airpower would neutralize the naval and air 

threat from the Italian mainland and Sicily, enabling each to be bypassed. 

Both notional attacks would be postponed on 20 May for roughly one 
69

month when another postponement would take place thereby pinning Axis 

troops in place and achieving surprise for the real effort against Sicily on 

10 July.10

Although complex, the deception “story” was robust. If the Germans 

only bit on one of the illusory offensives, attention and, most importantly, 

military strength would be diverted away from the most logical target, Sicily. Furthermore, the enemy did not need to believe the Allies were going 

to invade Greece and France, only that they could and might. The risk, of 

course, was that the Axis intelligence agencies would catch on to the charade; the exposed lies would then point a finger directly at the supposedly 

bypassed actual invasion area, having quite the opposite effect intended.

To mitigate this danger, the British deceivers used every method and resource in their playbook—to name but a few: double agents; the creation of 

fake units complete with camps, administration, and vehicles; amphibious 

training for Greek troops; appeals for Greek interpreters and fishermen familiar with the Greek coast; distribution of maps of cover objectives, intelligence 

on Axis units in France and the Balkans, Polish-Bulgarian phrase books, and 

Pound notes overprinted with “France,” “Bulgaria,” and “Greece”; and deceptive radio traffic. The multi-dimensional effort required an immense amount 

of coordinated work on the part of deception operators and intelligence staffs 

spread over thousands of miles. That Axis intelligence services never caught 

wind of BARCLAY stands as a testament to Allied security measures.11

In addition to Allied competence, other reasons also contributed to 

German gullibility. BARCLAY played upon German fears and expectations (interestingly, the skillful Italians never totally took the bait).12 For 

example, Hitler in particular worried obsessively about the Balkans. “A” 

Force had already mounted two recent operations, WAREHOUSE and 

WITHSTAND, to play upon these fears.13 BARCLAY need only continue in this regard. Furthermore, Abwehr, led by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, 

suffered from inefficiency, corruption, and disloyalty. Thus, despite the 

elaborate German apparatus for intelligence collection and analysis, they 

were consistently and successfully deceived.14 In addition, “yes-man-itis” 

increasingly permeated the German military high command as Hitler became more paranoid; if Adolf Hitler was worried about a threat to the 

Balkans then there were those on his staff that would affirm those fears.15

A plan as complex and comprehensive as BARCLAY contained many 

subsidiary and related operations. It also built upon the hard-earned achievements of previous deception enterprises. Enumerating all is beyond the 

scope of this essay, but a few examples provide a taste of the ingenuity, cre-
70

ativity, energy, and breadth of the whole. Operation LEYBURN supported 

BARCLAY from May through August 1943 by demonstrating interest in 

preserving works of art in the supposed target areas.16 For WATERFALL,

deceivers created a gigantic display of fake equipment in Cyrenaica. Over 

one hundred bogus landing craft, an armored division’s worth of dummy 

equipment, and enough gliders and aircraft for an airborne division were on 

full display in harbors, assembly areas, and airfields. This was intended for 

Axis photoreconnaissance aircraft in the only sector they could reach. The 

purpose was to fool photo interpreters and intelligence analysts into reporting preparations for an Allied assault against Greece and Crete.17 MINCEMEAT, discussed in more detail later, aimed to plant suggestions of planned 

invasions of Corsica and Greece by floating a body bearing fake documents 

ashore in Spain. Finally, CASCADE, which began in March 1942 and was 

enlarged several times until replaced by WANTAGE in 1944, comprised a 

sweeping order-of-battle deception that formed the essential background for 

BARCLAY’s notional eastern attacks.

Operation CASCADE

Operation CASCADE was, writes intelligence historian Thaddeus 

Holt, Dudley “Clarke’s and the Allies’ crowning achievement.”18 It was 

almost uniformly successful. By 1944, FHW carried every unit created on 

its Allied order of battle assessments.19 Consequently, CASCADE formed 

a firm foundation upon which a great deal of Allied strategic deception 

was based. Simply put, BARCLAY would not have succeeded without it. 

Due in large part to CASCADE, on 10 July 1943, at least seven German 

divisions awaited an assault that never came hundreds of miles away from 

their comrades on Sicily. By the time of the landings, the Germans believed that the Allies had 20 more divisions in the Mediterranean theater 

than they actually did (four armored, fifteen infantry, and one airborne), in 

addition to two Corps and one Army headquarters.20

Long-term order-of-battle deception is not easy. After the war Dudley 

Clarke said:

The amount of inconvenience and extra work it involves 

should deter anyone from embarking upon it lightheartedly, 

for, once started, it remains a standing dish which can never be neglected nor abandoned, and which may imperil both 

military plans and delicate Deception machinery if not tended 

with sufficient and regular care.21

To create a unit out of thin air required planting the seed with the enemy 

and creating physical and administrative manifestations that could be ob-
71

served. To maintain the notional unit’s existence in perpetuity necessitated 

thoroughness, patience, and diligence, among other qualities, in administrative and deception staff members when one careless error might bring 

the whole edifice crashing down.

The amount of effort expended, coordinated through both Cairo and 

London, was staggering. Every organization down to battalion-level needed 

a name and history. Soldiers wearing fake divisional patches regularly drove 

trucks marked with the same through areas where they might be detected. 

Thousands of official documents circulated with the names of fictitious units 

prominently displayed. Radio traffic routinely passed between bogus outfits. 

To prevent confusion, deceivers who fed false information to the enemy 

were provided with a comprehensive, regularly updated reference book that 

laid out the location, organization, and status of every counterfeit unit. Regular headquarters possessed a similar notebook that also contained information about the phony units that the deceivers wanted the enemy to know in 

addition to an estimate of what the enemy currently believed.22

Operation MINCEMEAT

Only one BARCLAY-related operation competed with CASCADE

in terms of significance, MINCEMEAT. If similar in terms of the scale 

of their respective deceptive effects, the two could not have been more 

different in conception and execution. While CASCADE was long-term, 

resource- and time-intensive, and useful for a multiplicity of purposes 

beyond BARCLAY, MINCEMEAT was comparatively quickly pulled together, tiny, and produced time-sensitive results.

Operation MINCEMEAT was perhaps the single most successful and 

spectacular deception action of the entire war. It was certainly the most 

famous, inspiring a best-selling book in 1953, The Man Who Never Was, 

and a well-received movie of the same name in 1956. More recently, Ben 

Macintyre’s 2010 Operation Mincemeat also hit the best-seller lists. Alas, 

the story may only be sketched out here.

MINCEMEAT was the brainchild of Flight Lieutenant Charles Cholmondeley (pronounced Chum-ly), seconded to MI5’s Section B1A, where 

he served as an “ideas” man. MI5 charged B1A with running captured spies 

as double agents. Cholmondeley knew that official but unimportant papers 

found after a British aircraft had crashed into the sea off Cadiz, Spain in 

September 1942 made their way into Abwehr hands. He theorized that a 

deception operation might take advantage of this. Cholmondeley suggested 

that the body of a drowned man dressed in military uniform with fake secret 

papers might be dropped from an airplane where it would be found and 
72

where nominally neutral Spanish authorities worked closely with Abwehr. 

One selling point of the scheme was that information of a far more secret 

nature, such as Allied plans for operations after Tunisia, could be introduced 

than through “normal” double agent channels. The basic premise of the 

subterfuge was not new; indeed, the intelligence community calls planting 

false information through a staged accident, a “haversack ruse,” after the 

episode in Palestine discussed in Chapter Two. MINCEMEAT’s uniqueness 

stemmed from the ingenious proposed method of executing it. From this 

germ, MINCEMEAT grew.23

Operation BARCLAY provided the opportunity to execute the idea. 

As “A” Force’s Dudley Clarke and the LCS’s John Beven pulled the 

threads of BARCLAY together, Sir John Cecil Masterman, chairman of 

the Twenty (XX—for “double-cross”) Committee that oversaw the running of double agents in Great Britain, assigned help to Cholmondeley 

in the form of Lieutenant Commander Ewen Montagu, RNVR, of Naval 

Intelligence Division’s Section 17M, which served as a clearinghouse of 

sorts for super-secret information and disinformation. The two made a perfect pair, and quickly worked to flesh out the details.

As executed, the success of MINCEMEAT rested in the details. Cholmondeley and Montagu acquired a suitable body, and brought Britain’s 

most eminent pathologist, Sir Bernard Spilsbury, on board to ensure that it 

would pass intensive examination. Exhaustive work went into constructing 

a background for the notional Major William Martin, Royal Marines. The 

pair settled upon submarine delivery as the most effective way of placing 

the body of Major Martin, and solved the problem of long-term storage 

and delivery by such a method. Finally, they created the documents Major 

Martin would carry, the key one being a personal letter from Vice Chief of 

the Imperial Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Nye, to General Sir 

Harold Alexander, Eisenhower’s deputy in the Mediterranean. The letter 

stated that the Allies were planning a landing in Greece, codenamed HUSKY, and another, codenamed BRIMSTONE, for which a fictional attack 

on Sicily would serve as a cover story. The letter hinted that Sardinia was 

BRIMSTONE’s target. Significantly, the letter did not tell the Germans 

anything they did not already suspect.

On 30 April, HMS Seraph cast loose Major Martin off Huelva, Spain. 

He did his duty well. For example, even the Japanese Chargé d’affaires

in Rome outlined grave Axis fears about Sardinia and southern France 

three weeks before the HUSKY landings. Moreover, OKW prioritized the 

defense of Greece for weeks after the Allies were established ashore in 

Sicily.24 The “haversack ruse” had worked.
73

What stands out most from the MINCEMEAT endeavor is the ability 

of the British deceivers to apply deception in a creative and flexible yet 

coordinated manner. Montagu and Cholmondeley were from different departments and selected for their unique, some might say “anti-regular,” 

personalities and skill sets. Yet they found a home where their talents 

would benefit the war effort. Furthermore, it is clear that the demands of 

the mission rather than administrative prerogatives informed MINCEMEAT’s planning and execution. Although not saints, the leaders of the 

British deception enterprise prized effectiveness over other concerns; they 

worked to coordinate their efforts toward a larger goal.

The Deep Roots of Organizational Success

After examining MINCEMEAT, BARCLAY, and CASCADE, one is 

left with the distinct impression that the British did military deception and 

intelligence operations well during World War II less because of far-sighted, rational decision-making and more because of their extensive experience and for deeply rooted aspects of their shared culture.

As a central player in the highly competitive, long game of imperial and European politics and warfare, the British had lengthy experience 

with intelligence and deception operations. This undoubtedly played a role 

in their early commitment to establishing organizations such as Dudley 

Clarke’s “A” Force. Indeed, one is tempted to assert that emphasizing deception during World War II came as almost second nature to them.25 The 

Americans, on the other hand, proved eager but willing amateurs when it 

came to strategic deception for which they had little experience and no 

standing organizations.26 We need not belabor this point.

Less clear, but no less significant, is the role that culture—the set of 

shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization—played in accounting for British organizational 

success.27 The influence of culture is particularly challenging to evaluate. 

How, for example, does one gauge the exact consequence of class structure or elite liberal arts university education upon the British officer corps 

and deception operations other than to say that these surely had an effect? 

For example, MINCEMEAT’s masterminds, Cholmondeley and Montagu, were both “gentlemen.” Montagu was the second son of a baron and 

attended Cambridge, while Cholmondeley was also from a respectable 

family and Oxford-educated. Did their collective creativity stem from a 

similar cultural orientation, or did it instead mean that their “eccentricity” 

would be tolerated, celebrated even, because they were gentlemen rather 

than upstart rankers? Whatever the answer to these questions, one thing is 
74

undeniable—the British Empire possessed a seemingly limitless number 

of talented deceivers and intelligence operatives, including, most appropriately, Ian Fleming, the creator of the fictional James Bond.

More clear when considering the impact of culture are its organizational 

manifestations, such as staff systems.28 The British staff system was more 

flexible than the American one. It lacked a true chief of staff and was usually 

composed of two parts, General (“G”) and Administrative (“Adm”). The 

effect of this organization was that deception operatives often had direct 

access to the commander. The American one, on the other hand, revolved 

around a rigid hierarchy. Assistant chiefs of staff of one of the four primary staff sections—Personnel (“1”), Intelligence (“2”), Operations (“3”), and 

Supply (“4”)—reported to the chief of staff who in turn reported to the commander. Deceivers, then, had to gain two levels of approval at the very least 

before a commander ever heard their ideas. The problem with this structure 

was, in the words of intelligence historian Thaddeus Holt, “that it smothered 

deception, which of all the activities needs to be imaginative and flexible, 

under layers of bureaucracy and bureaucratic coordination.”29

If the American approach to organizing a military staff hurt deception efforts, it also possessed great strengths. The systems-oriented, managerial-focused American method made possible the mobilization of the economy and 

over twelve and a half million men, and the projection of these men with their 

equipment to the far sides of the globe. Here, truly, an effective and efficient 

system was the only answer. If there are lessons in this for today, they are that 

not all significant military problems are answered best with a system and, 

specifically, that any attempt to systematize deception is doomed to failure.

Conclusion

As the 10 July invasion of Sicily approached, the strategically-oriented BARCLAY increasingly gave way to tactical deception operations, 

most notably Operation DERRICK that aimed to tie down Axis forces in 

western Sicily until the Allies were established on the southeast corner of 

the island.30 By then, BARCLAY had largely succeeded—British deceivers won on the cognitive battlefield, causing ambiguity that led the Germans to misallocate resources in a manner advantageous to the HUSKY 

landings. Indeed, Dudley Clarke, as responsible as anyone for the achievement, judged BARCLAY as:

the peak of the Deception effort in the Mediterranean theater. 

‘Barclay’ was neither the biggest nor the longest of the major 

Strategic Deception Plans of the War, but it was one of the 

most straightforward in the almost ‘classic’ style and it illus-
75

trated more clearly than most the principle lessons both of 

planning and execution.31

BARCLAY and its subsidiary and related operations were the consummation of a maturation process. By 1943, British deceivers dominated 

the strategic-level cognitive battlefield, shaping the operating environment 

in ways that multiplied the effectiveness of combat plans and forces. This 

occurred because the British believed that deception mattered, manifested this long-term commitment with resources and actions, and constantly 

adapted organizations, theories, and methods based upon experience.

However, it is possible to overestimate the significance of deception 

to ultimate military success. BARCLAY was no exception. Indeed, by 10 

July, there was, argues Thaddeus Holt, “general recognition, especially by 

the Italian intelligence services, that Sicily was certain to be attacked.”32

Still, the possibility that the Allies might and could land in Corsica, Sardinia, and Greece meant that at least ten German divisions remained committed to spurious missions. Despite the fact that BARCLAY failed to 

deceive completely the Axis intelligence services, it was certainly worth 

the effort.

The effectiveness of deception operations is notoriously difficult to 

measure precisely. The consequences of ambiguity, misunderstanding, and 

confusion are hard to assess. Influences beyond perceptions planted by 

deceivers play upon an adversary’s mind. For example, German forces 

in Greece remained throughout the HUSKY campaign and briefly gained 

a new commander, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel. That this occurred was due to both Allied deception efforts and Hitler’s phobia regarding the Balkans. So, too, was the choice to commit only two German 

divisions initially to the defense of Sicily warranted by realistic concerns 

about Italy’s commitment to the war. Should Italy abruptly surrender, 

which occurred in September, the 60,000 Germans on the island would 

find themselves dangling at the end of a very long rope. Even today, it is 

impossible to determine the exact degree to which deception and other 

concerns played roles in these decisions.

One reflection upon the effects of Operation BARCLAY remains—

the consequences for how we view the past and the Sicily campaign in 

particular. An interpretation that, in the words of historian Carlo D’Este, 

“[f]rom the outset the Allies had taken the safe, conservative path” has 

become an article of faith.33 Most historians marshal German judgments 

of the campaign to support this understanding of Allied operational decision-making. But German commanders thought, as we have seen, the 
76

Allies had far more combat power in the Mediterranean than they did because of Operation CASCADE. For instance, Generalleutnant Eberhard 

Rodt, commander of the 15. Panzergrenadier-Division, still believed in 

1951 that “approximately 50 enemy divisions [were assembled] in the area 

of Algiers-Tunis” when the Allies possessed far fewer.34 How this commonly shared overestimation of Allied combat power affected the German 

military’s understanding of the campaign is little understood, but certainly 

must have had repercussions. If the Allies did indeed have fifty amphibious-ready divisions in North Africa, the 1947 assessment of Heinrich von 

Vietinghoff, commander of the German 10. Armee in Italy, that “from the 

German standpoint it is incomprehensible that the Allies did not seize the 

straits of Messina. This would have been possible without any special difficulty” makes perfect sense.35 But, again, the Allies did not. Allied military deception in the Mediterranean, it seems, plays upon our perceptions 

even today.
77

Notes

1. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume Five, Strategic Deception (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 

92. Other works consulted for this essay include, F. H. Hinsley, et al, British 

Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 

Volume Three, Part I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Thaddeus 

Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (New 

York: Scribner, 2004); Ben Macintyre, Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man 

and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory (New York: 

Harmony Books, 2010); Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never Was (New York: 

J. B. Lippincott, 1953); Carlo D’Este, Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943 

(New York: Harper-Collins, 2008); Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw 

Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, United States Army in World War II

(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1965).

2. Howard, 10, 31-33, 40; Holt, 215-245.

3. Howard, 31.

4. Howard, 71.

5. Howard, 41. Deception practitioners refer to playing on an adversary’s 

fears and expectations as Magruder’s Principle. During the 1862 siege of 

Yorktown, Confederate Major General John Bankhead Magruder successfully 

deceived Union Major General George Brinton McClellan into thinking that 

he had far more strength than he actually possessed by catering to McClellan’s 

cautious disposition.

6. On the conception of MINCEMEAT, see Macintyre, Operation Mincemeat, 9-60; Montagu, the author of The Man Who Never Was, left out much in 

his 1954 book due to the top-secret nature of his work. Although The Man Who 

Never Was is a fantastic read, Macintyre’s book is more reliable as a source.

7. Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 45-52; Holt, The 

Deceivers, 99-109.

8. This synopsis of Clarke’s ideas is derived from Howard, 33, 39, 40-42; 

Holt, 52-98.

9. Holt, 366.

10. Holt, 367, 809; Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 

86-87.

11. Holt, 367-369; Howard, 85-88.

12. Holt assesses the “Italians as by far the most competent [of the Axis 

intelligence services], but Italy was not a prime target of major strategic deception.” Holt, 99.

13. Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 88.

14. Holt, The Deceivers, 102-106

15. Macintyre, Operation Mincemeat, 39-40.

16. Holt, The Deceivers, 827.

17. Holt, 368, 843.

18. Holt, 225.
78

19. Holt, 226-227; Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 44.

20. Howard, 43-44.

21. Dudley Clarke quoted in Holt, The Deceivers, 227.

22. Holt, 25-226.

23. The description of Operation MINCEMEAT is based upon the following 

sources, Macintyre, Operation Mincemeat, passim; Howard, British Intelligence 

in the Second World War, 89-92, 206, 245-6; Holt, The Deceivers, 369-78, 829

24. Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 91.

25. For a few examples see, Huw Davies, “Wellington’s use of deception 

tactics in the Peninsular War,”Journal of Strategic Studies, 29:4 (August 2006): 

723-750; Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969), 25-43.

26. Holt, The Deceivers, 247.

27. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/culture, accessed 15 April 

2018.

28. For an excellent discussion of the effects of British and American staff 

systems on deception during World War II see, Holt, The Deceivers, 66-71.

29. Holt, 68-69.

30. On these tactical deception operations, see Holt, 379-382.

31. Dudley Clarke quoted in Holt, 366.

32. Holt, 379.

33. D’Este, Bitter Victory, 551.

34. Eberhard Rodt, “15th Panzer Grenadier Division in Sicily,” Manuscript 

#C-077 (Koenigstein, CZ: US Army Military History Institute, 1951; translation 

1989), 1, 5.

35. Heinrich von Vietinghoff, “Brief Estimate of the Overall Situation in the 

Mediterranean up to the Landing on the Italian Mainland” Manuscript #D-116 

(Garmisch, Germany: HQ European Command Historical Division, 1947), 5.
79

Chapter 5

Operation KREML

German Strategic Deception on the Eastern Front in 1942

Alan P. Donohue

Introduction

The German Wehrmacht suffered its first major reversal of the Second World War in the depths of European Russia during the winter of 

1941-1942. A combination of faulty intelligence, poor logistical planning, 

inclement weather conditions, and the sheer tenacity of the Red Army 

brought the German invaders to a shuddering halt along the entire front, 

nowhere more spectacularly than at the gates of Moscow. The Führer and 

Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler, decided in early 

1942 that the renewed summer offensive would not be aimed at the Soviet 

capital city, but instead towards the vitally important, oil-producing regions of the Caucasus region in the south (Operation BLAU). Indeed, Hitler had consistently expressed the opinion that economic factors were of 

paramount importance to the conduct of modern warfare, but he believed 

that his generals did not understand this as they were too conservative and 

devoted to outdated maxims of war that focused solely on the destruction 

of the enemy’s armed forces. The Wehrmacht, he posited, would now face 

an insurmountable crisis in terms of operational freedom if it did not seize 

the Caucasus oil for itself. A further mitigating factor for this plan was 

that, if successful, it would have the added boon of denying the Soviets 

their own most important source of oil.1

Hitler and his top military aides were fully cognizant that losses suffered by the Ostheer (“eastern army”) in 1941 could not be replaced in 

full, which meant that the offensive in 1942 would only be conducted on 

one axis (as opposed to three the previous summer). In fact, the Chief of 

the General Staff, Colonel-General Franz Halder, had suggested that the 

Army should go over to the defensive for the year in order to rebuild and 

prepare for the full offensive commitment of all army groups in 1943. 

This strategy, however, was anathema to Hitler, who was fearful that any 

respite would allow the Soviets to reconstitute their own armed forces and 

remain in the war until the Western Allies were in a position to open a second land front on the European mainland. Once Hitler had formulated his 

own strategy for the coming campaign—a single operation in the south towards the Caucasus oilfields —he would not be disabused of his rationale; 
80

indeed, he was supported by many of his subordinates, particularly his economic advisors, who were themselves mindful of the dire fuel situation. The 

initial concern now was to try to convince the Soviet political and military 

leadership that the target of the German summer offensive would be Moscow as opposed to the southern sector. A strategy of deception was initiated 

under the code name Operation KREML (‘Kremlin’) that eventually came 

to involve the highest ranking generals and politicians down to frontline 

troops and individual saboteurs.

It is somewhat incongruous that such an important and fateful deception plan should be afforded so little attention in a field of study that has 

N

Turkey

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Rostov

on Don

Belgorod

Simferopol

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German Intentions and

Soviet Expectations

1942 0 50 100 150 200 250 Miles

0 100 200 300 400 km

Rzhev

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First Phase of

Main Operation

(starting from 15 Jun)

Intended Front

Adjustments Prior

to Main Operation

Possible Alternative

to Main Thrust

Possible Additional

Relief Attacks /

Second Operations

Maykop

Final Objective

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III

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(starting from 15 Aug)

Kursk 

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of Main Thrust

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31 March 1942

Baku

Second Phase of

Main Operation

(starting from 15 Jul)

International Border

Armored and Motorized Formation

Oil Deposits

Plans for

Operation Blue Soviet

}Expectations }

Krasnodar

Groznyy

Figure 5.1. German intentions and Soviet expectations, 1942. Graphic created by 

CSI Press staff.
81

otherwise been steadily gaining in significance. In fact, Operation KREML

has been described as having had the potential to make it a “masterpiece 

of this somewhat speculative form of military art.” Most significantly, it 

had a sound premise in that it advocated a renewal of the offensive against 

Moscow, which actually made strategic sense given the proximity of German Army Group Center to Moscow as well as the importance of the Soviet capital as a center of administration and industry and as a transportation 

hub. This was also what Stalin and the Soviet high command ultimately 

expected.2 However, though the capture of Moscow would have been especially welcome in terms of military strategy, the destructive impact on 

the Soviet war economy, and the effect on German morale at home and at 

the front, it would undoubtedly have been a costly venture: An offensive 

in this region would effectively have been a frontal assault on the most 

heavily defended sector of the entire Eastern Front.

Initial stages of preparation and the Soviet response

Planning for KREML was under way almost as soon as it was for 

BLAU. On 12 February, the chief of the armed forces high command 

(OKW), Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, issued a directive entitled “Guidelines for Enemy Deception” (Richtlinien für die Feindtäuschung). As part 

of this undertaking, German counter-intelligence agents were tasked with 

convincing the Soviets that Moscow and the industrial areas of the middle 

Volga region would be the primary targets of the renewed German offensive.3

 For example, members of the recently formed Russian Nationalist 

People’s Army (Russkaia natsional’naia narodnaia armiia, RNNA), comprised of former Red Army prisoners of war, were trained as spies and 

saboteurs to be transferred to the Soviet rear from the end of May. Among 

other things, the Gestapo (German secret state police) supplied them with 

identification papers and passports, military and political documentation 

to allow access to important locations, and stamps and seals for the majority of the military commissariats and district councils around Moscow. 

Some of those who returned reported that they had been active not only 

in Moscow but also as far away as Cheliabinsk, Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg), and other cities.4

 The German authorities also began a campaign 

to destroy Soviet espionage efforts in Western Europe that summer, which 

resulted in the arrest of approximately 100 operatives.5

KREML was so secretive that even Germany’s Axis partners on the 

Eastern Front (principally Romania, Italy, and Hungary) were not to be 

privy to the details. On 1 April, Halder raised the question of how operational intentions in the southern sector could be disguised while at the 

same time continuing the pretense of a renewal of the assault on the Soviet 
82

capital. Hitler ordered, inter alia, that extreme caution was to be exercised 

during preliminary talks with the representatives of Germany’s allies and 

that the goals of the forthcoming operations were not to be mentioned.6

Halder was generally reticent about KREML, even when confiding 

in his own diary. However, on 3 May, he noted that he had had a meeting 

with the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (Major-General Günther Blumentritt) about the deception measures being initiated for BLAU. Nine 

days later, Halder wrote that the Chief of Staff of Army Group Center 

(Major-General Otto Wöhler) had received instructions that day from both 

Hitler and himself concerning these plans, but does not go into any further detail. Finally, almost two weeks before BLAU began, he noted that 

outstanding issues had been discussed with Wöhler, especially with respect to implementing measures for KREML. The plan, he concluded, was 

straightforward: “Mislead the enemy.”7

Unsurprisingly, the main focus of concern for the Soviets was their 

capital city and how to defend it against the likely German offensive. 

For the month of April, the command of Briansk Front (one of three 

army groups screening Moscow) decreed that its main priority was to 

hold the lines it occupied. It further noted that, in strengthening these 

positions, the main operational areas were to be given special attention, two of which were to be prioritized by the local commanders: The 

Bolkhov–Belëv sector, and the Orël–Mtsensk axis towards Tula (both 

approximately 300 km south-west of Moscow).8

 On 5 April, the chief 

intelligence officer (Ic) of Army Group Center noted that Soviet Western Front (Army General G.K. Zhukov) had apparently transferred 60th 

Rifle Division to the north-west in order to create a Schwerpunkt (“point 

of main defense”) on both sides of the road Bolkhov–Belëv.9 This was 

exactly where the Germans had ostensibly planned their main advance 

on Moscow (discussed below).

Three months after Keitel issued his initial order, his deputy, Colonel-General Alfred Jodl, supplemented it with more specific information 

on the situation as it stood. Present circumstances, he declared, were favorable for KREML for a number of reasons. Significantly, intentions would 

be largely hidden from the enemy because deployments for BLAU extended well into the rear area of Army Group Center. There was an east to west 

movement of troops (which suggested that they were being redeployed 

away from the southern sector), and a localized regrouping of units in 

Army Groups South and Center was currently being implemented (which 

would doubtless add to the enemy’s uncertainty with respect to German 

intentions). Jodl further noted that there were plans to increase statements 
83

in military journals and in the foreign press—as well as in the German 

press to a limited degree—about the significance of Moscow as the focal 

point of Soviet resistance, its importance as a communications hub, and 

the fact that it was the center of Soviet armaments production. The general 

theme of such proclamations was to be that the capture of Moscow would 

create a breach in the enemy line while at the same time deprive the Soviet 

leadership of much of its flexibility. The loss of the capital would also 

deny the Russians the ability to regroup and continue the struggle west of 

the Volga. From 25 May, Jodl suggested, it would be inevitable that the 

enemy would have some sort of clarification about German force dispositions. From the end of that month, therefore, it would be especially important to draw Soviet attention away from Army Group South to Army Group 

Center. It would also be imperative to feign weakness in many sectors of 

Army Group South by substituting units of the satellite armies for German 

formations. This would have the added benefit of offering a period of rehabilitation to the troops that would be withdrawn. Even the German soldiers 

at the front were to be misled into believing that Moscow would be the target of the offensive, and, where possible, intermittent reinforced artillery 

fire was to be carried out in certain areas. Likewise, the remaining sectors 

of Army Groups Center and North were to busy themselves with lively 

reconnaissance and deceptive measures as well as the preparation of local 

feints in order to conceal the true defensive posture of these positions and 

to tie down as many enemy units as possible.10 German units also spread 

disinformation in radio traffic that was specifically meant to be picked up 

by Red Army commands.11

On 9 May, an Abwehr (German military intelligence) report based on 

information gleaned from the Exchange Telegraph news agency in Moscow suggested that Zhukov’s preparations for the anticipated German offensive towards Moscow were “completed”. The same agency also noted 

around this time that the Soviets had observed large troop movements to 

the southwest of Moscow in the Briansk–Orël–Kursk area.12 These, of 

course, were forces to be used during BLAU, but it was certainly plausible 

from the Soviet perspective that these enemy formations were concentrating instead for a renewed advance on the capital.

Intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts were augmented by a 

somewhat unlikely source in the form of the German Minister for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, Joseph Goebbels, who confided his own 

contribution to his diary on different dates beginning three months before 

the start of BLAU. On 6 April, for example, he noted that a number of articles which stated that the capture of the enemy’s capital city was always 
84

of paramount importance in war had been published by his department in 

military journals. He hoped that this would encourage international observers to focus their attention on Moscow—or at the very least the northern 

sector—instead of on the south, though he admitted that nobody seemed to 

have fallen for the ruse up to that point. Goebbels later wrote that he would 

personally send a boisterous news correspondent known to his fellow journalists in the West on a trip to the central sector of the Eastern Front, followed immediately by his reassignment to neutral Portugal, where he was 

to act drunk and spread rumors about an impending assault on Moscow.13

Additionally, Goebbels’s diary entry for 20 May reveals a plan whereby an 

“unauthorized” article had been published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine

newspaper, only to then be unceremoniously withdrawn because it seemingly revealed German intentions to attack the Soviet capital. Though he 

was not entirely convinced that such endeavors would have a significant 

impact, he nevertheless noted that “one must always try whatever one can 

do.” Three days later, he suggested that he was planning to have an article 

apparently written by the OKW published in Turkey or Portugal about an 

offensive in the central sector. He admitted, however, that this action had 

the potential to do more harm than good should the real authors of the article become clear, though again he stressed that “everything possible” had 

to be done in order to conceal BLAU. Goebbels further noted that Hitler 

himself had fully approved of these efforts.14 On the following day, Halder 

suggested that deceptive measures with respect to BLAU had “worked 

well” judging by what was being reported in the foreign press. Finally, on 

30 May Goebbels noted that Hitler was “very satisfied” with the effects of 

the reports published by the German journalists abroad. The Führer added 

that they had done a “very great service” to the conduct of the war.

15

These efforts were reinforced to a great degree by Stalin’s own distrustful nature. Around this time, for example, the British had discovered 

from a “secret and reliable source” that German VIII Fliegerkorps (“Air 

Corps”) was being transferred from the central sector to the Crimea in the 

south, which indicated that a German offensive was imminent there. However, he refused to trust the British even when they offered him such highly accurate signals intelligence information (most likely emanating from 

Ultra, its encryption of top-echelon German communications).16 Stalin’s 

dismissal of outsider information that had foretold the initial German invasion of the Soviet Union the previous year (Operation BARBAROSSA) 

had nearly resulted in defeat; his suspicion of the intentions of the British 

government would now once again have almost fatal repercussions for his 

people and armed forces.
85

KREML becomes “official”

On 29 May, the commander-in-chief of Army Group Center (Field 

Marshal Günther von Kluge) finally signed the order that supposedly 

made Moscow the target of the German summer offensive. Frontline 

units deliberately allowed some copies to fall into the enemy’s hands in 

different ways, such as on dead officers or on aircraft that had apparently 

deviated from their flight paths. The Luftwaffe (air force) carried out 

aerial reconnaissance on defensive positions in and around Moscow as 

well as further eastward around the cities of Vladimir, Ivanovo, Tambov, Gor’kii (Nizhnii Novgorod), and Rybinsk. Operatives disseminated 

false information over the radio and agents increasingly crossed the front 

lines in this sector. A complete regrouping and transfer of troops and 

command posts also took place.17 Army staffs were instructed to develop 

plans for their operations up to 5 June, while corps headquarters were to 

have their work completed five days later. From 10 June, each unit was 

to schedule a meeting in order to discuss forthcoming operations. Those 

Don River

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Bryansk

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Kaluga

Tula

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9th

Army

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4th Army

2nd Panzer Army

Moscow

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Salient

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Army Group Center

1 June 1942 0 50 100 150 Miles

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16th Army

Figure 5.2. Army Group Center, 1 June 1942. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
86

required to attend were the chiefs of staff, chiefs of operations, and the 

chief intelligence officers of the corps and divisions involved.18

The order stated that the armies were to be ready to begin their attacks 

no later than the end of June. In order to allow the Luftwaffe to stagger 

its support, 4th Army and 2nd Panzer Army (in the south) would ostensibly begin their operations on “X-Day,” while 3rd Panzer Army (on the 

left wing) would, according to developments, most likely join battle five 

days later. On the right flank, 2nd Army was to move on Elets (350 km 

due south of Moscow), while Army Group North was either to stay on 

the defensive or, in the case of an enemy withdrawal, to advance with its 

southern wing towards Peno–Ostashkov. On the northern flank of the attack front, infantry reserves were to be brought in to help take Klin (80 km 

north-west of Moscow), while 9th Army was to remain on the defensive. 

All maps, plans, and aerial reconnaissance photographs were only to be 

issued to corps headquarters for the moment.19 The Luftwaffe, meanwhile, 

was given the task of reconnoitering the rear area of the sector as far as the 

Volga along the line Kazan’–Vol’sk (700 km east of Moscow).20

On the final day of May, the intelligence department of Army Group 

Center recorded a build-up of armor near Belëv in the form of Soviet III 

Tank Corps in the sector held by LIII Corps (see Figure 5.3). It was further 

noted that the Soviets were strengthening to the immediate west along the 

front line of XXXXVII Corps (mot.) while simultaneously withdrawing 

forces from the western extremity of the Sukhinichi salient (between 4th 

Army in the north and 2nd Panzer Army in the south). Both instances 

could be seen as either preparation for an enemy attack or else defensive 

measures in expectation of a German advance. The situation was similar 

in the northern sector. On 4 June, local German intelligence noted that 

deserters had stated for the first time that the Soviet forces opposite the 

eastern front of 9th Army apparently had no offensive intentions but had 

instead assumed a defensive posture. Two days later, Army Group Center 

suggested that increased activity by scout parties and shock troops as well 

as reconnaissance operations in company to battalion strength demonstrated the “nervousness” of the Russians before 3rd Panzer and 9th Armies “in 

expectation of German attacks.”21

This apprehension was justified because of what the Soviets themselves had been observing. Briansk Front reported that on 14 May and 

for the following few days there had been movement from the west via 

Briansk towards Orël of up to 300 panzers, a number of which had left 

in the direction of Bolkhov.22 In fact, the Germans had been using the 

roads Rogachëv–Roslavl’ and Roslavl’–Briansk–Orël as “through roads” 
87

(Durchgangsstraßen) VII and VIIa respectively. These were used to move 

units through the rear area of Army Group Center to Orël but then on to 

Army Group South in preparation for BLAU.

23 What Briansk Front had 

been observing was actually armor to be used in the drive to the river Don 

further south that was merely transiting through the sector held by Army 

Group Center—as noted by Jodl at the beginning of May—with only a 

small number heading towards Bolkhov. Thus, Soviet 61st Army holding this sector could be forgiven for assuming that the tanks continuing 

towards Orël would ultimately be deployed on the Mtsensk–Tula axis for 

the advance on Moscow.

N

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1 June 1942

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Moscow

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thrust toward Moscow

0 20 40 50 Miles

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LIII

Figure 5.3. Army Group Center (Corps), 1 June 1942. Graphic created by CSI 

Press staff.
88

On 5 June, 4th Army issued an order for KREML to its subordinate 

units. Apart from the information issued by Army Group Center a week 

previously, the army now revealed more specific tasks that it had been ordered to carry out. Its primary goal was the destruction of the enemy units 

in the Sukhinichi salient. Additionally, the three divisions of LIII Corps 

were to break through north of Bolkhov and advance via Belëv in order to 

win bridgeheads over the river Oka on either side of the village of Likhvinka. From there they were to attack towards the important road juncture 

of Kaluga (170 km south-west of Moscow). As might be expected, every 

detail was taken into account, including cooperation with the Luftwaffe

and the boundaries between the corps. However, the order stipulated that 

only corps commanders were to be informed at this time of the preparations.24

These commanders continued to intensify their disinformation efforts 

at this level. XXXXVII Panzer Corps would try to do what 2nd Panzer 

Army had failed to do the previous winter and take the important town of 

Tula (175 km due south of Moscow). For this operation it would supposedly have two panzer divisions (4th and 17th) as its spearhead, in addition 

to 25th Infantry Division (mot.) and 112th Infantry Division on the left 

wing plus two more divisions to be added on the right.25 This would have 

amounted to an exceptionally strong contingent for a short frontage of approximately 25 km and would certainly have been a cause for great alarm 

among the Red Army commanders in this sector if they had been privy to 

this information. Another possible candidate for such disinformation was a 

teleprinter message sent by LIII Corps to 4th Army stating that the expected warning order for KREML had not arrived at its headquarters and was 

feared lost. The corps command requested an inquest in order to determine 

when and how the order had been sent.26

With less than a month to go before the start of BLAU, Army Group 

Center headquarters sent batches of maps of the Moscow area to its subordinate commands down to regimental level, though they were not to 

be opened until 10 June. Only the chiefs of staff of the headquarters in 

question knew that the whole operation was merely an elaborate ruse.27

On 5 June, 2nd Panzer Army ordered that only once the maps had been 

opened five days later were the plans to be discussed—in secret—by the 

corps and divisional staffs. Other measures were then to be implemented, 

such as increasing the number of agents beyond the line Tula–Moscow 

and preparing leaflets with information regarding intentions. Sufficient 

amounts of these were then to be sent to corps headquarters to be handed 

out to the troops.28 Most agents who had previously crossed the Soviet 
89

lines had never been heard from again, so the Germans could assume that 

Soviet counter-intelligence was working efficiently. They also knew that 

the local population was likely to inform the authorities about any suspicious activity, so even the merest trickle of information would suffice to 

arouse interest. The aim of the exercise was therefore to allow the Soviets 

to “find” the pieces of the puzzle and put it together themselves.29

Towards the end of the first week of June, the deception was beginning to take shape according to the orders that had been issued. 4th Army 

sent Army Group Center its operational intentions and intended force 

employment on a 1:300,000 scale map together with a detailed list of 

requests for additional reserves. The army headquarters also called for 

air support concentrated in the sector of LVI Panzer Corps, which was 

hypothetically its Schwerpunkt (“point of main attack”) for the elimination of the Sukhinichi salient, though this was simply yet another ruse to 

arouse Soviet suspicions.30 By 9 June, Army Group Center had received 

all operational intentions from its subordinate armies, and Wöhler ordered that further work on KREML could continue. His staff now also 

disseminated plans for the arrival of headquarters, formations, and independent GHQ units.31 On the same day, 2nd Army was informed that 

Army Group Center would be feigning its attack towards Moscow within the next twenty-four hours.32

On 12 June, 4th Army ordered that all attack units were to be stocked 

with the following:

11⁄2 infantry ammunition combat loads

2 artillery ammunition combat loads

5 days provision of fuel

10 days provision of rations33

By now, the armies involved were working hard together to try to give the 

impression that they were preparing for a genuine operation. Two days 

later, 4th Army informed 2nd Panzer Army that the orders to be attended to 

by XXXXVII Corps (which would make up the southern grouping for the 

proposed elimination of the Sukhinichi salient) were urgently needed. 4th 

Army asked the corps to intensify its work on the orders and inform army 

headquarters of its timeline for completion.34

On 18 June, 2nd Panzer Army headquarters notified its subordinate 

units that most of the troops to be brought in would arrive by rail and 

would detrain at Orël (about 50 km behind the front line). It even addressed the provision of the requisite number of road signs for the conver-
90

sion of town names to the Latin alphabet. These were to be provided for 

the population centers along the lines of advance right up to those places 

that were ostensibly the goals of the operation.35

Meanwhile, on 13 June the chief intelligence officer of Army Group 

Center had suggested that, as before, the enemy stood in a defensive posture in the entire sector in expectation of a German offensive. A week later, 

his staff noted that the Soviets had conducted attacks at several places 

along the front, which suggested that they were anticipating a German offensive and that they wanted to gain clarity through partial attacks as well 

as impede German preparations. On the following day, it reported that 

the strongest of these attacks had occurred on the left wing of 2nd Panzer 

Army (i.e. in the Bolkhov–Belëv sector, where the Soviets were expecting 

the main German thrust). On the 23rd, the intelligence department further 

noted that the focus of enemy aircraft activity was in the center of the army 

(LIII Corps). Most tellingly of all, three days before BLAU began in the 

south, Army Group Center suggested that the Soviets were expecting an 

imminent offensive in the central sector, or at the very least that they were 

growing increasingly uncertain about the situation in general. On the day 

German forces launched the actual offensive, a Red Army soldier captured 

due west of Moscow stated that the Soviets had been expecting a German 

offensive there for the past three days and that the troops had been ordered 

to hold their positions to the last man.36 The deception had evidently been 

a complete success thus far.

Around the same time, however, one incident abruptly threw the German plans into turmoil. With just nine days to go until the beginning of 

the offensive, the chief of operations of 23rd Panzer Division, Major Joachim Reichel, crash-landed behind Soviet lines while on a reconnaissance 

mission. Against protocol, he had been carrying orders, maps, and details 

of deployments for the first stage of BLAU that the Soviets subsequently 

recovered from the wreckage. As a consequence, a furious Hitler set in 

place a strict code of conduct with respect to security issues, and he was 

fully justified in being angry over the whole episode.37 In an addendum to 

the BLAU directive, he had already specifically laid out guidelines for security procedures. These included no telephone calls concerning planning 

and execution forward of the army group and Luftwaffe command posts; 

the requirement to make all necessary clarifications either in person or 

by encoded teleprinter; and withholding the most important details of the 

forthcoming operation from the satellite armies (i.e. Romanians, Italians, 

and Hungarians).38 The fact that Hitler had even felt it necessary to issue 

such orders was indicative of his sensitivity to security in general, and the 
91

counter-espionage measures that he laid out before BLAU show that intelligence was a matter he took very seriously. As it transpired, his agonizing 

over the consequences of the so-called “Reichel Affair” was misplaced, as 

Stalin had already convinced himself that this was simply yet another part 

of the German ploy to divert Soviet attention from Moscow. Ironically, 

the whole episode that originally threatened to completely undo German 

deception plans had now succeeded—through sheer good fortune—in reinforcing them.

Three days before BLAU commenced, the armies in the central sector 

were informed of slight changes to their own plans. 2nd Panzer Army notified its subordinate units that there would either be a temporary cancellation of KREML or a completely new assignment, as reserves originally 

intended for the army were now needed more urgently elsewhere. Preparations were to continue as normal, though individual headquarters were 

not to redeploy their units for the moment. Further orders were to follow. 

However, even as late as 2 July, Army Group Center informed 2nd Panzer 

Army that the OKH had ordered the continuous, vigorous implementation 

of the measures originally set out until further notice.39 Furthermore, once 

BLAU had begun, Wehrmacht reports on the radio and in the newspapers 

declared that German forces had gone over to the offensive “in the southern and central sectors of the Eastern Front.”40

By this time, however, the Germans were finally winding down 

KREML. The Soviets, on the other hand, remained deceived. On 7 July, 

the commander of Army Group Center noted that the enemy was attempting to conduct breakthroughs along the line Orël–Briansk (2nd Panzer 

Army) and had concentrated armored formations and strong air support 

there. Two weeks later, Wöhler reviewed the situation before Moscow. He 

suggested that the Soviets had transferred only very few units south, but 

that these losses had been more than offset with new arrivals and the replenishment of all units already in the front line. He further noted that the 

Soviets had therefore not only not weakened their forces despite what was 

happening further south, but had actually continuously strengthened their 

defenses before Moscow as they were still uncertain of German intentions.41 Thus, even over three weeks after the beginning of BLAU, German 

deception efforts continued to fool the Soviets into believing that Moscow 

ultimately remained the principal target of the offensive.

Conclusions

Lieutenant-General Ivan Bagramian was the Chief of Staff of 

South-Western Direction in summer 1942, where the Germans cut his 
92

formation to pieces during the initial stages of BLAU and beyond. 

Writing after the war, however, he dismissed the effects of KREML

out of hand after discussing it in three of the briefest of paragraphs in 

his memoirs.42 Even today, certain historians treat the results produced 

by this deception operation with the same disregard as Bagramian did. 

Nevertheless, the facts are self-evident: Weeks after the major Soviet 

defeat at Khar’kov in May, Stalin was still riveted to the German threat 

to Moscow, and only after the collapse precipitated by BLAU did he finally acknowledge the threat to the southern sector.43 He was not alone, 

of course. Soviet intelligence had actually identified the large concentration of German forces and their preparations for an offensive on the 

southern strategic axis, yet the Stavka (armed forces high command) 

continued to believe that the main German thrust targeted Moscow.44

Even precise British intelligence could not convince the Soviet leadership of German intentions. Indeed, Stalin and Molotov—who had 

so readily trusted Hitler during their brief dalliance as collaborators—

had by now formed a deep-seated mistrust of their Western allies and 

feared that the Americans and British would inevitably conclude a separate peace with the common enemy. The Western Allies’ continuing 

refusal to open a second front in France further exacerbated the tense 

situation—a stance that fueled a paranoia in Stalin which lingered long 

after the conflict had come to an end.45

The influential Chinese military thinker, Sun Tzu, wrote over two 

and a half millennia ago that if the enemy does not know where to 

expect an attack then he must make defensive preparations in many 

different places. Thus, he will be weakened wherever he is engaged.46

This was the principal tenet behind Operation KREML. The objective of BLAU remained the destruction of the main Soviet forces, but 

having these forces in position and expecting an attack would have 

been especially disadvantageous for the German commanders.47 The 

German deception proved its worth with respect to this aim: When the 

Germans finally launched the offensive, the Soviets had 28 armies between Leningrad and Tula, but only 18 in the southern sector between 

Tula and the Caucasus.48 The deployment by the Russians of 80 percent of their tanks and 60 percent of their aircraft in the central sector 

at the beginning of BLAU provides further evidence of the successful 

outcome of KREML.

49 Finally, the commanders and headquarters of 

most of the Soviet army groups agreed with Stalin, the Stavka, and 

the General Staff that the German advance would be renewed in the 

central sector.50 The deception that resulted from the disparate actions 
93

which made up Operation KREML was instrumental to the success of 

the actual offensive further south. Throughout the first half of 1942, 

the Soviet leadership remained transfixed by the threat of a resumption 

of the assault on Moscow and deployed its forces and reserves accordingly, thereby expediting the German thrust towards Stalingrad and the 

Caucasus later that summer and fall.
94

Notes

1. Hitler believed from intelligence sources that the region was responsible 

for as much as 92 percent of all Soviet oil production: Adolf Hitler, Hitler”s 

Table Talk, 1941-1944: His Private Conversations, intro. Hugh Trevor-Roper 

(London: Enigma Books, 2000 [1953]), 615 (5 August 1942). Though the actual 

figure was not quite this high, the Caucasus was still by far the most important 

oil-producing area of the country.

2. Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the 

East (New York: Military Heritage Press, 1988), 329. Army Group Center was the 

German formation that held the central sector of the Eastern Front. At its closest 

(i.e. easternmost) point it stood approximately 160 km due west of Moscow.

3. “Feindtäuschung,” Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg, Germany 

(hereafter BA-MA), RW 4/678, fol. 58; George E. BLAU, German Campaign 

in Russia: Planning and Operations (1940-1942) (Washington, DC: Dept. of the 

Army, 1955), 116.

4. Extract from an overview by the Soviet Central Staff of the Partisan 

Movement (TsShPD) entitled “Nationalist Formations in the Occupied Territories” 

(January 1944), cited in A.N. Artizov, ed., General Vlasov: istoriia predatel’stva, 

vol. 1: Natsistskii proekt “Aktion Wlassow” (Moscow: ROSSPÈN, 2015), 562. 

Both cities mentioned are approximately 1,500 km due east of Moscow.

5. Jonathan Haslam, Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet 

Intelligence (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 119.

6. Andreas Hillgruber, ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der 

Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab) 1940-1945, vol. 2: 1. Januar 1942 – 31. 

Dezember 1942 (Frankfurt/Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1963), 313 (hereafter KTB 

OKW, vol. 2).

7. Cited in Anon., “Operatsiia ‘Kreml’’,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 8 

(1961), 81.

8. “Plan osnovnykh meropriiatii voisk Brianskogo fronta na aprel’ m-ts 

1942 goda” (n.d.), Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow, Russia (hereafter TsAMO), f. 202, op. 5, d. 222, ll. 1-2.

9. “Unterlagen des Ic der Heeresgruppe Mitte: Zusammenfassende Feindbeurteilungen,” TsAMO, f. 500, op. 12454, d. 512, l. 15.

10. “Feindtäuschung” (7 May 1942), BA-MA RW 4/678, fol. 57, 58-59, 60.

11. A.M. Samsonov, Stalingradskaia bitva (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), 50-51.

12. BA-MA RH 2/2116, fol. 16-17, 18 (n.d.). Zhukov had also been simultaneously overall commander of the forces of Western Direction. A Soviet 

strategic direction (napravlenie) corresponded roughly to a theater or axis, and 

comprised two or more fronts (army groups).

13. Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943, ed. Louis P. Lochner (New York: Doubleday, 1946), 162-63, 223 (21 May).

14. Goebbels, 221-22, 226; Joseph Goebbels, Joseph Goebbels Tagebücher, 

1924-1945, vol. 4: 1940-1942, ed. Ralf Georg Reuth, 3rd ed. (Munich: Piper, 

2003), 1795.
95

15. Cited in KTB OKW, vol. 2, 380 (24 May); Goebbels, Tagebücher, 1801.

16. Bradley F. Smith, Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded 

Intelligence, 1941-1945 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 108.

17. P.P. Chevela, “Novye Ispytaniia,” in V.A. Zolotarëv, ed., Velikaia 

Otechestvennaia voina, 1941-1945: voenno-istoricheskie ocherki v chetyrëkh 

tomakh, vol. 1: Surovye ispytaniia (Moscow: Nauka, 1998), 323.

18. Anon., “Operatsiia ‘Kreml,” 81.

19. “Prikaz na nastuplenie na Moskvu,” cited in Anon., “Operatsiia 

‘Kreml’’,” 82-84.

20. “Zaiavki VVS po aèrofotorazvedke russkikh ukreplenii,” cited in Anon., 

“Operatsiia ‘Kreml’’,” 87.

21. “Unterlagen des Ic der Heeresgruppe Mitte: Zusammenfassende Feindbeurteilungen,” TsAMO, f. 500, op. 12454, d. 512, ll. 190, 202, 209.

22. “Zhurnal boevykh deistvii BrianF: period s 02.04.1942 po 13.07.1942 

g.,” TsAMO, f. 202, op. 5, d. 556, ll. 126-27.

23. “Anlagen zum KTB der Heeresgruppe Mitte – Führungsabteilung – 

Akte: Märsche großer Verbände, Heft vom 1.5.-30.6.1942,” TsAMO, f. 500, op. 

12454, d. 390, passim.

24. “Kreml. Befehl für den Angriff auf Moskau,” BA-MA RH 20-4/344, 

doc. 121.

25. BA-MA RH 21-2/896, fol. 129 (map, n.d.). XXXXVII Corps (mot.) was 

renamed XXXXVII Panzer Corps on 21 June 1942.

26. BA-MA RH 20-4/363, doc. 5 (7 June).

27. Earl F. Ziemke, “Operation Kreml: Deception, Strategy, and the Fortunes of War,” Parameters, 9 (1) (1978), 76.

28. “Kreml,” BA-MA RH 21-2/896, fol. 38-39.

29. Ziemke, “Operation Kreml,” 78.

30. “Kreml,” BA-MA RH 20-4/363, doc. 4 (5 June 1942).

31. BA-MA RH 20-4/363, doc. 6.

32. BA-MA RH 20-2/160, fol. 68.

33. “Besondere Anordnungen für die Vorbereitung der Versorgung für den 

Angriff auf Moskau,” BA-MA RH 20-4/363, doc. 7.

34. BA-MA RH 20-4/363, doc. 6.

35. BA-MA RH 21-2/896, fol. 86, 89; Anon., “Operatsiia ‘Kreml’’,” 81.

36. “Unterlagen des Ic der Heeresgruppe Mitte: Zusammenfassende Feindbeurteilungen,” TsAMO, f. 500, op. 12454, d. 512, ll. 231, 262, 264, 268, 273, 282.

37. David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, The Stalingrad Trilogy, vol. 

1: To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 

1942 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 103.

38. “Besondere Bestimmungen über die Geheimhaltung und Propaganda” 

(5 April 1942), BA-MA RH 20-2/160, fol. 7-8.

39. BA-MA RH 21-2/896, fol. 108.

40. Cited in S.A. Gerasimova, Rzhev 1942: pozitsionnaia voinia (Moscow: 

Iauza; Èksmo, 2007), 78 (my italics).
96

41. “Unterlagen des Ic der Heeresgruppe Mitte: Zusammenfassende Feindbeurteilungen des Ic der Heeresgruppe Mitte vom 2.7.-30.9.1942,” TsAMO, f. 

500, op. 12454, d. 527, ll. 309, 261-63.

42. I.Kh. Bagramian, Tak shli my k pobede (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977), 79-80.

43. David M. Glantz, Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster 

through Soviet Eyes (Shepperton: Ian Allan, 1998), 35.

44. Cited in Anon., “Operatsiia ‘Kreml’’,” 82.

45. Haslam, Near and Distant Neighbors, 120.

46. Cited in Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classic Strategic Thought, 

3rd ed. (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 160.

47. Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 329.

48. Stephen Walsh, Stalingrad, 1942-1943: The Infernal Cauldron (London: 

Simon & Schuster, 2000), 38.

49. V.I. Semenko and L.A. Radchenko, Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina: kak 

èto bylo... (Belgorod; Khar’kov: Knizhnyi Klub “Klub Semeinogo Dosuga,” 

2008), 160.

50. A.M. Vasilevskii, “Between Moscow and Stalingrad,” in Seweryn Bialer 

(ed.), Stalin and his Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II (London: Souvenir Press, 1970), 402, 404.
97

Chapter 6

Red Star Resurgent

Soviet Deception Operations at Stalingrad, 1942-1943

First Lieutenant Kyle B. Vautrinot

The Second World War has many storied campaigns and battles, but 

none on the Eastern Front equaled the brutal fight for Stalingrad. In the 

summer of 1942, the German Wehrmacht seemed invincible, lunging 

deeper into Soviet territory and advancing against the British in North 

Africa. In six months, however, the Wehrmacht found itself fighting desperately to relieve the encircled Sixth Army, even as other Soviet offensives pushed back against German territorial gains made in the summer. 

The Battle of Stalingrad, together with the Battle of El Alamein in North 

Africa and Midway in the Pacific, form the turning points in the war, when 

the Allies seized the strategic initiative. A common explanation for the 

Red Army’s victory at Stalingrad is German overconfidence and increased 

Soviet experience and ability in operational level warfare, but this does not 

fully capture what happened during the Stalingrad campaign.

Stalingrad was not only a decisive operational victory for the Red Army, 

but the first instance of any combatant defeating and destroying a German 

field army in the war. The Soviet Union had rapidly learned key lessons 

from combat and implemented new tactics and techniques in order to deliver victory. Chief among those lessons were the value of deception and 

denial, known in Russian as maskirovka. The Red Army demonstrated this 

increased understanding of deception, intelligence, and operational maneuver by assembling and launching Operation URANUS, the counteroffensive that relieved the besieged city, without providing German intelligence 

enough evidence to predict its timing and scale. The plans for the offensive 

substantially improved and expanded upon previous deception theories and 

efforts to mislead German commanders and intelligence officers at Stalingrad, enabling deep battle operations in the winter of 1942-43 that decisively contributed to the Red Army’s victory. This is evident in an examination 

of pre-war maskirovka theory, the Red Army’s initial efforts in 1941, and the 

deception and intelligence plans during the Stalingrad campaign.

Deception Theory to 1941

After the First World War and the Russian Civil War, which embroiled 

most of the Russian countryside in conflict, Soviet military commanders 
98

and theorists continued to believe in the value of the offensive. During 

the interwar period, the Red Army developed doctrine calling for a combination of strong defensive positions and decisive offensive operations, 

with the aim of destroying a hostile nation’s army.1

 As a key component 

of that doctrine, the Red Army knew that surprise would be vital, and 

carried on the tradition of maskirovka that the Imperial Russian Army had 

established leading up to the First World War. An examination of the 1929 

and 1936 field regulations reveals only cursory treatment of maskirovka, 

but livelier examination in General Staff articles. A possible explanation 

for the lack of in-depth treatment in formal regulations is because of the 

classified nature of General Staff articles, meant for internal consumption 

and debate, while the field regulations were an official and published government document.

The 1929 Field Regulations stated that commanders achieved surprise by conducting troop operations “with the greatest concealment and 

speed.” They enabled this by having units in secondary sectors maintain 

active operations in order to distract and deceive the enemy‘s perception 

of where the offensive would fall.2

 The Field Regulations further stated 

that commanders enabled concealment by “adaptation to the terrain and 

camouflage...[and] keeping secret the preparations for the maneuver and 

its goals.”3

 The Red Army viewed this as necessary to prevent a notional 

enemy from learning of an offensive in time to reposition forces and prepare to receive the attack. Specifically, the regulations charged engineering units with camouflaging troop deployments, and stated that smokescreens offered both concealment and an anti-aircraft defensive measure.4

Although focused at the tactical level, the maskirovka guidance here was a 

starting point for the nascent Red Army. The regulations considered concealment of the time and place of an offensive as critical, but lacked exact 

guidance on how to implement concealment.

The 1936 Provisional Field Regulations provided more details on 

how the Red Army viewed maskirovka, but did not provide more insight 

or prescribe a defined doctrine. The Red Army re-emphasized the importance of surprise through speed, concealment, and the introduction of 

new weapons and tactics, but did not go into detail concerning how to 

create or maintain surprise.5

 Specifically, the regulations prescribed utilizing terrain, night marches, and planning secrecy in order to conceal a 

commander’s intent. If commanders limited the size of planning circles, 

and kept planning documents to an easily-controlled minimum, they could 

safeguard critical documents or personnel with intelligence. The regulation also focused heavily on troop movement, emphasizing the need to 
99

conduct river crossings at night combined with multiple fake crossings to 

prevent an enemy from determining bridgehead locations.6 As in the 1929 

regulations, the 1936 Provisional Field Regulations did not examine the 

planning process in detail.

Despite the lack of detailed analysis of deception and surprise, the Red 

Army’s officers did not shy away from the subject’s treatment in Voennaia 

Mysl’ (tr. Military Thought), the General Staff journal, with two articles 

meriting attention. In the July 1937 issue, G.R. Pochter examined case 

studies from the First World War and expanded on the existing maskirovka

theories. Critically, he emphasized that a deception plan attempted to conceal an army’s disposition while creating false indicators to mislead enemy intelligence officers.7

 Radio transmissions with troop demonstrations, 

fabricating documents to be captured by enemy patrols, and the creation of 

false encampments, supply depots, and vehicles would all contribute to a 

false or ambiguous intelligence picture for the enemy.8

 Pochter also examined the increasing importance of aerial reconnaissance, and how unusually strong defensive arrangements might compromise deception. If planners 

could prevent aerial reconnaissance of a specific area, intelligence officers 

might focus more assets there to determine why defenses were stronger in 

one sector than in another. In the case of the main effort, this might attract 

unwanted attention, but notable increases in neighboring sectors or fronts 

could deceive enemy intelligence.9

 Pochter re-emphasized this concept 

in his discussion of deception principles. As he recognized, a deception 

plan needed to be logical with each component mutually reinforcing other 

elements. For example, demonstrations and deception efforts in a front 

ill-suited for offensive action were not believable, and therefore wasted 

valuable resources.10 Radio deceptions worked best when accompanied 

by corroborating troop movements, and falsifying unit designations could 

prevent knowledge of an increase in maneuver units. Commanders needed 

to emphasize deception and give it the same planning considerations as 

reconnaissance, march security, and logistics.11

In the March 1941 issue of Voennaia Mysl’, Colonel A.I. Starunin revisited operational surprise, and argued maintaining surprise did not mean 

maintaining secrecy until an offensive’s start. In his definition, surprise 

was “the unexpected appearance of powerful forces and resources at a 

sensitive point...where he [the enemy] cannot oppose them with sufficient 

forces at the given time.”12 Starunin emphasized that concealing the maneuver and emplacement of an offensive force was difficult at best, but 

surprise was largely a function of how much an enemy knew and how concentrated an enemy was in the assault sector. In order to conceal a unit’s 
100

emplacement, subunits could occupy assault positions over time, preventing observation of large troop movements.13 Conversely, Starunin also emphasized speed as an element of surprise, but cautioned that railroads are 

an obvious reconnaissance targets, and troop movements required swift 

execution under security conditions similar to road marches to achieve 

both secrecy and caution. Moreover, once an attacker penetrated the first 

line of defense, aggressive mobile forces could quickly advance along an 

enemy’s flanks, creating local surprise by the speed and violence of the 

assault.14 Ironically, despite examining the reasons for Germany’s recent 

military victory over France, the Soviet Union failed to mirror image or 

effectively counter these capabilities, and suffered both surprise and military catastrophe just a few short months later.

From Summer 1941 to Spring 1942

For all the emphasis placed on surprise and deception, the Red Army 

and the Soviet Union at large remained unprepared for the German invasion in the summer of 1941. Since 1940, the Red Army’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) had been receiving agent reports of German 

troop movements and conducted a detailed analysis of NKVD agent reports from within occupied Poland. Those agents identified German division strengths and locations, and agents within Germany relayed reports 

of war preparations and plans.15 By the late spring of 1941, the GRU and 

NKVD identified over 100 German divisions along the border and troop 

movements across Europe, but very few of these reports made their way 

to Stalin.16 Stalin read the few reports he saw with scorn, derision, and 

disbelief, which contributed to German success despite poor measures at 

concealing troop movements, as he authorized no defensive measures or 

deployments. The Red Army’s General Staff knew that war was imminent, 

but could not react appropriately due to Stalin’s attempts to salvage the 

non-aggression pact.

The Red Army soon found itself surrounded at Brest-Litovsk, Bialystok, Kiev, and Minsk.17 The Red Army kept reconstituting and raising 

forces even as German forces reduced these and other pockets while the 

front lines retreated eastward, and by November 1941 a German operational pause well short of Moscow allowed time to place new forces on the 

line.18 The Red Army’s General Headquarters, or Stavka, welcomed that 

operational pause, a reflection of the German invasion’s logistical limitations and failure to destroy the Red Army. At this time in the war, Soviet 

units operated along shorter, interior lines of communication and supply, 

making command and control easier. The accumulation of reserve armies 

presented an opportunity for Stavka during the last weeks of November. 
101

Recognizing the chance, the Red Army began one of its first deception 

efforts in a desperate gamble to protect Moscow and halt the resumed German attack.

From new and reconstituted forces, the First Shock, Tenth, and Twentieth Armies spearheaded a counteroffensive on 6 December 1941 designed 

to push German forces back from the approaches to Moscow. The three 

armies, in reserve behind the front, faced the task of moving up to their 

assembly areas and deploying to the front lines without betraying their 

presence or purpose. Overconfidence and poor weather prevented German 

intelligence from accurately identifying the new armies, and tightly controlled sequential planning by Stavka created an effective cloak of secrecy 

for the three armies. In fact, the army commanders did not know their 

objectives and roles until a few days before the offensive, with movement 

beginning on 27 November.19 Commanders used maskirovka measures in 

a general sense to ensure surprise, and limited efforts to their respective 

commands in the absence of a Stavka or front-directed plan, similar to the 

way pre-war regulations emphasized that creating surprise was a commander’s prerogative and duty.20

The three counteroffensive armies moved units only at night, with 

roads, supply depots, and rail lines camouflaged to prevent German observation and targeting.21 First Shock Army entered the defensive battles 

outside Moscow prior to 6 December, but German reconnaissance failed 

to recognize its units as the introduction of a new field army. German 

intelligence identified the new units and concentrations all along the 

front lines, but did not assess a likely offensive.22 On 6 December 1941, 

First Shock, Tenth, and Twentieth Armies led the counteroffensive, and 

the Wehrmacht, caught off balance and at the end of its supply lines, 

withdrew under pressure. The counteroffensive quickly ran out of steam, 

however, as better prepared German forces stopped the advance and Soviet forces outran their logistics capabilities; both armies had reached 

their culminating points, and without fresh reserves, neither could continue offensive operations.

Ultimately, the December 1941 counter-offensive was a lesson in 

tactical maskirovka, as the compressed planning timeline and need to secure Moscow’s approaches prevented elaborate feints, demonstrations, 

or schemes to confuse German reconnaissance efforts. Deception efforts 

alone cannot account for the counteroffensive’s surprise and effectiveness; 

German distraction with logistical difficulties, poor weather, and increasing equipment difficulties prevented an effective German response until 

after Soviet efforts had exhausted themselves against better-entrenched 
102

and—supplied forces. The systematic, if unplanned, use of concealment 

measures showed the Red Army what was possible with deliberate deception planning and initiative. For the remainder of the 1941-42 winter 

campaign, Soviet commanders implemented tactical maskirovka measures 

to greater or lesser effect, but never with the same degree of effectiveness 

as the 6 December counterattack.

Case BLAU and the Stalingrad Campaign

In the early spring of 1942, the Red Army prepared for the next round 

of offensives, and virtually every senior Red Army officer believed that 

the renewed German offensive would target Moscow and the Caucasus. 

Of the two, however, Stalin believed Moscow was the primary objective, 

due to the presence of Army Group Center’s seventy divisions and the 

political importance Stalin placed on holding the city.23 Unfortunately for 

Stavka and the Soviet armies to the south, the Germans hid their intentions 

for Case BLAU through Operation KREML, covered in the previous chapter. This had serious operational and strategic consequences for the Soviet 

spring offensives.

On 28 June 1942, Army Group South’s Fourth Panzer Army broke 

through over the Donets, and advanced quickly to Voronezh, catching 

Stavka off guard despite capturing the offensive’s plans on 19 June.24

Unlike the summer of 1941, Stalin allowed the Red Army to fall back, 

and commanders avoided the catastrophic encirclements of the previous year. By 12 July, the Germans had advanced so rapidly that Stavka

established the Stalingrad front, and by 19 July officially notified the 

city to prepare for war. The advance broke through the Donets Basin, 

and the Red Army attempted to hold the Germans west of the Don with 

the 62nd and 64th Armies, but quickly fell back as the Soviet infantry 

lacked support from essential artillery and tank units. In any event, Hitler’s contradictory orders quickly began to show his erratic focus during 

the course of the campaign as he constantly shifted the Fourth Panzer 

Army, preventing it from assisting both General Paulus’ Sixth Army’s 

drive to Stalingrad and supporting Army Group A’s advance into the 

Caucasus to any effective degree. This eventually had fatal consequences for the fighting around Stalingrad. By late August 1942, German 

aircraft launched heavy raids into Stalingrad, and Sixth Army closed 

in on the city, pressing 62nd and 64th Armies into a narrow defensive 

perimeter, shielded only by 24th Army.25 Repeated attempts to attack 

Sixth Army’s northern flank failed due to poor coordination, a pattern 

that repeated itself throughout the fall, lulling the Oberkommado des 

Heeres, or OKH, into complacency. 
103

Creating the Cloak

When Sixth Army approached the outskirts of Stalingrad in late August and early September, the Soviet 62nd and 64th Armies had retreated 

into the city and across the Volga in an attempt to reconstitute and establish a defensive perimeter. As the German Sixth Army advanced, Stavka

recognized that there would not be an offensive towards Moscow, which 

enabled freedom of maneuver for the reserve armies built up over the summer. This presented the Red Army’s senior commanders and planners with 

an unprecedented opportunity to plan the course of the battle, instead of 

simply reacting to German blows.

Beginning in the summer of 1942, the Red Army began a series of 

deception and intelligence operations in order to conceal troop redeployments, determine the disposition of German and Romanian defenses, and 

confuse German intelligence assessments on the time, place, and scale 

of the counteroffensive. The Stalingrad campaign saw the first attempts 

at strategic deception, with the Western and Kalinin fronts postured for 

offensive operations all through the summer and fall in order to divert 

German formations away from Army Group South and relieve pressure 

Figure 6.1. German Advance to Stalingrad, 24 July–18 November 1942. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.

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Melitopol

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Salsk

Poliava

Kremenchung

Rostov

Izyum

Tsymlanskaya Voroshilovgrad

Novorossisk

Kerch

Armavir

Tuapso

Maikop

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German Advance to Stalingrad

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ź

4 A X

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104

on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The Rzhev-Sychevka operation, in this 

context, was a large and elaborate feint from 30 July to 23 August, which 

also had the effect of preventing German divisions from transferring to 

Army Group South to contain the new salient. German intelligence and the 

high command largely believed that the Red Army’s strategic focus was 

along the Moscow approaches, transferring twelve divisions to positions 

opposite the salient and assessing that any offensive action along the front 

would take place in Army Group Center’s area.26 Although this deception 

occurred before counteroffensive planning began, the potential for action 

along the Moscow sector distracted German planners and intelligence officers. In September, troop movements in and out of the Western front 

served to confuse German intelligence assessments, as counteroffensive 

planning for Stalingrad began in earnest on 12 September and reserve divisions received training under fire.27 As late as 29 October, OKH assessed 

that the most likely course of action was a Soviet offensive against Army 

Group Center out of the Rzhev-Sychevka salient, as large-scale movement 

in the Moscow sector seemed oriented to this end.28

With the counteroffensive targeting the northern and southern flanks 

of Army Group B, General Zhukov and General Vasilevsky, the Red Army’s Chief of Staff, focused on two deception objectives. First, Soviet 

commanders concealed the movement and deployment of counteroffensive forces to the Southwestern, Don, and Stalingrad fronts to conduct 

a double envelopment, encircle the Sixth Army, and relieve Stalingrad. 

Second, German intelligence had to be misled concerning the time, 

place, and scale of the counteroffensive through the actions of neighboring fronts on the operational level. To the northwest of Stalingrad, 

the Voronezh Front conducted a series of demonstrations, imitating the 

construction of river crossings, concentrating and regrouping armored 

and artillery formations, and moving formations across the front. This 

focused German attention on Army Group Center, but non-essential Soviet commanders were uninformed regarding the time and place of the 

offensive, despite concluding that there were plans for one.29 Closer to 

Stalingrad, the Red Army implemented a variety of operational and tactical deception methods. From 29 September to 4 October, the Stalingrad 

Front launched attacks to maintain bridgeheads on the western bank of 

the Volga south of the city. Although worthwhile in their own right, the 

attacks served as demonstrations and feints in order to draw German 

forces away from the fighting inside the city itself, and buy time for 

62nd Army to receive and integrate reinforcements into the defense.30

The Stalingrad Front’s bridgeheads across the Volga, once secured, gave 
105

Operation Uranus a southern flank. When German attention shifted back 

to securing the city and containing the bridgeheads, the Stalingrad Front 

gradually moved two mechanized corps, one tank brigade, two rifle divisions, and seven artillery divisions across the Volga under cover of 

darkness, as regulations and best practices prescribed.31

The Southwestern Front under Lieutenant General Vatutin created 

both concealed and false river crossings over the Don, moved only at 

night, constructed false concentrations of artillery and vehicles to mislead German reconnaissance, and even used loudspeakers broadcasting 

music to hide the engine noise of tank divisions and corps.32 Deliberate 

planning, combined with presenting German reconnaissance with what 

the Front wanted to display, created a situation that enabled three tank 

corps to assume assault positions undetected across from German lines. 

All across the front line in Stalingrad, Soviet troops openly displayed 

a defensive posture, with Stavka distributing instructions to fortify and 

prepare a defense in depth. German intelligence expected this based on 

past observations, and Soviet efforts to create that impression exploited 

complacency in German headquarters.

Soviet intelligence and reconnaissance efforts also played a significant role in safeguarding the operational security of the offensive, as well 

as identifying weak points for the counteroffensive to exploit. The Red 

Army relied principally on aerial reconnaissance and ground razvedka, 

to include troop, engineer, and artillery reconnaissance efforts to monitor 

operational movements of German forces and develop the commander’s 

assessment of the front, respectively. In the Stalingrad area aerial razvedka

primarily operated in a belt extending thirty to forty kilometers into German territory, focusing along the primary axis of advance for the ground 

forces as well as observing rail lines and hard-surfaced roads for German 

operational and tactical reserve movements.33 The Red Army’s infantry 

utilized raids, ambushes, and combat reconnaissance patrols to capture 

documents and personnel, and assess defenses across the frontline at tactical and shallow operational depths. 

The information they gathered was of interest to regimental and divisional commanders, but reconnaissance patrols occasionally achieved 

operational and strategic impacts. On 1 October 1942, for example, a reconnaissance patrol near Sadavoe 27 kilometers southwest of Stalingrad 

captured the documents for Case BLAU, as another patrol in the Ukraine 

had in early July, and confirmed the order of battle and timetable for the 

advance. These documents enabled front and Stavka intelligence to realize 

how overextended and behind schedule the German forces were, as well as 
106

identifying weaker units along the front.34 Critically, documents captured 

on 9 November from a German division opposite the Don front revealed 

poor German morale and readiness, which could be verified by observation across the planned offensive axis.35

Immediately before the offensive, battalion-sized elements conducted a reconnaissance-in-force to determine the extent and posture of Romanian and German defenses. The Southwestern front’s Fifth Tank Army 

conducted a reconnaissance in force on 17 November and determined the 

forward line of troops had been withdrawn two to three kilometers in its 

sector, which enabled the artillery and engineer plan to be adjusted while 

convincing the Romanians that the Soviet offensive action had failed.36

This was an effective measure, but only if action quickly followed reconnaissance; in some cases, units conducted pre-battle reconnaissance 

a week prior to action with no other patrols, enabling German tactical 

reserves to shift or reinforce undetected.

The Red Army, despite its remarkable variety of deception plans, did 

not entirely conceal their intent. The Romanian Third Army commander, General Dumitrescu, reported an increasing number of Soviet probes, 

and his own reconnaissance confirmed a general buildup of Soviet forces across the Don.37 German commanders and staff officers met his concerns with contempt, largely stemming from their impression that the Red 

Army was almost defeated and Romanian incompetency. This dismissal 

blatantly ignored the lessons of the previous winter and spring, which had 

demonstrated the Red Army’s capability to launch front-sized attacks under conditions of severe secrecy. German commanders assumed that once 

Stalingrad fell, the Russians would lose their will to fight, but the Red 

Army had maintained operational security and was poised to cut off and 

surround Sixth Army.

The Offensive

By mid-November 1942, the Southwestern, Don, and Stalingrad 

fronts had assembled 160,000 men, 430 tanks, and 6,000 artillery tubes 

and mortars in preparation for the offensive.38 On 19 November, the 

Southwestern front’s artillery opened fire on the Romanian Third Army 

and began Operation URANUS. In line with the assessment that they 

could expect only local attacks, the Romanians received the understrength XXXXVIII Panzer Corps as a reserve unit, largely as a way 

to mitigate the commander’s fears of a winter offensive.39 German intelligence was, not for the first time in the war, decisively incorrect as 

Fifth Tank Army broke through the forward defenses and rapidly worked 
107

into Third Army’s rear areas, including the panzer corps. A day later, the 

Stalingrad front launched an offensive against Romanian units south of 

Stalingrad, breaking through their lines and assaulting the neighboring 

German units’ flanks as the XIII and IV Mechanized Corps advanced 

deeper into the German rear.40 On 23 November, the two fronts linked 

up at Kalach-on-Don, fifty kilometers from Stalingrad, encircling Sixth 

Army and achieving URANUS’ immediate goals. At first, Stavka and 

the front commanders did not realize the extent of the encirclement, but 

the resulting surprise for the Soviets and Germans created a whirlwind 

of operations. 

The Germans knew that the destruction of Sixth Army would be an 

operational disaster, and that aerial resupply, combined with a ground relief operations, could break the encirclement and present a viable threat 

to the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts. The Soviets, knowing that the 

ring was tenuous at best, rapidly mounted further offensive action to expand the outer cordon, deny freedom of movement to Army Group B, and 

defeat aerial resupply efforts by ground and air actions. Throughout this 

period, the Red Army displayed further operational deception measures 

that led to a shift in strategic momentum.

Three key factors during the winter of 1942-43 influenced Soviet and 

German actions. First, the Germans failed to estimate accurately the loFigure 6.2. Soviet Winter Offensive, Operations 19 November-12 December 

1942. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.

N

Ukraine

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108

gistical requirements of Paulus’ Sixth Army, carelessly downgrading Paulus’ requested 700 tons of supplies per day to 300 tons while assuming 

that they possessed sufficient transport aircraft to meet this requirement. 

Both Soviet action and German failures in maintenance and logistics made 

these estimates highly inaccurate. Second, the attempted relief operation 

under Field Marshal von Manstein had only one German panzer army and 

two Romanian armies, all of which had retreated from URANUS’ advance 

and required a refit period prior to resuming the offensive. The Fourth 

Panzer Army remained capable of maneuver, but the Romanian armies no 

longer formed coherent units, requiring individual divisions to integrate 

into German formations.41

Finally, Soviet armies along unengaged fronts remained postured for 

offensive operations due to earlier deceptions, and had already identified 

additional weak areas farther along the front line that could replicate the 

success of Operation URANUS. In accordance with Soviet prewar deep 

battle doctrine, now adopted due to its effectiveness, the Red Army’s 

fronts identified weaker flanks and units along the front line and concealed 

their buildup to encircle, destroy, or push back Army Group B. As General 

Vasilevsky realized the scale of the encirclement, the planned operation to 

Figure 6.3. Soviet Winter Offensive, Operations 13 December 1942–15 February 

1943. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.

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Turkey

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109

encircle Army Group B, code-named SATURN, earned the new moniker 

LITTLE SATURN in recognition of its more limited objectives.

The Southwestern front received orders to attack against the Italian 

Eighth Army and the German Army Detachment Hollidt, with the objective 

of overrunning German airfields and seizing Morozovsk, further isolating 

Stalingrad and preventing resupply of the pocket as well as presenting a 

threat General Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army had to honor.42 Commanders 

issued verbal orders at the army level, and kept a single set of planning 

documents at each level under tight security. Troops concentrated for LITTLE SATURN behind the front, and moved under darkness to jumping 

off positions under strictly enforced noise, light, and transmissions discipline—in the frontline trenches, smoking and even verbal orders were 

forbidden. A prolonged period of reconnaissance blunted German efforts 

to discover the offensive’s start, but also revealed Soviet intentions. The 

scale of reconnaissance prevented the location of exact attack sectors, and 

instead created a long list of possible attacks to guard against, which secured surprise for the Soviets. 15 December saw the Italian Eighth Army’s 

turn to fall back as the Southwestern front, after concealing the deployment of five rifle divisions and three mechanized corps, attacked the left 

flank of Army Group Don.43

After two days of resistance, the Soviet First Guards, Third Guards, 

and Sixth Armies broke through the Italian lines and advanced into the 

German rear unopposed, as the 17th Panzer Division had been reassigned 

from Eighth Army to General Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army at his request.44

Major General Badanov’s XXIV Tank Corps provided the best indication 

of the levels of surprise achieved during LITTLE SATURN, catching the 

main German airbase at Tatsinskaya off-guard and unaware. After destroying seventy-two aircraft and overrunning the airbase on 24 December, the 

XXIV Tank Corps’ raid forced the Luftwaffe to relocate farther west to 

a makeshift airfield, severely damaging German resupply efforts.45 With 

three Soviet armies willing to conduct raids deep into the German rear, 

Field Marshal von Manstein knew that he could not continue the relief attack towards Sixth Army, and so halted and withdrew Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army. With their withdrawal, von Manstein condemned Paulus’ Sixth 

Army to the inevitable fate of utter destruction or surrender, having lost 

the best chance for a breakthrough immediately after URANUS’ success 

by failing to issue timely orders for a breakthrough to link up with the 

relief column. The Soviet advance was too rapid, and German lines too 

overextended, to open and hold a corridor from Stalingrad to the rest of 

Army Group Don.
110

Red Star Resurgent

The success of Operations URANUS and LITTLE SATURN prompted wider offensives, all using maskirovka to greater or lesser extent to 

capitalize on German withdrawals and continue the momentum built up 

by General Vasilevsky. The Germans, already retreating from Stalingrad, 

recognized the possibility of losing Army Group A in the Caucasus and 

ordered a general withdrawal, almost back to the June 1942 start lines. 

Stalingrad ultimately became Germany’s high water mark, and set into 

motion the Red Army’s inexorable advance towards Berlin, but not without great additional cost.

The Soviets learned a key deception lesson from the campaign: surprise largely hinged on concealing the time, place, or scale of an offensive. From a commander’s viewpoint, achieving surprise for all three 

remained ideal and became the stated goal for tactical and operational deception, but enabling surprise for at least one factor contributed 

to varying levels of success. The Romanian Third Army on URANUS’ 

northern flank provided the clearest example, as its commander had received indications of increased enemy activity, but did not anticipate the 

time or scale of the offensive that overran his army. Operation URANUS 

also demonstrated the links between strategic and operational deception, 

as efforts against Army Group Center occupied OKH’s intelligence assessments even as the Red Army concealed troop movements in the Stalingrad region.

Practically speaking, Soviet efforts to link deception and intelligence 

grew substantially during the course of the campaign. By creating misleading or false concentrations of troops outside the planned attack areas and falsifying defensive postures in attack sectors, as seen in the 

Voronezh and Southwestern fronts, the Red Army’s senior commanders 

were able to deceive German intelligence staffs in Army Group B and 

OKH. In contrast, effectively concealing troop concentrations, tactical 

assembly areas, and camouflaging troop deployments into the front line 

enabled commanders to see the value of camouflage and operational security discipline. Red Army intelligence and reconnaissance then provided feedback on effectiveness, enabling commanders to maintain or 

adjust the deception and camouflage measures. The Soviets leveraged 

aerial reconnaissance for long-range operational and strategic razvedka

outside the campaign to determine the concentrations and movements 

of German forces into and out of the Stalingrad region, and to detect 

the operational reserves posing threats to the offensives. Troop and artillery reconnaissance created an accurate disposition of German troop 
111

levels, force concentrations, and defensive works and captured prisoners 

to determine what knowledge, if any, German officers and soldiers had 

concerning Soviet dispositions and intentions.

The late winter offensives of 1943 pushed the Germans back farther, 

but also saw a stabilization of the front line after losing Kharkov to the 

Germans again in March. Stavka and the Red Army’s commanders relearned the lessons of concentration and the need to reinforce rapidly advance units in the aftermath, but Kharkov’s loss set the stage for Kursk, 

which saw the Soviet Union gain the strategic initiative for the rest of the 

war.46 As German intentions became clear, the Red Army applied of the 

same methods proven during the Stalingrad campaign—concealing troop 

movements and marshalling areas, camouflaging elaborate defensive 

works, and even using the same command team of Generals Zhukov and 

Vasilevsky to coordinate the Kursk defense and the strategic counteroffensive that followed. Kursk was the first operation incorporating a maskirovka plan mandated by Stavka, and the experience the Red Army accrued at 

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels influenced the General Staff.47

As the fall strategic offensives opened, the Red Army began recording and 

distributing its deception lessons in time for Stavka to begin planning Operation BAGRATION, which removed German forces from the territory 

of the Soviet Union.
112

Notes

1. Field Regulations of the Red Army, 1929. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1929. 

Translated by JPRS, 13 March 1985. Accessed 12 December 2017 at http://

www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a354513.pdf, 3.

2. Field Regulations of the Red Army, 1929, 4.

3. Field Regulations of the Red Army, 1929, 46.

4. Field Regulations of the Red Army, 1929, 76.

5. Provisional Field Regulations for the Red Army. Moscow: Voenizdat, 

1937. Translated by JPRS, 12 June 1986. Accessed 12 December 2017 at http:www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a361873.pdf, 2-3.

6. Provisional Field Regulations of the Red Army, 70.

7. G.R. Pochter, “Operational Deception and Surprise.” Military Thought, 

No. 7 (July 1937). Translated by Eastview Press, February 2018, 63.

8. Pochter, 63-64.

9. Pochter, 65.

10. Pochter, 67.

11. Pochter, 66.

12. A.I. Starunin, “Operational Surprise.” Military Thought, No. 3 (March 

1941). Translated by Eastview Press, February 2018, 27.

13. Starunin, 34.

14. Starunin, 35.

15. Christopher Bellamy. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World 

War. (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 137.

16. Bellamy, 143-144.

17. John Keegan. The Second World War. (New York: Penguin Books, 

2005), 184, 186.

18. Bellamy, Absolute War, 302-303

19. David Glantz. Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. 

(Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2006), 48-49.

20. A Soviet front was an operational level formation similar to an Army 

Group, often named for a geographical location or direction, i.e., Western front, 

Central front, 1st Ukrainian front, etc.

21. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, 51.

22. Glantz, 51-53.

23. Bellamy, Absolute War, 449.

24. Antony Beevor. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943. (New York: 

Penguin Books, 1999), 71-72.

25. Beevor, Stalingrad, 116.

26. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, 109-110

27. Beevor, Stalingrad, 221-222.

28. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, 110.

29. Glantz, 111.

30. Glantz, 112.

31. Glantz, 112.
113

32. Glantz, 112.

33. David Glantz, Soviet Military Intelligence in War (Abingdon-onThames: Routledge, 2006), 121-123.

34. Glantz, 129.

35. Beevor, Stalingrad, 234.

36. Glantz, Soviet Military Intelligence in War, 131-132.

37. Beevor, Stalingrad, 229.

38. Bellamy, Absolute War, 531.

39. Beevor, Stalingrad, 231.

40. Beevor, 248.

41. Keegan, The Second World War, 235.

42. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, 121.

43. Glantz, 121-122.

44. Beevor, Stalingrad, 297, 300.

45. Beevor, 300-301.

46. Keegan, The Second World War, 461-462

47. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, 149.

115

Chapter 7

Operation BAGRATION

Maskirovka at Its Height, Summer 1944

Curtis S. King

The Red Army’s crushing defeat of German Army Group Center 

(AGC) in Belorussia in June-July 1944 was a decisive victory for the Soviet Union in World War II. By the end of the campaign (known to the 

Soviets as Operation BAGRATION), the Soviets had decimated an entire 

German Army Group; killed, wounded, or captured hundreds of thousands 

of German soldiers; and advanced over 200 miles. A major reason for this 

success was the Red Army leadership’s effective use of deception, which 

caused poor German deployments that left them unprepared for the Soviet 

offensive. The Soviets, building on their already extensive doctrine and 

execution of deception in earlier operations were able to convince much of 

the German high command that the major Soviet offensive for the summer 

of 1944 would occur to the north (Baltic States) and south (Ukraine) of 

AGC in Belorussia. This left the army group that bore the brunt of the main 

Russian effort with inadequate resources, particularly in armor and mobile 

reserves. In examining the role of deception in Operation BAGRATION, it 

is important to understand the Soviet concept of maskirovka, which entails 

a full range of deception operations and techniques and was already a large 

part of Red Army doctrine prior to the summer 1944 offensive.

Maskirovka

The Russian term maskirovka has sometimes been translated simply as 

“camouflage,” but maskirovka is a much more extensive view of deception 

than mere camouflage.1 In fact, Soviet doctrine has defined maskirovka as:

The means of securing combat operations and the daily activities 

of forces; a complexity of measures, directed to mislead the enemy 

regarding the presence and disposition of forces, various military 

objectives, their condition, combat readiness and operations, and 

also the plans of the command...maskirovka contributes to the 

achievement of surprise for the actions of forces, the preservation 

of combat readiness, and the increased survivability of objectives.2

Maskirovka includes camouflage, but also encompasses a wide variety of 

measures and techniques designed to deceive the enemy, conceal Soviet 

capabilities and intentions, and achieve surprise.
116

The Russian theory and practice of deception has a long history that 

pre-dates the formation of the Soviet Union and continuously evolved 

through the inter-war years and up to BAGRATION. As early as 1904, the 

Imperial Russian Army had a maskirovka school that continued with the 

Red Army and wrote much of the early Red Army theory and concepts on 

the topic.3 These early concepts focused mostly on tactical deception. At 

the time of the publication of the 1929 Field Regulations, Red Army doctrine still focused on concealment at the tactical level, but it also discussed 

rapid troop movements—often at night—and the use of new technology 

and doctrine to surprise the enemy. For example, the Soviets might conceal the development of a new weapons system or airframe so that, when 

first used, this equipment and its capabilities would be a surprise to the 

enemy. The Red Army 1935 Instructions on Deep Battle and the 1936 

Field Regulations continued the trend of greater emphasis on maskirovka. In addition to added emphasis technological surprise, these manuals 

stressed the use of secret concentrations of forces and surprise artillery 

concentrations. Building on this doctrine, Soviet military theorists writing in the journal of the General Staff, Voennaya Mysl (Military Thought) 

added even more detail to the concept and methods of maskirovka. This 

included procedures for developing a maskirovka plan and assigning deception objectives to subordinate combat units as well as particular missions for aviation, cavalry, engineer, support, signal and political elements. 

The 1939 Field Regulations continued the earlier doctrine with even more 

emphasis at planning for deception at all levels.4

Despite an impressive doctrine on maskirovka, it was the Soviets 

who fell victim to deception in June 1941 and were surprised by the 

German invasion known as Operation BARBAROSSA. The Germans 

certainly deserve credit for their own deception methods prior to the 

offensive, but a large part of their success also lay in self-delusion by the 

Soviet leadership who refused to believe that a German attack was imminent. Nonetheless, the Red Army General Staff quickly responded to the 

invasion and began to issue instructions to the field forces to correct deficiencies. In just four days after the invasion, it issued its first instructions 

on maskirovka, which reiterated the 1936 and 1939 Regulations with 

some added recommendations.5

 After some better success at deception 

in the Moscow counteroffensive, the Soviet High Command (known by 

its Russian name, Stavka) issued new directives in 1942 that discussed 

operational level maskirovka in more depth and stressed security in the 

planning process.6

 This led to improved deception for the counterattack 

at Stalingrad (Operation URANUS), where maskirovka formed an inte-
117

gral part of the plan and not just an “add-on,” as in previous operations.7

In April 1943, Stavka called for even stricter secrecy when planning or 

regrouping forces. The 1943 Field Regulations gathered many of the 

earlier Stavka directives into a single regulation. It provided even more 

details on the contents of maskirovka plans and added some other factors 

to consider in deception operations to include the value of air dominance. Another update to the Regulations in 1944 stressed even further 

the need for surprise, especially at the operational level. Also in 1944, 

the Red Army published The Manual on Operational Maskirovka, the 

first doctrinal publication devoted exclusively to deception operations. 

The manual summed up the existing concepts of maskirovka and emphasized that the Soviets could not just rely on secrecy to achieve surprise, 

but needed to create false objectives, make use of feints and demonstrations, and develop an effective disinformation campaign.8

Thus, going into the planning for BAGRATION, the Red Army had 

extensive doctrine and successful experiences in maskirovka. This combination led the Soviets to look at maskirovka at all three levels of war: 

strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic maskirovka “is conducted by 

the high command and includes a complex of measures to protect the secrecy of preparations for strategic operations and campaigns, as well as 

disinformation of the enemy regarding the true intentions and operations 

of [our] armed forces.”9

 At the operational level, Fronts (the Red Army 

term for an army group) and armies were responsible for maskirovka. Similar to the strategic level, the goal of deception for the Fronts and armies 

was to enable surprise, which forced the enemy into an unfavorable position.10 At the tactical level, divisions, regiments, and battalions conducted 

maskirovka with the main (but not exclusive) goal of concealing forces 

from the enemy.11 In addition to planning and executing maskirovka at all 

three levels of war, the Soviets viewed deception as being applied through 

both active and passive measures. Active methods included misleading 

and misinforming the enemy. Passive methods were more along the lines 

of concealing units and physical locations, as well as concealing intent.12

All of these aspects of maskirovka informed the Red Army leaders as they 

planned for Operation BAGRATION.

 Overall Planning for BAGRATION

The Soviets emerged from 1943 with many successful operations, 

especially in Ukraine, which left them with several options for offensives in the summer of 1944. Stavka and the General Staff examined 

four possible options for their summer offensive and concluded that the 

main effort should be a four-Front offensive in Belorussia with the goals 
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of destroying AGC, liberating Belorussia, and paving the way for follow-on offensives to advance into Poland.13 After deciding on the main 

strategic effort for 1944, Soviet leadership worked out the details of the 

operational plan. The development of the plan began with Stavka and 

Stalin giving the general outline of the strategy to the General Staff and 

Fronts at an initial meeting on 28 April. By 14 May the Soviet leaders 

had completed the preliminary plan, and the General Staff released the 

approved (initial) plan six days later. The Front commands provided additional input and, after further meetings, Stavka approved the final plan 

on 30 May and issued it the next day.14

The plan for BAGRATION involved attacks by four Red Army Fronts 

on multiple axes that would annihilate AGC (see Figure 7.1). The Soviet 

General Staff described it as “a simultaneous offensive by Soviet forces along the Polotsk—Svencionys, Orsha—Minsk, Mogilev—Minsk 

and Bobruisk—Slutsk directions” with the goal of the “encirclement and 

destruction of the enemy’s groups of forces in the areas of Vitebsk and 

Bobruisk, the development of the attacks along converging axes toward 

Minsk, and the encirclement and destruction of the main enemy group of 

forces.”15 Starting in the north, First Baltic Front, under General Ivan Bagramyan, and Third Belorussian Front, under Colonel General (later General) Ivan Chernyakhovsky, were to break through at Vitebsk and encircle 

the German forces there. To the south, Second Belorussian Front, commanded by Colonel General Georgii Zakharov, was to support the efforts 

of the Soviet armies on its left and right and destroy the German forces 

holding Mogilev. Further south, the First Belorussian Front, led by General Konstantin Rokossovsky, had the most ambitious tasks. It was to encircle and destroy German forces at Bobruisk. Further south and west, the 

Front was to break through German forces on the north edge of the Pripyat 

Marshes and advance to Minsk. All of the Soviet Fronts were to eventually 

converge on Minsk to destroy any remaining forces of AGC.16 To further 

assist in synchronizing the Soviet effort, Stavka tasked Marshal Aleksandr 

Vasilevsky with coordinating the offensives of First Baltic and Third Belorussian Fronts. Another Stavka representative, Marshal Georgii Zhukov 

received orders to coordinate First and Second Belorussian Fronts.

The Soviet plan required a massive reinforcement of the four Fronts 

attacking AGC in order to ensure a successful offensive. Prior to the 

transfer of these forces, the Red Army had only 1,000,000 men to face 

the roughly 850,000 Germans of AGC, which was not nearly enough 

to ensure a successful attack. To improve the correlation of forces, the 

Soviets moved five combined arms armies (two in reserve), two tank 
119

armies (one in reserve), the First Polish Army (in reserve), one air army, 

five tank corps, two mechanized corps, and four cavalry corps into position for the summer offensive. It designated the reserve forces for commitment after BAGRATION began. The forces added to the four Fronts 

for the initial assaults included over 400,000 men; 3,000 tanks and assault guns; 10,000 artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket launchers; as well 

as 300,000 tons of fuel.17

Rogachev Bobruisk

Zhlobin Slutsk

Gomel

Minsk Berezino

Borisov

Orsha

Smolensk Lepel

Polotsk

65A 1 Bel Front

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28A 1 Bel

Front

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33A 2 Bel

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3 Bel Front

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Front

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5GTA 3 Bel

Front

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11GA

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Front

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1 Bal Front

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AGC

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Mogilev

Krichev

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Russia

Operation Bagration

Deployments and Soviet Plan

June 1944 0 15.5 31 Miles

0 25 50 km

N

Vitebsk

Railroad

Figure 7.1. Operation BAGRATION: Deployments and Soviet Plan, June 1944. 

Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
120

The Soviets concentrated their reinforcements for the crucial initial 

attacks designed to destroy AGC as close to the front line as possible. 

Fifth Guards Tank Army moved from Ukraine to the Third Belorussian 

Front. That Front also received Eleventh Guards Army and II Guards 

Tanks Corps. First Baltic Front received Sixth Guards Army and I Tank 

Corps. All of these forces supported the powerful effort at Vitebsk. Second Belorussian Front received LXXXI Rifle Corps along with other 

units to assist in the attack on Mogilev. Rokossovsky’s First Belorussian 

Front took command of Twenty-eighth Army, I Guards Tank Corps, and 

a Mechanized Cavalry Corps for the effort on Bobruisk and exploitation 

further west.18

Before discussing the Red Army’s plans for deception in support of 

BAGRATION, it is important to note two factors inherent in the German 

Army high command and in the command of AGC that had an influence 

on Soviet maskirovka measures. First, the German leadership was predisposed to believing that the main Soviet effort would be south of the 

Pripyat Marshes against German Army Group North Ukraine (AGNU). 

Both Hitler and the High Command of the Army (in German known as 

Oberkommando des Heeres, or OKH) held this belief. In addition, the 

commander of AGC, Field Marshal Ernst Busch, and the commander of 

AGNU, Field Marshal Walter Model, also thought the main Soviet effort would be in northern Ukraine with the ultimate aim of cutting behind 

(west) of AGC and isolating that group in one massive pocket—a plan that 

had been one of the original courses of action discussed by Stavka. The 

Germans believed this was the most likely Soviet plan because that was 

what the Germans themselves would have chosen if they were doing the 

Soviet planning. Thus, even when evidence became apparent of a Soviet 

build-up in front of AGC (north of the marshes), the Germans dismissed 

the Soviet concentrations as forces being gathered for a supporting effort 

only.19 Soviet deception efforts took advantage of German expectations of 

an attack in northern Ukraine and placed great emphasis on creating the 

illusion of a Soviet main effort focused there.

The second factor helping the Soviet planning efforts was Hitler’s 

(and subsequently Busch’s) reliance on “fortified regions” based on cities close to the front-lines. Hitler was convinced that refusing to allow 

front-line troops to retreat, and having them defend strongpoints—even 

if isolated—could buy time for counterattacking German forces to restore 

the situation.20 On 20 May, Busch tried to convince Hitler of the need for 

withdrawal before the Soviets launched an assault in order to shorten his 

line, or at least allow greater flexibility for retreats once the fighting had 
121

begun. Hitler rebuked the Army Group commander, accusing Busch of 

being like the other German generals who “spent their whole time looking 

over their shoulder.”21 From this point on, Busch never questioned the 

Nazi dictator, and the four fortified regions of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, 

and Rogachev remained a major feature of AGC’s defensive plan. This 

played into the Soviet deception effort. Even if the Germans could detect 

some of the Red Army build-up in front of AGC, it still made sense for the 

Soviets to conceal the size and scope of the offensive so that they could 

surround and destroy the units in the fortified regions before the Germans 

could withdrawal or initiate a rescue mission.

Deception Planning

Soviet deception planning formally began with Stavka’s maskirovka

directive issued on 29 May and signed by Zhukov and General Aleksei 

Antonov, Chief of the Operations Directorate of the Red Army General 

Staff. The directive, focused mostly on strategic maskirovka, began with 

instructions concerning the massive movement of forces to the four Fronts 

in BAGRATION:

To insure concealment of activities going forward on all 

fronts, I order:

1. All movements of troops and equipment are to be done only 

at night, strictly observing night march discipline. Movement 

during the day is to be authorized only in weather when flying is absolutely impossible, and only for individual groups 

that cannot be observed by the enemy on the ground. At daytime halting places and new assembly regions, troops and 

equipment are to be dispersed and carefully camouflaged. 

Personnel must not communicate with the local population 

and movement of groups and subunits along open roads and 

terrain sectors must be minimized. Direct special attention to 

concealment when replacing first-line troops.22

In addition to these restrictions on movements, the reinforcements 

and shifting units were subject to timetables that kept them away from 

the front-line—and German detection—for as long as possible. Arriving 

units were kept at least fifty kilometers from the front until five to seven 

days before the offensive. At that point, these units could move to within 

twelve to twenty kilometers from the front, but they could not move into 

their attack positions until one or two nights before the assault began.23

Stavka also strictly controlled all rail movement. Full cars only moved 

forward at night and then returned—empty but with their lack of content 
122

concealed—in daylight. Units moving to the front by rail disembarked at 

multiple stations and then concentrated with night road movements.24

The Stavka maskirovka plan then went on to discuss the need for deception in the development of fire plans. It directed that “during the entire 

period of regrouping and preparation for action keep up the existing fire 

situation. Establish a procedure for ranging artillery and mortar weapons that guarantees concealment of the artillery grouping in the primary 

axis.”25 The newly arriving artillery concentrations were not permitted to 

fire. Instead, only existing artillery could register their weapons using a 

single gun for each battery, and only in the later stages of the preparations 

for BAGRATION, 17-21 June.26 The Soviets needed overwhelming fire 

support in order to achieve rapid penetrations on the flanks of the fortified 

regions, and thus they planned for the use of large “breakthrough” artillery 

divisions, which needed to be concealed from the Germans. They also 

minimized antiaircraft fires.27 In addition to ground fires, the Soviet Air 

Force (VVS) hid the gathering ground support aircraft prior to the start 

of the offensive, and used only long range aviation assets, mostly from 

Ukraine, to maintain the routine level of air bombardment on AGC.28

Limiting reconnaissance work so as to not reveal Soviet intentions 

was the next topic of the directive. The Stavka order read:

Prohibit newly arrived formations from conducting ground 

reconnaissance. Do not conduct commander’s reconnaissance in large groups simultaneously. To conceal the true 

sectors of action organize the work of commander’s reconnaissance groups on a broad front, including the passive 

sectors. In necessary cases, command personnel on commander’s reconnaissance are authorized to wear the uniforms and gear of privates. Tank soldiers are categorically 

forbidden to appear on commander’s reconnaissance in 

their special uniforms.29

This instruction on reconnaissance was just one part of an overall secrecy 

plan designed to ensure that the Germans did not discover the concept, 

plans, or preparations for BAGRATION. The Red Army leaders maintained strict secrecy of the operation during the planning and preparation 

stages. They limited the individuals with knowledge of the plan to the 

smallest possible number. As an example, Third Belorussian Front’s did 

not issue their written orders until 20 June, three days before the offensive. 

All orders were hand-written and hand-delivered. The Soviets virtually 

eliminated radio traffic, while minimizing telephone communications.30
123

Although a marked reduction in radio and telephone activity could possibly give away an operation, the risk for the Soviets was small because they 

minimized their communication activities almost all of the time, and along 

the entire length of the front. Marshal Vasilevsky, Stavka’s representative 

coordinating First Baltic and Third Belorussian Fronts, summed up these 

efforts: “All that colossal work had to be conducted in conditions of strict 

secrecy in order to hide from the enemy the huge complex of preparatory 

work for the forthcoming summer offensive.”31

Stavka also directed that the commanders and staffs at all levels participate in the planning and execution of all maskirovka operations. The 

directive ordered that the commands organize “careful daily checks on 

execution of all orders relating to concealment. Make daily checks from 

the air of the concealment of headquarters and positions, for which purpose special officers from the front and army staffs must be appointed.”32

In addition, the Fronts provided their own maskirovka orders and reports 

by 1 June.33 Front and army staff representatives conducted ground and air 

inspections of the deception efforts and sent these results to the General 

Staff each day at 2200 hours.34 The Red Army not only created plans for 

deception, they ensured that staffs and commanders at all levels were in 

place to oversee the execution of the maskirovka plan.

After Stavka had provided its instructions, each of the Fronts developed their own maskirovka plans. In most cases, the Fronts emphasized 

the Stavka directive while adding some details of their own. First Baltic 

Front’s plan stated:

1. All movements of troops and rear services are to be done 

only at night between 2200 and 0400 with an exactly determined travel distance. Do not try to travel long distances. 

End marches in forested, sheltered regions. Do not permit 

columns to stretch out or lagging subunits to move during 

daytime. No matter where troops and their rear services may 

be when light comes, all roads must be perfectly still; all 

movement must stop.

2. Motor vehicles can travel only at night with headlights 

out. Set up white signs that are plainly visible at night on the 

roads. Paint the front part of the hood and rear sides of vehicles white. Traveling at high speed or passing vehicles on the 

march is categorically forbidden.35

Bagramyan’s Front plan also called for units to travel on planned routes 

and not to enter areas where they might be seen by the Germans. Even if 
124

German reconnaissance planes appeared, they were not to be fired upon. 

It was permitted to respond only to major German air attacks. The plan 

also specified that when “enemy aircraft appear during tactical exercises 

subunits and units must take cover immediately and, according to predetermined signals, quickly deploy and simulate defensive construction on 

natural lines.”36 The Front also reiterated Stavka’s instructions regarding 

artillery fire and registration, and the strict control of radio and telephone 

communications. The Baltic Front added specific personnel to enforce the 

deception plan:

No activity (troop movement, hauling supplies, commander’s reconnaissance, and so on) can be permitted or carried 

out before steps have been taken to conceal this activity. For 

this purpose: Select one assistant chief of staff at all unit and 

formation headquarters to be assigned to work out instructions for camouflaging troops in all types of combat activity and to see that specially designated officers monitor this 

closely.37

First Baltic Front’s order repeated Stavka’s directive concerning security of reconnaissance operations and added: “In zones scheduled for 

vigorous actions, step up defensive works, paying special attention to the 

quality (convincingness) of construction on dummy minefields and the 

like.”38 Bagramyan’s Front maskirovka plan contained tremendous detail. 

It included measures for discipline on the march and instructions for subordinate commanders to enforce this discipline. Similarly, it instructed 

Soviet leaders to exercise restraint with air reconnaissance. The Provost 

Service was given direct responsibility to enforce much of the march, fire, 

reconnaissance, and communication discipline. For this purpose, the provost had three zones:

a. the front zone, from the line of front bases (city of Nevel’) 

to the line of army bases (Zheleznitsa, Bychikha). The organization of provost work in this zone is assigned to the chief 

of staff of the front;

b. Army zone, from the line of army bases (Zheliznitsa, Bychikha) to the line of division exchange points;

c. Troop zones, from the line of division exchange points to 

the forward edge of defense.39

Continuing instructions gave specifics for the provost on how to control 

the movements of units to include the number of provost officers to be 

assigned, the best locations for the officers, and their specific missions. 
125

Finally, the directive “categorically forbid written communications relating to activities being carried on. Only the restricted circle of scheduled 

persons should be permitted to see the content of essential documents, and 

documents must not go beyond the headquarters that prepared them” and 

it required “reports to front headquarters at 2100 each day [to] report the 

results of the concealment inspection.”40

Each of the other Soviet Fronts developed their own maskirovka plans. 

These plans were similar to First Baltic Front’s instructions, but each had 

some unique aspects of their own. Chernyakhovskii’s Third Belorussian 

Front assigned special escorts for the newly arriving units and emphasized the use of air inspections to check concealment. It also stipulated 

specially assigned officers from the staff to inspect maskirovka preparations.41 Zakharov’s Second Belorussian Front mirrored Stavka and the other Fronts’ emphasis on secrecy with some added instructions on the rear 

services’ preparations and details on concealing the assumption of frontline positions by the attacking forces.42 In addition to their own deception 

operations, Third and Second Belorussian Fronts conducted “diversionary 

and imitative” activity to distract from the major efforts at Vitebsk and Bobruisk.43 Rokossovsky’s First Belorussian Front also conducted extensive 

maskirovka planning. In addition to most of the measures discussed above, 

the Front emphasized conducting defensive preparations by front line units 

to hide the offensive preparations behind the front. Units conducted false 

movements during the day and then regrouped in new positions at night. 

Engineers laid bridges in false locations and then took them up, and they 

deployed dummy vehicles on an incorrect axis. Officers checked on all of 

these preparations and reported to higher headquarters. Specific instructions went to infantry, artillery, tank, aviation, and engineer units to ensure 

that they supported the deception plan.44 In his memoirs, Rokossovsky 

confirmed the importance of “concealment of troop movements” and “all 

kinds of stratagems to mislead the enemy.”45 The Front commander went 

on to praise his Chief of Staff, Colonel General Mikhail Malinin for his 

innovation in deception operations for the Front.

Most of the Soviet maskirovka efforts discussed so far might be considered as passive—designed to hide the intent and extent of the Red 

Army preparations. Active deception measures were also used to convince 

the Germans of Soviet intentions in false directions. This effort sought to 

play on German beliefs that the Soviet main effort in the summer of 1944 

would be in north Ukraine, and to a lesser extent, in the Baltics.

A key component of this deception was based on the locations of the 

Soviet tank armies. These armies were crucial to Soviet success in 1943 
126

in Ukraine. The Germans had become convinced that only Red Tank 

Armies could provide the main effort for any offensives in 1944. Except 

for the hidden transfer of Fifth Guards Tank Army to Third Belorussian 

Front, the other Soviet tank armies remained in Ukraine in the summer 

of 1944. In fact, these tank army units lacked their full complement of 

tanks after the campaigns of 1943. However, the Army headquarters and 

skeleton forces remained in Ukraine without receiving new forces, while 

maintaining routine radio traffic to convince the Germans that the tank 

armies were at full strength.46 At this time, the Soviets also stopped all 

offensive operations in the area of AGC and started work on defensive 

positions to convince the Germans that the Soviets only wanted to defend 

in Belorussia.47 While the bulk of the tank army headquarters continued 

to be very visible in Ukraine, smaller tank corps, mechanized corps and 

cavalry corps units were transferred to the Fronts facing AGC. Additionally, Stavka directed the Fronts to the north and south of BAGRATION 

to simulate offensives in their regions to draw attention away from the 

main effort on AGC.48 It tasked Third Ukrainian Front with simulating 

an offensive on its right flank using eight or nine divisions with artillery 

and air support while sending similar instructions to Third Baltic Front.49

Deception Execution and Effectiveness

The execution of the Soviet deception effort, while not flawless, was 

generally successful, and it left AGC ill-prepared for the massive onslaught 

that it faced on 23 June 1944. For the most part, the Soviets successfully 

hid the enormous volume of rail traffic prior to the offensive. These rail 

movements included three armies and multiple separate corps with artillery 

and air support—29 rifle divisions, nine tank or mechanized corps, and two 

cavalry corps. In addition to moving these units to their assembly areas, the 

rail network also carried 5,718,916 tons of supplies in 126,589 freight cars 

in the weeks before the attack.50 However, the need for night movements and 

deception limited the amount and speed of rail transport, and the transportation of reinforcements and supplies fell behind schedule. The movement of 

Fifth Guards Tank Army was supposed to be complete by 18 June, but it was 

delayed. Also, III Guards Mechanized Corps could not be moved on schedule. Planners referred the matter to Stalin who agreed to delay the attack 

from its original date of 14 June to 23 June.51 Maskirovka was so important 

to the Soviets that they were willing to delay their attack to ensure that their 

movements were kept hidden from the Germans.

The success of these efforts can be measured in the German intelligence 

reports at OKH and AGC. In late May, AGC detected some elements of Eleventh Guards Army moving into place, but it still concluded that the main So-
127

viet effort would be in north Ukraine. On 30 May, based on the mistaken belief that this constituted the Soviet main effort, OKH transferred LVI Panzer 

Corps from AGC to AGNU, leaving Busch with almost no mobile reserves. 

On 2 June, an AGC report expected only holding attacks on its front. The 

army group’s war diary did report some Soviet build-ups throughout June, 

and it concluded that AGC might expect some heavy attacks. However, the 

main Soviet effort was still anticipated south of AGC. The OKH Intelligence 

Branch confirmed these conclusions. The final intelligence reports of the 

Germans recognized some Soviet effort against AGC, but expected it to be 

a supporting effort. In addition, the Germans completely underestimated the 

size and extent of the Soviet offensive in Belorussia.52

One last measure of success of the Soviet deception effort is the superiority of forces that the Red Army amassed against AGC. They had a 

2.5:1 advantage in men, a 2.9:1 advantage in artillery and mortars, a 4.3:1 

advantage in tanks and assault guns, and a 4.5:1 advantage in aircraft. In 

addition to these overall numbers, the Soviet Fronts massed their forces in 

the crucial attack zones, achieving a 10:1 ratio of forces or better in these 

zones prior to the offensive.53 Figures 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate the largely 

undetected (or underestimated) concentration of First Belorussian Front 

forces in the Bobruisk direction. The German Intelligence assessment 

(see Figure 7.2) detected some of the reinforcing corps that were coming 

to First Belorussian Front but could not determine their exact locations. 

The assessment also tended to spread Soviet divisions evenly along the 

front, especially in the Sixty-fifth Army area. In reality (Figure 7.3), the 

Soviets concentrated tremendous strength near Rogachev and south of 

Svetlogorsk for the breakthrough designed to encircle Bobruisk. Also, the 

Front received additional corps that the Germans failed to detect. These 

corps were poised to exploit the initial penetrations deeper into the German rear. Each of the other Fronts’ major breakthrough areas targeted by 

BAGRATION achieved similar results.

With the help of maskirovka operations, the Soviet offensive was a 

tremendous success. A partisan offensive in AGC’s rear area preceded 

the attack and helped disrupt German communications and supply routes. 

Then, on 22 June, First Baltic and Third Belorussian Fronts opened their 

assaults on both sides of Vitebsk. The next day, Second and First Belorussian Fronts began their attacks. In less than a week, Vitebsk had been 

surrounded and reduced, while First Belorussian Front did the same at Bobruisk. Other Soviet forces achieved breakthroughs at Orsha and Mogilev. 

Hindered by Hitler’s demand to hold fortified regions and surprised by 

the strength and speed of the Soviet attacks, much of AGC was destroyed 
128

in the front-line just as the Red Army commanders had planned. Soviet 

columns exploited this success by rapidly crossing the Berezina River and 

closing two pincers at Minsk on 3 July. Red Army forces continued to advance far to the west through mid-July when BAGRATION transitioned 

into the Lvov-Sandomierz Operation with Fourth Ukrainian Front opening 

its offensive south of the Pripyat Marshes. In the end, the Soviets were 

Bobruisk

N

Rogachev

Parichi

Svetlogorsk

Zhlobin

Kalinkovichi

German Intelligence Picture

Soviet Deployment (Bobruisk)

22 June 1944 0 5 12 Miles

0 10 20 km

XX

XX

XX

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XX

XX

XX XX

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1 Bel

65A Front

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1 Bel

61A Front

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1 Bel

48A Front

XXXX

1 Bel

3A Front

German Intelligence

detected some additional

Corps for each Army,

but the Germans did not

know the Reserves’

location or strength

Railroad

Figure 7.2. German Intelligence picture of Soviet deployment, June 1944. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
129

on the outskirts of Warsaw with German AGC virtually destroyed as an 

effective fighting force.

Conclusion

The Soviet deception effort worked—it succeeded in surprising the 

Germans as to the direction of the main effort of the Soviet offensive in 

the summer of 1944, and the vast power and scope of the attack on AGC. 

Figure 7.3. Actual Soviet deployment, June 1944. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.

Bobruisk

N

Rogachev

Parichi

Zhlobin

Kalinkovichi

Actual Soviet

Deployment (Bobruisk)

22 June 1944 0 5 12 Miles

0 10 20 km

XXXX

1 Bel

3A Front

XX

Reserve Corps of

3rd and 48th Armies

deployed to the front,

concentrated for

breakthrough

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

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XX

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XX

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XX XX

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XX XX XX

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XX XX

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Reserve Corps of

65th Army deployed

to the front,

concentrated for

breakthrough

New Army HQs

allowed 65th Army

to concentrate on

a narrow front

Svetlogorsk

N

XXX

New Units Undetected

Railroad
130

Perhaps more importantly, we can conclude that some of the basic concepts of Soviet deception efforts and their techniques are still valuable to 

professional military leaders today.

One concept that seems to permeate all deception operations, but applies particularly well to BAGRATION is the ability to take advantage 

of your enemy’s preconceived ideas. US Army Techniques Publication 

(ATP) Draft No. 3-13.4, Army Military Deception Planning, outlines:

Required perceptions are the personal conclusions, official 

estimates, and assumptions the deception target must believe 

in order to make the decision that will achieve the MILDEC 

[Military Deception] objective. These adversary perceptions 

will form from both objective (observation and analysis) and 

subjective (intuition and experience) analysis. They are also 

heavily impacted by biases, preconceptions, predispositions, 

and filters applied in the collection, analysis, delivery, and reception of information.54

The Red Army leadership understood that the Germans expected an 

attack in north Ukraine and focused their deception on reinforcing what 

the Germans already assumed the most likely Soviet course of action.55

Only one tank army moved from Ukraine (Fifth Tank Army) and did so 

with the utmost secrecy. This left the remaining tank armies’ headquarters in Ukraine—but with few tanks because those headquarters did not 

receive replacements. Nonetheless, the Germans believed that these tank 

armies were the main effort, in part due to “ingrained self-delusion.”56

Another area that the Soviet maskirovka effort in BAGRATION illustrates is the current doctrinal concept of integration. The ATP emphasizes that:

MILDEC is an integral part of the concept of an operation 

and must be considered, at all levels, throughout the planning 

process. It is especially important to develop a concept for 

MILDEC that supports the overall mission, as part of COA 

development.

Deception plans must also be integrated with higher headquarters plans. Deceptions must also be consistent with 

Army doctrinal norms. The MILDEC planner assists the 

staff in integrating the deception operation throughout all 

phases of the operation.

This begins with planning, continues through execution, and 

concludes with the termination of the deception.57
131

The Soviets excelled at this concept. They integrated deception planning 

with the operational plan at all levels, and designated officers to inspect 

these measures and report their effectiveness to higher headquarters.

Finally, the Soviets devoted extensive assets to their deception effort. Maskirovka was not just an afterthought. Active measures such as 

the feint in northern Ukraine and concealment efforts for the movement 

of reinforcements and supplies required the time and efforts of hundreds 

of thousands of men to execute properly. In the end, deception cannot 

just be a paragraph in a plan, it must be emphasized, integrated, and 

resourced across all levels of the joint force in order to help achieve the 

desired effects.
132

Notes

1. Kenneth Katzner, English-Russian, Russian English Dictionary (NY: 

John Wiley and Sons, 1984), 585. This dictionary translates maskirovka as 

masking, disguising, and concealment. It also gives maskirovka the military focused definition as camouflage. Roger Beaumont, Maskirovka: Soviet 

Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (College Station, TX: Center for 

Strategic Technology of Texas A & M University, 1982), 1. See also Charles 

J. Dick, From Defeat to Victory. The Eastern Front, Summer, 1944 (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2016), 14. Dick writes that “Maskirovka is a 

form of combat support, its purpose being to conceal the disposition and activities of friendly troops and mislead the enemy with regard to the grouping and 

intentions of those troops in order to achieve surprise. Maskirovka is a single, 

all-embracing concept that includes concealment, deception and disinformation, counter reconnaissance and security.”

2. David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War

(London: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1980), 2. See also Beaumont, Maskirovka, 3. Beaumont writes that Soviet doctrine’s definition of maskirovka

“encompasses a diverse spectrum of stratagems employed to warp the enemy’s 

view of the Soviet positions, designs and missions.”

3. Major General Evgenii Korotchenko and Colonel Nikolai Plotnikov, 

“Informatsiia—tozhe oruzhie: O chem nel’zia zabyvat’ v rabote s lichnym sostavom” [Information is also a weapon: About which we cannot forget in working 

with personnel],” Krasnaia zvezda [the Soviet military journal known as Red 

Star] (February 17, 1994), as quoted by Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive 

Control Theory and the Military,” in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 

Volume 17, 2004 – Issue 2, 5.

4. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 5-14.

5. Glantz, 21-23.

6. The Soviet Union’s political leader and Commander of the Red Army, Josef 

Stalin, headed Stavka. In addition to military members such as the Commissar for 

Defense, the Deputy Commander of the Red Army, the Chief of the General Staff, 

and the commanders of the Navy and Air Force, Stavka included key Politburo 

members such as the commissar for Foreign Affairs, the Commissar of Internal 

Affairs, and the chief of economic production for the military.

7. Dick, Defeat to Victory, 63.

8. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 25-34. On page 33, Glantz quotes the 

following from the regulation: “Surprise dumbfounds the enemy, paralyzes his 

will, and deprives him of an opportunity to offer organized resistance.

Surprise is achieved:

-by leading the enemy astray and by keeping the plan of upcoming 

actions in strictest secrecy;

-by the concealment and swift regrouping of forces and of the 

concentration of overwhelming forces and weapons in the decisive 

locations;
133

-by the surprise [unexpected] attack of aircraft, cavalry, and motorized tank units;

-by surprise [unexpected] opening of annihilating fires and the 

beginning of swift attacks.”

9. As quoted by Glantz, 2.

10. A Red Army Front was an Army Group, but smaller than a German 

Army Group. Similarly, Soviet Armies were smaller than German armies 

(roughly 60 to 70 per cent the strength of a German army). This chapter will 

use the term Front (with capital “F”) to distinguish Red Army Fronts from the 

general term of front, such as the front line.

11. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 2-3. See also Beaumont, Maskirovka: 

Soviet Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception, 5. Beaumont adds that the 

Soviets also apply the concept of surprise at all three levels of war, 7-8.

12. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe, IL: The Free 

Press and the Rand Corp., 1953), 266. See also Beaumont, Maskirovka: Soviet 

Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception, 7.

13. General of the Army Sergei M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at 

War. Book One (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981, English Translation, 1985), 

297-299. Shtemenko was the chief of the Operations Directorate of the General 

Staff during the planning for BAGRATION. In his memoirs, he discusses the 

General Staff’s examination of four option for the Summer offensive: an attack 

northwest from Ukraine designed to cut behind AGC and trap it in one large 

pocket, an attack in the Baltic region, an attack on Finland, and the option that 

was eventually adopted, a direct attack on AGC on several axis designed to destroy the German Group with multiple encirclements close to the front. For the 

goals of the Belorussian offensive see David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein, 

translators and editors, Belorussia 1944. The Soviet General Staff Study (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 3-4; and Richard W. Harrison, translator and 

editor, Operation BAGRATION. The Rout of the German Forces in Belorussia. 

Soviet General Staff (West Midlands, England: Helion & Company, Ltd., 2016), 

48. See also Anthony Tucker-Jones, Stalin’s Revenge. Operation Bagration & 

the Annihilation of Army Group Centre (Barnsley, England: Pen and Sword 

Military, 2009) 3-5.

14. Walter S. Dunn, Jr., Soviet Blitzkrieg. The Battle for White Russia, 1944 

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000), 20-23; and Dick, Defeat to 

Victory, 98.

15. Harrison, BAGRATION, Soviet General Staff, 49; and Shtemenko, The 

Soviet General Staff at War, 313.

16. Harrison, 50-51; Glantz and Orenstein, Belorussia. The Soviet General 

Staff Study, 7; and Dick, Defeat to Victory, 97-98. See also Dunn, Soviet Blitzkrieg, 23-24, which identifies six separate breakthroughs by the Soviet attacks. 

Also Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 360-362.

17. Glantz, 362.

18. Dunn, Soviet Blitzkrieg, 28.
134

19. Gerd Niepold. Battle for White Russia. The Destruction of Army Group 

Center, translated by Richard Simpkin (London: Brassey’s Defense Publications, 1987), 15-18; Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat 

in the East (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 

1968), 313-314; and Alex Buchner, The German Defensive Battles on the Russian Front 1944, translated by David Johnston (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 

Ltd., 1995), 146-147.

20. Dunn, Soviet Blitzkrieg, 8; Dick, Defeat to Victory, 94-95; and Tucker-Jones, Stalin’s Revenge, 24-25.

21. Niepold. Battle for White Russia, 14.

22. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 616.

23. Dunn, Soviet Blitzkrieg, 27; Glantz, 357-358; and Niepold. Battle for 

White Russia, 47. Glantz points out that the concealment efforts in troop movements was largest taken up to that point in the war for the Soviets. In 1943, The 

Red Army have moved only one army into reserve, and it was only committed in 

a counterattack role. The rest of the regrouping was within the Fronts. In 1944, 

multiple armies were moved between Fronts as well as numerous separate corps.

24. Dunn, Soviet Blitzkrieg, 27.

25. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 616.

26. Dunn, Soviet Blitzkrieg, 27; Niepold. Battle for White Russia, 47; and 

Glantz, 365.

27. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 313.

28. Glantz and Orenstein, Belorussia. The Soviet General Staff Study, 29.

29. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, Appendix 2, 616.

30. Niepold. Battle for White Russia, 49; Glantz and Orenstein, Belorussia. 

The Soviet General Staff Study, 29 and 57-59; Shtemenko, The Soviet General 

Staff at War, 307-309; and Paul Adair, Hitler’s Greatest Defeat. The Collapse of 

Army Group Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1994), 52.

31. As quoted by Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 362.

32. Glantz, 616-617.

33. Glantz, 617.

34. Glantz, 367.

35. Glantz, 617.

36. Glantz, 617.

37. Glantz, 617.

38. Glantz, 618.

39. Glantz, 618.

40. Glantz, 619.

41. Glantz and Orenstein, Belorussia. The Soviet General Staff Study, 43-44.

42. Glantz and Orenstein, 51-55.

43. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 369.

44. Glantz and Orenstein, Belorussia. The Soviet General Staff Study, 56-64.

45. Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, A Soldier’s Duty

(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970, 1980 [English translation, 1985]), 237.

46. Dunn, Soviet Blitzkrieg, 28-29; and Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 314.
135

47. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 306-307.

48. Dunn, Soviet Blitzkrieg, 27-29.

49. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 306-307.

50. Dunn, Soviet Blitzkrieg, 29-30; and Dick, Defeat to Victory, 99.

51. Dunn, 28.

52. Niepold. Battle for White Russia, 15-24. See also Glantz and Orenstein, 

Belorussia. The Soviet General Staff Study, 64-66; and Dunn, Soviet Blitzkrieg, 

3-5 and 29.

53. Niepold. 57.

54. United States Army Techniques Publication (ATP), Draft, No. 3-13.4, 

Army Military Deception Planning (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department 

of the Army, Dec, 2017), 11.

55. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 314

56. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 370.

57. ATP Draft, No. 3-13.4, Army Military Deception Planning, 14.

137

Chapter 8

Deceive, Divert, and Delay

Operation FORTITUDE in support of D-Day

Scott C. Farquhar

Operation FORTITUDE is an example of a full-spectrum information operation conducted by the Allies in World War Two “[w]ith the 

object of inducing the enemy to make faulty strategic dispositions” in 

support of their victorious campaign in northwest Europe.1

 It was a 

years-long scheme aimed at deceiving the highest levels of the Nazi 

government and continued seamlessly down to confusing the smallest 

German tactical formation. The Allies achieved this with a thorough 

British counter-intelligence effort to deprive and then deceive the Axis 

powers’ intelligence services. The information warfare effort began 

with the Allies using human intelligence via espionage and signals intelligence by collection and decryption of Axis military and diplomatic 

radio traffic. It continued against Axis photo and measurement intelligence and battle-damage assessments with the use of false Allied troop 

deployments, radio transmissions, and an air bombardment to divert 

enemy combat power. The Allies maintained the plan with adherence 

to operational and communications security procedures in contrast to 

Hitler’s failed efforts.

The western Allies agreed to begin their long-awaited campaign to 

invade and liberate northwestern Europe, Operation OVERLORD. Its 

supporting and inherent deception plan was code-named BODYGUARD 

after Churchill’s remark to Stalin at the Tehran Conference that “In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”2

Churchill’s War Cabinet included the Joint Planning Staff, which in 

September 1941 included a committee for military deception called the 

London Controlling Section (LCS). After a period of disorganization, British Army Lieutenant Colonel John Bevan joined and took command of the 

LCS. Bevan recruited talented personalities and meshed deception with 

other nascent intelligence operations, such as the ULTRA code-breaking 

activities at Bletchley Park (BP) and the counter-intelligence system of 

the so-called “Twenty Committee,” (for the Roman numeral XX, meaning “double-cross”).2

 These seemingly ad hoc organizations worked at the 

strategic level and became models of joint, inter-agency, and coalition op-
138

erations (some vestiges of which still exist). The LCS, as a secret organization, assumed responsibility for executing for Operation BODYGUARD.3

Bevan completed the deception plan to support Operation OVERLORD, previously approved on Christmas Day, 1943. Throughout 

1943, the LCS conducted a series of deception operations through the 

existing Anglo-American headquarters, Chief of Staff to the Supreme 

Allied Commander-Designate or COSSAC. Under the rubric of Operation COCKADE, COSSAC developed operational deception maneuvers 

intended to draw German attention, and, hopefully, forces away from 

Allies in the Mediterranean and the Eastern fronts by threatening invasions at other locations, such as France and Norway. Though not fully 

successful in deceiving the Germans, COCKADE served a useful purpose to the LCS and its subordinate elements as opportunities to test and 

practice Allied deception systems while simultaneously provoking and 

measuring the German responses.

Operation COCKADE’s deception operations mirrored the joint, combined, and inter-agency nature of the LCS in their targeting and execution. 

These included demonstrations visible to enemy forces by large naval amphibious flotillas, sometimes with embarked troops and equipment, and 

supporting air forces. Feints in enemy contact accompanied each operation, including air strikes, amphibious or airborne Commando raids, and 

guerrilla attacks by special operations forces. Inherent to each operation 

were fake Allied orders of battle (“phantom units”), false radio traffic, 

and controlled leakage via the “double-cross” agents. The latter measure 

strengthened the spies’ “legends” and, to their German handlers, veracity. The LCS nested strategic diplomatic skullduggery against neutral or 

Axis-allied countries within these operational and tactical deceptions to 

further erode trust in the enemy camp.4

In an inverse of the British, and later Allied, intelligence skills, the 

Germans started the war strongly and then declined in diplomatic, espionage, and communications intelligence capabilities. Despite being a 

military dictatorship, the Nazis exhibited poor communications and operational security and spent their counter-intelligence energies on rooting 

out political dissent or hunting down racial and ideological foes. Also, in 

contrast to the eventually streamlined and efficient system under LCS, the 

Germans had two separate strategic intelligence organizations. The first 

was the national military intelligence service, the Abwehr, established to 

gather military and diplomatic information, including code-breaking and 

exploitation. The second was the Nazi Party’s sinister security apparatus, 

the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA). These were in continual ideologi-
139

cal and bureaucratic conflict until the RHSA absorbed the Abwehr in early 

1944. This disastrous “hostile takeover” did nothing to improve German 

intelligence capabilities against Operation BODYGUARD.

Through the LCS, the Allies established a “feedback-loop” to the 

Abwehr by means of “turned” spies and decrypted communications. The 

British security services captured every German spy on the British Isles 

in the first months of the war and successfully hid their efforts from the 

Abwehr. These spies “turned” (or “doubled”) on their former masters and 

reported tailor-made intelligence to their handlers. The LCS, some of 

whose senior members were novelists and playwrights, wrote a complex 

script of fact and fiction to mislead the Germans while BP’s ULTRA operation monitored the audience’s reaction. The German agents under LCS 

control recruited rings of other spies, all fictitious, to carefully feed more 

and more information to the Abwehr. This fictitious network allowed the 

LCS a twofold advantage; it demonstrated that there were no unknown 

German agents in their midst and it obviated the need for the Abwehr to 

send reinforcements. The Abwehr transmitted their intelligence requirements to their agents, providing an intelligence coup for the LCS, as it 

announced clearly what its customer, the German High Command (OberKommando de Werhrmacht-OKW), did not and needed to know. The XX 

Committee set about filling this need.5

ETO Chain of Command

Combined Chiefs of Staff

SHAEF Eisenhower (US)

Tedder (UK)

Naval Forces

Ramsay (UK)

Ground Forces

Montgomery (UK)

Air Forces

Leigh-Mallory (UK)

UK

Prime Minister

US

President

VII Corps

Collins (US)

V Corps

Gerow (US)

XXX Corps

Bucknall (UK)

I Corps

Crocker (UK)

UTAH

Beach

UTAH

Beach

OMAHA

Beach

OMAHA

Beach

GOLD

Beach

GOLD

Beach

JUNO

Beach

JUNO

Beach

SWORD

Beach

SWORD

Beach

RAF Bomber

Command

Harris (UK)

USAAF 8th AF

Doolittle (US)

Allied Strategic Air Forces Bletchley Park

(BP)

R-Force

Ops ‘B’

“XX Committee”

1st Army

Bradley (US)

2nd Army

Dempsey (UK)

London

Controlling

Station (LCS)

Figure 8.1. ETO Chain of command. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
140

Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery arrived in England just after 

Christmas 1943 and were briefed by COSSAC on the existing Operation 

OVERLORD plan. It was complex, involving a cross-channel amphibious 

invasion of northern France, but characteristically limited, almost timid, 

owing to its half-hearted origins. The weak operational maneuver plan 

was fortunately backed by an adequate deception operation created by the 

practiced staff of the LCS and COSSAC. Eisenhower and Montgomery 

immediately set to improving on both.6

General Eisenhower’s headquarters, now designated Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), evolved from a planning 

staff to one capable of conducting a campaign. General Montgomery, 

now commanding 21st Army Group, the combined land force headquarters for OVERLORD, strengthened the invasion force and refined its 

assault and lodgment areas. Both required extensive modifications to 

their supporting deception operations. COSSAC conducted the various 

COCKADE deceptions throughout 1943 under its G-3 Operations “B” 

Department staff, called Ops (B). British Army Colonel Noel Wild, who 

was another experienced protégé of the Mediterranean theater’s deception chief, the brilliant and eccentric Brigadier Dudley Clarke, and who 

had been in charge of Montgomery’s deception plan at Al Alamein, took 

over Ops (B) concurrent with Eisenhower’s assumption of command.7

Colonel Wild was now responsible for OVERLORD’s theater-level 

deceptions. General Montgomery retained Wild’s peer, Colonel David 

Strangeways, as his deception chief at 21st Army Group.8

The LCS measured the German intelligence-gathering capabilities 

throughout 1943 in anticipation of Operation OVERLORD. Through 

ULTRA and battle-damage assessment against the Abwehr spying effort, the LCS correctly deduced that the Germans had only two sources 

with which to collect information out of physical contact with the Allies: 

spies and radio interception. The first was controlled by XX Committee 

and the other was carefully managed by SHAEF’s Ops (B). Photo-reconnaissance by Luftwaffe overflights of the UK were rare and obviated the 

need for extensive physical deception, such as dummy vehicles. Allied 

control of the air domain resulted in an imagery “black hole” in the Dover region. This allowed the LCS to control the information domain by 

causing the Abwehr to urgently request intelligence from its agents.

Deceive

Colonel Wild set out to fulfill BODYGUARD’s stratagem, targeted 

at OKW, with one nested within General Montgomery’s operational ma-
141

neuver plan, Operation NEPTUNE, the airborne/amphibious cross-channel attack. This deception plan, also inherited from COSSAC, was named 

Operation FORTITUDE in February 1944. Colonel Wild and Ops (B) set 

about to obscure the thrust of the Allies’ assault from Eisenhower’s opposing HQ, Oberbefehlshaber West (OB-West; “Supreme Commander, Western Theater”) under Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt. SHAEF’s 

staff estimated that Montgomery’s forces required fourteen days (until 

D+14) to establish a beachhead with enough forces to begin offensive operations. Operation FORTITUDE intended to create this time and space by 

preventing German forces from massing against it.

In contrast to COCKADE, which tried unsuccessfully to convince the 

Germans of an impending cross-channel attack in 1943, FORTITUDE 

sought to portray the Anglo-American force staging in the UK as unready 

to invade until mid-summer 1944. The Allied deception was two-fold, 

gaining space by portraying a main and supporting effort and buying time 

with the former occurring forty-five days after the latter. ULTRA intercepts revealed that the Germans believed that a lack of amphibious shipping and poorly-trained American forces arriving in England were delaying the invasion; both estimates were correct. A shortage of invasion craft, 

particularly LSTs, combined with General Montgomery’s doubling of the 

XXXX

BR. BOMB. COM.

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21st Panzer Div

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Allied Invasion Force

and German Dispositions

6 June 1944 0 20 40 60 80 Miles

FORTITUDE South

1 Army Group

2 Army (3rd US, 1st Cdn)

8 Corps HQs

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Figure 8.2. Allied invasion force and German disposition, June 1944. Graphic 

created by CSI Press staff.
142

size of NEPTUNE forces and a lack of training areas postponed D-Day by 

a month, from May to June. Emphasizing these actual challenges assisted 

the FORTITUDE scheme.9

Building on Operation COCKADE’s various geographically disbursed schemes, FORTITUDE attempted to deceive, divert, and delay 

German forces defending Normandy. An enormous task across a huge 

front, the Allies’ deception plan began to mirror Germany’s widespread 

defenses from Norway to Spain. Just as OB-West contained subordinate 

headquarters and coastal fortifications, SHAEF’s Operation FORTITUDE 

created false headquarters, units, depots, and airfields across the UK while 

simultaneously concentrating its actual combat power opposite Normandy in southwest England. German dispositions in northwest France, with 

the bulk of their forces near the Pas-de-Calais, which OKW and OB-West

staffs deemed the most likely and most dangerous courses of action, aided 

SHAEF efforts immeasurably. The Pas-de-Calais is the narrowest point 

in the English Channel and allowed rapid transit of amphibious shipping, 

afforded the densest air cover, held several excellent ports, and, crucially, 

provided the shortest distance to the heart of Germany.10

The Germans, under Rundstedt’s OB-West, arrayed their forces in 

France in two field armies, Heeresgruppe B, under Generalfeldmarschall 

Erwin Rommel, and Heeresgruppe G, under Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz. Rommel was responsible for the defenses of all of northern France 

(the channel coast) while Blaskowitz had a portion of the Atlantic (the Bay 

of Biscay) and all of France’s Mediterranean coast. Rommel divided his 

army group into Fifteenth Armee along the Pas-de-Calais region and Seventh Armee defending Normandy and Brittany. Using sound military logic 

and pattern analysis, Rommel placed the majority of his forces, about eighteen divisions, under Fifteenth Armee north of the Seine River in the Pas-deCalais, while allocating only five divisions to Seventh Armee in Normandy.11

These were “700-series” “fortress divisions” manning fortifications along 

the coast reinforced by a dozen high-quality “300-series” infantry divisions, 

only one of which garrisoned Normandy. Rommel’s defense plan fixed these 

forces in place, preventing their reaction to a landing outside their assigned 

sector. German armored divisions comprised the essential element in the 

race to build up forces into and against the beachhead. Of the six available in 

northern France, Rommel allocated only one to Normandy. He dispersed the 

others across his defensive front, but controlled them through a complicated 

and irrational command system orchestrated by OB-West and, in actuality, Adolf Hitler at OKW in Berlin. FORTITUDE sought to exploit this unwieldy arrangement in order to maximize German confusion and friction.12
143

To shape the German defenses, SHAEF accordingly divided Operation FORTITUDE into two halves, NORTH and SOUTH. The first included the creation of a fictitious field army, the British Fourth Army, headquartered in Scotland. An economy of force in the overall effort, Operation 

FORTITUDE NORTH used few resources, but aimed to convince the Germans of a multi-division amphibious landing, potentially in concert with 

Soviet forces, to seize harbors, airfields, and production facilities in Norway. This deception leveraged existing Allied facilities in Scotland, such 

as the Commando Course, an amphibious operations training area, and the 

Scapa Flow naval base. These actual troops, and those rotating through 

(e.g. US Army Ranger battalions and divisional Ranger companies), used 

false radio traffic to mimic divisions forming and training. SHAEF placed 

commensurate fake marriage announcements, unit athletic team scores, 

and military band concert schedules into British news media and various 

semi-official outlets via newsreels and service publications. These opensource intelligence feeds lacked physical backing, as Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft failed to penetrate British air defense in Scotland.13

Operation FORTITUDE NORTH, building on COCKADE’s sub-plan 

TINDALL, helped to convince the OKW to retain 400,000 German naval, 

air, and ground forces, including twelve divisions, in Norway. These remained throughout Operation OVERLORD and until the end of the war. 

The increasingly-stretched Wehrmacht could not afford this commitment 

while the Allies devoted fewer than 500 men to FORTITUDE NORTH.

Divert

At the level below SHAEF, General Montgomery and Colonel Strangeways worked throughout January 1944 on the revised plan that became 

Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH. The original COSSAC plan intended 

to merely camouflage the build-up of Allied forces in southwest England, 

but Strangeways considered this both unrealistic and insufficient. Instead, 

he developed an information “ju-jitsu” whereby he used the enemy’s intelligence and operational inertia against him.14 Approved in mid-February, 

the scheme was a double of FORTITUDE NORTH that created a credible 

threat to Rommel somewhere other than Normandy by inventing a second 

Allied army group in southern England, a twin of Montgomery’s. Strangeways established an organization called R-Force in 21st Army Group to 

conduct his operational and tactical deceptions similar to what Brigadier 

Clarke’s A-Force accomplished in the Mediterranean Theater.

The Allies, through BP intercepts, knew that German intelligence had 

learned of the existence in England of an American ground headquarters, 
144

the European Theater of Operations, US Army (ETOUSA). This was the 

service component command for the build-up of troops throughout 1943 

and handled training and administration. From this kernel of truth, Strangeways’ R-Force began to populate OB-West’s enemy order of battle by using a cover plan code-named QUICKSILVER. ETOUSA now became a 

fictitious combat organization, the 1st US Army Group (FUSAG). Like 

COSSAC, it had a headquarters near London but awaited its designated 

commander. The quite real and flamboyant Lieutenant General George S. 

Patton, Jr., soon took command of the fictional FUSAG enhancing the 

ruse. The German intelligence services appreciated Patton’s considerable 

abilities displayed in the Mediterranean and considered his previous supernumary status in ETO a poorly-executed deception on the Allies’ part.15

The crux of the problem for General Montgomery was the need to 

achieve tactical surprise for the D-Day landings in Normandy and then shift 

to convincing the Germans that NEPTUNE was only a diversion from the 

real operational objective. Strangeways knew the majority of German defenses were in the Pas-de-Calais; he now developed a series of deceptions 

(what the deceivers called “the story”) to keep those forces diverted there 

prior to and after NEPTUNE. He refined these complicated maneuvers 

into Plans QUICKSILVER I through VI, with each plan sub-divided into 

phases occurring before and after D-Day. The first two plans fed the Germans information of an increasing force that was strong enough to invade 

the Pas-de-Calais in mid-July. On D-Day, once NEPTUNE was underway 

and its scale apparent to the Germans, the QUICKSILVER plans shifted 

to their second phases. The post-D-Day chapters of “the story” portrayed 

NEPTUNE as a diversion intended to draw German mobile forces away 

from the Pas-de-Calais to Normandy, allowing Patton’s FUSAG to land 

behind them for an armored drive into Germany.16

FUSAG and its commanding general gained a combination of real 

and fictitious subordinate units and headquarters in the late winter and into 

spring of 1944. The former were new US and Canadian combat formations 

that completed initial training in North America and debarked in western 

England before assignment to FUSAG. After a bombastic welcome by Patton, these units quietly transferred to Montgomery’s control, leaving behind various administrative clues for the Abwehr.

17 The 1,200 man-strong 

specially-trained and equipped deception troops of Strangeways’ R-Force 

executing QUICKSILVER II, or “the Wireless Transmission Plan,” comprised FUSAG’s only actual assigned units. Alongside engineers building 

dummy camps and vehicle staging areas, there were electronic warfare 

units, the innocuously-named US Army 3103rd Signal Services Battalion 
145

and the British Army No. 5 Wireless Group.18 Throughout the spring of 

1944, these units dispersed teams across southeast England to transmit 

radio traffic portraying division, corps, and army-level headquarters. Initially following a script, they eventually began sending actual, slightly edited messages from Montgomery’s real units, who were restricted to using 

landlines or messengers to minimize their radio transmissions.19

Plans QUICKSILVER III, V, and VI were the naval counterpart of 

QUICKSILVER I and II that created the necessary amphibious fleet to 

transport and supply FUSAG across the Dover-Calais strait. QUICKSILVER III had the by-now familiar components of visual, electronic, and 

movement deception: hundreds of dummy landing craft assembled in six 

locations around Dover broadcasting fake radio traffic and erecting signage 

to direct the phantom corps, divisions, and specialist amphibious troops of 

FUSAG to their staging areas and embarkation points. QUICKSILVER 

V and VI provided activities of an invasion fleet in southeastern England 

by ship traffic, signal lamps, and minesweeping. At night, various Allied 

small craft equipped with radar reflectors, Morse operators, and towing 

a myriad of blinking barges provided visual and electronic signatures to 

German coastal radars and radio intercept stations in the Pas-de-Calais.

The QUICKSILVER activities followed the pattern and pace of 

General Montgomery’s masked NEPTUNE preparations in southwest 

England. Strangeways timed them to appear larger to convince the Germans that FUSAG was the still-building main effort to follow the Normandy landings. The last component of QUICKSILVER, part IV, the air 

plan, was a kinetic combat operation rather than the demonstrations of 

the ground and maritime plans and did the most to divert German attention towards the Pas-de-Calais.

QUICKSILVER IV was a comprehensive air interdiction plan designed to reinforce the entire FORTITUDE deception while simultaneously isolating the Normandy region. Whereas the earlier COCKADE plans 

had failed to bring the Luftwaffe to battle, by spring 1944 the Allies had 

almost achieved air superiority over France, rendering that priority moot. 

Instead QUICKSILVER IV “was a robust, predatory air campaign that 

took real action against militarily significant targets combining both diversionary and deceptive elements into one coordinated operation...with the 

very real presence of aircraft and bombs.”20 Over the protests of the Allied 

bomber commanders, it included a bombardment scheme of increasing intensity leading up to, through, and beyond D-Day. The targets attacked in 

and around the Pas-de-Calais, especially rail and road bridges and railway 

marshalling yards, prevented or delayed the lateral movement of German 
146

forces west to Normandy or the reverse, in keeping with “the story” of 

FORTITUDE SOUTH.21

QUICKSILVER IV comprised almost half of the total Allied bombing effort in the four months prior to D-Day. Planners carefully weighted 

the air forces’ attack and reconnaissance missions to support the FORTITUDE SOUTH diversion, with the Pas-de-Calais and Normandy receiving attention proportional to their portrayal as main and supporting 

efforts (about 4:1 in bombing and 2:1 in photoreconnaissance sorties). 

German battle damage assessments correctly deduced these attacks were 

attempts to isolate their defenses from the interior of France. It also supported the R-Force build-up of phantom troops and shipping in southeast England by staging thousands of real fighter sorties from austere 

airfields in the Dover region, away from their actual bases in the southwest. German radar and radio listening stations in France tracked and 

monitored the aircraft’s ingress and egress routes, confirming the base 

locations. Observation reports via the XX Committee from three false 

spies the Abwehr ordered to surveil the Dover region “corroborated” 

measurement and signals intelligence.22

German dispositions in the first week of June confirm the effectiveness 

of FORTITUDE SOUTH. Their forces remained massed in the Pas-deCalais, heavily engaged in building defenses for the expected mid-summer 

attack, rather than training and rehearsing for an imminent invasion. Rommel had dispersed the feared armored divisions well back from the coast, 

where a lack of fuel and the absence of counterattack orders prevented effective reconnaissance or rehearsals. In a final example of the asymmetry 

of intelligence, the Allies’ weather forecast accurately predicted a storm in 

the channel with a small break beginning on 6 June. The Germans had lost 

their north Atlantic weather stations and could only visualize the beginning of a week-long gale. Consequently, Rommel took leave in Germany 

and the commanders and staffs of the Normandy-based army, corps, and 

divisions took advantage of the suspected lull to conduct a map exercise 

in eastern Brittany on the night of 5-6 June, placing Rommel’s command, 

Heeresgruppe B, at the lowest alert level. Commanders granted troops 

leave and passes to sustain morale prior to the anticipated surge in activity 

before the expected mid-July invasion.23

Cunningly, as NEPTUNE forces reached their point of no return, the 

prized spy of the Abwehr, code-named Alaric Arabel (and GARBO by XX 

Committee), transmitted to Berlin an accurate report on the size, composition, and destination of the invasion. Like the fake observers counting real 

fighter sorties taking off from Dover, this report was of no use as it was too 
147

late for the Germans to react to, but its accuracy and detail solidified his 

bona fides at OKW. This last quality paid huge dividends in maintaining 

the Pas de Calais ruse during the coming weeks.24

Delay—TAXABLE, GLIMMER, and TITANIC

The final steps of the FORTITUDE deception plans confused the German defenses during the NEPTUNE airborne and amphibious landings and 

gained surprise for the Allies while slowing and dispersing the inevitable 

counterattacks. As with FORTITUDE SOUTH, these plans were a low-cost, 

high-payoff mix of real and simulated air, sea, and ground forces that appeared to be the main force directed at the Pas-de-Calais. SHAEF’s Colonel 

Wild and the Ops (B) staff, planned and directed the operations executed by 

the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and a small group of Special Air Service 

(SAS) men. The first two, code-named TAXABLE and GLIMMER, were 

feints by ships and aircraft enhanced by electronic warfare methods in the 

Dover-Calais strait beginning a few hours before D-Day.25

TAXABLE and GLIMMER were closely linked and combined RAF 

special operations aircraft of No. 617 Squadron (the famed “Dambusters”) 

and Royal Navy Volunteer Reservists manning eighteen small harbor patrol craft. The air-sea duo moved at the same speed, but slightly ahead of, 

the NEPTUNE invasion fleet; the boats towing radar-reflecting balloons 

EXECUTOR OPERATION

or PLAN

CONDUIT SENSOR TARGET (EFFECT)

LCS

XX Committee

(COL Bevan, et. al)

BODYGUARD

“the story”

HUMINT/OSINT Agents/spies,

press releases,

media events

Abwehr / RHSA

and OKW

(Deceive)

OPs (B)

(COL Wild)

COCKADE /

FORTITUDE North

Radio transmissions,

demonstrations, raids

EW intercept,

traffic & pattern

analysis,

OB-West

Heeresgruppe B

“Atlantic Wall” units

(Deceive & Divert)

R-Force

(COL Strangeways)

FORTITUDE

South /

QUICKSILVER

TITANIC

GLIMMER &

TAXABLE

Air: bombing, photo

recce

Ground: staging,

rehearsals, dummy

paratroopers

Maritime: ship traffic,

staging,

minesweeping, radar

jamming

Battle Damage

Analysis

EW, Photo recon,

contact reports

Radar, contact

reports

OB-West

Heeresgruppe B

“Atlantic Wall” units

Mobile Reserve

Naval District HQs

(Divert & Delay)

Figure 8.3. Operation chart. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
148

with Lancaster bombers orbiting in a precise racetrack pattern whilst dropping radar-jamming “chaff” (tinfoil strips, similar to tinsel). The skillfully-piloted boats continued the QUICKSILVER III, V, and VI actions of 

false radio and visual signals commensurate with an enormous invasion 

fleet. As dawn neared, the bombers returned to base while the small boats 

laid a smokescreen before dashing towards the main German coastal artillery battery at Cap d’Antifer. The boats then retreated to England, laying 

mines to cover their withdrawal.

GLIMMER was a similar operation using fewer aircraft and ships than 

TAXABLE. German coastal defenses engaged both feints but inflicted no 

losses. The German army, navy, and air defense units in the Pas-de-Calais 

all reported contact with the large force their systems had observed. Commanders rapidly disseminated these false reports up the German chain of 

command from Fifteenth Armee, the naval district, and Luftflotte 3 to OBWest and thence to OKW in Berlin (all monitored by BP), followed with the 

inevitable clarifications and retractions at dawn just as NEPTUNE began.26

Operations TITANIC I through IV mimicked the airborne drops occurring simultaneously in Normandy with another mix of RAF bombers and 

special operations forces. TITANIC I dropped dummy paratroopers inland 

from the Pas-de-Calais “invasion” beaches to simulate an entire Allied airborne division landing in the dark. The dummies (called “Ruperts”) contained pyrotechnic firefight simulators while two SAS teams engaged the 

responding Germans troops to add realism. Subsequent daylight discovery 

of “Ruperts” conflicted with the very real casualties SAS men caused when 

reports of both arrived at the headquarters of Fifteenth Armee.

27

TITANIC II, III, and IV also dropped hundreds of “Ruperts” and 

their fireworks on the eastern, western, and southern flanks of the actual 

Allied airborne and glider landing zones just inland from the Normandy 

beaches. A further two SAS “sticks” parachuted in near Saint-Lô. As in 

the Pas-de-Calais, German reaction forces engaged in an escalating series of firefights, ambushes, and futile searches. The few mobile German 

forces in Normandy received confused reports and orders to attack, halt, 

reverse, and then withdraw, all while suffering casualties as FORTITUDE 

forces targeted them. The mobile regiment that could have reinforced the 

OMAHA and GOLD beach defenses remained far out of place searching for paratroopers until well after those close-run landings had gained a 

foothold ashore. The French Maquis, previously quiescent as part of the 

scheme to lull the Germans while carefully gathering information for the 

Allies, now began long-planned acts of sabotage. With their commanders 

out of place, contradictory reports pouring in, and communication lines 
149

disrupted, German units only managed a slow and fragmented reaction to 

the airborne landings.28

On D-Day, with each passing hour, another Allied infantry battalion 

landed on SWORD, GOLD, JUNO, OMAHA, and UTAH beaches while 

more skidded into the glider landing zones. Armored brigades, artillery 

regiments, and specialist engineer troops soon joined them to defend and 

solidify the beachhead. The Germans launched uncoordinated counterattacks that failed to prevent Montgomery’s forces from getting ashore and 

linking together along a solid, if precarious, front. The defending German 

corps headquarters in Normandy, badly sited in Saint-Lô, could not effectively control its subordinate divisions nor give an accurate report of 

Allied strength to Seventh Armee. Instead, various German headquarters 

began to piecemeal battalions and regiments in different directions, never 

achieving mass on D-Day. QUICKSILVER IV continued to hold the attention of German intelligence towards the Pas-de-Calais by increasing air 

attacks across the operational depth of OVERLORD.29

By D+3, the Germans knew NEPTUNE was not a raid, but remained 

unsure of its size and scope, and OB-West could not afford to be wrong. 

There was only one group of mobile armored forces available, and if committed to Normandy and decisively engaged by the attackers, FUSAG 

might land to their rear between them and the Reich. At this point of maximum need for operational information, punctuated by contradictory and 

confusing reports at OB-West and OKW, agent Alaric Arabel/GARBO reported in again. The spy transmitted an extremely detailed order of battle 

of Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, easily confirmed by Rommel’s HQ 

fighting it in Normandy, with an additional detailed description of Patton’s FUSAG. The latter almost perfectly aligned with the independently 

assembled picture obtained by the radio interception service of the OKW. 

Over the next vital few days, while the Anglo-American-Canadian forces 

clawed out their Normandy lodgment, the spy further refined for Berlin 

the size and disposition of Montgomery’s forces, while reporting on the 

preparations of the eleven divisions and two corps of FUSAG to attack the 

Pas-de-Calais in July. OKW, now possessing what it believed to be superior, all-source intelligence, refused to take the Allied “bait” and denied 

Rommel the release of the armored reserve behind the Pas-de-Calais.30

FORTITUDE continued past the fourteen days required by General Montgomery to build up enough forces to create a break-out from 

Normandy. Through July, the elaborate deception continued, with Alaric 

Arabel/GARBO feeding OKW an explanation of why Patton was transferred from command of FUSAG in Dover to the Third (US) Army in 
150

Normandy, namely to take advantage of the unexpected success of the 

diversionary attack. By August, “the story” changed to portray NEPTUNE as the main effort and the units arriving in Normandy allocated 

away from FUSAG. Newly-created units and headquarters maintained 

the threat of a second attack in the Pas-de-Calais or the Low Countries. 

One by one, Allied aircraft attacked and destroyed German headquarters 

located by ULTRA, forcing commanders to travel by road to give orders 

face-to-face, resulting in many of them succumbing to strafing attacks, 

including Rommel himself.

Operation FORTITUDE succeeded by creating an imaginative plan 

that leveraged the enemy’s weaknesses, prejudices, and predilections. The 

Germans had poor strategic, diplomatic, and economic information-gathering methods, but excellent tactical, particularly signals, intelligence. 

Germany never fully realized its former inadequacies, and came to rely 

on the latter. Britain perceived this weakness and took full advantage. 

Churchill’s war cabinet, and later the Combined Chiefs of Staff, embraced 

deception and integrated it in planning and execution from strategic to 

tactical levels. It vertically nested every aspect of BODYGUARD, FORTITUDE, QUICKSILVER, and TITANIC, but also ensured each could 

stand alone as a successful deception.

The FORTITUDE deceptions are significant and should be studied 

for how they enabled the Anglo-American-Canadian army to invade an 

enemy-occupied continent at far lower cost than planners anticipated. The 

measure of FORTITUDE is that it allowed the Allies to gain a foothold 

and build its firm base through the summer of 1944 without even feeling 

the full weight of the Wehrmacht based in France, thereby preserving combat power for the liberation of Europe.
151

Notes

1. “Plan FORTITUDE,” Headquarters, SHAEF, 23 February, 1944 Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1.

2. Martin J. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill Vol. VII (London: Heinemann, 

1988), 586.

3. ULTRA was the code name for the security classification given to the 

product of code breaking, but describes Allied effort to defeat Germany’s 

Enigma encryption machine. The British Government Codes and Cipher School 

(GC&CS) used modern organization and management at Bletchley Park and allowed the Allies to intercept, decrypt, and analyze German military, diplomatic, 

and commercial radio traffic. In a triumph of operational security and personal 

discipline, ULTRA remained secret until declassified in 1975. See Ronald Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War (NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978).

4. Christopher Andrew, “F.H. Hinsley and the Cambridge moles: two patterns of intelligence recruitment” in Richard Langhorne (ed.), Diplomacy and 

Intelligence during the Second World War: Essays in Honour of F.H. Hinsley

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 22-40; Roger Hesketh, FORTITUDE: The D-Day Deception Campaign (Woodstock, NY: 2000), i-xx. Hesketh 

was a key deception planner; his book is an adapted version of a formerly “most 

secret” after-action review.

5. Hesketh, FORTITUDE, 1-7.

6. Ben Macintyre, Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies (NY: 

Crown Publishing, 2012), 1-6, 21-27.

7. Gordon Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, DC: Office of the 

Chief of Military History, 1950), 1-230; a succinct account is in John Keegan, Six 

Armies at Normandy (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books Ltd., 1982), 21-67.

8. Brigadier Dudley Clarke is the “Godfather” (or “midwife”) of British 

WWII military deception. Clarke codified “Escape & Evasion” and founded 

“A-Force” (which later became the Special Air Service – SAS) as well as the British Commandos (who gave birth to the US Army Rangers). See Thaddeus Holt, 

The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (NY: Scribner 

and Sons, 2004), especially 9-15, and Nicholas Rankin, Churchill’s Wizards: The 

British Genius for Deception, 1914–1945 (London: Faber and Faber, 2008).

9. Hesketh, FORTITUDE, 24-35.

10. “Plan FORTITUDE,” Headquarters, SHAEF, 23 February, 1944; F.H. 

Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. III, Part II, (London: 

HMSO, 1988), 3-39.

11. This is also a case of “mirror-imaging” where the Germans reversed 

their nascent 1940 plan (Operation Sealion) to invade England across the 

Calais-Dover strait into an enemy COA. The Germans were also absent any 

amphibious doctrine or experience and had little appreciation of the knowledge 

gained by the Allies in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters.
152

12. The western Allies had assaulted directly into ports in Norway (Op. 

WILFRED), Dieppe (Op. JUBILEE), and North Africa (Op. TORCH). Only in 

Sicily and Italy had the Allies conducted over-the-shore beach landings.

13. Richard Hargreaves, The Germans in Normandy, (Mechanicsville, PA: 

Stackpole, 2006), 20-32; J.E. & H.W. Kaufmann, Fortress Third Reich: German 

Fortifications and Defense Systems in World War II, (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2003), 302-320.

14. “Plan FORTITUDE,” Headquarters, SHAEF, 23 February, 1944; Hesketh, FORTITUDE, 155-173.

15. Hesketh, 34-35.

16. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 350-351.

17. Hesketh, FORTITUDE, 8-16.

18. This series of stem-winders inspired the iconic opening scene in the 

1970 Hollywood film “Patton.”

19. Americans used trained troops portraying HQ signal personnel while the 

British economized by using a single truck equipped with numerous transmitters 

and an automated “player piano”-type device. As noted, messages and codes used 

were those of 21st Army Group. Continually using a code increases the chances for 

enemy EW assets to collect and break it; Colonel Strangeways successfully argued 

that it was worth the risk for his realistic deception. Jonathan Gawne, Ghosts of the 

ETO: American Tactical Deception Units in the European Theater (Haverton, PA: 

Casemate, 2014), 185-186; Hastings, OVERLORD, 63; Hesketh, FORTITUDE, 

36-37.

20. FORTITUDE was so important that two compartmented security procedures were modified; QUICKSILVER radio deceivers and BP code-breakers 

were briefed on NEPTUNE (classification “BIGOT”) and SHAEF planners on 

ULTRA to provide fidelity and alacrity in their respective roles. Hastings, The 

Secret War, 480-483.

21. Eric D. Hresko, “QUICKSILVER IV: The Real Operation Fortitude” 

(School Of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force 

Base, AL, 2010), vi, 23.

22. Hastings, OVERLORD, 42-43.

23. Hresko, QUICKSILVER IV, 33-36; Hesketh, FORTITUDE, 118-122; 

Robert Kershaw, D-Day: Piercing the Atlantic Wall (London: Ian Allan Publishing, 2008), 38-41.

24. Kershaw, D-Day, 20-41.

25. GARBO’s report was horribly bungled by the Abwehr-cum-RHSA but 

eventually passed to OKW and, eventually, Adolf Hitler. The spy, a Spanish volunteer named Juan Pujol, received both a German Iron Cross and British Knighthood 

for his actions. Hesketh, FORTITUDE, 212, 274; Holt, The Deceivers, 665.

26. Holt, The Deceivers, 578–579.

27. There was another small naval-only deception similar to TAXABLE/

GLIMMER named BIGDRUM on the western flank of UTAH Beach to distract 

the coastal defenses around Cherbourg.
153

28. The SAS troops also operated loudspeakers playing sounds of gunfire 

and shouted orders recorded during training exercises. The men eventually 

linked up with Allied troops, though several were captured and executed. Mary 

Barbier, D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion, 

(Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007), 112.

29. The commanding general of one German division was killed in an ambush racing back to his command post from the map exercise, another delayed 

until noon; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 293-300; Kershaw, D-Day, 80-94.

30. Hresko, QUICKSILVER IV, 38-52.

31. Kershaw, D-Day, 190-201, 237; Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944: 

German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness, (Winnipeg, Canada: J.J. Federowicz Publishing, Inc., 2000), 304-392.

155

Chapter 9

Chinese Deception and the 1950 Intervention in the Korean War

Joseph G.D. Babb

This chapter outlines the key strategic, operational, and tactical issues involved in the “deceptive” introduction of the Chinese People’s 

Volunteers (CPV), into the conflict on the Korean Peninsula in October and November of 1950. This analysis addresses several key issues 

beginning at the strategic level with how Washington missed the signs 

that Mao Tse-tung’s (Mao Zedong’s) People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

would come to the aid of its Communist ally. This oversight is all the 

more troubling given that the Central Intelligence Agency had already 

“raised alarms” in June and the Chinese passed specific warnings to 

Washington through Indian diplomatic sources as early as September.1

The Chinese strategic deception is best characterized as taking advantage of the effects of the Magruder Principle.2

 The senior leadership of 

the United States believed the People’s Republic of China, in the process 

of consolidating political power and still conducted military opeations 

against remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s (Jiang Jieshi’s) Nationalist forces, were in no position to support their Korean allies with a large-scale 

military intervention. The Chinese leadership successfully reinforced 

this false estimate of Chinese capabilities.

The deception at the operational level was centered around the deployment of hundreds of thousands of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

troops, their equipment, and logistics support from all over eastern China 

to Manchuria and along the Korean border. More significantly, China’s 

military forces then covertly infiltrated multiple armies (corps-level formations) across the Yalu River in October and November of 1950. General 

Douglas MacArthur and the Eighth Army staff continued to believe, even 

after the initial devastating attacks in late October, that this was a only a 

warning and not the intial phase of a massive, broad front, multi-army 

attack that actually occurred about a month later.

For the deception at the tactical level, the Chinese used well-practiced techniques of night marches, daytime concealment, and avoidance 

of ground and air reconnaissance assets to fool the meager and inadequate 

intelligence collection means of the United Nations Command (UNC). 

Forward elements of both United States and Republic of Korea units approaching the Yalu failed to discern and properly react to the first Chinese 
156

assault. These forces, under orders from MacArthur, continued to attack 

toward the Yalu and were again caught by surprise with the massive late 

Novermber assault. S.L.A. Marshall declares in his book, The River and 

the Gauntlet, “There resulted one of the major decisive battles of the present century followed by the longest retreat in Americn history.”3

 This is a 

classic case study in military deception—unexpected in scale and scope—

from strategic to tactical level. This failing is especially troubling when 

fighting a military whose basic tenet of war was unambiguously stated in 

500 BCE—all warfare is based on deception.4

The factors at each level that played into the dramatic success of 

the Chinese intervention, after the earlier surprise of the North Korean 

attack, are complex. In Washington, critical factors included divisive national politics over who “lost China” to the Communists and strategic 

intelligence failures. Considerable ambiguity existed in American policy 

circles regarding the newly established Communist regime in China not 

to mention its relationship to the Soviet Union and North Korea. There 

was certainly hubris in General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters; his 

staff conspicuously overlooked and underestimated the capabilities of 

the newly victorious, battle-hardened Chinese Red Army—a formation 

that had been at war for more than a quarter of a century against an 

American ally, the Chinese Nationalists.

Finally, no one in the Far East or in Washington comprehended the full 

extent the of strategic and operational risk of the Truman Administration’s 

consistent application of austerity measures to the national defense budget. The consequences of a comprehensive unpreparedness of the military 

units in the Asian theater were dire. They were thrown into a conflict their 

leaders had not anticipated. Although there was some foreboding regarding the overall readiness of the Eighth Army in Japan, no one either foresaw or planned to mitigate the unique challenges of fighting an expeditionary war in Asia. The surprise North Korean attack that drove UN forces to 

the southeast corner of the peninsula appeared unstoppable until it wasn’t. 

Likewise, the UN counterattack from Pusan and Inchon to the Yalu that 

brought China into the war was a rout, until it wasn’t.

Setting the Stage—Fool Me Once

In October, 1949, Mao Zedong announced the establishment the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The forces of the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) had defeated the American-supported Nationalist forces led 

by Jiang Jieshi in the rekindled civil war after the Allied defeat of the 

Japanese in 1945. By late 1949, the Nationalists had retreated to the island 
157

of Taiwan. Thereafter, Generalissimo Jiang reconstituted and rearmed the 

Nationalist forces maintaining key garrisons on several outlying island 

groups near the Chinese mainland. However, there was little doubt that 

Mao and the Communists were determined to seize Taiwan, destroy Jiang’s regime, and eliminate these offshore enclaves occupied by the Republic of China (ROC).

On 12 January 1950, the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, 

gave a speech implying both the ROC on Taiwan and the Republic of Korea 

(ROK) were outside of the American defense perimeter in the Asia Pacific 

area.5

 In late January and early February, Mao and his Foreign Minister, 

Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai), travelled to Moscow to meet with Stalin. On 14 

February the partners signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual 

Assistance.6 In early March of the previous year, Stalin and Kim Il-sung, the 

newly installed leader of North Korea, had met to discuss military and economic issues. The three Communist countries slowly but surely built a close 

and supporting relationship inimicable to the United States.

In response to the growing global Communist threat, President Truman directed a joint State-Defense Department committee to re-examine 

US national security strategy in light of changes to the global security environment since 1945. On 14 April 1950, this committee issued A Report 

to the National Security Council–68, better known as NSC-68. In it, the 

United States operationalized the strategy of containment first outlined by 

George F. Kennan in “the Long Telegram.” The document focused on the 

Soviet Union as the primary future threat and Europe as the expected theater of conflict.7

 In light of Acheson’s Press Club speech and the wording 

of NSC-68, Washington appeared to have established a new policy toward 

China and Northeast Asia as a secondary theater. The ambiguity of America’s attitude toward developments in mainland Asia created a strategic 

opportunity for Kim, and for his allies in Moscow and Beijing.8

About two months later, on 25 June 1950, the armed forces of the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), with the acquiescence 

of the Soviet Union and China, attacked south to unite the peninsula under 

Communist rule. As outlined in in T.R. Fehrenbach’s classic account, This 

Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness, the United States was not ready, 

as a nation or as a military, for a major conflict to contain Communism, 

especially in Asia. The vast majority of America’s ground units in the theater had spent most of the postwar period conducting occupation duties 

in Japan. These units were under-strength, poorly equipped, and in small 

garrisons with few training opportunities for large-scale exercises, due to 

the lack of maneuver areas in occupied Japan.
158

Four Army divisions and one regiment constituted the occupation 

force in Japan and Okinawa. The American units (a corps and two divisions) that had occupied Korea south of the 38th parallel in September 

of 1945 had all been withdrawn by June 1949. Not expecting an outright 

invasion of its ROK ally, the United States military only had about 500 

American personnel in-country. These personnel were part of the Korea 

Military Advisory Group (KMAG) advising and assisting the ROK in 

its ongoing counterinsurgency campaign.9

 The total size of the entire 

United States Army worldwide in June of 1950 was 591,000 with just 

ten combat divisions.10

In contrast, when North Korea attacked on 25 June 1950, Mao Zedong had already established the robust Northeast Border Defense Army. 

By July the PLA began transferring four additional armies (PLA armies 

equated to a US corps in terms of combat strength) to Manchuria and the 

border. This movement was conducted virtually out of sight of American 

intelligence collection assets in keeping with the Red Army’s long-practiced methods of clandestine movement of large formations. Mao also 

ordered intelligence personnel and observers to North Korea. In August 

and September, as the North Korean offensive at first succeeded and then 

rolled back as the UN forces counterattacked, two additional Chinese 

army groups (armies) with six more armies (corps) plus artillery and anti-aircraft artillery units began to move to the area.11 The Chinese intelligence assets on the ground in North Korea observing the retreat were 

aware of the general disposition of the attacking forces and the potential 

gaps forming between major elements, especially where the weaker ROK 

Army formations were deployed.

A key question, both at the time and today is, how could this have 

happened without American strategic intelligence capabilities detecting 

the movement? Jiang’s ROC was still at war with the PRC. His human 

intelligence sources would certainly have passed this information on to 

the United States. In early July, General Douglas MacArthur, without the 

permission of President Harry S. Truman, visited Taiwan to consult with 

Jiang and some of his senior officers. Jiang offered Nationalist troops to 

fight in Korea, but when Truman learned of the offer, he politely refused 

it, fearing it would provide a justification for Chinese intervention. He did, 

however, order the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. Mao and the Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP) leadership interpreted this act as a sign of a US 

shift to a broader anti-PRC strategy and a sign the US wished to play larger 

role in the defense of Taiwan.12 Strategically, the potential for Truman’s 

moves to be misinterpreted or misunderstood by Mao, and the scope of 
159

the emerging conflict based on such a misunderstanding were ignored by 

key decisionmakers and planners from the beginning, in both Washington 

and in the Far East.

Once a credible Chinese high government official warned the Truman 

Administration not to cross the 38th parallel, the failure to focus strategic 

intelligence collection assets to detect further movement and the disposition of those forces already deployed to the border posed an even larger 

problem. How did MacArthur’s Far East Command (FECOM) miss hundreds of thousands of troops and supporting equipment being moved to 

an area adjacent to the DPRK? FECOM either lacked or did not properly 

task the strategic collection assets available. Historian Christian Heller argues there was a systemic problem in the FECOM intelligence community 

in “manning and skill sets, erroneous target prioritization, and failure to 

integrate tactical intelligence into strategic analysis.”13 Given the information available, the belief that the Chinese would not enter the conflict became difficult to justify and defend, both then or now. By early July 1950, 

UN forces no longer doubted the success of the attacking divisions of the 

North Korea army. The attack completely surprised Washington, the ROK 

leadership and its supporting KMAG advisors both in its scale and timing. 

Within 48 hours of the North Korean invasion President Harry S. Truman ordered American air and naval assets into the fight. On 1 July, under 

the overall command of General MacArthur, who had been designated to 

lead United Nations Command (UNC), elements of the US 24th Infantry 

Division left Japan to deploy to Korea. By 5 July, the division’s ill-fated 

Task Force Smith engaged in a bitter, but ineffective defense against North 

Figure 9.1. Members of the 24th Division’s Task Force Smith Deploying to Korea.
160

Korean Army (KPA) forces south of Seoul, the national capital. For the 

next month Republic of Korea (ROK) and the American-led UNC forces 

received steady reinforcments from Japan, Okinawa, Hawaii, and the US 

mainland. Lieutenant General Walton Walker’s Eighth Army conducted 

a fighting retreat back to the Pusan Perimeter in the far southeast corner 

of the country. By early September, the Eighth US Army, with significant support from allied airpower, was holding its own. Elements of four 

US Army divisions (1st Cavalry, 2nd, 24th, and 25th Infantry) and one 

Marine division now contributed to the defensive effort. On 15 September, MacArthur ordered Walker to prepare for a counterattack from Pusan 

while X Corps with two divisions conducted an amphibious landing at 

Inchon near Seoul. 

On 25 September 1950, the X US Corps consisting of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division successfully established a 

beachhead at Inchon and moved inland to cut the North Korean line of 

communication near Seoul. They quickly secured the capital and elements of the 7th Division linked-up with Eighth Army units from the PuSea of

Japan

Kunsan

Taejon

Ch’ǒnan

Taegu

P’yǒngtaek

P’ohang

Chochiwon

Yǒngdǒk

Samch’ǒk

N

Elevation 500m

Elevation 1,000m South Korea Elevation over 1,000m



 













Makp’o

Osan

Seoul



Kimp’o

Inch’ǒn

Puch’ǒn

25 Sep

15 Sep

21 Sep 26 Sep

Pusan

Masan





15 Sep

XX

ROK Mar.

28 Sep

XX

ROK Mar. (Fleet)

Naval Demonstration 

XXXX

WALKER

EIGHTH

XX

1

 

Yellow Sea









Pyongyong

Kyǒgju

Pusan







Masan

Taegu

Kǒch’ang

Chinju

Yǒngch’ǒn

 Waegwan

XX

1

XX

ROK 1

(Operational

25 Sep)

XXX

IX

XX

2

XX

ROK 6

XXX

1

XXXX

WALKER

EIGHTH

XXX

II ROK

{ }

Elements of 1st CAV

Div linked up with 7th

IN Div 2345 hrs 26 Sep



XX

1 Mar. XXX

X

X Corps conducted

amphibious assault

15 Sep

XX

ROK Mar.

Situation 26 September 1950 and

Operations Since 15 September

0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

26 Sep

2 Sep

23 Sep

US Kyǒngju

XX

ROK Mar. (Fleet)

XX

7

XX

25

XX

24 (Res.)



XXX

ROK I

XX

ROK 8

XX

ROK Cap

XX

ROK 7

X

U.K. 27

Figure 9.2. Situation 28 September 1950 and Operations Since 15 September. 

Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
161

san perimeter on 27 September.14 This two-pronged offensive decisively 

blunted, and then reversed, the DPRK invasion. MacArthur was now 

determined to continue the offensive and complete the destruction of the 

North Korean forces. On 27 September the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff authorized MacArthur to continue the attack north of the 38th 

Parallel, but with caveats. This was followed on 29 September with approval by Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall. President Truman, 

however, demanded that the offensive could only continue if there was 

no Soviet or Chinese intervention, out of a desire to avoid any military 

confrontation with either of those two nations.15

MacArthur planned to have the Eighth Army pass through X Corps and 

continue up the western side of the Korean Peninsula toward Pyongyang. 

He also wanted to re-insert X Corps in a second amphibious assault on the 

east coast. However, the collapse of the KPA and the UN advance across the 

width of the peninsula was so rapid, X Corps entered the North Korean port 

of Wonson already in the hands of ROK forces. MacArthur’s plan was for 

the UNC to get to the Yalu River as soon as possible. Within weeks of merely hanging on in the face of a concerted effort by the KPA to push the the 

defending forces off the peninsula, UN forces were now poised to complete 

the destruction of those same forces.

As early as 30 September, ROK units had crossed crossed into North 

Korea. The US 1st Cavalry Division, the leading element of Eighth Army, 

remained north of Seoul prepared to continue the offensive when ordered. 

On 3 October, MacArthur officially announced that forces of the UNC 

had crossed had crossed the 38th parallel. ROK President Syngman Rhee 

“said that he did not expect the UN forces to stop at the 38th Parallel, but 

if they did, he continued ‘we will not allow ourselves to stop.’ And stop the 

ROK troops did not.”16 In his outstanding analysis of the conflict from the 

tactical to the strategic level, David Halberstam argues, “On the American 

side, the decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and head north was in 

a way a decision that made itself.”17 For MacArthur and his UN forces, the 

die had already been cast. The offensive to reunite the Korea Peninsula had 

become irresistible. However, Mao’s commitment to oppose a UN drive 

north of the 38th Parallel and the destruction of his North Korean ally was 

just as powerful. By late September, moving at night and by forced marches, more than 250,000 Chinese troops had assembled on the north side of 

the Yalu River while more were moved into the area.18 The true extent of 

this massive build up was masked by the ingrained deceptive practices 

of the PLA now called the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) under the 

command of Chinese Marshal Peng Dehuai.
162

On 7 October, elements the Eighth Army’s vanguard, the 8th Cavalry Regiment, led the US 1st Cavalry Division into North Korea. Its advance had been proceeded by numerous ROK units across the the width 

of the peninsula.19 In early October, the military defeat of Kim Il-Sung’s 

forces appeared to be a foregone conclusion. Only a massive third-party 

intervention could stop the UN offensive. Nevertheless, the extent of the 

operational movement of China’s forces was not known and MacArthur 

remained convinced the Chinese would not intervene.

“On 15 October, five and a half years into his presidency Harry Truman finally met Douglas MacArthur. By that time, MacArthur’s troops 

were racing toward the Yalu, and Chinese troops were four days from 

crossing the river and heading south.”20 In this controversial meeting with 

Truman on Wake Island, when asked by the President about the chances 

of Chinese or Soviet interventions, “MacArthur answered, ‘Had they intervened in the first or second month, it would have been decisive. We are 

no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. 

The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria.’ Of these only 100,000 to 

125,000 were situated along the Yalu, and only 50,000 or 60,000 could 

have gotten across.”21 His numbers were off by two-thirds. MacArthur, the 

architect of the brilliant victory at Inchon, now led his forces to disaster 

in an unanticipated major confrontation with China’s huge land army. For 

this endeavor he had Truman’s qualified blessing.

Setting the Trap—Fool Me Twice

About two weeks earlier, on 2 October, the Indian government had 

passed on to the UN in New York a warning that they had received through 

their ambassador in Beijing from the Chinese foreign minister, Zhou Enlai. During China’s war with Japan (1937-1945), Zhou had been Mao’s 

liaison to the Nationalists and their US advisors in Chongqing. During this 

time, and for over a year after the Japanese surrender, he was well known 

to, and had worked closely with, General George C. Marshall. Zhou’s 

message was unambiguous—if UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel and 

invaded North Korea, China would have to respond to protect itself and its 

ally. Yet, by mid-October, UN forces had not only crossed the 38th Parallel, they had taken Pyongyang, and were at or near the Yalu. This was an 

indication that the Chinese were not going to intervene. This played into 

China’s deception and MacArthur’s perception and predisposition. Their 

inability to act thus far suggested that they did not intend to do so.

The Chinese Communists had prepared for this possibility even before Kim Il-sung had begun his invasion. In late October of 1950 when 
163

UN forces reached the Yalu, 24 Chinese divisions out of a planned 39 

had already deployed to the China-North Korea border.22 More than “a 

study in unpreparedness,” FECOM’s willful self-deception stands as the 

archetype of strategic and operational negligence. General MacArthur, 

supported by his long-serving and devoted intelligence officer (G-2), 

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, had assured President Truman 

that the Chinese would not enter the conflict in strength, if at all. He 

went on to speculate that what forces they might put into the fight would 

be too little, too late. MacArthur and his headquarters staff continued to 

plan and conduct operations under these untested assumptions. To further hamper a full appreciation of the danger, MacArthur’s forces pushed 

forward too rapidly to fully implement proper security precautions or 

intelligence collection practices.23

Figure 9.3. Situation 28 October 1950 and Operations Since 7 October. Graphic 

created by CSI Press Staff.

,

Ch’unch’on

N

North Korea



14 Oct

XX

ROK CAP

14 Oct 7 Oct

XXX

X

38th Parallel

Boundary between

Eighth Army and

X Corps effective

24 Oct

Situation 26 October 1950 and

Operations Since 7 October

0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

Sojoson

Bay









C  horwon



Pyonggang

Sariwon





Wonsan

Yangyang

Iwon

 Hongwŏn



Tokchŏn

 Anju





XX

ROK 3

X

BR 27

X

BR 27

XX

ROK 6

XX

ROK 8

XX

ROK 6

XX

ROK 8

XX

ROK CAP

XX

ROK 1

XX

ROK 8

III

187th Regimental

Combat Team

XX

ROK 6

7 Oct

20 Oct

26 Oct

26 Oct

China

South Korea

20 Oct

Tongjoson

Bay

Chinese

counterattack

25 Oct–6 Nov

Sunchŏn

XX

ROK CAP

Kaesŏng

Pyonggang

Yangdŏk

XX

ROK 3

14 Oct

7 Oct

XX

ROK 6

14 Oct

XX

ROK 7

XX

1

1st Cav Div

XX

XX

US 24

X

BR 27



XX

ROK 8

XX

ROK 7

XX

ROK 1

Seoul

XX

US 24

XX

{ 3

XX

1 Mar.

XX

7

Yongwon

Elevation 500m

Elevation 1,000m

Elevation over 1,000m
164

On 4 October, Marshal Peng Dehuai traveled to Beijing from his post 

in west-central China at Mao’s command. One of China’s “Ten Marshals,” 

Peng owed his rank, the equivalent to the American military’s five stars, to his 

superior service to the Chinese Communist armed forces through decades of 

conflict against the Nationalists and the Japanese. At this critical meeting of 

the Party Central Committee in Beijing, he received command of the PLA’s 

forces designated for service should the need arise. In order to provide a level of deniability regarding direct Chinese involvement, these forces would 

fight collectively under the banner of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV). 

Peng’s understanding of American motives and of Mao’s reasons for providing aid to the DPRK are outlined in Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal, his official 

biography published in English by the Foreign Language Press Beijing:

The US occupation of Korea, separated from China by only 

a river, would threaten Northeast China. Its control of Taiwan posed a threat to Shanghai and East China. The US 

could find a pretext at any time to launch a war of aggression 

against China. The tiger wanted to eat human beings; when 

it would do so would depend on its appetite. No concession could stop it. If the US wanted to invade China, we had 

to resist its aggression. Without going to a test of strength 

with US imperialism to see who was stronger, it would be 

difficult to build socialism. If the US was bent on warring 

against China, it would want a war of quick decision, while 

we would wage a protracted war, it would fight regular warfare, and we would employ the kind of warfare we had used 

against the Japanese invaders.24

Concerned, first and foremost, with protecting his newly-founded 

state, Mao initially committed the PRC to send Peng and a half a million 

men to Korea. His decision, made in secret, received the support of the 

key leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, one of the most 

experienced and competent Chinese generals on either side of the civil 

war and conflict with Japan received orders to defend the nation’s sovereignty, ideology, and future. As Peng’s explanation above indicates, this 

looming confrontation would not be a demonstration or feint to frighten MacArthur, nor would it be a limited, economy of force, engagement. MacArthur’s perceptions and assumptions could not have been 

more wrong. The Magruder Principle of the power of self-deception was 

clearly evident. The race to the Yalu resulting in attenuated supply lines 

and significant gaps on the flanks of the attacking units had left the UNC 

unprepared to move to the defensive. Worse, a northeast Asian winter 
165

rapidly approached adding the threat of poor vehicle mobility and freezing temperatures to that of large-scale combat against the combat-tested troops of the CPV. The Eighth Army and X Corps had unwittingly 

blundered into a trap Peng would soon spring.

By mid-October 1950, UNC advanced units conducting offensive 

operations had reached the Yalu River. Along the way they had captured 

and successfully interrogated not only North Korean soldiers, but also soldiers from the CPV who provided detailed information on the movements 

and pending operations of their units. American units in contact thus possessed solid intelligence indicators of imminent major Chinese involvement. Unfortunately, as the raw reports traveled up the chain of command 

from northern Korea to Willoughby at MacArthur’s headquarters they 

were filtered and generally rendered devoid of meaning. Division- and 

regimental-level staffs on both sides of the Korean peninsula possessed 

unambiguous evidence of the Chinese presence in North Korea. Nevertheless, MacArthur and his staff continued to maintain that there would 

be no significant action by the Chinese and the UN forces should continue 

advancing across a broad front to fully consolidate the gains of the offensive.25 UN units were still attacking when the Chinese hit on 18 October.

In the hour of its defeat, the Eighth Army was a wholly modern force technologically, sprung from a nation which prides 

itself on being as well informed as any of the world’s people.The Chinese Communist Army was a peasant body composed in the main of illiterates. Much of its means for getting 

the word around was highly primitive. In recent centuries, 

Figure 9.4. Chinese soldiers crossing the Yalu River in November 1950.
166

its people had displayed no great skill and less hardihood in 

war. But they matured their battle plan and become the victors on the field of Chongchon because they had a decisive 

superiority in information.26

Russell Spurr’s Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclared War Against 

the US in Korea, 1950-51 provides a detailed account, tactically and operationally, of how the Chinese People’s Volunteeers drove headlong into 

the X Corps in the northeast and Eighth Army in the northwest. In the east 

the Army and Marine divisons of X Corps retreated to a near miraculous 

“Dunkirk” at the port of Hungnam where the US Navy evacuated thousands of UN troops as well as refugees. In the west, Peng’s forces drove 

the Eighth Army south past Pyongyang, and then south of Seoul, in November and December of 1950. The near-complete collapse of UNC was 

a close run possibility. It did not establish a stable defensive line south of 

Seoul until January, 1951, when the first Chinese offensive lost its momentum and reached a culminating point.

Peng’s attacking army, consisting overwhelmingly of semi-literate, 

but hardy peasants, lacking significant air cover, artillery, and armor won 

a campaign of movement, maneuver, and infiltration. The CPV supported Peng’s deception throught the use of superior operational security, an 

unsurpassed ability to conceal its staging areas and movements, and the 

discipline of its massed light infantry. The great underlying flaws of the 

unprepared UN forces, masked in the September rout of the North Korean 

Army, reappeared with a vengeance as gaping holes developed between 

divisions, regiments, and battalions. Flanks were exposed and opened, and 

large-unit cohesion nearly lost.

The innate weaknesses of a dismounted, logistically challenged enemy, allied air power, small unit leadership, a good deal of luck, and the 

heroism of individual soldiers eventually saved the day. Hard-pressed, forward-deployed units of the Eighth Army and X Corps provided the breathing space for the UNC to recover as it conducted a fighting retreat south 

of Seoul. According to Peng’s brief account, to accomplish the defeat of 

the UN forces in October and November, the Chinese conducted five campaigns. Within the larger strategic deception of the Chinese intervention, 

his units conducted a series of operational and tactical offensive actions 

unforeseen and for the most part, undetected by UN forces in the limited 

engagement in October and the major offensive in November.

Marshal Peng Dehuai’s account of what he calls the “First Campaign” 

begins, “At dusk on October 18, 1950 I crossed the Yalu with vanguard 
167

units of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.”27 Within seven days his Fortieth 

Army, one of eleven armies that would cross the Yalu over the next four 

weeks, had achieved a decisive victory against US and ROK units in this 

first action near Bukjin and Unsan.28 The sharp and bloody engagement 

ended abruptly after which the Chinese broke contact and disappeared. 

This confirmed the assumption and fed into the deception that China was 

not conducting a full scale attack, but was merely warning that the UN 

offensive must stop.

“We employed the tactic of purposefully showing ourselves to be 

weak, increasing the arrogance of the enemy, letting him run amok, and 

luring him deep into our areas.”29 MacArthur having already ignored the 

Zhou diplomatic warning, moved into Peng’s trap by ordering the attack 

to the Yalu to continue. Although there were now elements of six Chinese 

armies in North Korea, Peng followed his initial attack with a period of 

seeming inactivity. CPV forces across the Yalu dispersed, went into hiding, 

and attempted to avoid contact with UN forces. Additional Chinese forces, 

traveling only a night, continued to cross at multiple locations along the 

border. They took full advantage of knowing the patterns used by UN air 

and ground reconnaissance flights and patrols to avoid detection. Peng 

assessed the situation and prepared for the next more expansive offensive.

In preparing for the “Second Campaign” Peng acknowledges, “the 

US, British, and puppet [ROK] troops were able to withdraw speedily to 

the Chongchon River and the Kechon Area, where they started to throw 

up defensive works. Our troops did not pursue the enemy because the 

main enemy force had not been destroyed even though we had wiped out 

six or seven battalions of puppet troops and a small number of American 

troops.”30 Another key to the Chinese deception was to attack ROK units 

and avoid the strong American forces. This created not only confusion as 

to the size and strength of CPV forces, but also the seams between units 

the Chinese later exploited as they positioned themselves for an attack 

into the flanks and rear of US forces. Peng’s second campaign began when 

MacArthur launched his offensive on 20 November.

“We sent small units to engage the enemy and to lure him to come 

after these units. It was nearly dusk when the enemy penetrated to the 

Unsan-Kusong line—the place we had planned for our counterattack...

then our main forces swept into the enemy ranks with the strength of an 

avalanche.”31 30 November found the Eighth Army and X Corps fighting 

a desperate withdrawal, retreating south in an attempt to avoid encirclement. Chinese special units infiltrated dressed as ROK forces collecting 

intelligence, attacking logistics units, and creating confusion as to the dis-
168

position of Chinese forces. The CPV armies and divisions consistently 

outmanuevered and outflanked the UN divisions continuously unhinging 

any attempt at a cohesive defense, with casualties and confusion continuing to mount. “The battles along the Ch’ongch’on River were a major 

defeat for Eighth Army and a mortal blow to the hopes of MacArthur and 

others for the re-unification of Korea by force of arms.”32 Peng’s Third 

Campaign consisted of breakout and pursuit operations. He put sufficient 

pressure on the X Corps’ three divisions, the 1st Marine, and the 3rd and 

7th Infantry, to force a retreat. After some very difficult fighting around 

the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, the Marines and the remnants of the 31st 

Regimental Combat Team fell back to the port of Hungnam for evacuation. 

The Chinese main effort against the Eighth Army continued even though it 

was taking significant casualties and outrunning its bare-bones sustainment 

capabilities. The mobility and staying power of the massed Chinese light 

infantry continued to unnerve the defending UN forces. Despite their losses, 

the Eighth Army formed successive defensive lines. According to Peng, “in 

the evening of December 31, 1950, our troops stormed across the 38th Parallel, captured Seoul, and crossed the Hangang River to recover the port of 

Inchon and drive the enemy to the 37th Parallel.”33

Peng fought his “Fourth and Fifth Campaigns” over the next two-and-a 

-half years with over five Chinese field armies. These operations consisted 

of costly and ineffective attacks and counterattacks back and forth across 

the 38th Parallel. The Chinese People’s Volunteers had successfully defeated the UN forces sent north to reunite the peninsula, liberated North 

Korean territory, and protected China’s sovereignty. The surprise of the 

KPA attack in June, and the one-two punch in October and November conducted by the CPV were significantly enabled by American self-deception 

at all levels. Military deception played a vital role in China’s victory over 

UN forces in the ending months of 1950 and led to stalemate, negotiation, 

and a situation on the Korean peninsula that continues today under the 

armistice signed in July 1953. As Sun Tzu cautioned, “Therefore I say: 

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never 

be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your 

chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant of both the enemy and 

of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.”34

Conclusion

American military officers had observed, studied, supplied, trained, 

advised, and fought alongside Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces 

from 1937 until early 1949. Neither force in the Chinese Civil War constituted an unknown. Since the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, US Army units had 
169

maintained a continuous presence in China through 1949. Brigadier General John M. Magruder headed the American Military Mission in China 

beginning in 1941 to coordinate the distribution of Lend Lease aid and to 

advise and assistance in its use. From 1942 through 1945, Generals Joseph 

S. Stilwell and Albert C. Wedemeyer led the mission to organize, train, 

equip, and advise in combat thirty-nine Nationalist Chinese divisions.

After the arrival of General George C. Marshall in November of 

1945, the US Army began planning to train and equip several Chinese 

Communist divisions at the request of Zhou Enlai. American Army officers, among them, Colonel David C. Barrett, had served alongside Mao 

and the Communists with the Dixie Mission in Yenan for more than two 

years beginning in August of 1944 and had reported on their observations. The last general officer advisor to the Chinese Nationalist Army, 

David C. Barr, later commanded the 7th Infantry Division in Korea 

during the conflict. The United States was not fighting an alien enemy or 

ideology. Senior American military leaders were aware of the hardiness, 

courage, and quality of Chinese soldiers when they were well led. The 

Chinese exploited the American penchant for not looking closely at our 

own history and experience.

Two major themes stand out in this analysis of how the United States 

Army was deceived in Korea. The first, and most obvious is hubris, the 

dismissal of the Chinese peasants against the American professionals. 

This was accompanied by the dismissal of the scale and sophistication 

of the potential capabilities of the PLA’s “Korean Volunteers” and their 

generals. The Red Army (after 1949, the PLA) fought the Japanese and a 

decades-long civil war with American allies, the Nationalists. In complex 

campaigns involving units from guerrilla squads to conventional army 

groups of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, the Communists had gained 

valuable experience in the conduct of war.

The second major, and related factor, is willful self deception. Several a priori judgments that the enemy could not or would not attack unduly influenced intelligence assessments and, therefore, operations. This 

occured despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary at all levels 

(strategic warnings, large scale operational movement and manuever, 

and available tactical intelligence). These themes relate directly to Sun 

Tzu’s verities, as noted, and a more modern warning from a noted American military writer, “Concentrated in a tight maneuver mass, guarded 

by an entrenched screen, north of the river, the Chinese Communist 

Army was a phantom which cast no shadow. Its every main secret—its 

strength, its position, and its intentions—had be kept to perfection, and 
170

thereby it was doubly armed.35 Failing to understanding the enemy and 

the tenets of our own doctrine of military deception risk defeat on the 

modern battlefield. The Army’s Field Manual 6-0 offers excellent advice 

on how to replicate Peng’s achievements. In Chapter 11 “Military Deception” the reader is urged to “exploit target biases” in order to force 

him into acting in a way inimical to his own interests. To paraphrase, the 

Chinese offered the targeted decisionmakers (MacArthur and his subordinates) information carefully calculated to reinforce known American 

biases, in a classic example of the Magruder Principle.

In a 2006 visit to the the People’s Liberation Army Museum in Beijing, 

the author was surprised to see a captured US Army regimental flag from 

the Korean War. Displayed among the artifacts that included American 

military equipment from the Korean and Vietnam Wars stand the colors of 

the 31st United States Infantry captured at Changjin in November 1950. 

Figure 9.5. Wet, stinging snow and ice add to the problems of 

a soldier as he carries as much equipment as he can manage 

during the withdrawal from Kot’o-ri to the sea.
171

The presence and status as battlefield trophies in the museum of a former, 

and potentially future enemy should warn today’s military professional, if 

they listen, of the exceptional power of military deception in war. Their 

sad fate highlights the cost of failing to heed such a warning:36

War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province 

of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory 

that it be thoroughly studied.37
172

Notes

 1. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/09/13/catastrophe-on-yalu-americas-intelligence-failure-in-korea. 3-6.

2. See US Army, Field Manual (FM) 90-2, Battlefield Deception (Washington, DC:1988).

It is generally easier to induce an enemy to maintain a pre-existing belief 

than to present notional evidence to change that belief. Thus, it may be more 

useful to examine how an enemy’s existing beliefs can be turned to advantage 

than to attempt to change his beliefs.

3. S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet: Defeat of the Eighth Army 

by the Chinese Communist Forces, November, 1950, in the Battle of the Chongchon River, Korea (Nashville: Battery Press, 1987), 1.

4. Sun Tzu, Samuel B. Griffith, and B. H. Liddell. Hart, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 1971), 67.

5. James I. Mattray “Dean Acheson’s Press Club Speech Re-examined” 

in Journal of Conflict Studies XXII/1, Spring 2002 [https://journals.lib.unb.ca/

index.php/jcs/articles/view/366/578, accessed 11 April 2018]

6. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners: 

Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 

1995), 111.

7. National Security Council Policy Paper 68. Full text available at: https://

www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm. Accessed 30 July 2018.

8. Goncharov, et. al., Uncertain Partners, 101-102.

9. Robert K. Sawyer and Walter G. Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea: 

KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1962). 

This book provides a detailed account of the mission, activities, and personnel 

advising the ROK military. This work would be a valuable resource as a case 

study for the newly formed Security Force Assistance Brigades.

10. James F. Schnabel and Stetson Conn, United States Army in the Korean 

War(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, 1972), 43.

11. Xiaobing Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army (Lexington, KY: 

University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 80-84.

12. Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 127.

13. Korea, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, Deptartment of the Army, 1997), 28-29.

14. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong: North to the Yalu: June-November 1950 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History Dept. of 

the Army, 1961), 536-537 and 594-595.

15. B. C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November 1950-July 1951 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1990), 18.

16. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 614-615

17. David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean 

War (New York: Hyperion Books, 2008), 323.
173

18. John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1993), 248.

19. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 623.

20. Halberstam, The Coldest Winter, 364

21. Halberstam, 367.

22. Toland, In Mortal Combat, 248.

23. https://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/Korean%20

War/Korea13.gif

24. Dehuai Peng, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: The Autobiographical 

Notes of Peng Dehuai (Foreign Languages, 1984), 473.

25. Halberstan, The Coldest Winter, 370-383. This section of the book 

describes in great detail MacArthur’s “professional sins” of “hubris and vanity” 

and how the intelligence coming up from the lower level units on the Chinese 

did indeed exist and was manipulated.

26. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, 1-2.

27. Peng, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal, 474.

28. Peng, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal, 474-475.

29. Peng, 476.

30. Peng, 475.

31. Peng, 476.

32. Korean War Commemorative Brochures,” CMH Publications Catalog 

– The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention, 13, accessed 8 April 2018, https://

history.army.mil/catalog/pubs/19/19-8.html.

33. Peng, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal, 477.

34. Sun Tzu, Griffith, and Hart, The Art of War, 62.

35. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, 1.

36. Korea, 1950 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, Deptartment 

of the Army, 1997), 255.

37. Sun Tzu, Griffith, The Art of War, 63. 

175

Chapter 10

From Maneuvers to War

The Egyptian Deception Plan on the Eve of the Yom-Kippur War

Tal Tovy

On 6 October 1973, the armies of Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel. This was the culmination of a long process of 

preparation on the side of the Arab states which included the planning and 

execution of an elaborate plan of political and military deception, especially on the Egyptian side. The offensive started with a heavy artillery 

bombardment and aerial attacks on Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) force 

concentrations, command and control, and logistics installations. In parallel with the artillery bombardment, thousands of Egyptian soldiers started 

to cross the Suez Canal, with artillery and tanks on the west bank of the 

Canal providing covering fire and pinning down the Israeli soldiers in the 

posts along the Canal. The Egyptian troops circumvented most of the Israeli posts, moving eastward in order to expand the bridgehead. They laid 

down improvised minefields and posted anti-tank ambushes in order to hit 

the Israeli armor, moving toward the Canal.

The Egyptian plan worked perfectly, and the Israeli troops were completely surprised. The IDF was logistically unprepared and the IDF’s 

Southern Command could not put together a complete picture of the front, 

especially concerning the size and composition of the Egyptian forces and 

the location of the crossing points. Israeli tank formations moving toward 

the canal had to split apart because of the heavy artillery fire and sustained serious losses to the Egyptian tank-hunter teams. Thus, the Egyptian army prevented the Israeli armored forces from taking their prepared 

posts, supporting the military firebases along the Canal, and repelling the 

attack. Air defense units, operating from the western bank of the Canal, 

inflicted heavy damage on the attacking Israeli Air Force (IAF), effectively preventing it from supporting the Israeli ground forces by attacking the 

Egyptian invading force and destroying the bridges built by the Egyptians 

across the Canal. Thus, Egypt successfully neutralized the same force 

components of the IDF that had inflicted a humiliating defeat on Egypt in 

the Six-Day War.

The Golan Heights front also saw a massive Israeli surprise. Although, 

in the weeks leading to 6 October, the Israeli forces in the Golan Heights 

were put in a state of high alert, the Israeli expectation was that Syria 
176

would conduct a limited operation, which would last less than one day. 

Either way, the simultaneous offensive by Egypt and Syria caught the IDF 

unprepared, and thus the first days of the war were extremely costly in 

terms of Israeli casualties. This inflicted a national trauma which had a 

decisive influence on the IDF force building in the following decades, and 

remains an open wound in the Israeli national memory.

This chapter will analyze three main issues. The first one will try to 

explain why Egypt needed such an elaborate deception plan. It is a common aspiration to gain a strategic advantage by disrupting the surprised 

enemy’s equilibrium, causing them to make erroneous military decisions, 

stemming from its shock and surprise and inability to grasp the entire 

scenario. In other words, to surprise the IDF and catch them unprepared, 

in order to attain the goals of the war. The second part will dissect the 

Egyptian approach to deception, while the third part will analyze how the 

Egyptian deception plan was based on the understanding of the Israeli 

security policy, and how the Egyptian plan worked in order to strengthen 

the Israeli belief that Egypt was incapable of starting a war. Therefore, the 

assessment of the Egyptian deception plan will be based on evaluating the 

Israeli intelligence picture before the start of the war.

The emphasis in this chapter will be the analysis of the Egyptian deception plan, because the Egyptian army had to cross an artificial water 

obstacle (the Suez Canal), at which point its forces would be extremely 

vulnerable. Additionally, the crossing of the Canal required meticulous 

preparations, such as accumulating and deploying the equipment needed 

for the crossing and training the units for the coming war. Thus, there was 

a critical need to disguise the preparations, the training and the deployment of the equipment in the staging areas.

Conversely, it is difficult to learn about the Syrian plan of deception 

because, unlike Egypt, where senior generals and politicians have written 

their memoirs after the war, no such books have been written in Syria. 

Additionally, Syrian archives are not open to researchers. However, there 

is no doubt that the Syrian deception plan was not as sophisticated as the 

Egyptian plan. It is obvious in retrospect that the Syrian army succeeded 

in maintaining strict compartmentalization so that the Syrian commanders 

only found out on the morning of 6 October that they would be going to 

war on the same day.

Unlike the Egyptian front, the Syrians had deployed their army within 

hundreds of meters to several kilometers from the IDF. The tense operational situation between the two armies reached its peak in the aerial bat-
177

tle, which took place on 13 September 1973, in which the IAF shot down 

twelve Syrian MiGs, with only one loss. This incident and the resulting 

closeness between the two armies was the main reason that the Syrian 

army only had to make minimal preparations in order to launch a sweeping 

surprise attack. Additionally, the Syrian army contained regular troops, on 

alert throughout the year. Thus the Syrian army could move from a defensive to an offensive deployment within a very short time, with hardly any 

Mitla Pass

Rumani

Bir Gifgafa

Bir Gidy

Port Said

Suez

Ismailia

Suez

Canal

Bor-Lev

Line

Tasa

N

Gulf of

Suez

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Bitter

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Egyptian Commando Attack

6 Oct

Egyptian Crossing/Reinforcement Phase 1

Israeli Counterattacks

6–13 October 1973 0 5 10 15 20 25 Miles

Mediterranean Sea

Egypt

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(40 miles)

XX

Sharon

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Gonen AFS

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135

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18

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Magan

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23

15

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Adan (–)

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2

][ ][ ][

Crossed

7 Oct

6–7 Oct

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Mendler (–)

6–7 Oct

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Meron

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14 (–)

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25

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Axis of Israeli Attack

Axis of Egyptian Attack

Roads

Railroad

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Elevation 610m

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Crossed

11–13 Oct

Crossed

11–13 Oct

Crossed

11 Oct

13 Oct

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15

X

Attack by

Repulsed 8 Oct

XX

7

Figure 10.1. The Egyptian crossing and reinforcement phase, October 1973. 

Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
178

discernable preparations. 1 As it happened, Israeli intelligence interpreted 

the Syrian moves before the war as either defensive preventive measures 

or as preparation for a limited military operation at the northern Golan 

Heights. Although the Northern Command of the IDF remained concerned 

about the Syrian military setup, there was no indication that Syria was 

getting ready for an all-out war.

The Foundations of the Egyptian Deception

The Egyptian deception plan, Operation SPARK, had two layers – political and military, and was based on two principles. The first was adopting the Soviet doctrine of deception (Maskirovka) emphasizing the importance of deception as a precondition for embarking on a large scale assault. 

In the years before the Yom Kippur War, Soviet deception activity could 

be clearly discerned in the invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). 2 In both cases, the Soviets camouflaged their military preparations under the guise of large-scale military maneuvers. Thus, the patterns 

of deception can be identified in the Egyptian plan, which disguised the 

preparations for war as a large-scale exercise.

Michael Handel maintained that deception is usually undertaken by 

armies that consider themselves weak in comparison with the enemy that 

they are facing. This is especially true for Egypt, which had been defeated 

by Israel three times. Thus, “the Arabs in 1973 had a much stronger incentive to employ deception.” 3 The Egyptian war plans, developed immediately after the defeat of 1967, defined the goal as re-conquering the Sinai 

Peninsula and restoring the pre-war border. However, facing the IDF’s 

superiority in air power and armor, as demonstrated in June 1967, Egypt’s 

weakness in these domains, as well as its inability to attack strategic targets 

within Israel, led Egyptian strategists to gradually modify their war plans. 

This understanding forced Egypt to make two strategic decisions: The first 

was Sadat’s decision, made in October 1972, to initiate a large-scale war 

with limited military goals, i.e. to deploy a massive military force not for 

the conquest of the entire Sinai Peninsula, but rather for taking control of 

a narrow strip of land about eight to twelve kilometers wide on the eastern 

bank of the Suez Canal. The evolving plan provided extensive anti-air and 

anti-armor protection to the attacking troops. This defense would neutralize the Israeli superiority in the air and in armored warfare.

The second decision, highly relevant to this chapter, was the need for 

deception, which would prevent the Israeli leadership from realizing that 

Egypt was heading for a war, albeit with limited goals. 4 This is where the 

second element of the Egyptian deception plan falls into place. This aspect 
179

was based on understanding the Israeli security perception and evaluating 

the intelligence indicators which would cause Israel to believe that Egypt 

was heading for war. In this way, the Egyptians lulled Israeli intelligence 

by reinforcing the prevailing belief that Egypt was not headed down the 

path to war.

As Israel had never issued a formal document defining the principles 

of Israeli national security, Sadat ordered a comprehensive analysis of the 

Israeli perception of national security, in order to identify its weaknesses. 

The analysis, which was an important step in planning the deception plan, 

relied on interviews given by the Israeli leadership to the media. At that 

time, the press was almost the sole channel of information for the Israeli 

public and was closely connected to the political and military establishment. In addition, a scheduled election in October 1973 brought about a 

plethora of statements addressing foreign relations and national security, 

including various predictions about the probability of a war against Egypt 

in the following years.

One of the key facts on which the Israeli assessment relied was the 

expulsion of the Soviet advisors from Egypt in June 1972. As far as Israel 

was concerned the removal of the Soviet advisors weakened the Egyptian 

army, especially since the thousands of Soviet advisors served not just as 

instructors to the Egyptian army, but also manned the Egyptian air defenses. Prime Minister Golda Meir, Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan and 

Chief of Staff, David Elazar clearly expressed this opinion in a series of 

public interviews.5

Israel’s perception of national security relied on six principles.6 Primarily, Israel must maintain a military and technological superiority 

against the Arab States, in order to convince them of the futility of war. 

This superiority will be achieved via the use of the IAF and the Armored 

Corps, whose superiority over the Arab counterparts had been proven in 

1967. The second principle was the intelligence assessment that the Arab 

states were incapable of coordinating their efforts, and thus any war would 

be conducted against each Arab state independently. The third principle 

was relying on the buffer territories which Israel had conquered as a result of the Six-Day War. These strategic areas afforded Israel the coveted 

secure borders and gave it an advantage in the face of any future Arab 

offensive. The fourth principle stated that any war should be opened by an 

Israeli preemptive strike, initiated by Israel. Additionally, any war should 

be as short as possible, due to Israel’s demographic and economic conditions, which make it hard to fight a prolonged war. This was also the basis 

of the fifth principle, stating that Israel’s intelligence establishment must 
180

predict an imminent war and provide an adequate warning, which will allow Israel to mobilize its reserve forces and launch preemptive air strike. 

The sixth principle stated that Israel must rely on one of the Superpowers, 

in order to assure itself of military and diplomatic support.

These assumptions resulted in the forming of a strategic perception, 

bolstered by the euphoria following the great victory of the Six-Day War 

and influenced by a disregard of the enemy’s military capability. 7 This 

perception stated that Egypt would not attack Israel until it had obtained 

the strategic capability to attack targets deep within Israel. This was based 

on the fact that Israel had proven its operational capability to attack Egyptian strategic targets during the War of Attrition. The perception further 

stated that Syria would not go to war without Egypt. Thus, if Egypt was 

unable to start a war against Israel, Syria would not start a war on its own. 

Although Israel estimated that the Egyptians were capable of crossing the 

Suez Canal, they would be deterred from doing so by the fact that Israel 

had the capability to attack strategic targets within Egypt, including the 

capital, Cairo. Again, there was a basic assumption that while Egypt was 

unable, as part of the opening moves, to attack strategic targets within Israel, and especially to incapacitate the Israeli airbases, it would not start a 

war, and therefore Syria would not go to war either. This basic assumption 

gained credence from the belief that Israel possessed a decisive military 

and technological superiority, and that the Arab states were aware of the 

fact that there was nothing they could do against Israel, especially not win 

a major war. 8 It is important to note that Israeli Intelligence estimated 

that, at some point in time in the future, Egypt would go to war against 

Israel and that the Arab States had not abandoned the hope of retaking the 

territories which they had lost in 1967. However, at that point in time (the 

end of 1972 and throughout 1973), the Arab states and especially Egypt, 

have not yet acquired the military strategic capabilities needed in order to 

achieve this goal.

The events of December 1972 and even more so in April-May 1973 

seemed to prove the Israeli Intelligence estimate. Israel started receiving 

intelligence reports stating that Egypt intended to initiate a war. The accumulating reports testified to the fact that Egypt was concentrating large 

forces, including artillery batteries and bridging equipment, on the west 

bank of the Suez Canal. Consequently, the IDF went on a high alert status and started mobilizing its reserve forces. However, the Commanding 

General of the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID), Major General Eli 

Zeira, stated that, as Egypt had not yet acquired the strategic capability 

to hit targets within Israel, it would not go to war and indeed, the war did 
181

not break out in the spring of 1973. Although Israeli intelligence estimated that Egypt would eventually acquire the required military capabilities, 

the prevailing assumption was that they would not be operational before 

1975-1976.9

 Moreover, in April 1973, during the presentation of the IDF 

multi-year work plan, both the chief of staff and the deputy chief of staff, 

Major General Israel Tal, stated that they did not expect a war to break out 

before mid-1977. 10

The formula promoted by the MID, according to which Egypt would 

not go to war without attaining strategic weapons, and that Syria would 

not go to war without Egypt, was commonly known as “The Concept,” 

and attracted dire criticism from the Agranat Commission, established in 

order to investigate the circumstances that led to the outbreak of the war.11

As this “Concept” was based on Egypt’s intentions and capabilities, the 

burden of estimating the probability of war fell on the shoulders of the intelligence officers who supervised the Egyptian front. The main failure of 

the “Concept” stems from the Israeli intelligence officers who focused on 

Egypt’s capabilities, and neglected its intentions. This world view, which 

was often expressed by Israeli senior officials, played an important part 

in the design of the Egyptian deception plan, both at the political and the 

military level. The Egyptians took these statements by Israeli politicians 

and senior officers as accurately representing the moods and perceptions 

prevalent in Israel, and thus, the planners of the Egyptian deception plan 

used the Egyptian media in order to nurture the Israeli “Concept.” The 

political aspect of the Egyptian deception plan, as will be presently shown, 

provided positive feedback to prevalent perceptions, in order to firmly set 

them within the Israeli consciousness. 12

The Political Dimension of the Egyptian Deception

The political aspect of the Egyptian deception consisted of two components: The first was news items, published in the Egyptian media, in order to bolster the Israeli “Concept,” the second was various statements by 

the Egyptian president made in several speeches given before the war. The 

team responsible for the executing the deception plan started its activity 

several months before the breakout of the war. 13

Let us remember that during April 1973 the IDF increased its alert 

status, as a result of accumulating information, indicating that Egypt was 

planning to start a war, probably around mid-May. The code name for this 

high alert state was Blue-White, and within its scope, the IDF performed 

several significant preparative actions, such as establishing a new armored 

division, moving emergency logistic depots closer to the front, and re-
182

freshing the operational plan for repelling an invasion, while fighting simultaneously in two fronts.

However, the MID, headed by Major General Zeira, emphatically stated that the probability of the outbreak of the war was extremely low. As the 

expected time for the outbreak of the war passed, the alert status returned 

to normal, and Zeira’s status within the military strengthened. It is unclear 

whether Egypt actually intended to go to war in May, but the fact that the 

IDF went to a high alert status required Egypt to lull Israeli intelligence 

back to sleep so that it would not be able to provide adequate warning of 

the coming war. Operational thinking expected IDF intelligence to provide 

a 24-48 hour warning before the outbreak of an Arab-initiated war. They 

would use this period of time to activate the reserve units, which comprised the main IDF fighting force, and send them to the relevant fronts. 

During this period of time, the Israeli air force would attack the enemy’s 

air defense systems, achieving air superiority, and enabling it to support 

the ground forces.

The most important role of the deception team was to release statements to both Arab and foreign media, knowing that Israel would collect 

such information, concerning the lack of armaments, low maintenance status of combat equipment, and the general lack of preparation of the Egyptian army. According to these publications, the weakness of the Egyptian 

army resulted from the expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt, and the 

long-term effects of this action. In March 1973, the Israeli newspaper 

Maariv quoted Jim Hoagland, the Washington Post reporter in Cairo, who 

had reported, based on Egyptian sources, that the national air defense system was wide open to an Israeli air attack since the summer of 1972. The 

article further stated that the maintenance status of military equipment was 

extremely low and that the prevalent opinion in the Egyptian military was 

that renewing the war at that time would be suicidal. Indeed, during the 

months following the expulsion of the Soviet advisors, the Egyptian army 

was in a bad state, but its state of preparedness improved considerably 

as the war approached. However, as the Egyptians understood the Israeli 

interpretation of the significance of the expulsion of the Soviet advisors, 

they continued to use the subject in order to promote the deception.

An additional topic the deception team strongly promoted was leaked 

rumors about the existence of severe disagreements between Egypt and 

Syria. The purpose of these rumors was to strengthen the idea that Egypt 

and Syria would not be able to collaborate militarily. This played on an 

important element of the Israeli perception of security, which assumed 

that the Arab World was divided to the point where it could not launch 
183

a coordinated attack. As mentioned above, one of the main elements of 

the Israeli concept was that Syria would not go to war without Egypt’s 

support. Thus an atmosphere of “lack of coordination” between the two 

states, served to bolster the Israeli intelligence estimate that the probability of war was extremely low, and that war should not be expected in 

the short term. The third issue was presenting Egypt as having abandoned 

the military way in favor of a political and diplomatic struggle in order to 

force Israel to withdraw from the territories conquered in 1967. Again, this 

bolstered the Israeli belief that Israel had achieved deterrence and that the 

technological and military gap between Israel and the Arab states made a 

military solution of the conflict impossible.

Most of the leaked items emphasized the use of the “Oil Weapon.” The 

Egyptian press published many articles about the use of the Oil Weapon 

in order to force the United States to apply pressure on Israel. According 

to these articles, the oil-producing Arab states, headed by Saudi Arabia, 

should establish a unified policy and a threat to the United States that, unless the American changed their policy, which was heavily biased towards 

Israel, Saudi Arabia would reduce the oil supply. Several editorial articles 

in Al Ahram, the official communications channel of the Egyptian regime, 

stated that the Zionist entity could be defeated by using the “Oil Weapon” 

and that Arab oil should be used against the United States, in order to force 

it to apply pressure on Israel.14

A series of meetings in the months preceding the war between senior 

Egyptian officials and the American administration, in an attempt to find 

a political formula for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai, further 

reinforced the turn to the diplomatic channel. It is impossible to determine, 

with any level of certainty, whether these meetings were part of the Egyptian deception plan. This is because the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, having brought the war in Vietnam to an end, made peace 

in the Middle East his next main mission, and Israel remained concerned 

that the Americans would indeed push for a diplomatic solution that would 

cost them the Sinai buffer.

After the war, it became known that the Egyptian foreign minister, 

who had met with his American counterpart several times, was not privy to 

the deception plan, and that President Sadat left him outside the inner ring, 

which dealt with the deception.15 It is also possible that Sadat had kept all 

the options in his hands, and, in parallel with the military preparations, 

also used the diplomatic channel. This may have been because he was 

afraid of a military confrontation with Israel and the failure of the deception plan. Research cannot provide a complete answer to these questions, 
184

mainly because the relevant archival material is not available. In any case, 

the important point for the purpose of this chapter is that Israel believed 

that Egypt was heading for a diplomatic rather than a military solution, 

and thus the diplomatic deception had achieved its goals.

As an interim summary, we can state that the political elements of 

Egyptian deception tended to emphasize the military weakness of the Arabs against Israel’s military might, the political rift between Egypt and 

Syria, and the power of the “Oil Weapon” as a tool allowing the Arab 

states to conduct a diplomatic struggle. The continuous promotion of these 

elements caused Israel to form a mental picture according to which Egypt 

had abandoned the way of war, and focused its efforts on resolving the 

conflict via diplomatic channels.

President Sadat implemented the second dimension of the deception 

plan via public statements, between June 1973 and his last speech at the 

end of September, which included a discernable change of tone. These 

speeches lack the extremist tone that characterized his first speeches, 

which stated that “what was taken by force can only be restored by force,” 

and that the only way to resolve the conflict was the military way. His 

speeches adopted a more moderate tone and emphasized topics of internal 

policy. Thus, for example, in his speech in July 1973, during the celebrations commemorating the Officers’ Revolution, Sadat emphasized the 

need to step up the diplomatic pressure via the United Nations. In other 

speeches, Sadat mentioned that, although the issue of liberating the occupied territories was still on the main agenda, in the near term, Egypt should 

focus on developing its economy for the welfare of its citizens. The implied meaning is that Egypt would not seek war in the near future, as war 

would be detrimental to the Egyptian economy, both because of its cost 

and because of Israel’s ability to destroy strategic-economic targets within 

Egypt.16 Thus, we can state that the political aspects of the deception plan 

were meant to create an illusion of safety among the Israeli decision makers. The Israeli media regularly reported these Egyptian statements and 

senior Israeli officials, political as well as military, concluded that Egypt 

was not going to war. Thus, the Egyptian deception effort gained feedback 

and could verify that the plan was indeed effective.

The Military Dimension of the Egyptian Deception

The final version of the Egyptian plan had the Egyptian military forces 

cross the Canal in five divisional efforts, dig in along a strip several kilometers wide and repel the Israeli counterattacks. Thus, the need for deception stemmed from a critical operational need. Taking the IDF by surprise 
185

became essential in order to prevent it from moving its regular forces from 

the depth of the Sinai Peninsula to block the Egyptian crossing and before 

it could activate its reserves. This meant that Israeli intelligence had to be 

prevented from providing an adequate warning.17

As mentioned above, the Egyptian deception effort relied on the Soviet maskirovka concept, meaning that Egypt intended to launch the assault 

as a continuation of a large-scale military maneuver.18 Soviet doctrine 

states that going to war or a wide-scale military operation through military 

maneuvers is one of the best ways to camouflage one’s intentions, which 

is why American forces on the Korean peninsula currently react to the 

annual North Korean war games with a high level of alert. This is because 

preparing an army for war under the guise of military maneuvers enables 

the attacker to bring its forces to a high state of preparedness and move 

them closer to the front without the victim suspecting anything.

Between 1968 and the breakout of the war, the Egyptian army executed a series of spring and autumn maneuvers, code name TAHRIR (Liberation), where the autumn maneuvers of 1973, TAHRIR 41, served as a 

cover for the Egyptian preparations for war.19 The guidelines and planned 

scenario of the exercise were known to Israel, and the IDF concluded that 

it was a routine exercise, identical to those executed by Egyptian army 

during the previous years. For this reason it did not raise any alarms. 20

Thus, the purpose of the Egyptian deception was to convince Israel that its 

operations, including the massive concentration of troops and war materials near the Canal, were nothing but routine activity, part of the annual maneuvers, which had been conducted regularly since the end of the 1960s.

In order to understand the main characteristics of the military deception, we have to analyze the guidelines of TAHRIR 41. This exercise was 

defined as an exercise at the strategic and operational levels, with the participation of tactical units. The goal of the exercise was to execute an offensive operation which would include a crossing of the Canal, destroying 

the opposing enemy units (the Bar-Lev Line outposts), in order to reach 

the international border. The timeframe for the operation has been set for 

1-7 October 1973.21 As part of the exercise, we can discern three main deceptive measures, which prevented Israel from learning that the exercise 

was a cover for the Egyptian preparations for war. The first measure was a 

wide scale discharging of the reserve units that participated in the exercise. 

On 27 September, about 140,000 reserve troops were mobilized for active 

service. On 4 October, many of them were released, and the Egyptian general staff announced that the rest of them would be demobilized by the end 

of the exercise, thus creating the impression that this was a routine mobili-
186

zation.22 These troops did not belong to front line units, as the main Egyptian fighting force was based on regular soldiers rather than on reserves. 

The operations order of the exercise stated that, at the end of the exercise, 

all the participating units would return to their peacetime stations.

The second deception measure was the way in which the Egyptians 

moved the bridging and crossing equipment to the front. This was essential, since the entire operation depended on crossing the Canal at several 

points simultaneously. Any convoy carrying bridging equipment required 

hundreds of vehicles, and thus the discovery of such huge convoys could 

provide a significant warning to Israeli intelligence. Therefore, the Egyptians transported most of the bridging equipment to the Canal Zone several 

weeks before the start of the exercise. Then, the convoys returned westward, after hiding some of the equipment near the Canal. The Egyptians 

executed these moves several times and in different areas, so that, by the 

scheduled start date of the exercise (actually of the war), all the equipment 

required for the first stage was positioned on the west bank of the Canal. 

The third deception measure was the definition of the goals of the exercise. 

The operations order defined the goal of the exercise as the conquest of 

the entire Sinai Peninsula within seven days. This fact helped reinforce the 

Israeli perception that this was just an exercise rather than preparation for 

war since the Egyptian army was clearly incapable of performing such a 

formidable task.

In addition to the military deceptive measures, we can discern two 

more modes of action. The first one was the imposing of strict measures 

for hiding and maintaining secrecy. Most of the Egyptian officer corps was 

unaware of the fact that TAHRIR 41 was, in reality, a cover for preparing 

the army to war. 23 Thus, for example, division commanders only learned 

the date of the war breakout on 3 October, while brigade and battalion 

commanders were not notified until 5 October. The hiding of intentions 

included senior political officials, and thus when the war broke out, several 

Egyptian ministers were abroad, including the foreign minister.

The second mode of action was the continuation of everyday routine. 

Thus, for example, it was announced that Egyptian soldiers would be allowed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and that the units should form 

lists of the soldiers and officers who were interested. These messages were 

transmitted on open channels so that they could be intercepted by Israeli 

intelligence. Until the morning of 6 October, Israeli lookouts could see 

Egyptian soldiers in the Canal area, walking about without their weapons 

and helmets, or wearing sports apparel, or swimming and fishing in the 

Canal. Thus the Egyptians managed to inspire an atmosphere of tranquility 
187

at the front. It is important to note that the civilian population working or 

living near the front was evacuated after the outbreak of the war. Thus we 

can state that during the weeks that preceded the war, Egypt was running 

a double set of activities: Maintaining routine while, simultaneously, preparing for war.

The routine of the Egyptian army was characteristic of an army that 

was not expecting combat operations in its near future. Troops were drafted and discharged, professional and command courses continued without 

a hitch and the training routine continued as in the preceding years, i.e. the 

training routine of an army which is preparing for a war without a specified date. Thus, for example, there were five infantry divisions protecting 

the Canal zone, all in defensive positions, which, throughout the exercise, 

gave no indication that they were about to change their posture and go on 

the offensive. Thus the deception plan was effective not only in misleading 

Israeli intelligence, but also the Egyptian army, and through it the Egyptian public in general.

The Israeli Intelligence Picture

On 30 September 1973, the Israeli general staff received the following 

intelligence picture: The Syrian army is positioned for war, without any 

need for special preparations. Additionally, the Egyptian army was scheduled to start a major exercise on the following day. The conclusion at the 

end of the discussion was that Egypt was not planning to go to war, and 

therefore Syria was unlikely to embark on an all-out war, although it might 

initiate a one day battle or launch a raid at the northern part of the Golan 

Heights. 24 The commanding general of MID reviewed Sadat’s speech of 

27 September, which, in his opinion, indicated that war was not imminent. 

MID explained away the massive force deployment throughout Egypt as 

part of the large military exercise, while it dismissed the Syrian position as 

defensive. Although the IDF started preparing for war on 5 October, MID 

was still excusing all the Egyptian activities which suggested an intention 

of going to war as part of the exercise, and the head of MID still stated 

emphatically that there was a low probability for war.25

Only early on the morning of 6 October did the MID intelligence assessment change, stating that a simultaneous Egyptian and Syrian offensive could be expected before the end of the day. 26 The war broke out 

around 1400, so Israeli intelligence ended up providing the IDF with ten 

hours of warning, instead of the expected 24-48 hours. As a result, the 

IDF was caught unprepared, and most of the reserve units could not be 

mobilized until after the outbreak of the war. The deception was complete, 
188

and Egypt achieved the initial goals which it had set for itself.27 Tens of 

thousands of Egyptian soldiers crossed the Canal and gained a foothold on 

the eastern bank. After having repelled some small, improvised counter-attacks, the Egyptians succeeded in stabilizing their bridgeheads and consolidated a defensive strip about eight to twelve kilometers wide. 28 Out of 

this defensive strip, they successfully fought-off the Israeli counterattack 

of 8 October, while inflicting heavy losses on the IDF, especially the IAF, 

thanks to fully-functional Soviet-built surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites 

across the canal in Egypt. Thus, Egypt had achieved an important military 

as well as a morale goal. Egyptian troops remained on the eastern bank of 

the Suez Canal until the end of the war.

Conclusion

The Egyptian Deception Plan was meant to achieve surprise as to the 

time of the offensive, as well as its location, and the plan achieved these 

goals, causing Israel to be surprised during the first phases of the war. The 

Egyptian Deception Plan was based on the Soviet concept of maskirovka, which promoted going to war as a direct continuation of a large-scale 

training exercise. Analysis of the Egyptian Deception Plan shows two dimensions: the diplomatic and the military. Diplomatic deception mostly 

relied on reinforcing the Israeli “Concept,” as Egypt had invested considerable effort in understanding the Israeli theory of national security, in 

order to feed it with false information and cause Israel to act in ways that 

suited the Egyptian goals.

 The Egyptians conducted the entire process of planning the war under 

a heavy shroud of secrecy, concealing it from ministers and senior officials 

of the Egyptian government. Even the military units, which were part of the 

operational plan, were unaware of the preparations, and their commanding 

officers learned of the attack only a few days before the outbreak of the 

war. Most of the preparations for war occurred while the Egyptian army 

was either under operational routine activity or preparing for the large 

autumn exercise. There is no doubt that Israeli Intelligence was aware of 

the entire activity of the Egyptian army, including the preparations for the 

large training exercise. However, it failed to properly analyze the wealth 

of information, and the MID vehemently clung to the “Concept,” which 

stated that the probability of war was extremely low. The deception prevented Israel from getting adequate warning necessary for mobilizing its 

reserve units. As a result, Egypt and Syria achieved a strategic surprise, 

which drastically changed the balance of power at the front during the 

first days of the war. While Syria had lost all its military gains as early as 

10 October, Egypt’s surprise resulted in a successful defense of its gains, 
189

and enabled it to meet the limited goals of the war that it had set for itself, 

and provide the necessary “face-saving,” so critical in the Arab world, that 

allowed it to later agree to the Camp David Accords, exchanging formal 

recognition of Israel for the return of the Sinai. Thus, the Egyptian deception plan, and the tactical successes that followed, enabled it to achieve 

significant strategic and diplomatic effects, including a restoration of lost 

territory and a permanent peace along its eastern border.
190

Notes

1. Eyal Zisser, “Syria and the October War: The Missed Opportunity,” in 

Asaf Simiver (ed.), The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy (Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, 2013), 70-75.

2. Department of the Army, FM 100-2-1: The Soviet Army – Operations and 

Tactics (Washington, DC, 1984), ch. 12, p. 8; ch. 15, p. 4; Peter deLeon, Soviet 

View of Strategic Deception (Santa Monica: RAND, 1981), 6-11. See also David 

M. Glantz, “The Red Mask: The Nature and Legacy of Soviet Military Deception,” in Michael I. Handel (ed.), Strategic and Operational Deception in the 

Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1987), 177-180.

3. Michael I. Handel, “Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in 

Historical Perspectives,” in Handel (ed.), Strategic and Operational Deception, 31.

4. Yoram Meital, “The October War and Egypt’s Multiple Crossings,” in 

Simiver (ed.), The Yom Kippur War, 49-66.

5. Hanoch Bartov, Dado: 48 Years and 20 more Days (Dvir: Or Yehuda, 

2002), 231-234. In Hebrew.

6. Matityahu Peled, “Israeli Military Doctrine,” in Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (London: Wildwood House, 1974), 

78-102. See also Aryeh Shalev, Israel’s Intelligence Assessment before the Yom 

Kippur War (Brighton: Sussex, 2010), 25-33.

7. Jacob Erickson, “Israel and the October War,” in Simiver (ed.), The Yom 

Kippur War, 30-36.

8. Michael I. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the 

Yom Kippur War (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post Press, 1976), 44-52

9. It is important to mention that the MID is charged with providing the 

national intelligence estimates to the political echelon. See: Shalev, Israel’s 

Intelligence, 1-6.

10. Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command in Yom Kippur War (IDF Military History Department, 2013), 39-40. In Hebrew.

11. Report of the Agranat Commission (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), 19. In 

Hebrew. See also Shalev, Israel’s Intelligence, 125-126; Erickson, “Israel and 

the October War,” 36-40.

12. Shalev, Israel’s Intelligence, 34-42.

13. Hassan el Badri, Taha el Magdoub, Mohammed dia el din Zohdy, The 

Ramadan War, 1973 (Dunn Loring, VA: Dupuy Associates, 1978), 45-46.

14. Peter Allen, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 

1982), 31-32.

15. Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins, 1975), 36-37.

16. Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s 

Intelligence Services (New York: Grove Press, 1991), 291-292.

17. El Badri et al, The Ramadan War, 1973, 46-47.

18. On the impact of Soviet deception, see for example: Glantz, “The Red 

Mask,” 239-253.

19. Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, 17.
191

20. Bartov, Dado, 321-322.

21. Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, 295-296.

22. Saad El Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American 

Mideast Research, 2003), 75.

23. El Shazly, 202, 206-209.

24. In view of the fear of a Syrian attack, the Northern Command raised the 

status alert in the Golan Heights. Engineering works for the bolstering of the 

anti-tank obstacles were accelerated and new minefields were laid. An additional 

armored brigade was sent to the Golan Heights to serve as a general reserve, and 

it was decided to mobilize an additional armored brigade. However, the prevailing opinion that Syria would not go on the warpath without active Egyptian 

support remained unchanged.

25. Golan, Decision Making, 245-249; Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret 

Wars, 296-297.

26. Bartov, Dado, 367. See also Shalev, Israel’s Intelligence, 113-123.

27. Badri, Magdoub, Zohdy, The Ramadan War, 1973, 51-52.

28. Allen, The Yom Kippur War, 66-70.

193

Chapter 11

Target San Carlos

British Deception during the Repossession of the Falkland Islands

Steven Paget

Private Alejandro Ramon Cano, an Argentinian paratrooper, reflected 

on the Falklands Conflict: “When they informed us that the English had 

taken the beach at San Carlos, then we knew we had lost, and that’s how 

it goes.”1

 While much hard fighting was to follow, the establishment and 

maintenance of the beachhead at San Carlos was fundamental to British 

success in repossessing the Falkland Islands following the Argentinian invasion on 2 April 1982. The Argentinian invasion was the culmination of a 

long-standing dispute over the sovereignty of the islands, which are located east of the South American mainland in the South Atlantic Ocean, over 

8,000 miles from the United Kingdom (UK).2

 The Falkland Islands are a 

UK overseas territory, but the ongoing dispute led to both sides claiming 

to have “repossessed” the islands—the Argentinians on 2 April and the 

British following the landing at San Carlos on 21 May.

Admiral John Fieldhouse, Commander Task Force 317, opined on 19 

April prior to the operation at San Carlos: “Given good tactical intelligence from advanced force operations, the UK Amphibious Force has the 

capability to effect an amphibious landing with minimum casualties, if 

mounted outside the areas of the major concentrations of Argentine defences.”3

 Generating the necessary conditions for a successful amphibious assault was a complex and diverse endeavor. It was acknowledged: 

“Much thought was given to a deception plan. This was posed on the belief that the Argentinians would expect us to follow American tactics and 

assault over a beach near Port Stanley.”4

 Deception operations have been 

characterized as involving multiple elements, including misrepresenting 

“capabilities and vulnerabilities,” the type of action to be taken, and the 

location and timing of operations.5

 During the planning and conduct of the 

successful amphibious landing at San Carlos on 21 May, the British acted 

to conceal the location and extent of some of their capabilities, while emphasizing others; fostered the misperception that hit and run attacks would 

be conducted rather than a consolidated amphibious landing; and created 

confusion over the timing and place of the landing. Although British forces required a land campaign culminating in the seizure of Port Stanley to 

repossess the Falklands, the troops needed not only to get ashore, but also 
194

to develop a position of strength from which they would not be dislodged. 

The planning guide for the landing at San Carlos noted: “The amphibious operation exploits the element of surprise and capitalizes upon enemy 

weaknesses through application of the required type and degree of force 

AFRICA

North

Atlantic

Ocean

South

Atlantic

Ocean

SOUTH

AMERICA

NORTH

AMERICA

EUROPE

The Falklands (Malvinas)

1982

0 250 500 750 1,000 Miles

N











Falkland

Islands

South

Georgia



Brazil

Chile

Argentina

Spain

U.K..

Trelew

London

Gibraltar

San Julian

Rio Gallegos

Rio Grande

Portsmouth 

5–6 April

Falklands Task

Force sails

Atlantic Conveyor

Sunk 25 May

Ascension Task

Force Base

Ascension

Island

HMS Sheffield

Sunk 4 May

General Belgrano

Sunk 2 May

Argentina invades the

Falklands on 2 April and

South Georgia

on 3 April 1982

Air Base

Ascension Island

Trelew

San Julian

Rio Gallegos

Rio Grande

Distance (km) to

Falkland Islands

6,000

1,070

780

800

700

Total Exclusion Zone

Figure 11.1. The Falklands. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
195

at the most advantageous locations at the most opportune times.”6 Deception operations were an important element in creating confusion about the 

location, timing, and nature of British operations and served to reinforce 

Argentinian misperceptions.

This chapter will contextualize the importance of deception operations 

by assessing the limited number of suitable low-risk landing sites available to the British and the importance of convincing the Argentinians that 

the landings would occur somewhere other than San Carlos. It will address 

the range of deception measures undertaken by the British from the feint 

conducted by the Carrier Battle Group during the transit to the Falklands 

to the diversionary attacks that coincided with the amphibious landing. It 

will also analyze the role of misinformation and media manipulation in 

generating confusion about the timing, location, and nature of amphibious 

operations. Ultimately, the article will consider the orchestration of air, 

land, and maritime power in conjunction with strategic, operational, and 

tactical deception plans to determine how the attackers achieved surprise 

and launched a successful amphibious assault.

Selection of San Carlos

Although the Argentinians expected the British to land near Port Stanley, they ruled the area out due to the proximity of the main enemy force 

and the risk of inflicting civilian casualties and destroying property. The 

British chose the eventual landing site, San Carlos, after extensive reconnaissance and evaluation. Like the selection of Normandy over the Pas de 

Calais for the D-Day landings, it represented a “compromise” based on 

the “requirements for the different forces involved” and a “net balance of 

the risks.”7

 The amphibious objective area (AOA) needed to be defendable 

against surface and submarine threats and the anchorage had to be calm 

and suitably deep to accommodate the ships. The topography needed to 

be sufficiently low for ships’ radars to detect aircraft at range, but high 

enough to inhibit the long-range targeting of ships. It required multiple 

beaches with suitable gradients and the prospect of dry landings, as well as 

sufficient space for a beach support area. The beaches needed to be out of 

range of both Argentinian artillery and counter-attacks, but close enough 

to the nearest high ground for it to be occupied quickly. The terrain to 

Stanley needed to be fair and, ideally, the route had to avoid bottlenecks.8

Planners considered 19 beaches for the amphibious landings, eventually narrowing the choice of landing site down to three: Berkeley Sound, 

Cow Bay/Volunteer Bay, and San Carlos. A variety of sources shaped decisions about the landing site and courses of action. Major Ewen South-
196

by-Tailyour was the “great guru” of local knowledge—having produced 

a sailing directions manuscript of the islands—and his experience compensated for dated official surveys of the Falklands that lacked soundings close to the beaches.9

 Southby-Tailyour’s information was vital, but 

it needed to be verified. The Special Boat Service (SBS) was tasked by 

Commodore Michael Clapp, the Amphibious Task Group Commander, 

with beach reconnaissance that continued right up to the landing and the 

Special Air Service (SAS) was tasked by Brigadier Julian Thompson, the 

Commander of 3 Commando Brigade and Landing Force Commander until Major General Jeremy Moore assumed command, to ascertain enemy 

dispositions.10 The intelligence not only helped to rule out sites, but also 

confirmed the worthiness of San Carlos.

West Falkland was ruled out by the amphibious planners as it was 

closer to the Argentinian mainland, thereby increasing the aerial threat, as 

well as a greater distance from the British carriers. While the Argentinians 

would undoubtedly have struggled to reinforce it, the British would ultimately have been compelled to conduct a second landing on East Falkland, 

with all the risks that would have entailed.11 With East Falkland almost 

certainly the landing site, planners debated the merits of a number of possibilities near Stanley. They eliminated Cow Bay, north of Stanley, due to 

the enemy presence, poor terrain to the capital, the route leading to a bottleneck at Green Patch, and its susceptibility to poor weather.12 The Berkeley Sound area was problematic due to the proximity of the enemy, the 

potential for Argentinian artillery to be moved into range, and the threat of 

mines.13 Port Salvador initially seemed an “ideal place, militarily,” but the 

narrow entrance presented a risk as mines or a sunken ship could block it 

and the surrounding ground was also sufficiently high to inhibit advanced 

warning of air attacks, but was still low enough to allow attacking aircraft 

to identify targets at range.14 It remained a back-up option if San Carlos 

proved infeasible, but “casualties in ships and men would have been very 

heavy” if it had been used.15

San Carlos was not without its limitations, but it had many advantages. 

San Carlos Water was navigationally sound, there were two entrances, it 

was sheltered against wind and weather, it could be defended from surface 

threats, and it contained three suitable beaches.16 Planners also considered 

the topography conducive to an amphibious landing and deemed the terrain suitable for Rapier defense, while the surrounding hills inhibited air 

attacks and the beaches had sufficient space for a support area. They expected the area to be largely unguarded and an attack there posed minimal 

risk to civilians. The absence of enemy forces was crucial as the British 
197

had “very limited assault capability” and were not equipped to land at a 

“well-defended beach.”17

The only disadvantage, from a landing force perspective, was that it 

was fifty miles from Stanley “as the crow flies.”18 There were further concerns on the naval side as the entrance could be mined (even after the 

initial landing), submarine activity could not be ruled out, and the British 

carriers would be a significant distance away to the east, limiting the time 

aircraft could spend over the amphibious forces.19 There were, ultimately, 

risks involved in using any of the sites, but Brigadier Thompson assessed 

San Carlos as the most, if not the only, viable option, noting, “San Carlos, 

in retrospect, was the only place you could go.”20

Argentinian Perceptions

Eliot Cohen and John Gooch have opined that “it is a cardinal principle of deception that the deceiver succeeds by reinforcing his opponent’s 

misconceptions.”21 The British based their planning in the Falklands on the 

belief that the Argentinians would expect the landing to occur somewhere 

other than San Carlos. The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) 

presented an appreciation of the defense of the Falklands from the per-



Swan

Island

King

George Bay



  







Goose Green

Darwin

Douglas



Fitzroy

Stanley Bluff Cove

West

Falkland

Port Stephens

San Carlos Teal

Inlet

South

Atlantic

Ocean

The Falklands (Malvinas)

1982

0 10 20 30 Miles

Night of 20–21 May

3 Commando Bde lands

Sea Lion

Island

N

Bleaker

Island

Passage

Island

Lively

Island

Sounders

Island

Keppel

Island

Pebble

Island

Queen Charlotte

Bay

Low Bay

Airfield

FAA Skyhawk A-4

Elevation 500m

Elevation 1,000m

HMS Coventry

Sunk 25 May

RFA Sir Galahad and

RFA Sir Tristram

damaged by

Argentine aircraft

8 June

6–8 June

5 Infantry Bde

(2 Scots Guards and

1 Welsh Guards) lands at

Bluff Cove and Fitzroy

Night of 14–15 May

raid by SAS

Port Howard

HMS Ardent and

HMS Antelope

Sunk 21 May

East

Falkland

Figure 11.2. The Falklands, 14 May-8 June 1982. Graphic created by CSI Press staff.
198

spective of the military governor, Brigadier General Mario Menéndez, at 

the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 14 April 1982. It revealed that the British 

perceived that the Argentinians expected them to land at Stanley, Lafonia 

or West Falkland.22 Commodore Clapp acknowledged that the Task Force 

conducted deception operations to “help the Argentinians in their almost 

certain assumption that we would land, USMC (United States Marine 

Corps) style, directly into or very close to Stanley in a once-only coup de 

main (or even a coup de grâce!).”23

Argentinian assessments demonstrated a lack of clarity about British 

intentions. The mining of the Cape Pembroke sea area and the beaches 

used to land their own forces indicated that the Argentinians believed that 

the British intended to land near Stanley.24 They regularly overlooked San 

Carlos—even when they considered other locations. Reports prepared 

for Brigadier General Menéndez, by his Chief of Staff, Brigadier General 

Américo Daher, and his Chief Intelligence Officer, Colonel Francisco Cervo, listed fourteen and eleven possible landing options, respectively, but 

San Carlos did not feature in either.25 An Argentinian document produced 

in mid-May focused on the likelihood of a direct assault on Stanley or a 

low-risk landing to the north east of the capital. San Carlos did feature as 

one of three other landing options, alongside Fitzroy and Port Louis, but 

the Argentinians dismissed it as “disadvantageous” due to the distance to 

the capital.26 Following helicopter flights around the Falklands by President Leopoldo Galtieri and Brigadier Generals Menéndez and O.L. Jofre, the latter recalled, “San Carlos was mentioned but was dismissed as 

being too far away...so it was decided that our main force would remain 

around Stanley, with only our Special Forces to harass any landings further away.”27 Importantly, the Argentinians assumed that the British would 

employ harassment and distraction troops prior to the main landings.

British planners exploited Argentinian misconceptions about a potential landing at Stanley on a number of occasions in early May. Following naval gunfire on 1 May that was intended to simulate the preparatory bombardment prior to an amphibious landing, Argentinian soldiers 

Horacio Benítez and Juan Diez recalled, “We thought that the British 

were trying to land but our artillery drove them off.”28 It soon became 

clear that these were not the much-anticipated landings, but the Argentinians remained concerned. Lieutenant Colonel David Comini, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, incorrectly reported on 

8 May that 16 launches were approaching the beach at Port Harriet and 

would land within 15 minutes, with the false alarm potentially having 

resulted from a “spoof” message.29
199

Argentinian assessments changed over time, with the British official 

history noting that by mid-May, “Argentine commanders had a reasonably 

accurate grasp of British strategy—to attack and destroy targets of opportunity...and to infiltrate reconnaissance units...while preparing for an 

assault in a lightly defended area under protection of diversionary attacks 

elsewhere.”30 A 62-man force known as the “Eagle Detachment”—or the 

“Mob” to the British—moved to Fanning Head on 15 May. Although the 

Argentinians intended the move to provide warning of any landing in that 

area and to protect the entrance to Port San Carlos and the northern entrance to Falkland Sound following HMS Alacrity’s transit through the 

area on 12 May, there is no evidence that they considered it a serious risk 

at that time.31 Even after 3 Commando Brigade landed at San Carlos, the 

perceived threat of 5th Infantry Brigade landing at or near Port Stanley 

continued to constrain Argentinian action. The British exploited Argentinian misperceptions at every stage of the campaign to maximize their 

strengths and minimize their vulnerabilities.

Operation TORNADO: The Conduct of British Deception 

Operations

Deception had underpinned the success of historical British operations 

such as in Palestine in the First World War and at El Alamein, Sicily and 

Normandy in the Second World War, as discussed in previous chapters. 

That lineage was continued during the Falklands Conflict. British planners 

considered deception to be extremely important and recommended that 

“some or all of the following gambits should be co-ordinated to achieve 

distraction and disguise:”

Deceptive grouping and routing

Communications jamming, spoofing and simulated security 

breaches

Interference with shore air navigation radio aids and IFF

Use of chaff, flare drops, diversionary bombardment and underwater acoustic deception to suggest a false beachhead

Diversionary attacks by Special Forces before D Day.32

The British practiced deception from the moment that the Carrier Battle 

Group set sail for the Falklands. After reaching the 8th Parallel, Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, Commander of the Carrier Battle Group, initiated 

a “long feint towards the South American mainland” to further the notion 

that the British might launch a preparatory strike directly against Argentina.33 They employed chaff to deceive reconnaissance aircraft by creating the 
200

appearance of a much larger fleet, thereby suggesting that the amphibious 

forces were in tow.34 They hoped that the threat of an early landing would 

force the Argentinians to maintain a higher state of alert and induce fatigue 

prior to the amphibious operation.35 Rear Admiral Woodward revealed, “In 

this way I suspected, rightly, they would believe, wrongly, that we were on 

our way to Port Stanley for a full-frontal assault.”36

The disposition of British forces could not be concealed forever and 

required further deception measures to prolong the Argentine confusion. 

The British initiated Operation TORNADO, a “ruse” involving naval 

bombardments and air strikes on and around Stanley airfield to convince 

the Argentinians that the area was being softened up for an amphibious 

landing.37 In addition, Clapp arranged for the operation of false radio circuits and floated ashore documents relating to an amphibious landing near 

Stanley.38 The leaked signals referred specifically to Operation TORNADO, a supposed “large combined operation against mainland and Falkland 

Islands targets to be launched in near future.”39

Operations commenced in dramatic fashion on 1 May, with naval 

bombardments on infrastructure and troops near Stanley airfield, Vulcan 

bomber strikes on the airfield, and twelve Sea Harrier sorties; eight on the 

airfield and four at the air strip at Goose Green.40 Woodward was realistic 

about the limited prospects of the air strikes doing serious damage to the 

airfields, but he anticipated that they would convince the Argentinians for 

at least 24 hours that a landing would take place at Stanley and provide an 

opportunity to land reconnaissance forces.41

The Royal Air Force (RAF) conducted two of an eventual five Vulcan 

strikes—codenamed Operation BLACK BUCK—before the amphibious 

landing.42 The first strike on 1 May dropped twenty-one 1,000-lb. bombs 

and caused sufficient damage to prevent both A-4 Skyhawks and Dassault 

Super Etendards from using the runway.43 The Ministry of Defence (MoD) 

made a public announcement soon after the raid as the “political, diplomatic, 

military context,” made it imperative to establish that the “precision” strikes 

had avoided civilian casualties, as well as to emphasize British strengths and 

highlight Argentinian vulnerabilities.44 The perceived threat to the Argentinian mainland prompted the redeployment of Mirage aircraft to focus on 

home defense rather than offensive operations. The strike also helped reinforce the notion that the British were focused on Stanley, especially when a 

second raid bombed near the western end of the runway on 3-4 May.

HMS Hermes launched three waves of Sea Harriers on 1 May; the 

first suppressed Argentinian anti-aircraft defenses at Stanley, the second 
201

targeted the runway, and the third attacked the Goose Green airstrip. 

The so-called “Three Musketeers”—Her Majesty’s Ships Alacrity, Arrow, and Glamorgan—peppered Argentinian facilities before withdrawing from their bombardment positions. When the ships returned, the resultant confusion caused by the bombardments provided the necessary 

cover for the infiltration of reconnaissance parties. The British, in sum, 

encouraged the Argentinians “in every way possible to believe” that 1 or 

2 May would be “D-Day.”45

British forces maintained pressure against Argentinian facilities and 

forces at Stanley in order to conceal their true intentions. British aircraft 

dropped 51 tons of ordnance in total; 30 from the RN’s Sea Harriers and 

21 from the RAF’s Vulcans prior to the amphibious landing.46 Ships from 

the Carrier Battle Group conducted twelve bombardments of Argentinian positions between 1 and 20 May, with improvements in accuracy 

demonstrating the concentric nature of British operations following reconnaissance reports from Special Forces that identified key targets such 

as ammunition dumps, artillery and radar.47 No. 846 Squadron conducted

covert helicopter support activities, flying 26 sorties on 12 different nights 

across the same period.48 The purpose of British activities was once again 

multi-faceted; harass the enemy, keep attention focused on Stanley, and 

attrite Argentinian aircraft by provoking attacks on the ships.

Deception and preparation activities came to a crescendo on 20-21 

May. Captain Michael Barrow, Glamorgan’s Commanding Officer, received an order to conduct a “one-man amphibious landing.”49 With the 

ship stationed off Stanley peninsula, Glamorgan bombarded positions between Mount Brisbane and Berkeley Sound using a combination of high 

explosive and star shells. Wessex helicopter sorties and the transmission 

of false signals to simulate the commencement of an amphibious landing 

further augmented the ruse.50 Pre-emptive measures were taken to ferment the idea of an imminent “all-out attack” near Stanley. A Radio South 

Atlantic broadcast on 18 May noted that the “softening-up” of defenses had already begun to “wear down the garrison.”51 The bombardments, 

therefore, appeared as an intensification of action against the vicinity of 

Stanley. Glamorgan’s bombardments on 20 May provoked “a number of 

explosions and a large amount of tracer,” prompting Navigating Officer, 

Commander Ian Inskip, to assess that the Argentinians “were anticipating imminent invasion.”52 Menéndez received reports about activities near 

Berkeley Sound that seemed to affirm the long-held assumption that the 

British would attack somewhere around Port Stanley. Captain Barrow assessed Operation TORNADO to have been “largely successful” and Clapp 
202

heralded it as “a most useful exercise in deceit that I hoped helped to keep 

significant forces well away from the west of East Falkland.”53

Preparatory and Diversionary Operations

Extensive preparatory operations underpinned British success during 

the amphibious landing. Woodward was directed to provoke intense air 

and sea confrontations with the intention of achieving local sea and air superiority as part of the tasking he received on 27 April.54 The threat posed 

by the Argentinian Navy needed to be counteracted prior to the landing. 

The submarine HMS Conqueror’s sinking of the cruiser ARA General 

Belgrano had major ramifications for the conflict as it led directly to the 

withdrawal of the Argentinian fleet, including the carrier Veinticinco de 

Mayo, and ensured that the British did not encounter their enemy’s major 

warships for the duration of the conflict.55

A British memorandum warned tellingly, “We are assured of sea control. Total and lasting air superiority is less assured.”56 Air and sea superiority had been deemed necessary precursors to an amphibious landing and, 

while the naval threat had been diminished, the air battle was ongoing.57

Woodward hoped that the combination of naval gunfire and air strikes on 

1 May would prompt a reaction that would expose the enemy’s defensive 

plan and allow for the attrition of Argentinian aircraft but achieved mixed 

results.58 The Argentinians initially believed that a landing was imminent 

and their reaction offered portents about their likely approach when the 

real thing eventuated. The anticipated attritional air battle, however, did 

not occur. Three Mirages and one or two Canberras were destroyed, with 

Arrow and Glamorgan suffering minor damage in return.59 Woodward assessed, “Their air force had tried its best...and failed. I could not have 

asked for a better response to the deception plan.”60 The British were, nevertheless, unable to inflict the level of losses that they desired and would 

not have the same luck in provoking air action prior to the landings, undermining the process of attrition.

Thompson had informed the Land Deputy to Admiral Fieldhouse, 

Major General Moore, on 6 May that without air superiority the British 

risked “losing [a] large part of Brigade, possibly before we get ashore” and 

warned that “amphibious operations cannot be successfully carried out in 

[a] hostile air environment.”61 The threat made the SAS raid on Pebble 

Island on 15 May an important preparatory measure as light aircraft that 

could have interfered with the amphibious landing used the grass air strip 

there. Glamorgan illuminated the airfield and also bombarded both aircraft 

and Argentinian positions, while the SAS conducted operations.62 The at-
203

tacks wrecked or rendered unserviceable all eleven aircraft, including six 

FMA Pucarás, and destroyed ammunition and fuel stores. The raid diminished the Argentinian air threat, reduced morale and may have reinforced 

the notion that British forces preferred hit and run attacks rather than a 

consolidated amphibious assault.

In addition to Pucarás and Aermacchis on the Falklands, the Argentinians could also employ mainland-based Super Etendards, A-4 Skyhawks, 

Daggers (a variation of the Mirage V) and Canberras. British planners held 

discussions about delaying the landing due to the air threat, but considered the operation viable if they conducted it at night and preceded it with 

diversions and deception to inhibit the Argentinian response. Clapp was 

cognizant that “with so many eggs in so few baskets the loss of just one 

major ship would spell disaster,” but understood that the risk would have 

be tolerated, as unpalatable as it may have been.63 Concerns over the loss 

of credibility, the potential to sustain troops at an effective combat level, 

the risk of attrition, declining weather, and the possible erosion of public 

support and international opinion militated against delaying the landing.64

Woodward mused, “On paper, they still had air superiority and for all we 

knew had been saving themselves up for the day when the British finally 

moved in to re-take the Falkland Islands.”65

It was essential, therefore, that the British provided no early warning 

of the landing to uphold the deception and maintain secrecy. The movement of the “Eagle Detachment” to Fanning Head added a necessary 

preliminary step to the landing as their infantry support weapons, including 105mm recoilless anti-tank guns, could have wreaked havoc on 

landing craft.66 Two Wessex helicopters—one of which had been fitted 

with thermal-imaging equipment to help locate Argentinian forces and 

establish that there were no additional troops in the vicinity—covertly 

landed an SBS team to counter the threat.67 The SBS attack, supported 

by naval gunfire, led to the position being abandoned after a short but 

aggressive engagement and, although elements of the “Mob” later shot 

down two British Gazelle helicopters, the attacks greatly diminished the 

threat to the landing.68

While planners deemed efforts to conceal the approach of the amphibious ships crucial, drawing Argentinian attention elsewhere by launching 

diversionary action acquired equal importance. Clapp has acknowledged:

Any real deception landing would have taken rather more 

troops than we had, although one of the great advantages of 

Special Forces of the calibre of ours is that, with the modern 
204

automatic weapons at their disposal against an inexperienced 

and frightened enemy, they can give the appearance of being 

a larger force than they actually are.69

The diversionary force, D Squadron, 22 SAS, infiltrated covertly to 

occupy the strategic reserve and proceeded with both force and speed to 

magnify the scale of their attack, utilizing machine guns, mortars, rockets 

and naval gunfire.70 The raid achieved its objective. The garrison commander at Darwin conceded that he believed he was under attack by at 

least a battalion strength force and prisoner interrogations later conducted by 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment indicated that the Argentinians 

thought they were facing the main landing.71

Achievement of Surprise

It was hoped initially that the size of the islands would prevent comprehensive surveillance by observation posts and, consequently, it might 

be feasible to conduct an unobserved landing in darkness. The British were 

fortunate that the weather was in their favor initially, with Clapp’s report 

of proceedings stating, “all prayers as to weather answered” due to the 

mist and drizzle.72 This impeded the view of both Argentinian air patrols 

and shore-based lookouts and afforded extra time before the defenders 

discovered the landing.

The commencement of naval bombardments, however, prompted First 

Lieutenant Carlos Esteban to send a lookout to observe San Carlos Water. 

The lookout spotted the amphibious force, but some troops had already 

disembarked and further landing craft were in transit. The defenders requested air support from Goose Green, but only one of the first six Pucarás 

deployed was able to take off due to HMS Ardent’s bombardment and 

although that aircraft spotted and reported the presence of the amphibious force, a single Stinger missile shot it down.73 An Aermacchi ordered 

from Stanley after news of the landing reached the capital attacked HMS 

Argonaut and took note of the number of ships involved, before the pilot 

reported the information to Menéndez.74

While there were some minor hitches including a navigational error 

that held up entry into San Carlos Water and delays in disembarking troops 

into landing craft, they were not critical.75 Ivar Hellberg, Commanding 

Officer of the Commando Logistics Regiment, summarized, “Complete 

surprise was achieved and the amphibious landing plan worked like clockwork. All the main objectives were achieved by first light on 21 May and 

the fighting troops were ashore within four hours of ‘H’ Hour.”76 The only 

Argentinian forces encountered on land within the vicinity of the beach-
205

es were positioned at Port San Carlos and they dispersed in the face of 

oncoming British troops. The enemy failed to inflict any casualties on 

the British ground force during the actual landing, although the shooting 

down of the two Gazelle helicopters resulted in three deaths. Clapp noted 

succinctly, “My job had been to land the landing force ‘without significant 

loss’...and I had.”77

Several observers have heavily criticized the subsequent Argentinian 

response, after being caught unprepared by the landing. Woodward appraised tersely that the Argentinians had “screwed this operation up very 

badly” by allowing the uninhibited passage of the amphibious forces into 

San Carlos Water and then by attacking the “wrong” ships; the escorts 

rather than troop and supply vessels.78 The Argentinian pilots, in fairness, 

had fewer than thirty seconds to identify and engage targets inside San 

Carlos Water. When the air attacks began, Clapp observed, “much of the 

shipping being off-loaded was...sufficiently well protected by the terrain 

to present a difficult target. Hence, although hits were received, little significant damage was done to the Amphibious Group and unloading was 

continued with little interruption.”79 The escorts rather than the troop and 

supply ships bore the brunt of the attacks, with Ardent sunk and Her Majesty’s Ships Antrim, Argonaut, Brilliant and Broadsword suffering damage. 

Major General Moore adjudged that the Falklands Conflict demonstrated 

the “appalling shipping losses that can be suffered from even unsophisticated aircraft and weapons systems.”80 Indeed, further ferocious attacks 

on British ships followed, leading to the damage and loss of a number, 

including the sinking of HMS Antelope on 23 May and HMS Coventry on 

25 May, but the attacks had not halted the amphibious landing.81

The Argentinian commanders were aware by 22 May that the British 

had solidified their position and could call on air defense and artillery, 

meaning that they needed extensive air operations to try to remove them.82

Menéndez was not prepared to compromise the Argentinian defenses 

around Stanley or redeploy forces on the approach due to concerns that 

5th Infantry Brigade might disembark elsewhere on the island. The limited availability of helicopters, moreover, would have hindered any such 

move.83 It was also hoped vainly that the British might use the landing to 

restart political negotiations. The beachhead, in reality, was the staging 

post and logistical lifeline for the repossession of the Falklands. On the 

25th anniversary of the landings, a British newspaper described 21 May as 

“the day Argentina knew [the] war was lost” as defeat seemed inevitable 

once the bridgehead had been established.84 Three weeks of hard fighting 

followed as British forces “yomped” across East Falkland, culminating in 
206

the Argentinian surrender at Stanley on 14 June, after notable engagements 

at Mount Longdon, Mount Kent, Mount Harriet, Two Sisters, Mount Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge.

Misinformation and Media Manipulation

Lawrence Freedman has pointed out that “any military operation will 

involve factors beyond the professional remit of the military” and that was 

undoubtedly the case during the Falklands Conflict.85 Both the government and the media have been scrutinized over various security breaches, with the announcement by the BBC that the Amphibious Task Group 

and Carrier Battle Group had rendezvoused on 18 May being a particular 

source of criticism due to the potential for compromising the hard-won 

achievement of surprise. Once the capacity to land forces had been made 

known to the Argentinians, it was essential that the nature and timing of 

the landings remained a mystery.

Newspaper and television coverage was inevitably rife with speculation about likely courses of action with a range of opinions being 

expressed about when and where the landing would occur, as well as 

whether it would be opposed. The MoD determined that information 

should be withheld until well after the beachhead had been established 

to avoid provoking Argentinian air attacks during the landing phase. 

Consequently, it was necessary to both control and shape media reports. 

Although the conflict pre-dated social media and fitness tracking applications that have the potential to compromise secrecy, restrictions needed to be placed on correspondents with the Task Force. Copy had to 

be vetted locally and cleared through the MoD Press Office and could 

only be released after official press releases. Correspondents were also 

prevented from utilizing MARISAT (maritime satellite communications) 

while reporting restrictions were in place.86 In addition, the vulnerability 

of the amphibious ships prompted the MoD to allow “a degree of misinformation to be promulgated,” which “contributed positively to the 

successful outcome of an audacious landing plan.”87

An un-attributable briefing by the Permanent Under-Secretary of the 

MoD, Sir Frank Cooper, played an important role in the misinformation 

campaign. Indicating that there would be an “increase in pressure,” Cooper declared, “Don’t see this as a great World War II epic, a sort of great 

D-Day and everybody goes storming across the beaches.”88 The suggestion 

that the “screw will be turned” in a “variety of ways” and at a “variety of 

points” prompted the media to speculate that the attackers would conduct 

“hit and run” and “smash and grab” raids.89 In accepting retrospectively 
207

that he did not tell the “whole truth,” Cooper contended that conjecture 

about British plans was “very helpful.”90

The official announcement at noon on 21 May downplayed British 

action and indicated that raiding parties had been landed during the night. 

Cooper met with media editors again once the landing was under way, but 

was more forthcoming this time. He requested that the media appear “confused” about the nature of the operation as “light was breaking in the Falklands and we had got the whole of the stores and a lot of people still to get 

ashore...and we did not want to give any information to the Argentines as 

to where we were, what our intentions were, and what forces were going 

there.”91 Tellingly, early evening news broadcasts back in Britain were still 

reporting, based on Argentinian sources, that British forces had conducted 

a number of raids, including a major one at San Carlos. A post-operation 

public relations report emphasized, “The media is naturally keen to report 

conflict as fully and as quickly as possible, but the MoD and operational 

commanders are bound to be less concerned with immediacy than the need 

to preserve operational secrecy to ensure that the reporting of operations 

does not prejudice their success, put lives at risk or give away valuable intelligence.”92 The promulgation of inaccurate and misleading information 

by the media aided the deception and helped maintain secrecy, even when 

it was done unknowingly.

Conclusion

In a speech about the landings at San Carlos, John Knott, the Secretary 

of State for Defence, declared triumphantly on 24 May 1982, “Argentinian 

forces did not interfere to any significant extent with the landing itself. The 

amphibious ships involved in the first stages of the operation were able to 

withdraw without incident to safer waters.”93 While the Falklands Conflict 

demonstrated that “an ability to assault a defended beach is not always 

required when alternative landing sites are available,” cultivating the prospect of landing unopposed requires significant planning and preparation to 

ensure the necessary element of surprise.94

While it could be posited that Argentinian errors were of greater significance than the web of deception spun by the attackers, the exploitation 

of confusion limited reappraisals of likely British intentions. Deception 

was a force multiplier as the preservation of secrecy and the fermentation 

of confusion about the nature, location and timing of amphibious operations created conditions conducive to a successful landing with limited assault capability. It was important, therefore, that the deception operations 

conducted both in theater and back in Britain complemented one another. 
208

Breaches of security at the strategic level had the capacity to undermine 

deception operations and erode secrecy at the operational and tactical levels.

Lani Kass and J. Phillip London have observed that deception is intended to “cause the adversary to commit the critical errors that will serve 

one’s own plan; increase an opponent’s susceptibility to our actions; and 

deny him the opportunity to capitalize on our vulnerabilities.”95 British 

planning and operations succeeded in all three areas. Deception was of 

great significance in the Falklands because it helped to affirm pre-existing 

Argentinian misperceptions and precluded the reinforcement of San Carlos, the laying of mines, and the early intervention of air and naval forces. 

The later air attacks at Bluff Cove on the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries (RFAs) 

Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram, which were transporting Welsh Guards to 

Fitzroy on 8 June, as well as the sinking of a landing craft from HMS 

Fearless carrying British vehicles, demonstrated the dangers inherent in 

the venture.96 Fifty men lost their lives in the attack, which resulted in the 

abandonment of both RFAs, with around three times as many injured, as 

well as a further six fatalities aboard the landing craft. The attacks further 

emphasized the importance of deception and, ultimately, the achievement 

of surprise at San Carlos.

The landings at San Carlos hold contemporary relevance, in addition 

to their historical significance, due to the importance attached to unopposed amphibious landings. The House of Commons Defence Committee reported in February 2018, “The more recent doctrine and tasking of 

amphibious units places great emphasis on unopposed landings, ideally at 

night, to maximise stealth, surprise and the amount of time available to get 

reinforcements and equipment ashore before the enemy is in a position to 

counterattack.”97 Any amphibious operation involves cooperation between 

the services and the landing at San Carlos was no exception; combining 

air, land and maritime forces to great effect, as well as deception operations in all three of these domains. Complementary tactical, operational, 

and strategic-level deception, including the manipulation of the media at 

the political interface, created the environment for the successful amphibious landing. The landing at San Carlos was, ultimately, a truly joint operation underpinned by a wide range of carefully planned and highly effective 

deception measures.
209

Notes

1. Hugh McManners, Forgotten Voices of the Falklands (London: Ebury 

Press, 2007), 219.

2. For more on the sovereignty dispute, see Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: Volume I: The Origins of the Falklands 

War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 4-6. The British claim has rested on both 

self-determination, with the vast majority of the population (99.8% of voters 

in the 2013 referendum) favoring the Falkland Islands remaining a UK overseas territory, and the principle of “acquisitive prescription,” which is based on 

the idea that “after all nations have acquiesced to one nation’s de facto control 

of territory for a period of time, often fifty years, that nation gains legal title 

to that territory.” Klaus Dodds and Alasdair Pinkerton, “The Falkland Islands 

Referendum 2013,” Polar Record, 49:4 (2013), 415; Lowell S. Gustafson, The 

Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1988), xii.

3. The National Archives of the UK (TNA), DEFE 24/2504, Admiral J.D.E. 

Fieldhouse, Commander-in-Chief Fleet to Chief of the Defence Staff, “Operation Sutton: Outline Plan,” 19 April 1982.

4. TNA, Admiral 202/924, Commodore, Amphibious Warfare, “Operation 

Corporate-Report of Proceedings,” 6 September 1982.

5. Lani Kass and J. Phillip London, “Surprise, Deception, Denial and Warning: Strategic Imperatives,” Orbis (Winter 2013), 76.

6. TNA, DEFE 69/1020, Commodore, Amphibious Warfare, “Op Corporate–Amphibious Assault Planning Guide,” 13 May 1982.

7. Stephen Prince, “British Command and Control in the Falklands Campaign,” Defense & Security Analysis, 18:4 (2002), 342.

8. TNA, Admiral 202/924, Commodore, Amphibious Warfare, “Operation 

Corporate-Report of Proceedings,” 6 September 1982; Michael Clapp and Ewen 

Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos 

Water (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007), 78-79.

9. Lieutenant Colonel Mike Morgan, interview with author, 24 October 

2012; Major General Julian Thompson, interview with author, 26 October 2012.

10. TNA, DEFE 24/2504, COS TS9(1), “Presentation,” undated; Julian 

Thompson, “Force Projection and the Falklands Conflict,” in Stephen Badsey, 

Rob Havers and Mark Grove (eds.), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: 

Lessons for the Future (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005), 84. Although Major 

General Moore officially took over on 12 May, he did not arrive in theatre until 

30 May and communication problems meant that Brigadier Thompson was 

the de facto Landing Force Commander for the landing at San Carlos. Julian 

Thompson, “Falkland Islands: Operation Corporate, May-June 1982,” in Tristan 

Lovering (ed.), Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from the Sea (Woodbridge: Seafarer Books, 2007), 460.

11. TNA, DEFE 24/2504, Ministry of Defence, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 

“Directive to the Commander-in-Chief Fleet: Operation Sutton,” 15 April 1982.
210

12. Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 87.

13. Julian Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands: No Picnic 

(Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2013), 32.

14. Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Reasons in Writing: A Commando’s View of the 

Falklands War (London: Leo Cooper, 1993), 147.

15. Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade, 33.

16. Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands 

Battle Group Commander (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 189.

17. TNA, Admiral 202/815/1, Staffs, COMAW and HQ 3 Cdo Bde (RM), 

“An Appreciation of the Situation in the Falkland Islands,” 15 April 1982; Julian 

Thompson, The Royal Marines: From Sea Soldiers to a Special Force (London: 

Sidgwick & Jackson, 2000), 560.

18. Thompson, “Force Projection,” 89.

19. TNA, Admiral 202/924, Commodore, Amphibious Warfare, “Operation 

Corpoate-Report of Proceedings,” 6 September 1982.

20. Thompson, interview.

21. Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of 

Failure in War (New York: Free Press, 2006), 118.

22. TNA, DEFE 24/2504, COS S17, “Defence of the Falkland Island-An 

“Argentine” Appreciation,” 14 April 1982.

23. Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 100.

24. Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, 148.

25. Nick van Der Bijl, Victory in the Falklands (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 

2007), 35 & 37.

26. van Der Bijl, 39.

27. Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the “Malvinas:” The Argentine 

Forces in the Falklands War (London: Viking, 1989), 55-56.

28. Middlebrook, 81.

29. Nicholas van der Bijl and David Aldea, 5th Infantry Brigade in the 

Falklands War (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003), 158-159.

30. Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 

Volume II: War and Diplomacy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 441.

31. Middlebrook, The Fight for the “Malvinas,” 143-144.

32. TNA, DEFE 24/2504, Admiral J.D.E. Fieldhouse, Commander-in-Chief 

Fleet to Chief of the Defence Staff, “Operation Sutton: Outline Plan,” 19 April 1982.

33. Woodward, One Hundred Days, 131.

34. Alastair Finlan, The Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf 

War: Culture and Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 89.

35. TNA, DEFE 24/2504, Colonel T.S. Sneyd, “Deception Proposals-Liaison with CINCFLEET HQ Northwood,” April 1982.

36. Woodward, One Hundred Days, 132.

37. Steven Paget, “Under Fire: The Falklands War and the Revival of Naval 

Gunfire Support,” War in History, 24:2 (2017), 222.

38. Commodore Michael Clapp, written interview with author, 9 January 2013.

39. Freedman, The Official History, Volume II, 462-463.
211

40. Sharkey Ward, Sea Harrier over the Falklands (London: Cassell, 2003), 183.

41. Woodward, One Hundred Days, 132-133.

42. TNA, DEFE 24/2511, “Operation Corporate: Air Commander’s Report-Report of Proceedings,” 27 October 1982.

43. Lawrence Freedman, “Air Power and the Falklands, 1982,” in John Andreas Olsen (ed.), A History of Air Warfare (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2010), 164.

44. TNA, DEFE 13/1663, DPR (RAF), “Accusations of MOD Official 

Statements Aiding Argentine Intelligence,” 11 June 1982.

45. Woodward, One Hundred Days, 132.

46. David Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War (London: Leo 

Cooper, 1987), 174.

47. TNA, Admiral 202/1002, 148 (Meiktila) Commando Forward Observation Battery, Royal Artillery, “Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): Report of 

Naval Gunfire Support,” 1 July 1982; David Hart Dyke, Four Weeks in May: The 

Loss of HMS Coventry, A Captain’s Story (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), 78-79.

48. Brown, The Royal Navy, 171.

49. Woodward, One Hundred Days, 244-245.

50. Captain Michael Barrow, written interview with author, 10 September 

2012.

51. The radio station had been set up “in support of operational plans to 

demoralise Argentine troops”. TNA, DEFE 24/2254, Press Desk, “Radio Atlantico Del Sur,” 21 May 1982; TNA, DEFE 24/2254, SPG28: “Media Assessment Team Directive,” 4 May 1982; TNA, DEFE 24/2254, Note by Ministry of 

Defence Officials, “Radio Atlantico Del Sur,” 14 May 1982.

52. Commander Ian Inskip, Ordeal by Exocet: HMS Glamorgan and the 

Falklands War 1982 (London: Chatham Publishing, 2002), 105.

53. Barrow, written interview; Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious 

Assault Falklands, 100.

54. Freedman, The Official History, Volume II, 417.

55. John Roberts, Safeguarding the Nation: The Story of the Modern Royal 

Navy (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2009), 144.

56. TNA, DEFE 24/2504, Chief of the Defence Staff, “Landing Operations-Falkland Islands,” undated.

57. TNA, Admiral 202/815/2, Brigadier J.H.A. Thompson to Major GeneralRM, “Operation Sutton: Air and Sea Superiority,” 6 May 1982.

58. Freedman, The Official History, Volume II, 282.

59. TNA, Admiral 202/892, CTG 317.8, “Operation Corporate War Diary,” 

undated.

60. Woodward, One Hundred Days, 143.

61. TNA, Admiral 202/815/2, CTG 317.1 to Major GeneralRM, “Op Sutton,” 

6 May 1982.

62. McManners, Forgotten Voices, 182-183.

63. Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 100.

64. TNA, DEFE 24/2504, Rear Admiral D.M. Eckersley-Maslin, “Operation 

Corporate-Study of Scope for Delaying Landing Operations on the Falkland Is-
212

lands,” 18 April 1982; TNA, DEFE 24/2504, D.A. Reece (SO2 Army Ops), “Op 

Corporate-Maintaining the Landing Force at Ascension Island,” 17 April 1982.

65. Woodward, One Hundred Days, 229-230.

66. Alastair Finlan, “British Special Forces and the Falklands Conflict: 

Twenty Years On,” Defense & Security Analysis, 18:4 (2002), 324.

67. TNA, DEFE 69/987, “Operation Corporate-845 Squadron Report of 

Proceedings,” 1 September 1982.

68. Hugh McManners, Falklands Commando (London: William Kimber, 

1984), 105.

69. Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 133.

70. McManners, Forgotten Voices, 197-198.

71. Alastair Finlan, “British Special Forces in the Falklands War of 1982,” 

Small Wars & Insurgencies, 13:3 (2002), 89.

72. TNA, Admiral 202/924, Commodore, Amphibious Warfare, “Operation 

Corporate-Report of Proceedings,” 6 September 1982.

73. Freedman, The Official History, Volume II, 465.

74. Middlebrook, The Fight for the “Malvinas,” 151.

75. TNA, Admiral 202/892, CTG 317.8, “Operation Corporate War Diary,” 

undated.

76. Ivar Hellberg, “Falklands Logistics,” The RUSI Journal, 152:3 (2007), 61-62.

77. Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 144.

78. Woodward, One Hundred Days, 262.

79. TNA, Admiral 202/924, Commodore, Amphibious Warfare, “Operation Corporate-Report of Proceedings,” 6 September 1982.

80. TNA, Admiral 201/276, Major General J.J. Moore, Headquarters, Commando Forces, Royal Marines, “Operation Corporate-Report of Proceedings,” 

18 October 1982.

81. Secretary of State for Defence, The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons 

(London: HMSO, 1983), 9. Notably, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, the First Sea 

Lord, had anticipated that six destroyers/frigates might be sunk during the conflict, but he was prepared to tolerate double those losses. Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the Thatcher Era (London: 

Simon & Schuster, 2009), 341.

82. Freedman, The Official History, Volume II, 472.

83. Nicholas van der Bijl, Nine Battles to Stanley (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 

1999), 113.

84. John Shirley, “The Day Argentina Knew War was Lost,” The Guardian, 

21 May 2007.

85. Lawrence Freedman, “On Military Advice,” The RUSI Journal, 162:3 

(2017), 18.

86. Freedman, The Official History, Volume II, 457.

87. TNA, DEFE 13/1663, DPR (RAF), “Accusations of MOD Official 

Statements Aiding Argentine Intelligence,” 11 June 1982.

88. Freedman, The Official History, Volume II, 463.
213

89. Valerie Adams, The Media and the Falklands Campaign (Houndmills: 

Macmillan, 1986), 106-107.

90. D. George Boyce, The Falklands War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 155.

91. Adams, The Media, 107.

92. TNA, DEFE 47/59, Neville Taylor, “Falkland Operation: PR Report,” 2 

July 1982.

93. TNA, PREM 19/630, “Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence,” 

24 May 1982.

94. Ian Speller, “Delayed Reaction: UK Maritime Expeditionary Capabilities and the Lessons of the Falklands Conflict,” Defense & Security Analysis, 

18:4 (2002), 368.

95. Kass and London, “Surprise,” 76.

96. James Corum, “Argentine Air Power in the Falklands War: An Operational View,” Air & Space Power Journal (Fall 2002), 72-73.

97. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Sunset for the Royal Marines? 

The Royal Marines and UK Amphibious Capability,” 4 February 2018, 9.

215

Chapter 12

Deception in the Desert

Deceiving Iraq in Operation DESERT STORM

Donald P. Wright

Operation DESERT STORM remains one of the shortest and least 

costly of America’s military victories. The Coalition campaign that began 

in January 1991 opened with five weeks of air strikes that attacked both 

strategic targets and tactical units. With Iraqi forces reeling from the air 

campaign, the ground offensive began on 24 February and in less than 100 

hours, dislodged Iraqi forces from Kuwait and compelled Saddam Hussein 

to capitulate. The victory came at the cost of less than 250 lives on the 

Coalition side.

The success of Operation DESERT STORM was founded on the decisive advantage in training, armament, and leadership held by US air and 

ground forces. Equally important, however, was the way in which senior 

Coalition commanders employed these advantages against the Iraqi Army. 

The plan for the ground campaign featured a broad Coalition attack on 

Iraqi units in Kuwait that fixed them in position. At the same time, mobile 

and lethal armored forces enveloped the Iraqi Army from the west, by 

driving deep into southern Iraq, aiming for the Iraqi Republican Guards divisions, Saddam’s Hussein’s strategic reserve and Praetorian Guard. This 

envelopment proved to be the devastating blow that forced the Iraqi Army 

out of Kuwait and into a headlong retreat northward into Iraq.

Deception played a key role in the way this plan developed. Given 

the size, capability, and deployment of the Iraqi Army, deceiving the Iraqi 

chain of command at both the operational and tactical levels became critical to Coalition commanders. This chapter examines the development and 

implementation of the Coalition deception plan, including the plan’s objectives, the ways and means used to achieve these goals, and the degree 

to which the plan succeeded in misleading Iraqi commanders.

Operation Desert Shield—Defending Saudi Arabia

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi military forces attacked Kuwait and quickly 

took control of the small state on the Persian Gulf. As justification for the 

invasion, Saddam Hussein claimed that Kuwait was historically a province of Iraq, a dubious assertion at best. In reality, after the long and expensive war against Iran left Iraq with large debts, Saddam was far more 
216

interested in debt forgiveness from his allied neighbors or control over 

Kuwait’s large oil reserves that would provide an infusion of much-needed 

capital. In a matter of days, Iraqi forces not only seized Kuwait but took 

position on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, posing a clear threat to the Saudi oil 

fields. The Saudi king requested international support on 6 August and a 

global coalition led by the United States immediately answered the call.

Within three days US Air Force aircraft took position just behind the 

Saudi-Kuwaiti border and a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division secured key military sites inside Saudi Arabia. Over the next two months, 

US ground forces continued to flow into the country and pushed out toward the Kuwaiti border to join Saudi units in defensive positions oriented 

against a possible Iraqi attack. By the end of September, the rest of the 

82nd Airborne Division had arrived along with the other main elements 

of the XVIII Airborne Corps—101st Airborne Division, the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment—as well as 

the 1st Marine Division. A significant amount of air power provided by the 

Saudi Air Force, US Air Force, and US Navy complemented the expanding ground defenses. The US Navy had also positioned a US Marine amphibious force consisting of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) 

and 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in the Persian Gulf just off 

the Kuwaiti coast.

The defense of Saudi Arabia, called Operation DESERT SHIELD, 

quickly became a multi-national effort. Egypt, Syria, France, and the 

United Kingdom joined the Coalition and began sending forces to Saudi 

Arabia in the fall of 1990. By the end of October, Coalition partners 

had deployed over 200,000 troops to DESERT SHIELD—130,000 of 

which were American.1

 Central Command (CENTCOM), led by US 

Army General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, served as the overall theater 

headquarters for the campaign. Most US ground forces fell under the 

XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters and occupied positions behind the 

Saudi and Arab partner units on the front lines along the Kuwaiti border. 

However, CENTCOM maintained amphibious forces afloat, expanding 

in October the number of Marine units prepared to conduct operations 

along the Kuwaiti and Iraqi coastline.

On the other side of the border, Iraqi forces had consolidated into a defensive posture. Iraqi records seized in 2003 show little evidence that the 

senior Iraqi leadership had serious intent to invade Saudi Arabia in 1990.2

However, Saddam Hussein remained determined to retain his hold on Kuwait and, in August, began deploying more forces along the Kuwaiti-Saudi 

border. By late September, twenty Iraqi divisions occupied Kuwait. Nine 
217

of these divisions deployed along the Saudi frontier where they constructed complex defenses comprised of dug-in positions protected by minefields.3

 Mobile mechanized forces, armed with modern weaponry and capable of mounting counter-attacks against Coalition attacks, backed up the 

front-line divisions. To counter a Coalition amphibious landing, the Iraqi 

military command placed several infantry divisions along the Kuwaiti 

coast. As his reserve, Saddam positioned the Republican Guard Forces 

Command, a corps of eight elite divisions, in southeastern Iraq just north 

of the Kuwaiti border. In early October, the total Iraqi force in Kuwait and 

southeastern Iraq numbered approximately 430,000.4

The Shift to the Offensive

In mid-September 1990, when it appeared that Saddam Hussein no 

longer posed a threat to Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM began planning for 

offensive operations designed to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.5 The 

planning process sped up in the month that followed as it became clear 

that peaceful means would not secure an Iraqi withdrawal. In October, 

General Schwarzkopf’s planners initially conceived of an air-land offensive that relied on the forces immediately available in Saudi Arabia and 

the region. For the land operation, this meant the XVIII Airborne Corps, 

the recently arrived 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Marine Division, and 

Arab, British, and French forces. The early versions of the plan offered a 

straightforward concept: after an air offensive destroyed command networks as well as other strategic targets and attrited Iraq’s ground units, 

Coalition forces would attack along three axes directly into Kuwait.6

 The 

main effort would attempt to outflank the strongest Iraqi defensive positions by attacking up the Wadi al Batin, a dry streambed that formed the 

western Iraqi-Kuwaiti border and had served repeatedly as an invasion 

route between the Arabian Peninsula and Mesopotamia. This main force 

would drive north up the wadi toward Kuwait’s northern border, cutting 

off Iraqi forces in the southern part of Kuwait. Because much of the 

combat power in the plan came from XVIII Airborne Corps, this became 

known as the “One Corps” concept.

 However, no one at CENTCOM was satisfied with this plan. In the 

eight years of war against the Iranians, Iraqi military leaders had successfully learned how to plan and conduct defenses in depth. Moreover, by 

October 1990, it was clear to Coalition commanders that Iraqi positions 

in Kuwait were complex and manned by a force roughly equal in size 

to the one they had available for the ground offensive. Even if the air 

campaign succeeded in wearing down Iraqi combat power in Kuwait, the 

ground campaign would still likely face staunch resistance. After the war, 
218

Schwarzkopf described the “One Corps” concept as a “straight-up-themiddle charge right into the teeth of the Iraqi defenses” that lacked any 

element of surprise and would likely incur “substantial” Coalition casualties, threatening popular support at home.7

On 11 October, the CENTCOM staff briefed this plan to President 

George H. W. Bush and his national security staff. Neither Bush nor his 

advisors were comfortable with the “One Corps” concept and encouraged 

Schwarzkopf to be more imaginative. Four days later, the CENTCOM 

commander told his planners to develop a new concept for the offensive 

that included a second US Army armored corps. Schwarzkopf’s new vision featured a bold envelopment of Iraqi forces from west of the Kuwait 

border. The Iraqi Army had arrayed its defenses along Kuwait’s east coast 

and its southern border. But the Iraqi defensive line terminated just west of 

the Wadi al Batin and there were no forces along Kuwait’s western border. 

This defensive scheme presented a right flank vulnerable to the type of 

envelopment Schwarzkopf had envisioned.

The new CENTCOM plan—labeled the “Two Corps” concept—took 

advantage of the open Iraqi flank. First, a supporting attack by the XVIII 

Airborne Corps, US Marines, and other Coalition units would drive directly into Kuwait to seize Kuwait City, an action that would effectively 

fix Iraqi forces. In what eventually became known as the “Left Hook,” the 

Persian

Gulf

Saudi Arabia

Iraq

Iran

Kuwait City

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17 Jan

25 Jan

Qatar

USMC

International Boundary

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Preparing for the Ground War

20 January–24 February 1991

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17 Feb

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Figure 12.1. Preparing for the ground war, January-February 1991. Graphic 

created by CSI Press staff.
219

newly-added armored corps would then move quickly north from its attack positions west of the Kuwaiti border (on the Coalition left flank) into 

Iraq and strike deep to the Euphrates River thereby cutting off Iraqi forces 

in Kuwait. Then the corps would attack east toward to destroy the Republican Guards Force Command, their main objective, located on Kuwait’s 

northern border.8 On 8 November, President Bush formally ordered the 

US Army’s VII Corps, consisting of two armored divisions, a mechanized 

infantry division, and an armored cavalry regiment, to deploy from Germany to Saudi Arabia. Schwarzkopf would soon have the two corps that 

made his plan of envelopment a reality.

As November progressed, however, concerns in CENTCOM grew 

about the forces required to attain both objectives of the envelopment: 

cutting off Iraqi forces in Kuwait and destroying the Republican Guards 

Forces Command. To address this, CENTCOM strengthened the “Left 

Hook” by adding the XVIII Airborne Corps to it. The four divisions in this 

corps would now serve as the western-most elements of the envelopment 

and strike deep toward the city of An Nasiriyah. The VII Corps would also 

receive reinforcement in the form of the British 1st Armoured Division, 

giving the corps a total strength of three armored divisions, a mechanized 

infantry division, and an armored cavalry regiment. Additionally, to make 

an amphibious landing in Kuwait more feasible, Schwarzkopf added the 

5th MEB to the Marine forces afloat.

The new “Two Corps” concept—with the envelopment force as the 

new main effort—drew its viability from the element of surprise. To help 

guarantee this, the CENTCOM commander and staff began to develop a 

complex deception plan designed to mask Coalition intent at the operational and tactical levels. From CENTCOM’s perspective, the Coalition 

effort could not succeed unless the Iraqis had been deceived about the true 

scheme of the offensive campaign.

The Deception Plan

In the fall of 1990, several doctrinal works provided the foundation 

for the development of military deception plans. Field Manual (FM) 100-

5, Operations (1986), stated that deception was integral to operations and 

established the optimal characteristics of deception, emphasizing simplicity and believability. Equally important was the manual’s contention that 

the most effective form of military deception was the exploitation of the 

enemy’s preconceptions, stating that commanders should try to “convince 

an opponent to believe what he wants to believe anyway-that his current 

course of action is correct.”9

 Known as Magruder’s Principle, this form of 
220

deception is based on the idea that it is far easier to exploit the enemy’s 

beliefs than to alter those beliefs.10 The most common example used to 

illustrate Magruder’s Principle is the elaborate plan created by the western 

Allies during the Second World War to deceive the Germans as to where 

the invasion of France would actually take place. Hitler and his generals 

believed strongly that the invasion site would be the Pas de Calais. Accordingly, the Allies created a plan that reinforced this preconception and 

successfully exploited it to assist the actual landings in Normandy, over 

200 miles from the Pas de Calais.

FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception (1988), went into far greater detail on 

how commanders and staffs develop deception plans. The US Army had 

not practiced operational deception in large-scale combat operations since 

the Korean War. Before DESERT STORM, the most recent use of military 

deception by the US Army as part of Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989. In 

that operation, Army planners had focused deception at the tactical-level, mainly using repetitive small-unit exercises and movements to lull the 

Panamanian Defense Forces into a sense of complacency. 11 The US Army 

published FM 90-2 to help revive the US Army’s ability to integrate deception into operations at all levels. The manual offered the maxims of 

deception including Magruder’s Principle as well as historical cases of 

successful and unsuccessful deception efforts. FM 90-2 contended that 

successful battlefield deception rested on three “cornerstones:” Intelligence Support, Integration and Synchronization, and Operational Security.12 Further, FM 90-2 directed planners to identify the main objective 

of the deception, the target of the operation, and the “story” they would 

communicate to achieve the objective. CENTCOM employed all these elements in the DESERT STORM deception plan.

 The development of the CENTCOM deception plan began on 6 November 1990 when General Schwarzkopf formally approved the “Two 

Corps” concept. To create the plan, he turned to a special cell in the CENTCOM Plans (J5) staff section.13 Schwarzkopf gave the planners in the cell 

a simple objective: prevent the Iraqis from learning about the two corps 

envelopment from the west.14 The best way to do this was to keep the Iraqi 

focus on Coalition forces just south of Kuwait and afloat in the Persian 

Gulf to the east.15 Saddam Hussein and his military commanders had to be 

convinced that Coalition attack would come either from across the border 

to the south or from the waters to the east. Preferably they should think 

that the ground invasion would include both an attack north across the 

Saudi-Kuwaiti border and an amphibious landing from the Persian Gulf. 

The Iraqi national command should not have any indication of a Coalition 
221

invasion of Iraq directly from its western flank. If it worked, this deception 

plan would prevent the Iraqis from repositioning forces to that open flank, 

making the envelopment far more likely to secure Coalition objectives 

swiftly and with relatively few casualties.

Magruder’s Principle served as the foundation for the plan. By November 1990, the Iraqi defensive array in Kuwait served as strong indication of how Saddam Hussein and his generals understood Coalition intent. The Iraqi command had significantly strengthened its defenses on the 

southern Kuwaiti border as well as on the Persian Gulf Coast. They had 

deployed several additional infantry divisions just west of Wadi al Batin 

but had done nothing to protect its open western flank. For the CENTCOM 

deception cell, the best means to achieve the goal set by Schwarzkopf was 

to reinforce the Iraqi preconception of the Coalition offensive campaign. 

To do this, the CENTCOM planners determined that their main target was 

Saddam Hussein who, in 1990, oversaw all aspects of Iraqi military operations, to include the placement of Iraqi forces in Kuwait and southern 

Iraq.16 The “story” aimed at the Iraqi leader was simple: Coalition forces 

deployments, actions, and announcements all indicated a ground offensive 

featuring amphibious landings from the gulf and attacks from the south 

toward Kuwait City and up the Wadi al Batin.

The Deception Begins

The most important part of the deception plan involved the disposition 

and movement of the two US corps that made up the “Left Hook.” The locations of the VII and XVIII Airborne Corps had to support the deception 

story until the Iraqis were no longer capable of detecting their move to 

attack positions on the western flank. For this reason, both the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps remained in tactical assembly areas dozens of 

miles south of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border until after the air campaign began 

on 17 January 1991. The VII Corps’ assembly area was forty miles south 

of the Saudi-Kuwait border just east of Wadi al Batin, a location that reinforced the Iraqi presumption of an attack up that streambed into Kuwait. 

According to the CENTCOM deception plan, early air strikes eliminated 

specific Iraqi intelligence sensors, including observation posts and radar 

sites that might have identified the relocation of the two US corps to the 

western flank. At roughly the same time, Army counterintelligence teams 

moved into the area near the Saudi town of Hafr al Batin to spread the story of an imminent US attack north up the Wadi al Batin among suspected 

Iraqi agents.17
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On 20 January, after the Coalition had essentially achieved air superiority, the units of the XVIII Airborne Corps started moving west toward 

their attack position approximately 125 miles west of Wadi al Batin, near 

Ahvaz

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Forces

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24th

Mechanized

Infantry 2nd Armored

Cavalry Regiment 1st

Infantry

1st Cavalry

1st Armored 3rd Armored

British Forces

XVIII ABN CORPS

ARMY CENTRAL

COMMAND

VII CORPS

2nd Marine Div 1st Marine Div

Arab

Forces

Coalition Forces

Hafar al Batin

Kuwait City

Ash Shabakah

As Salman

As Samawah

An Nasiriyah

Al Basrah

Az Zubayr

Bubiyan

Island

King Khalid Military City

Safwan

r evi R sir gi T

Hawr al Hammar

Persian

Gulf

Saudi Arabia

Kuwait

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0 20 40 50 Miles

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eratio

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ert Storm

24–25 February 1991

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International Boundary

Oilfields

Elevation 500 ft.

Elevation 1.000 ft.

Elevation 1,500 ft.

Elevation over 2,000 ft.

 Figure 12.2. Operation Desert Storm, 24-25 February 1991. Graphic created by 

CSI Press staff.
223

the Saudi town of Rafha. Moving mostly at night, by both ground and air, 

and following strict operational security measures, the corps completed its 

300-mile movement on 25 January. The VII Corps delayed its movement 

west until 15 February, nine days before the scheduled beginning of the 

ground offensive, for two reasons: its attack position was much closer to 

its assembly area—approximately forty miles west of Wadi al Batin; and 

the longer its units remained east of Wadi al Batin, the more the corps reinforced the Iraqi belief that the Coalition planned to attack directly north 

into Kuwait.

Because synchronization of the deception plan across the theater was 

so important, the CENTCOM deception plan directed several critical actions to occur simultaneously with the movement of the two corps into the 

attack positions. On the operational level, CENTCOM directed the Marines afloat in the gulf to increase their preparation and rehearsals for an 

amphibious assault in January and early February. Schwarzkopf had used 

amphibious exercises in the fall to induce the Iraqi leadership into thinking that an attack would come from the sea. After the air campaign began, 

he hoped to reinforce this belief. The CENTCOM commander stated that 

after the air campaign began:

We continued our heavy operations out in the sea because we 

wanted the Iraqis to continue to believe that we were going 

to conduct a massive amphibious operation in this area...we 

wanted him [Saddam Hussein] to concentrate his forces [in 

Kuwait]—which he did.18

To assist in this effort, CENTCOM allowed the media to cover the Marines 

as they rehearsed amphibious operations and broadcast stories about those 

preparations. General Schwarzkopf also made very public visits to Marine 

Amphibious units on 15 February, a move designed to keep Iraqi attention 

on the Persian Gulf.19 On 24 February, the first day of the ground offensive, the Marines and Navy mounted an amphibious feint that consisted 

of the battleship USS Missouri firing on an island just east of Kuwait City 

and SEAL teams landing on the Kuwaiti coast to detonate explosives simulating the first phase in Coalition amphibious landings.20

CENTCOM integrated and synchronized the deception plan at the tactical-level as well. Two weeks before the ground offensive began, Schwarzkopf’s staff held a deception planning conference and disseminated guidance to lower level units.21 That guidance emphasized the larger objective: 

reinforce the Iraqi belief that the main attacks would be made directly 

into Kuwait. To mask the operational shift to the west, the Iraqis had to 
224

believe that both the VII Corps and the XVIII Airborne Corps remained 

in their assembly areas and intended to attack into Kuwait, east of Wadi 

al Batin. The XVIII Airborne Corps nested its own deception plan under 

the CENTCOM deception framework. The corps fielded a twelve-person 

deception cell which had deployed to Saudi Arabia with camouflage decoys, communication emulators, and other equipment. Each of the four 

divisions in the corps had their own deception teams and equipment. On 

13 February, 300 Soldiers, including the deception teams, PSYOPS teams, 

a signal company, an engineer platoon, a smoke platoon, and an infantry 

platoon, moved into what were called “deception tactical assembly areas” 

near the Kuwaiti border. These forces communicated and conducted operations that emulated major XVIII Airborne Corps units. The corps reinforced the deception story by dropping half a million surrender leaflets 

on Iraqi units to the immediate north of the deception assembly areas and 

spreading messages in nearby Saudi communities about an impending attack due north.

In the VII Corps Tactical Assembly Area, the deception measures involved combat actions. On 20 January, the Syrian 9th Armored Division 

began pulling out of its position on the Saudi border just west of Wadi al 

Batin. The US 1st Cavalry Division, designated as the theater reserve, replaced the Syrians and faced several Iraqi infantry divisions dug in across 

the border.22 The 1st Cavalry Division’s mission was to attract Iraqi attention, masking the movement of VII Corps to its attack positions. The 

division’s actions involved aggressive patrolling of the border by ground 

and air scouts as well as engineer operations consistent with preparations 

for an attack. Periodically, soldiers of the division fired artillery rounds 

or anti-tank missiles at Iraqi targets. The activity increased in intensity as 

the date of the ground offensive approached. On 19 and 20 February, the 

division commander sent mechanized units across the Iraqi border and up 

Wadi al Batin to conduct a reconnaissance. Finding Iraqi forces occupying well-prepared and complex defensive positions, the 1st Cavalry units 

became embroiled in a five hour battle that included artillery strikes and 

close air support. Throughout this month long period of increased combat, 

as the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps moved toward their attack 

positions on the western flank, the Iraqi units in the Wadi al Batin sector 

remained focused on the 1st Cavalry Division, as intended.

The Ground Offensive and the Deception Plan—An Assessment

Before dawn on 24 February 1991, a brigade from the 101st Airborne 

Division crossed the Saudi border and air assaulted deep into southern 

Iraq. The far edge of the “Left Hook” was now moving and the ground of-
225

fensive was underway. On the western flank, XVIII Airborne Corps units 

met little enemy resistance and those few Iraqi units they encountered 

were surprised by the sudden appearance of Coalition forces. So successful was the offensive on this edge of the flank that Schwarzkopf directed 

VII Corps to attack earlier than planned so that it could keep up with the 

XVIII Airborne Corps. VII Corps’ divisions attacked from their positions 

west of Wadi al Batin and met little resistance from an unprepared enemy. 

As part of that attack, the 1st Cavalry Division executed the last action in 

the CENTCOM deception plan. As VII Corps began moving across their 

line of departure, the 1st Cavalry Division mounted a feint north up the 

Wadi al Batin that included artillery, attack helicopters, and a full brigade 

assault into Iraqi defensive lines. As the feint culminated 15 kilometers 

north of the border, VII Corps to the west pushed into Iraqi territory.23

On the eastern flank of the CENTCOM offensive, Arab and US Marine units attacked into the main Iraqi line of defense. They met far more 

resistance and progress was slower. However by day two of the ground 

campaign, the Coalition was far ahead of the plan’s timeline. The XVIII 

Airborne Corps had already seized the highway near the city of An Nasiryah, over 100 miles inside Iraq. By day three, VII Corps turned northeast and began the attack against the divisions of the Republican Guard 

Forces Command. Marine units in the east reached the outskirts of Kuwait 

City, taking thousands of Iraqi prisoners and watching as other Iraqi soldiers streamed north toward Iraq and away from the fight. On the fourth 

day, VII Corps completed its near destruction of the Republican Guard, 

Arab forces liberated Kuwait City, and the Coalition announced a cease 

fire. The ground offensive had achieved all of its objectives in less than 

100 hours.

To what degree had the CENTCOM deception plan succeeded? Deception planners at several levels devised means of confirming whether 

their actions were having the desired effect. The CENTCOM planners 

designated both airborne surveillance (JSTARS), special operations units, 

and other collectors to monitor Iraqi unit dispositions.24 As the start of the 

ground campaign approached, the CENTCOM intelligence staff was certain that the Iraqis remained positioned to defend against an amphibious 

assault and attacks directly into Kuwait. On the tactical-level, the XVIII 

Airborne Corps deception cell received signals intercepts that verified Iraqi 

units believed the corps remained located just south of the Kuwaiti border 

rather than hundreds of miles west on the edge of the Left Hook.25 In the 

immediate aftermath of the DESERT STORM, Schwarzkopf deemed the 

deception plan, especially the Marine amphibious threat, a critical suc-
226

cess.26 As evidence of the deception plan’s success, many participants in 

DESERT STORM and analysts of the campaign have pointed to the fact 

that through 24 February 1991, Saddam Hussein maintained many of his 

divisions along the Kuwaiti coast, few west of Wadi al Batin, and none on 

his western flank.27 These dispositions suggested strongly that the Iraqis 

had not detected the two Coalition corps on the western flank.

Since 2003, assessments of captured Iraqi documents present a more 

complex story. Those records reveal that beginning in August 1990, 

Saddam Hussein and his senior Iraqi commanders expected the Coalition to launch a combined air and ground campaign to liberate Kuwait. 

Further, senior Iraqi officials were unanimous in their assumption that 

the main Coalition offensive would come on the Kuwaiti border, with a 

corps-level attack via the Wadi al Batin.28 Concerns about an amphibious landing in Kuwait began in September 1990 with some of the Iraqi 

leadership expressing alarm as well about possible Coalition airborne 

operations to the north of Kuwait City.29 By January 1991, Saddam and 

his advisors were clearly focused on enemy forces to the south of the Kuwaiti border and to the east in the Persian Gulf in expectation of attacks 

from both these directions.

In that month, however, the Iraqi leadership began to receive reports 

of US forces moving west. Saddam received a report of this on 23 January 1991 from his Military Intelligence Directorate, known as the GMID, 

which indicated “a massive movement of hostile forces with helicopters 

going towards Rafha.”30 The GMID director noted that this report correlated positively with information he was receiving from an Iraqi embassy 

in an unnamed country. At this point, the GMID interpreted this as an 

American move to protect their western flank during the coming ground 

offensive which they maintained would come across the Kuwaiti border.

In early February, the GMID reported more indications of a major 

concentration of Coalition troops on the western flank. One source reported US troops from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions near the 

Saudi town of Ar Ar, just west of Rafha. This area was in fact the western 

edge of the XVIII Airborne Corps attack position. The GMID director sent 

a memorandum to Saddam’s office several days later which argued that 

previous assumption about a Coalition amphibious assault was likely a 

deception.31 This information might have had a bigger impact on Saddam 

and his senior leaders if they were not also receiving intelligence about 

the concentration of US armor units near the Wadi al Batin as well as 

imminent amphibious and airborne assaults in Kuwait, all of which reinforced their presumptive understanding of the Coalition plan.32 Still, in 
227

the second week of February, reports from a variety of sources about large 

contingents of enemy forces on the western flank continued to flow into 

senior Iraqi headquarters, breeding confusion about Coalition intent.

By 18 February, confusion had given way to clarity. On that day, the 

GMID sent Saddam’s office a report that offered a generally accurate assessment of the Coalition Left Hook, including a warning that the enveloping force could easily strike deep into Iraq and cut off Iraqi forces in Kuwait.33 Thus a week before the ground offensive was scheduled to begin, 

Saddam Hussein and his senior commanders had received a clear picture 

of the Coalition threat on the western flank and an accurate estimate of the 

intent of those forces. Yet the Iraqis did essentially nothing to counter this 

danger. As with the attacks at Pearl Harbor and on 9/11, sometimes accurate indicators can be drowned out in a cacophony of false noise.

The captured records do not reveal how Saddam and his senior reacted 

to this GMID report or what plans might have been discussed to counter 

the Left Hook. As one analyst of the captured Iraqi documents has noted, by mid-February 1991, Coalition air superiority meant that the Iraqis 

could not shift ground forces without risking their destruction. Further, 

the identification of the Left Hook did not dissipate Iraqi concerns about 

the amphibious threat and the concentration of enemy forces along the 

Kuwaiti border, as the coalition remained capable of executing all three 

simultaneously. Iraqi preconceptions about Coalition intent had paralyzed 

Saddam Hussein’s Army.

The CENTCOM deception plan ultimately proved a success. The use 

of Magruder’s Principle as the foundation of the plan was the most critical 

factor in the successful deception. For over five months, CENTCOM’s 

dispositions and actions reinforced the Iraqi assumption about how the 

Coalition would try to liberate Kuwait. CENTCOM’s efforts to synchronize the elements of the plan in time and integrate the deception into the 

operational and tactical levels as well as between ground and maritime 

services were the reasons why Iraqi preconceptions endured well into February 1991. Clearly, CENTCOM had not been able to prevent the Iraqis 

from detecting the XVIII Airborne and VII Corps shift to the west. However, in retrospect, that failure was relatively unimportant given Iraqi operational limitations, especially after the Coalition air campaign achieved 

air superiority. All adversaries have vulnerabilities and good military deception plans take advantage of those weaknesses in order to increase the 

chance of winning on the battlefield. CENTCOM’s deception plan did just 

this, strengthening the likelihood of victory by confusing the enemy and 
228

preventing him from gaining accurate information about the exact time, 

place, and scale of the Coalition’s successful effort to liberate Kuwait.
229

Notes

1. Richard M. Swain, Lucky War: Third Army in DESERT STORM (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), 

38. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Englehardt, SSI Special Report. Desert Shield 

and DESERT STORM: A Chronology and Troop List (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 1991), 23-25.

2. Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic 

Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 125.

3. Woods, 139; Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus (eds.), The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and DESERT 

STORM (Washington D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1995), 103.

4. Englehardt, Desert Shield and DESERT STORM, 22.

5. Swain, Lucky War, 76-77. Swain notes that planning for an air offensive 

began in August 1990.

6. Schubert and Kraus, The Whirlwind War, 9-10.

7. Norman H. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero: The Autobiography 

(New York: Bantam, 1992), 356.

8. Swain, Lucky War, 92.

9. US Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington DC: 1986), 53.

10. Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, 

“Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore” (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 

Agency, 1981), 5.

11.Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, 

Planning, and Crisis Management June 1987–December 1989 (Washington DC: 

US Army Center of Military History, 2008), 208.

12. US Army, Field Manual 90-2, Battlefield Deception (Washington DC: 

1988), 1-30 – 1-32.

13. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas L. Tystad, “The Role of the Media in the 

Operational Deception Plan for Operation DESERT STORM” (Monograph, 

School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992), 15. This information obtained by 

author through interview of chief CENTCOM DESERT STORM planner.

14. Richard M. Swain, Lucky War, 89.

15. Stephen A. Bourque, Jayhawk!: The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War

(Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2002), 31.

16. Tystad, “The Role of the Media in the Operational Deception Plan for 

Operation DESERT STORM,”16.

17. Tystad, 20.

18. General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, CENTCOM News Briefing Transcript, 27 February 1991. Reprinted in Major Charles D. Melson, Evelyn A. Englander, and Captain David A. Dawson (eds.) US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 

1990-1991: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Washington DC: USMC 

Histories and Museums Division, 1995), 49.

19. Tystad, “The Role of the Media in the Operational Deception Plan for 

Operation DESERT STORM,” 31.
230

20. Tystad, 22.

21. The account of XVIII Airborne Corps deception operations in this 

paragraph is derived from Gary P. Melton, “XVIII Airborne Corps Deception” in 

James P. Finley (ed.) US Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook (Fort 

Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, 1995), 345-

347. This article was originally published in Military Intelligence October-December 1991, 43-45.

22. This account of the 1st Cavalry Division’s deception actions is derived 

from Stephen A. Bourque, Jayhawk!, 141-146.

23. Bourque, 206.

24. Tystad, “The Role of the Media in the Operational Deception Plan for 

Operation DESERT STORM,” 22-23.

25. Gary P. Melton, “XVIII Airborne Corps Deception,” 346.

26. General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, CENTCOM News Briefing Transcript, 27 February 1991, 51.

27. See Tystad, “The Role of the Media in the Operational Deception Plan for 

Operation DESERT STORM,” 25.

28. Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles, 137.

29. Woods, 135.

30. Woods, 188.

31. Woods, 199.

32. Woods, 199.

33. Woods, 207.
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Conclusion

The Future of Military Deception Operations

Conrad C. Crane

The first time I encountered the topic of deception in any detail during 

my professional military education was when I attended the Command 

and General Staff College in 1990-1991. All our major texts on the topic 

were translations from Russian sources. The main point I remember learning from those references was that most successful deceptions were based 

on exploiting existing enemy expectations, I never remember that being 

called the “Magruder Principle,” however. We had no volume like this one 

to provide historical case studies or look at how other nations incorporated 

deception into their military campaigns. Yet we realized that somewhere 

along the line the senior commanders in DESERT STORM must have 

picked up some tips, as we watched our triumphant forces sweep the befuddled Iraqi army out of Kuwait.

That is the most recent case study in this collection, and a fine example of operational and tactical deception on our part. But that was almost 

30 years ago, and the world has changed much since then. While the last 

18 years of persistent limited-contingency operations might not feature 

the lethality or tempo of major combat with a peer or near-peer, in regards to matters of deception there is at least as much to learn from the 

American experience in 21st-century conflict as from these case studies 

from the 20th. In a world of constant and conflicting news coverage, 

ubiquitous social media, and a myriad of surveillance technologies and 

platforms, the possibilities, complexity, and importance of deception operations have only increased. They have now become a constant, beginning long before and sometimes even independent of combat operations 

to accomplish national objectives. If I were to suggest the addition of 

more case studies to this collection it would be examples like Korea 

where adversaries successfully deceived us, because arguably no enemies have been more successful at effective deception at all three levels 

of war as our recent foes in these “limited–contingency operations.” In 

fact they have often been able to use tactical deception to obtain extensive strategic effects, collapsing the levels of war together through adroit 

information campaigns.

Our contemporary world has become so cynical about the nature of 

truth that almost every action or statement from any source is interpreted 
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as being deceptive by someone. That contributes to a number of observations worth making about modern warfare:

The Fog of War has become thicker and grayer. Potential adversaries are well aware of the power of American military forces, and will 

pursue policies designed to challenge us without crossing our threshold 

to resort to a violent response. Deception at many levels is an essential 

component of these “Gray Zone” approaches, which can involve the use 

of proxies, cyber operations, and many forms of subversion by peers and 

near-peers. This pits Clausewitz against Sun Tzu, with one side primed to 

see war as violent and the other trying to win without actual fighting. Identifying whether we are in conflict with an adversary, and the exact nature 

of that conflict, has become more difficult.

Perception is more important than reality. Modern warfare requires 

constant messaging on many levels. Target audiences include our own soldiers and people, adversary leaders and troops, and international observers. Often what those audiences think we have done is more important 

than actual accomplishments. And our enemies have been very adroit at 

exploiting that fact.

All lines of effort are cloaked in information operations. All actions 

have an information reaction. Because of the importance of shaping perceptions, planners must think carefully about how to control the impact 

of any task or operation. That includes dealing with unexpected outcomes 

and things that go wrong. And they must be prepared for attempts by adversaries to distort even the positive results achieved. This requires a continuous anti-deception focus.

Who controls the ground controls the message. This effort to 

counter adversary deception is made harder by our American penchant 

for long range precision strikes, whether with Special Operations Forces 

or smart bombs. Without persistent presence in a target area, our enemies 

will control post-strike imagery and narratives. A tactical success can 

become a strategic setback. This happened innumerable times in both 

Afghanistan and Iraq. Such dilemmas will not disappear in a major conventional fight, especially in heavily populated urban areas. Post-strike 

assessments must be done quickly and include plans to counter adversary information operations.

The more information you need, the more vulnerable you are to 

deception. American forces have come to expect almost instantaneous 

satellite communications with a broad array of headquarters, GPS guidance for targeting and navigation, enemy and friendly force trackers, and a 
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myriad of useful linked computer databases and software. All of these are 

vulnerable to enemy manipulation and exploitation.

Spoofing information is much more dangerous than cutting it off. 

While denying access to those information sources can cripple an operation and threaten the synchronization required to conduct multi-domain 

operations, even more serious consequences can be obtained by creating 

distrust in them. We can create all sorts of redundant and resilient systems 

to work around enemy attempts to deny access to information, but ferreting out false information can be much harder. If every bit of information 

must first be judged for its reliability, that creates an immense burden on 

soldiers and systems.

It is easier to deceive us than most of our enemies. There are a couple reasons for this disparity. One is our reliance on so many forms of information that can be subject to deception and disinformation campaigns. 

Our adversaries have the same exploitive technology that we do. ISIS has 

employed their own surveillance drones. North Korea has been termed a 

“cyber superpower” by some commentators. Most of our potential enemies are less reliant on as much information, or are better prepared to deal 

with its denial. Recent Russian military exercises have featured the use of 

messengers that not only provides a workaround when other communication means are denied but also reduces electronic signatures and vulnerabilities. This has been a common insurgent tactic in recent limited-contingency operations. Are we prepared to do the same? Our younger soldiers 

are also from a generation that is always connected with cellphones and 

social media. That creates more avenues for enemy exploitation, and also 

vulnerabilities for our own operational security. The other reason is that 

we have a much more open society than most potential adversaries. Can 

anyone imagine carrying out Operation FORTITUDE in today’s media environment? How would American media react today to the sort of manipulation the British employed in the Falklands campaign? Deception campaigns against us will not just be conducted on the battlefield or in theater, 

they will also be aimed at the home front. This adds another dimension to 

the concept of multi-domain operations. And most of the American public 

has forgotten what war is really like, seeing it as resembling a video game 

of precision targeting where few people get hurt, making them especially 

vulnerable to real or distorted images of the actual costs of war.

But we also have more tools for deception. While me may be dependent upon more sources of information than many of our enemies, that 

also gives us more sources of deception to exploit. Perhaps future operations plans will include an annex on setting up a false trail in social media, 
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a series of Facebook posts designed to reinforce enemy convictions that 

we are undisciplined and careless in such communications. And as our 

enemies adopt many of the new surveillance technologies they can also 

be targeted. Initially radar appeared to make aerial deception impossible, but eventually we figured out how to jam and spoof it, creating still 

another pathway to deceive. We can do the same with emerging technologies today.

However, deceiving even relatively simple enemies requires sophisticated operations. As we have recently found in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, effective deception operations require a great deal of cultural understanding. We have had special difficulties in that arena with non-Western 

societies. And no matter who the adversary is, we still must deal with our 

own ubiquitous media, always digging for information and questioning 

what they get. Everyone seems to have surveillance drones these days, 

complicating battlefield deception. One careless picture on Facebook 

can also derail the most sophisticated plan. We are usually operating 

with allies, as well, with different information capabilities and requirements. In that respect the case studies in this collection are very useful 

in demonstrating the complexity of successful deception operation even 

in the twentieth century. Future warfare will magnify the difficulty with 

additions to the problem set that include urban terrain, lots of civilians, 

adversaries with very sophisticated information capabilities and countermeasures, an evolving cyber realm, ubiquitous media, distrust of fake 

news, unrealistic public expectations about weapon accuracy and collateral damage, and the dilemmas of gray zone conflicts. We may win, or 

lose, the next war, and never really know it.
235

About the Authors

Joseph G. D. (Geoff) Babb

Joseph G. D. (Geoff) Babb, PhD, is a historian in the Department of 

Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 2012, he earned his doctorate in History at 

the University of Kansas. He was an Army China Foreign Area Officer 

educated in Hong Kong and Beijing and served in the Defense Intelligence 

Agency and at United States Pacific Command. He has written several 

book chapters on history and national security topics on China and Asia. 

He is currently working on a book on the Chinese military in the Second 

World War.

Conrad C. Crane

Dr. Conrad Crane is Chief of Historical Services for the US Army Heritage and Education Center and a retired Army officer. He is a 1974 graduate 

of USMA with an MA and PhD from Stanford. He has written or edited 

books and monographs on World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. 

He was the lead author for the ground breaking 2006 Army/Marine Corps 

counterinsurgency doctrine, and his most recent book, derived from that experience, is Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War.

Alan P. Donohue

Alan P. Donohue, PhD, is an independent researcher based in Dublin 

and Freiburg. He holds an MA in Military History from the University of 

Leeds and earned his PhD from the University of Dublin, Trinity College, 

for his dissertation on Adolf Hitler as a military commander. His primary focus of research is on the German-Soviet conflict during the Second 

World War and he has published several articles on the subject.

Brian J. Drohan

Major Brian J. Drohan, US Army, is a strategic planner at Eighth 

Army in the Republic of Korea. He earned his doctorate in History from 

the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and is the author of Brutality in an Age of Human Rights: Activism and Counterinsurgency at the 

End of the British Empire (Cornell University Press, 2018). He has taught 

history at the US Military Academy and served overseas in South Asia and 

the Middle East.
236

Scott C. Farquhar

Scott C. Farquhar is an Army civilian serving as a military analyst for 

the Mission Command Center of Excellence. A retired infantry officer, he 

served tours overseas in Germany, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the former Yugoslavia. Mr. Farquhar is a former instructor at the US Army’s Command 

and General Staff College and military historian at the Combat Studies 

Institute. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Providence College and a 

masters’ from Kansas State University in History. He is the author of Legacy of Langres: The US Army’s Plan to Educate Reserve and National 

Guard Officers in the Inter-War Period, 1920-1940, several chapters in 

A Different Kind of War: The US Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, 

October 2001–September 2005, and edited Back to Basics: A Study of the 

Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD, and numerous studies, 

articles, and papers for CALL, the United States Institute for Peace, and 

the Society for Military History.

Mark E. Grotelueschen

Mark E. Grotelueschen, PhD, is a Professor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies at the US Air Force Academy. He previously 

served as Professor of History and Chief of the Military History Division 

at USAFA. A 1991 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy, he 

received his MA from the University of Calgary and his PhD from Texas 

A&M University. He is the author of Doctrine Under Trial: American Artillery Employment in World War I (2000) and The AEF Way of War: The 

American Army and Combat in World War I (2007), the latter of which has 

been repeatedly named to the US Army Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List, and most recently, Into the Fight: April-June 1918 (2018), one 

of the volumes in the US Army Center of Military History’s World War I 

commemoration series. He is a retired USAF lieutenant colonel.

Gregory S. Hospodor

Gregory S. Hospodor, PhD, is an Associate Professor in the Department of Military History at the United States Army Command and General 

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a graduate of the College 

of William & Mary, the University of Mississippi, and Louisiana State 

University, where he completed a dissertation on the US-Mexican War, 

1846-1848. His research focuses on World War II military operations in 

the Mediterranean and the US-Mexican War.
237

Curtis L. King

Curtis L. King, PhD, graduated from the US Military Academy in 

1982 with a BS in History and English literature. He holds a MA and 

PhD from the University of Pennsylvania in Russian and Soviet military 

history and served as an instructor in the USMA Department of History, 

overseas in Sarajevo, Bosnia and as a historian for NATO. He is currently a historian on the Staff Ride Team at Combat Studies Institute, Army 

University Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is the author of the Staff 

Ride Handbook for Grant’s Overland Campaign in the Civil War, as well 

as numerous articles, book reviews and encyclopedia entries. He is currently working on a book examining logistics in McClellan and Grant’s 

campaigns in the Civil War.

Gary W. Linhart

Gary W. Linhart is a Historian with the Combat Studies Institute, Army 

University Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he directs the Military 

History Instructor’s Course (MHIC), among other duties. He holds a BS in 

Military History from the United States Military Academy and a MA.from 

Syracuse University, and is a retired infantry lieutenant colonel.

Steven Paget

Steven Paget, PhD, is a Principal Lecturer at the University of Portsmouth in the United Kingdom. He earned his PhD from the Australian 

National University and is the author of The Dynamics of Coalition Naval 

Warfare: The Special Relationship at Sea (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). In 

addition, he has published a number of articles on American, Australian, 

British, and New Zealand military history and operations.

Christopher M. Rein

Christopher M. Rein, PhD, is a Historian with the Combat Studies Institute, Army University Press at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He earned his 

doctorate in History in 2011 at the University of Kansas and is the author 

of one book, The North African Air Campaign, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2012, and several peer-reviewed articles. He is a 

retired Air Force lieutenant colonel and served as a navigator aboard the 

E-8C Joint STARS during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI 

FREEDOM.
238

Tal Tovy

Tal Tovy, PhD, is an associate professor at Bar Ilan University in Israel 

and also teaches in the IDF’s Tactical Command College. He holds a PhD 

in History from University of Haifa. Dr. Tovy has published extensively 

on a variety of military history topics, including the influence of counterinsurgency theory and practice upon American combat operations. His other 

fields of interest and research include Western military thought and US 

military history, and he is the author of The Changing Nature of Geostrategy 1900-2000: The Evolution of a New Paradigm (Air University Press, 

2015). He has contributed articles to Armed Forces and Society, Journal 

of Military and Strategic Studies, European Journal of American Studies, 

and War in History, among others.

Kyle B. Vautrinot

First Lieutenant Kyle B. Vautrinot, US Army, is a Battalion Assistant 

Operations Officer in the 504th Military Intelligence Brigade, Fort Hood, 

Texas. He holds a B.A. from Norwich University. His assignments include 

one deployment with Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL.

Donald P. Wright

Donald P. Wright, PhD, is the Deputy Director of Army University 

Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a PhD in History from Tulane 

University and has written or edited a number of works on contemporary 

US military operations, including On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign, The US Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003-January 

2005, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, 2008) and A Different Kind of 

War: The US Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001–

September 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, 2010).


U.S. Army Combined Arms Center