U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

61–551 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

REGIONAL SECUIRTY IN SOUTH ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

October 20, 1999

Serial No. 106–70

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(
(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

PETER T. KING, New York

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

JOHN MCHUGH, New York

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL GILLMOR, Ohio

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

MICHAEL P. ENNIS, Subcommittee Staff Director

DR. ROBERT KING, Democratic Professional Staff Member

MATT REYNOLDS, Counsel

ALICIA A. O’DONNELL, Staff Associate
(III)

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

The Honorable Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................................... 10

Dr. Arona Butcher, Chief of Country and Regional Analysis Division, Office

of Economics, United States International Trade ............................................. 15

The Honorable Teresita Schaffer, Director for South Asia, Center for Strategic

and International Studies ................................................................................... 31

Mr. Selig S. Harrison, Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Institute; and Fellow,

The Century Foundation ..................................................................................... 35

APPENDIX

Honorable Karl F. Inderfurth ................................................................................. 48

Dr. Arona Butcher ................................................................................................... 55

Honorable Teresita Schaffer ................................................................................... 63

Mr. Selig S. Harrison .............................................................................................. 68

Additional Material Submitted for the Record:

Editorial submitted to the record by Hon. Sherrod Brown, A Representative

in Congress from Ohio ......................................................................................... 70

Question submitted to the record to Hon. Inderfurth by Hon. Sherrod Brown . 71
(1)

REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA

Wednesday, October 20, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:20 p.m., in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will come to order. The House

has completed its media vote.

The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific meets today in open

session to receive testimony on regional security concerns in India

and Pakistan. South Asia, of course, defies easy generalizations. It

is a region with enormous potential, yet much of that potential remains unrealized. India, which is the world’s largest democracy,

has just experienced a remarkably successful election, but elected

officials remain extremely reluctant to take the reforms necessary

to restructure and modernize the country. At least that is the perception.

In Pakistan, the governments of Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif

and Benazir Bhutto have been plagued by mismanagement and

corruption. However, concerns about the ineptitude of civilian government in Pakistan have been overtaken by events.

The military coup in Pakistan has, of course, fundamentally

changed the security equation in South Asia. We now face pressing

questions regarding the stability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. We

ask whether a military regime will be more belligerent or adventurous than a civilian government, whether civilian rule will soon

return, and whether the coup provides an entre for Islamic fundamentalists to increase their influence.

The recent events in Pakistan also have an impact upon U.S.

sanctions policy. Legislative authority was granted to permit the

President to waive for one year the mandatory sanctions imposed

on India and Pakistan following their nuclear tests. That one year

waiver is due to expire in two days. I, for one, am very suspicious

or skeptical that unilateral sanctions or the threat of sanctions will

alter Indian/Pakistani behavior.

Despite my reservations, I am interested to hear the views of our

witnesses on the role that the U.S. might play in promoting peace

and stability across the entirety of the region during this difficult

period. Certainly peace and stability are at risk in South Asia.

Both India and Pakistan appear committed to developing a mean-
2

ingful nuclear capability, together with the means to deliver that

weaponry.

In addition to last year’s nuclear tests, both nations are moving

forward on intermediate-range ballistic missiles that would be able

to carry a nuclear payload. The Indian National Security Council

has released a strategic white paper that calls for a nuclear triad

of 500 air-launched, sea-launched, and ground-launched nuclear

missiles. Such a force would be greater than the nuclear arsenals

of Britain, France, and China. If India would actually pursue such

a nuclear force, it surely would trigger an arms race with both

Pakistan and China and certainly would leave the entire subcontinent at far greater risk of nuclear war.

The threat is not exclusively on the nuclear level. This summer’s

fighting between the Indian Army and the Pakistani-supported infiltrators in Kashmir highlighted the potential for events to deteriorate rapidly at the level of conventional warfare. The Indian Army

suffered severe losses and was under great pressure in some corners in Delhi to strike an insurgent basis deep in Pakistan. If that

had occurred, further escalation might have be unavoidable. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed, and the situation has, at least temporarily, quieted. Nonetheless, tempers remain high, and when the

Indian Air Force recently shot down a Pakistani military aircraft

that was flying near the border, the situation threatened once

again to spin out of control. It is, needless to say, a situation

fraught with danger.

Amidst such setbacks, nevertheless, there is reason to hope. The

Lahore peace process, which Prime Minister Sharif and Vajpayee

began last year, continues to hold promise as a means to resolve

differences. We should not minimize the differences, but there

clearly is broad support in India and Pakistan for resolving the disputes that have divided these countries since independence. If the

Lahore process has taught us anything, it is that the people are

tired of war and are tired of politicians who are forever seeking to

gain some minor tactical advantage vis-a-vis their neighbors.

If Pakistan and India could ever resurrect the Lahore peace process and surmount their deep divisions, the way would appear open

to resolve many of the other regional problems.

The Subcommittee is privileged today to have witnesses with

wide-ranging and exceptional expertise on South Asia. Testifying

for the Administration is Assistant Secretary of State for South

Asian Affairs, the Honorable Karl F. Inderfurth. Mr. Secretary, we

welcome you back to the Subcommittee where, on a number of occasions in the past several years, you cogently have provided us

with the Administration’s perspective and policies on key South

Asian issues.

Secretary Inderfurth assumed his current position in August

1997 after serving as the U.S. Representative for Special Political

Affairs to the United Nations where his portfolio included U.N.

Peacekeeping, disarmament, and security affairs. Mr. Secretary,

your testimony today comes at an interesting time, so closely following the Indian elections. We certainly are interested in your

views regarding the importance of extending the waiver authority

on existing U.S. sanctions and how the Administration will exercise

any renewed waiver authority. We are also interested in your views
3

regarding whether the Lahore peace process can now be jumpstarted and what it means to U.S. interests if the peace process

flounders. In addition, we would like you to address the U.S.-Pakistani military-to-military relationship, particularly in the wake of

the coup.

We are also pleased to have Dr. Arona Butcher, Chief of the

Country and Regional Analysis Division at the U.S. International

Trade Commission (ITC). Dr. Butcher is also Adjunct Professor at

Howard University. She comes before the Subcommittee for the

first time. The ITC has just concluded a study of the impact of the

Glenn Amendment sanctions and the possible repercussions of reimposing the sanctions.

Dr. Butcher, I am interested to learn the ITC’s assessment of

how effective the sanctions were and whether the inconvenience

caused by the sanctions justified their imposition. In particular,

have U.S. agriculture and commercial exporters had difficulty in

regaining market share after the sanctions were waived?

We are also honored to have a highly qualified second panel to

share their views. The Honorable Teresita Schaffer completed a

long and distinguished in the Foreign Service, including service as

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, at the

time the most senior post available. She has served as a Foreign

Service Officer in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh and was U.S.

Ambassador to Sri Lanka. Ambassador Schaffer is currently the Director of South Asia’s program at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies (CSIS).

Mr. Selig Harrison is Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Institute and Fellow at the Century Foundation. He was for many

years the Washington Post Bureau Chief for South Asia and is

presently an adjunct professor at the Elliot School of International

Affairs at George Washington University. He is the author of five

books on India and Pakistan and security, and his writings frequently appear in the Washington Post, the New York Times, and

scholarly journals.

Gentlemen and ladies, as is consistent with the practice of the

Subcommittee, your entire written statements will be made a part

of the record. I request that you limit your introductory remarks,

if you can, to no more than 10 minutes so we can allow adequate

time for members’ questions.

Let me turn, however, first to the distinguished gentleman from

California, the Senior Democrat of this Subcommittee for his introductory comments, and then we will start the testimony. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will just

take a minute. First, I want to commend you for holding this hearing. I want to welcome Secretary Inderfurth and Dr. Butcher to our

hearing, and I would very much hope that the Secretary will deal

very candidly with the rather dramatic developments in his region.

I happened to tune in on General Musharraf’s televised speech,

and I was watching that speech with one of my grandchildren. The

general spoke slowly and eloquently and with great deliberation,

and he said, ‘‘We shall not have a military government,’’ and I interrupted him and said, until it is absolutely necessary, and those

were exactly his words, ‘‘until it is absolutely necessary’’.
4

It reminded me of General Zia’s tenure, which I believe was

equally temporary at the outset. He advised us that he will restore

civilian government as soon as possible, the military will stay in

only as long as it is absolutely necessary, and it was 11 years, as

I recall, that the Zia government stayed in office.

So one of the things that I am very anxious to have you expand

on, Mr. Secretary, is what in our judgment is the time line that the

Pakistani troops will be back in the barracks, because however bad

civilian governments may be in developing countries—and we could

certainly be here ad nauseam and ad infinitum criticizing the various civilian governments Pakistan has had in recent years—it is

still obvious, at least to me, that on balance a military coup and

disposition of a duly elected civilian government is not a desirable

phenomenon in South Asia or any other place.

I would be grateful if you could give us your insight, both with

respect to the personal circumstances that may have led to this, to

what extent General Musharraf’s background as a Pakistani who

lived in India in earlier periods and his rather blunt statements in

recent days indicate that this, in fact, is only a temporary phenomenon, that a civilian regime will be restored and that the

troops will return to their barracks.

I also would be grateful if you could give us your appraisal of the

Indian elections. If my memory serves me right, it has been over

a quarter century that an incumbent Prime Minister’s party was

returned to office, even though this is a very complex coalition of,

I believe, 17 parties; because on the surface it appears, and I don’t

wish to interfere in Indian domestic politics, it is a sign of stability

and continuity which at the generic level we must welcome. It is

not desirable in Eastern Europe or East Asia to have governments

turned out of office at every election, which is the phenomenon we

had in a number of newly independent societies such as the Baltics

where, with every election cycle, we had the incumbents turned out

of office.

I realize that Indonesia is outside of your purview but you are

knowledgeable about Indonesia, and if you are able and willing to

say a word about the new President and what we can expect in

terms of his attitude toward developing stronger and better relations with the United States and what his attitude is likely to be

with respect to the very tragic developments in East Timor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Congressman Lantos.

Congressman Rohrabacher has asked to make a brief opening

statement. I extend that opportunity to him and to other Members

who desire that. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, for the

last three years I have repeatedly warned this Subcommittee and

the State Department that the Clinton Administration’s policy on

the Taliban, which has been decidedly pro-Taliban, would create

great instability in Central Asia and would undermine democracy

in Pakistan. Today, Mr. Chairman, the chickens are coming home

to roost.

The recent instability in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and the conflict in Chechnya to some degree can be traced to drug money and

fanatical Islam coming out of Afghanistan. And talking about drug
5

money, the Taliban’s opium production in Afghanistan doubled last

year, and now democracy has fallen in Pakistan. This is not a result of personalities. It is a result of policy, bad policy, bad policy

on the part of this Administration.

Eight years ago, after the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a

tremendous opportunity for South and Central Asia. The lack of

courage and the incomprehensible policies of the Clinton Administration have created a crisis in Central Asia where there was none.

This Administration’s policies have been more than a failure. It has

been a disaster for millions of people whose lives have been affected, including a recent influx of 300,000 destitute refugees from

the Taliban into the Panger Valley hoping for some sort of refuge

from their fury given to them by Masudin and some of the last resisters to the Taliban, whom we have never helped.

Mr. Chairman, this Subcommittee as well as the Full Committee

needs to go on record condemning this Administration, including

Mr. Inderfurth, for clear attempts to thwart congressional oversight

into its policies. It took more than a year from the time when the

request was made for documents concerning this Administration’s

Afghan policy to be delivered to this Subcommittee. The first batch

of documents was made available more than six months after Secretary Madeline Albright assured the Full Committee on the record

at a Committee hearing that the documents would be forthcoming.

In no way have we seen all the documents, although some documents have been presented, and I want to thank some other Members of the Committee who supported my request all along, including Chairman Gilman of the Committee. Mr. Ackerman, for example, let it be known that it was important when requests like this

were made that they be followed through. Yet, it took over a year

to get even some of the documents, and the first documents that

were delivered, Mr. Chairman, had newspaper clippings, insulting

this Committee.

Even in the selected documents that have been disclosed thus

far, I might add and to let my fellow members know, there is evidence of past support by this Administration of the Taliban, a policy that was altered only after pressure by the Full Committee and

by women’s groups over the defiance of the Taliban over Mr.

Osama Bin Laden, a terrorist in Afghanistan.

Still, there is no recognizable effort by this Administration to

contribute to the defeat or removal of the Taliban. Furthermore,

there has been little effort by this Administration to assist the refugees in the Panger Valley and other areas of Afghanistan that are

just facing a horrible fate due to the Taliban’s continued campaign.

The chaos and suffering in South and Central Asia, and now

Pakistan, has been escalated, this suffering and the chaos, by the

policies of this Administration. And as far as I am concerned, it is

a shameful record, and the cover-up of the information for us to determine what that policy was is even more shameful.

I am looking forward to receiving, Mr. Inderfurth, the rest of the

State Department documents that you have kept from us. And

again, Mr. Chairman, let me note in the scant documents that have

been delivered to me, we have already found evidence of a dualtrack policy.

Mr. LANTOS. Would the gentleman yield?
6

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I don’t think I have the time anymore.

Mr. LANTOS. I think in all fairness we will need to respond to

this broadside——

Mr. BEREUTER. Are there other Democrats who wish to speak?

Perhaps he will yield you time, Mr. Lantos. The gentleman from

American Samoa is recognized for an opening statement, and he

yields apparently to Mr. Lantos.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I yield time.

Mr. LANTOS. I thank my friend and colleague for yielding. Apparently it has become customary to open every hearing of the House

International Relations Committee with an intemperate attack on

the Clinton Administration, and I deeply regret that this particular

hearing is no exception. I would be grateful if my colleague from

California would supply this Committee in open or closed session

his evidence of the support of the Clinton Administration for the

Taliban, because I consider his statement to be absurd and delusional, and I am using my adjectives carefully. I consider my colleague’s statements absurd and delusional.

The Clinton Administration has been steadfast in its opposition

to the Taliban. As a matter of fact, the Clinton Administration has

led the international attempt to weaken and minimize the Taliban,

and since my colleague made reference to the unspeakable attitude

of the Taliban vis-a-vis women, let me remind all of us that this

Administration has been in the forefront for women’s rights, both

in the United States and internationally.

So while this interjection has provided us with a moment of levity and amusement, I have to state categorically that I do not consider the gentleman’s statements to be a serious statement but a

statement which, unless backed up by evidence, evidence to which

Members of the Full Committee are fully entitled, if Mr. Rohrabacher has such evidence, evidence that in fact the Clinton Administration is a secret supporter of the Taliban and their policies

vis-a-vis women. I look forward to receiving that evidence from Mr.

Rohrabacher.

I want to thank you for yielding me that time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Does the gentleman yield back?

Mr. LANTOS. I yield back my time to my colleague from American

Samoa.

Mr. BEREUTER. The Chair would like to proceed as soon as possible with our witnesses. I would say the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is within his rights to present these concerns, and the gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos, has been

critical of that but not of the gentleman’s intent or integrity, and

so this is in accordance with the Subcommittee and Committee

rules at this point. Does another Member who wish to be recognized? The gentleman from American Samoa.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I reserved my time, but in

the essence of time, I am going to pass on my opening statement

and I would gladly yield——

Mr. BEREUTER. I think the gentleman’s time has expired, but I

would hear from the gentleman on this side, and then I will come

to Mr. Ackerman. Is that all right? I think that is the way we

should proceed. You may proceed, the gentleman from Louisiana,

and then I will come to Mr. Ackerman.
7

Mr. COOKSEY. I, too, share some concerns about some of the

events that have occurred recently and in the not-so-distant future.

I also have shared some of my colleague, Mr. Rohrabacher’s concerns also about maybe the way it has been handled. But we came

here to hear the witnesses, and I have another Committee that I

am on. This morning we had some important witnesses, and we

dispensed with all of these opening statements that it seems always sound the same from both sides. We went right to the heart

of the business, and we got a lot done. It was a lot more efficient.

It was a better utilization of my time and everyone else’s time.

I am a surgeon, and, as a surgeon, we go in, we make a diagnosis, and then we either operate or do not operate. Well, I am

ready to operate and get rid of a lot of the rhetoric and proceed.

I think that the Committee Chairman should consider doing

what one of my other Committee’s Chairman has done in dispensing with all these opening statements hear from the witnesses,

and have closing statements. Then maybe everyone would stay to

the end of the hearing.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman. I would very much like

to proceed. It is a different arena that you are operating in now,

I would say to the gentleman. [Laugther]

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the Chairman and I greatly respect the

good doctor for his goodwill being inserted into the process. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join you in welcoming the witnesses before the Subcommittee today. In particular, I want to commend Secretary

Inderfurth and his team at the South Asia Bureau for the way they

have led our policy initiatives in a very tough region.

The contrasting events in India and Pakistan over a single 24

hour period speak eloquently about the new challenges and opportunities that we face in South Asia. In India we have seen hundreds of millions of voters enthusiastically exercise their votes in

a free and fair election. Although there has been some concern

about election fatigue, it appears that a sort of political stability

has returned to India with a strong majority given to Prime Minister Vajpayee’s coalition.

On the other hand, we saw an awful turn of events in neighboring Pakistan where a democratic government, however flawed,

was overthrown by the military. Notwithstanding General Pervez

Musharraf’s moderate words, we should not be lulled into thinking

that this will be a moderate government. After all, he has suspended the Constitution and the elected national and provincial assemblies, dismissed the government and declared a state of emergency. He is also the author of Pakistan’s ill-fated invasion of India

last summer.

I am concerned, and I believe the Administration is as well, over

what we did not hear from General Musharraf. We did not hear a

clear timetable for new elections for the reestablishment of democratic government. I believe that we must remain engaged with

Pakistan, but that we should do so on the side of the Pakistani people. We must identify and support democratic elements within

Pakistan so that the people of Pakistan can again enjoy their

democratic rights.
8

The people of Pakistan are not celebrating the demise of democracy. They are at best celebrating the demise of an allegedly corrupt government.

The waiver authority contained in the Defense Appropriations

Act should not be used to reestablish an arms pipeline with Pakistan, and I am pleased that the Administration is not considering

that. When democracy is restored however, the waiver authority

should be used to strengthen democratic institutions and promote

economic growth.

That same authority should also be used to move U.S.-India bilateral relations to a higher plane which would allow India and the

United States to forge a strategic partnership in South Asia. In the

past, we have neglected our relationship with India, and the legacy

of that neglect has been mistrust.

I believe it is time to re-examine our basic premise regarding

U.S. policy in South Asia. We should look beyond the simplistic

prism of Pakistan-India rivalry and see that Indian democracy is

our natural ally within the region. The best way to demonstrate

our commitment to the people of India is by ensuring that the

President travels to India, which I encourage him to do as soon as

possible.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to hearing the witnesses.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Gillmor.

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I seek recognition for

two reasons: First, to associate myself with the spirit of the comments by Dr. Cooksey; and second, to yield to my colleague from

California, Mr. Rohrabacher, on the condition that he doesn’t use

all the time.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Fine. Thank you very much. I will just say

a few words concerning Mr. Lantos’ attempted rebuttal of my opening statement.

Let me just say that for a year I requested documents. This is

not a laughing matter. It is not a laughing matter when the Secretary of State comes before a hearing, a public hearing, makes a

promise for documents, and then not only drags her feet but stonewalls that promise and stonewalls the request. This is not a matter

of levity, Mr. Lantos. This is a very serious issue.

Sixty percent of the world’s opium is now produced in Afghanistan. These billions of dollars are spilling over, as I warned they

would for so long, into Pakistan and into Central Asia. The fact

that the Administration repeatedly has been unwilling to provide

the documentation for exactly what you asked us to do, to determine what the policy is. And I will say that there is indication that

I have already read in the very small number of documents that

Mr. Inderfurth managed to give to us of a past support for the

Taliban, and I see no reason why the other documents—this is a

legitimate request.

Again, I applaud Mr. Ackerman. At least Mr. Ackerman didn’t

call it delusional and laughable that we were trying to get to the

heart of this policy matter by requesting documentation from the

Administration. That is our job here. This is not a matter of levity

in terms of laughing it off. This is matter of seriousness, and I have
9

taken this job very seriously. That statement that I issued in the

beginning, right from the start of this, was something that has

been three years’ worth of work on my part. I have been to the region time and again. I have talked to the leaders there. There is

every indication that this Administration has done nothing to

thwart the Taliban, and then we have foot-dragging on requests for

evidence. What else are we to conclude except there is something

they are trying to hide?

I am trying to do my job, and I am serious about it, and those

who accept this sort of brush-off that I am being delusional or that

someone who is asking for this information is delusional I think is

undermining the credibility of this Committee, and I yield back the

balance of my time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Would the gentleman from Ohio yield?

Mr. GILLMOR. Yes.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I hope the

gentleman from California understands that I believe that we have

oversight responsibilities, and I have supported his request for information from the Administration. I would like now to move forward.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I have a very brief opening statement.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Brown, gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. BROWN. I am not going to express, as Dr. Cooksey and Mr.

Gillmor did, my opposition to opening statements, as I am making

one.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for just a real short moment. I want

to enter into the record, ask unanimous consent to enter into the

record A.M. Rosenthal’s October 15th op-ed piece from the New

York Times called ‘‘The Himalayan Era,’’ and its subtitle is the

‘‘Tilt Toward Pakistan.’’

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection.

[The editorial referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The events of last week

I think underscore the errors of our ways in South Asia under

presidents of both parties, going back for more than a generation.

We have seen 40 years of a pro-American military government or

at least influenced by the military in Pakistan. We have seen 40

years of U.S. military support in Pakistan. Next door, we see a

country for the last 50 years that has practiced democracy, the 50

years that recently has been warmed.

We have built a closer and closer relationship with India over the

last few years, but I just think the coup in Pakistan, the pro-Pakistani tilt of our government through most of the post-World War

II years underscore to me the importance of our building our relationship with India much better than we have in the past. It is

country of a billion people. Pakistan is a country of one-seventh the

size of that; not that Pakistan is not important to us, but I think

that we as a nation have leaned the wrong way, have gone in the

wrong direction.

I think the events of the last couple of weeks underscore that

better than any of us could say, and I would just like to again

thank Secretary Inderfurth for his work in strengthening ties with
10

India and encourage him and the State Department to do better.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Brown.

Mr. Secretary, we look forward to your statement. Thank you for

appearing today and for being willing to respond to our questions

after your opening statement. We will hear from Dr. Butcher next,

but your entire statement will be made part of the record. You may

proceed as you wish.

STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE KARL F. INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. INDERFURTH. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos, and

Members of the Committee, there is the biblical injunction of the

last shall be the first. If you look at my testimony, I had Afghanistan at the last of my testimony. I think that given what we have

heard, I would like to make just a very brief remark on what Congressman Rohrabacher has had to say.

First, I take issue with virtually every point made by Congressman Rohrabacher except for his evident concern for the Afghan

people, which I think he knows we both share. Now, in terms of

the oversight responsibility——

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Secretary, would you pull that mike a little

closer, please?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Certainly. In terms of your reference to the

oversight responsibilities of the Committee, I would like to say

something about that, because I am sure it would be of concern to

every Member of the Committee whether or not you are receiving

the information that you have requested.

We are complying with the request made by Chairman Gilman

which was made formally on May 21st. Now, this was following

procedures established between the Committee and the State Department for making requests of this nature. We immediately contacted our embassies, we notified relevant bureaus in the Department and began what is indeed a time-consuming and labor-intensive process of collecting these documents and preparing them for

transmittal to the Department.

On July 20th, the first set of documents was sent to Congressman Rohrabacher. This set included, as he pointed out, a number

of pages of unclassified material, true, but also included 17 classified documents, which were made available by staff of the State

Department in his office.

Now, the second set of documents was delivered September 2nd,

and this set contained more than 40 classified documents.

A third tranche is being prepared and will be delivered to the

Congressman shortly, and at least one more tranche will follow

that.

Now, we trust that this effort which we are making, very much

in compliance with our responsibilities, we hope that this effort we

are making will fulfill Congressman Rohrabacher’s request and

that it will prove worthwhile. But I do want to say that, having reviewed these documents myself, that they offer absolutely no support for his contention that the U.S. Government has now or in the

past had a covert policy of support for the Taliban; and I think as
11

you will hear in my statement in a moment, the sanctions that we

have recently placed on the Taliban for its continued support for

Osama Bin Laden, as well as for the U.N. Resolution which was

passed last Friday by the entire U.N. Security Council, which

places sanctions on the Taliban, would suggest there is not a policy

of support but indeed opposition to the Taliban for its support for

international terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, a brief glimmer of hope, if I could just start before I get to my prepared statement, because you mentioned the

Lahore process. Unfortunately I am much more informed about Lahore than I am about Indonesia. I apologize about that, but we too,

the last time I testified here, we hoped that the Lahore process of

Prime Minister Vajpayee and Prime Minister Sharif would set a

new stage for relations on the subcontinent. That took place in February. Unfortunately, since then, we have seen a Kashmir crisis in

Kargil, and last week we saw the military overthrow of the government in Pakistan. So there have been significant setbacks for the

Lahore process.

But I do want to note the one glimmer of light and that is, that

the Lahore-Delhi bus service, which was inaugurated by the two

Prime Ministers in February, continues to run uninterrupted. Even

though we had these major disruptions to what we had hoped was

a new stage in their effort at reconciliation, at least the bus service

itself continues to operate. We hope that maybe at some point the

Lahore process itself could get back on track.

Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate this opportunity to appear before

the Subcommittee today for a number of very obvious reasons already alluded to and referred to by Members of the Committee. I

believe that this is an auspicious time to meet with you. We have

a number of immediate challenges facing United States policy in

South Asia, and this afternoon I will address three in particular

and try to do those as quickly as possible. My full statement I appreciate being placed in the record.

The three issues would be the political crisis in Pakistan where

the Army has taken the reigns of power, the recent elections in

India and the formation of a new government, and the situation in

Afghanistan and our steps to combat international terrorists who

take shelter there.

At the top of our agenda today is the political crisis which erupted a week ago in Pakistan. As I said, Mr. Chairman, my full statement will summarize more of my remarks, including developments

since October 12th. I would, however, like to focus on our policy at

present toward Pakistan.

We listened closely to General Musharraf’s nationwide address

last Sunday night. We heard his pledge for a return to a true democracy in Pakistan and that the Armed Forces have no intention

of remaining in power any longer than necessary, but we are disappointed with what we did not hear. Specifically, we did not hear

an announcement of a clear timetable for the early restoration of

constitutional, civilian and democratic government. As Congressman Lantos pointed out, you will remember that an earlier Army

Chief, General Zia, anticipated a brief period of military control

when he took power. He ended up ruling for 11 years.
12

The press in Pakistan and here has focused in recent days on the

rationale for the general’s actions. Much of the coverage has

seemed to support General Musharraf’s statement that Pakistan

had hit rock bottom.

For our part, we are not justifying or condoning the general’s actions. As a matter of principle, one that we believe applies throughout the world, the remedy for flawed democracy is not a military

coup or suspension of a democratically elected legislature or the detention of the elected government. In our view, Pakistan’s longterm stability lies in developing civilian political institutions which

are self-correcting through political processes, not through the expedient of military intervention.

President Clinton, Secretary Albright and other U.S. officials

have expressed our deep regret at this setback to democracy and

our hope that Pakistan’s authorities will acknowledge and fulfill

their duty to restore Pakistan to civilian, democratic, constitutional

government as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman, until we see a restoration of democracy in Pakistan, we have made it clear we would not be in a position to carry

on business as usual with Pakistani authorities. As you know, Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act contains a

prohibition against a broad range of assistance for a country whose

democratically elected head of government is deposed by military

coup or decree. We have applied those sanctions with regard to

Pakistan. As a practical matter, most forms of assistance are already prohibited for Pakistan under the Glenn Amendment and

other statutory requirements.

Now, as General Musharraf told his Nation, actions speak louder

than words. The United States will watch closely as the General

acts to fulfill his pledge to return his country to democracy and to

address the other serious problems he identified, including the

economy and corruption. We call on General Musharraf to respect

civil liberties, freedom of the press, judicial independence, and

human rights while this process proceeds. Our own actions toward

Pakistan in the days ahead will be guided in large part by the

steps the new authorities take.

Mr. Chairman, one final word on Pakistan, if I may. Despite our

deep disappointments with this latest setback to democracy in

Pakistan, we have no choice but to stay engaged. We cannot walk

away. Pakistan is important. It is important because stability, or

the lack thereof, in Pakistan will have an impact on Pakistan’s

neighbors, the region and beyond. Pakistan is important because it

can serve and we hope one day will serve as an example of a progressive Islamic democracy. Pakistan is important because it is a

link, both economic and political, between the Indian Ocean and

Central Asia, because it has significant human and economic resources and because it has historically been a friend of the United

States. It is important, therefore, for the United States and other

longtime friends of Pakistan to express their concern, exert their

influence and take those steps necessary and appropriate so that

Pakistan can see a prompt return to civilian rule and restoration

of the democratic process as called for by President Clinton.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, turning to India, we

are also facing a challenge, but in this case a more positive one.
13

India has just completed the largest exercise of democratic voting

the world has ever witnessed. More than 360 million voters cast

ballots. The final results of India’s month-long election gave the 17-

party coalition of Prime Minister Vajpayee 303 seats in the lower

House of Parliament, 31 more than needed to form a simple majority. Atal Bihari Vajpayee was sworn in for the third time as India’s

Prime Minister on October 13. It was also, as Foreign Minister

Jaswant Singh pointed out, and Congressman Lantos, the first

time in 27 years in India that an incumbent Prime Minister has

been returned to office. President Clinton called Prime Minister

Vajpayee to offer his congratulations.

Mr. Chairman, there are substantial elements of continuity between the previous and the new governments; in particular, in the

key positions of Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Home Minister,

Finance Minister and Defense Minister. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s

ability to maintain continuity of leadership in the key ministries

and his successful effort to accommodate his coalition partners

should mean that his government will be quick off the mark in implementing policy priorities, including economic reform, rural development and national security.

This new government also appears to have a larger and therefore

potentially stronger coalition, a fact that we hope will enable India’s leaders to adopt a longer-term perspective rather than one

overshadowed by the prospect of a brief tenure.

Mr. Chairman, the new government’s initial messages to the

world are positive. Both Foreign Minister Singh and Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and National Security Advisor

Brajesh Mishra, who will be in Washington tomorrow, have reiterated their intention to seek a national consensus for signing the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This Administration remains

committed to the CTBT and believes it is an important measure to

restrain the prospect of a nuclear arms race in South Asia.

Now, as everyone here knows, we have faced our own challenges

recently with ratification and understand the importance of forging

a solid domestic consensus which we will continue to try to do. The

United States will also continue to urge both India and Pakistan

to sign and ratify the CTBT because we believe it is in their national security interest to do so.

There are a number of other steps in the nonproliferation area

that we are encouraging India and Pakistan to take to address our

concerns and those of the international community. These steps,

which we believe are consistent with Indian and Pakistani security

interests, include constructive engagement on fissile material, restraint in missile developments, including nondeployment and

strengthened export controls. Deputy Secretary Talbot will resume

his dialogue with Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh on these issues.

Mr. Chairman, we also see signs of promise on the economic

front. There are reports that the new government will put in place

a new economic package by mid-November. The package would

cover a wide range, a wide spectrum, including reforms of the financial, industrial and infrastructure sectors. In Finance Minister

Sinha’s own words: ‘‘we want to undertake the second generation

of economic reform.’’
14

Prime Minister Vajpayee has also acknowledged the need for India’s greater integration into the world economy, and several bills

that would help open India to greater investment are awaiting the

new Parliament’s approval. These include proposals to open up the

insurance sector to private domestic and foreign companies and a

telecommunications plan that would accelerate investment in private telephone networks. With the new government in place, we

are hopeful that India will return to a firm course toward liberalization.

Economic opportunities in the energy sector will be one of many

subjects that Energy Secretary Bill Richardson will discuss with

his Indian counterparts next week when he becomes the first U.S.

Cabinet officer to visit India since the formation of the new government.

Mr. Chairman, with the new government in place in Delhi, we

will focus intensely on the future of the Indo-American relationship. President Clinton is acutely aware that as the first American

President elected since the end of the cold war, he has an unprecedented opportunity to put our relations with India on a substantially different footing. No longer do New Delhi and Washington

find themselves at cross purposes because of cold war constraints.

In the words of Prime Minister Vajpayee, ‘‘we are natural allies’’.

To define that new relationship and to invest it with the broadest

and deepest possible meaning, we have to address the complex set

of issues that surfaced with the Indian nuclear tests in May last

year, addressing them from our perspective and from India’s perspective. Our ability to move forward and the extent of our future

cooperation will be influenced by the progress we make, particularly in the nonproliferation area.

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, the Administration appreciates Congress’ recent action granting the President permanent

comprehensive waiver authority for the Glenn, Symington and

Pressler sanctions. I want to emphasize that we sought enhanced

waiver authority because this would give us more flexibility as we

pursue our agenda in South Asia. The unfolding situation in Pakistan is a reminder of how quickly things can change in South Asia

and therefore of the importance of ensuring that we have a range

of tools at our disposal. Once the legislation is enacted, we will use

the authority effectively and prudently and, I want to emphasize,

in consultation with Congress.

Mr. Chairman, let me turn now for a brief moment to Afghanistan and an update on our concerns about Osama Bin Laden. As

you know over the past year we have repeatedly contacted the

Taliban and encouraged them to expel Bin Laden without delay

and avoid further confrontation on this issue with the U.S. and others in the international community. Unfortunately, the Taliban has

not been responsive.

In July, President Clinton issued an Executive Order blocking

the Taliban’s property and banning commercial transactions with

the Taliban. In August, Ariana Airlines was placed under sanctions. To date we have frozen more than $34 million in Taliban assets.

Most recently and through U.S. diplomatic efforts, the rest of the

world has now joined us in expressing its resolve to end terrorist
15

operations in Afghanistan. A U.S.-initiated resolution passed

unanimously by the U.N. Security Council last week demands that

the Taliban stop sheltering Bin Laden and assure that he be expelled and brought to justice. If the Taliban fail to do so by November 15, their assets will be frozen worldwide, and Taliban-owned,

-leased, or -operated aircraft will be denied permission to take off

or land anywhere in the world.

This resolution is the result of intense U.S. effort, and represents

a significant step forward in our campaign to end Bin Laden’s terrorist activities.

Mr. Chairman, let me just add, we are prepared to work with the

Taliban to rid Afghanistan of terrorist networks. As President Clinton said following passage of the U.N. sanctions resolution last

week, the international community has sent a clear message. The

choice between cooperation and isolation lies with the Taliban.

Mr. Chairman, may I conclude by noting that our ability to pursue our agenda in Washington and indeed throughout the world depends in large part on adequate funding for our foreign affairs

budget, a point that Secretary Albright makes repeatedly.

As you know, earlier this week, President Clinton vetoed the foreign operations appropriations bill because it was funded at approximately $2.2 billion below his request. The Administration believes these cuts are dangerously shortsighted. The bill’s low funding level, in the President’s words, ‘‘puts at risk America’s 50 yearold tradition of leadership for a safer, more prosperous and democratic world.’’

Obviously, the across-the-board cuts in foreign affairs spending

will harm what we are trying to do in South Asia. Indeed, if the

proposed cuts are enacted, the Administration will be forced to reduce our efforts to counter terrorism, prevent and reduce conflict,

and support regional democracy, stem the spread of deadly diseases

like HIV-AIDS, address trafficking in women and children, and

fight drugs, all of which are clearly in the interests of the American

people and key to our agenda in Washington.

Mr. Chairman, we face a number of immediate and long-term

challenges, as well as opportunities in Washington, where our national interests are engaged. We need your support and the necessary resources to do our job.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Inderfurth appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Secretary Inderfurth. Next we will

hear from Dr. Arona M. Butcher, the Chief of Country and Regional Analysis Division, Office of Economics, United States International Trade Commission.

You may proceed as you wish, Dr. Butcher.

STATEMENT OF DR. ARONA BUTCHER, CHIEF OF COUNTRY

AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS DIVISION, OFFICE OF ECONOMICS, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

Dr. BUTCHER. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,

I want to thank you for the opportunity to present the findings of

a study conducted by the International Trade Commission on the
16

U.S. economic sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan after these

countries detonated nuclear explosive devices in May 1998.

As you know, on March 16, 1999, the Committee on Ways and

Means asked the Commission to examine the economic sanctions

imposed on India on May 13, 1998, and Pakistan on May 30, 1998,

pursuant to section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, also

known as the Glenn Amendment.

The Committee asked the Commission to analyze the effects of

the sanctions on the U.S. Economy and to assess the likely economic impact on the United States, India, and Pakistan if the sanctions are reimposed, summarize the instances when the sanctions

have affected humanitarian activities and the activities of multinational institutions in India and Pakistan.

The major finding of the Commission’s report is that the quantifiable impact of the Glenn Amendment’s economic sanctions and

the likely impact of the reimposition of these sanctions on the

United States, India, and Pakistan are relatively small. However,

according to U.S. Industry, the main impact of these sanctions is

increasing the perception that U.S. Companies could be unreliable

suppliers.

The Glenn Amendment sanctions on India and Pakistan that

were triggered in May 1998 and analyzed in the Commission study

are as follows:

Deny export credits and guarantees by any U.S. Government department or agency, such as the USDA, the U.S. Export-Import

Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the U.S.

Trade and Development Agency. These sanctions were waived until

October 21, 1999.

Second, prohibit U.S. banks from making any loan to the government of the detonating country, except for purposes of purchasing

food or other agricultural commodities. This was also waived until

October 21, 1999.

Third, oppose the extension of any loan for financial or technical

assistance by international financial institutions such as the Asian

Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and

the World Bank, except for humanitarian purposes. This was

waived for Pakistan until October 21, 1999, but is in force for

India.

Fourth, terminate U.S. foreign aid programs, except for humanitarian assistance and food or other agricultural commodities. This

is in force.

The short duration of the sanctions precluded an empirical analysis on the effects of sanctions on the United States prior to the

waiver. For example, restrictions on the provision of USDA export

credits and guarantees were lifted on July 15, 1998, and many of

the remaining components of the Glenn Amendment sanctions

were waived by the President on December 1, 1998.

Therefore, in order to assess the impact of the Glenn Amendment

sanctions on the U.S. economy, the Commission obtained information from U.S. industry and reviewed relevant literature, reviewing

information from conducting a telephone survey of over 200 U.S.

companies and associations, by holding a public hearing, and from

written submissions, and from other government agencies involved

in monitoring and enforcing actions.
17

In the case of India and Pakistan, macroeconomic data and trade

data were examined for the 1995–1999 period. In order to assess

the likely impact on the United States, India, and Pakistan of the

reimposition of sanctions, a global economic model was employed

with 1995 as a base year, the most recent year for which data on

trade flows for India and Pakistan and their major trading partners were available.

According to U.S. industry sources, the industries most affected

by the Glenn Amendment sanctions were those related to the sale

of certain agricultural products, industrial machinery, transportation, construction, and mining equipment, electronics products,

and infrastructure development services. Another result of the

sanctions was and continues to be the increasing perception of U.S.

companies as unreliable suppliers.

In addition, according to U.S. industry, the sanctions continue to

have a negative impact on U.S. business in India as U.S. companies are reluctant to pursue business opportunities because of uncertainty over sanctions.

The likely impact of the reimposition of the Glenn Amendment

sanctions on the United States, according to the model results,

would be an estimated cost, measured in terms of loss of purchasing power, of about $161 million, or less than one-tenth of 1

percent of U.S. GDP in 1995. The decline in overall U.S. employment would be less than two-tenths of 2 percent and would be primarily in the U.S. grain sector. U.S. wages and the return to capital would decline by less than one-tenth of 1 percent.

However, the reimposition of the sanctions prohibiting USDA export credits and guarantees would likely result in an estimated net

benefit for the United States, similar to the benefit from removing

an export subsidy, of about $27 million; that is, denying export

credits to the Indian and Pakistan importers results in savings for

the U.S. economy.

The reimposition of these sanctions, however, is likely to adversely affect U.S. wheat exports to Pakistan, primarily because

Pakistan is a significant user of USDA export credits. U.S. wheat

producers in the Pacific Northwest, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington

would be affected most if Pakistan were to shift to alternate suppliers such as Australia and Canada.

According to U.S. Industry, the reimposition of restrictions on

company or customer access to project financing or loan guarantees

from Eximbank and OPIC most likely will hinder efforts of U.S.

companies seeking to do business in India and Pakistan. This in

turn might harm U.S. international competitiveness and diminish

the perception of U.S. companies as reliable suppliers. Financial

services firms in particular reported that their operations would be

affected. These sanctions would make it more difficult for U.S. companies to participate in major infrastructure projects.

In the case of India, the Glenn Amendment sanctions appear to

have had a minimal overall impact on its economy. This is most

likely due to the fact that India’s economy is not dependent upon

foreign bilateral and multilateral assistance, and thus appeared not

to have been adversely affected by the postponement of several

World Bank loans.
18

According to the Government of India, the overall cost of the Glenn Amendment sanctions to the Indian economy was about $1.5

billion in 1998, about .4 percent of India’s gross domestic product.

India experienced an initial downturn in its financial sector after

the U.S. sanctions were imposed. But its economy recovered by late

1998 to post a 5.6 percent growth rate for that year.

The likely impact of reimposition of sanctions would be estimated to a total cost of $320 million, equivalent to less than one-tenth of

1 percent of India’s current GDP. The estimated effects on wages

and the return to capital in India and Pakistan also would be

small, declining by less than one-tenth of 1 percent. The reimposition of sanctions prohibiting USDA export credits and guarantees

was estimated to have no cost for India, since India imports relatively little grain from the United States. Grain is the primary

commodity affected by USDA export credits and guarantees that is

exported to India.

The major alternative suppliers benefiting from reduced U.S. exports to India and Pakistan under the Glenn Amendment sanctions

would be the other major trading partners of the sanctioned countries. These include Japan, Europe, the rest of Asia, Australia, New

Zealand, and the South Pacific trading partners.

In the case of Pakistan, the Glenn Amendment sanctions most

likely have had a small impact on its economy. The United States

was a relatively small provider of aid, trade, and investment for

Pakistan before the sanctions were activated. Moreover, most U.S.

economic assistance to Pakistan was terminated in 1990 by other

sanctions. Pakistan did experience an economic downturn immediately after the Glenn Amendment sanctions were triggered, but

there may be other factors, for example, the IMF reform package,

that may have influenced this downturn. Despite these economic

difficulties, Pakistan’s economy grew by 5.4 percent in 1998.

The likely impact of the reimposition of sanctions on Pakistan would be estimated to cost about $57 million, less than 1 percent

of Pakistan’s current GDP. The net welfare loss to Pakistan from

the imposition of the sanctions could be as large as $6 million.

The cost to Pakistan of reimposition of sanctions prohibiting

USDA export credits and guarantees was estimated to be approximately $20 million, used primarily to purchase wheat from the

United States. However, Pakistan would most likely shift to alternative suppliers in Australia and Canada if the Glenn Amendment

sanctions prohibiting USDA export credits are reimposed. In the

case of humanitarian activities, the effects of the Glenn Amendment sanctions on India and Pakistan also appear to be minimal,

as the sanctions did not apply to the provision of humanitarian aid

or to the provision of medicines and medical equipment. India does

not appear to have been adversely affected by the postponement of

several non-humanitarian World Bank loans. Pakistan could, however, be adversely affected if the United States and the other major

countries oppose future IMF loans for Pakistan.

Finally, some of the factors influencing the analysis in this report

are that India and Pakistan are relatively small trading partners

of the United States.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Butcher, excuse me. We have those factors

right in front of us here in your statement. I wonder if you could
19

summarize and tell us what you think the economic effects are in

your own words, in summary.

Dr. BUTCHER. The economic effects are, basically, relatively

small, as I have indicated, because of some of the factors here,

since they are small trading partners of the U.S.A. Also, the short

duration of the sanctions did not influence the activity in India and

Pakistan. Also, the other factors, for example, in Pakistan, where

Japan is a major donor of aid, and also the IMF reform package

was already implemented in Pakistan. Also, the east Asian financial crisis affected activities in these countries.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Butcher appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. We will now proceed under the five minute rule

under regular order.

I would begin the questioning by mentioning, Secretary

Inderfurth, that there has been some discussion among commentators about what has happened in Pakistan, of the fact that in the

51 years of its independence, Pakistan has now had military rule

for 25 or 26 years. As I understand it, there has not been a substantial outcry or demonstrations in the streets against the coup

that has taken place.

Perhaps that is because of the popularity or lack thereof of the

recent government, and perhaps it is because of the desperate or

declining economic conditions that were serious—I will not use the

word ‘‘desperate’’—that existed.

But what are we to make of the fact that Pakistan has chosen

a military course, or at least has found itself with military leadership for half of its existence and of how we see at the moment no

clear outcry against a coup which has taken the elected government from power?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Mr. Chairman, I think your observations about

the reaction to the military takeover are accurate. It is very clear—

and we have been seeing this for many weeks as it unfolded, a

great deal of concern in Pakistan itself about the direction the

country was heading. The economic situation was clearly at the top

of that agenda or near the top—and was widespread corruption, a

feeling that the relations between the civilian government and

other segments of society, the Sharif government, were reaching a

certain crisis proportion.

A backdrop to this is the history of civilian-military relations in

that country. In half the 52 year history of Pakistan there has been

a military government. Prime Minister Sharif, his relations with

the military were filled with a great deal of tension. A year ago he

had dismissed the chief of the army staff, General Karamat, and

had replaced him with General Musharraf. There was tension

there which was exacerbated by the Kargil crisis in Kashmir. We

believe that Prime Minister Sharif made the right decision after his

meeting with President Clinton to see the Line of Control restored

in Kashmir and to see that crisis ended, but the way in which that

crisis took place and the ill feelings that resulted from that certainly made relations between Prime Minister Sharif and the military more difficult.
20

That came to a head just two weeks ago when Prime Minister

Sharif attempted to dismiss, or—I’m sorry, two weeks ago they expected to have this repaired, and then last week he tried to dismiss

General Musharraf and the army reacted.

Mr. BEREUTER. If I could interject, there is a part here of your

possible response—there are press reports indicating that the

Prime Minister in effect warned of the difficulty he would place

himself and his government in if in fact he made the decisions we

were supporting, in the case of Kargil; and second, that General

Musharraf was in fact the leader of the incursion that took place.

Would you care to factor that into your response?

Mr. INDERFURTH. I will, because that has gotten some attention.

There is no question that the Kargil crisis did factor into the unraveling of the situation in Pakistan.

It is our very strong view that the mistake with Kargil was made

when a decision was taken by the Pakistani Government, we believe, and approved by Prime Minister Sharif, but also led by General Musharraf as head of the army, to try to back forces going

across the Line of Control and seizing certain territory in Indianheld Kashmir. That precipitated what was indeed the most dangerous conflict between the two countries since 1971.

The decision by Prime Minister Sharif to see these forces returned, that decision combined with very effective military action

brought that crisis to an end. It could have gotten worse. It could

have escalated—either by calculation or miscalculation. Bringing

that crisis to an end when you are dealing with two nuclear capable states was very important.

The consequences of Kargil for what was an ongoing crisis within

Pakistan, included the government’s increasing crackdown on legitimate forms of dissent, the freedom of the press. All of this led

to what I think we have seen in the last several days.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. My time has expired.

I would call on the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, in

accordance with Committee procedures. The gentleman is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, am I correct in my understanding that the Administration does not intend to use the Pressler and Glenn Amendment waivers to restart an arms supply relationship with Pakistan?

Mr. INDERFURTH. That is correct; we have no plans or intentions.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much.

In your summary of your statement just a moment ago, you said

that the Administration believed that the Sharif government approved of the Kargil incursion. Does that mean to imply that they

approved of it afterwards, or they knew about it before? Were they

complicitous in the formulation of that policy, or just went along

for the ride afterwards?

Mr. INDERFURTH. The ride got very bumpy. I think they were in

on the take-off, if you want to use that metaphor. We believe there

was civilian approval for this. This was not, to our knowledge, to

our information—and again, we are not inside the Pakistani government; we cannot say with absolute certainty, but the informa-
21

tion that we have leads us to the conclusion that it was a militaryproposed operation and a civilian-approved operation.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I think the interest here is whether or not, during the famous bus trip by the Prime Minister to Lahore, if indeed

Mr. Sharif was duplicitous during that meeting and knew about

the fact that Kargil was or was about to take place?

Mr. INDERFURTH. We don’t have an answer to that. We believe

that operation had been on the shelf for some time. Whether or not

it had been pulled off the shelf and presented in February, when

Prime Minister Sharif and Prime Minister Vajpayee were meeting,

we don’t know the answer to that. We would hope that was not the

case.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you.

Your statement notes that you will use the authority in the defense appropriation bill ‘‘effectively and prudently and in consultation with the Congress.’’ certainly that is exactly what we would

expect.

Do you have a sense at this point of what would be a prudent

and effective use of the waiver authority?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Well, let me say that assuming the DOD bill

is signed, we would plan to renew the waivers that are currently

in effect for India immediately. We would then assess what further

steps should be taken with that authority in light of our renewed

engagements with the new Indian government.

No decisions have been taken here. We have a number of issues

which we are working on where we want to see progress, and we

would hope that authority would contribute to that. I should mention, by the way, that we are currently reviewing the so-called ‘‘entities list.’’

Mr. ACKERMAN. That was going to be my next question. Basically, have you begun the process which calls for the paring down

of the list, and how far along are you? Can we expect a shorter list,

or no list?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Well, we are in that process of looking carefully

at the entities list. I think that we have been engaged in that now

for a few weeks. The DOD appropriations bill language does ask

for—I think it is a 60 day period to report to Congress, so we will

certainly have that within that timeframe and perhaps sooner.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you.

In the light of the fact that General Musharraf was the architect

of the Kargil invasion, what are the chances to restart a meaningful dialogue between both India and Pakistan? Should the Indian

government trust him, and if so, why?

Mr. INDERFURTH. As I mentioned in my brief opening remark,

the Lahore process does not look well these days, even though the

bus service continues.

I think, as we are, the Indian government will wait to see what

actions General Musharraf takes in the days ahead. We have said,

and I said in my statement, that we are going to move forward

based on actions, not on words. I think the Indian government will

take the same approach.

I think there is concern in New Delhi about the military takeover. They have had experience with military governments in the

past. They have approached this so far in a low-key, cautious way.
22

The new government has not been formed. We have no timetable

for a return to democracy.

There is, I think, a great deal to be learned about how General

Musharraf intends to proceed before we or the Indian government

or I think the international community can make decisions on any

of these issues, including a resumption of the Lahore process.

We would hope, however, that process could be resumed, because

it has appeared to be the only promising avenue for some reconciliation between the two countries in a very long time.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the generous allocation of the

time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. I wish we had more.

The gentleman from California is recognized under the five

minute rule. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you for reminding me, Mr. Chairman.

Just a couple of housekeeping matters.

Mr. Inderfurth, does the State Department have its cables and

electronic communications computerized?

Mr. INDERFURTH. You may be talking to the wrong person, Congressman. I am not a computer whiz. We can certainly provide you

the information on that, on our data system. I am sure it is computerized and I am sure that the search would include that, as well

as files and e-mails and cables and everything that you have asked

for.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. To your knowledge, does the State Department computer system have the capability to search out subject

matter areas?

Mr. INDERFURTH. I don’t know how it searches.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will leave it at that. Thank you very

much. You don’t know.

You are personally aware that Chairman Gilman verbally requested at a closed hearing from Secretary Albright in November

of last year for the documents that we were talking about?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Congressman, the formal request was made on

May 21. I am sorry we cannot——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Inderfurth, if you can, answer my question, please. Were you aware of Chairman Gilman’s——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, there is no reason

any of us have to shout at the witnesses.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When someone is trying to eat up my time,

I have five minutes, which the Chairman talked to me about.

Could you please answer the question, were you aware of Chairman Gilman’s verbal request for the documents that I had requested earlier in November?

Mr. INDERFURTH. In an open or closed session? Did you say

closed session?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It was a closed session.

Mr. INDERFURTH. I am not aware of it.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You were not aware of it? How many times

did I tell you of Mr. Gilman’s request?

Mr. INDERFURTH. I think you said in open session.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How many times did I remind you of Mr. Gilman’s verbal request at that hearing?
23

Mr. INDERFURTH. Well——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I can tell you, it was over five times.

Mr. INDERFURTH. We need it in writing, I am sorry.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It was over five times.

How many times did this Member have to remind you of the

verbal commitment of Secretary Albright in that November hearing

to provide the documents forthwith?

Mr. INDERFURTH. That commitment was made and it is being

pursued now in light of the formal written request. The commitment was a good one.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Inderfurth.

Mr. Inderfurth, let me just note that in your own statement

today you state, ‘‘Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to work with the

Taliban to rid Afghanistan of terrorist networks,’’ and it goes on,

talking about how the Clinton Administration has made that choice

of cooperation or isolation, and that choice lies with the Taliban.

Let me note, Mr. Inderfurth, that to me that is reconfirming everything that I have been saying. Plus, Mr. Inderfurth, let me note

that this is very similar to saying to Al Capone, ‘‘Whether or not

you are going to help us rid Chicago of bootleggers is up to you.’’

the Taliban are up to here with terrorism, they are up to here in

the opium trade, and for you to make these kinds of statements

about cooperating with the Taliban underscores exactly the point

that I have been trying to make, does it not?

Mr. INDERFURTH. It does not.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.

Mr. INDERFURTH. The work with the Taliban—in this instance,

we have an indictment of Osama Bin Laden. If they would like to

turn him over, we will work with them. We will go to their border

and take Bin Laden and bring him back to New York and put him

on trial. That is what we are referring to. If they need some way

to get him out of the country, we are prepared to work with them

for that. That is exactly and only what we were referring to.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Inderfurth, did your assistant talk to you

about a document S–175? It is a State Department cable dated 8/

07/98.

Mr. INDERFURTH. No, I don’t have the whole list of documents.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Did your assistant who came to me and went

over those documents relate that document to you?

Mr. INDERFURTH. If you are referring to Mr. Morrison, he did report on his discussions with you; but not specific documents and

dates, if you want to provide that to me, if it is unclassified, I

would be glad to talk about it in this session.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is it your position, and you are stating, can

I say, under oath today——

Mr. BEREUTER. No.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I guess we cannot say that, can we? But you

are reaffirming that there is nothing in State Department cables

that you have read or know about that indicates any past support

or present support for the Taliban?

Mr. INDERFURTH. I have seen nothing to that effect.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is a great answer. That is an answer.

You know, you were a newsman, Mr. Inderfurth. You know what

kind of answer that is. That is an answer that is so full of weasel
24

words it means nothing. Nothing that you have seen? I used to be

a newsman, too. I recognize when people sometimes do not want

to see things, they don’t see it. Is it possible that there are documents in the State Department that you have not seen that indicate this?

Mr. INDERFURTH. We have provided you the full documentation

that we have available. As I said, of those documents that I have

seen, nothing supports your allegations. Again, I would be pleased,

as I have said from the outset, to discuss these with you in open

or closed session, in your office, my office, any fashion you would

like to do it.

Again, this has been a charge that you have made for some time.

In the review that has been done in compliance with Chairman Gilman’s formal request, I have seen nothing to support what you

have—the charges that you have made. But again, if you have

something that perhaps I overlooked in reviewing these, please let

me know.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I would just close by saying that I renew my

statement that the documents that I have seen do indicate past

support for the Taliban. I cannot go into detail; they are secret documents.

Number two, just from Mr. Inderfurth’s testimony today and the

other investigations that I have carried on, I certainly renew this

charge. There is nothing that can be done on the other side of this

aisle to try to laugh off this charge. This is a very serious charge.

It goes to the heart of our oversight powers.

I appreciate Mr. Ackerman’s support for our requests for these

documents.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the

gentleman be given one extra minute.

Mr. BEREUTER. Is there objection?

Hearing none.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I certainly will.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Secretary, have you either seen, heard, or

known of any document in existence, or even heard any rumors of

such documents being in existence, other than from the allegations

made by my distinguished colleague from California?

Mr. INDERFURTH. No, I have not.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Did I get around to all the obfuscations?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. I would thank the gentleman very much

for his taking this issue very seriously, and although we come at

things from different sides of the aisle, we know this is a very serious responsibility. We have these document requests. I am looking

forward to the rest of the documents. I will be very happy to talk

to you in private or public about that.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would appreciate

the continued cooperation of your Department with the gentleman

from California in continuing to provide documents, with the full

understanding that sometimes you can’t prove a negative, and

maybe such documentation does not exist, and if so, perhaps at

least with that background, the gentleman at one point will be sat-
25

isfied that he has seen everything that there is that might be seen.

Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. I would move on to

the next person; but just saying that, I would just say that if the

gentleman from California would like the assistance of Chairman

Gilman and myself, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Gejdenson, in trying to make

sure that we have this discussion. I think it would be salutary because it is getting in the way of good relationships between the Executive Branch and this Committee and this Subcommittee. We

need to solve the problem if we can.

I now turn to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Hastings, under

the five minute rule.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In deference to Mr.

Ackerman, he asked that I yield to him briefly.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. I make that request just to ask

unanimous consent that the remarks and questions by the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Brown, be made a part of the record.

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection, that will be the order.

[The Question referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. The gentleman reclaims his time and may proceed.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, my colleague, the gentleman from California, has

persisted in his line of inquiry, which he is perfectly entitled to. I

would urge, however, in all fairness, that his remarks not be taken

at all to suggest that the Administration in any way is condoning

actions of the Taliban.

As a matter of fact, Secretary Inderfurth’s testimony reflects very

accurately a number of circumstances. In July, President Clinton

issued an Executive Order blocking the Taliban’s property. The Administration has castigated the Taliban on numerous occasions regarding its human rights policies and especially its treatment of

women.

The expelling of Bin Laden is something that, through diplomatic

efforts, the United States has been able to achieve the kinds of results that the rest of the world have now joined us in expressing

their resolve to end terrorism. So it is a bit unfair, although not

at all without the purview of the member’s prerogatives, but it is

a bit unfair to characterize the efforts or testimony of Secretary

Inderfurth as not being productive.

I find, among other things, it to be most productive, particularly

in light of the prolific statements that he makes, suggesting among

other things the strength of this Administration’s views with reference to the eradication of terrorism in Afghanistan.

That said, Mr. Chairman, I had not meant to use my time for

that purpose, but I could not allow that kind of thing to go poisoning into the record without understanding with clarity this Administration’s position as stated by Secretary Inderfurth in the

very fine comments that he has offered us here today.

In addition, I would like to ask you, Secretary Inderfurth, two

things; and then Dr. Butcher, not to leave you over there without

a question.

My question to you, Dr. Butcher, would be if the sanctions affected the economies of India and Pakistan, and did their econo-
26

mies suffer a drop in productivity because of the sanctions? I gather the question would be to what extent have they found alternative sources, and how successful has the United States industry

been in recapturing their previous market share?

If I could, I would go to Secretary Inderfurth first and ask him

whether or not the military regime that is in force now in Pakistan

might be more supportive of, in your view, or sympathetic toward

Islamic fundamentalism.

Second, Secretary Inderfurth, from the year that I arrived in

Congress I have advocated that President Clinton should visit

India. I know such a visit has been planned and scheduled and rescheduled, and then put off the schedule because of the nuclear

testing of India and Pakistan. I would urge that you urge that the

President understand that I think, for one, as one member, that he

ought to go to India now more than ever, notwithstanding what

has happened in the coup in Pakistan, notwithstanding the nuclear

testing.

I will leave it at that and ask you a question. Do you know, of

your own knowledge, whether President Clinton intends to visit

India in the near future? Those are my questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. INDERFURTH. Mr. Chairman, the last question first: The

President still intends to visit South Asia next year. That is the

case. Now, the exact nature of that visit is still under consideration

at the White House, but his intention to visit South Asia in the

Year 2000, hopefully early in the Year 2000, is still there.

On the question of Islamic fundamentalism, I made reference in

my testimony to General Musharraf’s speech to the Nation, and

through CNN, to the international community on October 17. He

said in that speech, and I think it is apropos of your question, he

said in his speech that ‘‘Islam teaches tolerance, not hatred; universal brotherhood, and not enmity; peace, and not violence.’’

He also said, ‘‘I would like to reassure our minorities that they

will enjoy full rights and protections.’’

Now, it is our view that these are not the words of an extremist.

But again, as I said, in earlier remarks, we will be very much

watching General Musharraf in terms of his actions, as well as his

words. So we hope that direction that he outlined is one that he

will pursue in Pakistan.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for 30

seconds for Dr. Butcher to respond.

Mr. BEREUTER. She will have that under regular order. Thank

you.

Dr. Butcher.

Dr. BUTCHER. Regarding regaining market share, that will depend on the funding from the Export-Import Bank and OPIC. For

example, Boeing lost contracts with India and Pakistan on aircraft,

but once the waiver was in effect, they regained market share—

they were able to get the funding to sell aircraft and parts to India.

Similarly, with export credits from USDA, wheat exports rely on

that as well. If those are reimposed, the alternative suppliers for

Pakistan are Canada and Australia, offering competitive terms. So

again in case of Pakistan’s wheat imports, 78 percent of its imports

come from the U.S. in 1997–1998, the rest comes from Australia.

If they are unable to get export credits, they would most likely go
27

to Australia or Canada. It is basically a function of funding available to our U.S. exporters to sell to Pakistan and India.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you both.

Mr. BEREUTER. Congressman Hastings, I appreciate you pursuing that matter.

Dr. Cooksey, you are recognized.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We do appreciate the

witnesses being here today and giving their testimony. It is good

to hear it.

I want to ask a question, and I would hope that you can—and

I know the answer, but I feel that it needs to be stated in the

record.

The appropriations bill for the Department of Defense is in the

process of being considered by Clinton, and you are familiar with

the Glenn Amendment that you referred to, Dr. Butcher. There is

new waiver authority in that Department of Defense bill that

would waive these sanctions against Pakistan and India.

Now, am I not correct in that if Clinton chooses to veto this Department of Defense conference or the bill, that then the waiver expires tomorrow, according to the Glenn Amendment as outlined in

your testimony—and tomorrow is October 21, 1999—so then the

sanctions will be reimposed on India and Pakistan; and would this

Democrat President move us back to an isolationist position with

some of these sanctions? Is he aware of that? Is he willing to move

back to sanctions?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Congressman, I——

Mr. COOKSEY. Is the State Department aware of that?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Of course we are, and I actually have a response for you on this. But I don’t think that the issues at stake

with respect to the DOD appropriations bill are riding on this issue

of the waiver authority for India and Pakistan. I think there are

larger issues involved there.

Mr. COOKSEY. In terms of vetoing?

Mr. INDERFURTH. In terms of vetoing. I think that he and the Administration is well aware that embedded within the DOD appropriations bill is the waiver authority for India and Pakistan, which

we greatly appreciate because it is comprehensive and permanent,

and we have worked very hard with Members of Congress, and we

greatly support or appreciate the support that we have had there.

But I don’t think that a veto of a DOD appropriations bill would

relate to moving us back to an isolationist point of view or anything, quite frankly, related to his view on India and Pakistan. It

would simply be a part of the legislative process.

Now——

Mr. COOKSEY. But there would be a reimposition of the sanctions?

Mr. INDERFURTH. There would be; but let me go through that just

very briefly. It is timely because today is October 20 and tomorrow

this may or may not take place. We are well aware that we have

until the 21st.

Clearly, we would like to see this authority approved and signed

into law. We are looking, however, if that does not take place by

tomorrow, for ways to find a bridge between tomorrow’s expiration
28

and the issuance of a new waiver under the authorities contained

in the DOD bill.

Our lawyers are working to see if it is feasible to interpret the

one year Brownback authority that is currently law as allowing the

President to extend the waiver for an interim period. Now—and

this is in consultation, obviously, with Congress——

Mr. COOKSEY. Please be brief. I am running out of time.

Mr. INDERFURTH. I am sorry. If we are unable to create such a

bridge, the waiver will lapse and the restrictions would be reimposed, but that would be done for reasons associated with the legislative process, not a policy decision or determination.

Moreover, we judge that there would be minimum impact if this

does occur, if this interim period lasts only for a short period of

time, which we would expect. Sorry. It is not a surgical answer but

it is the best I can do.

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is not surgical, but he hopes it is a suture.

Mr. COOKSEY. And it would be a patch, a steri-strip, maybe.

This is my closing comment. I personally am really offended by

people like Bin Laden. I used to spend a lot of time in Kenya, Dr.

Butcher, and I assume you are from Kenya, since your undergraduate degree is there. I was working up north of Nairobi in the

Meru area, about 30 miles there, off and on for 6 years.

A lot of the people that were injured and blinded in the bombing

because they had two bombs. There was one bomb that caused everybody to go look to see what the noise was, and there was a second bomb which blew out the windows. There were a lot of people

that had glass in their eyes. I know some of the surgeons that took

care of them there.

Guys like Bin Laden are bad guys. Guys like Bin Laden and the

Taliban are terrorists and they are responsible for killing Americans and killing Pakistanis and Afghans and everybody else. Those

people need to be taken out.

Unfortunately, they hide behind a religion, and I don’t think that

religion is what they claim it is. I think there are some real fine

Muslims that do adhere to the teachings of Mohammed. But the

one thing that those people do understand is that they understand

focus, they understand firmness, and they understand force.

When those people continue to produce opium and they continue

to shelter terrorists and they continue to cause bedlam around the

world, I think we have one alternative: I think we need to play

hardball with them. They understand force and firmness. They understand putting a bomb on top of their head. But it needs to be

done in a very effective manner. It needs to be done so that people

in Kenya and people around the world can go to their embassy, go

to their work, go to their homes and survive.

I am concerned that the top person in the Executive Branch

tends not to be focused, tends not to be firm. He was passive when

I was in the military 30 years ago, but that is another issue. It just

sends the wrong message to these people. They think they can get

by with murder, and they have done it.

Unless you can get everybody on board and present this message,

this image, this message that there are some tough Americans that

would be tough on bad guys, I think we would continue to suffer
29

because of this lack of firmness and focus and leadership at the top

of the Executive Branch.

There are some good people in the State Department, there are

some very professional people that I think are indeed very firm and

very professional.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Cooksey.

We turn now to the Vice Chairman, Mr. Royce, for his questions

under the five minute rule.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have talked at length about this issue of Afghanistan. I just

want to raise the point again that if there had been no Taliban,

there would not be a Bin Laden, in my view. There would not have

been these opportunities. There would not be this safe harbor.

I guess the frustration that some of my colleagues are expressing

here today is the feeling that perhaps there has been a laissez-faire

attitude, you might say, in terms of how we approach the problem

of Afghanistan. Maybe it is because it seemed insoluble. But the

point is that I think for my colleague from California, he feels a

little like a Cassandra who has warned again and again of what

is coming, and now sees exactly what he warned about coming before us here. Yet there still is not the focus nor the understanding.

For those who have gone to Afghanistan and seen the orphans,

seen the devastation, and seen the commitment for violence that is

coming out of that cauldron, as my colleague the gentleman from

California has done, there is this feeling that no one really understands just what is in store for that region and for the world.

So perhaps at times we get a little frustrated. I have had many

meetings with the Administration where I tried to encourage

broadcasts, a Radio Free Afghanistan concept, where people could

get the information, so that the inevitable would not happen, so the

Taliban would not overtake Afghanistan. Well, we did not do that.

There have been international summits where leaders around

the world have tried to get together the various combatants in a

way in which maybe they could contain the Taliban, but we have

let nature take its course, you might say, in the view of many. So

here we are today with exactly what some of us feared facing us.

I guess I would just say that there is still the opportunity for

concepts like Radio Free Afghanistan. There is still the opportunity

to try to figure out a scenario in which we reverse what has happened there. But if we just kick the can down the road and wait

for it to be someone else’s problem, we may find it one of the great

challenges of our time, ultimately.

I wanted to ask you a question about General Musharraf and

about the commitments he is making.

One would be, will he make a commitment to not now condone

or indirectly support cross-border terrorism across the Line of Control of the type that was previously authorized in the Kargil mission? It is clear that given our past experience with his judgment,

that I think we now need to hear that he will follow the previous

government’s policy to at least try to discourage international terrorism.

I would just like to understand if he has given some assurances

along that line.
30

Mr. INDERFURTH. Congressman, on your point about Afghanistan, I am in total agreement with the fact that our inattention or

inability to address Afghanistan since the end of the Soviet occupation and the warfare that has continued since then is having increasingly serious consequences for the international community

and for us.

Whether it be in the harboring of terrorists, whether it be in the

fact that Afghanistan is now the leading producer in the world of

illicit opium, whether it be in human rights abuses and the treatment of women and girls, the spillover effects of Afghanistan are

ones that we have been calling attention to, but we have been able

to do very little about for a very long time.

What Congressman Rohrabacher has been saying on that subject, pay attention to Afghanistan, we are totally in agreement. We

just think he is barking up the wrong tree, thinking that we had

a policy of covert support for the Taliban. What we did have initially was a lack of understanding about what this Taliban movement was. It came virtually, literally out of nowhere, and given the

fighting, the chaos in Afghanistan, the question arose: Might this

be, you know, an answer for stability?

As soon as it was apparent that the Taliban was not that answer, our statements and policy responded accordingly, and it has

ratcheted up to the point to where we are now putting sanctions

and taking the steps I mentioned here.

Again, we need to do something about this, and if we don’t, we

will pay an even heavier price in the days ahead.

On the question of General Musharraf, in his speech and indeed

in a meeting that he had with Ambassador Milam who returned to

Islamabad immediately after the takeover and met with him at

President Clinton’s direction, certain assurances were provided, including in his speech on a return to democracy and the rest, but

no timetable; dialogue with India but not specifics. He did announce a unilateral military de-escalation, of pulling Pakistani

forces back from their international border, not the Line of Control

but their international border.

We will be pursuing in the days ahead firmer commitments from

General Musharraf on that issue, including cross-border terrorism.

The Indians have said they cannot resume the Lahore process until

cross-border terrorism ceases. We believe steps like that should and

must be taken, and we will press very hard for that.

Mr. ROYCE. In closing, I would just suggest that King Zahir Shah

has put forward a plan that is pretty well received by rank and file

Afghans to move toward a general assembly, and a way in which

to do that—and I just in closing would like to again encourage you

to do all you can do to attempt to raise that plan, because I think

with the rank and file and even with many of the Mujahedeen, it

has promise, if we could just get the international community behind it and try to move the concept.

Mr. INDERFURTH. We are aware of the former king’s plan, and we

stay in touch with him and his people in Rome.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you again.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Royce.

Mr. Secretary, I thought your exchange you had here with Mr.

Royce earlier on the Taliban and the Administration was very im-
31

portant. I am going to try to make sure that the Full Committee

has that available to them. I want to thank both of the witnesses

for your patience.

Dr. Butcher, we haven’t asked many questions for you, but the

information you provided has been helpful to us, and I very much

appreciate it as we all do.

Mr. Secretary, I confess to some frustration, not with you but

with the fact that we scratched the surface only of a few geographic

sectors, and there are times when hearings are good methods of

conducting oversight. They ought to be supplemented, it seems to

me, with informal briefings. If you would participate with that in

a Members’ briefing, we will start that process periodically from

next year.

Mr. INDERFURTH. I would be more than pleased to do that.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would like now to call the second panel. We

have two distinguished witnesses, and we will hear from them in

order. First, Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, Director of South Asia

Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS; and Mr. Selig

S. Harrison, Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Institute Fellow, the

Century Foundation.

I have provided more detailed biographical material on these two

people at the beginning of the hearing. I want to thank both of

them for their patience and for being with us today. As with the

first panel, your entire statements will be made a part of the

record, and you may proceed as you wish. Ambassador Schaffer,

please proceed. Thank you very much.

STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE TERESITA SCHAFFER, DIRECTOR FOR SOUTH ASIA, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)

Ms. SCHAFFER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to

have this opportunity to testify before your Subcommittee. In years

past when I was in the State Department and testified before your

predecessor, I always wondered what happened when the government witnesses finished, breathed their sighs of relief and sped out

the door, and I finally have a chance to find out.

Mr. BEREUTER. Well, generally it is not quite so late in the day.

I apologize for that fact.

Ms. SCHAFFER. I would like to make some brief observations on

the dramatic developments in Pakistan over the past week and

then to share my recommendations about U.S. policy priorities for

the region.

First, Pakistan and a disappointing end to a disappointing government. Pakistan has lived under a stressed and seriously flawed

democracy for the past 11 years. Each of the four changes of government since 1988 involve serious charges of corruption and abuse

of power. Assistant Secretary Inderfurth touched on the country

systemic problems: corroded national institutions, pervasive corruption, sectarian strife and urban violence, and a crisis in the government’s finances. He might also have mentioned that long-term social problems like high population growth and widespread illiteracy

have gone untended, victims of bad priorities and of the government’s cash crunch.
32

The one that worries me most is the disaffection in Pakistan’s

smaller provinces at what they consider to be domination by the

larger Punjab. As much as a year ago, many Pakistanis were ruefully concluding that the democratic government couldn’t deliver

the goods, or at least this democratic government couldn’t deliver

the goods. This explains why the Pakistanis in the main greeted

last week’s coup with relief rather than outrage, and that in many

ways is the saddest commentary on last week’s events.

Pakistan’s prior experience with army regimes suggests that beyond a brief honeymoon period, they have a bad effect on both the

army and the country. We are right to call for a restoration of

democratic government in Pakistan. In the final analysis, that is

the only way that a government can acquire the legitimacy the

country craves.

Furthermore, all the problems that we have been talking about

need to have their solutions enshrined in representative institutions. In particular, the dangerously frayed relations among the

provinces cannot be put right without a genuine political process,

real elections and an accountable Parliament in which people of all

four provinces find their voice.

But if democracy is an absolutely vital goal, I would argue it is

not the only one. Ultimately, Pakistan needs not just an elected

government—we have had four examples of how they didn’t succeed—they need one that can deliver the goods.

How should the United States respond to this situation? I believe

that our basic principle should be to judge the regime in Pakistan

by its actions. The burden of proof is now on General Musharraf

to show that he is actually fulfilling the agenda he has sketched

out.

We should watch in particular two areas. First, re-establishing

decent and accountable governance, as he promised in his speech

last Sunday; and this is something which an appointed government

in fact can do or can make a big beginning toward doing.

The second thing we should watch is management of relations

with India. The Army high command, as Mr. Inderfurth told you,

did initiate the dangerous Kargil adventure, and therefore, they

bear a large measure of responsibilities for the current downward

spiral in relations. They are also in a unique position to reverse it

if they choose to do so.

The announcement of the thin-out of forces along the international border is a useful olive branch. Stopping infiltration across

the Line of Control in Kashmir would be a good next step, and in

this respect, Mr. Inderfurth talked about getting a commitment to

that effect. I am not particularly interested in the commitment. I

am interested in seeing what happens. Commitments are cheap. It

is the action that is important.

If the current leadership meets these high standards and if it

then moves swiftly back to the barracks, America’s democratic values and its strategic interest could both come out ahead. History

does not leave one very optimistic, but we should watch what actually happens. For the duration of this military government, current

law rules out most aid and military sales and a high-profile political embrace would seem to be quite out of place. That is a fitting

response to the overthrow of an elected government. But I agree
33

with Mr. Inderfurth that we need to remain in close touch, including a serious military-to-military policy dialogue.

If the new government is able to meet IMF conditions, as their

predecessors did not, I also see no reason for us to prevent international institutions from funding financial stabilization and related programs.

I would also like to leave you five brief thoughts about American

policy in the rest of the region. First, the U.S. should encourage

India and Pakistan to find a real settlement to their differences,

but recognize that the work of settling has to be done by those

countries. I oppose naming a special envoy on Kashmir. The Administration is right to conclude that a third-party role can only be

effective if both countries accept it.

While it is up to India and Pakistan to work out the terms of the

settlement, both need to come to terms with some unpleasant realities. For Pakistan, this means recognizing that they are not going

to get Kashmir and that they may need to build a political consensus around a solution that doesn’t significantly change today’s

map. For India, the difficult reality is that they really have to allow

self-rule for the valley of Kashmir, a much larger measure of autonomy and hands-off for what passes for a political process there

which has been badly distorted for the last 50 years. Otherwise

they face the nasty cycle of insurgency and repression.

My second point is that the U.S. should reexamine its nonproliferation priorities. I fully support the goal of CTBT signature

by India and Pakistan, and indeed, I hope that the Senate will in

time reconsider its action rejecting U.S. ratification of the CTBT.

But to me, there are two issues that are more important to the

nuclear safety of the world. The first is avoiding nuclear conflict,

and the second is preventing export of nuclear materials or knowhow from India and Pakistan.

To me, the Kargil episode demonstrated two things: one, that

India and Pakistan really don’t want a nuclear confrontation; and

two, that it would be easy to slip into one by accident. This makes

a compelling case for increasing the margin of safety through risk

reduction measures between those two.

As for exports, both India and Pakistan have declared that they

will not export the products from their programs, and as far as

anyone knows, they have not done so. Strengthening this resolve,

formalizing it and sharing information on its implementation are

critical to ensuring that unintended leakage doesn’t occur. These

are the things that are important if you are worried about the nuclear ‘‘wannabes.’’

Third point, I think we should delink India and Pakistan policy

wherever possible. Clearly, the military regime in Pakistan will inhibit major U.S. policy initiatives there. There is no need to subject

relations with India to the same inhibitions. Waiving sanctions on

India makes sense even if Pakistan is now going to be under new

sanctions.

Developments in Pakistan should not lead the President to cancel his plans to visit South Asia. A visit to India and Bangladesh

could still serve the U.S.’s interests.

Fourth point, in much of the region the greatest potential lies in

economics. This is especially true in India where the economic re-
34

forms launched in 1991 are beginning to bear fruit. The existing

level of economic reform has been accepted across the political spectrum, and I think we can expect more action now that there is a

government in place with a somewhat longer time perspective. One

can also point to similar trends in Bangladesh and in Sri Lanka.

We should nurture the economic relationships both by encouraging trade and investment and by continuing our aid programs.

The one in Sri Lanka in particular has taken a beating during the

last few years of cuts in the aid budget.

My final suggestion is don’t lash the rest of the region to India

and Pakistan. Both the Administration and Congress rightly devote

most of their South Asia energy to India and Pakistan. However,

I would urge both this Committee and the Administration to reserve a little air time for the rest of the region. Their political and

economic health is not determined by India’s and Pakistan’s troubles. They offer smaller but still attractive markets for American

business. It doesn’t take a huge effort and it doesn’t take a huge

amount of time to tender relations with these countries, and this

can contribute to healthier regional relationships which in turn can

even provide a better context for India and Pakistan to manage

their problems.

In closing, I would like to reinforce the plea I know you have received from Mr. Inderfurth and others for more generous funding

of the nation’s diplomatic business. Taken all together, the U.S.

Government’s international affairs budget is less than 1 percent of

the total budget, but look at what you get for that 1 percent. I look

on it as a vaccination against the international scourges of chaos

and war. When diplomacy is working properly, you don’t see it in

action and everyone wonders what the fuss is about; but when it

breaks down or when America’s diplomats do not have the tools to

do the job properly, the world and the U.S. taxpayer pay the price.

In South Asia, we are coasting on the accumulated political capital of half a century of patient work, but funding has been drastically cut for the tools that helped build relationships in the past:

economic aid, public diplomacy, international visitor grants, military education and training, and, indeed, diplomatic establishments. The size of the diplomatic establishments has shrunk, and

they don’t have the state-of-the-art communications they need to

mitigate that loss. I think that a properly staffed and equipped diplomatic presence in the region is an inexpensive way to ensure that

we are providing the attention it needs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Teresita Schaffer appears in the

appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador Schaffer, thank you for your excellent statement. I think it is straight forward. It actually, I think,

helps to not be part of the Administration to make such a statement. They certainly do not have state-of-the-art communications,

you are absolutely right about that. They know it, too. It is a matter of finding the funds.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Harrison, we look forward to hearing your

testimony. You may proceed as you wish.
35

STATEMENT OF SELIG S. HARRISON, SENIOR SCHOLAR,

WOODROW WILSON INSTITUTE AND FELLOW, THE CENTURY

FOUNDATION

Mr. HARRISON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be

brief. It is late.

I think that it is clear that the advent of General Musharraf’s

government in Pakistan has exacerbated the tensions between

Pakistan and India. Therefore, the point that I would like to stress

today is that all grants and sales of military spare parts, components and weapons systems to Pakistan should remain suspended

indefinitely.

Now, Secretary Inderfurth reassured us, he said there are no

plans or intentions to resume such grants and sales, but I can foresee the bargaining that is going to go on and discussions that will

go on between the United States and the new government in Pakistan. There is a great danger of slippage on this issue because General Musharraf, who is trying to project an image of moderation in

an effort to grease the way for both economic and military aid, is

going to talk about deals—with moves toward what Secretary

Inderfurth called ‘‘civilian, constitutional, and democratic’’ government to be made in exchange for modifications of restrictions on

particularly the sale of military spare parts. And I think we should

be very alert to the need to avoid that.

General Musharraf and his deputy, Lieutenant General Mohammed Aziz were personally responsible for initiating the Kargil invasion last May that led to a serious military conflict between India

and Pakistan. Now, it is welcome that he has unilaterally withdrawn some Pakistani forces from the India-Pakistan international

boundary, but as has been noted before today, that does not extend

to Kashmir, which is what would really count.

Indeed, General Musharraf has made clear that Pakistan will

continue to sponsor and support insurgent activity in the Indianadministered areas of Kashmir. This policy poses a continued

threat to peace and stability in South Asia, and the United States

should in no way condone or support it.

I think the United States should seek to promote a settlement

of the Kashmir issue. I agree with Secretary Schaffer that the way

not to do it is to become directly involved in attempting to mediate,

but what the United States can do to promote a settlement of the

issue is to declare its support for the Line of Control as the permanent international boundary.

In the absence of such a clear American position, Pakistan will

feel emboldened to continue its present policy of seeking to bleed

India in Kashmir through support of insurgent activity. A settlement based on the Line of Control, at present the de facto boundary, of course, as the de jure boundary, should be accompanied by

American efforts first to induce both Indian and Pakistan to increase substantially the degree of autonomy accorded to the areas

of Kashmir under their control, and second, to move toward the reduction of military deployments in both Indian and Pakistani areas

of Kashmir when cross-border insurgent activity by Pakistan has

ceased.

Now, turning to the issue of economic aid policy toward both

India and Pakistan. Whether and when to resume U.S.-supported
36

multilateral economic assistance to Pakistan should be decided on

the basis of economic criteria alone, and in that I agree with what

Secretary Schaffer has just said. The IMF has withheld disbursement of the latest pending installment of its bailout package because the previous government failed to meet key economic performance criteria, especially with respect to tax collections. If the

new government is able to meet IMF performance criteria and

move credibly toward economic stability, aid disbursements should

be resumed. The people of Pakistan should not be the victims of political events beyond their control, and this principle should also be

applied to India where we have imposed sanctions. At the present

time, World Bank loans for power and roads which directly affect

the lives of people in the rural areas are prohibited by our policy.

I do hope that President Clinton will go to India and Bangladesh

early next year as is being discussed. I doubt very much that the

political conditions in Pakistan will permit him to go there. If he

does go to South Asia I hope at that time he is able to announce

an end to the sanctions that have been imposed over the nuclear

issue.

Now, for some general comments. We should be clear about what

American interests are in South Asia. Our most important interest

is to have friendly relations with India, which is eight times bigger

than Pakistan and is emerging as a major military and economic

power. India will have a big navy that will affect our access to the

Indian Ocean and to the South China Sea. India is going to be a

nuclear power. The balance of power in Asia will be based on both

a nuclear India and a nuclear China. Technologically, India could

make an ICBM in not too many years. So, it is clearly in the American interest to be on friendly terms, just as it is with China. We

lost sight of that, as one of the Members pointed out, during the

cold war, and we gave Pakistan $4 billion in military hardware and

tilted toward Pakistan on Kashmir.

Now we have a chance to get our policy right, and that requires

lifting economic sanctions on both India and Pakistan while keeping the lid tight on military transfers.

I regret that Brownback 2 lumped economic and military aid together, because there is a basic difference in how we should be

handling these two types of relationships.

In conclusion, the contrast really is very striking between a stable democratic India that has just completed another impressive

election and is doing well economically, and an unstable Pakistan

with a military dictatorship once again. We should be clear that it

is at this point a dictatorship, especially when we look at the fact

that the courts are not allowed to operate in any way. There is a

totally arbitrary government at the present time, and so we

shouldn’t—I was very distressed that Ambassador Milam started

talking about how moderate General Musharraf is. This is a situation that is very, very capable of leading to all kinds of arbitrary

repression of human rights within a very short period of time.

American interests and American values both dictate that we improve our relations with India while continuing to cooperate with

Pakistan in economic development if it is able to get its act together.

I think I will conclude at that point.
37

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harrison appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, both of you. I would like

to now proceed under the five minute rule, and Mr. Hastings and

I will have a chance hopefully to followup on a couple of questions.

Both of you have indicated, I believe, that if economic criteria are

met, then multilateral aid should continue through the IFI, including the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank.

Ambassador, why is it important, and also Mr. Harrison, to distinguish that a new Brownback provision combined lifting military

sanctions with economic sanctions? I think it implies that you are

supporting economic sanctions being lifted as well. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRISON. Not as well. Economic sanctions but not military

sanctions.

Mr. BEREUTER. I mean as well as Ambassador Schaffer.

Mr. HARRISON. Yes.

Mr. BEREUTER. Why?

Ms. SCHAFFER. Why should economic aid continue from the multilateral institutions?

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes.

Ms. SCHAFFER. Pakistan is close to economic meltdown, at least

in those parts of the economies that touch the government. The

crops get better or worse with the weather, but the rest of the economy is in very serious trouble. Industrial production is down. Investment is in the tank. The balance of the payments is in desperate shape if the debt rescheduling runs out, which it will without an IMF program, and where government revenues have fallen

very seriously short of goals because agriculture is untaxed, and

most of the wealthy managed to evade taxes.

The IMF program is intended to address this problem. It is in

no one’s interests that the problem gets worse, but it is also very

important that the IMF’s conditions be met, and that is what

Nawaz Sharif’s government was never able to do. They had trouble

with each negotiation. They hadn’t concluded the negotiations for

the most recent tranche, and the reason they hadn’t concluded it

was the IMF didn’t believe they were going to do it.

Mr. BEREUTER. I follow business affairs there involving some

business in my own state involved in a major way in Pakistan. One

of the difficulties that continues is the corruption in the government and the impact that had on Americans’ attitude about investment, about construction, and about joint development projects has

become very negative. Is there anything you can say and suggest

to do about that?

Ms. SCHAFFER. Yeah, I would like to say two things about that.

First of all, General Musharraf has, not surprisingly, targeted corruption on his short list of things to do. This has been very difficult

in other countries because anticorruption drives so very easily turn

into witch hunts. I think it is desperately important that they do

try to weed out corruption, but in order to do that, I am afraid they

are going to catch some of their own people. Human nature alone

would dictate that there is at least one general who has strayed

from the straight and narrow, and if they do that, they will have

credibility. Otherwise they won’t.
38

My second point has to do with the question of military sales. I

would argue that military sales should not take place. I differ with

my colleague in that I don’t think this needs to be enshrined in

law. I think it can be done by policy, and that makes it easier to

modify the policy when conditions dictate, which they aren’t going

to under a military government.

Mr. BEREUTER. Well, if the President would sign the DOD bill,

he would have that flexibility.

Ms. SCHAFFER. I am not in government anymore, so I don’t have

to deal with that.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Harrison, you pointed out that Pakistan is

one-eighth the size, some would say one-seventh the size of India,

but, of course, it is a very large country in population already, despite the comparison with its neighbor. It will be in the seven or

eight largest countries in the world in population in 2010, I am

sure, if not already.

Pakistan has—as I mentioned when the Secretary was here taking questions—had now military rule for almost half of their existence, and we have American commentators questioning whether

democracy is really going to work there and is really going to be

supported by the people. What are your reactions to the record in

Pakistan and what we should expect in the way of an end to military rule?

Mr. HARRISON. Neither the civilian nor the military governments

in Pakistan have been very successful. Pakistan started out without a mobilization of its people on a democratic basis in the period

before it was created. India had a freedom movement in which all

sections of the population were involved, so it had a base for democracy. Pakistan has been run by the upper crust in the country

ever since it was independent, and so therefore I don’t think prospects for democracy are as hopeful in Pakistan as they are in India.

But I do think that military rule is no answer. We have seen that

in all the military dictatorships Pakistan has had. They have

proved to encourage big-time corruption, big-time drug running, to

an even greater extent I would argue, than the civilian authority.

Absolute power does corrupt absolutely.

I think that we shouldn’t expect Pakistani democracy to move in

rapid sequence toward anything we would like, but I think arbitrary rule of the kind that is now being exercised in Islamabad is

going to lead to all kinds of polarization of forces in Pakistan that

will make it less stable than ever. This we could go into in great

length.

On your previous question I would like to say that in distinguishing between military and economic sanctions, I had in mind

the fact that I would like to see the United States able to have bilateral aid to both India and Pakistan that would help deal with

their economic and social problems, and I want to see multilateral

aid to India resumed. I think that the sanctions we imposed after

the nuclear tests really made no sense because it was clear they

weren’t going to be effective, and so that was simply a

misassessment of the situation and what the consequences would

be.

The consequences were naturally to force both governments to

show that they weren’t going to bow to this kind of foreign pres-
39

sure. They haven’t been effective. They are not going to be effective. All they are doing is preventing the World Bank from making

power loans, road construction loans and other loans that are very

important to the economic development and the stability of India.

And there are comparable cases in Pakistan of economic aid that

if the economic standards and criteria are met could be profitably

extended.

The time for punishment for the nuclear test is over, and it has

been proven to be ineffective. It isn’t even just. The United States

has 10,000 nuclear weapons. The United States isn’t doing anything at the global nuclear arms control level to bring China into

a whole global process of nuclear arms reduction that would make

it less necessary for India to have nuclear weapons. So it doesn’t

make sense at any level, and I hope that we are reaching an understanding of that and that the Congress will cooperate with the Administration in moving on to a new phase in which we put that behind us, get back to positive economic relations with both India and

Pakistan.

Pakistan is a big country. That is why I favor an approach toward economic assistance which is separate from our desire to punish the generals who have just taken over.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Harrison, thank you very much. I need to

move on to my colleague, but I want to say I agree with the gentleman on the imposition of sanctions after the nuclear tests, and

I do think—and that is a very common view that you and I share

on Capitol Hill—the Administration made a mistake in not recognizing the fact that while those sanctions may have worked to

delay nuclear development. Ultimately, however, once both sides

had tested, the sanctions were no longer productive.

I yield to the gentleman from Florida at this time.

Mr. HASTINGS. I thank the Chairman, and I certainly thank both

the witnesses for extraordinarily, refreshingly clear testimony, and

I echo the Chairman’s sentiments. I think he will agree that I was

one of those that thinks that the Administration made a mistake

with reference to the sanctions. What he said I reiterate, but we

are now, though, in need of your expertise more than ever. We are.

It seems to me that when coups take place, that the emphasis

is on the person that leads the coup, and all of the media attention—and Mr. Harrison, you were in the media—focusing on this

individual and his or her actions; and there have been more hises than hers out there in the world.

Who else in Pakistan, for example, not clandestinely or with any

lack of visibility, who else can we talk to? It seems that Benazir

Bhutto would be the only person that might have some kind of a

national following. Are there others?

Ms. SCHAFFER. Is that your question, sir?

Mr. HASTINGS. Yes.

Ms. SCHAFFER. I think Benazir Bhutto, it is going to be a long

time before she has a chance to revive her political career. She is

out of the country and under indictment for serious and reasonably

credible corruption charges.

Mr. HASTINGS. That I understand. But you do agree that she has

a national following?
40

Ms. SCHAFFER. Her party has a national following which she embodies. The Muslim League, Nawaz Sharif’s party, is a serious

party, although they have got their factions and their internal disputes. Other actors on the political scene tend not to have a national following. There are quite a number of other parties. Indeed,

there was a parade of Pakistani opposition politicians who came

through Washington in the last couple of months, none of whose

parties have done very well at the polls.

One force to watch is the Islamic party called Jamaat-i-Islami.

They have not done very well in elections, but they have been

talked about in more recent months as among the moderate elements of the Islamic right. And what was particularly interesting

was that they started talking more about clean government than

about Islamic government.

But I think the reason people focus on the personality of the coup

leaders, is that the coups tend to install single-person governments,

a dictatorship. I think he would aspire to a term more like ‘‘enlightened despotism,’’ but you still basically have the same punch line.

I do know from people I have spoken to that they are approaching people I look on as serious players for some of the civilian leadership jobs. We will see whom they are able to recruit. We know

at this point very little about who will be the personalities who run

this government below the level of General Musharraf. He has only

been in charge for eight days. So we know very little about how

light or heavy-handed his rule is going to be, and I think most of

those are still questions at this point.

Mr. HASTINGS. I see. Mr. Harrison.

Mr. HARRISON. I would just say that I think what we should be

focusing on is supporting a return to political processes. I am not

going to nominate the next leaders of Pakistan. I think that has

to happen internally through divisions that may occur within both

the PPP and the Muslim League. There are also smaller parties on

the moderate left that in the past the United States wouldn’t think

of touching, which we should consider part of that political process.

And I think that the regional political elements in Pakistan who

don’t have a national platform do represent something at the local

level, represent some of the democratic impulses in Pakistan that

have to be given play.

You know, it is a cliche to say that there is no shortcut to democracy. I think we simply have to press for not just what the Assistant Secretary referred to as a decent and accountable government,

but a government that really allows democratic processes to occur

and involves a free press and involves a free judiciary—of course,

none of which is the case at the moment in Pakistan.

This talk about a ‘‘true’’ democracy makes me very nervous because I have been talking to Pakistani leaders since the early

1950’s, including all the military leaders who have taken over political power, and the military has always wanted what is now being

put in place: a government with a National Security Council that

would be over and above the civilian ministers, who would not have

a democratic base from which they emerge, but rather would be

creatures of the military government.

General Zia outlined his plan for a National Security Council to

me in 1985 or 1986. General Karamat was dismissed by Nawaz
41

Sharif because he advocated that same thing. This is an old struggle in Pakistan. It is a struggle between civilian and military authority and the United States should, in the final analysis be on

the side of civilian authority. Nawaz Sharif’s failure to give effective economic leadership is very tragic because he was very brave

in standing up to the military and in trying to preserve civilian authority. People have said that he wasn’t a democrat, he did this

and he did that and so forth. The fact is he didn’t allow the military to press its campaign for a National Security Council. He did

stand for peace with India, and he took risks politically to do that.

So it is very tragic that he was a failure on other fronts and that

he exposed himself to this action; and of course we don’t yet know

what happened with that airplane, which is a fascinating episode

and also casts doubt on whether there is any way for him to return

to power.

But anyway, the answer to your question is we can’t pick the

democrats of Pakistan, but we can insist, we can use whatever influence we have to work for the return of a democratic process in

Pakistan.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, are we going to have a second

round?

Mr. BEREUTER. I have more questions. Why don’t you proceed

with another five minutes.

Mr. HASTINGS. I will try to do it in less. I am interested—thank

you, Mr. Chairman—that, Ambassador Schaffer, your statement reflects that there should be no ‘‘high-profile embrace’’. Now, Mr.

Harrison said that you hope that President Clinton goes to Bangladesh and India.

My question, I have advocated, I think there were missed opportunities in India and Pakistan by virtue of this Administration

early on not having visited there with high-profile summitry and

everything else in the region, and I suggested that. I have documented it repeatedly. That is irrelevant at this point.

If the President were to go to only India and Bangladesh, would

that not exacerbate problems in the general area, and would it not

lead some, no doubt, to advise him that he shouldn’t go at all for

fear of exacerbating problems? The tradition has seemingly been

that you go to India, you go to Pakistan, you go to Pakistan you

go to India, like you go to Israel, you go to Jordan. You understand

what I am saying? And so where are we on that?

I advocate, contrary to you, Ambassador, that he should still go,

and doubtless along the lines of what Mr. Harrison is saying, at

least to Bangladesh and India.

Ms. SCHAFFER. I would argue that a trip to Bangladesh and

India is very much appropriate. Given the rarity of U.S. Presidential visits in the region, I really can’t recommend a visit to

Pakistan under current circumstances. The last time a U.S. President visited South Asia, it was Jimmy Carter, and he only went to

India. Certainly this idea that if you go to one you have to go to

the other is of relatively recent vintage, and that is something I

think we ought to be getting away from.

Now, there have been legions of high-level, mostly military visitors, under the democratic government to Pakistan, who went to

Pakistan and didn’t necessarily go to India. And I think this is a
42

good time to cultivate different strokes for different folks, but I

think we have to be a little sophisticated about it.

The Pakistanis will understand, particularly coming so soon after

the military coup, that this is not the kind of thing they can expect

from the United States, but they can expect a serious dialogue.

They can expect us to listen seriously, and they can expect us to

tell them what is on our minds.

Mr. HARRISON. You have raised a very important point, and I

want to make very clear what I think about this. It seems to me

that the essence of our problem in South Asia has been we always

felt we had to treat India and Pakistan as if they were two equal

countries. They are not. And I think that is the root of the problem.

Pakistan was given to believe that we wanted to balance things in

the subcontinent by giving a lot of military aid so that it could

stand up to India and act as if it is an equal. That has been the

root of the whole problem. Right now, they think that we are going

to help them to get Kashmir—or at least to get India out of Kashmir. And we have got to bring all of that to an end.

If we had a constitutional government in Pakistan, of course the

President should go there also; but under present circumstances, I

think there is absolutely no reason why we should equate India

and Pakistan. And India is what really counts for the United

States in that part of the world. Pakistan is important mainly to

make sure that we don’t have a lot of trouble that undermines the

stability of the region as a whole, not because of its intrinsic importance, except that there are 130 million people there whose economic and social welfare is important. And that is why I favor economic aid being made available on economic criteria.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. I am happy to yield to you the time. I have a few

questions. If you can respond briefly, I would appreciate it, but I

know they are complicated.

Both of you have commented, I believe, about stopping military

sales to Pakistan, and I have no argument with that concept.

Would you, however, favor continued military-to-military contact,

including IMET? I would ask both of you.

Ms. SCHAFFER. I would.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Harrison?

Mr. HARRISON. I don’t have any problem with IMET, no.

Mr. BEREUTER. All right.

Mr. HARRISON. I would like to see that in lots of countries where

we don’t approve of the system, so we could extend this to a rather

broad——

Mr. BEREUTER. We have run into situations, of course, where we

have lost contact with a whole generation of military officers in a

country, and I am not sure it has been very positive in its impact.

Mr. Harrison, you said one thing that is quite interesting and

controversial; and that is, that you would favor America declaring

its support for the Line of Control in Kashmir as the permanent

international boundary. And you say that eliminates the ambiguity

which could embolden Pakistan to continue its present policy of

seeking to affect that situation in Kashmir. Now, your position

would seem to be supported by the Indians, but tell me a bit more

about why that would be favorable.
43

Mr. HARRISON. I think that would have to be accompanied by

India and Pakistan undertaking to give greater autonomy to the

Kashmiris in their parts of Kashmir. The reason I favor this is that

I think this is a cancer, and it is an opportunity—it is a place

where Pakistan can keep bleeding India and making trouble indefinitely, as it has now for many, many years.

Inside Kashmir, my assessment of the forces inside Kashmir is

that the forces prepared to accommodate to an India that gives

them autonomy are as strong, if not stronger, than the forces favoring independence for Kashmir. Independence for Kashmir would be

very disruptive of the stability of the subcontinent because of the

fact that you have so many Muslims in India, and this would call

into question the loyalty of those Muslims. You would have HinduMuslim conflict in India. That would feed into a Pakistan conflict.

Our interest in that part of the world is stable development and

economic progress. All of this would be disrupted if the Kashmir

issue was allowed to fester.

Ambassador Schaffer wrote a good op-ed piece with her husband

in the Washington Post a while back that talked about why the

Line of Control is probably the only realistic way to settle this

issue. So that I think that the basic point is that Pakistan thinks

that if they keep the fire burning, they can drag us into supporting

their position because we supported it for so many years, that they

think they can get us back to tilt again to their side on Kashmir.

And I think that is what we have got to disabuse them of, and the

only way to disabuse them of that expectation, that hope, to get

them to face the facts of life, to get them to agree to a settlement,

is to make the Line of Control the basis for the settlement. It is

the only realistic way to end this problem.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Ms. SCHAFFER. Could I make one comment on that?

Mr. BEREUTER. Certainly.

Ms. SCHAFFER. The only way in which I differ with my colleague

is that I think it would be useless and probably counterproductive

for the U.S. Government to publicly assert its support for the Line

of Control as the basis for a settlement. The challenge of the Indians and the Pakistanis, if they are ever to deal seriously with

Kashmir, is going to be building the political consensus behind the

unpleasant things they have to do. That means that I think the

task for the U.S. Government in the near term is, quietly and behind the scenes, making it very clear to Pakistan that they will not

support their effort to get Kashmir away from India and that they

don’t see any possibility of a settlement that significantly changes

the map.

But you have got to allow them a little bit of private space to

build a political consensus, and if you put all of your positions in

public, I think you destroy that chance.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. I have two more final questions for

both of you. One, do you have any sense that there is an

Islaminization of the Pakistani military, a move toward fundamental Islamic orientation? Second, what impact does the coup

with this military government for Pakistan have in the way of an

effect on Sino-Pakistani relations, if any?
44

Mr. HARRISON. I have very definite views on this question, and

I think that there has been a struggle within the Pakistan military

higher levels, going back to the Afghan war, between many officers

who have an affinity, let us say, for Islamic fundamentalist thinking and connections, informal connections with some of the Islamic

fundamentalist groups, and others who are what you might call

strictly professional soldiers with none of that in their minds. Of

course, we knew General Hameed Gul during the Afghan war was

a very good example of an ISI director who was very outspoken in

his views on this subject.

So that goes back quite a way, and it has continued, and the Islamic fundamentalist forces have been growing in Pakistan. They

have made a prime target of trying to win friends in high places

in the military and at the middle-level of the military, and they

have definitely gained ground.

General Musharraf is, of course, a soldier’s soldier and a professional military man, and all of his colleagues are; but some of them

are also people who have been a part of the ISI group and the

group friendly to it in the high levels who share a lot of the Islamic

fundamentalist thinking. That doesn’t mean they are not also professional military men. Of course they are.

So I think what is new about this new situation is that you do

have at the high levels a stronger influence, Islamic fundamentalist

influence in the Pakistan military, than ever before. It is not as if

they want to take Pakistan down the road of Islamization advocated by some of these fundamentalist parties. Basically they have

a hard-line approach toward India, a confrontational approach toward India, an agenda which is to bleed India, and an animus, a

get-even for Bangladesh attitudes, and they see these fundamentalist parties for which they have an affinity as allies, because

these parties can provide them the for manpower to send people up

to Kargil or wherever and to carry out operations, without the need

for people with Pakistani Army uniforms.

So there is a natural partnership, and therefore that is why I

consider this a very dangerous period and why India is so suspicious of this new leadership and why General Musharraf and

General Aziz happen to be the ones who cooked up this Kargil adventure. And so your question, in short, is very well taken, and I

think that we should be very cautious in appraising the moderate

professions of General Musharraf. We should look to see what he

does on the Kashmir cease-fire line, which is more important than

moving back forces that had been moved forward anyway.

He moved forward forces at the time of Kargil on the international border. They added to their deployment. All he has done

now is pull them back. So he has gone back to the status quoante

and this is fine. This is a welcome gesture, and it is a cheap gesture.

So I think your question gets to the main point before us today,

and why we have to be very cautious. I don’t think it necessarily

means they want to Talibanize Pakistan, but they do want to—

when they have a chance, they will try to rekindle trouble with

India.

Ms. SCHAFFER. I would suggest that besides watching what happens in Kashmir, you want to watch what happens in Afghanistan.
45

The other interesting byplay, of course, is that the general who

Nawaz Sharif wanted to name to replace Musharraf when he fired

Musharraf was the head of the Interservices Intelligence, which is

of course the principal sponsor of the Taliban. He was also a personal friend, and he has also had a reputation for being very close

to the Islamic right. So there may be some wheels within wheels

at work.

You also asked about the impact on relations with China. The

short answer is not much.

Mr. BEREUTER. All right. That is good news.

Gentleman from Florida have any last thoughts or questions?

Mr. HASTINGS. No, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Thank you very much for sticking

with us. Your testimony was very important to us. I benefited from

it. I know that all of our colleagues would have if they had been

here. Thank you for spending the time. We appreciate it. The Subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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A P P E N D I X

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