Filed 12/4/14 Rosado v. Hendricks CA2/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

MICHAEL ROSADO, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

PIERRE STEPHANE HENDRICKS et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

 B252484 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. MC024189) 

 APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Randolph 

Rogers, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Michael Rosado, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

 Herzfeld & Rubin, Vadim Braslavsky, for Defendant and Respondent Pierre 

Stephane Hendricks, M.D. 

 Prindle, Amaro, Goetz, Hillyard, Barnes & Reinholtz, Jack R. Reinholtz and 

Cynthia A. Palin, for Defendant and Respondent Steven N. Brourman, M.D. 

 
2

Plaintiff Michael Rosado, appearing in propia persona, filed the instant appeal 

after the trial court entered judgment in favor of two of the defendants on anti-SLAPP 

grounds. Rosado also appears to challenge the denial of his request for entry of default as 

to one of these defendants. For the reasons stated below, we deem waived Rosado’s 

underdeveloped challenges to the anti-SLAPP judgments and affirm the trial court’s 

ruling as to the entry of default.1

 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 We have cobbled together the following chronologic recitation from the parties’ 

appendices, supplemented as necessary by review of the trial court’s docket. PlaintiffMichael Rosado (Rosado), appearing in propia persona, filed a complaint against 

defendants Pierre Stephane Hendricks (Hendricks), Roberta Hykes (Hykes), and Steven 

Brourman (Brourman) (collectively Defendants) on April 24, 2013. The complaint 

alleged that defendants engaged in improper conduct while participating in Rosado’s 

worker’s compensation proceedings. On May 6, 2013, Rosado filed self-prepared 

documents asserting that an individual named Ralda Pineda served the complaint, 

summons, assignment of judge, and notice of case management conference “in person,” 

“on” Hendricks’s and Brourman’s addresses. No such document pertaining to Hykes is 

in the appellate record. The only indications that Rosado attempted to serve Hykes are an 

assertion to that effect in Rosado’s brief and a notation on the trial court docket that 

Rosado’s proof of service as to Hykes was “faulty.” (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); 

Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a); Luckey v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 81, 89.) 

The trial court docket also deems “faulty” Rosado’s other proofs of service. 

 Brourman appeared and demurred to the complaint on May 24, 2013. The trial 

court sustained Brourman’s demurrer on June 27, 2013, and ordered Rosado to file an 

amended pleading no later than August 16, 2013. 

 

1

 The acronym SLAPP refers to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. 

(See Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 817.) 
3

 The same day that the trial court sustained Brourman’s demurrer, Rosado 

submitted an incomplete form requesting entry of default against Hendricks and Hykes to 

the clerk’s office. Rosado also submitted a proposed judgment form, on which he 

checked a box indicating that judgment was obtained by default. Rosado further 

requested that the clerk remove Hendricks and Hykes from his “injury case,” attached a 

three-page note explaining the “context” for his request (namely that Pineda had served 

Hendricks on April 26, 2013), and furnished a June 11, 2013, letter he had received from 

Hendricks’s insurance company as “proof that, Pierre Hendricks; received the summons, 

complaint, case management.” 

 The clerk’s office issued a Notice of Rejection-Default/Clerk’s Judgment on July 

8, 2013. The clerk did not check any boxes indicating that there were defects in Rosado’s 

proofs of service. The clerk checked only the box labeled “other” as the reason for 

denying Rosado’s request for entry of clerk’s judgment. The clerk provided the 

following explanation in the space next to the checked box: “Court ordered you to file an 

amended complaint on 6-27-13. You need to seek legal assisstance [sic]on how to 

properly prepare a default judgment. This case is not a clerk judgment case. A clerk 

cannot order defendants removed, only a judge can. Seek legal assisstance [sic].” 

Nothing in the record suggests that Rosado revised or resubmitted his request for entry of 

default, and it is unclear whether he sought legal assistance at any point. 

 On July 9, 2013, Hendricks appeared and filed a special motion to strike Rosado’s 

original complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 426.15 (to “anti-SLAPP” 

motion). Hendricks also demurred to the original complaint, which we presume 

remained operative as to him. (See Ellis v. Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc. 

(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 853, 889 (“[O]n appeal we presume the trial court’s order is 

correct, indulge all presumptions in favor of that correctness, and resolve all ambiguities 

in favor of affirmance.”).) The appellate record does not indicate that Rosado filed any 

documents in opposition to Hendricks’s anti-SLAPP motion or demurrer. According to 
4

the trial court’s order, Rosado argued only that his request for entry of default against 

Hendricks had been improperly denied. 

 The trial court rejected Rosado’s contention that he was entitled to entry of default 

against Hendricks. It reasoned that entry of default was not warranted because “the proof 

of service filed by plaintiff indicates that defendant [Hendricks] was not properly served 

with the summons and complaint.” The trial court was unable to ascertain whether 

Pineda served Hendricks personally or via substitute service, but found the proof of 

service deficient in either instance because it stated neither the time of service (required 

for personal service) nor the name of the person on whom service was effected (required 

for substitute service). 

 The trial court also granted Hendricks’s anti-SLAPP motion. It concluded that 

Hendricks had carried his burden of demonstrating that the allegations against him 

stemmed from conduct he had undertaken “in furtherance of [his] right of petition or free 

speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public 

issue.” Specifically, the trial court found that Rosado’s claims related to Hendricks’s 

alleged filing of false documents while serving as a “Qualified Medical Evaluator” in 

Rosado’s worker’s compensation case. The trial court determined that Hendricks’s 

showing shifted the burden to Rosado to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the 

merits of his claims, and concluded that Rosado failed to carry that burden in light of his 

failure to submit evidence supporting his claims or countering the claim of litigation 

privilege asserted by Hendricks. Accordingly, the trial court granted Hendricks’s antiSLAPP motion and dismissed his demurrer as moot on August 14, 2013. The trial court 

entered judgment in favor of Hendricks on September 5, 2013. Our review of the trial 

court’s docket indicates that the notice of entry of judgment was filed on September 25, 

2013. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a); Luckey v. Superior 

Court, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 89.) 

 Rosado filed an amended complaint on August 15, 2013. The amended complaint 

asserted twelve claims against all three defendants. 
5

 On September 19, 2013, Brourman filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike and 

demurred to Rosado’s amended complaint. Rosado filed a strongly worded opposition 

brief on October 9, 2013. The trial court held a hearing on Brourman’s motions on 

October 17, 2013. A few days later, the trial court ruled that Brourman had carried his 

burden of showing that Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 applied to Rosado’s 

claims and that Rosado had failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the 

merits. The trial court granted Brourman’s anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed his 

demurrer as moot. The trial court entered judgment in Brourman’s favor on November 1, 

2013, and notice of entry of judgment was filed on November 12, 2013. 

 Rosado filed the instant appeal on November 8, 2013. On his notice of appeal 

form, Rosado checked boxes indicating that he was appealing from “Default judgment,” 

“Judgment after an order granting a summary judgment motion,” “Judgment of dismissal 

under Code of Civil Procedure sections 581d, 583.250, 583.360, or 583.430,” “Judgment 

of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer,” “An order after judgment under Code 

of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(2),” “An order or judgment under Code of Civil 

Procedure section 904.1(a)(3)-(13),” and “Other.” Rosado added the notation, “See 

attached forms.” No attachments appear in the record. Rosado named all three 

Defendants as Respondents. 

 In a corrected case information statement filed on January 8, 2014, Rosado 

checked boxes indicating that he was appealing from “Default judgment,” “Judgment of 

dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer,” and “Other.” Rosado stated that he was 

appealing from judgments or orders dated August 14, 2013, August 27, 2013, and 

November 6, 2013. He attached the orders granting Hendricks’s and Brourman’s antiSLAPP motions to the corrected case information statement. He also attached the Notice 

of Rejection-Default/Clerk’s Judgment and a note averring that Hendricks and Hykes 

were in default and that his request for entry of default against them had been timely. 

 The trial court docket indicates that notice of order to show cause was filed in the 

trial court on December 13, 2013. Neither the docket nor the parties’ appendices indicate 
6

who filed the notice or requested an order to show cause, but counsel for Brourman 

appears to have been the sole participant at the January 15, 2014, hearing. Because 

Rosado failed to appear at the hearing, the trial court dismissed his remaining claims for 

want of prosecution pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 583.410, subdivision (a). 

The dismissal was without prejudice. Rosado included the order of dismissal in his 

appellate appendix but did not amend his notice of appeal to encompass it or file a 

separate notice of appeal attacking it. 

DISCUSSION 

 We begin our analysis on appeal with the presumption that the trial court’s 

judgments were correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Gonzalez 

v. Rebollo (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 969, 976.) To overcome this presumption, Rosado 

must affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court committed reversible error. (Denham, 

supra, at p. 565; Gonzalez, supra, at p. 976.) He must “present argument and authority 

on each point made” (County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591; 

Cal. Rules of Court,2 rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)), and cite to pertinent evidence or other matters 

in the record that demonstrate reversible error (rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Guthrey v. State of 

California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115). “[F]ailure of an appellant in a civil action 

to articulate any pertinent or intelligible legal argument in an opening brief may, in the 

discretion of the court, be deemed an abandonment of the appeal justifying dismissal.” 

(Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119; In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 

952, 994.) Rosado is not excused from these obligations or consequences by virtue of his 

propia persona status. “The rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties 

represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation,” (Rappleyea v. 

Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-85); litigants proceeding without counsel are 

“‘entitled to the same, but not greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’” 

(Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1056.) 

 

2

 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 
7

 Hendricks contends that dismissal of this appeal is warranted in light of Rosado’s 

failure to comply with the California Rules of Court3 and other rules of civil procedure.

Rosado’s eight-page submission indeed disregards numerous requirements imposed by 

rule 8.204(a). It lacks a table of contents, (rule 8.204(a)(1)(A)), argument headings and 

subheadings, (rule 8.204. (a)(1)(B)), and references to the record (rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)). It 

also fails to provide a coherent summary of the significant facts, (rule 8.204(a)(2)(C)), 

neglects to discuss or even clearly identify the judgment(s) or order(s) appealed from 

(rule 8.204(a)(2)(A) & (B)), and omits any citation to legal authority. (Rule 

8.204(a)(1)(B).) 

 We agree with Hendricks that the deficiencies in Rosado’s brief fatally undermine 

his challenge to the entry of judgment in favor of Hendricks and Brourman on antiSLAPP grounds. Nothing in Rosado’s brief can fairly be read to challenge or even allude 

to either pertinent trial court judgment. The closest the brief comes to doing so is an 

assertion that “[t]hese judgments in favor of two of the defendants and one defendant 

who did not even respond to the summons and civil complaint [ ] must be reverse for 

justice must prevail.” “We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them. 

[Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court 

to treat the contentions as waived. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke

(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; Berger v. Godden, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 1119.) 

We therefore treat as waived any and all of Rosado’s challenges to the anti-SLAPP 

rulings. 

 We nonetheless conclude, however, that Rosado has provided us with a minimally 

cognizable argument as to what appears to be his central contention on appeal: that his 

request for default as to Hendricks was improperly denied. We address this intermediate 

 

3

 Ironically, Hendricks emphasizes Rosado’s failure to comply with former 

California Rule of Court, rule 14, which no longer exists. Rule 14 was renumbered to 

California Rule of Court, rule 8.204, as of January 1, 2007. (See California Rules of 

Court, rule 8.204.) 
8

ruling pursuant to our authority under California Code of Civil Procedure, section 906. 

(See Sweeting v. Murat (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 507, 511 fn. 6.)4 

 Rosado disputes the trial court’s conclusion that default properly was denied 

because his proof of service as to Hendricks omitted information required by California 

Code of Civil Procedure sections 415.20 and 417.10, subd. (a). Rosado emphasizes that 

the clerk accepted and filed his proof of service and “did not check off, line proof of 

service” on the notice rejecting Rosado’s request for entry of default. 

 The clerk’s acceptance of Rosado’s filing is of no moment. So long as a filing 

complies with the formatting requirements set forth in Rules 2.100-2.119, “the clerk has a 

ministerial duty to file it.” (Carlson v. State of California Department of Fish & Game

(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276.) Accordingly, the filing of a defective paper does not 

negate or cure its deficiency. To the contrary, “the filing of a defective paper may bring 

later adverse consequences if timely corrections are not made.” (Carlson v. State of 

California Department of Fish & Game, supra., at p. 1276.) 

 Moreover, the filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption of 

proper service “only if the proof of service complies with the statutory requirements 

regarding such proofs,” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 

1442), and the trial court correctly concluded that the proof of service as to Hendricks did 

not satisfy the statutory requirements. The proof of service as to Hendricks failed to 

articulate the “time, place, and manner of service and facts showing that the service was 

made in accordance with” the California Code of Civil Procedure, as required by 

California Code of Civil Procedure section 417.10. The proof of service states only that 

Pineda “served these foregoing documents in person, on Hendricks address,” on an 

unspecified date and at an unspecified time. Although “strict compliance with the code’s 

 

4

 Rosado also appears to challenge the denial of default as to Hykes. This 

intermediate ruling is not properly before us because Rosado has not filed a notice of 

appeal challenging the January 15, 2014, final judgment dismissing his claims against 

Hykes. (See Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1315-1316; Cal. 

Code Civ. Proc., § 906.) 
9

provisions for service of process is not required” as a general matter, (Ramos v. 

Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1443 (citing Pasadena MediCenter Associates v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 773, 778)), “‘the rules leading to 

[default judgment] are precise and should be followed to the letter’” because of the 

substantial consequences that flow from an entry of default. (Pelayo v. J.J. Lee 

Management Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 484, 497 (quoting Jones v. Interstate 

Recovery Service (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 925, 928).) Those rules require the filing of a 

proper proof of service with the clerk. (Pelayo v. J.J. Lee Management Co., Inc., supra,

at pp. 495-497.) Rosado did not fulfill this requirement. 

 Finally, we are not persuaded by Rosado’s suggestion that the clerk’s failure to 

check the “proof of service” box on the rejection notice prevented the trial court from 

upholding the clerk’s decision on that basis. Just as we may affirm a correct decision of 

the trial court “regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to 

its conclusion,” (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19), so too 

may the trial court “affirm” the clerk’s well-founded rejection of a request for entry of 

default. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. Respondents Hendricks and 

Brourman are awarded their costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J. 

We concur: 

EPSTEIN, P. J. MANELLA, J.