U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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S. HRG. 115–418 

FOREIGN CYBER THREATS TO THE 

UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JANUARY 5, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.Govinfo.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

JANUARY 5, 2017 

Page 

FOREIGN CYBER THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES ................................................ 1 

Lettre, Honorable Marcel J., II, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence .... 5 

Clapper, Honorable James R., Jr., Director of National Intelligence .................. 7 

Rogers, Admiral Michael S., USN, Commander, United States Cyber Command; Director, National Security Agency; Chief, Central Security Services 10 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 52 

(III)

(1) 

FOREIGN CYBER THREATS TO THE 

UNITED STATES 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 5, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, 

Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Cruz, 

Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

Other Senators Present: Senators Purdue, Warren, Peters, and 

Sasse. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, good morning, everyone. 

Before we begin, I want to welcome all our members back to the 

committee and extend a special welcome to the new members joining us. On the Republican side, we are joined by Senator Purdue 

and Senator Sasse. On the Democrat side, we are joined by Senator 

Warren and Senator Peters. 

It is a special privilege to serve on this committee, most of all 

because it affords us the opportunity to spend so much time in the 

company of heroes, the men and women who serve and sacrifice on 

our behalf every day. I hope you will come to cherish your service 

on this committee as much as I have over the years, and I look forward to working with each of you. 

The committee meets this morning for the first in a series of 

hearings on cybersecurity to receive the testimony on foreign cyber 

threats to the United States. I would like to welcome our witnesses 

this morning: James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence; 

Marcel Lettre, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and Admiral Mike Rogers, Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Director 

of the National Security Agency, and Chief of the Central Security 

Service. 

This hearing is about the range of cybersecurity challenges confronting our Nation, threats from countries like Russia, China, and 

North Korea and Iran, as well as non-state actors from terrorist 

groups to transnational criminal organizations. In recent years, we 

have seen a growing series of cyber attacks by multiple actors, attacks that have targeted our citizens, businesses, military, and government. But there is no escaping the fact that this committee 

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meets today for the first time in this new Congress in the aftermath of an unprecedented attack on our democracy. 

At the President’s direction, Director Clapper is leading a comprehensive review of Russian interference in our recent election 

with the goal of informing the American people as much as possible 

about what happened. I am confident that Director Clapper will 

conduct this review with the same integrity and professionalism 

that has characterized his nearly half a century of government and 

Military Service. I am equally confident in the dedicated members 

of our intelligence community. 

The goal of this review, as I understand it, is not to question the 

outcome of the presidential election. Nor should it be. As both 

President Obama and President-elect Trump have said, our Nation 

must move forward. But we must do so with full knowledge of the 

facts. I trust Director Clapper will brief the Congress on his review 

when it is completed. This is not the time or place to preview its 

findings. 

That said, we know a lot already. In October, our intelligence 

agencies concluded unanimously that, quote, the Russian Government directed compromises of emails from United States persons 

and institutions, including from United States political organizations. They also assessed that, quote, disclosures of alleged hacked 

emails were consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts and that these thefts and disclosures were intended to interfere with the United States election process. 

Since then, our intelligence community has released additional 

information concerning these Russian activities, including a joint 

analysis report that provided technical details regarding the tools 

and infrastructure used by the Russian civilian and military intelligence services to attack the United States. 

Every American should be alarmed by Russia’s attacks on our 

Nation. There is no national security interest more vital to the 

United States of America than the ability to hold free and fair elections without foreign interference. That is why Congress must set 

partisanship aside, follow the facts, and work together to devise 

comprehensive solutions to deter, defend against and, when necessary, respond to foreign cyber attacks. 

As we do, we must recognize that the recent Russian attacks are 

one part of a much bigger cyber problem. Russian cyber attacks 

have targeted the White House, the Joint Staff, the State Department, our critical infrastructure. Chinese cyber attacks have reportedly targeted NASA, the Departments of State and Commerce, 

congressional offices, military labs, the Naval War College, and 

United States businesses, including major defense contractors. 

Most recently, China compromised over 20 million background investigations at the Office of Personnel Management. Iran has used 

cyber tools in recent years to attack the United States Navy, 

United States partners in the Middle East, major financial institutions, and a dam just 25 miles north of New York City. Of course, 

North Korea was responsible for the massive cyber attack on Sony 

Pictures in 2014. 

What seems clear is that our adversaries have reached a common 

conclusion: that the reward for attacking America in cyberspace 

outweighs the risk. For years, cyber attacks on our Nation have 

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been met with indecision and inaction. Our Nation has no policy 

and thus no strategy for cyber deterrence. This appearance of 

weakness has been provocative to our adversaries who have attacked us again and again with growing severity. Unless we demonstrate that the costs of attacking the United States outweigh the 

perceived benefits, these cyber attacks will only grow. 

This is also true beyond the cyber domain. It should not surprise 

us that Vladimir Putin would think he could launch increasingly 

severe cyber attacks against our Nation when he has paid little 

price for invading Ukraine, annexing Crimea, subverting democratic values and institutions across Europe, and of course, helping 

Bashar Assad slaughter civilians in Syria for more than a year 

with impunity. The same is true for China, Iran, North Korea, and 

any other adversary that has recently felt emboldened to challenge 

the world order. Put simply, we cannot achieve cyber deterrence 

without restoring the credibility of United States deterrence more 

broadly. 

To do so, we must first have a policy, which means finally resolving the long list of basic cyber questions that we as a Nation have 

yet to answer. What constitutes an act of war or aggression in 

cyberspace that would merit a military response, be it by cyber or 

other means? What is our theory of cyber deterrence, and what is 

our strategy to implement it? Is our Government organized appropriately to handle this threat, or are we so stove-piped that we cannot deal with it effectively? Who is accountable for this problem, 

and do they have sufficient authorities to deliver results? Are we 

in the Congress just as stove-piped on cyber as the executive 

branch such that our oversight actually reinforces problems rather 

than helping to resolve them? Do we need to change how we are 

organized? 

This committee intends to hold a series of hearings in the 

months ahead to explore these and other questions. We look forward to hearing the candid views of our distinguished witnesses 

today who have thought about and worked on these questions as 

much as anyone in our Nation. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want 

to commend you for your leadership in promptly scheduling this 

hearing on foreign cyber threats. 

I would also like to welcome our witnesses: Director Clapper, 

Under Secretary Lettre, and Admiral Rogers. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your dedication. 

While I understand that our witnesses will be discussing the 

cyber threats that many countries, including China and India, pose 

to our Nation, I would like to focus for a few minutes on the widely 

reported instances of Russian hacking and disinformation that 

raised concerns regarding the election of 2016. 

In addition to stealing information from the Democratic National 

Committee and the Clinton campaign and cherry-picking what information it leaked to the media, the Russian Government also created and spread fake news and conspiracies across the vast social 

media landscape. At the very least, the effect of Russia’s actions 

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was to erode the faith of the American people in our democratic institutions. These and other cyber tools remain highly active and engaged in misinforming our political dialogue even today. 

There is still much we do not know, but Russia’s involvement in 

these intrusions does not appear to be in any doubt. Russia’s best 

cyber operators are judged to be as elusive and hard to identify as 

any in the world. In this case, however, detection and attribution 

were not so difficult, the implication being that Putin may have 

wanted us to know what he had done, seeking only a level of plausible deniability to support an official rejection of culpability. 

These Russian cyber attacks should be judged within the larger 

context of Russia’s rejection of the post-Cold War international 

order and aggressive actions against its neighbors. Russia’s current 

leaders, and President Putin in particularly, perceive the democratic movements in the former Soviet states, the West’s general 

support for human rights, press freedoms, the rule of law and democracy, as well as NATO and EU enlargement, as a threat to 

what they believe is Russia’s sphere of influence. 

Putin’s Russia makes no secret of the fact that it is determined 

to aggressively halt and counter what it characterizes as Western 

encroachment on its vital interests. The invasion of Georgia, the 

annexation of Crimea, the aggression against Ukraine featuring sophisticated hybrid warfare techniques, the continuing military 

buildup despite a declining economy, saber-rattling in the Baltics 

and Baltic Sea, the authoritarian onslaught against the press, 

NGOs, and what remains of the Russian democratic opposition, the 

unwavering campaign for national sovereignty over the Internet, 

and the creation of an ‘‘iron information curtain’’ like China’s Great 

Firewall and its aggressive interference in Western political processes all are of one piece. Russia’s efforts to undermine democracy 

at home and abroad and destabilize the countries on its border cannot be ignored or traded away in exchange for the appearance of 

comity. 

Furthermore, what Russia did to the United States in 2016, it 

has already done and continues to do in Europe. This challenge to 

the progress of democratic values since the end of the Cold War 

must not be tolerated. 

Despite the indifference of some to this matter, our Nation needs 

to know in detail what the intelligence community has concluded 

was an assault by senior officials of a foreign government on our 

electoral process. 

Our electoral process is the bedrock of our system of government. 

An effort to manipulate it, especially by a regime with values and 

interests so antithetical to our own, is a challenge to the Nation’s 

security which much be met with bipartisan and universal condemnation, consequences, and correction. 

I believe the most appropriate means to conduct an inquiry is the 

creation of a special select committee in the Senate, since this issue 

and the solutions to the problems it has exposed spill across the 

jurisdictional divides of the standing committees on Armed Services, Intelligence, Foreign Relations, Homeland Security, and Judiciary. Failing that, our committee must take on as much of this 

task as we can, and I again commend the chairman for his commitment to do so. 

5 

Therefore, I am pleased and grateful that his efforts will be extended, the energy will be invested on the matters that are so critical to the American people. I also want to applaud President 

Obama’s initial steps publicized last week to respond to Russia’s 

hostile actions. 

General Clapper, Under Secretary Lettre, Admiral Rogers, we 

appreciate your urgent efforts to discover what happened and why 

and to make these facts known to the President, the Presidentelect, Congress, and the American people. Although your investigation and report to President Obama is not yet public, we hope you 

will be able to convey and explain what has been accomplished so 

far, including the steps already announced by the President. 

In addition, I am sure we will have many questions about how 

we are organized in the cyber domain and what changes you have 

recommended going forward, subjects that President Obama referenced in his signing statement of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. 

These are difficult issues, but they are of vital importance to our 

Nation, our security, and our democracy. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you in a bipartisan manner to conduct a 

thorough and thoughtful inquiry and to do more to address the 

cyber threats our Nation faces more broadly by state and non-state 

actors. Thank you very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome to the witnesses, and Mr. Secretary, we will begin with you for any opening statements or comment you might have. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MARCEL J. LETTRE II, UNDER 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. LETTRE. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, 

members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

today. I will shortly turn the microphone over to Director Clapper 

for some comments, followed by Admiral Rogers. As this is my last 

appearance before this committee before stepping down from 8 

years of Pentagon service in a few weeks, I want to—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I am sure you will regret not having that opportunity again. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LETTRE. It will be nice to be skiing a little bit in February. 

That is for sure. 

But having said that, since I am just a few weeks from stepping 

down, I do want to thank this committee for its partnership and 

I want to thank Director Clapper and Admiral Rogers for the privilege of being able to serve together with them in the leadership of 

the U.S. intelligence community. To the men and women of the 

U.S. intelligence community, civilian and military, thousands of 

whom are deployed today around the world advancing U.S. interests and protecting America, I do admire your integrity. I admire 

your service. It has been an honor to serve with you over the last 

many years. 

In the interest of time, I will briefly note the Department of Defense’s views on cyber in three core themes: first, the threats we 

must address; second, what we are doing to address them now; and 

third, the difficult but urgent work we know still lies ahead. 

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First, the threats. As you know, the Department of Defense’s 

leadership believes we confront no fewer than five immediate but 

also distinct and evolving challenges across all operating domains. 

We are countering the prospect of Russian aggression and coercion, 

especially in Europe, something we unfortunately we have had to 

energetically renew our focus on in the last several years. 

We are also managing historic change in perhaps the most consequential region for America’s future, the Asia-Pacific, and watching for risks associated with China’s destabilizing actions in the region. 

We are checking Iranian aggression and malign influence across 

the Middle East. 

We are strengthening our deterrent and defense forces in the 

face of North Korea’s continued nuclear and missile provocations. 

We are countering terrorism with the aim of accelerating the 

lasting defeat of ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and 

al Qaeda. 

These are what many in the Department of Defense have termed 

the Four Plus One, four state-based challenges and an ongoing condition of battling terrorism. 

As our joint written statement for the record has detailed, each 

of these security challenges, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and 

global terrorist groups such as ISIL, presents a significant cyber 

threat dimension to the United States military. Cyber is an operating domain that is real, complex, dynamic, contested, and must 

be addressed. 

Second, what we are doing about it. The Department of Defense 

has for several years pursued a comprehensive strategy for maintaining the necessary strategic dominance in this domain. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has pressed for DOD [Department of 

Defense] to change, to adapt, and to innovate not only to meet today’s challenges but also to ensure that we effectively defend 

against cyber threats well into an uncertain future. 

We have built and continue to build the means and methods that 

will strengthen our relative position against each of these dimensions of the cyber threat. The Government cyber policies, reflected 

in presidential policy directives and executive orders, provide guidance on the absolute necessity of a whole-of-government approach 

critical to protecting our Nation. 

The Department has developed, refined, and published its cyber 

strategy which clearly lays out three key DOD cyber missions: defending DOD networks, providing cyber options for our military 

commanders, and when called upon by our Nation’s leaders, defending the Nation against cyber attacks of significant consequence. 

As the Director and Admiral Rogers will note, since 2009, the Department has matured Cyber Command to ensure clear command 

responsibility and authority and growing capabilities essential to 

our unity of effort for cyber operations. 

We also continue to mature our cyber mission forces which this 

fall achieved initial operating capability, or IOC, status. This force 

is providing military capability to execute our three missions in 

cyberspace. We are building new capabilities and new tools for the 

cyber mission force to use. 

7 

Third, what remains to be done. As much as we have done, we 

recognize there is much more to do. Let me mention just a couple 

of those most important tasks here. 

First, we need to continue to develop and refine our national 

cyber policy framework, which includes the evolution of all dimensions of our deterrence posture: the ability to deny the adversary’s 

objectives, to impose costs, and to ensure that we have a resilient 

infrastructure to execute a multi-domain mission. This refinement 

in evolution in our deterrent thinking and capability will further 

empower decision-making at net speed. 

Second, within the Department, Cyber Command has matured 

and is doing more to protect the Nation and support global operations than ever before, and we need to continue, in fact, accelerate 

this maturation. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense supports the 

elevation of Cyber Command to a unified combatant command and 

supports ending the dual hat arrangement for the leadership of 

NSA [National Security Administration] and Cyber Command and 

doing so through a deliberate conditions-based approach while continuing to leverage the shared capabilities and synergies. 

Finally, we must redouble our efforts to deepen partnerships between government and the private sector and between the U.S. 

Government and our allies. We must continue to seek help from 

American industry, the source of much of the world’s greatest technology talent, in innovating to find cyber defense solutions, build 

resiliency into our critical infrastructure systems, and strengthen 

our deterrence. With our international allies and partners, we must 

work together to promote stability in cyberspace, universal recognition that existing international law applies in cyberspace, and the 

adoption of voluntary peacetime norms of responsible state behavior. 

Mr. Chairman, thanks. I look forward to your questions. I will 

now pass the baton to Director Clapper. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General Clapper? 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., 

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Director CLAPPER. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

and distinguished members of the committee, first thanks very 

much for your opening statements. Obviously, we are here today to 

talk about cyber threats that face our Nation, and I will offer some 

brief valedictory recommendations and a few parting observations. 

I certainly want to take note of and thank the members of the committee who are engaged on this issue and have spoken to it publicly. 

I know there is a great interest in the issue of Russian interference in our electoral process based on the many classified briefings the intelligence community has already provided on this topic 

to the Congress. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson and 

I have issued statements about it. The joint analysis report that 

you alluded to publicly issued by the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation provided details on 

the tools and infrastructure used by the Russian intelligence services to compromise infrastructure associated with the election, as 

8 

well as a range of United States Government political and private 

sector entities, as you described. 

As you also noted, the President tasked the intelligence community to prepare a comprehensive report on Russian interference in 

our election. We plan to brief the Congress and release an unclassified version of this report to the public early next week with due 

deference to the protection of highly sensitive and fragile sources 

and methods. But until then, we are really not prepared to discuss 

this beyond standing by our earlier statements. We are prepared 

to talk about other aspects of the Russian cyber threat. 

We also see cyber threats challenging public trust and confidence 

in information services and institutions. Russia has clearly assumed an even more aggressive cyber posture by increasing cyber 

espionage operations, leaking data stolen from these operations, 

and targeting critical infrastructure systems. 

China continues to succeed in conducting cyber espionage against 

the United States Government, our allies, and United States companies. The intelligence community and the security experts, however, have observed some reduction in cyber activities from China 

against United States companies since the bilateral September 

2015 commitment to refrain from espionage for commercial gain. 

Iran and North Korea continue to improve their capabilities to 

launch disruptive or destructive cyber attacks to support their political objectives. 

Non-state actors, notably terrorist groups most especially including ISIL, also continue to use the Internet to organize, recruit, 

spread propaganda, raise funds, collect intelligence, inspire action 

by disciples, and coordinate operations. In this regard, I want to 

foot stomp a few points that I have made here before. 

Rapidly advancing commercial encryption capabilities have had 

profound effects on our ability to detect terrorists and their activities. We need to strengthen the partnership between government 

and industry and find the right balance to enable the intelligence 

community and law enforcement both to operate, as well as to continue to respect the rights to privacy. 

Cyber operations can also be a means to change, manipulate, or 

falsify electronic data or information to compromise its integrity. 

Cyberspace can be an echo chamber in which information, ideas, or 

beliefs, true or false, get amplified or reinforced through constant 

repetition. All these types of cyber operations have the power to 

chip away at public trust and confidence in our information, services, and institutions. 

By way of some observations and recommendations, both the 

Government and the private sector have done a lot to improve cybersecurity, and our collective security is better but it is still not 

good enough. Our Federal partners are stepping up their efforts 

with the private sector but sharing what they have remains uneven. I think the private sector needs to up its game on cybersecurity and not just wait for the Government to provide perfect warning or a magic solution. 

We need to influence international behavior in cyberspace. This 

means pursuing more global diplomatic efforts to promulgate 

norms of behavior in peacetime and to explore setting limits on 

cyber operations against certain targets. 

9 

When something major happens in cyberspace, our automatic default policy position should not be exclusively to counter cyber with 

cyber. We should consider all instruments of national power. In 

most cases to date, non-cyber tools have been more effective at 

changing our adversaries’ cyber behavior. When we do choose to 

act, we need to model the rules we want others to follow since our 

actions set precedents. 

We also need to be prepared for adversary retaliation, which may 

not be as surgical, either due to our adversary’s skill or the inherent difficulty in calibrating effect and impact of cyber tools. That 

is why using cyber to counter cyber attacks risks unintended consequences. 

We currently cannot put a lot of stock, at least in my mind, in 

cyber deterrence. Unlike nuclear weapons, cyber capabilities are 

difficult to see and evaluate and are ephemeral. It is accordingly 

very hard to create the substance and psychology of deterrence in 

my view. 

We also have to take some steps now to invest in the future. We 

need to rebuild trusted working relationships with industry and 

the private sector on specific issues like encryption and the roles 

and responsibilities for government, users, and industry. 

I believe we need to separate NSA and CYBERCOM [Cyber Command]. We should discontinue the temporary dual hat arrangement, which I helped design when I was Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 7 years ago. This is not purely a military 

issue. I do not believe it is in the NSA’s or the IC’s [intelligence 

community] long-term best interest to continue the dual hat setup. 

Third, we must hire, train, and retain enough cyber talent and 

appropriately fuse cyber as a whole-of-IC workforce. Clearly cyber 

will be a challenge for the U.S., the intelligence community, and 

our national security for the foreseeable future, and we need to be 

prepared for that. Adversaries are pushing the envelope since this 

is a tool that does not cost much and sometimes is hard to attribute. 

I certainly appreciate, as we all do, the committee’s interest in 

this difficult and important challenge. 

I will wrap up by saying after 53 years in the intelligence business in one capacity or another, happily I have just got 15 days 

left. 

[Laughter.] 

Director CLAPPER. I will miss being involved in the intelligence 

mission, and I will certainly miss the talented and dedicated patriots who are in the United States intelligence community. I am very 

proud of the community of professionals I have represented here 

for the last 6-1⁄2 years who do not get much public recognition and 

who like it that way. They have always supported me and I am 

confident they will do no less for my successor, whoever that turns 

out to be. 

With that, let me stop and pass to Admiral Rogers. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, General. 

Admiral Rogers? 

10 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY 

SERVICES 

Admiral ROGERS. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

members of the committee, good morning and thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today on behalf of the 

United States Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. 

I am honored to appear beside Director Clapper and Under Secretary Lettre and I applaud them both for their many years of public service. It has been a true honor, gentlemen. 

When we last met in September, I discussed the changing cyber 

threat environment, and today I look forward to further discussing 

this complex issue. Of course, some aspects of what we do must remain classified to protect our Nation’s security. Today I will limit 

my discussion to those in the public domain. 

We have seen over the course of the last year how this cyber 

threat environment is constantly evolving. We have all come to 

take for granted the interconnectivity that is being built into every 

facet of our lives. It creates opportunities and vulnerabilities. Those 

who would seek to harm our fellow Americans and our Nation utilize the same Internet, the same communications devices, and the 

same social media platforms that we, our families and our friends 

here and around the world use. We must keep pace with such 

changes in order to provide policymakers and our operational commanders the intelligence and cyber capabilities they need to keep 

us safe. That means understanding our adversaries to the best of 

our ability and understanding what they mean to do and why. We 

are watching sophisticated adversaries involved in criminal behavior, terrorism planning, malicious cyber activities, and even outright cyber attacks. While this is a global problem, we have also 

recently witnessed the use of these tactics here at home. 

The statement for the record that we have provided jointly to 

this committee covers the threat picture worldwide, but I know this 

hearing today will inevitably focus on reports of interference in our 

recent elections. I echo Director Clapper in saying that we will 

await the findings of the just-completed intelligence review ordered 

by the President and defer our comments on its specifics until after 

that review is shared with our leaders and congressional overseers. 

I do want to add, however, that over this last year, NSA and 

Cyber Command have worked extensively with our broader government partners to detect and monitor Russian cyber activity. The 

hacking of organizations and systems belonging to our election 

process is of great concern, and we will continue to focus strongly 

on this activity. 

For NSA’s part, we focus on the foreign threat actor in foreign 

spaces, but we share our information as readily as possible with 

the rest of our partners in the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and Federal law enforcement, as well as others 

within the U.S. Government and the private sector. 

As you know, Russian cyber groups have a history of aggressively 

hacking into other countries’ government infrastructure and even 

election systems. As I have indicated, this will remain a top priority for NSA and U.S. Cyber Command. 

11 

In this changing threat environment, I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of improving cybersecurity 

and working related issues across public and private sectors. We 

continue to engage with our partners around the world on what is 

acceptable and unacceptable behavior in cyberspace, and we clearly 

are not where we want to be, nor where we need to be in this regard. 

We continue to make investments in technologies and capabilities to improve detection of malicious cyber activities and make it 

more difficult for malicious cyber actors intending to do us harm. 

Combating cyber threats take more than technology. It takes talented, motivated people, and we are investing more than ever in 

the recruitment and retention of a skilled workforce that is knowledgeable, passionate, and dedicated to protecting the Nation for the 

safety of our citizens and of our friends and allies around the 

world. 

Innovation is one of the key tenets of NSA and Cyber Command 

and we need to invigorate the cyber workforce that think creatively 

about challenges that do not ascribe to traditional understandings 

of borders and boundaries. This remains a key driver and a key 

challenge as we look to the future. 

Cyber Command is well along in building our cyber mission 

force, deploying teams to defend the vital networks that support 

DOD operations, to support combatant commanders in their missions worldwide, and to bolster DOD’s capacity and capabilities to 

defend the Nation against cyber attacks of significant consequence. 

The organizations I lead, the U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, have provided intelligence, expert advice, 

and tailored options to the Nation’s decision-makers in response to 

recent events. Much of their activity can only be discussed in classified channels, but I must say I am proud of what both organizations have accomplished and will accomplish, even as we acknowledge we have to do more. 

I look forward to your questions. 

Finally, on one personal note, I apologize to all of you. I have an 

ongoing back issue, and if I have to stand up in the course of this 

time period, please do not take that as a sign of disrespect in any 

way. I guess I am just getting older. 

That is all I have for you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I know how you feel. 

[Laughter.] 

[The joint prepared statement of Director Clapper, Mr. Lettre, 

and Admiral Rogers follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE JAMES R. CLAPPER, THE

HONORABLE MARCEL LETTRE AND ADMIRAL MICHAEL S. ROGERS

INTRODUCTION

Chairman McCain, Vice Chairman Reed, and Members of the Committee thank 

you for the invitation to offer the testimony of the Department of Defense and the 

Intelligence Community on cyber threats to U.S. national security. Our statement 

reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community’s extraordinary men 

and women whom we are privileged to lead. We in the Intelligence Community are 

committed every day to provide the nuanced, multidisciplinary intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect 

American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world. 

12 

The order of the topics presented in this statement does not necessarily indicate 

the relative importance or magnitude of the threat in the view of the Intelligence 

Community. 

Information available as of 1 January 2017 was used in the preparation of this 

assessment. 

JOINT STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

Information and communication technologies play an increasing role in the security of the United States. Cyberspace is both a resource on which our continued security and prosperity depends, and a globally contested medium within which 

threats manifest themselves. As their cyber capabilities grow, our adversaries are 

demonstrating a willingness to use cyberspace as a platform for espionage, attack, 

and influence. Foreign Intelligence Entities continue to quietly exploit our nation’s 

public and private sectors in the pursuit of policy and military insights sensitive research, intellectual property, trade secrets, and personally identifiable information. 

Cyber threats have already challenged public trust and confidence in global institutions, governance, and norms, while imposing costs on the global economy. These 

threats pose an increasing risk to public safety, as cyber technologies are integrated 

with critical infrastructure in key sectors. Adversaries also continue to use cyber operations to undermine U.S. military and commercial advantage by hacking into U.S. 

defense industry and commercial enterprises. The breadth of cyber threats posed to 

U.S. national and economic security has become increasingly diverse, sophisticated, 

and serious, leading to physical, security, economic, and psychological consequences. 

Despite ever-improving cyber defenses, nearly all information, communication networks, and systems will be at risk for years to come from remote hacking to establish persistent covert access, supply chain operations that insert compromised hardware or software, malicious actions by trusted insiders, and mistakes by system 

users. In short, the cyber threat cannot be eliminated. Rather, cyber risk must be 

managed in the context of overall business and operational risk. At present, however, the risk calculus some private and public sector entities employ does not adequately account for foreign cyber threats or systemic interdependencies between different critical infrastructure sectors. 

We assess that some countries might be willing to explore limits on cyber operations against certain targets, although few are likely to support total bans on the 

development of offensive capabilities. Many countries view cyber capabilities as a 

useful foreign policy tool that also is integral to their domestic security, and will 

continue developing these capabilities. Some also remain undeterred from conducting reconnaissance, espionage, and even preparation for attacks in cyberspace. 

PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES

Our adversaries have capabilities to hold at risk U.S. critical infrastructure as 

well as the broader ecosystem of connected consumer and industrial devices known 

as the ‘‘Internet of Things.’’ Security researchers continue to discover vulnerabilities 

in consumer products including automobiles and medical devices. Examples of cyber 

incidents with real world consequences include a cyber attack on a Ukrainian power 

network in 2015 that caused power outages for several hours and a ‘‘ransomware’’— 

software designed to block a user’s access to data sometimes by encrypting it—infection that forced a hospital in the United Kingdom in late 2016 to cancel scheduled 

medical procedures, divert trauma patients to other hospitals, and impact access to 

essential services such as blood transfusions. If adversaries achieve the ability to 

create significant physical effects inside the United States via cyber means, this 

would provide them new avenues for coercion and deterrence. 

COMMERCIAL AND SECURITY CONSEQUENCES

Our adversaries continue to use cyber operations to undermine U.S. military and 

commercial advantage by hacking into U.S. defense industry and commercial enterprises in the pursuit of scientific, technical, and business information. Examples include theft of data on the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, the F–22 Raptor fighter jet, 

and the MV–22 Osprey. This espionage reduces our adversaries’ costs and accelerates their weapon systems development programs, enables reverse-engineering and 

countermeasures development, and undermines U.S. military, technological, and 

commercial advantage. In addition, adversaries often target personal accounts of 

government and industry officials as well as their close associates to enable cyber 

operations. 

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PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

The impact of cyber threats extends beyond the physical, security and commercial 

realms. Online information operations and manipulation from both states and nonstate actors can distort the perceptions of the targeted victim and other audiences 

through the anonymous delivery of manipulative content that seeks to gain influence or foment confusion and distrust. Information taken through cyber espionage 

can be leaked intact or selectively altered in content. For example, Russian actors 

have seeded falsified information into social media and news feeds and websites in 

order to sow doubt and confusion, erode faith in democratic institutions, and attempt to weaken Western governments by portraying them as inherently corrupt 

and dysfunctional. 

CYBER POLICY, DIPLOMACY, AND WARFARE

Foreign Cyber Policies. National and domestic security interests are an important 

component of global Internet policy, as is a robust and stable global digital economy 

and the free flow of information online. As foreign countries seek to balance security, economic growth, and interoperability objectives, many are implementing new 

laws and technical changes to monitor and control access to information within and 

across their borders and to control user access through means such as restrictions 

on encryption and steps to reduce anonymity online. 

However, these states will probably not significantly erode the overall global 

connectivity of the Internet. Furthermore, some state information control efforts will 

almost certainly be challenged by a broad coalition of states and non-state cyber 

stakeholders, including innovative technologists, industry leaders, privacy advocates, hackers, and others with an interest in opposing censorship or government 

control of cyberspace. 

Diplomacy. In 2015, following a China-United States bilateral joint statement on 

this issue, G–20 leaders affirmed that that no country should conduct or support 

cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with the intent of providing competitive 

advantages to companies or commercial sectors. U.S. diplomatic efforts continue to 

focus on the promotion of a strategic framework of international cyber stability during peacetime and during armed conflict that is built on three pillars: global affirmation of the applicability of existing international law to State activity in cyberspace; the development of international consensus on certain additional voluntary, 

nonbinding norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace during peacetime; and 

the development and implementation of practical confidence-building measures to 

facilitate inter-State cooperation on cyber-related matters. The promotion of this 

framework is complicated by efforts to build and enhance international cooperation 

to address shared threats. These efforts also are hampered by the lack of consensus 

over key concepts such as what constitutes an armed attack, act of aggression, or 

the use of force in cyberspace. Furthermore, countries do not widely agree on how 

such principles of international law as proportionality of response or even the application of sovereignty apply in cyberspace. 

Cyber Warfare. As of late 2016 more than 30 nations are developing offensive 

cyber attack capabilities. The proliferation of cyber capabilities coupled with new 

war-fighting technologies will increase the incidence of standoff and remote operations, especially in the initial phases of conflict. Cyber attacks against critical infrastructure and information networks also will give actors a means of bypassing 

traditional defense measures and minimizing the advantage of geography to impose 

costs directly on their targets from a distance. Russian officials, for example, have 

noted publicly that initial attacks in future wars might be made through information networks in order to destroy critically important infrastructure, undermine an 

enemy’s political will, and disrupt military command and control. Adversaries 

equipped with similar offensive cyber capabilities could be prone to preemptive attack and rapid escalation in a future crisis, because both sides would have an incentive to strike first. Cyber attacks against private sector networks and infrastructure 

could provoke a cyber-response by the intended target, raising the possibility of corporate and other non-state actor involvement in future cyber conflict and blurring 

the distinction between state and non-state action. Protecting critical infrastructure, 

such as crucial energy, financial, manufacturing, transportation, communication, 

and health systems, will become an increasingly complex national security challenge. 

CYBER THREAT ACTORS

Russia. Russia is a full-scope cyber actor that poses a major threat to U.S. Government, military, diplomatic, commercial, and critical infrastructure and key reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:28 Jan 03, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\33-940.TXT WILDA
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source networks because of its highly advanced offensive cyber program and sophisticated tactics, techniques, and procedures. In recent years, we have observed the 

Kremlin assume a more aggressive cyber posture. Russian cyber operations targeted 

government organizations, critical infrastructure, think tanks, universities, political 

organizations, and corporations often using spearphishing campaigns. In foreign 

countries, Russian actors conducted damaging and/or disruptive cyberattacks, including attacks on critical infrastructure networks. In some cases Russian intelligence actors have masqueraded as third parties, hiding behind false online 

personas designed to cause the victim to misattribute the source of the attack. We 

assess that only Russia’s senior-most officials could have authorized the recent election-focused data thefts and disclosures, based on the scope and sensitivity of the 

targets. Russia also has used cyber tactics and techniques to seek to influence public 

opinion across Europe and Eurasia. Looking forward, Russian cyber operations will 

likely target the United States to gather intelligence, support Russian decisionmaking, conduct influence operations to support Russian military and political objectives, and prepare the cyber environment for future contingencies. 

China. Beijing continues to conduct cyber espionage against the United States 

Government, our allies and U.S. companies. Since the China-United States cyber 

commitments in September 2015, private-sector security experts continue to detect 

cyber activity from China, although at reduced levels and without confirmation that 

stolen data was used for commercial gain. Beijing has also selectively used cyber 

attacks against foreign targets that it probably believes threaten Chinese domestic 

stability or regime legitimacy. China continues to integrate and streamline its cyber 

operations and capabilities into a dedicated cyber element that will be increasingly 

difficult to detect or counter. 

Iran. Tehran continues to leverage cyber espionage, propaganda, and attacks to 

support its security priorities, influence events and perceptions, and counter 

threats—including against United States allies in the Middle East. Iran has also 

used its cyber capabilities directly against the United States, as in distributed denial of service attacks in targeting the United States financial sector in 2012–13. 

North Korea. Pyongyang remains capable of launching disruptive or destructive 

cyber attacks to support its political objectives, as demonstrated by its destructive 

attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014. South Korean officials have 

also concluded that North Korea was probably responsible for the 2014 compromise, 

exfiltration, and disclosure of data from a South Korean nuclear plant, and for numerous denial of service and data deletion attacks. 

Terrorists. Terrorists groups—to include al Qaeda, Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—continue to use the Internet to collect 

intelligence, coordinate operations, raise funds, spread propaganda, and incite action. Groups such as the Taliban also use Internet-based technology for similar purposes. While not as sophisticated as some state actors, Hizballah and HAMAS will 

continue to build on their cyber successes inside and outside the Middle East. ISIL 

personnel will continue to seek opportunities to target and release sensitive information about United States citizens in an effort to spur ‘‘lone-wolf’ attacks as demonstrated in their 2015 operations that disclosed potential targeting information 

about U.S. military personnel. 

Criminals. Cybercrime remains a persistent and prevalent malicious activity in 

cyberspace. Criminals develop and use sophisticated cyber tools for a variety of purposes including theft, extortion, and facilitation of other criminal activity. 

‘‘Ransomware has become a particularly popular and effective tool for extortion, one 

for which few options for recovery or remediation are available if the victim has not 

previously backed up the affected data. In 2016, criminals employing ransomware 

targeted the medical sector, disrupting patient care and undermining public confidence in medical institutions. Some criminals use markets conducted on the socalled dark web to sell or lease malware to anyone willing to pay, including state 

and non-state actors. 

RESPONSES

Perhaps the most significant counterintelligence threat to our nation, both currently and in the future, involves the rapid development and proliferation of disruptive, advanced technologies that provide adversaries with capabilities that even just 

a few years ago were not considered plausible. Sophisticated technical collection 

through a variety of means is available to more adversaries than ever before and 

can occur virtually anywhere and involve telephones, computers, Internet, cell 

phones, wired and wireless networks, as well as conversations and activities in offices, homes, vehicles, and public spaces. Disruptive technology is being built and 

fielded at an unprecedented rate, and we are already dealing with the consequences 

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of a hyperconnected world. The complexity of technological advances, both in the 

tools themselves and the methods used to compromise them, necessitates a much 

greater technical and cyber literacy than what was required of us even five years 

ago. 

As we face this ever-changing cyber threat environment, the Intelligence Community and U.S. Cyber Command have been hardening internal U.S. Government systems, increasing knowledge and awareness among industry and the community, and 

engaging more closely with a host of partners to share best practices and threat information. The National Security Agency, in particular, has taken aggressive measures to hire and retain the cybersecurity talent needed to operate in this challenging 

environment. In addition, Cyber Command leverages the capacity and capabilities 

of 133 Cyber Mission Force teams that are responsible for synchronizing and executing cyber operations to support combatant command operations, and for the defense and security of service component and Department of Defense Information 

Networks. Cyber Command has established close working relationships with both 

international and interagency partners and stands ready to support a whole of nation response. The National Counterintelligence and Security Center’s (NCSC) innovative public awareness campaign has resulted in placing numerous short informative videos on its public-facing website concerning cyber and associated threats, 

which are of immediate, practical use to federal, industry and community partners 

alike. NCSC also established a National Counterintelligence Task Force for Critical 

Infrastructure to coordinate counterintelligence efforts to mitigate this threat. 

While many government organizations can make a unique contribution to securing our networks and the nation, no one agency has the capability to do so alone. 

The security of systems and networks is not the responsibility of one person or one 

agency or one industry, but rather requires a whole of nation response and a culture 

of cybersecurity among all users of the information space across private and public 

sectors. 

The Intelligence Community and U.S. Cyber Command have been working to provide the Secretary of Defense and DOD policymakers with effective options for operational cyber responses to threats to U.S. interests. This remains a work in 

progress, and we welcome the assistance of this Committee in ensuring that we 

have the resources and authorities to succeed in this mission. 

CONCLUSION

In summary, the breadth of cyber threats to U.S. national and economic security 

has become increasingly diverse, sophisticated, and dangerous. Over the next five 

years, technological change will only accelerate the intersection of cyber and physical devices, creating new risks. Adversaries are likely to further explore cyber-enabled psychological operations and may look to steal or manipulate data to gain 

strategic advantage or undermine confidence. The Intelligence Community has been 

vigilant in the detecting and sharing of cyber threat information with partners such 

as U.S. Cyber Command, as well as our nation’s network protection organizations 

such as the Department of Homeland Security, and will continue to do so for the 

safety of our nation. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Director, I just have to—General Clapper, I 

just have to mention the name, Mr. Assange, has popped up, and 

I believe that he is the one who is responsible for publishing names 

of individuals that work for us that put their lives in direct danger. 

Is that correct? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, he has. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you think that there is any credibility we 

should attach to this individual given his record of—— 

Director CLAPPER. Not in my view. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Not in your view. 

Admiral Rogers? 

Admiral ROGERS. I second those comments. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

For the record, on October 7th, the Homeland Security and Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence—their assessment was that 

the United States intelligence community is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromise of emails from 

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United States persons and institutions, including from United 

States political organizations. It goes on to say these thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the United States election 

process. Quote, such activity is not new to Moscow. Russians have 

used similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia. 

Quote, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia’s senior most officials could have authorized these activities. 

General Clapper, those are still operable and correct statements? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, Chairman McCain, they are. As I indicated in my statement, we stand actually more resolutely on the 

strength of that statement that we made on the 7th of October. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you. 

Really what we are talking about is if they succeeded in changing the results of an election, which none of us believe they were, 

that would have to constitute an attack on the United States of 

America because of the effects if they had succeeded. Would you 

agree with that? 

Director CLAPPER. First, we cannot say—they did not change any 

vote tallies or anything of that sort. We had no way of gauging the 

impact that—certainly the intelligence community cannot gauge 

the impact it had on choices the electorate made. There is no way 

for us to gauge that. 

Whether or not that constitutes an act of war I think is a very 

heavy policy call that I do not believe the intelligence community 

should make. But it certainly would carry in my view great gravity. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Admiral Rogers, have you seen this problem in your position getting worse or better? In other words, it is my information that their 

techniques have improved, their capabilities improved. The degree 

of success has improved. Is that your assessment? 

Admiral ROGERS. I have publicly said before that the Russians 

are a peer competitor in cyber. If you look broadly beyond the Russians to cyber at large, the level of capability of nation states and 

actors around the world continues to increase. I cannot think of a 

single significant actor out there who is either decreasing their 

level of investment, getting worse in their tradecraft or capability, 

or in any way backing away from significant investments in cyber. 

Chairman MCCAIN. With all due respect to you, Mr. Secretary, 

I have not seen a policy. In other words, I do not think any of our 

intelligence people know what to do if there is an attack besides 

report it. I do not think that any of our people know, if they see 

an attack coming, what specific actions should be taken. Maybe I 

am missing something, but I have asked time after time, what do 

you do in the case of an attack? There has not been an answer. 

There has not been an answer. I believe that unless we have specific instructions to these wonderful men and women who are doing 

all this work, then we are going to be bystanders and observers. 

I am glad to hear you respond to that. 

Mr. LETTRE. Mr. Chairman, you are right that we have a lot 

more work to do to put the right deterrence and response framework in place on cyber. This is somewhat of a new domain of operations and in some cases warfare. In my personal opinion, the next 

administration would be well served to focus very early on those 

questions of continuing to develop our overarching policy, a comVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:28 Jan 03, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\33-940.TXT WILDA
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prehensive approach, and an increasingly robust and refined deterrence framework. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you. 

Finally, Director and Admiral, would it make your job easier if 

you did not have to report to seven different committees? 

Director CLAPPER. Chairman McCain, my hands have been 

slapped before when I ventured into the delicate area of congressional jurisdiction. In the remaining 15 days that I am in office, I 

do not think I am going to speak to that. Afterwards that might 

be different. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, we will look forward to calling you 

back. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Admiral Rogers? 

Admiral ROGERS. Can I second the comments of the Director of 

National Intelligence? 

Chairman MCCAIN. But it does make it difficult, does it not? It 

is not exactly stove-piping, but overlapping jurisdictions I think 

makes your job a little harder, does it not, I mean in all candor, 

Admiral? 

Admiral ROGERS. The way I would phrase is I think clearly an 

integrated approach is a key component of our ability to move 

ahead here. I would say that in the Government, in the private sector, there is no particular one slice where that is not applicable. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Clapper, you responded to the chairman that in October 

you and the Director of Homeland Security concluded that the Russian Government intervened in the election. Admiral Rogers also 

seconded that view. That is also today the view, for the record, of 

the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigations] and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], in fact, all the intelligence community. Is 

that correct? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. The forthcoming report is done essentially by those three agencies, CIA, FBI, and NSA. 

Senator REED. The same conclusion with respect to the involvement of high-level Russian authorities is shared by all these agencies? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. 

Senator REED. The chairman just noticed the legislative 

compartmentalization. Is that reflected also in terms of operations, 

in terms of, for example, Admiral Rogers, if you through NSA or 

through your sources detect something that is obviously a disruption, something that is patently wrong, you can communicate to the 

FBI or law enforcement, but there is no mechanism to make things 

happen administratively. Is that fair? 

Admiral ROGERS. There is certainly a process, and in fact, there 

have been several instances that I can think of in the last 18 

months where we have run through that exact same scenario. Intelligence, as it does in many other areas, other domains, will detect incoming activity of concern. We, NSA, will partner with FBI, 

the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Cyber Command to enVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:28 Jan 03, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\33-940.TXT WILDA
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sure the broader government, the Department of Defense and FBI 

in its relationship with the private sector. 

But the biggest frustration to me is speed, speed, speed. We have 

got to get faster. We have got to be more agile. For me at least 

within my span of control, I am constantly asking the team what 

can we do to be faster and more agile. How do we organize ourselves? What is the construct that makes the most sense? We cannot be bound by history and tradition here, so to speak. We have 

to be willing to look at alternatives. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

General Clapper, one of the aspects of this Russian hacking was 

not just disseminating information that they had exploited from 

computers, but also the allegations of fake news sites, fake news 

stories that were propagated. Is that accurate, or is that one aspect 

of this problem? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. Without getting too far in front of the 

headlights of our rollout next week to the Congress, this was a 

multifaceted campaign. The hacking was only one part of it, and 

it also entailed classical propaganda, disinformation, fake news. 

Senator REED. Does that continue? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. 

Senator REED. The Russians particularly are very astute at covering up their tracks. It appears that they were not quite as diligent or—let me ask a question. 

Do you believe that they made little attempts to cover up what 

they were doing as a way to make a point politically? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, again, without preempting the report, 

that is classical tradecraft that the Russians have long used. Particularly when they are promulgating so-called disinformation, they 

will often try to hide the source of that or mask it to deliberately 

mask the source. 

Senator REED. Let me just ask one more time. In this situation, 

though, were there attempts to mask their involvement, very elaborate and very, very sophisticated, or was it just enough to have 

plausible deniability? 

Director CLAPPER. Sir, I would rather not get into that. That 

kind of edges into the sources and methods and I would rather not 

speak to that publicly. 

Senator REED. Fair enough. 

These activities are ongoing now in Europe as Europe prepares 

for elections. Is that a fair assumption? 

Director CLAPPER. It is. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Yesterday, the ‘‘Wall Street Journal’’ indicated that the President-elect is considering changes to the intelligence community. 

Have you at all, as the experts in this field, been engaged in any 

of these discussions, deliberations, advice? 

Director CLAPPER. No, we have not. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I heard this morning that a lot of the news media was characterizing this as a hearing on Russian hacking, and actually it is on 

19 

foreign cyber threats to the United States. I am trying to cover a 

couple of the other ones. 

First of all, I received something this morning, Director Clapper, 

that I was very glad to read. I have often said that the threats we 

are facing today are greater. I look wistfully back at the days of 

the Cold War. Your statement that was in print this morning said 

sometimes all of this makes me long for the Cold War when the 

world essentially had two large mutually exclusive—and so forth. 

I think it is important that we talk about this because the general public is not aware of the nature of the threats that are out 

there that have not been out there before. 

Admiral—no. Director Clapper, we have had a lot of most damaging cyber attacks perpetrated against the American people. 

When the chairman gave his opening statement, he singled out 

three or four of them. One of them was the OPM [Office of Personnel Management] incident. That was 2014 and 2015, Office of 

Personnel Management. It was a breach and threat to personal information, birthdates, home addresses, Social Security numbers of 

over 22 million individuals. 

I would like to ask you what action was taken after that and 

what kind of effect that might have had on the behavior of the Chinese. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, the major action that we took, of course, 

was remediation in terms of advising people of what the potential 

risks were. And, of course, there was a lot of work done. NSA was 

deeply involved in this in enhancing or improving the cybersecurity 

posture of OPM, and Admiral Rogers might speak to that. 

I would say that this was espionage. It was not an attack per se. 

And, of course, I am always a bit reticent about people who live in 

glass houses should not throw publicly too many rocks. There is I 

think a difference between an act of espionage, which we conduct 

as well and other nations do, versus an attack. 

Mike, do you want to comment? 

Admiral ROGERS. Just as a broader point, I think the OPM issue 

highlights that massive data concentrations increasingly have 

value all of their own. What do I mean by that? I can remember 

10 years ago earlier in my time in cyber thinking to myself large 

databases like OPM are so large. The ability of an intruder, an external actor to actually access, fully extract, and bore their way 

through millions upon millions of records would be difficult. But 

with the power of big data analytics, large data concentrations now 

become increasingly attractive targets because the ability to mine 

that data for insights, which is what we think drove this action in 

the first place, becomes more and more easily done. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. I appreciate that very much. 

In your joint statement—by the way, I like the idea of joint statements. It makes our questioning a lot easier. 

You talk about the—you end up stating through one of your 

paragraphs, in short, cyber threat cannot be eliminated. Rather, 

cyber threat must be managed. It is interesting that in the Edison 

Electric Institute—it is a publication. I think it just came in this 

morning—they say exactly the same thing. This seems to be one of 

the rare cases where we have government and industry working together. Their statement was the electric power industry recognizes 

20 

it cannot protect all assets from all threats and instead must manage risk. 

Now, they go on to describe working together with government, 

and they say the industry’s security strategy is constantly evolved 

and are closely coordinated with the Federal Government through 

a partnership called the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council, 

ESCC. Can you comment? Are we looking at getting some success 

out of that? 

Director CLAPPER. I think it is emblematic of a lot of work that 

the intelligence community has done, the Department of Homeland 

Security in engaging with each of the, I think, 16 key infrastructure sectors in this country and providing—what we have embarked on is providing them, tailored to each one of those sectors, 

intelligence estimates of what the threats and vulnerabilities are in 

order to help them take measures to enhance their cybersecurity. 

I think the major point here is that if there is any connection 

whatsoever with the Internet, there is an inherent security vulnerability, and we have to manage the risk that is generated accordingly with full knowledge of that fact. If there is an Internet connection, there is always going to be a vulnerability. 

Mike? 

Admiral ROGERS. I would echo that. I think part of our challenge 

is our defensive strategy must be two-pronged. We have to spend 

time making it difficult for people to gain access, but we must acknowledge that despite our best efforts, there is a probability that 

they are still going to get in. 

What do you do? As a guy who defends networks on the Cyber 

Command side, I would tell you it is a whole different process, 

methodology, prioritization, and risk approach in dealing with 

someone who is already in your network versus trying to keep 

them out in the first place. We have to do both. 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that. My time has expired. I have 

one last question just for the record. You cannot answer it at this 

time. 

But a year ago—it is a year and 2 months ago I think it was, 

Admiral Rogers—you made the statement before this committee 

that, quote, we have peer competitors in cyberspace and some of 

them have already hinted that they hold the power to cripple our 

infrastructure and set back our standard of living if they choose. 

I would like for the record if you could just kind of outline which 

of our peer competitors might be the closest to choosing to use their 

power. 

Admiral ROGERS. As I have publicly said before, the Russians are 

the peer competitor to us. But I look at other nations. You look at 

China, for example, and the level of capability and investment they 

are making. I am watching their abilities rise significantly. Iran, 

North Korea, currently at a moderate level. But clearly the level 

of investment, the capability we are seeing, and their willingness 

to employ cyber in some very aggressive ways that would be way 

beyond our normal risk calculus is of concern. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Nelson? 

Senator NELSON. I think it is the general assumption that you 

all have said that our systems can be invaded that has the AmerVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:28 Jan 03, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\33-940.TXT WILDA
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ican people, we as policymakers concerned, but the average American concerned that there is no privacy anymore. 

General, do you think in the report next week that you all will 

ascribe a motivation to Putin for the election attempt? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, we will ascribe a motivation. I would 

rather not, again, preempt the report. 

Senator NELSON. Understood. 

Well, then will you discuss after the report what is sufficient in 

the future to impose enough cost to make them stop this kind of 

activity? 

Director CLAPPER. No. If we are going to speak to that, that 

would be separate from the report. What the report will include, 

per the President’s tasking, was a section contributed by the Department of Homeland Security and NIST [National Institute of 

Standards and Technology], I believe, on best practices for defending, but it does not speak to that, which is really out of our lane. 

That is a policy call. 

Senator NELSON. We are now talking about deterrence, and as 

one of you said in your testimony, it is not like the nuclear standoff 

of mutually assured destruction because we do not have a particular deterrence now. Would you discuss that? 

Director CLAPPER. The point I was trying to make is that in the 

case of nuclear deterrence, there are instruments you can see, feel, 

touch, measure, weaponry. We have had a demonstration a long 

time ago of the impact of nuclear weaponry. That is what creates 

both the physical substance of deterrence, as well as the psychology. The problem with the cyber domain—it does not have 

those physical dimensions that you can measure, see, feel, and 

touch as we do with nuclear deterrence. 

Senator NELSON. Let me give you an example. Help us understand had the supposed invasion into the Vermont utility been in 

fact an invasion by a foreign power and ascribed to that was shutting it down, if that had been the case, what would be some of the 

options we would do. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, again, this would be a—as I understand 

it, by the way, it was not. But had it been from the malware planted by a foreign power, I think that is something that would be very 

situational dependent as to what to do about it. As I indicated in 

my remarks, perhaps a cyber reaction to a cyber act may not be 

the best course of action. Some other form of national power. Sanctions is what we have traditionally used. 

As I also indicated, the problem, at least for me, is— and I will 

ask others to speak if they want to—if you do retaliate in a cyber 

context, not knowing exactly what counter-retaliation you will get 

back. We go through all kinds of exquisite thought processes on deciding how to react. We try to be very surgical, very precise. We 

try to gauge what the second order or unintended consequences 

might be. I do not think others are similarly disposed to consider 

such precision and such exactness when they respond. There is always that issue of counter-retaliation, ergo my brief mention that 

it is in my view best to consider all instruments of national power. 

Senator NELSON. I think that is what is concerning us. Could we, 

the United States—do we have the ability that we could make it 

22 

so tough on North Korea with a cyber attack that it would deter 

them from some of their strange behavior? 

Director CLAPPER. Not necessarily via a direct cyber reaction, 

given the difficulty of gaining access to their cyber networks. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Director Clapper, you are pretty far along on the report that will 

be released next week, obviously. How far along are you? What do 

you lack and how will this be released? Will it be in a classified 

format? Will you be willing to testify in an opening hearing like 

this, or will we need to go down the SCIF to hear this? 

Director CLAPPER. What is planned is a series of briefings in the 

Congress. I think I have four more hearings to do, first with our 

oversight committees, which will be closed hearings I believe. Then 

there will be all-House, all-Senate hearings I believe next week as 

we roll out a version of the report—— 

Senator WICKER. Those will be classified. 

Director CLAPPER.—followed by an unclassified version. 

Senator WICKER. I see. The public will not hear sources and 

methods, but you think it will be fairly convincing without going 

beyond what—— 

Director CLAPPER. I assure you that I intend to push the envelope as much as I can particularly on the unclassified version because I think the public should know as much about this as possible. This is why I felt very strongly about the statement we made 

in October. We will be as forthcoming as we can, but there are 

some sensitive and fragile sources and methods here, which is one 

reason why we are reticent to talk about it in this setting. 

Senator WICKER. You have said that, and I expect you will be 

challenged with some very talented questioners up and down the 

dais here today on that. 

I would have to support what Senator Nelson has said. As regrettable and reprehensible as the hacking of political parties is, I do 

think Senator Nelson has touched on really the larger issue which 

really is the subject matter of this hearing and that is what the 

real threats are. It concerns me that we really do not know what 

the deterrence ought to be. I wonder at what level are conversations taking place within the administration or within the intelligence community about what is appropriate in terms of a response. You mentioned countering cyber with cyber is not necessarily the number one solution. Secretary Lettre mentioned that 

we should impose costs, and perhaps after you answer, I can ask 

him to expound on that also. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, we have had many discussions in the 

White House situation room at Deputies Committee, Principals 

Committee, and NSC [National Security Council] meetings about 

what to do when we have these attacks. I think the Sony attack 

by the North Koreans is a case in point. There you get into the 

complexities of if you launch a counter cyber attack—I want to be 

careful here, but you have to use some other nation’s infrastructure 

in order to mount that attack. That gets into, as I have learned, 

complex legal issues involving international law. The judgment was 

to impose some other costs other than a direct cyber retaliation. 

23 

Senator WICKER. Did you recommend the President’s sanctions? 

Were his actions in response to the Russian hacking part of your 

recommendation, or did that come from someone else? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, without going into internal decisionmaking, I think that was a consensus interagency view. 

Senator WICKER. Secretary Lettre, what about imposing costs? 

What did you mean by that? 

Mr. LETTRE. Well, as part of an approach to deterrence that 

takes each case as it comes up case by case, we need to look at 

ways to respond—first deter and then respond to attacks at a time 

and a place of our choosing that favors advantages that we have 

as we use all of the instruments available. We look to deny objectives and then impose costs, as you indicated, Senator. 

Imposing costs really can come from things like were announced 

last week with the sanctions that were applied in the case of the 

Russian hacking situation, but they can go more broadly than that. 

From the military’s perspective, we are concerned not just about 

Russia’s cyber hacking, but also about a range of aggressive actions 

by Russia across multiple regions of the globe. We look to impose 

costs on Russia by a range of measures across multiple regions in 

partnership with our allies through NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization], where we can, to push back on Russian actions and 

deter future aggressive actions. That is a bit of what we mean by 

imposing costs here. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It seems that every attack is handled on a 

case-by-case basis, and that is not a strategy. 

Senator McCaskill? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

I know this will probably confuse you a little bit, General Clapper, but review again how long you have been working in intelligence. 

Director CLAPPER. I started in 1963. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You enlisted in 1963. Correct? 

Director CLAPPER. No. I enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1961. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Then transferred to the Air Force? 

Director CLAPPER. Right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You flew support for combat missions in 

Vietnam? 

Director CLAPPER. I did two tours in Southeast Asia, one in Vietnam in 1965 and 1966, and then I was stationed in Thailand flying 

the reconnaissance missions over Laos and Cambodia in 1970 and 

1971. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Would you say that your experience in the 

military and especially your service for the Government has always 

been for either political party and apolitical in terms of your mission and your job? 

Director CLAPPER. Absolutely. I have served—I toiled in the 

trenches in intelligence for every President since President Kennedy. I have served as a political appointee in both Republican and 

Democratic administrations. I am apolitical. 

Senator MCCASKILL. By the way, without getting into classified 

information, there are thousands of men and women who are workVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:28 Jan 03, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\33-940.TXT WILDA
24 

ing in the intelligence community right now, General Clapper. Correct? 

Director CLAPPER. Absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Would you say that their experience in 

many instances mirrors yours, in terms of military experience, 

many of them being either Active military or retired military? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. A large part of the intelligence community workforce are military, and of course, there are many former 

military, either those who completed full careers or those who 

served enlistments briefly and then came to the intelligence community as civilians. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Would you think it any less important that 

we maintain the intelligence community as a foundational, apolitical bloc of our country in terms of its protection? 

Director CLAPPER. I could not feel stronger about exactly that. I 

think it is hugely important that the intelligence community conduct itself and be seen as independent, providing unvarnished, untainted, objective, accurate, and timely and relevant intelligence 

support to all policymakers, commanders, diplomats, et cetera. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do, in fact, members of the intelligence community engage in life-threatening and very dangerous missions 

every day, particularly as it relates to the war on terror? 

Director CLAPPER. You only need to walk into the lobby of CIA 

and look at the stars on the wall or the front lobby of NSA, and 

the number of intelligence people that have paid the ultimate price 

in the service of their country. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let us talk about who benefits from a President-elect trashing the intelligence community. Who benefits from 

that, Director Clapper? The American people, them losing confidence in the intelligence community and the work of the intelligence community? Who actually is the benefactor of someone who 

is about to become commander-in-chief trashing the intelligence 

community? 

Director CLAPPER. I think there is an important distinction here 

between healthy skepticism, which policymakers, to include policymaker number one, should always have for intelligence, but I think 

there is a difference between skepticism and disparagement. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I assume the biggest benefactors of the 

American people having less confidence in the intelligence community are in fact the actors you have named today, Iran, North 

Korea, China, Russia, and ISIS. 

Director CLAPPER. The intelligence community is not perfect. We 

are an organization of human beings, and we are prone sometimes 

to make errors. I do not think the intelligence community gets the 

credit it is due for what it does day in and day out to keep this 

Nation safe and secure in the number of plots, just one example, 

terrorist plots that have been thwarted, both those focused on this 

country and other countries. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I want to thank the chairman and I want 

to thank Senator Graham and others. There have been others I can 

count on maybe a little bit more than one hand who have stood up 

in a nonpolitical way to defend the intelligence community over the 

last few weeks. The notion that the soon-elected leader of this 

country would put Julian Assange on a pedestal compared to the 

25 

men and women of the intelligence community and the military 

that is so deeply embedded in the intelligence community—I think 

it should bring about a hue and cry no matter whether you are a 

Republican or a Democrat. There should be howls. Mark my word. 

If the roles were reversed, there would be howls from the Republican side of the aisle. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you for that nonpartisan comment. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Director Clapper, how would you describe 

Mr. Assange? 

Director CLAPPER. How would I describe? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Assange. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, he is holed up in the Ecuadorian embassy in London because he is under indictment I believe by the 

Swedish Government for a sexual crime. He has, in the interests 

of ostensibly openness and transparency exposed in his prior exposures, put people at risk by his doing that. I do not think those of 

us in the intelligence community have a whole lot of respect for 

him. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Admiral? 

Admiral ROGERS. I would echo those comments. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Senator Fischer? 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and I do thank you 

for your service. 

Gentlemen, as you all know, about a year ago, Congress passed 

the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act. Director Clapper, could 

you comment on what steps have been taken to implement the act 

in particular to provide cyber threat information in the possession 

of the Federal Government to non-government entities? 

Director CLAPPER. There has been a lot of work done—and this 

is principally through both the FBI and Department of Homeland 

Security—to share more broadly with the private sector. Prior to 

the enactment of this act, I think this has been a theme that we 

have all worked hard. Certainly one of the reasons for the creation 

of the Office of Director of National Intelligence was to assume a 

domestic role as well and to promote sharing as much as we can. 

I think a lot of improvement has been made, as I look back over 

the last 15 years, but there is more work to do. 

We have done a lot of work with, for example, fusion centers, the 

76 or so fusion centers that exist throughout the country, to convey 

more information to them. I have a network of 12 domestic DNI 

[Director of National Intelligence] reps, Director of National Intelligence representatives, which are FBI special agents in charge. We 

work through them, those instrumentalities, on a regional basis to 

convey more information particularly on cyber threats to State and 

local officials, as well as the private sector. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral Rogers, what is your assessment of the current state of 

information sharing between the Government and the private sector, especially regarding cybersecurity threats? More importantly, 

26 

what is the appropriate level of expectation to have with respect to 

that information sharing? 

Admiral ROGERS. In some ways I would characterize it as uneven. Some sector relationships, as you heard General Clapper talk 

about, the 16 sectors within the critical infrastructure of our Nation—in some sectors, the relationship is very mature. Information 

tends to flow very regularly. Other sectors, it is not quite as mature. I think the positive side is, with the legislation, we have now 

developed a framework for how we do it. I still am concerned on 

the Government side. I will only speak for NSA and Cyber Command. On the Government side, I am not entirely comfortable that 

the products that I am generating are optimized to achieve outcomes for our private counterparts. I am always trying to remind 

our team our success needs to be defined by the customer, not what 

we think is the right format or the right things to share. 

Senator FISCHER. Do you think there is any additional legislation 

that is going to be required? I guess I am asking, what do you 

need? Do you think there are proper authorities that are currently 

in place, or do we need new legislation? Or do you guys just need 

to improve on your execution of it? 

Admiral ROGERS. Probably all of the above, to be very honest. 

I look at what are the changes that we are going to need collectively to create the workforce of the future. I work within the DOD 

in an intel framework. But I would argue this is kind of universal. 

It does not matter where you are working. Where does the structure—what is the recruitment and the benefit process that we need 

to retain and attract a workforce? 

I am curious with the new administration coming in their broad 

view of roles and responsibilities—are they comfortable with the 

current structure? Will their view be that we need to fundamentally relook at something different? I would be the first to acknowledge, as I previously said this morning, we have got to get faster. 

We have got to get faster. 

Senator FISCHER. You know, you have talked about case by case 

and the ad hoc nature of our policies when it comes to cyberspace 

before this committee many, many times, and that has been an 

issue that this committee and the ETC [Emerging Threats and Capabilities] Subcommittee in particular has tried to address by requiring strategies so that we can deter these hostile actors and delegations of authority, a definition of what an act of war in cyberspace is. You know, we can go on and on. The chairman just mentioned we do not have a strategy. Some of us just do not feel there 

is a strategy that is laid out there. 

When you talk about speed and dealing with cyber attacks, I assume you are just referring to our agencies in responding to attack 

that is directly upon us. Do you think there needs to be any kind 

of consensus-building on the international stage with our allies in 

order to increase speed, or would that delay it even more trying to 

run this through channels in trying to respond quickly? Do we 

reach out to allies, or do we perform our first duty in protecting 

this country? 

Admiral ROGERS. We routinely do that now. You clearly have 

highlighted it is a bit of a double-edged sword. But it goes to the 

point from my perspective, cyber just does not recognize many of 

27 

these boundaries. When you are trying to deal with an incident, is 

this something that is really truly totally domestic, or has it originated from somewhere external to our Nation? What kind of infrastructure did it pass through? There is a whole lot of complexity 

to this. I apologize. It is not a simple binary choice there, even as 

I acknowledge there are tradeoffs. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to join Senator McCaskill in expressing my appreciation 

for the service of our intelligence community and to you, Mr. Chairman, for your very strong and courageous statements in support of 

the work of this committee to give credit and credibility to that intelligence community and to your statements also about the importance of cyber warfare. It is not the first time we have been here 

on this topic, and you have been resolute and steadfast in seeking 

to elevate public awareness and public consciousness about the importance of cyber attacks on this country and the threat of cyber 

warfare. 

I want to explore a little bit why these very demeaning and 

dismissive comments about our intelligence community are so dangerous to our Nation. Is it not true, Mr. Clapper, that public support for robust responses to cyber attacks on our Nation depends 

on the credibility of our intelligence community and dismissing the 

conclusions, very credible and significant conclusions, about the 

Russian attack undermines public support for actions that the 

President must take to deter and punish these kinds of actions? 

Director CLAPPER. I do think that public trust and confidence in 

the intelligence community is crucial, both in this country and I 

think the dependence that other countries, other nations, have on 

the U.S. intelligence community. I have received many expressions 

of concern from foreign counterparts about the disparagement of 

the U.S. intelligence community or, I should say, what has been interpreted as disparagement of the intelligence community. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, there is no question about the disparagement. There is no question about the dismissing and demeaning of the intelligence community, entirely unmerited. Would 

you agree, in light of your saying that you are even more resolute 

now in your conclusion about Russian involvement in this hacking, 

that comparing it to the judgment made about weapons of mass destruction in the Iraq situation is totally a red herring, totally 

wrong? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, I agree with that. 

My fingerprints were on that national intelligence estimate. I 

was in the community then. That was 13 years ago. We have done 

many, many things to improve our processes, particularly with respect to national intelligence estimates, in order to prevent that 

from happening again. 

Whatever else you want to say about the intelligence community, 

it is a learning organization, and we do try to learn lessons. It is 

a very difficult business and getting harder all the time. There will 

be mistakes. But what we do try to do, as we did after the NIE 

[National Intelligence Estimate] from October 2002 on weapons of 

28 

mass destruction in Iraq, was to learn from that, profit, and make 

change. Our posture, particularly with respect to a very important 

document, the apex of our product line, national intelligence estimates, it is the difference of night and day. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I appreciate the extraordinary humility of 

that statement, especially in light of the excellence and expertise 

that your organization and you personally have brought to this 

very, very difficult endeavor to provide—and I am quoting you I 

think—unvarnished, untainted, timely, accurate information to the 

most critical national security decisions that this Nation makes. I 

want to express my appreciation for it and say that I think some 

of the disparagement has been a terrible disservice to our Nation 

and to the very brave and courageous men and women who put 

their lives at risk so that this Nation can be better informed in 

using our military and other force. I hope that we will see a 

change. 

I also join the chairman in saying that we need better policies 

on what constitutes a cyber attack on this Nation and provide a 

more robust response, for example, against the Russians not necessarily in cyber but to impose stronger sanctions on their oil exports, on their use of foreign exchange. The response to cyber attacks need not be one in the cyber domain and in fact might be 

even more effective if it hits their economy and their pocketbook 

and their livelihoods. 

Mr. Under Secretary, I appreciate your comments in that regard. 

I do not know whether you want to comment in response to what 

I have said. I am out of time. Maybe we can get that in writing. 

Director CLAPPER. Senator Blumenthal, I do want to thank you— 

on behalf all the women and men of the intelligence community, I 

want to thank you for that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton? 

Senator COTTON. Thank you all for appearing before us. 

Mr. Secretary, Director Clapper, since this is your final appearance, I know you hope, thank you very much for your many years 

of service, Director Clapper, particularly you. 

I will add my voice to Senators Blumenthal and McCaskill in my 

admiration for the men and women in our intelligence agencies. I 

have had a chance as a member of the Intelligence Committee to 

meet them here at hearings and at their headquarters around the 

world. They do not get the credit they often deserve. The troops 

that we help provide for in this committee usually do because they 

wear uniforms and they are known in public, but intelligence officers do not wear uniforms and they are frequently undercover. I 

want to express my admiration and deepest respect and gratitude 

for what they do. 

We have heard a lot of imprecise language here today—and it 

has been in the media as well—phrases like ‘‘hacked the election,’’ 

‘‘undermine democracy,’’ ‘‘intervened in election.’’ I want to be more 

precise here. Director Clapper, let us go to the October 7th statement. That says, quote, the recent compromises of emails from 

United States persons and institutions, including from United 

States political organizations, were instructed by the Russian Government. Are we talking there specifically about the hack of the 

29 

DNC [Democratic National Committee] and the hack of John 

Podesta’s emails? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. 

Senator COTTON. Are we talking about anything else? 

Director CLAPPER. That was essentially at the time what we 

were talking about. 

Senator COTTON. At the time then—it says that the recent disclosures through websites like DCLeaks and WikiLeaks are consistent 

with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. DNC 

emails were leaked first, I believe, in July. Is that what the statement is talking about there? 

Director CLAPPER. I believe so. 

Senator COTTON. Mr. Podesta’s emails I believe were not leaked 

until that very day on October 7th. Was the statement referring to 

that yet, or was that not intended to be included? 

Director CLAPPER. I would have to research the exact chronology 

of when John Podesta’s emails were compromised. But I think, 

though, that bears on my statement that our assessment now is 

that is even more resolute than it was with that statement on the 

7th of October. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

Admiral Rogers, in November at the Wall Street Journal Forum, 

you stated, quote, this was a conscious effort by a nation state to 

attempt to achieve a specific effect. End quote. By that, did you 

also refer to the hack of the DNC, the hack of John Podesta’s email 

and the leaks of those emails? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes. 

Senator COTTON. Did you refer to anything else besides those two 

things? 

Admiral ROGERS. To be honest, I do not remember the specifics 

of that one particular 30-minute engagement, but clearly what you 

outlined was part of my thought process. 

Senator COTTON. Okay. 

Then further on in that statement, Director Clapper, the intelligence community says, quote, it would be extremely difficult for 

someone, including a nation state actor, to alter actual ballot 

counts or election results by cyber attack or intrusion. End quote. 

You stated that earlier today as well, that we have no evidence 

that vote tallies were altered or manipulated in any way. 

Director CLAPPER. That is correct. 

Senator COTTON. That is what happened. Let us discuss why. 

Director Clapper, in response to Senator Nelson, you stated that 

the report soon to be released will discuss the motive. Would you 

care to give any kind of preview today? 

Director CLAPPER. I would rather not. 

Senator COTTON. I did not think so. 

Director CLAPPER. There is actually more than one motive. That 

will be described in the report. 

Senator COTTON. In your 53 years of intelligence, is ascertaining 

the motives, plans, and intentions of foreign leaders among the 

hardest tasks that we ask our intelligence services to perform? 

Director CLAPPER. It always has been. 

Senator COTTON. There is a widespread assumption—this has 

been expressed by Secretary Clinton herself since the election— 

30 

that Vladimir Putin favored Donald Trump in this election. Donald 

Trump has proposed to increase our defense budget to accelerate 

nuclear modernization and to accelerate ballistic missile defenses 

and to expand and accelerate oil and gas production which would 

obviously harm Russia’s economy. Hillary Clinton opposed or at 

least was not as enthusiastic about all those measures. 

Would each of those put the United States in a strong strategic 

position against Russia? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, certainly anything we do to enhance our 

military capabilities, absolutely. 

Senator COTTON. There is some contrary evidence, despite what 

the media speculates, that perhaps Donald Trump is not the best 

candidate for Russia. 

Okay. That is what happened. That is why it happened, or at 

least a preview that we are going to know why it happened. Let 

us move on to the impact. 

Director Clapper, you said to Senator McCain earlier, quote, the 

intelligence community cannot gauge the impact, end quote, on the 

election. Is that because that kind of electoral analysis is not a task 

that is within the traditional responsibility and skill sets of intelligence services? 

Director CLAPPER. That is correct. 

Senator COTTON. That is something that is more suited for someone Shawn Hannity or Michael Barone or Nate Silver, election analysts that have written extensively on the election. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, it certainly is not the purview of the 

U.S. intelligence community. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Heinrich? 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman. 

Since this will likely be the last hearing that some of you will 

attend in front of this committee, I just want to thank you all for 

your service and thank all the men and women who work for you. 

I want to say a special note of gratitude to Director Clapper for 50 

years of incredible service to this country. 

I think what makes America great has been our ability to elect 

leaders through a fair, through a peaceful and a transparent process without fear of rigging or interference in elections. Unfortunately, in this past election, we know that interference occurred. 

When I say ‘‘interference,’’ I want to be specific. It is not about 

someone physically stuffing ballot boxes or someone hacking our 

electronic voting machines to give one candidate more votes than 

the other. It is about selectively and deliberately releasing damaging information in hopes of furthering one’s strategic objectives, 

in this case, Russia’s strategic objectives. 

I believe this is going to happen again unless there is a price to 

be paid. This interference impacts the foundation of our democracy, 

our elections, which is why I welcomed the sanctions against Russia announced by the President and why I believe we need to be 

evaluating additional Russian sanctions. It is simply too important 

for both parties and for the future of our country. 

Secretary Lettre, given the need for deterrence in this atmosphere which, as you said, is not always achieved by a cyber reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:28 Jan 03, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\33-940.TXT WILDA
31 

sponse, how important are tools like sanctions to imposing the kind 

of clear costs that you articulated? 

Mr. LETTRE. Sanctions are a very useful tool in that toolkit. I 

think in the case of the current situation that we find ourselves in, 

it would be prudent to continue to look at other options to impose 

more sanctions on Russian actors as the facts continue to develop. 

Senator HEINRICH. I would agree with that estimate and I hope 

that folks on both sides of the aisle will be looking at those additional tools. 

For any of you who want to answer this, I would like to know 

how has the President-elect’s at least inferred dismissive attitude 

towards the intelligence community broadly impacted morale in 

your agencies? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I have not done a climate survey, but I 

hardly think it helps it. 

Senator HEINRICH. Does anyone want to add to that? 

Admiral ROGERS. I do not want to lose good, motivated people 

who want to help serve this Nation because they feel they are not 

generating value to help that Nation. I am the first to acknowledge 

there is room for a wide range of opinions of the results we generate. We do not question that for one minute, and every intelligence professional knows that. I have had plenty of times in my 

career when I have presented my intelligence analysis to commanders and policymakers, and they have just looked at me and 

said, hey, Mike, thanks but that is not the way I see it or you are 

going to have to sell me on this. That does not bother any of us. 

What we do I think is relevant, and we realize that what we do 

is in no small part driven in part by the confidence of our leaders 

in what we do. Without that confidence, I just do not want a situation where our workforce decides to walk because I think that really is not a good place for us to be. 

Senator HEINRICH. I think many of us could not agree more. If 

the underlying facts that the intelligence community brings us are 

incorrect, we should call that out. I just have not seen any evidence 

indicating that in this case. Oftentimes we come to different strategic or policy points of view based on that information, but that 

is an entirely different thing. 

Director Clapper, I want to go to a little bit more of not just the 

classified information, but the relevance of publicly available information of the whole picture of Russia’s activities within the context 

of this election. Can you talk a little bit about the activities of the 

Russian Government’s English language propaganda outlets, RT 

[Russian International Television], Sputnik, as well as the fake 

news activity we saw, as well as the social media and how those 

paint a complete picture that is supplemental to what we saw with 

the hacking in this case? 

Director CLAPPER. I appreciate your raising that because while 

there has been a lot of focus on the hacking, this was actually part 

of a multi-faceted campaign that the Russians mounted. And, of 

course, RT, which is heavily supported, funded by the Russian Government, was very, very active in promoting a particular point of 

view, disparaging our system, our alleged hypocrisy about human 

rights, et cetera, et cetera. Whatever crack, fissure they could find 

in our tapestry, if you will, they would exploit it. All of these other 

32 

modes, whether it was RT, use of social media, fake news—they exercised all of those capabilities in addition to the hacking. And, of 

course, the totality of that I think, regardless of what the impact 

was which we cannot gauge, just the totality of that effort not only 

as DNI but as a citizen I think is of grave concern. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. I also want to thank you and 

the men and women that work diligently in the intelligence community for the work that they do for the United States of America. 

Admiral Rogers, you have stated twice now—you have really 

stressed this point—that you must be faster and more agile in your 

responses. Our discussion this morning will go back to a discussion 

that we had in September of this last year in front of this body because I believe it is important that you understand the capabilities 

that exist out there and are readily available to the United States 

Cyber Command. 

This past September, I asked you about a Government Accountability Office report that stated the Department of Defense does 

not have visibility of all National Guard units’ cyber capabilities 

because the Department has not maintained a database that identifies the National Guard units’ cyber-related emergency response 

capabilities, as required by law. 

I was a bit alarmed when you stated that you have not seen the 

report. It was a report that took about a year to compile and was 

presented to both this committee and the House Armed Services 

Committee. Four months later, I still have not received an answer 

from you, my questions for the record. All of this morning, all of 

the GAO [Government Accountability Office] recommendations are 

still open from this report. 

It has been 4 months and I would just like an update on that, 

if you have been able to read the report and where is the Department at in regards to tracking National Guard cyber capabilities? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, ma’am. First, we did not get your question 

until December, but I acknowledge that you have formally asked 

us this. 

First, as U.S. Cyber Command, I am the operational commander. 

Manning, training, and equipping is a function of services and the 

Department. For me in my role, I track the operational readiness 

levels of all National Guard and Reserve units that are allocated 

to the mission force. I bore into them in the exact same way I do 

the active side. 

In terms of more broadly, how is the Department tracking the set 

of skills that are available both in the Reserve component, I would 

argue it is the same challenges that are in the Active component. 

How do you take advantage of the breadth of capability that is 

broader than just a particular military occupational specialty, for 

example? I am the first to acknowledge, after talking to my teammates at OSD and the services, I do not think we have a good answer for you. I will have something in writing for you within the 

next week or so because I do acknowledge that we need to do that. 

33 

Senator ERNST. I do appreciate that because how long has the 

United States been experiencing attacks from entities outside of 

the United States. 

Admiral ROGERS. You could argue we have been in this cyber dynamic for over a decade. It has gotten worse. 

Senator ERNST. A decade. We have taken the steps of developing 

Cyber Command and the capabilities that exist both in our Reserves, National Guard, and the Active component units. To become faster and more agile, we need to know what those capabilities are. If you have a solution to that on how we can track those 

capabilities, we need to figure that out. Many of these units have 

the capability of defending networks and yet we are not utilizing 

those capabilities. We do not know where they exist, to be honest. 

Admiral ROGERS. Please do not take from my comment that we 

do not believe that the role of the Guard and Reserve is not important. If you look in the last 12 months, we have got two cyber protection teams from the Guard that have been mobilized. We have 

brought online in the Guard and the Reserve national mission 

teams for the first time within the last year. I mean, it is great to 

see how the Guard and Reserve are developing more and more capability. That is a real strength for us. 

Senator ERNST. Absolutely, and I think we will continue to see 

those develop even more in the future, but we need to be able to 

utilize those capabilities that exist out there. 

You know that many of our best soldiers in the National Guard 

and Reserve come from the private sector. I know this from some 

of my own guardsmen that work full-time in computer technology 

and cyber technology. You stated in September, you were trying to 

figure out how better to leverage the National Guard. Do you have 

a response for that? Have you thought of ways that we might be 

able to use those Guard units more readily? 

Admiral ROGERS. This is a topic that in fact I just was talking 

to General Lengyel, the Director of the Guard Bureau, a few weeks 

ago to say, hey, look, this is something in 2017 I want us to sit 

down. I think there is a couple of specific mission areas where the 

capabilities of the Guard and Reserve are really well optimized because I would be the first to admit the answer cannot be every time 

we will just throw the Active component at this. I do not think that 

is an optimal approach for us to do in business. 

You will see this play out for us in 2017. We got to work through 

the title 32 versus title 10 issue, what role, what is the right way 

to do this. 

Senator ERNST. Absolutely. 

Admiral ROGERS. Do we put it within the defense support to civil 

authority construct? I would like that because it is a framework 

that we already have. I am a big fan of let us not reinvent the 

wheel when it comes to cyber, how do we take advantage of processes and the structures and authorities that are already in place. 

That is one thing you will see some specific changes on within the 

Department. We are working through that right now on the policy 

side. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. Well, I appreciate it. I know my time 

is expiring. I look forward to working with you on that, Admiral 

Rogers. 

34 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for all your efforts today, for the amazing careers you have had. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I think it is 

critically important to our Nation. I want to be clear that the purpose of today’s hearing is not to debate the validity of the election, 

but to discuss foreign attempts to use cyber attacks to attack our 

country, including the recent Russian actions intended to influence 

our elections. I appreciate the bipartisan effort to get our people 

the answers they deserve. 

I am grateful for the amazing efforts that our intelligence agencies put forth every single day, that every day lives are on the line 

to make sure that we are safe and to make sure that all Americans 

have a chance to take care of their families and go to sleep at night 

and not have to worry while your people are on the front lines all 

around the world. I can tell you on behalf all Hoosiers that when 

it comes down to a choice between your people, our intelligence 

agencies, and Julian Assange, we are on your team every time. I 

actually find it stunning that there is even a discussion in our 

country about the credibility of our intelligence agencies versus Mr. 

Assange. It is astounding to me that we would even make that 

comparison when you see the stars in the CIA headquarters of all 

the people who have lost their lives and all who have lost their 

lives in our agencies to keep us safe. 

Director Clapper, how would you describe your confidence in attributing these attacks to the Russian Government as opposed to 

someone in their basement? 

Director CLAPPER. It is very high. 

Senator DONNELLY. The Government has named those responsible for the DNC hacks as APT–28 and APT–29, part of the Russian intelligence services, the GRU and the FSB [Federal Security 

Service]. Are all these actors targeted by these two entities known 

to the public, sir? 

Director CLAPPER. I am sorry, sir. The question again? Were all 

what? 

Senator DONNELLY. All the actors targeted by these two entities, 

the GRU, the FSB, APT–28, 29—do we know everybody? Have you 

told us who is involved, or are there more that you cannot discuss 

at this time? 

Director CLAPPER. Right. I do not think I can discuss that in this 

forum. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. 

How far up the chain, in what you can tell us, does this go in 

regards to the Russians? At what level were the instructions to 

take these actions given? 

Director CLAPPER. Again, sir, I cannot speak to that in this setting. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you. 

Do you think we are communicating clearly to our adversaries in 

a language that they will understand that the costs will outweigh 

any gains they get if they try this again? Not only you, Director, 

but the others, and how do we best send that message, do you 

think? 

35 

Director CLAPPER. Well, certainly the sanctions that have been 

imposed, the expulsion of the 35 intelligence operatives, the closure 

of the two facilities which were used for intelligence purposes, and 

the other sanctions that were levied, I think does convey a message. It is open to debate whether more should be done. I am a big 

fan of sanctions against the Russians, but that is just me. 

Senator DONNELLY. Admiral, what would you say, sir? 

Admiral ROGERS. I would agree. I mean, the challenge here is, 

look, I do not think it is in the best interest of any of our nations 

to be in this confrontational approach to doing business, and we 

have got to figure out how do we articulate what is acceptable, 

what is no acceptable in a way that enables us to move forward in 

a productive relationship. That is not unique to the Russians. I 

would argue that that is a challenge for us with a whole host of 

actors out there. This has just, in some ways, been the poster child 

for this challenge of late. 

Director CLAPPER. I would add to that, if I may, that it certainly 

would be a good thing if we could find areas where our interests 

converge. I am speaking of ours and the Russians. We have done 

that in the past. Just to foot stomp Admiral Rogers’ point. But I 

think there is a threshold of behavior that is just unacceptable, and 

somehow that has to be conveyed. 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, I am out of time, but on behalf of all 

the American people, we want to thank you. You have dedicated 

your lives to keeping us safe, and we are incredibly grateful for it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you and 

the ranking member for holding this hearing. 

I also want to thank you, General Clapper, Mr. Secretary, for 

your service, as this might be your last hearing, and the men and 

women you lead. 

You described in your testimony the increasing attacks we are 

seeing not just from Russia but China and other actors, Iran, North 

Korea, their increasing capabilities. The chairman’s opening statement pretty much stated that it is his view—and I certainly share 

the view—that we are being hit repeatedly because the benefits 

outweigh the costs for those who are taking these actions against 

us. Do you agree with that? 

Director CLAPPER. I do and I think we all do. For adversaries 

like—I will just name—North Korea and Iran, it is relatively lowcost acts that can cause havoc. What I think we have seen over 

time is that they keep pushing the envelope because as their capabilities improve and they are willing to exercise those capabilities. 

Senator SULLIVAN. If that is the case—I was glad that I think 

there is some consensus here. You are talking about retaliating, 

upping the costs with all instruments of power, Mr. Secretary, you 

mentioned at the time of our choosing, in the realm of our choosing. But it does not seem to be happening. It does not seem to be 

happening because the attacks continue. 

Let me just give an example. Let us say Iran conducted—and you 

mentioned that they are being more aggressive more risky than 

North Korea—some kind of cyber attack. If we did something 

maybe without announcing it, like the President announced the 

36 

Russian counteraction, but let us say we did not announce it and 

let us say we did something where we essentially collapsed their 

financial system or something pretty dramatic. We let them know 

we did it, but we do not have to publicize it. Do you think that is 

the kind of action that would say, hey, do not do this or we are 

going to come back and retaliate at our time, our choosing, and 

crush you? How come we have not done that yet, and do you think 

if we did something like that with the Iranians or the North Koreans, would that deter them in the future, Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. LETTRE. Senator, I think you are getting right at the question of what do we mean by a proportional response in some instances. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Or asymmetric. You are talking about asymmetric responses, which I fully agree with. 

Mr. LETTRE. That is right. Or in instances that are significantly 

serious and grave, whether a more than a proportional response is 

required to really set that deterrence framework in place. 

Senator SULLIVAN. But is the key question not right now—it 

came from the chairman’s opening statement, which I think you 

agreed with—is that nobody seems to be intimidated by us right 

now. 

Let me give another example. Senator Inhofe asked a question 

early on about China. China hacked allegedly—maybe you can confirm that—government-led—22 million files, a lot of the SF–86 files 

that you use for background clearances. They have mine I was informed by the Government. Very sensitive information, as you 

know, that they could use against intelligence operatives and military members. Senator Inhofe asked the question, what did we do? 

The answer that I heard from all of you was, well, we try to protect 

people like me and, I am sure, others whose sensitive intel information and background information was compromised. But I did 

not hear any claim of a retaliation on a huge hack—huge. 22 million American Federal, military, intel workers got hacked by the 

Chinese. 

The President signed this statement with President Xi Jinping, 

the United States-China Security Agreement, but obviously, General Clapper, from your testimony the Chinese have not abided by 

that. Have they? 

Director CLAPPER. They have. 

Senator SULLIVAN. I am sorry. I thought you said in your testimony today that they continue to conduct cyber attacks. 

Director CLAPPER. They continue to conduct cyber espionage. 

They have curtailed—as best we can tell, there has been a reduction, and I think the private sector would agree with this. There 

has been some reduction in their cyber activity. The agreement 

simply called for stopping such exfiltration for commercial gain. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me just ask a final question. Did we retaliate and up the costs against China after an enormous cyber attack against our Nation? 

Director CLAPPER. We did not retaliate against an act of espionage any more than other countries necessarily have retaliated 

against us for when we conduct espionage. 

Senator SULLIVAN. But is that answer not part of the problem 

that we are showing that we are not going to make it costly for 

37 

them to come in and steal the files of 22 million Americans, including many intel officers? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, as I say, people who live in glass houses 

need to think about throwing rocks because this was an act of espionage. We and other nations conduct similar acts of espionage. If 

we are going to punish each other for acts of espionage, that is a 

different policy issue. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your opening statements are always erudite and thoughtful, but I thought today’s was 

particularly so. You touched on all the important points that have 

really formed the basis for this hearing. I want to thank you for 

that. 

Director Clapper, I think it is important to put some context 

around some of these discussions. One of the most important things 

to me is that your public statement in October, along with Jeh 

Johnson, was prior to the election, and you were simply telling 

facts that you had observed. In my experience of reading intelligence community communications, it is one of the more unequivocal that I have seen. You have stated here you have high confidence in those conclusions that the Russians were behind it, that 

it was intended to interfere with our elections, and that approval 

went to the highest levels of the Russian Government. Have you 

learned anything subsequently that you can tell us here today to 

contradict those findings that you publicly stated last October? 

Director CLAPPER. No. In fact, if anything, what we have since 

learned just reinforces that statement of the 7th of October. 

Senator KING. There was no political intention. You were simply 

reporting facts as you saw them. I presume that is correct. Your 

history is one of being nonpolitical. 

Director CLAPPER. Absolutely. I felt particularly strongly, as did 

Secretary Johnson, that we owed it to the American electorate to 

let them know what we knew. 

Senator KING. Now, people in Maine are skeptical and they want 

to have evidence and proof. I am hearing from people, prove it. The 

problem, as I understand it, is the desire to provide evidence that 

is convincing that your conclusions are correct versus the danger 

of compromising national security on sources and methods. Can 

you sort of articulate that? Because I think that is an important 

point. 

Director CLAPPER. We have invested billions, and we put people’s 

lives at risk to glean such information. If we were to fulsomely expose it in such a way that would be completely persuasive to everyone, then we can just kiss that off because we will lose it, and then 

that will endanger our—imperil our ability to provide such intelligence in the future. That is the dilemma that we have in intelligence. We want to be as forthcoming and transparent as possible, 

but we feel very, very strongly, as we do in this case, about protecting very fragile and sensitive sources and methods. 

Senator KING. Let us again turn to a question of context. What 

we saw in this country this fall and going back actually almost a 

year was an example of a Russian strategy that has been playing 

out in Europe for some time that includes not just hacking, as you 

said, but disinformation, propaganda. 

38 

I heard just from a senior commander—I took a break here from 

the hearing—in Europe that Russia is actually buying commercial 

TV stations in western Europe at this point. This is a comprehensive strategy that we have seen playing out in eastern Europe, and 

also there was a report this morning that they are funding one of 

the candidates for the presidency of France in the election this 

May. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, the Russians have a long history of 

interfering in elections, theirs and other people’s. There is a long 

history in this country of disinformation. This goes back to the 

1960s, you know, the heyday of the Cold War—funding that they 

would share or provide to candidates they supported, the use of 

disinformation. But I do not think that we have ever encountered 

a more aggressive or direct campaign to interfere in our election 

process than we have seen in this case. 

Senator KING. There are so many more channels of 

disinformation today than there were in the past. 

One final point. 

Director CLAPPER. That is exactly right, and that is a very key 

point about the—of course, the cyber dimension and social media 

and all these other modes of communication that did not exist in 

the Cold War. 

Senator KING. One final point. We had a meeting with the committee with a group of representatives from the Baltic States, and 

I know the chairman was just in the Baltic States. They are just 

deluged with this. I mean, they have been warning us about this 

for years, about the messing around with elections. I said, so what 

do you do? How do you defend yourself? They said, well, we are trying to defend ourselves in various ways, but the best defense is for 

our public to know what is going on so they can take it with a 

grain of salt. I thought that was a very interesting observation because their people now say, oh, yeah, that is just the Russians. 

That is why I think public hearings like this and the public discussion of this issue is so important because we are not going to 

be able to prevent this altogether. But we need to have our people 

understand when they are being manipulated. Would you agree 

with that conclusion? 

Director CLAPPER. Absolutely. That is why I felt so strongly 

about the statement in October. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Just to follow up, General Clapper. During 

the Cold War we had a strategy and we had Radio Free Europe. 

We had Voice of America. Senator Graham, who will be speaking 

next, will attest that in our recent trip they do not have a strategy. 

They do not have a counter-propaganda—the United States of 

America I am talking about. We have got to develop that strategy 

even if it encompasses the Internet and social media. But they are 

doing pretty significant stuff particularly in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. Would you agree, Senator Graham? 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. I appreciate being before the committee. 

Thank you. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, I would. 

39 

Would you agree with me that Radio Free Europe is outdated? 

Director CLAPPER. I am frankly not up on—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, it says ‘‘radio,’’ and a lot of people do not 

listen to the radio like they used to. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, actually radio is a very popular mode in 

many parts of the world. 

Senator GRAHAM. Radio is big in your world? 

Director CLAPPER. In my world? 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. 

Director CLAPPER. Not so much. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. I do not listen to the radio much either. 

The bottom line is you are going to be challenged tomorrow by 

the President-elect. Are you okay with being challenged? 

Director CLAPPER. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you both welcome it? 

Director CLAPPER. We do. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think it is appropriate? 

Director CLAPPER. We do. 

Senator GRAHAM. Are you ready for the task? 

Director CLAPPER. I think so. 

Senator GRAHAM. Good. 

Is there a difference between espionage and interfering in an 

election? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. Espionage implies, to me at least, a passive collection, and this was much more activist. 

Senator GRAHAM. When it comes to espionage, we better be careful about throwing rocks. When it comes to interfering in our election, we better be ready to throw rocks. Do you agree with that? 

Director CLAPPER. That is a good metaphor. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think what Obama did was throw a pebble. 

I am ready to throw a rock. 

Would I be justified as a United States Senator taking your information about Russia’s involvement in our election and what they 

are doing throughout the world and be more aggressive than President Obama if I chose to? 

Director CLAPPER. That is your choice, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think he was justified in imposing new 

sanctions based on what Russia did? 

Director CLAPPER. I do. 

Senator GRAHAM. To those of you who want to throw rocks, you 

are going to get a chance here soon, and if we do not throw rocks, 

we are going to make a huge mistake. 

Admiral Rogers, is this going to stop until we make the cost 

higher? 

Admiral ROGERS. We have got to change the dynamic here because we are on the wrong end of the cost equation. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. You got that right. 

Could it be Republicans’ next election? 

Admiral ROGERS. This is not about parties per se. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. It is not like we are so much better at cybersecurity than Democrats. 

Admiral ROGERS. Right. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, I do not know what Putin was up to, but 

I do not remember anything about Trump in the election. 

40 

Now, if Trump goes after the Iranians, which I hope he will, are 

they capable of doing this? 

Admiral ROGERS. They clearly have a range of cyber capability 

and they have been willing to go offensively. We have seen in the 

United States in the one dam. 

Senator GRAHAM. If Trump takes on China, which I hope he will, 

are they capable of doing this? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. We got a chance as a Nation to lay down a 

marker for all would-be adversaries. Do you agree with that? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, and I would be the first to acknowledge 

we need to think about this broadly. 

Senator GRAHAM. We should take that opportunity before it is 

too late. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that the foundation of 

democracy is political parties, and when one political party is compromised, all of us are compromised? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. All right. 

Now, as to what to do, you say you think this was approved at 

the highest level of government in Russia, generally speaking. Is 

that right? 

Director CLAPPER. That is what we said. 

Senator GRAHAM. Who is the highest level of government? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, the highest is President Putin. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think a lot happens in Russia big that 

he does not know about? 

Director CLAPPER. Not very many. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. I do not think so. 

Director CLAPPER. Certainly none that are politically sensitive in 

another country. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Now, as we go forward and try to deter this behavior, we are 

going to need your support now and in the future. I want to let the 

President-elect know that it is okay to challenge the intel. You are 

absolutely right to want to do so. But what I do not want you to 

do is undermine those who are serving our Nation in this arena 

until you are absolutely sure they need to be undermined. I think 

they need to be uplifted, not undermined. 

North Korea. Let me give you an example of real world stuff that 

he is going to have to deal with Trump. Do you believe that North 

Korea is trying to develop an ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] to hit the United States or that could be used to hit the 

United States? 

Director CLAPPER. That could be, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, Admiral Rogers? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. When the North Korean leader says that they 

are close to getting an ICBM, he is probably in the realm of truth? 

Admiral ROGERS. He is certainly working aggressively to do that. 

Senator GRAHAM. If the President of the United States says it 

will not happen, he is going to have to come to you all to figure 

41 

out how far along they are because you would be his source for how 

far along they are. Is that right? 

Director CLAPPER. I hope we would be the source. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. I hope he would talk to you too. Here is 

what I hope he realizes, that if he has to take action against North 

Korea, which he may have to do, I intend to support him, but he 

needs to explain to the American people why. One of the explanations he will give is based on what I was told by the people who 

are in the fight. Let me tell you this. You do not wear uniforms, 

but you are in the fight. We are in a fight for our lives. 

I just got back from the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia. If you 

think it is bad here, you ought to go there. 

Ladies and gentlemen, it is time now not to throw pebbles but 

to throw rocks. I wish we were not here. If it were up to me, we 

would all live in peace, but Putin is up to no good and he better 

be stopped. Mr. President-elect, when you listen to these people, 

you can be skeptical but understand they are the best among us 

and they are trying to protect us. 

Thank you all. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Would you have any response to that diatribe? 

[Laughter.] 

Director CLAPPER. Senator Graham and I have had our innings 

before, but I find myself in complete agreement with what he just 

said and I appreciate it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Director CLAPPER. Chairman McCain, if I might just pick up on 

a comment of yours and that has to do with the information fight, 

if you will. This is strictly personal opinion, not company policy. 

But I do think that we could do with having a USIA [United States 

Information Agency] on steroids, United States Information Agency, to fight this information war a lot more aggressively than I 

think we are doing right now. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You know, I agree, General, and I think one 

of the areas where we are lacking and lagging more than any other 

area is social media. We know these young people in the Baltics 

are the same as young people here. They get their information off 

the Internet, and we have really lagged behind there. 

Senator Gillibrand? 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking 

Member, for hosting this very important hearing. 

I want to follow on some of the questioning that Senator Ernst 

started concerning the National Guard and cyber. I have been 

pushing DOD to use the Guard for years and appreciate that this 

is beginning to happen. Members of the Guard bring unique skills 

and capabilities, and we should be leveraging them. 

Admiral Rogers, I look forward to working with you on how best 

to do this. Can you tell me whether there has been movement on 

the Army National Guard cyber protection teams being included in 

the cyber mission forces? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes. We brought two online that have been activated in the last year, two additional that are coming online in 

2017, the first of which just came online. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. How much more is left to be done? 

42 

Admiral ROGERS. The Guard and Reserve are bringing on an additional 21 teams. Those will not be directly affiliated with the mission force. But one of the things I think we are going to find over 

time, the only way to generate more capacity in a resource-constrained world is to view this as an entire pie, not just, well, here 

is one sliced off area, the mission force, and here is a separate area, 

the Guard and Reserve. I think what we are going to be driven to 

is we are going to have to look at this as much more integrated 

whole. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I do too because at the end of the day, our 

Guard and Reserve—they have day jobs and they may be working 

at Google and Microsoft and Facebook and all these technology 

companies and have extraordinary skills. As a way to tap into the 

best of the best, I think we should look at people who already have 

these skills who are already committed to serving our Nation as 

best we can. I appreciate your work. 

Admiral ROGERS. If I could, one area that I would be interested 

in your help in—for many employers in the Guard and Reserve— 

and I say this as the son of guardsman when I was a kid growing 

up—they often—sometimes—tend to view that service as something that you do overseas. Hey, I am willing to let you go because 

you are going to Afghanistan, you are going to Iraq. In the world 

of cyber, we are operating globally from a garrison, pick the location—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. From any location in the world. 

Admiral ROGERS. Anywhere. 

This just came up. General Lengyel and I were just talking about 

this yesterday, as a matter of fact. I said one of the things we need 

to do is educate employers about what is the nature of this dynamic, and it is every bit as relevant as we are sending somebody 

to Afghanistan or Iraq. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I think that is right. 

On a separate topic but related, I have long been advocating for 

aggressive development of the manpower that we need to support 

our cybersecurity mission. In particular, I continue to believe that 

we have to not only develop the capability in our military and the 

interest in cyber among young Americans, but that the military 

must be creative when thinking about recruitment and retention of 

cyber warriors. 

How would you assess our current recruitment and retention of 

cyber warriors? What challenges do you foresee in the future, and 

what recommendations do you have to address them? Because, obviously, we are competing with some of the most dynamic, innovative companies in the world, but we need them to be our cyber defense and our cyber warriors. 

Admiral ROGERS. Knock on wood. In the military aspect, we are 

exceeding both our recruiting and retention expectations. I worry 

about how long can we sustain that over time in the current model. 

My immediate concern is a little less on the uniform side in part 

because if money was a primary driver for them, they would not 

have come to us in the first place. 

On the civilian side, however, that is probably my more immediate concern. I am finding it more challenging. We are able to recruit well. Retaining them over time—I am really running into this 

43 

on the NSA side right now. How do you retain high-end, very exquisite civilian talent for extended periods of time? 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Well, I would be delighted to work with you 

over the next year on that. 

Director Clapper, I was very interested in your opening remarks 

and the initial conversation you were having about the Russian 

hack onto the DNC and to various personnels’ emails and the question of whether it was a declaration of war. Given that that is such 

a serious statement, I want to ask you, do you think we should 

take things like the Democratic or Republican Party infrastructure 

and consider them to be critical infrastructure? Should we actually 

be looking at our infrastructure differently because of this recent 

event? 

Director CLAPPER. That has been a subject of discussion about 

whether, you know, our political infrastructure should be considered critical infrastructure. I know Secretary Johnson has had a 

discussion with State officials about that, and there is some 

pushback on doing that. It is a policy call. Whatever additional protections that such a declaration would afford, I think that would 

be a good thing. But whether or not we should do that is really not 

a call for the intelligence community to make. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Well, I hope it is one that the members 

here on this committee will discuss because if it does result in such 

a grave intrusion, maybe it should be critical infrastructure. Certainly politics and political parties are not set up that way, and so 

it would be quite a significant change. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Director Clapper has to leave in about 20 

minutes. We will enforce the time. 

Senator Tillis? 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Gentlemen, thank you all for your service. I for one have high 

confidence in the community that you represent, and I hope that 

they recognize that I speak for most of the Senators here that 

share the same view. 

Director Clapper, I am going to spend most my time probably reflecting on some of the comments that you have made. The glass 

house comment is something I think is very important. 

There has been research done by a professor up at Carnegie-Mellon that has estimated that the United States has been involved in 

one way or another in 81 different elections since World War II. 

That does not include coups or regime changes. Tangible evidence 

where we have tried to effect an outcome to our purpose. Russia 

has done it some 36 times. In fact, when Russia apparently was 

trying to influence our election, we had the Israelis accusing us of 

trying to influence their election. I am not here to talk about that, 

but I am here to say that we live in a big glass house and there 

are a lot of rocks to throw. I think that is consistent with what you 

said on other matters. 

I want to get back to the purpose of the meeting, the foreign 

cyber threats. I think, Admiral Rogers and Director Clapper, you 

all have this very difficult thing to communicate to policy people 

who many not have subject-matter expertise in this space. For example, Director Clapper, you were saying that one of the problems 

44 

with the counterattack—I think it was you. It could have been Admiral Rogers—is that you may have to use an asset that is actually 

a presence on some other nation where that nation may or may not 

know that we have a presence there. In fact, we have presences 

across cyberspace that are not known that as a part of a counterattack, the counterattack could be nothing more than exposing our 

presences because we know a lot of our adversaries may or may not 

be aware of presences that we have out there in appropriate locations. Is that correct? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, and I think you have succinctly illustrated the complexities that you run into here. 

Senator TILLIS. That is why as thrilling as somebody who has 

written the precursors to phishing code before and stolen passwords as a part of ethical hack testings—I was paid to do this. 

That underscores the need for us to really be educated about the 

nature of this battle space and how more often than not, it is probably more prudent to seek a response that is not a cyber response 

given the fluid nature. 

We are in an environment now where we see a threat and we 

build a weapon system. It is on the water. It is on the air. It is 

on the ground. Then we kind of counter that threat and we come 

up with war plans to use that capability. 

In cyberspace, major weapon systems get created in 24-hour cycles. You have no earthly idea whether or not you have a defensive 

capability against them. If you all of a sudden think let us go declare war in cyberspace, be careful what you ask for because collectively there are 30 nations right now that have some level of cyber 

capability. There are four or five of them that are near peer to the 

United States. There are two or three that I think are very threatening and in some cases probably have superior capabilities to us 

in terms of presences, maybe not as sophisticated but potentially 

in a cyber context more lethal. 

I think there are a lot of questions. One of the beauties of being 

a freshman—I guess now I am not a freshman—being at the end 

of the dais, all the good questions have been asked. But one of the 

things that I would suggest that we do is we as members really get 

educated on the nature of this threat and the manner in which we 

go about fighting it and understanding that the iterative nature of 

weapons creations on the Internet are unlike anything we have 

seen in record human history for warfare, and we need to understand that. 

We also need to understand what the rules of engagement are 

going to be and how future AUMFs actually include a specific 

treatment for behaviors that are considered acts of war and then 

a whole litany of things that we should do for appropriate responses so that we can begin to make more tangible the consequences of inappropriate behavior in cyberspace. 

That is not so much a diatribe, but it probably is a speech, Mr. 

Chair. 

The last thing I will leave you with is, Admiral Rogers, I would 

like for my office to get with you and continue to talk about how 

we get these bright people, retained and recruited, to stay up to 

speed with developing these threats. We need to understand that 

they are secret to creating these weapon systems to counter the 

45 

malicious acts like Russia, China, Iran, and a number of other nations are trying to develop against us. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono? 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

I think it is clear that we have tremendous concerns about the 

Russian hacking in our elections, and I think it is more than ironic 

that we have a President-elect who kept talking about our elections 

being rigged, which I would consider trying to interfere with our 

elections to be a part of a rigged kind of an election. At the same 

time, he denied Russia’s activities in this regard. 

Some of this was already touched on regarding the Presidentelect’s attitudes toward the intelligence community, the impact on 

morale. Going forward, as we are challenged by the need to have 

more cyber-aware or skilled cyber workforce, if this attitude toward 

the intelligence community does not change on the part of decisionmakers, including the President, would you agree that it would 

make it that much harder, Director Clapper and Admiral Rogers, 

to attract the kind of cyber-experienced workforce that we need to 

protect our country? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, it could. I do not know that we could say 

some of these statements have had any impact on recruiting. It 

could. 

Senator HIRONO. Or retention. 

Director CLAPPER. I think it could. 

On retention, I think just maybe to embellish what Admiral Rogers was saying, I do think that consideration needs to be given to 

having more flexibility and more latitude on compensation for our 

high-end cyber specialists who are lured away by industry that are 

paying huge salaries. That is not why you are in the Government, 

not why you serve in the intelligence community, not obviously for 

money. But I do think in those highly technical, high-end skill sets 

that we badly need in the Government in the intelligence community, that it would be helpful to have more latitude on compensation. 

Admiral ROGERS. I would agree, Senator. 

Senator HIRONO. Very briefly. 

Admiral ROGERS. Both of these individuals know within the last 

24 hours, which I said using my authority as the Director of NSA, 

I am going to authorize the following increased compensations for 

the high-end cyber part of our workforce because I am just watching the loss. 

Senator HIRONO. Yes, of course. It is not just compensation that 

attracts people to what we are doing in our intelligence community 

because service to the country is a very important motivation. And, 

of course, I would think that morale would be very much attendant 

to that. 

There was some discussion about what would constitute, in the 

cyber arena, an act of war. Director Clapper, I note in your testimony that I think this is one of the reasons that we want to develop international norms in this arena. Who should be the key 

players in developing agreeing to these international norms in the 

cyber arena? If the big players are United States, China, Russia, 

46 

if we do not have those players at the table to come up with these 

international norms, how realistic is it to develop and—— 

Director CLAPPER. Well, that is exactly the challenge. Those are 

the key nation states that we would need to engage. There has 

been work done under the auspices of the United Nations to attempt to come up with cyber norms, but I think we are a ways 

away from those having impact. 

Senator HIRONO. Would you agree, Admiral Rogers? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator HIRONO. Turning to the awareness of the public as to the 

extent of the threat, a 2016 opinion piece by two members of the 

9/11 Commission—basically they said that the most important 

thing government and leaders in the private sector can do is to 

clearly explain how severe this threat is and what the stakes are 

for the country. 

Director Clapper, do you think that the general public understands the severity of the cyber threat and the stakes for the country? What should Americans keep in mind with regard to this 

threat? What can ordinary Americans do to contend with this 

threat? 

Director CLAPPER. I think there is always room for more education, and certainly we have a role to play in the intelligence community in sharing as much information as we can on threats posed 

by both nation states, as well as non-nation states. 

I think there are simple things that Americans can do to protect 

themselves. You know, be aware of the threat posed by spear 

phishing, for example, which is a very common tactic that is used 

yet today. We have a challenge in the Government getting our people to respond appropriately to cyber threats. This is one case 

where communicate, communicate, communicate is the watchword. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cruz? 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Thank you for your service 

to our Nation. 

The topic of this hearing, cybersecurity, cyber attack, is a growing threat to this country and one that I think will only become 

greater in the years ahead. We have seen in recent years serious 

attacks from, among others, Russia, China, North Korea. Indeed, 

it is with some irony—I spent a number of years in the private sector, and to the best of my knowledge never had my information 

hacked. Then all I had 

to do was get elected to the United States Senate and the Office 

of Personnel Management was promptly hacked and everyone on 

this bench had our information stolen by a foreign assault. 

My question, Admiral Rogers, starting with you is what do you 

see as the greatest cybersecurity threats facing our country, and 

what specifically should we be doing about it to protect ourselves? 

Admiral ROGERS. A small question. 

When I look at the challenges and the threats, it is, in no particular order, significant extraction of information and insight that 

is generating economic advantage for others, that is eroding operational advantage at times for us as a Nation. That is, as you have 

seen in this Russian piece, where not just the extraction but then 

the use of this information adds a whole other dimension. What 

47 

concerns me beyond all that is what happens as we start to move 

in an environment in which not only is information being—I have 

heard some people use the phrase ‘‘weaponized.’’ What happens 

when now we see people suddenly manipulating our networks so 

we cannot believe the data that we are looking at. That would be 

a real fundamental game-changer to me, and to me it is only a 

question of the ‘‘when’’ not the ‘‘if’’ this is going to happen. What 

happens when the non-state actor decides that cyber offers an 

asymmetric advantage to them? Because their sense of risk and 

their willingness to destroy the status quo is significantly different 

and greater than your typical nation state. Those are the kinds of 

long-term things. 

As we talked about more broadly today, we have got to get better 

on the defensive side because part of deterrence is making it harder for them to succeed. I acknowledge that. But a defensive strategy alone is not going to work. It is a resource-intensive approach 

to doing business, and it puts us on the wrong end of the cost equation. That is a losing strategy for us, but it is a component of a 

strategy. We have got to ask ourselves how do we change this 

broader dynamic. To go the point you have heard repeatedly today, 

how do we convince nations and other actors out there that there 

is a price to pay for this behavior, that in fact it is not in your best 

interest. 

Senator CRUZ. What should that price be? 

Admiral ROGERS. It is a wide range of things. There is no one 

silver bullet, which is another point I would make. If we are looking for the perfect solution, there is not one. This will be a variety 

of incremental solutions and efforts that are going to play out over 

time. There is no one single approach here. 

Senator CRUZ. Well, and your point about manipulating data, 

about a month ago I chaired in a different committee a hearing on 

artificial intelligence and our economy’s growing reliance on artificial intelligence. One of the things that the witnesses testified 

there was concern on the cybersecurity side of a hack that would 

modify the big data that is being relied on for artificial intelligence 

to change the decision-making in a way nobody is even aware it 

has been changed. I think that is a threat I hope that you all are 

examining closely, and it is the sort of threat that could have significant repercussions without anyone even being aware it is happening. 

Let me shift to a different topic. Director Clapper, you have testified before this committee that Cuba is an intelligence threat on 

par with Iran and listed below only Russia and China. There are 

reports that Lourdes, the Russian-operated signal intelligence base 

in Cuba, will be reopened. Additionally, this past summer Russia 

and Nicaragua struck a deal to increase military and intelligence 

cooperation, resulting in an influx of Russian tanks into Managua 

and an agreement to build an electronic intelligence base, which 

may be disguised as a satellite navigation tracking station. 

To the best of your knowledge, what is Russia’s strategy in the 

western hemisphere, and how concerned are you about the Russians expanding their influence in Cuba and Nicaragua? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, the Russians are bent on establishing 

both a presence in the western hemisphere and they are looking for 

48 

opportunities to expand military cooperation, sell equipment, airbases, as well as intelligence gathering facilities. It is just another 

extension of their aggressiveness in pursuing these interests. 

With respect to Cuba, Cuba has always had long-standing, very 

capable intelligence capabilities, and I do not see a reduction of 

those capabilities. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thanks to the witnesses for today and for your service. 

Mr. Chair, I appreciate you calling this hearing. I think this 

hearing is a test of this body, the Article 1 branch of Congress, this 

hearing and others to follow. 

I was chairman of the Democratic National Committee for a couple years, and we had a file cabinet in the basement that had a 

plaque over it. It was a file cabinet that was rifled by burglars in 

an invasion of the Democratic National Committee in 1972. It was 

a bungled effort to take some files and plant some listening devices. 

That small event led to one of the most searching and momentous congressional inquiries in the history of this country. It was 

not partisan. One of the leaders of the congressional investigation 

was a great Virginian called Will Butler, who was my father-inlaw’s law partner in Roanoke, Virginia before he went to Congress, 

played a major role. It was not an investigation driven because 

something affected the election. The 1972 presidential election was 

the most one-sided in the modern era. But it was a high moment 

for Congress because Congress in a bipartisan way stood for the 

principle that you could not undertake efforts to influence an 

American presidential election and have there be no consequence. 

The item that we will discuss and we will discuss more when the 

hearing comes out is different. That was a burglary of a party 

headquarters that was directed to some degree from the Office of 

the President. But this is very serious. The combined intelligence 

of this country has concluded that efforts were undertaken to influence an election by an adversary, an adversary that General Joe 

Dunford, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in testimony before this hearing, was in his view the principal adversary of the 

United States at this point. 

In addition, the attack was not just on a party headquarters. The 

October 7 letter that you have referred to talked about attacks on 

individuals, current and former public officials with significant positions, and also attacks on State boards of elections. The letter of 

October 7 traced those attacks to Russian entities, Russian companies, and did not ascribe, at least in that letter, to that directed by 

the Russian Government, but I am curious about what the full report will show. 

It is my hope that this Congress is willing to stand in a bipartisan way for the integrity of the American electoral process and 

will show the same backbone and determination to get all the facts 

and get them on the table, as the Congress did in 1974. 

There was another congressional inquiry that was directed after 

the attacks on 9/11, and there was a powerful phrase in that report 

that I just want to read. The commission concluded, quote, the 

most important failure was one of imagination. We do not believe 

49 

leaders understood the gravity of the threat. That is something I 

think we will have to grapple with. Did we have sufficient warning 

signs? I think we did. Having had sufficient warning signs, why did 

we not take it more seriously? That question is every bit as important as a question about what a foreign government, an adversary, 

did and how we can stop it from happening. 

Three quick points. 

One, is the report next week that is going to be issued not solely 

going to be confined to issues of hacking but also get into the dimension of this dissemination of fake news? Will that be one of the 

subject matters covered? 

Director CLAPPER. Without preempting the report, we will describe the full range of activities that the Russians undertook. 

Senator KAINE. I think that is incredibly important. 

I had a little role in this election. I was along for he ride for 105 

days and was the subject of a couple of fake news stories. It was 

interesting. There were at least three that the mainstream media 

did not cover because they were so incredible that like why would 

they. But I looked at one of the stories that had been shared 

800,000 times. When I see an administration who has put in place 

as the proposed national security advisor someone who traffics in 

these fake news stories and retweets them and shares them, who 

betrays a sense of either gullibility or malice that would kind of 

be—these are stories that most fourth graders would find incredible. That a national security advisor would find them believable 

enough to share them causes me great concern. 

Second, go back to Joe Dunford. He talked about Russia as a potential adversary because they have capacity and they have intent. 

With respect to our cyber, I think we have capacity, but I think 

what we have shown is we have not yet developed an intent about 

how, when, why, whether we are going to use the capacity we have. 

If we are going to shore up our cyber defense, in one word do you 

think what we really need to shore up is our capacity, or do we 

need to shore up our intent? 

Director CLAPPER. As we look at foreign adversaries, that is always the issue is capability and intent. Certainly in the case of the 

Russians, they do pose an existential threat to the United States. 

I agree with Chairman Dunford on that. It is probably not our 

place, at least my place, in the intelligence community to do an assessment of our intent. That is someone else’s place. It is not mine. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed, 

for holding this hearing. 

Thank you all very much for testifying this morning and for your 

service to the country. 

Dr. Robert Kagan testified before this committee last December 

with respect to Russia. At that time, there was less information 

known to the public about what had happened in their interference 

in the elections. 

But one of the things he pointed out was that Russia is looking 

at interference in elections, whether that be cyber or otherwise, the 

whole messaging piece that you discussed with Senator Heinrich, 

as another strategy along with their military action and economic 

and other diplomatic methods to undermine Western values, our 

50 

Euro-Atlantic alliance, and he very democracies that make up that 

alliance. Is that something that you agree with, Director Clapper? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. That is clearly a theme. It is certainly 

something that the Russians are pushing in messaging in Europe. 

They would very much like to drive wedges between us and Western Europe, the alliances there, and between and among the countries in Europe. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I assume that there is agreement on the 

panel. Does anybody disagree with that? 

One of the things that I think has emerged, as I have listened 

to this discussion, is that we do not have a strategy to respond to 

that kind of an effort. We do not have a strategy, it has been testified, with respect to cyber, but a broader strategy around messaging around how to respond to that kind of activity. Do you agree 

with that? 

Director CLAPPER. I am speaking personally. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Sure. 

Director CLAPPER. This is not an institutional response. As I 

commented earlier to Senator McCain, I do think we need a U.S. 

Information Agency on steroids that deals with the totality of the 

information realm and to mount in all forums and to include the 

social media. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I am sorry to interrupt, but can I just ask why 

do you believe that has not happened. Director Clapper, Admiral 

Rogers? 

Director CLAPPER. For my part, I do not know why it has not. 

I cannot answer that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Admiral Rogers? 

Admiral ROGERS. From my perspective, in part because I do not 

think we have come yet to a full recognition of the idea that we 

are going to have to try to do something fundamentally different. 

I think we still continue to try to do some of the same traditional 

things we have done and expecting to do the same thing over and 

over again, yet achieve a different result. 

Senator SHAHEEN. No. That is the definition of ‘‘crazy.’’ I think 

we have determined that. 

Secretary Lettre? 

Mr. LETTRE. I would just add that in this area, the capability and 

intent framework is useful to think about. I think it is only in the 

last few years that we have seen adversaries with true intent to 

use propaganda and the ability to reach out as terrorists are doing 

and try to incite and match that up with the tremendous power 

that social media tools allow to make that easy and simple and effective and broadly applicable. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Given that this is a strategy and given that 

it is aimed not just at the United States particularly with respect 

to interference in our elections but at Western Europe and Eastern 

Europe for that matter, is there an effort underway to work with 

our allies through NATO or otherwise? I have been to the cybersecurity center in Estonia, but there did not seem to be a NATO 

agreement that this was something that we should be working on 

together to respond to. Is this an effort that is underway? 

Mr. LETTRE. Just speaking from my lens on things, there is a lot 

of interest in doing that and doing it more effectively and more 

51 

comprehensively, but we have not cracked the code on doing it effectively yet. We need to keep the pressure on ourselves and our 

NATO allies who are likeminded in this regard to keep improving 

our approach. 

Admiral ROGERS. It has also got to be much broader than just 

cyber. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Director Clapper, my time is almost up, but before you go since 

this is the last opportunity we will have to hear from you, can I 

just ask you, do you think the DNI needs reform? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, there is always room for improvement. 

I would never say that this is the ultimate. I do think it would be 

useful, though, if we are going to reform or change the DNI or 

change CIA, that some attention be given to, in our case, the legislative underpinnings that established the DNI in the first place 

and then have added additional functions and responsibilities over 

the years, that the Congress has added, to our kit bag of duties. 

But to say that there is not room for improvement, I would never 

suggest that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I appreciate that. I certainly agree with you. 

I think that if there is going to be this kind of major reform, hopefully both legislators and others who have been engaged in the intelligence community will be part of that effort. 

Director CLAPPER. I certainly agree the Congress, no pun intended, gets a vote here I think. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I know that our time has expired, and I 

apologize to our new members that you will not have time because 

you have to go. But maybe, Director Clapper, since this may be, 

hopefully, your last appearance, do you have any reflections that 

you would like to provide us with, particularly the role of Congress 

or the lack of the role of Congress in your years of experience? 

Director CLAPPER. I am going to have to be careful here. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I do not think you have to be. 

[Laughter.] 

Director CLAPPER. I was around in the intelligence community 

when the oversight committees were first established and have 

watched them and experienced them ever since. Congress does 

have clearly an extremely important role to play when it comes to 

oversight of intelligence activities, and unlike many other endeavors of the Government, much of what we do, virtually all of what 

we do is done in secrecy. The Congress has a very important, a crucial responsibility on behalf of the American people for overseeing 

what we do particularly in terms of legality and protection of facilities and privacy. 

At risk of delving into a sensitive area, though, I do think there 

is a difference between oversight and micromanagement. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, we thank you. We thank the witnesses. 

This has been very helpful. Director Clapper, we will be calling you 

again. 

Director CLAPPER. Really? 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. This meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

52 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

CYBER DETERRENCE

1. Senator INHOFE. Director Clapper, is it possible to deter adversaries from attacking America in an environment where the strategic capability and weapon system is available to anyone with broadband internet access? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

2. Senator INHOFE. Director Clapper, do you believe that sanctions like the ones 

levied against Russia in response to its election-related cyber activities are the proper tool to discourage future such behavior? What other tools would you recommend? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

3. Senator INHOFE. Director Clapper, do you believe that Obama Administration’s 

response to Russia’s recent activities represents a blueprint for effectively dealing 

with state-orchestrated malicious cyber activity? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

CHINA

4. Senator INHOFE. Director Clapper, do you believe China is abiding by its commitment not to support cyber enabled theft of intellectual property including trade 

secrets or other confidential business information for commercial advantage? Are 

they still conducting cyberattacks on the United States? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

TELECOM COMPANIES WITH TIES TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

5. Senator INHOFE. Director Clapper, in 2012, the House Intelligence Committee 

determined that China-based telecommunications companies Huawei and ZTE posed 

potential dangers to national security due to their entanglements with the Chinese 

Government. The same year, Australia denied a $41-billion national broadband contract to Huawei over similar concerns. However, Huawei is again trying to making 

inroads in Australia, and is working in the state of Victoria on data analysis and 

key utility systems. Do you believe significant involvement by our close allies with 

companies like Huawei poses a significant threat? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID PERDUE

THREATS TO U.S. INFRASTRUCTURE AND HOW TO RESPOND

6. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, you have stated several times that other nation states, such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, have the power to cripple 

our critical infrastructure. Could these actors take down the U.S. power grid with 

their current capabilities today? 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

7. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, do such actors have the power to take down 

our banking and/or transportation infrastructure grids today? 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

8. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, if a state actor, or state-sponsored actor, 

were to take down any of our critical infrastructure (specifically, one of the 17 infrastructure subsecors designated as ‘‘critical infrastructure subsectors’’ by the Department of Homeland Security), would you consider this an act of war? 

Admiral ROGERS. I defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as the determination of what constitutes an ‘‘act of war’’ is a policy and legal decision. U.S. 

Cyber Command could respond to a Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) 

request if the request is routed through the Department of Homeland Security to 

the Secretary of Defense, and subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense. 

9. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, how would you recommend the U.S. respond 

to such an attack? 

53 

Admiral ROGERS. As commander of U.S. Cyber Command, I would present our 

Nation’s leaders with suitable options for the employment of cyberspace capabilities 

in response to the incident, and to deter or prevent further hostile acts. However, 

it is important to recognize that a cyber attack does not necessarily require a cyber 

response. Cyber is only one element of national power our leaders can consider 

when developing a U.S. Government response to any type of attack on our Nation. 

10. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, what are we prepared to do in response to 

such an attack? 

Admiral ROGERS. Cyberspace response options, which vary by adversary and must 

be addressed on a case-by-case basis, should include whole-of-government considerations/response, and are subject to policy considerations. It is important to recognize 

that a cyber attack does not necessarily require a cyber response. Cyber is only one 

element of national power our leaders can consider when developing a U.S. Government response to any type of attack on our nation. U.S. Cyber Command’s efforts 

to develop a rapidly maturing Cyber Mission Force (including those in the National 

Guard), coupled with strong relationships with intelligence organizations, foreign 

partners, allies, industry, academia, and joint partners, provide a resilient foundation from which we are developing cyberspace options to defend our networks, deter 

adversaries, and help defend the nation. U.S. Cyber Command is actively developing 

additional capabilities and capacities, aligned against our adversaries, so that when 

called upon by our nation’s leaders, we are ready to support with full-spectrum 

cyberspace options. 

DEFINITION OF CYBER ‘‘ACT OF WAR’’ AND INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS

11. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper and Admiral Rogers, you raised in your 

joint testimony that the key problem in dealing with cyber issues with our adversaries is that there is not an international consensus over key concpets regarding 

what constitutes an act of aggression or use of force in cyberspace and what international laws should govern this debate. What efforts are being undertaken to advance a sense of consensus on how we define cyberattacks on the world stage? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

12. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper and Admiral Rogers, how can we better define the rules of the road for cyber internationally so we can appropriately defend 

our NATO allies when necessary, and so that any actions that we deem as appropriate countermeasures don’t get blown out of proportion and elicit unforeseen consequences? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

13. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper, you said in your February 2016 threat assessment that you would continue to monitor compliance with China’s September 

2015 commitment to refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled 

theft of intellectual property for providing a completive advantage. Could you provide us with an update on China’s compliance with the September 2015 agreement? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

14. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper, does China continue to sponsor hacking 

and cyber espionage for commercial gain? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

‘‘DUAL HAT’’ ISSUE

15. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, in the president’s signing statement of the 

2017 NDAA, President Obama expressed his displeasure with the new limitations 

preventing the premature separation of Cyber Command and NSA. Is it still your 

professional military advice that maintaining the ‘‘dual hat’’ is in our best national 

security interest? 

Admiral ROGERS. My professional military advice is that separation is the right 

step in the future, but it will take dedicated effort and resources to ensure the longterm success of both organizations following separation. Therefore, upon elevation 

of U.S. Cyber Command, the Commander, USCYBERCOM, should provide the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a vision and plan for 

potential future separation. This vision and plan would define the required resources and associated time table for separation. 

54 

16. Senator PERDUE. Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, the President’s statement suggests that the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence are taking steps to begin the separation. Have you been asked 

to take any irreversible steps that may undermine the law the President signed a 

few weeks ago prohibiting the separation until a number of specific conditions have 

been met? 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. No. 

17. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, how would you advise the next administration to consider the ‘‘dual hat’’ issue? 

Admiral ROGERS. I would advise the administration that elevation and the dualhat issue are separate and distinct. My professional military advice is that separation is the right step in the future, but it will take dedicated effort and resources 

to ensure the long-term success of both organizations following separation. Additionally, I recommend the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to a combatant command 

occur now. Upon the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command, the Commander, U.S Cyber 

Command, should provide the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff a vision and plan for potential future separation. This vision and 

plan would define the required resources and associated time table for separation. 

ISIS—DISRUPT V. DESTROY

18. Senator PERDUE. Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, according to Secretary 

Carter, we are ‘‘using cyber tools to disrupt ISIS’s ability to operate and communicate over the virtual battlefield.’’ Why are we only trying to ‘‘disrupt’’ ISIS’s ability 

to operate and communicate in cyberspace? Shouldn’t we aspire to destroy ISIS’s 

ability to leverage cyberspace to its advantage? 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

19. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, to what extent are overly restrictive limitations or the lack of clear policy guidance from the Obama Administration impeding 

your ability to utilize cyber on the battlefield? 

Admiral ROGERS. Cyber has been successfully used on the battlefield in support 

of and in executing primary military objectives; we are getting better at delivering 

cyber effects to support our National objectives every day. That said, it is a complex 

domain that requires a better coordinated whole-of-government approach and allocation of commensurate resources so that the speed at which cyber effects can be delivered meet the timing and tempo required on the battlefield. Currently, outside 

of existing authorities granted under the Countering Adversary Use of the Internet 

(CAUI) EXORD, operations that will create a cyber effect must be approved by the 

President (PPD–20). 

20. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, how could the military better use the cyber 

tools at our disposal to target ISIL’s ability to operate and communicate over the 

virtual battlefield? 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

CYBER AS A PART OF RUSSIAN HYBRID ATTACKS AND HOW TO BETTER AID EUROPEAN

ALLIES

21. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper and Secretary Lettre, we’re seeing an intensification of so-called hybrid warfare by Russia not only in the United States, but 

also against targets in Eastern Europe, such as the use of a combination of 

cyberattacks, propaganda, and little green men to destabilize and otherwise subvert 

Ukraine. Given the fact that many of these actions can’t be immediately confirmed 

as attributed to Russia, what’s the appropriate response of nation-states to these 

types of actions? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

22. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper and Secretary Lettre, how do you think 

Russia might further use cyber warfare going forward to destabilize Ukraine or the 

Baltics, especially as a part of a broader hybrid warfare effort? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

55 

23. Senator PERDUE. Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, what are we doing to 

assist states who may be vulnerable to future Russian cyberattacks to help them 

build up their capabilities? 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

24. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, how 

concerned should we be in the United States about the Russian capacity and capability in cyberspace? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

25. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper and Secretary Lettre, are we prepared and 

postured to counter this threat? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

CYBER POLICY DEFICIENCIES

26. Senator PERDUE. Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, some have expressed 

concern that the dysfunction of the White House policy process has greatly restricted the Department of Defense’s ability to provide capabilities that could address urgent warfighter needs. From a warfighting standpoint, would you characterize the authorities delegated to you as being expansive or limited? 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

27. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, how does the delegation of authority for 

Cyber Command compare to the authorities you are delegated as NSA director in 

emergency situations? 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

28. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, how has the uncertainty hampered your 

ability to meet the needs of the geographic combatant commands? 

Admiral ROGERS. Uncertainty in the emerging cyberspace domain is a challenge; 

however, close interagency coordination, information sharing, and planning has delivered positive mission outcomes in support of combatant commander objectives 

around the globe. As we do so, our greatest challenge is our combatant commanders 

want more and more as we bring forces online. I believe that is a testament to what 

our men and women bring to the fight. What I hear from my fellow operational commanders is ‘‘could you do even more and could you do it faster’’? 

IRANIAN CYBER THREATS

29. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, it 

now appears that Iran has ramped up its use of cyberattacks (including on U.S. financial institutions) as well as cyber reconnaissance efforts on diplomats and critical infrastructure. Do you believe that the Iranian regime has control over the majority of cyber operations that emanate from Iran? Are most cyberattacks coming 

from Iran state-directed? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

30. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, 

could you discuss Iran’s cyber capabilities and how they impact our national security? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

NORTH KOREA CYBER THREATS

31. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, last 

year, South Korean officials uncovered a North Korean plot for a massive 

cyberattack where North Korea hacked into more than 140,000 computers at 160 

South Korean firms and government agencies. Have you found proof of any similar 

56 

threats or attacks on United States companies and government agencies from North 

Korea? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

32. Senator PERDUE. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, what 

could be done to deter North Korean cyberattacks against the United States? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

ADEQUATE CYBER FORCE

33. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, the Services are largely on track to meet 

the September 2018 goal for the training of a 6,200-person cyber force. However, 

the same cannot be said concerning the development and procurement of basic tools 

and capabilities required for both defensive and offensive cyber operations. Unless 

the services begin to prioritize the development of these capabilities, we could be 

heading down the path to a hollow cyber force. Do you agree that we are currently 

on the path of creating a hollow cyber force? 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

34. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, are you aware that some services failed to 

fund even the most basic tools like those necessary for the cyber protection teams 

to assess and triage compromised networks? 

Admiral ROGERS. No. Each of the Services has funded its Deployable Mission Support System (DMSS) solution to support the Cyber Protection Teams. I signed the 

DMSS System Requirements Document (SRD) on August 16, 2016. The Services 

participated in the year-long drafting of the DMSS SRD and either had or were in 

the development of their material solution for the DMSS during SRD development. 

All have procured and provided—to some level—their DMSS. U.S. Cyber Command 

has funded and is in the process of conducting a formal assessment of each Service 

DMSS solution to ensure the CPTs have the minimum capability to execute their 

mission. Additionally, U.S. Cyber Command is drafting a TASKORD to each of the 

Service Cyber Components directing specific software solutions to ensure standardization to meet basic CPT requirements. 

35. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, are the services committed to requesting the 

resources needed to make our cyber forces effective? If not, what do we need to do 

to ensure that we are resourcing appropriately? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes. From our perspective, each Service recognizes the needs of 

our cyber forces and is committed to force readiness. Each has brought capabilities 

to the fight for both offensive and defensive purposes. That said, because each Service uses a unique model for recruiting, organizing, manning, training, and equipping 

the Cyber Mission Force, we have disparate models that do not facilitate a uniform 

or holistic approach to force management across the DOD cyber enterprise. 

Additionally, the Services continue to support most U.S. Cyber Command requests 

for joint capability development (manpower, tools, and infrastructure) through appropriate DOD processes. 

36. Senator PERDUE. Admiral Rogers, do you have the hiring authorities needed 

to compete for talent with the private sector and retain them once trained? 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TED CRUZ

IRAN-NORTH KOREA COOPERATION

37. Senator CRUZ. Director Clapper, thank you for the response to the October 

19th, 2016 letter I sent you expressing concern over the possible nuclear cooperation 

between Iran and North Korea. To follow up on your response, it would be helpful 

if you could provide input to the below questions in an unclassified format. 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

38. Senator CRUZ. Director Clapper, does the Intelligence Community need any 

additional tools or policies to track Iranian and North Korean illicit activity? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

57 

39. Senator CRUZ. Director Clapper, does the Intelligence Community assess that 

there has been a change in the level of their collaboration following Implementation 

Day of the JCPOA? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

40. Senator CRUZ. Director Clapper, does the Intelligence Community assess that 

China has increased their economic ties to North Korea, freeing the latter from 

some of the effects of sanctions? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

CHINA

41. Senator CRUZ. Admiral Rogers, I am concerned about the increased global 

reach of Chinese telecom companies that have established infrastructure in Iran, 

North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and now Cuba. United States intelligence agencies have 

linked these nominally private entities to China’s military and internal Pentagon reports found that Chinese-manufactured electronics had been loaded with malware. 

It is my understanding the NSA, along with the FBI, has begun a formal review 

to assess the national security implications of a potential U.S. partnership with such 

a company. Can you confirm this? 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

42. Senator CRUZ. Admiral Rogers, what is your assessment of the national security risk that would result from United States firms entering joint enterprises with 

such Chinese telecom companies? 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

43. Senator CRUZ. Director Clapper, when China’s compliance with the September 

2015 cyber agreement came up in last week’s hearing, you testified that China continues ‘‘to conduct cyber-espionage. They have curtailed, as best we can tell. There 

has been a reduction and I think the private sector would agree with this. There 

has been some reduction in their cyber activity. The agreement simply called for 

stopping such exfiltration for commercial gain.’’ However, this reduction does not remove concern that China still seeks to appropriate United States intellectual property via cyber intrusions. According to a 2016 Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council report, cyberattacks from Chinese hackers have continued and 

outpaced other nation-state actors in consistency, volume, and severity. Moreover, 

private firm Crowdstrike found that China continued cyberattacks on United States 

technology and pharmaceutical firms—suggesting a motivation to appropriate U.S. 

intellectual property. Despite the Intelligence Community’s assessed curtailment of 

cyber-espionage by China, do you share the report’s opinion that China remains the 

most active nation-state with respect to cyberattacks against American business enterprises? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

44. Senator CRUZ. Director Clapper, what level of confidence does the Intelligence 

Community provide their assessment that the September 2015 agreement successfully curtailed Chinese hacking and by how much has it been curtailed? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

45. Senator CRUZ. Director Clapper, does the Intelligence Community believe that 

the People’s Republic of China has taken action against any independent cyber 

attackers within China? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

NORTH KOREA

46. Senator CRUZ. Director Clapper, North Korea demonstrated its cyber capabilities in the 2014 hack on Sony Pictures. In reviewing the statutory criteria of international terrorism—‘violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that . . . [that] appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population’’, it is my estimation 

that the Sony hack clearly rose to the level of coercion. In threatening Sony executives, North Korea effectively committed cyber terrorism against the United States. 

In your professional opinion, is the Sony hack justification for re-designating North 

Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

58 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

NORTH KOREA

47. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, 

a recent report by the South Korean Defense Agency for Technology and Quality 

claims that North Korea possesses the capability to take down PACOM’s network 

and inflict damage upon the United States power grid. What is your assessment of 

this report and North Korea’s progress in development of its cyber capabilities and 

do you believe that they have the capacity to disrupt PACOM or the United States 

power system? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

CYBERCOM

48. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Rogers, what is the timeline for elevating 

CYBERCOM to a fully operational combatant command? 

Admiral ROGERS. I have recommended to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that Elevation of U.S. Cyber Command can occur immediately upon the decision of the President. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN

U.S. TOOLS FOR CYBER RESPONSE AND STRATEGIC CALCULUS

49. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, in 

public remarks at a conference on November 15, 2016, Admiral Rogers described 

Russian-directed hacking to interfere with our election as ‘‘a conscious effort by a 

nation state to attempt to achieve a specific effect.’’ The Intelligence Community’s 

January 6, 2017 declassified report, ‘‘Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in 

Recent United States Elections,’’ [hereinafter Intelligence Community Assessment, 

or ICA] concluded with ‘‘high confidence’’ that ‘‘Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the United States presidential 

election[,]’’ that ‘‘Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the United States 

democratic process,’’ and that the Russian Government’s ‘‘influence campaign [ . . . 

] blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by 

Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and 

paid social media users or ‘trolls.’ ’’ We have a diverse array of tools in our toolbox 

for responding to a state-sponsored cyber-attack. The Administration exercised some 

of these options on December 29, 2016—expelling spies and sanctioning certain individuals and groups. When we respond to cyberattacks with our own cyber-based 

countermeasures, what kind of response do you generally believe is more effective: 

‘‘loud’’ offensive actions that plainly demonstrate the strength of our capabilities to 

the enemy, or covert actions that might be incorrectly attributed or otherwise misinterpreted but might have a greater effect over a longer time? Please explain. 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

QUALIFICATION OF A CYBER-ATTACK AND PROTECTION OF DATA INTEGRITY

50. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, during the Committee’s hearing, Director Clapper suggested a distinction between a 

cyber-attack and an act of cyber-espionage. Appearing before the House Intelligence 

Committee on September 10, 2015, Director Clapper said the July 2015 data breach 

of the Office of Personnel Management [hereinafter OPM] ‘‘really wasn’t [an attack] 

since it was entirely passive and didn’t result in [ . . . ] destruction of data or manipulation of data. It was simply stolen.’’ If OPM employee information—or voter registration rosters in the recent election—had been manipulated or corrupted in any 

way, would this have constituted a cyber-attack, and what would be the threshold 

of intent or harm to constitute a cyber-attack? Please explain and cite any applicable legal authority or policy. 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. Whether a particular cyber activity rises to the level of an 

armed attack or a use of force under international law, or otherwise constitutes an 

unlawful intervention, is determined on a case-by-case basis by our Nation’s leaders. 

59 

I defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense response submitted below for what 

the threshold of intent or harm is for an action to constitute a cyber attack. 

Yes. Generally, what constitutes a cyber attack is any malicious cyber activity 

that disrupts, denies, degrades, manipulates, or destroys computers, computer networks, the data stored on them, or the virtual or physical services and infrastructure that they support. 

However, in this scenario, after a determination is made that malicious cyber activity constituted a’’cyber attack’’ on the United States, there are a number of other 

factors that must be determined including attribution, the severity and impact of 

what is being done with the exfiltrated employee information, degree of information 

manipulation or corruption, and intent. Each malicious cyber activity will then be 

examined on a case-by-case basis and against a variety of the aforementioned factors to determine the most appropriate response. (whether the cyber activity constitutes an ‘‘armed attack’’ under the law of armed conflict is a slightly different 

question, but would similarly require a case-by-case determination in light of the 

scale and effects) 

51. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, the 

potential for data manipulation is a serious concern—both for defense and civilian 

networks. The witnesses have previously alluded to this point in public statements. 

For example, in public remarks at a conference on November 19, 2015, Admiral Rogers shared concerns about data manipulation stating ‘‘what happens if what I’m 

looking at does not reflect reality [ . . . and] leads me to make decisions that exacerbate the problem I’m trying to deal with.’’ Our daily lives rely on confidence in the 

integrity of the data that is used to keep our nation safe and our economy operating. 

In addition to active cyber defense measures, such as firewalls, and offensive deterrence measures, do we routinely create and monitor redundancies for all critical 

data infrastructure such that, in the event of a breach and manipulation, we are 

able to positively detect and correct any distorted data? Please explain. 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

NORMS OF BEHAVIOR IN COUNTERING MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY

52. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, 

would both state-sponsored and non-state actor-sponsored malicious cyber-attacks 

on the United States constitute acts of war? Please explain and cite any applicable 

authority. 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

53. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper and Admiral Rogers, during the Committee’s hearing, USDI Lettre made a passing reference to ‘‘what do we mean by a proportional response.’’ When the United States decides to execute countermeasures in 

response to malicious cyber activity that we can confidently attribute to a particular 

state, what are the primary considerations associated with a proportional response—the malicious nature of the cyber-attack, the unique vulnerabilities of our 

adversary, or other factors? Please explain and cite any applicable authority. 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

54. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, 

what are the factors that determine whether malicious cyber activity—state-sponsored or committed by a non-state actor—against the United States requires a response? Please explain and cite any applicable authority. 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

55. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, how 

do you determine when and whether it is appropriate for the United States Government to publicly attribute malicious cyber activity directed against the United 

States? Please explain and cite any applicable authority. 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

60 

56. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, how 

do you determine when and whether it is appropriate for the United States Government to declassify information related to a malicious cyber activity directed against 

the United States? Please explain and cite any applicable authority. 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. I concur with the response from Office of Secretary of Defense 

and defer this question to the Director of National Intelligence who is responsible 

for coordinating declassification determinations in accordance with Executive Order 

13526. 

MANAGING ESCALATION IN COUNTERING MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY

57. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, how 

do we respond to a state-sponsored malicious cyber-attack while maintaining escalation dominance—in other words, the ability of the United States to limit the risk 

of unintended and prolonged escalation and end a cyber-based conflict on our terms? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. The decision of how our Nation responds to a state-sponsored 

malicious cyberattack is one made by our Nation’s leaders. They have all instruments of national power on the table, including other military capabilities and a 

whole-of-government approach as well. 

As a matter of long-standing policy, we don’t define how we would respond to an 

adversary in any domain. My duty is to provide the Secretary and President with 

credible options in cyberspace that, along with options in other domains, offer our 

leadership multiple courses of action to control escalation. From my perspective, 

that is best done with policies and authorities that enable our cyber mission forces 

to conduct their missions when directed. 

ENHANCING CYBER SECURITY IN OUR DEMOCRACY

58. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, the 

United States has a highly-digitized, interconnected economy that is more vulnerable to cyber intrusions because the Government does not exercise authoritarian 

control over the Internet. How do we fortify our own critical cyber-infrastructure 

against attacks while maintaining the openness and transparency of our networks? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

59. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, private businesses and other companies are increasingly the targets of state-sponsored 

cyber-attacks, and protecting the information held by these companies and their 

customers is important to our citizens’ privacy, our economic security, and our national security. Cybersecurity presents many challenges, including the potential friction between information sharing among government agencies and private companies to pre-empt cyber threats, and the desire to secure communications and devices 

through encryption. Given the greater vulnerability of our open and interconnected 

networks, are you concerned that the sharing of cyber threat data among the Government and the private sector could make our country more vulnerable to theft and 

other malicious cyber activity—in addition to endangering the privacy of our citizens’ data? Please explain, including relevant concerns under both voluntary and 

mandatory sharing scenarios. 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

60. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, 

would universal encryption—without any mandated backdoors—on servers and devices help address the unintended consequences of well-intentioned cyber threat information sharing? 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

61 

RUSSIAN MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY AGAINST OTHER NATIONS’ ELECTIONS

61. Senator WARREN. Director Clapper, Secretary Lettre and Admiral Rogers, the 

Intelligence Community Assessment observed that Russia ‘‘will apply lessons 

learned from its campaign aimed at the United States presidential election to future 

influence efforts in the United States and worldwide, including against U.S. allies 

and their election processes.’’ With elections scheduled this year in the Netherlands, 

France, Germany, and elsewhere, what steps are your agencies currently taking to 

help strengthen these and other allies’ cyber defense capabilities against Russian 

and other election-related state-sponsored malicious cyber activity? Please explain. 

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary LETTRE. [Deleted.] 

Admiral ROGERS. [Deleted.] 

Æ