J-A23018-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RONELL MICHAEL MURRAY,

Appellant No. 1666 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 24, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0009537-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 16, 2019

Appellant, Ronell Michael Murray, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of 3-12 years’ incarceration, imposed following his conviction for 

possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”) and possession of a controlled 

substance.1 Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress, as well as the admission of hearsay evidence during the suppression 

hearing. After careful review, we affirm.

At the suppression hearing, Pittsburgh Police Detective John 

Henson testified that on April 10, 2017, he received a telephone 

call from Allegheny County Detective Romano and three FBI 

special agents requesting that Detective Henson go to Magee

Hospital to pick up Appellant. [N.T. Suppression, 8/2/18, at 4-5.] 

Detective Henson testified that Detective Romano told him 

Appellant “had an active state parole violation warrant for his 

arrest.” [Id. at 5.] Detective Romano informed Detective Henson 

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1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30) and (a)(16), respectively. 
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that [he] had searched NCIC, an electronic database widely used 

by law enforcement personnel, and [that] the database confirmed 

that Appellant had a state parole violation warrant. [Id. at 5-6.] 

Detective Henson arrested Appellant and found heroin, cash and 

a cell phone on a search incident to arrest. [Id. at 7.] Next, the 

Commonwealth produced Exhibit One, which Detective Henson 

identified as the active warrant for Appellant’s arrest filed through 

the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution and submitted to 

NCIC. [Id. at 7-8.] Detective Henson testified that NCIC would 

not show a probation violation that did not include an arrest 

warrant. [Id. at 10.]

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 4/15/19, at 3. 

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with PWID-heroin and 

possession of heroin on October 2, 2017. He filed a timely suppression motion 

on May 16, 2018. Following a hearing held on August 2, 2018, the trial court 

denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. The parties proceeded to a stipulated, 

non-jury trial that began on October 22, 2018. On October 24, 2018, the trial 

court convicted Appellant on both counts. The court sentenced him to 36-144 

months’ incarceration for PWID-heroin, and to no further penalty for the 

possession offense. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and a timely, court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. On April 15, 2019, the trial court issued its Rule 

1925(a) opinion. Appellant now presents the following questions for our 

review:

I. Under the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions, police must 

have a valid warrant at the time they arrest an individual. The 

Commonwealth did not present any physical evidence that a 

warrant existed before [Appellant]’s arrest, and there was no 

evidence to support an exception to the warrant requirement. 

Accordingly: 
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Did the Commonwealth’s testimony that a non-testifying detective 

heard that a warrant existed fail to establish probable cause to 

arrest [Appellant]?

II. The Commonwealth presented a detective’s testimony 

concerning a statement by another, non-testifying detective about 

information received by phone about the existence of an arrest 

warrant for [Appellant] prior to his arrest. Accordingly: 

Did the trial court abuse its discretion since such testimony was 

inadmissible hearsay as it exceeded the scopes of course of 

conduct and present sense impression testimony?

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

Essentially, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish 

at the suppression hearing that a warrant to arrest Appellant existed prior to 

his arrest by Detective Henson. Because Pennsylvania does not recognize a 

good faith exception to the warrant requirement,2 Appellant contends that the 

fruit of that ostensibly illegal arrest, i.e., the seized heroin, should have been 

suppressed, even if Detective Henson had reasonably relied on the information 

he received from Detective Romano. Alternatively, Appellant contends that 

the only evidence of the existence of the warrant—Detective Henson’s 

testimony regarding the information he received from Detective Romano—was 

inadmissible hearsay.

We begin by noting:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s 

denial of a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether 

the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the 

legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the 

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2 “Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not incorporate a 

‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule.” Commonwealth v. 

Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 905–06 (Pa. 1991).
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prosecution prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider 

only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence 

for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the 

factual findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those 

facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn from 

them are in error.

Commonwealth v. Bell, 871 A.2d 267, 271 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations 

omitted).

In addition, “[i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province as 

factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 

be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823 

A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003). The suppression court is also 

entitled “to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” 

Commonwealth v. Benton, ... 655 A.2d 1030, 1032 ([Pa. 

Super.] 1995). Finally, at a suppression hearing, the 

Commonwealth has the burden of “establish[ing] by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the evidence was properly 

obtained.” Commonwealth v. Culp, ... 548 A.2d 578, 581 ([Pa. 

Super.] 1988).

Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

Instantly, Appellant argues: 

[Detective] Henson lacked personal knowledge about state parole 

warrants and relied on the statement of a non-testifying witness 

who had received information over the phone that a warrant 

existed. This testimony amounts to nothing more than a good 

faith belief that a warrant existed prior to arrest. As such, the 

Commonwealth failed to establish that police had an arrest 

warrant or an applicable exception to detain [Appellant], and the 

trial court’s order denying suppression must be reversed.

Appellant’s Brief at 11.

The trial court determined that a valid warrant existed prior to 

Appellant’s arrest:

This [c]ourt found the Detective’s testimony credible that 

Appellant had an active warrant. The undisputed evidence 
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indicates that Appellant had an active warrant but the officer who 

looked at NCIC personally was not called as a witness. Appellant’s 

argument that this testimony is required is incorrect. The officer’s 

testimony was more than sufficient to support a finding that the 

officer knew that a warrant was outstanding for Appellant’s arrest. 

TCO at 4. The Commonwealth agrees with the trial court, adding that “the 

prosecution not only offered testimony from Detective John Henson, the 

arresting officer, that established that he had knowledge of the outstanding 

warrant at the time of arrest, but it also produced a copy of the warrant itself.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. 

At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth’s burden was to 

establish that the arrest was lawful by a preponderance of the evidence. See

Culp, 548 A.2d at 581. A copy of the warrant issued by the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole was entered into evidence at 

the suppression hearing as Commonwealth Exhibit 1. N.T., 8/2/18, at 7-8.3 

The warrant is dated April 10, 2017, the date of Appellant’s arrest. The 

document is time-stamped 8:10 p.m., which was when it was faxed to 

Detective Henson. However, the document does not specifically indicate a 

time when it was issued. Thus, Appellant argues that it is possible that the 

warrant could have been issued after he was arrested. 

Detective Henson testified, however, that the only way Appellant would 

show up in the NCIC system is if a warrant had, in fact, already been issued. 

Id. at 9-10. The trial court found this evidence credible based on its own 

experience with the NCIC system. Id. at 14. Moreover, the trial court 

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3 Appellant provides a copy of the warrant as Appendix D to his brief. 
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necessarily found Detective Henson’s testimony credible that he only 

effectuated the arrest warrant after learning of its existence in the NCIC 

system from Detective Romano. 

We agree with the trial court that this evidence was sufficient to satisfy 

the Commonwealth’s burden of proof. A warrant was issued on the day of 

Appellant’s arrest, and Detective Henson received word that Appellant was in 

the NCIC system, therefore demonstrating that a warrant had already been 

issued. While it is possible that Detective Henson was mistaken or lying, the 

trial court was free to find instead that his testimony was credible. See

Elmobdy, 823 A.2d at 183. Furthermore, while the Commonwealth failed to 

produce absolute proof of the warrant’s existence prior to Appellant’s arrest, 

we ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that it 

was more probable than not that it had been, in the circumstances of this 

case. See Commonwealth v. $6,425.00 Seized From Esquilin, 880 A.2d 

523, 529 (Pa. 2005) (“A preponderance of the evidence [standard] is 

tantamount to a ‘more likely than not’ standard.”). Accordingly, we conclude 

that Appellant’s first claim lacks merit.4 

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4 Appellant asserts that our decision to affirm under the facts of this case 

“would all but eviscerate the warrant requirement under the Pennsylvania and 

Federal Constitutions as the Commonwealth, in lieu of producing the warrant, 

could merely present a witness who heard another claim to know of ... a 

warrant for the defendant’s arrest at some unspecified time prior to a search 

or arrest.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4 (footnote omitted). We disagree. 

Here, the Commonwealth produced an arrest warrant issued on the same day 

of Appellant’s arrest. Thus, the trial court did not solely rely on Detective 
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Next, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it overruled his 

hearsay objection to Detective Henson’s testimony regarding the 

communication he received from Detective Romano.

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence, 

our standard of review is one of deference. Questions concerning 

the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the 

trial court, and its discretion will not be reversed absent a clear 

abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error 

of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the 

law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, 

or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by 

the evidence of record. Furthermore, if in reaching a conclusion 

the trial court overrides or misapplies the law, discretion is then 

abused and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(cleaned up). 

“Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the 

matter asserted in the statement.” Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 

1057, 1060 (Pa. 2001). Hearsay is inadmissible, see Pa.R.E. 802, unless an 

exception applies, see e.g., Pa.R.E. 803, 803.1, 804. 

The trial court admitted Detective Henson’s testimony as non-hearsay 

and/or under the presence-sense-impression exception to the hearsay 

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Henson’s testimony or the hearsay elements contained therein in determining 

that the warrant existed. Instead, the court relied on Henson’s testimony in 

conjunction with the warrant to establish the additional fact that it was more 

likely than not that the warrant was issued prior to Appellant’s arrest. We do 

not suggest by our decision today that we would reach the same conclusion 

had the Commonwealth failed to produce a warrant at the suppression 

hearing, or if the warrant clearly evidenced that it had been issued after the 

arrest. 
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requirement. See TCO at 4; Pa.R.E. 803(1) (“A statement describing or 

explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the 

declarant perceived it.”). However, we find it unnecessary to address the 

admissibility of Detective Henson’s testimony regarding his conversation with 

Detective Romano in the circumstances of this case, as it is clear that, even if 

inadmissible to prove the existence of the warrant, we agree with the 

Commonwealth that any error was harmless because the warrant itself was 

introduced at the suppression hearing. 

Harmless error exists if the state proves either: (1) the error did 

not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; or 

(2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely 

cumulative of other untainted evidence which was 

substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; 

or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt 

was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was 

so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have 

contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Burno, 154 A.3d 764, 787 (Pa. 2017) (cleaned up)

(emphasis added).

The Commonwealth argues:

[I]t should be noted that where the result at a suppression hearing 

would have been the same with or without the inadmissible 

evidence, the error in admitting the evidence is deemed to be 

harmless. Here, Judge Rangos, immediately upon announcing her 

decision that she was denying suppression, indicated that she 

found significant “the fact that the warrant is dated on the day 

that [Appellant] was arrested” [N.T. Suppression at 19]. The 

Commonwealth would submit that, even absent Detective 

Romano’s statement made prior to [Appellant]’s arrest that there 

was an active warrant for him, there was sufficient proof of the 

warrant’s existence-namely, the warrant itself dated April 10, 

2017, which, as established previously, the prosecution entered 
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into evidence at the hearing. Thus, because suppression would 

not have been proper even without the at-issue statement, any 

error in admitting it would have been harmless. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 16-17. 

We agree with the Commonwealth. The at-issue hearsay testimony 

about the warrant was largely duplicative of the evidence of the warrant itself. 

Moreover, hearsay testimony is generally admissible to prove that an officer 

had probable cause to arrest, because

[t]here is a vast difference between the sufficiency of hearsay 

information necessary to show probable cause for an arrest and 

the factors relating to admissibility of hearsay evidence to prove 

an accused’s guilt at trial. The test for probable cause to arrest is 

not one of certainties, but rather of probabilities dealing with the 

considerations of everyday life.

Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 431 A.2d 1023, 1025 (Pa. Super. 1981) 

(quotation marks omitted). 

This reasoning applied in Jenkins regarding hearsay evidence tending 

to support a showing of probable cause also applies to the evidence of the 

existence of a warrant in the context of the Commonwealth’s burden of proof 

at a suppression hearing. Thus, the Commonwealth was only required to 

prove that it was more likely than not that the warrant existed prior to 

Appellant’s arrest. To the extent that the at-issue testimony was admitted for 

the truth of the matter asserted as Appellant contends, any such error was 

harmless where, here, the actual warrant for Appellant’s arrest was also 

admitted at the suppression hearing and was “substantially similar to the 
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erroneously admitted evidence.”

5

 Burno, 154 A.3d at 787. Accordingly, we 

deem any error in the admission of the hearsay testimony regarding the 

warrant to be harmless. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/16/2019

 

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5 We acknowledge that the admitted warrant did not specify the time when it 

was issued. However, Appellant has failed to provide any case law suggesting 

that such specificity is required beyond a date of issuance, the presence of 

which is undisputed in this case. Moreover, the warrant did not contain a time 

or date of issuance that was at odds with Detective Henson’s testimony, as 

the 8:10 p.m. transmission time was not inconsistent with the warrant itself 

having been issued prior to Appellant’s arrest. Accordingly, the physical 

evidence—the warrant—was substantially similar to the evidence of the same 

provided by Detective Henson’s testimony.