[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-10822

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20651-KMM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

EDUARDO BARNES, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(January 6, 2015)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 14-10822 Date Filed: 01/06/2015 Page: 1 of 7 
2

Eduardo Barnes appeals his conviction and sentence of 120 months of 

imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

Barnes challenges the denial of his motion to suppress; the admission of an 

inculpatory statement during his sentencing proceeding; and the procedural 

reasonableness of his sentence. Barnes also challenges, for the first time, the 

constitutionality of section 922(g). We affirm.

The district court did not err by denying Barnes’s motion to suppress the 

firearm. Barnes lacked standing to challenge the search of the rental vehicle in 

which the firearm was found. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134, 99 S. Ct. 

421, 425 (1978); United States v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859, 864–65 (11th Cir. 2009). The 

driver of the vehicle, Ricky Taylor, told officers that a man named “Shrimp” 

loaned the vehicle to him, and neither Taylor nor Barnes were listed as approved 

drivers on the rental agreement. As a passenger, Barnes had standing to challenge 

the traffic stop, but the evidence established that the stop was “constitutional 

[because] it . . . [was] based upon probable cause to believe a traffic violation ha[d]

occurred . . . .” United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008). Sean 

Bergert, an officer for the City of Aventura, Florida, stopped the vehicle because 

Taylor was speeding and made a sharp turn that almost caused the vehicle to

collide with Bergert’s patrol car. See Fla. Stat. § 316.183(1). Barnes fled from the 

back seat before the rental vehicle came to a stop, and officers noticed a semiCase: 14-10822 Date Filed: 01/06/2015 Page: 2 of 7 
3

automatic handgun lying in the accessory pocket of the rear passenger door that 

Barnes had left ajar. Barnes lacked any expectation of privacy in the vehicle.

The district court fulfilled its obligation to make an independent and 

informed decision about the lawfulness of the traffic stop. A magistrate judge held 

a hearing on Barnes’s motion to suppress and credited Bergert’s testimony about 

the reasons for the traffic stop. Barnes objected and was entitled to de novo review 

of the decision to rely on Bergert’s testimony, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3), but 

the district court was unable to obtain a transcript of the hearing. The district court 

made a final determination about the validity of the traffic stop when it assessed 

Bergert’s testimony during Barnes’s bench trial. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 

U.S. 667, 680–81, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 2415 (1980). And the district court was entitled 

to credit Bergert’s undisputed explanation that he stopped the driver of the rental 

vehicle for speeding in violation of Florida law. As stated by the district court, 

Bergert’s “testimony . . . [was] sufficient to support the denial of the motion” to 

suppress. We are “satisfied that [the] district court . . . exercised his non-delegable 

authority by considering . . . actual testimony, and not merely by reviewing the 

magistrate’s report and recommendations.” United States v. Elsoffer, 644 F.2d 357, 

359 (5th Cir. 1981).

The district court did not err by adopting the recommendation of the 

magistrate judge to use Barnes’s incriminating statement to determine an 

Case: 14-10822 Date Filed: 01/06/2015 Page: 3 of 7 
4

appropriate sentence. Although Barnes’s statement was not admissible as 

substantive evidence of his guilt because he was not advised of his rights to remain 

silent and to counsel, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966),

he acknowledged that his “statements [could] be considered at sentencing . . . 

unless [they] were involuntary or unreliable.” The district court reviewed de novo

the agents’ testimony about Barnes’s interrogation, see Diaz v. United States, 930 

F.2d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 1991), and determined that Barnes’s statement was “the 

product of a free and deliberate choice.” See United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 

F.3d 1303, 1318 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 

106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141 (1986)).

The district court did not err in denying Barnes’s motion to exclude his 

inculpatory statement at sentencing. Detective Roderick Passmore and Officer 

Ricardo Martinez, of the Miami Dade Police Department, and Agent David Solis, 

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified, without dispute, that when 

Passmore asked Barnes about his destination at the time of the traffic stop, he

confessed that he was on the way to shoot someone. Passmore and Solis testified 

that they treated Barnes as a cooperative witness in hopes of obtaining information 

about gang-related homicides in the area and that, during the interview, which 

lasted no longer than seven hours, Barnes remained cooperative, articulate, and 

alert. And Martinez testified that, before Barnes made the inculpatory statement, he 

Case: 14-10822 Date Filed: 01/06/2015 Page: 4 of 7 
5

was fed, relocated to a more comfortable conference room, and allowed to speak to 

a federal agent. See id. The agents testified consistently that Barnes was not 

physically or verbally coerced and, although Solis offered to inform prosecutors 

about Barnes’s cooperation, Solis testified that he did not promise Barnes any 

reward for cooperating. See United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1295–96 

(11th Cir. 2005). And Barnes made his inculpatory statement after refusing to talk 

to Detective Jonathan Ruiz, which evidenced that Barnes knew he was not required 

to speak to law enforcement and that he could choose when and with to whom to 

speak. This record, which establishes that Barnes was well-treated, the interview 

was relaxed, and Barnes was acting intelligently, supports the determination of the 

district court that Barnes’s statements were “freely and voluntarily given.”

Barnes argues, for the first time on appeal, that his statements were 

inadmissible because he was not timely presented to a magistrate judge, see 18 

U.S.C. § 3501(c), but this argument fails. To prevail on review for plain error, 

Barnes must prove that an error occurred and that the error is plain, affects his 

substantial rights, and “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings.” United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1222 (11th Cir. 

2010). Section 3501 provides that a confession is admissible when made 

voluntarily and “within six hours immediately following arrest or other detention,”

and is admissible even if made after the expiration of the six-hour deadline, so long 

Case: 14-10822 Date Filed: 01/06/2015 Page: 5 of 7 
6

as the delay in presenting him to a judicial officer is “reasonable considering the 

means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such 

magistrate judge or other officer.” 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). Because the record is not 

developed about exactly how much time elapsed between Barnes’s arrest, his 

confession, and his presentment or about the availability of a judicial officer, we 

cannot say that any delay in his presentment was unreasonable.

The use of Barnes’s inculpatory statements to determine his base offense 

level did not make his sentence procedurally unreasonable. The district court was 

allowed to use Barnes’s incriminating statement to enhance his sentence. The 

district court credited the agents’ testimony; their testimonies established that 

Barnes made the statements voluntarily; and Barnes was given advance notice of

the evidentiary hearing and had the opportunity to rebut the evidence about the 

interrogation. See United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005).

Although Passmore testified that Barnes used the word “kill” and Solis recalled 

that Barnes used the word “shoot,” the district court reasonably found that the 

terms were “internally consistent.” In the light of Barnes’s statements and his 

possession of a firearm, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Barnes 

had armed himself as part of a plot to murder another person. Based on that 

finding, the district court correctly assigned Barnes a base offense level of 33 

based on the cross-references in the Sentencing Guidelines that addressed the 

Case: 14-10822 Date Filed: 01/06/2015 Page: 6 of 7 
7

possession of a firearm in connection with an attempted murder. See United States 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2K2.1(c)(1), 2X1.1(c)(1), 2A2.1(a)(1) (Nov. 

2013). Barnes argues that the district court enhanced his sentence based on facts

that were not alleged in his indictment or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable 

doubt, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but the district court was 

allowed to enhance Barnes’s sentence because “its findings [did] not increase [his]

sentence beyond the statutory maximum authorized by [the] facts determined in 

[his] guilty plea,” United States v. Dean, 487 F.3d 840, 854 (11th Cir. 2007). 

Barnes concedes that his argument, made for the first time, about the 

constitutionality of section 922(g) is foreclosed by precedent. We have held 

repeatedly that section 922(g) is constitutional, facially and as applied, as a lawful 

exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. 

Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 

1258, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2001). “Under [our] prior precedent rule, we are bound 

to follow a prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this court en 

banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 

1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district 

court did not err, plainly or otherwise, when it convicted Barnes of violating 

section 922(g).

We AFFIRM Barnes’s conviction and sentence.

Case: 14-10822 Date Filed: 01/06/2015 Page: 7 of 7