U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

61–428CC WASHINGTON : 2000

THE PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT: AN

ASSESSMENT OF WORKER SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 22, 1999

Serial No. 106–87

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce

(

2

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE

TOM BLILEY, Virginia, Chairman

W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, Louisiana

MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida

JOE BARTON, Texas

FRED UPTON, Michigan

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

Vice Chairman

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER COX, California

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

GREG GANSKE, Iowa

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia

TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma

RICK LAZIO, New York

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming

JAMES E. ROGAN, California

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING,

Mississippi

VITO FOSSELLA, New York

ROY BLUNT, Missouri

ED BRYANT, Tennessee

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

BART GORDON, Tennessee

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois

ANNA G. ESHOO, California

RON KLINK, Pennsylvania

BART STUPAK, Michigan

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland

GENE GREEN, Texas

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin

BILL LUTHER, Minnesota

LOIS CAPPS, California

JAMES E. DERDERIAN, Chief of Staff

JAMES D. BARNETTE, General Counsel

REID P.F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

FRED UPTON, Michigan, Chairman

JOE BARTON, Texas

CHRISTOPHER COX, California

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

Vice Chairman

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

GREG GANSKE, Iowa

ROY BLUNT, Missouri

ED BRYANT, Tennessee

TOM BLILEY, Virginia,

(Ex Officio)

RON KLINK, Pennsylvania

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

BART STUPAK, Michigan

GENE GREEN, Texas

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,

(Ex Officio)

(II)

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Testimony of:

Cochran, Thomas B., Director, Nuclear Programs, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc .......................................................................................... 305

Fowler, Ronald B .............................................................................................. 301

Graves, M. Brad, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems .................................... 305

Green, Richard D., Director, Waste Management Division, Environmental

Protection Agency, Region 4 ......................................................................... 385

Hummer, John J., Director of Corporate Environment, Safety and Health,

Lockheed Martin Corp., accompanied by Richard J. Leon, Counsel ......... 345

Jenkins, Garland E .......................................................................................... 298

Key, Jim H., Pace Local 5-5550 ....................................................................... 292

Knapp, Malcolm R., Deputy Executive Director of Operations for Materials, Research, and State Programs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission .. 388

Logan, Robert W., Commissioner, Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection; accompanied by John Volpe, Manager, Radiation

Control Branch, Kentucky Cabinet for Health Services ............................ 391

Michaels, David, Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and

Health, Department of Energy .................................................................... 376

Miller, James H., Executive Vice President, USEC, Inc., accompanied

by Robert Moore, Counsel ............................................................................ 358

Nemec, Joseph F., President, Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC ...................... 349

Material submitted for the record by:

Green, Richard D., Director, Waste Management Division, Environmental

Protection Agency, Region 4, responses for the record .............................. 408

Hummer, John J., Director of Corporate Environment, Safety and Health,

Lockheed Martin Corp., letter dated November 22, 1999, enclosing

response for the record ................................................................................. 410

Logan, Robert W., Commissioner, Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection, responses to questions of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ............................................................................... 418

Michaels, David, Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and

Health, Department of Energy, responses for the record .......................... 423

Miller, James H., Executive Vice President, USEC, Inc., responses to

questions of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ............. 415

Nemec, Joseph F., President, Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC, responses

to questions of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ......... 413

(III)

(1)

THE PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT:

AN ASSESSMENT OF WORKER SAFETY AND

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton (chairman)

presiding.

Members present: Representatives Upton, Burr, Bilbray,

Whitfield, Bryant, Bliley (ex officio), Klink, Stupak, Green, Strickland, DeGette, and Dingell (ex officio).

Staff present: Dwight Cates, majority investigator; Amy Davidge,

legislative clerk; and Edith Holleman, minority counsel.

Mr. UPTON. Good morning. Today the subcommittee will review

worker safety and environmental contamination at the Paducah

Gaseous Diffusion Plant located in the congressional district of

Congressman Ed Whitfield. This hearing follows a recent June

hearing where this subcommittee reviewed the Department of Energy’s nuclear safety program for protecting workers engaged in

nuclear activities at DOE facilities as required by the Price Anderson Amendments Act of 1998. At that hearing, the subcommittee

learned that DOE has not been aggressive in issuing nuclear safety

rules or in holding its contractors accountable for complying with

nuclear safety requirements. Today, at the urging of Congressman

Whitfield, the subcommittee will assess DOE’s effectiveness in enforcing worker safety at the Paducah site, as well as the Department’s current and past efforts to deal with the enormous wastes

that have accumulated in the course of nearly 50 years of uranium

enrichment at Paducah.

The Paducah site was built in the early 1950’s to increase the

government’s production of enriched uranium for defense and nondefense needs. The plant is surrounded by the West Kentucky

Wildlife Management Area which, I am told, is a significant recreational resource to the Paducah community. Paducah is one of

three gaseous diffusion plants, including the K-25 plant and the

Portsmouth plant built by the Department of Energy’s predecessor

agency, the Atomic Energy Commission. The government ceased

uranium production for weapons purposes in 1964. However,

Paducah’s enriched uranium output was actually increased in the

late 1960’s to meet the growing demands of the U.S. Naval Nuclear

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Program and the nuclear power industry. The plant was operated

for AEC and DOE under contract by Union Carbide between 1951

and 1986, and then by Martin Marietta which became Lockheed

Martin between 1984 and 1996. Pursuant to the Energy Policy Act

of 1992, the newly created government corporation USEC assumed

uranium enrichment responsibility in 1993 at the Paducah and

Portsmouth plants with Lockheed Martin continuing as contractor.

USEC was privatized last year, and has assumed control of the

plants from Lockheed Martin. The Paducah and Portsmouth plants

are still owned by DOE, and are leased to USEC, which uses the

plants to produce low-enriched uranium for sale as commercial

power reactor fuel.

The DOE retains responsibility for remedial action of past environmental releases, or legacy wastes at the site, including nearly

37,000 canisters of depleted uranium. Contaminants found in

groundwater wells around Paducah in 1988 eventually led to a

Superfund site designation for Paducah in 1994. Several Superfund

studies and cleanup actions to contain the spread of contaminants

in groundwater and soil are already underway. Since October 1998,

environmental responsibilities at Paducah have been managed by

DOE’s contractor, Bechtel Jacobs Corporation. USEC employs approximately 1,500 people, and Bechtel Jacobs employs 400 at Paducah.

There are many issues that we will cover today and they all stem

from the committee’s interest in ensuring that the workers and the

surrounding community are safe. On today’s first panel we will

hear from three workers currently employed at Paducah—Mr. Jim

Key, Mr. Garland Jenkins, and Mr. Ronald Fowler—and one Lockheed Martin employee who has worked at Paducah, Mr. Brad

Graves.

I want to express my thanks to each of you and commend you

for your bravery in coming forward to relate your experiences at

this site. I realize that your efforts to reveal the truth at Paducah

have introduced uncertain risks and complications in your lives but

your efforts are truly appreciated. In the past 3 months, the country has learned more about Paducah than the DOE would have revealed in a period of years. You should also know if you experience

any act of retaliation following your testimony before this subcommittee, you should notify us immediately.

Because of your efforts, and the front page press attention you

have generated, the Secretary of Energy is now focused on worker

safety and environmental issues at the Paducah site. Mr. Richardson visited the Paducah site on October 23, 1998, and met with the

members of the Paducah Site Specific Advisory Board. According to

the minutes of this meeting, board members expressed serious concerns regarding plutonium emissions from the site, the health impacts of legacy wastes at the site, and the fear of being forgotten

within the Department’s large Oak Ridge complex. The board’s requests were not enough to attract the necessary attention to these

issues.

Nonetheless, the two-phased investigation the Secretary recently

initiated may answer many of the questions the board sought answers to last year. However, I still remain concerned that the first

phase of DOE’s investigation, covering the period from 1990 to

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present, is insufficient. Preliminary findings of the Department’s 2-

week onsite review of worker safety and environmental issues at

Paducah were released last Tuesday. Findings include: 1, a failure

of DOE to perform adequate health and safety oversight at Paducah; 2, a lack of discipline, formality and oversight with respect to

Bechtel Jacobs’ radiation protection program; and, 3, significant onsite hazards from legacy wastes stored onsite. But 2 weeks is not

enough time to get your hands around 10 years of mismanagement.

These preliminary findings do not include environmental sampling

data DOE has collected on and offsite. The Department has told

committee staff that radiation readings at one offsite stream are

high enough to require technicians to wear protective clothing

while taking samples. This contaminated stream is fully accessible

to the public, but there are no warning signs.

In light of these findings, I should point out that several State

and Federal studies around Paducah indicate that there is contamination offsite, but not at levels of current health hazard to the public. However, data recently obtained by the committee indicate that

the levels of plutonium in offsite soil are higher than what the

State, EPA, DOE and DOE’s contractors have been telling the public.

I want to make it clear that this information needs to be verified

and any health issues resolved quickly. This committee will give

close scrutiny to any government agency or contractor who may

have misled the Paducah community regarding offsite contamination.

It is also important to point out another issue that the Department’s investigation of Paducah has not reviewed. Radiation protection in areas currently controlled by the United States Enrichment Corporation is regulated by the NRC. The NRC has informed

the committee that the company is in compliance with nuclear safety requirements and that workers at the site are adequately protected from radiation. However, plant upgrades to protect workers

in the event of an earthquake are still not complete. When the

United States Enrichment Corporation was privatized last year,

DOE transferred more than $200 million worth of uranium to the

company to pay for these NRC upgrades which were supposed to

be completed in 1997. This is a significant safety issue that will be

thoroughly investigated as part the committee’s review of the privatization of the United States Enrichment Corporation.

Clearly there are many issues that need to be closely evaluated

at Paducah. There seem to be new revelations coming forth every

day. The Department’s Phase II investigation covering the period

before 1990 has not even started. I expect that the Phase II effort

will take months. It is unreasonable to believe that we will have

all the answers today. However, I do expect candid answers regarding the Department’s surprising lack of safety oversight and the

mistakes made by DOE’s contractors and the management changes

that must occur to raise the level of worker safety and environmental cleanup performance at Paducah.

I also appreciate and thank the staff for working so hard on this

hearing. I know that it was rather quickly set up and particularly

with the delay last week because of the hurricane threat to WashVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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ington. We appreciate on both sides the good staff work done by

both the Democratic and Republican members of the staff.

At this point, I would like to make a unanimous consent request

that a number of documents that have been circulated on both

sides be made a part of the record. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. UPTON. And I would recognize the ranking member of the

subcommittee, Mr. Klink.

Mr. KLINK. I just note that we will have additional documents

that we will want to insert in the record as well.

Mr. UPTON. Fine.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. KLINK. First of all, I want to thank you for holding this important hearing, and I would applaud the staff for the work that

they have done to help put this hearing together.

The Department of Energy and the Atomic Energy Commission

have a decade-long disgraceful record of denying workers at the nuclear weapons plants who labor every day with highly radioactive

material, often under dangerous conditions, the compensation that

they deserved when they fell ill. They also have a long and shameful history of telling their workers that handling radioactive material is not dangerous and punishing those that ask questions or

who conducted the studies that determined otherwise.

In many ways this hearing is the latest in a series of hearings

that this committee has been holding for over 2 decades, and it is

depressingly similar. In 1978 we heard from a cancer researcher

who was fired by the DOE when he found unusually high cancer

deaths among the workers of the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility.

In 1988 we took testimony about failed safety programs, plants

unsupervised by government owners, safety reports buried in back

cabinets, safety regulations routinely ignored, and award fees that

encourage contractors to hide safety problems from the government. In 1994 this subcommittee worked with the GAO to reveal

that every year DOE was paying over $40 million to private law

firms to keep from paying workers’ compensation claims and environmental damages that resulted from its contractors’ deliberately

negligent behavior. Over the years probably $1 billion has been

spent to avoid liability, and all of it was taxpayer money.

We had some successes. Admiral Watkins and his tiger teams

changed as much as possible in the DOE culture. The Whistleblower Protection Act was passed to protect contract workers who

came to Congress to talk about the problems. Billions of dollars

was appropriated for cleanups. Independent oversight was instituted and hopefully will not be destroyed by the DOE reorganization recently approved by the House. But this is not enough. The

testimony we will hear today will again address these historic problems and will show that at Paducah, workers and the environment

are still not being protected. The workers are not being compensated, and the lack of action I believe is deliberate.

As far back as 1952, the Department recognized that to avoid

worker exposure to both uranium and small quantities of plutonium in recycled feedstock when used in the gaseous diffusion processing system, the material should be maintained in a closed system, workers should have respiratory protection and protective

clothing. They should never be allowed to work with open wounds.

Every single one of these restrictions was violated at Paducah.

Management was also told to determine where plutonium would go

and whether it would concentrate and at what levels it would concentrate. They did not.

By the late 1950’s the Paducah and Oak Ridge laboratories were

finding cesium, and strontium in the feedstocks, and by 1960 the

Biology and Medicine Division of the AEC reported neptunium contamination at Paducah and resulting worker exposure problems.

The authors of this memo said that 300 people at Paducah

should be checked for exposure but that the site hesitated to ‘‘proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00283 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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ceed to intensive studies because of the union’s use of this as an

excuse for hazard pay. I am afraid the policy at this plant is to be

wary of the unions and any unfavorable public relations.’’ That is

the end of the quote.

Another memo in 1960, which admitted there were jobs which

produced localized areas of somewhat elevated concentrations of

uranium in air for short periods of time, also worried that any reduction in exposure would cost money. None of this was ever told

to the workers. The health physics program to check their exposure

was nonexistent in the early days, and we will hear from two

health physicists at the radiation control program at Paducah it

was still nonexistent in the early 1990’s. Management told one of

the physicists that Paducah was a chemical plant. The contractor

didn’t have adequate staff for measuring instruments for uranium.

Although contamination was everywhere, there were no posted

areas, and workers freely walked throughout the site. In fact these

witnesses, both hired by Martin Marietta, supposedly to put the

plant in order, were not told by management that plutonium and

neptunium were present.

The environmental side of Paducah was little better. Contaminated drums and trash have been buried willy nilly on the site,

sometimes off the site; trichloroethylene, TCE, a toxic solvent was

poured onto the ground. Contaminated scrap and metal were left

out in the weather in huge piles, adding to the contaminated

ground plumes leaving from the site. There is an old pond filled

with drums containing uncharacterized waste. After the pond was

full, the barrels were piled on the ground and covered with dirt. A

much larger pile was called drum or barrel mountain. It also contains contaminated drums and other refuse covered up by dirt. The

two largest groundwater plumes which contained techtinium 99

and trichloroethylene move one foot per day. Despite the expenditure of $400 million in cleanup funds at Paducah, there is no adequate remediation underway for this most

obvious of waste streams. Dump sites are not even located, much

less characterized. DOE and its contractors have not bothered to

talk to the workers to find out where they dumped the waste.

What has been Martin Marietta’s and the DOE’s response over

the past decade? Some upgrades have been made prior to the

transfer of the plant to the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, but according to the latest DOE investigation, the radiation control program on the DOE part of the site is still deficient. Worker training

to deal with transuranics occurred once in 1992. Bioassays to determine uptakes of radioactive material by workers still have not been

done. The most contaminated process buildings were shut down,

but they have not been characterized. For several years they were

used as changing rooms; security personnel sometimes used them

for training, going around in the contaminated dust. Now under

DOE’s direct control, they are falling apart because of disrepair,

which also releases contamination.

During the development and manufacture of nuclear material,

many people were injured. Most have now been compensated in

some way only after years of suffering. The soldiers at the test sites

have been compensated. The Marshal Islanders have been compensated. The institutionalized children that were subjected to raVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00284 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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diation experiment have been compensated. The uranium miners

have been compensated, but the workers have never been compensated. If they ask questions about their health and working conditions, they were vilified, threatened and lied to by the government to which they were so dedicated. Joe Harding’s heirs were

told in 1991 that DOE dismissed his claims of dangerous working

conditions and declared the plant to be safe. DOE said there was

no presence of a thick uranium hexafluoride dust because it was

not consistent with the mode of operation, but uranium was found

in Mr. Harding’s bones and today we will hear testimony from two

eyewitnesses about the thick uranium and asbestos dust in the

plant that workers were forced to breathe.

When Joe Harding left the plant in 1972 he was told he would

get a disability pension for an unrelated leg injury. But when

Union Carbide reneged and the DOE, backed by the Justice Department, fought every claim for workmens’ compensation and

wrongful death, Joe Harding finally died in 1980 at the age of 58.

And just 2 years ago his widow finally received $12,000 in settlement of her claims. Just last week, secretary Richardson called Joe

Harding a cold war hero and gave his widow a medal. Clara Harding doesn’t need a medal. She is impoverished and has lost her

home. She deserves the widow’s benefit that she has been denied

for almost 20 years.

Today, Mr. Chairman, I am announcing that I am sending a letter to Secretary Richardson asking him to reopen that settlement

and pay with interest the full amount owed to Clara Harding. It

would be a small beginning to ending this very disgraceful era, and

I would ask unanimous consent that my letter to Secretary Richardson be included in the transcript of this hearing.

Mr. UPTON. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE

September 22, 1999

The Honorable BILL RICHARDSON

Secretary

U.S. Department of Energy

1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20585

DEAR SECRETARY RICHARDSON: Last week, you personally awarded Clara Harding,

the 76-year-old widow of Joe Harding, with a medal from the U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE). You called her late husband a ‘‘Cold War hero,’’ and honored Mrs.

Harding for her ‘‘personal contribution in reminding us of the human face of the

men and women who contributed to the nation’s effort and the ultimate success in

winning the Cold War.’’

It is true that the injured workers are the forgotten victims of the Cold War.

While the Department has spent billions of dollars to clean up the environmental

damage caused by the negligent handling of toxic, hazardous and radioactive waste,

minuscule amounts have been spent to compensate workers made ill by the very

same materials. In fact, over the years, the Department has spent tens of millions

of dollars in legal fees to make sure that these workers did not receive workmen’s

compensation, medical assistance, disability payments and pensions. The entire

legal establishment of the federal government was massed to avoid these claims.

Sick workers were ridiculed, vilified and lied to and about.

The case of Joe Harding is a classic example of this treatment. However gracious

and heartfelt this gesture to Mrs. Harding may have been on your part, it cannot

obscure the decades’ of shabby, dishonest treatment and poverty that the Hardings

were subjected to by the actions of the Department, its contractors and its lawyers.

Nor can it obscure the fact that it took Mrs. Harding more than 15 years to receive

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a paltry $12,000 settlement for her late husband’s workmen’s compensation claims.

This payment, which was fought for years by Union Carbide’s and DOE’s own lawyers, was received less than two years ago.

Joe Harding worked for 181⁄2 years at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant

(GDF). He was a process operator who worked without any radiation protection in

air thick with uranium dust that was also contaminated with plutonium, neptunium

and possibly ruthenium. Sometimes he did maintenance in pipes that moved uranium hexaflouride from building to building. He suffered lesions, stomach pain and

other symptoms of radiation illness. But the company told him that his work environment was safe even though it knew that it was not.

When Mr. Harding left the Paducah GDF in 1971, he was 49 years old and ill,

probably with the cancer to which he ultimately succumbed. Before he left, he was

promised a 100 percent disability pension from Union Carbide. But he never received that a nickel of that pension. He lost his health insurance. He never received

a retirement pension. After Mr. Harding died, the Department issued a report said

that there was not enough radiation exposure at Paducah to cause his illness, and

that ‘‘The presence of thick dust in the air which Mr. Harding stated occurred . . . is

not consistent with the mode of operation’’ at the plant. As testimony at the Subcommittee’s hearing today will show, the DOE report writers lied to deny Mr. Harding his compensation. Mr. Harding’s statements were absolutely consistent with

the mode of operation at Paducah. Workers frequently labored in thick uranium

dust, and many were sick. You heard many similar statements from workers yourself last week.

Mrs. Harding deserves an ‘‘honor’’ that she can take to the bank. By this letter,

I am requesting that you direct the Department’s Office of General Counsel and

Union Carbide to go back to the court of jurisdiction in which the Harding settlement was filed and move to reopen that settlement so that it can be increased to

fully reimburse Mrs. Harding for her years of pain and penury. Additionally, I am

requesting you to investigate what happened to Mr. Harding’s retirement pension.

We have been told by DOE officials that he was offered a pension, but never returned the paperwork. This would be surprising since Mr. Harding fought many

years to obtain some kind of compensation for his work.

Please respond in writing by Thursday, September 30, 1999, with the steps the

Department intends to take to fully compensate Mrs. Harding and to investigate the

retirement pension. If you have any questions, please have your staff contact Edith

Holleman, Minority Counsel, at (202) 226-3407.

Thank you for your immediate attention to this very important matter.

Sincerely,

RON KLINK

Ranking Member, Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee

cc: Rep. Fred Upton

Mrs. Clara Harding

Mr. UPTON. At this point I recognize the chairman of the full

committee, Mr. Bliley, for an opening statement.

Chairman BLILEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing

builds on the committee’s ongoing commitment to hold the Department of Energy and its contractors accountable for poor management practices that compromise worker safety, cause unnecessary

environmental contamination, and waste billions of taxpayer dollars. The long list of poorly managed DOE projects and programs

has kept the committee very busy over the past several years. Unfortunately, we do not have the resources to keep track of all of

DOE’s mistakes, but it has been necessary to take a hard, close

look at several issues.

The subcommittee’s past DOE hearings include the Pit 9 cleanup

disaster in Idaho, the spent nuclear fuel project at Hanford, the

troubled Office of Science and Technology, the radioactive tank

waste at Hanford, the questionable funding of Molten Metal Technologies, misdirected contract reform efforts, and just recently, a

review of the Department’s nuclear safety program. Each of these

hearings have informed the committee of some of the more pressing

problems at DOE. Today’s important hearing will review worker

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safety and environmental contamination at the Paducah Gaseous

Diffusion Plant located in Kentucky.

I have been alarmed by the reports I have read about the Paducah site. My first priority is to determine whether current conditions at the site and contamination offsite are threatening workers

and the community. For this information I must rely on DOE and

the Federal and State agencies. The committee has communicated

with each of these agencies and the picture is still unclear. Last

month Secretary Richardson sent a team of investigators to the

site. He has stated that DOE has not uncovered ‘‘any imminent

threat to the public health, worker safety, or the environment, but

we are continuing to investigate these concerns.’’

The Secretary has been quick to react to Paducah’s problems, but

only since they have received front page attention. Where has the

Department’s health and safety oversight been? Why does it take

a special investigation to find out whether the workers at Paducah

are safe? I have an answer: It is because the Department’s safety

oversight responsibilities at Paducah have been severely mismanaged. The initial findings of the Department’s investigation

have uncovered serious mismanagement by DOE, and several problems with DOE’s contractor, Bechtel Jacobs Corporation, regarding

nuclear safety oversight, radiation protection of workers and environmental monitoring. However, these findings are not new. Many

of the problems uncovered by the Department’s recent investigation

were identified in a July 1990 Tiger team safety review at Paducah, initiated by former Secretary Watkins.

For instance, in 1990 the Tiger team found DOE oversight roles

and responsibilities have not been well defined, documented or

communicated. A correction plan was put into place in 1991, and

millions were spent for improvements, but 9 years later the same

problems persist. Thus, what confidence can we have that corrective actions from DOE’s new investigation will be implemented?

Furthermore, how can we be confident that DOE’s 2-week review

is sufficient?

Today’s hearing will allow us to review what further actions need

to be taken by DOE, DOE’s contractors and the regulators to ensure the safety of workers and the community.

The Paducah site and its dedicated workers have a proud place

in history. The uranium enriched at the site helped win the cold

war, and today it helps supply 40 percent of the world’s nuclear

fuel for electricity. We owe it to the Paducah community to cut

through the culture of silence and deceit at Paducah, and allow for

the truth to come out. The truth and the answers will start today

at this hearing. I thank you for it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. Mr. Strickland.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The subject of today’s hearing is shocking and terribly disturbing. The lives of thousands of workers and the safety of local communities depends on

our swift and just response to this crisis. I applaud the Secretary

of Energy for this initiative to thoroughly investigate these recent

reports and to take responsibility to address the needs of past and

present workers who have been placed in harm’s way. I represent

southern Ohio, not Paducah, Kentucky. Southern Ohio is the home

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of the uranium enrichment plant located near Portsmouth. It is

Paducah’s sister plant.

It is totally unacceptable that the current worker compensation

proposal offered by this administration covers only Paducah workers, leaving Portsmouth workers out in the cold. In other words,

employees charged with carrying out the same work for this government, who may have been injured as a result of the work, are

being treated differently simply because they lived and worked in

different places. Is this just? Is it fair? Of course it isn’t.

That is why this committee and this Congress should correct this

inequity. Our government must take responsibility for all of its employees, past and present, who have been injured due to the exposure to hazardous materials. When the administration’s proposal is

sent to Congress for action, I pledge to do everything humanly possible to ensure equal treatment for all DOE workers.

Because this crisis demands our immediate attention, Mr. Chairman, I urge you to join me in working to make this legislative proposal more inclusive and to see that it is swiftly passed into law.

Further, I am requesting that this subcommittee hold a similar

hearing on the Department of Energy’s investigation of the Portsmouth site at the earliest appropriate time, and I urge you to join

me in working to rectify our government’s abandonment of cold war

veterans and their modern day colleagues.

Finally, our action will demonstrate to the American citizens just

what kind of government they have and what kind of people we

are.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. UPTON. We certainly appreciate your interest on this and I

assure you we will continue to monitor this and I know that questions for this site obviously reflect a deep interest in your site in

your State as well.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Whitfield.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I particularly want

to thank Chairman Bliley and Chairman Upton and Mr. Klink for

agreeing to have this hearing and to speed up the process, particularly regarding the health and well-being of the current and former

workers at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, as well as citizens in the surrounding area.

And before I read my statement, I would like to announce that

we have been trying to obtain approval for DOE to reprogram

$1.96 million to begin cleaning up uranium hexafluoride cylinders

at the Paducah plant. There are over 37,000 of them there, and we

obtained that approval this morning and so that is a very small

step in beginning to immediately try to address this problem.

I am delighted that Mr. Klink talked about Joe Harding. I might

also say that the Paducah Sun in 1986 ran an article talking about

all of its problems at the Paducah plant, with the exception of the

plutonium. It is tragic that it has taken this many years to focus

on this and to begin to clean it up. The events of the last month

and a half at the Paducah plant have all the elements of a best

selling spy novel—exhumed bodies with uranium; allegations of

missing documents; coverups; long-term exposure to toxic materials; black radioactive ooze at landfills. Unlike a great book with

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a good ending, this story is still unfolding, and I am determined

that the ending of this story is not a tragic one.

Since my election to Congress 5 years ago, I have worked with

the employees at the Paducah plant to preserve collective bargaining rights, to protect their pension benefits and jobs in the

midst of privatization, to minimize the impacts of the declining domestic uranium market and increased Russian uranium imports,

and to obtain funds for the construction of a uranium hexafluoride

conversion facility to convert the depleted uranium.

But today I am committed to finding answers to important questions which have been raised by a Federal lawsuit and subsequent

articles.

The first panel of witnesses includes employees of the Paducah

plant who have raised serious allegations of wrongdoing by former

DOE contractors, Lockheed Martin and Martin Marietta, as well as

Union Carbide.

They allege that the contractors knowingly presented false and

fraudulent claims for payment, cost compensation and awards

under contracts with the Department of Energy, and they endangered the health and welfare of the employees. From this panel I

want to hear the specific allegations and the evidence to support

those allegations.

The second panel is composed of witnesses representing past and

present DOE contractors and the current operator of the production

facility—Lockheed Martin, Bechtel Jacobs, and the United States

Enrichment Corporation. From this panel I want to know if the allegations raised are true. In addition, we want to know whether

the deficiencies enumerated in the Tiger team assessment of 1990

have been corrected; what problems exist in cleaning up the site

today; what is the timetable and site management plan for the

cleanup; and was there a calculated effort to keep workers and the

community in the dark about the presence of plutonium in the materials the plant received, and what Congress can do to facilitate

the cleanup.

The third panel includes the Federal and State regulators of the

plant—the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Kentucky Department of Natural Resources. From this panel I want to

know why supervision of the plant has been so lax, to explore the

Energy Department’s proposal for a pilot project to compensate

workers with injuries resulting from radiation exposure, is the

plant safe today and what steps will be taken to clean up the contaminated sites and to correct mismanagement of the past.

Mr. Chairman, I represent men and women who have worked

and still work at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. They have

not asked for, nor do they expect much. They do, however, expect

their employers and the government to be honest with them, to

provide them with a safe place to work, to pay them a fair wage

and to compensate them for medical expenses incurred because of

their responsibility by the government or its contractors.

The entire Paducah community is entitled to answers about the

plant to clean up this area and to correct past wrongs. I hope my

colleagues on the subcommittee will help uncover why it took an

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investigative report and a Federal lawsuit to bring these revelations to light.

Help us separate fact from fiction. We want to know the truth,

and we want a safe working place for workers not only at the Paducah plant, but at Portsmouth and Oak Ridge and other DOE facilities around the country. Thank you.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

We recognize the ranking member of the full committee, a member of this subcommittee, Mr. Dingell.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I commend you for

holding this hearing. Worker safety at DOE nuclear sites has long

been a matter of interest to me and also to the committee. It was

the subject, as members of this subcommittee will recall, of regular

investigative work by this subcommittee during the 1980’s and

early 1990’s. Back when I chaired the subcommittee in 1994, I

made one observation that still holds true: One of the largest

groups of likely American victims of the cold war are the workers

who labored for years in our vast nuclear weapons complexes

across the Nation.

Unfortunately, last week, Mr. Chairman, the House of Representatives, when it voted to create an autonomous nuclear weapons agency within the Department of Energy, turned its back on

these workers and communities around the weapons facilities and

the environment. The House voted to return to the secret days of

the Atomic Energy Commission when so many of these tragedies

began and when the culture was created that we suppressed public

flow of information and didn’t give a whoop about the environment,

worker safety and other things.

That created a situation where our employees at these facilities,

whether they be Federal or contractors, were calmly and serenely

irradiated and subjected to other risks of employment and when

the communities found that contamination of every one of these

sites was regular order of business. And I would observe to you,

Mr. Chairman, this was all done under a culture which was caused

because of its secretive character, the suppression of information to

the public at large, the media, and of course to the Congress which

was viewed as a threat by that agency at that time. And it took

us years to break that attitude on the part of that agency.

Today we are seeing that the Congress has willingly returned to

that in the legislation we passed last week. Worker safety in these

times was knowingly jeopardized in favor of weapons production,

and the safety of people in adjacent communities was severely

risked; and as a result, all of the sites under the former jurisdiction

of the Atomic Energy Commission, acting under a veil of secrecy,

are now contaminated with hazardous both high- and low-level of

nuclear waste.

Those who had the temerity to ask questions were systematically

harassed, intimidated, and the Congress and others were

stonewalled. When outsiders made inquiry on these matters, lying

was the usual refuge of bureaucrats in that agency.

Today’s hearing is important, and again, Mr. Chairman, I commend you. What went on at Paducah was outrageous, but what

went on at Paducah was replicated at many other sites run by the

Atomic Energy Commission.

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Last week’s vote by the House was also outrageous. We do need

many more hearings like this to convince the leadership of this

House to reverse the course and go out for independent and aggressive oversight of the weapons complex to see to it that we work to

bring about the necessary cleanup and to see to it that that cleanup involves not only the physical cleanup of sites, but a cleanup of

an attitudinal problem at DOE, which is the inheritance of the

mantle of the Atomic Energy Commission, and to see to it that we

have a situation come about where the Congress can find out what

goes wrong and properly supervise this matter instead of returning

to the veil of secrecy which caused so many of the problems.

I thank you and commend you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At this time, I would request to be able to pass and reserve my time.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Burr.

Mr. BURR. I thank the chairman and I also thank the entire committee and our witnesses, because the postponement of this hearing allowed many of us to go back to the State of North Carolina

and address what still today is a significant disaster and will continue to be a problem.

I want to commend Mr. Whitfield for one of the finest opening

statements that I have heard in a long time, and one that clearly

tells me that he has stayed focused on the human face behind the

issue, and that is the workers in Paducah and the many people

that live around this plant.

Paducah does have a long history, a history that goes back to the

1950’s, a history that if this were the book, it would include the

cold war, it would include the need for nuclear development, and

this was at the centerpiece of that effort.

Throughout those 50 years, much has happened. And quite honestly, questions have been raised about safety and contamination.

Mr. Whitfield alluded to the Paducah Sun article in 1986. Had we

only listened then, maybe we could have started this process much

sooner.

It has been amazing to me after reviewing the documents for this

hearing, my conclusion is why didn’t we listen? Why didn’t we listen to the Paducah Sun? Why did it take the Washington Post and

other news outlets finding documents that this committee and Congress could not obtain through the Department of Energy because

in many cases contractors never filed those papers with that agency. How is it that for 9 years, an appendix to the report could be

lost and all of a sudden reappear?

Ladies and gentlemen, I think that raises the question that we

should be here to ask: How hard are contractors and the Department of Energy working today to solve the problems at Paducah?

Much time has been spent talking about other investigations, other

sites, and clearly that is a responsibility of this Congress, but I am

hopeful that what we will do today before we leave is that the Department of Energy, the contractors, and the Congress will commit

that we will clean this site up and assure worker safety.

Let me read you a quote from Dave Michaels with the Department of Energy that appeared in the Post on September 9. He said,

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‘‘We are most concerned that these problems continue to repeat

themselves and that the laboratory management, despite commitments made in previous enforcement actions, have failed to correct

identified problems. We have used enforcement on things that we

knew were real and contractors haven’t responded.’’

Well, I understand that the investigations are ongoing. I am concerned that the Department of Energy’s preliminary observations

announced September 14 are simply a rehash of earlier investigations. If in the end DOE does not improve in the way in which it

oversees contract operations, how it evaluates contractor performance, and the way that it actually writes its contracts, then none

of the other changes it makes will take hold. If DOE will not make

the needed changes in contract management, I am certain this

committee and this Congress will have a large say in how we proceed in the future.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, but I especially thank those media outlets that were able to access documents that furthered the urgency for this hearing and I yield back

the balance of my time.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Green.

Mr. GENE GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as a Member

of Congress and an American, it makes me ashamed to read the

documents that we have and that we as a country treated our

workers, or through the contractors we hired, this way.

I want to thank the chairman for scheduling this hearing and,

again, not having the long-term seniority that our ranking member

has, it is frustrating, I imagine, to be here year after year and be

told that something is being done and yet it is not.

Over and over we hear of lax standards and nonexistent safety

protocols and hazards and dangers that no one should have to tolerate. Despite action and oversight by this committee, it seems

every time Congress hears how these problems are fixed, you hear

the latest plan for improving the working conditions at these facilities, we instead have to hear more problems: our most recent problem at Paducah, Kentucky where for almost 40 years we have managed to avoid dealing with clear evidence of radiation hazard for

workers.

In one report from 1960, it appears that the people we put in

charge kept the information about the real possibility that dangers

and unsafe working conditions existed secret because the managers

were afraid that they would have to pay hazardous pay. We will

hear testimony from environmental safety officials at the plant

about exposure of workers to plutonium which is so radioactive

that one millionth of an ounce, if inhaled, can cause cancer.

As early as 1952 we knew that exposure of workers to plutonium

and other man-made metal was dangerous. That did not stop those

who ran the facilities from ignoring the dangers to workers and

failing to protect them from exposure. It seems that the contractors

we hired knew that there was widespread and systematic and documented failures in their effort to stop the spread of these materials, but did nothing to try to correct it.

Our government bears much of the blame for the lack of oversight which has led to this and other situations. However, I hope

that by now we would have identified the problems and been far

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down the road toward solving them, and I hope that the Department of Energy and the contractors have done a better job at our

other facilities, whether they be in Ohio or Texas, and I look forward to the testimony today from the witnesses. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Bilbray.

Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the

ranking member for holding this hearing, and I think the bipartisan aspect of this hearing is something that we should encourage

more often.

I would like to congratulate the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr.

Whitfield, because ever since he came to this Congress I know that

this issue has been one that he has been doggedly following and

hounding. He knew that it was an issue that was not going to go

away, and he did it in a very organized, to a degree quiet at times,

but very effective way of forcing this issue out into the light of day.

And Mr. Whitfield, I think you set an example for a lot of us, that

you may feel strongly about things, but screaming and shouting is

not the only way to take care of problems. Actually addressing

them is appropriate.

Mr. Chairman, the more I read these reports, I thank my lucky

stars that when I was working around a nuclear facility I was

working under the Department of Defense rather than the Department of Energy, and I just say that as somebody who has worked

and seen the safety precautions and the employee protection that

the Department of Defense rendered to those of us working in

those environments, and I have to raise up my hands and shrug

my shoulders and say why not here.

But I also have to point out that we can find blame and fault,

and that is really easy for us who are legislators to point fingers

at any administration. The problem is, can we find answers? And

I would ask to take a look at the fact that all of us bear in some

degree responsibility in the past, t we bear more responsibility to

make sure that these situations are addressed in the future. And

I would ask all of us what are we doing to initiate some answers

here.

And just this morning I have heard the statement of cleanup

mentioned countless times, and I would just ask every member who

has ever mentioned the issue of cleanup, at are we doing to make

cleanups safer and more cost effective?

A good example is the problem doesn’t stop with the DOE. The

fact is that we just had a situation last year where the Army Corps

of Engineers cleaned up a World War II site, shipped the material

from New York all of the way to California, and then disposed of

it illegally in a facility that is not supposed to be taking nuclear

material. And their reason for doing it, to save money.

So I think that we need to look around and say there is a deeper

problem here, and I will just ask all of us to remember that every

time we talk about cleaning up a nuclear site, we should be asking

ourselves and the public should be asking us what are we doing to

provide the facilities to cleanup these sites, cause the material removed has to go somewhere. And I ask this committee as an oversight committee to take a look at what happened last year and

what we need to do in the future so that the material can be

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cleaned up and transferred to an appropriate disposal site, which

is something that none of us want in our neighborhood, but we all

want done somewhere.

We need to learn from the mistakes of the past; let’s change the

system but maybe change our own attitudes about being proactive

in nuclear cleanup, and say what is this committee as the Commerce Committee doing to initiate the ability for Paducah to be

cleaned up in a safe, cost-effective manner? And I think that this

hearing can remind us that doing nothing is not an option.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

Mr. Stupak.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize that I will

be in and out of this hearing because I have a number of congressional hearings today. I am very interested in this hearing because

I think it is important that we examine the safety record of the Department of Energy with respect to its handling of plutonium and

other radioactive materials. Yesterday the Washington Post reported that radiation risks to workers were concealed at Paducah

because of ‘‘fear of a public outcry.’’ While it is unclear from the

news article whether DOE had knowledge of the contamination, it

is clear that their oversight of the operation was disastrous. This

disaster has caused people to pay with their lives, due to cancer

they contracted while working in that unsafe environment.

The Department of Energy has done a horrendous job of protecting the public workers and the public in Paducah from radiation exposure and harm. DOE is now proposing to ship plutonium

through both of our districts as well as that of Mr. Blunt from this

subcommittee. DOE assures us it will be handled safely by a responsible government contractor. Yet to this point, the DOE has refused to have public hearings in my district or anywhere else along

the shipment route. Even though the Canadian Government is having public meetings on the shipment, DOE is refusing to even hold

one hearing in this country. Are they afraid of public outcry? Does

this situation sound disturbingly similar to the subject of this current hearing today? I hope not.

I believe DOE and its contractors should be open and forthright

with respect to their responsibility in the operation at Paducah. I

believe they have both a duty and an obligation to find out who is

responsible for these lapses and ensure the victims are treated fairly.

Furthermore, I believe DOE should quit stalling and begin hearings on the proposed MOX fuel shipment scheduled to go through

our districts. Enough coverups. We need public discussion. DOE’s

track record with Paducah gives us a serious doubt and reason to

doubt the safety of DOE’s nuclear weapons program. Only public

discussion and reparation will repair that lost trust. Let me remind

DOE officials here today, last week the House unanimously passed

my amendment to hold public hearings before you begin shipment

of the plutonium and the MOX fuels.

Four hundred thirty-five Members said hold hearings. I darn

well hope that we have those hearings and have them soon.

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Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to working with you on this issue as well as the MOX fuel

shipment issue.

Mr. UPTON. I supported your amendment on the House floor and

only a slow subway and the rain stopped me from getting over

there to speak in favor of it.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. I want to thank you for having this hearing. My colleague from Tennessee, Zach Wamp, represents the Oak Ridge area

and for those of you who know him, know how strong he feels

about all issues and certainly will work aggressively to ensure that

the right thing is done in this instance to include Oak Ridge.

I do want to associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Strickland

and Mr. Whitfield who also have facilities. We have talked a little

bit and as I sit here and listen and review the materials, I too am

very concerned about what appears to be not negligence but active

coverup over a number of years, and for reasons that are very inappropriate given the risk involved here.

I do again thank all of you for being here. I look especially forward to hearing from the workers, both at Paducah and Oak Ridge,

and I don’t know if this is their first opportunity to actually testify,

but I welcome that and look forward to that and I yield back the

balance of my time.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

At this point we welcome our first panel. They include Mr. Jim

Key, Mr. Ronald Fowler, Mr. Thomas Cochran, and Mr. Brad

Graves. It is my understanding that many of you, if not all,

brought counsel with you, which is certainly fine and fits under the

committee rules, but by doing so they need also to be sworn, in

that everything is under oath here. If you would identify them

when you begin your testimony, that would be appropriate. At this

point if you would stand and raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. UPTON. By the way, your counsel need to do the same thing.

Identify yourself and then we will swear you in.

Mr. COOPER. Charles Cooper, representing Mr. Jenkins and Mr.

Fowler.

Mr. EGAN. Joe Egan, representing Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Fowler

and Mr. Cochran.

Mr. MCMURRAY. William F. McMurray for Mr. Jenkins and Mr.

Fowler.

Mr. MULL. Martin Mull for Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Fowler.

Mr. LAWRENCE. Mr. Lawrence for Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Fowler

and Mr. Cochran.

Mr. UPTON. For counsel, who did not take the oath previously,

raise your hand I will swear you.

[Counsel sworn.]

Mr. UPTON. Now you are all under oath. Mr. Key, we will start

with you. We would like you to limit your remarks to 5 minutes.

Your statement will be made fully part of the record in its entirety,

if you can stay pretty close to 5 minutes.

By the way, because of the delay in the hearing from last week

due to the hurricane, we very much appreciate getting your testimony on time so we could review it over the weekend. Go ahead.

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TESTIMONY OF JIM H. KEY, PACE LOCAL 5-5550; GARLAND E.

JENKINS; RONALD B. FOWLER; M. BRAD GRAVES, LOCKHEED

MARTIN ENERGY SYSTEMS; AND THOMAS B. COCHRAN, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

Mr. KEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to come before you today. My name is Jim Key.

Mr. UPTON. Could you bring the mike a little closer?

Mr. KEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and committee members for

allowing me to come before you today. I am Jim Key, an hourly

electrician at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant at Paducah,

Kentucky. I was hired by Union Carbide in 1974 as a laborer and

I have worked for a succession of contractors, including Martin

Marietta, Lockheed Martin, and most recently the privatized

United States Enrichment Corporation. Since 1989 I have also

served as the environmental safety and health representative for

Local 5-550 of the Paper Allied Industrial Chemical and Energy

Workers Union.

At the outset, allow me to clarify for the record that neither I nor

PACE Local 5-550 is a party to any litigation with respect to health

and safety issues at Paducah at this time. The Department of Energy headquarters oversight staff have included me in daily

outbriefs when they investigated the Paducah site during the

Phase I study between August 17 and September 3, 1999. It was

disturbing to learn, however, that elements within Department of

Energy now want to exclude me from further participation, apparently based on the erroneous charge that I had leaked my notes

from the outbriefs to the press. This is wholly inaccurate and appears to be a function of the Department of Energy looking for a

scapegoat to blame for the publicity associated with the disclosure

of the oversight team report.

If there is one message that I want the committee to receive from

the workers at Paducah today, it is this: The majority of current

and former workers are afraid that they may have been exposed to

substances like plutonium without proper protection and that they

will, as a result, be stricken with a fatal disease and lose their

lives.

Allow me to describe some of the working conditions and I think

you will understand the fear. Shortly after I was hired in 1974 I

joined the group of workers who were directed to take drum loads

of uranium metal shavings from the machine shop and dump them

into deep, onsite pits. The uranium spontaneously ignited before

the metal chips ever hit the bottom of the hole and a pungent and

irritating smoke enveloped us. A coworker used a front-end loader

and dumped soil to cover over the fire. The reason the uranium

metal caught fire is it is hydrofluoric.

During the plant upgrades CIP-CUP project, 20-foot diameter

converters were hoisted by overhead cranes with pipe openings

that emitted clouds of smoke. The smoke was uranium hexafluoride

reacting with moisture in the air. Sometimes the smoke was so

thick, you could not see the overhead crane operators. Respirators

were not required. Between 1977 and 1982 I was assigned the responsibility of grinding asbestos transite to fit as covers over highvoltage electrical cable. I was not provided any personal protective

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equipment or air monitoring. At the end of the day when I went

to the change room, my entire body was covered with white asbestos dust.

Union Carbide Nuclear Corporation knew in 1952 that the introduction of plutonium-contaminated reactor tails into the uranium

enrichment process at Oak Ridge, a process similar to Paducah,

may require consideration of certain changes to the health physics

program, including a contamination control program.

In 1985 DOE identified a need to protect workers from exposure

to transuranics. The report concluded that Paducah management,

in conjunction with DOE, should conduct an exposure assessment

for those workers involved in processing and recycling material at

Paducah Feed Plant.

A similar recommendation was made to conduct an exposure assessment at the Portsmouth, Ohio Oxide Conversion Facility. DOE

admitted no such exposure assessment was performed for the first

time last week.

Another report in 1990, ‘‘Neptunium Experience at PGDP,’’ concluded that the presence of transuranics at Paducah requires significantly different control procedures. What is clear is that the

government’s contractors knew the need to protect workers from

plutonium and other transuranics since 1952. It took 40 years after

the Union Carbide memo cited above to implement a contamination

control program specifically for transuranics such as neptunium

and plutonium. Because the site didn’t have this basic radiation

control equipment for almost 40 years, contamination of all types

was tracked from building to building, into vehicles and into workers’ homes.

In summary, workers are afraid of what may happen to them in

the future. They have worked in conditions which exposed them to

radiological and chemical contamination that have long legacy periods. These workers who served our Nation as veterans of the cold

war production era must not be forgotten. The workers at Paducah

and DOE sites deserve more than medical monitoring. They deserve coverage of the work force under the Federal workers’ compensation system that shifts the burden of proof onto the Federal

Government to demonstrate that workplace exposures didn’t lead

to illnesses in light of the Department of Energy’s deceit and failure to monitor workers for radiation and other types of risk; and,

two, health insurance coverage for all at-risk workers and their

spouses.

The harm to humans must be taken as seriously as the environmental harm to dirt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Jim H. Key follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JIM H. KEY, PAPER, ALLIED-INDUSTRIAL, CHEMICAL &

ENERGY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

I am Jim Key, an hourly electrician at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant

(‘‘PGDP’’) in Paducah, Kentucky. I was hired by Union Carbide in 1974 as a laborer,

and I have worked for a succession of contractors including Martin Marietta, Lockheed Martin, and most recently for the privatized USEC, Inc. Since 1989, I have

served as the Environment, Safety & Health Representative for Local 5-550 of the

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1The Local was chartered by the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union

(‘‘OCAW’’) on January 21, 1953.

Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers Union (‘‘PACE’’) and its

predecessor the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union (‘‘OCAW’’).1

PACE represents approximately 850 hourly production, maintenance, environmental restoration, waste management and escort workers who are employed by

USEC, Inc. Approximately 30 PACE workers who are performing waste management and cylinder management under USEC’s direction are scheduled to be

transitioned to the DOE’s Management and Integrating Contractor, Bechtel-Jacobs

LLC, on October 4, 1999.

At the outset, allow me to clarify for the record that neither I, nor PACE Local

5-550, is a party to any litigation with respect to health and safety issues at Paducah at this time.

DOE Headquarters Oversight Staff has included me in the daily out-briefs by the

DOE Oversight Team when they investigated the Paducah site during the Phase I

study between August 17 and September 3, 1999. It was disturbing to learn, however, that elements within DOE now want to exclude me from further participation,

apparently based on the erroneous charge that I had leaked my notes from the

outbriefs to the press. This is wholly inaccurate, and appears to be a function of

DOE looking for a scapegoat to blame for the publicity associated with the disclosure of the Oversight team report. DOE needs to provide public assurances that a

designated union representative will continue to be included in all outbriefs as the

Paducah investigation continues.

1. A Fundamental Concern of Workers at Paducah

If there is one message I want the Committee to receive from the workers at Paducah, it is this:

The majority of current and former workers are afraid that they may have been

exposed to substances like plutonium without proper protection and that they

will, as a result, be stricken with a fatal disease and lose their lives. I have this

fear from my 25 years of work at Paducah.

Allow me to describe some of the working conditions and the site’s historic failures to protect workers from exposure to everything from asbestos to radiation, and

I think you will understand that fear.

2. Brief History of My Personal Working Conditions and Lack of Exposure Monitoring to Transuranics

URANIUM FIRES: Shortly after I was hired in 1974, I joined a group of laborers

who were directed to take drum loads of uranium metal shavings from the machine

shop and dump them into deep holes behind an on site (C-746) warehouse. The uranium spontaneously ignited before the metal chips ever hit the bottom of the hole

and a pungent and irritating smoke enveloped us. A co-worker used a front loader

and dumped soil to cover over the fire. We don’t know if the fires were smothered

by the soil, because we were directed to go back and get another truckload of uranium shavings which also ignited when we dumped those drums. The reason the

uranium metal caught fire is that it is pyrophoric, which means that, under certain

conditions, the uranium will simply self-ignite and burn. To my knowledge, this

dumping ground has yet to be characterized, and is not included in the DOE’s 2006

Plan for Environmental Cleanup.

URANIUM DUSTS: I worked on the Cascade Upgrade Project (‘‘CIP-CUP’’), removing and installing the large motors that drive the thousands of compressors in

the enrichment process. During the disassembly process, 20-foot diameter converters

were hoisted by cranes with pipe openings that were emitting clouds of smoke. The

smoke was uranium hexaflouride (‘‘UF6’’) reacting with moisture in the air. When

this reaction occurs, uranium becomes airborne. My co-workers reported that the

smoke was so thick, they couldn’t even see the crane operators. Respirators were

not required.

ASBESTOS EXPOSURES: Between 1977 and 1982, I was assigned the responsibility for grinding asbestos transite to fit as covers over high voltage electrical cable.

I was provided no Personal Protective Equipment (‘‘PPE’’) or air monitoring. At the

end of the day, I went to the change room with my entire body covered with asbestos dust.

NO RESPIRATORY PROTECTION: I worked in the C-410 building which, beginning in 1953 and continuing through 1976, was used to convert plutonium-contaminated uranium, known as ‘‘reactor tails,’’ back into uranium hexaflouride for introduction into the uranium enrichment plant at Paducah. I recall having to hold my

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breath to get through clouds of unknown fumes in the C-410 building and there was

no respiratory protection required.

TRANSURANICS: In the mid-1970’s, I observed operators cleaning up spills of

‘‘black powder’’ (crushed spent reactor fuel that contained plutonium, neptunium,

and technetium-99) in the C-410 Feed Materials Building. Workers were not advised

on the presence of transuranics, or the need for special health physics monitoring.

The first time I ever learned plutonium or neptunium was used and employees were

at risk of exposure was in 1990, when Martin Marietta advised of the need for monitoring employee exposure to transuranics.

NO CONTAMINATION CONTROL: There were no formal contamination control

procedures in use at Paducah until 1990. Contamination control involves the use of

radiation detectors that workers pass through to make sure that they don’t have

contamination on their clothes, skin or shoes that they could track outside of the

building. Because the site didn’t have this basic radiation control equipment for almost 40 years, contamination of all kinds was tracked from building to building,

into vehicles, and off-site into workers’ homes.

3. DOE and Its Contractors Deliberately Failed to Protect Workers from Uptakes to

Neptunium and Plutonium For Nearly 40 Years

Union Carbide Nuclear Company knew in 1952 that the introduction of plutonium

contaminated ‘‘reactor tails’’ into the uranium enrichment process at Oak Ridge—

a process similar to that at Paducah—‘‘may require consideration of certain changes

to the plant health physics program’’, including a contamination control program.

This March 26, 1952 Union Carbide memo, which was declassified in 1995, states,

‘‘[S]ince plutonium has a specific activity approximately 100,00 times that of uranium, it may be noted that a very much smaller mass of plutonium is required to

produce a given surface or air contamination level than is necessary with uranium.’’

The memo added: ‘‘From a radiation standpoint, plutonium is considered somewhat

more toxic than is uranium with the result that the plant acceptable limit for plutonium air contamination should be lower than is the corresponding uranium limit.’’

Additionally, the memo stated that under certain conditions it would be necessary

to have specific contamination controls for plutonium, including labeling areas as

‘‘plutonium contaminated locations’’ and tagging equipment accordingly. (Memo attached)

Again in 1985, DOE identified the need to protect workers from exposure to

transuranics. The Joint Task Force on Uranium Recycle Material Processing (DOE/

OR-859), September 1985 concluded that ‘‘Paducah management, in conjunction

with DOE, should conduct an exposure assessment (to transuranics and fission

products) for those workers involved in the processing of recycled material at the

Paducah Feed Plant.’’ A similar recommendation was made to conduct an exposure

assessment at the Portsmouth, Ohio Oxide Conversion Facility. We have no evidence that these recommendations were acted upon or communicated to the workforce. (Excerpt attached)

In yet another report, Neptunium Experience at PGDP, K/ETO-30 (September

1990), DOE’s contractor concluded that ‘‘[t]he presence of transuranics [at Paducah]

requires significantly different control procedures.’’ (Excerpt attached)

What is clear is that the AEC and DOE contractors knew of the need to protect

workers from plutonium and other transuranics with special safeguards as early as

1952. The need for exposure assessment to transuranics was declared in 1985. Finally, 40 years after the Union Carbide memo cited above, Martin Marietta Energy

Systems commenced a contamination control program specifically for transuranics

(neptunium and plutonium). The Environment, Safety and Health Information Bulletin (February 29, 1992) states: ‘‘The program demands a higher level of compliance

with Health Physics Practices and lowers the acceptable limits for air and surface

contamination in the plant.’’ (Excerpt attached).

In 1990, Martin Marietta commenced a voluntary program for workers to provide

a simulated 24-hour sample for transuranics. The 30 people who volunteered, however, were not necessarily those who were most at risk for transuranic uptakes, i.e.

those who worked in the feed plant buildings or the enrichment process areas. Approximately 16 hourly workers were included—less than 2% of the hourly workforce.

The results were invalidated, however. On February 11, 1991, Martin Marietta

Energy Systems announced it would ‘‘invalidate’’ the sample results due to ‘‘several

concerns and discrepancies’’ at the contract laboratory that performed the work

(memo attached). Martin Marietta asked that employees resubmit new samples, and

announced that Oak Ridge National Laboratories would re-analyze samples. Only

7 workers elected to participate in the re-test—three of which were hourly. Apparent mistrust of Oak Ridge National Labs, a DOE controlled operation, was cited as

a reason why far fewer Paducah workers elected to participate in the follow-up

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2Trip Report, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Henry B. Spitz, January 29, 1993, attached

to Memorandum to File from J.H. Stebbings, NIOSH, February 8, 1993

tests. To rectify the concern, the local union identified independent labs, but Martin

Marietta completely rejected their use.

Results for the 7 workers were reported on July 15, 1991. All 7 reported less than

detectable levels of plutonium and other transuranics. However, the results from the

original 30 bioassay sample results and the written analysis of what went wrong

at the contract laboratory have never been disclosed. Recently, I was told by USEC,

which controls access to DOE’s information, that this particular information about

the 30 bioassay samples is ‘‘sensitive’’ and ‘‘management is reluctant to release this

information due to concern about how it would be used’’.

If management is correct that the contract laboratory simply erred in its performance, there should be nothing to fear from the full and free examination of this data.

However, such needless secrecy breeds mistrust. Perhaps, the Commerce Committee

could assist in securing this data for the workers.

DOE claims that it has historically provided whole body counting machines for detecting internal dose. According to a 1993 NIOSH Memorandum 2, Paducah used the

mobile in vivo monitoring system from Oak Ridge Y-12 and could only schedule

exams infrequently. The detection system produced results that were ‘‘unreliable

and erratic’’ according to NIOSH, and it was not usually possible to perform an in

vivo exam immediately after a suspected uptake by a worker since the mobile system was either not on site or out of service being repaired. Since uranium processed

at Paducah was typically quite soluble, ‘‘the lack of an in vivo examination on demand was a serious deficiency’’, according to NIOSH.

The reality of plutonium contamination in the production process did not register

with the overwhelming majority of the hourly workforce at Paducah until an article

appeared in the Washington Post on August 8, 1999. Why was the workforce in the

dark when Martin Marietta had instituted a voluntary testing for transuranics in

1990? After 1990, when the term ‘‘transuranics’’ was introduced to the hourly workforce, a listing of specific radioactive elements, such as plutonium, was rarely included in employee communications, and when plutonium was mentioned, it was labeled as a ‘‘trace’’ quantity. It is true that some people received limited training on

the presence of plutonium. But even today, the current basic training manuals (General Employee Training, Radiological Worker I and Radiological Worker II) that

every employee must study to work at the plant do not communicate the presence

of plutonium and neptunium.

5. Workers’ Locker Rooms Were ‘‘Hot’’

Reactor tails and feed processing stopped when the government was ordered to

buy UF6 from outside vendors in the late 1970’s. The so-called ‘‘feed’’ building (C410) remained in use for 13 more years for support activities, such as the locker

room for changing, and storage and repair of computers. Surveys of the C-410 locker

area in November 1989 found lockers had up to 350,000 dpm (disintegrations per

minute) of fixed contamination. The toilet and shower areas had 175,000 dpm. The

computer storage area had 175,000 dpm. By comparison, the limit for off site release

is 5,000 dpm for fixed contamination. At these levels, the DOE Radiation Control

Manual suggests that these areas should have been posted as a ‘‘contamination

area’’ or as a ‘‘high contamination area,’’ and, thus, should not be used as a clean

change area. Further, these surveys do not identify what isotopes were in the buildings. The reported contamination could have included some amounts of plutonium

The C-410 Feed Building was closed shortly thereafter. The C-410 building, as

well as C-420 and C-340 (a uranium metals production and hydroflouric acid production building), are not adequately characterized, and no plan or funding exists

for decontaminating and decommissioning. Animals have taken up residence in the

C-410 building and are tracking contamination out of the building.

To the best of my knowledge, the DOE contractors did not require workers to provide bioassay samples to determine if there had been ingestion of plutonium, neptunium or other transuranics until 1991. If any sampling did occur, internal dose or

burden results of these transuranics were not reported to workers. Although the

union has requested it, there has been no epidemiological morbidity or mortality

study at the site.

5. Current Worker Safety Problems Identified by the Oversight Team on the DOE

Part of the Paducah site

The DOE oversight team made a number of observations, including:

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• the air sampling process used at the site today does not ensure that air sample

results are effectively used to establish the need for respiratory protection, or

that the respirators now in use provide adequate worker protection. • there has not been adequate radio-isotopic characterization, adversely impacting

the effectiveness of the rad protection programs. • radiation control procedures are generic and may need to be tailored to specific

jobs and hazards. • radiation control training doesn’t adequately address radiological hazards, such as

transuranics, nor do rad work permits describe the radiological hazards.

If these and other worker safety findings are validated, DOE will need to take

hands-on steps to make sure that the contractor and subcontractor radiation protection programs are brought into compliance with the Price Anderson Act regulations.

The DOE team made two additional significant observations:

• Release criteria for radiologically contaminated property is not being consistently

used and justified. For example, fluorine cells were sold to private industry

without regard to the presence of detectable plutonium. • DOE’s oversight of contractor and subcontractor activities has been very limited

The two findings are particularly significant, as DOE has announced a program

to recycle and selling a major part of the 60,000 tons of radiologically contaminated

metals that are stored at Paducah. DOE is proposing to recycle 9,350 tons of

radiologically contaminated nickel that has become contaminated throughout

(volumetrically) with uranium, plutonium, neptunium and technetium-99.

This proposal is being made by DOE even though the NRC has not established

a de minimus standard for releasing volumetrically contaminated metals into unrestricted, every day commerce. Every effort to permit this activity has been met with

widespread public opposition from the public and the scrap-based steel industry.

The oversight team’s observations raise fundamental questions about whether

DOE should be trusted to control the free release of massive quantities of radioactive materials into the scrap metal market that could result in intimate human

contact. This includes everyday items such as baby carriages, knives and forks, surgical implants such as hip replacements, iron tonics and eyeglass frames.

The Oak Ridge Operations Office has not conducted an intensive safety oversight

review at Paducah in many years. The Paducah Plant only has 10 federal employees, and cannot be expected—given its scarce resources—to carry out a vigorous

oversight program. What the situation demonstrates is that you cannot oversee a plant the size and complexity of Paducah from 350 miles away by

telephone. Yet this is how Oak Ridge manages Paducah. Congress needs to

establish a Paducah Operations Office with sufficient federal staff, budget

and contracting authority to manage the site.

DOE also found that Bechtel-Jacobs’ oversight of subcontractors has not been visible and effective. Consequently, the DOE observed, many DOE requirements are not

being effectively implemented. This raises a red flag about DOE’s embrace of the

Management & Integrating contact approach—a model that DOE has touted as the

wave of the future.

The DOE team found that information provided to the public has been delayed,

is in forms not clearly understood by the general public and stakeholder groups, and

leads to a perception that DOE and the contractor are withholding information from

the public. This observation validates the experience of PACE, which has been

stonewalled in its efforts to obtain basic health and safety data, such as requests

for data on leukemia incidence, bioassay data, and in vivo monitoring data for Paducah workers surveyed at Fernald.

6. DOE Headquarters Oversight Efforts Have Been Inadequate

The Department of Energy’s Office of Enforcement is responsible for enforcing the

radiation protection regulations that were adopted pursuant to the Price-Anderson

Act Amendments at 10 CFR Part 835. To my knowledge, they have never conducted

an inspection at the Paducah Plant. DOE has only assigned 4 inspectors to cover

the DOE nuclear complex nationwide. Congress needs to beef up DOE’s Enforcement capacity, because DOE doesn’t seem willing to do it on its own.

7. Summary

Workers are afraid of what may happen to them in the future. They have worked

in conditions that have exposed them to radiological and chemical contamination

that have long latency periods and can have catastrophic results. These workers—

who served our nation as veterans of the Cold War production era—must not be forgotten.

Medical monitoring by independent, certified occupational physicians is needed

today to identify diseases which hopefully can be caught early enough to be successVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00301 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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fully treated. DOE’s medical surveillance program needs to be expanded and funded

so that any nuclear worker who wants a medical exam at Paducah, Portsmouth and

Oak Ridge can obtain one. Monitoring is imperative, but without any other remedy,

monitoring is simply a process to watch people get sick and die.

The workers at Paducah and other DOE sites deserve more than just medical

monitoring. They deserve:

(1) coverage for the workforce under a federal workers compensation system that

reverses the burden of proof onto the federal government to demonstrate that

workplace exposures didn’t lead to illness, in light of DOE’s failure to monitor

workers for radiation and other toxic risks, and

(2) health insurance coverage for all at risk workers and their spouses through retirement.

The harm to workers must be taken as seriously as is the harm to dirt. Resources

must be committed the human beings who were unknowingly exposed to these many

hazards.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Key. Mr. Jenkins.

TESTIMONY OF GARLAND E. JENKINS

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, good

morning. My name is Garland E. Jenkins. I don’t normally go by

the name of Garland. People generally call me Bud. I live at 2744

Lake View Church Road, Benton, Kentucky. I’m here today to testify about conditions at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in

western Kentucky. I’ve never testified before a congressional committee or subcommittee before, so I hope you’ll be patient with me.

But I think what I have to say is important. My main concern is

the safety of my fellow workers and the neighborhood.

I have lived in the Paducah area all my life, for over 30 years.

The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant is not a particularly beautiful place but the area around it is. The area immediately next to

the site is a wildlife refuge and used frequently for hunting, fishing, et cetera. I’ve spent a good deal of time there myself with my

family.

I have spent my whole working career at the Paducah site. I

began working there in 1968 after graduating from high school and

getting out of the military. I still work there. I began working there

for Union Carbide. I’ve also worked for Martin Marietta Energy

Systems, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Lockheed Martin Utility Services, and United States Enrichment Corporation. So I’ve got

over 30 years’ experience at the site and with its operations and

working conditions.

Looking back on my experience at the Paducah site, I guess you

could say it’s almost hard to believe. But what I’m going to tell you

is the absolute truth. I worked for a long time as one of the operators in the C-410 and C-420 plant. This plant took various kinds

of uranium from outside sources, converted it chemically to black

oxide, uranium dioxide, then to greensalt, or UF4, and finally to

uranium hexafluoride or UF6. The UF6 was the feedstock for the

enrichment cascades.

Around 1973, Union Carbide began to resume using uranium

that had been recovered from spent reactor fuel. We called this

stuff RT tails, or rat tails. It was pulverized into a very fine powder

in Building 400 and then it come to the 410 feed plant. When it

was moved to the 410 feed plant, it came to us in hoppers, with

the consistency of flour, but much heavier. I know that we handled

many thousands of tons of these RT tails. I know now, but didn’t

299

know then, that these RT tails were contaminated with plutonium,

neptunium and other radioactive substances.

The work environment in C-410 and C-420 was awful. The air

was extremely dusty with black oxide, greensalt and chemical

smoke from UF6 releases. Sometimes it was difficult to breathe.

Two exhaust fans blew the contaminated air outside, but as far as

I am aware, these releases were not reported. We didn’t use respirators unless it got so bad that breathing or seeing was impossible, so we were constantly inhaling the dust and fumes. There

were no devices to measure radioactivity in the air. We wore no radioactivity protective clothing, just regular white overalls and work

gloves. We ate meals in these contaminated clothes. Of course we

often showered before leaving the plant, but still these were just

regular showers, nothing special. So often we would still be contaminated when we got home. Bed linens in the morning would

often be green or black from the black oxide and greensalt.

Waste management practices was pretty bad. Five ton hoppers of

RT tails and yellowcake uranium frequently spilled, and dust

would fly everywhere and eventually settle on the floor. At the end

of the shift we would sweep it into a dumpster along with the regular nonradioactive trash. All would be taken to a sanitary landfill,

just like regular household trash. I believe other contaminated materials were also sent to sanitary landfills. When this contaminated

stuff spilled outside, we hosed it down into ditches, usually at

night.

I also worked on recycling metals, such as gold, from nuclear

weapons. To my knowledge, none of this gold was ever surveyed for

radioactivity before it was released. This is even though the recycling operations took place in the same contaminated building

where plutonium contaminated RT tails were pulverized.

There was just no effective radiation protection. We were told

that the uranium substances we were working with were safe and

posed no threat to our health or to the health of our families. We

were told we were not getting any dose. We were even told that

materials were safe enough to eat. There were no health physics

professionals present in the workplace. There were no radiation

warning signs or markings, no restricted areas where entry was

controlled, and no radiation maps of the building. We had film

badges but they weren’t checked very often. There was no regular

checking for uranium that we might have breathed or consumed,

and it would still be in our body. Every other year or so, a truckmounted body counter would arrive at the site to take whole body

counts. I remember the technicians who ran the counter taking the

readings over and over again, saying they could not believe the

numbers. We were never told the results. I went to a special facility near Cincinnati once for a whole body count and was assured

everything was okay but was never given the results.

These are just some of my experiences at the Paducah plant. I

am not sure of what radiation dose I received over the years. I am

now sure it was extremely high but I certainly don’t believe the

contractor’s records. I’ve always believed what I was doing at the

Paducah plant was important to the national defense. I’m proud to

have played a small part in the cold war and in protecting this

great country from harm. Thank you for listening to me.

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[The prepared statement of Garland E. Jenkins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARLAND E. ‘‘BUD’’ JENKINS

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, good morning. My name is Garland E. Jenkins. I don’t usually go by the name Garland. People usually call me

Bud. I live at 2744 Lakeview Church Road, Benton, Kentucky. I’m here today to testify about conditions at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Site in western Kentucky. I’ve never testified before a Congressional Committee or Subcommittee before

so I hope you will be patient with me. But I think what I have to say is important.

My main concern is the safety of my fellow workers, past and present, the safety

of their families, and the safety of my neighbors.

I’ve lived in the Paducah, Kentucky area for over thirty years. The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant itself is not especially beautiful. But the area around it, and

western Kentucky, is nice. The area immediately next to the Site is a wildlife refuge

and is used frequently for hiking and fishing. I’ve spent a good deal of time there

myself with my family.

I’ve spent my whole working career at the Paducah site. I began working there

in 1968 after graduating from high school and serving in the military. I still work

there.

I began there working for Union Carbide. I’ve also worked for Martin Marietta

Energy Systems, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Lockheed Martin Utility Services, and U.S. Enrichment Corporation. So I’ve got over thirty years experience at

the Site, and with its operations and working conditions.

Looking back on my experience at the Paducah Site, I guess you could say it’s

almost hard to believe. But what I’m going to tell you is the absolute truth. I worked

for a long time as one of the operators in the C 410 and C 420 feed plant. This plant

took various kinds of uranium from outside sources and converted it chemically to

black oxide (or uranium dioxide), then to greensalt (or UF4), and finally to uranium

hexafluoride (or UF6). The UF6 was the feedstock for the enrichment cascades.

Around 1973, Union Carbide began to resume using uranium that had been recovered from reactor spent fuel. We called this stuff RT tails, or ‘‘rat tails.’’ It was pulverized into a very fine powder in Building C 400, where I have also worked. Then

it was moved to the feed plant. It came to us there in 5-ton hoppers, with the consistency of flour, but much heavier. I know that we handled many thousands of tons

of these RT tails while I was there. I know now, but didn’t know then, that these

RT tails were contaminated with plutonium, neptunium, and other radioactive substances.

The work environment in C 410 and C 420 was awful. The air was extremely

dusty with black oxide, greensalt, and chemical smoke from UF6 releases. Sometimes it was difficult to breathe. Two exhaust fans blew the contaminated air outside, but as far as I am aware these releases were not reported. We didn’t use respirators, unless it got so bad that breathing or seeing was impossible, so we constantly inhaled the dust and fumes. There were no devices to measure radioactivity

in the air. We wore no radiological protective clothing, just regular white overalls

and work gloves. We ate meals in these contaminated clothes. Of course, we often

showered before leaving the plant, but these were just regular showers—nothing

special. So often we’d come home still contaminated. Bed linens in the morning

would often be green or black from the black oxide and greensalt.

Waste management practices were also pretty bad. Five ton hoppers of RT tails

and yellowcake uranium frequently spilled, and dust would fly everywhere and

eventually settle on the floor. At the end of the shift we would sweep it up into a

dumpster along with the regular non-radioactive trash. All would be taken to the

sanitary landfill just like regular household trash. I believe other contaminated material was also sent to sanitary landfills. When this contaminated stuff spilled outside, we’d hose it down into a ditch, usually at night.

I also worked on recycling metals, such as gold, from nuclear weapons. To my

knowledge, none of this gold was ever surveyed for radiation before it was released.

This was so even though the recycling operations took place in the same contaminated building where the plutonium contaminated RT tails were pulverized.

There was just no effective radiation protection. We were told that the uranium

substances we were working with were safe and posed no threat to our health, or

to the health of our families. We were told we were not getting any ‘‘dose’’. We were

even told the materials were safe enough to eat. There were no health physics professionals present in the workplace. There were no radiation warning signs or markings, no restricted areas where entry was controlled, no radiation maps of buildings.

We had film badges, but they weren’t checked very often. There was no regular

checking for uranium we might have breathed or consumed, and would still be on

301

our bodies. Every other year or so a truck-mounted whole body counter would arrive

at the Site to take whole body counts of some of the workers. I remember the technicians who ran the counter taking the readings over and over again, saying they

didn’t believe the numbers. But we were never told the results. I went to a special

facility near Cincinnati once for a whole body count, and was assured afterwards

that everything was fine.

All this about lack of safety precautions was true, even though, as I know now,

the RT tails we were working with and breathing were contaminated with radioactive plutonium, neptunium, and technicium.

These are just some of my experiences at the Paducah Site. I’m not sure what

radiation dose I received over the years. I’m now sure that it was extremely high.

I certainly don’t believe the contractor records, but even those show my dose exceeding federal limits. About five years ago, I had to have the lower part of my esophagus replaced surgically with a plastic tube because of corrosive damage there. I’ve

been told by my doctor that there is a 99% chance that the situation will become

cancerous.

I’ve always believed what I was doing at the Paducah Plant Site was important

to the national defense. I’m proud to have played a small part in the Cold War and

in protecting this great country from harm. But if I had to do it all over again, I’d

be much less trusting of what my contractor bosses were telling me. I probably

wouldn’t have worked there at all, knowing what I now know. Many of my good

friends are dead, or dying. I always wonder whether Plant conditions caused their

sicknesses and deaths.

I want to do what I can to make sure that conditions at the Site are improved.

You know, we trusted the contractors when they told us everything was OK, that

we weren’t getting any dose, and that none of the RT tails or other stuff was dangerous. We trusted them to record our doses correctly and tell us if we were in trouble. I’m darn mad that these big corporations used us to earn huge fees from the

Government for so-called good safety performance. I think we should make them

pay some of this back. The whistleblowers have agreed to give half of any recovery

we get in the qui tam lawsuit to the Natural Resources Defense Council for protection of the environment.

Thank you for listening to me.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

Mr. Fowler.

TESTIMONY OF RONALD B. FOWLER

Mr. FOWLER. Good morning. My name is Ronald B. Fowler. I am

a Section Manager for Training and an Applied Health Physicist

employed by the United States Enrichment Corporation at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. I have worked at the site since

1991; most of that time for my previous employers, Lockheed Martin Utility Systems and its predecessor, Martin Marietta Utility

Systems.

I am a health physicist. Health physics is the profession responsible for protecting workers and the public from excessive and unnecessary exposure to radiation. Health physics is supposed to be

a rigorous part of every nuclear facility in this country. Prior to

coming to Paducah, I worked as a health physicist for several commercial nuclear power plants. I am certified by the National Registry for Radiologic Technologists. I have extensive experience and

training in applied health physics. I have trained numerous other

health physicists throughout the nuclear industry. Earlier in my

career, I developed a series of health physics and reactor training

videos that have been widely distributed throughout the industry.

I have received numerous awards, commendations, and promotions

in my work. My resume is attached to my written testimony.

When I first arrived at Paducah in 1991, I was astounded. I discovered that there was essentially no health physics program at

this site, and the situation had apparently persisted for 37 years.

302

This was all the more surprising in that the Paducah plant deals

with extremely high levels of radioactive particulates compared to

a commercial nuclear power plant. That generally means more protection is required, not less, especially to guard against the inhalation and possible ingestion. To protect workers and the public,

there are certain things that are part and parcel of any proper

health physics program—in these circumstances, access controls,

placarding, radiation maps, airborne monitors, detailed exposure

records, thermoluminescent dosimeters, effluent controls and monitors, radiation training, radiation protective clothing, and a

trained health physics staff. These things, however, were virtually

nonexistent or severely lacking at the Paducah facility.

I was hired to help Paducah develop a health physics training

program. Needless to say, I was not a popular person among management. I kept pointing out many serious defects and infractions

in the health physics area. For years, it was like scooping water

out of the ocean. I was bucking a management culture that had

told workers for decades there were no health risks at Paducah, the

radiation will not harm you, and that you could eat radioactive particulate substances commonly used at the site; that regulations are

for other facilities but not Paducah; that production takes place

over precedence, over health.

What I was not told about at the time, and I only discovered

much more recently, was just how widespread and significant the

transuranic contaminants like plutonium and neptunium in the environment were in and around the site. I was unaware of tens of

thousands of tons of plutonium-contaminated feedstocks that had

been brought to the site for years for processing. Had I known this

initially, my concerns would have been compounded manyfold, as

they are today.

I became a whistleblower when I was told the plant security

force had begun posting my picture with a bullet hole through my

forehead. Security guards began following me wherever I went.

They intentionally damaged my vehicle. This scared me and my

wife to death. I had already been denied promotions, and management was taking other actions to harass and intimidate me for my

continuing reporting of defects. I wanted to leave the facility, but

I have a wife and a sick mother-in-law I have to support.

Last year, I went to a law firm in Washington staffed by nuclear

engineer attorneys. They assisted me in preparing a complaint to

the Department of Labor. This was not a health physics complaint

but a plain white harassment and intimidation complaint. Ironically, we offered Lockheed and USEC to settle my complaint with

me by my retiring early. They refused, calling my concerns insignificant. In retrospect, it is perhaps fortunate for all of the Paducah

workers and residents that they did this, because later on I found

documents showing significant offsite contamination of plutonium.

My attorneys found this extremely curious and they contacted Dr.

Cochran of the Natural Resources Defense Council. They also consulted with other technical experts. Plutonium was not supposed to

exist in any significant quantities at a uranium enrichment facility.

They visited me with Dr. Cochran and toured the site. They asked

me to attempt to locate other documents showing onsite and offsite

303

contamination. I searched some of the document files earlier this

year, and I was truly astonished at what I found.

With the assistance of my colleague, Chuck Deuschle, I found the

results of radiological surveys taken on- and offsite in the 1990’s

showing activity levels literally tens of thousands of times higher

than background levels of radiation. There were dozens of samples

of plutonium and neptunium found in ditches offsite, some more

than 100 times the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s release limit.

There were radiological surveys of common work areas showing radiation tens to thousands of times higher than the prescribed action levels, in areas like the cafeteria, the kitchen, locker rooms,

storage rooms and the parking lots. There were indications of radioactive wastes going into sanitary landfills offsite, of lagoon-like

sludge containing plutonium nearly 2,000 times the level of NRC

release limits.

As a health physics training manager, I had never been told of

these very serious radiological conditions. These findings were

squarely at odds with annual environmental reports prepared by

my superiors stating all laws, regulations, and DOE orders were

fully complied with. Needless to say, most of the workers were also

in the dark.

Now, like many of my colleagues and Paducah neighbors, I’m

downright scared. I have shed real tears over the many friends and

colleagues at the site who were deceived and now, like Mr. Jenkins,

suffer real health consequences. I worry constantly about the recreational users of nearby Kentucky and Federal recreation areas

who continue to engage in activities on contaminated land and waters. I recently asked for my radiation dose records from Paducah

and received a supposed dose history reporting that I had received

no dose whatsoever for all but two of the more than 30 quarters

I have worked at the site. These records are clearly fraudulent.

On virtually a weekly basis, even now, I continue to report

health physics and other safety infractions to management. Those

infractions have continued, right up to the present month. Even

last April, I noticed unplacarded trucks with uranium hexafluoride

cylinders parked in downtown Paducah in an unsecured open lot,

with children on bicycles riding freely among them. It is only recently that I view my reports as something less than futile.

I would like to thank Secretary Richardson for the safety standdown he ordered at the site. It was the very first sign that somebody in authority is finally paying attention to the workers and the

people of Paducah. There is a long way to go. In my view, the government owes it to the Paducah workhorse to demand proper rad

controls, to clean up the site and surrounding environs, and to

monitor the workers’ health. I believe those at fault should pay for

these efforts and should compensate the workers.

Finally, the government owes it to the workforce to participate

in the necessary cleanup so as to preserve the jobs. Thank you very

much.

[The prepared statement of Ronald B. Fowler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RONALD B. FOWLER

Good Morning. My name is Ronald B. Fowler. I am a Section Manager for Training and an Applied Health Physicist employed by the United States Enrichment

Corporation at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. I have worked at the site since

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1991, most of that time for my previous employers, Lockheed Martin Utility Systems and its predecessor Martin Marietta Utility Systems.

I am a health physicist. Health physics is the profession responsible for protecting

workers and the public from excessive and unnecessary exposure to radiation.

Health physics is supposed to be a rigorous part of every nuclear facility in this

country. Prior to coming to Paducah, I worked as a health physicist for several commercial nuclear power plants. I am certified by the National Registry for Radiologic

Technologists. I have extensive experience and training in applied health physics,

and I have trained numerous other health physicists throughout the nuclear industry. Earlier in my career, I developed a series of health physics and reactor training

videos that have been widely distributed throughout the industry. I have received

numerous awards, commendations, and promotions in my work. My resume is attached to my written testimony.

When I first arrived at Paducah in 1991, I was astounded to discover that there

was essentially no health physics program at the site, and that this situation had

apparently persisted for at least 37 years. This was all the more surprising in that

the Paducah plant site deals with extremely high levels of particulates compared

to a nuclear power plant. That generally means more protection is required, not

less—especially to guard against inhalation and ingestion. To protect workers and

the public, there are certain things that are part and parcel of any proper health

physics program—in these circumstances, access controls, placarding, radiation

maps, airborne monitors, detailed exposure records, thermoluminescent dosimeters,

effluent controls and monitors, radiation training, radiation-protective clothing, and

a trained health physics staff. These things, however, were virtually non-existent or

severely lacking at Paducah.

I was hired to help Paducah develop a health physics training program. Needless

to say, I was not a popular person among the management, since I kept pointing

out the many serious defects and infractions in the health physics area. For years,

it was a lot like scooping water out of the ocean. I was bucking a management culture that had told workers for decades that there were no health hazards at Paducah, that radiation will not harm you, that you can eat the radioparticulate substances commonly used at the site, that regulations are for other facilities but not

Paducah, that production takes precedence over health.

What I was not told about at the time, and only discovered much more recently,

was just how widespread and significant were the transuranic contaminants like

plutonium and neptunium in the environment at and around the site. I was unaware that tens of thousands of tons of plutonium-contaminated feedstocks had been

brought to the site for years for processing. Had I known this initially, my concerns

would have been compounded manyfold, as they are today.

I became a whistleblower when I was told the plant security force had begun posting my picture with a bullethole through my forehead. Security guards began following me wherever I went, and my car was damaged. That scared me and my wife

to death. I had already been denied a promotion, and management was taking other

actions to harass and intimidate me for continuing to report defects. I wanted to

leave the facility, but I have a wife and a sick mother-in-law to support.

Last year I went to a law firm here in Washington staffed by nuclear engineerattorneys. They assisted me in preparing a complaint to the Department of Labor.

This was not a health physics complaint, but a plain vanilla harassment and intimidation complaint. Ironically, we offered Lockheed and USEC to settle my complaint

with me retiring early. They refused, calling my concerns insignificant. In retrospect, it is perhaps fortunate for all Paducah workers and residents that they did.

Because later on, I found documents showing significant off-site contamination of

plutonium. My attorneys found this extremely curious and contacted Dr. Cochran

of the Natural Resources Defense Council. They also consulted with other technical

experts. Plutonium was not supposed to exist in any significant quantities at a uranium gaseous diffusion plant. They visited me with Dr. Cochran and toured the site.

They asked me to attempt to locate other documents showing on-site and off-site

contamination. I searched some of the document files at the site early this year. I

was truly astounded by what I found.

With the assistance of my college Chuck Deuschle, I found the results of radiological surveys taken on and off-site in the 1990s showing activity levels literally

tens of thousands of times higher than background levels of radiation. There were

dozens of samples of plutonium and neptunium found in ditches offsite, some more

than 100 times the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s release limit. There were radiological surveys of common work areas showing radiation tens to thousands of times

higher than the prescribed action levels for the plant, in areas like the cafeteria,

the kitchen, locker rooms, storage rooms, and in parking lots. There were indications of radioactive wastes having gone into the sanitary landfills off-site, of lagoon

305

sludge containing neptunium more than 2000 times the level of NRC release limits.

As a health physics training manager, I had never been told of these very serious

radiological conditions. These findings were squarely at odds with annual environmental reports prepared by my superiors stating that all laws, regulations, and

DOE Orders were being fully complied with. Needless to say, most all of the workers were also in the dark.

Now, like many of my colleagues and Paducah neighbors, I’m just downright

scared. I have shed real tears over the many friends and colleagues at the site

whowere deceived, and who now, like Mr. Jenkins, suffer real health consequences.

I worry constantly about the recreational users of nearby Kentucky and federal

recreation areas who continue to engage in activities on contaminated land and waters. I recently asked for my radiation dose records from Paducah and received a

supposed dose history reporting that I had received no dose whatsoever for all but

two of the more than 30 quarters I have worked at the site. These records are clearly fraudulent.

On virtually a weekly basis now, I continue to report health physics and other

safety infractions to management. Those infractions have continued, right up to the

present month. Last April I noticed unplacarded trucks with uranium hexafluoride

cylinders parked in downtown Paducah in an unsecured open lot, with children on

bicycles riding freely among them. It is only recently that I view my reports as

something less than futile. I thank Secretary Richardson for the safety stand down

he ordered last week at the site. It was the first sign that someone in authority is

finally paying attention to the workers and people of Paducah.

There is a long way to go. In my view, the government owes it to the Paducah

workforce to demand proper radiological controls, to clean up the site and surrounding environs, and to monitor the workers’ health. I believe those at fault

should pay for these efforts, and should compensate all workers. Finally, the government owes it to the workforce to participate in the necessary cleanup, so as to preserve jobs.

Thank you for your interest in these matters.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

Mr. Graves.

TESTIMONY OF M. BRAD GRAVES

Mr. GRAVES. Good morning. My name is Brad Graves, I’m an employee with Lockheed Martin Energy Systems. Due to the timeframe of my invitation, a written statement had been waived in my

case, so I will be reading from notes here. Please forgive me. It is

important to note that I am not a relator in this particular action,

however I am here to provide information relative to the radiological conditions at the Paducah site while I was there.

I have been nationally registered by the National Registry of Radiation Protection Technologists and I’m comprehensively certified

by the American Board of Health Physics in this practice. As such,

a lot of my information that I present to you will probably be technical in nature. If I use units that you don’t understand or if I say

things that you have confusion about, please ask me to repeat. I

will be happy to.

Thank you for your invitation and your time gentlemen, ladies.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

Dr. Cochran.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS B. COCHRAN

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to

appear before your committee to discuss the health and safety

problems at Paducah. My name is Thomas B. Cochran, I’m the Director of the Nuclear Program at the Natural Resources Defense

Council.

After hearing from Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Fowler and the other

witnesses, I don’t think you need to hear from me, but I’m going

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to take this opportunity in any case. I have four brief messages I

want to leave with the committee. As Mr. Jenkins had said, we are

here because we are concerned about the health and safety of the

workers at Paducah and the citizens living near the plant.

Second, the problems we are addressing are current. They are

not just problems of the past. While the situation has improved in

recent years, basic worker protection problems persist. Contractors

are violating basic radiation protection regulations as we speak.

The mind-set that has led to the deaths and illness of workers such

as Joe Harding from past exposures persist at the Paducah plant

and unnecessary deaths and illnesses will continue unless there is

a radical change, a sea change, in the culture of plant management.

Third, the levels of exposure and contamination at the facility

and offsite are not insignificant as some have suggested. The levels

in some cases are well above regulatory limits. Moreover, it has

been a basic tenet of the health physics profession since 1949 that

for prudence, it is an obligation to keep radiation exposures as low

as reasonably achievable in light of economic and technical and

practicality considerations. This ALARA regulation is embodied in

EPA regulations, NRC regulations, DOE orders, it is a basic tenet

of the profession, and it is not being applied properly at the Paducah plant today.

Fourth, the Federal Government, the State of Kentucky, and its

citizens and workers at Paducah have been lied to. As a consequence, we do not know how bad the situation really is. An independent investigation is needed.

In the Paducah case, the qui tam case under the False Claims

Act and the issues before this committee involve four categories of

health and safety issues. First, excessive exposure and poor or unlawful control of radiation exposure to workers; excessive releases

and insufficient or unlawful control of radioactivity released offsite;

third, unlawful disposal of radioactive wastes; and, fourth, improper recycling into commerce of scrap materials contaminated

with radioactivity.

With regard to the first, there is an appalling lack of health

physics protection for workers at the Paducah plant. Until the late

1980’s, the plant had no professional health physics program.

Workers were neither advised of the hazards of working with uranium nor monitored for exposure to uranium and other radioactive

isotopes. The workplace was not properly monitored and lacked the

proper controls over contaminated spaces. Clearly the plant managers were grossly violating DOE worker safety regulations.

This week I interviewed a former plant worker who left the site

in 1992 after working there for 39 years. He was completely uninformed about even the most basic health physics concepts that

workers are required to know. He said to me, ‘‘It’s all Greek to me.’’

Most or some of these deficiencies were confirmed by a recent

DOE audit which led to the Secretary of Energy ordering a 24-hour

stand-down at the plant while the work force received additional

health physics training. Indeed, my review of DOE’s auditors’ findings this week led me to believe that the factual allegations of our

lawsuit are being affirmed in most of their key particulars. The

audit also illustrates that the problem is a current problem and not

307

just a historic one. The worker conditions would be bad enough had

the uranium been the only significant radioactive element present

at the plant. We now know that 100,000 tons of feedstock contaminated with fission products and transuranic elements were processed at the plant.

We respectfully request Congress to ensure that a competent,

independent firm systematically search the historical records at

Hanford, Paducah, Savannah River and Oak Ridge for information

on the contamination levels of this recycled uranium feed, including how the contamination levels changed over time. We also respectfully request that Congress immediately demand that DOE

order its staff and its contractors at the Paducah, Portsmouth, and

Oak Ridge gaseous diffusion plants to maintain the integrity of any

physical and electronic evidence at these plants as well as any documentation and electronic files that could be useful to reconstruct

worker exposure and contractor and DOE culpability.

From my visit to the Paducah plant earlier this year, I found

areas outside the security fence that were contaminated with radioactivity and not properly labeled. The public had access to areas

that are or may be contaminated with radioactivity in excess of appropriate levels. These areas should no longer be used for recreational purposes without a comprehensive offsite characterization, access controls, proper placarding and marking and removal

of radioactive sources at a minimum. The lack of protective measures I witnessed offsite, given what I presently know, was astounding. There is an inadequate effort by the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant management to minimize the transport of radioactivity

offsite by controlling the flow of contaminated water offsite via numerous ditches. We now know from DOE auditors that the sampling data reported to DOE by the contractors apparently omitted

fugitive emissions from the plant which may have amounted to

thousands of kilograms of contaminated material.

Together with the onsite conditions, these violations indicate that

the contractors at Paducah have been and are today operating in

callous disregard for the basic tenets of the health physics profession by failing to keep exposures to radiation as low as reasonably

achievable, taking into account technical, practical and economic

considerations. Uranium is a carcinogen. It is also chemically toxic.

It will destroy your kidneys if you get too much uranium in your

kidneys. It is unwise and unlawful to expose people to uranium unnecessarily, and one is not permitted to release it into the accessible environment indiscriminately.

Congress should investigate whether the cleanup contractor systematically performs and documents ALARA analyses before undertaking significant decontamination efforts at the site. According

to workers at Paducah, including the other relators, the contractors

illegally buried materials contaminated with radioactivity offsite,

including what has been characterized as a sanitary landfill. The

recent discovery of radioactive black ooze represents another unlawful offsite dump. Most importantly, and this is attached to my

testimony, a Kentucky police investigator reportedly found criminal

dumping activity at an around the site in 1991. And DOE contractor personnel were reportedly told by their contractor bosses

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that if they did not dump radioactivity wastes illegally onto Kentucky land, they would be fired.

This demands a thorough investigation. Was DOE aware of this?

Was the report followed up? If not, why not? Is a new criminal investigation warranted? With DOE’s approval, radioactive wastes

that have been dumped offsite illegally are apparently now being

shipped to a site, EnviroCare of Utah, that obtained its license to

operate and amendments to its license during a time in which its

owner paid the top regulatory official in Utah more than $600,000

in cash, gold coins and a ski condominium.

The Department of Energy apparently believes it is appropriate

to continue to enrich this owner with taxpayer funds so long as he

merely declines to participate in the day-to-day management of his

company.

Apparently, enormous quantities of radioactively contaminated

steel, nickel, aluminum and significant quantities of contaminated

gold and possibly silver were recycled by the contractors into the

streams of commerce. This problem persists today. The Department

of Energy is subsidizing—subsidizing—the recycling of thousands

of tons of radioactively contaminated scrap metal from the former

nuclear weapons plant at Oak Ridge, one of the sister plants to the

Paducah plant.

In a recent court decision, a Federal district judge expressed serious concern that the potential for environmental harm is great, especially given the unprecedented amount of hazardous materials

the DOE contractor seeks to recycle. The DOE office responsible for

the oversight of the Paducah plant is also overseeing this Oak

Ridge recycling project. The last thing DOE should be doing is subsidizing the dumping of its nuclear wastes into commercial products.

I urge you, Congress should pass legislation that precludes the

recycle of radioactively contaminated materials when they may

come into imminent human contact. We have suggested and we believe the evidence does and will continue to show that DOE, notwithstanding its own shortcomings, was seriously misled by the

contractors operating the Paducah facility and site. We hope the

government will seize the opportunity to hold the contractors accountable for what surely will be a massive and massively expensive cleanup and worker monitoring and compensation project.

The taxpayers should not have to foot this bill. It is my understanding that DOE indemnity provisions for contractors do not

apply in cases of contractor misconduct, such as the case here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Thomas B. Cochran follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS B. COCHRAN, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR PROGRAMS,

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

My name is Thomas B. Cochran. I am Director of the Nuclear Program and hold

the Wade Greene Chair for Nuclear Policy at the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (‘‘NRDC’’). NRDC is a national environmental public-interest organization

with over 400,000 members that has been extensively involved in monitoring the environmental activities of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (‘‘DOE’s’’) nuclear weapons complex. I am one of four relators in the civil action filed against Lockheed Martin Corporation, et al. under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act related

to these DOE contractors’ operation of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (‘‘Paducah GDP’’). A summary of my qualifications are set forth in the front of my qui tam

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disclosure statement, which I submitted to the committee with exhibits in response

to a subpoena duces tecum.

Summary of the Issues Surrounding the Paducah Case

The Paducah case involves four categories of health and safety issues:

a) excessive exposure and poor or unlawful control of radiation exposure of workers;

b) excessive releases and insufficient or unlawful control of radioactivity released

off-site;

c) unlawful disposal of radioactive wastes; and

d) improper recycling into commerce of scrap materials contaminated with radioactivity.

In association with each of these categories of health and safety issues:

i) the contractors at the Paducah GDP have engaged in systematic falsification of

reports to the Federal and State governments and to the public; and

ii) the Department of Energy (‘‘DOE’’) relied too much on what its contractors were

telling it, and obviously failed to provide adequate oversight of those contractors.

Finally, there is a need for Federal legislation to prevent similar abuses in the

future.

Next, I will briefly summarize the health and safety issues.

Excessive Exposure and Unlawful Control of Radiation Exposure of Workers

There has existed at the Paducah GDP an appalling lack of health physics protection for workers. For many years, the plant apparently had no professional health

physics program. Workers were not properly advised of the hazards of working with

uranium, particularly uranium in particulate and gaseous form. Workers were not

properly monitored for exposure to uranium and other radioactive isotopes. The

workplace was neither properly monitored nor were there proper controls over contaminated spaces. Clearly, the plant managers were grossly violating DOE Orders

and the basic health physics tenet to keep radiation exposures ‘‘as low as reasonably

achievable’’ (‘‘ALARA’’). (See Appendix A of my Disclosure Statement) This week, I

interviewed a former plant worker who left the site in 1992 after working there for

39 years. He had never heard of the terms ‘‘ALARA,’’ ‘‘as low as reasonably achievable,’’ ‘‘as low as practical,’’ or ‘‘ALAP.’’ ‘‘It’s all Greek to me,’’ he said of the concept.

Some of the more telling pieces of evidence of the appalling working conditions

at the plant are:

a) reports that the bed sheets of workers turned green from the radioactive uranium

tetrafluoride (UF4, or ‘‘greensalt’’) that was carried home on their clothing and

bodies;

b) reports by workers of conditions in buildings where chemical conversion activities

took place—where they worked without respirators in rooms densely filled with

radioactive dust;

c) extremely high measurements of uranium deposited in the bones of Mr. Joe Harding, a deceased worker whose bone tissues was assayed after his death;

d) reports of lunchrooms, locker rooms, computers, and kitchens significantly contaminated with radioactivity; and

e) reports that uranium concentrations in sanitary sewage at the site were so high

that a special project (Project GLIT) was instituted to recover uranium from

sewage sediment.

While health physics conditions at the plant may have improved somewhat in recent years, my observations at the site, my review of documents, and my discussions

with the other relators indicate that the Paducah GDP’s managers still are not complying with DOE Order 5400.5, 10 C.F.R. Part 835, or following the rudiments of

good health physics practices. In fact, based on my discussions with the other relators the following deficiencies are noted:

i) Monitoring of workers for internal exposure to radioactivity is inadequate. The

frequency of urine, fecal and perhaps whole-body counts is inadequate to reliably establish worker exposure. Workers are not properly advised of their radiation exposure, and in any case, historical exposure records would be erroneous

and incomplete because of the failure to adequately monitor for internal and external exposure. Documents reveal shocking inadequacies as recent as this

month.

ii) Some areas within the security fence that are excessively contaminated with radioactivity are not properly marked and secured as radiation-controlled areas,

and there is no health physics program in place to control adequately the movement of workers into and out of controlled areas.

310

iii) There is inadequate monitoring and control of personnel and vehicles leaving the

site to prevent or limit the transport of radioactivity off-site.

iv) Radiation survey instruments are not adequately calibrated.

v) There are insufficient numbers of certified health physicists and trained health

physics technicians on site and inadequate and in some cases inappropriate supervision of the technicians.

Some or most of these conditions appear to have been confirmed by a recent DOE

audit that led to the Secretary of Energy ordering a 24 hour stand down at the

plant while the workforce received additional health physics training. Sadly, if the

Secretary thinks he can solve the worker health problems in 24 hours he is being

very ill-advised by his staff, or is offering up a political rather than a substantive

fix. Indeed, my review of DOE’s auditors’ findings this week lead me to believe that

the factual allegations of our lawsuit are being affirmed in most of their key particulars. The audit also illustrates that the problem is a current problem, and not just

a historic one.

These worker conditions would be bad enough had uranium been the only significant radioactive element handled at the plant. A report in Nuclear Fuel, March 16,

1992, summarizing from a Martin Marietta report, indicated that 101,268 tons of

feedstock were brought to the Paducah GDP site principally from Hanford, but also

from DOE’s Savannah River Site. This feed was separated uranium recovered from

processing at Hanford and Savannah River irradiated production reactor fuel. This

uranium was contaminated with fission products as well as neptunium, plutonium

and other transuranic isotopes.

This material, according to Martin Marietta, was found to be far more contaminated than commercially reprocessed reactor fuel—which itself is generally significantly contaminated. For example, the report notes that between 175 and 700 times

the levels of technetium-99 that are found in commercially reprocessed fuel were

found in the Paducah GDP feedstock material. Concentrations of transuranics (principally plutonium and neptunium) were measured at 20 to 450 times the levels normally found in reprocessed fuel.

There were four chemical separation plants (B, T, REDOX and PUREX) at Hanford. These used at least three separate chemical separation processes, each of

which went through modifications and upgrades. Therefore, it is safe to assume that

over the years there were improvements in the capability to separate out radioactive

contaminants from the uranium. In fact, the first chemical separation technique did

not even separate the uranium from the fission products. This was only done later

when improved processing techniques became available.

We respectfully request Congress to ensure that a competent independent firm systematically searches the historical records at Hanford, Paducah, Savannah River, and Oak Ridge for information that could shed

light on the contamination levels of this recycle uranium feed and on how

the contamination levels changed over time, and who was responsible for

sending highly contaminated and unfit recycled spent reactor fuel feedstocks to Paducah.

It would also be possible to obtain additional useful information by sampling the

residual contamination in the most contaminated chemical processing buildings at

the Paducah GDP. I was appalled to learn that Bechtel-Jacobs, DOE’s cleanup contractor, may have destroyed some of the most valuable evidence by recently washing

down some of the contaminated processing buildings’ walls in order to avoid the inconvenience and expense of providing building workers with proper respiratory protection. Reportedly, outside personnel have recently been interviewed to assist in destroying some files at the site, although I do not know the relevance of these files

to the issues we have raised. In any case, we respectfully request the Congress

to immediately demand that DOE order its staff and its contractors at the

Paducah, Portsmouth and Oak Ridge GDPs to maintain the integrity of any

physical and electronic evidence at these plants, as well as any documents

and electronic files that could be useful in reconstructing worker exposures and contractor and DOE culpability. Congress should do the same

with regard to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (‘‘NRC’’) in its regulatory oversight capacity over USEC.

Excessive Releases and Unlawful Control of Radioactivity Off-Site

I visited the Paducah GDP site earlier this year, on February 24-25, 1999. This

visit revealed the sub-standard circumstances that are in violation of DOE health

and safety requirements. I found the following:

a) Areas outside the security fence that are contaminated with radioactivity were

not properly labeled and the public had access to areas that are, or may be, contaminated with radioactivity in excess of appropriate levels.

311

b) Significant areas of the off-site environs around the Paducah GDP are generally

contaminated with radionuclides and should no longer be used for recreational

purposes without a comprehensive off-site characterization, immediate access

controls for radiologically contaminated areas, proper placarding and marking,

removal of radioactive sources, and remediation of streams, ponds, and sediment banks, at a minimum. The lack of protective measures I witnessed off-site

(given what I know is present on-site) is astounding.

c) There is inadequate effort by Paducah GDP management to minimize the transport of radioactivity off-site by controlling the flow of contaminated water offsite via numerous ditches.

On February 25, 1999, I took radiation measurements and collected sediment

samples in publicly accessible areas outside of the Paducah GDP security fence.

Most of the radiation measurements that I took in the environs around the Paducah

GDP, outside the security fence, were at or near background levels. A few readings

were higher than background. Inside a section of concrete culvert sitting on top of

the ground in an area accessible to the public, I measured radiation levels that were

between 10 and 20 times background. I did not determine whether the radioactivity,

the source of this radiation, was easily removable or fixed.

I also collected 12 sediment samples in areas accessible to the public. An analysis

of these samples indicated that the U-238 (i.e., depleted uranium) concentration in

various ditches in publicly accessible unmarked areas was found to be between 10

and 80 times background or between 0.3 and 2.5 times the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (‘‘NRC’s’’) draft release criteria for decontamination of a site. The high end

of this range is comparable to the concentration one might encounter in phosphate

ores containing uranium.

The measurements I took are not inconsistent with earlier recorded off-site readings presented in the qui tam disclosure statement of Mr. Deuschle (See Deuschle’s

Exhibits 3 and 4), one of the other relators, though many substantially higher readings are recorded in past data. The data indicate contamination levels in off-site

sediment (through at least 1994) that far exceed federal requirements for plutonium, neptunium, thorium, uranium, and technetium, at a minimum. The data

show plutonium-239 measurements of up to 240 pCi/g, exceeding the NRC standard

by a factor of 127, and neptunium-237 measurements of up to 63 pCi/g, exceeding

the NRC standard by a factor of 335.

I regard the soil data for the actinide isotopes as particularly troubling in one respect, because these heavy isotopes like plutonium-239 and neptunium-237 are not

generally mobile and do not generally migrate in water as easily as many other isotopes. The high readings off-site suggest to me that relatively large quantities of

such isotopes must have been deposited through effluent releases. Slow migration

would suggest such contamination may be present for many, many more years. The

isotopes are generally very long-lived as well. Neptunium-237 has a half-life of 2.14

million years. Plutonium-239 has a half-life of 24.4 thousand years. While technetium generally passes relatively quickly through the body, plutonium is one of the

more toxic isotopes, and is a bone and liver seeker in humans.

There is no question that readings of the levels disclosed by Mr. Deuschle would

require immediate posting, and should have led to prompt removal or remediation

in many circumstances. Had the contractors been in compliance with DOE Order

5400.5 pertaining to ALARA, it is unlikely that these contamination levels would

have occurred. Even if significant releases had occurred due to some unforseen

event, once detected through an adequate health physics program, immediate steps

would have been undertaken to minimize further releases and obviate these high

contamination levels.

I have reviewed numerous documents prepared by Lockheed Martin or Martin

Marietta for DOE suggesting that the maximally exposed individual off-site from

Paducah GDP operations could expect to receive no more than 100 millirems, and,

indeed, a far lesser number (in some cases only 2 millirems) in any year. In my

opinion, which I believe any respectable nuclear scientist would concur in, the actual measurements recorded, though not subsequently reported, suggest that the

maximally exposed public individual could have received over 100 millirems per

year. Moreover, the contractor is required by DOE Orders to maintain exposures as

far below 100 millirems per year as is reasonably achievable. Lockheed Martin and

the previous Paducah DGP contractors were clearly in violation of this ALARA requirement. We now know from DOE’s auditors that the sampling data reported to

DOE by the contractors apparently omitted ‘‘fugitive’’ emissions from the plant,

which may have amounted to thousands of kilograms of contaminated material.

The risks to the general public due to these off-site releases are considerably less

than the risks to the workers from on-site exposure to radioactivity. Nevertheless,

these off-site releases are in clear violation of DOE Order 5400.5, which requires

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that radiation exposures be ALARA. Together with the on-site conditions these violations indicate that the contractors at Paducah have been and are today operating

in callous disregard for the basic tenets of the health physics profession, and are

failing to keep exposures to radiation as low as reasonably achievable taking into

account technical, practical and economic considerations.

Uranium-238, the predominant radioisotope at Paducah, is not the most hazardous radioisotope either on the basis of mass (i.e., gram for gram) or specific activity (i.e., curie for curie). However, it is carcinogenic. It is unwise and unlawful to

expose people to uranium unnecessarily, and one is not permitted to release it into

the accessible environment indiscriminately. Congress should investigate whether

an ALARA analysis was performed and documented, for example, before contaminated buildings were recently hosed down at the site. How did Bechtel-Jacobs dispose of the contaminated water? Was it processed, or dumped into the sewer or

ditches?

There is the separate but related issue of off-site atmospheric emissions of radioactivity. Since I do not have firsthand knowledge of these matters I place the following in the category of issues that call for thorough investigation:

a) There are accusations that there were massive releases of radioactivity to the atmosphere that typically occurred at night.

b) Reportedly, the air monitoring stations around the Paducah GDP that were operated by the State of Kentucky were turned off during a recent period for lack

of money. This also calls into question the adequacy of the State’s monitoring

of ditches and streams that received liquid effluent from the Paducah GDP.

c) There was reportedly a high and unexplained reading at an air monitor at a nearby high school as recently as last fall.

Unlawful Disposal of Radioactive Wastes

According to workers at Paducah, including the other relators, the contractors illegally buried materials contaminated with radioactivity off-site, including in what

has been characterized as a ‘‘sanitary landfill.’’

In The Washington Post, August 29, 1999, it was reported that just outside the

so-called ‘‘sanitary landfill’’ workers recently discovered radioactive ‘‘black ooze’’

seeping from the ground where a drilling rig had become stuck in the soft earth.

DOE denies that this is related to the landfill. If that is true, it suggests a second

unlicensed, unlawful, radioactive waste dump off-site in the area. There are probably more. Again, a thorough investigation is needed. The landfill should be adequately sampled with core samples.

Documents obtained by our attorneys (see Attachment No. 1) reveal that a Kentucky police investigator reportedly found criminal dumping activitiy at and around

the site in 1992, and DOE contractor personnel were reportedly told by their contractor bosses that if they did not dump radioactive wastes illegally onto Kentucky

land they would be fired. This demands a thorough investigation. Was DOE aware?

Was the report followed up? If not, why not? Is a new criminal investigation warranted?

With DOE’s approval, radioactive wastes that have not been dumped off-site illegally are apparently now being shipped to a site—Envirocare of Utah, Inc.—that obtained its license to operate during a time in which its owner payed the top regulatory official in Utah more than $600,000 in cash, gold coins, and a ski condominium. DOE apparently believe it is appropriate to continue to enrich this owner

with taxpayer funds so long as he merely declines to participate in the day-to-day

management of the company.

Unlawful Recycling into Commerce of Scrap Materials Contaminated with Radioactivity

Apparently enormous quantities of radioactively contaminated steel, nickel, aluminum, and significant quantities of contaminated gold (and possibly silver) were

recycled by the contractors into the stream of commerce. This was apparently done

a) without adequate monitoring of the radioactive contamination remaining in these

recycled materials; b) without adequate DOE or national radiation protection standards for limiting the permissible volumetric contamination of the recycle material;

and c) without an ALARA analysis and documentation of the same.

This problem persists today. As part of a $238 million contract with BNFL, Inc.,

the DOE is subsidizing the recycling of thousands of tons of radioactively contaminated scrap metal from a former nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

Since last October BNFL has been recycling radioactive scrap metal and selling it

for use in commercial products such as cookware, orthodontic braces, medical devices, and children’s toys; some 100,000 tons of scrap metal will be recycled.

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The DOE contract protects BNFL from fluctuations in market prices of scrap aluminum, copper, and nickel by requiring DOE to cover 80% of BNFL’s losses when

market prices drop below 95% of the contract baseline price for the metals. According to a BNFL estimate, under recent market conditions, this would result in a $9

million DOE subsidy for the recycling of 6000 tons of nickel alone.

DOE’s subsidy violates DOE, Environmental Protection Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements that public exposure to radiation be ‘‘as low as

reasonably achievable.’’ DOE’s artificial support of radioactive metals recycling not

only unnecessarily increases the public’s exposure to radiation—there are other options—but makes no sense economically. There is no justification for DOE to subsidize the recycling of nuclear waste into commercial products.

In a recent court decision, a federal district judge expressed serious concern that

‘‘[t]he potential for environmental harm [from the BNFL recycling project] is great,

especially given the unprecedented amount of hazardous materials the Defendants

seek to recycle.’’

The radioactive contaminants in the metals pose a long-term threat, as they remain hazardous for more than 200,000 years. The BNFL project poses significant

risks because (1) surveying methods for radioactivity are imperfect and could result

in the improper release of contaminated metals; (2) the recycling method for the

Oak Ridge nickel is experimental and untested for large-scale production; and (3)

the health effects of low-level radiation are the subject of significant scientific controversy.

The recent revelations about the failed environmental, safety and health oversight

at DOE’s facility in Paducah, Kentucky, which like the Oak Ridge facility is a gaseous diffusion plant, raises further concerns about the risks of the Oak Ridge scrap

project. The DOE office responsible for oversight of the Paducah facility is also overseeing the Oak Ridge recycling project. After 50 years of demonstrated chronic mismanagement of the nuclear weapons complex, DOE claims that it can safely recycle

radioactive materials for use in products for the general public. With so much evidence to the contrary, the last thing DOE should be doing is subsidizing the dumping of its nuclear waste into commercial products. Congress should pass legislation that precludes the recycle of radioactively-contaminated materials

when they may come into intimate human contact.

The Contractors Have Engaged in Systematic Falsification of Reports to the Federal

and State Governments and to the Public

The heart of the qui tam action against Lockheed Martin, et al., to which NRDC

is a party, is that the contractors were aware of unlawful activities related to worker exposure, off-site releases, burial of radioactive waste and recycling of contaminated material, and yet proceeded to present false and misleading statements about

these activities, representing that they were complying with DOE orders and all applicable laws and regulations. We assert that the DOE contractors were willfully,

illegally, recklessly, in bad faith, imprudently, and /or negligently: (1) dumping significant quantities of radioactive and/or mixed waste in unauthorized locations; (2)

exposing workers at the Paducah GDP site to unnecessary and unlawful levels of

radioactivity through contact, proximity, contamination, inhalation, and ingestion,

failing adequately to monitor worker exposures properly, and failing to report radiation hazards to the workers and to the authorities; (3) failing adequately to report

accurately to the proper authorities regarding levels of radioactive contamination;

(4) failing adequately to properly remove contamination in recycled materials, monitor for radiation prior to shipment of these materials off-site, or inform recipients

of contamination; (5) failing to properly measure off-site contamination and control

public access where necessary; and (6) failing to meet federally proscribed radiation

protection standards. While engaged in these activities the contractors made numerous false statements to the DOE, the State of Kentucky and the public. We ask for

Congress’ assistance in ensuring that the full compendium of such false statements

is found and preserved.

The Department of Energy Has Failed to Provide Adequate Oversight, Though This

Does Not Excuse the Contractors

We understand that at most times the Department had no more than 6 to 12 personnel on site, to oversee contractor work force of nearly 2000. The improper and

illegal activities at the Paducah GDP occurred throughout its 46 year history of operation. The failure of DOE and its predecessor agencies, the Energy Research and

Development Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission, to prevent these activities

demonstrates the quality of the Government oversight over the nation’s uranium enrichment enterprise. One cannot of course presume that one’s contractors are lying

to you. But the fact that some of these improper and illegal activities have occurred

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right up until the present is a measure of the degree and quality of the DOE oversight even today.

NRDC Notification to DOE

On or about May 27, 1999, we informed the staff of DOE that in a matter of a

few days we would be filing under seal a qui tam action related to activities at the

Paducah GDP. The disclosure statements of the four relators were provided to the

DOE staff at that time, and we briefed the staff on the technical and legal issues.

On May 28, 1999, I hand-carried a second copy of the four disclosure statements

together with a cover letter to the office of the Secretary of Energy. In the cover

letter, I said,

I am writing to inform you of the serious health and safety risks at the Paducah, Kentucky, gaseous diffusion plant. These violations require your immediate

attention. Yesterday we presented our concerns and the facts supporting our

proposed qui tam action against the Paducah contractors to members of your

staff from the Environmental Management, Environmental Safety and Health,

and Nuclear Energy programs and the General Counsel’s office. We are providing you with copies of the relevant documents to ensure that you are fully

informed of the gravity of the issues at the Paducah facility.We are grateful

that finally, more than 14 weeks later, DOE’s auditors have confirmed our findings and allegations. Sadly, however, the Paducah Manager of Projects for

Bechtel-Jacobs—the contractor in charge of cleaning up the Paducah site—in

anticipation of the one-day-long safety stand down at the facility last week, announced to his personnel: ‘‘More to come—I still have season’s tickets to the circus for sale if anyone still needs one.’’ Clearly, far more than a just a day will

be required to change the culture of the Paducah contractors.

Who Should Pay?

We have suggested, and we believe the evidence does and will continue to show,

that DOE, notwithstanding its own shortcomings, was seriously misled by the contractors operating the Paducah facility and site. We hope the government will seize

the opportunity to hold the contractors accountable for what surely will be a massive, and massively expensive, cleanup and worker monitoring and compensation

project. The taxpayers should not have to foot this bill. It is my understanding that

DOE indemnity provisions for contractors do not apply in cases of contractor misconduct, such as is the case here.

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Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

And thank all of you.

At this point we are going to go to 5 minutes of questions by each

of us up here. I am stunned. I have to tell you that I have two nuclear plants, two nuclear energy plants in my district. I visit there

fairly often. There has never been a time, whether I have been a

Member of Congress or a staff member or as an interested party

who lives pretty close to these folks, as they have a lot of tours that

go through, you don’t have one of those little detectors that they

give you, they do a little readout at the end of the trip, they tell

you what it is and everybody is fine.

As I listened to your testimony, particularly from the four of you,

the first four that actually worked there for a number of years, I

am just stunned that you didn’t have anywhere close to that same

type of protection or readout that virtually anyone involved in the

nuclear industry has.

I guess my question for the first four, Mr. Key, Mr. Jenkins, Mr.

Fowler and Mr. Graves, particularly Mr. Fowler and Mr. Jenkins:

How often did you have one of these whole body radiation counts

in the years that you’ve worked there? I’ll start with Mr. Key. Did

you ever have one?

Mr. KEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I had one during the period of time

that I worked there.

Mr. UPTON. You worked there again how many years?

Mr. KEY. Since 1974.

Mr. UPTON. You had one?

Mr. KEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. UPTON. Even today do people have those little count—whatever they call those.

Mr. KEY. The whole body counter or the TLD?

Mr. UPTON. You put it on your lapel or something like that. Are

there people today, Mr. Fowler?

Mr. FOWLER. You’re talking about a TLD. That’s what monitors

your whole body dose.

Mr. KEY. I was confused, Mr. Chairman. I thought you meant

monitoring by the mobile in vivo body counter that used to come

from the Oak Ridge facility to Paducah. Yes, since I have been employed there in 1974, I have always possessed a TLD dosimeter or

a type of radiation monitoring dosimeter.

Mr. UPTON. So you had one all along since you’ve been there?

Mr. KEY. The dosimeter, yes, sir.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Jenkins, did you?

Mr. JENKINS. Yes, sir it was a film badge in the earlier years and

then they changed it to a TLD.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Fowler?

Mr. FOWLER. I’ve worn a TLD since I’ve been at the plant but

never have I ever had a whole body analysis done, which at any

other nuclear facility in the country is a standard health physics

practice. A person such as myself who been there for 8 years would

probably have had a minimum of eight if not more whole body

counts done at a commercial site. I have never been offered or

given the opportunity to have one.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Graves.

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Mr. GRAVES. Yes, I was issued a TLD when I came onsite. It’s

important to note that the TLD, thermoluminescent dosimeter, is

for measurement of external exposure hazards. It’s not for the

measurement of internal intakes of radioactive material. That’s

done through bioassay methods such as in vivo counting or in vitro

bioassay.

Mr. UPTON. Is that the whole body radiation then that measures?

Mr. GRAVES. Essentially the TLD measures outside influence of

radioactive material, gamma and beta radiation, but the bioassays

are what is more predominantly used for the measurement of internal uptakes of radioactive material.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Key, have you ever had the

whole body count?

Mr. JENKINS. Yes, sir, I’ve had approximately six in the time that

I’ve been there. The first several—and the truck-mounted whole

body counter, the technician would take it two or three times. He

just couldn’t believe the readings.

Mr. UPTON. He never told you what the readings were?

Mr. JENKINS. No, sir. Then I was sent to Cincinnati, right outside Cincinnati, for a special, one of the people that they sent up

there. We went through it but I never was given my readings.

Mr. UPTON. Is there a way that you think you can find out your

readings today?

Mr. JENKINS. Sir, I don’t know.

Mr. UPTON. How do we find out what these readings are? As you

all testified to how scared folks still are working there, it would

seem the first line of defense, the first line of some appeasement

is to try and look at what these readings were to in fact gauge exactly what you were exposed to and whether it was safe or not, period.

Mr. FOWLER. My answer to that is I was doing the initial posting

of the facility in which I found areas that had to be posted as radiation areas according to the codes of Federal regulations. I was

wearing their TLD. The areas were 10 to 20 millirem per hour. I

worked in them for months, yet they gave me a zero dose. That is

why that was fraudulent. If that were wrong, and I got a zero dose,

then why aren’t they still allowing the areas to be posted?

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Key, do you want to comment?

Mr. KEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, back to the in vivo body counting

measuring device that was routinely brought up very infrequently

to the Paducah site, I did receive one of those body counts. At the

end of completion of the count, the material was reviewed by the

technician to me, though I was never handed a copy.

As recent as 2 months ago when the Washington Post broke the

story, I began asking for known documents existing, that which is

the in vivo whole body counting, which we sent 16 selected hourly

employees from our facility. I’ve asked for those records. I’ve asked

for the documentation concerning the 24-hour special simulated

bioassay urine sampling for transuranics. I’ve also asked for the

fecal sampling results of the current and involved hourly work

force, whereby I can cross-reference those documents to ensure that

all participants did in fact have the opportunity to participate and

that we could take that data and turn it over to our health physics

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individual we have with the international union. As of this date,

I have yet to receive any documents that I have requested.

I also requested that those documents be forwarded to the DOE

oversight investigative team. I am unsure if they ever received

those.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Klink.

Mr. KLINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s hard to tell where to

begin. First, from what Mr. Key and Mr. Fowler said in response

to your questions, it appears—and I’m going to try and cover some

territory—I ask you to bear with me, in brevity—it will be greatly

appreciated.

What you seem to be saying is, No. 1, you’re having a hard time

getting questions answered. Mr. Fowler, you’re saying you don’t believe the answers when you get them; is that correct?

Mr. FOWLER. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. KLINK. Mr. Key, you agree as well?

Mr. KEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLINK. Mr. Graves, according to your previous interview

with committee staff, if you disagree with anything I’m saying, interrupt me if you would. You came from the commercial nuclear industry to Paducah as a health physicist for Martin Marietta in

1989. It was your job to get the plant in order so it would conform

with DOE orders regarding worker exposure, radiation controls, et

cetera. You told the staff when you arrived that there was no radiation control at Paducah. In fact, if I can quote from my staff’s

notes during their interview with you, you said they were noncompliant in all areas. RADCON was brand new to them. They

didn’t know what was present at the workplace.

The health physics program, they had one, but there were two

technicians at the site for over 1,000 employees.

Is that an accurate picture of what you found?

Mr. GRAVES. I was initially hired by Martin Marietta to teach

employees, the technicians that I spoke of. There may have been

another technician but the staff was very, very small. I should say

that.

Mr. KLINK. You think it was an inadequate number?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes. That was my initial job there, to teach them,

as I had taught in the nuclear power industry where I had come

from. After that I went to the field operations manager responsibility, and that responsibility was to look at all aspects of the program and try to determine the compliance status of that program

with regard to current regulations.

Mr. KLINK. You say that RADCON or radiological control was

new to them. What about contamination? Did they know what it

was?

Mr. GRAVES. When I said in the statement that every fundamental area of the radiological control program at the time was

noncompliant or inadequate, that is a true statement. Generally

once I got to the site, coming from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, regulated site, it was quite a shock to me; but as I understood

once I got there, that for an extremely long period of time, and this

was inferred to me by employees, that the plant was considered a

chemical plant and that there was uniform contamination throughout the facility and we just had a lot of work to do.

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Mr. KLINK. What does that mean if they treat it like a chemical

plant?

Mr. GRAVES. Essentially my first impression is they were unaware basically of what they were working with or the hazards

thereof. That was the thought process that I had. But this was a

uranium facility, and I was aware of that coming in, because that’s

why I was brought on board.

Mr. KLINK. They were not aware that they were dealing with radioactive material?

Mr. GRAVES. No, I can’t say that. But the general thought

process——

Mr. KLINK. You’re saying that you think they may have been

aware but their thought process was not——

Mr. GRAVES. The overall culture of the facility as it was operated

for a lot of years was that of a chemical processing facility. That’s

what was reported to me when I got there. I use that as an example.

Mr. KLINK. But they knew they were dealing with radioactive

material?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLINK. You told staff when you were surveyed you found

technical contamination in every area you looked. Were any of

those areas posted?

Mr. GRAVES. No, sir. There was widespread contamination across

the facility, yes.

Mr. KLINK. Were the people at the site capable of monitoring

uranium?

Mr. GRAVES. To the extent necessary to fulfill the regulations, no.

We didn’t have enough staff to adequately monitor the workplace.

Mr. KLINK. Tell me about the instrumentation that you found.

Mr. GRAVES. The instrumentation predominantly was beta

gamma monitoring instrumentation.

Mr. KLINK. Was that the most modern?

Mr. GRAVES. The instrumentation that they had was up to date.

It was contemporary in its use. There are some situations within

the facility where alpha radiation is predominant over beta

gamma. There were questions regarding the appropriateness of

some of the instruments used with regard to the source term in the

area, but they were in the process of getting more instrumentation

and trying to eventually get up to speed to what they needed to be.

Mr. KLINK. Did you tell staff during the interview that the instrumentation was archaic, that the laboratory couldn’t read your

samples, that plus-or-minus error was sometimes 100 percent?

Mr. GRAVES. The instruments that you’re speaking of now are

different from the instruments I just addressed in the conversation.

Mr. KLINK. What’s the difference?

Mr. GRAVES. The difference in the instruments are one is a handheld type instrument that is used by technicians to determine the

gross alpha beta gamma activity at the site. What I made mention

of to the staff person was that the radiochemical capability or the

ability to discern between transuranics and uranium appeared to

be process-oriented, archaic. The lower limit of detection was not

sufficient to be of use to a health physicist in this regard.

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Mr. KLINK. So you couldn’t detect the transuranics at the site;

is that correct?

Mr. GRAVES. We couldn’t do that at a number that would be considered reasonable to provide radiological protection.

Mr. KLINK. Did anyone tell you that there was plutonium or

other transuranics located at the site?

Mr. GRAVES. Not when I first came on board. I first became

aware of the transuranics, I think I made the statement when I

was doing a review of one of the buildings, and I came across large

quantities of technetium 99 that was just identified through a

walk-through. And asking questions as to where this stuff comes

from—I came from nuclear power, I didn’t understand why technetium was at a uranium enrichment facility. They said they did

have processor reactor returns in the past. Based upon that response, I asked them about some other isotopes, CCM, being one

because it has a relatively long half-life.

Then I asked the question about transuranics. At that time I was

told that there were a number of drums, eight if I recall correctly,

of transuranic waste at the facility, in a storage location that was

a very well-defined storage location.

Mr. KLINK. What was the timeframe from the period you were

told to come in here and fix it—and I assume that you were not

told immediately upon arrival what you were dealing with—and

the period of time at which you found out about the transuranics

at the site?

Mr. GRAVES. It is important to note from a health physics concern, what transuranic waste is, is much different than what transuranic waste is from a CERCLA standpoint. The response that I

got initially was based upon CERCLA standards, which is a large

amount of activity per gram of substance. But from a health physics concern, minute quantities of transuranics, or small quantities

of transuranics can be a problem or concern in the radiological

workplace.

It wasn’t until there had been a spill with a drum of one of these

eight drums that I became aware of the amount of activity that

they were talking about when they told me about the transuranic

waste.

Mr. KLINK. Again, what was the period of time between when

you first arrived there and this spill occurred and you found out

about the transuranics?

Mr. GRAVES. About a year, sir.

Mr. KLINK. What was the response of management when you expressed your concern as a health physicist about these

transuranics?

Mr. GRAVES. At which time, the time of the spill?

Mr. KLINK. Whenever you found out about it.

Mr. GRAVES. I was surprised at the numbers or the amount of

transuranics in the drum that was spilled. I think the general

thought process of management at the time was that, one, I didn’t

feel like they had an appreciation of the seriousness of this type of

isotope in a uranium facility. And second, I think it was generally

felt that true normal CIP-CUP project maintenance, removal of

cascade, that a lot of the material that hadn’t processed in the past

had been removed from the system.

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Mr. WHITFIELD [presiding]. Mr. Klink, I’ve let you go over a couple of minutes. I think we better proceed. We have a lot of questions to ask. Maybe we will have an opportunity for another round.

First of all, Mr. Key and Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Fowler and Mr.

Graves, I want to tell you how much we appreciate your willingness to come up here and testify. I know that it is particularly difficult when you are in this situation. You are still employees and

you are testifying on issues that you deem very important, and so

we thank you for being willing to do that.

Mr. Key, in your testimony you had referred to a bioassay analysis study in 1990 conducted on employees at the plant. Did you

indicate that those results were never released, or would you expand on that a little bit?

Mr. KEY. On the initial 24-hour simulated bioassay for

transuranics at the plant, we were able to get approximately 30

volunteers to participate for that. However, the results came back

and the contractor called a meeting and claimed that the independent laboratory had cross-contaminated all of his instrumentation and thereby they were going to invalidate the results. I have

since asked specifically for those exact sample results and as of yet

have not received that. In fact, a management representative discussed with me that management was very reluctant to release

that information because of the unknown of how it would be used.

Mr. WHITFIELD. So it has been over 8 years and you still don’t

have that information?

Mr. KEY. That’s correct.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, from all of the newspaper articles on this,

I think there is an attitude out there right now that offsite or outside the production area that USEC has responsibility for, there

are some real contamination problems, significant problems, over

90,000 drums out there, for example. There also seems to be a perception that inside the production plant today is safe.

Now, all of you have been involved in that plant, you’ve worked

there now or you’ve had experience with it, like Mr. Graves. I

would just ask you today, do you consider the production facility

that is operated by USEC to be a safe place today? Mr. Key? Then

go right down the line.

Mr. KEY. I believe that safety at the plant has drastically improved with respect to industrial safety and radiological control

procedures and policies from the early 1990’s to the present day.

I believe there is always room every day for improved safety, including worker involvement. A very recent NRC internal investigation of USEC policies and practices, workers were not involved in

that investigation, in the out-briefing. Unlike when OSHA comes

onsite, there is dedicated worker involvement and walk-around

with the OSHA inspectors, and really under OSHA we feel like

now we have a voice to be heard and can any time file a formal

complaint.

As one suggestion to the committee, I would suggest that NRC

regulations adopt OSHA standards which include the worker involvement and participation.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Jenkins?

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Mr. JENKINS. Sir, I agree with Mr. Key, but I have a hard time

believing the records after 30 years of being falsified to. I’ll put it

that way.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Fowler?

Mr. FOWLER. Yes, sir, I know that problems persist to this day.

The problems we are talking about are current still. They are not

just problems of the past. Yes, things have improved somewhat.

But, I’ll give you four examples. Approximately 3 weeks ago, it was

found that Bechtel Jacobs workers had been working in cylinder

yards for months, nontrained, did not know what permits were.

When this was caught, they sent these individuals to training. Ten

of them failed. They retrained them. Three of them then failed. I

started talking with these individuals. The problem was functional

illiteracy. People were allowed to work in areas, they couldn’t read

the monitors, they couldn’t read the permits.

Three weeks ago, a computer was tagged as radiation free and

ready to be delivered to a local school and it was found to be significantly contaminated. Plant management had proved the system

worked. They said we found it. But it wasn’t found by them. One

of the whistleblowers’ wives did a second check on the survey readings and found it to be contaminated. If she had not done this, a

student would be sitting at a computer terminal getting unnecessary radiation exposure.

Again, about 10 days ago, plant workers were sent into a contaminated building that required respiratory protection. Yet they

had none. They were told to just wet down the areas and they

could work without a respirator. A member of the safety department caught this, they halted the job, told the workers they would

have to go to respiratory training. While these individuals were in

that training, they let another group of workers go in without respirators and finish the job.

In the main cafeteria, to this day, there has never been any access monitoring, so a contaminated person could enter at will. In

other eating areas around the site, there were some monitors put

in place, but the alarms were going off frequently and it became

a problem for health physics. So these monitors are taken out. The

problems are not only in the past, they are current, and they affect

the workers today.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Dr. Cochran, I have been told that you are quite

an expert on nuclear issues. You were quoted in a peer-reviewed

journal as saying, ‘‘The situation is as close to a complete lack of

health physics as I have observed outside the former Soviet Union,

which we know is horrible.’’

Did you make that statement?

Mr. COCHRAN. I did. And I stand by it. I had visited the

Chelyabinsk 65 in what is now Russia, which is their Hanford, and

toured a reactor that was shut down. The conditions—we left an

auditorium, put on some smocks, walked around in the reactor,

walked outside, back around through the auditorium, took the

smocks off and hung them on the rack for the next person.

Based on my conversations with the other relators, particularly

Mr. Fowler and Mr. Deuschle, Mr. Jenkins, I would say a similar

attitude persists at the Paducah plant.

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You are going to hear this afternoon, or later this morning, from

the senior person at Bechtel Jacobs. I would urge you to also examine an e-mail message sent from the Paducah manager of projects,

Mr. Jimmy Massey, on September 8. That is the day before the

shutdown, the Richardson 1-day or 24-hour shutdown. This memo

was sent to the gentleman that is going to testify before your committee, Mr. Nemec, Joe Nemec. At the end of his memo, he says,

‘‘More to come. I still have season tickets to the circus for sale if

anyone still needs one.’’ He is describing the events surrounding

this case and the shutdown ordered by the Secretary as a circus.

He described in the Paducah Sun the 24-hour shutdown as a family

meeting. He describes as one of the activities that will be conducted

in this 24-hour period, review and spruce-up of red postings.

When I visited the site in February, outside of the fence in

ditches that I measured, contamination levels in excess of NRC

limits, there were no red postings. That is why I am telling you

there is a need for a radical change in the culture at that plant.

You cannot run—you cannot have senior manager in the cleanup

sending memos to his staff and his superiors pretending that this

is not a big issue when in fact it is.

Mr. WHITFIELD. We have a copy of that e-mail. We will be asking

about that.

Mr. KLINK. Mr. Chairman, can you yield to me for a second?

Mr. WHITFIELD. Yes.

Mr. KLINK. I would ask unanimous consent that we have that

document made permanent in the record. I am told it is in the

packet. We haven’t seen it yet. Thank you very much.

[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, the DOE, you are going to hear

from a DOE representative who says that the team that went down

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there said that they didn’t find any imminent hazards to workers

and the public. I think this was a very unfortunate statement. An

imminent hazard would be a nuclear explosion, a criticality accident or meltdown of a reactor. We’re talking about chronic exposures to workers and those issues persist.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Dr. Cochran, thank you for answering the question. We will be following up later on this.

Next is Mr. Stupak.

By the way, this is such an important issue that we are going

to 7-minute questioning instead of 5.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. Let me again apologize. I have been up

in the Superfund hearings, bouncing back and forth today here,

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, as you know we have had hearings in the short

time I have been on this committee with DOE about Lawrence

Livermore, the spy situation out there. Now west Paducah, now we

have got the transportation of the plutonium. What I am really

concerned about, not just the plants, as the doctor properly pointed

out, but also just the culture, the attitude, the lack of trust and

confidence in DOE in not just running plants but their whole

makeup, their whole environment there. I’m not sure how we address it. We have really got to get their attention and not just a

lot of assurances from them, but we have got to see changes in the

Department of Energy.

It is not just this administration. When you talk about Lawrence

Livermore, that went back over five administrations. The west Paducah stuff just wasn’t recent, it has been going on, as we see.

Now we want to transport plutonium through my district and

others, and we cannot even get a hearing on the darn thing. You

wonder about trust and all that. As I listened and read the testimony, there has been a lot of discussion about what is happening

outside, especially, Mr. Key, to workers, what is happening outside.

But how about internally, biologically, what is happening when

they breathe asbestos or uranium hexafluoride?

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask you, Mr. Key, what can result from

breathing uranium hexafluoride, do you know, as a worker?

Mr. KEY. Of course breathing uranium hexafluoride fumes, it is

irritating to the throat and nasal mucous passages, and can result

in bronchial, upper respiratory ailments. Beyond that I don’t have

the expertise to say.

Mr. STUPAK. You are basically ingesting uranium?

Mr. KEY. Correct.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Key, you also testified to what appears to be

massive exposure to asbestos dust during the late 1970’s and you

said the early eighties. And since 1964, since 1964, it has been

common knowledge that working without protection with asbestos

can cause asbestosis, but it takes a long time for asbestosis to develop. Has DOE or the contractor done anything to monitor, to

track workers for asbestos exposure internally?

Mr. KEY. Not to my knowledge. The international union has a

mobile screening unit. When requested, it has came to the Paducah

location twice at the request of the PACE Local Union President,

David Fuller, and the chest X-rays are taken and they are read by

the certified readers.

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Mr. STUPAK. Is this mobile unit, is this something that the union

does internally for its members, or does DOE contract to provide

it when the union requests it? How does that go?

Mr. KEY. To my knowledge it is only a union-involved program.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay.

Mr. WHITFIELD Mr. Jenkins?

Mr. JENKINS. I would like to respond. Myself, the lower part of

my esophagus, I had to have it surgically replaced with a piece of

plastic. Whether it caused it or not, I can’t testify. My doctor said

that there is a 99 percent chance that it is going to turn into cancer. Whether it does, I don’t know.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Jenkins, were you in the area where you would

have breathed this uranium hexafluoride?

Mr. JENKINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

In your testimony, Mr. Key, you talk about working in clouds of

fumes in the building. Did workers ever ask for respiratory protection so they could breathe?

Mr. KEY. The building that I was referring to was the C-410 and

C-420 building which processed the rat tail uranium tails material.

And the clouds of fumes that we walked through, there were times

that I held my breath to get through those.

Respiratory protection was only provided in the form of a World

War II gas mask. It was placed in a box throughout the building.

You could pull it out and it was not necessarily clean. And because

it was general use, if you did not get it tight enough, the fumes

would still permeate around the seal. One day I took the exhalation

valve cover off one of the respirators, and it had dry rotted to the

point that it did not provide protection.

Mr. STUPAK. Did you ask the supervisors for masks?

Mr. KEY. No, sir. You have to understand the indoctrination

process that the majority of workers at the plant went through.

When I was hired by Union Carbide, it was frowned upon for you

to ask any questions. If you raised safety issues, generally you

were given the worst job assignments within your department. You

were labeled a troublemaker, lazy, nonproductive to bring up safety

as an issue. That later transpired into what was termed the ‘‘right

to know,’’ employee right to know. I could ask management a question and then management would decide if I needed that right to

know on that issue.

Mr. STUPAK. Did you ask questions under the right to know?

Mr. KEY. Yes. In fact there were some general safety issues in

the early and mid-eighties where I went to the safety department

and I would say that OSHA regulation on this particular issue is

this. The response was, We are not under OSHA, return back to

your job.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Key, has there been any testing

and monitoring to determine radiation exposure to the workers, do

you know? Has there been any testing or monitoring?

Mr. KEY. Testing that I am aware of, of course you have heard

testimony in relationship to the in vitro body counter which was a

mobile unit out of Oak Ridge. There is a 1992 NOISH report which

specifically points out the unreliable detection capabilities of that

unit and the numerous mechanical breakdowns of it. That unit, as

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I am aware, was only for uranium and only the group of 30 plant

workers that were sent for nonjelly detectors, commonly referred to

as the geranium-type detectors, has the ability to monitor the body

for transuranics.

Mr. STUPAK. That is the only monitoring or testing that you are

aware of?

Mr. KEY. That I am aware of.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Stupak, your time is expired.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. This is a question for Mr. Fowler and Mr. Graves.

Were you aware of any occasion where a DOE nuclear safety inspector ever visited the plant or reviewed the safety procedures

there in Paducah?

Mr. GRAVES. During my tenure at the site, there was a tremendous amount of DOE involvement from a Tiger team standpoint

and independent oversight from HHS groups and program folks

and folks out of the House. So yes, there was a lot of DOE involvement.

Mr. BRYANT. You are saying DOE personnel on the site?

Mr. GRAVES. We had a site office where DOE employees were

housed. In addition to that, there were several different DOE representatives that came and did audits and assessments as a function of the new initiatives of Admiral Watkins.

Mr. BRYANT. And part of that audit function would be obviously

safety?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir. There was a lot of influence on safety.

Mr. FOWLER. After Mr. Graves left the facility, I never had the

opportunity to meet one of these individuals in the field. I did discuss some issues with them in my office regarding interpretations

of regulations, but I never had the opportunity to meet one again

in the field after those days.

Mr. BRYANT. Help me distinguish between your office and the

field.

Mr. FOWLER. I am the training manager for compliance at the facility and my office is—I am in charge of the OSHA and radiological protection training. I have had questions asked in regards

to the regulations. But since Mr. Graves left, I have not seen a

DOE auditor in the field.

Mr. BRYANT. On the date that Mr. Graves left, tell me when that

was?

Mr. GRAVES. Early 1992.

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Key and Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Graves made mention of a Tiger team review. I think that occurred in the early

1990’s, maybe 1991. Would each one of you tell me, and Mr. Key,

you go first, were you aware of that Tiger team audit review and

if it found any safety concerns?

Second, were any steps taken by the contractor as a result of

that to remedy any of these safety concerns?

Mr. KEY. Yes, sir. In my experience with the Tiger team, both

when they were investigating and review of their findings, the contractor then developed action items for closure of those Tiger team

findings.

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Yes, there were a lot of safety findings within that and on the—

on some of the industrial safety findings, I was asked as a representative of the union to go out and review some of the exact locations in which the union did sign off on some of the safety de

minimis items. The others, the majority of them have validation for

closure.

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Jenkins, do you have any comments?

Mr. JENKINS. No, sir. Just about the same thing that Jim said.

We worked real hard cleaning the place up. When they came in

and made their inspections and everything, we did get a feedback

on what they found and some of it was fixed.

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Fowler, do you have any follow-up on that?

Mr. FOWLER. Yes, I do. I believe even to this day, there is only

approximately 10 Department of Energy employees onsite I believe

full time, and I have never seen an individual, an inspector out

there at night, to this day.

Mr. BRYANT. And I know that we have—there is another side to

this and we have witnesses coming in to testify on the second and

third panels, probably a couple of other sides.

Mr. Fowler, you seem to sort of bridge this area in terms of

timewise and in your capacity there at Paducah. From your perspective, who is to blame here? If you can—I know that you can

probably talk for days on this, but I am concerned about the Department of Energy as well as the contractor or contractors and in

terms of what I mentioned in my statement about the possibility

of coverup or negligence and gross negligence and intentional acts

and all kinds of things there from a legal perspective, where would

you lay the fault?

Mr. FOWLER. I think it is clearly on the contractor. I didn’t see

their findings placed in any of the official environmental reports

that I started finding. I don’t believe they told the Department of

Energy the real story.

Mr. BRYANT. Do you lay any fault with DOE on not having

enough oversight and supervisory control?

Mr. FOWLER. Yes, that is an aspect that they were to look over.

But again, the facts that were not given to them were by the contractor.

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I have concluded my questions.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you. Mr. Strickland.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank

each of you for coming here and for helping us more fully understand this.

I would like to take just a moment, if I could, to ask if there is

anything that you have not shared with us this morning that you

would like to share before your time is up, before this panel concludes? Is there any bit of observation, opinion, or information that

you would like for us to know?

Mr. KEY. Mr. Strickland, I do have a concern with the number

of DOE site employees at the site, only 10, and given its scarce

oversight and budget and the capability, I think it demonstrates

that the Oak Ridge office is trying to operate the Paducah site via

telephone. And with the size and complexion of the plant, I do not

believe that is appropriate, and feel that Congress needs to establish a Paducah site operations office with sufficient funding, staff

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and contracting authority in order to manage it correctly. And they

may also include the Portsmouth into that.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Key. All of the problems that

we are talking about Paducah apply to Portsmouth, and I have

been told that we do not know what materials came to Portsmouth

or what amounts or from whence those materials came. So I just

want to reemphasize once again that all of the employees need the

protection of this government and that we are going to fail in our

responsibilities, if for reasons of fear of liability or fear of setting

a precedent of some kind, we were simply to limit this program to

a pilot project and exclude hundreds, perhaps thousands of employees, that were just as faithful to this government and just as important in winning the cold war as the wonderful workers at Paducah.

In terms of who is responsible and who knew what when, Mr.

Jenkins, did Union Carbide managers or Martin Marietta managers, to the best of your recollection, ever tell you that the ore or

the recycled reactor tails and other materials that you were working with were safe?

Mr. JENKINS. Yes, sir. They told us that they were safe enough

to eat. I have been told several times, ‘‘Guys, you could eat this

stuff.’’

Mr. STRICKLAND. It would be interesting to gather those folks

and offer them a good meal. I suspect that they would have a different kind of attitude.

Mr. Fowler, you spoke of having your picture posted on the wall

with a bullet or a target on you. Can you just tell us briefly what

that felt like?

Mr. FOWLER. My wife and myself have been extremely concerned.

They used my picture for target practice, which when I turned in

to upper management and they looked at the issues, they told me

they considered that as a joke.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Do you recall the names? You don’t have to give

them here.

Mr. FOWLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Do you recall the names of individuals who

may have responded to you in that manner?

Mr. FOWLER. Yes, sir. I was told that it was a joke but they

planned no disciplinary action for the employee that might have

done it because it was awhile back.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Would you mind sharing the names of the person or persons who responded to you in that manner and who they

worked for?

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Howard Pulley, USEC; and Mr. Steve Seltzer,

USEC Employee Concerns Manager.

It carried on to have my car intentionally damaged on plant site

in which the ex-plant manager paid for the damages to be repaired

out of his own pocket, writing me a check.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Do you have reason to believe that even perhaps today there are individuals who may be observing you more

closely than they should or following you or in other ways trying

to intimidate you?

Mr. FOWLER. Yes, sir. There is a pattern that when—I have an

access pass for my vehicle anywhere onsite. It is routinely followed.

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I will park my vehicle at my office and I am having security officers to come to me and say, move your vehicle. I ask the reasons

why and they tell me because we want you to. My vehicle is routinely stopped and searched for no reason. Others that borrow my

vehicle to enter the facility, they will stop it because it is my vehicle.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Fowler. Mr. Key.

Mr. KEY. Mr. Strickland, the only other concern I have is a lot

of documents relating to plutonium and reactor tails are viewed as

trace amounts. There is a 1990, I believe, document which is put

out by DOE and it is entitled Closing the Atom, ‘‘Closing the Circle

of the Atom,’’ and within that is a very vivid picture that I feel the

committee members need especially to review. It shows one particle

of plutonium inside of a lung eradicating 10,000 healthy lung cells

and causing mutation, and that was published by the Department

of Energy.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you. Thank you all and thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Burr.

Mr. BURR. Mr. Graves, let me ask you, to your knowledge, did

Martin Marietta ever falsify or withhold from DOE the level or existence of contamination or health hazards at Paducah?

Mr. GRAVES. I am not aware of that; no, sir.

Mr. BURR. Are you aware of any documentation or knowledge

withheld from the worker or the legal team in this lawsuit upon

their request by current contractors?

Mr. GRAVES. No, sir, I am not aware of that either.

Mr. BURR. Let me ask you with your degree of experience, in

your opinion is there enough evidence of contamination that the

alarm bells should have gone off and clearly earlier than today we

should have known about the level of contamination at the Paducah site?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURR. Do you believe that documentation exists today and

did exist back even at your time at Paducah that clearly showed

the evidence of contamination at the levels that are claimed today?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir. Several documents existed that identified

the levels of contaminant there.

Mr. BURR. When you raised questions of contamination and

worker safety with your management at the time of your original

employment at the Paducah site, did they approach it and follow

up with the same passion that you displayed the concerns to them?

Mr. GRAVES. No, sir. As I said earlier, I don’t think that they had

an appreciation for—you have to understand that there was a lot

of change going on at that time. Admiral Watkins came in and

raised the bar, as was mentioned, as to what appropriate radiological control was. Those of us that entered the complex DOEwide, that had experience in the areas of nuclear power, or the

Navy that were used to that level of rigor, were met obviously with

resistance. It was change and when there is change, it breeds certain conflicts. No, I don’t think that they received my message with

as much rigor as I provided it.

Mr. BURR. Mr. Cochran, you certainly have been active at the attempt to retrieve documents. I think in your document list, tab 8-

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A is in fact an executive summary from 1991 and I will just highlight one thing. I am sure that you are familiar with this. That the

results of that report suggest in a very clear way that plutonium

is not present in offsite sediments. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, sir. That is so stated in the executive summary of that Phase I report. There is no plutonium other than in

the water.

Mr. BURR. Not only was it stated in the executive summary, was

it not also stated that there was no plutonium contamination found

in the Annual 1991 Environmental Report on Paducah?

Mr. COCHRAN. And in other environmental reports.

Mr. BURR. You have requested for some time, I think since last

spring, or your legal team, documents that pertain to a reference

about appendix 2 B-17 of the 1991 Phase I site investigation, which

it was noted in the executive summary was to come; am I correct?

Mr. COCHRAN. That is correct. I think Mr. Fowler mentioned that

earlier. My attorney, Mr. Egan, searched the public document room

at Paducah in Karville for any references to onsite and offsite contamination. Those appendixes were missing from the Phase I report.

Mr. BURR. The request for those appendices was to whom?

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, there were various requests over a period of

3 months by Mr. Egan, primarily working through the librarian at

the public document room, who was very helpful. She made

inquiries——

Mr. BURR. Which contractor is in charge of the documents?

Mr. COCHRAN. I don’t know who is in charge of the public document room or whether it is DOE or a contractor.

Mr. BURR. As it relates to offsite, I believe it is Bechtel Jacobs,

am I correct? Based upon that request, when did you receive the

appendix?

Mr. COCHRAN. I have never received the appendix. I have

heard——

Mr. BURR. You have seen data from it, though?

Mr. COCHRAN. The other regulators, Mr. Fowler and Mr.

Deuschle, found computer printouts of the data taken by a company hired by Martin Marietta, a company called CH2M Hill, and

the computer printout data was in the health physics files at the

U.S. Enrichment Corporation spaces, but it was only later that we

discovered that that was the same data that was in the missing appendices in the public document room, and for that matter missing

in every Phase II report that was publicly circulated, to the best

of my knowledge.

Mr. BURR. Let me ask Mr. Egan to come forward. If you would

just lean toward the mike. Let me just ask you, Mr. Egan, based

upon your request for that appendix, when did you receive it?

Mr. EGAN. We have never received it. We pursued it from a number of different angles, as Dr. Cochran said. The first request was

to the very helpful librarian in Karville, who herself said she never

received a request for it, had never realized it was missing. She

contacted Oak Ridge and apparently contacted Bechtel Jacobs over

a 3-month period. Her final answer to us was that she was unable

to locate it.

Mr. BURR. I have a copy of it. Do you find that surprising?

337

Mr. EGAN. I understand you do.

Mr. BURR. The Louisville paper has a copy of it, but you don’t

have a copy of it and you were the first one to request it?

Mr. EGAN. That is correct.

Mr. BURR. Mr. Graves, whose responsibility is it, based upon a

contractor’s obligation with a site like this, to make sure that the

reports are fully conveyed to DOE?

Mr. GRAVES. I am not sure that I know the answer to that question. There are probably a number of individuals that are responsible for that.

Mr. BURR. Mr. Cochran, let me go back to you.

Clearly we have entered into the record this document which you

have requested for some time, your legal team. But you have

looked at data that was used to compile that appendix. Let me ask

you, does that data substantiate plutonium contamination offsite at

Paducah?

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, it does, well in excess of regulatory limits in

areas that when I visited the site were unposted and, to the best

of my knowledge, are still unposted today in violation of DOE regulations.

Mr. BURR. When you were there in the 1991-1992 timeframe,

were you aware of plutonium contamination?

Mr. GRAVES. I was only aware of it to the extent that I am aware

of it today as a result of the spill. My main focus when I was at

the plant was the health and safety of the radiological worker. In

normal activities and duties of the work going on around the site,

yes, I was aware that there was contamination out beyond the

bounds of the site. The levels of transuranics versus uranium I

don’t recall right now, but I knew after research that they were

certainly present.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Ms. DeGette.

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cochran, I know that you are one of the relators in the civil

contam action, and I know that the Justice Department is looking

at some of those civil issues. One thing that struck me hard listening to your testimony was that it was peppered with references to

potential criminal activity at the site, including your testimony

about illegal dumping of uranium waste offsite on public grounds.

I am wondering if it would be accurate to say that as well as the

civil concerns and the concerns about remedying the situation for

workers onsite, you have concerns about potential criminal activity

as well?

Mr. COCHRAN. Well, first of all I am not an attorney.

Ms. DEGETTE. We will still listen to what you say.

Mr. COCHRAN. My reference to criminal activity derive from a police report that I attached to my testimony where you have the

Kentucky State Police inspector in charge of investigating hazardous waste making these allegations of criminal activity in 1991.

My point is I think this needs thorough investigation to see

whether those allegations were true. We certainly have evidence

that there was illegal offsite dumping. What action was taken by

the Department of Energy, if any, whether they were notified and

so forth.

338

Ms. DEGETTE. Do you know whether any investigation was undertaken?

Mr. COCHRAN. No. I only became aware of this memorandum

within the last week or 2.

Ms. DEGETTE. Are you aware of any other instances of employees, or any of the rest of you, of employees being told to hide data

or other kinds of willful activity that we should be concerned

about?

Mr. COCHRAN. Yes, I am aware of it from discussions with the

other three relators.

Ms. DEGETTE. Can you give me some examples of that, sir?

Mr. COCHRAN. One was—Mr. Fowler can correct me if I’m

wrong—I believe it was Mr. Deuschle when he found the computer

records of the missing data, he was told by his management to

bury the data and that it should not be made public.

Mr. Jenkins has referred to numerous truckloads of radioactivity

that was illegally dumped, much of it at night offsite.

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. Jenkins, do you want to expand on that?

Mr. JENKINS. Yes. I loaded out several trucks of slag, what is

commonly called magnesium slag from the C-340 building and they

were going to the dump. I said, Where are you guys taking this?

He told me offsite to the dump. At that time, I didn’t know if they

had a permit for it or what.

Ms. DEGETTE. Did you later learn that they had a permit?

Mr. JENKINS. A couple of days ago I learned that they didn’t have

a permit.

Ms. DEGETTE. Did he know that they didn’t have a permit?

Mr. JENKINS. I don’t know. He was doing what he was told by,

I presume, his boss.

Ms. DEGETTE. So you think that this was coming from high levels?

Mr. JENKINS. Yes, ma’am, I do.

Ms. DEGETTE. Dr. Cochran, something else that we were quite

surprised to learn was that apparently a plume of contaminated

groundwater is moving one foot a day toward the Ohio River, with

no effective remediation underway or even planned. I am wondering if you know who is responsible for that and what we can do

to get that remedied?

Mr. COCHRAN. I don’t know who is responsible for that. And I

don’t know how to remedy it.

But I would correct your statement. It is in the river.

Ms. DEGETTE. Right.

Mr. COCHRAN. It is not just moving toward, it is into the river.

Ms. DEGETTE. It is in the river now?

Mr. COCHRAN. To the best of my knowledge. It is the technetium

plume.

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. Fowler, let me ask you a couple of questions.

When you arrived at Paducah, did you have any interactions with

John Hummer who was in charge of health and safety for the gaseous diffusion plants for Lockheed Martin?

Mr. FOWLER. No, ma’am.

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. Graves told us there was no health physics

program in 1989, and from what I hear of your testimony, it was

still true that there wasn’t in 1991; is that right?

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Mr. FOWLER. I arrived at the plant in late 1991. My task was to

develop radiological training for the work force in health physics.

The majority of the work force did not know what ALARA stood

for, and they didn’t know how to implement any practices in radiological control.

Mr. GRAVES. As a point of interest, when I make the statement

that there was no health physics program, there was one in place;

but one that is reasonably capable of doing what it is supposed to

be doing in a compliant fashion with regulations, that is a different

story. So to say that there was no health physics program in place

is an overstatement, but there was not one that was capable of

dealing with the problems at hand.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Ms. DeGette, I am going to give you two more

questions, and then we are going to take 5 more minutes.

Ms. DEGETTE. I have one more question, and I don’t need the

second 5 minutes.

It is almost worse to have a program in place that doesn’t do the

job than to have no program, I would think.

Mr. GRAVES. Well, it is important to understand that throughout

the entire complex—of course, I can’t speak specifically to the entire complex—but in talking with colleagues over the years, when

the new regulations for contamination control came on board, nobody was ready to implement that. So you have to understand

what the culture was at the time, and the culture then and what

it was changing to.

The problem is if you take an extraordinarily long period of time

to get one in place that knows what it is doing and that is relative

to a function of what you are dealing with here.

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you.

Mr. WHITFIELD. We are going to go 5 more minutes for anyone

interested, and since I am the chairman, I will go first.

Mr. Graves, at one time you were the health and safety expert

with Lockheed Martin at the Paducah plant. In that capacity you

submitted observations and recommendations periodically through

the annual internal audit of the situation at the plant. I have some

copies of your handwritten notes during this time which are being

shown to you right now.

In these notes, you make several observations that the current

health physicist technician staffing level at Paducah was inadequate; the current health physicist position staffed with an individual with substantial operational health physics experience does

not exist. Radiation area postings do not bear approximate dose

rates; the current air monitoring system has too few locations to

characterize work location airborne concentrations of radioactivity.

And then in 1991 you talked about the work on the converter was

performed without a work permit, the health physics program still

not defined and enrolled by current procedures. And then you recommended a whole host of things that should be done to correct

these problems.

Do you know at that time when you made those recommendations whether those were taken care of?

Mr. GRAVES. Well, from the things that I am reading here, you

have to understand that as I understand this record, briefly looking

at it, I was the company counterpart for this particular audit. This

340

audit was conducted by Dr. Larry McKay, and I don’t recall the

other individual who was with him but I do remember the audit.

Yes, indeed they basically verified everything that we had been

talking about and described deficiencies in. They pretty much substantiated all that; yes, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Did they correct them from your knowledge?

Mr. GRAVES. Well, the process of change, we want to—correct

them as far as the timeframe, I haven’t been at the site for a very

long time. I know that we were only marginally successful during

my tenure at the site to change the inertia of the overall process.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Fowler has characterized that there was a

culture of lack of concern regarding the problems. Would you agree

with that?

Mr. GRAVES. Absolutely. There was a culture of doing business

for many, many years and some of us who came from the Navy or

the nuclear power influence when we got to these sites, it was very

difficult to explain or to discuss the fundamental parts of health

physics, controlling contamination at the source, ALARA. So yes, it

was extremely difficult to get the ball turned in the other direction.

Mr. WHITFIELD. All of us may very well have additional questions that we will submit to you all, and I might also say there will

probably be follow-up hearings on this. But at this time, Mr.

Strickland, do you have additional questions?

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just sitting

here listening to this, and I am thinking some terrible things happened. Some person or persons must be responsible for having

made either terrible judgments or purposeful decisions to engage in

behavior that has caused human harm. And I am wondering and

I assume that the contractors had an obligation to carry out certain

safety procedures. If they did not do that and if they submitted information that was misleading or inaccurate or deceptive, it seems

to me that that implies serious criminal behavior.

Like you, Mr. Cochran, I am not an attorney but one of the

things that bothers me is that we oftentimes do not hold people responsible. And so consequently, there is not the motivation for appropriate behavior in the future. Someone is responsible and, Mr.

Chairman, I would hope that using whatever mechanisms this committee has at its disposal, that we would consider encouraging a

criminal investigation into what we have heard here today, because

if decisions were made and contractual agreements were not kept

and lies were told, we need to identify who is responsible for that

and we need to hold them responsible. And unless we do that, my

concern is that this kind of behavior and the mistrust of government which obviously this has caused to happen, will continue.

I am interested in those of you who are on the panel regarding

whether or not, based upon your experience and what you do know,

that you would like to see an investigation into whether or not

criminal behavior occurred and if it did, whether or not it should

be pursued?

Mr. FOWLER. I definitely would like to have that looked into, sir.

Mr. JENKINS. I agree, sir.

Mr. COCHRAN. I share your thoughts completely.

Mr. GRAVES. I have no comment in that regard.

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Mr. KEY. The Presidential Report on Human Radiation Experiments, which I reviewed yesterday, which leads one to believe that

the Atomic Energy Commission purposely starting in 1947 had a

mission, and also decisions were made to deceive the workers and

public to keep this information internally. I guess my question, Mr.

Strickland, is when did this stop or has it stopped?

Mr. STRICKLAND. And just in closing, I would like to make this

comment. There is reference here to some of this material information was kept from workers because of fear that they may require

or expect hazardous pay. I don’t know if it is possible, but quite

frankly I would like to see if we can go back and identify all of

those employees, calculate what the hazard pay would be, add interest to that and make whoever was responsible, government or

contractor, compensate those persons and, if they are deceased,

compensate their families.

It seems to me that this is just—it is just almost unbelievable

and the frustration that you must feel I think is felt to probably

a much more minimal degree by us but we appreciate—I appreciate

the fact that you have come and you have shared and that you

have been willing to take this step. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. Strickland, I would urge you to examine the

ALARA requirement. This is a U.S. Government regulatory requirement to keep radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable. The contractor had an obligation to meet that, and to meet

that he has to have an entire program. Just like he has a financial

officer and accountants keeping his business books, he has to have

an entire program, a man in charge or woman in charge and a

whole battery of people whose duty it is to look for ways to minimize the exposure to workers.

Had that been in place by Union Carbide and by Martin Marietta and Lockheed Martin and Bechtel Jacobs, you probably would

not have the cancers and illnesses that occurred and you would not

have them in the future and you would not have that technetium

plume.

You are going to hear from Mr. Hummer who makes a statement

in his written statement on page 5, ‘‘With respect to workers’ safety, the radiation protection program at the Paducah plant during

Lockheed Martin’s management was developed and implemented to

conform to standards of the International Committee on Radiation

Protection, as well as the specific requirements of DOE.’’

That, sir, is a false statement.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Dr. Cochran we will be hearing from Mr. Hummer on the next panel. Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. I have two additional questions.

Mr. Graves, let me ask you, if I could, an internal Environmental

Compliance Review was done at Paducah by Martin Marietta in

December 1990 and it identified compliance problems with respect

to Martin Marietta’s implementation of the National Environmental Protection Act. According to this document, the review

found no system is in place to ensure that environmental impact

assessments prepared in compliance with NEPA are honored by

plant management.

However, in that same year’s environmental report, Martin Marietta told DOE that ‘‘compliance with NEPA is maintained by folVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00345 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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lowing the guidelines set forth by CET, DOE, and Martin Marietta.’’ Obviously these statements are in conflict. My question is, do

you have any explanation from your position as to why these statements would be made?

Mr. GRAVES. Mr. Bryant, again my responsibilities there were for

radiological protection. The construction or the dissemination of

documents relative to NEPA review or any other environmental

regulation, I was not privy to. I must say that I reviewed some documents from time to time, but as far as the actual execution of the

process, I can’t comment to, sir.

Mr. BRYANT. You have referred several times today, this was

something in the culture?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRYANT. Would this be consistent with that prior statement,

the culture that you found in Paducah?

Mr. GRAVES. I suppose that they could be looked at like that; yes,

sir.

Mr. BRYANT. I know that there are other witnesses that will follow on other panels that can more adequately address that question.

Let me ask, Mr. Fowler, if you know this answer. USEC made

a commitment to the NRC to complete seismic upgrades at the Paducah uranium enrichment plants by December 1997 and this is a

high-priority public health and safety project because the Paducah

plant is near a fault line. However, USEC has pushed the completion date back and is not close to finishing the work.

According to the most recent update of the NRC—and this is

September 15—the schedule for completing these upgrades slipped

back to September of the year 2000. Apparently DOE has transferred more than $200 million to USEC to complete these upgrades. Do you have any knowledge of this?

Mr. FOWLER. I know that they are bringing in a massive amount

of subcontractors to complete the project. I know that it is ongoing,

but the reasons for the delay, I can’t explain.

Mr. BRYANT. Again, I think we have other members of the later

panel who will be able to address that issue. In the event that

question is not asked, I would hope that they would address that

question.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Ms. DeGette.

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Strickland and I

were kind of wondering what some of the employees of the plant

think about this statement. ‘‘With respect to worker safety, the radiation protection program at the Paducah plant during Lockheed

Martin’s management was developed and implemented to conform

to standards of the International Committee on Radiation Protection as well as the specific requirements of DOE. Plant workers

were advised of radiation hazards and other safety hazards associated with their work, both in general and for specific activities.’’

Mr. Key?

Mr. KEY. During that period of time there was a lot of change

going on inside the plant. There were implementations of the contamination control program now. There were personal protection

for workers that in order to perform their job had to adhere to. The

whole work force was trying to absorb all the knowledge being

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thrown at them from various angles and some of that training that

they received was not efficient or we had to go back and retrain

on particular issues.

So to answer your question, some of the changes were viewed by

the workers themselves as requirements that were needed by DOE

and implemented, but as far as their knowledge of the international radiological committees and stuff, it was nonexistent because it was a complete culture change for us.

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. Fowler?

Mr. FOWLER. The work force—at that time I was involved in direct development of training. They were not always informed, and

I will make a reasoning, due to the management culture to support

health physics. That was not there. They did not support it.

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. Jenkins?

Mr. JENKINS. I agree with both Jim and Ron. Everything was in

turmoil then. Some of it was never gotten out, I will put it that

way.

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Ms. DeGette.

Mr. Burr, 5 minutes.

Mr. BURR. Mr. Cochran, there has been a tremendous amount of

interest not only by the Department of Energy but by EPA and

State environmental regulators as well as HHS to determine worker safety, and I think DOE has done a preliminary report. HHS

also finished a public health assessment done by the Agency for

Toxic Substances and Disease Registry which was completed last

month. It is still in draft form, I’m sorry. Let me read one of the

areas of the draft form to you and I will ask a question about it.

‘‘This means that although members of the public near the site

may be exposed to low levels of contamination in the environment

from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant facilities, concentrations

are not at a level that would cause harm to humans.’’ Based upon

some of the new documents that we have seen about the level of

contamination, how can an assessment be made in line with what

we are reading in this draft?

Mr. COCHRAN. I think that is an inaccurate statement that you

just read.

Mr. BURR. Let me ask you if you are aware of how in depth DOE,

HHS, EPA, State environmental agencies, are at their reassessments? Are they actually going in, doing the testing, or are they

using documentation that is available to come to a conclusion that

has been provided by the contractors?

Mr. COCHRAN. I don’t know. I do not have firsthand knowledge

of their activities other than, for example, the 2-page DOE auditor

statement or summary of the auditor—of the DOE audit and the

public statements made by DOE officials and EPA and so forth.

I think there needs to be a change in the culture of these organizations as well. First there are levels—there are levels of contamination offsite that are above regulatory limits. The hazard to the

public is less than the hazards to the workers. The main focus of

your investigation I think should be on workers and culpability.

It is incorrect, though, to say that the levels offsite, for example,

are at a level that would not cause harm.

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Mr. BURR. Let me take you back through some of the documents

that you and I have been through. We had an executive summary

in 1991. We had an annual environmental report on in 1991 that

was actually completed in October 1992. The executive summary

was completed on March 22, 1991. That executive summary at that

time stated that there was an appendix missing, that it was yet to

come. That is the same appendix that your legal team has asked

repeatedly to be produced. It has now been produced for the local

paper and for the Congress but not for you. Let me draw your attention to the date of the appendix, January 4, 1991.

Clearly this Phase I site investigation was completed and printed

in January 1991, 2 months prior to the completion of the executive

summary that said site investigation to come and clearly a year,

almost 2 years prior to the annual environmental report. Both the

executive summary and the environmental annual report were

written. The contractor had to have known of the existence of the

Phase I site investigation written and completed on January 4,

1991. What would you conclude from that?

Mr. COCHRAN. My conclusion is that the contractor was aware of

the contamination and covered it up and proceeded to make numerous false statements in environmental reports and reports to the

DOE and the State of Kentucky with regard to the levels of contamination.

Mr. BURR. Clearly if the appendix had been included in the executive summary or the annual environmental report, those reports

would have spelled out something totally different, would they not?

Mr. COCHRAN. If it had been in the executive summary, it would

have been harder to lie in the annual reports, yes.

Mr. BURR. I thank you and I thank the rest of the witnesses. I

yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Whitfield.

Mr. WHITFIELD. I would like to make one statement, Mr. Chairman. This panel has provided us with some shocking revelations

and under your leadership it is our intent to obtain all of facts and

correct this problem once and for all.

Mr. UPTON. As I excuse the panel, I want to thank you for your

hours of testimony this morning and this afternoon. I can assure

you that it is our intent to assure that all of the workers in all of

the sites feel that they are safe as they go to and from their job

and that the community that they live in, that those folks too will

be proud of the operation that is in that community. We will accept

nothing less. Thank you very much. You are formally excused.

Panel 2 includes Mr. John Jay Hummer, Director of Corporate

Environment, Safety and Health for Lockheed Martin; Mr. Joseph

Nemec, President of Bechtel Jacobs; and Mr. James Miller, Executive Vice President of USEC.

I would like to proceed with Panel II as we are close to having

some votes on the House floor. As I understand, each of you also

have counsel, as we had with the first panel. No? Mr. Hummer, do

you have counsel?

If you could all rise and identify your counsel and have your

counsel rise as well.

Mr. HUMMER. My counsel is Mr. Leon.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Moore.

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[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. UPTON. Thank you very much. You are now under oath. As

you saw with the first panel, we would like to limit your remarks

to no more than 5 minutes. Your entire testimony will be made certainly part of the record.

Mr. Hummer, we will start with you. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN J. HUMMER, DIRECTOR OF CORPORATE

ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH, LOCKHEED MARTIN

CORP., ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD J. LEON, COUNSEL; JOSEPH F. NEMEC, PRESIDENT, BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY,

LLC; AND JAMES H. MILLER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,

USEC, INC., ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT MOORE, COUNSEL

Mr. HUMMER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, on behalf of Lockheed Martin Corporation, I appreciate the opportunity

to provide testimony and answer your questions regarding safety at

the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant during the period that Lockheed Martin operated that facility. After nearly 3 decades in the

nuclear field, 20 years of which was an as an officer in the Navy

nuclear submarine program, I was hired in 1991 by Martin Marietta Energy Systems as the Director of Safety and Health in Oak

Ridge, Tennessee, with duties including programmatic responsibility for safety at the Paducah plant. Since 1994, I have served as

a Director of Environmental, Safety and Health at Lockheed Martin’s corporate level, with programmatic responsibility for the facilities it operates for the Department of Energy.

Owned by the Department of Energy, the Paducah facility was

built in the early 1950’s to produce enriched uranium for the Nation’s nuclear weapons program. In the mid-1960’s, its mission

changed to include production of fuel for commercial nuclear reactors. Between 1964 and 1977, enriched uranium from reprocessed

reactor fuel was introduced into that process. This reprocessed reactor fuel was known to be contaminated with small amounts of

transuranic elements, including plutonium.

Lockheed Martin operated the Paducah facility from 1984 to

1989. Although introduction of the contaminated reactor fuel had

ceased in 1977, some transuranic contamination remained. The

worker and environmental protection programs that Lockheed Martin took over in 1984 were viewed by DOE as effective to address

that contamination as well as the other safety risks inherent in the

facility. In the late 1980’s, however, the new Secretary of Energy,

Admiral Watkins, instituted enhanced safety standards and programs at all DOE facilities in order to meet the ever-increasing expectations of the American people for protection of workers and the

environment. Lockheed Martin, in coordination with DOE, improved the health, safety and environmental programs at Paducah.

Throughout the 15-year period that Lockheed Martin operated

the Paducah facility, it worked very closely with the Department

of Energy to fulfill DOE contract requirements and to ensure that

DOE was fully informed of plant circumstances. To the best of our

knowledge, the corporation did not mislead workers or DOE as to

the state of worker safety, environmental protection or any other

matter at the Paducah facility. To the extent that lawsuits have

been filed to date which raise new, unresolved allegations of wrongVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00349 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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doing by present or former Lockheed Martin employees, Lockheed

Martin intends to look into those allegations and deal with them

appropriately.

In the meantime, however, Lockheed Martin will defend these

suits vigorously and with every confidence that it will ultimately

be vindicated in the courts of law. Lockheed Martin also remains

committed to allay the concerns of the workers at the Paducah facility and their families. We will cooperate to the fullest extent possible with DOE and the Congress in their effort to protect the

health and safety of these workers and their community.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of John J. Hummer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN J. HUMMER, DIRECTOR, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT,

SAFETY AND HEALTH, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

Mister Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address this important matter on behalf of Lockheed Martin Corporation.

INTRODUCTION

I appear here today having worked in the nuclear field for nearly four decades.

I graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1958 and from the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program in early 1962. I later earned a Master of Science degree from the

University of Southern California. I served 23 years on active duty in the Navy,

principally operating nuclear submarines, but also commanding a major submarine

training center. After retirement from the Navy as a captain, I spent ten years consulting and providing management support for nuclear public utilities. In 1991, I

was hired as Director of Safety and Health for Martin Marietta Energy Systems in

Oak Ridge, Tennessee. I served in that capacity for three years and had programmatic responsibility for safety at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Since

1994 I have been a Director on the Martin Marietta/Lockheed Martin Environment,

Safety and Health staff at the corporate level with programmatic responsibility for

the numerous DOE facilities operated by Lockheed Martin.

Lockheed Martin Corporation has been asked to appear here today to provide information to the Committee regarding its management of the Paducah facility from

1984 to 1999. We are pleased to do so. However, it is important to note from the

outset that as a result of lawsuits that have been filed against us and other private

contractors who managed the Paducah facility—two of which having been filed so

recently that we have not had an opportunity to even answer them yet in court—

there are legal and practical limitations to how much we can say, at this time, regarding our performance under the contract with the Department of Energy. Nevertheless, because of our ongoing concern for the health and peace of mind of those

in the Paducah area and our desire to dispel as many as possible of the inaccurate

and false impressions that have been advanced to the public, I am here today to

help answer your questions. Before doing so, I believe some background information

would be useful.

MANAGEMENT HISTORY

The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant is an important part of our national nuclear

infrastructure. The plant was built for the Atomic Energy Commission (‘‘AEC’’) in

the 1950’s. It is still owned by the Department of Energy, the successor to the AEC.

From its initial operation until 1984 the Paducah plant was operated by Union Carbide Corporation for the DOE. In April 1984 Martin Marietta Energy Systems Inc.

succeeded Union Carbide as the plant operator. In 1993, pursuant to legislation

from the Congress, the United States Enrichment Corporation (‘‘USEC’’) was formed

and leased the Paducah plant uranium enrichment facilities from DOE for operation. Martin Marietta Utility Services Inc. (later Lockheed Martin Utility Services

Inc.) operated the plant for USEC from 1993 to 1999. DOE retained responsibility

for, and control of, the remainder of the Paducah plant, including environmental

management. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems continued as DOE’s operating contractor for those activities. In early 1998, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems was succeeded by the Bechtel Jacobs Company as the DOE contractor. In May 1999 USEC

took over direct operation of the production facilities, ending Lockheed Martin’s direct involvement with the Paducah plant.

347

Located in western Kentucky, the Paducah plant sits on a 3500-acre site owned

by the DOE. About 740 acres around the operating facilities are fenced, with the

remainder forming an uninhabited buffer area. The buffer area is accessible to the

public and is adjacent to a wildlife preserve. The uranium-enrichment facility includes huge multistory buildings with hundreds of electric motors consuming more

than a thousand megawatts of power to move the process gas through the diffusion

enrichment process. Support facilities for the plant are functionally equivalent to a

small city. The plant employs about 2000 men and women, including about 10 DOE

personnel.

URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROCESS

Although this hearing is not the place to describe in detail the scientific process

for uranium enrichment, there has been considerable public discussion and concern

about the presence of plutonium at the Paducah site and its hazardous potential to

the employees and the public. Some additional background might help explain how

plutonium was introduced into the Paducah facility and how safeguards implemented by contractor Lockheed Martin together with DOE helped protect workers

and the environment against the hazards posed by plutonium and uranium.

The Paducah plant uranium-enrichment facility was initially operated as part of

our country’s nuclear weapons program. For more than three decades it has also

played a critical role in enriching uranium for the commercial reactors that provide

electricity to communities around the country. Both weapons and reactor uses of

uranium require that the concentration of uranium 235 be increased from naturallyoccurring levels. At Paducah, the initial step in the enrichment process, the principal input or feed to the process is natural uranium in a gaseous fluoride state.

As a result of the Paducah process, uranium 235 concentration, or enrichment, is

increased to about 2%.

During three extended periods from the early 1950’s to the late 1970’s, enriched

uranium from reprocessed DOE reactor fuel was introduced into the enrichment

process at the Paducah plant, as part of a DOE effort to make the best use of the

unused enriched uranium. These ‘‘reactor returns’’ contained small amounts of

transuranic elements such as plutonium and neptunium, and fission products such

as technetium. Although the transuranic elements were present in very small proportion to the uranium, they posed special challenges to the radiation protection

program at Paducah because by comparison they were far more radioactive. These

challenges were recognized from the early days of the reactor return activities, and

certain controls to limit worker exposure and radiation dose were in place when I

joined Martin Marietta in 1991. The introduction of plutonium and other transuranic elements, however, had ended in 1977. Nevertheless, as a result of their earlier introduction between 1954 and 1977 Martin Marietta and Lockheed Martin and

their successors have had to work with DOE to monitor and protect the workers and

community against the residual presence of small amounts of those transuranic elements.

WORKER SAFETY PROGRAMS

To address the safety hazards at the Paducah plant, operating contractors developed and implemented programs based on DOE safety and environmental requirements. These programs were reviewed and approved by the DOE, and subject to

periodic evaluation by the contractor and DOE. The worker protection and other

safety programs in place in 1984, when Martin Marietta Energy Systems took over

operation at Paducah, were considered appropriate by all parties at that time.

With respect to worker safety, the radiation protection program at the Paducah

plant during Lockheed Martin’s management was developed and implemented to

conform to standards of the International Committee on Radiation Protection as

well as the specific requirements of DOE. Plant workers were advised of radiation

hazards and other safety hazards associated with their work, both in general and

for specific activities. Orientation and refresher general training included a discussion of plant radiation hazards, radiation warning and information signs and requirements to obey posted warnings, and information about the radiation monitoring program. Individuals who worked in certain areas of significant radiation received additional training and met special qualification requirements before being

assigned and performing the work. Employees were cautioned and trained to work

in ways that minimize the radiation exposure, particularly to minimize the time

spent in the radiation area, to stay as far from radiation sources as possible, and

to use available shielding whenever possible.

Employee concerns programs were also instituted to offer an opportunity for workers to voice safety concerns and have them resolved. Concerns could be raised anonVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00351 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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ymously, and any retaliation against individuals raising concerns was strictly

against our requirements. Potential safety issues that were identified by workers,

DOE, external agencies or internal management assessment were investigated and

resolved to the best of our ability, most in conjunction with the individual who

raised the issue.

It is important to emphasize that radiation protection and some other health programs require monitoring to determine individual exposure levels and frequent area

monitoring to determine levels of radioactive contamination. Radiation exposure

monitoring serves two principal purposes: to assure that individuals are not exposed

to amounts of radiation above established limits; and to help identify any need for

additional controls. Limits for radiation exposure are implemented at administrative

levels significantly lower than ICRP limits as part of the plan to limit exposures.

The potential for internal contamination of radiation workers was monitored

through a bioassay program. Bioassay was a routine part of the radiation protection

program at the Paducah facility (and the other gaseous diffusion facilities) because

of the presence of uranium. Data on the bio-assays of personnel engaged in particular activities or working in areas with the potential for internal exposure is in

DOE records.

In the late 1980’s Admiral Watkins, the Secretary of Energy, recognized that safety standards and programs at all DOE facilities needed to be enhanced in order to

meet the ever-increasing expectations of the American people for protection of workers and the environment. He instituted an aggressive audit program to identify and

correct shortcomings, including shortcomings in the radiation protection programs.

Improvements in DOE programs now include more detailed safety and environmental program direction and guidance, standardized training for radiological workers, and nuclear safety requirements enforceable under the Price Anderson Act.

In response to the increased safety standards, Lockheed Martin developed and implemented enhanced safety and environmental programs at the Paducah facility.

Indeed, when Admiral Watkins, in early 1990, advised Norm Augustine, then

CEO of Martin Marietta, that the radiation control practices at its DOE facilities

operated by Energy Systems were not satisfactory, Mr. Augustine responded with

a description of actions already taken to improve the programs and a commitment

to continue to provide his personal attention to the issue. He also provided a more

detailed action plan to the DOE Manager of the Oak Ridge Operations Office.

MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

The standards for control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment,

whether into the air, soil or water, from DOE facilities, including the Paducah plant,

were established in DOE Orders and by the EPA. The Commonwealth of Kentucky

authorities additionally oversaw compliance with environmental requirements established in permits issued through the Cabinet for Natural Resources. To assess

radiological emissions from the plant, DOE elected to require Lockheed Martin to

collect and analyze samples from the water, soil and air at the plant, and to compare the results to the standards established in DOE Orders. In addition, a number

of off-site surface water sampling locations were established. Airborne emissions

were regulated under the Clean Air Act through a permit system administered by

the KDEP. To assure compliance with the Clean Air Act permits from the State of

Kentucky, stacks were sampled, ambient monitoring was conducted at various offsite locations, and on-site meteorological data was collected. In addition, external

gamma radiation was measured at a number of off-site locations, radiation surveys

were conducted throughout and around the plant site, and periodic aerial surveys

were conducted.

Data collected from the liquid and gaseous effluent monitoring programs described above were compiled, analyzed and reported each year in an annual environmental monitoring report for the Paducah plant. This report was distributed by

DOE to the news media and the public. In many years a press conference was called

to review the report and answer questions for the public and various environmental

groups.

CONCLUSION

Lockheed Martin (previously Martin Marietta) operated the Paducah plant for 15

years, with responsibility for protection of employees, the public and the environment from hazards associated with the plant. Throughout that period the corporation worked very closely with DOE to fulfill DOE contract requirements and expectations, and to ensure that DOE was fully informed of plant circumstances. To the

best of our knowledge, the corporation did not mislead workers or DOE as to the

state of worker safety, environmental protection or any other matter at the Paducah

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plant. To the extent that the lawsuits that have been filed to date raise new, unresolved allegations of wrongdoing by present or former Lockheed Martin employees,

Lockheed Martin intends to look into those allegations and deal with them appropriately. In the meantime, however, Lockheed Martin will defend these suits vigorously and with every confidence that it will ultimately be vindicated in the courts

of law. It also remains committed to allay the concerns of the workers at Paducah,

and their families. It will cooperate to the fullest extent possible with the Department of Energy and the Congress in their effort to protect the health and safety

of those workers and their community.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

Mr. Nemec.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH F. NEMEC

Mr. NEMEC. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Joe Nemec, President of the Bechtel Jacobs Company. We are the management and

integration contractor for environmental restoration work at Paducah at Portsmouth, Ohio and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. We are a relatively new contractor, been there about 18 months. Our role began

in April of last year. We are there specifically to clean up the site,

to stop the migration of contaminants, to clean up contaminated

areas both on and off the site, dispose of wastes from past operations, to maintain these inactive facilities until they can be decommissioned, and to manage the inventory of depleted uranium

hexafluoride, the surveillance and maintenance on the cylinders.

Our role does not include the conversion of that material to another

form. We have 94 employees at Paducah and about 275 subcontractor employees.

In January 1998 through March 1998 we went through a phasein period, a 3 month phase-in period where we reviewed existing

programs and placed the transferring Lockheed Martin people at

the appropriate point in our organization. With respect to the safety programs, we found an adequate set of procedures and process

and programs in all elements of safety. However, we did find five

separate programs for the five different sites that we oversee. And

so we developed an integrated safety management system using

the patterns that the Department of Energy had been developing

over the previous few years. That system has, I think, two important components for these discussions:

One, worker involvement. Every task we do, we get the workers

who actually have to do the work involved in the planning of that

task. That is a key to our success. That is only way that we will

really improve our safety record.

The second is management ownership of safety. It isn’t the safety

department’s responsibility. It is my responsibility and those people

who report to me, right down through our site manager and to the

first line supervisors.

It is also important that we have a system where we can continuously improve our safety through continuous feedback on all the

tasks. That is an important element of our entire safety program.

A few weeks ago, we had a fairly large DOE team visit the site to

look at a variety of things, including some of our operations. They

identified some preliminary concerns, and as a result the Secretary

of Energy called a 1-day stand-down and we conducted that standdown; gave us an opportunity to discuss with the site personnel

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again our safety program and to elicit any suggestions or any concerns that they had.

We expect that we will get a final report from DOE. We will read

and understand that report, develop a corrective action plan and

get on with any changes that are required.

I think it is important to recognize that that investigative team

found no imminent hazards to the workers, the public, or the environment and in fact we have what we believe is a fairly good safety

program at Paducah. On average, the radiation exposure to our

workers is less than 1 percent of the regulatory guideline, about

the same as you would receive by two transcontinental flights

across the country. We have had no environmental notices of violation, and our employees have worked for more than 500 days without a recordable injury.

I want to thank the chairman and the committee for inviting me

here. I will be happy to answer your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Joseph F. Nemec follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH F. NEMEC, PRESIDENT, BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY

LLC

My name is Joe Nemec, President of Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC, the management and integration (M&I) contractor for the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) environmental management and uranium programs work at Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio. About 80 percent of our work is at Oak

Ridge, with about 10 percent each at Paducah and Portsmouth. Our role at Paducah

is to restore the environment, dispose of the legacy waste in storage, and manage

the stockpile of depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6). We are not responsible for

operation of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP). That operation is the responsibility of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC). Bechtel Jacobs

Company has 94 employees and about 275 subcontractor employees at Paducah,

while USEC has about 1,600.

Recent events have focused attention on worker and public safety issues at the

Paducah site, and I will discuss those issues today.

Bechtel Jacobs Company is a relatively new contractor at Paducah. We were selected through the competitive process as the M&I contractor in December 1997 and

began a three-month phase-in on January 1, 1998. Eighteen months ago, on April

1, 1998, we assumed full responsibility for the DOE activities at the site from the

predecessor contractor, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems. We took over cleanup activities that had been in progress at Paducah since the discovery of off-site contamination there in 1988. We have been making measurable improvements in all areas

of that activity, including its associated safety and health program.

While we have made significant progress to date, I’ll be the first to acknowledge

that there is much left to do and always room for improvement. The safety review

recently initiated by DOE, and last week’s one-day stand down ordered by Secretary

Richardson, provided additional focus on safety.

It is our understanding that this review team did not find any imminent threats

to the health of workers, the public, or the environment. However, they have spoken

to us about some areas for improvement, and we’ve initiated actions to address the

issues they identified.

My remarks today will cover three major areas. First, I’ll describe Bechtel Jacobs

Company’s role and tell how it differs from that of previous contractors. Second, I’ll

describe the environmental management and uranium programs work at Paducah

for which we are responsible. And third, I’ll review our safety and environmental

programs, including actions we are taking in response to what we learned during

the stand down.

ROLE OF BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY

The scope of our work involves environmental management and uranium programs.

The environmental management portion of this assignment involves investigating,

planning, and performing cleanup of numerous facilities, disposal sites, and waste

materials that are left on-site from prior DOE operations; we refer to these wastes

as legacy wastes. The uranium programs task involves managing 63,000 cylinders

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of DUF6 stored at Oak Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth, with almost 38,000 cylinders at Paducah.

Our contract represents a major change in DOE’s contracting strategy for these

environmental management and uranium programs. Our predecessor had operated

the DOE facilities for many years under a management and operations contract,

which meant they performed most of the work with their own forces. Bechtel Jacobs

Company was hired to complete the cleanup of the facilities as an M&I contractor.

We plan, manage and integrate the work using primarily subcontractors to accomplish discrete individual tasks with a focus on project completion.

Our contract with DOE allowed us to bring in some new personnel and a new

management approach, but it also required that we hire the majority of the Lockheed Martin Energy Systems workforce at substantially equivalent pay and benefits. The former LMES workforce is to be moved to subcontractors during a two-year

transition period. We are 18 months into that two-year period. In another six

months we will have completed the transition, at which time about 90 percent of

the work will be performed by subcontractors.

By bringing us in as a new contractor, DOE has created the opportunity to review

and revisit the way cleanup work is conducted at Oak Ridge, Portsmouth and Paducah. We have taken the opportunity to make changes where we can improve safety

and efficiency. I will discuss some of these changes in greater detail. By keeping a

substantial number of the prior personnel, however, DOE continues to receive the

benefit of these employees’ site experience and knowledge.

OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND URANIUM PROGRAMS WORK AT

PADUCAH

DOE owns the 3,556-acre PGDP reservation and leases the uranium enrichment

facilities to USEC. DOE leases 290 buildings and facilities to USEC and retains 152

as ‘‘nonleased.’’ The nonleased facilities include:

• inactive facilities under surveillance and maintenance

• waste storage and treatment facilities

• a permitted solid waste landfill

• storage yards for cylinders containing depleted uranium hexafluoride

• burial grounds and scrap yards designated for environmental cleanup

• closed landfills

• DOE material storage areas

• two groundwater extraction and treatment systems

• office and laboratory facilities

• roads and grounds both inside and outside the perimeter security fence on the

DOE Reservation

A range of contaminants have been detected over the years in the DOE facilities

at Paducah and in the environmental media around these facilities. Some of these

contaminants are common to American industrial facilities, including trichloroethylene (TCE), a common industrial solvent, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),

commonly used in oils in electrical systems. Others contaminants are found primarily at facilities dedicated to nuclear applications, such as uranium, plutonium,

technetium and neptunium. The contamination that DOE is in the process of investigating and remediating resulted from historical operations and past practices no

longer in use at PGDP.

The risks to workers, the public and the environment posed by these contaminants depend on both the toxicity of the substance and the quantity, form, distribution and mobility of the material. Thus, although low levels of plutonium are

present at the site, it does not pose as much risk to workers, the public or the environment as does the uranium, which is present in much greater quantities, and

TCE and technetium, which are both mobile in groundwater.

Bechtel Jacobs Company is responsible for planning and executing a variety of environmental restoration activities at Paducah. These activities are being planned

and executed through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation

and Liability Act (CERCLA) process, which provides for federal [U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (USEPA)] and state regulatory oversight, and extensive public

notification and participation. CERCLA remedies are being developed and will be

implemented to address 211 solid waste management units, approximately 60,000

tons of scrap metal and approximately 50,000 drums of legacy waste. In addition,

interim actions are already under way to address two groundwater plumes, and innovative technologies are being evaluated as potential final remedies for all groundwater contaminants.

The regulatory framework for environmental restoration at Paducah is the Paducah Federal Facility Agreement (FFA)—a triparty agreement among DOE, USEPA

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Region 4, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky—that became effective on February

13, 1998. For several years before this date, Paducah environmental restoration was

implemented pursuant to an Administrative Consent Order under Sections 104 and

106 of CERCLA, as well as the corrective action requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit. The FFA coordinates the CERCLA-required activities, which are administered by USEPA, with the RCRA corrective action program administered by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. PGDP was placed

on the USEPA’s National Priorities List on May—31, 1994.

Prior to the commencement of our contract, DOE, the Commonwealth of Kentucky

and USEPA had identified 211 Solid Waste Management Units, and grouped these

units into 30 Waste Area Groups. Most of these areas are on DOE property, either

within the security fence or on the DOE Reservation. Historical contamination has

affected groundwater between the plant and the Ohio River to the north, and two

streams that receive surface water discharges from DOE property.

Our recent efforts have focused on streamlining the approach to remedial decision

making by consolidating the Waste Area Groups based on affected environmental

media. This approach will reduce the number of documents required to make cleanup decisions and will promote a comprehensive and coordinated approach to cleanup. The time and resources saved by streamlining the process will accelerate the

cleanup process.

Under CERCLA, results from environmental investigations are submitted to the

state and USEPA and maintained as the Administrative Record, which documents

the environmental decision-making process. Since 1993, site environmental information and a duplicate Administrative Record have been available to the public at the

Environmental Information Center in Paducah. Starting in 1989, public meetings

have been held on approximately a yearly basis to inform the public of the status

of environmental investigations and cleanup.

In addition to public meetings required by CERCLA, approximately 40 other public meetings and more than 100 other special events, tours and workshops have

been documented since the late 1980s at which information was provided about contamination and related environmental cleanup activities at the site. As a further

communications tool, an Environmental Advisory Committee was established in

1986 for quarterly updates about environmental issues. That group disbanded in

1996 when the Paducah Site Specific Advisory Board was formed under the Federal

Advisory Committees Act. The SSAB monthly meetings are noted in the Federal

Register and are open to the public.

As we move forward, the regulatory agencies and the public (including on-site

workers) will continue to be fully informed of all identified environmental conditions

and afforded the opportunity as required by CERCLA to participate in the cleanup

decision-making process.

Environmental Restoration

In these days of limited federal resources, efficient use of available resources is

being promoted by prioritizing cleanup actions based on risk. To facilitate efficient

resource allocation and promote a logical environmental remediation of PGDP, five

major factors for prioritizing environmental restoration have been identified by

DOE:

• Mitigate immediate risks, both on- and off-site.

• Reduce further migration of off-site contamination.

• Address sources of off-site surface water and groundwater contamination.

• Address the remaining on-site contamination.

• Final decontamination and decommissioning of DOE facilities

With regard to environmental contamination, interim actions have been taken to

address the known imminent threats, including providing an alternative water supply to affected residents, conducting off-site residential well monitoring, and implementing other institutional controls such as fish advisories and posting and fencing

of creeks. In addition, several interim actions had been taken to help reduce off-site

migration of contaminants. These included the construction and ongoing operation

of two groundwater extraction and treatment systems to address the high concentration areas of the northwest and northeast TCE plumes, which have jointly treated

approximately 600 million gallons of contaminated groundwater water since 1995.

Several interim actions had also been taken for surface water such as using an enhanced treatment system for Tc-99 prior to discharge and rerouting plant effluent

to control migration of contaminated sediment in on-site ditches.

However, while the site had undergone various degrees of characterization and

there has been a strong emphasis on implementing interim actions to address imminent threats, it was apparent that limited actions had been taken at the source

areas. There was a need to further integrate and assess existing data on a site-wide

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basis to support long-term solutions. Therefore, as part of our initial transition plan,

the existing cleanup strategy has been revised to reflect a more aggressive focus on

source areas and cleanup on a site-wide basis, with emphasis on long-term solutions. This new approach is projected to result in considerable efficiencies and expedite remedial actions for groundwater by approximately six years and surface water

by approximately three years.

Additionally, fieldwork for the final characterization phase for groundwater was

recently completed. A key technology demonstration is planned for FY 2000 to test

an in situ, passive reactive wall for treatment of groundwater contamination. This

information will be used to finalize the feasibility study and support the selection

of a final cleanup action for groundwater in FY 2001. If this technology demonstration is successful, its use in conjunction with other source treatment technologies

currently under consideration may prove to be considerably more effective and efficient than the existing groundwater pump-and-treat systems currently being used

for the northwest and northeast plume.

During the first year alone, Bechtel Jacobs Company has made significant

progress in the areas of both waste management and remedial action at Paducah.

Examples include the disposal of approximately 982 tons of waste in the on-site

DOE solid waste landfill, shipment of more than 81 tons of waste for off-site disposal, and on-site treatment of more than 19 tons of wastewater. Additionally,

under the remedial action project, we treated approximately 200 million gallons of

TCE-contaminated groundwater.

Scrap Metal

The approximately 50,000 tons of scrap metal currently stored at PGDP were generated as a result of numerous cascade upgrades and other activities conducted at

the plant over the past 45 years. This scrap material is surface contaminated with

uranium tetrafluoride, uranium hexafluoride, and trace elements of technetium. In

addition to this scrap metal inventory, DOE also has approximately 9,700 tons of

volumetrically contaminated nickel ingots in storage at PGDP. These radioactive

nickel ingots are the result of cascade improvements and cascade upgrade programs

conducted at the Oak Ridge and Paducah cascade facilities.

Cleanup at the scrap yard units has been delayed in the Accelerated Cleanup

Plan due to funding reductions. This delay has impacted cleanup of the surface soils

in the scrap yards, the buried radiological waste under the scrap piles, and the related surface-water units that receive runoff from the scrap yards. These units have

been identified as potential sources of off-site surface-water contamination. Removal

of these materials is necessary before scheduled FFA actions can be achieved. A listing of the scrap metal by metal type is:

Scrap Metal Totals

(tons)

Aluminum ......................................................................................................................................................................... 3,277

Nickel ................................................................................................................................................................................ 9,700

Copper .............................................................................................................................................................................. 43

Iron ................................................................................................................................................................................... 31,516

Stainless steel .................................................................................................................................................................. 29

Classified Scrap ............................................................................................................................................................... 15,713

Total .................................................................................................................................................................................. 60,278

The Bechtel Jacobs Company initiated an engineering evaluation/cost analysis

(EE/CA) in FY 1999 to support an action memorandum to address the scrap metal

inventory

Waste Management

Wastes managed by Bechtel Jacobs Company at PGDP include legacy wastes that

were generated prior to the leasing of production facilities to USEC July 1, 1993,

and wastes generated from cleanup activities. These are classified into five major

categories:

1. Mixed low-level waste (MLLW)

2. Low-level waste (LLW)

3. Hazardous waste

4. Sanitary/industrial waste; and

5. Transuranic (TRU) waste

As of 1999, PGDP legacy waste inventory includes 2,953 cubic meters of MLLW,

6,499 cubic meters of LLW, and 4.3 cubic meters of TRU waste.

With regard to waste disposal, the site has completed characterization of approximately 12,000 containers of waste to support waste classification and evaluation

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against various waste acceptance criteria in preparation for disposal. Additionally,

an EE/CA for scrap metal disposition was also recently completed. A final decision

selecting the preferred alternative is expected in the first half of FY 2000, with

fieldwork proposed to begin during the second half of FY 2000. The Paducah FFA

requires removal of all scrap metal by the end of FY 2003.

Decontamination and Decommissioning

A routine surveillance and maintenance program has been conducted at the DOE

facilities since 1995. Currently, 74 Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) awaiting remediation, 68 active facilities, and about 107 off-site and 53 on-site monitoring

wells are routinely inspected under this program. Maintenance consists of activities

designed to ensure safe and compliant conditions.

The inactive facilities included within C-410 Feed Plant Complex and the C-340

Metal Reduction Plant comprise about eight acres of multi-story floor space. Both

complexes were shut down in 1977. Both are contaminated with various levels of

PCBs, asbestos, and uranium, transuranics, and uranium compounds. The Surveillance and Maintenance (S&M) program consists of activities necessary to minimize

environmental, safety, and health vulnerabilities until actual decontamination and

decommissioning (D&D) of the facilities takes place (currently scheduled to begin

2014). Current activities are limited to routine inspections of waste storage areas

and facility inspections to identify needed maintenance and monitor facility integrity.

The Long Term Surveillance and Maintenance (LTS&M) Program maintains facilities and programs following interim or final remedial actions, and performs environmental and well sampling in compliance with the Paducah DOE environmental

monitoring program.

These post-remedial actions include:

• maintenance of the Water Policy which provides city water to approximately 100

residents within the area affected by the contaminant plumes;

• operation and maintenance of the two active pump and treat facilities (Northwest

Plume Groundwater System and Northeast Plume Containment System) operating to contain the high concentration zones of the respective plumes;

• maintenance of the eight institutional control fences and signs which provide public warnings of contamination affecting usage of Little Bayou Creek in off-site

areas;

• maintenance of the approximately 4,000 feet of scrap yards silt fence; and

• operation and maintenance of the North-South Diversion Ditch.

Uranium Programs

In the uranium programs, Bechtel Jacobs Company is responsible for almost

38,000 cylinders of DUF6; maintenance of approximately 400 acres of grounds and

roads inside and outside the security fence; support of the lease agreement between

DOE and USEC; S&M of inactive facilities; and management of approximately

16,000 troughs that collect oil drips contaminated with PCBs from the ventilation

systems within the operating gaseous diffusion plants.

The uranium program is responsible for the management of all the DUF6 generated since the start of enriched uranium production in 1952. Bechtel Jacobs Company also supports both DOE and USEC in maintaining the inventory of all uranium through the Nuclear Material Control and Accountability program and with

receiving Russian uranium feeds in support of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation program. Management of the DUF6 program is monitored by the Commonwealth of

Kentucky and operates in accordance with the Safety Analysis Report for the cylinder storage yards. Negotiation of an Agreed Order with the Commonwealth of

Kentucky for the management of the DUF6 inventory at Paducah is under way.

The management of 38,000 DUF6 cylinders requires that cylinder integrity be

maintained by a program of periodic inspections; movement to prevent ground contact, which contributes to accelerated corrosion; grit blasting and painting of severely corroded cylinders to arrest further corrosion; construction of concrete yards

to support improved storage conditions; and radioactive contamination monitoring

to protect employees and the environment.

DOE is aggressively pursuing a program to convert the existing DUF6 inventories

from its current uranium hexafluoride form to an oxide form. This program will

eliminate the chemical hazard by removal of the fluorine component and result in

a more stable uranium form suited to long-term storage or disposition. The Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement was completed in July 1999, and the

final Record of Decision was issued in August 1999. Award of a contract by DOE

for the design and construction of uranium conversion facilities is scheduled for

early 2000.

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Facilities managed by uranium programs at Paducah are all in the inactive category and are being monitored to ensure structural integrity, adequate access control, maintenance of fire protection systems, and containment of contamination until

the facilities can be transitioned to the Decontamination and Decommissioning program. All inactive facilities are periodically monitored and routine maintenance conducted to ensure protection for personnel and the environment.

The internal ventilation ductwork installed to cool the process electrical motors

in the gaseous diffusion plant building were originally constructed with PCB-impregnated gaskets. Over time, PCBs leached from the gaskets, requiring installation

and management of a PCB drip collection system and spill containment program.

The PCB drip collection system and spill containment program will continue as long

as USEC or its successor operates the gaseous diffusion plants.

OVERVIEW OF BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH

PROGRAMS

The terms of our contract required us to hire about 1,600 incumbent Lockheed

Martin employees performing the scope of work at Oak Ridge, Portsmouth, and Paducah. Bechtel Jacobs Company brought in a management team with experience in

the commercial sector and at other DOE sites. We brought in our own, non-incumbent Environment, Safety and Health (ESH) managers, including our overall ESH

program manager and discipline managers for Industrial Safety, Industrial Hygiene,

Radiation Protection, and Environmental Compliance. We also designated an ESH

manager to focus solely on the ESH programs of our subcontractors. During the

three-month phase-in period of our contract, these managers reviewed the existing

ESH policies, procedures, practices, and environmental permits. They also assessed

and interviewed the incumbent Lockheed Martin ESH staff to satisfy Bechtel Jacobs

Company that they were qualified. In general, we found that existing policies, procedures, and personnel qualifications were adequate to ensure safe continuity of operations when we assumed full responsibility for operations at the Oak Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth sites in April 1998.

We also determined that a number of significant changes were needed to accomplish the full transition to an M&I contract over a two-year period. I’ll highlight two

of these: Radiation Protection and Environmental Protection.

Radiation Protection

Our review of the radiation protection procedures revealed that, in effect, five separate programs existed at the five separate sites (three sites at Oak Ridge, plus Paducah and Portsmouth). Our Radiation Protection Manager determined that it

would not be efficient for one company to operate with five separate sets of procedures. We also determined that the procedures needed to change because of the fundamental differences between a management and operations approach using inhouse workers, and an M&I approach where the work is done by subcontractors. Because it would have been disruptive and unnecessary to implement an entirely new

program on the first day of our contract, we made appropriate changes in the existing radiation protection procedures so we would be able to operate on April 1, 1998,

and began a process of evolving to an integrated program.

From April 1, 1998, through September 30, 1998, a single set of Bechtel Jacobs

Company radiation protection procedures was developed. Suggestions for improvements were solicited from the workers using the procedures. The staff was trained

to the procedures, and the newly-developed radiation protection procedures were

fully implemented by October 1, 1998.

We are currently revising both these procedures and our Radiation Protection Program Plan to reflect the November 1998 changes to 10 CFR 835, ‘‘Radiation Protection for Workers.’’

We conduct our radiation protection program using the procedures, an operations

manual, and technical basis documents for external and internal dosimetry. The operations manual contains guidance needed by radiation protection personnel to authorize entry and work in radiological areas; to properly post radiation warning

signs on areas and labels on containers; to conduct surveys for radioactivity on

buildings and equipment; to conduct air monitoring for radioactivity; to control use

of industrial radioactive sources; to maintain radiation exposures of personnel as

low as reasonably achievable; and to conduct the routine radiation monitoring in active and inactive work areas to ensure personnel are appropriately apprised of the

radiation hazards in their work space.

Our technical basis document for external dosimetry describes the types of radiation fields expected to be encountered in the work place, which ensures that the

proper types of radiation monitoring badges are being worn by the workers. Our

technical basis document for internal dosimetry describes the technical rationale for

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testing individual workers for any radioactive material they may have inhaled or

ingested.

In 1998 and 1999 (through June 30) at Paducah, 530 and 311 workers, respectively, were monitored for external radiation exposure. The average exposure in

each year was less than 10 millirem (mrem), equivalent to the radiation exposure

received in one or two transcontinental airplane flights. The maximum individual

exposure was 459 mrem in either year, which is about one-and-one-half times the

amount of radiation received by a member of the public from natural background

radiation, and well below the applicable Federal regulatory limit of 5,000 mrem.

In 1998 and 1999 (through June 30) at Paducah, 163 and 107 workers, respectively, were monitored for internal radiation. We found that for both years only one

person had a dose above 10 mrem from uranium. This dose (12 mrem) is well below

the applicable Federal regulatory limit.

In 1998 and 1999, we also checked for plutonium, americium, and neptunium in

six Bechtel Jacobs Company subcontractor workers. We checked these workers because, based on available characterization data, they performed work in areas where

these radionuclides could possibly have been present. We found no positive results.

The preceding data covers only employees of Bechtel Jacobs Company and our

subcontractors, since USEC performs monitoring for their employees.

As work is transitioned to subcontractors, Bechtel Jacobs Company will require

that all subcontractors work under our radiation protection plan. All radiation safety monitoring will be done by a single radiation protection subcontractor to ensure

consistency throughout our projects.

Environmental Protection

During the early months of our contract, a due diligence assessment and management review was conducted to assess existing environmental conditions, regulatory

compliance, and cleanup strategies. The evaluation included a review of all existing

environmental permits and agreements, the compliance history, current status, adequacy of environmental actions taken to date, remedial priorities, and cleanup

schedules.

Based on the results of that effort and information collected to date, the environmental permits and agreements were determined to adequately address the scope

of site conditions. While the facility did have some limited history of minor violations, none were considered to be associated with imminent threats to human health

and environment, and all have been resolved to date with only one Notice of Violation, which involved administrative record keeping, issued at Paducah since 1995.

BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY ES&H PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS

Our work during the phase-in and transition periods of the contract also resulted

in the identification of several overall ESH program areas for improvement that I

would like to briefly highlight.

First, Bechtel Jacobs Company embraces a Zero Accidents Policy. This means that

we believe all accidents are preventable. Our goal is an injury- and illness-free

workplace, zero unpermitted discharges to the environment, and no noncompliance

with environmental permits or laws. While we have yet to reach the zero goal in

all areas, we believe that our policy reinforces to our workers that accidents or

unpermitted releases to the environment are unacceptable. One measure of the impact of this policy is that since we became the M&I contractor, we reduced the lost

workday away case rate by 37% and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recordable injury/illness rate by 47%. Our current rate for OSHA

recordables is 70% below the published Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) rate for

private industry. Our lost workday case away rate is 76% below the published BLS

rate. At Paducah, the Bechtel Jacobs Company staff has worked more than 500 consecutive days without a recordable injury case. Since April 1998 at Paducah, there

have been 11 first aid cases, and six radiation contamination cases, one radiation

uptake case above 10 mrem, no environmental Notices of Violation, and one nonconformance with the Kentucky Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit.

Second, we have made it clear that line management is accountable and responsible for ESH performance. Our ESH managers establish the policies and procedures, but the people who manage the work are accountable for performing the work

safely. To ensure safe performance, we have deployed our ESH subject-matter experts to the projects so that they are directly involved with work planning and execution in the field. We have also implemented a safe work operations training

course for first-line supervisors and ESH safety leadership workshops for our project

managers. The safe work operations course is scheduled at Paducah within the next

30 days.

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Third, we recognized our workers as being in the best position to identify the hazards of a job and as having the training, skills, and experience to safely mitigate

those hazards. As a result, we routinely involve our most skilled workers in the

‘‘work planning’’ process and obtain final reviews and feedback from affected crew

members during pre-job briefing prior to work execution. We also monitor our subcontractors’ work planning processes to ensure compliance with requirements for

worker involvement.

Finally, I have made it clear that each and every worker is empowered to stop

work, without fear of reprisal, if he or she believes that safety, health, or environmental protection will be compromised by a work activity. We initially experienced

some worker skepticism about this empowerment, but several discussions between

DOE staff and our workers during the recent stand-down at Paducah confirmed that

my message has been heard.

All of these improvements are consistent with our Integrated Safety Management

System, our system by which each work activity undergoes a rigorous five-step process by both workers and management team. These steps are:

1. Define scope of work.

2. Analyze hazards.

3. Develop and implement controls to mitigate the hazards.

4. Perform work within the established controls.

5. Collect feedback for improvement.

SUBCONTRACTOR ES&H PERFORMANCE

With our contract goal to subcontract more than 90 % of the work, the safety and

environmental protection performance of our subcontractors is critical. Before subcontractors can bid on our work, they must meet a safety and environmental protection criteria based on their past performance. Ten percent of potential subcontractors have not met our criteria, which are rigorous. In fact, there have been a few

complaints about how rigorous they are from the subcontracting community. But we

know that safety and environmental excellence exists in the subcontractor community because there has been no lack of qualified bidders meeting our safety and environmental protection criteria. We are fully committed to selecting subcontractors

who have demonstrated the ability to perform work in a safe and environmentally

sound manner.

Once on the job, the qualified subcontractors continue to perform safely and compliantly, in accordance with approved ESH plans, using a graded approach based

on job hazards, adhering to their contractual requirements, and under our observation. Failure to perform safely and compliantly is grounds for subcontract termination for cause. Because we want our subcontractors to be successful, we have implemented a Safety Advocate program under the direction of a Bechtel Jacobs Company ESH Subcontractor Manager. Each subcontract is assigned a Bechtel Jacobs

Company Safety Advocate (a professional ESH subject-matter expert) who works directly with the subcontractor’s ESH staff to ensure that expectations and requirements are understood and met.

CONTINUING IMPROVEMENTS IN SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

We believe our actions in the areas of industrial safety, radiation protection, industrial hygiene and environmental protection are effective in protecting our workers, the public, and the environment. We also recognize that there is always room

for improvement.

A few weeks ago, a DOE Environment, Safety and Health team performed a review at Paducah. The team did not uncover any imminent hazards to the workers

or the public but did have some preliminary verbal comments related to opportunities for improvement in radiological protection, procedures and conduct of operations. The team shared these comments with us at a meeting on September 3.

Based on the team’s input, Secretary Richardson ordered a one-day safety stand

down at the Paducah Site on September 9 to strengthen and enhance safety programs. He noted that while significant improvements have been made over the last

several years, the stand down affords an opportunity to further build upon existing

safety programs. The Secretary also said the stand down would give employees and

managers an opportunity to raise any concerns they may have, get questions answered and make suggestions for improved operations. My General Manager for operations and our company ESH Manager participated in the stand down.

Over the years, the DOE and its contractors have found that stand downs are an

excellent management tool to reinforce the importance of safety. By stopping all but

the most essential activities, we have been able to focus on one very important subVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00361 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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ject. We have also found that in the course of stand downs, employees usually come

up with several excellent suggestions for improvement.

The agenda for the one-day stand down included:

• Distribute and review an information sheet on plutonium and other transuranics

at Paducah with each Bechtel Jacobs Company and subcontractor employee.

• Emphasize use of safety suggestions program as a mechanism to relay anonymous

concerns or suggestions.

• Distribute and review fact sheet on rules (dos and don’ts) for DOE Material Storage Areas to each Bechtel Jacobs Company and subcontractor employee.

• Survey the site for degraded, missing, or inappropriate postings and barriers.

• Survey all standing Radiation Work Permits for accuracy, compliance, and currency. Inventory those that should be cancelled or modified.

• Dedicate a team of subject matter experts to work exclusively on resolving the

DOE Material Storage Area nuclear criticality concerns.

• Walk down and review each ongoing Bechtel Jacobs Company or subcontractor

project. Ensure presence of proper permits and other safety documents such as

Radiation Work Permits, Hot Work Permits, Lock Out/Tag Out, Job Hazards

Analysis, etc. and re-emphasize requirements for compliance and conduct of operations for each project with the project staff, both salaried and hourly.

We believe the stand down met its intended purpose. All the agenda items were

completed successfully with good involvement by the workforce. In the process of

discussing the stand down with our employees and subcontractors, we heard:

• Workers wanted more frequent information on dosimetry and air monitoring.

• Workers understand that they have stop-work authority.

• Workers feel they can change the system and be part of safety success.

In summary, since taking over the environmental management and uranium programs at Paducah 18 months ago, Bechtel Jacobs Company has made measurable

improvements in safety, radiation protection, and environmental protection, but continuous improvement is our goal. The recent visit from the DOE Headquarters ESH

review team, and last week’s stand down, are an integral part of making those improvements. No imminent hazards were identified, but we noted several areas for

improvement and we’re taking action. We will continue to work with DOE, our employees, and our subcontractors to ensure that we protect workers, the public, and

the environment.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

Mr. Miller.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. MILLER

Mr. MILLER. My name is James H. Miller. I am the Executive

Vice President of USEC Inc., and am responsible for the operations

at the gaseous diffusion plants located in Paducah, Kentucky and

Portsmouth, Ohio. USEC leases and operates certain portions of

the plants in Kentucky and Ohio from the U.S. Department of Energy and employs approximately 4,000 people with headquarters located in Bethesda, Maryland. I am pleased to have the opportunity

to provide the subcommittee with information concerning USEC’s

operations.

We are committed to ensuring that USEC maintains a safe work

environment for our employees and that our operations protect the

public and the environment. We have committed significant resources to improve the operation of the gaseous diffusion plants,

and we believe that our efforts thus far have been successful.

You have been provided with advance copies of my complete testimony. My intention today is to provide you with some brief introductory comments on that testimony and to give you an opportunity to ask any questions about USEC’s operations that you may

have.

The Energy Policy Act of 1992 established the U.S. Enrichment

Corporation as an interim step to the privatization of the uranium

enrichment enterprise. In accordance with that act, USEC leased

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portions of the GDPs from DOE and assumed responsibility for the

management of uranium enrichment activities at the GDPs commencing July 1, 1993.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission assumed regulatory jurisdiction over USEC operations from the Department of Energy on

March 3, 1997. In accordance with the 1996 USEC Privatization

Act and the Energy Policy Act, the U.S. Government privatized

USEC on July 28, 1998. In 1993 USEC initiated programs to upgrade nuclear safety, radiologically characterize he leased areas at

the GDPs, reduce the potential exposure of workers to radiation,

improve worker safety, implement pollution prevention and mitigation activities and ensure proper treatment and disposal of wastes.

Our nuclear safety upgrade program consisted of many projects

to bring GDP equipment and programs into full compliance with

NRC requirements and to enhance safety at the GDPs. USEC initiated a comprehensive site radiological characterization project

which was completed in 1998. This project surveyed all accessible

areas of the GDPs leased by USEC to obtain complete information

on the extent and the level of contamination that might be present.

As the survey was completed for each area, the postings for the

area were reviewed in light of the survey results and were adjusted

as appropriate. USEC also decontaminated areas throughout the

site. We now conduct routine radiological surveys to ensure radiological hazards are identified and communicated to employees and

that areas are properly posted. Procedures and training are in

place to ensure proper protection of individuals entering radiological areas.

Our radiation protection program is designed to achieve the goal

of keeping exposures to radiation from all sources as low as reasonably achievable. The doses received by USEC workers at the GDPs

are in fact very low.

USEC also undertook immediate action to address industrial

safety problems. Since taking over the operation of the GDPs, we

have reduced worker injury rates and lost workdays due to injuries

to less than half the 1993 rate. USEC has fully characterized its

waste streams at the GDPs and instituted new pollution prevention

initiatives. We also initiated waste minimization efforts and

achieved significant reductions in low-level radioactive and hazardous and mixed wastes. We share your concern for the health

and safety of our workers, their families and our community.

USEC is prepared to assist the committee in any way we can. I

would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of James H. Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES H. MILLER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, USEC

INC.

My name is James H. Miller. I am the Executive Vice President of USEC Inc. and

am responsible for USEC’s operations at the gaseous diffusion plants located in Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio. USEC Inc. is the world leader in production and sale of uranium fuel enrichment services for commercial nuclear power

plants. With headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, the Company leases and operates

portions of the plants in Kentucky and Ohio from the U.S. Department of Energy

and employs approximately 4,000 people.

I am pleased to provide the Subcommittee with information concerning USEC’s

operation of the gaseous diffusion plants (the ‘‘GDPs’’). USEC is committed to ensuring that it maintains a safe work environment for its employees and that its operVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00363 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
360

ations protect the public and the environment. To that end, USEC has committed

significant resources to improve the operation of the GDPs. As I will point out during this testimony, the record demonstrates that our efforts have succeeded.

My testimony today is comprised of four parts. First, I will provide some background describing the transition from a government enterprise into a private corporation regulated by NRC, OSHA, EPA and other federal and state agencies. Second, I will generally describe the state of the GDPs on July 1, 1993, when USEC

as a government corporation took over management of the uranium enrichment enterprise. Third, I will outline the actions taken by USEC from 1993 until today to

improve and enhance the operation at the plants in the areas of worker safety, radiological protection, nuclear safety, and environmental protection. Finally, I will describe the results of these actions to date.

BACKGROUND

Built in the 1950s to produce enriched uranium for national defense and, later,

for nuclear fuel for commercial reactors, the GDPs were operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor agencies. DOE and its predecessors

contracted with private companies to manage and operate the GDPs under the

agency’s direction and regulatory oversight. In June 1993, the GDPs were managed

and operated for DOE by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, a subsidiary of Martin

Marietta Corporation.

The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, established the United States Enrichment Corporation, a wholly owned government corporation, as an interim step

to the privatization of the uranium enrichment enterprise. In accordance with the

Energy Policy Act, commencing July 1, 1993, USEC leased portions of the GDPs

from DOE and assumed responsibility for the management of uranium enrichment

activities at the GDPs. USEC, as a government corporation, contracted with Martin

Marietta Utility Services, later to be Lockheed Martin Utility Services, to operate

and maintain the GDPs. The Energy Policy Act mandated that the GDPs be independently regulated by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), in addition to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and applicable state agencies.

The NRC assumed regulatory jurisdiction over USEC operations on March 3,

1997. Prior to that time, USEC operations were regulated by DOE under a Regulatory Oversight Agreement between DOE and USEC which was based upon the existing nuclear safety, safeguards, and security requirements of DOE.

In 1996, the USEC Privatization Act, Pub. L. 104-134, was enacted. In accordance

with the USEC Privatization Act and the Energy Policy Act, the U.S. Government

privatized USEC through an initial public offering of stock on July 28, 1998. After

privatization, USEC initiated steps to assume full and direct responsibility for the

operations of the GDPs. Accordingly, on November 18, 1998, USEC provided notice

to Lockheed Martin Utility Services as required by contract that USEC was terminating its contract to operate the GDPs. On May 18, 1999, USEC assumed direct

control of the operations of the GDPs.

THE STATE OF THE GDPS ON JULY 1, 1993

The Energy Policy Act directed that DOE complete an environmental audit of the

GDPs prior to the July 1, 1993, transition to USEC. DOE’s environmental audit documented that the GDPs were contaminated by a number of hazardous and radioactive materials including polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs); organic compounds

such as Trichloroethylene; metals such as lead, nickel and chromium; asbestos; and

radionuclides including uranium and technetium. The GDPs were also undergoing

cleanup and environmental remediation activities under the Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Paducah GDP was listed on the National Priorities List under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as Superfund. The presence of contamination

from transuranics was known as a legacy of past operations at the GDPs and the

lease with DOE specifically indemnifies USEC for any liabilities as a result of contamination from transuranics such as plutonium.

On July 1, 1993, there was incomplete information concerning the extent or level

of contamination that might be present in the process and support buildings or in

outside areas. There also was only limited characterization of wastes generated. It

was assumed that all process buildings and most support buildings were potentially

contaminated. In general, it was also assumed that wastes generated and stored on

site were mixed wastes, both hazardous and radioactive.

In addition to the environmental audit, DOE also performed an assessment of the

condition of the GDPs with respect to industrial safety. Under DOE, the operations

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of the GDPs were not subject to OSHA regulation. DOE’s assessment identified

many problem areas related to industrial safety. In 1993, the worker injury rates

at both GDPs were above industry norms.The USEC Privatization Act provided that

any liabilities associated with the operation of the uranium enterprise (including the

operation of the GDPs) prior to July 28, 1998, would remain direct liabilities of the

U.S. Government and DOE.

USEC’S ACTIONS SINCE JULY 1, 1993

USEC has made protection of our workers, the public and the environment a priority and has committed significant resources to improve and enhance the operation

of the GDPs. In 1993, USEC initiated programs to upgrade nuclear safety,

radiologically characterize the leased areas at the GDPs, reduce the potential exposure of workers to radiation, improve worker safety, implement pollution prevention

activities and ensure proper treatment and disposal of wastes.

USEC initiated a comprehensive Nuclear Safety Upgrade program to bring the

GDPs into full compliance with NRC requirements and to enhance safety at the

GDPs. DOE funded approximately $220 million of this Nuclear Safety Upgrade program.

USEC also initiated a comprehensive site radiological characterization project

which was completed in 1998. This project surveyed all accessible areas of the GDPs

leased by USEC to obtain complete information on the extent and level of contamination that might be present. The survey included outside areas with miles of roadways, millions of square feet of building walls, floors and lockers, over a million

tools and parts, and millions of document pages. As the survey was completed for

each area, the postings and markings for the area were reviewed in light of the survey results and were adjusted as necessary. USEC decontaminated areas throughout the site including over 5.5 million square feet of building floor space. This

project significantly reduced workers’ potential exposure to radioactive materials.

USEC undertook immediate action to address the industrial safety problem areas.

DOE funded $35 million to correct problem areas identified in DOE’s assessment

and other potential safety issues identified by USEC. USEC also initiated an effort

to improve work practices and procedures bringing them in line with industry best

practices.

USEC fully characterized its waste streams at the GDPs and instituted new pollution prevention initiatives to reduce the amount of waste generated and to change

waste streams to more benign forms. USEC identified and approved commercial licensed offsite waste treatment and disposal facilities and began shipping low-level,

hazardous and mixed wastes off site for proper treatment and disposal at licensed

commercial facilities.

RESULTS TO DATE

USEC’s radiation protection program is in compliance with NRC regulations. The

radiation protection program is designed to achieve the goal of keeping exposures

to radiation from all sources including transuranics as low as reasonably achievable.

The effectiveness of USEC’s program is demonstrated by data showing that the average annual dose for all GDP monitored personnel is less than 5 millirem per year

compared to the federal limit of 5000 millirem per year. The doses received by

USEC’s workers at the GDPs are also well below the averages for other NRC licensees. Procedures and training are in place to ensure proper protection of individuals

entering radiological areas. USEC conducts routine radiological surveys to ensure

radiological hazards are identified and communicated to employees and that areas

are properly posted. All employees are provided training regarding the potential

hazards associated with exposure to radioactive materials.

USEC continually assesses its radiation protection program to assure that it is

effective and to seek opportunities for improvement. USEC’s Health Physics organization conducts periodic reviews of the radiation protection program. USEC’s Safety,

Safeguards and Quality organization, which is independent of the radiation protection program and production, also conducts an audit program of the radiation protection program, reviewing different elements of the program throughout the year.

Most recently, during the week ending September 3, 1999, NRC conducted a confirmatory inspection of the Paducah plant’s radiation protection program, specifically examining measures used to protect workers and the public from hazards of

transuranics. NRC has provided USEC with preliminary information that it has

found that our program adequately protects workers and the public.

USEC’s commitment to protect its neighbors and the environment is equally clear

from the results it has achieved. USEC monitors its air emissions and water discharges to assure that it meets all applicable regulatory limits. USEC maintains a

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number of air monitors offsite and conducts additional portable sampling and monitoring onsite. Air emissions from USEC’s operations at the GDPs have been well

below the regulatory limits for radionuclides. During USEC’s operation of the GDPs,

air emissions each year typically have resulted in a total of less than one-tenth of

the EPA standard. Water discharges are monitored for uranium, technetium and

transuranics either weekly or quarterly depending on the nature of the discharge.

All USEC water discharges have been below regulatory limits.

USEC’s efforts to reduce other industrial safety hazards and improve practices

also has succeeded in improving worker safety. In July 1995, the Paducah GDP

reached a significant milestone with two million man-hours worked without a lost

workday case. Since taking over the operation of the GDPs, USEC has reduced

worker injury rates and lost work days due to injuries to less than half the 1993

rate and well below the national average for our industry. USEC also has an aggressive pollution prevention program. Low level radioactive waste generation was reduced by 36% at the Paducah GDP and 32% at the Portsmouth GDP between FY

1996 and FY 1999. USEC achieved similar reductions in the amount of hazardous

and mixed waste generated. The Paducah GDP achieved a 42% reduction in generation of hazardous and mixed waste between FY 1995 and FY 1999, and the Portsmouth GDP reduced generation by 70% between FY 1994 and FY 1999.

In 1998, the National Safety Council recognized the Paducah plant as successfully

improving production processes while achieving significant safety gains.

Finally, as you know, NRC is required to prepare periodic reports to Congress on

the GDPs’ performance. The NRC provided Reports to Congress in December 1997

and in January 1999. Both reported that USEC’s operation of the GDPs has provided adequate protection of the public health and safety and the environment and

generally has been in compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. On January

29, 1999, the NRC renewed the GDP Certificates of Compliance for a period of five

years—the maximum period permitted by the USEC Privatization Act.

CONCLUSION

Congress provided USEC with the mandate to improve the operation of the GDPs

and to enhance the protection of its workers, the public and the environment. USEC

is committed to carrying out that mandate. Safety is paramount at USEC. We believe that safety and business success are intertwined—safe workers and safe facilities are necessary to achieve quality performance. USEC has committed significant

resources and has taken significant strides to ensure safe operation of the GDPs.

The record demonstrates that our efforts have succeeded. We are proud of the dedication and hard work our employees and the results we have achieved. We are committed to building upon our success and continuously striving to improve.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

You heard those buzzers. We have a series of votes on the floor.

I know Mr. Burr has a speech at 1:30. I am going to let him go

first with 5 minutes of questions. When he is done, we will adjourn

temporarily until 2 o’clock.

Mr. BURR. I thank the chairman.

Mr. Nemec, let me ask you, I think it was Mr. Egan who was

the attorney who had requested documents, specifically the Appendix 2B-17 from Bechtel. That has since found its way to this committee and also the Louisville paper. Can I ask you as a representative of Bechtel, has that been provided to Mr. Egan, or do you

plan to?

Mr. NEMEC. Congressman, I am not aware of any request that

Bechtel Jacobs received from the attorneys regarding that. We did

receive a request from the committee and we did—and we were notified that the appendix was not in the document room. We found

it, we put it in there, we provided a copy to the committee. I’m not

aware that we received any request from the attorneys.

Mr. BURR. I’m sure if you didn’t, they will follow up with you.

Mr. NEMEC. I’m sure they will and they will get a copy.

Mr. BURR. Mr. Hummer, if I may spend a second with you. To

your knowledge has DOE ever asked Martin Marietta or a repVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00366 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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resentative of Martin Marietta to alter or to lose data as it related

to contamination or worker safety at the Paducah, Kentucky plant?

Mr. HUMMER. To my knowledge, that has never happened, Mr.

Burr.

Mr. BURR. Has Martin Marietta ever falsified or withheld documents from DOE or any regulatory agency with oversight over Paducah?

Mr. HUMMER. No, sir.

Mr. BURR. Has DOE ever requested the appendix missing from

the 1991 executive summary from Martin Marietta when they were

the main contractor?

Mr. HUMMER. I don’t know the answer to that question.

Mr. BURR. Are you familiar with the appendix 2B-17?

Mr. HUMMER. Only in the most general terms as it has been referred to in this hearing.

Mr. BURR. As a representative of Martin Marietta, do you find

it unusual or strange that an appendix that was completed in January 1991 was not included in the executive summary produced in

March of the same year or in the annual environmental report that

was completed in October 1992 for the year encompassing 1991?

Mr. HUMMER. On its face, yes, I do find it strange. I would have

to look into it further to see if there were reasons for it.

Mr. BURR. You don’t have an explanation or a reason as a representative of Martin Marietta today?

Mr. HUMMER. I do not.

Mr. BURR. What is Martin Marietta’s position as it relates to

their contractual obligation to the Department of Energy in 1991

as it relates to their assessment of contamination, worker safety?

Were you the sole contractor responsible for it?

Mr. HUMMER. Martin Marietta was the sole contractor at that

time, yes, and we were responsible for providing a comprehensive

report on an annual basis.

Mr. BURR. To your knowledge, did any of the annual environmental reports ever include the existence of plutonium contamination at the Paducah facility?

Mr. HUMMER. Yes, sir, they did.

Mr. BURR. As it related to offsite sources?

Mr. HUMMER. Yes.

Mr. BURR. When was that included?

Mr. HUMMER. I personally have seen a 1996 report that included

that. I haven’t seen others.

Mr. BURR. Clearly you wouldn’t question the existence of appendix 2B-17 produced by Martin Marietta that in 1991 found offsite

contamination of plutonium?

Mr. HUMMER. No, sir.

Mr. BURR. Do you find it odd that it would take until 1996 for

any official report to the Department of Energy to conclude that

there was contamination?

Mr. HUMMER. I don’t know that there was not—that that contamination was not reflected in earlier reports. I do know that I

saw it in a 1996 report. I did not look at earlier reports to determine if it was in those.

364

Mr. BURR. Well, I know that all the members have votes to get

to. My plans are to be back for some point of this. I appreciate the

witnesses’ time. I would yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. We will come back at 2 o’clock.

[Brief recess.]

Mr. UPTON. We are ready to start.

I just want to apologize to all the witnesses that we have today,

because we had to change the—Congress was not in session last

week on Thursday, I know that it changed your plans. It changed

our plans, too. At the time the decision was made, the eye of the

hurricane was expected to pass right down Pennsylvania Avenue.

That is why I thought it would be best to delay the hearing until

this week, but obviously we all had full schedules as well, and so

we are all jockeying things, including other subcommittees that are

meeting. That is one of the reasons why members are in and out.

Normally that doesn’t happen to the degree that it is happening

today. We apologize in advance. Blame it on Mother Nature and

me.

We will resume with the 5 minutes. I know that the Democratic

side will be back soon. I know that Mr. Whitfield has questions. I

know Mr. Burr had a speech. Because of the votes it was delayed.

But he intends to come back for this panel before we start the third

one as well.

Mr. Miller, it is my understanding that a number of years ago, the DOE had transferred more than $200 million to USEC to prepare the site in Paducah for the event of a possible earthquake.

And it is my understanding that the work that was intended to be

done is still—initially the seismic upgrades were promised to be

done by 1997? It is my understanding that you all have delayed the

seismic upgrades until next year, September of next year, 2000?

Seismic upgrade?

Mr. MILLER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I might make one clarification. The $200 million that was funded by the Department of Energy

was to cover in their entirety all nuclear safety upgrades to make

the transition from DOE regulation to NRC regulation. A portion

of that funding, specifically $23 million, was designated for the

seismic work.

Mr. UPTON. At Paducah?

Mr. MILLER. At Paducah.

Mr. UPTON. $23 million of the $200 million?

Mr. MILLER. That is correct, sir, for the seismic project at Paducah.

Mr. UPTON. What has happened to that money?

Mr. MILLER. That money has been expended. The project is ongoing, with the expected completion date as you have indicated, September of 2000. In addition to that $23 million, USEC has been

funding the additional funding required to complete that seismic

upgrade project.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Nemec, in DOE’s testimony, they state, a little

bit later, that in order to address the gaps in the company’s radiation protection program, DOE will initiate an independent and detailed review of Bechtel Jacobs company’s radiation protection program and its implementation at Paducah.

Do you believe that the radiation program is broken?

365

Mr. NEMEC. No, I do not.

Mr. UPTON. And needs to be fixed?

Mr. NEMEC. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman. I believe we have a

good radiation protection program. But we welcome the review. I

am sure that through that review, we will find some opportunities

for some enhancements. But we believe we have a good program.

Mr. UPTON. In the earlier panel, a number of the folks that testified talked about the full body review—the full body count. They

had a feeling that, in fact, the readings were never given to them.

Who has access to that? Do you have those records or does DOE?

Mr. NEMEC. I have no knowledge who has those records.

Mr. UPTON. Would you know, Mr. Hummer?

Mr. HUMMER. In general, Mr. Chairman, those records are Department of Energy records. Frequently they are maintained by the

contractor as part of the contract, but the records belong to the departments of energy.

Mr. UPTON. But they are Martin Marietta’s studies, right? They

conducted the review. Would they not have been provided up the

line from the years before?

Mr. HUMMER. I had thought that you were referring specifically

to the individual results of whole body counts, which is an ongoing

process. The specific volunteer studies that were referred to by the

earlier panel, yes, the results of those studies would have been provided to the Department of Energy. The studies should be in Martin Marietta, Lockheed Martin records as well as Department of

Energy records. But fundamentally since—from this Congress, the

Department of Energy funds all these activities at these facilities,

essentially all records, reports, surveys, that sort of thing, all belong to the Department of Energy.

Mr. UPTON. Do you know why they would not have been provided

to the individuals at the time that they were tested?

Mr. HUMMER. No, sir, I do not. During the period I was at Oak

Ridge as the Director of Safety and Health for Martin Marietta Energy Systems, it was a standard practice to discuss the results of

whole body counts and bioassay results which also were for internal contamination with the individual at the time those results

were received.

Mr. UPTON. Were you aware at all that in fact the counts might

have been misrepresented or denied to the folks who actually undertook the tests?

Mr. HUMMER. No, I was not.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Whitfield.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hummer, Martin Marietta, of course, was the successor company to Lockheed Martin. When did Martin Marietta become responsible for the offsite part of USEC, of the plant?

Mr. HUMMER. When Martin Marietta became the contractor in

1984, it had responsibility for both the operation of the facility and

the environmental management aspects of the facility.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, in 1990, the Tiger team came in and did

an assessment, setting out deficiencies for the facility. They were

pretty explicit in those deficiencies. Then the Department of Energy came in with their Phase I assessment which went back to

1990, and they set out deficiencies in the facility. And down in PaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00369 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
366

ducah when we asked Mr. Sadler the question, had the deficiencies

set out in 1990 been corrected, I don’t want to put words in his

mouth, but he said there were many things that had not been corrected. In fact, I remember him inferring that most things had not

been corrected. But why, during that period, when your company

was responsible, were those corrections not taken care of?

Mr. HUMMER. Martin Marietta and Lockheed Martin were responsible for the environmental management aspects at the Paducah plant until the spring of 1991 when Bechtel Jacobs was awarded the contract—I am sorry, the spring of 1998 when Bechtel Jacobs was awarded that contract. During that period, essentially all

of the findings from the Tiger team report were corrected. My understanding is that of the almost 200 findings from that report, all

but one have been corrected. I’m not sure of the specific nature of

that one.

Mr. WHITFIELD. So out of the 200 deficiencies, your testimony is

that all but one of the deficiencies was corrected by the time that

Lockheed Martin relinquished its responsibility?

Mr. HUMMER. Yes, sir. The long duration, talking in years, to

correct what might seem like fairly specific deficiencies may be a

little hard to understand at first, but many of these deficiencies required additional funding through the budget process to provide resources in the form of either people, equipment or even facilities.

Many of them required extensive rewriting of program documents,

retraining of individuals to understand the issues that they were

dealing with and what their specific responsibilities were. These

were not simple things to fix.

Mr. WHITFIELD. But it’s your contention that all of them were

taken care of except that one?

Mr. HUMMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. We have heard a lot of testimony today and in

the newspaper and with individuals personally that indicates that

there was a culture within the management of this facility that I

would describe as lackadaisical, lapsing in judgment sometimes,

not being as up to date on the issues as they should have been.

Would you say it is correct that even though management

changed in name—Union Carbide, Lockheed Martin, Martin Marietta, Bechtel Jacobs—that some individuals just transferred from

one company to the other? Would you say that is correct?

Mr. HUMMER. Absolutely. The vast majority of the people were

the same people. And in fact the people who operated the operational plant for the United States Enrichment Corporation were

the same Lockheed Martin people that transferred from Energy

Systems.

Mr. WHITFIELD. So it would be correct that even though companies changed, individuals were the same?

Mr. HUMMER. Absolutely.

Mr. WHITFIELD. When you relinquished responsibility for your

company, who was the project manager for the cleanup at Paducah?

Mr. HUMMER. I’m sorry, I’m not sure I understand the question.

Mr. WHITFIELD. When Lockheed Martin lost its contract for

cleanup, who was the project manager at that time?

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Mr. HUMMER. I’m not sure. Mr. Nemec is indicating it might

have been Mr. Massey.

Mr. NEMEC. The site manager at Paducah at that time was

Jimmy Massey. Jimmy is also the site manager at Paducah today.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman, my 5 minutes is up.

Mr. UPTON. I will let you have some more time at the end. We

will go to Mr. Strickland. Are you ready?

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir.

Thank you, gentlemen, for trying to help us understand what is

happening here.

I have a memo, I don’t know if anyone has asked about this or

not because I arrived just a moment ago. It is a memo from Jimmy

Massey. It was sent to a number of individuals, regarding the safety stand-down. It says, We anticipate that DOE will announce a

day-long safety stand-down, and on and on. The kinds of activities

we will do during that day include review and spruce up rad postings in DOE areas both on buildings and on land masses and so

on and so forth. It concludes by saying, I need to meet with the

project team this afternoon at 2 in the small conference room to

discuss, and so on and so forth, but it concludes with this statement:

‘‘and more to come. I still have season tickets to the circus for

sale if anyone still needs one.’’ That last statement is very puzzling

to me. I’m not sure what it means. Is it the Barnum and Bailey

circus? I’m just not sure what they are talking about there. What

I hope it doesn’t imply is that this matter is being taken lightly,

and the implication being we’re engaged in some kind of frivolous

activity with this stand-down. Would anyone have any insight into

what that may mean?

Mr. NEMEC. Congressman Strickland, that statement was an inappropriate statement by Jimmy Massey. We take this stand-down

very seriously. We take this investigation very seriously. I personally discussed that statement with Mr. Massey after I received it.

He received—he agrees that it was an inappropriate and it won’t

happen again. We do take it very seriously.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Nemec. I very sincerely appreciate that response from you and thank you for your opinion. I concur with it certainly.

There seems to be differences of opinion between some of the witnesses that we heard earlier and some of the statements that are

contained in the testimonies that have been submitted to us. I suppose it is possible that there are just legitimate differences of interpretation. But some of this seems to be material that would be

rather difficult to interpret and have such a broad difference of

opinion.

For example, in the statement by Mr. Hummer, there is this

comment:

‘‘The potential for internal contamination of radiation workers

was monitored through a bioassay program. Bioassay was a routine

part of the radiation protection program at the Paducah facility

and the other gaseous diffusion facilities because of the presence of

uranium.’’

Then there are others who indicate that this was not a routine

activity, that there may have been very limited numbers of employVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Sep 13, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00371 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
368

ees that were ever monitored or tested in this way. And so the discrepancy between that statement and this other information is

troublesome to me. I guess I would like to ask, was there routine

bioassay monitoring? If so, how many employees were involved and

during what period of time? Could you answer that for me, sir?

Mr. HUMMER. Yes. During the period of time that I was Director

of Safety and Health for Energy Systems, routine bioassay programs were in place for workers who had significant potential for

ingestion of radioactive contamination. I can’t tell you exactly how

many people were involved. I can get that information for you if

you like. That program had been in place for some time before I

arrived. Exactly when it started and how it evolved, I would have

to get additional information. Some of the witnesses this morning,

I believe, were responding to questions related to whole body counting, which is a support system for bioassay. But bioassay is the actual collection of biological samples from the individuals and their

analysis for contamination.

Mr. STRICKLAND. But that information regarding the number of

individuals, who they were, when the testing was done, what the

results were, would that be available to us or would that be data

that you could put your hands on and make available to the committee?

Mr. HUMMER. We should be able to get them from the Department of Energy.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you.

Mr. Hummer, it was alleged, it was indicated in the testimony

from the first panel from at least two of the witnesses, that your

companies or subsidiaries knowingly disposed of radioactive contaminated waste in offsite landfills that were not permitted for

such waste. Do you know if your company—can you affirm or deny

whether that happened?

Mr. HUMMER. Mr. Chairman, to the best of my knowledge, that

did not happen. These are new allegations to the company. To the

extent that this and other allegations are raised by the lawsuits

and other activities that are current, Lockheed Martin will do everything in its power to fully investigate these matters and resolve

them appropriately.

Mr. UPTON. Could you keep us posted of that activity?

Mr. HUMMER. Yes, I will.

Mr. UPTON. There was no way that DOE would have approved

such a transfer. I can’t believe that that would have happened.

Mr. HUMMER. And to the best of my knowledge, there is also no

way that plant management, Martin Marietta or Lockheed Martin

plant management, would have approved that activity.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Miller, we heard from Mr. Fowler sort of an ongoing saga of retaliation and harassment. You heard—I think you

were here for his assessment?

Mr. MILLER. That’s correct.

Mr. UPTON. Do you plan on doing anything—even today, I think

he indicated that he still was followed from stop to stop. Are you

planning any directive, any meeting? Is there any help that you

can provide us? What were your thoughts as you listened to his riveting testimony?

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman——

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Mr. UPTON. I know it disturbed a lot of us up here.

Mr. MILLER. I think first and foremost, speaking for our corporation, it is totally appropriate to state in total sincerity that our corporation does not tolerate, I do not tolerate and will not tolerate

harassment, intimidation of any nature, whether it be nonmanagement or management employees. USEC has pursued these issues,

as any corporation should and would, vigorously through its tenure

taking over these facilities wherever and whenever it was found.

We have administered disciplinary action up to and including discharge. I think certainly in this instance, which dates back prior

to any of these relevant issues that are being raised here today by

the committee, there are some differences in opinion regarding the

facts pertaining to vehicle searches. We have vigorously researched

these issues. The vehicle searches were at no greater frequency

than other vehicle searches which are mandated on our site for security reasons. And we investigated the sources of the alleged utilization of pictures, ID pictures, in the wrong fashion and have found

them not to be substantiated, but by an employee in an inappropriate, joking manner, and that employee was in fact reprimanded

for that conduct. I might add, that goes back significantly in time

during his first years of tenure in the facility.

But I think it is totally appropriate to say that any type of behavior along those lines is not tolerated by our corporation and will

not be tolerated.

Mr. UPTON. We may just put in the record a number of current

whistleblower complaints. I guess they are in the record. A person

alleged he was removed from management, I don’t know if you

know about these or have any comment on these that are open. Investigator indicated he is in settlement negotiations. We might ask

you to respond to these in writing.

[The information follows:]

370

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Whitfield, do you have additional questions? Mr. WHITFIELD. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Miller, we have heard testimony this morning from Mr.

Fowler and also Dr. Cochran that they today do not consider the

plant totally safe, that they view it with some significant problems

still at the production facility. How would you characterize the

workplace today? Mr. MILLER. We would definitely not agree with the characterization that the employees in the work force today are not protected

safely and adequately. We feel very comfortable and confident that

we have very vigorous health and safety programs, both from radiological controls, utilizing the ALARA program which was referred

to earlier, keeping the dose rates to our employees as low as reasonably achievable. We have made documented, significant improvements since 1993. We have essentially cut the average dose

rate of our radiation workers in half, down to less than 4 millirems

on an annual basis against the Federal standard of 5,000 millirems

as an annual limit.

We have additionally lowered the number of workers that at any

one point in time received greater than 10 millirems and have cut

those numbers basically in half since 1993 to 1998. We have focused heavily on contamination control. We have surveyed all accessible leased areas of the facility and implemented

not only dose rate control but contamination control which was required under our transition to the regulations under 10 CFR 20 for

NRC certification.

So I think, Congressman Whitfield, in a very brief, concise summary, the programs that we have in place we feel very comfortable,

do protect our workers. At the same time we constantly look for

areas of improvement. We can always improve and will continue to

carry forward with that attitude. Mr. WHITFIELD. Is there plutonium in the plant today? Mr. MILLER. I think the answer to that would be there are certainly trace amounts as a result of the past practices of reprocessing reactor tails. So yes, there would be trace amounts. Mr. WHITFIELD. Do you consider that harmful to the workers? Mr. MILLER. Not when we implemented and have implemented

our protective measures. We take it very seriously, as we do take

any radiological emission source and, where necessary, we have

people placed into respirators if the need arises. If there is a posted

area or a radiological work area where an employee is going to

enter, the postings are designed to understand—so that the individual understands the type of activity and the protective equipment necessary to work in that, and that the monitoring that is

done exiting the facilities and in combination with our monthly bioassay or urinalysis that is done on all rad workers, we feel very

comfortable that we have protected our employees and will continue to do so in the future.

Mr. WHITFIELD. When USEC assumed responsibility for the production facility, it is my understanding that an assessment was

371

done of the facility to determine deficiencies and that 55,000

square feet was decontaminated at that time because of what

turned up in the assessment. Now, if that is true, that would indicate, at least at the time USEC assumed responsibility for it, that

there were serious problems there. Would you agree with that or

not?

Mr. MILLER. It is very difficult for me to speak to practices and

conditions that existed prior to USEC coming on, but I do—it is

correct that when we implemented our contamination control programs and our surveys that there were significant areas that required immediate attention.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Nemec, back in April, you conducted some

readings when workers were around the cylinders with the uranium hexafluoride. The readings were quite low. Then when the assessment was conducted by the Department of Energy, they came

in in August and did readings there and there was quite a discrepancy in the readings. In fact, they noted that that was a significant

problem for them at that time. I know that Mr. Massey was quoted

in the paper as saying that he wanted an answer to how that discrepancy occurred. So how did it occur?

Mr. NEMEC. In actuality, the readings that were taken in April

were consistent with the Department of Energy readings in August. They both indicated a level of radiation dose that were consistent with one another. Those levels, then, and those readings in

April were used as a basis whether the employees, the subcontractor in this case, would be required to wear a dosimeter. We concluded that they would not be required to wear one because they

would get less than 100 MR of dose during the lifetime of the

project.

We revisited that decision after we got the DOE readings, because at that time we were not sure as to the accuracy of our April

reading, and we decided—we set the job down immediately and we

decided that it would be a prudent approach to put all of the workers in dosimeters since we were unsure of what went on, and to

launch an investigation into what had happened. I had our health

physics manager, certified health physicist from Oak Ridge, come

up to the site the day after the incident. I happened to be there

the night of the incident and was involved in making these decisions. He started the investigation which ultimately concluded that

our initial readings were consistent with the DOE readings. But a

prudent measure here would have been to put the people in

dosimeters and we did.

We have since changed our procedures to not allow that much

flexibility in the field with regards to use of dosimeters.

Mr. WHITFIELD. I understand you to say that your readings were

consistent with DOE?

Mr. NEMEC. Yes, they were.

Mr. WHITFIELD. May I ask one other question, Mr. Chairman?

Then I will be finished here.

There has been a lot of discussion about the D&D funds for the

cleanup. We all recognize that there is not enough money there,

but out of the $240 million appropriated each year for D&D funds,

the largest portion of that goes to Oak Ridge, of course. In fact,

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more goes to Oak Ridge than what you add up for Portsmouth or

Paducah together.

It is my understanding that of the money that goes to Paducah, $37 million a year, that maybe $25 million a year, is simply meeting compliance standards, doing testing, and that that money does

not actually go for cleanup. I know that is because of various environmental regulations. But is it possible that more money would go

for cleanup if you were exempted from some of these requirements,

assuming you could be exempt and still not further endanger the

community?

Mr. NEMEC. I suppose it might be possible, but I certainly

couldn’t quantify it. I think many of the things we do under our

compliance program, we would have to continue in any case. We

have to monitor our offsite releases and surface water. We have to

understand the groundwater plume and where it is going and continue our pump and treat operations. We have to do the surveillance and maintenance on the facilities and the upkeep, whether

the regulation is there or not, to prevent the spread of contamination.

So I’m not convinced that trying to remove some regulations

would solve the issue. I think we can, however, work within the

regulatory environment to streamline some of the up-front decisionmaking process and thus use less time and money on that which

we can then use for cleanup. And we are working on that with the

regulatory bodies.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman, if we have additional questions,

we can obviously submit it.

Mr. UPTON. All members will have that opportunity here.

Mr. Strickland.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. I have basically two questions. One I

would want to direct to Mr. Hummer. According to testimony from

Mr. Key, in 1990 there was a voluntary program established to test

volunteer employees for transuranics, some 30 people volunteered.

As you know, those results were analyzed by a contract laboratory,

a decision was made that they were invalid, and then there was

an opportunity for employees to resubmit. According to his testimony, only seven elected to participate in the retesting. Those results were looked at by a DOE-controlled operation. The results

were that there was no problem, I guess, with contamination of

these employees.

The question I have is, some employees have indicated to me,

and I think to others, that they are rather suspicious, they have

lost some faith, some confidence, that their records were handled

appropriately. According to his testimony, the results from those

original samples and the written analysis and an explanation as to

why they were rejected and what the findings were have not been

forthcoming.

And then he has this paragraph, and I would like to share it

with you. ‘‘If management is correct that the contract laboratory

simply erred in its performance, there should be nothing to fear

from the full and free examination of this data. However, such

needless secrecy breeds mistrust.’’ And then he says, ‘‘Perhaps the

Commerce Committee could assist in securing this data for the

workers.’’

373

I guess what I would like to ask you is: Is there a reason why

this data is not made available so that we can look at the difference which may have existed and so that we can determine,

based upon objective observers, whether or not the contract laboratory that did the initial analysis erred in their results?

Mr. HUMMER. There is no reason that I know of, Mr. Strickland.

The reports should be available, although this was somewhat before my time. Basically the reports should be available and the report of the quality assurance review to determine that that reported information was not accurate should also be available.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we request

this information be made available to the committee.

Mr. UPTON. I think that is a very good idea. We will do so.

Mr. STRICKLAND. The second and my final question has to do

with the testimony of Dr. Cochran. He alleges in his testimony—

and I will direct this to you, Mr. Nemec—that Bechtel has been

interviewing outside contractors to assist in the destruction of files

at the Paducah plant. I don’t know what kind of files he may have

been alluding to. But I would like to ask you if this is true, and

if so, what kind of files may he be talking about?

Mr. NEMEC. I’m not familiar with what Dr. Cochran was referring to. We may have hired a contractor to shred paper that we

generate in our operation and recycle it. But there is no intention

to shred any documents or destroy any documents that pertain to

this or to any other, future or past.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request that the

committee contact past and future contractors and DOE and ask

that no documents which may have any relevance to this investigation at all be destroyed until such time as the investigation is completed.

Mr. UPTON. That is fine.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you. I yield back my time.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Burr.

Mr. BURR. I thank the Chair.

Mr. Hummer, Martin Marietta did a number of internal audits

on their state of compliance. One that specifically sticks out is the

compliance as it relates to the National Environmental Protection

Act. The internal audits as I understand those within Martin Marietta said, and I quote, No system is in place to ensure that environmental impact assessments prepared in compliance with NEPA are

honored by plant management. Under the current structure, NEPA

assessment documents can be altered by plant management under

a conflict-of-interest situation. Yet the 1990 environmental report

for the Department of Energy stated that Martin Marietta was in

compliance with all NEPA guidelines.

Do you care to comment on that?

Mr. HUMMER. Yes, sir, Mr. Burr. I don’t find those two statements in contradiction. One of them says that there was no system

in place to ensure that the assessments were honored by plant

management. That does not say that noncompliances were found.

It says that there was no system in place to ensure that they were

honored. Our contention is that the requirements of NEPA were

being met and we were in compliance during 1990 and other years.

374

Mr. BURR. Let me go on in the October 1992 internal audit, and

I quote your auditors. The auditors found, quote, The NEPA program is headed in the right direction but all programs have not

been implemented to keep projects’ activities from not getting proper NEPA review. Some projects have been initiated without NEPA

review.

I would suggest to you that that part of the audit suggests that

you are not in compliance.

Mr. HUMMER. That says that; that activities not in compliance

were identified, yes.

Mr. BURR. What currently does Lockheed Martin have in the way

of DOE cleanup contracts?

Mr. HUMMER. Lockheed Martin has a contract to operate the

river protection program for the River Protection Office of DOE at

the Hanford facility formerly known as the tankways remediation

system.

Mr. BURR. That’s in the form of a subcontractor at Hanford, isn’t

it?

Mr. HUMMER. No, sir. Right now it is. As of the October 1 we will

be a prime contractor to the River Protection Office.

Mr. BURR. It is a little over $300 million to Martin Marietta currently on that contract?

Mr. HUMMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURR. Where else?

Mr. HUMMER. We do environmental cleanup work at Sandia National Laboratory as part of our M&O contract there. We do extensive environmental management and cleanup activities in Idaho

National Engineering Environmental Laboratory as part of our contract which ends on the 30th of this month there.

We also participate with Bechtel Jacobs in the environmental

management in making sure that things are properly identified at

the Oak Ridge facility, Y-12 and ORNL so when materials are

turned over to Bechtel Jacobs for further disposition, they are properly identified.

Mr. BURR. To your knowledge, did Martin Marietta ever receive

a performance bonus based upon any of the years that they represented Paducah under a DOE contract?

Mr. HUMMER. We received award fees during those periods for

those operations.

Mr. BURR. Were those award fees ever based upon safety?

Mr. HUMMER. Safety was one of the several evaluation criteria

used by the Department of Energy to determine the award fee, yes,

sir.

Mr. BURR. Given the documents that have made their way to the

forefront in the last month, as a representative of Lockheed Martin, do you believe that Martin Marietta was entitled to the qualification of those performance bonuses?

Mr. HUMMER. Yes, I do. None of those performance bonuses or

award fees was predicated on 100 percent perfect performance.

Therefore, there is no reason, based on what I have heard, to suspect that these particular individual items would drive that assessment significantly lower.

Mr. BURR. I would tell you, Mr. Hummer, in any way, shape or

form, anybody ever finds that there was an intentional effort to

375

withhold documents, that without reading specifically that contract

with DOE, I think that it would nullify not only the performance

bonus, but it would probably nullify the contract, and I would certainly ask that we look at that contract that was in existence then

to see if in fact with the information we have today it was

breached.

I thank all of our witnesses. This is an extremely important process for us to go through, and once again as it relates to cleanups

that deal with DOE, an extremely difficult hearing to present all

of the facts.

I am not yet convinced, Mr. Chairman, and colleagues, that in

fact we have all of the documents that are available. I only hope

that Mr. Strickland’s request is in fact one that can be honored and

in fact has not already happened in the case of some of the documents that I think exist. I thank the chairman and I yield back.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you, panel. As I noted earlier we have other

members that were not able to be here and we would like to have

the opportunity to submit additional questions in writing to you. If

you could respond to that in a fairly prompt way, that would be

terrific.

I appreciate your time regarding the delay that we had from last

week. You are excused, thank you.

Our final panel includes Dr. David Michaels, Assistant Secretary

for Environmental Safety and Health at the Department of Energy;

Mr. Richard Green, Director of Waste Management Division, EPA,

Region 4; Mr. Malcolm Knapp, Deputy Executive Director of Operations for Materials, Research and State Programs from the NRC;

Mr. Robert Logan, Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of

Environmental Protection, accompanied by Mr. John Volpe, Manager of the Radiation Control Branch at Kentucky Cabinet for

Health Services.

Do any of you have counsels or colleagues that are going to be

helping you in this? If you can identify them by name at this time

and we will have them sworn in as well.

Mr. MICHAELS. This is Mr. Jimmy Hodges who is the manager

of the Paducah site office for the Department of Energy. This is Mr.

Jim Olendorf who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Environmental Management Office of DOE; and this is Dr. David Statler, who is senior manager for the ongoing DOE investigation conducted by my office in Paducah.

Mr. UPTON. Anybody else?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. This is John Johnston who is chief of our

Federal Facilities Branch at EPA Region 4.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Knapp?

Mr. KNAPP. This is Mr. Robert Pierson who is chief of the responsible branch within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Paducah facility.

Mr. LOGAN. This is Mr. Michael Haynes and Mr. Downs with our

Office of General counsel.

Mr. UPTON. At this time if all witnesses and identified counsel

would stand and raise your right hand.

[Witnesses and counsel sworn.]

Mr. UPTON. Dr. Michaels, we will start with you. You know the

order here. Your entire testimony will be made part of the record,

376

and if you can limit your remarks to about 5 minutes as timed by

this fancy timer, that would be terrific.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID MICHAELS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY

FOR ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH, DEPARTMENT

OF ENERGY; RICHARD D. GREEN, DIRECTOR, WASTE MANAGEMENT DIVISION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 4; MALCOLM R. KNAPP, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS FOR MATERIALS, RESEARCH, AND

STATE PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION;

AND ROBERT W. LOGAN, COMMISSIONER, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN VOLPE, MANAGER, RADIATION CONTROL

BRANCH, KENTUCKY CABINET FOR HEALTH SERVICES3

Mr. MICHAELS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the actions

being taken by the Department of Energy in response to allegations

of current and historical environment safety and health problems

at Paducah and other DOE gaseous diffusion plants.

I am joined here by Jimmy Hodges, Jim Olendorf and David

Statler. My complete testimony has been provided to the committee

for record.

To begin, I would like to associate myself with the opening remarks of the members of this committee. I have spent much of my

career raising safety and health concerns of Department of Energy

workers, and before coming to DOE, I was one of its strongest critics. In the past year, Secretary Richardson and senior management

have worked very hard to change the safety culture at DOE facilities, and we greatly appreciate the bipartisan support the committee is giving us. Clearly though, they have a lot of work to do.

Let me also say at the outset that from the time these concerns

were brought to his attention, Secretary Richardson has made it

clear that he would get to the bottom of the issues and do what

is needed to be done to resolve them. We are especially concerned

that until 1990, workers at the gaseous diffusion plants may not

have been fully aware of transuranics nor trained in work practices

designed to protect them from the potential health impacts from

exposures to these materials.

When the Secretary was in Paducah last week, he spoke directly

with workers and community members. He listened to their concerns and apologized to members of the community who felt that

in the past the government has not been forthcoming about the

health risks they faced. The Secretary also announced that the

Clinton administration will propose legislation to establish a pilot

program for compensating current and former workers at Paducah

who have cancers caused by job exposures to radioactive contaminants.

As the Secretary said when announcing a proposal to help DOE

workers who have disease, this administration believes that if our

workers are ill because of exposure to hazards at the workplace,

they deserve fair and equitable compensation. I understand that

there is concern that the proposed program at this point is limited

to workers at Paducah, but I want to make clear that the Secretary’s overall commitment applies to all DOE workers. It is the

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intent that it will be a pilot program and inform our understanding

of possible health impacts at other gaseous diffusion plants. The

details of the proposed pilot are actively being discussed within the

administration and we expect a legislative proposal will be finalized shortly. We look forward to working with members of this

committee as we develop final legislation.

The independent oversight team is conducting its investigation in

Paducah in two phases, the first phase focused on environment and

health safety practices at Paducah over the past decade; the second

on historical issues. The team has completed its initial Phase I assessment. Their preliminary observations were released last week

and identified that some improvements need to be made in the

areas of radiation protection, environmental management and oversight.

In the area of radiological protection, the team observed that the

Paducah radiological protection program had been significantly improved in the early 1990’s. At the same time, they found that a

greater degree of discipline, formality and oversight is still needed

to ensure that worker exposure is maintained as low as reasonably

achievable.

With regard to environmental protection, the team reviewed

progress under the compliance agreement and examined potential

sources of continuing groundwater and surface water contamination which have not been fully isolated or effectively mitigated.

To address these concerns, the Department hopes to sit down

with its regulators to reexamine the priorities and pace of cleanup

activities as called for under the compliance agreement. The team

will return to Paducah this October, early October, to begin the

second phase of its investigation. This will focus on historical

issues at Paducah and will rely largely on interviews and review

of documents. We will be looking to current and former workers

and supervisors who have specific knowledge of plant operations

between the 1950’s and 1990. The team will begin its work in

Portsmouth in mid-December, to be followed at an investigation at

Oak Ridge in early 2000. This investigation is being supplemented

by two other assessments of past practices.

One will try to clearly identify the flow and characteristics of recycled uranium within the DOE complex over the last 50 years and

help us understand exactly where and how much of these materials

were at various DOE sites and at what times.

The second will seek to establish potential worker radiation exposures at the gaseous diffusion plants, especially where records are

less than complete or where worker exposure has not been well

characterized.

Another important part of the Secretary’s plan is support for expanded medical monitoring for current and former workers at all

three gaseous diffusion plants in the program managed by the

workers’ union. Over the next year we expect to provide complete

medical exams for 6,000 workers in Paducah, Portsmouth, and Oak

Ridge. To support these actions, Secretary Richardson announced

that the administration will propose a $21.8 million amendment to

the fiscal year 2000 budget. This will include $7 million for expanded medical monitoring and $10.7 million to accelerate environmental cleanup activities at Paducah and Portsmouth.

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It also includes $4.1 million to accelerate cleanup of inactive

DOE facilities at Paducah and Portsmouth in order to reduce or

eliminate chemical hazards, radiologically contaminated material,

and exposure to workers.

In addition to these activities, the Secretary has indicated that

he will hold all DOE contractors, past and present, responsible for

their actions. To help make that determination, the DOE Office of

General Counsel is assessing the contractual responsibility of

DOE’s contractors in the areas of environment safety and health.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, our actions to date serve notice that

the DOE, under the leadership of Secretary Richardson, will not

tolerate unresolved concerns about worker health and safety or unfair treatment to sick workers. I know the Secretary is committed

to righting any wrongs that may have been committed in the past

to the work force at this plant, and your support of these efforts

is critical to our success.

We appreciate the opportunity to be here today and would be

pleased to answer any of the committee’s questions.

[The prepared statement of David Michaels follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID MICHAELS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of Energy (DOE) response to allegations of current and historical environment

safety and health problems at the Paducah plant in Paducah, Kentucky. Let me say

at the outset that from the time these concerns were brought to his attention, Secretary Richardson has made it clear that he would conduct a complete and independent investigation to determine if any of these concerns were true. He further

committed to determine if workers were made ill because of inadequate worker protections, and that if they were, to seek to provide them with fair compensation.

As the Committee knows, DOE is currently responsible for environmental cleanup

from waste generated prior to lease of the facilities to the Uranium States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) in 1993 and for the management of the inventory of depleted uranium hexafluoride stored at the gaseous diffusion plants, including the

Paducah plant. This work involves approximately 94 employees of Bechtel-Jacobs,

the DOE current contractor for cleanup at the Paducah site, a transient subcontractor work force of up to 300 workers, and a small number of workers for USEC

that support site cleanup or management of the inventory of depleted uranium

hexafluoride.

Because Paducah is a designated Superfund site, cleanup of hazardous substances

other than uranium hexafluoride is being conducted in accordance with a Federal

Facilities Agreement among DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the

Commonwealth of Kentucky. This agreement establishes milestones and a schedule

for meeting them. Uranium enrichment activities were transferred to USEC in July

1993 in accordance with the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Uranium hexafluoride and

worker safety issues are covered under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act with

appropriate oversight by DOE. Additionally, USEC currently operates under a Nuclear Regulatory Commission certificate and is subject to NRC regulation.

In May 1999, the Department became aware that a qui tam case would be filed

under the False Claims Act in U.S. District Court. This suit alleges fraud on the

part of contractors at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, based on current and

past environment, safety and health violations. Once the case was filed, it was

placed under a court seal that prohibited DOE from acknowledging or discussing the

case with any party outside the federal government. While the allegations could not

be discussed, the Secretary felt it important to ensure that there were no imminent

threats to the environment, public health or safety. From June 18 to 21 of this year,

a technical team of health physicists and environmental engineers, led by the Oak

Ridge field office and supported by my staff, conducted an on-site review of the

areas currently under DOE’s control. This team concluded that there were no imminent health or safety threats to DOE’s workers. No public dialogue could be initiated at that time because of the restrictions imposed by the court seal.

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In August, many of the allegations became widely reported in the national media.

Shortly thereafter, Secretary Richardson called for a comprehensive response to the

public allegations. Subsequently, the court seal was lifted allowing the Department

to proceed with that response. My testimony today will describe these activities and

our progress to date in meeting the Secretary’s commitments.

Many of the concerns regarding worker safety and health that have been reported

to DOE stem from the presence of plutonium and other radioactive materials at Paducah, and the question of whether workers were adequately informed or prepared

to handle such materials. These materials resulted from the recycling of uranium

from weapons production plants to toxic gaseous diffusion plants during the 1950s,

1960s, and 1970s. After irradiation in a reactor, spent fuel containing unused uranium, fission products and transuranics was reprocessed at the Hanford, Savannah

River, or Idaho sites to separate the plutonium and remaining uranium from the

fission products. The uranium was converted to a transportable form, and was recycled for use at the gaseous diffusion plants at Paducah and Portsmouth. Preliminary

analysis also indicates that recycled materials may have also been transferred to the

Fernald Feed Materials Production Center and the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. The

gaseous diffusion plants converted the incoming uranium to uranium hexafluoride

for enrichment in the cascade. The concerns that have recently been expressed focus

on the transuranic elements and fission products that were and are present in this

recycled uranium. It is estimated that approximately 100,000 tons of recycled uranium was fed to the Paducah plant.

Environmental concerns alleged in the suit include both on-site and off-site contamination from legacy radioactive or hazardous materials, and potential for harm

to workers or public health and safety. Issues raised include:

• possible improper disposal of hazardous or radioactive materials both on- and offsite in publicly accessible areas; • apparent inappropriate release of materials that were radioactively contaminated,

release of contamination into site streams and drainage ditches, claims of inadequate control and posting of offsite contaminated areas, and • suspected exceedences of radiological air emission standards.

Independent Investigation

The comprehensive investigation into environment, safety and health concern, at

Paducah is being conducted by a senior team of investigators and technical experts

from my staff in the Office of Environment, Safety and health (EH). The investigation is being conducted in two phases. The first phase, now underway, is focused

on the adequacy of levels of protection provided to workers, the public and the environment today and over the past ten years. The second phase will focus on the

longer-term, more complex environment, safety and health issues over the plant’s

entire history. This phase will involve a comprehensive document review as well as

interviews with former workers. The team will also conduct investigations at the

gaseous diffusion sites in Piketon, Ohio and Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

The team of investigators arrived at the Paducah site on August 17 to begin the

first phase of the investigation and to examine information on health and safety

programs. Over a two-week period, team members reviewed documents, conducted

numerous interviews with officials and workers, conducted radiological surveys, inspected the site and collected extensive environmental samples. Samples were collected from onsite and offsite groundwater, surface water, and soil and sediment,

as well as buildings onsite. The samples are being analyzed by an independent laboratory to determine the full range of chemicals and radionuclides that may have

been released into the environment as a result of site operations. Some of these

samples have been split with the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The efforts are being

closely coordinated with both the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Additionally, Secretary Richardson has directed that this investigation be conducted in close coordination with current and former workers and their union representatives. Concurrent with this investigation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission conducted a review of radiation protection in the USEC-operated areas and the

State of Kentucky has increased offsite monitoring.

The DOE investigatory team is currently in the process of analyzing and validating its initial findings and preparing a final report to the Secretary. After being

briefed on the team’s initial observations, Secretary Richardson ordered a one-day

safety stand down at the Paducah Site. While the team found that there had been

safety improvements in recent years, some practices needed to be further improved

and the Secretary felt that the cessation of activities would provide an opportunity

for both workers and managers to focus on safety, raise concerns and make suggestions for improved operations.

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In its initial observations, the investigatory team verified earlier findings that

DOE operations at Paducah do not present imminent hazards to the workers or the

public. As is the practice in the Department’s Safety Management Evaluations conducted by the EH Oversight staff, the team also identified areas which would benefit from improvement in radiological protection, procedures and conduct of operations.

In response to the on-site investigation’s preliminary results, DOE field and program management has identified initial actions to respond to these concerns.

Preliminary Phase One Findings

• Radiological Protection. The team observed that the Paducah radiological protection program was improved in the early 1990s. At the same time, a greater degree of discipline, formality and oversight is still needed to fully protect workers

to assure that worker exposure to legacy radiological hazards is maintained as

low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). For example, the team found that 25

subcontractor employees working on a project in the uranium hexafluoride

(UF6) cylinder yard since May could be subject to radiological exposure of greater than 100 millirem in one year and should have worn dosimetry badges.

While this level of exposure is not a health hazard in itself, DOE ALARA regulations require that such workers wear personal dosimetry badges at this level

of exposure. As a result of this finding, the site stopped work, conducted appropriate training, and issued dosimetry badges to the workers.

The team also identified a number of radiologically contaminated areas on

DOE property that were not adequately controlled in accordance with DOE requirements. Workers have not received training on the hazards associated with

working with transuranics since 1992 and such training is not part of the site

safety training courses. Workers were also seen handling drums that contained

uncharacterized waste and quantities of concentrated Technicium-99. Finally,

the team observed weaknesses in the controls that are essential to radiological

protection, such as radiation work permits, procedures and procedure adherence, and air monitoring.

To address these findings, DOE field management will initiate an independent

and detailed review of the Bechtel Jacobs Company radiation protection program

and its implementation at Paducah. They will also work with the State of Kentucky

and EPA Region IV to assure that site postings of contaminated areas, as called for

in approved CERCLA or RCRA decision documents, are adequate.

• Enviromental Protection. The cleanup of Paducah is covered under a legally enforceable agreement with the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the EPA Region

IV. The agreement assigns cleanup priorities and schedule for completing work.

Over the last several years, work has been performed in cooperation with the

State and EPA to address the immediate risks to public health and environment, and the site is currently in compliance with that agreement. Activities

have included providing an alternate water supply to off-site residents and the

construction of groundwater collection and treatment facilities to control offsite

groundwater contamination. The investigatory team reviewed progress under

the agreement and focused on numerous potential sources of continuing groundwater and surface water contamination covered under the agreement that have

not yet been fully isolated or effectively mitigated. These include unlined contaminated landfills, scrap yards, burial grounds and spill sites.

Under the requirements of the cleanup agreement signed in 1998, characterization and cleanup of hazardous facilities and materials has been ongoing at

the site in accord with a prioritized schedule that contemplates completion of

cleanup in 2010. Nonetheless, the team has identified potential hazards that it

believes should receive greater priority. For example, material storage areas

(DMSA) contain significant volumes of uncharacterized scrap equipment and

materials that are potential hazards to workers. Further, process buildings that

have been shutdown for more than 20 years contain significant amounts of

uncharacterized hazardous materials including uranium in ventilation ducts

and piping, receiver ash, and transuranic contamination. Although surveillance

and maintenance is conducted, these buildings continue to deteriorate and are

not included in the 2010 cleanup schedule. The team recommended that the

hazardous materials should be removed, and that these buildings be maintained

in a condition that protects workers and the public and minimizes the risk and

cost of eventual decommissioning.

As observed in previous site reviews, many of the 30,000 55-gallon drums of

low-level waste onsite are stored outside in the elements or on unpaved ground

while awaiting shipment. Because of the need to address competing priorities,

the planned disposal date for these wastes is not until 2012. As also previously

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identified, the nearly 37,000 uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders are also

stored onsite in the open, and constitute long-term radiological and chemical exposure hazards to workers and the public.

The team reviewed detailed sample results from cascade-processing equipment that was transferred to private industry in 1997 and 1998. Approval of

these transfers was based on the site policy of using DOE’s uranium release criteria, rather than DOE’s more restrictive criteria for release of transuranic-contaminated material. Samples indicated that the equipment contained very

small, but detectable, quantities of plutonium, neptunium, and americium. The

team noted that had appropriate criteria been applied, the release might not

have been approved.

Pending completion of the final investigation report, the Department officials responsible for the Paducah site have identified a number of steps they will take immediately in response to these issues. First, the Department will examine existing

State of Kentucky and USEC site air monitoring systems to confirm that these systems would record any significant DOE contribution to overall site emissions. Second, the roofs of several shutdown but yet to be decontaminated buildings will be

sampled to support fugitive-emissions calculations. Third, as required under

CERCLA and the site’s cleanup agreements, regulators are now reviewing the Engineering Evaluation and Cost Analysis for the scrap metal piles and Drum Mountain.

Characterization and concurrent disposal of these materials are scheduled to begin

late in the summer of 2000. Finally, additional sampling and analysis of off-site

areas will be carried out.

As a further step to address hazards, the Bechtel Jacobs corporate ‘‘Safe Work Operations Workshop,’’ initially developed for the Oak Ridge site, will be adapted for

Paducah-specific issues and presented at Paducah. Bechtel Jacobs will also delelop

and present a detailed radiation safety and environmental protection program training module to all personnel who oversee the safety performance of subcontractors.

Finally, DOE will station two full-time Facility Representatives at Paducah to oversee field activities that affect environment, safety and health.

The investigation team will present its full report to the Secretary by September

30. In the meantime, DOE managers will continue to identify responses to the

team’s findings. We expect to complete the second phase of the Paducah investigation by the end of the year. The team will initiate its work at the Portsmouth plant

in mid-December, to be followed by the investigation at Oak Ridge.

Determine Flow of Recycled Materials Through the DOE Complex

DOE and its predecessor agencies produced more than 100,000 metric tons of recycled feed or waste streams containing trace quantities of fission products and plutonium. This material was sent not only to Paducah, but also to other sites in the

DOE complex. Today, our understanding of where that material went is limited.

Secretary Richardson requested a study that would provide a clear understanding

of the flow and characteristics of this recycled material.

The first figure attached shows the historical flow of recycled uranium throughout

the Department of Energy complex, as we currently understand it. Typically, the

spent fuel from the production reactors was reprocessed in separations facilities that

recovered the plutonium and uranium, while also separating out almost all of the

fission products. The separated uranium was converted to uranium oxide (UO6) and

shipped to Paducah or other sites. The figure also shows an interaction with foreign

military and commercial sources.

We are concerned not only with the flow of this material, but also its characteristics such as the level of residual plutonium and fission products. Past DOE studies

have suggested that no consistent or generally-accepted specification existed for the

maximum allowable amounts of transuranics and fission product elements in the recycled material, although specifications were generally low (i.e. in the range of 10

parts per billion (ppb) plutonium). Occasionally, specifications could be exceeded,

and for certain other recycled uranium bearing materials, we know that level of plutonium was higher.

The figure also shows that Paducah would send uranium-bearing ash to Fernald

for recovery. A 1985 DOE review revealed that in June 1980, the level of plutonium

in some of the ash was between 67 ppb and 7,757 ppb (average about 1123 ppb).

Other processes associated with the flow of recycled uranium may have also contained higher concentrations of transuranics, e.g. plutonium, neptunium and americium. One of the waste streams on the figure is shown in color to reflect that the

operation of washing uranium feed cylinders produced waste that may have been

higher in transuranics. The material mass flow review we have initiated will look

into this aspect of the uranium stream.

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The second figure shows the operating periods of the facilities involved in recycling uranium. As you can see, recycle activities began in the early 1950s, and there

were many sites and facilities involved in this work. Among these 13 sites, several

facilities have been decommissioned, making records retrieval more difficult. The

data on this chart is preliminary. We will have a more complete and accurate picture as the mass flow project progresses.

The mass flow project will address the flow and characteristics of recycled uranium over the last fifty years. The specific goals are to:

• Identify the mass flow of recycled uranium throughout the DOE complex from

early production to mid-1999 and create a publicly-available unclassified intersite flowsheet. • Identify the characteristics of, and contaminants in, the major uranium streams,

including the technetium, neptunium, plutonium or other radioactive content of

concern to worker or public health and safety. • Conduct site mass balance activities to identify any significant concern for potential personnel exposure or environmental contamination.

We expect this work to be complete by June 2000.

Worker Exposure Assessment Project

An important paint of the Secretary’s response to concerns at Paducah is to fully

address health concerns of current and former Paducah workers, especially where

records are less than complete, or where worker exposure to plutonium and other

materials has not been well characterized. To address this gap, an aggressive and

exhaustive search of records will be conducted at Paducah for the time period ranging from the early 1950s to the present. Assessments will then be performed by analyzing the exposure records of current and former workers to determine the extent

and nature of exposures, focusing on exposure to transuranics. The activity will include identifying, retrieving and reviewing exposure records. Should records prove

to be poor or non-existent, DOE would perform detailed reviews of relevant plant

process and monitoring data as well as extrapolations based on available exposure

information.

The goal of this effort, managed by the DOE Office of Environment, Safety and

Health and conducted by a team from the University of Utah, is to establish the

potential ranges of worker radiation exposures and identify, document and communicate the radiological issues that may have affected worker health at the Paducah

site since its opening. This work will help inform Paducah workers of their potential

radiation exposure and will help determine whether there may be any potential for

adverse worker health impacts from radiation exposure while working at the Paducah plant.

The project began the week of September 13, 1999 when the University of Utah

team began to interview workers and conduct an on site records search. The project

is expected to take six months and consists of the following subtasks:

• Mapping the various processes conducted at Paducah and identifying the associated potential radiological hazards, over time. This will include identification of

any events, such as equipment modernization, accidents, etc., that may have

presented potential radiological hazards to the workers;

• Identify, retrieve and evaluate radiological and worker exposure records to determine what the available records tell us about radiological conditions and worker

radiation exposure data at the site;

• Establish the feasibility of conducting a bioassay program for workers that would

measure actual individual radiation dose taken in the person;

• Establish the feasibility for and possibly conduct a radioassay, of residual materials at Paducah that would determine the radiological content of those materials and be useful in determining hazards workers were exposed to.

• Develop occupational exposure profiles. This subtask will compile all information

gained in previous subtasks to develop ‘‘bounds’’ or ranges of possible radiation

exposures of workers at Paducah.

• Conduct a worker communication program to ensure that workers understand and

accept the process use and the results obtained.

With the possible exception of the bioassay program, this project is expected to

be complete by April 2000.

Medical Monitoring for Current and Former Workers

Under an ongoing DOE program being conducted at a number of DOE sites, medical monitoring is being provided to 1200 former workers at the gaseous diffusion

plants (400 workers per year per plant). As part of the Secretary’s action plan, the

program will be expanded to include additional former employees at each site as

well as current worker at each site. The program provides an objective, independent

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and expert evaluation of the health status of workers. The accompanying educational program will help workers understand prior exposures and current health

risks.

As in the current program, medical screening will be conducted for health hazards

associated with exposure to a wide range of hazards related to a participant’s work

at the facility. The actual screening tests conducted will be tailored to a worker’s

exposure history and will generally include a physical examination, blood tests, and

chest x-rays. Where warranted by a worker’s exposure history, specialized tests and

other specialized screenings will be conducted. Physicians will review individual test

results from the screening program and communicate results to program participants. They will call patients to communicate any urgent findings based on examinations and inform them of any need for follow-up. Project personnel will also advise

participants whom need medical follow up about possible sources of health care.

The DOE-funded medical monitoring program will be independently implemented

by a consortium of organizations and staffed by highly qualified physicians and

other health professionals specializing in the field of occupational health.

Compensation for Sick Workers

Although the use of recycled reactor tailings was discontinued by the 1970s, plutonium and other transuranic residues are still present in small quantities at each

facility. Concerns have been expressed that, until 1990, workers may not have been

adequately informed about the contamination or trained in work practices designed

to protect them from the possible health impacts of such exposures. Enhanced worker protection programs for the protection of workers from the hazards of plutonium

and other radioactive materials were required after 1990.

Secretary Richardson recently announced that the Administration would propose

legislation to establish a targeted pilot program to provide compensation for Paducah workers who have cancer as a result of job-related exposures. It is the intent

that this be a pilot project that will be able to inform our understanding of possible

health impacts at the other gaseous diffusion plants. At the same time, the White

House National Economic Council is leading a study of the relationship between occupational disease and work at all DOE sites and the adequacy of workers’ compensation programs. The details of the proposed Paducah pilot are being discussed

within the Administration and we hope to propose legislation shortly.

Conclusion

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that Secretary Richardson, on behalf

of the entire Administration, takes the concerns that have been raised seriously and

is committed to investigate and resolve them. The investigation is both independent

and comprehensive. As you have seen, it has already begun to serve to get out the

facts and correct any current safety shortcomings. The existing environmental compliance agreement that guides remedial actions and schedules at the site has been

agreed to by DOE, the State of Kentucky and the Environmental Protection Agency.

Where the investigation team’s initial observations suggest that modifications to

this agreement, including adjustments in priorities, may be warranted to protect the

public and worker health and safety, we will pursue them.

We need to determine whether the Department has known of the presence of plutonium and other transuranics at Paducah and other sites. We also need to determine how well the workers knew of the hazards they were working with, and how

well they were protected from these hazards—even in very small amounts. We will

learn much more as our investigation moves ahead and seeks to confirm—in today’s

regulatory environment—whether the presence of these materials represented a potential health risk at Paducah or any other DOE plant.

We will continue our efforts in a manner that is forthright and responsive to the

public’s need for timely information, while at the same time being careful that our

answers are correct. We will also continue to work in a cooperative and transparent

way with the workers, their representatives, the public, and the Congress. Secretary

Richardson has made it clear that the days of secrecy and hiding information are

over. We are committed to getting accurate information and doing so in a responsible manner. We are also committed to treat the veterans of the Cold War with

dignity and with fairness.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer questions

from any of the Subcommittee members.

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Mr. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Michaels.

Mr. Green.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD D. GREEN

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to talk about Paducah

today. I am Richard Green, Director of EPA’s Waste Management

Division in EPA’s Region 4 office in Atlanta. I am responsible for

our programs dealing with hazardous substance regulation and

cleanup, primarily under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability Act, CERCLA, or Superfund, and

the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, or RCRA.

EPA’s role at DOE’s Paducah plant and my remarks focus on

EPA’s oversight role as overseers of DOE’s cleanup. EPA also has

regulatory responsibilities for facility compliance with permits for

its industrial operations which are governed by a variety of other

environmental laws which did not apply until relatively recently in

the plant’s operation history.

The Commonwealth of Kentucky is authorized as the primary environmental regulator in lieu of EPA under many EPA statutes

and we work closely with Kentucky in providing oversight of DOE’s

activities pursuant to those authorities.

I want to preface my comments about the cleanup at Paducah by

saying that EPA takes the concerns of current and former workers

regarding possible exposures in the DOE workplace very seriously.

My focus on the cleanup program does not imply any disinterest in

those concerns whatsoever. Personally, I was moved by testimony

that we heard earlier today on Panel I. However, my remarks will

address efforts under EPA’s authorities to effect cleanup and to

protect nearby populations.

I continue to follow the news reports about Paducah and the efforts by DOE’s team investigating health and safety issues. There

is so much to do at the site that it was difficult to even determine

where to start several years ago. We have been actively working

to require cleanup to take place. In fact, EPA Kentucky and DOE

facility representatives are ready now to reprioritize cleanup activities to address issues such as the removal of the scrap metal piles.

We welcome the opportunity to work with DOE and Kentucky to

identify other cleanup activities that can be accelerated.

In November 1988, EPA issued a CERCLA 104/106 administrative consent order by which DOE agreed to protect nearby homeowners from contaminated groundwater and to clean up any related contamination serving as the source for that problem. Under

this order, DOE has supplied drinking water to private residences,

continues to conduct monthly sampling of drinking water and has

completed an initial investigation to determine all sources of the

contaminants, including radionuclides which exceed Safe Drinking

Water Act requirements. The DOE immediately agreed to provide

bottled drinking water to nearby residents. Working with EPA and

Kentucky, DOE extended water lines to homes in the area of contamination and initiated an environmental study to determine the

nature and extent of the contamination that caused the offsite release as well as to identify other problem areas.

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The outgrowth of this initial work under the administrative order

resulted in two key Superfund Records of Decision or RODS having

to do with the northwest plume and the northeast plume, the two

major groundwater contamination plumes which are advancing

from the site to the Ohio River reportedly at about a foot a day.

These decisions require the Department to extract and treat the

most contaminated groundwater that is underlying the site. They

represent EPA’s requirement for early action under Superfund

whenever possible, and they are operating right now but they are

not the final remedy.

While these initial cleanup actions were underway, the site was

proposed for the National Priorities List, the Superfund list in

1993, and finalized on that list in May, 1994. Here is a summary

of what we have required under the order and the NPL listing so

far: EPA Kentucky and the facility have identified areas of known

or suspected contamination. We have set priorities for study and

cleanup and implemented detailed studies of the highest priority

sites. These include additional areas of groundwater contamination

that have been identified, water and sediments of streams near the

facility, soils onsite and across the plant for disposal. Six remedial

actions have been selected and implemented addressing groundwater, sediments in ditches, and surface soil at areas within the industrial complex. Two removal actions have been taken, one for a

radiologically contaminated rubble pile off the complex and a second for PCB contaminated soils within the complex.

Several detailed remedial investigations are underway and more

are set to begin as early as this month. We signed a Federal facilities agreement with DOE and Kentucky in February 1998. It helps

coordinate the actions of the three parties and sets milestones. It

requires the three agencies to coordinate with the public about

cleanup efforts and to participate in a site-specific advisory board

which consists of 18 or 20 local representatives.

The actions taken thus far, while significant and appropriate, are

by no means sufficient to address all of the known or potential contamination associated with the facility. EPA’s context for approaching its oversight of the facility’s cleanup is that Paducah, just as

the rest of the nuclear weapons complex, was self-regulated

throughout much of its operational history. That leads us to expect

to find additional areas of contamination, such as the landfills referred to by Mr. Garland in the Panel I testimony.

Setting priorities between response to known problems and

searching for unknown or suspected problems is a challenge but it

must be done. We take the community’s concerns extremely seriously, and we are pleased that DOE has expressed interest in developing a strategy to investigate offsite areas that may contain

hazardous waste.

The environmental priorities at Paducah should be reconsidered

in light of new concerns being raised. EPA supports a differently

balanced response to known problems as well as a broad-based

search for any areas that may be contaminated but not presently

known. We have done a lot here, but a lot remains to be done. Paducah has been constrained not only by the DOE budget, but in our

opinion by DOE’s allocation of that budget, particularly regarding

cleanup funding. Indeed we have been told by DOE that they will

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not be able to meet even the baseline commitments in the FFA beginning in about the year 2001. EPA does not accept this explanation and we have refused to renegotiate the FFA down. DOE and

Kentucky are ready to reallocate priorities, add additional actions,

and accelerate response at the site. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Richard D. Green follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. GREEN, DIRECTOR, WASTE MANAGEMENT

DIVISION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION IV

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to

be here today. I am Richard D. Green, Director of EPA’s Waste Management Division in the Agency’s Region 4 office, Atlanta, Georgia. I am responsible for our programs dealing with hazardous substance regulation and cleanup, primarily under

the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, and

the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. EPA’s role at the Department of Energy’s Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Kentucky, and my remarks, focus on EPA’s

oversight role as overseers of the Department of Energy’s cleanup. EPA also has

regulatory responsibilities for facility compliance with permits for its industrial operations governed by a variety of other environmental laws. The Commonwealth of

Kentucky is authorized as the primary environmental regulator in lieu of EPA

under many EPA statutes, and we work closely with Kentucky in providing oversight of DOE’s activities pursuant to those authorities.

I want to preface my comments about the cleanup at Paducah by saying that EPA

takes the concerns of current and former workers regarding possible exposures in

the DOE workplace very seriously. My focus on the cleanup program does not imply

any disinterest in those concerns. Rather, my remarks will address efforts under

EPA’s authorities.

I continue to follow the news reports about Paducah and the efforts by the DOE’s

team investigating health and safety issues. The cleanup of Paducah is a large and

complex task and has been receiving priority attention. In fact, EPA, Kentucky, and

DOE facility representatives stand ready to reprioritize cleanup activities to address

issues such as the removal of the scrap metal piles. EPA welcomes the opportunity

to work with DOE and Kentucky to identify other cleanup activities that can be accelerated.

On November 23, 1988, EPA issued a CERCLA 104 /106 Administrative Consent

Order by which DOE agreed to protect nearby homeowners from contaminated

groundwater and to cleanup any related contamination serving as the source for

that problem. Under this order, DOE has supplied drinking water to private residences, continues to conduct monthly sampling of drinking water, and has completed an initial investigation to determine all sources of the contaminants, including radionuclides, which exceed Safe Drinking Water Act requirements. The Department immediately agreed to provide bottled drinking water to nearby residents.

Working with EPA and Kentucky, DOE extended water lines to homes in the area

of contamination and initiated an environmental study (known as the Phase I study)

to determine the nature and extent of the contamination that caused the offsite release, as well as identifying other problem areas.

The outgrowth of the initial work required by the Administrative Order resulted

in two key CERCLA Records of Decision: Interim Remedial Action of the Northwest

Plume, and the Interim Remedial Action of the Northeast Plume. These two cleanup

decisions require the Department to extract the most contaminated groundwater underlying the site. While these initial cleanup actions were underway, the site was

proposed for the National Priorities List in 1993, and in May 1994, EPA finalized

the addition of the facility to the Superfund National Priorities List.

EPA, Kentucky and the facility have identified areas of known or suspected contamination, set priorities for study and cleanup and implemented detailed studies

of the highest priority sites. These include additional areas of groundwater contamination, water and sediments of streams near the facility, soils on-site, and areas the

Plant used for disposal. Six remedial actions have been selected and implemented

addressing groundwater, sediments in ditches, and surface soil at areas within the

industrial complex. Two removal actions have been taken, one for a radiologically

contaminated concrete rubble pile off the industrial complex and a second for PCB

contaminated soils within the complex. Several detailed remedial investigations are

underway and more are set to begin as early as this month.

While these actions were being planned and implemented, a Federal Facility

Agreement pursuant to CERCLA Section 120 was negotiated and signed February

13, 1998. The FFA helps coordinate the actions of DOE, EPA, and Kentucky and

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sets milestones for DOE’s cleanup program. The Agreement also requires the three

agencies to coordinate with the public about cleanup efforts and to participate in

the Site Specific Advisory Board formed in August 1996.

The actions taken thus far, while significant and appropriate, are by no means

sufficient to address all of the known or potential contamination associated with the

Paducah facility. EPA’s context for approaching its oversight of this facility’s cleanup is that Paducah, just as the rest of the nuclear weapons complex, was self-regulated throughout much of its operational history. That leads us to expect to find additional areas of contamination, both on and off-site. Setting priorities between response to known problems and searching for unknown or suspected problems will

always be a formidable challenge. The community’s concerns regarding additional

unknown areas of contamination are taken very seriously by this Agency.

The environmental priorities at Paducah should be reconsidered in light of new

concerns being raised. EPA supports a differently balanced response to known problems as well as a broad-based search for any areas that may be contaminated but

not presently known.

Mr. WHITFIELD [presiding]. Dr. Knapp.

TESTIMONY OF MALCOLM R. KNAPP

Mr. KNAPP. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the NRC’s

responsibilities regarding Paducah. I will briefly summarize our responsibilities, the risks posed to workers and the public, and our

current regulatory actions.

The Energy Policy Act of 1992 assigns the NRC responsibility for

regulating the safety, safeguards and security of the gaseous diffusion plants, and we take these responsibilities very seriously. We

certified the plants in November 1996 and assumed regulatory responsibility in March 1997. As stated in our reports to Congress in

1998 and 1999, we have determined that both plants are operating

safely and in accordance with our requirements.

Under the USEC lease agreements, certain areas are not included within the leased areas and these remain under DOE, not

NRC regulatory responsibility.

In the figure posted at my left, the blue areas in the Paducah

plant remain under DOE’s authority and responsibility. The cream

areas are the responsibility of USEC, regulated by NRC. The light

olive areas are areas of shared responsibilities by USEC and DOE

for access, and NRC regulates the USEC activities in those areas.

Prior to our assumption of regulatory oversight in 1997, USEC

performed a site-wide survey of indoor and outdoor areas of the

plants to identify any contaminated areas. They placed placards in

those contaminated areas which USEC was releasing from DOE to

identify them clearly, and they control these areas in accordance

with their radiation protection program.

Based upon our review of their records since 1997, worker radiation exposures at Paducah in NRC-regulated areas are very low

and in compliance with NRC requirements. With respect to the

public and the environment’s exposure, the report which USEC

provided as part of its application for certification and a subsequent report in 1997 show that with respect to USEC responsibilities, concentrations of transuranic radionuclides in airborne emissions, water samples, soil samples and sediment samples are within regulatory limits.

With respect to current NRC regulatory actions, we maintain a

staff of 2 full-time onsite resident inspectors at each plant who are

tasked with monitoring day-to-day plant operations, including radiological control practices in the area of the facility for which we

389

have responsibility. In addition, inspections by both headquarters

and regional specialists are conducted on about a monthly basis to

assess performance of plant operations.

An NRC inspection team comprised of health physics specialists

conducted a confirmatory inspection of USEC’s radiation protection

program during the week of August 20 at Paducah. While the team

is reviewing the results of that inspection, it tentatively concluded

that the USEC radiation protection program at Paducah is effective

in identifying and controlling worker exposure to contamination.

The team did identify two areas that require further investigation:

the methodology USEC uses to assess transuranic uptakes, and the

methodology USEC uses to determine the percentage of

transuranics in the sites’ contamination.

To conclude, USEC is operating the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion

Plant safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. Nevertheless, the recent series of articles has prompted additional scrutiny

by the NRC to ensure continued protection of workers and the public from exposure to uranium and other radioactive materials.

Although our ongoing inspection at Paducah raises several issues

which require additional information and assessment, based on our

reviews to date we have found existing exposures to USEC workers

are well within NRC regulatory limits.

That concludes my prepared testimony. I will be happy to answer

questions.

[The prepared statement of Malcolm R. Knapp follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MALCOLM KNAPP, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT, OFFICE OF THE

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Good morning, my name is Malcolm Knapp and I am an Executive Assistant in

the Office of the Executive Director for Operations. Thank you for providing me the

opportunity to discuss the NRC responsibilities regarding the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant and associated current issues. I will briefly summarize these responsibilities, risks posed to workers and the public, and NRC’s current regulatory actions related to the Paducah plant.

NRC Responsibilities

The Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, assigns NRC the responsibility for regulating the safety, safeguards, and security of

the gaseous diffusion plants, which are owned by the Department of Energy (DOE)

but leased and operated by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), now

a non-Government corporation. The NRC takes this responsibility for worker and

public health and safety very seriously. NRC promulgated requirements in 10 CFR

Part 76 on September 23, 1994, that provide the regulatory basis for NRC certification and inspection of USEC’s operation of the gaseous diffusion plants. A 1997

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between DOE and NRC further clarifies

NRC’s and DOE’s interactive roles for safety, safeguards, and security in those

areas leased by USEC.

NRC certified the gaseous diffusion plants in November 1996 and assumed regulatory responsibility in March 1997. As stated in NRC’s reports to Congress in 1998

and 1999, the NRC has determined that both plants are operating safely and in accordance with NRC requirements.

Areas Not Under NRC Responsibility

Under the USEC-DOE lease agreement, certain areas within the plants are not

included in the leased areas, and these areas remain under DOE, not NRC, regulatory responsibility at Paducah. These are areas containing material from operations conducted by DOE to support defense program activities (also known as legacy material) and areas containing significant quantities of high enriched uranium.

DOE retains responsibility for environmental protection, safety, safeguards, and security for these excluded areas, and DOE retains responsibility for environmental

restoration activities and waste management of the legacy material. Some areas

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within USEC leased buildings are not part of the leased USEC space, these areas

were retained by DOE and are used to store or contain DOE legacy material. These

areas are physically delineated as DOE space and are not subject to NRC regulation. Under the Atomic Energy Act, unless expressly stated otherwise by statute,

the NRC does not regulate DOE activities.

Contamination

Prior to NRC’s assumption of regulatory oversight in March 1997, USEC performed a site-wide survey of indoor and outdoor areas of the plants to identify any

contaminated areas. USEC placed placards in those contaminated areas which

USEC was leasing from DOE and which were to be under NRC jurisdiction to identify clearly these contaminated areas. In addition, any USEC areas which become

contaminated as a result of USEC operations, for example, maintenance activities,

are decontaminated or marked by USEC as contaminated areas. In each of these

cases, USEC controls these areas in accordance with its Radiation Protection Program as described in the Safety Analysis Reports.

Areas under NRC jurisdiction are routinely surveyed for contamination. USEC

surveys the lunchrooms and breakrooms in the cascade building area control rooms

daily during the work week to verify that any contamination levels are below limits

that ensure public and plant staff safety. In addition, onsite NRC resident inspectors regularly assess contamination controls to determine the effectiveness of the

plant Radiation Protection Program. In general, these assessments which are reported by the resident inspectors in their monthly reports, have found that USEC’s

contamination controls in place on USEC leased space are consistent with the plant

Radiation Protection Program and are, therefore, acceptable.

Worker Exposure

Worker exposure occurs from the inhalation or ingestion of radioactive material

(internal dose) and exposure to radiation from sources outside the body (external

dose). Both doses are added together to calculate total dose.

Based on NRC review of USEC records since 1997, worker radiation exposures at

Paducah in NRC-regulated areas are very low and in compliance with NRC requirements. The program uses personnel dosimetry (badges) for monitoring and recording

external radiation exposures and analysis of urine samples to monitor and estimate

worker internal radiation exposures. Radiation doses are reported in units of rem

or millirem (1000 millirem equals 1 rem). The NRC annual dose limit for a worker

from NRC licensed operations is 5 rem.

In 1997, those Paducah workers who did receive a dose had an average annual

total dose of 0.051 rem, while the average annual total dose at an NRC-licensed

power reactor was 0.202 rem and at an NRC-licensed fuel cycle facility was 0.236

rem. The largest total dose recorded in 1997 for any worker at the plant was 0.365

rem. Less than 2% of that dose was estimated to be from internal radiological contamination.

For 1998 the largest total dose recorded for any worker at the Paducah plant was

0.382 rem. Again less than 2% of that dose was estimated to be from internal radiological contamination. To put these doses into perspective, the average dose from

natural sources to a person in the United States is 0.300 rem per year and, as noted

previously, the NRC annual limit on total dose from NRC licensed operations to a

radiological worker is 5 rem.

Public/Environmental Exposure

USEC provided to NRC and other regulatory agencies an environmental compliance status report containing then current environmental and effluent monitoring

data as part of its application for certification. The report for 1997 is publically

available and shows that concentrations of transuranic radionuclides in airborne

emissions, water samples, soil samples, and sediment samples are within regulatory

limits.

Since NRC assumed regulatory oversight of the gaseous diffusion plants on March

3, 1997, NRC is not aware that any disposal by USEC of radioactive waste from

Paducah has occurred at other than authorized disposal facilities. Although portions

of the USEC-leased areas are contaminated with radioactive materials and will remain contaminated during enrichment operations, these areas will be decommissioned by DOE after the USEC lease is terminated and prior to release of the site

in accordance with criteria established by DOE.

No Current Activities Involving Recycled Uranium or Precious Metals

The reactor tails program, which enriched recycled uranium recovered from reprocessed defense reactor fuel, was conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission

(AEC) and DOE before USEC took over plant operations and before NRC assumed

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regulatory oversight of the gaseous diffusion plants on March 3, 1997. The recycling

of precious metals also was conducted at Paducah by the AEC and DOE before NRC

assumed regulatory oversight of the gaseous diffusion plants. Although both the reactor tails and precious metals recycling programs were completed before USEC

took over plant operations, USEC’s worker protection programs are required to assess the potential impacts of contaminants from both historical and current operations that may impact the work environment.

Current Regulatory Actions

The NRC maintains a full-time staff of two onsite resident inspectors at each

plant who are tasked with monitoring day-to-day plant operations, including radiological control practices, in those areas of the facility for which NRC has regulatory

responsibility. In addition, inspections by both Headquarters and Regional specialist

inspectors are conducted on about a monthly basis to assess performance of plant

operations.

An NRC inspection team comprised of health physics specialists conducted a confirmatory inspection of USEC’s Radiation Protection Program at the Paducah plant

during the week of August 30, 1999, and conducted a similar inspection at the

Portsmouth plant the week of September 13, 1999. Following a review of the results,

the team expects to close the inspection in mid-October. The objectives of the inspection are to confirm the adequacy of USEC’s: (1) understanding of the radiological

contamination on site; (2) controls for worker protection for transuranics such as

neptunium and plutonium, technetium and uranium radionuclides; (3) internal and

external dose assessment program for these radionuclides; (4) characterization

methodology for measuring these radionuclides; and (5) environmental and effluent

monitoring practices for these radionuclides.

Although the NRC inspection team is still reviewing the results of the Paducah

and Portsmouth inspections, they have tentatively concluded that the USEC Radiation Protection Programs at Paducah and Portsmouth are effective in identifying

and controlling worker exposure to contamination. Air sampling and work controls

in areas where workers could possibly get exposed to plutonium contamination are

effective and no internal exposures were indicated. The team identified two issues

which require further investigation: (1) the methodology USEC uses to assess transuranic uptakes; and (2) the methodology USEC uses to determine the percentage

of transuranics in the site’s contamination. USEC is preparing information to respond to these issues, and some members of the NRC inspection team returned to

Paducah this week to follow up. Although the methodology used by USEC to assess

internal dose is being evaluated further, the NRC has not found any indication that

the annual dose to any worker or member of the public has approached NRC safety

limits in portions of the facility that are regulated by NRC. Inspection exit meetings

which are open to the public are anticipated to be held near the two sites in early

October 1999.

Conclusion

In conclusion, USEC is operating the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant safely and

in accordance with NRC requirements. Nevertheless, the recent series of articles

has prompted additional scrutiny by the NRC to ensure continued protection of

workers and the public from exposure to uranium and other radioactive materials.

Although our ongoing inspection at Paducah raises several issues that require additional information and assessment, based on our reviews to date, we have found

that existing exposures to USEC workers at the plants are well within NRC regulatory limits.

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Logan, I didn’t have an opportunity to talk to

you, but I am delighted to see you and Dr. Volpe here and appreciate you taking time to come. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT W. LOGAN

Mr. LOGAN. Thank you. My name is Robert Logan, and I am

Commissioner of the Department for Environmental Protection in

Kentucky, and with me I have Dr. Volpe who is Manager of the Radiation Control Branch in the Cabinet for Health Services. We appreciate the opportunity to speak before the committee about Kentucky’s efforts to address environmental issues at the Paducah

Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

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The Commonwealth is deeply concerned about the worker exposure to citizens in the area, but today my comments are focused on

environmental issues.

The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant is situated in western

Kentucky, located in McCracken County, approximately 9 miles

west of Paducah and 3 miles south of the Ohio River on a 3,422-

acre Federal reservation. DOE has had exclusive regulatory authority for radionuclides on their property. From 1952 until the

mid-1970’s, DOE has had exclusive control over the waste generated and disposed at the facility. The Kentucky Cabinet currently

has regulatory authority for air quality, water and waste management. The State authority to regulate these concerns comes from

the delegation of Federal environmental programs including the

Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Resource and Conservation

and Recovery Act, RCRA.

The NRC, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the

Cabinet for Health Services has primary jurisdiction for radioactive

air emissions. EPA did not grant authority to address radioactive

emissions to our air program until July 14, 1999. Based upon this

grant authority, Kentucky has adopted subpart H of the Radionuclide Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants. The Cabinet is currently reviewing the USEC Title 5 operating air permit

application.

In water, Kentucky began permitting the facility for water discharges in 1984 after delegation of the national pollution discharge

elimination system.

Under the NPDS program, the Cabinet has issued two permits.

One permit focuses on discharge associated with plant operations,

cleanup of groundwater plumes and contaminated soils and

stormwater runoff from the storage areas and multiple landfills.

This permit is issued to DOE and its operating contractor.

The second permit is issued to USEC and addresses the process

water from uranium enrichment, stormwater runoff from processing and storage areas, cooling water and sanitary waste water.

The DOE and USEC permits contain monitoring requirements

and limitations for toxicity, metals, organics, radioactive materials,

including uranium, technetium-99 and alpha beta particles and

conventional pollutants. Kentucky performs quarterly inspections

of both discharge permits. DOE performs monthly monitoring for

conventional and quarterly monitoring for radionuclides. We have

issued six Notices of Violations on these permits. These NOVs, as

we call them, have been obtained for the corrective actions for the

violations, and subsequent inspections of the plant have revealed

that corrective actions were completed.

In the area of waste, Kentucky has issued four waste management permits to the facility. In 1991, a hazardous waste permit

was issued under subtitle C requirements under RCRA to DOE.

This permit requires DOE to characterize and remediate contamination at over 200 contaminated areas at the facility. In April

1991, Kentucky’s Cabinet issued a solid waste disposal permit for

the disposal of residential waste generated at the facility. In February 1985, we issued a solid waste disposal permit for the disposal

of inert solid waste generated at the facility. The residential and

inert landfills were capped in 1995 and 1992 respectively.

393

In November 1996, Kentucky issued a solid waste disposal permit for the disposal of solid waste generated at the facility. DOE

has appealed certain conditions contained if the permit. DOE is

challenging Kentucky’s ability to require characterization of DOE’s

solid waste prior to disposal and challenges the Cabinet’s authority

to set limits on the level of radioactivity associated with solid waste

that can be disposed of in a solid waste landfill.

These challenges are currently pending in State and Federal

court. These three permits were issued under subtitle D of the

Solid Waste Disposal Act. Quarterly monitoring was required at

these subtitle D landfills. This monitoring has identified chromium,

technetium-99 and TCE as contaminants of the groundwater. Kentucky has required DOE to increase the frequency of its groundwater monitoring and to provide an assessment of the source of the

groundwater contamination. DOE has advised Kentucky that contamination is not coming from these landfills.

In addition to its regulatory authority, in 1991 the Commonwealth entered into an Agreement in Principle with DOE in which

the Commonwealth conducts oversight of environmental remediation. Under the Agreement in Principle, Kentucky has conducted

18 separate studies at the facilities concerning the fate and transport of contaminants and their associated environmental impacts.

Under health and safety, the Cabinet for Health Services’ efforts

at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant have been redirected toward radiation monitoring and oversight of the DOE activities in

order to ensure protection of public health and the environment.

The Cabinet of Health Services provides technical advice for onsite

and offsite radiation issues at Paducah.

For example, in CHS’s activities during the period 1995 to 1999,

they include the collection of over 4,500 samples from surface

water, groundwater, soil sediments and vegetation in the vicinity

of the plant.

CHS has regulatory authority over radiological issues outside the

facility boundary. The Department of Energy has regulatory authority under the Atomic Energy Act with respect to nuclear safety

issues, including worker health and safety. We have also entered

into Federal facilities agreement, a site management plan. In May

1994 the facility was placed on EPA’s Superfund national priority

list under CERCLA. Therefore, as a result of this listing, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Department of Energy and U.S. EPA

have entered into a Federal facilities agreement in 1998 which addresses the overlapping responsibilities of the U.S. EPA under the

State and RCRA and CERCLA. This establishes a cleanup time

line for the facility of 2010.

Kentucky has concerns about DOE’s ability to meet this deadline

considering its current funding levels. The State is also concerned

about the extent of remediation that DOE has proposed for the facility, and in previous correspondence Kentucky has expressed

these concerns to DOE management and members of the congressional delegation. We have placed correspondence in the record,

and we want to note that on September 14, the Department of Energy press release has acknowledged our concerns. We hope DOE

will in turn acknowledge this into action.

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Soils at the site are collected and analyzed by DOE. Kentucky

ensures the quality and accuracy of sampling by a protocol to split

samples with the Department of Energy. Over 5,000 soil samples

have been collected by Kentucky and DOE since 1990. The samples

were tested for over 400 chemicals on the hazardous waste constituent list.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Logan, we have your entire statement. If

you would summarize.

Mr. LOGAN. In summary, Mr. Chairman, Kentucky has several

major issues that it wants to discuss. First and foremost is concern

over soils contamination at the site. We have concerns about the

groundwater contamination in the plume. We want to make sure

that all of the information that has been developed we have received, and we are very concerned regarding the recent allegations

that radioactive waste may have been disposed of at locations previously unknown to the State, and we continue to urge DOE to provide full accounting of its past disposal practices. And Kentucky is

concerned that DOE is not receiving the funding necessary to conduct the cleanup in a timely manner.

Mr. Chairman, we believe Congress must provide adequate funding to DOE to ensure the protection of the citizens and the environment of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

[The prepared statement of Robert W. Logan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. LOGAN, COMMISSIONER, KENTUCKY

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee my name is Robert W. Logan. I am

Commissioner of the Department for Environmental Protection in the Kentucky

Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet (NREPC). I have with me

today Dr. John Volpe, manager of the Radiation Control Branch in the Kentucky

Cabinet for Health Services. We are here to speak before the Subcommittee on

Oversight and Investigations concerning the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant

(PGDP). The PGDP is a large, industrial complex situated in western Kentucky. It

is located in McCracken County approximately nine miles west of Paducah and

three miles south of the Ohio River on a 3,423 acre federal reservation. Seven hundred forty-eight acres are fenced and contain most of the areas used by the PGDP.

Surrounding the plant is the West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area, composed

of 2,781 acres and managed by the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources. The PGDP is a uranium enrichment facility owned and operated by the

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) from 1952 until 1993. On July 1, 1993, United

States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) assumed operations at the plant. The main

function of the plant is the enrichment of uranium.

REGULATORY AUTHORITY

DOE historically and currently has had exclusive regulatory authority for radionuclides on their property. From 1952 until the mid-1970’s, DOE had exclusive control over the waste generated and disposed at the facility.

The Kentucky NREPC currently has regulatory authority for air quality, water,

and waste management. The state authority to regulate these areas comes from the

delegation of federal environmental programs including the Clean Water Act, the

Clean Air Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).

Air

Kentucky does not have complete authority for Title V of the Clean Air Act, however, Kentucky has issued a series of 21 permits to DOE and its contractors since

March 18, 1980. Air permits have generally not regulated radioactive emissions. The

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA),

and Kentucky Cabinet for Health Services (CHS) have had primary jurisdiction over

radioactive emissions. USEPA did not grant authority to address radioactive emissions to air until July 14, 1999. Based upon this grant of authority, Kentucky adopted Subpart H, the radionuclide National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air PolVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:55 Sep 14, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00398 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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lutants (NESHAPS). The NREPC is currently reviewing the USEC Title V operating

permit application.

Water

Kentucky began permitting the facility for water discharges in 1984 after delegation of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting

program to Kentucky in September 1983. Under the NPDES program, Kentucky

NREPC issued two permits. One permit focuses on discharges associated with plant

operations, cleanup of groundwater plumes and contaminated soils, and storm water

runoff from storage areas and multiple landfills. This permit is issued to the DOE

and its operating contractor. The second permit is issued to the USEC and addresses process water from uranium enrichment, storm water runoff from processing and

storage areas, cooling water, and sanitary wastewater.

The DOE and USEC permits contain monitoring requirements and limitations for

toxicity, metals, organics (PCB and TCE), radioactive materials (Uranium and Technetium-99 and Alpha and Beta Particles), and conventional pollutants.

Kentucky performs quarterly inspections of both discharge permits. DOE performs

monthly monitoring for conventional pollutants and quarterly monitoring for radionuclides. Six Notices of Violations (NOVs) have been issued by Kentucky on these

permits. These NOVs contained corrective actions for these violations. Subsequent

inspections revealed that corrective actions were completed.

Waste

Kentucky issued four waste management permits to the facility. In 1991, a hazardous waste permit was issued under the subtitle C requirements of RCRA, to

DOE. This permit requires DOE to characterize and remediate contamination at

over 200 contaminated areas at the facility.

In April 1981, Kentucky NREPC issued a solid waste disposal permit for the disposal of residential waste generated at the facility. In February of 1985, Kentucky

NREPC issued a solid waste disposal permit for the disposal of inert solid waste

generated at the facility. The residential and inert landfills were closed in 1995 and

1992, respectively. In November of 1996, Kentucky issued a solid waste disposal permit for the disposal of solid waste generated at the facility. DOE has appealed certain conditions contained in the permit. DOE is challenging Kentucky’s ability to

require characterization of DOE’s solid waste prior to disposal and challenging the

Cabinet’s authority to set limits on the levels of radioactivity associated with solid

waste that can be disposed in a solid waste landfill. These challenges are currently

pending in state and federal court. These three permits were issued under Subtitle

D of the Solid Waste Disposal Act.

Quarterly monitoring is required for the three subtitle D landfills. This monitoring has identified chromium, Technetium-99 and trichloroethylene (TCE) as contaminants of groundwater. Kentucky has required DOE to increase the frequency

of its groundwater monitoring and to provide an assessment of the source of the

groundwater contamination. DOE has advised Kentucky that the contamination is

not coming from these landfills.

Oversight

In addition to its regulatory authority, in 1991 the Commonwealth of Kentucky

entered into an Agreement in Principal with DOE in which the Commonwealth conducts oversight of environmental remediation. Under the AIP, Kentucky has conducted eighteen separate studies at the facility concerning fate and transport of contaminants and their associated environmental impacts.

Health and Safety

The Cabinet for Health Services’ efforts at the PGDP have been directed toward

Radiation Monitoring and Oversight of DOE activities in order to ensure protection

of public health and the environment. CHS provides technical advice for on-site and

off-site radiation issues at PGDP. For example, CHS’s activities during the period

of FY1995 through FY1999 included the collection of over 4500 samples from surface water, groundwater, soils, sediment, and vegetation in the vicinity of the

PGDP. In this time frame, CHS conducted 13,094 radiochemical analyses on the

samples collected at PGDP and 15,773 quality control analyses to ensure the accuracy and precision of PGDP sample results.

CHS has regulatory authority over radiological issues outside the facility boundary.

The DOE has regulatory authority under the Atomic Energy Act with respect to

nuclear safety issues including worker health and safety.

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Federal Facilities Agreement—Site Management Plan

In May of 1994, the facility was placed on USEPA Superfund National Priority

List under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Therefore, as a result of this listing, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the DOE and the USEPA, entered into a Federal Facilities Agreement (FFA)

in 1998 which addresses the overlapping responsibilities of USEPA and Kentucky

under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and CERCLA.

The FFA established a clean up time line for the facility of 2010. Kentucky has

concerns about DOE’s ability to meet this deadline considering its current funding

levels. Kentucky is also concerned about the extent of the remediation DOE has proposed for the facility. In previous correspondence Kentucky has expressed these concerns to DOE management and members of our congressional delegation. We would

like to place this correspondence into the record today. We want to note that a September 14 DOE press release has acknowledged our concerns. We hope DOE will

turn its acknowledgements into action.

SITE CONTAMINATION

Soils

Soil samples are collected and analyzed by the DOE. Kentucky assures the quality

and accuracy of sampling by a protocol to split samples with DOE. Over 5,000 soil

samples have been collected by Kentucky and DOE since 1990. Over 400 chemicals

on the hazardous waste constituent list, as well as gross alpha and beta particles,

PCBs, Technetium-99 and other radioactive elements.

Over 200 waste management units have been identified in the RCRA permit. Contamination at these units includes inorganics, metals, and radionuclides. The FFA

requires DOE to submit a report detailing the overall soil contamination at the facility by November 1999. Characterization and remediation of the soil is one of Kentucky’s highest priorities.

Surface Water

The USEC facility withdraws approximately 10 million gallons of water from the

Ohio River daily for the uranium enrichment process. Process discharges are to Little and Big Bayou Creeks through permitted outfalls. These outfalls from the facility

are monitored monthly by the NREPC and by the facility. Surface water and sediment samples are collected semiannually along Little and Big Bayou Creeks. Soil

in the discharge water (sediment) and process water are contaminated with low levels of PCBs, metals, and radionuclides. DOE has been notified about these contaminants.

Further, CHS performs a risk assessment of the radionuclides levels and where

elevated levels are identified, DOE is notified by CHS.

Groundwater

Approximately 9 billion gallons of groundwater are contaminated in three groundwater plumes. Trichloroethylene (TCE) was detected in off-site residential wells in

1988. Trichloroethylene (TCE) and Technetium-99 (99Tc) were discovered in private

water wells north of the plant in August 1988. Kentucky notified potentially impacted residents and DOE. This prompted DOE to provide municipal water service

to residences and businesses within the projected area of migration of the contaminated groundwater. Ensuing investigations confirmed that TCE and Technetium-99

(Tc99) were traveling off-site via two massive groundwater plumes, the Northeast

Plume and Northwest Plume. The Drinking Water Policy Area was recently enlarged to accommodate a new plume (southwest plume). Most of the groundwater

contamination is confined about 60 to 100 feet below the surface. Actions have been

taken to monitor the progression of the groundwater plumes and to assure that no

one is drinking and/or using impacted groundwater: (1) sealing and capping groundwater wells within the Drinking Water Policy Area, (2) converting residences to a

municipal water supply, (3) conducting door-to-door surveys, (4) publishing a newsletter, (5) conducting well-record searches, (6) sampling outside the Drinking Water

Policy Area, (7) notifying local drilling companies about the Drinking Water Policy.

DOE is also monitoring outside the Drinking Water Policy Area and has installed

pumps. They are treating wells to slow the progression of the plume.

Since 1991 over 250 groundwater wells located at various depths have been monitored on a biweekly basis. Over 400 chemicals on the hazardous waste constituent

list, as well as gross alpha and gross beta particles, Technetium-99 and other radioactive elements such as Uranium, are routinely monitored. Other radioactive elements such as Thorium, Plutonium and Neptunium have been detected in a few

groundwater wells at extremely low concentrations on an irregular basis. These inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:55 Sep 14, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00400 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
397

clude wells located on DOE reservation and property off-site. Over 10,000 groundwater samples have been collected by Kentucky and DOE since 1990.

Interim corrective actions have already been implemented to slow down the progression of the Northeast and Northwest Plumes

To effectively clean up the groundwater, all sources of groundwater contamination

must be identified and remedial actions designed to address the dense nonaqueous

phase liquids (DNAPLS). Remediation of groundwater is also one of Kentucky’s

highest priorities.

Air

The CHS installed and calibrated eight (8) continuous air samplers in the vicinity

of the PGDP during FY 1997 to FY 1999. The CHS operates the eight air samplers

to monitor airborne radioactive emissions from PGDP activities. Seven air monitoring stations are located on the DOE reservation in the vicinity of plant. One air

monitor is located approximately 5 miles southeast of the PGDP to determine background activity.

The CHS began collection and analyses of continuous air samples in January 1997

following a start-up and calibration period during which field operational problems

with the samplers were corrected and laboratory methods for analyzing the sample

filters were developed. Filters from continuous air samplers are collected on a weekly basis. In excess of 300 samples have been collected from January 1997 to present.

The CHS conducted 645 radiochemical analyses on the samples.

Analytical results from all continuous air sampler locations indicated that radiation activities were less than the maximum daily allowance, MDA, and, therefore,

were below the background levels. In the event of exceedences, DOE is notified.

Fish and Wildlife

The West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area (WKWMA) surrounds the facility.

The NREPC and Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife have worked since 1992

to evaluate any adverse impact on the environment or wildlife in the WKWMA.

Kentucky currently monitors deer, fish, and other wildlife in the WKWMA for contamination from the facility. PCBs found in fish collected and analyzed from the Little Bayou Creek prompted Kentucky to issue a fish consumption advisory in 1988.

Low levels of plutonium were found in two samples of deer taken from the WKWMA

in 1994. The levels did not pose a threat to health. Since that time, subsequent sampling has not revealed the presence of plutonium contamination in deer. Low levels

of PCBs, metals and radionuclides have been found throughout the ecosystem in all

levels of the food chain. Remediation of the site will be the only cure for these problems.

Community Relations and Outreach

Since 1993, the NREPC, DOE and EPA produce a quarterly newsletter, ‘‘Kentucky Environmental Oversight News.’’ Over 2,300 individuals receive copies of the

newsletter statewide. However, outreach is focused on the Paducah area.

The NREPC, DOE and EPA began the process of development of a citizens’ advisory board in January 1995. The site specific advisory board (SSAB), created in

1996, is composed of 12 board members from the community and five state and federal regulatory agency representatives. The board meets periodically to discuss

issues related to the permitting and corrective action.

Additionally, in response to recent allegations about the facility, Kentucky has established a toll free number for citizens to obtain information about the facility and

to voice their concerns.

Summary

Kentucky is concerned with the recent allegations that radioactive wastes may

have been disposed at locations previously unknown to the NREPC. Therefore, we

continue to urge DOE to provide a full accounting of its past waste disposal practices. As noted Kentucky is concerned that DOE is not receiving the funding necessary to conduct the clean up in a timely manner. Therefore, we believe that Congress must provide adequate funding to DOE to ensure protection of the citizens

and environment of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Logan.

Dr. Knapp, in your opening statement toward the end, you were

talking about the safety of the production facility operated by

USEC. In closing, you said several other issues have been raised

which we are looking at in more detail. What issues are you referring to there?

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Mr. KNAPP. I was principally referring to the two that I mentioned in the latter part of my testimony. They have to do with the

methodology that USEC is using to assist transuranics uptakes

and the methodology that they are using to determine the percentage of contamination which is transuranics.

In both cases, the percentages are low enough that we are very

comfortable that workers are properly protected. That is contamination—that is, uptakes in general, as you heard from USEC earlier, are very low. They are less than 10 percent of NRC’s limits

for worker exposure. A small fraction of those exposures result

from transuranics.

We want to better understand the methodology they use to calculate that fraction. So these are not significant issues but we simply want to pursue them. It is an area where we want more comfort with what is going on. We anticipate having this resolved by

the time we formally close our inspection in October.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Since USEC has had responsibility for the production facility, have they been cited or fined by NRC?

Mr. KNAPP. They have received a number of violations. They

have received, I believe, 38 noncited violations, 62 Level 4, that is

our lowest level of violation. They have been involved in 4 of what

we call Level 3 violations, one of which did result in a civil penalty

of $55,000.

For perspective—and this is a comparison that it is difficult to

make, this is a somewhat higher level of violation than we might

find, say, for a 2-unit commercial plant regulated by the NRC, but

I think it is also fair to say that this is a different kind of plant

and they are coming under NRC regulation, which tends to result

in a somewhat higher number of violations than we would expect

after a few number of years.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Is there a significant difference between NRC’s

and DOE’s health and safety requirements?

Mr. KNAPP. They are fundamentally identical. The bottom line,

the requirements that we have for exposures to workers and the

public, full body dose, dose to parts of the body, are identical.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Green and Mr. Logan, if the site at Paducah

was owned by a private company with the same problems, would

you be treating them the same way?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. Congressman, we probably would have

done things similar to the way we have done them. We entered into

early action with DOE. We asked them to provide bottled water.

We do that on the private side regularly. We asked them to take

interim action on the groundwater. We do that, too. They did it.

We have an enforceable—we entered into an order with them,

yes. Of course, the main difference in treating a Federal facility is

we really cannot say to them on the commercial—as we would to

a commercial polluter and Superfund, if you don’t do this, we will

do it and then we will send you the bill and we will cost-recover

the money. However, sites this big are rare. We have nothing on

the commercial side, at least in Region 4 that approaches this in

terms of size or really seriousness.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Would you have any ballpark figure of what you

think it would cost to clean this up?

399

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. We have identified over 200 solid waste

management units. We don’t have a handle yet on the extent of

contamination offsite, and not even all of it onsite, as recent newspaper reports showed.

Based upon what we know, however, DOE is saying—and we

have no real reason to dispute it—that the total cost could reach

over $200 billion.

Mr. WHITFIELD. $200 billion?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Is that DOE-wide or is that just Paducah?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. No, sir, I believe it is just Paducah. Let me

confer with Mr. Johnston. (Mr. Owendoff comes forward and states

that $200 billion is the estimated cost of cleaning up the entire

DOE complex.)

Mr. WHITFIELD. Do you agree with that?

Mr. OWENDOFF. I am Jim Owendoff. It is for the entire complex:

Oak Ridge; Ridgeland in Washington; and Rocky Flats in Idaho.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Logan, do you want to respond?

Mr. LOGAN. Had this been a private corporation or private business, we would have not been as sensitive to the budget requirements and the financial impact. We would have entered into similar agreements and a plan of action for characterization and remediation and a timeframe for cleanup, but we would have probably

accelerated the schedule.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Dr. Michaels, we have talked a little bit today

about the Tiger team report and you have just completed your

Phase I assessment back to 1990; and at least my memory was

that some of the same problems today were there back in 1990. A

significant number of them were the same; is that correct?

Mr. MICHAELS. It is correct, and at the same time it is not correct. They can be characterized the same way, but the severity is

quite different. You heard about a situation that is some ways is

out of control. What we saw in a recent investigation on which I

presented the preliminary findings, we found some concerns that

we take very seriously, but they were in the area of discipline and

ALARA, the lowest allowable exposure that we can reasonably

achieve. And we want to reach that, and that is why we took it

very seriously. You can’t say that it is the same extent of problems

that the Tiger team saw.

Mr. WHITFIELD. More severity than anything else?

Mr. MICHAELS. Yes, but the areas in health physics or environmental contamination certainly were the same.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Did you agree with Mr. Nemec’s statement that

his reading and DOE’s reading on the cylinders were consistent

with each other?

Mr. MICHAELS. I haven’t looked at that carefully. I don’t think

that they were necessarily inconsistent, but we took it seriously

enough that we thought that people should be badged.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Logan—well, to be fair about this, you have

5 minutes, Mr. Strickland.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Michaels, I have lots of questions to ask you and I will try

to ask them succinctly, and if you can give me an abbreviated response.

400

First of all, I have a document here sent by the Deputy Director

of Naval Reactors, T.J. Glothier, regarding the pilot project, and it

troubles me greatly. It argues against this effort. It says it would

set a precedent for compensation of occupational radiation injury

claims. The draft pilot program could establish an inappropriate

precedent for other DOE and DOD activities where plutonium is

handled. It says that the DOE proposal sets a precedent without

identifying the full potential scope of the problem.

And what this sounds like to me is an attempt to avoid responsibility and a fear of setting a precedent and accepting liability.

Now I understand the need for caution, but we are talking about

human lives and human health and safety, and it really troubles

me that any part of our government would take such a cautious approach. The benefit of the doubt ought to go to workers who have

been inappropriately exposed to dangerous materials. That ought

to be the position of this government.

I have written the White House saying that the workers at Portsmouth and the workers at Oak Ridge should not be excluded from

this. I know that there was a facility that operated briefly at Portsmouth—for I don’t know how long. It was shut down because they

couldn’t contain the contaminants. Could you tell me how long that

conversion facility at Portsmouth was operational?

Mr. MICHAELS. I am sorry, I didn’t come prepared with that information. I don’t think any of our staff here has it either.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Can you provide that?

Mr. MICHAELS. Yes.

Mr. STRICKLAND. So you can’t tell me how much radiation was

not contained and for how long it was not contained?

Mr. MICHAELS. That’s correct. Even knowing how long it operated, knowing what our records look like, I don’t think that I would

be able to give you those answers.

Mr. STRICKLAND. So you can’t tell me what level of exposure

workers at Portsmouth may have received while that plant was

operational?

Mr. MICHAELS. That is correct. We have this large investigative

study that will look at that issue, among the other issues, but the

best we will do is try to estimate what the exposures were.

Mr. STRICKLAND. I understand, and I have confidence in your efforts. But I am just trying to get some things on the record here.

Now, material came to my plant that was dangerous. Workers

handled it. There was exposure. The operational facility was shut

down, and yet apparently this administration is prepared to send

to this Congress legislation asking that workers at Paducah be covered and that the workers at Portsmouth and Oak Ridge not be

covered. Is that your understanding?

Mr. MICHAELS. That is my understanding. The Secretary’s commitment is to make sure that every affected worker is covered. We

are just trying to figure out how to get there.

Mr. STRICKLAND. I have total confidence in the Secretary’s efforts. My statement is directed toward the administration and the

fact that they are prepared to send to this Congress legislation that

would exclude workers who have been exposed potentially to the

very same conditions as the workers at Paducah. I do not see how

that can be justified.

401

Can any of you there at that table give me a rationale for why

such behavior should be undertaken by this administration?

Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my

time.

Mr. WHITFIELD. That’s the first time I have ever seen a panel

speechless.

Mr. Bryant, you have 5 minutes.

Mr. BRYANT. Thank you. I don’t think I can say it any better

than my colleague Mr. Strickland has said it, but certainly in

terms of Oak Ridge, which is not in my district, but I do know that

our congressional delegation from Tennessee is extremely concerned that any exposure—and certainly there appears to have

been some—that we go in through all these locations and make

sure that the workers are adequately treated.

I had a couple of more immediate concerns beyond the workers,

off the site. I would ask Mr. Knapp, I had asked the question earlier to one of the first members of the panel about the work that

you are doing in terms of improvements to the site in the event

there were an earthquake there. And my understanding, they were

3 years behind schedule. And my question was essentially why is

it taking so long to get these improvements made? In the event

there were an earthquake, you know, you’re risking an awful lot

of people around the Paducah area.

Mr. KNAPP. I can’t give you all the reasons for the time that it

takes, but I’ll try to say a few things. I have visited the site. The

improvements are extensive. They involve putting a great deal of

steel in to brace the structures at two of the buildings which are

susceptible to earthquakes. The NRC received an application from

USCC to extend that deadline.

We looked at it with considerable care. We did a risk analysis of

it based on, among other things, the fact that they have derated

the cascade in those buildings to run them at below atmospheric

pressure which will reduce the consequences should a severe earthquake occur. Based on the amount of time it would take them to

do the work that they have to do, we considered that it was acceptable for them to extend that period through June 30, 2000.

We now understand informally, they may come in for a few

months beyond that and we are considering whether it will be acceptable to continue further this delay. I don’t have an answer to

that.

With respect to other reasons why it is taking so long, a part of

this, as I mentioned in the early part of my testimony, there are

areas even within the buildings which USEC has which remain

under the control of DOE because they have legacy material in

them. And in some cases, the presence of this legacy material, we

understand from USEC, makes it difficult for them to get into

parts of the buildings to be able to complete the construction of this

bracing.

And at this time, we understand that when DOE is able to release some of these areas, may have an effect on when the job will

be done. We understand that DOE is working on it aggressively.

That’s the best answer I can give you.

Mr. BRYANT. Thank you.

402

Mr. Green, you or Dr. Knapp mentioned this water that’s going

toward the Ohio River. Dr. Cochran, on the first panel, indicated

it had already arrived. Were you the one that mentioned it just a

few minutes ago between the two of you?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRYANT. Why is there this disagreement?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. I noted what Dr. Cochrane said earlier and

we have no evidence that it has reached the river, haven’t seen any

data to say that it has. We have slowed the migration of the

plumes significantly. And I am told that there is a chance that

based on what we see so far, that we could intercept them completely. The EPA has not seen any data that says they’ve reached

the Ohio.

Mr. BRYANT. That’s encouraging. Because certainly I think we all

agree that what needs to be done there—is it that big a problem?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRYANT. Is it being overstated?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. No, sir, it’s not being overstated.

Mr. BRYANT. It seems to me it would be a big problem.

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. It is. We don’t want it to reach the river.

I do want to emphasize that these remedies that are in place, that

we’re calling pump and treat remedies, extraction, physically extracting water and treating it and discharging treated water, these

are interim remedies to stop or slow the plume. This is not the

final remedy.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Burr.

Mr. BURR. Mr. Green, I honestly think from your comments that

you are engaged in this in a very positive way, and I thank you

for that and for the EPA. And you said something that piqued my

interest just a little bit. You said when you got involved in the site,

and I quote you, ‘‘There is so much to do, we didn’t know where

to start.’’

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURR. When was that?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. Well, that was in the mid-eighties, actually,

when the site was no longer—well, it lost its sovereign immunity

really, and became subject to the Federal Facilities Compliance

Act. And then we, State Health Department, saw the data and

issued the order. And it’s not that we issued the order on high to

DOE; DOE was very cooperative in implementing the order. And

that’s how we—that’s the beginning of our involvement.

Mr. BURR. The appendix that we’ve talked about today in the executive summary was in fact part of a Superfund investigation, am

I correct? Or it was a requirement under Superfund? Later I guess,

1994, it officially was a Superfund site, correct?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. Later it was, yes. In 1994 it was final on

the NPL.

Mr. BURR. That executive summary required EPA approval prior

to its release, did it not?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. I need to know, Mr. Burr, if you mean the

worker health and safety appendix?

Mr. BURR. It’s the Phase I results of site investigation, Phase I,

done by Martin Marietta, March 22, 1991. It’s my understanding

that to release that, it required EPA approval.

403

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. Yes, sir, that’s correct.

Mr. BURR. To your knowledge—were you involved in it in this

site at that time?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. No, sir.

Mr. BURR. Okay. Given that that required EPA approval, do you

have any knowledge of EPA ever going back to request that appendix 2B-17 that has been missing for 9 years?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. I personally don’t.

Mr. BURR. Has EPA requested of the current contractor, Bechtel,

2B-17 appendix?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. I don’t know, Mr. Burr.

Mr. BURR. I would take from that, that you don’t currently have

a copy of the appendix 2B-17.

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. That’s correct.

Mr. BURR. Would you like a copy?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. I would.

Mr. BURR. I think our good friends in the front row are probably

making that note as we go through.

Dr. Michaels, does DOE have a copy of 2B-17 appendix?

Mr. MICHAELS. I’m told we do.

Mr. BURR. When did you receive that?

Mr. MICHAELS. Let me request Jimmy Hodges, manager of the

Paducah site, to answer this.

Mr. HODGES. We have a copy of the appendix B that you talked

about and I don’t know the exact date that we actually—it was received. But when we did note that it was missing from the reading

room, we were able to find that within a day’s time and put that

back in the reading room. So it did exist. It was available. It was

just not in the reading room at that time.

Mr. BURR. You were at the site; am I correct?

Mr. T4Hodges. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURR. Was this document really missing for 9 years?

Mr. HODGES. In my opinion, it was not. It did not appear in the

reading room, I can’t give you an explanation for that. But the data

was available. It was used in the production of other reports that

were generated as a result of that site characterization. So the data

did exist. Why it was not in that particular document in the reading room, I don’t have a good explanation for it.

Mr. BURR. As a matter of fact the data did not exist in a report

until 1996 is I think the first indication that we were given by

Martin Marietta. Can you shed any light on how that appendix

could be completed in January 1991, the executive summary was

then completed on March 22, 1991, approved by the EPA, and a

year later in October 1992, the annual environmental report required by DOE was compiled by Martin Marietta and neither one,

the executive summary nor the annual report, referenced to a plutonium contamination?

Mr. HODGES. I don’t know the answer to that sir. I can certainly

research that and give you a better opinion of what might have

happened there.

Mr. BURR. Mr. Logan, does the state of Kentucky have a copy of

2B-17 appendix?

Mr. LOGAN. Yes, sir we recently received a copy of that on a request to DOE. We didn’t have, until we read in the paper that it

404

was missing. We made a request for it and we did receive a copy

of it.

Mr. BURR. I’ll be very quick, Mr. Chairman. In that document,

it states that as much as 240 picocuries per gram of soil of plutonium contamination was found. Mr. Knapp, I have no idea about

this stuff. Is that a lot of plutonium contamination?

Mr. KNAPP. Sir, I’m not a health physicist. I’ll be delighted to

provide that answer for the record, but I don’t know off the top of

my head. Let me check quickly with my staff. I’m just not sure we

know that right here.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Burr, I think what we’ll do is we’ll each take

another round not to exceed 5 minutes.

Mr. BURR. Can we reverse the order we were in?

Mr. WHITFIELD. Do you have to go out somewhere?

Mr. BURR. Mr. Bryant and I have another hearing downstairs

that we’ve patiently—I will wrap up in——

Mr. WHITFIELD. Are you asking unanimous consent that——

Mr. BURR. I would be happy to ask unanimous consent that we

go in reverse order.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Can I take 1 minute to ask a question? Then

I’ll be finished.

Mr. BURR. If the gentleman will allow Mr. Knapp the answer to

this one, I’ll be happy to yield.

Mr. KNAPP. According to my staff, that concentration is approximately 10 times allowable release limits by the NRC.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Go ahead.

Mr. BURR. Let me ask it this way.

Mr. WHITFIELD. We’re going to give you another 5 minutes, Mr.

Burr.

Mr. BURR. If this amount of plutonium contamination was found

onsite, which you have responsibility for, correct—NRC has oversight on——

Mr. KNAPP. If it were found onsite, yes, within the USEC areas,

yes, we would be responsible for it.

Mr. BURR. Would you require it to be cleaned up?

Mr. KNAPP. Yes.

Mr. BURR. Would it be a worker safety issue?

Mr. KNAPP. At a concentration that low, I’m not sure I would call

it a worker safety issue, but an environmental protection issue, and

it would have to be cleaned up to NRC standards.

Mr. BURR. Mr. Logan, several times in the press, I think the

Commissioner of Public Health has recently stated, and I quote,

‘‘Exhaustive State tests did not show a health threat to anyone living in the area around the plant,’’ end quote. Now that you have

available to you appendix 2B-17, is this something that the State

of Kentucky is going to look at a little more seriously as it relates

to offsite contamination?

Mr. LOGAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURR. In most cases, can this committee assume that a lot

of the investigations that have happened in the last several years

are investigations that have used the prior data available to determine contamination?

Mr. LOGAN. I would think a number of the investigations that

have been submitted have relied on historical data, but also there

405

has been State data that has been generated concurrently with

that, sir.

Mr. BURR. And Mr. Green, my last question: Would the EPA

agree that this level of plutonium contamination is in fact a threat?

Mr. RICHARD GREEN. Yes, sir. I’m not—ordinarily I would have

to consult other people to say yes, but I have a chart in my briefing

book that leads me to say yes.

Mr. BURR. I thank all of you for your willingness and openness

to be here and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you.

Mr. Strickland.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Michaels, you went through in your testimony some information that I would like to make sure that I have recorded accurately.

Did you say that you would be at the Portsmouth site to begin your

investigation by mid-December?

Mr. MICHAELS. Sir, we plan to begin the scoping of it in November, and we’ll be onsite in January.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Onsite in January. And then you indicated a

figure of 6,000 workers would be medically monitored or screened.

And could you tell me where those workers would be from?

Mr. MICHAELS. That—that’s a budget request. The budget

amendment that the Secretary has asked is for additional money

to support the expansion of our former working screening program

to include current workers as well as more former workers at the

three gaseous diffusion plants, and that would be in Portsmouth,

Paducah and Oak Ridge.

Mr. STRICKLAND. And more specifically, my understanding is

that at Paducah the Department is going to conduct medical

screenings which are likely to be helpful in detecting early health

effects from potential exposure to radioactive materials, thereby extending the lives of those who may be discovered to have problems

at an early stage.

Mr. MICHAELS. We certainly hope that will be the outcome.

Mr. STRICKLAND. And that being the case, do you plan to do such

screening, these lung examinations, for example, at Portsmouth

and Oak Ridge as well?

Mr. MICHAELS. It’s my understanding we’ll use the same protocol

at three sites, with variation based on what we know about exposure histories. But any expansion to Paducah would be the expansion to Portsmouth and Oak Ridge as well, sir.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Has the Department requested the necessary

funding in order to make sure that this rather costly operation will

be adequately funded?

Mr. MICHAELS. I believe we’ve announced the request. I don’t

know if the amendments—yes, I’m told the amendment has been

sent by the White House to Congress. And we look forward to your

support on that.

Mr. STRICKLAND. You have it. I’m looking forward to your coming

to Portsmouth.

Mr. MICHAELS. And as far as you know, I’ll be coming to Portsmouth before the investigation as well to meet with the workers as

I promised you.

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Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Dr. Michaels. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Yes, sir. Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As Mr. Burr said, we’re

shuttling back and forth between this hearing and another hearing.

And I know this has been a long day. I spent most of my time in

here. And I too want to thank all of you, especially on this third

panel for being so patient and waiting for us.

Dr. Michaels, same questions in terms of Oak Ridge, and you

mentioned Portsmouth, and you have the same protocol in line for

both of the facilities that you would have for Paducah. What kind

of timeframe are we talking about for Oak Ridge?

Mr. MICHAELS. Mr. Bryant, we haven’t set a schedule for Oak

Ridge. We’ll be going to Portsmouth next. As we complete that,

which we see completing in late winter, we’ll then go to Oak Ridge

to look at the specific issues around the transuranics. However, at

the same time, I didn’t really address this in terms of Portsmouth

directly, but there’s a process that President Clinton has requested

in the memo in July to have us look at—have the White House and

all the agencies look at occupational illness across the DOE weapons complex. And we’ll be going out, and I specifically will be going

out to both Oak Ridge and to Portsmouth as well as to other sites

to gather data about the potential health effects of our exposures

there to report to the White House in order to understand how we

can best provide compensation to workers across the complex.

We have been tasked to finish that entire investigation by the

end of March. We’ll be coming to Oak Ridge probably within the

next few months to gather more information on that as well.

Mr. BRYANT. It would seem to me in the overall plan by the

President, Oak Ridge and Portsmouth and Paducah would be very

high priority since there probably is known damage there. I think

one of the—Mr. Green mentioned earlier about trying to weigh the

balance between the known onsite versus the unknown offsite and

knowing that there’s probably something out there, but you have

to look for it. But we know—we know there are things there in Oak

Ridge and Portsmouth and Paducah. And I would urge you to make

that your highest priority as opposed to going elsewhere and finding out what the situation might be.

Let me go back to—and you may have been asked this question

earlier—but back to Kentucky, I know offsite—when your folks

first went there, they had to wear protective clothing on some of

the offsite areas. Are there warnings for the general public out

there now in those locations? I think they were tested and actually

some indication of radiation was found and the workers did need—

not have, but need—protective clothing. Is that premise true?

Mr. MICHAELS. Dr. David Statler, he’s our Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oversight who’s heading the team down there.

Mr. STATLER. It’s important to note the definitions that define

offsite and onsite at Paducah. You have an area inside the secured

fence that belongs to DOE. You have almost as large or a larger

area outside the fence that belongs to DOE, that is really DOE

property but outside the fence. And then beyond that, you have

public property or offsite property that borders that. There’s no

fence between that and the DOE property.

407

We found through our surveys, we took both surveys, radiological

surveys as well as independent groundwater sediment and surface

water samples, and those samples are not analyzed yet. They’re in

the process. But the surveys, we found contamination on DOE

property beyond the security fence, not on public property, that exceeded the limits in 835—10 CFR 835 for posting, and they were

not properly posted. In some cases, there were signs of contamination, the levels were not posted. There are contaminated ditches

and lagoons and properties. And in one case where the team went

in to a small creek or stream to take a sample, they did a survey

first, and it required booties and gloves and it was not posted as

such. So we contend that 835 should be applicable to DOE property

beyond the fence and the postings place.

Mr. BRYANT. The bottom-line question on this is, is there any

property, whether it’s government-owned or public property, that

the public has access to that would be dangerous that’s not posted?

Mr. STATLER. The public does have access to that DOE property

offsite. In most cases it’s not fenced. There are a few signs saying

DOE property, but they have access.

Mr. BRYANT. Is that posted warning?

Mr. STATLER. Not posted adequately in our——

Mr. BRYANT. That’s something I’m sure our folks from Kentucky

will be aware of. Thank you.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sorry that I—lots of meetings. It all telescoped, our schedules,

now we have votes that are going on. I have two questions.

One, Dr. Michaels, it’s my understanding that your nuclear safety inspectors have never conducted a comprehensive compliance inspection at Paducah; is that right? Comprehensive, everything.

Mr. STATLER. The Office of Nuclear Safety, between 1991 and

1995, conducted investigations or assessments there, including in

1994 a radiological assessment that identified many of the same

concerns. We had also performed event investigations at that locality in Paducah. Since the transition to NRC and DOE of the USEC

facilities, other priorities, staffing have prevented us from sending

a team there. So we have not actively done a complete assessment

of Paducah since 1995.

Mr. UPTON. But that’s going to change now, is that not right?

Mr. STATLER. It’s already changed. We’re doing an investigation,

yes, sir.

Mr. UPTON. Are we going to see posting—I’ve known about this

recreation area that’s close by, and I think Mr. Bryant was just

touching on that now in terms of his question. Is that going to

change pretty quickly in terms of the warning signs to all residents

of Paducah not to—and what will those signs say?

Mr. STATLER. The requirements on DOE property on- or offsite

are defined by 10 CFR 835 and how they should be posted. I believe the site has submitted a corrective action plan and they are

reviewing those postings. We identified more than just signs that

needed painting. We identified areas onsite and offsite on DOE

property that were contaminated and not posted, or posted improperly. And so I would hope that those would be fixed rather quickly,

if not already.

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Mr. UPTON. Well, again, I apologize for being in and out during

this hearing but I guess, Mr. Whitfield, if you have no further

questions.

Mr. WHITFIELD. I do. Just one.

Mr. UPTON. I yield back my time.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Logan, there was a quote from you or Mr. Volpe in the Paducah Sun on August 11, 1999 that said if you followed the effluent

ditch from the plant, ‘‘it leads to Little Bayou Creek toward the

Ohio River. We have an automatic sampler that samples the creek

every 6 hours and we have never found plutonium.’’ Is that correct?

Mr. VOLPE. That’s correct. Since we’ve had that in place, it collects a sample every 6 hours. There’s detection of plutonium at this

offsite location.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And how long have you had that?

Mr. VOLPE. We have had that in place, I believe it’s about 2

years. We’ve had to take it out because of vandalism and then we

put it back in in cages.

Mr. WHITFIELD. At any of the other locations, have you found

traces of plutonium at a level——

Mr. VOLPE. Not with our automatic samplers.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay. Dr. Michaels, it’s my understanding that

there is some new technology now in which you are able to detect

lung cancer by using CAT scans. As we go into this monitoring program—and I know that dollars are an important part of that—I

would urge the Department and I would like to work with you to

see if we can include this CAT scan screen as a part of this monitoring process. I hope that you all would work with us at least in

exploring that.

Mr. MICHAELS. Yes, sir. It’s certainly one of the things under consideration right now. We would be pleased to work with you.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, I want to thank all of you. This has been

a complex subject and I thank the staff for the tremendous job in

the short period of time in putting this all together. As you know,

there may be follow-up hearings on this on the House side. We

know there will be on the Senate side. And we will be following up

with some questions for you to answer as well. But thank you for

your time. Thank you for coming up here. And we look forward to

working with you and solving the problem. Thank you. The hearing

is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]

RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD OF RICHARD D. GREEN, DIRECTOR, WASTE MANAGE- MENT DIVISION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 4, ATLANTA

GEORGIA

Question 1. Based on current institutional controls at the Paducah gaseous Diffusion Plant (Paducah), are visitors, workers and residents surrounding the Paducah

site adequately protected from radiological and chemical releases from the Paducah

site?

Response: The protection of area residents and visitors to the perimeter of the facility, until such time as remedial actions for past releases are completed, is in part

accomplished by access restrictions and postings of warning signs. These postings

have been improved and expanded since September 1999, but cannot provide a level

of protection equivalent to removal of the source of the hazard. Threats to residents

from drinking water contamination have been controlled by requiring the Department of Energy (DOE) to provide clean water to residents in the area of the DOE’s

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groundwater releases. Institutional controls on withdrawal of contaminated groundwater are currently adequate to protect residents. All such institutional controls will

be regularly reviewed by the EPA, the Commonwealth of Kentucky (KY) and the

DOE for adequacy.

Worker safety and the protection of visitors within the perimeter of the facility

is the responsibility of the DOE for non-production areas and of USEC for areas

leased from DOE for the production of enriched uranium.

Question 2. During its recent Phase I investigation at the Paducah site, the Department of Energy (DOE) sampled environmental media for chemical and radiological analysis. Did DOE plan this sampling effort with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or share these data with EPA in a timely fashion?

Response. DOE did not plan this sampling effort with the EPA, nor did DOE submit the standard pre-investigation work plan to EPA. EPA received a copy of this

report just prior to its public release. After the September 22, 1999 hearing held

by the House Commerce Committee, EPA requested sampling results from the investigation team. Upon Completion of the analysis of most samples and the assessment of the data by the investigation team, sampling data was provided to EPA Region IV by the State of Kentucky staff on October 8, 1999. An EPA project manager

was briefed on the final results of the investigation on October 14, and the investigation report was published formally on October 20. EPA has contacted Dr. David

Michaels and Dr. David Stadler, of DOE’s Environmental, Safety and Health Office

of Oversight, who have pledged full cooperation with EPA in any subsequent work

they undertake at the Paducah facility.

Question 3. Please explain why plutonium contamination in offsite sediments was

not identified in the Executive Summary of the DOE report ‘‘Phase I Results of the

Site Investigation, March 22, 1991.’’

Response. This Report was prepared as required by EPA’s consent order, and was

reviewed and approved by the Agency. The Executive Summary noted those contaminants that were determined by risk assessment to pose the principal threat to

human health and the environment. Because the risk assessment of offsite contamination was based on a recreational rather than a residential exposure scenario, plutonium was not a principal threat contaminant. Therefore, it was not included in

the Executive Summary. Its presence was included in the text of the Report.

Question 4. At the hearing, DOE indicated that areas offsite have been identified

with radiological contamination high enough to require sampling technicians wear

protective clothing. Why have these contaminated areas remained uncontrolled for

public access? Are there other areas offsite with similar amounts of contamination

that are also uncontrolled?

Response. The area in question is one of the outfall ditches at the boundary of

the fenced perimeter of the facility. The area is known to be contaminated and was

posted with warning signs prior to the investigation. Other areas offsite that are

contaminated are also posted with seaming signs, primarily along Big and Little

Bayou Creeks. If DOE had submitted a work plan before the sampling, EPA would

have informed them of the need for adequate worker protection measures in these

areas. Postings in the areas in question have been expanded since the hearing, and

were inspected by personnel from EPA on November 10, 1999. DOE is reviewing the

adequacy of its postings at all areas of contamination, and EPA is participating in

that effort.

Question 5. Please describe how the public around Paducah could be impacted

from contaminated surface waterways around Paducah.

Response. The public may be exposed to contaminated surface waterways through

recreational uses, such as fishing and swimming, of Big and Little Bayou Creeks.

Risk assessment based on such recreational use assumes frequent use over a long

period of time. Fish have been found to be contaminated with levels of PCB’s that

are not safe for human consumption, and those areas of the Creeks have been posted with advisories against such consumption.

Question 6. In light of DOE’s recent findings, please describe what efforts the EPA

is taking to fully characterize offsite contamination and ensure the public is adequately protected from offsite releases.

Response. The Agency sponsored a meeting on November 8-10, 1999 with DOE,

KY and site contractor Bechtel-Jacobs to set priorities for response actions in FY

2000, 2001 and 2002. Removal or control of known areas of offsite contamination

was set as a priority for DOE. Investigation of any reports of further offsite contamination was set as a priority for all participants. EPA has inspected the DOE postings at areas of known offsite contamination for adequacy, and will require further

postings if necessary. Each participating agency is represented on a work group that

will prepare a site management plan to remediate all areas of contamination by

2010. This Site Management Plan will be used in developing DOE’s annual budget

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1 Now, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. (LMES). Hereafter, I will refer to the company

as MMES/LMES.

submittal for cleanup of Paducah as required by the Federal Facilities Agreement.

All participants agreed to streamline their procedures for documenting, submitting

and approving response actions while still allowing full participation by the public.

Question 7. Why has DOE failed to adequately assess sediments, soils, surface

water, and other environmental media in areas outside the security fence to ensure

public safety in these areas?

Response. Priorities for response at Paducah have been balanced between assessment and response to known hazards within a constrained budget. Highest priority

has been set on groundwater contamination beneath the facility and within the

Water Policy Area and removal of the areas of highest soil/sediment contamination

onsite to prevent further offsite migration of contamination.

Question 8. Please list and describe any enforcement actions EPA has taken

against the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) for non-compliance with

environmental regulations.

Response. The Commonwealth of Kentucky is fully authorized to implement environmental programs in lieu of EPA. EPA is not aware of violations of permits by

and has thus not taken enforcement action against the USEC.

Question 9. What efforts are currently underway to control ‘‘hot spots’’ contributing to groundwater contamination around Paducah. Specifically, please include a

description of your efforts to remove TCE stored in the C-400 building. Please also

identify any proven technologies that may address the problem more effective[ly].

Response. Trichloroethene (TCE) is not stored in the C-400 building to the best

of EPA’s knowledge. Releases and spills within the building in the past have resulted in TCE contamination underneath the building. In response to EPA’s order,

two groundwater withdrawal systems are in place within the on-site hot spots to

recover TCE. DOE, KY and EPA are participating in a panel to evaluate innovative

technologies and test them on-site, particularly to address ‘‘deep’’ contamination of

geologic strata with TCE. Deployment of these and other technologies, such as iron

filing ‘‘gates’’ to remove TCE as groundwater flows through them, are a high priority

for FY 2000 and 2001 at the facility.

RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD OF JOHN J. HUMMER, DIRECTOR OF CORPORATE

ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP.

Question No. 1: Please explain why plutonium contamination in offsite sediments

was not identified in the Executive Summary of the Department of Energy (DOE)

report ‘‘Phase I Results of the Site Investigation, March 22, 1991.’’

Response: The report entitled ‘‘Results of the Site Investigation, Phase I’’ at the

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant was prepared by CH2M Hill in accordance with

the August 1988 Consent Order between the United States Department of Energy

(DOE) and the United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region IV

(USEPA), and pursuant to a contract with Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.

(MMES).1 Environmental sampling, laboratory analysis, and reporting of test results were performed by and/or on behalf of CH2M Hill. MMES, DOE, USEPA, and

the Commonwealth of Kentucky were given the opportunity to comment on the draft

report. To my knowledge, the report provides an accurate summation of CH2M

Hill’s findings and the Executive Summary highlights issues considered significant

by CH2M Hill. CH2M Hill has responded to a number of questions from Congressman Bliley about the information in the Report and its Summary, and I have nothing to add to their response.

Question No. 2: According to the October 1999 Phase I Independent Investigation

report, DOE identified radioactive ‘‘black ooze’’ in areas close to offsite landfills that

were not permitted for radioactive wastes. These offsite residential and sanitary

landfills were managed by Martin Marietta pursuant to its contract responsibilities

with DOE.

a. Did Martin Marietta at any time dispose of radioactive wastes at offsite landfills, including the C-746-S residential landfill and the C-746-T industrial landfill?

b. Did Martin Marietta know that DOE Orders require that radioactive waste

only be disposed of at licensed facilities?

c. Did anyone from DOE ever approve the disposal of radioactive wastes in facilities not licensed for such wastes?

Response: Both the ‘‘black ooze’’ described in the DOE Phase I Independent Investigation and the C-746-S landfill to which it is adjacent are on the DOE property,

and it is my understanding that they are considered onsite for purposes of CERCLA

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2 Although the C-746-5 landfill is referred to as ‘‘residential,’’ this is probably because it was

used for sanitary wastes. The landfill is on DOE property and to my knowledge has only been

used for DOE wastes.

cleanup and for state permitting purposes. MMES/LMES was not operating the Paducah facility at the time the so-called ‘‘black ooze’’ was discovered. It is my understanding, however, that the ‘‘black ooze’’ may have emanated from certain roofing

materials which were used as fill for a drainage ditch relocation project, prior to

MMES assuming responsibility in 1984. I do not know the extent to which DOE approved and/or participated in the disposal of such materials. With regard to the specific questions above, I offer the following responses:

a. I have no information indicating that radioactive wastes (meaning wastes with

radioactive contaminants above limits allowed by DOE) were placed in either the

C-746-S residential 2 landfill or the C-746-T industrial landfill. The C-746-S and C746-T landfills were managed by MMES/LMES from 1984 until their closure in 1992

and 1995. The landfills are located onsite—meaning that they are on DOE property.

As far as I know, these landfills were operated by MMES/LMES in accordance with

state requirements.

b. MMES/LMES was certainly familiar with the DOE orders that were applicable

to it through its contract with DOE. Further, my understanding is that DOE requires that the disposal of any radioactive waste, as defined by DOE, at a location

that is off DOE property must conform to applicable state and federal regulations.

c. I am not aware of any DOE approval to dispose of radioactive waste off DOE

property at facilities not licensed for such waste.

Question No. 3: According to the internal Environmental Compliance Audit Report

by Martin Marietta dated October 1992—and discussed at the hearing—Martin

Marietta auditors found ‘‘the NEPA program is heading in the right direction, but

all programs have not been implemented to keep projects/activities from not getting

proper NEPA review... some projects have been initiated without NEPA review.’’

However, Martin Marietta informed DOE in its 1992 Paducah Environmental Report ‘‘compliance with NEPA is maintained by following guidelines set forth by the

CEQ, DOE, and Energy Systems.’’ Please explain why Martin Marietta reported to

DOE it was in compliance with NEPA requirements in 1992 if Martin Marietta

auditors found projects ‘‘initiated without NEPA review.’’

Response: Based upon my review of the relevant environmental report and audit

report to answer this question, the statement regarding NEPA compliance presented

on page xvi of the 1992 Paducah Environmental Monitoring Report appears to be

a general program description of the guidelines used to implement NEPA requirements. It was not intended to be a statement of compliance status. The audit report

to which you refer was an observation regarding weaknesses in implementation of

the internal NEPA review procedure, which, if not corrected, could have resulted in

failure to review a project or activity. It was not a finding of non-compliance with

NEPA.

Question No. 4: Was the health physics program in place at the time Martin Marietta and later Lockheed Martin were operating the Paducah site fully adequate? Did

the health physics program provide workers the type of protection required by as

low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) standards?

Response: It is my understanding that the health physics program in place when

MMES took over the management of the Paducah facility in 1984 was considered

adequate under the DOE expectations at that time. As DOE expectations changed,

the health physics program underwent changes to bring it into conformance with

changing expectations. However, based on the information that was available to

MMES, the health physics program was fully adequate to maintain radiation exposures well below established limits.

It is also my understanding that the radiation doses at Paducah were historically

low in comparison to other facilities within the DOE complex. As a result, the

ALARA program at Paducah at the time MMES took over the facility management

was considered consistent with that expected for a low dose facility. However, when

the DOE expectations changed, the ALARA program also changed.

Your question about the health physics program providing the type of protection

required by ‘‘ALARA standards’’ suggests that specific standards are associated with

the ALARA principle. To my knowledge, ALARA does not set standards, rather it

is a principle: to maintain radiation doses as low as reasonably achievable. Thus no

specific standards are associated with ALARA. It is up to an organization implementing ALARA to identify sources of radiation in their facilities, determine the

reasonably achievable methods to limit the radiation exposure to workers from those

sources, then implement those methods. Continuous review and improvement are

implicit in implementing ALARA. As described in the preamble to 10 CFR Part 83

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5, DOE does not intend to establish ALARA as a duty of care for purposes of tort

litigation.

Question No. 5: Did ALARA protections extend to eating areas within the plant?

Were employees routinely monitored for contamination before they were allowed to

enter eating areas? Were the eating areas routinely monitored?

Response: As the ALARA principle was introduced into DOE directives, it was implemented at all areas in the Paducah plant. Again, radiological control requirements and practices instituted to keep radiation doses ALARA evolved with time.

At one time, hygiene practices (i.e., handwashing, showering, changing clothes) were

thought to be sufficient to minimize the spread of contamination. When DOE established requirements to monitor employees leaving potentially contaminated work

areas, those requirements were implemented over time at the Paducah plant as

funding and resources allowed. Associated with this action, workplace monitoring,

to include eating areas, was increased to ensure that contamination was not being

spread from radiological areas into non-radiological areas.

Question No. 6: Did Martin Marietta keep full and adequate records of the individual exposure of every plant worker for whom such records are required?

Response: To my knowledge, MMES/LMES generated and maintained the necessary records for those employees for whom monitoring was required by DOE during the time MMES/LMES managed the Paducah facility.

Question No. 7: Please describe the monitoring system Martin Marietta and later

Lockheed Martin had in place to detect contamination on people and vehicles leaving the Paducah site?

Response: The monitoring activities to detect external contamination on people

and vehicles evolved during the time MMES/LMES managed the Paducah facility.

To my knowledge, little monitoring to detect external contamination was done when

MMES began managing the facility. Over time, as part of the upgrades to the site

contamination control program, more monitoring for external contamination was

done. Vehicles were characterized to determine their radiological status. Vehicles

with loose contamination were supposed to be removed from service and decontaminated prior to returning to service. Once the initial characterization was complete,

a routine monitoring program was established consistent with the potential for becoming contaminated, and contaminated vehicles were marked to facilitate control.

Once a routine monitoring history was established, along with increased contamination control at the source, the marking was stopped. The monitoring program for

items, material, and equipment/vehicles being released from radiological areas became the primary method for ensuring that no contamination was being spread to

non-radiological areas.

As stated in an earlier response, the radiological control program evolved so that

those employees in areas where contamination could be present were monitored before leaving the potentially contaminated work area. I am not aware of any monitoring of individuals upon leaving the facility.

Question No. 8: Was Martin Marietta and/or Lockheed Martin cited for health and

safety violations while operating the production and environmental programs at the

Paducah plant?

Response: Lockheed Martin Utility Services, Inc. (LMUS) was cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for health and safety violations

while operating the production programs at Paducah. MMES/LMES were not subject to OSHA regulation, and thus not subject to OSHA citation.

Question No. 9: When did Martin Marietta know that transuranics were contained

in the recycled spent nuclear fuel sent to Paducah from Hanford and the Savannah

River Plant?

Response: I have no reason to believe, and consider it unlikely, that DOE or the

prior contractor provided information to MMES during the 1984 contract transition

that transuranics were contained in the recycled spent nuclear fuel returns. I also

have no reason to believe, and consider it even more unlikely, that this type of information was given to potential bidders for the contract at the time the request for

proposals was issued back in the 1980s. Given the information I have seen since

the transuranic issue was raised in these proceedings, the presence of transuranics

was clearly known to the managing contractor and DOE employees when the materials were sent to Paducah in the 1950’s and in the years that followed. By the time

MMES took over the management of the site in 1984, the shipments had ceased,

and a facility upgrade had been finished which was thought to have removed most

of the transuranics from the processes. Most of the employees of the prior contractor

transferred to MMES, with some either retaining or assuming management positions with MMES. In addition, in 1985, DOE produced a Report Of The Joint Task

Force On Uranium Recycle Materials Processing, which discusses the presence of

transuranics at Paducah, as well as at other DOE facilities. One MMES employee

413

was a Task Force member, and MMES was on distribution for that report. Thus,

MMES probably knew in 1984 and certainly knew in 1985 that trace transuranics

had been contained in the spent nuclear fuel processed in the Paducah plant years

earlier.

VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP

December 14, 1999

Mr. DWIGHT CATES

Investigator

U.S. House Commerce Committee

316 Ford House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

DEAR MR. CATES: I am writing in response to your recent inquiry seeking clarification regarding Jay Hummer’s letter of November 22, 1999 to Chairman Upton.

We have reviewed the responses in the letter carefully and can verify, as I indicated when we first spoke, that Mr. Hummer answered the Chairman’s questions

both individually and in his capacity as a representative of Lockheed Martin Corporation, and past and present affiliated corporations, which had responsibilities at

the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The responses, therefore, also represent the

knowledge Lockheed Martin has to date on the matters in question, but as you

know, Lockheed Martin is currently engaged in an ongoing process of investigating

the issues. Nevertheless, we have tried to provide you with answers that are as complete and responsive as possible at this time.

I hope this adequately responds to your concerns. Please do not hesitate to contact

me at your earliest convenience if you should have any questions. Until then, I remain,

Very truly yours,

RICHARD J. LEON

RESPONSES OF JOSEPH F. NEMEC, PRESIDENT, BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY, LLC, TO

QUESTIONS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Question 1. According to the Department of Energy (DOE) Phase I Independent

Investigation at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (independent investigation),

there is an ‘‘absence of DOE or Bechtel Jacobs oversight of radiological work practices.’’ Why has there been an absence of Bechtel Jacobs oversight at Paducah?

Response. Bechtel Jacobs provides oversight to work activities at Paducah. This

is accomplished by our line managers, subcontractor technical representatives, safety advocates, as well as independent oversight by Performance and Quality Assurance, and Environment, Safety, and Health. In the M&I approach, oversight is expected and enhanced by each subcontractor’s responsibilities for oversight of their

work activities. This combination provides a defense in-depth approach to oversight

and managing safety activities for work planning and performance.

The Bechtel Jacobs Company Management and Integration (M&I) contract requires us to perform the majority of work utilizing subcontractors. It also dictates

that we ‘‘flow down’’ DOE requirements to our subcontractors, including provisions

for them to be responsible for complying with those requirements, including self-assessment and oversight. Accordingly, oversight of work practices is accomplished by

both Bechtel Jacobs staff, as well as subcontractor Environment, Safety, and Health

(ES&H) staff. In addition, we are implementing, as required by contract, our Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS). The ISMS places more emphasis on ‘‘up

front’’ worker involvement in planning and hazard analysis. This approach builds

in safe work practices to the planning process by those performing the work and

reduces reliance on ‘‘back end’’ oversight to ensure compliance.

Collectively, the increased responsibility of subcontractors for performing their

own oversight, the implementation of ISMS, and oversight of the subcontractors by

the Bechtel Jacobs Company provides equivalent oversight when compared to a selfperformance management approach. Bechtel Jacobs Company is committed to providing the appropriate level of oversight to our subcontractors and ensuring that

they, in turn, are living up to their responsibilities and contractual obligations to

perform their own measure of oversight for all ES&H areas.

Question 2. According to the independent investigation, ‘‘Bechtel Jacobs radiological work permits (RWP) lack information required by procedure to control radiological work effectively.’’ Please explain why Bechtel Jacobs RWPs lack adequate

safety information.

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Response. The RWPs referred to were originally designed to be generic in nature

to support routine work. Bechtel Jacobs Company has implemented appropriate action to ensure that the procedure governing RWPs is followed rigorously. We have

already undertaken the following actions:

All RWPs identify the training requirements to enter the area as required by procedure. Radiological survey data are attached to the permit, or the permit identifies

where the data are located.

Job specific RWPs are based on the work to be performed, the contaminants and

levels of contaminants, and existing data. Work scope is provided to the health

physics department by the task lead. This information is reviewed by the health

physics dosimetry group and RCT supervisors during a pre-job as low as reasonably

achievable (ALARA) review. Information from the pre-job ALARA review is used to

develop the RWP. This information is reviewed with the RCT by the RCT supervisor. Information on the RWP is reviewed by the work crew during a pre-job briefing. All workers must sign the RWP prior to entering the work location.

Question 3. According to the independent investigation, a Bechtel Jacobs employee

received a 24 mrem dose in 35 days at the cylinder yard. Why are Bechtel Jacobs

dose rate measurements two to three times lower than the dose rate measurements

the investigation team has observed in the cylinder yard?

Response. The cylinder yard is a large area, approximately 4.5 acres. Based on

this work activity, a worker normally receives an exposure typical of the average

from the entire yard. The dose rate readings collected by the independent investigation team were obtained in areas with higher dose rates. Subsequent to the investigation teams survey, the Bechtel Jacobs Company performed a study consisting of

54 measurements taken systematically at grid points over the entire cylinder yard.

The Bechtel Jacobs measurements in the higher dose rate areas were similar to

those taken in the same areas by the investigation team and in the April 1999 Bechtel Jacobs Company measurements taken prior to the job. The Bechtel Jacobs measurements in their totality are representative of the average dose rate on the entire

yard and are therefore representative of the exposure conditions for workers. Despite these facts, the degree of conservatism applied in this case was not consistent

with my expectations. As a result, additional controls will be established to require

an independent review by our Environment, Safety, and Health manger or designee

whenever radiation exposure rates could result in a worker exceeding the approved

monitoring threshold in 10 CFR 835, regardless of the duration of the job.

Question 4. According to the independent investigation, ‘‘Bechtel Jacobs cannot

adequately demonstrate that the unconditional release of equipment from the site

is consistent with DOE requirements.’’ Why is Bechtel Jacobs unable to demonstrate

unconditional release of equipment consistent with DOE requirements?

Response. Bechtel Jacobs Company has an established program for unconditional

release of excess equipment and materials including technical basis and guidance

that is rigorous, detailed, and complies with DOE requirements. The Bechtel Jacobs

Company program requires a Survey and Release Plan to be prepared for equipment

release. The Survey and Release Plans are used to document how material is surveyed for unconditional release to demonstrate consistency with DOE requirements.

The independent investigation report noted this on page 38: ‘‘While Bechtel Jacobs

does have a procedure for unrestricted release of equipment, they did not apply it

during the process of releasing the fluorine cells.’’ What the independent review

team found was that the required plan for the release of the fluorine cells was not

prepared in accordance with the unconditional release procedure and all approvals

for release were not obtained.

Radiation surveys were performed by Bechtel Jacobs Company on the fluorine

cells and samples of the solution in the cells were collected and analyzed. The results of the radiation surveys demonstrated that the DOE requirements and appropriate release limits (uranium versus transuranic) were used. The results of samples

of the solution in the cells were used to demonstrate that the exposure to the solution would not be harmful to health or the environment. DOE approval from the

Paducah Site Office was obtained for the release, however, DOE Headquarters approval was not obtained in accordance with requirements. Line management has

been directed that an additional independent review will be conducted prior to unconditional release of excess equipment and materials to ensure required Survey

and Release Plans and all required approvals have been completed in accordance

with requirements.

Question 5. The independent investigation found several problems with subcontractor safety practices. How will Bechtel Jacobs correct these deficiencies?

Response. The Bechtel Jacobs Company subcontract language in Exhibit G—Environment, Safety and Health, holds the subcontractors fully accountable for ES&H

and DOE requirements. Prior to commencement of work, all subcontractors are reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:55 Sep 14, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00418 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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quired to prepare and submit a comprehensive ES&H plan that includes a crosswalk of all activities in the subcontract to the DOE requirements in the Bechtel Jacobs Company prime contract and applicable environmental regulations. We agree

that in a number of instances, some procedures have not been followed by subcontractors. Bechtel Jacobs Company has filed occurrence reports indicating that we

have been vigilant in overseeing subcontractor work and in self-reporting. Further,

there have been several follow-up formal and informal discussions with the involved

subcontractors’ senior management to reinforce the importance Bechtel Jacobs

places on ES&H compliance and the safety of all workers. We have clearly communicated to our subcontractors that poor performance in the ES&H arena is grounds

for termination.

The Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC Management and Integration (M&I) contract

requires implementation of an Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS). Bechtel Jacobs Company has implemented the system and provided a description of the

process in BJC/OR-87, Revision 2, Integrated Safety Management System Description, September 1999. A further definition of the flow-down of requirements to the

work execution level, including subcontractors, is discussed in the BJC/OR-146, Revision 1, Integrated Safety Management System Supplement, July 1999. As mandated by regulation, we have placed the responsibility for the safety and health of

their employees directly on subcontractors and will maintain an oversight role to ensure compliance. The requirement to include qualified ES&H staff as part of the

subcontractor project team is included in our Exhibit G subcontract language. Subcontractors may adopt our health and safety plan or work to their own equivalent

plan. All subcontractors work to the Bechtel Jacobs Company Radiation Protection

Plan. Oversight, including the use of radiation control technicians under contract to

Bechtel Jacobs Company, is an integral part of the Radiation Protection Program.

The ISMS process defines the oversight role of the Bechtel Jacobs Company Subcontract Technical Representative (STR), the Safety Advocate, and the Bechtel Jacobs project team ES&H members. These personnel work directly to review subcontractor programs and performance and provide feedback and direction. The STR provides day-to-day direction to subcontractors and ensures that they comply with all

of the terms and conditions of their subcontracts, including requirements for ES&H

performance. The Safety Advocate function was specifically created by Bechtel Jacobs Company to assist our subcontractors in understanding and implementing DOE

ES&H requirements. The Safety Advocate provides an additional ‘‘set of eyes’’ on

subcontractor safety performance and augments the presence of the Bechtel Jacobs

Company ES&H subject matter experts who provide project-specific oversight working with subcontractor ES&H personnel.

In addition, we implemented on November 1, 1999, additional awareness training

for our Safety Advocates to enhance their knowledge of radiation safety, environmental protection, industrial hygiene, and industrial safety. This training will be

completed at Paducah by December 31, 1999.

Question 6. To date, has Bechtel Jacobs been cited for any violations of DOE orders or regulations governing health and safety at the Paducah plant?

Response. No.

Question 7. You currently provide radiation exposure data to employees only once

a year. During the stand-down, those employees indicated that they wanted to receive the data more often. Have you agreed to their requests?

Response. Yes. Bechtel Jacobs Company will develop and implement a communications initiative to provide more frequent exposure data to employees and subcontractors.

RESPONSES OF JAMES H. MILLER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, USEC, INC., TO

QUESTIONS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Question 1. Please describe the current status of each outstanding issue with respect to the United States Enrichment Corporation’s (USEC) Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) Compliance Plan for the Paducah site (Compliance Plan).

a) Please identify the original completion date for each outstanding issue in the

Compliance Plan.

b) For those outstanding issues that have missed the original completion date,

please provide an explanation of why a delay has occurred, as well as an explanation of when each outstanding issue will be completed

Response. The NRC issued the initial Certificate of Compliance (Rev. 0 of GDP1) for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in September 1996 and assumed regulatory oversight of PGDP in March 1997. In connection with the initial

certification, NRC approved Revision 3A of the Compliance Plan, dated August 1,

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1996 that was prepared by the Department of Energy. The Compliance Plan identified 57 issues that required actions to bring PGDP into full compliance with NRC

regulations, established a plan of action and schedule for completion and established

the parameters for continued operation until the actions were completed. To date,

actions have been completed for 51 of the 57 issues identified in the Compliance

Plan. The following provides the information requested for the six outstanding

issues:

Issue 2—Upgrade the Application Safety Analysis Report

Original Completion Date: August 17, 1997

Current Approved Completion Date: August 17, 1997

Status: On February 14, 1997 DOE provided USEC with the updated safety analysis report. On August 18, 1997 USEC provided a portion of the information required by Issue 2 to the NRC and submitted the remainder by October 31, 1997.

NRC review has been ongoing since that time.

Reason for Delay: The two month delay in USEC’s submittal to NRC was due to

the unanticipated complexity involved in the review of DOE’s updated safety analysis report. This Issue will remain open until NRC review is completed.

Issue 8—Exceptions for Criticality Accident Alarm System

Original Completion Date: Submitted on April 9, 1996 prior to approval of Compliance Plan

Current Approved Completion Date: Not Applicable

Status: USEC has provided criticality accident alarm coverage in all areas of the

plant required by NRC regulations to have such coverage. Prior to approval of the

Compliance Plan, USEC submitted technical analyses required by the Compliance

Plan to demonstrate that areas identified in the Compliance Plan do not require

criticality alarm coverage. NRC review has been ongoing since that time. This Issue

will remain open until NRC review is completed.

Reason for Delay: Not Applicable

Issue 27—Procedures Program

Original Completion Date: March 3, 2002

Current Approved Completion Date: March 3, 2002

Status: USEC has completed all actions for this Issue except for the action which

requires that the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) complete a review of

all In-Hand and liquid UF6 handling procedures within 5 years from the date that

the NRC assumed regulatory authority for PGDP (March 3, 1997). This action is on

schedule to be complete prior to that date.

Reason for Delay: Not Applicable

Issue 36—Seismic Capability of Buildings C-331 and C-335

Original Completion Date: December 31, 1997

Current Approved Completion Date: June 30, 1999

Status: USEC submitted a certificate amendment request in January 1999 to request an extension of the completion date until June 30, 2000. Although NRC has

not yet approved this extension, they did issue a Notice of Enforcement Discretion

on June 30, 1999 which permits USEC to continue plant operations until such time

as they complete their review and issue a certificate amendment. More recently,

USEC, DOE and NRC met to discuss the issue of removing material from certain

DOE Material Storage Areas (DMSAs) to support completion of the seismic modifications in those areas. USEC is currently on schedule to have all the seismic modifications completed by June 30, 2000 except for those DMSAs which have not been

cleared sufficiently to allow work to be completed. USEC has informed NRC that

additional time past June 30, 2000 will be necessary to complete the seismic modifications in areas affected by the DMSA issue. USEC, DOE and NRC are currently

examining this issue and USEC hopes it will be resolved shortly

Reason for Delay: The Seismic Upgrade Project is a large scale steel construction

project. The overall project involves 723 steel installation locations, 2,530 tons of

steel, and 12,000 individual steel pieces. In order to install this steel, the demolition

of 4,000 pieces of steel are required. Initially, three Unreviewed Safety Questions

associated with the installation of the proposed modifications were identified, which

required NRC review and approval prior to beginning actual construction work.

Once work was begun in the buildings, additional factors delayed the project. The

temperatures inside the cascade buildings had a greater impact on worker productivity than initially projected. In addition, the process of removing the existing concrete and steel in preparation for the installation of the new steel bracing was much

more labor intensive than expected. Further, the original design did not identify all

of the interferences with existing equipment which needed to be relocated or reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:55 Sep 14, 2000 Jkt 062464 PO 00000 Frm 00420 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\61428 pfrm04 PsN: 61428
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solved. Finally, it has taken much longer than expected to begin removal of material

from the DMSA locations which must be cleared in order for the modifications to

be completed.

Issue 46—Criticality Accident Alarm System—Horn Audibility and Issue 50—Criticality Accident Alarms for Nearby Buildings

Original Completion Date: December 15, 1998

Current Approved Completion Date: January 18, 2000

Status: This project is on schedule to meet the current approved completion date.

The upgraded CAAS system has already been placed into operation in several facilities on site.

Reason for Delay: The conceptual design to satisfy the requirements of these Compliance Plan actions originally required installation of additional air powered CAAS

horns and upgrading the existing air system to supply the air necessary to power

these additional horns. During the detailed design process, further reliance on the

existing plant air system to support the CAAS system was determined to be undesirable. As a result, a new system was designed to improve CAAS horn reliability

by providing a dedicated air system and air accumulators to supply the new CAAS

horns. To enhance reliability of the sitewide CAAS system, this same concept is

being applied to all CAAS air horns on site. The change in design and increase in

scope required a delay of approximately one year to complete the entire upgrade but

will result in an improved system.

Question 2. Please explain why DOE material storage areas at Paducah have not

been characterized, analyzed or resolved even through they were identified more

than two years ago.

Response. DOE is responsible for characterizing, analyzing or resolving the DOE

material storage areas (DMSAs) at Paducah. USEC has limited responsibilities with

respect to the DMSAs as set forth in the agreement, ‘‘USEC and DOE Agreement

for DOE Material Storage at the Gaseous Diffusion Plants’’ which was signed by

DOE and USEC in May 1996. This agreement specifies that, to the extent required

by NRC, USEC will perform the following tasks: (1) visually inspect process equipment to identify enriched uranium deposits, (2) segregate equipment containing

such deposits, (3) establish and maintain DMSA boundaries and signage, and (4)

maintain necessary documentation concerning such activities. USEC has met its responsibilities to the extent permitted by DOE. Because of an unreviewed safety

question (USQ) raised by DOE’s subcontractors in early 1997, access to the DMSAs

for further visual inspections has not been permitted until the USQ is resolved by

DOE.

In addition, as requested by DOE, USEC performs services for DOE on a reimbursement basis. DOE from time to time has requested USEC to perform some services in connection with the DMSAs. In order for DOE to resolve the USQ and safely

remediate the DMSA areas, the appropriate Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation

(NCSE) and associated procedures required development. USEC began this work for

DOE early in January 1998. NCSE development was a complex effort requiring significant engineering development work. This NCSE to support DOE DMSA work

was completed and delivered to BJC in November 1998. DOE/BJC Readiness Assessment Team Approval was received in May 1999. DOE/BJC are responsible for

scheduling the remaining work to address the DMSAs.

Question 2 (continued) Please explain what schedule or cost impacts may occur

with USEC’s effort to complete seismic upgrades at Paducah due to DOE’S failure

to characterized, analyze, and resolve DOE material storage areas.

Response. The Seismic Upgrade Project is a large scale steel construction project.

The overall project involves 723 steel installation locations, 2,530 tons of steel, and

12,000 individual steel pieces. In order to install this steel, the demolition of 4,000

pieces of steel are required. Total project cost will be on the order of $70 million.

The Seismic project has been planned and scheduled in an assembly line fashion

to gain efficiency and maintain project control of the contractor. The DMSA delays

have caused the Seismic project to ‘‘skip’’ locations. These ‘‘skipped’’ locations have

been added to the end of the project schedule due to uncertainty as to when the

DMSA areas would be free of DOE material to allow construction work to occur. The

‘‘skipping’’ of locations requires rescheduling, duplication of Health Physics surveys,

duplication of welding and burning permits, scaffolding construction, etc. In addition, working skipped locations later in the scheduling is far less efficient due to

the loss of assembly line construction techniques.

The current estimate as to the cost impact of these delays is approximately $11

million. The current estimate as to the schedule impacts of these delays is approximately 3 months. These estimates were formulated prior to the most recent DOE

concern with criticality safety and therefore are likely to change. Schedule revisions

418

are in process to determine the optimum integration of seismic work and required

DMSA work. The goal is to complete Seismic work in the shortest period of time.

An important decision point will occur in February 2000. Up until this point,

other Seismic construction work will be available for USEC’s contractor. Beginning

in February 2000, if the DMSA areas are not available for work, initial demobilization of the contractor work force (approx. 25% to 50%) would begin. Remobilization

of this skilled work force (i.e., hiring, training, clearances, etc) would add significantly to the DMSA schedule and costs.

Question 3. Is USEC responsible for funding the characterization and movement

of DOE material storage areas? If so, what is the estimated cost of this effort, and

how will USEC provide the necessary funds to complete characterization in a timely

manner?

Response. No, USEC is not responsible for funding the characterization and movement of DOE material storage areas (DMSAs). DOE and USEC responsibilities are

described in an agreement, ‘‘USEC and DOE Agreement for DOE Material Storage

at the Gaseous Diffusion Plants’’ was signed by DOE and USEC on May 28, 1996.

DOE is responsible for ensuring that DMSAs are maintained in accordance with

DOE requirements. This agreement specifies that, to the extent required by NRC,

USEC will perform the following tasks: (1) visually inspect process equipment to

identify enriched uranium deposits, (2) segregate equipment containing such deposits, (3) establish and maintain DMSA boundaries and signage, and (4) maintain necessary documentation concerning such activities. USEC has met its responsibilities

to the extent permitted by DOE. Because of an unreviewed safety question (USQ)

raised by DOE’s subcontractors in early 1997, access to the DMSAs for further visual inspections has not been permitted until the USQ is resolved by DOE. In addition, as requested by DOE, USEC provides services to DOE on a reimbursable basis.

DOE has from time to time requested services from USEC in connection with the

DMSAs. USEC has performed these services as requested.

Question 4. According to testimony provided by Mr. Key, USEC’s training manuals for employees make no reference to plutonium and neptunium in the workplace.

Is this true, and, if so, why is there no such reference?

Response. Formal training modules regarding transuranics were developed and

presented to the site personnel in 1992. The training was not, however, incorporated

into the new employee training and the continuing training for site personnel until

1999. The training did address the hazards associated with exposure to radioactive

material and the precautions and procedures to minimize exposure to radioactive

materials as required by 10 CFR 19.12, Instructions to Workers. The activity levels

of transuranics in the work place are below the thresholds requiring their inclusion

in radiation exposure assignment. Never-the-less, the current site training programs

have been revised to include transuranics.

Question 5. Will the delay in completing seismic upgrades cause a delay with

USEC’s request to NRC to increase uranium enrichment assay levels at Paducah

from 2.75 percent to 5 percent?

Response. No. The increase in enrichment assay level to 5 percent at PGDP can

be accomplished independent of completing the seismic upgrade. In a meeting with

the NRC on August 3, 1999, USEC informed the NRC of its plan to request an increase to the authorized assay limit at PGDP in early-2000. USEC has developed

a detailed project plan and currently intends to submit a Certificate Amendment Request (CAR) to increase the assay limit at PGDP by May 2000. NRC must approve

the CAR prior to USEC implementing changes in operations to support higher assay

production.

RESPONSES OF ROBERT W. LOGAN, COMMISSIONER, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO QUESTIONS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND INVESTIGATIONS

Question 1. At the hearing, DOE indicated that areas offsite had been identified

with radiological contamination high enough to require sampling technicians wear

protective clothing. Why have these contaminated areas remained uncontrolled for

public access? Are there other areas offsite with similar amounts of contamination

that are also unposted?

Response: As a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Agreement State, Kentucky’s

posting requirements can be found in 902 KAR 100:019, Sections 23, 24 and 25. In

addition, Radiation Dose Limits for Individual Members of the Public (902 KAR

100:019, Section 10), and Compliance with Dose Limits for Individual Members of

the Public (902 KAR 100:019, Section 11) are identical to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission regulations.

419

Kentucky has a Field Sampling and Analysis Plan (FSAP) for Environmental

Monitoring Activities which includes a Health and Safety Plan and a Quality Assurance Program Plan.

All Kentucky activities are conducted according to these plans. Monitoring staff

are required to have the proper dosimetry and all are subject to bioassays. Personnel monitoring data for Commonwealth employees are well within the requirements of 902 KAR 100:019.

Question 2. Why has DOE failed to adequately assess sediments, soils, surface

water, and other environmental media in areas outside the security fence to ensure

public safety in these areas?

Response: DOE’s progress in complete characterization of environmental media

outside the security fence is directly related to available funding from Congress. To

the best of our knowledge, U.S. DOE/PGDP has sampled and characterized those

areas outside the industrial boundary sufficiently to determine if imminent threats

to human health and the environment exist. Those areas that the Cabinet believes

to be a potential threat to public safety were posted with warning signs. The Cabinet is aware that contamination exists outside the security fence. These contaminated areas and the sources that feed contaminants to the surface water system will

be investigated under review by the Commonwealth and U.S. EPA.

Question 3. What is the State of Kentucky doing to identify radiological contamination at other offsite areas accessible to the public?

Response: The Commonwealth reviews all data and reports provided by DOE to

determine potential restricted areas, as well as on-site and offsite impacted areas.

In addition, as indicated above the Commonwealth has a FSAP which it utilizes to

sample impacted areas.

The FSAP was designed based upon known release patterns from the facility. The

FSAP is a dynamic document that can be modified based on suspected or known

areas of contamination.

The Commonwealth’s efforts are documented by the more than 4,000 samples collected since 1995.

Question 4. Based on current institutional controls that inform the public and restrict access to offsite contaminated areas, are visitors, workers, and residents surrounding the Paducah site adequately protected from radiological and chemical releases from the Paducah site?

Response: Based on the information to date, the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet believes that, adequate institutional controls and/or removal actions have been implemented outside the security boundary to assure adequate protection of visitors to the wildlife management area and residents surrounding the PGDP. The Cabinet has not evaluated worker health and safety since

the Cabinet has no regulatory authority over that issue. U.S. DOE and the USEC

are obligated to assure worker health and safety.

Question 5. Illegal dumping activities were reported in Spring 1991 by Kentucky

police investigator Mr. D.W. Senf in memoranda sent to Kentucky policy captain

J.W. Pennington. Please explain what the State of Kentucky did with this information, and whether Mr. Senf’s findings were resolved.

Response: Kentucky collected surface soil samples from the area of concern in

May 1991. The soil samples were analyzed for gamma emitting radionuclides and

99Tc. All radionuclides analyzed for were below detection limits.

In June 1991, a gamma ray dose rate survey was conducted for the area of concern in the presence of Mr. Senf. No ‘‘hot spots’’ or levels above background were

observed during the gamma ray dose rate survey.

Based on the results of the gamma ray dose rate survey and the soil sample data,

no further action was taken. Mr. Sent did not provide any information to suggest

further action was necessary. The investigation is summarized in a June 17, 1991

memorandum.

Question 6. The State is authorized or delegated the authority to administer several federal environmental laws, including the Clean Water Act and the Solid Waste

Disposal Act. In addition to permitting and monitoring requirements with respect

to these programs, does the State of Kentucky have any financial obligations with

respect to clean-up activities at the Paducah site?

Response: No.

Question 7. In your written testimony, you indicate Kentucky has collected over

4,500 samples of surface water, groundwater, soils, sediment, and vegetation around

the Paducah Plant between 1995-1999. In addition, over 13,000 radiochemical analyses and over 15,000 quality control analyses have been conducted to ensure the accuracy of DOE and contractor results. Based on all the tests the State has performed at Paducah, do you think the workers at the Plant and the people who live

and recreate on lands outside the Plant are safe?

420

Response: The Commonwealth as a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Agreement State does not have regulatory authority in regard to DOE worker health and

safety.

DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is self-regulating for radioactive materials.

Based on available data, there is no immediate threat to public health from releases from the site.

This conclusion is supported by the results of DOE’s Phase I investigation.

Question 8. Please list each environmental permit violation administered by the

State of Kentucky at the Paducah site. Please also describe how each violation was

corrected.

Response: See attachment.

PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT—HAZARDOUS WASTE VIOLATIONS

RESOLUTIONS OF VIOLATIONS POST 1990 HAZARDOUS WASTE VIOLATIONS KY8-890-008-982

I. 8/22-24/1990 NOV issued, 6 violations written.

Violations documented were: Insufficient employee training, manifests incomplete, restricted wastes stored beyond 1-year period, three drums of hazardous

waste over 90-day accumulation period, facility not operated to prevent releases

(based on high number of spills).

Manner in which violations were resolved: All but one violation were resolved during an inspection conducted on June 23, 1992. The violation involving restricted wastes was resolved with the issuance of a Federal Facilities Compliance

Agreement that listed guidelines for handling waste streams at TSDs.

II. 11/27/91 NOV issued, 11 violations were written.

Violations documented were: The wastewater stored at building C-733 from

the sump of the same building did not have a ‘‘Waste Container Label’’. The field

inspection log used for buildings C-733 and C-746-R Storage Facilities were not consistent with the Part B Permit, Part II.B.4, Attachment V, Section F. The inspection

log for the Lime Precipitation Unit C-400-D lacked the time of inspection in violation of 401 KAR 35:020, Section 6. Waste D002, D006, D007, D008 was stored beyond 90 days at the Nickel Stripper Unit in violation of 401 KAR 32:030, Section

5, and KRS 224.866. Weekly container inspections and/or daily tank inspections

were not conducted during storage of the D002, D006, D007, D008 hazardous waste

at the Nickel Stripper Unit in violation of 401 KAR 35:180, Section 5 and/or 401

KAR 35:190, Section 6. The C-400-C waste location logs did not describe the storage

of the D002, D006, D007, D008 hazardous waste in violation of 401 KAR 35:050,

Section 4. Employees were not completely trained in violation of 401 KAR 35:020,

Section 7, 401 KAR 34:020, Section 7, and the Part B Permit Part B.Il.B.5. Manifest

Document Number 140 dated 8/22/91 did not have a handling code on it in violation

of 401 KAR 32: 100. Arrangements of response actions during an emergency were

not made with the State Emergency Response Team in violation 401 KAR 35:030,

Section 7. A copy of the Contingency Plan was not distributed to the State Emergency Response Team in violation of 401 KAR 35:040, Section 4. The Land Disposal

Restriction Forms accompanying Manifest Document Number 133 and 135 states

that the waste D008, D009 has a capacity variance until May 8, 1992, which was

not correct due to the presence of D008, lead, which was restricted from land disposal as of August 8, 1990. This constituted a violation of 40 CFR 268.7.

Manner in which violations were resolved: Inspection completed on June 23,

1992. This inspection also served to resolve all but one of the August 22-24, 1990

violations.

III. 6/9/92 NOV issued, 2 violations were written.

Violations documented were: Waste soil contaminated with dioxins was stored

at an inappropriate location.

Manner in which violations were resolved: A June 16th and 17th inspection

documented that the waste soil was containerized and that it had been moved to

an acceptable location. All violations corrected.

IV. 10/30/92 NOV issued, 1 violation was written.

Violations documented were: Wastes were stored in an underground storage

tank in excess of the 90-day allowed holding time.

Manner in which violations were resolved: Underground tank was certified

closed on January 4, 1993.

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V. 10/7/93 NOV issued, 3 violations were written.

Violations documented were: Failure to develop and implement a written

schedule for inspecting monitoring equipment, safety, and emergency equipment important to detecting and responding to environmental or human health hazards.

Failure to document monitoring, safety, and emergency equipment maintained by

Chemical Operations and the Fire Department Failure to test and maintain all Contingency Plan equipment.

Manner in which violations were resolved: A financial penalty was assessed

which was paid on 6/8/94.

VI. 2/22/95 NOV issued, 2 violations were written.

Violations documented were: Failure to manage waste mercury from line recorders removed from the enrichment process. Storage of waste mercury over 90-

days without a permit.

Manner in which violations were resolved: There was a disagreement in regulatory interpretation between DOE and the Commonwealth. DOE agreed to accept

the Commonwealth’s interpretation of the regulations and the matter was dropped.

VI. 8/30/99 NOV issued, 1 violations were written.

Violations documented were: Failure to provide notification of activity to be

performed inside a Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU).

Manner in which violations were resolved: Sampling of uncharacterized soil

was completed in accordance with the Commonwealth’s sampling plan. Results were

submitted to the Commonwealth within the prescribed time limit.

PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT—SOLID WASTE VIOLATIONS

Chronology of NOV’s at the #073.14 Landfill

08/08/90 Noted Violations—NOV Issued 09/04/90. Communication system not

operational (401 KAR 47:120-1); interim cover eroded (401 KAR 48:090-7); litter

(401 KAR 48:090-9); inadequate daily cover (401 KAR 48:090-3).

12/12/90 Re-inspection: Communication system repaired, interim cover erosion repaired, daily cover applied to working face. All violations resolved.

01/30/92 Noted Violations—NOV Issued 02/13/92. Entrance sign didn’t indicate operating hours (401 KAR 48:090-14); erosion and ponding water observed in

ditch.

02/26/92 Re-inspection: Entrance sign corrected, erosion repaired, ponding water

and drainage problems corrected.

01/27/93 Noted Violations—NOV Issued. Failure to notify within 48 hours of receiving groundwater sample results which indicate contamination; failure to arrange for a split sampling event; failure to sample for all required parameters.

All violations are of 401 KAR 48:300.

05/19/93 Letter sent discussing notification requirements. DOE submitted revised

method of dealing with ground water sample results. NOV resolved.

08/31/93 Noted Violations—NOV Issued. 401 KAR 40:010-4—Failure to comply

with instructions to demonstrate compliance with groundwater maximum contaminant levels.

09/09/93 Letter sent rescinding violation due to DOE submitting adequate data and

results.

Chronology of NOV’s at the #073.15 Landfill

08/08/90 Noted Violations—NOV Issued 09/04/90. 401 KAR 48:060—Communication system inoperative; waste not spread or compacted; waste not covered within one week; interim cover is eroded; water ponding in one area.

12/12/90 Follow-up Inspection. Communication system operable, waste compacted

and spread, interim cover erosion repaired, and ponded water area regraded. All

previous violations corrected.

05/07/91 Noted Violations—NOV Issued 05/20/99. 401 KAR 48:060—Interim cover

eroded; water was ponded in interim area.

06/26/91 Follow-up Inspection. Interim cover repaired, ponded water area regraded.

All previous violations corrected. No violations noted.

01/30/92 Noted Violations—NOV Issued 02/14/92. 401 KAR 48:060—Water ponded

east of interim area; entrance sign did not contain operating hours, both violations.

02/26/92 Follow-up Inspection. Re-inspection: Ponded water regraded, entrance sign

corrected, All previously noted violations have been corrected.

09/02/93 Noted Violations—NOV Issued. 401 KAR 40:010-3—Failure to comply

with written instructions to prove non-contamination.

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09/09/93 Same letter sent for 073-014. NOV resolved.

Chronology of NOV’s at the #073.45 Landfill

11/08/94 Noted Violations—Inspected by Donna Shartung: NOV issued 11/08/94.

401 KAR 40:020—Failure to notify the cabinet prior to well drilling.

11/24/94 Letter sent to DOE noting regulation requires notification. NOV considered

resolved.

PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT—WATER QUALITY VIOLATIONS

KPDES PERMIT NO. KY0004049 AND KY0102083

Numeric violations of KPDES permit limits for conventional pollutants have generally been corrected by process control changes which resulted in more effective

treatment. Corrections of numerical limit violations have generally occurred quickly,

so there has not been formal Quarterly Non-Compliance Report (QNCR) action since

1994, other than the issuance of a Notice of Violation (NOV). Normally, if the problem persisted, a Demand Letter would be issued for the subsequent quarter, unless

the problem were successfully addressed. (In 1997, for example, a Total Residual

Chlorine exceedance was cited in one quarter and corrected before the next quarter.

That was the most recent violation of a permitted effluent limit.) Currently, the facility is conducting a Toxicity Reduction Evaluation (TRE), to address toxicity problems which were identified in 1998.

PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT—AIR QUALITY VIOLATIONS

1. May 24, 1999 NOV from May 18, 1999, Inspection

May 24,1999 NOV for noncompliance with 401 KAR 58:040 Section 3(1) mailed to

United Thermal Industries Incorporated a subcontractor engaged in asbestos removal for USEC. NOV required written response from contractor within fifteen

days stating actions taken or to taken correct and prevent future violations.

United Thermal Industries, Inc. failed to have a current KY certification before engaging in the removal of asbestos. Reply to NOV received June 2, 1999, from

United Thermal Industries, Inc. Application submitted to Kentucky Division for

Air Quality for certificate did not contain requests for Supervisor certifications.

United Thermal Industries, Incorporated submitted applications for Supervisor Certification on May 18, 1999. The Kentucky Division for Air Quality issued Supervisor certifications 1500 hours on the same day.

NOV reply and actions taken by United Thermal Industries Incorporated were sufficient to resolve violation. No further enforcement action deemed necessary. No

further violations cited against company.

2. NOV issued on August 28, 1997 from August 7, 1997 Inspection.

NOV issued to USDOE on August 28, 1997 for noncompliance with permit conditions as follows.

USDOE did not record pressure drops for the baghouse that controlled particulate

emissions at the uranium hexafluoride cylinder grit blasting operation on September 9, 1996 and October 28, 1996.

USDOE did not promptly notify the Kentucky Division for Air Quality of the above

deviations from the permit.

USDOE did not submit notification of start of construction of the vitrification of low

level radioactive soil project to the Kentucky Division for Air Quality within

thirty days.

NOV required written response from contractor within fifteen days stating actions

taken or to taken correct and prevent future violations.

Reply from DOE received on September 11, 1997. DOE will specifically address the

permit conditions in new contractor contracts after June 5, 1997. DOE states

that they had notified the Cabinet that construction started on October 3, 1996.

The Permit condition clearly states that the Kentucky Division for Air Quality

is to be notified in writing. No such notification was received by the Division

until after the NOV was issued. DOE requested that the violations be withdrawn. Violations were valid and were not withdrawn as requested. Inspections

made in 1998 and 1999 found no further violations of these permit violations.

No further enforcement action was taken as the violations did not repeat.

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3. April 5, 1996 inspection report cites possible violation of 401 KAR 50:035 Section

5 for operating the northwest plume air stripper without a permit. Possible violation cited as DOE claims CERCLA exemption from permitting. More information

requested.

April 26, 1996 letter from USDOE states that the project is subject to CERCLA and

exempted from state permitting.

Letter of August 16, 1996 from Mr. Roger Cook, of the Kentucky Division for Air

Quality Permit Review Branch to Jimmy Hodges, Site Manager, stating no permit is required for the NW plume project.

4. NOV issued on July 27, 1993 to USEC for violations of 401 KAR 61:015 and 401

KAR 5 0:06 Sections 2(2) and 4(1). Noncompliance with regulatory and permit

opacity emissions limitations for #2 coal fired indirect heat exchanger.

NOV required written response from contractor within fifteen days stating actions

taken or to taken correct and prevent future violations.

Reply received on August 18, 1993 from USEC. Number two indirect heat exchanger

taken out of service on July 28, 1993. To ensure future compliance PGDP will

switch to alternate indirect heat exchangers fuels when opacity is in excess of

the standards.

Letter of September 1, 1993, from Ken Frye, Regional Supervisor, Kentucky Division for Air Quality, to Mr. Charles W. Martin, USEC, stating that August 18,

1993, reply was not totally satisfactory. Taking the #21 indirect heat exchanger

off line was the proper action to take but more information on problems with

the emission control units was required.

Problem ultimately resolved through repairs and improved operation of the heat exchanger and its control equipment.

5. NOV issued based on August 19, 1992 inspection cited denied access, refusal to

release coal samples, and fugitive emissions.

Through several meetings with cabinet management, credentials and access problems were satisfactorily resolved. Coal samples were ultimately received after

the cabinet asserted its authority to require them. Fugitive emissions were reduced through better controls, including more thorough and frequent watering

of stockpiles and haul roads.

6. NOV issued June 7, 1991 for fugitive emissions from a coal stockpile.

Problem ultimately resolved through enhanced controls, mainly wet suppression.

RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD OF DAVID MICHAELS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

QUESTIONS FROM COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE

Question 1: Please provide one copy of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Phase

I independent investigation report (independent investigation).

Answer: A copy of the independent investigation is provided for your information

and use.

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Question 2: During its recent independent investigation, DOE sampled media for

chemical and radiological analysis. What was the purpose of this sampling effort,

and what are your findings?

Answer: Environmental samples were collected and analyzed by the investigation

team in an effort to confirm that the current analytical results being reported by

the site are accurate and representative of actual environmental conditions. This effort was not intended to characterize the site for remediation purposes. Remedial

Investigations studies are conducted by the Department’s Environmental Management Program and are reviewed and approved by environmental regulatory agencies.

The results of the independent sampling were generally consistent with historical

environmental monitoring results produced and published by the site. There also

was general agreement between the independent sample results and the results of

the analysis of split samples by the site. Those matches provides, additional confidence that DOE site contractors are producing accurate environmental monitoring

results.

In a few cases, sediment sample results identified contaminants at levels not previously identified by the site. These transplant were taken at the North-South Diversion Ditch (between Ogden Landing Road and the site security fence), and outfalls K011 and K015. These discrepancies are likely to be related to the lack of homogeneity of contaminants in the soils.

Question 3: Did DOE plan its independent investigation sampling effort with the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)? If not, please explain why. Also, prior to

the release of the independent investigation report, did EPA request or receive environmental sampling data. If not please explain why.

Answer: DOE did not plan the sampling effort with the EPA. The team was directed to conduct an independent investigation of the site, and operated under strict

deadlines established by the Secretary of Energy for the completion of the initial

phase of the investigation. In planning the independent environmental sampling effort, the team evaluated the results of past Remedial Investigations that were performed by DOE contractors and overseen and approved by EPA and the Commonwealth of Kentucky. These reports described the nature and extent of environmental

contamination from past releases from the Paducah plant. The team utilized these

reports, as well as routine environmental monitoring results produced by DOE site

management, to plan the most effective and efficient sampling strategy for the independent investigation. Onsite representatives from Kentucky participated in the

sampling effort by collecting several split samples of groundwater, surface water

and soils/sediments. The EPA Project Manager for Paducah was consulted on the

initial conclusions of the investigation team immediately following the completion

of field investigations.

The EPA did request sampling results from the investigation team. Upon completion of the analysis of most samples and the assessment of the data by the investigation team, sampling data were provided to EPA Region IV and Commonwealth

of Kentucky staff on Friday, October 8, 1999. An EPA project manager was briefed

on the final results of the investigation on Thursday, October 14, 1999. The investigation report was formally published on Wednesday, October 20, 1999.

Question 4: At the hearing, DOE indicated that areas onsite had been identified

with radiological contamination high enough to require sampling technicians to

wear protective clothing. Why have these contamination areas remained uncontrolled for public access? Are there other areas onsite with similar amounts of contamination that are also un-posted?

Answer: The investigation team noted areas of contamination that exceed Bechtel

Jacobs radiological posting criteria in outfalls K011, the North South Diversion

Ditch, and along little Bayou creek on DOE property but outside the site security

fence. The Bechtel Jacobs health physics procedures require that such areas be posted as soil contamination areas and/or contamination areas, and that appropriate

measures be taken to prevent inadvertent entry. Some of these areas were posted

with signage and wording that were the result of CERCLA Records of Decision or

interim corrective measures, but these postings were not consistent and, in some

cases, did not specify the presence of a radiological hazard. Neither DOE nor Bechtel Jacobs site representatives was able to provide a sound basis for not controlling

such areas in accordance with the Bechtel Jacobs radiation protection program.

The investigation team noted that the most significant areas of contamination

have been identified during past investigations, but, the full extent of radiological

contamination both inside and outside the security fence has still not been characterized by a sitewide survey and sampling program.

The Department subsequently made changes to improve the sign postings for radioactively contaminated areas on DOE property. Site personnel have, for example,

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posted signs that clearly identify the presence of radiological contamination on both

sides of the North-South Diversion Ditch, and at several outfall ditches and culverts

associated with Little Bayou Creek.

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN UPTON

Assessment of Environmental Media

Question 5: Why has DOE failed to adequately assess sediments, soils, surface

water, and other environmental media in areas outside the security fence to ensure

public safety in these areas?

Answer 5: The Department has worked with regulators in the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) and the Commonwealth of Kentucky to ensure that assessments are done in areas outside the security fence to identify contamination in sediments, soils, surface water, and other environmental media, as described below. In

addition, on November 8th and 9th, 1999, representatives from DOE field offices

and Headquarters, EPA, and Kentucky met to review strategies and priorities for

assessment and remediation to maximize cleanup within available resources.

DOE regularly assesses conditions, both inside and outside the security perimeter,

and reports results of environmental monitoring at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion

Plant in the site’s Annual Environmental Report. In addition to the environmental

monitoring reported annually in this report, the Department has conducted environmental assessments and investigations since the discovery of off-site groundwater

contamination in 1988 to assess conditions outside the security perimeter, or contamination inside the security perimeter which could migrate beyond the fence

boundaries. I would like to provide for the record a listing of investigation activities

the Department has carried out from 1989 to the current time.

The information follows.

Environmental Assessments Conducted at Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP)

Date Assessment/Investigation Report Title/Number

1989-1991 ........ Phase I Site Investigation ............ Phase I Site Investigation Work Plan DOE/OR/07-1203. Volumes 1,

2, and 3

Results of Site Investigation Phase I at the PGDP KY/F-R-4

1991 .................. Public Health and Ecological Assessment.Results of Public Health and Ecological Assessment KY/SUB/13B97777CP-03/1991/1

1990-1992 ........ Phase II Site Investigation ........... Phase II Site Investigation Work Plan KY/ER-3

Results of the Site Investigation, Phase II at PGDP KY/SUB/13B97777 P03/1991/1

1993 .................. Northwest Plume Investigation ..... Characterization of the Northwest Plume Utilizing a Driven DiscreteDepth Sampling System KY/ER-22

1994 .................. Northeast Plume Investigation ..... Field Sampling Plan for the Northeast Plume DOE/OR/07-1222&D2

1993-1995 ........ Waste Area Groups (WAG) 1&7 .... Remedial Facility Investigation Work Plan for WAGs 1&7 and Kentucky Ordnance Works SWMUs 94, 95, and 157 DOE/OR/07-1147

Remedial Investigation Report for WAGs 1&7 at PGDP, Paducah, KY

DOE/OR/07-1404

Remedial Investigation Report for SWMUs 94, 95, and 157 DOE/OR/

07-1405

1994-1996 ........ WAG 17 ......................................... RCRA Facility Investigation Work Plan for WAG 17 at PGDP, Paducah, KY DOE/OR/07-1202&D2

Remedial Investigation Report for WAG 17 at PGDP, Paducah, KY

DOE/OR/07-1404

1995-1999 ........ WAG 6 ........................................... Integrated Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study Work Plan for

Waste Area Group 6 at the PGDP DOE/OR/07-1243&D4

Remedial Investigation Report for WAG 6 at the PGDP, Paducah, KY

DOE/OR/07-1727 Volumes 1, 2, 3, and 4

1996-1999 ........ WAG 27 ......................................... Integrated Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study Work Plan for

Waste Area Group 27 at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant,

Paducah, Kentucky DOE/OR/07-1518&D3

Remedial Investigation Report for WAG 27 at the PGDP, Paducah,

KY DOE/OR/07-1777 Volumes 1, 2, 3, and 4

1997-Current ..... WAG 28 ......................................... Work Plan for Waste Area Group 28 Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study and Waste Area Group 8 Preliminary Assessment/Site

Investigation at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah,

Kentucky DOE/OR/07-1592&D2 Primary

1998-Current ..... Data Gaps ..................................... Sampling and Analysis Plan to Support a Site Wide Current Remedial Strategy for DNAPL DOE/OR-07-1719

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Environmental Assessments Conducted at Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP)—Continued

Date Assessment/Investigation Report Title/Number

1998-Current ..... WAG 8 ........................................... Work Plan for Waste Area Group 28 Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study and Waste Area Group 8 Preliminary Assessment/Site

Investigation at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah,

Kentucky DOE/OR/07-1592&D2 Primary

As a result of these data collection and assessment activities, a number of actions

have been taken to protect the public’s health and safety outside the plant security

fence. I would like to provide for the record a summary of the actions taken.

The information follows.

Actions Taken at Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant to Protect the Public Health & Safety

Project/Event Action Taken

Off-site Groundwater Contamination

Controls (1988-89).

Identified and sampled local wells

Provided interim bottle water to anyone who wanted it

Initiated routine residential sampling

Provided water tanks to any residents with contaminated wells

Initiated health surveys of residents with contaminated wells

Identified radiological contamination in Little Bayou Creek, North/South Diversion

Ditch, and KPDES Outfall 011. Posted ‘‘No Trespassing’’ signs.

Contaminated Rubble Pile at Ballard

County Wildlife Area and Related

Controls.

Removed rubble pile

Performed systematic search for other rubble piles which resulted in identification

of several additional rubble piles which were grouped into WAG 17

Performed expedited health physics surveys of piles

Subsidence Control at the Sewage

Treatment Plant.

Fenced sewage treatment plant to protect recreational users of the area from

physical hazards (i.e., subsidence)

Elevated levels of PCBs in fish ........... Commonwealth of Kentucky issued a fish advisory for the Little Bayou Creek and

KPDPS Outfall 011

C-750-A and B Underground Storage

Tanks.

Removed tanks in 1991 with partial soil excavation

Excavated additional soils and closed in 1998

C-746-K Sanitary Landfill Interim Corrective Measures (Initiated in 1992).Installed a low permeability cap to repair subsidence and restore a 5% slope to

the top of the landfill to assist in precipitation runoff

Implemented a surface water monitoring program

Maintenance of a previously installed leachate containment dam and filter trap

Tricliloroethylene (TCE) Use at PGDP .. Use of TCE was discontinued at PGDP on June 30, 1993

Sludges/sediments from large degreaser were containerized and placed in waste

storage

RCRA Closures (1993-present) ............ Closed the following units in accordance with RCRA: C-400-B&C Nickel Stripper,

C-409 RCRA Pilot Plant, C-720 Large Degreaser, and C-746-R RCRA Storage

Pad

Closed C-404 Uranium Burial Ground in 1987

Institutional Control of Off-Site Contamination in Surface Water Interim Corrective Measures (Initiated

in 1993).

Installed fencing at 13 sites outside the PGDP security perimeter along the KPDES

outfalls 001 and 011, C-616 lagoons, the NSDD, Big Bayou Creek, and Little

Bayou Creek to restrict casual public access

Posted warning signs at C-616

Posted warning signs at the Outfalls and NSDD

Posted a Fish Consumption Advisory for Little Bayou Creek

Containment of Scrap Yard Sediment

Runoff Interim Corrective Measures

(Initiated in 1993).

Installed sill fences around the scrap yards to filter the contaminated silt which

could be mobilized during rainfall events

Installed gabion type silt traps with nonwoven geotextile material in two ditches

draining the scrap yards to contain contaminated sediments

Water Policy Engineering Evaluation/

Cost Analysis (Initiated in 1993).

Provided municipal mater supply to residents with in the area that could potentially be affected by migration of groundwater contamination

Established agreements with residents which restricted use of their wells

Established agreements with residents which allowed access for sampling or testing

Ongoing payment of associated water bills

Locked and capped affected residential wells

North/South Diversion Ditch (NSDD)

Record of Decision (Initiated in

1994).

Installed ion exchange system in C-400 to reduce radionuclide concentrations in

effluents prior to discharge into the NSDD

Established the target treatment level as the Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs)

Installed (by USEC) settling lagoons at the C-600 facility to remove fly ash from

effluents prior to discharge to the NSDD

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Actions Taken at Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant to Protect the Public Health & Safety—

Continued

Project/Event Action Taken

Installed two lift stations in the NSDD which discharged to a pipeline to transport

permitted effluent discharges and storm water runoff from the southern end.

This system bypassed approximately 50% of the NSDD inside the security perimeter, thereby reducing the potential for mobilizing contaminated sediments in

the vicinity of NSDD

Installed a gabion type rock structure with nonwoven geotextile material secured to

the upstream side near the ditch 001 lift station to mitigate the potential for

contaminant transport from the bypassed portion of the NSDD to offsite area

Installed warning signs on both sides of the NSDD to give notice that elevated levels of radionuclides, metals, and PCBs are present in the area

Interim Remedial Action for the Northwest Plume (Initiated in 1993).Installed a total of four extraction wells at two locations (two at each location)

and associated piping to extract contaminated groundwater from the highest

concentration area of the Northwest plume and pump this water to a treatment

system

Installed a treatment system consisting of air strippers, ion exchange, and activated carbon to treat the contaminated (TCE and Tc-99) groundwater to a target treatment limit of 5 ppb for tricliloroethene (TCE) and 900 pCi/g for Tc-99

prior to discharge to Outfall 001

Outfall 011 (1995) ............................... Lined ditch with bentonite and installed rip-rap to reduce transport of PCB-contaminated sediments

Interim Remedial Action for the Northeast Plume (Initiated in 1995).Installed a total of two extraction wells at one location to extract contaminated

groundwater from the highest concentration area of the Northeast plume

Installed a collection and piping system to collect and pump contaminated

groundwater to an existing cooling tower for volatilization of TCE and 1,1-

dicholoroethene

WAG 22 Solid Waste Management

Units (SWMU) 2 and 3 Record of

Decision (Initiated in 1995).

Implemented a groundwater monitoring program in the uppermost aquifer, the Regional Gravel Aquifer, to detect any release of contaminants from SWMU 2

Implemented institutional controls (signs and deed restriction) at SWW 2

C-746-S&T Landfill Closures ............... Closure was initiated in accordance with Kentucky Solid Waste Regulations in 1995

WAG 17 Removal Action (1996) .......... Removed contaminated soils 124 under DOE removal action authority

Properly packaged and stored material as waste

WAG 17 Record of Decision (1997) ..... Established that no further remedial action was necessary to protect human health

and the environment

WAG 23 Removal Action (1997) .......... Excavated approximately 115 cubic meters from SWMUs 1, 56, 57, 80, and 81 to

reduce PCB levels to below 25 ppm and dioxin levels to less than 1.3 ppb

WAGs 1 and 7 Record of Decision

(Initiated in 1998).

Deferred investigation and action on SWMU 38, C-615 Sewage Treatment Plant,

until unit ceases operation

Upgraded groundwater monitoring system around the C-746-K landfill

Installed institutional controls (signs and fences) around C-746-K

Implemented deed restrictions on C-746-K

Transferred responsibility for SWMUs 94, 95, and 157 (all located in former KOW

area) to the Corp of Engineers

Established that no further remedial action was necessary to protect human health

and the environment for the following SWMUs: 130, 131, 132, 133, 134 and 136

SWMU 91 Record of Decision

(Lasagna TM) (Initiated in 1999).

Completed design of Lasagna TM treatment system

Abandoned three wells located within the SWMU

Removed a cold bath pit used in testing UF6 cylinders

Construction scheduled for treatment system September 1999

Radiological Postings (Ongoing) ......... Post areas of radiological contamination which exceed limits defined in 10 CFR

835.

In addition to the activities identified in the two proceeding listings, three major

remedial investigations remain to be completed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement. These include investigation of the surface water in FY 2000-2001,

investigation of surface soils in FY 2001-2002, and investigation of burial grounds

in FY 2004-2005.

Radiological Contamination

Question 6: What is DOE doing to identify radiological contamination at other offsite areas accessible to the public?

Answer 6: The Department has conducted a number of investigations to identify

possible radiological contamination at offsite areas around the Paducah, Kentucky

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site. Where we have identified contamination, we have taken steps to mitigate risks

to public health and safety.

Actions taken to identify and address offsite radiological and chemical contamination have included routine sampling of residential water supplies; provision of alternative water supplies when contamination was found in residential wells; removal

of deteriorating tanks and excavation of contaminated soils; improved treatment of

waste streams to decrease possible offsite releases; installation of additional fencing

to restrict access to possible contaminated areas; posting of warning signs to prevent

use of contaminated water, including fishing and recreational use; installation of extraction wells to remove contaminated groundwater from various areas around the

site-, and implementation of a groundwater monitoring program to ensure that any

releases are detected. A detailed listing of the assessments conducted at the Paducah site, and actions taken to protect health and safety, was provided for the record

in response to the preceding question. These listings show, by year, the various Departmental actions taken to mitigate the spread of contamination offsite and to prevent public access to unsafe areas.

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant

Question 7: What was the assessed value of natural uranium DOE transferred to

the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) in 1998 for the purposes of completing nuclear safety upgrades at Paducah?

Answer: In 1998, the Department transferred 3,803,610 kgU of natural uranium

and 44.276 Metric Tons of low-enriched uranium to the United States Enrichment

Corporation for settlement of nuclear safety liabilities at the gaseous diffusion

plants and other liabilities. The value of these transfers was assessed at $220 million.

Question 8: What portion of the assessed value of the natural uranium transferred

to USEC was intended to pay for the completion of seismic upgrades at Paducah?

Answer: The Department transferred natural uranium and low-enriched uranium

valued at $220 million under the Department-negotiated agreement with the United

States Enrichment Corporation related to nuclear safety upgrades costs at the gaseous diffusion plants. That agreement settled a number of Departmental liabilities,

including completion of seismic upgrades at Paducah, which the Department estimated would total $34.6 million.

Question 9: Please explain why DOE material storage areas at Paducah have not

been characterized, analyzed or resolved even though they were identified more

than two years ago.

Answer: There are 148 DOE Material Storage Areas (DMSAs) at the Paducah

Site. Based on inspections and records review, enough is known about the materials

and equipment in 70 of these DMSAs to conclude that they do not present a criticality hazard. However, there are 78 DMSAs in which additional information is

needed. Of the 78 DMSAs, 13 present the highest priority for near-term characterization and disposition because fissile material could be present in quantities that

could present a hazard under certain conditions.

Over the last year, the Department had been developing nuclear-grade procedures

and controls for the characterization and disposition of DMSAs with a potential for

accumulation of fissile materials. Because of the nuclear safety aspects of this work,

it proceeded at a slower pace. For example, we have taken the time that was needed

to develop procedures to govern this work, to conduct the necessary criticality safety

evaluations and safety assessments, and to perform a readiness assessment—all of

which provide the basis for DOE’s approval to proceed with characterization and

disposition actions for the DMSAs.

Until recently, the priority for DMSA characterization and disposition was focused

on portions of 24 DMSAs that contain materials and equipment that must be moved

in order for United States Enrichment Corporation’s (USEC) seismic upgrade to proceed. However, a recent investigation completed by DOE’s Office of Environment,

Safety and Health identified 11 DMSAs that possibly contain fissile materials, presenting a criticality hazard—consequently, these areas must also be characterized

and dispositioned on a priority basis. Subsequent review by the DOE contractor

identified an additional 2 areas of potential concern. About half of these 13 DMSAs

that are of concern to DOE are the same DMSAs that are a priority with USEC—

but some of them are not. This has caused the Department to re-examine the priority and schedule for characterization and disposition of the DMSAs that are a priority for DOE and those that are a priority for USEC. In the interim, until a final

plan is complete, we have proceeded to characterize and disposition/move materials

in one DMSA that does not present a criticality concern. By doing so, this allows

work required by USEC to proceed while providing an opportunity for workers to

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gain more experience before handling a DMSA that presents a potential criticality

hazard.

We are currently working with the USEC and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop a consolidated plan for accelerating the characterization and removal

or disposition of the DMSAs in a manner that meets the needs of both USEC and

the Department. It is essential that DOE and USEC work closely together on this

as the work depends on a limited number of properly trained and security-cleared

USEC Inc employees at the site. Once issued, the final plan will be provided to the

House Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.

Question 10: Please explain what schedule or cost impacts may occur with USEC’s

efforts to complete seismic upgrades at Paducah due to DOE’s failure to characterize, analyze, and resolve DOE material storage areas.

Answer: The Department is presently working with the United States Enrichment

Corporation (USEC) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to determine

the schedule and cost impacts associated with plans to remove materials and equipment located in DOE Material Storage Areas (DMSAs) to support USEC’s seismic

upgrade project. However, a recent investigation by the Department of Energy (October 1999) identified several other DMSAs not related to the seismic upgrade

project that also require expeditious removal. At present, plans are being developed

that would allow for timely removal and disposition of all materials and equipment

in the DMSAs that are adjacent to areas in which seismic upgrades are planned,

as well as for timely characterization and disposition of the additional DMSAs that

were identified as potential areas of criticality concern in the recent DOE investigation.

We are working together to develop a comprehensive plan that meets the objectives of USEC, which are to complete the seismic upgrades, and the objectives of

DOE, which are to address DMSAs that may have criticality safety concerns on an

expedited basis. Once the plan is finalized we will be able to provide you the impact

on cost and schedule.

Question 11: Is USEC responsible for funding the characterization and movement

of DOE material storage areas? If so, what is the estimated cost of this effort, and

how will USEC provide the necessary funds to complete the characterization in a

timely manner?

Answer: Generally, the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is not responsible for funding the characterization of materials and equipment contained in

the DOE Material Storage Areas (DMSAs). However, since 1997, USEC has been

funding and conducting non-characterization work associated with the DMSAs in accordance with the agreements signed on June 23, 1996, and December 31, 1996.

Both of these agreements have been previously submitted to the Subcommittee. In

addition, to support their seismic upgrade project, USEC has also agreed to fund

and provide manpower for equipment and materials that must be removed from

DMSAs in order for USEC to complete seismic upgrades.

The total estimated costs of completing the DMSA removal actions for the seismic

upgrade project and for the remaining DMSAs where potential criticality concerns

exist are currently under development by the Department and USEC.

Plutonium Contamination

Question 12: Please explain why plutonium contamination in offsite sediments

was not identified in the Executive Summary of the DOE report ‘‘Phase I Results

of the Site Investigation, March 22, 1991.’’

Answer l2: The Executive Summary discusses chemical and radiological contamination off site, but does not specifically identify plutonium contamination, although

other radiological contaminants were identified in the summary. However, the body

of the Phase I Site Investigation Report, March 22, 1991, does discuss plutonium

contamination. The full report received DOE, Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), public, contractor, and State review. It is unclear why the plutonium contamination was not mentioned in the Executive Summary.

Prior to the Phase I report, plutonium contamination had been identified and reported. For example, the 1980 Annual Site Environmental Report contained a table

showing that transuranic elements (plutonium and neptunium) had been detected

in fish, apples, milk, and deer. The 1980 report was submitted to various State

agencies, the U.S. EPA Regional Office, and local news media.

The Department also identified the presence of plutonium contamination and elevated radiation exposure readings in documents reporting the results of a Phase I

investigation survey, including a September 18, 1990, Occurrence Report and a DOE

media advisory issued on October 1, 1990. The local newspaper, the Paducah Sun,

carried a story in its October 2, 1990, edition that discussed the presence of uranium and ‘‘transuranic elements such as plutonium, neptunium and technetium.’’

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The regulatory agencies in the Commonwealth of Kentucky and U.S. EPA were also

informed of these findings through the monthly reports.

Question 13: Please explain whether soil sample SS-2—measured as part of DOE’s

independent investigation—is consistent with data obtained in the March 22, 1991

Phase I report.

Answer: The independent investigation team collected a sample in the North

South Diversion Ditch between Ogden Landing Road and the site security fence

(sample SS-2). This sample was determined to contain elevated plutonium 239/240,

neptunium 23.7, and thorium 230 levels. The 1991 Phase I report and supporting

data dated January 4, 1991, contains survey and sampling results for soils and sediments in the North South Diversion Ditch. The results of these samples in the vicinity of the location of SS-2 also showed elevated levels of plutonium, cesium and thorium. While the reported levels of plutonium and cesium from the 1991 samples are

consistent with the results of the independent investigation team associated SS-2,

the level of thorium-230 reported in 1991 is significantly lower than the level recently identified by the investigation team at that location.

Institutional Controls

Question 14: Based on current institutional controls that inform the public and

restrict access to offsite contaminated areas, are visitors, workers, and residents

surrounding the Paducah site adequately protected from radiological and chemical

releases from the Paducah site?

Answer ]4: The Department has installed institutional controls that restrict access

to offsite contaminated areas on DOE property surrounding the operating facilities

at the Paducah site. The Department installed postings, fences, and signs agreed

to by the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as measures that would protect the public and workers. In addition, in response

to the observations of the investigation team led by the Department’s Office of Environment, Safety and Health, the Department has completed additional postings on

DOE property outside the security fence that identify radiologically contaminated

areas.

Contaminated Water

Question 15: When contaminated wells were discovered in 1988, EPA ordered

DOE to provide safe drinking water to private residences and the extension of municipal water lines to the homes in the area of contamination. In addition, a comprehensive water monitoring program was put into effect. The current ‘‘sump &

pump’’ method for dealing with the contaminated water does not appear to be addressing the problem at the source. Please explain what efforts are currently underway to control ‘‘hot spots’’ that are contributing to this groundwater contamination.

Specifically, please include a description of your efforts to remove TCE stored in the

C-400 building. Please also identify any proven technologies that may address the

problem more effectively.

Answer 15: The Department’s programmatic strategy for site remediation, which

was developed in conjunction with, and approved by, both EPA and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, utilizes a risk-based approach consisting of four phases. The

Department will first address imminent threats, including both on and off-site conditions; then reduce further migration of off-site contamination; then address

sources of off-site contamination; and lastly address remaining areas of on-site contamination.

Providing municipal water to affected residents and installing groundwater pumpand-treat systems were intended to address imminent threats and reduce the further mitigation of the high concentration portion of the off-site contamination

plumes. However, these two steps are only intended to serve as interim measures

until a more comprehensive solution can be developed. DOE recognizes the limitations of the existing pump and treat system and acknowledges that any comprehensive solution for groundwater must include actions at the source areas (i.e., the ‘‘hot

spots’’ in the vicinity of the C-400 Building) to be effective.

The ‘‘hot spots’’ in the vicinity of the C-400 Building (Waste Area Groups, WAGS,

3, 6, 27, and 28) are the sources of the contaminated groundwater migrating from

the site. These source areas are contamination from past activities; there are no trichloroethylene (TCE) materials currently stored in the C-400 Building. DOE recently completed remedial investigations for several of the major TCE source areas

(WAGs 6 and 27) and expects to complete characterization of the southwest plume

and remaining TCE sources (WAGs 3 and 28) in early FY 2000. Upon collection of

this additional data, the Department will have sufficient information to complete a

site-wide feasibility study that will lead to the selection of a final remedial action

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for the groundwater contamination. The draft feasibility study is scheduled to be

issued in June 2000.

To support source remediation, DOE recently completed a successful demonstration of the ‘‘LASAGNA’’ Technology, which removes TCE from soils, and is in the

process of full-scale deployment at the TCE test pit area. DOE is also conducting

a pilot field demonstration of another promising new technology in FY 2000. This

new in-situ reactive barrier technology, when used in conjunction with other source

treatment technologies, may prove to be significantly more effective than the traditional pump and treat systems. In addition, DOE is working to identify technologies

at Paducah through the Innovative Treatment Remediation Demonstration Program

(ITRD), which provides outside technical expertise to help find solutions to complex

remediation problems at DOE sites and works with stakeholders to gain acceptance

of promising technologies. At Paducah, the ITRD is working to identify proven technologies to address ground water and soil contamination problems. Question 16: DOE has proposed a plan to compensate workers at Paducah that

have demonstrated adverse health effects due to radiological exposure. Please explain how causation will be established between exposure to radioactive contaminants at Paducah facilities and adverse health effects pursuant to the proposed compensation plan. Answer: The Department considered a number of options for compensating workers at Paducah who have illnesses that may be associated with radiological exposure. Because of the lack of exposure monitoring data for these workers, it is not

possible to accurately determine the doses they received. Therefore, in consultation

with the National Economic Council, the Department elected to adopt the Radiation

Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) model in developing Title III of the legislation.

RECA has a compensation program for workers who were on site during atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. To be eligible for compensation, workers must establish that they were (1) onsite at the time of weapons testing and (2) have one

of the cancers listed in the statute.

In the Administration’s proposal for Paducah workers, criteria are that (1) workers must have worked on site for one year during the time period winch recycled

reactor tailings were processed, (2) worked in a position where they were badged

for radiation exposure (or should have been badged), and (3) have primary cancer

of the bone or the lung or one of the radiogenic cancers listed in RECA. Question 17. Was radiation exposure to workers monitored and documented prior

to 1989? How could anyone actually prove causation if no records were kept? Answer: DOE has radiation protection standards and requirements in place that

include monitoring thresholds, documentation, and reporting requirements. At Paducah, DOE has found a lack of exposure monitoring data and is currently investigating the adequacy of worker exposure records at all three gaseous diffusion

plants, including Paducah. While it may be difficult to prove causation from these

records, causation is not the only criteria used in compensation systems. In the program established by the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, workers are eligible

for compensation is they establish that they were (1) onsite at the time of weapons

testing and (2) have one of the cancers listed in the statute. This was the model

used in the Administration’s proposal for Paducah workers.

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant

Question 18: Was DOE aware of illegal dumping activities reported in Spring 1991

by Kentucky police investigator Mr. D.W. Senf, and referenced in Dr. Tom Cochran’s

written testimony? If so, what did DOE do with this information? Answer: Based upon our review, it does not appear that DOE was aware of a report of illegal dumping made in 1991 by Mr. Senf. In recent discussions with the

Kentucky Cabinet for Health Services, we have been told, in response to that allegation, the cabinet had the area in question surveyed and no elevated levels of contamination were found.

Question 19: During Secretary Richardson’s most recent visit to Paducah, he said

DOE would take whatever legal action is necessary to ‘‘make all former operators

at the plant responsible for their roles in keeping workers in the dark about plutonium.’’ He later commented that those actions could impact not just the most recent

contractors, but Union Carbide as well. Please explain what actions DOE is taking

to hold former contractors at Paducah responsible for nuclear safety deficiencies. Answer: The Department’s actions include: the investigation of the current (since

1990) and prior (before 1990) environment, safety and health procedures and practices; evaluation of concerns related to operations prior to 1990; examination of relevant site records; evaluation of potential liability for civil penalties (applicable to

activities after January 1996); and assessment of current and prior contractual responsibilities and liabilities.