UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

CHARLES VICTOR FLINT, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 23-8069 

(D.C. No. 2:23-CR-00067-ABJ-1) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Last year, Charles Flint pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography under 

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). At sentencing, the district court determined, over Flint’s 

objection, that his 2007 Colorado conviction for attempted sexual assault on a child 

triggered a mandatory minimum ten-year sentence under § 2252A(b)(2) because that 

conviction “relat[es] to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. 

R. 32.1(A). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 30, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 23-8069 Document: 010111087270 Date Filed: 07/30/2024 Page: 1
2 

conduct involving a minor.” The district court then sentenced Flint to ten years in 

prison, followed by five years of supervised release. 

Flint now challenges the district court’s application of the enhancement under 

§ 2252A(b)(2). He argues that under the categorical approach, his Colorado 

conviction for attempted sexual assault on a child does not qualify as a predicate 

offense for the enhancement because the state statute criminalizes a broader range of 

conduct than the generic federal offenses listed in § 2252A(b)(2). See Descamps v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) (explaining that under formal categorical 

approach, state-law conviction cannot trigger statutory enhancement “if the [state] 

statute sweeps more broadly than the generic [federal] crime”). But Flint 

acknowledges that our precedent forecloses his argument, and he brings it only to 

preserve it for further review. 

Indeed, we have held that “neither the text nor the history of the enhancement 

statute limits triggering offenses to those mirroring federally[ ]defined offenses.” 

United States v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316, 1325 (10th Cir. 2016); see also United 

States v. Hebert, 888 F.3d 470, 475 (10th Cir. 2018) (same). By its plain terms, the 

statute requires a mandatory minimum ten-year prison sentence if the defendant “has 

a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any [s]tate relating to aggravated sexual 

abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.” § 2252A(b)(2) 

(emphasis added). Giving the phrase “relating to” its ordinary meaning, we explained 

that “the offense need only ‘stand in some relation to,’ ‘pertain to,’ or ‘have a 

connection’ with” aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct 

Appellate Case: 23-8069 Document: 010111087270 Date Filed: 07/30/2024 Page: 2
3 

involving a minor. Bennett, 823 F.3d at 1322 (quoting United States v. Becker, 

625 F.3d 1309, 1310 (10th Cir. 2010)). If it does, the enhancement in § 2252A(b)(2) 

applies—even if the state statute criminalizes more conduct than the federal law. Id.

at 1322–25. And here, Flint does not dispute that under this interpretation of the 

statute, his Colorado conviction for attempted sexual assault on a minor qualifies as a 

predicate offense for the mandatory minimum under § 2252A(b)(2). 

As Flint recognizes, “[w]e are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en 

banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.” 

United States v. Begay, 974 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting In re Smith, 

10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). Because our precedent forecloses 

Flint’s challenge to the application of the § 2252A(b)(2) enhancement, we affirm.1

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

1

 Because our precedent forecloses Flint’s challenge, we affirm without 

reaching the government’s contention—which Flint vigorously disputes—that Flint 

waived his appellate arguments by “chang[ing] his theory on appeal” and failing to 

argue plain error. Aplee. Br. 7; see also United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 

(10th Cir. 2019) (“When an appellant fails to preserve an issue and also fails to make 

a plain-error argument on appeal, we ordinarily deem the issue waived (rather than 

merely forfeited) and decline to review the issue at all . . . .”). 

Appellate Case: 23-8069 Document: 010111087270 Date Filed: 07/30/2024 Page: 3