Marcus Clay, Ph.D.

Understanding the “People” of the People’s 

Liberation Army

A Study of Marriage, Family, 

Housing, and Benefits
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by the China Aerospace Studies Institute

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People of the PLA

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2 Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

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People of the PLA 3

Preface

As the People’s Liberation Army PLA continues to undergo a wide range of 

institutional and equipment changes, it garners much attention from think tanks, 

academics, and other militaries from around the world. While the organizational 

and technological changes of the PLA are certainly important and merit study, 

one aspect that often is overlooked is the ‘softer’ side, the people who actually 

operate that equipment, and occupy the positions that make up the organizations.

This study focuses on the People of the People’s Liberation Army. Without 

people, there is no army, and without highly trained people, there is no modern 

army. This is true not just for China, but for nations all over the world, the United 

States included. U.S. military periodicals and journals often feature articles and 

exposes detailing a myriad of ‘people problems’ facing the Department of Defense 

today. Obesity of potential recruits, low levels of civilian unemployment, and 

massive pilot shortage, are just a few of the challenges that the U.S. facing with 

recruiting, training, and retaining the best and brightest for the U.S. military. 

China’s Communist Party faces many of the same challenges in trying to fill and 

maintain the ranks of the PLA; however, some are uniquely Chinese, and may 

come as a surprise to those not familiar with certain aspects of Chinese culture. 

For example:

“Military spouses are no longer private citizens once they marry an active duty 

military member, and the stability of their marriage becomes a matter of national 

security (by law).”
4 Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

Certainly, a housing regulation here and a leave policy change there does not 

merit the same amount of research resources as does the newest fighter jet or 

missile technology; however, in order to ensure that leaders, policymakers, and 

practitioners at all levels get a holistic view of the PLA, the “People” can not be 

overlooked entirely. “Understanding the “People” of the People’s Liberation Army” 

seeks to lay the foundation to better understand some of the key personnel issues 

that the PLA faces, and openly discusses in its own newspapers and journals.

Dr. Brendan S. Mulvaney

Director, China Aerospace Studies Institute
People of the PLA

Introduction

Understanding personnel issues of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is 

crucial for making objective evaluations of the key strengths and weaknesses 

of China’s growing military. Ultimately, military power relies on its people, as 

a recent RAND commentary correctly suggested.1 Although many researchers 

focus on the potential capabilities of new equipment entering the force, it is 

important to consider that the PLA is learning from its ongoing interactions 

with Chinese society and concentrating on improving its force structure and the 

quality of personnel.2 One key aspect pertaining to the recruitment/conscriptioni

and retention of qualified personnel for the PLA is its quality of life arrangements, 

especially its marriage, family, housing, and benefits policies.

The current literature on the content and implications of China’s military 

reform mainly focuses on three areas: 1) major organizational reform including 

establishing a new joint command and control structure with nodes at the 

Central Military Commission (CMC) and theater levels and the 300,000-man 

downsizing3; 2) the rapid upgrade and the accelerated research and development 

of more advanced weapon systems and equipment4 ; and 3) CMC Chairman Xi 

Jinping’s control over the PLA and plan to reinvigorate Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP) organs within the military. However, an important yet overlooked 

aspect of the current military reform, potentially the weakest link pertaining to the 

sustainability of the reform, remains the military’s force building and personnel 

i In the PLA, all officers/cadre are recruited, while the enlisted force is a combination of recruitment 

and conscription.

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issues. The rapid reform measures being forcefully carried out at various levels of the 

Chinese military have inadvertently created a significant amount of pressure and 

anxiety not only for the military personnel but also their family members. As the 

reform intensifies, frequent family separations, long work hours and uncertainty 

surrounding the reorganization and troop reduction may negatively affect active 

duty personnel’s stress level, put a strain on their personal relationships with wives, 

husbands, children and other family members and friends, and cause them to 

rethink their intention to stay in the armed forces in the long term. 

Indeed, in the eyes of Chinese law, military spouses are no longer private 

citizens once they marry an active duty military member, and the stability of their 

marriage becomes a matter of national security.ii The PLA seems to be closely 

monitoring the emotional status of its personnel5 and taking active measures 

to revise existing or establish new measures to address pressing concerns of the 

military families. Stress-related mental health issues have prompted the PLA, in 

particular the political work departments, to increase implementation of mental 

health oversight at the unit level.iii It is no surprise that in his report given at the 

19th National People’s Congress (NPC) in October 2017, Chinese President Xi 

Jinping repeatedly emphasized the importance of better treatment for military 

personnel while pledging that the PLA “will protect the legitimate rights and 

interests of military personnel and their families” and “will make military service an 

occupation that enjoys public respect,” including “establishing an administration 

for veterans.”6 As such, on 13 March 2018, China officially announced the 

establishment of the Ministry of Veteran Affairs (退伍军人事物部) under the 

State Council.7

To be sure, the Chinese government is keenly aware of such challenges and 

has openly pledged to actively address these issues. In 2016, Dou Yupei (窦玉沛), 

ii “Considering the fact that the military is the foundation of the political power and national stability, the 

stability of military marriage is directly related to the stability of the military morale; and the protections of 

military marriage and family relationships is important for the overall national affairs.” “Protecting military 

marriage is a legal instrument (保护军婚是我国的一项法律制度),” Renmin wang, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/

junshi/20010225/403037.html

iii In 2017, there were approximately 45 references to mental health-related issues in the Air Force News alone. 

A closer look at such issues revealed that the sources of the high stress PLA personnel endure are mainly the 

higher intensity of actual-combat training and dealing with family issues during the ongoing military reform 

period. For instance, one article, published on 29 August 2017 KJB page 2, noted that every summer, thanks 

to the busy training schedule and the sensitive selection and demobilization work, all personnel face a lot of 

pressure from work and life and they tend to be more active in their thoughts and experiencing more emotional 

ups and downs. As a result, an Eastern TCAF brigade established a mental health intervention small group that 

was composed of professional psychologists, as well as battalion and company cadres and backbone soldiers. This 

group regularly conducted evaluations of the mental health status of its personnel.

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People of the PLA

Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (民政部),iv wrote in the People’s 

Daily (人民日报), 

“With the adjustment of social interest relationships (社会利益关系调整), change 

of people’s value systems (人们价值取向变化), the reform of social labor system (社会

用工制度改革) and the impact of the long-term and relatively peaceful environment 

(长期相对和平环境), series of conflicts and problems of force building and military 

and civil personnel have been accentuated, especially regarding difficulties in 

arrangements for military members who have been separated from the military 

(退役军人安置), difficulties in employment arrangements for family members who 

accompany the active-duty military members (家属随军就业), implementation of the 

preferential compensation policies for disabled military members and their families (优

抚政策),v and difficulties in high-quality military personnel recruitment/conscription 

(高素质兵员征集), which have a direct impact over the attractiveness of pursuing a 

military career (军事职业吸引力) and the sense of glory and pride for members of the 

armed forces (军人荣誉感自豪感).”8

Also in 2016, while meeting with representatives from “Double Support” 

Model City (county) and “Double Support” model organizations and individuals 

in Beijing,9 President Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of “Double Support” 

work during the military reforms followed by Premier Li Keqiang pointing out, 

more specifically, 

“First, we need to expand their [military members’]“way out [options] (后路),” 

establish special measures and preferential policies and provide full support for the 

arrangements for military members who separate from the military. Various levels 

of party and political organizations and SOEs and administrative organizations, 

especially the central government directly-owned enterprises (央企) should accept 

iv A more important and higher position Dou held at the time (he was later dismissed from the position 

due to violations of Communist Party Disciplines in late 2016) was Director and Deputy Group Leader of 

the National “Double Support” Working Leading Small Group (全国双拥工作领导小组副组长兼办公室主任). “Double 

Support (双拥)” was a shorthand for “Support the military members and treat their family members with 

priorities and Support the Political policies and love the people (拥军优属, 拥政爱民).” On the roles of Leading 

Small Groups (LSGs) in the Chinese political structure, see: Chris Johnson, Scott Kennedy, “Xi’s Signature 

Governance Innovation: The Rise of Leading Small Groups,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/xis-signaturegovernance-innovation-rise-leading-small-groups, October 17, 2017, accessed on 2 February 2018. Alice Miller, 

“The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institute, Fall 2008, 

Issue 26.

v The prioritized compensation policies for disabled military members and their families(优抚政策) is issued 

by the PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs, and covers a variety of support policies for military members and their 

families over special treatment, compensations, pensions, employment assistance. For a detailed overview of the 

policies, see: in Chinese, http://www.chashebao.com/shebaotiaoli/17992.html.

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

more former military members. Also, entrepreneurship of former military personnel 

should also be encouraged and supported. Second, we need to consolidate the “back 

yard (后院),” and perfect the prioritized compensation policy system (完善抚恤优待

政策体系), gradually increase the compensation level and thoroughly enforce political 

privilege and living support for those retired or separated from the military cadres 

(离退休干部). Take good care of those family members who relocated with their 

military spouses and assist them with finding employment opportunities or create 

favorable policies to support them to start their own businesses. Third, we need to 

support their “offspring (后代),” the government, society and schools need to focus 

on military children’s education and implement the special support policies (优待政

策). Allocating solid-quality educational resources, and support military children to 

enroll in nearby schools and transfer to schools following the relocation of the military 

families, while special arrangements should be made for families of military members 

who are stationed at border and remote regions.”10

Despite the dramatic transformations of the Chinese socio-economic status 

over the past three decades and the rapid advancement of its weapon systems and 

equipment, the PLA’s marriage, family and benefit policies, more importantly, the 

cultural norms such policies were built upon, largely remain legacies from China’s 

revolutionary era. Is the PLA capable of reinventing itself through updating its 

personnel policies to keep up with the rapid changes of the Chinese society? Does 

the Chinese military have a functioning support system to manage its quality of 

life policies to satisfy the mounting expectations of its increasingly younger, more 

urban and better-educated members who were born in China’s post-reform and 

opening up era? 

This report seeks to shed light on the past, present, and future of this complex 

and important topic, while at the same time, it provides a preliminary analysis on 

the implications of marriage, family, housing and benefit policies over the PLA’s 

recruitment/conscription and retention of its key source of strength - its people. 

More specifically, the report addresses the following issues, among others:

• Marriage

• Families accompanying the military member

• Employment Assistance

• Childcare

• Housing

• Military Leave, Pay, and Benefits

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People of the PLA

Key Findings

• Family and personnel issues are a major concern of the PLA during this 

period of military reform, as seen in the numerous discussions of such 

matters in official PLA Chinese language publications both online and 

in print.

• PLA military members continue to need approval from their units to 

get married, and restrictions still exist disallowing a civilian female 

partner in a military marriage to file for divorce. Until 2011, with a few 

exceptions, enlisted personnel were not allowed to marry someone from 

their unit’s vicinity or to marry someone from within his/her unit. 

• The political departments at various levels of the military play a large 

role in assisting its male personnel to find potential life partners through 

organized matchmaking events, usually held on military bases. Such 

service provided seems to be only open to male military officers and 

NCOs based on their age – between 25-28.

• The PLA continues to use a qualification system to determine whether 

married military members are allowed to live together with their families. 

Generally speaking, the PLA does not allow its new officers and NCOs to 

live together with their new wives and families until they meet a general 

minimum time-in-service ranging from 10-12 years. The current policy 

stipulates that officers stationed in regular locations need to reach the 

company leader-grade level (正连职) and NCOs who are Master Sergeant 

Class Four and above (served 10 or more years) to be qualified to have 

families “accompanying” them. 

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• Housing shortage remains a major concern of the military and various 

measures have been taken to build new and renovate existing housing 

to accommodate the needs of military families who qualify for provided 

housing. The housing shortage was partially due to senior military 

officers abusing the provided housing policies, eviction work has been 

intensified under Xi Jinping’s military reform. On 1 August 2015, the 

PLA began to implement its Housing Provident Fund (HPF) Loans to 

allow military members to borrow up to ¥400,000 (roughly $63,000) 

from their HPF with maximum 20-year term to purchase commercial 

properties.

• The PLA has significantly improved its leave and pay policies as it seeks 

to use monetary incentives to attract and retain its qualified personnel. 

As more active-duty military members belong to China’s single-child 

generation, the leave policy has changed from allowing the military 

members to visit their parents staying in their hometowns once every 

four years to once every two years and eventually to once a year for 

a period of 40-45 days. In 2006, PLA officers and NCOs reportedly 

received pay increases ranging between 80 and 100 percent. Again in 

2017, they received another 40% increase. In 2018, a division-leader 

grade PLA officer, roughly equivalent to a U.S. O-7, makes roughly 

¥264,000 ($41,969) annually in total compensation. 

Contribution and Methodology

This report provides a new angle to examine the PLA’s strengths and 

weaknesses through studying the evolution of PLA’s personnel policies 

in several key areas. It also uses primary Chinese language resources to 

summarize and analyze this important issue. It traces the origin of the 

principles pertaining to military marriages in Chinese marriage laws and 

studies the official documents guiding the PLA’s marriage and family policies, 

such as the Regulations on Issues Regarding How The Military Implements 

The Marriage Law (军队贯彻实施〈婚姻法〉若干问题的规定),Measures on 

Employment Arrangements for Military Family Members Accompanying the 

Military Personnel (军人随军家属就业安置办法), the People’s Republic of China 

PLA Regulations on Active Duty Off icers’ Leave and Family Visits (中国人民

解放军现役军官休假探亲规定), the PLA Regulations on NCO Management (

中国人民解放军士官管理规定) and On Further Improving and Standardizing 

Grassroots Work and Order Management (关于进一步规范基层工作指导和管

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理秩序若干规定), and Regulations on Standardizing and Completing Military 

Personnel Benef its and Treatment (关于规范完善军队人员有关福利待遇的若干

规定). It also analyzes a collection of open-source primary Chinese language 

materials, including military newspapers, periodicals, and websites, such as 

PLA Daily (解放军报), Air Force News (空军报), China Air Force Journal (中

国空军), PLA Pictorial Journal (解放军画报), Chinese Ministry of National 

Defense website (www.mod.gov.cn) and PLA website (中国军网) (www.81.

cn), followed by comparing such official discourse with the Chinese military 

spouses’ online discussion threads on Zhihu (知乎)vi and other major Chineselanguage social media platforms. 

Key Terms and Concepts

The PLA is fundamentally different from the U.S. armed forces. Whereas 

the U.S. military supports and defends the Constitution of the United States 

against all enemies, as demonstrated in the oaths of enlistment,11 the PLA, 

as Chinese President and CMC Chairman Xi Jinping put it, “must be up 

to shouldering the missions and tasks of the new era entrusted to them by 

the [Chinese Communist] Party and the people.”12 It is the armed wing of 

the Chinese Communist Party. Compounded by the nuances of the Chinese 

culture, largely a hybrid system influenced and shaped by Chinese tradition, 

the recent revolutionary past, the Communist Party rule and Western 

influence, Chinese military terms and jargon, particularly those pertaining 

to the domestic sphere of force building and personnel issues and policies, 

can be confusing to people conducting research on the Chinese military. The 

following is a list of terms related to this issue, and provides basic explanations 

based on translations and definitions from the PLA’s official dictionary, 

identified simply as the Junyu (军语),13 as well as their extended meanings 

in the policy context. The terms are organized in English alphabetical order. 

• Fuyuan (复员): PLA members to be separated from the military and 

resume civilian positions.

• Hukou (户口): translated as household registration system. Hukou

assigns citizens into “rural” or “urban” status based on parents’ place 

of origin. The hukou system is used to actively limit where a person is 

allowed to live, receive education, and work. If one is born into a rural 

vi Zhihu.com is one of the most popular Chinese language online platforms to ask questions and connect 

with people who contribute unique insights and quality answers. The number of registered users of Zhihu had 

reached 17 million as of May 2015 with 250 million monthly page views.
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

hukou attempting to change to a more attractive residence or to an urban 

hukou can be extremely difficult, if not impossible. In this way the hukou

system institutionalizes inequality and consolidates the government’s 

administrative control over China’s population. But marriage still 

remains a possible route to gaining urban hukou, for both civilian and 

military members alike. When they marry an urban hukou holder, rural 

Chinese are allowed to convert their rural hukou into urban hukou. Still, 

there is a considerable qualifying period after marriage registration 

before this conversion can take place and the waiting time can range 

from two years in cities such as Guangzhou to 10 years in Shanghai and 

Beijing.14

• Jiashu suijun (家属随军): family subordinates/dependents accompanying 

the military members at their stationed location living on/off base. 

Unlike the U.S. military, not all PLA family members are allowed to 

receive housing, either on-base or off-base, offered or subsidized by the 

military so that they could “accompany” their military members. Due to 

the shortage of on-base housing and the huge gap of standards of living 

at different locations in China, the PLA established grade and time in 

service requirements to guide its family policies. Jiashu suijun remains 

the core issue of the PLA personnel policies and will be discussed 

extensively in this report.

• Jiti hunli (集体婚礼): group weddings; usually managed by the Political 

Departments of a military unit and takes place on military bases.

• Junhun (军婚): military marriage, which enjoys special protections 

according to Chinese laws. 

• Junsao (军嫂): military wives, the Character sao often conveys a respectful 

connotation while addressing someone who is older in age. Interestingly, 

there is not an equivalent term to address military husbands in Chinese. 

• Tigan (提干): refers to an enlisted person being selected to go through 

further military-sponsored education or certain training programs to 

become an officer due to outstanding performance at his/her current 

billet.

• Tuiyi / Tuichu xianyi (退役/退出现役): applies to all military personnel 

when they leave active duty, regardless of whether they are demobilized 

or retired. This term is also used when ship/aircraft/weapons and 

equipment are decommissioned/retired from service. Military personnel 

who separated from the military regardless of their status were generally 

known in Chinese as Tuiwu junren (退伍军人).

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People of the PLA

• Xiangqin (相亲): organized matchmaking or blind dates. In the PLA 

context, it refers to blind dates either set up by military members’ 

families or relevant political departments/officers of the military unit.

• Zhuanye (转业): Military members who zhuanye are transferred to 

government departments or institutions (政府机关和事业单位) and 

maintain their cadre status. Zhuanye applies to Intermediate Grade and 

above NCOs ( 中级士官以上 ) and officers. See Appendix A for officer 

grades and ranks and Appendix B for NCO Grades and Ranks. Also 

known as Jihua anzhi (计划安置), or planned arrangements. Most cities 

implement a system consisting of an evaluation process and a written 

test to place these cadres.

• Zizhu zeye (自主择业): literally means to look for jobs by oneself and 

it applies to PLA cadres who have served for more than 18 years. It 

is unclear as to how many military members who choose this option 

voluntarily “resign” from the military or have been forced out due to 

structural adjustment of the military. Those who choose to zizhu zeye

do not receive assistance in finding jobs but will receive a one-time 

separation fee from the military. 

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Marriage 

A Brief History of The Legal Foundations 

Protecting military marriages has been a consistent policy of the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC).15 Even before the establishment of the PRC, to 

ensure that the combat capabilities of the military men, the Marriage Law 

of the Chinese Soviet Republic (中华苏维埃共和国婚姻法), promulgated on 8th 

April 1934, stipulated that:

Article 11. “Wives of soldiers of the Red Army when claiming a divorce must 

obtain the consent of their husbands (红军战士之妻要求离婚,需得其夫同意), but 

in areas where communication by letter is easy and where the husband has not 

returned home nor communicated by letter for two years, the wife may approach 

the local government and request registration of the divorce. In areas where 

communication by letter is diff icult, and four years have elapsed since the husband 

last communicated by letter or since he last returned home, the wife may approach 

the local government and request registration of the divorce.”16

During the Sino-Japanese War, the Marriage Regulations of the Shanxi, 

Ch’ahar, and Hebei Border Area (晋察冀边区婚姻条例)) also stipulated that: 

Article 16. Spouses of military personnel on active service in the war against 

Japan shall not request divorce, unless it has been uncertain for a period of more 

than four years whether the spouse is still living. (“抗日军人之配偶,非于抗日军

人生死不明逾4年后, 不得为离婚之请求”)17

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People of the PLA

The so-called New Marriage Law of the PRC promulgated in 1950 and 

the revised marriage law in 1980 continued to use such clauses to provide 

special protection for PLA personnel’s rights in divorce, for instance, Article 

19 of the Marriage Law promulgated on 1st May 1950 immediately after the 

establishment of PRC, stipulated:

Article 19. In the case of a member of the revolutionary army on active service 

who maintains correspondence with his or her family, that army member’s consent 

must be obtained before his or her spouse can apply for divorce.18

On the 28th of April, 2001, the Standing Committee of the NPC passed 

a revision of the Marriage Law (adopted in 1980) to reflect the social changes 

occurring in China in the areas of marriage and family. According to Article 

33 of the Marriage Law, 

“If the spouse of a soldier in active service desires a divorce, the matter shall be 

subject to the soldier's consent, unless the soldier has made grave errors.”19

According to PRC Criminal Law Article 259, “Those who live together 

with or marry someone whom they know is the spouse of an active duty 

service member are to be sentenced to three years or fewer in prison or put 

under criminal detention.”20 To resolve disputes of divorce, the courts can 

also use Article 9 of the Supreme People's Court’s Opinions on Several Issues 

concerning the Implementation of the General Principles of the Civil Law of 

the People's Republic of China (关于贯彻执行民事政策法律若干问题的意见) to 

mediate while the political unit of the military personnel, at the regiment 

grade and above, could also work with the military personnel and approve 

the divorce.

In 2017, a former PLA member who spoke on condition of anonymity 

explained that the law dates from wartime, when it was intended to protect 

military marriages so servicemen could focus their minds on battle. Now he 

believes, however, the fact that the two parties in a military marriage do not 

have equal rights is problematic, because if a member of the military cheats, 

it is difficult for a civilian spouse to gather evidence, as they are not permitted 

on army bases without their partner’s permission.21

Marriage Regulations

The PLA generally upholds the principle of encouraging its personnel 

to marry late (晚婚). Males must be at least 25 years old and females 23. 

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Unmarried personnel are not allowed to live together.22 Although married 

men may enlist in China’s military, two-year conscripts/ enlistees are not 

allowed to marry until they return to civilian life, because, according to a 

Peking University sociologist, the “group living arrangements and intensive 

military training are believed to interfere with servicemen’s ability to 

invest the time and energy that married life requires.”23 Military academic 

institution cadets are not allowed to get married while they are enrolled in 

military academic institutions. In reality, no married men or women could 

have been admitted to the military institutions in the first place, because the 

Chinese military institutions require its candidates to be less than 20 years 

old,24 while the Chinese Marriage Law currently enforces one of the world’s 

highest minimum marriage ages, allowing only men over 22 and women over 

20 to wed.25 Hence no married men/women could have been admitted into 

such military institutions either. 

Until 2011, enlisted personnel were not allowed to marry someone from 

their unit’s vicinity or to marry someone from within his/her unit.vii It was 

unclear as to why exactly the PLA imposed this restriction, but most likely 

it was out of the concern for better control of its enlisted forces. It may 

be speculated that once the enlisted personnel, mostly from the rural areas, 

marry someone from their unit’s vicinity, particularly at an urban location, 

they may be more prone to leaving the military to pursue the relative comfort 

of a civilian life. 

In 2012, however, this restriction was partially lifted. The Ministry of Civil 

Affairs and the PLA’s General Political Department (GPD) jointly issued a 

policy in 2012 in which it stated that, upon approval by his/her brigade’s, or 

higher, Political Department, NCOs are allowed to marry someone from the 

unit’s location or within the same unit, if one of the criteria is met: 1) he/she 

is an intermediate-level NCO; 2) male NCOs above 28 years old and female 

NCOs above 26 years old; or 3) children of martyrs,viii orphans or NCOs 

vii Exceptions: if the military member was an orphan, disabled or reached age 30 yet had tremendous difficulty 

finding a spouse form his hometowns. Such personnel were allowed to marry someone from its unit’s location 

upon approval from a corps level and above political headquarters. Female NCO nurses, if having difficulty 

finding spouses from her hometown, were allowed to marry within the same unit or marry someone from the 

unit’s vicinity. P.251. (军队贯彻中华人民共和国婚姻法若干问题的规定)and this is mostly due to the Hukou (household 

registration) system in China which restricts the free mobility of people moving from rural to urban areas.

viii This is a legal distinction in China. “The government has certified and recorded about 2 million heroes 

and martyrs. The government runs a martyrs database online that shows names from the past century or so. 

The government laid out requirements for martyrdom in 2011—stipulating that deaths must have occurred 

in the course of public service” “China Guards Its Historical Heroes With New Law”, Chun Han Wong, Wall 

Street Journal, April 27, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-moves-to-police-its-history-with-newlaw-1524758002

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People of the PLA

with disabilities due to combat, public cause or illness.26 After an enlisted 

personnel who married at the unit’s location is demobilized, he/she is now 

allowed to settle down at his/her spouse’s (as well as spouse’s parents) hukou

registration location, if the military spouse has an urban hukou, as long as the 

couple had been married for two years, they are allowed to gain permanent 

residency status in the urban area.27

To be sure, marriage and family housing issues remain to be a concerning 

factor for the PLA. This generally reflects the mainland Chinese society at 

large. Launched in 1980, China’s one-child policy has resulted in a hugely 

imbalanced population with more than 30 million surplus males, which is 

“about the size of Canada.”28 A report by the All-China Woman’s Federation 

in 2015 showed that the marriage age for Chinese was 26 on average, which 

is older in developed areas.29 And in 2015, the number of single people at or 

around that age in China reached nearly 200 million. The proportion of the 

population made up by unmarried people more than doubled from 6 percent 

in 1990 to 14.6 percent in 2013.30

The CCP Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued the 

Medium and Long-term Youth Development Plan (2016-2025) in 2017, listing 

marriage as one of the Top Ten youth issues.31 The Chinese Communist 

Youth League even pledged to help more Chinese singles to tie the knots 

through organizing more dating activities and matchmaking services.32 Given 

its male-majority nature, marriage-ability related issues within the PLA loom 

even larger than in the civilian world. Whereas marriage issues may impact 

the social structures as a whole, the PLA is particularly concerned about its 

negative impact on the overall morale and combat capability of its troops. 

The official Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND)’s website even 

contains a designated page featuring military marriage issues titled, “If you 

ever want to get married, marry a PLA member (嫁人就嫁解放军).”33 Indeed, 

articles and stories about relationships, marriage and family life have become 

a fixture of almost all of the key PLA newspapers, periodicals and websites. 

For example, Air Force News (空军报), which is the PLA Air Force’s official 

newspaper published five times a week, had approximately 90 and 70 articles 

in 2016 and 2017, respectively, touching upon this matter. In recent years, 

group weddings (集体婚礼) have also been organized by the political work 

departments or Party Committee branches at the grassroots organizations 

(i.e., below the regiment level) with an increasingly high-profile publicity. 

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The public perception about marriage in the Chinese society seems to 

be drastically different from the U.S. Whereas in the U.S., most parents of 

young adults who reach the age of 18 would most likely expect their children 

to live independently if they have enough monthly income to cover the major 

living cost, the Chinese parents of young adults in their 20s or even early 

30s generally exert larger influence. In some cases, they exert direct control 

over their children’s life and they tend to take a more hands-on approach to 

help arrange their children’s adult life, a most important component of which 

is, getting married. In major urban areas, it is not unusual to see parents 

gather at public parks or community centers to exchange information on 

their children’s behalf about finding potential life partners.34

It is against this background that the PLA matchmaking arrangements 

should be understood. Similar to civilians, historically, unmarried PLA 

personnel are usually introduced to potential life partners through friends 

from their same hometown or their own family members who remain at their 

home location. This is partially because of the Chinese hukou system, which 

constrains the free mobility of labor from rural to urban areas. However, 

these traditional mechanisms have proven ineffective in responding to the 

increasing demands of active-duty military members, because most activeduty military personnel only had limited annual leave time that they could 

use to meet and get to know their potential life partners off-base. The various 

restrictions imposed on military members’ lifestyle, particularly the fact that 

most enlisted PLA members are required to live in barracks, was also a major 

concern of civilian females who worry about the long-separations upon 

marrying military personnel. 

The PLA matchmaking work is often led by the Political Work 

Department of the PLA; they have actively worked with civilian media in 

recent years to organize large-scale “blind dates” (相亲) for their marriage-age 

military members. Usually a large number of selected young females who are 

also in the love and marriage market would register online and participate in 

a mass “blind-date” on military bases, jointly held by the military and local 

government departments that are in charge of civilian affairs. Sometimes such 

“blind-dates” are also accompanied by group weddings of military personnel, 

including officers and NCOs, who were previously introduced to each other 

through the same series of matchmaking events. Young military members and 

the female participants of such “blind dates” are also invited to become the 

audience of the gala-style weddings.

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People of the PLA

Figure 1: “Let’s marry PLA members: an inside look at PLA matchmaking 

(嫁人就嫁解放军,看兵哥哥如何相亲)!” 2017-10-26 08:00 http://www.sohu.com/a/200284373_612863

Figure 2: “Let’s marry PLA members: an inside look at PLA matchmaking 

(嫁人就嫁解放军,看兵哥哥如何相亲)!” 

2017-10-26 08:00 http://www.sohu.com/a/200284373_612863

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Figure 3: A Scene from a PLA Matchmaking Event (解放军相亲大会抱美女赛跑)

2015.11.04 14:56:47 http://slide.news.sina.com.cn/s/slide_1_2841_90885.html/d/8#p=8

Figure 4: A Scene from a PLA Matchmaking Event (解放军相亲大会抱美女赛跑)

2015.11.04 14:56:47 http://slide.news.sina.com.cn/s/slide_1_2841_90885.html/d/8#p=1

Such “matchmaking” programs are often organized at the service level. For 

the Air Force, a “Military Matchmaking Gathering (军旅姻缘会)” program 

was created in 2006 and it has been held consecutively for 11 years. By 2016, 

a total of more than 430 marriage-age civilian females and military males “fell 

in love” through this program and a total of 93 couples eventually registered 

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People of the PLA

to marry.35 For the Army and Navy, matchmaking seems to be less organized 

and there was only sporadic reporting on occasional matchmaking events or 

group weddings, but the content and format seems to be similar to the Air 

Force events.36 One point of interest, however, is that matchmaking service 

provided by the military seems to be only open to male military officers and 

NCOsix based on their age, between 25-28, as shown in one matchmaking 

event held in Beijing.37

In October 2017, a Central Theater Command Air Force military base held 

the 11th “Military Matchmaking Gathering (军旅姻缘会),” which gathered 

123 single civilian females and 120 military personnel and it was reported 

that 30 military men were able to find their future spouse (心仪的另一半) 

through this event.38 Among these successes, one female participant named 

Li Ting (李婷) fell in love with a military member named Li Hongbing (李红

兵) and she was quoted as saying “I am willing to stand by your left side, because 

I know that your right hand is reserved for saluting the motherland!”39 Chinese 

Central Television (CCTV) also participated in organizing a simultaneous 

“perfect wedding (完美婚礼)” for the military members and chauffeured four 

newly-married military couples to the “blind date” site in military vehicles 

to “receive well wishes from their families and fellow military friends.”40

According to the organizer, the 2017 “matchmaking” was under huge pressure 

and was particularly difficult compared with the past events, because this 

unidentified Air Force department (空军某部) underwent reorganization 

in the 2016-2017 military reform and it now included more units that had 

been reassigned to be under its organization, so the number of unmarried 

military personnel had significantly increased. However, leaders of the 

Party Committee and Headquarters Department were determined to resolve 

the difficulties of its military personnel and they saw such “matchmaking” 

activities as conducive to creating an environment that could help retain its 

personnel.41 Such matchmaking gathering and group weddings “strengthens 

the unity of our officers and soldiers, and boosts our belief in cherishing our 

current positions and being responsible.”42

In 2016, the 10th “Military Matchmaking Gathering” was jointly organized 

by the Central Theater Command Air Force Wuhan Command Postx and 

Wuhan Evening News (武汉晚报) and was held in Wuhan, Hubei Province. A 

ix A survey of multiple websites recruiting civilian female participants of such organized matchmaking events 

seem to suggest that both officers and NCOs meeting the age requirement are participants of such events. Junior 

enlisted soldiers, however, are not included in such events, as stated earlier, the PLA does not allow enlisted 

soldiers to get married during their enlistment. See, for example, http://www.lyd.com.cn/n/774028.

x This became the Wuhan Base in 2017

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group wedding of 10 couples was held simultaneously with the “matchmaking 

gathering,” which had more than 170 civilian females and 150 military officers 

and NCOs participate.43 The photos from this event showed that family 

members including the children of married military members, parents, and 

friends were also present at the gathering. The big screen on the stage of the 

auditorium where the weddings and gathering was held also showed photos of 

military families. The gala even included military children’s performance.44

Figure 5: Li Ming (李明), “嫁人就嫁解放军”军旅姻缘会是个好活动!

来源:中国军网作者:李明、吴稀责任编辑:杜海丰

2016-10-24 11:191 http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_7320082_3.htm

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People of the PLA

Figure 6: Li Ming (李明), “嫁人就嫁解放军”军旅姻缘会是个好活动!

来源:中国军网作者:李明、吴稀责任编辑:杜海丰

2016-10-24 11:191 http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_7320082_18.htm

Figure 7: 嫁人就嫁解放军!军歌嘹亮中的浪漫婚礼军嫂都想要

2017-12-23 21:11:27 https://xw.qq.com/cmsid/20171223A0OG5T00

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

Figure 8: “共和国礼炮部队的集体婚礼,这个婚礼有点高大上”

2016-10-13 08:47文字:王博、尹博、万偲伟摄影:李光印http://www.sohu.

com/a/116007476_350277

One key question is, “Why group weddings?” An Air Force News article 

written by a PLAAF grassroots political instructor might have reflected some 

of the thoughts.45 According to Shi Zhiguang (石志广), the Party Committee 

of his unit accepted his request to help organize a group wedding around 

August 1st, aka “Army Day”, celebrating the founding of the PLA. Shi was 

“touched by” this decision and noted that there were three reasons why he 

liked the group wedding idea. First, there were six enlisted personnel under 

his tutelage registered to get married this year and, if he allowed them to 

hold weddings respectively, it would almost certainly mean that each of them 

would be holding banquets. “That would be such a waste of resources and, 

if they start drinking, that would cause unnecessary challenge to the strict 

‘alcohol ban’ in the military.” “Also, competitions among these soldiers would 

also become the source of tension among them.” Second, Shi believed that 

offering group weddings is also a great way to offer rewards to the six enlisted 

personnel who had become the backbone personnel in their unit. To make 

the wedding work, Shi also revealed that the regiment’s Political Division (

政治处) even held a coordinated meeting with the political commissar, who 

personally drafted the text for the wedding speech.46

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People of the PLA

Indeed, most of the highly-scripted PLA group weddings were held on 

military bases around the “August 1” celebrations and were loaded with political 

symbolisms. Weddings of larger scale would almost always receive publicity 

from local and national media. Take another example, on 1 August 2017, an 

unspecified brigade of the PLA’s 75th Group Army that was stationed in 

Yunnan Province held a group wedding for its 22 officers and soldiers. It was 

because “due to the military reform and multiple major missions, almost all of 

them had to postpone their individual weddings. Hence the military decided 

to help them organize it together around the August 1st (Ba-yi) holiday.”47

Tell Great “Love Stories” and Select the “Most Beautiful Military Wife (最美军嫂)”

A survey of all the official “love stories” published by Air Force News 

between 2016 and 2017 revealed a few patterns of how the Air Force, or 

the PLA at large, perceives marriage. Love and marriage within the military 

remain to be seen as a service to the national interest despite the dramatic 

modernization and westernization of the Chinese society as a whole. Great 

emphasis has been put on sacrifices of the female spouse of the military 

members in support of the career advancement of the latter and the overall 

enhancement of the Chinese military power. “Giving up the small family 

[individual family], and support the big family [the country] (舍小家顾大家)” 

remains the guiding principle of all military marriages. 

Below is a typical “love story” promoted by the official PLA media:

Kong Tingting is the wife of staff off icer Liu Yanchao who belongs to the 

93023 Unit. She is 30 years old and she and her husband Liu Yanchao were high 

school sweethearts and now they have a 4.5 years old son. According to Kong, her 

husband’s national college entrance exam (高考) score was high enough for him 

to attend one of the top civilian universities yet he chose to study at National 

University of Defense and Technology (国防科技大学) [in Changsha (长沙), 

Hunan Province]. They maintained a long-distance relationship throughout the 

4-year undergraduate studies while she took the economy class train (硬座) and 

traveled 18 hours each way, from Shijiazhuang (石家庄) [in Hebei Province] to 

Changsha to visit him during holidays. Upon graduation, Kong gave up taking 

the civil service exam (公务员考试) and withdrew her employment letter from a 

bank and settled down in Mudanjiang (牡丹江) [in Heilongjiang Province] to 

accompany her husband (then still a boyfriend) despite that he could only leave his 

barrack and come home to visit her over the weekend. They married a year later. 

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

The young couple were both from the countryside while their parents remained 

in rural area and were barely living off farming on their land (靠一亩三分地

养家). As their life in Mudanjiang began to stabilize, however, Kong’s husband 

was ordered to transfer to Hulunbuir (呼伦贝尔) [in Inner Mongolia Autonomous 

Region]. Kong, three month pregnant at the time, decided to support her husband 

and quit her job and began her life as a military wife accompanying her deployed 

husband (随军生活).

After they arrived in Hailar (海拉尔), [the largest metropolitan area in Inner 

Mongolia], they moved four times and stayed at a temporary apartment [likely 

shared it with someone else] loaned by Liu’s unit, then a flat without independent 

bathroom by themselves, followed by living in an NCO apartment (士官公寓), 

and f inally settled in a permanent apartment. During the following four years 

before their son began kindergarten (幼儿园) [however, this is roughly equivalent 

of a preschool/pre-K in the US and it usually starts when kids are 3 years old] 

Kong became a stayed-at-home mom despite that she had an undergraduate degree. 

She then went back to work full-time. With the steady increase of military pay and 

benef its, the young couple bought their f irst car and began to dream of buying their 

own apartment/condo that they would decorate it together one day.48

The purpose of such widely publicized “love stories,” almost always in 

first-person narration formats, is perhaps mostly for domestic consumption. 

They promote positive energy among PLA personnel and families through 

glorifying the spirit of making “sacrifices” for the country. Almost all of the 

stories discuss the hardship of maintaining long distance relationships and the 

long separations in military marriages. And these stories almost always end 

up with the authors, or the military spouses, pledging that she is committed 

to supporting the great career choice of her spouse and she firmly understood 

that her spouse loves the “bigger family” or his country, more than the 

“small family” of his own. On Chinese social media, a group of official CCP 

organization accounts also actively promote such messages by organizing 

discussions and interviews with military spouses.xi Catering to a younger 

crowd, the social media stories use screenshots, emojis, and even cartoons to 

garner attention yet the messages being promoted convey almost exactly the 

same logic of “national interest trumps individual happiness.” Nevertheless, 

all of intensive promotions of military marriages reflect concerns of the 

xi There were multiple military spouse groups on Chinese social media including one that was clearly 

promoted by the CCP Youth Central Committee’s (共青团中央) official Sina weibo account. 

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People of the PLA

military over such quality of life issues for its personnel during the reform, 

particularly “below the neck (脖子以下) (corps level and below)” reform which 

will negatively impact the morale of its troops. Marriage-ability and familyrelated concerns, such as housing and military children’s school enrollment, 

may challenge the PLA’s ability to attract and especially retain capable and 

qualified personnel. 

With the tight control of Chinese-language media and strict censorship, 

it is extremely difficult to evaluate, sometimes even to discover, credible 

discontent about any official policies. However, open-source research 

of Chinese language information on this topic still provides a glimpse of 

bubbling discontent of younger-generation military spouses (mostly born in 

the 1980s and 1990s) over military marriages as one military spouse put it 

explicitly “our Motherland is my love rival (祖国是我的情敌).”49

In Chinese public perception, military wives are strong and selfsacrificing. Jun sao (军嫂) are seen as model patriots who put the nation’s 

interests ahead of their private desires, as they sustain their lives and families 

on their own while their husbands are stationed at distant, high-security 

bases. The confidentiality of military assignments means that the couple’s 

communication is limited, and sometimes unpredictable.50 Nevertheless, 

as more and more “post 1980s” (80后) and “post 1990s” (90后) generation 

females become military spouses, the identity and cultural image of traditional 

military wives is going through transitions, which may pose new challenges 

for the personnel management work of the PLA. The Chinese “millennials,” 

particularly those who were born and raised in urban areas, are generally more 

open-minded, independent, tech-savvy and social media-obsessed. They brag 

about their military husbands’ buying them gifts via online shopping sites and 

even quibble with the criteria used by “the Most Beautiful Military wife (最

美军嫂)” award competition held at the military husband’s unit.51 According 

to a wife who is in her twenties, “Must all the military wives be having bitter 

attitudes towards life and complain about their miserable conditions (苦大仇

深)? What is wrong with my pursuit of personal growth and better quality of 

life? I do not think it contradicts my husband’s working hard to establish his 

career in the military! Military wife is an identity, not a job (军嫂是身份,不

是职业)!”52 Yet another young military wife, while visiting her NCO husband 

working at a grassroots company during the Chinese New Year, complained 

about her being called “family subordinate (jiashu, 家属).” She said, “in a 

modern society and modern marriage, I am not a subordinate to my husband. 

We are equal partners in the marriage!”53

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In another 2017 article, a 33-year-old young mother named Wang Jing 

wrote, “We owe our son too much.” Wang works in the northwestern province 

of Gansu, while her husband’s military base is in neighboring Qinghai 

province.54 Though she was able to visit somewhat frequently because of the 

proximity, she felt upset about the fact that their little boy had so little time 

with his father. Their son started kindergarten nearly a year ago, but his father 

has only been able to pick him up twice. The boy is especially disappointed 

when he is sick and his dad isn’t there. “I used to tell him these things about 

protecting people and defending the country, but he can’t understand that,” 

Wang explains. “I never said those words again. I just told him that some of 

the young uncles who work with his dad can’t go home at all, but at least your 

dad can come back to see you sometimes.”

Furthermore, in the discussions about military marriage and family 

lives, female military members were rarely mentioned. It was assumed that 

considering the rather small number of female PLA members, most of them 

would marry fellow male military members.55 Such marriages sometimes even 

entail longer separations. For instance, an article in December 2017 Air Force 

News revealed that a couple of transport aircraft pilots assigned to different 

units have been living separately for 11 years.56

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Families Accompanying the Military Member (家属随军)57

Unlike the U.S. military where military families are provided with a wide 

range of options in terms of on-base or off-base housing with basic allowance 

for housing (BAH) so that the military member can choose either way to 

maintain its work-life balance,58 most of the PLA military members were 

faced with immediate separations from his/her families upon getting married. 

Generally speaking, the PLA does not allow its new officers and NCOs to 

live together with their new wives and families until they meet a general 

minimum time-in-service ranging from 10-12 years.59 Many PLA military 

families have been negatively affected by such restrictions. For instance, 

according to a widely reported story in China documenting a military wife’s 

“long march” to visit her husband on his base, her husband, a company 

commander was stationed at a remote area near the China-Inner Mongolia 

border. Four months out of a year the roads were cutoff due to the excessive 

amount of snow. Many years ago, she decided to take their then five-year-old 

daughter to visit her husband in the winter. It took them half a month to 

get to the headquarters of this company at the edge of an aboriginal forests 

which was 600 li (300 miles) away from his station. As the snow blocked the 

road into the station, the communications were cut off. In the end the couple 

was not able to meet and was only able to talk over the phone instead as her 

husband only had a one-month- long leave.60 Before military members were 

“qualified” to live with their families, leave time and family visit time was the 

only window when they were able to spend time with their families. And for 

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those who are stationed in remote areas, such as the company commander 

noted in the story quoted above, even family visits may not go smoothly. 

The PLA’s regulations for allowing families to accompany military 

members have changed several times since the 1950s: 

In July 1953, the Central People’s Government People’s Revolutionary 

Military Committee allowed military officers who were platoon grade and 

above and served in the military for more than five years to have their 

families live together with them and receive limited benefits; and, in January 

1955, after the military salary reform, military spouses (wives) of officers 

were allowed to live with the military members and supported solely by the 

latter’s salary; however, in November 1957, the GPD issued a new directive 

and encouraged all of the military family members to return to their original 

villages or towns to help with “socialist construction”.61

In July 1961, according to the new notice issued by the GPD, officers’ 

families were again allowed to live on-base, with the approval of the political 

organs of its regiment or division; in April 1963, the “Regulations on 

Appropriate Arrangement for Military Officer’s families (关于妥善安置军官

家属的规定),” stated that battalion-deputy grade or deputy political instructor 

and above positions, officers with the rank of senior captain (大尉)xii and 

above, older than 35 years, served in the military for more than 15 years or 

were pilots were allowed to live on-base. 

In October 1986, political departments at the brigade level were allowed 

to give approvals to those families that had met the requirements and applied 

to live with the military member. In February 1989, family members of 

military personnel who were stationed at border regions or on remote islands, 

were allowed to convert their rural hukou, (农村户口) to urban hukou (城镇

户口) at their original hometown location, and employment would also be 

arranged for them. 

In July 1991, there was a major clarification for the regulations regarding 

the qualifications of military families that were allowed to accompany the 

military members. For the purpose of comparisons Table 1 below shows the 

most recent regulations, published in 2011, with the 1991 regulations: 

xii From 1955-1965, the PLA had a senior captain rank between captain and major.

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Table 1: Policies on Family Members Accompanying the Military Member

Issue July 1991 

“Regulations on Appropriate 

Arrangement for Military Officer’s families (关于妥善安置军官家属

的规定)”

March 2011 

“Notice Pertaining the Adjustment of policies for military families accompanying the military 

member (关于调整军人家属随军政策

的意见) ”

Stationed in regular locations Officers and civilian cadre at the 

battalion deputy leader-grade level 

(副营职) or with 15 years of active 

duty; Master Sergeant Class Three 

NCOs and above (i.e., those with 

12 or more years of service)

Officers in most locations who are 

at the company leader-grade level 

(正连职); Master Sergeant Class 

Four NCOs and above (served 10 

or more years)

Stationed on specially designated as remote areas (an island or 

along the border)

Officers and civilian cadre at the 

company leader-grade level (正连职) 

who have served for at least three 

years; Officers and civilian cadre at 

the company deputy leader-grade 

level (副连职) who have served for 

at least 10 years; Master sergeant 

class three NCOs (i.e., those with 

8 years of service) who live in specified designated as remote areas

No restrictions for officers and 

civilian cadres; For NCOs, Master 

Sergeant Class Four and above

Served on a vessel Officers at the company deputy 

leader-grade level(副连职) who have 

served on a vessel for at least three 

years

No restrictions

Special designated billets All officers who serve as aircrew 

members and on a nuclear submarine, or those with a college degree, 

and specialized technical officers 

and civilian cadres who have 

worked within a top-grade science 

and technology department for at 

least 5 years can have their families 

accompany them as soon as they 

get married

No restrictions

Stationed in Beijing Officers in Beijing who are at the 

battalion leader-grade level (正营

职) or at the battalion deputy leader-grade level (副营职) who have 

served for at least 15 years

Officers in Beijing who are at the 

battalion deputy-leader grade level 

(副营职)

62 63

According to the policies revised in 2011, the PLA allows its military 

member and his/her family to decide whether or not they would like to 

accompany the military personnel and different policies are in place to 

support such family decisions: 

• Those family members who choose to accompany the military member, 

upon approval, will be able to transfer their hukou (registration) from 

rural to urban at the stationed location if stationed in an urban area;

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• The military would entrust the civilian government at the stationed 

location to provide employment assistance for the military spouses who 

relocate with the military member; those who choose to start his/her 

own business would receive preferential tax benefits such as discount or 

waiver of the business tax;

• The military children who relocate with the family would be allowed to 

use either local civilian or military-run schools/kindergartens; 

• Family members who remain unemployed would receive a monthly 

basic living stipend of ¥500-700 (roughly $80-110) and the military 

will provide standard medical insurance and social security insurance 

(in the Chinese context, this is called endowment insurance) (养老保险);

• Officers and NCOs whose family choose to accompany them will receive 

supportive apartment housing based on their ranks and grades;

• Cadres (officers) at the company level and NCOs whose family 

accompany them are allowed to take turns (轮流) to stay at home on 

weekends and holidays;

• Families of officers and NCOs that qualify for “accompanying 

requirements” yet choose not to relocate to the military member’s 

stationed location will receive a monthly couple’s separation stipend (

夫妻分居补助) of ¥100 (roughly $16); starting on 1 January 2013, the 

amount of monthly stipend was again increased to ¥300 (roughly $47).64

The military units will be providing this stipend to its personnel and 

if both husband and wife are military members, upon verification, the 

stipend will be provided by the military unit of the member who qualifies 

for the “accompanying conditions” or the husband’s unit if both qualify. 

• Military spouse and minors, either accompanying the military member 

or not, will receive preferential medical treatment (医疗待遇).

Employment Assistance for Spouses Accompanying the Military Members

Since the 2011 “Notice Pertaining To The Adjustment of Policies for 

Military Families Accompanying The Military Member (关于调整军人家

属随军政策的意见)” was published, there were a total number of roughly 

340,000 military family members accompanying the military members out of 

the entire PLA. However, only 170,000 family members, or close to 50% of 

the total families, according to the official account, had successfully resolved 

their employment-related problems by 2016.65

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People of the PLA 33

From the founding of the PRC up until 2011 there had not been an 

official document put in place to address this issue. There were only 

regulations guiding the practice of providing social insurance for military 

cadres’ unemployed family members while they accompany the military 

person.66 In 2013, accompanying the change of the general criteria for 

families joining the military members, the PLA, for the first time, issued a 

systematic guideline “Measures for Employment Arrangements for Family 

Members Who Accompany the Military Personnel (军人随军家属就业安置

办法)” to standardized the procedures, services and support it would offer in 

terms of employment assistance for military family members.67

The policy document highlighted that the employment assistance will be 

guided by the principle of “private sector as the main channel, internal [within 

the PLA] employment (内部安置) as supplement, actively encouraging and 

subsidizing self- directed job search or starting own businesses (鼓励扶持自

主择业创业).”68 Furthermore, “it is the responsibility of government agencies, 

people’s organizations (人民团体) and state-owned enterprises and public 

institutions (事业单位) to accept and assist in arranging jobs for military 

family spouses.” Local governments of various levels will be shouldering the 

responsibility of supervising relevant agencies or institutions to implement 

employment assistance policies while the military will provide the information 

of military spouse to local government and relevant departments, organize 

vocational training programs and help with identifying appropriate jobs 

within the military. The provincial military districts (省军区) and garrisons (

卫戍区/警备区) system will be the leading unit for military family employment 

at the location of the military member and it needs to become a bridge to 

facilitate coordination and devise and follow through specific measures for 

arrangements:

• Those who are public servants (公务员) will be directly transferred to 

an equivalent position within the government at the location of the 

military member (随军家属对口安置身份);

• Those who work with a public institution (事业编) will be organized to 

attend group selection exams based on their professional background 

(身份随军家属划岗定向招聘); Local governments will be supervising 

local public institutions to set aside a certain number of positions and 

organize targeted recruitment (定向招聘)69
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

By 2014, it was reported that 22 provinces and municipalities including 

Inner Mongolia, Shandong and Guizhou, had issued its policies accompanying 

the “national measures.”70 Changchun City, in Jilin Province, arranged more 

than 100 jobs for military spouses all at one time, while Beijing set up close 

to 350 positions at the community level (社区岗位), and the Lanzhou city 

government designated more than 30 positions within its public service sector 

and other public institutions for military spouses accompanying the military 

member. Nevertheless, by late 2017, there still existed numerous problems 

in terms of implementation in this policy area.71 In 2017, Beijing officially 

kicked off a “pilot project for assisting military family employment (助力随

军家属就业工程).” In February 2018, 75 military spouses accompanying their 

military members in the border region found jobs.xiii

xiii 北部战区陆军某边防旅75名随军家属落户驻地, 2018年02月20日 08:31:30 来源: 解放军报. According to this report, 

although unemployed family members who accompany military members were supposed to receive “hardship 

pay (困难补助)” and certain insurances, due to the limited capacity of the local government and the large amount 

of newly transferred military personnel and their family members, many military families’ needs were not met. 

After working tirelessly with local government, this brigade was finally able to resolve these issues and even 

allowing those without permanent housing to settle down. (无房也可随军落户). 然而, 旅队新调整组建, 一些由异地转隶过

来的官兵家属的随军补助无法申领. “驻地政府也有难处, 驻地人口少, 部队多, 财政压力大.” The report also revealed that a border 

defense 2nd battalion instructor was among those who benefited from the latest development. Zhang, had been 

living in the Gobi Desert and separated from his family for 19 years.

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People of the PLA

Childcare

Since the founding of the PRC, units at the division grade and above, 

as well as regiment grade airfield stations and hospitals, were allowed to 

establish their own daycares to serve military families. Bases that were located 

in remote border areas, on remote islands and places that were far away from 

civilian residential regions, were also allowed to establish schools for cadre’s 

children or, depending on the city, the military unit could establish food and 

boarding stations (干部子女食宿站). These military daycares and schools were 

supposed to be guided by state and local educational administrations. The 

GPD and GLD provided funds to such educational institutions. In 2004, 

a joint document issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Department of 

Education, and GPD also dictated that children of military officers would 

receive preferential treatment while applying to enroll in civilian K-12 

educations and high-education institutions.72 However, concerns about the 

care and education of military children remain a major issue frequently 

discussed in Chinese language military publications. Some military members 

stationed at remote areas are sometimes pressured by his family to zhuanye

(转业) so as to transfer to civilian positions in the public sector, out of 

concerns for a lack of better-quality educational resources for their children 

at the stationed locations.73

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Housing

The PLA requires all two-year conscripts/enlistees to live in on-base 

military barracks. NCOs who were below Master Sergeant Class Four (less 

than 10 years of service) are also required to live in barracks. Senior Grade 

NCOs, upon approval for his family to be accompanying the military member 

(家属经批准可以随军), will be provided housing (apartment 公寓房) with the 

military member paying a monthly rent.xiv 74 Active-duty NCOs also receive 

rent allowance (房租补贴), HPF (住房公积金) and housing allowance (住房补

贴). In order to withdraw HPFs and housing allowances in a lump sum, one 

has to move out of the on-base or off-base military housing.

Historically, the PLA’s housing policy has been a combination of subsidized 

military housing and allowing the military members to purchase housing on 

their own (租用公寓住房与购买自有住房相结合的保障制度). The housing size 

is determined by officers’ grades and the military members are also required 

to pay rent for on-base housing based on the housing size. When it comes to 

purchasing one’s own accommodations, officers can either choose to purchase 

the military housing they are currently renting at a discounted rate (依房

改成本价购买) or choose to purchase subsidized housing built by his unit 

or commercial housing. Those who purchase subsidized housing either built 

by the military or the civilians would receive housing allowance (住房补贴), 

which was composed of basic allowance (基本补贴) and locality allowance (地

xiv In August 2008, the rent was increased from ¥1.2/square meter to $2.6/square meter. At the same time, it 

also increased the housing allowance (房租补贴). The rent remains significantly lower than the monthly salary of 

the NCOs. See: http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2008-08-06/0601515021.htm

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People of the PLA

区补贴). The basic allowance, calculated based on certain percentage of basic 

salaries, is included in the monthly paychecks while the locality allowance 

applied to military members who were stationed in regions with high real 

estate prices.75 More specifically, as of 2000, military officers and NCOs are 

all eligible for receiving housing allowance, and the amount of allowance was 

calculated based on four factors: grade and rank, service time, salary, and the 

allowed housing size assigned for each grade and rank.76

The “Notice Pertaining the Adjustment of Policies for Military Families 

Accompanying The Military Member (关于调整军人家属随军政策的意见)”77

issued in 2011 by then President Hu Jintao also announced the establishment 

of new housing projects for the military families who would accompany the 

military members. The housing projects were supposed to be completed within 

three years. In 2010, an online process titled “My House, My Decision (我的

住房我做主)” was open to all PLA military members to vote for the most liked 

layout of military apartments.78 The plan stated that, between 2010 and 2013, 

the military would be combining adjusting existing housing, renovating and 

rebuild old housing and build new housing to gradually resolve the housing 

issues for the military families. Grassroots level unitsxv were supposed to 

receive preference in this project and the focus of 2010 would be on the 

comprehensive construction of modern logistics trial site (现代化后勤试

点), and push for the entire staff and organizations for corps and division 

level and brigade and regiment units and organizations and units that were 

stationed at designated remote regions; in 2012, the focus would be on more 

stabilized brigade and regiment level units and make arrangements for those 

organizations that had large amount of personnel and more responsibilities. 

By 2013, the housing project should be completed. According to the new 

standard for military apartment buildings, newly-built or rebuilt housing 

should guarantee 60 square meters per household and for those that were 

renovated from old housing would guarantee 72 square meters per household. 

In 2017, an Air Force News article reported that the construction of new 

barracks was wrapped up and 72 new apartments were handed over to the Air 

Force Xi’an Flight College’s 2nd brigade (西安飞行学院二旅).79 Although it 

was delivered more than three years later than the timeline suggested in Hu 

Jintao’s plan, details revealed in this article proved to be in accordance with 

the general policy guidelines.

xv In the PLA context, it usually refers to battalion and company level units that are at the lowest level of the 

military hierarchy.

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

It was relatively easy to build new housing; however, the “adjusting” of 

existing housing proved to be a major challenge. Although, theoretically 

speaking, all the apartments and condominiums military members and 

families were assigned to live in belong to the military and are managed by 

the respective Logistics Department, in reality this system has been abused by 

a large number of military officers who treated these properties as their own; 

this has in turn contributed, to a certain degree, to the housing shortage.80

At some relative wealthy places with pleasant weather, some military families, 

who’s military members have already retired or have been transferred to a 

different location but retained their housing based on their grade (corps and 

above), rent out their “military housing” to pocket profits during holiday 

seasons.81 According to Chen Xianyi (陈先义), a former Director of the 

Cultural Department of the PLA Daily (原 (解放军报) ( JFJB) 文化部主任), a 

lot of active-duty officers with relatively high grades own multiple housing 

units, largely because of the multiple relocations they had during their 

career. “For instance, when a higher-level officer relocated to Shanghai from 

Guangzhou, concerned about “face” (迫于颜面), the Guangzhou unit would 

not take back his old housing. It all adds up to the problem of one officer with 

multiple housing in various locations.”82

Indeed, violations and abuse of the PLA’s housing policies was a widespread problem with serious consequences. It led to housing shortages for 

many officers and NCOs who were qualified for military housing. They were 

forced to purchase or rent on their own housing.83 For example, in August 

2006, JFJB reported that 91 personnel from the former Lanzhou Military 

Region Headquarters were sued by the military “eviction team” because these 

former headquarters staff and cadres who already left the military and gained 

housing from his/her civilian government departments continued to occupy 

military barracks; it led to a housing shortage for more than 80 active-duty 

cadres who qualified for housing. The Shaanxi Xi’an Yanta District People’s 

Court (陕西西安市雁塔区人民法院) eventually ruled in favor of the Eviction 

Team.84

In May 2014, the PLA’s four General Departmentsxvi and the CMC 

jointly issued an order to require units of all levels to carry out a so-called 

“three cleanups (三清)”. This included “clean up the houses (清房), clean up 

the use of military vehicles (清车), and clean up the people (who were abusing 

such policies) (清人).”85 In July 2014, an official document titled “Notice on 

xvi General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department 

(GLD), and General Armament Department (GAD)

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People of the PLA

Further Resolving The Violations of Military Housing And Use of Military 

Vehicles of Retired Cadres Or Those Who Have Separated From The 

Military (关于进一步做好离退休干部违规住房用车问题清理工作的通知)” was 

issued for the entire PLA to implement. According to PLA Daily’s official 

Weibo account, the Notice stated that: 

• Rent, which is calculated based on the highest market price of commercial 

houses, will be directly withheld from one’s monthly pay to account for 

the extra housing one occupies; 

• Houses that were originally built to be offered as subsidized housing 

but were purchased in violation of relevant regulations will be 

unconditionally bought back at its original sales price by the unit which 

profited from the sales (违规购买的房改房由售房单位无条件原价收回);

• Individuals who objected to turning in extra house(s) that he/she 

occupies will be suspended to receive military benefits or receiving 

military services and support (拒不退交的个人暂停各种服务保障 中止福

利发放);

• Those military members’ widowers and children who refused to move 

out of the houses that were in violation of the relevant regulations will 

be reported to their work unit/company/offices, and will be evicted 

abided by legal measures if needed. (对拒不腾退住房的遗孀和子女,向

当事人所在单位通报情况,必要时采取行政或法律手段予以清退)

86

At the time, it was reported that some older generation cadres and their 

families were cooperative in the process. According to JFJB, during the “three 

cleanups,” for instance, Niu Xiuzhen (牛秀珍) and Zhou Yueqian (周月茜), two 

widowers of nation-founding generals (开国将军), volunteered to move from 

their homes of almost half a century inside an Air Force designated residential 

area in Beijing to a retirement facility for retired cadres (干休所) in Beijing.87

However, given the complex nature and extensiveness of housing policy violations, 

the implementation of such policies did not go smoothly as originally expected. 

Some units even had to establish designated offices named the “Eviction Office 

(清房办).”88 In one military base which successfully “cleaned up” more than 200 

houses that were identified as taken in violation of regulations, measures taken 

to ensure results of the “cleaning up” process also included exposing the names of 

those who repetitively refused to move and cutting off their water and electricity 

supplies... the discipline inspection department, security guards and military 

service departments also jointly made recordings guaranteed by joint signatures 

to carry out forced evictions (强制清退).89

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

Overseas Chinese language media reported in 2016 that more detailed 

standards were revealed by the CMC which laid out harsh measures taken 

to ensure that “all military members who retired at corps deputy leader 

grade and above (副军职以上退休人员) should move out of the independent 

buildings they were occupying and move into apartments with appropriate 

size of apartment in accordance with their grades and service time.”90 The 

mainland China-based Southern Weekend even counted that between 1990 to 

2014, there were a total of 11 regulations and policy documents pertaining 

to military housing that had been issued.91 As recent as in January 2018, 

however, the implementation of such policies seems to be still ongoing.92

To address the housing shortage for those families who qualify for 

accompanying the military member or those who pay temporary visit to their 

military member, in 2015, Xi Jinping issued the “Regulations on Standardizing 

Benefits and Preferential Treatment of Military Personnel (关于规范完善军队

人员有关福利待遇的若干规定),” which allows the military member to receive 

certain amount of housing allowance based on the standard market rate. It 

also allows the military unit to provide ground transportation assistance for 

those temporary visitors of the military member and assistance for their 

receiving medical care during their visit.93

On 1 August 2015, “Administrative Measures for HPF Loans of Military 

Members (军人住房公积金贷款管理办法)” also took effect.94 JFJB reported that 

the interest accrual of the military housing provident fund officially started 

on January 1st 2017. According to the Ministry of Defense, HPF “aims to 

enrich and perfect the policy of the military housing currency treatment and 

is a concrete measure to safeguard the legitimate interests of the officers and 

soldiers and to ensure that the officers and soldiers can enjoy the related 

treatment and policy over the housing provident fund as regulated by the 

state.”95 More specifically:96

• All military officers, civilian cadresxvii (wenzhi ganbu / 文职干部), NCOs 

and retired officers under the military’s management are eligible to apply 

to HPF loans with priorities given to those who purchase commercial 

properties, are based in remote regions, or those who live at different 

locations from their spouses combined with grades and service time;

xvii In November 2017, the PLA issued the new “PLA Civilian Contractor Regulations (中国人民解放军文职人

员条例) which stated that the current civilian cadres would be gradually converted into the Civilian Contractor 

system. See: “Decipher the Civilian Contractors regulations (军队权威部门详解 (中国人民解放军文职人员条例)),” 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-11/10/c_129738060.htm

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People of the PLA

• The house to be purchased shall be the first house and the applicants 

and their spouses should not have used any other local HPFs offered by 

civilian government offices;

• Currently, the general upper limit of the HPF loans is set at ¥400,000 

yuan (roughly $63,000) with maximum 20-year term for all military 

officers and NCOs. When exceeding the set limit of the amount, local 

government’s HPF policies are to be followed. The total loan’s term 

should not exceed 65 years while combined with the applicant’s age (贷

款期限与本人年龄之和不超过65年)

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

Military Leave, Pay and Benefits

Leave

The military leave policies have gone through significant changes since 

the PRC was founded. In 1952, the Central People’s Government People’s 

Revolutionary Military Commission (中央人民政府人民革命军事委员会) 

decided that only division-grade and above military officers, aviation crew 

and college instructors were allowed to take an annual leave once a year. 

By 1954, it was expanded to include all of the unmarried officers who live 

separately from their parents and married officers who live separately from 

their spouses. In 1964, the leave system was abolished, although some cadres 

were allowed to visit their families upon approval. In 1978, a new leave policy 

was put in place for officers who served in plateau region, border areas, and 

remote islands, who were above 45 years old and served more than 15 years. 

In the 1980s, two important documents – “Regulations on Family Visits for 

Active Duty Military Cadres (关于军队现役干部探亲待遇的规定)” and “Notice 

on Issues Related to Military Cadre’s Leave (关于军队干部休假问题的通知)” 

were issued in 1981 and 1987, respectively, and further elaborated on the 

policies.97

A major overhaul of the leave and family visit policies took place in 2003, 

which was implemented around the time when the PLA was going through 

its 200,000-man downsizing under President and CMC Chairman Jiang 

Zemin.98 The GPD issued the “Regulations on Military Leave And Family 

Visits For PLA Active-Duty Military Officers (中国人民解放军现役军官休

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People of the PLA

假探亲规定)” which took effect on 1 January 2004. The new “Regulations” 

were a direct response to the changing demographics of the PLA recruits, 

and the PLA realized that the leave policies that had been in place for almost 

20 years were “neither systematic nor formalized (不够系统规范)” and lacked 

“support implementation mechanisms (保障落实机制).”99 As a direct response 

to concerns of “the increasing number of single-child military officers (独生子

女军官)”, the new “Regulations” updated its policies regarding the frequency 

allowed for family visits, from once every four years to once every two years, 

so that “military officers can feel more relaxed while serving in the military (

安心部队工作).”100

During Xi Jinping’s current round of military reform and 300,000-man 

downsizing, which officially kicked off in 2016, military family visit and 

leave policies were again revisited. To further increase the benefits of activeduty military personnel and ensure that the “legitimate rights and welfare (

合法权益)” of enlisted military members were protected, in April 2017, the 

CMC, CMC Political Work Department and Logistic Support Department 

issued a “Notice on Relevant Issues of Active Duty Military Members’ Leave 

And Family Visit (关于现役军人休假探亲有关问题的通知)” accompanied by 

“Regulations on Standardizing Benefits And Status For Military Personnel 

(关于规范完善军队人员有关福利待遇的若干规定).”101 The latter specifically 

clarifies that, for officers and soldiers who could not use up their leave due 

to work, the “Regulations” would guarantee financial compensations. Such 

measures were touted as “heart-warming measures” to ensure the improvement 

and sustainable development of the generation of combat capabilities (战斗力

生成提高与持续发展).102 The highlights of the new changes included:

• Married military officers can now visit parents (including in-laws) once 

a year (up from once every two years); 

• For those who live separately from their spouses or family members, 

the family can now pay on-base visit twice a year (which also used to be 

once a year) 

• The military member are allowed to visit his family (年度探亲) twice a 

year (previously once a year) 

Perhaps aiming to transform the PLA’s “leave culture,” the new notice 

also emphasized that the leaders of each unit were encouraged to take full 

leave so that the enlisted personnel would feel “comfortable and relaxed (平

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

和愉悦)” to take their leave and not worry about “looking bad.” (领导没休假,

自己想休又不好意思休). The new regulations also emphasized the importance 

of allowing military members to use up their leave days with specific targeted 

objectives: “Military officers were required to use up at least 60% of the annual 

leave days; officers who live separately from their families were required to 

use up at least 70% of the annual leave days, while the NCOs were required 

to hit the 70% mark. 

To ensure the implementation of offering monetary compensation to 

military members for unused leave days, instead of having each unit manage 

the funding, the CMC is now providing funding for the entire PLA’s unused 

leave compensations. Also added was the regulation that the higher one’s 

grade and rank, the less compensation per unused leave day will one receive. 

This was to ensure the policy was put in place to favor grassroots organizations 

and personnel.103

The highlights for PLA leave policies for military officers and NCOs are 

shown in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, below:

Table 2: 2017 PLA Leave Policies for Military Officers104

Time-in-Service Marriage Status Leave Days ( 休假) Family Visit Days (探亲)

Those who serve 

under 20 years

Single (divorced and 

widowed)

parents at the same location: 

20 days 

parents at different location: 

20 days

parents at the same location: 

0 days

parents at different location: 

30 days

Married (spouse at the 

same location)

parents at the same location: 

20 days 

parents at different location: 

20 days

parents at the same location: 

0 days

parents at different location: 

20 days

Married (spouse not at 

the same location)

parents at the same location: 

20 days

spouse and parents at the 

same location: 20 days

spouse and parents at different location: 20 days

parents at the same location: 

40 days

parents at different location: 

40 days

spouse and parents at different 

location: 45 days

Those who serve 

more than 20 

years

Single (divorced and 

widowed)

parents at the same location: 

30 days

parents at different location: 

30 days

parents at the same location: 

0 days

parents at different location: 

30 days

Married (spouse at the 

same location)

parents at the same location: 

30 days

parents at different location: 

30 days

parents at the same location: 

0 days

parents at different location: 

20 days

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People of the PLA

Married (spouse at different location)parents at the same location: 

30 days

spouse and parents at the 

same location: 30 days

spouse and parents at different location: 30 days

parents at the same location: 

40 days

parents at different location: 

40 days

spouse and parents at different 

location: 45 days

Table 3: 2017 PLA Leave Policies for NCOs105

NCOs Marriage Status Leave Days Family Visit Days

Single (divorced and 

widowed)

N/A parents at different location: 20 days (corporal 

and below); 30 days 

(sergeant and above)

Married (parents at the 

same location)

N/A spouse at different 

location: spousal visit 40 

days/year.

Married (parents at 

different location)

N/A 20 days for parents visit 

every two years; if spouse 

and parents at same location: only spousal visit 

applies, 40 days/year; if 

spouse and parents both 

at different locations, 45 

days

Pay and Benefits

In the discussions of the steady increase of China’s national defense 

budget, the increasing cost of PLA personnel had not been given enough 

attention. Although it remains unclear exactly how many resources the PLA 

had dedicated to the pay and various types of allowances to its personnel, the 

PLA understood the importance of using monetary incentives to boost the 

retention rate of its service members and had provided significant increases 

in its military pay and benefits in recent years. 

Two-year enlistees and NCOs

NCOs in the PLA receive a monthly salary which is composed of three parts:106

• Base Salary (jichu gongzi; 基础工资)

• Grade and Rank Salary (junxian jibie gongzi; 军衔级别工资): This salary 

is divided into six grades (NCO grades 1-6) and between five and ten 

steps (dang档) for each grade.

• Time in Service Salary (junling gongzi; 军龄工资): This is calculated 

from the time the member joined the PLA.

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

In July 2006, the PLA increased the wages, living expenses, and pensions 

for its officers and NCOs. Reportedly, all PLA officers and NCOs received 

pay increases ranging between 80 and 100 percent.107 For example, prior to 

the 2006 salary increase, a PLA colonel earned ¥2,000 ($256) per month. 

Following the salary increase, a PLA colonel earned ¥4,200 ($539) per 

month.108 In 2018, the PLA increased NCOs’ basic salaries by 40% and 

increased the monthly allowance for the two-year enlistees to ¥480.109 Table 

4 below shows the estimated 2006 pay standards of the PLA enlisted force.

Table 4: NCO Salaries in 2006

Rank All Compensation/ 

Month (RMB)

Salary/Month 

(RMB)

Annual Total 

(RMB)

Private 2nd Class (列兵) 200-220 2,400-2,640

Private 1st Class (上等兵) 220-240 2,640-2,880

Corporal (下士) (8 steps) 560-630 6,720-7,560

Sergeant (中士) (8 steps) 700-805 8,400-9,660

Sergeant First Class (上士) (10 steps) 790-970 9,480-11,649

Master Sergeant Class Four (四级军士长) 

(10 steps)

930-1,200 11,160-14,400

Master Sergeant Class Three (三级军士

长) (11 steps)

1,130-1,570 13,560-18,840

Master Sergeant Class Two (二级军士长) 

(12 steps)

1,480-2,085 17,760-25,020

Master Sergeant Class One (一级军士长) 

(not applicable in 2006)

Other than basic salary, a PLA member is also entitled to a variety of stipends 

and subsidies. One important and rather unique stipend, known as the preferential 

stipends (家庭优待金) needs to be singled out and explained.110 This was a fund 

designed to be paid by the local government of military member’s home of 

record (户口所在地) to his family, which originally served as a compensation 

for the family’s loss of labor.111 Exact amounts are contingent on whether the 

member’s hometown is in a rural or urban area – and the level of general economic 

development of the area. For instance, the families of rural youth from Shaanxi 

province can receive preferential stipends about 1.5 times the average income 

for other rural families in the previous year.112 In another example, according to 

an official notice jointly issued by the Hunan Provincial Civil Affairs, Finance 

and Conscription Office, starting on 1 January 2018, the standard amount of the 

preferential stipends for the entire Hunan Province, rural and urban families alike, 

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People of the PLA

is ¥12,000 yuan. The funds will continue to be appropriated through province, city 

and county levels. 

Based on its economic development level and necessity of the conscription/

recruitment work, each locality is also allowed to increase the amount of the 

preferential stipend, which should be covered by its own budget.113 The first 

payment of the preferential stipends is not made, however, until the enlisted 

personnel complete the first 12 months of service.114 While serving on active duty, 

compensation to families cannot be less than 50% of the pay for urban workers. 

Furthermore, pay cannot be less than 50% of the previous year’s average living 

standard.115 Urban and rural compensation is now unified into a single system.116

The money is apparently deposited in their family’s bank account once per 

year, which they can withdraw using a debit card.117 Additional compensation 

is included for personnel who receive a First-Class Achievement Award (一等

功) (15%), Second-Class Achievement Award (二等功) (20%), and Third-Class 

Award (三等功) (5%).118 And families of conscripts who serve in Tibet receive 

an additional ¥12,000 for each year, and families of conscripts who serve in high 

plateaus receive ¥10,000 for each year. 

According to the Military Member Preferential Treatment Policy (军人抚

恤优待政策)”, the PRC Conscription Law (中华人民共和国兵役法), and the 

Ministry of Civil Affairs’ “Response to the question regarding whether enlisted 

soldiers should receive family preferential stipend (关于士兵从部队考入军校

是否享受优待金问题的答复),” the family preferential stipends were designed 

for two-year enlistees only and once the two-year enlistee are admitted to 

military academic institutions (考入军校) or have been promoted to become 

NCOs, they will automatically be disqualified for this stipend.119 However, 

before and around the time when the revision of the Conscription Law was 

taking into effect in 1998, the PLA allowed a number of enlisted personnel 

to serve beyond the original conscripted time (超期服役), who would legally 

continue to receive the preferential stipend.xviii Many enlisted-soldier-turned 

cadets were essentially treated the same way and continued to receive the 

stipend upon entering the military higher education institutions.120 The legal 

explanations of the Regulations of Military Member’s Preferential Treatment 

(军人抚恤优待条例) issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs stipulated that:

xviii Before the 1998 revision of the Conscription Law, the PLA allowed enlisted personnel to serve beyond the 

required three-year term. For the Army, the extra service term had a limit of an additional three years while the 

Navy and the Air Force had a limit of four years. In the 1998 revision, the clause regarding “serving extra time in 

the military” had been replaced by enlisted soldiers are supposed to be serving a maximum of two years.

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“The family preferential stipend will be distributed in accordance to the term of 

enlistment that was legally allowed by the law. For personnel who continued to serve 

in the military after 3 years, regiment and above level headquarters should notify local 

governments to continue providing the stipends to military members’ families.”xix

This practice may have been carried out for a few more years in the early 2000s but 

eventually ceased as the number of directly-recruited college-student enlisted personnel 

from civilian higher educational institutions gradually increased.

Officers

The PLA Officer’s pay is composed of four parts: base salary, allowances, and 

subsidies including121:

• Base Salary (jiben gongzi; 基本工资). This is determined according to the 

officer’s grade, rank, billet, and time in service.

• Servicemen’s Professional Allowance (junren zhiye jintie; 军人职业津贴). 

This is an allowance provided to officers who provide certain duties and 

tasks in addition to their main responsibilities.

• Grassroots Cadre Billet Allowance (jiceng ganbu gangwei jintie; 基层干部

岗位津贴). This allowance is provided to all officers posted in battalions, 

companies, and platoons.

• Regional Allowance (diqu jintie, 地区津贴). This is a subsidy provided to 

officers stationed in hardship areas. The amount varies based on the level of 

hardship as determined by the PLA.

• Specialty Subsidies (zhuanye butie, 专业补贴). This is a subsidy provided to 

personnel working in high-demand billets that require special skills such as 

aviation and naval technical positions, as well as national defense scientific 

research positions. The amount of the subsidy is determined by the degree of 

specialization that the position requires.

Like the enlisted force, the PLA officers also receive a variety of subsidies and 

allowances and the actual benefit package one receives may vary tremendously. 

xix This report also noted that after the enlisted personnel was admitted to military educational institutions 

in their second year, in the PLA’s perspective, if their family preferential stipends cease, it would lead to an 

imbalance with those enlisted personnel still on active duty in their units or who have exceeded their required 

enlistment term. In order to encourage enlisted personnel to pursue advanced studies, many of these cadets are 

treated like personnel who have exceeded their required enlistment term and continued to be given the family 

preferential stipends in accordance with unit notification. But this only creates a new imbalance, as according to 

regulations military institution cadets who are directly recruited from non-military sources are not entitled to the 

family preferential stipends. However, both the enlisted personnel-turned cadets and civilian-turned cadets would 

be together at military academic institutions but would be treated differently, which was considered unfair.

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People of the PLA

For example, subsidies for officers stationed in Tibet can almost triple the amount 

they would receive if assigned to other areas in China.

In the 2017-18 military benefit reform, a new holiday stipend was created for 

both the enlisted force and the officer corps. During the five major holidays “New 

Year’s Day, Spring Festival, Labor Day, PLA Day, and National Day” all military 

members would receive ¥1000; with military officers who are stationed in Beijing, 

Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing receiving an extra ¥500 and NCOs stationed 

at such locations receiving an extra ¥200.122 The main adjustments are listed in 

Table 5 below: 

Table 5: Estimated Active-duty Military Officer Salaries and Compensation in 2018

(在职军官干部工资待遇)

123

Grade Monthly Salary + Increases 

(RMB)

Total (including allowances, and 

subsidies etc.) (RMB)

Total Annual Compensation 

(RMB)xx

Division-leader grade 8,000 + increase of 2,283 22,000 264,000 

Division deputy-leader grade 7,129 + increase of 2,123 20,000 240,000 

Regiment leader-grade 6,214+ increase of 1,953 18,000 216,000 

Regiment deputy leader- grade 5,457+ increase of 1,813 16,000 192,000 

Battalion leader-grade 4,857+ increase of 1,658 12,000 144,000 

Battalion deputy leader-grade 4,375+ increase of 1,528 10,000 120,000 

Company leader-grade 3,974+ increase of 1,398 8,000-9,000 96,000-108,000 

Company deputy leader-grade 3,679+ increase of 1,308 8,000 96,000 

Platoon leader-grade 3,452+ increase of 1,218 6,000-7,000 (not including 

Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner 

Mongolia’s extra subsidies)

72,000-84,000 

xx

In the PLA, all money filters down from the government through the Finance 

Bureau of the CMC Logistic Support Department (former GLD) to the service 

headquarters’ Logistics Department’s Finance Bureau. It is then filtered to the 

local unit’s Logistics Department’s Finance Office, which either directly deposits 

compensation to the military member’s bank account or pays them in cash on a 

monthly basis. If the money is received in cash, the military member typically 

deposits the money in a local bank. Based on available information, a high 

percentage of personnel stationed in rural areas still receive their money in cash 

and then deposit it in a local bank, so that their families can access the money 

xx Including an estimated U.S. dollar amount based on rate in April 2018.

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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

using a debit card in another location.xxi Military members normally receive their 

pay between the 1st to 5th of the month.124

The PLA only began to issue military support cards (保障卡) to its military 

personnel to use as an integrated way to receive their pay, insurance, and receiving 

medical benefits in 2011.125 In December 2017, it was announced that the 2ndgeneration of military support card would be put into use in 2018.126 Compared 

with the 1st-gen support card, which played an important role in supporting 

military members’ benefits, health insurance, and housing allowances, the new 

card, with better security features, contains isolated dual-chip technology and 

allows one chip mainly to be used for military use and another for other financial 

uses such as telephone banking, online banking, and mobile phone banking.127

For instance, it supports popular Chinese third-party payment platforms such as 

Alipay (支付宝) and WeChat pay (微信支付); and the purchase and management 

of wealth management products offered by Chinese financial institutions.128 It can 

be used for multiple purposes including salary, medical, and clothing with crucial 

personal identification information pre-loaded in the card to ensure accurate 

verifications. It also offers military members and families special discounts while 

making purchases. 

 Figure 9: PLA Military Support Cards (2nd-Gen)

In 2017, as a tribute to the National Army’s Day on 1 August 2017, the 

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC, 中国工商银行) officially 

announced its creation of a credit card designated to military members with 

xxi A front-page article in the Air Force’s newspaper in 2016 showed personnel in a rural area receiving their 

salary in cash and members from the Bank of China sitting at a table to take their money and deposit it for them.

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People of the PLA

an emotionally-charged name, “ICBC Credit Card for the Military Soul (军魂

卡).” The card offers five different covers matching the fivexxii military services.129

This was the first time that a commercial bank issued a designated credit card for 

military members and their families. According to the official website of ICBC, 

this credit card also offers bonus points and discounts on airfare and train rides 

and it also advertised that “once a special app matching the card was installed 

on one’s cellphone, scanning the card would also give the user access to viewing 

of the images of the newly developed military equipment with special-effect.”130

Other than the credit card offerings, ICBC also developed various kinds of wealth 

management products and credit loan services.131

Another important aspect of the benefit package for PLA members is 

retirement benefits and the various compensation packages for those who leave 

the military, either voluntarily or following the reorganization orders, before they 

reach the retirement age. There were mainly four channels through which PLA 

members separate from the military: retirement, pre-determined reassignment(计

划分配), which is commonly known as Zhuanye, self-directed job search, or Zizhu 

Zeye(自主择业) and civilian contractor conversions.132 There are a few policy 

documents addressing this issue including “Provisional Measures Regarding 

Resettlement of Military Cadres Transferred to Civilian Work (军队转业干部

安置暂行办法) issued in 2001, “Measures on Housing Assurance for Military 

Cadres Transferred to Civilian Work (军队转业干部住房保障办法) which was 

issued in 2000, and “Suggestions on Resettlement of Military Cadres Transferred 

to Civilian Work and Who Choose to look for Jobs on their own (关于自主择业的

军队转业干部安置管理若干问题的意见)” in 2001.133 Most recently, in November 

2017, the PLA updated its “Civilian Contractor, or wenzhi renyuan conversion (

文职转改)” policies which essentially opened up a new channel for post-service 

arrangement of military members.134

Strictly speaking, zhuanye only applies to Intermediate Grade and above 

NCOs (中级士官以上) and officers who reach or come close to the maximum 

age of deputy regiment grade (副团职). NCOs at intermediate level, or who 

have served in the military for more than 10 years, could also qualify for zhuanye

upon approval. Theoretically, military members who zhuanye are transferred 

to government departments or institutions (政府机关和事业单位) and are able 

to maintain their cadre status, although in practice, most of military zhuanye

personnel had to settle with positions within civilian government that were lower 

xxii Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

in status than their military grades and ranks.xxiii Most civilian governments 

at various levels implement a system consisting of an evaluation process and a 

written test to place these cadres. The reason why it is a key concept to understand 

in the context of the PLA’s personnel policies is that due to family pressures, 

many military members choose to zhuanye so that they could regain the work-life 

balance. Over recent years, zizhu zeye (自主择业), has become a popular option 

among military cadres who have served in the military for 20 years and reached 

the regiment or battalion grade. Upon separation from the military, those who 

zizhu zeye receive a “settlement fee (自主择业补助费)” paid in lump sum based on 

years of service and grade levels and will continue to receive a monthly stipend (

月退役金). For instance, in 2017, a battalion grade cadre who chooses this option 

receives ¥413,000 roughly $65,000 in settlement fee and would continue to 

receive his/her monthly stipend of approximately ¥7,260 (roughly $1100).135 To 

put it in perspective, with the same grade level, if one chooses to zhuanye, or 

transfer to arranged civilian government jobs, he/she would receive a one-time 

“job transfer fee (转业费)” of ¥349,000 roughly $55,000 but will not receive any 

monthly stipend since a civilian government salary is to be guaranteed.136

The announcement of the new “Wenzhi renyuan conversion” in late 2017 as 

a component of the military reform, known in Chinese as Zhuanwen (转文) was 

most likely established as a supplementary measure to help reduce the pressure 

for Zhuanye throughout the 300,000-man downsizing.137 It essentially provided 

military-established civilian positions, vis-à-vis the public servant positions made 

available for military personnel through Zhuanye, for active-duty military officers 

(including civilian cadres) to transfer into. 

xxiii This is partially due to the incompatibility of the skillset of demobilized military members and those 

required for civilian government positions; and perhaps, also due to resistance from the career government 

workers within the organizations that demobilized military members were assigned to.
People of the PLA

Conclusions

First, the changes of such personnel policies have reflected the fundamental 

changes of the Chinese society as a whole. Most notably, the intensive measures 

that had been put in place to improve the policies of “dependents accompanying 

military members (家属随军)” and housing in recent years clearly showed that 

the military is keenly aware of the changing perceptions of the society towards 

marriage, family life and work-life balance. The changing demographic structure 

of the Chinese society and marriage-ability issues are also forcing the military 

to be more involved in the personal lives of its military members and taking into 

consideration their family needs. Take the changes of military leave and family 

visit policies as another example. As more active-duty military members belong to 

China’s single-child generation, the policy has changed from allowing the military 

members to visit their parents staying in their hometowns once every four years 

to once every two years and eventually to once a year for a period of 40-45 days.138

However, as military reform deepens and more intensive actual-combat 

training, drills, and exercises are to be carried out as an integral component of 

Xi Jinping’s pursuit of building a strong army, the challenges facing the PLA’s 

personnel policies are only intensifying. It remains to be seen if the PLA is 

capable of following through on its promises. Even when the political will at the 

top leadership level was ample, as demonstrated in the push for housing reforms 

within the military, the complex vested interest within the PLA runs deep and 

the implementation of policy initiatives may, in reality, take much longer than 

originally expected to be realized. 
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

Second, many of the quality of life issues and policies discussed in this report 

are interrelated, which means the implementation of one policy has a domino 

effect on others. Most notably, aside from the strict restrictions for military family 

members to be “qualified” to accompany military personnel, housing shortages for 

qualified military families may negatively impact the marriage ability of military 

members as most Chinese families regard property ownership as a prerequisite 

for marriage.139 Although a rather standard and open grading system based on a 

calculated score of grade, ranks, service time and marital status assigned to each 

military member, had been used to calculate one’s eligibility for provided housing 

since late 1990s, the poor implementation of such policies, or the housing shortage 

that were to be assigned to qualified personnel, led many military members to seek 

early separation from the military either through Zhuanye or Zizhu zeye.

140

Third, the core challenge of the PLA’s personnel policies is whether such 

policies prove effective in retaining the most talented personnel. Almost all of 

the policies discussed in this report were supposed to help the PLA attract and 

retain its people. The PLA’s grassroots political officers have worked tirelessly to 

organize matchmaking events and group weddings to help military personnel find 

spouses, because not being able to find wives has become a major concern and has 

prompted more marriage-age military members to leave the military or not want 

to join in the first place. Setting up a “hard quota” to ensure all active-duty military 

personnel use up their leave seems extreme, if not bizarre, but if understood 

through the lens of boosting the attractiveness of the military as a profession, 

it shows the length the military is willing to go to ensure the execution of its 

policies. The issuance of credit cards and embedding a mobile payment function 

into the military support cards are also clear measures to modernize the image of 

the military so that the online shopping demands of the younger generation PLA 

members can be better met and monitored. Beyond the scope of issues discussed 

in this report, the PLA has also updated its Discipline Regulations (纪律条令) to 

allow the use of smartphones in 2015 and to allow military members to acquire 

civilian driver’s licenses and purchase private cars. It is worth noting that such 

measures might seem normal or nothing of significance in a U.S. military context; 

nevertheless, compared with the past and the starting point of the PLA’s personnel 

policies, these policy changes were rather significant. 

In conclusion, this report hopes to serve as a preliminary study guide for further 

research of the personnel policies of the PLA. It is an important yet understudied 

aspect that should be taken into consideration while conducting evaluations of 

the overall strength and weakness of the Chinese military power. During the 
People of the PLA

current military reform and reorganization which officially kicked off in 2016, 

maintaining the stability of the military and boosting morale has been a top 

concern of the PLA leadership. Xi Jinping’s high talks about making the military 

an honorable profession, along with the high-profile announcement of establishing 

a Ministry of Veteran Affairs, the first of its kind in China’s modern history, and 

the drastic increase of benefit packages for active-duty military members have all 

demonstrated that the PLA is not only focusing on the advancement of weapon 

systems and equipment, but it has also put in a significant amount of investment 

in its own personnel, who would be the fundamental driving force for building a 

truly strong army. 
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

About the Author

Dr. Marcus Clay is a Research Analyst with BluePath Labs and a CASI 

associate. Previously, he conducted research on Asian security at the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He also worked as a consultant at the 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), 

where he supported various programs related to China's financial sectors.
People of the PLA

Appendix A: 

PLA Officer Grades and Ranks

57

Note: Since 2002, CMC members who are 67 or younger at the time of the Party Congress can remain until 

the next congress (age 72). Members who are 68 at the time of the Party Congress must retire.
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

Appendix B: 

PLA Noncommissioned Officer 

Grades and Ranks since 2009

58
People of the PLA 59

Endnotes

1 Radha Iyengar, Brad Carson, Amy Schafer, and John Winkler, “Military Power Is All About People: A 

Return to Personnel Policy,” July 27, 2017, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/07/military-power-is-allabout-people-a-return-to-personnel.html.

2 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, Routledge, 2nd 

edition, 2012. p.237.

3 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, 

Challenges, and Implications, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National 

Strategic Studies: China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10, March 2017.

4 SCMP Staff, “10 Chinese military milestones as Xi Jinping overhauls the People’s Liberation Army,” 

Friday, 14 July, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2102515/10-chinesemilitary-milestones-xi-jinping-overhauls.

5 Official PLA media dedicate important front page stories addressing marriage and family issues, for 

instance, see “Reform not only test the military personnel, but also the military wives [面临改革考验的不只是

军人, 还有军嫂],” http://www.81.cn/jwsj/2017-11/29/content_7848183.htm, 中国军网; Wu Genfeng [吴根锋], 

Yu Wei [余伟], “Good morality is conducive to combat capabilities: Jinan Air Force Region Air Regiment 

strengthens political ecology construction [好风气催生战斗力- 济空航空兵某团加强政治生态建设纪实],” Air Force 

News [空军报], 18 November 2014.

6 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and 

Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” Delivered at the 

19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017. http://www.chinadaily.com.

cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.

7 Huang Panyue, “China to form ministry of veteran’s affairs,” http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2018-03/13/

content_4806707.htm, Xinhua Wang, 2018-03-13.

8 “Further develop and innovate the ‘double support’ work as a service for the strategy of national rejuvenation 

and strengthening the military [在服务强国强军战略中推进双拥工作创新发展],” was originally published on 

People’s Daily [人民日报] , January 26, 2016 and was posted on the website of the CCCPC Party Research 

Office’s [中共中央文献研究室] website: https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/gsjsyj/201601/t20160126_209738.htm.

9 Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang met with representatives from “Double Support” Model City [county] and 

“Double Support” model organizations and individuals in Beijing. Xinhua News, http://www.xinhuanet.

com/politics/2016-07/29/c_1119306354.htm.

10 Ibid.

11 “Oaths of Enlistment and Oaths of Office,” US Army Center of Military History, https://history.army.mil/

html/faq/oaths.html.

12 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and 

Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” Delivered at the 

19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017. http://www.chinadaily.com.

cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

13 PLA Military Terminology (中国人民解放军军语), Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, December 

2011, which is simply identified in English as the “Junyu.”. This is a follow up to the 1997 edition.

14 “‘Hukou’, and what birthplace can still mean for marriage in China”, 4 April, 2017. http://theconversation.

com/hukou-and-what-birthplace-can-still-mean-for-marriage-in-china-75032.

15 Luo Erwen [罗尔文], “The marital affairs of the PLA [解放军的婚事]” http://www.infzm.com/content/41452

,2010-02-10. Nanfang Weekend (南方周末).

16 Marriage Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic, [Promulgated 8th April 1934].

17 Marriage Regulations of the Shanxi, Ch’ahar, and Hebei Border Area [], Passed by the first session of the 

Consultative Assembly of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area on 21 January 1943, and promulgated by the 

Administrative council of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area on 4 February 1943.

18 Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China Promulgated 1st May, 1950.

19 Marriage Law of PRC, see http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384064.htm.

20 Criminal Law of the PRC [Adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 

1, 1979 and amended by the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People's Congress on 14 March 1997], 

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/dbtyw/jdwt/crimelaw/t209043.htm.

21 Fu  Danni, “Military Wives Soldier On Through Loneliness and Secrecy,” http://www.sixthtone.com/

news/1893/military-wives-soldier-through-loneliness-and-secrecy, 5 February 2017.

22 Regulations on the military implementation of the Chinese Marriage Law (军队贯彻中华人民共和国婚姻法若干

问题的规定); Also see “ How much do you know about military marriages [關於軍婚你了解多少? 軍婚說明書你值得

收藏], 2016-04-13 China PAP net [中国武警网], https://kknews.cc/news/ovjy5q.html.

23 Chunni Zhang, “Military Service and Life Chances in Contemporary China,” Population Studies Center 

Research Report 14-829, September 2014, University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research.

24 “Requirements for Military Institutions Admissions [军校招生条件],” 2017-06-12 10:26, http://www.sohu.

com/a/148095378_181845.

25 Marriage Law of PRC, see http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384064.htm.

26 “PLA General Political Department: NCOs are allowed to marry someone from the same unit or the unit’s 

vicinity [解放军总政治部: 士官可在驻地或内部找对象结婚],” Yangcheng Evening News [羊城晚报], 2 January 2012, 

accessed via http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2012_01/02/11720933_0.shtml.

27 “Questions and Answers on post-service arrangement policies for enlisted personnel [退役士兵安置政策问答], 

PLA Daily (解放军报), September 13, 2016, p.10. http://sy.mca.gov.cn/article/fgzc/201609/20160900886056.

shtml

28 Mei Fong, “Little emperors to little slaves: how one-child policy will play out in China,” http://www.

scmp.com/culture/books/article/2123467/little-emperors-little-slaves-how-one-child-policy-will-playout-china, 11 December 2017.

29 Ma Chi, “Youth organization to help more singles tie the knot,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/2017-05/19/content_29420910.htm, chinadaily.com.cn | Updated: 2017-05-19.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid. Also see: “To all the Chinese single youth, the Youth League is here to help,” http://en.people.cn/

n3/2017/0519/c90000-9217695.html, People's Daily, 19 May 2017.

32 Ibid.

33 See: http://www.mod.gov.cn/reports/201112/merry_pla/index.htm; which contains mostly old posts and a 

few links explaining the relevant PLA marriage policies.

34 Jamie Fullerton, “Meet the Chinese Parents Who Go on Dates for Their Kids,” https://www.vice.com/

en_us/article/5gky7d/shanghai-dating-convention, 2014.

35 Li Ming [李明], Wu Xi [吴稀], “’Please marry a PLA man’” [“嫁人就嫁解放军” 军旅姻缘会是个好活动], China 

Military online [中国军网], 2016-10-24 11:191. http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_7320082.

htm.

36 “Navy weddings on stealth combat vessel” [海军婚礼真有派头 054级隐身战舰来助兴], http://slide.mil.news.

sina.com.cn/h/slide_8_38615_33022.html; “Master Chief ’s wedding photos become front-page stories 

of a provincial newspaper” [厉害了我的军士长! 他们的婚纱照上了省市报纸的头版头条], http://bb.81.cn/dbjsxw/

content_7490036_12.htm; “The PLA matchmaking event – racing with beauties in arms” [解放军相亲大会抱

美女赛跑], http://www.chinanews.com/mil/hd2011/2015/11-04/578261.shtml 2015.11.04.

37 http://www.hunlian100.com/news-471.aspx.

38 “Please marry a PLA man” [嫁人就嫁解放军, 看兵哥哥如何相亲!] 2017-10-26 08:00, http://www.sohu.

com/a/200284373_612863.

39 Zhang He [张鹤], Luo Jiajia [罗佳佳], “The Perfect Wedding” [完美婚礼], Zhongguo Kongjun Net [中国空军网], 

2017-10-17 10:130. http://kj.81.cn/content/2017-10/17/content_7789717_13.htm.

40 Ibid. Also see “Please marry a PLA man,” [嫁人就嫁解放军], 2017-12-23, https://xw.qq.com/

cmsid/20171223A0OG5T00.

60
People of the PLA 61

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Li Ming [李明], Wu Xi [吴稀], “’Please marry a PLA man.’

44 Ibid.

45 “Group weddings with military characteristics [军味满满的集体婚礼],”Air Force News (空军报), 12 September 

2016, p4.

46 Ibid.

47 http://www.chinanews.com/tp/hd2011/2017/08-02/760215.shtml

48 Kong Tingting [孔婷婷], Han Yanzhao [韩艳昭] “Letters from an aircrew family” [望天族], Air Force News (空

军报), 1 November 2017, p4.

49 “Our motherland has become my love rival” [因为爱你, 我跟祖国做了情敌], http://finance.ifeng.

com/a/20170421/15313182_0.shtml.

50 Fu  Danni, “Military Wives Soldier On Through Loneliness and Secrecy” http://www.sixthtone.com/

news/1893/military-wives-soldier-through-loneliness-and-secrecy, Feb 05, 2017.

51 “Military wives’ ‘atypical’ complaints: [I] did not marry him because of his military uniform” [军嫂的另类“吐

槽”: 不仅是因军装嫁给他的] http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2017-03/10335997.html 2017-03-19.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Fu Danni, “Military Wives Soldier On Through Loneliness and Secrecy.”

55 “Survey shows military members having difficulty finding love and marriage due to long separations,” [军人

婚恋调查: 长期分居致对象难找], http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-02-09/214419663824.shtml.

56 Wang Bo [王波], Xiao Jianjun [肖建军], Air Force News, 12 December 2017, p.4.

57 The PLA Encyclopedia: Cadre Work of the Armed Forces (军队干部工作), Second Edition, [中国军事百科全书第二版], 

Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, July 2007. p. 229-230.

58 “Living on base: pros and cons,” https://www.military.com/money/pcs-dity-move/living-on-base.html.

59 The PLA Encyclopedia: Cadre Work of the Armed Forces (军队干部工作), 2007, p. 229-230. Also, see: http://news.

sina.com.cn/c/2011-05-14/171022464903.shtml.

60 “Further relaxing the policies pertaining to military families joining the military members,” [再放宽军人家属

随军政策], http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-05-14/171022464903.shtml.

61 Directives on mobilizing military officers’ spouses to return to the countryside to contribute to socialist 

construction work (关于动员军官家属还乡生产参加社会主义建设的指示), November, 1957. in PLA Encyclopedia, (军

队干部工作).

62 Chinese Naval Officers’ Handbook (中国海军军官手册), Qingdao Publishing House [青岛出版社], 1991, 

p. 285.

63 “The official guide on family and post-service arrangement policies in 2017,”[权威! 2017 家属随军待遇安置等

政策最新解答], http://www.sohu.com/a/129726224_660024.

64 Xiong Yuxiang [熊玉祥], “PLA increased its separation allowance to ¥300 per month” [解放军调整夫妻

分居补助 提高至每人每月300元], PLA Daily (解放军报), July 15, 2013, 09:58    http://politics.people.com.

cn/n/2013/0715/c70731-22199028.html.

65 Fang Yongzhi [房永智], “Perspectives from the PLA Army Engineering University: Implement the good 

policies pertaining to dependents accompanying military members properly,”[陆军工程大学看法: 把依法安置随军

家属的好政策落实好] October 26, 2017 09:17:10, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-10/26/c_129726911.

htm. China Youth Daily (中国青年报).

66 The PLA Encyclopedia: Cadre Work of the Armed Forces (军队干部工作), Encyclopedia of China Publishing 

House, 2nd ed. 2006, p.234-235. 

67 “Interpreting the employment assistance work for PLA family members accompanying the military 

personnel” [解读军人随军家属就业安置工作], http://www.mod.gov.cn/policy/2014-06/25/content_4518513.

htm.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Fang Yongzhi [房永智], “Perspectives from the PLA Army Engineering University

72 PLA Encyclopedia, p.230-231.

73 Xiao Ying [肖瑛], Chen Chengya [陈成亚], “Life at a Western Theater Command Air Force radar 

station” [西部战区空军雷达站生活], Air Force News [空军报], December 7, 2017, p.4. and Zhang Hong 

[张宏], Cui Weitao [崔伟涛], “Open-heart discussion about quality of life issues at a Central Theater 

Command Air Force air unit ” [中部战区某航空兵部队生活问题 “谈心”], Air Force News [空军报], December 7, 2017, 

p. 1.
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

74 PLA Air Force Soldier Handbook [解放军空军士兵手册], Lantian Chubanshe [蓝天出版社], Beijing, 2006. 

p. 339-342.

75 PLA encyclopedia, p. 228-229.

76 “Military member’s housing subsidies and how do they collect them” [军人住房补贴标准是什么? 军人住房补贴如

何领取], http://zhishi.fang.com/xf/qg_183875.html.

77 “China will provide 100,000 new free housing for families accompanying military members” [中国将无偿

为近10万新增随军家属提供住房], 2011-08-30,    PLA Daily (解放军报), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/

shehui/2011-08/30/content_13222493.htm.

78 “My house, my decision online evaluations” [网上展开“我的住房我做主”评选], China Military Net [中国军网], 

December 15, 2010. http://news.ifeng.com/mil/gundong/detail_2010_12/15/3513160_0.shtml

79 Wang Jian [王健], Cao Chuanbiao [曹传彪], “Ensure the fairness of housing arrangement” [秉公分房让规矩严起

来], Air Force News [空军报], 13 March, 2017, p.3.

80 “200 apartments returned to the military” [200余套违规住房这样清出来], November 7, 2016,10:05:01 PLA 

Daily (解放军报), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-11/07/c_1119862192.htm.

81 Ibid.

82 Yu Dong, Gong Yuzhe, “The Chinese armed forces carried out ‘grand evictions of occupied military 

housing’ ” [中国军队大清房], Southern Weekly (南方周末) 2014-08-14 10:20:34, http://www.infzm.com/

content/103183.”

83 Jiang Xi [蒋曦], “Two former founding Lieutenant generals’ widows returned their homes of 50 years to the 

military” [两位开国中将遗孀腾退已住了约50年的住房], Pengpai News, 2014-11-05 07:13, http://www.thepaper.

cn/newsDetail_forward_1275689.

84 Yu Dong [于冬], “The PLA’s grand evictions” [中国军队大清房].

85 Lv Xintong [吕欣彤],“The military evaluates the status of army-wide vehicle, housing, and personnel 

inspections [全军通报第一批清房清车清人情况], PLA Daily (解放军报), September 24, 2014. p.1. http://www.81.

cn/jmywyl/2014-09/24/content_6151287.htm.

86 Yue Feifei [岳菲菲],“Xi Jinping approves requiring retired military cadres to return occupied military 

apartments [军队严令离退休干部清退违规住房获习近平批准], July 26, 2014. 02:59, Beijing Youth Daily [北京青年报] 

http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-07-26/025930581345.shtml.

87 Ibid.

88 Jiang Xi [蒋曦], “Two former founding Lieutenant generals’ widows.”

89 “200 apartments returned to the military” [200余套违规住房这样清出来].

90 http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/16/11/15/n8494957.htm, Epoch Times, 15 November 2016.

91 Yu Dong[于冬], “The PLA’s grand evictions” [中国军队大清房].

92 Zhong Shi, “The military reform will drastically reduce military leaders’ retirement benefits [軍隊改革將領退

休待遇銳減],” Ming Pao 2018-01-28 A12.

93 “Regulations on Standardizing Benefits and Preferential Treatment of Military Personnel”[总参, 总政, 总后印

发 (关于规范完善军队人员有关福利待遇的若干规定)], March 18, 2015.08:00:30, PLA Daily [解放军报], http://www.

xinhuanet.com/mil/2015-03/18/c_127592083.htm.

94 “The First Military Housing Provident Fund [HPF] mortgage was distributed”[全军首批军人住房公积金贷款发

放], http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2015-12/02/content_130917.htm.

95 Defense Ministry's Regular Press Conference on 25 May 2017, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/

focus/2017-05/26/content_4781443.htm.

96 Measures on Military HPF Loans Management (军人住房公积金贷款管理办法), https://m.ifeng.com/

shareNews?aid=112202791 and “Explanations on military HPF loans [军人使用住房公积金贷款购房, 你想知道的

都在这里了], https://www.sohu.com/a/195046537_660024. “One picture shows you the process of military 

HPF applications” [一张图告诉你军人住房公积金贷款申请流程], 2016-04-25 10:10:16, People’s Frontline Express [

人民前线报], http://www.zggjj.com/ywlc/10375.jhtml.

97 PLA Encyclopedia, p. 226-227.

98 “The PLA’s history of major downsizing” [盘点中国军队的历次裁军], September 2015, http://www.bbc.com/

zhongwen/simp/china/2015/09/150903_profile_china_military_parade_history.

99 “New Military Officer’s Leave and Family Regulations” [新 (现役军官休假探亲规定) 发布施行], http://www.

mod.gov.cn/service/2005-11/26/content_4087663.htm, PLA Daily [解放军报], 2005-11-26.

100 Ibid.

101 “Regulations on Standardizing Benefits and Preferential Treatment of Military Personnel.”

102 “Latest update of the military leave policies for active-duty military members” [现役军人休假探亲最新政策发布], 

http://www.sohu.com/a/217682879_99973654 2018-01-19 16:26.

103 “Military leave and family visits policies issued in 2017” [2017年颁布现役军人休假探亲 (事假) 婚假, 产假, 病

假, 疗养假等) 相关问题的最新通知], http://www.sohu.com/a/217682879_99973654; http://wemedia.ifeng.

com/20719643/wemedia.shtml; 2018-01-19 16:26.

62
People of the PLA 63

104 “Time to enjoy the military leave! Latest policies on active-duty military members’ leave and family visits” 

[不再“望假兴叹”! 现役军人休假探亲最新政策发布] 20 May 2017, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170520/51128870_0.

shtml.

105 Ibid.

106 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, New York: 

Routledge, 2006, p. 56.

107 Xu Guanyu, “What’s Behind the Military Budget Increase?” People’s Daily Online [English Edition], 

March 15, 2007, available from english.people.com.cn/200703/15/eng20070315_357782.html.

108 Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, Travis Tanner eds., “The “People” in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, 

And Education in China’s Military,” 2008, Strategic Studies Institute [SSI], US Army War College, p.214.

109 PLA Air Force Enlisted Force Handbook (中国人民解放军空军士兵手册), Beijing: Lantian Press, November 2006, 

p. 324-332.

110 “Five things you need to know about family preferential stipend” [义务兵家庭优待金, 需要知道的五件

事], The Military Journalist [军报记者] 2015-10-20 00:0332 http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-10/20/

content_6730448.htm

111 Ma Fuyun [马福云], Zhang Xiaoyu [张晓玉],“Studies of the Preferential Treatment of enlisted personnel [义

务兵优待研究], Research Center of Ministry of Civil Affairs [民政部政策研究中心], 9 August 2008. http://zyzx.

mca.gov.cn/article/yjcg/yjyfaz/200808/20080800019209.shtml.

112 www.0730hao.cn/Article/zbdt/29562.html

113 “Notice on the adjustment of volunteer soldiers’ family preferential stipends policy,” Department of Civil 

Affairs of Hunan Province website, http://mzt.hunan.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfg/wj/201803/t20180327_4979828.

html.

114 “2016 Henan recruitment/conscription info” [2016 河南征兵工作],www.0730hao.cn/Article/zbdt/34269.

html

115 “2015 Ningxia MR discussed recruitment/conscription work” [2015宁夏征兵办主任答记者问], www.0730hao.

cn/Article/zbdt/31152.html.

116 “2015 Henan recruitment/conscription info” [2015黑龙江征兵工作], www.0730hao.cn/Article/zbdt/31129.

html. www.0730hao.cn/Article/zbdt/30984.html.

117 “2015 Liaoning recruitment/conscription info” [2015辽宁征兵工作], www.0730hao.cn/Article/zbdt/31278.

html.

118 “2015 Guizhou recruitment/conscription info” [2015贵州征兵工作], www.0730hao.cn/Article/zbdt/31357.

html.

119 “The Q&A on PLA’s Preferential Treatment policies” [解放军优抚安置政策解答 退役士兵免费教育培训], PLA 

Daily [解放军报], 13 November 2016, https://m.sohu.com/n/390045941/. 

120 Ibid.

121 “Cadre Salary and Welfare System,” in Song Shilin and Xiao Ke, eds., China Military Encyclopedia (中国军

事百科全书), Military Science Publishing House [军事科学出版社], Vol. 4, p. 41.

122 “The latest on PLA Military Pay, 2018 [军人工资最新消息], http://www.wifi03.com/news/gongzi/88122.

html.

123 Ibid.

124 “2018 New Standard for Military salaries and benefit” [2018年部队工资待遇最新标准], http://www.sohu.

com/a/220551789_99890634.

125 http://www.china.com.cn/military/txt/2010-11/08/content_21295105.htm

126 Sun Xingwei[孙兴维], Tang Shaojun [唐绍军], “The PLA is putting the 2nd-gen support card to use starting 

1 December 2017” [我军第二代军人保障卡12月1日起全面推广应用], The Military Journalist [军报记者]作者: 2017-

09-07 13:47 http://www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2017-09/07/content_4791489.htm. 

127 Ibid.

128 Sun Xingwei [孙兴维], Guo Chen [郭晨], “Interpreting the five major functionalities of the 2nd-gen military 

support card” [权威解读!第二代军人保障卡5大新亮点] 2018-03-29 13:07 http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2018-03/29/

content_7987412_2.htm.

129 “ICBC issued its first credit card for military members” [工行首推军人专属个人信用卡], http://bank.hexun.

com/2017-08-01/190268468.html. It should be noted, however, that the PLA Strategic Support Force is 

not a service [军种], even though the bank said it is.

130 Ibid.

131 “ICBC issued its first credit card for military members” [工行首推军人专属个人信用卡],

132 “The Five Channels of Separating from the military [军官退役五种方式],” http://k.sina.com.cn/

article_6391514875_17cf6c6fb0010029ch.html

133 PLA encyclopedia.
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute

134 “Details of the policy of active-duty military officer converting to civilian contractor” [重磅! 现役军官转改文职

人员政策落地], 2017-12-14 14:30 http://www.sohu.com/a/210439471_99973654.

135 “2017 military officers’ zhuanye compensation in one picture” [2017军官转业费结算, 看完这张图就明白了], 2017-

04-29 09:31, http://www.sohu.com/a/137173538_613197.

136 Ibid.

137 “Civilian contractor reform and its benefits” [军队文职人员改革 “让首批‘吃螃蟹’的人不吃亏], May 13 2018, http://

www.infzm.com/content/135639.

138 “Active-duty military members’ leave policy and family visits” [现役军人休假探亲最新政策发布], 2018-01-19 

16:26, http://www.sohu.com/a/217682879_99973654.

139 “No house, no marriage?” 2014-05-05 07:54, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-05/05/

content_17482343.htm.

140 Yu Dong[于冬], “The PLA’s grand evictions” [中国军队大清房].

64