In re: Adoption/Guardianship of Dustin R., No. 24, September Term, 2015 

APPEALABILITY – INTERLOCUTORY ORDER – JURISDICTION – 

STATUTORY AUTHORITY – MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW (1984, 2012 REPL. 

VOL.) § 5-328(a) – MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW (1984, 2012 REPL. VOL.) § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) – MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW (1984, 2012 REPL. VOL.) § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(8) – SEPARATION OF POWERS – ARTICLE 8 OF MARYLAND 

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS – Court of Appeals held that: (I) Court of Special Appeals 

erred in dismissing Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH”)’s appeal 

because Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sitting as a juvenile court (“juvenile 

court”)’s order was immediately appealable at a minimum as interlocutory order granting 

injunctive relief; (II) juvenile court had jurisdiction and statutory authority to order DHMH 

to develop and approve written plan of clinically appropriate services in the least restrictive 

setting that ensured that child with disabilities would continue to receive services, where 

child was not yet twenty-one years old when juvenile court issued order and where such 

services were required to protect child’s health and welfare, and where juvenile court’s 

order served to bridge gap in services as child transitioned from juvenile guardianship care 

to adult guardianship care and whatever final outcome (including judicial review) may be 

of any Medicaid fair hearing proceedings; and (III) juvenile court did not violate separation 

of powers. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

No. 24

September Term, 2015 

______________________________________ 

IN RE: ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP OF 

DUSTIN R. 

______________________________________ 

Barbera, C.J. 

Battaglia 

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts 

Harrell, Jr., Glenn T. (Retired, 

Specially Assigned), 

JJ.

______________________________________ 

Opinion by Watts, J. 

______________________________________ 

Filed: December 21, 2015 

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. 02-Z-08-000054 

Argued: November 9, 2015 
 This case concerns whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in dismissing on its 

own initiative an appeal by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH”), 

Respondent, and whether the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sitting as a juvenile 

court (“the juvenile court”), had the authority to order DHMH to continue to provide 

services after age twenty-one to Dustin R. (“Dustin”), Petitioner, a medically fragile child 

who needed life-sustaining care. 

 We hold that: (I) the Court of Special Appeals erred in dismissing DHMH’s appeal 

because the juvenile court’s order was immediately appealable at a minimum as an 

interlocutory order granting injunctive relief; (II) the juvenile court had jurisdiction and the 

statutory authority to order DHMH to develop and approve a written plan of clinically 

appropriate services in the least restrictive setting that ensured that Dustin would continue 

to receive services, where Dustin was not yet twenty-one years old when the juvenile court 

issued its order and where such services were required to protect Dustin’s health and 

welfare, and where the juvenile court’s order served to bridge the gap in services as Dustin 

transitioned from his juvenile guardianship case to adult guardianship care and whatever 

the final outcome (including judicial review) may be of any Medicaid fair hearing 

proceedings; and (III) the juvenile court did not violate the separation of powers. 

BACKGROUND 

On December 16, 1992, Dustin was born. In February 1995, when he was two years 

old, Dustin entered foster care. In that year, the juvenile court terminated Dustin’s 

biological parents’ parental rights and granted guardianship to the Anne Arundel County 

Department of Social Services (“DSS”) with the right to consent to adoption or long-term 
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care short of adoption. On March 28, 1995, DSS placed Dustin in a treatment foster care 

home with Jacqueline and Darrell P. (“Mrs. P.” and “Mr. P.,” respectively).1 Dustin’s 

placement with Mr. and Mrs. P. was successful; Mr. and Mrs. P.’s home was designated 

by court order as Dustin’s permanent placement; and the juvenile court gave Mr. and Mrs. 

P. limited guardianship authority to make medical (including mental and dental health), 

educational, and out-of-State travel decisions on Dustin’s behalf. Dustin has lived with 

Mr. and Mrs. P. since March 28, 1995. 

 There is no dispute that Dustin is medically fragile and has special needs. Dustin 

has, among other conditions, an intellectual disability, severe seizure disorder, cortical 

visual impairment, gastro-esophageal reflux, scoliosis, osteoporosis, ischemic 

encephalopathy, global orthopedic impairments, cerebral palsy, and an Unidentified Long 

Chain Fatty Acid Syndrome with a Mitochondrial Disease (a metabolic disorder).2

 Dustin 

has a tracheostomy, full glottal closure,3

 a colostomy, and a gastrostomy tube for feeding. 

DHMH administers the Maryland Medical Assistance Program (“Medicaid”), which has 

 

1

In certain parts of the record, Mrs. P. is referred to as “Jackie.” 

2Dustin’s doctor testified that “[a] mitochondrial abnormality is a large group of 

disorders” and that “the mitochondrion . . . is th[e] part of the cell that . . . convert[s] food 

into energy” and regulates the body’s equilibrium. In a nursing care plan for Dustin, the 

notes section states that, as a result of this condition, “Dustin has limited ability to 

metabolize long chain fatty acids[.]” 

3The “glottis” is “the opening between the vocal cords in [the] throat.” Glottis, 

Merriam-Webster (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/glottis 

[http://perma.cc/LC9Z-HAE7]. According to Dustin’s doctor, as a result of the full glottal 

closure, or full epiglottal closure, in which Dustin’s “vocal chords are basically closed 

off[,]” Dustin has a “very difficult” time making sound and needs “to generate a fair amount 

of force to be heard because he has no vocal chords.” 
- 3 - 

paid Dustin’s medical expenses in foster care.

As Dustin grew older, his condition worsened. On February 18, 2005, when Dustin 

was twelve years old, after an emergency hearing, the juvenile court ordered DSS to secure 

round-the-clock (twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week) nursing services for 

Dustin.4 In response, DSS filed an emergency motion requesting to remove Dustin from 

the home of Mr. and Mrs. P. and to move him to another placement that would cost 

“substantially less[,]” as the cost of round-the-clock nursing services exceeded the 

Medicaid rates. Ultimately, DSS reached an agreement to provide the additional private 

nursing care to Dustin by supplementing the Medicaid rates through splitting the cost of 

the supplemental payments between the Developmental Disabilities Administration 

(“DDA”) (which DHMH administers) and the Department of Human Resources. In 2006, 

DSS contracted with MedSource Community Services, Inc. (“MedSource”) to provide 

round-the-clock nursing services at an hourly rate that exceeded the Medicaid 

reimbursement rate. Since that time, Dustin has had a rotating team of eight registered 

nurses providing round-the-clock services. 

As early as 2010, Dustin began to seek the provision of services for himself after 

age twenty-one. In March 2010, at age seventeen, Dustin filed a petition for cocommitment to DHMH and DSS. The juvenile court denied the petition without prejudice. 

In June 2011, Dustin filed an amended petition for co-commitment to DHMH and DSS, 

requesting that the juvenile court require DHMH and DSS to “present a written plan to 

 

4According to Mrs. P., when Dustin was younger, his health was “much less 

complicated” and he required only eight hours of nursing per day. 
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provide for the care of Dustin [] in the [] home [of Mr. and Mrs. P.], including 24 hour 

skilled nursing care, upon turning” twenty-one years old. Dustin described his medical 

condition at that time in the amended petition as follows: 

[] Dustin, now 18 1⁄2 years old, is a severely medically fragile child with 

special needs. He is diagnosed with Unidentified Long Chain Fatty Acid 

Syndrome with a Mitochondrial Disease (metabolic disorder), Mental 

Retardation, Severe Seizure Disorder, Gastro-Esophageal Reflux, Cortical 

Visual Impairment, Scoliosis, Osteoporosis, Global Orthopedic 

Impairments, and Cerebral Palsy. Because Dustin has limited ability to 

metabolize long chain fatty acids, has severe protein allergies, and frequent 

dramatic fluctuations in his blood sugar levels, he is fed a reduced protein 

formula and must be assessed a minimum of every 4 hours to prevent a 

metabolic crisis which may impact multiple body systems. He has a 

gastrostomy tube[,] as well as an intravenous port for antibiotic 

administration and blood sample draws. [On] March 8, 2011[,] his rectum 

was permanently[,] surgically closed[,] and the surgeons created a permanent 

colostomy. He has fragile skin with a history of pressure ulcers, a history of 

gastrointestinal bleeding, and urinary retention with a history of bladder 

infections. At the time of this [amended] petition, he has been diagnosed 

with Neutropenia, a condition that compromises the body’s ability to heal or 

fight infection due to an extremely low white blood cell count. This 

condition further complicates the metabolic disorder.

[] He functions at the cognitive level of about a [six-]month[-]old. He does 

not have the ability to control his movement[,] and is transferred throughout 

the day from bed to wheelchair to standing frame frequently. In each piece 

of equipment, he is repositioned frequently[,] with multiple soft pads to 

prevent pressure sores and to stimulate long bone growth. He can[]not make 

sound[,] so he must be within sight of the nurse at all times. He receives all 

nutrition and most of his medication through a gastrostomy tube into his 

stomach and receives all intravenous medications and nutrition through the 

surgically implanted BardPort that provides direct access to the heart through 

the Vena Cava. He has doctor’s orders to receive 16 medications at specified 

times every day[,] and receives 5 additional medications on a “prn[,]” or as 

needed[,] basis. He receives oxygen through [a] tube in his trachea when his 

blood oxygen saturation is low. Because he can[]not swallow or clear his 

airway, he is suctioned through the trachea tube when necessary, as 

determined by the nurse, to prevent aspiration of fluid into his lungs. He is 

also catheterized for urine every four hours and more frequently if he has an 

infection. 
- 5 - 

(Record references omitted). Eventually, in April 2013, DHMH consented to cocommitment, and the juvenile court ordered DHMH to “continue the planning process for 

the transition of [Dustin] from foster care under the guardianship of [DSS] to the 

guardianship of his current foster parents or other appropriate persons[.]” Significantly, 

between March 2010—when Dustin first filed a petition for co-commitment to DHMH and 

DSS—and August 2013, on multiple occasions, Dustin requested that the juvenile court 

order DHMH to fund and provide to him after his twenty-first birthday the same services 

that he was then receiving. DHMH consistently opposed those requests on the grounds 

that such requests exceeded the juvenile court’s authority. 

In Fall 2012, DHMH and DSS began planning for Dustin’s transition out of his 

juvenile guardianship and foster care. On December 6, 2012, representatives of DHMH 

participated in a quarterly Treatment Team Meeting that DSS organized. A DDA 

representative, who was at the meeting to help plan for Dustin’s transition from foster care, 

stated that DDA was committed to working with Medicaid’s Rare and Expensive Case 

Management Program (“REM”) “to determine the recommended level of services.” The 

DDA representative agreed to follow up with a DDA nurse to complete an assessment of 

Dustin in coordination with REM before the next scheduled Treatment Team Meeting. On 

February 7, 2013, a DDA nurse assessed Dustin and observed that Dustin “has an extensive 

medical history with treatment needs that are not deleg[]able to unlicensed staff[,]” but the 

DDA nurse opined that “the licensed nursing service is able to be shared” because Dustin 

was “not receiving treatments at intervals that would disallow for shared service with 
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another person of equal or lesser licensed nursing need.” On March 4, 2013, Dustin’s 

resource coordinator recommended a service change, in which she noted that the outcome 

desired was as follows: “Dustin will be provided his current supports in order to continue 

living in his current residence when he turns 21.” The resource coordinator stated that, 

“for Dustin to continue living in his current residence, all funding [that] he is currently 

receiving needs to continue, with the budget being through [DDA] at the time that he turns 

[twenty-one] years old.” 

On March 7, 2013, DSS conducted a Treatment Team Meeting, which 

representatives of DHMH, Dustin’s resource coordinator, Mrs. P, and Dustin’s counsel 

attended. The notes from the meeting state that the group was “in the process of planning 

for Dustin’s transition to DDA when he turns [twenty-one years old] in December.” The 

notes from the meeting state that a request for service change had already been submitted 

to DDA, and that DDA was to respond by March 29, 2013. During the meeting, Mrs. P. 

expressed her concern “for Dustin to continue with the current quality of nursing 

services[,]” which she believed to be “essential . . . for Dustin to remain in the [P. family] 

home after he turns” twenty-one years old. The notes from the meeting indicate that 

“[t]here continue[d] to be disagreement about the rate of nursing care[,]” and reported 

DDA’s intent to distribute a plan for Dustin for care in the P. family home “[i]n the next 3 

to 4 months,” and the need for an “alternative plan” if Mrs. P. was not comfortable with 

the plan for nursing care in the P. family home. 

 In a letter dated June 5, 2013—after DHMH consented to co-commitment—DDA

proposed a transition plan for Dustin. DDA stated that Dustin would remain eligible to 
- 7 - 

participate in REM; that Medicaid would pay for Dustin’s medical care; and that Dustin 

would be eligible for a DDA waiver,5 whether or not he remained in the home of Mr. and 

Mrs. P. DDA stated that it would seek to move Dustin to a residential program if Mr. and 

Mrs. P. decided not to seek guardianship. 

 Mr. and Mrs. P. decided to seek guardianship of Dustin so that he could remain in 

their home; on July 26, 2013, Mr. and Mrs. P. submitted through Dustin’s resource 

coordinator a proposed service funding plan, in which they, in coordination with 

MedSource, proposed to “[c]ontinu[e] Dustin’s budget ‘as is[.]’” The budget for Dustin’s 

care would continue to cover items such as training and orientation for Dustin’s nursing 

team, case management, payment of non-covered medical supplies and prescriptions, 

partial payment of utilities within the home of Mr. and Mrs. P., and equipment 

maintenance. In a letter dated August 14, 2013, DHMH responded to the proposed service 

funding plan, stating that certain services provided to Dustin were “covered waiver 

services[,]” including Dustin’s nursing, medical equipment and supplies, medications, and 

other medical care, but that other services requested in the proposed service funding plan 

were not covered, and thus were denied.6

 

 On August 26 and 27, 2013, and September 27, 2013, the juvenile court conducted 

 

5The DDA waiver, which the DDA receives from the federal Centers for Medicare 

and Medicaid Services, permits eligible participants to receive care in a home or in the 

community, instead of an institution. See Community Pathways Waiver, Department of 

Health and Mental Hygiene, http://dda.dhmh.maryland.gov/SITEPAGES/community%20

pathways.aspx [http://perma.cc/7A5G-LPDS]. 

6The letter also set forth Dustin’s appeal rights, advising Dustin that he or his 

authorized representative could “request a Medicaid Fair Hearing at the Maryland Office 

of Administrative Hearings . . . by writing within ninety days of the date of th[e] letter[.]” 
- 8 - 

an annual guardianship review hearing. At the hearing, counsel for DHMH and DSS 

readily acknowledged that the dispute was over funding for Dustin’s services, which Mr. 

P. and Mrs. P. wanted to continue after Dustin’s twenty-first birthday. The juvenile court 

heard testimony from witnesses on Dustin’s behalf, including: Dr. Richard Kelley, a 

pediatrician specializing in metabolic diseases, accepted as an expert in biochemical 

genetics and the complex nature of metabolic disease and its impact on bodily systems of 

children and adults, who had been caring for Dustin for approximately fifteen years; 

Stefania Bockmiller, a registered nurse, who had been caring for Dustin for nearly ten 

years, accepted as an expert in registered nursing care of medically complex and fragile 

patients in hospital and community settings; Mona Yudkoff, a registered nurse, accepted 

as an expert in registered nursing with a focus on rehabilitation and life care planning; Jay 

Balint, the executive director, president, and chief executive officer of MedSource; Sherry 

Davis, Dustin’s resource coordinator; Mrs. P.; Laura Kress, the assistant director of nursing 

for nursing practice at Johns Hopkins Hospital; and A’lise Williams, director of DHMH’s 

Board of Nursing, whose deposition testimony was admitted into evidence. 

The juvenile court also heard testimony from witnesses on DHMH’s behalf and 

DSS’s behalf, including: Rosslyn Hill, Dustin’s DSS social worker; Vanessa Bullock, the 

deputy director of the central Maryland regional office of DDA; and Marie Adams, a DDA 

registered nurse. 

At the hearing, counsel for DHMH argued that the juvenile court lacked the 

statutory authority to order the relief that Dustin requested—namely, that services continue 

after his twenty-first birthday. Counsel for DSS argued that ordering the relief would 
- 9 - 

violate the separation of powers. By contrast, Dustin’s counsel contended that the juvenile 

court had the statutory authority to order a plan of clinically appropriate services in the 

least restrictive setting. 

 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court orally ruled that DHMH’s plan 

was clinically inadequate, stating: 

I expressed my concern over the position of [DSS]. They are his current 

guardian, [] yet they stand next to [DHMH] in . . . trying to convince [me] to 

cut benefits for Dustin. 

. . . It’s a cutback of services and that’s what they’re proposing. And I’m not 

sure that’s consistent with their obligations as guardian of his person. 

* * * 

 This is a life and death issue for me. And I’m afraid th[at] DHMH 

and DSS really [are] not looking out through the eyes of it being a life and 

death issue. 

The juvenile court identified two issues, namely, “what services are necessary[] to obtain 

the ongoing care needed after the guardianship terminates . . . at age” twenty-one, and 

whether DHMH’s plan offered “clinically appropriate services in the least restrictive 

setting.” The juvenile court stated that the following factual findings had been found to be 

proven “no matter what standard of proof” applied: 

1. Dustin has a disability and is a medically fragile child per the [Code of 

Maryland Regulations] definition[.]

2. He needs ongoing care[.] 

3. He needs clinically appropriate services, which is[,] ultimately, what I 

have to decide[.] 

4. And that is keeping what he already has; it cannot be decreased, it’s lifethreatening if it’s decreased, and his needs were the same and probably will 
- 10 - 

get more complicated as he gets older[.] 

5. I believe that the P. residence is the least restrictive setting; I’m not sure 

anybody’s going to dispute that he’s been there since age two --

6. There are emotional ties[.] 

7. We know a description of all the improvements done to that house[.] 

8. Everyone that currently cares for him at the P. house knows what he 

needs[.] 

[9]. I find clearly that 24/7 [registered nurse] care, which he’s already 

getting[.] 

 And I’m not sure how anybody can dispute that finding because it’s 

already been agreed to. It’s already been acknowledged that’s what works 

and that’s what keeps him out of the hospital. Anybody [who] suggests that 

it should be decreased, whether it’s motivated by money, just is not looking 

at this case objectively --

[10]. His needs will increase[.] 

[11]. As I stated, maintaining the status quo, in my view, is a matter of life 

or death[.] 

 And you know the governmental agencies involved here, I guess I can 

say I’m a little annoyed, because to me, a deal is a deal. They made a deal 

with Dustin, they made a deal with the P.’s, and now they want to renege on 

that deal, and I just have a problem with that. . . . They just out-of-hand 

rejected the plan submitted, even though they knew it worked, and even 

though they knew it had been approved for the last six or seven years. . . .

[12]. The current arrangement works and should not be changed[.] 

[13]. This case is a level-of-care issue[.]

 I find that it’s not only in the best interest of Dustin -- and if we value 

life at all this is a life-and-death matter, in the view of this particular member 

of the bench. . . . 

[14]. A group home is clearly not appropriate[.] 
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[15]. And all of the services that he’s currently getting, just so I’m clear[,] as 

defined by the statute[,] are “clinically appropriate services.” 

 After making the factual findings above, the juvenile court addressed a two-page 

document that Dustin submitted entitled “Proposed Findings and Order,” and the following 

exchange occurred:

[THE COURT:] So that’s my decision. I’ve looked at the order, Proposed 

Findings of Fact and Order, and before I place my signature on it, are there 

any other comments regarding the order? 

[COUNSEL FOR DHMH]: I would ask that the order list the specific 

services that the Court is ordering that [DHMH] fund. 

THE COURT: Counsel, I don’t need to do that. If you’ve been paying 

attention at this trial, you know what those services are. They’re everything 

he’s getting now. . . . [I]n my view[, they] are going to be necessary after he 

turns [twenty-one]. 

[COUNSEL FOR DHMH]: Does that include payments to Mrs. P.?

THE COURT: It includes everything. . . . It includes . . . exactly what he’s 

getting now. . . . There is no need to change any of that. 

 The juvenile court signed the “Proposed Findings and Order,” which reads, in full, 

as follows: 

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND ORDER 

On August 26-27, 2013 and September 27, 2013[,] a Guardianship Review 

Hearing was held and Dustin [] requests that the Court make the following 

Findings: 

1) Dustin requires 24/7[,] one-on-one skilled nursing care provided by 

registered nurses [who] have been fully oriented to his care needs and 

have demonstrated competence in all of the tasks on the Skills Checklist 

developed by the supervising nurse. 

2) Dustin requires the continuation of all services that will ensure that the 

agency is able to retain the current nurses [who] have been fully oriented 
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to continue to care for him[,] including[,] but not limited to[,] call-out 

pay, orientation, holiday pay, and vacation. 

3) It is in Dustin’s best interest to remain in the least restrictive setting in the 

home of the P[.] family[,] who are willing to continue to provide a home 

to him after he turns [twenty-one]. 

4) Dustin requires the continuation of all other services currently provided 

that enable Dustin to remain healthy and safe in the P[.] home. 

5) DHMH has not provided a plan for Dustin of clinically appropriate 

services in the least restrictive setting.

6) That [another planned permanent living arrangement] is in Dustin’s best 

interest because of his ongoing[,] extensive[,] and extraordinary medical 

conditions and his profound physical and developmental disabilities.

Further, Dustin requests that this Court: 

1) ORDER that DHMH develop and approve a written plan that ensures that 

Dustin will continue to receive all of the services and supports [that] he 

is currently receiving[,] including[,] but not limited to[,] all services that 

will ensure that Dustin will receive 24/7, one-on-one skilled nursing care 

provided by registered nurses [who] have been fully oriented to his care 

needs and have demonstrated competence in all of the tasks on the Skills 

Checklist developed by the supervising nurse. 

2) ORDER that DSS

[7] and DHMH each report to the [juvenile] court and all 

parties in writing monthly [] the specific steps taken to ensure that 

Dustin’s current level of services and supports will continue in the P[.] 

home. 

3) ORDER that the Stipulation of the parties dated April 26, 2005, shall 

continue to remain in effect; 

4) ORDER that this matter be scheduled for hearing within [two] months[]

for a Guardianship Review to determine adequacy of the progress toward 

the goal of achieving a seamless transition that will ensure Dustin’s health 

and safety and maintain the continuity of his placement in the community 

in the P[.] home. 

 

7At DSS’s request, the juvenile court crossed out “DSS” and initialed the alteration. 
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5) ORDER that the Court continue to grant Mr. and Mrs. [] P. the authority 

to make medical (including mental, dental and vision health), 

educational[,] and out[-]of[-S]tate travel decisions on Dustin’s behalf.[8]

At the bottom of the Proposed Findings and Order, the juvenile court judge signed on the 

signature line that had been provided. The judge announced: “The order is signed.”9 

After the guardianship review hearing, the clerk of the juvenile court made the 

following docket entries: 

Num/Seq Description Filed Jdg

00168000 Hearing Sheet 09/27/13 PFH

00169000 No Pro Se Party at time of Proceeding 09/30/13 TBA

00170000 Reasonable Efforts Made by DSS 09/30/13 TBA

00171000 Another Planned Permanent Living 09/30/13 TBA

 Arrangement 

00172000 Proposed Finding and order 09/30/13 PFH

On October 24, 2013, DHMH noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. 

On December 2, 2013, the juvenile court conducted another guardianship review 

hearing.10 The juvenile court judge signed an order dated December 2, 2013, crossing out 

the word “Proposed,” so the title read “PROPOSED ORDER”; the order, as amended and 

 

8The juvenile court denied DHMH’s request to insert into the order a provision 

requiring Mrs. P. apply for guardianship of Dustin. 

9At the hearing on September 27, 2013, the juvenile court also signed a second 

order, which had been drafted and submitted by DSS, that addressed routine guardianship 

review matters. The order did not reference DSS’s or DHMH’s responsibilities after 

Dustin’s twenty-first birthday, and stated that the matter was scheduled to “be terminated 

on December 16, 2013[,]” Dustin’s twenty-first birthday. 

10The previous guardianship review hearing was conducted by, and the September 

27, 2013 order was signed by, the Honorable Paul F. Harris, Jr. The December 2, 2013, 

guardianship review hearing was conducted by the Honorable Philip T. Caroom. 
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signed by the juvenile court judge, provided, in pertinent part: 

PROPOSED ORDER 

Upon a Guardianship Review Hearing on December 2, 2013 and the Findings 

made by [the juvenile court] on September 27, 2013, this Court hereby issues 

the following: 

[] ORDER that DHMH develop[,] approve[, and] supply to counsel for other 

parties by 12/9, 2013 “close of business[,]” a written plan that ensures that 

Dustin will continue to receive the services [that] he is currently receiving[,] 

including[,] but not limited to[,] all services that will ensure that Dustin will 

receive 24/7, one-on-one skilled nursing care provided by registered nurses 

[who] have been fully oriented to his care needs and have demonstrated 

competence in all of the tasks on the Skills Checklist developed by the 

supervising nurse.

* * * 

[] ORDER that this matter be scheduled for hearing 12/12, 2013, at 1:30 p.m. 

. . . for a Guardianship Review to determine adequacy of the progress toward 

the goal of achieving a seamless transition that will ensure Dustin’s health 

and safety and maintain the continuity of his placement in the community in 

the P[.] home. If there is a signed, approved Service Funding Agreement and 

there are no outstanding issues, the parties shall notify the court and the 

hearing will be canceled[.] 

After the December guardianship review hearing, the clerk of the juvenile court made the 

following docket entries: 

Num/Seq Description Filed Jdg

00180000 Hearing Sheet 12/02/13 PTC

00181000 No Pro Se Party at time of Proceeding 12/02/13 TBA

00182000 Order of Court 12/03/13 PTC

On December 11, 2013, DHMH entered into a contract with MedSource Community 

Services, Inc. for “MedSource to implement the [September 27, 2013] Order and the Plan, 

pending the outcome of [DHMH]’s appeal of the Order[.]” 
- 15 - 

 On appeal, although neither DHMH nor Dustin raised any issue as to the 

appealability of the juvenile court’s September 27, 2013 order, in an unreported opinion 

dated December 22, 2014, a three-judge panel of the Court of Special Appeals dismissed 

DHMH’s appeal on its own initiative, a majority holding that the September 27, 2013 order 

was not a final, appealable order; accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals did not reach 

the merits. Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals determined that, although “[t]he 

hearing transcript le[ft] no doubt that the [juvenile] court subjectively intended to render 

an unqualified, final disposition of the claim[,]” “the document executed by the [juvenile 

court] did not adjudicate the claim, and, objectively speaking, it was not a final order”; and, 

“although the clerk made a record of the document that the [juvenile court] signed, the 

docket entry did nothing to indicate that anything had actually been determined.” Notably, 

the Honorable Andrea M. Leahy dissented, stating that the juvenile court signed the 

proposed order, consistent with its oral rulings on the record, and that the juvenile court 

and the parties intended the signed proposed order to be a final, appealable order. 

On January 21, 2015, Dustin filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari,

raising the following three issues: 

1. Does an alleged scrivener’s error in the form of an order and docket entry 

render the order invalid and require dismissal of an appeal, even if it might 

deprive an extraordinarily medically fragile youth of life-sustaining relief?

2. Did the juvenile court exceed its authority under the guardianship law by 

ordering DHMH to enter into a plan to obtain the same life-sustaining care 

for a youth aging out of the system that he has received for the last ten years? 

3. Is a juvenile court order requiring a State agency to develop and approve 

a plan to obtain ongoing life-sustaining care for a ward of the court, entered 

pursuant to express provisions of the guardianship statute, unconstitutional 
- 16 - 

under the separation-of-powers doctrine? 

On February 5, 2015, DHMH filed an answer and cross-petition for a writ of certiorari, 

raising the following three issues: 

1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in dismissing [DHMH]’s appeal from 

an order granting an injunction?

2. Is Dustin [] required to use the available administrative remedy to 

challenge [DHMH]’s decision on funding for the services [that] he will 

receive after his [twenty-fir]st birthday? 

3. Did the juvenile court exceed its authority in ordering [DHMH] to develop, 

approve, and implement a plan to provide specified services to Dustin []? 

On April 17, 2015, this Court granted the petition and denied the cross-petition. See In re: 

Adoption/Guardianship of Dustin R., 442 Md. 515, 113 A.3d 624 (2015). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“An appellate court reviews without deference a [lower] court’s interpretation of a 

statute[.]” Howard v. State, 440 Md. 427, 434, 103 A.3d 572, 576 (2014) (citation 

omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Appealability 

 Both Dustin and DHMH contend that the juvenile court’s order is appealable as an 

interlocutory order granting an injunction, and that the Court of Special Appeals erred in 

dismissing DHMH’s appeal on its own initiative. We agree. The September 27, 2013 

order was immediately appealable at a minimum as an interlocutory order granting 

injunctive relief. 
- 17 - 

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.) (“CJP”) § 12-303(3)(i) 

provides that an order granting an injunction is an appealable interlocutory order, stating: 

A party may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders entered 

by a circuit court in a civil case: . . . [a]n order[ g]ranting or dissolving an 

injunction, but if the appeal is from an order granting an injunction, only if 

the appellant has first filed his [or her] answer in the cause[.]

(Paragraph breaks omitted). Maryland Rule 15-501(a) defines an “injunction” as “an order 

mandating or prohibiting a specified act.” In State Comm’n on Human Relations v. Talbot 

Cnty. Det. Ctr., 370 Md. 115, 139, 803 A.2d 527, 541 (2002), we explained: “An injunction 

is a writ framed according to the circumstances of the case commanding an act which the 

court regards as essential to justice, or restraining an act which it esteems contrary to equity 

and good conscience.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Injunctive relief 

is relief prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or commanding someone to 

undo some wrong or injury . . . generally, it is a preventive and protective remedy, aimed 

at future acts, and it is not intended to redress past wrongs.” Colandrea v. Wilde Lake 

Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 394-95, 761 A.2d 899, 911 (2000) (ellipsis in original) 

(citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).

Although the Maryland Rules do not define “order,” in Prince George’s Cnty. v. 

Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 661, 667 A.2d 898, 903 (1995), we described an “order” as follows: 

“[A]n ‘order’ emanates from a court and, in fact, constitutes a command or decree of the 

court.” For purposes of contempt of a court order, the Court of Special Appeals has stated 

that “the order must be sufficiently definite, certain, and specific in its terms so that the 

party may understand precisely what conduct the order requires.” Droney v. Droney, 102 
- 18 - 

Md. App. 672, 684, 651 A.2d 415, 421 (1995) (citations omitted). If the order is 

sufficiently definite, then parties must comply with the dictates of the order, and a party 

may be held in contempt for “willful” noncompliance. Royal Inv. Grp., LLC v. Wang, 183 

Md. App. 406, 448, 961 A.2d 665, 689 (2008), cert. dismissed, 409 Md. 413, 975 A.2d 875 

(2009). 

 Here, it is plainly evident that the juvenile court’s September 27, 2013 order was an 

“order” as that term is understood, and that it was an order that at a minimum granted

injunctive relief to Dustin. The record demonstrates that the juvenile court ordered DHMH 

to develop, approve, and implement a plan to provide ongoing services to Dustin. As such, 

the order granted injunctive relief because it was “a writ framed according to the 

circumstances of the case commanding an act which the court regard[ed] as essential to 

justice[.]” State Comm’n on Human Relations, 370 Md. at 139, 803 A.2d at 541. It is 

obvious that the order was, indeed, an order. The juvenile court orally ruled and signed 

the “Proposed Findings and Order” submitted by Dustin; in its oral ruling, the juvenile 

court made factual findings, including findings consistent with those contained in Dustin’s 

proposed findings, and determined on the record that Dustin was entitled to the relief that 

he requested. The juvenile court then stated that it granted Dustin’s request that DHMH 

perform the acts specified in the “proposed” order. After some discussion about a 

requested alteration to the text of the “proposed” order, and the juvenile court’s resolution 

of that request, the juvenile court announced that “[t]he order is signed”; clearly, that the 

order was titled “Proposed Findings and Order” was of no significance at all. Put plainly, 

by signing the “proposed” order, the juvenile court made the “proposed” order into an 
- 19 - 

actual order, and clearly intended the order as a binding command to the parties. That the 

juvenile court did not strike out the word “Proposed” in the title, or otherwise alter the 

prefatory language (i.e., “Dustin [] requests” and “Dustin requests”), is not dispositive of 

whether the order is, in fact, an order.11

 

 The record demonstrates that the juvenile court at a minimum granted mandatory 

injunctive relief to Dustin, as confirmed by: (1) the positions taken by the parties in the 

Court of Special Appeals and this Court, i.e., the lack of any contest whatsoever as to the 

appealability of the order; and (2) more importantly, the juvenile court’s subsequent order 

of December 2, 2013, requiring DHMH’s compliance with the September 27, 2013 order 

by the close of business on December 9, 2013. Both parties had actual notice of the entry 

of the September 27, 2013 order and its terms, as both were present at the hearing. See 

Md. R. 15-502(d) (“An injunction is not binding on a person until that person has been 

personally served with it or has received actual notice of it by any means.”). That the 

docket entry simply noted entry of the order under the title of the order—“Proposed 

Finding[s] and Order”—is of no consequence; it is clear that the courtroom clerk simply 

entered the title of the document as the docket entry. 

In sum, we hold that the Court of Special Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal 

 

11Notably, when discussing the one proposed alteration to the order (striking out the 

reference to DSS), and despite the juvenile court soliciting further comments on the order 

prior to signing the order, neither Dustin nor DHMH requested that the word “Proposed” 

or the prefatory language of “Dustin requests” be stricken from the order. In other words, 

ostensibly, neither Dustin nor DHMH believed that the word “Proposed” or the prefatory 

language rendered the order null. 
- 20 - 

because the juvenile court’s order was appealable at a minimum as an interlocutory order 

granting injunctive relief. See CJP § 12-303(3)(i). It is clear that, here, the juvenile court 

signed an order setting forth the relief requested by Dustin, and both parties understood the 

order to be the juvenile court’s command or decree. Having held that the appeal was 

erroneously dismissed, we address the merits of the issues presented to this Court.12 

II. Statutory Authority and Jurisdiction 

 Dustin contends that the juvenile court was authorized to order DHMH to enter into 

a plan to obtain “life-sustaining services” for him to continue after he reached age twentyone. Dustin argues that Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol.) (“FL”) § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) and (8) protect children with disabilities transitioning to adult care and 

grant the juvenile court the power, before Dustin turned twenty-one, to order DHMH to 

obtain ongoing care for him that would be needed after he turned twenty-one, and to order 

DHMH to submit a plan of clinically appropriate services in the least restrictive setting for 

him. Dustin asserts that the statute’s plain language is unambiguous in this regard. Dustin 

maintains that the juvenile court’s common law parens patriae powers enable it to protect 

him. 

DHMH responds that the juvenile court lacked the authority to order it to develop, 

approve, and implement a plan to provide services to Dustin after his twenty-first birthday 

because, under FL § 5-328(a)(2), the juvenile court had limited statutory jurisdiction 

 

12We hold that the September 27, 2013 order was appealable, at a minimum, as an 

interlocutory order granting injunctive relief and, applying judicial restraint, without 

opining on the merits of the Court of Special Appeals’s final judgment analysis, we need 

not address whether the order was also appealable as a final judgment. 
- 21 - 

extending only until Dustin attained the age of twenty-one, and, under FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii), 

the juvenile court lacked the authority to order services after the conclusion of its 

jurisdiction. DHMH argues that the plain language and legislative history of the statutes 

confirm that the juvenile court lacked the authority to order it to provide services or funding 

after Dustin’s twenty-first birthday. 

 For the following reasons, we agree with Dustin. 

The statutes’ plain language leads to the conclusion that the juvenile court had the 

authority to order DHMH to provide services for Dustin to continue after he reached age 

twenty-one. “As a court of limited jurisdiction, the juvenile court may exercise only those 

powers granted to it by statute.” In re Ryan W., 434 Md. 577, 602, 76 A.3d 1049, 1064 

(2013) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. State, 399 Md. 565, 574, 924 A.2d 1175, 1180 

(2007) (“We have held that juvenile courts, as statutorily created courts of limited 

jurisdiction, may exercise only those powers expressly designated by statute.”). Pursuant 

to FL § 5-328(a), if a local department is a child’s guardian, as is the circumstance here, 

the juvenile court:

(1) retains jurisdiction until:

(i) the child attains 18 years of age; or

(ii) the juvenile court finds the child to be eligible for emancipation; 

and

(2) may continue jurisdiction until the child attains 21 years of age. 

In other words, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction extends only “until the child attains 21 

years of age.” FL § 5-328(a)(2). 

 FL § 5-324(b)(1), concerning the grant of guardianship and accompanying order, 
- 22 - 

provides, in pertinent part: 

In a separate order accompanying an order granting guardianship of a child, 

a juvenile court:

. . . 

(ii) consistent with the child’s best interests:

. . . 

7. shall direct the provision of any other service or taking of any other 

action as to the child’s education, health, and welfare, including:

. . . 

B. for a child with a disability, services to obtain ongoing care, 

if any, needed after the guardianship case ends; and 

8. may co-commit the child to the custody of [DHMH] and order 

[DHMH] to provide a plan for the child of clinically appropriate 

services in the least restrictive setting, in accordance with federal and 

State law[.13] 

We must construe FL § 5-328(a) and FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii) to determine whether the 

statutes authorized the juvenile court to order DHMH to provide services to Dustin after 

his twenty-first birthday. In doing so, we reiterate: “In interpreting a statute, a court first 

considers the statute’s language, which the court applies where the statute’s language is 

unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose.” Hailes v. State, 

442 Md. 488, 495, 113 A.3d 608, 612 (2015) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 

13FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii) applies to orders that are issued at guardianship review 

hearings. See FL § 5-326(a)(8)(viii) (“At each guardianship review hearing for a child, a 

juvenile court shall: . . . take all other action that the juvenile court considers to be in the 

child’s bests interests, including any order allowed under [FL] § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)[.]”). 
- 23 - 

Plain Language

We unequivocally hold that the juvenile court had jurisdiction and the statutory

authority to order DHMH to develop and approve a plan that ensured that Dustin would 

continue to receive services, where Dustin was not yet twenty-one years old when the 

juvenile court issued its order and where such services were required to protect Dustin’s 

health and welfare; in other words, the juvenile court had jurisdiction and statutory 

authority to issue the September 27, 2013 order to DHMH to provide services for Dustin 

after age twenty-one. By its plain language, FL § 5-328(a) provides that, in cases where 

the local department is a child’s guardian, the juvenile court “retains jurisdiction[] until the 

child attains 18 years of age[,]” but that it “may continue jurisdiction until the child attains 

21 years of age.” (Paragraph break omitted). In other words, although the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction ordinarily ends once a child turns eighteen years old, the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction “may” extend until the child turns twenty-one years old. FL § 5-328(a)(2). 

Indeed, when read in its logical order, FL § 5-328(a)(2) states, in its entirety: “If a local 

department is a child’s guardian under this subtitle, a juvenile court: [] may continue 

jurisdiction until the child attains 21 years of age.” (Paragraph break omitted). By contrast, 

FL § 5-328(a)(1)(i) states, in its entirety: “If a local department is a child’s guardian under 

this subtitle, a juvenile court: [] retains jurisdiction until[] the child attains 18 years of 

age[.]” (Paragraph breaks omitted). 

FL § 5-328(a)(2)’s use of the word “may” is significant because it indicates a 

legislative intent to provide the juvenile court with the discretion to extend its jurisdiction 

over a guardianship matter past the ordinary cut-off date of a child’s eighteenth birthday. 
- 24 - 

See, e.g., Anne Arundel Cnty. Ethics Comm’n v. Dvorak, 189 Md. App. 46, 83, 983 A.2d 

557, 579 (2009) (“[T]he word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually implies some degree 

of discretion.” (Citation and some internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, 

under FL § 5-328(a)(2), if the juvenile court exercises its discretion to extend its 

jurisdiction in a guardianship proceeding past a child’s eighteenth birthday, the juvenile 

court is not thereafter divested of jurisdiction in that guardianship proceeding until the child 

turns twenty-one years old. Thus, the juvenile court has the authority to act, even if a child 

is twenty years and three hundred and sixty-four days old. What this means is that the 

juvenile court in the instant case had jurisdiction to issue both the September 27, 2013 

order and the December 2, 2013 order because Dustin was twenty years old at the time 

those orders were issued; indeed, Dustin did not turn twenty-one years old until December 

16, 2013. FL § 5-328(a)(2)’s plain language leads to the conclusion that the juvenile 

court’s jurisdiction continues until a child turns twenty-one, not that the juvenile court’s 

order is no longer effective when a child reaches age twenty-one. 

Accordingly, we turn to FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) and (8) to determine whether the 

juvenile court had the statutory authority to order DHMH to develop and approve a written 

plan of clinically appropriate services in the least restrictive setting that ensured that Dustin 

would continue to receive the services that he was then receiving. FL § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) states: 

In a separate order accompanying an order granting guardianship of a child, 

a juvenile court: . . . consistent with the child’s best interests: . . . shall direct 

the provision of any other service or taking of any other action as to the 

child’s education, health, and welfare, including: . . . for a child with a 

disability, services to obtain ongoing care, if any, needed after the 
- 25 - 

guardianship case ends[.] 

By its plain language, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) provides that, prior to termination of the 

guardianship case (i.e., before the juvenile court is divested of jurisdiction), the juvenile 

court must order a party to provide any service or take any other action to obtain any 

ongoing care needed to protect the health of a child with disabilities after he or she turns 

twenty-one years old. In other words, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B)’s purpose is to ensure 

that services are provided for, if needed, i.e., that care is in place before a child turns 

twenty-one years old, so that there is no gap in care between the end of the juvenile 

guardianship case and transition into the adult guardianship system. 

Indeed, such judicial action is mandated by FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B), which 

provides that the juvenile court “shall direct” the provision of such services. See, e.g., 

Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 738, 4 A.3d 976, 982 (2010) (“[T]he word ‘shall’ indicates 

the intent that a provision is mandatory.” (Citations omitted)). Furthermore, FL § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B)’s plain language—specifically, “any other service or taking of any 

other action”—encompasses a multitude and variety of services or actions. “Any” means, 

in relevant part, “one, some, or all indiscriminately of whatever quantity” and is “used to 

indicate a maximum or whole[.]” Any, Merriam-Webster (2015), http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/any [http://perma.cc/W9FK-M476]. “Service” means “help, use, 

benefit” or a “contribution to the welfare of others[,]” and can include “a facility supplying 

some public demand[.]” Service, Merriam-Webster (2015), http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/service [http://perma.cc/NA66-8PYS]. And, “action” means 

“[t]he process of doing something; conduct or behavior” or “[a] thing done[.]” Black’s 
- 26 - 

Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Thus, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) authorizes—indeed, 

requires—the juvenile court to order any service or action, without limitation, consistent 

with the child’s bests interests. 

 In the case of “a child with a disability,” FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) requires the 

juvenile court to direct the provisions of “services to obtain ongoing care, if any, needed 

after the guardianship case ends[.]” “Obtain” means “to gain or get (something) usually 

by effort” or “to gain or attain usually by planned action or effort[.]” Obtain, MerriamWebster (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/obtain 

[http://perma.cc/UH42-KJLE]. “Ongoing” means “continuing to exist, happen, or 

progress” or “continuing without reaching an end[.]” Ongoing, Merriam-Webster (2015), 

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ongoing [http://perma.cc/R2QK-J9LU]. 

And, “care” means “things that are done to keep someone healthy, safe, etc.[,]” and clearly 

encompasses foster care and nursing care. Care, Merriam-Webster (2015), 

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/care [http://perma.cc/C8JN-V8VU]. Thus, 

FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B)’s plain language requires that the juvenile court take action 

before a child with a disability turns twenty-one years old (i.e., before the guardianship 

case ends) to direct the provision of services needed to obtain ongoing care that the child 

will require after turning twenty-one years old. 

 In short, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) unambiguously provides that, while a juvenile 

court has jurisdiction in a guardianship case (i.e., before a child turns twenty-one years old, 

assuming the juvenile court has exercised its discretion to extend its jurisdiction pursuant 

to FL § 3-528(a)(2)), the juvenile court is required, consistent with the best interests of a 
- 27 - 

child with a disability, to direct the provision of any service or the taking of any action 

necessary for the child’s health and welfare, including services to obtain ongoing care that 

may be needed after the guardianship case ends. Here, the juvenile court acted in 

accordance with the express authority conferred on it by FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B). In the 

September 27, 2013 order, the juvenile court directed DHMH to take action to ensure that 

Dustin continued receiving ongoing services necessary for his health and well-being. As 

discussed above, because Dustin was twenty years old at the time, the juvenile court had 

jurisdiction over the guardianship case. And, as Dustin is disabled, FL § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) directed the juvenile court to take action before Dustin turned twentyone years old to obtain the ongoing care that Dustin would need after the guardianship case 

ended on his twenty-first birthday. 

 We perceive no merit in DHMH’s contention that FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) limits 

the juvenile court’s authority to order the guardian to apply for public benefits or 

entitlements that would take effect after a child turns twenty-one years old, and that the 

juvenile court could not order the guardian or another to provide a particular service after 

the guardianship case ends. As an initial matter, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B)’s plain 

language does not limit the services or actions that the juvenile court can and must order; 

indeed, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) authorizes the juvenile court to order any and all 

services needed to obtain ongoing care for a child with a disability, not just services that 

assist the child in obtaining care once he or she turns twenty-one years old. And, lest there 

be any confusion, we reiterate that FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) authorizes the juvenile court 

to order services to obtain ongoing care needed after the guardianship case ends; FL § 5-
- 28 - 

324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) does not extend the juvenile court’s jurisdiction or otherwise permit the 

juvenile court, after the guardianship case has ended, to direct the provision of services or 

the taking of actions. Stated otherwise, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) authorizes the juvenile 

court, while it has jurisdiction and while the guardianship case is ongoing, to order the 

provision of services to obtain ongoing care to be provided after the guardianship case 

ends, but FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) does not authorize the juvenile court to order anything 

once the guardianship case has ended. Had the juvenile court issued its order after Dustin’s 

twenty-first birthday, our analysis in this case would differ. Simply put, though, FL § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) does not run afoul of the jurisdiction granted to the juvenile court by 

FL § 5-328(a), but instead grants the juvenile court the authority to order services to obtain 

ongoing care in the case of a child with a disability while the juvenile court has jurisdiction. 

Moreover, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7), unlike other subsubparagraphs in FL § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii), does not limit the juvenile court to ordering DSS to take action or provide 

services, but rather authorizes the juvenile court to direct the provision of any services or 

the taking of any action as to the child’s welfare. For example, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(2) 

states that the juvenile court “may direct provision of services by a local department [of 

social services] to: A. the child; or B. the child’s caregiver[.]” (Paragraph breaks omitted). 

And, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(3) states that the juvenile court, “subject to a local department 

[of social services] retaining legal guardianship, may award to a caregiver limited authority 

to make an emergency or ordinary decision as to the child’s care, education, mental or 

physical health, or welfare[.]” Because FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii) includes language in 

subsubparagraphs (2) and (3) limiting the juvenile court’s order to DSS, but does not 
- 29 - 

contain such language in subsubparagraph (7), such an omission is presumed to be 

intentional. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 142 Md. App. 239, 251, 788 A.2d 717, 723, aff’d 

sub nom. Goldberg v. Miller, 371 Md. 591, 810 A.2d 947 (2002) (Using one of the rules 

of statutory construction, negative implication, in a particular Supreme Court case, “the 

Court reasoned that, when Congress included particular language in one section of a statute, 

but omitted it in another section of the same act, it could be presumed that Congress acted 

intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (Citations omitted)). 

 FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(8) provides that, consistent with a child’s best interest, the 

juvenile court “may co-commit the child to the custody of [DHMH] and order [DHMH] to 

provide a plan for the child of clinically appropriate services in the least restrictive setting, 

in accordance with federal and State law[.]” By its plain language, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(8) 

authorizes the juvenile court to order DHMH to submit a plan of clinically appropriate 

services in the least restrictive setting for a child who is co-committed to DHMH. That is 

exactly what occurred here. Dustin was already co-committed to DHMH as of April 2013, 

and the juvenile court ordered DHMH to develop and approve a plan of clinically 

appropriate services—including “24/7, one-on-one skilled nursing care provided by 

registered nurses”—to serve Dustin in the P. home, which the juvenile court determined to 

be the least restrictive setting. Indeed, given the juvenile court’s factual findings—which 

DHMH has not challenged in this Court—we have no difficulty in concluding that the 

juvenile court was correct in ordering DHMH to develop and provide a plan for the 

minimum level of clinically appropriate services necessary for Dustin in the P. home. FL 

§ 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(8) is unambiguous, and the juvenile court adhered to it in this case. 
- 30 - 

 We are unpersuaded by DHMH’s contention that FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(8) does not 

permit the juvenile court to order “specific services[.]” The September 27, 2013 order 

directed DHMH “to develop and approve a written plan that ensure[d] that Dustin w[ould] 

continue to receive all of the services and supports [that] he [was then] current[ly] 

receiving[.]” The order left the contours of the plan up to DHMH, which had the flexibility 

and discretion on how to fashion a plan that complied with the requirement of providing 

Dustin with the services and supports that he had been receiving for a number of years 

prior to the guardianship review hearing. For example, nothing in the juvenile court’s order 

required DHMH to continue using MedSource as the provider of Dustin’s nursing care. 

Indeed, how to comply with the juvenile court’s order and which providers to use were left 

entirely to DHMH. When read in context of the juvenile court’s factual findings, the 

juvenile court’s order directed DHMH to provide a specific level of care because DHMH’s 

plan failed to provide clinically appropriate services in the least restrictive setting. And, in 

any event, pursuant to FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(8), in conjunction with FL § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B), the juvenile court had the authority not only to order DHMH to provide 

a plan for Dustin of clinically appropriate services in the least restrictive setting, but also 

to direct the provision of services to obtain ongoing care for Dustin to continue after his 

twenty-first birthday (i.e., to order DHMH to implement the plan so that Dustin would 

continue receiving the services he was then receiving).

 In sum, we hold that, under the plain language of FL §§ 3-528(a)(2), 3-

524(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B), and 3-524(b)(1)(ii)(8), the juvenile court had both the jurisdiction and 

statutory authority to order DHMH to develop and approve a written plan of clinically 
- 31 - 

appropriate services in the least restrictive setting that ensured that Dustin would continue 

to receive the services that he was then receiving, where Dustin was not yet twenty-one 

years old when the juvenile court issued its order, where such services were required to 

protect Dustin’s health and welfare, and where it was necessary for the juvenile court to 

order services to bridge the gap as Dustin transitioned from his juvenile guardianship case 

to the adult guardianship system.14

Relevant Legislative History 

Although the plain language of the relevant statutes is unambiguous and our analysis 

could end at this point, we nonetheless address the legislative history on which DHMH 

relies. 

We are aware that, in 2013, the General Assembly considered and rejected a 

proposal to amend FL § 5-328 to extend the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over cases 

involving children who are medically fragile until age twenty-three; the General Assembly 

also rejected an amendment that would have authorized the juvenile court to review the 

content and enforcement of certain plans with respect to medically fragile children. See 

S.B. 1010, Third Reading (Mar. 29, 2013), at 6, available at

http://www.mgaleg.maryland.gov/2013RS/bills/sb/sb1010t.pdf [http://perma.cc/E6LYWGC8]. Specifically, Senate Bill 1010 would have amended FL § 5-328(a)(2), such that 

the statute would have read as follows:

(a) If a local department is a child’s guardian under this subtitle, a juvenile 

court:

 

14In the subsection entitled “The Bridge,” infra, we explain the precise contours of 

the bridge. 
- 32 - 

. . . 

(2) may continue jurisdiction: 

(I) until the child attains 21 years of age; OR

(II) IF THE CHILD IS MEDICALLY FRAGILE AND HAS A 

DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, FOR 2 ADDITIONAL YEARS 

AFTER THE CHILD ATTAINS 21 YEARS OF AGE FOR THE 

JUVENILE COURT TO REVIEW, AS NECESSARY, THE 

CONTENT, IMPLEMENTATION, AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE 

CHILD’S TRANSITION PLAN, INDIVIDUAL SERVICE PLAN, OR 

SERVICE FUNDING PLAN DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED 

UNDER § 5-525.3 OF THIS TITLE OR § 7-804 OF THE HEALTH – 

GENERAL ARTICLE. 

Id. (bolding and underlining in original). Senate Bill 1010 was passed by the Senate before 

failing in the House of Delegates. See S.B. 1010, History, 

http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?pid=billpage&stab=03&id=sb1010&

tab=subject3&ys=2013rs [http://perma.cc/W6QB-XYAN]. 

DHMH’s reliance on this legislative history is a red herring. Whether the General 

Assembly rejected an amendment to extend the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in guardianship 

cases to age twenty-three in the case of medically fragile children has no bearing 

whatsoever in this case, where the juvenile court acted while it had jurisdiction, i.e., before 

Dustin turned twenty-one years old. Thus, that the General Assembly rejected such an 

amendment extending the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is simply not relevant and does not 

assist this Court with ascertaining the General Assembly’s intent as to a juvenile court’s 

authority when it has jurisdiction; indeed, what can be gleaned from the rejection of the 

proposed amendment is that the General Assembly “did not intend to achieve the results 
- 33 - 

that the amendment would have achieved, if adopted.” State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 721, 

720 A.2d 311, 317 (1998) (citations omitted). Thus, that the General Assembly did not 

intend to extend the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in guardianship cases to age twenty-three 

in the case of medically fragile children is of no consequence. 

The General Assembly enacted FL § 5-324 as part of the Permanency for Families 

and Children Act of 2005. See 2005 Md. Laws 2581, 2628-29 (Ch. 464, S.B. 710). As 

originally proposed, FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii) contained only seven subsubparagraphs, 

including FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7), but not FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(8). See S.B. 710, First 

Reading (Feb. 4, 2005), at 50-52, available at 

http://www.mgaleg.maryland.gov/2005rs/bills/sb/sb0710f.pdf [http://perma.cc/BP27-

VAAF]. However, the Public Justice Center, a non-profit legal organization, supported by 

the Foster Care Court Improvement Project, proposed adding an eighth subsubparagraph 

to what would become FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii) to read as follows:

(8) May co-commit the child to the custody of the Department of Health and 

Mental Hygiene and order the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to 

provide such services as the court finds to be in the child’s best interest. 

Letter from Kevin Slayton, Policy Director of the Public Justice Center, to Brian E. Frosh, 

Chairperson, and Members of the Judicial Proceedings Committee (Feb. 23, 2005). 

According to the Public Justice Center: 

This additional language is needed to ensure that the court has all 

appropriate options available to meet the needs of these children. The 

court may find it necessary to order such co-commitment for children with 

severe developmental disabilities or complex medical issues. [Senate B]ill 

[710,] as currently drafted[,] gives the court a finite list of choices, does not 

address this option, and does not include any broad catch-all language 

permitting the court to make other orders that it considers to be in the best 
- 34 - 

interest of the child. 

Id. (emphasis added). In its memorandum supporting amending FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii) to 

add the eighth subsubparagraph proposed by the Public Justice Center, the Foster Care 

Court Improvement Project explained why it supported the amendment, stating: 

[DHMH] would have the same fiscal responsibility to provide services to 

severely disabled children as they do now. The amended bill would simply 

make [DHMH] legally responsible. These are the same children that the 

court already has the authority under the [Child in Need of Assistance] statute 

. . . to co-commit to DSS and DHMH. Please also note that very few cases 

would be affected since there are few severely disabled children that go 

through a [termination of parental rights] process. 

Memorandum from Althea R. Stewart Jones, Director of the Foster Care Court 

Improvement Project, to Delegate Theodore J. Sophocleus (Apr. 6, 2005). 

Ultimately, the Senate amended Senate Bill 710 to add subsubparagraph FL § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(8) as proposed by the Public Justice Center, except for substituting “any 

services” for “such services.” Amendments to Senate Bill No. 710 (First Reading File 

Bill), Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 22, 2005), at 1, available at

http://www.mgaleg.maryland.gov/2005rs/amds/bil_0000/sb0710_07897801.pdf [http:// 

perma.cc/KY89-BJVL]. DHMH objected to the breadth of the proposed language and 

opposed Senate Bill 710 as amended, urging the Judicial Proceedings Committee to issue 

“an unfavorable report.” As a result, the House of Delegates revised FL § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(8) to eliminate the phrase “any services that the court finds to be in the child’s 

best interests” and replace it with the phrase “a plan for the child of clinically appropriate 

services in the least restrictive setting, in accordance with federal and State law.” 

Amendment to Senate Bill No. 710 (Third Reading File Bill), Delegate Hubbard (Apr. 8, 
- 35 - 

2005), available at http://www.mgaleg.maryland.gov/2005rs/amds/bil_0000/sb0710_8936 

2402.pdf [http:// perma.cc/6W5C-W5SQ]; see also 2005 Md. Laws at 2629. Notably, the 

House of Delegates did not oppose Senate Bill 710 in its entirety as DHMH urged, but 

instead amended and passed Senate Bill 710. Accordingly, the General Assembly enacted 

FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(8) as amended by the House of Delegates. See 2005 Md. Laws at 

2629. Amending the language in Senate Bill 710 from “any services that the court finds to 

be in the child’s best interests” to the language currently in FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(8)—“a 

plan for the child of clinically appropriate services in the least restrictive setting, in 

accordance with federal and State law”—demonstrates only the General Assembly’s intent 

to narrow the scope of the juvenile court’s order under FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(8). Indeed, the 

amended language still authorizes the juvenile court to order DHMH to provide such a plan 

where a child is co-committed to DHMH. Moreover, we note that amendment to FL § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(8) before its enactment has no effect whatsoever on FL § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B)’s plain language, and does not demonstrate any legislative intent to 

limit the juvenile court to particular boundaries when ordering the provision of services or 

actions to obtain needed ongoing care for a child with a disability. 

Additionally, Senate Bill 710’s Fiscal and Policy Note addressed the impact of 

Senate Bill 710 on DHMH, noting at the outset that there was a “[p]otential significant 

general fund expenditure increase for . . . DHMH[] to provide plans for clinically 

appropriate treatment services that may be ordered by a juvenile court.” S.B. 710 Fiscal 

and Policy Note Revised, at 1, available at http://www.mgaleg.maryland. 

gov/2005rs/fnotes/bil_0000/sb0710.pdf [http://perma.cc/6WVN-7YW8]. Senate Bill 
- 36 - 

710’s Fiscal and Policy Note later explained in greater detail: 

There could be a potentially significant increase in general fund expenditures 

for DHMH to provide the services that may be required by [Senate B]ill[ 

710]. 

[Senate B]ill [710] authorizes a juvenile court to co-commit a child who is 

the subject of a guardianship petition to the custody of DHMH, as well as to 

a local department of social services. DHMH may then be ordered to provide 

a plan of clinically appropriate treatment services for the child in the least 

restrictive setting that conforms to State and federal law. The order for cocommitment could affect the Administrations of Medical Care Programs, 

Mental Hygiene, and Developmental Disabilities. DHMH advises that while 

some services may already be provided to these children if they are 

Medicaid-eligible and the services are considered medically necessary, there 

is still likely to be a significant fiscal impact, affecting . . . DDA[] to the 

greatest degree. 

According to the Judiciary, 895 guardianship petitions were filed in circuit 

courts in fiscal 2004. [The Department of Human Resources] advises that as 

many as 250 children annually could be co-committed to DHMH under the 

provisions of [Senate B]ill[ 710]. However, the Department of Legislative 

Services advises that because the juvenile court only has discretion to cocommit children to DHMH and is not mandated to do so, there is insufficient 

data to estimate accurately how many children a juvenile court may decide 

to order into a co-custody arrangement with DHMH for services. Also, 

[Senate B]ill [710] requires that DHMH provide a plan for clinically 

appropriate treatment, but does not specifically require that DHMH 

implement the plan. If DHMH provided a plan for treatment services only, 

that could substantially mitigate the additional costs of [Senate B]ill[ 710]. 

However, by way of illustration, general fund expenditures for DHMH could 

increase by $10 million annually if a juvenile court co-committed 125 

children to the custody of DDA annually, DDA was ordered to provide a 

clinically appropriate treatment plan for each child, and DDA was ordered to 

implement each plan. 

Id. at 6-7 (emphasis in original). In other words, Senate Bill 710’s Fiscal and Policy Note 

expressly recognized that, although Senate Bill 710—specifically, what is now FL § 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(8)—“does not specifically require that DHMH implement the plan” that a 

juvenile court may order it to provide, the juvenile court could order DHMH to “implement 
- 37 - 

each plan[,]” in which circumstance, there “could be a potentially significant increase in 

general fund expenditures for DHMH to provide the services that may be required[.]” Id.

at 6-7. Thus, Senate Bill 710’s Fiscal and Policy Note bolsters our reading of FL §§ 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) and (8)—that FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(8) authorizes the juvenile court to 

order DHMH to provide a written plan of clinically appropriate services in the least 

restrictive setting, and FL § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) authorizes the juvenile court to order 

DHMH to implement that plan and, indeed, provide any other service or take any other 

action to obtain ongoing care for a child with a disability that is needed after the 

guardianship case ends. In short, the legislative history on which DHMH relies does not 

alter the plain meaning of FL §§ 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) and (8), but rather supports 

affirmance of the juvenile court’s orders. 

Common Law Parens Patriae Authority 

In addition to having both jurisdiction and statutory authority to issue the September 

27, 2013 order and the December 2, 2013 order, the juvenile court had authority to act in 

accord with Dustin’s best interests pursuant to its common law parens patriae authority. 

In Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 702, 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 

(1982), we described parens patriae authority, stating: 

The parens patriae jurisdiction of circuit courts in this State is well 

established. The words “parens patriae,” meaning “father of the country,” 

refer to the State’s sovereign power of guardianship over minors and other 

persons under disability. It is a fundamental common law concept that the 

jurisdiction of courts of equity over such persons is plenary so as to afford 

whatever relief may be necessary to protect the individual’s best interests.

(Citations omitted). And, more recently, in In re Najasha B., 409 Md. 20, 33-34, 972 A.2d 
- 38 - 

845, 852-53 (2009), in the context of a child in need of assistance case, we elaborated:

The State of Maryland has a parens patriae interest in caring for those, such 

as minors, who cannot care for themselves and the child’s welfare is a 

consideration that is of transcendent importance when the child might be in 

jeopardy. In furtherance of this interest, we have recognized that in cases 

where abuse or neglect is evidence, particularly in a [child in need of 

assistance] case, the court’s role is necessarily more pro-active. The juvenile 

court, acting under the State’s parens patriae authority, is in the unique 

position to marshal the applicable facts, assess the situation, and determine 

the correct means of fulfilling a child’s best interests. 

(Citations, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted). To that end, in Montgomery 

Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 418, 381 A.2d 1154, 1162 (1977), 

the Court of Special Appeals stated that the juvenile court “stands as a guardian of all 

children, and may interfere at any time and in any way to protect and advance [a child’s] 

welfare and interests.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Here, the juvenile court had broad authority under its common law parens patriae 

authority to act in Dustin’s best interests to provide for Dustin’s ongoing care as he aged 

out of the juvenile guardianship system and transitioned into the adult guardianship system, 

particularly where Dustin is a child with extraordinary disabilities who cannot care for 

himself. The State has the ultimate responsibility for the health and welfare of those 

children with disabilities who are under guardianship. Thus, even if FL §§ 5-

324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) and (8) were ambiguous as to the juvenile court’s authority—which 

they are not—we would nevertheless hold that, under the circumstances of this case, 

involving a child indisputably in need of life-sustaining services, common law parens 

patriae authority empowered the juvenile court to act as it did to issue an order requiring 

DHMH to have ongoing care in place for Dustin after he turns twenty-one years old and 
- 39 - 

ages out of the child welfare system. Stated otherwise, absent clear statutory language 

prohibiting the juvenile court from acting as it did, the juvenile court had inherent authority 

and discretion pursuant to its common law parens patriae authority to act to provide lifesustaining services. 

Practical Considerations

Additionally, practical concerns support our holding. As Amici curiae15 explain, if 

the juvenile court were not authorized to order that clinically appropriate services in the 

least restrictive setting be provided and in place before a child ages out of the child welfare 

system, “gaps or outright lapses in care would almost certainly occur.” Brief of Amici 

Curiae First Star, Inc., et al. in Support of Dustin, at 22. This outcome would clearly run 

afoul of the juvenile court’s responsibility to act in the best interests of a child and to protect 

the child’s health and welfare. As such, Amici curiae contend that the authority exercised 

by the juvenile court in this case is an authority that is broadly exercised by juvenile courts 

across the State:

[T]he sheer breadth of juvenile court orders that would be precluded under 

DHMH’s view would work a sea change in the practical—and long 

unquestioned—operation of the juvenile court. Such a change would have 

significant if not disastrous consequences, not only for guardianship children 

but for the administrability of the child welfare system. The juvenile courts 

are responsible for managing guardianship cases and determining the 

 

15Amici curiae “include non-profit organizations, professional associations, and 

private law firms dedicated to protecting the rights of children and at-risk populations[,]” 

namely: First Star, Inc.; Advocates for Children and Youth; the Baltimore Child Abuse 

Center; the Coalition to Protect Maryland’s Children; the Family Tree; the Franklin Law 

Group, P.C.; Hope Forward, Inc.; the Law Offices of Darlene A. Wakefield, P.A.; the 

Maryland Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers; the Maryland State 

Council on Child Abuse and Neglect; the Public Justice Center; and Randall & Sonnier, 

LLC. 
- 40 - 

appropriate level of care for guardianship children, and in that capacity 

juvenile courts have routinely ordered state agencies to provide a broad array 

of services—everything from drug treatment, psychological and 

neuropsychological evaluations, therapy and medical devices[,] to housing 

assistance, vocational training, and transportation assistance. Precluding the 

juvenile court from issuing such orders, as DHMH’s position here would do, 

would fundamentally alter the juvenile court’s authority, and would, as a 

practical matter, strip that court of its central role in managing guardianship 

cases. Not only would such a result be harmful to guardianship children, but 

it would also create serious fiscal and administrative problems for the [S]tate. 

If the juvenile court is found to lack the authority to order state agencies to 

provide the broad range of services that it currently orders, then disputes over 

whether the service is necessary and who should pay for it will be pursued 

through the administrative appeal process. That route will be expensive, 

cumbersome, and inefficient—serving neither the interests of guardianship 

children or the [S]tate.

According to Amici curiae, adopting “DHMH’s position would strip the juvenile court of 

its ability to enter numerous orders for which its authority had previously been 

unquestioned.” To the extent that Amici curiae are correct, for this Court to essentially pull 

the rug out from under the juvenile court and read FL §§ 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) and (8) 

contrary to their plain language would render uncertainty throughout the juvenile courts of 

this State, and would render juvenile courts unable to enter orders consistent with the best 

interests of the child. We decline to do so. 

“The Bridge” 

 As a final matter, although we hold that the juvenile court had statutory authority 

under FL §§ 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) and (8) to act as it did, that statute serves to provide a 

bridge in services as a child transitions from the juvenile guardianship system and into the 

adult guardianship system. In other words, FL §§ 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) and (8) do not serve 

as the basis for creating an entitlement to particular services for all time. 
- 41 - 

Indeed, we pause to make clear that the juvenile court may order services pursuant 

to FL §§ 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B) and (8) to bridge the gap as Dustin transitions from a 

juvenile guardianship to an adult guardianship and obtains services through the adult 

guardianship system. The services ordered by the juvenile court cannot and do not continue 

necessarily until Dustin’s demise. Rather, services ordered by the juvenile court to bridge 

the gap continue only until such time as the child transitions into an adult guardianship and 

his or her guardian(s) seeks authorization for the provision of the same or substantially 

similar services as those ordered by the juvenile court through the Medicaid fair hearing 

process. See Code of Maryland Regulations 10.01.04–10.01.12 (“Fair Hearing Appeals 

Under the Maryland State Medical Assistance Program”). The burden is on the child’s 

guardian to proceed with the adult guardianship process and to seek the Medicaid fair 

hearing; the child’s guardian cannot stand idle and do nothing after a juvenile court orders 

a bridge in services. Thus, here, the burden is on Mr. and Mrs. P. to proceed with moving 

Dustin into the adult guardianship system,16 and, if DHMH persists in wanting to provide 

services different materially than as directed by the juvenile court, to seek a Medicaid fair 

hearing to obtain the same or substantially similar services as those ordered by the juvenile 

court as necessary to protect Dustin’s health and welfare going forward. DHMH should 

have every incentive to assist Mr. and Mrs. P. through the process. In the meantime, the 

juvenile court’s order, which was lawfully issued pursuant to the juvenile court’s statutory 

and parens patriae authority, remains in effect, and the juvenile court has the power to 

 

16It is our understanding that Mr. and Mrs. P. were, in fact, awarded adult 

guardianship of Dustin after he turned twenty-one years old. 
- 42 - 

enforce its order until such time as Dustin goes through the Medicaid fair hearing process 

(if necessary) and is provided the life-sustaining services he requires. See CJP § 1-202(a) 

(“A court may exercise the power to punish for contempt of court or to compel compliance 

with its commands in the manner prescribed by Title 15, Chapter 200 of the Maryland 

Rules.”); Md. R. 15-205–207 (Constructive Contempt); Dodson v. Dodson, 380 Md. 438, 

448, 845 A.2d 1194, 1199 (2004) (“[T]he purpose of civil contempt is to coerce present or 

future compliance with a court order, whereas imposing a sanction for past misconduct is 

the function of criminal contempt.” (Citation omitted)). Obviously, the juvenile court 

anticipated the ability to enforce its order. In its order of December 2, 2013, the juvenile 

court ordered a review scheduled for December 12, 2013, four days before Dustin turned 

twenty-one; it would be illogical to conclude that the juvenile court intended for DHMH’s 

plan to be effective for only four days until Dustin’s twenty-first birthday on December 16, 

2013. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, we reiterate that we hold that the juvenile court had jurisdiction and 

statutory authority to order DHMH to develop and approve a written plan of clinically 

appropriate services in the least restrictive setting that ensured that Dustin would continue 

to receive the services that he was then receiving, where Dustin was not yet twenty-one 

years old when the juvenile court issued its order and where such services were required to 

protect Dustin’s health and welfare, and where the juvenile court’s order served to bridge 

the gap in services as Dustin transitioned from his juvenile guardianship case to adult 

guardianship care. 
- 43 - 

III. Separation of Powers

DHMH contends that the juvenile court’s order violates the separation of powers 

because it interferes with DHMH’s “administration of its programs and budget by ordering 

services without regard to the funds appropriated to pay for such services or [DHMH]’s 

regulations governing the provision of such services[.]” On the other hand, Dustin 

contends that the juvenile court’s order does not violate the separation of powers because 

it acted pursuant to express statutory authority. We agree with Dustin and explain.

Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: “That the Legislative, 

Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct 

from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall 

assume or discharge the duties of any other.” Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of 

Rights “explicitly prohibit[s] one branch of government from assuming or usurping the 

power of any other branch.” Getty v. Carroll Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 399 Md. 710, 730, 

926 A.2d 216, 229 (2007). In O’Hara v. Kovens, 92 Md. App. 9, 20, 606 A.2d 286, 291, 

cert. denied, 328 Md. 93, 612 A.2d 1316 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 920 (1993), the 

Court of Special Appeals remarked that “[t]here is no concept more fundamental to our 

system of government than the doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, 

executive, and judicial branches.” Nevertheless, “[d]espite its language, the [separation of 

powers] doctrine has never been so rigidly applied,” as Article “8 of the Maryland 

Declaration of Rights does not impose a complete separation [among] the branches of 

government.” McCulloch v. Glendening, 347 Md. 272, 283, 701 A.2d 99, 104 (1997) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
- 44 - 

Here, the juvenile court did not violate the separation of powers. As discussed 

above, FL §§ 5-328(a)(2), 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(7)(B), and 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(8) expressly 

authorized and empowered the juvenile court to act as it did. As Dustin’s counsel pointed 

out in his brief and at oral argument, the issue is not whether the juvenile court improperly 

exercised judicial power to the detriment of the executive branch, but instead the issue is 

one of statutory interpretation, i.e., whether the General Assembly delegated the authority 

to the juvenile court to act as it did in this case. Perhaps tellingly, DHMH does not contend 

that the General Assembly lacked the authority to enact the statutes at issue in this case or 

that the statutes themselves are unconstitutional. We note that “enactments of the [General 

Assembly] are presumed to be constitutionally valid and [] this presumption prevails until 

it appears that the [statute] is invalid or obnoxious to the expressed terms of the 

Constitution or to the necessary implication afforded by, or flowing from, such expressed 

provisions.” Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 218, 334 

A.2d 514, 520 (1975) (citations omitted).17 Absent any argument by DHMH that the 

 

17DHMH’s reliance on Md. State Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Prince 

George’s Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 47 Md. App. 436, 423 A.2d 589 (1980) is misplaced. 

In that case, the Court of Special Appeals held that a juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to 

order DHMH to pay for the costs of maintaining a child in need of assistance in a private 

hospital. See id. at 441, 423 A.2d 592. After concluding that the juvenile court lacked the 

authority to order DHMH to pay for the child’s care at a private hospital, holding that the 

statute at issue “empower[ed] the court to commit a child to the custody of DHMH[, but 

did] not confer upon the court any right to mandate the specific terms of the 

commitment[,]” id. at 445, 423 A.2d at 594, the Court of Special Appeals addressed, in 

dicta, the separation of powers doctrine and concluded that the juvenile court’s order 

“invade[d] the Executive department by directing the Secretary of DHMH to pay out 

monies for a purpose not funded by the [General Assembly] nor requested by the 

Executive[,]” and “intruded on the Legislative Branch by directing the funding of [the 
- 45 - 

statutes at issue are unconstitutional or that the General Assembly improperly delegated 

authority to the juvenile court, we discern no basis on which to conclude that the juvenile 

court violated the separation of powers in the instant case, where it acted according to 

express statutory authority.18

 

child]’s private hospital confinement[,]” id. at 452, 423 A.2d at 597. Notably, the 

discussion of the separation of powers doctrine was dicta. And, as discussed in In re 

Demetrius J., 321 Md. 468, 476, 583 A.2d 258, 262 (1991), the statute at issue in Md. State 

Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene was later amended to “permit[] the court to name the 

type of facility but generally bestow[ed] no authority on the court to specify a particular 

facility.” Thus, as to that point, Md. State Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene is no longer 

good law. 

18In its brief, DHMH also contends that the juvenile court lacked the authority to 

enter the order because Dustin failed to exhaust his administrative remedies to challenge 

DHMH’s plan for providing services to him after he turned twenty-one before seeking 

relief from the juvenile court. According to DHMH, Dustin was required to challenge its 

plan through the Medicaid fair hearing process. We need not address the issue because we 

denied the cross-petition for a writ of certiorari, in which DHMH raised the issue; 

significantly, Dustin did not raise an issue as to exhaustion of administrative remedies in 

the petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. In other words, the issue 

concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies is not before this Court, as we limited 

our grant of certiorari to those issues raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari. See Md. 

R. 8-131(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in 

reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals . . . , the Court of Appeals 

ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or 

any cross-petition and that has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals.”); 

Robinson v. Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 440, 788 A.2d 636, 641 (2002) (“This Court has 

consistently taken the position, under [Maryland] Rule 8-131(b) and under our certiorari

practice prior to the adoption of a rule on the subject, that in our order granting certiorari, 

. . . we may either limit the issues or add issues which the parties have not presented in 

certiorari petitions or cross-petitions.” (Citations omitted)); Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 

134, 143, 355 A.2d 455, 459 (1976) (“[N]ot only did the State fail to raise in a timely 

fashion the [issue] . . . , but the issue was not embraced in our order granting the writ of 

certiorari. Where this Court’s order granting certiorari limits the issues to be considered, 

no additional questions will ordinarily be dealt with even if such additional questions were 

raised in the petition or in a cross-petition.” (Citation omitted)). 
- 46 - 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 

APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO 

THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO 

AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 

COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY. 

RESPONDENT TO PAY COSTS.