UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-1763

PROGRESSIVE CHURCH OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST, INC.,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PROGRESSIVE CHURCH OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST-TALLAHASSEE, INC.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:19-cv-03541-JFA)

Submitted: September 30, 2022 Decided: October 12, 2022

Before THACKER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Megan A. Rosenberg, Jennifer C. Rey, THE HOGAN LAW FIRM, LLC, 

Brooksville, Florida; Louis D. Nettles, NETTLES LAW FIRM, Florence, South Carolina, 

for Appellant. James Y. Becker, Costa M. Pleicones, Columbia, South Carolina, Sarah P. 

Spruill, HAYNSWORTH SINKLER BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM: 

The Progressive Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ, Inc. (the “Church”) filed suit 

against the Progressive Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ-Tallahassee, Inc. (the 

“Tallahassee Congregation”) to determine the validity of a deed signed by the Presiding 

Bishop of the Church purporting to transfer a parcel of real property where the Tallahassee 

Congregation worshipped (the “Tallahassee property”) to the Tallahassee Congregation 

without the permission of the Church’s Board of Bishops. The district court determined 

that the deed was invalid and granted summary judgment in favor of the Church. The 

Tallahassee Congregation appeals, arguing that the Board of Bishops was illegitimate, the 

Church’s Constitution should be given no weight because the Church did not adhere to it, 

and the Tallahassee Congregation paid for the purchase of the Tallahassee property. We 

affirm. 

We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. 

Calloway v. Lokey, 948 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2020). “A district court ‘shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. 

Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A 

genuine dispute exists “if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a genuine issue of material 

fact exists, this court “view[s] the facts and all justifiable inferences arising therefrom in 

the light most favorable to . . . the nonmoving party.” Id. at 565 n.1 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

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“[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play 

in resolving church property disputes.” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 

U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[R]eligious freedom 

encompasses the power of religious bodies to decide for themselves, free from state 

interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Id. 

at 721-22 (cleaned up). “In assessing whether to exercise jurisdiction in a civil proceeding 

involving a church, it is important to determine whether the church is of a ‘hierarchical’ 

nature. If the church is hierarchical, a civil court should defer to the final authority within 

its hierarchy, declining even to determine . . . whether it has complied with church laws 

and regulations.” Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699, 715 (4th Cir. 2002). In determining 

whether a church is hierarchical, a court considers whether: 

1) The corporations in question are organized under the state religious 

corporations act governing the incorporation of religious societies that are 

subordinate parts of larger church organizations. 

2) Resolutions of the subordinate entity acknowledge the superiority of the 

superior entity. 

3) By-laws of the lower authority have been submitted to the higher for 

approval. 

4) The priest takes an oath to be obedient to the higher authority. 

5) Provisions in the constitutions and by-laws of both the superior and 

subordinate levels suggest a hierarchical relationship. 

Id.

Our review of the record supports the district court’s conclusion that the Church 

operated as a hierarchical organization and that deference is owed to the Church’s highest 

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authority. See id. The Church is incorporated under South Carolina’s act governing the 

incorporation of religious organizations; the Church Constitution provides that the 

organization operates on national, district, and local levels, provides for the collection of 

fees from districts to be rendered to the national organization, and requires that member 

churches adhere to the rules and bylaws of the Church; and upon their appointment, pastors 

of local congregations agree to operate under the Board’s authority and pursuant to the 

Church Constitution. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in 

determining that the Church was a hierarchical organization. 

The Board of Bishops is the highest authority within the Church, according to its 

Constitution. See id. at 717 (looking to church’s governing documents to determine its 

highest authority). At the time the deed purporting to transfer the Tallahassee property was 

signed, the Board of Bishops had been properly appointed in compliance with the Church 

Constitution; any alleged history of noncompliance with the Constitution by the Church is 

irrelevant. And, while the Tallahassee Congregation claims that the 2019 election and 

appointment of the Board of Bishops occurring before the deed was executed was 

illegitimate, a civil court defers to the hierarchical authority in matters of internal church 

government and will not scrutinize the Church’s appointments to the Board of Bishops. 

See id. at 715. Although the Tallahassee Congregation argues that there is a question of 

fact as to who supplied the funds for the original purchase of the property, this question is 

immaterial because the record makes clear that the property was purchased by the Church, 

the mortgage and property were titled in the Church’s name, and the Church Constitution 

provided for the ownership of churches by the national Church organization. 

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Because the Church is incorporated in South Carolina, South Carolina’s statute 

governing nonprofit corporations applies to the Church’s operations. See Phoenix Sav. & 

Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 F.2d 862, 868 (4th Cir. 1970) (citing Erie R.R. v. 

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) (stating that substantive issues in a diversity suit are 

resolved according to state law). Turning to the validity of the transfer, South Carolina law 

requires that every corporation have a board of directors, and that all corporate powers be 

exercised and affairs of the corporation be managed by the board, unless the articles of 

incorporation authorize another person to exercise particular powers. S.C. Code Ann. § 33-

31-801 (2006). “If religious doctrine governing the affairs of a religious corporation is 

inconsistent with the provisions of [South Carolina law governing nonprofit corporations], 

the religious doctrine controls.” S.C. Code Ann. § 33-31-180 (2006). Because the 

Tallahassee property is located in Florida, Florida law governs the transfer of property. 

Florida law requires either that the party transferring the property or “the party’s lawfully 

authorized agent” sign the deed before two witnesses, Fla. Stat. § 689.01 (2021), or that an 

instrument be “sealed with the common or corporate seal and signed in its name by its 

president or any vice president or chief executive officer,” Fla. Stat. § 692.01 (2021). 

Although the deed in this case was signed by the Presiding Bishop, the deed did not 

contain a corporate seal, and therefore did not comply with the requirements of Fla. Stat. 

§ 692.01. As such, to be effective, the deed must have been signed by the Church’s 

lawfully authorized agent. See DGG Dev. Corp. v. Estate of Capponi, 983 So. 2d 1232, 

1233-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that a deed is ineffective on its face to convey 

title if not properly executed in accordance with the conveyancing statutes). Neither the 

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articles of incorporation nor the Church Constitution authorize the Presiding Bishop to 

transfer property on behalf of the Church. Thus, the Board of Bishops has the sole power 

to authorize such a transaction. Since the Presiding Bishop was not authorized by the Board 

of Bishops to sign the deed, the transaction was not valid under Florida law. We conclude 

that the district court did not err in granting the Church’s motion for summary judgment. 

Finally, the Tallahassee Congregation filed a motion for an injunction pending this 

appeal seeking to stop the Church from barring the Tallahassee Congregation members 

from the Tallahassee property. A motion requesting such relief ordinarily must first be 

made in the district court unless the moving party shows that the court has already denied 

the requested relief or that moving first in the district court would be impracticable. Fed. 

R. App. P. 8(a)(1)(A), (2)(A). Additionally, “[t]he party requesting a stay bears the burden 

of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of [judicial] discretion” needed for 

issuance of the stay. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009). 

The Tallahassee Congregation did not first request injunctive relief in the district 

court and has not met its burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of 

this court’s discretion. Moreover, our decision renders the request for relief moot. 

We affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment and deny the 

Tallahassee Congregation’s motion for an injunction pending appeal. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

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