BORDER SECURITY

DHS Needs to Strengthen 

Its Efforts to Modernize Key 

Enforcement Systems

Statement of David A. Powner, Director, 

Information Technology Management Issues

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Management Efficiency, 

Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST

Thursday, February 6, 2014

GAO-14-342T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-342T, a testimony before 

the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Management Efficiency, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of Representatives 

February 6, 2014

BORDER SECURITY

DHS Needs to Strengthen Its Efforts to Modernize Key 

Enforcement Systems

Why GAO Did This Study

DHS’s border enforcement system, 

known as TECS, is the primary system 

for determining admissibility of persons 

to the United States. It is used to 

prevent terrorism, and provide border 

security and law enforcement, case 

management, and intelligence 

functions for multiple federal, state, 

and local agencies. It has become 

increasingly difficult and expensive to 

maintain and is unable to support new 

mission requirements. In 2008, DHS 

began an effort to modernize the 

system. It is being managed as two 

separate programs by CBP and ICE.

In December 2013, GAO reported that 

DHS needed to strengthen its efforts to 

modernize these key enforcement 

systems. This statement summarizes 

that report. Specifically, it covers (1) 

the scope and status of the two TECS 

Mod programs, (2) selected program 

management practices for TECS Mod, 

(3) the extent to which DHS is 

executing effective oversight and 

governance of the two TECS Mod 

programs, and (4) the importance of 

addressing our recommendations for 

improving DHS’s development efforts.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making no new 

recommendations in this statement. In 

its December 2013 report, GAO 

recommended that DHS improve its 

efforts to manage requirements and 

risk, as well as its governance of the 

TECS Mod programs. DHS agreed 

with all but one of GAO’s eight 

recommendations, disagreeing with the

recommendation about improving

CBP’s master schedule. GAO 

continues to believe improvements are 

necessary to validate schedule 

commitments and monitor progress.

What GAO Found

The schedule and cost for the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) border 

enforcement system modernization program known as TECS Mod that is 

managed by Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) continue to change; while 

the part managed in parallel by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is 

undergoing major revisions to its scope, schedule, and cost after discovering that

its initial solution is not technically viable. CBP’s $724 million program intends to 

modernize the functionality, data, and aging infrastructure of legacy TECS and 

move it to DHS’s data centers by 2016. To date, CBP has deployed functionality 

to improve its secondary inspection processes to air and sea ports of entry and, 

more recently, to land ports of entry in 2013. However, CBP is in the process of 

revising its schedule baseline for the second time in under a year. Further, CBP 

has not developed its master schedule sufficiently to reliably manage work 

activities or monitor program progress. These factors raise questions about the 

certainty of CBP’s remaining schedule commitments. Regarding ICE’s $818 

million TECS Mod program, it is redesigning and replanning its program, having 

determined in June 2013 that its initial solution was not viable and could not 

support ICE’s needs. As a result, ICE largely halted development and is now 

assessing design alternatives and is revising its schedule and cost estimates. 

Program officials stated the revisions will be complete in spring 2014. Until ICE 

completes the replanning effort, it is unclear what functionality it will deliver, when 

it will deliver it, or what it will cost to do so, thus putting it in jeopardy of not 

completing the modernization by its 2015 deadline. 

CBP and ICE have managed many risks in accordance with some leading 

practices, but they have had mixed results in managing requirements for their 

programs. In particular, neither program identified all known risks, nor escalated 

them for timely management review. Further, CBP’s guidance reflects most 

leading practices for effectively managing requirements, but important 

requirements development activities were underway before such guidance was 

established. ICE, meanwhile, operated without requirements management 

guidance for years, and its requirements activities were mismanaged, resulting in 

testing failures and delays. ICE issued requirements guidance in March 2013 that 

is consistent with leading practices, but it has not yet been implemented.

DHS’s governance bodies have taken actions to oversee the two TECS Mod 

programs that are generally aligned with leading practices. Specifically, they 

have monitored TECS Mod performance and progress and have ensured that 

corrective actions have been identified and tracked. However, a lack of complete, 

timely, and accurate data have affected the ability of these governance bodies to 

make informed and timely decisions, thus limiting their effectiveness. Until these 

governance bodies base their performance reviews on timely, complete, and 

accurate data, they will be constrained in their ability to effectively provide 

oversight.

View GAO-14-342T. For more information, 

contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9586, or 

pownerd@gao.gov
 

Page 1 GAO-14-342T 

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) border enforcement system, known as TECS.1

In 2008 the department initiated TECS Modernization (TECS Mod) to 

modernize existing system functionality, address known capability gaps, 

and move the program’s infrastructure to DHS’s new data centers. TECS 

Mod is managed as two separate programs working in parallel: U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) are each modernizing existing functionality specific to 

their respective roles and missions within the department. Both programs 

had planned to be fully operational by September 2015.

TECS 

has been used since the 1980’s for preventing terrorism, providing border 

security and law enforcement, and sharing information about people who 

are inadmissible or may pose a threat to the security of the United States, 

and today still provides traveler processing and screening, investigations, 

case management, and intelligence functions for multiple federal, state, 

and local agencies. Over time, however; it has become increasingly 

difficult and expensive to maintain because of technology obsolescence 

and its inability to support new mission requirements. DHS estimates that 

TECS’s licensing and maintenance costs are expected to be $40 million 

to $60 million per year in 2015.

In December 2013, we reported that DHS needed to strengthen its efforts 

to modernize these key border enforcement systems.2

 

1

TECS was created as a system of the Customs Service, which was then a component 

within the Department of the Treasury. The term TECS initially was the abbreviation for 

the Treasury Enforcement Communications System. When the Customs Service became 

part of DHS under the Homeland Security Act, TECS became a DHS system, and 

thereafter has simply been known as TECS. 

In that report, we 

issued multiple recommendations aimed at improving DHS’s efforts to 

develop and implement its TECS Mod programs. My testimony today will 

summarize the results of that report. Specifically, I will cover (1) the scope 

and status of the two TECS Mod programs, (2) selected CBP and ICE 

program management practices for TECS Mod, (3) the extent to which 

DHS is executing effective executive oversight and governance of the two 

2

GAO, Border Security: DHS’s Efforts to Modernize Key Enforcement Systems Could be 

Strengthened, GAO-14-62 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 5, 2013).
 

Page 2 GAO-14-342T 

TECS Mod programs, and (4) the importance of addressing our 

recommendations for improving DHS’s development efforts.

The work on which my testimony is based was conducted from December 

2012 to December 2013. Further details on the scope and methodology 

for the previously-issued report are available within that published 

product. In addition, we analyzed recently-received documentation from 

DHS on the status of the two TECS Mod programs. All work on which this 

testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

TECS is an information technology (IT) and data management system 

that supports DHS’s core border enforcement mission. According to CBP, 

it is one of the largest, most important law enforcement systems currently 

in use, and is the primary system available to CBP officers and agents 

from other departments for use in determining the admissibility of persons 

wishing to enter the country. In addition, it provides an investigative case 

management function for activities carried out by ICE agents, including 

money-laundering tracking and reporting; telephone data analysis; and 

intelligence reporting and dissemination.

Over time, TECS has evolved into a multifaceted computing platform that 

CBP describes as a system of systems. This mainframe-based system 

dates back to the 1980s and interfaces with over 80 other systems from 

within DHS, other federal departments and their component agencies, as 

well as state, local, and foreign governments. It contains over 350 

database tables, queries and reports (e.g., querying law enforcement 

records to determine if a traveler appears on a terrorist watch list), and 

multiple applications (e.g., ICE’s existing investigative case management 

system). CBP agents and other users access TECS via dedicated 

terminals. The system is managed by CBP’s Office of Passenger 

Systems Program Office and is currently hosted at CBP’s datacenter.

On a daily basis, the system is used by over 70,000 users and handles 

more than 2 million transactions—including the screening of over 900,000 

visitors and approximately 465,000 vehicles every day. In addition, 

federal, state, local, and international law enforcement entities use TECS 

to create and disseminate alerts and other law enforcement information 

Background
 

Page 3 GAO-14-342T 

about “persons of interest.” Ten federal departments and their numerous 

component agencies access the system to perform a part of their 

missions. 

The current TECS system uses obsolete technology, which combined 

with expanding mission requirements, have posed operational challenges 

for CBP and others. For example, users may need to access and 

navigate among several different systems to investigate, resolve, and 

document an encounter with a passenger. In addition, CBP identified that 

TECS’s search algorithms do not adequately match names from foreign 

alphabets. TECS’s obsolescence also makes it difficult and expensive to 

maintain and support. Specifically, DHS estimates that TECS’s licensing 

and maintenance costs are expected to be $40 million to $60 million per 

year in 2015.

In 2008, DHS initiated efforts to modernize TECS by replacing the 

mainframe technology, developing new applications and enhancing 

existing applications to address expanding traveler screening mission 

needs, improving data integration to provide enhanced search and case 

management capabilities, and improving user interface and data access. 

DHS’s plan was to migrate away from the existing TECS mainframe by 

September 2015 to avoid significantly escalating support costs. The 

modernization effort is managed by two program offices—one at CBP and 

the other at ICE—working in parallel, with each having assumed 

responsibility for modernizing the parts of the system aligned with their 

respective missions.

CBP expects that its modernization efforts will yield certain improvements 

over the existing system, including the following.

• Enhancements to TECS’s search algorithms to better match names 

from foreign alphabets; address gaps in current processes that could 

result in missing a person of interest. This includes an improved ability 

for inspectors to update information on travelers at air and sea 

borders at the time of encounter.

• Improvements in the flow and integration of data between CBP and its 

partner agencies and organizations. This is intended to aid the 

agency’s inspectors by providing timely, complete, and accurate 

information about a traveler during the secondary inspection process.

CBP planned to develop, deploy, and implement these capabilities 

incrementally across five projects from 2008 to 2015.
 

Page 4 GAO-14-342T 

• Secondary Inspection: This project is to support processing of 

travelers referred from primary inspection for either enforcement or 

administrative reasons. According to CBP, this project’s functionality 

was fully deployed to all air and sea ports of entry in 2011, and was 

fully deployed to all land ports of entry in 2013.

• High Performance Primary Query and Manifest Processing: This 

project is intended to improve TECS data search results in order to 

expedite the processing of manifests from individuals traveling to the 

United States on commercial or private aircraft, and commercial 

vessels. It is to be fully operational by March 2015.

• Travel Document and Encounter Data: This project is intended to 

improve CBP’s ability to query and validate travel documentation for 

both passengers and their means of conveyance. It is to be fully 

operational by March 2015.

• Lookout Record Data and Services: This project is intended to 

improve the efficiency of existing data screening and analyses 

capabilities. It is to be fully operational by March 2015.

• Primary Inspection Processes: This project is intended to modernize 

the overall inspection process and provide support for additional or 

random screening and communication functions. It is to be fully 

operational by March 2015.

As part of each of these projects, CBP is also developing an online 

access portal, called TECS Portal, for authorized users to access 

information remotely using a modern web browser, along with security 

and infrastructure improvements, and the migration of data from the 

current system to databases in the new environment at the DHS 

datacenter. Ultimately, TECS Mod functionality is to be deployed to over 

340 ports of entry across the United States.

ICE’s TECS Mod effort is to focus on specific law enforcement and 

criminal justice functions; tools to support ICE officers’ collection of 

information, data analysis, and management operations; enhanced 

capabilities to access and create data linkages with information resources 

from elsewhere in DHS and other law enforcement agencies; and 

capabilities to better enable investigative and intelligence operations, 

corresponding management activities, and information sharing. Similar to 

CBP, ICE intended to deliver functionality in multiple phases:

• Phase 1: Core Case Management: This phase was to encompass all 

case management functions currently residing in the existing TECS 

system. ICE planned to develop and deploy these functions in three 

releases beginning in 2009, and was scheduled to deploy Release 1 

by December 2013, with additional releases following about every 12 
 

Page 5 GAO-14-342T 

months, in order to achieve independence from the existing TECS 

platform by September 2015. Specific capabilities that were to be 

provided include:

• basic electronic case management functions, including opening 

cases, performing supervisory review of cases, and closing cases 

within the system;

• development of reports for use as evidentiary material in court 

proceedings arising from ICE agents’ investigations;

• maintenance of records relating to the subjects of ICE 

investigations; and

• audit capabilities to monitor system usage.

• Phase 2: Comprehensive Case Management: This phase was to 

expand on the features delivered as part of phase one and to be 

delivered in four increments starting in 2016, with an estimated 

completion date in fiscal year 2017.

DHS’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the Office of the 

Under Secretary for Management are to play key roles in overseeing 

major acquisition programs like TECS Mod. For example, the CIO’s 

responsibilities include setting departmental IT policies, processes, and 

standards; and ensuring that IT acquisitions comply with DHS IT 

management processes, technical requirements, and approved enterprise 

architecture, among other things. Within the Office of the CIO, the

Enterprise Business Management Office has been given primary 

responsibility for ensuring that the department’s IT investments align with 

its missions and objectives. As part of its responsibilities, this office 

periodically assesses IT investments like TECS Mod to gauge how well 

they are performing through a review of program risk, human capital, cost 

and schedule, and requirements.

In October 2011, DHS’s Under Secretary for Management established the 

Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management. This office is to 

ensure the effectiveness of the overall program execution governance 

process and has the responsibility for developing and maintaining DHS’s 

Acquisition Management Directive.3

 

3

The Acquisition Management Directive provides the overall policy and structure for 

acquisition management within the department and is used in planning and executing 

acquisitions. 

It is also responsible for periodically 

providing independent assessments of major investment programs—

DHS Oversight of Major IT 

Programs
 

Page 6 GAO-14-342T 

called Quarterly Program Accountability Reports—as well as identifying 

emerging risks and issues that DHS needs to address.

In December 2011, DHS introduced a new initiative to improve and 

streamline the department’s IT program governance. This initiative 

established a tiered governance structure for program execution. Among 

other things, this new structure includes a series of governance bodies, 

each chartered with specific decision-making responsibilities for each 

major investment. Among these are executive steering committees, which 

serve as the primary decision-making authorities for DHS’s major 

acquisition programs. ICE chartered its steering committee in September 

2011 and it has been meeting since December of that year. CBP 

established its steering committee in early 2013 and it held its first 

meeting in February.

CBP has begun delivering functionality to its users; however, its schedule 

and cost commitments continue to change and are still being revised. 

Specifically, CBP intends to modernize the functionality, data, and aging 

infrastructure of legacy TECS and move it to DHS’s data centers. CBP 

plans call for developing, deploying, and implementing these capabilities 

in five distinct projects that are to be delivered by 2015. To date, CBP has 

completed one of these five projects, having completed its deployment of 

functionality to improve its secondary inspection processes to air, sea, 

and land ports of entry in 2013. CBP is in the process of revising its 

schedule baseline for the second time in under a year, making it unclear 

when the program ultimately intends to deliver needed functionality.

Exacerbating this situation is the fact that CBP has not developed its 

master schedule sufficiently to effectively manage work activities or 

monitor the program’s progress.4

 

4

Our research has identified, among other things, that a key element associated with a 

complete and useful schedule or roadmap for executing a program such as TECS Mod is 

to logically sequence all work activities so that start and finish dates of future activities, as 

well as key events based on the status of completed and in-progress activities, can be 

reliably forecasted. See GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 

Project Schedules, Exposure Draft, 

Specifically, the program has not linked 

all the work activities in the individual project schedules, nor has it defined 

dependencies that exist between projects in the master schedule: 

approximately 65 percent of CBP’s remaining work activities were not 

GAO-12-120G (Washington, D.C.: May 2012).

Schedule and Cost of 

Both TECS 

Modernization 

Programs Are 

Unclear
 

Page 7 GAO-14-342T 

linked with other associated work activities. Thus, any delays early in the 

schedule do not “ripple” (i.e., transmit delays) to activities later in the 

schedule, meaning that management will be challenged to determine how 

a slip in the completion date of a particular task may affect the overall 

schedule. In our report, we also noted that CBP had not yet developed a 

detailed schedule for significant portions of the program. CBP reported in 

January 2014 that it has now completed that work.

Program officials stated these deficiencies existed because the program 

has only two staff members with skills needed to properly develop and 

maintain the schedules, and that fully documenting all the dependencies 

would be time consuming, and in their view, not sufficiently important to 

warrant the additional resources necessary to complete them. However, 

without a complete and integrated master schedule that includes all 

program work activities and associated dependencies, CBP is not in a 

position to accurately determine the amount of time required to complete 

its TECS modernization effort and develop realistic milestones.

The program’s cost estimates have also changed as a result of 

rebaselining and are also being revised. The program’s baselined lifecycle cost estimate5

Meanwhile, ICE is replanning its $818 million TECS Mod program, having 

determined in June 2013 that the system under development was not 

technically viable and could not support ICE’s needs—this coming after 

having already reduced the scope of its initial program installment by 

about 70 percent due to protracted technical difficulties and schedule 

delays. Specifically, ICE determined that, after spending approximately 

$19 million, the system under development could not be fielded as part of 

ICE’s eventual solution due to ongoing technical difficulties with the user 

was approximately $724 million, including $31 million 

for planning management, $212 million for development, and $481 million 

for operations and maintenance. As of August 2013, the program 

reported that it had expended about $226 million. However, as previously 

stated, the program is in the process of revising its estimate, and thus, it 

is unclear how much it will cost to complete the program. In January 

2014, CBP reported that its revised estimates should be approved 

internally and submitted to DHS for its approval by the end of January 

2014.

 

5

This estimate is in the program’s November 2012 acquisition program baseline.
 

Page 8 GAO-14-342T 

interface, access controls, and case-related data management. Instead of 

continuing with the existing technical solution, the program manager 

explained that ICE would scrap a significant portion of the work done to 

date and start over. As a result, ICE halted most development work in 

June 2013 and has since been assessing different design and technical 

alternatives. In January 2014, ICE reported that it had rebaselined its 

program requirements and that it anticipates having its revised cost and 

schedule estimates finalized this coming spring. Nevertheless, given the 

time lost in developing the current technical solution, as well as the 

already reduced program scope, ICE cannot say what specific features it 

will release to users, when this functionality will be delivered, or how 

much such efforts will cost. As such, ICE is at significant risk of not 

achieving independence from the existing system by 2015.

Both CBP and ICE implemented risk management practices that are 

generally—though not fully—consistent with leading practices, and both 

had mixed results in managing program requirements. Of four leading 

practices associated with effective risk management, CBP and ICE each 

fully implemented two (establishing documented risk management 

processes and assigning roles and responsibilities for managing risks)

and partially implemented the other two (capturing all known risks and 

managing risk mitigation efforts through to completion). Specifically, 

neither program identified all known risks, nor escalated them for timely 

review by senior management.

Further, of four leading practices for managing program requirements, 

CBP fully implemented three (establishing a requirements management 

process, assigning roles and responsibilities for requirements 

development and management activities, and defining a change control 

process) while partially implementing the one other (eliciting user needs). 

However, CBP began executing key requirements activities before such 

practices were established, and as a result, CBP officials reported that 

some TECS Mod requirements were not as consistently well-formed or 

detailed because their process during that time lacked rigor. In ICE’s 

case, management weaknesses and the lack of appropriate guidance for 

the program’s requirements management process led to technical issues, 

testing failures, and ultimately, the deferral and/or deletion of about 70 

percent of the program’s original requirements. ICE issued new 

requirements guidance for the program in March 2013 that is consistent 

with leading practices, but has yet to demonstrate that these have been 

fully implemented.

TECS 

Modernization’s Risk 

Management Is 

Generally Consistent 

with Leading 

Practices, but 

Requirements 

Management Has 

Had Mixed Results
 

Page 9 GAO-14-342T 

DHS’s governance bodies have taken actions to oversee the two TECS 

Mod programs that are generally aligned with leading practices. 

Specifically, they have monitored TECS Mod performance and progress 

and have ensured that corrective actions have been identified and 

tracked. However, a lack of complete, timely, and accurate data have 

affected the ability of these governance bodies to make informed and 

timely decisions, thus limiting their effectiveness. For example:

• Steering committees. In an April 2013 meeting, the CBP program 

manager briefed the steering committee on its target milestone dates; 

even though the agency told us a month later that it had not fully 

defined its schedule, raising questions about the completeness and 

accuracy of the proposed milestone dates upon which the committee 

based its oversight decisions.

• The Office of the CIO. In its most recent program health 

assessments, the Enterprise Business Management Office partially 

based its rating of moderately low risk on CBP’s use of earned value 

management; however, the program manager stated to us that the 

CBP program is not utilizing earned value management because 

neither it nor its development contractor had the capability to do so. 

Similarly, even though ICE had not reported recent cost or schedule 

data for its program—an issue that may signal a significant problem—

the Office of the CIO rated ICE’s program as medium risk. The 

reliance on incomplete and inaccurate data raises questions about the 

validity of the risk ratings.

• Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management. In the 

July 2013 Quarterly Program Accountability Report, DHS’s Office of 

Program Accountability and Risk Management rated both TECS Mod 

programs as high value with low risk. However, CBP’s low-risk rating 

was based in part on the quality of the program’s master schedule 

and acquisition program baseline; however, as we stated earlier, 

problems with the agency’s schedule raise questions about the 

validity and quality of those milestones. Further, the low-risk rating it 

issued for ICE was based, in part, on its assessment of ICE’s 

performance between April and September 2012, which rated the 

program’s cost performance with the lowest possible risk score. Yet, 

during that same time period, program documents show that ICE 

TECS Mod’s cost and schedule performance was declining and varied 

significantly from its baseline. For example, program documents show 

that, as of June 2012, ICE TECS Mod had variances of 20 percent 

from its cost baseline and 13 percent from its schedule baseline. 

Moreover, the Quarterly Program Accountability Report is not issued 

in a timely basis, and as such, is not an effective tool for decisionDHS’s Governance 

Bodies Have Taken 

Actions Aligned with 

Leading Practices, 

but Incomplete and 

Inaccurate Data Have 

Limited Their 

Effectiveness
 

Page 10 GAO-14-342T 

makers. For example, the most recent report was published on July 7, 

2013, over 9 months after the reporting period ended and therefore 

did not reflect that, since then, ICE has experienced the issues with its 

technical solution described earlier in this report. As discussed, these 

issues have caused the program to halt development and replan its 

entire acquisition. Consequently, the newly-issued issued report is not 

reflective of ICE’s current status, and thus is not an effective tool for 

management’s use in providing oversight.

Until these governance bodies base their reviews of performance on 

timely, complete, and accurate data, they will be limited in their ability to 

effectively provide oversight and to make timely decisions.

In our report, we made several recommendations to improve DHS’s 

efforts to develop and implement its TECS Mod programs. Specifically, 

we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the CBP 

Commissioner to: (1) develop an integrated master schedule that 

accurately reflects all of the program’s work activities, as well as the 

timing, sequencing, and dependencies between them; (2) ensure that all 

significant risks associated with the TECS Mod acquisition are 

documented in the program’s risk and issue inventory—including 

acquisition risks mentioned in our report—and are briefed to senior 

management, as appropriate; (3) revise and implement the TECS Mod 

program’s risk management strategy and guidance to include clear

thresholds for when to escalate risks to senior management, and 

implement as appropriate; and (4) revise and implement the TECS Mod 

program’s requirements management guidance to include the validation 

of requirements to ensure that each is unique, unambiguous, and 

testable. In January 2014, CBP provided documentation that it had taken 

steps to begin addressing the second, third, and fourth recommendations.

We further recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct 

the Acting Director of ICE to: (1) ensure that all significant risks 

associated with the TECS Mod acquisition are documented in the 

program’s risk and issue inventory—including the acquisition risks 

mentioned in our report—and briefed to senior management, as 

appropriate; (2) revise and implement the TECS Mod program’s risk 

management strategy and guidance to include clear thresholds for when 

to escalate risks to senior management, and implement as appropriate; 

and (3) ensure that the newly developed requirements management 

guidance and recently revised guidance for controlling changes to 

requirements are fully implemented.

Implementation of 

Recommendations 

Could Improve DHS’s 

Efforts to Develop 

and Implement Its 

TECS Mod Programs
 

Page 11 GAO-14-342T 

We also recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 

Under Secretary for Management and acting Chief Information Officer to 

ensure that data used by the department’s governance and oversight 

bodies to assess the progress and performance of major IT acquisition 

programs are complete, timely, and accurate.

DHS concurred with all but one of our recommendations, disagreeing with 

the recommendation regarding the weaknesses in CBP’s schedule. In 

response, DHS stated that CBP’s scheduling efforts for TECS Mod were 

sound. However, given the weaknesses in CBP’s master schedule, we 

continue to believe that management will be unable to determine how a 

slip in the completion date of a particular task may affect the overall 

project or program schedule, and thus, absent any changes, continuing to 

use it as a tool to track progress will remain ineffective.

In conclusion, after spending nearly a quarter billion dollars and over 4 

years on its two TECS Mod programs, it remains unclear when DHS will 

deliver them and at what cost. While CBP’s program has delivered one of 

the five major projects that comprise the program, its commitments are 

being revised again and the master schedule used by the program to 

manage its work and monitor progress has not been fully developed. 

Moreover, ICE’s program has made little progress in deploying its system, 

and is now completely overhauling its original design and program 

commitments, placing the program in serious jeopardy of not meeting the 

2015 deadline and delaying system’s deployment. The importance of 

having updated cost and schedule estimates for both the CBP and ICE 

programs cannot be understated, as this important management 

information will provide Congress and DHS with visibility into the 

performance of these vital border security investments. Further, while 

both agencies have defined key practices for managing risks and 

requirements, it is important that the programs fully implement these 

critical practices to help ensure that they deliver the functionally needed 

to meet mission requirements and minimize the potential for additional 

costly rework. Finally, until DHS’s governance bodies are regularly 

provided complete and accurate data for use in their performance 

monitoring and oversight duties, their decisions may be flawed or of 

limited effectiveness.

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer 

any questions at this time.
 

Page 12 GAO-14-342T 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please 

contact me at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. Individuals who 

made valuable contributions to this testimony and the associated report 

are Dave Hinchman (Assistant Director), Deborah Davis (Assistant 

Director), Kara Epperson, Rebecca Eyler, Daniel Gordon, Sandra Kerr, 

Jamelyn Payan, and Jessica Waselkow.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

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