series iV 

volume 8 

national security agency 

central security service 

No. 

UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY 

A History of U.S. Communications 

Intelligence during World War ZI: 

Policy and Administration 
This mon-ph is a product of the Natlond kurity Agency history 

program. Its aontenta and COPC~~OPB are thaw of tbe author, baaed 

on original rei3eamh, and do not necessarily represent the official 

viewa of the National Security Agency. Please addresa divergent 

opinion or additional detail to the Center for Cryptologic History 

(8542). 
UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGK HISTORY 

Series TV 

World WQ~ I1 

VoIum 8 

A History of U.S. Communications Intelligence 

during World War 11: Policy and Administration 

Ra bert Louis Benson 

CENTER FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

1997 
Table of Contents 

List of Illustrations ............................................................. v 

Foreword .................................................................... vii 

Introduction and Acknowledgments ............................................. ix 

Chapter 1: U.S. corn. 193%1946 ......................... 

The U.S. Intelligence Organizations Prior to Pearl Harbor ... The Other COMtPrT Organizations: Coast Guard. FBI. and FCC . . Prewar COMINT Agreements with the British ..................... Toward Pearl Harbor ..................... ......... 

Chapter 2: The First Year of War . . 

The Impact of War .......................................... .... 31 

The Expansion and Reorganization of Army COMINT during 1942 .......... 32 

Navy COMINT Reorganization and Exmnsion in Washington during 1942 ..... 43 

The Army-Navy-FBI COMINT Agreements Marchduly 1942 ................. 47 

U.S..British COMINT Agreements in Washington - 1942 ..................... 56 

Navy COMLNT in the Pacsc ............................................... 62 

Chapter 3: Army- Navy Policy and Organizational 

Development during 1943 ....................... 

The Combat Intelligence Division and OP-20-G .... .......... 77 

The Army COMW Breakthrough in 1943 .................................. 80 

Central Bureau Brisbane ................................................. 85 

Proposals for Closer Army-Navy Cooperation .............................. 90 

Chapter 4: The Army-British comT Agreements of 1943: 

The ENGMA Crisis ................................ 

The Crisis in3ritish.U.S. Relations ..... 

An Agreement Is Reached ................. The Implementation of the Agreements .................... 

Chapter 5e British.U.S . Navy COMLNT Agreements of 194EL1944 ... 

Chapter 8: Continued Jurisdictional Problems regarding 

Clandestine Communications ........................ 

The Radio Lntelligence Division ..................... The Navy-FBI Controversy and the Attendant 

Disputes regarding the British ............ 
Chapter 7: The Army and Navy Move toward 

Full Cooperation. 1944-1946 .......................................... 133 

The Army and Navy For& Cooperation .............................. 133 

The Workings of ANCICC and the Creation of ANCIB ..................... 135 

Chapter 8: Internal Army and Navy Organizational Developments. 

194k1946 ......................................................... 141 

SSOsinthePacific ................................................... 141 

Developments at the War Department ................................... 143 

Abmpted Army Consolidation in the Theaters and the 

Creation of ASA ........................................... 148 

Developments in Navy COMINT Organization in Washington 

and the Pacific .............................................. 156 

Glossary of Abbreviations .................................................... 163 
List of IIlustrations 

Colonel Raymond Eliot Lee, Army attach6 in London, 193s 

1939,1940-1941 

RED machine analog. This cipher device was used for high-level 

diplomatic trac until it was superseded by the PURPLE 

machine in February 194 1. 

The dapanew ;e machime 

General J. 0. Mauborgne, chiefsignal officer -4 

Bletehley Park, Headquarters, Government Code and Cipher 

School 

Abraham Sinkov 

Lieutenant Commander A. D. Kramer headed the OP-20-G 

translation section. 

Major General Damn Olmstead, chief signal officer 

Carter W. Clarke, wartime chief of special branch I1954 

photograph) 

Aerial view of Arlington Hall Station, 1945 

George Eicher, director, Signal Intelligence Division, Sial 

Section, HQ ETOUSA 

Cryptographic and security personnel, 849th SIS 

Rear Admiral Joseph Redman, director, naval communications 

Solomon Kullback, chief B-2, SIS 

Lieutenant Commanrler Luther L. L. Dilley, USN Cryptanalysis 

Section, FRUPAC 

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, CINCPAC 
W. Preston Corderman, chief SSS, (1955 photograph as major 

general) 

Arlington Hall Station employee at a decipherment machine 

Dr. Alan Turing, cryptamlyst and mathematician 

Casablanca Conference, January 1943 

German ENIGMA cipher machine exhibited at the National 

Cryptologic Museum, Fort Meade, Maryland 

Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Rowlett 

Mqjor General Clayton Bissell, assistant chief of staff, G-2 

SID ETOUSA, Headquarters SI Division, 59 Weymouth Street 

Captain Joseph N. Wenger, assistant director naval 

eommunica tions, OP-20-G 

Captain Jack Holtwick, Jr., USN, officer in charge, RAGFOR 
Foreword 

The revelations about World War II eryptology - begun with the publication 

in 1974 of F. W. Winterbotham's The Ultm Secret md continued with extensive 

decbsification of original documents - sparked a great reevaluation of 

wartime events. Most wartime decisions, operations, and events, even those 

long considered settled, have had to be reconsidered, The ULTRA revelations 

have also sparked a cottage industry of books, monographs, and articles based 

on the wealth of original dmrnents decbif ied over the past two decades. A 

great many of these books have concentrated on the information content of 

communicat~ons intelligence reports, relating newly released COMINT to a 

particular corn rnandsr, operat ion, or theater, 

One lacuna in the study of world war COMINT, therefore, is an 

examination of the organizations ti12 produced communications ht elligence 

and how they changed under pressure. Both the U.% Army and Navy had 

relatively small COMINT organizations in the prewar period, and both 

expanded rapidly with the advent of hostilities. Expansion was only one aspect 

of the 'institutional challenges they faced: the processes which attended 

peacetime were inadequate for support of military operations on a global 

scale. With national survival and individual lives at stake, the services 

demanded more information - both tactical and strategic - and more timely 

distribution than ever before. 

The U,S. military COMINT organizations far the firat time engaged in close 

cooperation with a foreign ally, the United Kingdom. By the end of the war, 

the United States and the United Kingdom were linked in communications 

int eiligence activities at levels perhaps unprecedented in international affairs, 

at least on a voluntary basis. To achieve this advantageous situation, the U.8. 

Army and Navy had to make considerable adjustments in organization and 

policy. 

Rapid expansion, urgent requirements for information, international 

agreements - these factom forced the American COMlNT organizations into 

profound changes. While the services never completely solved the problems 

posed by these challenges, by war's end they created structures and 

implemented policies which, however cu mbersorne, achieved high levels of 
combat support, Understanding how the services changed from the 

organizations of 1940 to those of 1945 is an essential undergirding for 

undenrtanding the production and use of COMINT product in World War ll as 

weU as the postwar movement toward centralization. 

MF. Robert L. Bewon has produced an important monograph about these 

changes. His careful research and writing about the what and why of 

Institutional changes and their far-reaching effects constitutes fundamental 

study of these complex issues, Mr. Bewon's book ia strongly recommended for 

all who wish to understand the origins of modern COMLNT, how It has grown, - and how COMlNT policy has developed. 

David A. Hatch 

Direct or, 

Center for Cryptologic History 

viii 
A Ribtory of U.S. Communic8tions Intelligence 

during World War 11: Policy 4 Adminkbation 

INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The objective of this study is to provide an authentic and reliable guide to 

U.S. communications intelligence (COMINT) during World War 11. A complete 

history of this subject would be an overwhelming task; therefore, I have 

limited this effort to matters of high-level policy, administration, and 

organization, I have tried to show how communications intelligence was 

controlled and directed by each service and how these services related to each 

other and to their British counterparts. This is not a history of cryptanalysis 

or COMIHT operations, nor is there much here about the specific uses made of 

CO MINT. 

Nevertheless, within these limits, ,l have tried to be complete. That is, I 

have made an effort to show not only how Army and Navy COMINT activities 

were run but also how COMINT was structured in the Coast Guard, FBI, and 

Federal Communications Commission {FCC). There is also a great deal here 

on the non-COMINT prducing agencies - the Military Intelligence Service 

(MIS) and the Office of Naval Intelligence QONI). In fact, my account as it 

relates to the Army has more to do with the MIS than with Arlington Hall, I 

hope the reasons for this will be made clear in the text, 

Much of this study seems to be concerned with service politics and 

interservice disagreements. I can only say that I recognize that COMINT was 

often produced in spite of certain high-level maneuverings. On that same 

theme, I also recognize that the people who produced the real COMINT 

pmduct are, in this study, quite secondary figures, There is little here about 

Frank Rowlett, Solomon Kullback, or Frank Raven. 

A word about the British. This study could almost be subtitled nThe 

Development of a COMlNT Allian~e.'~ The emphasis on British intelligence is 

an absolute must for a policy and administrative history, because there is no 

understanding of the development of U.S. CO MINT without continually 

reporting and examining the role of the British. 

The sources used in this study are adequately identified in the footnotes 

and the sources section. I have used the footnotes to report a great deal of 

supplementary information, and I hope that the reader will turn to them, 

The research for this study and the preparation of a draft manuscript were 

done from August 1975 until August 1916 under the auspices of a Cryptologic 
Education Fellowship at the National Cryptologic School, NSNCSS. It would 

have been impossible to have completed a study of this scope but for the fact 

that m many documentary sources had been gathered together in previous 

years by Vincent 3. Wilson, Jr., and Henry I?. Schorreck of the History 

Department at NSA and their predecessors, especially Dr. George Howe and 

Ed Fishel. Throughout my fellowship, which allowed for complete 

indepdence in my work, M-m. Wbn and Schorreck were most helpful in 

suggesting research leads, crit lqulng the project, and providing general 

encouragement. Mr. Wilson edited the study. 

I want to thank the following persorrr who provided or suggested sources of 

valuable information: Thomas P. Troy, CIA; Captain Wayman I?, Packard, USN 

(Ret); Dr. Jack Mason, U.S. Naval Institute; James McKinney, FCC; Pat 

Paddock FBQ DD. Pinke, Center for Military History; and Jerry Hess, National 

Archives. In addition, Mr. Bob Hilbish, Naval Field OOtfice for Intelligence 

Operations, and Mr. Owen Crowder, NSA, kindly allowed me to have material 

couriered thugh their offices. 

My only regret is that I was not able to obtain certain material stored at 

Crane, Indiana, by the Naval Security Gmup 

1 wrote this study between 1975 and 1976, and some of it appeared In 

various Agency journals during the 1970s. However, this is the first complete 

edition to be publbhd. If I were writing this today, I would use some 

additional sources, especially U.S. Navy materials, that were not available to 

me at the time, Also, the Center for Cryptologic History (CCH) has 

conducted many excellent interviews since that time. However, It seems to 

me that the study can still be interesting and useful as ia Therefore, I made 

very few changes. Finally, I especially thank Barry Carleen, Jean Persfnger, 

Laura Clark, Vicki Adair, Tom Johnson, and Dave Hatch of the Center for 

Cryptologic History for getting this to press. 

ROBERT LOUIS BENSQN 
Chapter 1 

U.S. COMINT, 1939-1941 

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS PRIOR TO PEARL HARBOR1 

By the time the United States entered the Second World War, significant measures 

had been taken Bward establishing an intelligence structure. On 26 June 1939, President 

Roosevelt issued to the Army, Navy, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) an order 

restricting investigation of espionage and sabotage. These agencies clarified their 

relationship in the Delimitations Agreement of 5 June 1940, whereby the Military 

Intelligence Division (MID) and the Ofice of Naval Intelligence (ONI) were to have 

cognizance over the services' military and civilian personnel in espionagelcounterespionage and sabotage matters, while the FBI would have that responsibility for 

civilians. The Army would have authority overseas in the Philippines and Panama, the 

Navy in Guam and Samoa, and the FBI in the other territories (Hawaii and Pueh Rico). 

The consultative or exchange bdy that acted on the Delimitations Agreement became 

known as the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference EIIC), composed of the director, 

FBI, or a senior assistant; the assistant chief of staff(ACS), G-2, who headed MID; and the 

director of naval intelligence (DNE). The overall coordinator of the IIC, if only informally, 

was Adolph A. Berle Jr., assistant secretary of state.' 

On or about 24 June 1940, President Roosevelt made broad foreigm intelligence 

assignments. The FBI was to collect intelligence and conduct counterintelligence 

operations in the Western Hemisphere, while all other foreign intelligence was to be the 

responsibility of the Army and Navy. To fulfill its role, the FBI formed the Special 

Intelligence Service (SES), which operated in Latin America throughout the war. 

In a final prewar directive, the president authorized the formation of the office of the 

Coordinahr of Information (COI) in June-July 1941. The COI, renamed the Ofice of 

Strategic Services (OSSJ in 1942, was headed throughout its existence by William J. 

Donovan, a prominent New York attorney and well-known hero of the First World War. 

The role of COI land OSS) was often ambiguous, but it became the primary U.S. 

intelligence agency, for other than communications intelligence (COMINT), during the 

Second World War. Donovan and the COI were not popular with the IIC members, who in 

fact made a last-minute effort in May 1941 to stop Donovan from forming the organization. 

The IIC members held that as their own relationship was satisfactmy (though it really was 

not), a superagency and a formal coordinator were unnecessary.' 

The COI, though a Donovan creation, was inspired by British intelligence personnel, 

especially through the medium of British Security Coordination (BSC) . The BSC, 
established in 1940, was the Western Hemisphere arm of the British Secret Service (also 

known as the Secret Intelligence Service and MI-6) and was headquartered in New York 

City. It acted as a more or less independent body under the direction of William 

Stephenson, a Canadian millionaire who, like Donovan, was a hero of the last war. 

Stephenson and Donovan became close friends and established a U .S.-British partnership 

in intelligence that would help OSS establish itself almost worldwide. Stephenson also 

&d d. Edgar Hoover and the FBI. None of this pleased the Army and Navy. These 

early relationships strongly influenced U.S. C~MINT policy, particularly because the latter 

remained in the hands of the Army and Navy. 

Whatever the agreements and divisions of reqmnsibility, the actual intelligence assets 

of the U.S. before Pearl Harbor were rather thin - except for eommmications intelligence. 

ONI was by no means inexperienced in covert operations and counterintelligence 

techniques, but these were largely limited to the U.S. and itsr possesrsions. Overseas the 

Wavy depended on attach& and &wrvers whose success in intelligence collection was 

quite modest The Army also depended on its attachgs and was quite ill-served. Attaehhs 

were selected largely on the basis of independent wealth and social acceptability. Army 

counterintelligence, especially in the overse& departments, was busy. Both MID and OM1 

had a tiny cov of experienced intelligence analysts, men who jeopardized their own 

advamement by their interest in this unpopular field. The FBI did quite well in 

counterintelligence and undoubtedly disrupted most German operations in the U.S. and 

later in Latin America. All the services received an ever-increasing amount of 

information from the British, though again largely in counterintelligence. 

There was one more try to better ' 

coordinate the U.S. intelligence 

activities, this on a British model. The 

Army attache in London, Colonel 

Raymond E. Lee, advanced the idea in 

1941 of a Joint Inklligenee Committee 

(JIG),' which was to act as a 

"clearinghouse" for intelligence coming to 

the U.S. from British agencies. The JIC, 

which initially included only MID and 

ON1 representation, did not become 

active until after Pearl Harbr, and it was 

only briefly involved in U.S. COYINT 

a~tivities.~ 

Colonel Ilaymond EUot Lee 

Army attache in bndon, 1985-1989,1940-1S41 
Thus on the eve of war, the U.S. had a fledgling foreign "secret intelligence servid' (the 

five-month-old CCOI) and a modest counterintelligence effort. There were as yet no 

smcant secret sources of intelligence - except for the communications intelligence 

organizations, which were then, as during the war, the most carefully guarded and vital 

Before the creation of the Second Signal Service Company on 1 January 1939, the SIS 

received its intercept from the First Radio Intelligence (RI) Company, which had been 

organized at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, in 1938, and the radio intelligence detachments 

of the various signal companies - the Panama Signal Company in the Canal Zone; the 

Seventh Company at Fort Sam Houston, Texas; the Ninth Company at Fort Shafter, 

Territory of Hawaii; the Eighth Company at Presidio of San Francisco; and the Tenth 

Company at Fort Mills, Philippines.' Except for the First RI Company, which was under 

the office of chief signal officer (OCSigOl, the radio intelligence detachments of the signal 

companies were under the command of the signal officers of the appropriate corps or 

department, Personnel of these detachments were transferred to the Second Signal 

Service, which was also augmented from other sources. 49 

By the end of 1939 the following monitoring stations (MS) were available to the SIS: 

MS1: Fort MonmouthlFort Hanmek, New Jerseys 

MS-2: The Presidio of San Francisco, California 

MS3: Fort Sam Houston, Texas 

MS-4: Corozal, the Canal Zone 

MS-5: Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii 

MS-6: Fort McKinley, Philippine Islands 

MS-7: Fort Hunt, Virginia (near Mount Vernon) 

These seven monitoring stations remained the basic source of SIS intercept tra& until 

after Pearl Harbor. 

At SIS in Washington, the raw traffic from the stations was worked by four 

cryptanalytic sections under the general supervision of Mr. William F. Friedman, the chief 

assistant to Colonel Spencer Aking 

Japanese diplomatic 

German diplomatic 

Italian diplomatic 

Mexican (and other Latin 

American) diplomatic 

Supervisor 

Mr. Frank B. Rowlett 

Mr. Solomon Kullback 

Mr. Abraham Sinkov 

Mr. H. F. Bearce 
The assignments seem not to have been rigid, and the various sections assisted each 

other. As can be seen, the main SIS effort was against foreign diplomatic tr6e. 0 ther 

intempt ad cryptanalytic coverage was added Wore Pearl Harbor: the diplomatic 

Mi of Vichy France, Spin, and Portugal, and espionage syhms of Germany and 

Japan. The SIS lacked khe meam - personnel, equipment, and monitoring stations - to 

cover German or Italian military communications. Japanese army traffic, however, was 

intercepted by MS-6 land its predecessor detachment) from the Philippines. In September 

1940, Mr. Friedman learned that Shtion 6 was doing good work on Japanese army 

tmEc.'O The tdfic was sufficient to enable STS to tentatively reconstruct certain 

Japanese my radio nets in China and Japan." hrding to a report prepared aRer the 

war began, the following numhrs of Japanese army messages had been available to SIS 

before the war.'' 

Year 

1935 

1937 

1938 

1939 

1940 

1941 

Number of Messages 

61,000 (34,000 from British sources) 

But there were no solutions or translati~ns.'~ The Japanese army codes were 

extremely difficult, and, in spite of the seemingly high volume of messages available, 

coverage was perhaps erratic and unsystematic. Most important, the SISs solution of the 

Japanese PURPLE system during 1940 required that army resources be turned to its 

exploitation. WRPLE was the highest-level Japanese diplomatic system, and its breaking 

was undoubtedly the greatest achievement in prewar Corn. 

The SIS successes with diplomatic systems were truly impressive. All Japanese 

diplomatic systems were solved (PURPLE, RED, LA, and many more) as were the systems of 

other countries (though not Germany). Japanese espionage messages, sent in diplomatic 

system, and German espionage traf51 were also read. 

All this material, decrypted and translated by SIS, was forwarded to MID for analysis 

and dissemination to an ever-shrinking circle of authorized readers. 
R~fl -chine asJog 

This cipher &vice,was uwd fop high-Ieveldiplomaik C&i 

mil U was sllpermded by tha PURPLE Whine in3elrruary 1941. 

The Japanese PURPLE machine 
The Navfs COMINT organization during the prewar period was rather more comprex 

than &e Army's. There were three COBdINT processing centers (as opp~sed to one for SIS) 

and a patar number of intercept stations. The Naws Corn taqptrs were aTm more 

extensive: Japanese naval, German naval (primarily U-boat), Axis merchant marine, and 

diplomatic (mainly Japanese). In addition, work was done on Vichy, Portuguese, and 

Spanish naval mms. The intercept sih serving OP-20-G during this perid were as 

f0110w~;l~ 

Station A Shanghai, China (disestablished in October 1940) 

Station B Guam 

Station C Corregidor (previously at Cavite), Philippine Islands 

Station G Amagansett, Mew York 

Station H Heeia, Territory of Hawaii 

StationJ dupiter, Florida 

Station M Cheltenham, Maryland 

Shtian 0 San Juan, Puerto Rim 

Station S Bainbridge, Washington 

Station W Winter Harbor, Maine 

Station U Toro Point (previously Balboa), Canal Zone 

h addition, there were direction finding (DF) facilities located at many of the above 

stations and elsewhere. Sites involved solely in DF included Poyners Hill, North Carolina; 

Guantanamo, Cuba; American Samoa; and Point St. George, California. 

Most of these intercept and DF sites were in operation by the end of 1939. Some had a 

particularly long history. Skation 3, Guam, dated to 1929, and there had been intercept 

operations in the Philippines even before that.'' 

The processing centers where cryptanalysis ICA), traffic analysis (TA), and 

translation were performed were at Corregidor (known as the Cast unit), Pearl Harbor, 

and Washington. The Cast unit supportad the Asiatic Fleet, commanded by Admiral 

Thomas Hart. Cast was under the military command of the Sixteenth Naval District.'' 

The Pearl Harbor unit supported the Pacific Fleet, commanded by Admiral James 0. 

Richardson and later by Admiral Husband Kimmel. It was under the military command 

of khe Fourbenth Naval District. Both Cast and Pearl Harbor were guided and supported 

by OP-2043, which was itself a processing center. -c and solutions and translations 

were forwarded to 20-G by Cast and Pearl Hmbor.17 Cast was also in wntact with the 

Army's MS6 at Fort Mills, and there was an exchange of traffic, It should also be noted 

that Cast supported General MacArthur in the Philippines, as it had far greater capability 
than MS6. Cast, unlike the SIS station, had a "mpf of the P- madine, and More 

Pearl Harbor, it had been assigned to cover and decrypt Japanese diplomatic MIC.~ 

By the end of 1941,OP-20-G had some 300 people (this figure my or may not include 

the Continental United States (CONUS) intercept d DF The Pearl Harbor 

unit had about thirty oWrs d enlisted men with an additional Gfty to sixty at the 

intercept and DF facility.z0 The Cast unit's strength was seventy-sk, of whom twenty-six 

were involved in processing," 

A necessarily bd summary of naval cowrwr processing during the immediate 

prewar period is represented in the following chart. 

Center Officer in Charge 

Washhgton Coder 

(OP-20-GI Laurance Word 

Material Being Worked 

Japanese naval sysbms, especially JN-25, 

the general fleet system; naval systems of 

other countries; diplomatic system8 (mainly 

Japanese) 

Pearl Harbor Lieutenant Commmde$ Japanese navy fleet officers' &, TA; other 

Joseph Rochefort Japanese naval systems 

Cast Lieutenant Rudolph JN-26; PURPLE; other Japanese naval 

Fabian systems; TA 

Analysis and dissemination of the COMINT product were performed for the Navy 

Department by ON], and for the fleeta by the appropriate staff intelligence officers 

(Commander Ed& T. Layton for Admiral Kimmel; Commander Redfield Mason for 

Admiral H artl . 

THE OTHER COMINT ORGANIZATIONS: COAST GUARD, FBI, AND FCC 

The United Shbs Coast Guard (USCG) 

became involved in COMINT through its law 

enforcement responsibilities. In 1924 the 

Coast Guard's communications personnel 

began intercepting the radio traffic of 

rumrunners. Various groups of smugglers 

used elahrate shipbshore communications 

and code and cipher systems. A cryptanalytic 

unit was established in the 1920s, and thi6 

unit was placed in the intelligence division of 

the Coast Guard in 1931 .= The chief cryptanalyst of the unit was Elizebeth Friedman, 

wife of William F. Friedman. Elizebeth Friedman 
She hired and trained several college graduates to assist her, and they solved most of the 

rumrunner systems and testified in many successful prosec~tions.~ 

Following the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, the Coast Guard continued to use radio 

intercept to detmt other types of smuggling activities. The cryptanalytic unit continued to 

function, on a reduced basis, and included cde and cipher development in its worta4 

During the Munich Crisis of 1938, the secretary of the treasury directed the Coast Guard 

b monitor radio tr&S ". . . for any clues pointing to sudden changes in the international 

situation."% Similar directives were made by the secretary More the outbreak of war in 

September 1939. 

In 1939 the Coast Guard cryptanalytic unit was transferred from the intelligence 

division ta the communications division. During that year Coast Gd radio monitors 

began to oovw "nonneutral* communications of merchant ships as part of the Coast 

Guard's responsibility to enforce American neutrality laws. This type of work led to the 

detection of clandestine stations operating in the Western Hemisphere. By late 1940 the 

Coast Guard was regularly intercepting and cryptanalyzing messages to and from these 

stations, which were operated by German @ Italian intelligence stgenh?' Thk type of 

COMINT became a Coast Guard specialty and would remain so throughout the war. 

Stations were detected in the U.S., Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and other Latin American 

countries. 

In keeping with the Delimitations Agreement and President Roosevelt's 

counterintelligence directive of 1939, the FBI was initially the chief consumer of Coast 

Guard COMIW. But when it became apparent that the FBI was not properly sharing this 

cumm with other internsteal agencies, the assistant secretary of the treasury directed on 

17 June 1941 that Coast Guard intelligence disseminate this material to the State 

Department, Army, and Navy." %n afterwards, Captain James Roosevelt, COI liaison 

officer, was also placed on distribution for Coast Guard COMINT. 

USCG-FBI relations were particularly strained during 1941 by the "vvV TEST-AOR" 

case. The Coast Guard had been monitoring clandestine stations using the callsigns vvv 

TEST and AOR. In July 1941, when the FBI arrested members of a German espionage ring 

in the US., the Coast Guard learned that TEST was an FBI-controIled radio station 

communicating with Hamburg, Germany (AOR). Mu& of the FBI-transmitted material 

being relayed from German intelligence station GLENN in Mexico City seemed to the Coast 

Guard to be good intelligence of demonstrable value to German U-boat operations.28 The 

resultant espionage trials egposed information concerning U.S. cryptanalysis and German 

cryptographic technique. Many of the suspicions concerning FBI security practices would 

crop up again and again in the relationship between the armed forces and the bureau and 

may be traced b that trial and circus of publicity. 

The FBI itself had a COMINT effort in the prewar period. In October 1939, Mr. Paul 

Napier was hired by the FBI aa its frrst full-time "cryptographer" (ie., cryphrdystl. For a 
time cryptanalysis of criminal and foreign communications was conducted by the 

cryptographic element of the FBI technical laboratory, which also prepared the FBI's 

secure systems. In December 1940, a separate cryptanalytic section was formed, under the 

direction of W. G. 3. Blackburn, who reported to Mr. E. P. Coffey, laboratory direcbr, and 

ultimately to FBI associate director Edward A. Tamm (who later became a federal judge). 

By the time of Pearl Harbor, the cryptanalytic section had twenty peoplenZg The main 

interest of the section was German espionage trafic, but attempts were also made to soIve 

German and Japanese diplomatic sy~terns.'~ In June 1941 the FBI solved "certain codes 

used by the Vichy government of France."" During this period the FBI cryptanalysts 

received training from the SIS and from Mrs. Friedmanhs2 

The FBI's sources of raw traffic in the prewar period are not definitively known. 

However, on 11 October 1940 J. Edgar Hoover wrote Federal Communications 

Commission (FCC) chairman James L. Fly to suggest that Japanese, French, Italian, 

German, and Russian cables should be obtained &y the FCC). Mr. Hoover offered FBI 

assistance in cryptanalysis should the FCC be unable to "break the codes." Mr. Fly 

suggested a personal conference an the m&ter. Instead there followed correspondence 

between Hoover and Fly into January 1941, with inconclusive results. It was Mr. Fly's 

contention that the FBI proposition involved legal, administrative, and budgetary 

problems.3a What is certain is that before Pearl Harbor the FCC was providing the FBI 

with intercept, including that from established international cir~uits.~"ut there is no 

evidence that the FCC was obtaining cables from the cable companies, as Mr. Hoover 

seemed to be suggesting in his initial letter to Mr. Fly. If the FBI had access to the cable 

companies, it was through their own, or perhaps British, efforts. 

After Pearl Harbor the FBI experimented with both intercept (from sites in Maryland 

and Oregon) and field prwessing (in Oreg~n).~ The FBI also had benefit of the traffic 

developed in the TEST-AOR case and later controlled radio station cases. Nor should we 

overlook the FBI's ability to use surreptitious means of obtaining foreign cryptographic 

materials in both the U.S. and Latin America. This was done for the FBI's own 

intelligence objectives and, whether requested or not, for the Army-Navy COMINT 

or ganizati~ns.'~ 

As we have seen, another organization involved in COMlNT was the FCC. According to 

FBI records, as early as 16 October 1939, Chairman Fly was planning a COMINT 

organization to be based in New York In a meeting that day with FBI 

representatives, Fly claimed that a presidential order gave the FCC the sole responsibility 

for "intelligence received through international communications." The FBI could not 

agree to that portion of his plan, which called for FBI agents to be assigned to his 

organization working under FCC control. Whatever the origin of Mr. Fly's plan (there is 

nothing on this matter in FCC COMINT files reviewed by the author), it came to nothing. 

The alleged presidential order cited by Mr. Fly has not been identified. 
In June 1940, immediately after the fall of France, FCC supervisor George Sterling 

conceived the plan to uae FCC monitoring capabilities to detect possible Axis spies, 

saboteurs, and infiltrator^.^^ Sterling, an Army reserve offlcer who served in the Army 

COMINT organization in France during World War I, promptly wrote a $6 million budget 

proposal for this new operation and cleared it through E. K. Jett, FCC chief engineer, and 

Mr. Fly. He received more funds than requested, and he set about prmuring equipment, 

personnel, and new sites. His base was the existing FCC network heretofore involved in 

enforcement of U.S. radio laws. The Sterling organization was originally called the 

National Defense Organization (NW) and was renamed the Radio Intelligence Division 

(RID) in early 1942. Ultimately RID had twelve primary and eighty secondary radiomonitoring stations throughout the US., Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. Sterling 

obtained the best receivers, recorders, and DF equipment then available and set the 

organization to work on its mission: detection, location, and interception of foreign 

intelligence radio stations in the U.S. and in other areas where the national defense was 

affected. As an enforcement agency, the RID could act on its own product. Most often its 

efforts were on behalf of the intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, 

and FBI. .# 

The RID, like the other secondary COMINT organizations (USCG, FBI) became involved 

in the TEST-AOR case. Again the lack of coordination was revealed. Through DF, RID 

located the apparent German station on Long Island. The FBI was apprised of the 

situation and was hld that the FCC would raid the station if the former took no action. At 

the last moment, FBI associate director Ed Tamm revealed that the station was being 

operated by the FBI." From late 1940 through 1941, the RID intercepted German 

intelligence traffic between Germany and Portuguese, West Africa, Central America, and 

Brazil. Their work against German agents in Honduras and the Canal Zone during 1940 

assisted in the neutralization of a group supporting U-boat ~perations.~ 

Although there is no record of a presidential policy directive (in writing, at least) 

governing COMINT before July 1942, the Army and Navy made efforts in the prewar period 

to reach agreement concerning their respective responsibilities. 

In a document dated 8 December 1939 entitled "Agreement Regarding Special 

Material," signed by Colonel E. R. W. McCabe, ACS, G2, and Rear Admiral Walter S. 

Anderson, the DNI, the services agreed to take special care in disseminating COMINT.~~ 

MID and ON1 were to have sole responsibility for handling the CoMlfJT that they received 

from their own service agencies. But if the material to be disseminated was jointly 

produced Ci.e., by OP-20-G and SISl or was to be disseminated outside the Army or Navy, 

then there was to be coordination, and each service was to be informed of the action taken. 

This of course was an agreement on security rather than on COMINT production. 

During July 1940, Commander Safford of OP-20-G and Colonel Akin of SIS began 

serious discussions on division of intercept, cryptanalysis, and other aspects of processing, 

and they appointed a small study cornmithe. But, as SafTord reported on 25 July to 
Admiral Noyes, the director of naval cornmunicati~ns (DNC), no agreement could be 

reacMq Word noted that it was mutually agreed that the Army would attack foreign 

military systems while the Navy would at- foreign naval system. The matter of 

contention was diplomatic traffic. The lack of agreement was especially imporhnt, wrote 

Word, because foreign milihry traffic was virtually uninterceptable at long distances, 

because of the low-powered transmitters commonly used. Thus the Army, unlike the 

Navy, had only diplomatic trac to work. Safford suggested to Noyes that the best 

division of diplomatic effort was along national lines; the Army should deal with German, 

Italian, Mexican, ad Latin American Mic, and the Navy with Japanese and Russian 

tr&i. But Akin had bld Word that General Mauborgne, the chief signal officer, would 

not agree to this. Safford then outlined for the DNC the other possible rnethds of division. 

Included were division by cryptographic system or on the basis of radio transmitting 

stations. 

General J. 0. Maubargnq c hie C signal officer 

On 27 July 1940, Safford again addressed Admiral Noyes on this matter.43 He 

suggested three alternative plans in order of preference: 

1. The Army was t4 intercept Japanese, German, Italian, Mexican, South American, 

and Russian army b£&, as well as the international circuits carrying diplomatic traKt(:. 
The Army waa to "decrypt" foreign military traffic and the diplomatic systems of 

Germany, Italy, Mexico, and other Latin American countries. he Navy was to intercept 

Japanese, German, Italian, and Russian naval traffic, aa well as the international circuits 

carrying diplomatic traffic. The Navy would "decrypt" the foregoing naval systems and 

the diplomatic traffic of Japan and Russia. 

2. If General Mauborgne would not accept the foregoing, the Army would be offered 

responsibility for all Japanese diplomatic systems. 

3. Failing in the above, Japanese diplomatic systems were to be divided. The machine 

systems (m~and PURPLE) were to be worked by the Army and the other Japanese systems 

by the Navy. 

On 31 July the services again appointed a joint panel to study the problem. The 

committee was cornposed of Lieutenants Earle F. Cook and Robert E. Schukraft, SIS, and 

Lieutenant Commander E. R. Gardner and Lieutenant Junior Grade J. A. Greenwald, OP20-GeM The committee was charged with examining all possible methods of division, but 

especially the Mauborgne plan, which was to*divide intercept on the basis of transmitting 

station, and a plan to pool all trafEc and arrange for an equitable basis for "translation." 

There was no mention of cryptanalysis. The study committee was also to report about the 

current status of each service's operations in other than militarylnaval intercept. 

The committee submitted a report on 24 August and a revision on 27 September. The 

final report was approved by Akin, Sdford, Neyes, and Mauborgne on 3 October 1940.45 

Basically the report was an acceptance of the Mauborgne plan. Particular international 

commercial circuits being jointly covered were to be assigned exclusively to the Army or 

the Navy (however, some joint coverage was to remain), virtually eliminating duplication. 

The report, which became an agreement with the signatures of Noyes and Mauborgne, 

addressed the matter of processing of intercept to a very limited degree. This was to assign 

the Russian problem to the Navy and the Mexican problem to the Army. It was further 

agreed to continue delivery of traffic from the intercept sites to Washington by the existing 

means, which were radio, airmail, regular mail, and courier, rather than turn to teletype, 

because the latter was too expensive. 

The report revealed in great detail the intercept assets of the Army and Navy, at least 

in diplomatic coverage, as of the summer of 1940. The following personnel and receivers 

were being used: 

Army 

Navy 

Number of Operators Number of Receivers 

While the FBI (or FCC or USCGl does not seem to have entered into any formal 

COMINT agreements with the services, the matter was under discussion at the time of these 
Safford-Akin conversations. On 5 July 1940, a conference had been called by General 

Sherman Miles, ACS, G-2 (he was chosen by General George Marshall, chief of staff, in 

April to replace McCabe) and attended by Admiral Noyes, Admiral Anderson, General 

Mauhrgne, and FBI associate director Ed Tamm.& Miles explained that the president, 

through his military aide, General Edwin Watson, had expressed concern about the lack of 

intelligence coordination and exchange between the Army, Navy, and FBI. Miles and 

Anderson then revealed to Mr. Tamm the existence of "radio telegraph monitaring 

stations," which were intercepting "international radio messages," and that the Army and 

Navy were coordinating these efforts to avoid duplication. Admiral Anderson also told Mr. 

Tamm that special arrangements had been made with the commercial cable companies to 

obtain copies of messages. Admiral Anderson provided no Tamm stated that the 

FBI was not receiving any results of these operations. While the FBI had no interest in 

foreign miIitary or naval matters, Tamm continued, he expected that matters of interest to 

the FBI must be appearing in trafEc. Admiral Anderson assured him that ON1 had 

furnished the FBI general intelligence concerning the Western Hemisphere. Miles and 

Mauborgne agreed to search their records ". . . to make certain that the Bureau was 

receiving and had received everything that might be of interest to it." 

At this conference some of President bsevelt's views on COMINT activities were 

revealed. General Mauborgne stated that as Henry L. Stimson was about to be nominated 

as secretary of war, he (Mauborgne) had gone to General Watson to gain assurance that 

Stimson would not be allowed to dismantle Army COMINT as he had done once before (in 

1929, when he was secretary of state). The president (either directly or through his 

military aide, General Watson) told Mauborgne that Army COMINT operations should be 

continued and that Stimson was not to be advised of these activities, Admiral Anderson 

also stated that he had briefed President Roosevelt about Navy CoMNT and had been told 

that the program should be continued. 

The FBI did not become a regular recipient of Army and Navy COhflN, although as has 

been described, the Bureau had access to GOMINT from other sources in the prewar period. 

The precise nature of the COMINT that the FBI did receive from the Army and Navy 

deserves further study. It may be stated that the FBI did not have access to ~UWLE or 

other Japanese diplomatic systems MA GIG"). But it seems likely that the Army and Navy 

did share with the FBI GOMINT relating to clandestine activities in the Western 

Hemisphere (the SIS especially worked German clandestine traffic, sometimes in concert 

with the Coast Guard). 

During 1940, Admiral Noyes and General Mauborgne reached an unwritten 

agreement for "decoding and translating Japanese intercepts" on this basis: the Army 

would qrocess Japanese diplomatic and consular traffic on even days of the month and the 

Navy on odd days. This agreement may have been reached in August, though 

contemporary documentation is lacking, and that date seems at odds with the 

aforementioned 3 October agreement, which makes no reference to an odd-even day 
under~tanding.~' Whatever the date of the agreement (and it was certainly made by the 

end of 1940), its simplicity created problems. For what was to be used as the determining 

date - transmission date or receipt date by the COMINT center? The agreement was refined 

so that the date became the Japanese cryptographic date based on the numbering system 

of the Japanese rigi in at or.^' 

There was considerable additional Army-Navy mperation attendant on the solution 

of the Japanese P~LE machine (September 1940). The Navy helped build copies of the 

PURPLE machines, and the Army then released copies of the machine to the Navy. The 

Navy had WRPE machines at OP-20-G in Washington and at the Cast operation in the 

Philippines. 

On 28 January 1941, the dissemination agreement of 8 December 1939 was 

superseded by a new agreement signed by General Miles and Captain Jules James, the 

adng DNI. This agreement was in chart format accounting for dissemination, retention, 

and destruction of each copy of a translated intercept. While the agreement did not so 

state, it applied mainly to Japanese diplomatic-consular traffic. On external distribution 

for these intercepts (that is, outside of OP-20-WON1 and SIS/MID) were the secretary of 

war, chief of staff, and military aide to the president." 

PREWAR COMINT AGREEMENTS WITH THE BRITISH 

U.S.-British COMINT agreements, like other intelligence arrangements between the 

two countries, were fragmented and uncentralized. The Army, Navy, FBI, and Coast 

Guard had independent contacts with the British. Nonetheless, the key event of this 

period was a joint undertaking. This was the Army-Navy mission to Bletchley Park (BPI, 

the home of the British COMINT organization, the Government Code and Cipher School 

(GC&CS). 

The reader should bear in mind that what follows is an account of CQMI~JT activities, 

almost to the tohl exclusion of the larger matter of the growing alliance between the 

United States and Britain and the extraordinary confidential relationship between 

President Roosevelt and Prime ,Minister Winston Churchill. Two events are offered as 

guideposts: Mr. Churchill became prime minister on 20 May 1940; by the end of June 

1940, President Roosevelt had determined to release fifty overage U.S. destroyers to the 

Royal Navy. 

While the U.S. Army's, and to a lesser extent the Navy's, "mainstream" COMINT 

relationship with the British from 1940 to 1941 can be described in some detail, there are 

separate, and confusing, relationships resulting from the presence in the U.S. of a large, 

covert British intelligence organization. This was BSC, referred to in Section 1, which was 

headed by William Stephenson. BSC became the main conduit for COMINT going between 

the U.S. agencies in Washiigton and GC&CS. Though the arrangement began before 
Pearl Harbor, much of this is a later development. But it can be said of prewar BSC and 

COMINT that BSC obtained, surreptitiously, aids for British cryptanalysis by operations in 

Washington and New York (one target was the Italian embassy). BSC also passed 

information relative to certain "lower-echelon cipher systems" to the FBI via Captain H. 

Montgomery Hyde." Other BSC involvement in COMINT, with or without FBI assistance, 

can only be surmised.52 

Bletchlay Park, Headquarters,Government Code and Cipher School 

The formal British-U.S. GOMINT relationship may have been initiated by the British in 

early 1940, when a proposal was made to the U.S. naval attache (Captain Alan Kirk) 
calling for broad COMINT cooperation. Though the Navy saw this as an opportunity to 

learn about German naval systems, this approach was alao rejected.= 

The BriW now began their campaign, at a high level, to tap U.S. technical and 

industrial resources. On 8 July 1940, Lord hthian, the British mhassador to the U.S., 

wrote Resident RooseveIt suggesting, among other things, that the British government 

would appreciate a braad exchange of secret technical information especially in the ". . . ultra short wave radio field.'m 

The Lothian request was favorably received. As the chief of the Army's War Plans 

Division, General George V. Strong noted on 19 July the secretary of war and the 

president had adopted a stance that the U.S. shouId "give all information possible to the 

British to aid them in their present struggle and furnish them such material assistance as 

will not interfere seriously with our own defense preparations."59 Strong suggested to 

General Marshall that the ACS, 6-2, be designated as &e Army's coordinator for technical 

exchange with the British. This was approved by the secretary of war on 22 JuIy 1940, and 

the State Department was advised of this arrangement the same day.56 

Two weeks later General Strong and &%era1 Delos C. Emmons, commanding general 

of General Headquarters (GHQ) Aii Force, departed for London. At the same time, the 

Navy sent Rear Admiral Robert Ghormley, the assistant chief of naval operations 

(ACNOI, to England as a special observer. These missions were of the highest level, and 

Ghormley, at least, received his instructions personally from President Roosevelt. These 

officers were to hold technical discussions, learn of British war plans, and generally 

observe the situation within Britain, then undergoing heavy bombing and facing possible 

invasion.*7 Whether Strong and Ghortnley hk with them spec& instructions regarding 

possible U.S.-U.K. COMINT collaboration is uncertain, but it is improbable, considering 

subsequent events. Their main technical interests were probably general 

communications, radar, air defense techniques, and antisubmarine warfare. 

On 23 August Strong cabled General Marshall to advise him that England was a "gold 

mine" of bhkal information that should be expl~ited.~ Strong urged the assignment of 

a U.S. technical staff to London, as the atkche's staff was too small. He might also have 

added that the sudden demands of modern warfare were rather beyond the typical Army 

attachh. The attach4 in London was Colonel Raymond E. Lee, soon to be promoted to 

brigadier general and subsequently (and very briefly) to become the ACS, 

On 29 August Assistant Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson notified the Army chiefs 

of arms and services and G-2 that General Strong's recommendations would be the topic 

for discussion at the War Department's weekly staff meeting, to be held the next day. Mr. 

Patterson reported that a secret British technical mission, headed by Sir Henry Tizard, 

was in the U.S. and that a reciprocal mission to England should be st~died.~ 

In response to the growing sentiment for cooperation with the British, Colonel Akin 

and Mr. Friedman of SIS prepared an informal paper, divided into five parts, 
recommending an Army CoMINT position. The paper was prepared on or about 1 

September 1940 and was shown to General Mauborgne and Commander Safford of OP-20- 

G. The Akin-Friedman proposals were these: 

1. Cryptographic - nothing secret to be disclosed to the British and specif~cally no 

mention to be made of the machines M-134-A, B, or C (the latter also known as the 

CSP-888); 

2. Training Material - some exchange of texts; 

3. Cryptanaiygis - full exchange with the British on a reciprocal basis but only in 

conjunction with the U.S. Navy; 

4. General Cryptadytic Technique -reciprocal exchange of mechanical and machine 

information; 

5. Exchange of Intercept Traffic - broadest possible exchange especially to obtain 

Japanese and German tactical traffic for U.S. study. 

Safford disagreed with items three and four. 

The matter was dramatically thrust before the War Department several days later 

when Strong cabled from hndon:" 

London No. 401. September 6,1940 

Are you prepared to exchange full information on all German, Italian, andJapanese cde and 

cryptographic idormation therewith? Are you prepared to agree to a mntinwus exchange of 

important intercept in connection with the above? Please expedite reply. 

This message far the Chief of Staff from Strong 

Lee 

The Navy would later claim that Strong had acted abruptly and unilaterally. 

According to Captain Kirk, the naval attache, General Strong, in addressing a British 

staff group, offered the British all US. information on Japanese diplomatic systems. The 

British were astounded, said Kirk, but readily accepted the offer.B2 That Strong acted 

without the Navy's agreement is likely, but he was following a policy quite acceptable to 

the Army. 

General Marshall took no immediate action on Strong's message, seeking rather an 

opinion from the Signal Corps and MID. General Mauborgne was at the Signal Corps 

center at Fort Monmouth where he received a summary of events from Colonel Clyde 

Eastman. Eastman reported that General Miles would take no action until General 

Mauborgne had given his opinion. Colonel Eastman also advised Mauborgne that General 
Strong's message had been shown to Admiral Anderson, the DNI. Anderson, and Admiral 

Noyes, too, tentatively rejected the proposal.= 

General Mauborgne telegraphed his position two days later? 

23WW -Fort Monmouth, Nd., September 7,1940 

Aa a matter of mnce to National Defense strongly urge wncurrermce Chief StaE 

in pmpoaalGeneralStrvng that thb government exchange complete technical information ra 

Japanem German and Italian codes and cipher systems but believe conatant exchange of 

tra& -. Each pverttment should rely upon own in-t serviesa for mUecthn 

aPd wadatiw. U- to dkum Paragraphs A. C. D and E of Akin's 

memomdam becslf8e mt believed pertinent Stro+~ radio. 

On 9 September General Miles added hie favorable endorsement to COMINT 

cooperation in a memorandum to Generd Marshall on various aspects of technical 

collaboration with the British.- General Marshal approved the exchange and the role of 

MID as coordinator for the War Department. 

Probably because the Navy did not agree, nothing was done for some weeks to 

accomplish an exchange. The Navy's position was not unreasonable. The WWLE machine 

solution was only weeks old when Strong proposed that it be given to the British - this 

before the British had made any specifw offer to provide information of similar value. 

Strong returned to Washington before the end of September. He made a personal report to 

the president, and it seems likely (though there is no record) that the matter of ~WNT 

cooperation was discussed. 

The matter was renewed by General Miles on 4 October, when he wrote to Lieutenant 

Colonel W. M. Regnier, !%wetmy Stimson's aide, to urge, as absolutely essential, an 

immediate exchange with the British of ". . . information concerning military, military 

attache and diplomatic codes, ciphers, cipher devices and apparatus, and code and cipher 

systems employed by Germany, Italy, and Japan together with all information concerning 

the methds employed to solve messages in codes or ciphers of the classes mentioned." The 

information to be furnish4 by the U.S. would include the PURPLE machine ~lution.~ 

Miles noted the Navy's opposition and expressed the belief that it was based on a fear of 

aiding the British in s01ving.U.S. systems.67 Miles stated these reasons for his 

rmmmendations: 

1. It would result in the Army being able to obtain (if the British cooperated) foreign 

army and air force trsc and solution data unavailable from U.S. resources. 
2. With these expnded sources of intelligence, the U.S. muld learn more of possible 

German and Italian plans regarding the Panama Canal and Latin America. German and 

Italian espionage in the U.S. might be exposed. 

3. The British would be materially assisted by what the U.S. could provide. . 

A favorable decision was reached 

during December 1940. On 26 

December orders were issued to Mr. 

Friedman (who was recalled to active 

duty as a lieutenant colonel) to travel 

to England. Because of Mr. Friedman's 

illness, however, these ordera were 

cancelled on 17 January 1941, and 

orders were issued on the 17th and 

24th, respectively, to Captain 

Abraham Sinkov and Lieutenant Leo 

Rosen, both of SlS, detailing them to 

MID for temporary duty with the U.S. 

military attachkinLondon. They were 

to take the PURPLE machine to the 

Briti~h.~ 

Abraham Sinkov 

The timing of the Sinkov-Rosen mission was partly dictated by the availability ot 

suitable transportation. On 15 January 1941, a British staff delegation, accompanied by 

General Raymond Lee and Admiral Ghormley, sailed from England aboard the new 

battleship, HMS George V. The British joint-service group included Rear Admirals 

Bellairs and Danckwerts, Air Vice Marshal Slessor, and Major General Morris. They 

formed the permanent British staff organization in Washington, later known as the 

British Joint Staff Mission. So began the formalization of the allian~e.'~ 

&sen and Sinkov, joined by naval officers Robert Weeks and Presmtt Currier of OP204, departed for England on the George V in early February with a PURPLE machine and 

other COMINT material in their possession.70 Upon landing in England, the party visited 

the office of the military attache, delivering a letter from General Strong that indicated 

they were on a special mission. They were then driven to BletehIey Park where their 

presence was explained, except to a small group of initiates, as being a Canadian 

delegati~n.~' As Sinkov would later recall, the circumstances of the mission were so secret 

that he never knew if the British expected to receive the PURPLE machine or even knew 

that the U.S. had solved the system. 

The mission remained at GC&CS for ten weeks. They received information about 

German, Italian, Russian, Latin American, and Japanese systems, military and civil, and 

learned about the status of various British COMINT operations. Weeks and Currier spent 
much of their time studying intercept and DF operations and obtained equipment used for 

the latter. The group was briefed concerning the greatest British secret: that the German 

ENIGMA, used by all the German armed forces, had been solved and was being exploited. 

They were not permitted to take notes about the ENIGMA, nor was the technical briefing 

they received adequate to allow the U.S. to duplicate the British success. The officers gave 

a special pledge of secrecy regarding ENIGMA, and the Army members agreed to reveal the 

secret only to General Miles, Colonel Akin, and Mr. Friedman. General discussions were 

held concerning future cooperation, and the British requeshd COMINT assistance in the 

Far East, whew they were hindered by a lack of Japanese linguists. The miasion returned 

to the U.S. in April 1941, this time on a British destroyer." 

This mission, carried out by junior officers, was one of the most important events of the 

prewar period. It would be hard ta imagine an action more likely to cement an alliance 

than one in which two countries exchange their most vital secrets. The mission was 

revealed, in general terms, to the public during the Pearl Harbor hearings &r the war. 

Its significance was not lost on historians seeking to find evidence for President 

Roosevelt's alleged perfidy in secretly leading the U.S. toward a war to rescue his British 

friendx7' I 

At the time, the U.S. agencies seemed satisfied with the exchange. But two years 

later, when the Army was stilI not exploiting any foreign military traffic, there was 

considerable dissatisfaction at how little the British had shared concerning ENIGMA. This 

story is told in chapter 4. 

In the Far East, the Cast unit in the Philippines and the British C~MINT organization 

in Singapore entered into an informal agreement of mutual assistance early in 1941. This 

cooperation lasted until the two units were evacuated during the series of disasters that 

overcame Malaya and the Philippines in early 1942. 

According to British sources, possible cooperation was first discussed within British 

intelligence circles in December 1940.~~ On10 February 1941, the British DNI radioed the 

commander in chief of the China naval station authorizing immediate and full exchange 

with the U.S. of COMINT material and methods.75 The timing is significant, for the SinkovRosen group had just released, or was about to release, the PURPLE machine to GC&CS. A 

PURPLE machine went from Bletchley Park to Singapore soon after Cast received its 

PURPLE machine from 20-G. 

At the end of February 1941, a US.-British C~MINT conference was held in Singapore. 

Among the U.S. participants were Captain Archer Allen, the naval observer in Singapore, 

and Lieutenant Commander Jefferson Dennis, former head of the Cast unit, who had 

remained in the Philippines to help Cast with TA problems. The USN delegation released 

to the British a Japanese merchant ship code, a naval personnel code, and callsign 

information. The British, in turn, provided valuable information about JN-25, which was, 

for COMINT purposes, the most profitable Japanese naval 3y~t.m.~~ In April 1941, when 
the British commander in chief Far East flew to Manila for high-level staff conferences, hd 

was acmmpanied by Lieutenant Commander Burnett of the Singapore COMINT unit. 

Lieutenant Commander Burnett visited Cast, where arrangements were made for a 

private one-time cipher system for radio exchange of COMXNT data. This system 

supplemented the weekly bulk exchange of COMINT made by the Clipper airplane.77 

With wide-ranging COMINT cooperation with the British now a fact of U.S. policy, 

additional arrangements were made in Washinwn. On 25 May 1941, the British DNI, 

Admiral John H. Godfrey, and his aide, Commander Ian Fleming, arrived in the U.S. 

Wrey's mission was to encourage the US, to integrate its intelligence ~ervices.'~ The 

Godfrey-Fleming mission was undoubtedly aimed toward giving a boost to William J. 

Donovan's efforts to create a U.S. secret intelligence service. Fleming even wrote two 

memorandums to Donovan, suggesting how such a service might be organized and naming 

persons whom he (Fleming) thought should fill key position^.^' The author has not found 

specific information to show that Wrey and Fleming dealt with OP-20-G, but it is almost 

cerhin that in their meetings with ONI, which did take place, GOMINT was discussed. 

Very smn after, if not concurrently, Captain Edward G. Hastings, RN, came to 

Washington to head the working committee of the U.S.-based adjunct of the British Joint 

Intelligence Committee. Hastings, a representative of the chief of the secret service {CSS), 

was mainly concerned with British-U.S. COMINT relations until his recall in late 1943.8' It 

is interesting to note that Ian Fleming recommended to Mr. Donovan that Captain 

Hastings be chief of communications for Donovan's planned organization (the COI) 

Hastings was a GC&CS veteran! 

Admiral Godfrey's visit was returned by a special mission to the British Admiralty in 

August 1941, consisting of Captain Sherwood Picking, Commander Arthur McCollum, 

and Walter Chappell, all of ONI, and Archie Wrangham, an o%cer of the Royal Marines on 

duty at ONI. Picking and Wrangham were killed in an air crash in England, and it 

became McCoIlum's mi~sion.'~ Unfortunately only Captain Picking had been given 

specific instructions in Washington concerning the objectives of the mission. Commander 

McCollum visited various parts of the Naval Intelligence Division and ultimately, through 

the personal intervention of Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, gained access 

to British COMINT. McCollum then visited sites involved in COMINT 

Beginning in June 1941, OP-20-G and GC&CS began to exchange GOMINT, first 

through the British embassy in Washington and later (perhaps in August) through British 

Security Coordination in New York City. The material went by air. Material for GC&CS 

from OP-20-G was called EWT, and that received by OP-20-G, PQR.83 

In that busy August, Commander Alfred Denniston, head of GC&CS, visited the SIS in 

Washington. At a meeting on 16 August general discussions were held and a week-long 

itinerary laid out. Denniston was to visit all sections, observing the SIS efforts against 

German, Italian, French, Latin American, and Japanese communications. Denniston 
explained to his hosts the status of the cryptanalytic effort^ at GC&CS, and a system for 

"... safe and direct forwarding and exchange of documents was agreed upon."Bq And in a 

eoncession undoubtedly welcomed by SES, Denniston announced that GC&CS cooperation 

with its developing Canadian counterpart organization would depend on that organization 

discharging Herbert 0. Yardley, the discredited American cryptanalyst, who had been 

seeking foreign employment for the past decade. 

A listing of the U.S. personnel at the Denniston conference may serve to identify the 

SIS hierarchy just before the war: 

Lieutenant Colonel Rex Minckler, chief of SIS 

Captain Harold G. Hayes 

Captain Earle F. Cook 

Captain Abraham Sinkov 

Lieutenant Leo Rosen 

Mr. William F. Friedman 

Mr. Frank B, Ruwlett 

Dr. Solomon Kullback 

At the end of his visit, Commander Denniston arranged for Major Geoffrey Stevens's 

assignment to SIS as a liaison officer. Major Stevens, who probably was in Washington at 

the time, stayed with SIS until October 1944, when he was replaced by Major John R. 

Cl~eadle.'~ 

Denniston also visited OF-20-G, which he discovered was where the ENIGMA was being 

worked on. Denniston had hoped that the U.S. would concentrate its GOMINT efforts on the 

Japanese:' and he repeated this theme as late as mid-1943, to no avail. 

TOWARD PEARL HARBOR 

The intelligence aspects of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor have been examined in 

such detail that one hesitates to say more.87 Therefore, this section is only a broad outline 

of COMINT handling. 

The GOMINT product of the SIS - decrypted and translated messages - was given to 

MID for analysis and dissemination. There was very little analysis. In the months just 

before Pearl Harbor, COMINT derived from Japanese messages was personally delivered by 

SIS officers to Lieutenant Colonel Rufus Bratton, chief of the Far East section of the 

intelligence branch of MID. Bratton personally read each item and delivered the 

translations daily to a small circle of readers who included General Miles, General 
Marshall, Mr. Stimson, and a very few of5certs in the War Plans Divkaion of the General 

Staff. 

Within MID itself almost no one except Bratton and Miles had regular access to MAGIC, 

the Japanese diplomatic material. The chief of the intelligence division, Colonel Hayes 

Kroner, claimed no regular access; the oEmr of the Japanese desk, Lieutenant Colonel 

Dusenberry, may have shared some of the reading, ae he did the delivery, with Colonel 

Bratton, his chief; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Beth, who headed the Situation Section of 

MID, did not see MAGIC. Each recipient had b read each intercept or perhaps a summary 

dintercepts. There were no written analyses, no special reports, no "finished" intelligence 

derived from MAGIC. Copies of intercepts were stored by Bratton; extra copies were 

destroyed. 

The Navy's handling of MAGIC was 

similar to the Army's. Lieutenant 

Commander A. D. Kramer, an ONE 

officer on detail to OP-20-G as a 

translator, performed functions similar 

to that of Colonel Bratton. Within ON1 

proper, Commander McCollum, who 

had the Far East desks, was 

responsible for analysis of bfAGIC and 

other CO~ derived from Japanese 

naval wmmunications. The problem of 

COMINT handling was compounded in 

the Navy Department by the ongoing 

controversy between ON1 and War 

Plans, headed by Admiral R. K. 

Turner, as to who was ultimately 

responsible for analysis. Turner won Lieuhaant Commandsr A. D. Kramer 

out, and he proved to be incapable beaded the OP-WM irmslation section 

as an intelligence analyst. To the 

professional intelligence officers who later gave testimony before Congress, Admiral 

Turner was the villain in the Navy's use, or non-use, of COMINT.~ 

There was unquestionably greater dissemination and analysis of COMINT within the 

Navy. The Navy had far greater sources than the Army (the reader is reminded that the 

bulk of the naval corn effort was on naval Corn, not on MAGIC) and had two overseas 

COMINT centers directly serving the fleets. 

The Pearl Harbor material relative to that has been examined leads to several 

sidcant conclusions. No MAGIC or naval intercept available to the U.S. directly 

identified Hawaii as the intended target of a Japanese attack. Several espionage messages 

between Japanese intelligence in Hawaii and Tokyo, during the period late November to 6 
December 1941, gave fairly strong indications that Hawaii might be in danger. However, 

the most important of these messages were not translated (in OP-204, aa it happened) 

until after the attack. 

In spite of the complexity of prewar intelligence organizations and arrangements that 

have been described above, they proved to be only an elementary framework for what 

would be needed. Many inadequacies were exposed immediately at the outbreak of war. 

Notes 

1. The major source for this outline dU.S. intelligence prior to Pearl Harbor (other than COMINT) is Thomas F. 

Troy, The Cmr&rrator of Infirmation and British Inlelligegsnce, published as vol. 18, No. 1-5, in the CIA journal 

Studies in Itltslligence, Spring 1974. Troy's account is Mied. 

2. For Berle's view of his role, see extracts from his papers conkind in Beatrice 3. Berle and Travis 3. Jacobs 

(ed.), Navigating the Rapids, From the Papers ofAhlf A. Berk (New York, 1973). Berle was decidedly nnt the 

director of IIC, and no such position existed. Berle was an Army intelligence officer 1917-19 at the War 

Department and in Paris. 

3. Troy, 99. 

4. Ibid., 98-99. See also Vernon Davis, The History of the doant Chisfs of Staff in World War II, vol. 1, JCS 

Historical Division, 1972,5053. 

5. This was during 1942. See chapter 2. In theory the IIC was concerned with counkrinklIigence, and the JIG 

would be a higher body with broader interests, though of similar mernbemhip. The IIC actually dealt in both 

positive intelligence and oounterintelligence, at least for the Western Hemisphere. 

6. From 1939 until Feb. 1942, OF-20-G was known as he Communication Security Section or the Radio 

Intelligence Section. The commonly used term for the organization was OP-20-G, which will be used throughout 

this study. 

7. George R. Tbornpson and Dixie B Harris, The Signal Corps: The Oulcarne {Mid-1943 through 1945) 

(Washington, DG, Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMN), 19661,333. See note 6. 

8. U.S. Crypfolagic Activities 194146, Pad 2: Intercept and Processing, NSA historian, 1953. The lineage and 

development of the Army's intercept sites before World War I1 is by no means fully establiahsd. Intercept 

operations at Fort Hancock began in 1938, when a detachment from the First RI Company moved into an isolated 

building on the beach at Sandy Rook. Fort Hanwck is only twenty miles north of Fort Monmouth, where 

intsrcept operations had previously been carried out. In documents of Oct. 1940, MS.1 is shown as Fort 

Monmouth again rather than Fort Hancock. I believa that MS1 remained at Fort Hancock but that general 

administrative, and later teletype, support was at Monmouth. Thus the site was identified interchangeably as 

Fort Hanaociu'Fort Monmouth. (See especially the 1976 interview of Mr. Albert Jones, NSA employee. Jones was 

an intercept operator at Hancock 193S1939.1 

10. Memorandum from Sam Snyder to Mr. Friedman, 12 Sep. 1940, subject: Station 6 Traffic (classified), NSA 

Historical Collection (hereafter referred to as PISAHG). 
12. "Copy of report given to Lieutenant Rowlett, May 16,1942,"NSAHc. 

13. The author does not suggest that thars onght to or could have been solutions or translations. In an interview 

in 1975, Mr. Frank B. Rowlett opined that Japanese army traffic was too inadequate for mlution to have been 

possible. There were probably never more thnfifteenSISintercept operators at MSG, adcavering both the lowpowered (according to Rowlett) Japanese army trafficand the Japanese diplomatic tr&c(which wasexploitable) 

was impossible. 

14. NAVSECGRU S&ttions, 1922-1959. Photocopy of an undated listing, presumably prepared by the Naval 

Security Group, NSAHC (classifisd). 

16. Summary of interviews of Captain Rudolph J. Fabian, USN (Ret) conducted 1975-76 by Captain Wayman 

Packard, USN (Ret). Captain Packard, who has written a history of Naval Intelligence. provided much 

information to the author. 

17. The prewar relationship of OP-20-G with the fieid sites was complex. It ia addressed in great detail by 

Captain Laurance SaiFord in his testimony before ths various Pearl Harbor inquiries. The focus of the author's 

gtudy is on World War II policyladministFstion and not on intelligence preceding or related to the Pearl Harbor 

attack. 

18. By far the bs& account of intelligence related Wthe Pearl Harbr attack is Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl 

Harbor: Wrning arrdzdeciswn (Stanford, 1962). Mrs. Wohlatettsr made an impressive gtudy of the forty volumes 

of testimony -Pearl Harbor Attach (PHA) - resulting from congrsssional hearings in 1946. 

19. Wohlshtter, 171. This figure probably includes the intercept sitea (other than in the Pacific). 

20. Rochefort testimony, PITA, Part 10, 4,673. 

21. Fabian tsptimony, PHA, Part 36.46fE; and memorandum from Joseph E. Wenger to Op-20-G, 26 Jan. 1942, 

subject: Reorganiaatwn, NSAHC (clamifed). 

22. Memorandum from J. F. Farley, USCG to Commander John R. Redman, OP-20-G, 6 Msrch 1942 (classified), 

NSAHC. Captain Farley was chief of USCG communications from 1937 to 1942 and later, as a rear admiral, was 

commandant of the Coast Guard. This memorandum gives a history of USCG COMIMT. 

23. Intsrvisw with Mrs. Friedman, Jan. 1976. 

24. Ibid. 

25. Farley memorandum. It is not statedjust what type of cornmunicat.lons were to be covered by the USCG. 

26. Farley memorandum; also, memorandum from Commander L. T. Jones, OP-20-G, 7 Sep. 1944, subject: 

Clandestine Radio Intelligence, NSAHC (classified). 

27. Farley memorandum. 

28. Memorandum from J. F. Farley to Commander J. R. Redman, 28 Mar. 1942 (classfied), NSAHC; also, History 

of Coast Guard Unii 387, NSA Cryptobgic Collection, undated. 

29. Interview of Paul Napier and I. Woodrow Newphsr, retired FBI cryptanalysts, Oct. 1975. 

30. Ibid. 

31. Letter from Brigadier General Sherman Mil~s, ACS, G-2, to J. Edgar Hoover, 28 June 1941, National 

Archives, Record Group 165. The Miles letter acknowledges a 19 June 1941 letter from Hovver in which Hoover 

apprised MID of the mlution and offered to help MID with unsolved traffTc. Miles claimed the Army had "none on 
hand for decoding." Mila waa aLntrst certainly being cagey in this reply as the SIS w88 working Vichy taac. 

TRe Miha let& was draftad by W. Preston Corderman. 

32. Wapier-Newpher interview; Mrs. Friedman interview. 

33. Correspondence bmn Mr. Hwver and Mr. Fly, Oct. 19QOJan. 1941, in BOX 9, hod Group 173 (RID 

Rscords), National Archives. Some of this mrre~gondence hma besn declasded,but some remaiw under FBI seal 

(the author saw all the material). 

34. Napier-Newpkr inh~iews. Circuits included thorn carrying South America-Tokyo diplomatic traRic. 

36. Ibid. 

36. See vol. 2, the General Cryptanalytic Problems, in History of tks Signal Security Agency in World War II, for 

material on FBI ~urreptitious assistance (clad~ed). 

37. Letter to the author from the FBI, 26 January 1976. The author has not seen the dmumenta summarized in 

this letter. While a powible mistaken date, Oct. 1940 instead of Oct. 1939, ssems obvious, the FBI letter was in 

response to specific requests and diacueaions with FBI personnel involved in COMINT. Further. the 

correspondence cited in footnote 35 does not describe a meeting or promal resembling that of 1939. RG173 

contains no material earlier than summer 1940. Chairman Fly was a Naval Academy graduate and a former 

naval otlicer. My tentative conclusion is that Fly did mak: such a proposal and that it wa9 unrelatedta later FCC 

(from summer 1940 on) involvement in COMINT. 

38, Interviews with Mr. Sterling by author. 1975. 

39. Sterling interview. 

40. George Sterling, "The U.S. Hunt for Aria Agent Radios," Studies in Infelligence, vol. 4 Spring 1960, CIA 

(FOUO). 

41. "Agreement Regarding Special Material;" filed in vol. 1 of CutdogofPapers, a colledion prepared by AFSA in 

1952, NSAHC (hereafter cited aa Cablog) Iclassified). 

42. Memorandum from Safford to OP-20, 25 July 1940, subject: Coordination of Intercept and Decrypting 

Activities of the Army and Navy With Detailed Appenb (same subject), vol. 1, Catalog (classified). 

43. Memorandum from &Ford to Noyes, 27July 1940, vol. 1, Catudag (chssifisd). 

44. Memorandum from Commander Safford and Colonel Akin to Joint Army-Navy Committee, 31 Jdy 1940,vol. 

1, Catalog (classified). 

45. The approval document, committee report, and appendices (all claasif-dl are in vol. 1 of Ca:atalog. This 

material is of exceptional histarical interest. It shows virtually the mmplete picture of $IS intercept operations as 

of Oct. 1940: circuits covered, number of intercept operators at each station, amount and type of equipment, and 

number and type of messages intercepted. The information concerning OP-20-G is less complete, as there is no 

information on naval COMINT (i.e., anti-Japanese; anti-German). Diplomatic COMINT was for the Navy, unlike 

the Army, a sideline. 

46. This was eegentially an IIG gathering, though the term was not yet in use. The source for this meeting is 

Memorandum forth direcbr, Tamm to d. Edgar Hoover, 5 July 1940, NSAHC. A copy of tkis memorandum was, 

provided to the writer in 1976 by FBI liaison after its existence was made known to the writer by CIA historian 

Thomas Troy. 

47. The SIS accompliflhed this in Washington during 1940 (or earlier) and 1941 as follows: Each morning an 

officer visitad the RCA ofiice, and there he used a special camera, lights, and copystand to photograph telegrams 
of interest. He then took the fdm to SIS, where it was developed and copies were quickly distributed ta the 

cry ptanalysts. Interview of Frank 8. Rowle tt by Vincent Wihn and Henry Sckorreck. NSAHC. 

48. A-t 1944 ia tha date auggsstd by Captain SaEord in s memorandum be wrote on 14 Feb. 1946. {vol. 1, 

Catalog). The fimt solutions to the PURPLE machine were made on 27 Sep. 1940. (See History of SSA, voL 2,4L 

46.) 1 believe the odd-even agreement datesfrom a#krthe 3 Oct. 1940 agreement, but probabIy mn&er,at least 

by the and of 1940. See discussion oftbe odd-even agraementinmrioustestimony in PHA; also Wohlatetker, 173- 

75. 

49. Rowlatt interview, tam 19. 

50. Vol. 2.c.t8), catalog. 

51. For aide to British ctyptanalyais, see H. Montgomery Hyde, Room 3603 (New York, 1963) and Cynthia, {New 

York. 1966h for Captain Hyde and the exchange ofcipher ayatems with FBI. see letter to the author from the FBI, 

26 Jan. 1976. 

52. I believe that BSC had access to cables in New York City, though I have found no documentation. One reason 

for believing thi is that President Roosevelfs friend and confidant, Commander Vincent Astor, USN (Ret), was a 

director of Western Union. hr engaged in intelligence coordination and operations for the president and was 

cloaely aHied on a pewonal basis with William Stephenson, head of EX. (The foregoing bawd in part on 

mnversations by the author with CIA historian ThomasJmy.) 

53. Memorandum from Lieutenant Commander A. D. Krarner to OP-20-G, 8 June 1942, subject: Cryptsndysis. 

FBI Activities, and Liaimn with the British (classif~d), NSAHC, in FBUCoast Guard general file. Thi~ 

document, hereaffer cited aa Kramer Memorandum of 8 dune 1942, is an exceptionally important historical 

document covering a wide range of USN-British intelligence relations. 

64, Aide-Memoirs Lothian to Roosevelt, 0 July 1940,ACSI #2. NSAHC. 

55. Memorandum from Strong to Chief of Staff, 19 duly 1940, ACSI #2, NSAHC. 

56, Ibid; also, memoredurn from Henry L. Stimson, secretary of war, to secretary of state, 22 July 1940, ACSl 

#2, NSAHC. 

57. Vernon Davis, The Hiutory of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, vol. 1; Origin of the doint and 

Combined ChwfsofStaff (Washington, DC, Historical Division JCS, 1972), 99-100. 

58. Paraphrased Cable, Raymond E. Lee (for Stroog) to War Department, 23 Aug. 1940, ACSI #45, NSAHC. 

59. General Miles had been Lee's predecessor as Army attache in Landon. Both Miles and Lee were found 

wanting ae ACS, G2. Their sslsdion is a strong indictment of General Marshail's knowledge of and inkrest in 

inteiligence. This subject is a recurring theme of this study. 

60. Memorandum from Patterson to chiefs of arms and services and G2,29 Aug. 1940, subject: Information to be 

Obtained from Abroad, ACSI #45, NSAHC. 

61. ACSI 145, NSAHC. 

62. Krarner memorandum of 8 June 1942. 

63. Letter from Golone1 Eastman to General Mauborgne, 5 Sspt. 1940, ACSI R45, NSAHC. 

64. ACSI f45, NSAHC. 

65. Memorandum from ACS, G-2 to chief of staff, 9 Sap+ 1940, subject: Directivs to G-2 Covering interchange of 

Secret Technical Information With Representetiveaof the British Governmenf ACSI #Q5, NSAHC. 
65. Memorandum from Miles to Regnier, 4 Oct. 1940, subjact: Cad= and Cipher$ AN1 R45 Idadled), NSAHC. 

67. Aa CoIoneI AUted McCormack of the Military Intelligence WCB would learn in 1943, the 8ritiah had been 

reading US. State Department MI at Ied until tbe US. entered the war. (Cladid memorandum from 

MtCormacktoColo~lhrterW.Chrka,l5dune 1943.ACW #40,NSAIIC3 

68. The travel orders am in ACSX #a. There is no mention in these orders of the natnre ofthair -a 

69. Vernon Davia, vol. 1.108. 

70. While I have not found rpeciiic docmefitation on this don, the Navy% participation was certainly 

approved d ordered by Mnt RomeveIt. The US. party sailed- Annapolis, Mary W. 

71. Lztk b the author from Pdetrmr Siukov, 1076, HSAHC. 

72. Ismr to the author from Profesmr Sinkov; aim Hisbry of SSA, vol. 2, 11-13; and Siakov-Rosen 

memorandum to ACS, C2,11 Apr. 1941: and Report of Cqpbogmphie Mission, lsigned by Sinkov and hen (not 

dated but obviody is from 19411, atl in ACSI #46. Sir John Dill headed "General Mar~hallt letkr ta field 

marshall dated 23 Dec 19- in ACSl +44, MAHC. It is inkding to note tbat the basic Sinkov-ha 

dacumenta (ta A= 6-2 ad the mote techwid Rsport of Mkmn) maks no mention of ENIGMA. 

BO mcmt waa this information. The WIGMA mmt was revealed to the US. officers with the approval of Prime 

Miiinistsr Winston Churchill. (backgtound paper for Dill} 

73. See, For example, the writings of Charles Beard. Gerbert Fek, Harry Elmsr Barn-, and William Lange. 

Bed and Barnes were, unfortunately, ofthe "Conspimg Theory* school. 

74- Rank Bi&Noval SIGLN!I', vol. Mal,lJapaneseI, CC&CS Histocim 93 ff (e). 

15. Ibid., 95. 

76. Ibid., 96-96, and Rudolph Fabian intsrviewsconducted by Captain Packard. Captain Fabiau, who places Jeff 

Demk at the meeting, snggwta the date as Dee. I940 while the W&CS has it as Feb. 1941. Unlw I have run 

towar separata ~onfemnce9, Ibelieve the latter date is more likely. 

78. Thomas Troy, The Coodinah of IMrmQfion and B&A InteUigem. 105 (classified). 

79. Ibid. 

80. Mr. Troy, upon review of bents in hi possesaim, pla-s Captain Hastings with the JIC (called the 

"Junior JIC") in Washington in the wunmer of 1941. This ia wnfirmed in Kramer memorandum of 8 dune 1942. 

bskkgs'a link to the CSS is apparent in numerous lab referencm Further, his later organizational placement 

in Washington was with tha British AdmiraltJr delegation, and he was fodly identified aa the CG&CS 

representative to the U.S. in 1842. 

81. All details of this mission are from the oral history of the late Rear Admiral Arthur S. McCoilum. transcript in 

possession of the US. Naval Institute in Annapolis, Dr. Jack Mason. historian, clrstodian. See 244 ff. (bereahr 

cited as M&11um Od Hm). 

82. %id. Unforttmateb, McCollum did not detail this information for the intarviewer, and the author has not 

lean any USN dwuments relakd ta his mimion. McCollum, born in Japan to missionary parents,wasaJapane~e 

linguist and long-time ON1 veteran. The assist from Sir Dudley Pound was arranged through a U.S. Naval 

Reset- officer on duty in landon, Lieutenant Commander Paul Hamrnond. Hammond. a wealthy New York 

banker. was a pacetime yrrehting armpanion of Sir Dudley. 
83. Birch, Naval SiGlNT mi. la), 209 (clmsified); also Krarner memorandum of 8 June 1942. 

84. Minutes of Coderence, August 16,1941, ACSI #45+ NSAHC. This exchange would be handled by BSC, New 

York. 

85. Historical paper entitled "Cooperation with GCgECS" preparad by Lieutenant McCracken, Signal Corps, 

1945(?), ACSI #46, NSAHC. 

86. Birch, Naval SIGINT wl. (a), 175 (cladled). 

87. Roberta Wohlstatter's Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision is by far the bed account. 

88. See McCollumOrai fii-ry; McCollum, T.6. Wilkinson, Kramer, stc., testimony inPHA.Specia1 
Chapter 2 

The First Year of War 

THE IMPACT OF WAR 

With the outbreak of war in the Pacific on 7 December 1941, the mo~t important U.S. 

COMINT facilities became the Navy's Cast unit in Corregidor and the Hawaii unit, soon to 

be known as Hypo. They were also the most exposed, and Cast had to be evacuated within 

a few months. The Army would also lose its only station then capable of monitoring 

Japanese army tr&c - MS-6, Fort Mills, Philippine Islands. 

MS-6, which had copied Japanese army trac in 19394 (though SIS managed no 

solutions), had during 1941 worked almost exclusively ag.ainst Japanese diplomatic 

communications. These intercepts were laboriously reenciphered, often by the chief of MS 

6, Major Joseph Scherr, and then radioed bwashington. Beginning on the afternoon of 8 

I)ecember, which was 7 December in Hawaii and in the U.S., and within hours &er the 

first Japanese air attacks on Clark Field, the station turned its attention to Japanese 

tactical nets. There were some immediate successes in identifying Japanese air-ground 

wmmunications controlled from Formosa.' When Major Scherr was assigned to the staff of 

Brigadier General Spencer Akin, General MacArthur's signal offrcer, MS-6 was briefly 

commanded by Lieutenant Harold R. Brown, a former enlisted man with extensive C50MIMT 

experience. On Christmas Eve MS6 was dissolved as an SIS unit and moved to 

Corregidor, where it was placed under the command of Akin and Scherr. From then until 

late March 1942, it provided COMINT support for the beleaguered U.S. Army forces in the 

Philippines: intercept and traffic analysis of Japanese army units, monitoring of Japanese 

air force circuits for early warning, and rudimentary cryptanalysis. Potentially useful 

information from Japanese cummunication service messages was faithfully radioed to the 

SIS in Washington. General Akin and Lieutenant Colonel Scherr left the Philippines with 

MacArthur in March. On the 24th, MacArthur, in a message from Australia to Lieutenant 

General Jonathan Wainwright, his successor in the Philippines, ordered Brawn and the 

COMINT detachment (eleven men) to evacuate to Australia. Most of them eventually 

reached Australia, where they helpedform the nucleus of a new COMINT efforL2 

The Army's only remaining SIS site in the Pacific was MS-5, Hawaii. This skation was 

owrated by twenty-five enlisted men, without an SIS commanding officer, under the 

administration of the Hawaiian department signal officer. ~efore'the outbreak of war, the 

mission of MS5 was diplomatic intercept. With the sudden onset of an emergency, the 

station was hard pressed and unable to provide significant GOMINT support. There was no 

DF equipment, the command structure was confused, and there was no clear mission. The 
Army turned to the Federal Communications Commission's Rsdio Intelligence Division 

and continued to depend on it through most of 1942: 

The situation was no better in Alaska, where a Japanese invasion seemed more likely. 

The Army's basic communications within Alaska and between Alaska and the U.S. were 

good. The cable between Seward and Seattle went into operation on 3 December 1941, 

providing reliable communications between the Alaskan Command and the Western 

Defense Command."ut there was no COMINT unit in Alaska, and there would h none 

until a radio intelligence company was sent there in 1943. CoMIN support was provided 

by the IUD from its several monitoring stations in Alaska and the Pacifie Northwest.= 

As described in chapter 1, the Navy's GOMINT assets in the Pacific were considerable. 

Because both Cast and Hypo were capable of processing their own traffic - performing 

traffic analysis, DF, cryptanalysis, and translation - problems of communication with 

Washinmn over the now-congested radio facilities at Pearl Harbor and Manila were not 

as important. At this time, the dispersed nature of Navy COMINT was undoubtedly an 

advantage. Station B at Guam was lost on 10 December when the island was surrendered 

to the Japanese. Some COMINT personnel wem captured, but the Japanese never learned 

about their activities. As a result of prewar planning, much material had hen destroyed 

or removed as had some of the key personnel. The COMINT operations building and COMINT 

materials were burned before the Japanese landed.' 

Within the US., the Navy's facilities were also more advanced than the Army's 

facilities at the beginning of the war. The main OP-20-G stations were already linked to 

Washington by teletype. The Army had opened a teletype between the Presidio IMS2) 

and Washington on the night of 6 December. Teletype had also been installed between 

Washington and MS-1, Fort Monmouth/Fort Hancock, but the operators there failed to 

respond to the SIS attempt to open that link on 6 1)ecember.' 

The outbreak of war, then, disrupted and endangerd some GOMINT facilities. The 

extreme inadequacy of Army intercept facilities for the new tasks at hand was apparent. 

THE EXPANSION AND REORGANIZATION OF ARMY COMINT DURING 1942 

When the war began, the SIS was operating under a new chief, Lieutenant Colonel 

Rex Minckler, and a new chief signal officer CCSO), Major General Dawson Olmstead. 

Minckler had replaced the highly regarded Spencer Akin in June 1941, with the latter, as 

we have seen, going to the Philippines as General MacArthur's signal officer. Minckler, 

later described as a poor organizer and manager, and as uncooperative with MID, would be 

replaced in April 1942.' 

General Olmstead had been General Marshall's personal choice as chief signal officer 

to replace General Mauborgne, who was pressured to retire in July 1941, six weeks ahead 
of schedule. Maubome - confidentially 

told General Marshall at the time that 

he did not feel Olmstead was qualified 

for the task. Mauborgne's choice was 

Colonel Harry C. Ingles, who in fact 

replaced Olmatead when the latter was 

forced out in disgrace it! 1943.' 

General Olmstead, unlike General 

Mauborgne, had very little knowledge 

of COMINT.'~ About two weeks before 

Pearl Harbor, Olmstead departed 

Washington for an inspection tour of 

Panama in spite of the entreaties of his 

chief assistant, Colonel Otis K. 

Sadtler, who believed that war was 

imminent.Hedidnotreturnuntil16 1 

December, and Colonel Sadtler ran the 

Signal Corps and SIS during his 

absence. l1 

Major General Daws~n Olmstead, 

chief signal officer 

On 27 December the SIS became a division of the Operations Branch, OCSigO, but a 

few days later the Army Communications Service was created, and the SIS remained 

under this element of the OCSigO throughout the war. The Communications Service was 

first headed by Colonel Sadtler, who was replaced by Brigadier General Frank Stoner 

during 1942. Stoner remained in this position and was closely involved in high-level 

policy related to the SIS. 

The SIS itself was broadly organized into these units in January 1942; 

A (Administration) Major Harold G. Hayes 

(Cryptanalytic) 

(Cryptographic) 

(Laboratory) 

Major Harold Doud 

Captain Earle F. Cook 

Major A. J. McGrail 

Second Signal Service Company Captain Robert Schukraft 

The COMINT (Cryptanalytic) unit B was divided into:12 

B-1 (Japanese) 

(Italian) 

(French) 

Major Eric Evensson 

Captain Solomon Kullback 

Captain Abraham Sinkov 

Lieutenant H. F. Bearcc! 
B-5 (Stenographic) 

B-6 VW~L:) 

B-7 (South America) 

Miss Louise Rather 

Captain Robert Sehukraft (who also 

commanded the Second Sii Service 

-the unit inkrcepthgthe traffic) 

Lieutenant Larry M. Gldell 

Further expansion of this structure was directed by the Military Intelligence Service 

0 in April 1942. The MIS waaaeated when the War -ent was reorganhd in 

March 1942. This action profoundly dd khe SIS and military intelligence in generoll. 

By this general reorganization, the old War Department arrangement, with chiefs of arms 

and services existing alongside the General Staff, was swept away. The offices of the chiefs 

of infantry, cavalry, and field artillery (and others) were ablislhed. The CSO and OCSigO 

remained, but they were now made subrdhate to a huge new CONUS command, the 

Services of Supply, soon renamed the Army We Forces (ASFI. Its chief for the duration 

of the war was Lieutenant Gnerrh Brehon 3. Somenell, a veteran Amy engineer. Thus 

the Signal Corps lost its direct acoes~ to the chief of staff, and the SXS wars placed under yet * another layer of control. 

The MID remained as G2 on the Army General Staff, But because of the sentiment 

within the Army's reorganization committee (which was hired by General Joseph T. 

McNarney) that the General Staff should be limited in size and not be an operational 

organhation, a curious structure was created. Henceforth, MID would be a small group 

performing purely st& functions. Its operational arm would b the Military Intelligence 

Service, a theoretically independent Wer Department Agency which, however, would 

report to ACS, G2. 

The fvst chief of MIS was Colonel Hayes A. Kroner of the old MID. Kroner also had 

the title of deputy ACS, G2.I8 By the end of April 1942, the MIS would consist of 342 

officers and 1,005 civilians and enlisted pers~nnel.'~ The MIS charter, contained in War 

Department Circular Number 59, dated 2 March 1942, stated that "the Military 

Intelligence Service, under the direction of the assistant chief of staff, Military ' 

Intelligence Division, War Department General St&, will operate and adminiskr the 

service of collection, compilation, and dissemination of military intel1igence."l5 In 

practice, the MIS and MID continued to act as one until the summer of 1944, when another 

attempt was made to separate staff from operations. The MIS charter was a clear basis for 

its control of SIS (SfS wa~ not, of murse, mentioned in circular 59 bemuse it was sa mt 

an organhtion), as would soon be made clear. 

The post-Pearl Harbor changes resulted in the departure of General Miles as ACS, G 

2. He was sent to Latin America 011 an inspection tour in January, and when he returned 

he had, in && lwt his job. The new G2 was Brigadier General Raymond Lee, late of 

attach4 duty in London His tour was very brief and unsdul, and he was replaced by 
sixty-twwyear-old Major General George V. Strong, an offioer of towering reputation in 

the Army.'' 

There now entered on the scene two men who would guide Army CoMINT policy 

throughout the war: Carter W. Clarke and Alfred McCormack. Mr. McCormck was the 

law partner of John J. McCloy, who had recently been appointed assistant secretary of 

war. In December 1941 Mr. McCormack came to Washington and asked McCloy for the 

toughest assignment the latter had.'' At about the same time, Secretary of War Henry 

Stimson came to the conclusion, in the light of Pearl Harbor, that Army COMINT was 

inadequate. He asked Assistant Secretary McCloy to suggest someone, preferably a 

lawyer experienced in handling complicated matters, who could establish an organization 

to properly deal with COMINT. McCloy offered the job to MeCormaek. The latter then 

received his charge from Mr. Stimson: study the problem and make recommendations on 

how t.a expand Army COMINT and make it usable.18 

Mr. McCormack (commissioned -as a colonel a few months later) went to work in 

January 1942. He Iwked into SZSs production of GOMINT and its handling within MID. 

While a new subelement had been est,ablished in the Far East section of MID to 

specifically study COMINT, McCorrnack found that the procedures were much as before as 

the responsible officer would ". . . take what looked interesting and pass it along in 

paraphrased form without any attempt either to check or evaluate the information or to 

supplement it by collateral intelligen~e."'~ 

McCormack was a hard taskmaster, and he summarily dismissed 

from his presence several officers who 

had been assigned to aid him in his 

Ultimately he came into 

contact with Colonel Carter W. Clarke, 

chief of the Safeguarding Military 

Information (SMI) section of MID. 

Clarke was a regular officer with 

twenty-five years in the Army, much of 

it spent in intelligence work." By 

March 1942 Colonel Clarke had 

assumed a preeminent position in 

Army COMIWT management, although 

the final definition of his role would Carter W. Clarke,wartime chief of 

not come until May. specid branch (1954 photogcaph) 

By March McCormack had concluded that a very large expansion of Army COMINT was 

needed and that this couId beat be acmmplished by placing it under the operational control 

of G-2.a2 General Strong agreed with this view. As a step in that direction, the Special 

Service Branch, soon renamed the Special Branch, was created in mid-May 1942. Colonel 
Clarke was appointed as its chief, and McCormack became his deputy. Clarke was 

appointed "the authorized representative of the assistant chief of st&, G2, for the purpose 

of supervising all signal intelligence activities of the War Department.*' His 

responsibilities were to inelude liaison with other government agencies involved in 

cowm, prepration of COMINT directives to the CSO, and the appropriate supervieion to 

insure their accomplishment. The functions of the Special Branch included the following: 

3. analysis of CQ~ received from SIS 

2. dissemination of COM~NT within the War Department (and to other agencies) 

During the first year of its existence, the Special Branch was divided into 

Headquarters (Clarke, McCorrnack), Area Seetions (tb research desks), and Repor t8 

Section. The personnel buildup was low - there were thirty-eight officers and civilians by 

duly 1942, and twenty-eight officers and fifty-five civilii by March 1943.= Colonel 

McCormack initially concentrated on &tin% analysts while Colonel Clarke worked 

with SIS on expansion of their facilities and personnel. The product of the Special Branch 

was the daily MAGIC Summary, an analysis of key SIS translations. Special studies were 

also prqmred. Recipients of this prduct, which was finished intelligence, included the 

secretary of war, the chief of staff, key offiwrs of the General SM (such as in the 

-rations Division), OMf, and State Department. 

In June 1942 General Strong made an effort to bring these activities to a logical (to 

MID) conclusion. Be recommended to General Marshall that the MIS should have 

complete control of Army whm~~ and cryptography, an arrangement that had eW 

until 1929 when Army regulations were changedB Strong reasoned that the daily 

operating decisions of the SIS were intelligence decisions that ought to be under his mntrol 

but that at present ". . . G-2 has only a liinited control over this extremely important suurce 

of intelliigence, while the &cers of the Signal Corps are burdened with decisions requiring 

the training and information that they do not have.M 

The Strong propael was rejected. As MIS would later Iearn, Strong's proposal was 

favored by Colonel Frank Bullock, the new chief of SIS; by Lieutenant Colonel Minckler, 

his predecessor; and by Mr. Friedman and other SIS officers. The transfer of authority was 

strongly opposed by General Olmstead and General Stoner. Because of that opposition, 

the SIS committee studying the Strong proposal reported against the transfer of 

authority.= Nonetheless, the preeminence of Colonel Clarke and the MIS was established. 

Evaluation, dissemination, and security of COMINT would be a function of intellgence 

rather than signals.= 

Meanwhile the expansion of SIS had begun. In late March 1942 important discussions 

were held between Clarke, Stoner, and SES officers. Clarke advised SIS that new priorities 

would be fortbcomhg and that highest piiority was to be given ta the army and air force 
trafi of Germany, Japan, Russia, and Italy.ao In addition, large intercept stations were to 

be established near Washington and on the West Coast. 

This was formalized (and altered) in an important directive of 18 April 1942 from MIS 

to the CSO.'l The immediate expansion of SIS was directed. A large, permanent intercept 

station was to be built near Washington to cover European traffic, and a similar station 

was to be built on the West Coast to cover the Pacific and Asia. The SIS was to consider 

moving its headquarters out of Washington for better security from enemy agents and 

possible bombing. Secondary intercept stations were to be in Alaska and Ireland or 

Iceland. The SIS priorities in intercept and processing were to be in this order: 

1. The armies and air forces of Germany, Japan, Italy 

2. Japanese, German, and Italian military attachCs 

3. Axis diplomatic trac 

4. German administrative radio nets 

5. Vichy traffic 

6. Other diplomatic tr&c between Tokyo and Latin America, Sweden, Vichy France, 

Bangkok, Lisbon, Madrid, and Moscow 

7. Traffic between Berlin and Latin America, Lisbon, and Madrid 

8. Vatican traffic 

The SIS could vary these priorities, on their own initiative when conditions warranted, but 

MIS was to be notified immediately . 

The SIS was to fully process intercept and furnish translated material to MIS. SIS 

collaboration with the British was authorized for exchange of intercept, exchange of 

methods of solution, and assignment of liaison personnel. The existing arrangements for 

obtaining trdEc from the FCC, Navy, and Coast Guard were to be continued. And finally, 

the SIS was to procure mobile DF equipment for the field forces, leaving long-range, fixed 

DF equipment to the other services (i.e., Navy, Coast Guard, and FCC). 

Through the efforts of Colonel Clarke and Colonel Bullock, the SIS obtained the 

buildings and grounds of the Arlington Hall Junior College in Arlington, Virginia. SIS 

headquarters moved there in July 1942. At the same time, a farm was purchased near 

Manassas, Virginia, for use as the primary monitoring station for the East Coast. By June 

1943 there would be 53 officers and 1,627 enlisted men of the Second Signal Service 

Battalion (formerly company) at Vint Hill Farm Station (VHFS).'' Two Rock Ranch near 

Petaluma, California - forty miles north of San Francisco - became the primary 

monitoring station for the West Coast. Two Rock, purchased by the War Department in 

August 1942, was operational in January 1943.33 VHFS became the new MS-1, replacing 

Fort Hunt, Virginia (formerly MS71, and Fort MonmoutWFort Hancock (formerly MS1). 
Two Rwk became MS-2, replacing the SIS site at the Presidio (the Eomr MS-21. 

Two ROCk would remain much smaller than VHPS, but it kame the SISs largest single 

murce of Japanese army trfic. 

Aerial dew of Hagtam HBU StatiW, 1946 

Coexisting with the intercept service of the SES's Second Signal Service Battalion were 

the signal radio intelligence (SRI) companies. Under Army doctrine at the beginning of 

the war, SRI companies were organic to general headquarters or numbered armies, while 

radio platoons (intelligence) were to be assigned to diviaion." There were various changes 

in these procedures dictated by the existing organizational structures in the different 

theaters. As an example, radio intelligence companies, known as signal service companies 

(SSC), were assigned to each corps in the European theater from D-Day on. The purpose of 

the SRI (and SSCs) was to provide tactical COwN'r for the field commanders through 

interception and analysis of lower-level enemy field communications. These involved 

enemy ground forces' betical Mom traffic, &-mud voice, and Morse. The SRI 

company might perform DF, TA, lower-level CA, and translation, to give the army (or 

COY) commander intelligence from the tactical signals of his opposite number in the field. 

The SRIs were under the wmd ofthe appropriate commanding general; thb authority 

was exercised through the theater (as General Akin in Southwest Pacific Area - SWPA), 

army or corps signal officer, and G-2 ofliter. 
In practice there were many variations leading to administrative confusion (at least 

for the War Department in Washington). For instance, the West Coast SiUs (Weatern 

Defense Command), especially prior to the activation of the new MS-2 at Two Rock Ranch, 

were intercepting high-level Japanese army communications and sending them to SIS for 

processing. This was not tactical CoMtNT. The SIS station in Hawaii, MS-5, was 

ultimately manned by an SRI company rather than by Second Signal Service personnel. 

And in the SWPA the SRIs intercepted what Japanese signals they could, at any level 

(except diplomatic). 

This two-tiered intercept system continued throughout the war: one level under the 

SIS, the other under fieldtheater commanders. However, the MIS did send directives to 

the SRIs, via the commanding generals, at various times during the war. The fust group 

of directives, prepared by Colonel Clarke, was sent out on 31 March 1942.= While these 

directives were not entirely practical and were replaced within a year, they are listed here 

to give some idea of the early deployment of SRls: 

Major Command and SRI Company 4? 

We~tern Defense Comnd: 

lO2nd (The Presidio) and 125th (Fort Lewis) 

Third Army: 

122nd and 124tk, Fort Sam Houston, Texas 

Caribbean Defense Command: 

120th (Trinidad and Panama) 

Hawaiian Department: 

lOlst (not there for several months) 

Eastern Defense Command: 

Section of Twenty-first Signal Service Company 

(Newfoundland) 

Detachment of 122nd {~orthern Ireland) 

Debc hment of 122nd (Fort Dix, New Jersey) 

123rd (Fort Benning, Georgia) 

121st (staging for Iceland) 

Ako: Detachment ofl2lst 

(under orders for Awtralia) 

Intercept Assignment 

Japaneae army stations 

Ark espioaage and Mexican army 

stations 

Axis espionage stations 

Japanese army stations 

German army and air force stations 

German army and air force mtions 

Axis espionage stations 

Axis espionage stations 

German army and air force stations 

Japanem army stations 

In each case, the CSO (in Washington) was authorized to deal directly with the above 

units regarding circuits to be covered, frequencies, form of copying materid, and 

submission of traffic. Copies of all intercept were to be forwarded by mail to SIS. 

At the same time, the SES and MIS assigned monitoring station numbers to all suwces 

of traffic. This was done to keep better track of the (theoretically) multitudinous sources of 

traffic over and above that of the SIS/Second Signal Service. As an example, the Western 

Defense Command traffic (i.e., the 102nd and 125th SRIs) was known as MS-15; traffic 

from the FCC's RID was known as MS9l?' 
SIS underwent various name changes through the summer of 1942. On 22 June it was 

briefly renamed the Signal Intelligence Service Division and three weeks later the Signal 

Security Division (SSD).37 During the next year it would be called the Signal Security 

Service (SSS) and finally the Signal Security Agency (SSA).30 

Until November 1942 Army combat operations were restricted to the Southwest 

Pacsc Area. MacArthur and his headquarter! party, which included COMINT experts 

Major Joseph Scherr and Brigadier General Spencer Akin, reached Australia from the 

Philippines on 17 March 1942. On 1 April 1942 General MacArthur radioed the War 

Department urgently requesting the assignment of COMINT and cryptographic personnel. 

He requested twelve persons qualified in cryptanalysis and translation. He noted that the 

delay in sending intercepts to Washington (versus having his own CA people) was a 

problem." Colonel Clarke dr&d a reply that was radioed on 3 April: eighteen officers 

and enlisted men with appropriate qualifications would depart by air for MacArthur's 

headquarters as soon as possible. The message referred to "SIS at your headquarters," a 

clear statement that MacArthur would have his own COMINT enter.^ The advance party, 

mnsisting of Captains Abraham Sinkov and Hugh Erskine, arrived at MacArthur's * 

headquarters in Melbourne during April. More Washington SIS personnel would follow.41 

Interestingly, Sikov and Erskine received no instructions from the ACS, G2 or MIS. It 

was clear to them that they would be working for General Akin only.4a 

MacArthur's COMINT charter had actually been radioed to him on 30 March, perhaps 

prompting his request for personnel. Like the directives to the SRI companies (detailed 

above), it was general. However, it gave General MacArthur the authority to assign his 

own intercept directives. Still, the CSO was authorized to communicate with MacArthur's 

SRI company on technical matters.43 

The result of this - and actions within the theater - was the creation of the Central 

Bureau, later called Central Bureau Brisbane (CBS), on 6 April 1942. Planning for this 

organization had begun under Scherr and Akin as soon as they arrived in Australia. CBB 

was an Allied COMINT organization consisting of U.S. Army, Royal Australian Air Force 

(RAAF), and Australian army personnel. - All intercept was a~omplished by Australian 

units until the end of 1942, when the U.S. Army's 126th SRI Company began operations. 

General Akin retained the title of director CBB, while day-h-day operations were under a 

three-man board of deputy directors, one of whom was Captain (later Colonel) Sinkov. 

Sinkov also headed the U.S. Army's 837th Signal Service Detachment, the administrative 

unit for the SIS personnel in CBE.44 The development of CBB wilI be described in greater 

detail in chapter 3. 

COMINT support for the European theater was slower in development. The need was 

less immediate, and there was an elaborate British COMINT organization far beyond 

anything that existed in the Pacific. The first U.S. Army headquarters in the European 

theater was the U.S. Army Forces British Isles, created in January 1942 and redesignated 

European Theater of Operations U.S. Army (ETOUSA) on 3 June. A platoon of the 122nd 
SRI Company went to Ireland in the spring of 1942 and made attempts to intercept 

Getman army traffic in mid-May.- In June 1942 Lieutenant Colonel George Bicher, a 

Signal Corps veteran with extensive training and e~perience with SIS, was d director 

of the Si Intelligence Division, Signal Section, Hq ETOUSA. He was ah director of 

SIS ETOUSA." Initially he had operational control of the SRI companies arriving in the 

U .K . , which meant he was charged with their training. He maintained contact with a2 

ETOUSA and the Government Code and Cipher School. By March 1943 his staff ccmsisted 

of only thirty-four officers and enlisted men. As a member of his sM would later recall, 

SIS eTOUSA prsonne1 occupied khemselvea learrring all they could from the British 

about the German army field code, German communications technique, and practical 

a~pects of field intercept. This in turn was pas& on to the SRI personnelVq7 

When the U.S. Army did go into combat in North Africa in November 1942, the Army's 

field COMINT came under other organizational structures activated specfically for this 

campaign At AFHQ there was a "Y northwest Africa Commith" under SIS veteran 

Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Hayes. The U.S. Army MINT units in its spb were the 

12- and 128th Si Wo htelligenee (SRI) companies. Sub~equently, 849th SIS was 

created to provide U.S. SRI companies in North Africa with better field processing 

capability. The 849th was activated at Ft. Devens, Massachusetts, on 2 December 1942 

with a strength of 16 oEcew and 102 enlisted men; it arrived in Algiers on 1 February 

1943.' 
Another special unit was Signal Intelligence Detachment 9251-A, with eighty-nine 

officers and men. Thie unit was train4 at Vint Hill, Arlington Hall, and ETOUSA. When 

it arrived in Algiers on 20 February 1943, it provided personnel for the intelligence branch 

of the 849th. With the arrival of the 123rd and 117th SRI companies in early 1943, there 

were four SEU companies in North Africa operating under the 849tl1.~' 

Army COMINT was now very much in combat, providing direct support to commanders 

through theater G-2 channels. This was pure tactical COMINT derived from the 

communications of German combat units operating in the theater. Once (and if) the units 

received special training at Arlington Hall or Vint Hill, the SIS had no further role until 

traffic was received, and that did not always happen. (Nor did all units receive SIS 

training.) The MIS played little part in the operations of the SRIs other than to issue 

broad intercept directives from time to time, It is doubtful if the MIS had much 

information about what went on at S1S ETOUSA or with the 849th in North Africa. 

Cryptographic and security par~onnel, 849th SIB 
NAVY COMINT REORGANIZATION AND EXPANSION IN 

WASHINGTON DURING 1942 

On the night of 7 December 1941, Assistant Secretary of State A. A. Berle Jr., wrote in , his diary that one job he would not want at that moment was director of naval 

intelligence.m Actually Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, the DNI, survived the Pearl Harbor 

debacle and remained on the jab until July 1942, when he went to sea. He served in 

important combat roles throughout the war. ONI, however, had by that time begun a 

steady decline. 

In OP-20 and OP-20-G, major changes were afoot by the second month of the war. On 

23 January 1942, Captain Laurance Safford, the long-time head of OP-204, proposed a 

major reorganization in a memorandum to the director of naval communications, Admiral 

Leigh Noyes. Safford suggested the creation of OP-20-Q, a cryptographic division, under 

himself, while OP-20-G would be limited to communications intelligence. He suggested 

that Lieutenant Commander Welker assume control of OP-20-G." The reason for Safford's 

action is not clear. He had recently been promoted to capkin, and, at his request, had been 

placed on engineer duty only, a move that would allow him to remain at his specialty 

rather than return to sea duty. Possibly Safford was forced out; that was the contemporary 

view. As Commander Arthur McCollum described the situation, the CNO's staff was 

having a "nervous breakdown" in the wake of Pearl Harbor, and Safford, an excitable 

person himself, had to go.'2 Perhaps Safford knew that he would be replaced and 

preempted his relief with a suggestion that would still leave him an important activity.53 

Safford's suggestions were circulated for comments in OP-20/OP-204. The result was 

a new organization, considerably different from what Word had envisioned. On 12 

February 1942, Commander Joseph R. Redman, the assistant DNC, directed the following 

realignment in QP-20:54 

OP-20-G Radio Intelligence 

Communications Security 

(COMSEC) 

Commander John R. Redman 

Lieutenant Commander Densford 

OP-20-Q Cryptography Captain Safford 

Commander John R. Redman, the brother of Joseph Redman, was an experienced 

communications officer, without any prior involvement in Navy COMIWT. He got the job 

because he was available, because of political maneuvering, and undoubtedly because he 

was the brother of the assistant director of naval communications (ADNC). Prior to Pearl 

Harbor, he had been in Washington for several years serving as the Navy Department's 

representative to the various U.S. radio frequency allotment committees. He was then 

selected for sea duty. Soon after Pearl Harbor, the new vice chief of naval operations 

IVCNO), Vice Admiral Frederic J. Horne, cancelled those orders so that Redman could 

remain at OP-20 to prepare directives on radio authentication (a speciality of his). When 
John Redman found that Admiral Noyes was not acting on these proposed directives, he 

{Redman) reluctantly went to Admiral Horne to diwuss the situation.$ On 24 February, 

Noyes was relieved as DNC and replaced by Joseph R. Redman.% 

Commander Joseph N. Wenger, who had been serving on the DNC's staff, was selected 

as the executive off~cer (OP-20-GA) for John Redman. Wenger was an experienced COMINT 

officer with special expertise in trae analysis. Wenger remained in Of -20-G throughout 

the war, becoming its head in late 1944. He was the moving force within the organization 

and the person most responsible for guiding its administration and interservice 

relationships. 

Rear Admiral Joeepb Redmm,directar, naval communications 

The 12 February memorandum that announced the cryptologic changes in OP-20 

contained mission statements for each of the new sections. OP-20-G was to have the 

following major responsibilities: 

1. General operational control and coordination of intercept and monitor stations, DF 

nets, and decrypting units 

3. CA and decryption 

4. Translation of decrypts 

5. Correlation and interpretation of radio intelligence 

This was a Fwst step in clarifying the expanding role of OP-20-G. Of special interest 

was the command-and-control feature: there was to be a general operational control and 

wordination of all naval CoMIwT units, both for intercept and processing. And OP-20-G 

assumed the function of analyzing its own product, a situation far diEerent from that in 

While this history is not of COMXW operations and exploitation, a brief summary 

follows of OP-20-G's successes by the end of 1942, by way of illustrating the very advanced 

nature of the U.S. Navy9 primary GOMINT efforts: 

German mvai:Of By the beginning of the war, German U-boat circuits were known 

and were being covered by East Coast intercept stations, Cheltenham, Maryland (Station 

M), being the primary site until replaced by Chatham, Massachusetts (Station C), in 

January 1943. U-boat trEtffic (ENIGMA) was readable - intermittently - beginning in 

December 1942. 

Japanese There were numerous Japanese naval (JN) systems. The merchant 

shipping code (known first as N-L and later as JN-50) became readable in 1939. JN-25, the 

most important system, became readable in early 1942. By the end of 1942, there were 299 

OP-20-G personnel in Washington working JN-25. Japanese naval attach6 tr&c was 

readable during (and before) 1942. 

In all of their cryptanalytic efforts, OP-20-G had been aided by a technique not 

available to SIS: clandestine access to cryptographic materials through missions 

undertaken by ON1 agents, especially in ~e; York City and San Francisco. The SIS had 

no personnel to undertake such operations, nor did the prewar MID.p3 

The aubsection of OP-20-G responsible for distribution of COMINT was GC 

(communications). A few officers from this then small element delivered naval COMINT 

summaries, written by GI (Combat Intelligence), twice daily to COMINCH and ONI. They 

delivered MAGIC (diplomatic) summaries to the DNC, the White House, the secretary of the 

navy, COMINCH, and ONLM 

Outside Washington, Goharm items were dispatched in a variety of waya. Intelligence 

from decryption and trafKc analysis was sent to the collective address "COMB," which 

comprised FRUPAC (Fleet Radio Unit Pacific in Hawaii); the Pacific commands; Fleet 

Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL - the CoMINT unit in Melbourne, Australia, composed of 

Cast evacuees); and COMINCH and OPNAV (CNO) in Washington. Technical 

information went out on the TUNA collective address, which included FRWPAC and 

FRUMEL. These items went out by radio (except for the local, i.e., OPNAV and 

COMINCH, addressees) from the Navy Department's radio central (OP-19). Not until 

1943 would OP-20-G (GC) have its own communication^."^ 

With the loss of the Philippines, accurately foretold by Commander Wenger in 

January 1942, the Navy's West Coast intercept stations became more important. Because 

of Wenger's correct appreciation of the probable course of events, West Coast intercept of 

Japanese naval txaffic began in earnest during Mar~h.~' This, combined with FRUPAC's 

intercept and processing, seems to have met the Navy's needs from March until May while 

the Philippine unit was reforming in Australia. 
In late June 1942, Navy COMINT policy was reevaluated by Admiral Horne. According 

to Cornriander McCollum, this came about aRer discussions &tween Admiral Home and 

the Redman brothers did not result in agreement as to how COMINT operations were to be 

directed. Joseph Redman had opined that a division of authority between ONI and OP-20- 

G was unworkable, though cooperation between the two elements had been going on for a 

number of years. Redman wanted all or nothing. At a conference attended by Joseph and 

John Redman, Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Schuermann (a future DNI) and McCollum, 

Horne announced khat henceforth ON1 would no longer have any control over COMINT 

policy. COMINT would be entirely under the control of naval communication^.^^ 

However, ON1 maintained its evaluative function for the time. In a COMINCH 

directive of 6 August 1942, the VCNO was advised that ON1 would be ". . . responsible for 

early evaluation of a subject traKic with a view to correcting, expanding, amplifying, and 

effecting other necessary treatment thereof, and for dissemination, when deemed 

necessary by the vice chief of naval operations, of these results to the addressees who were 

former recipients of the unevaluated informati~n.'~~ 

In another measure taken during the summer of 1942 to establish principles 

governing Navy COMINT, Admiral King directed that COMINT could be passed to 

subordinate commanders (that is, those commanders under the commanders in chief 

AtIantic and Pacific, and commander Southwest Pacific Force) only in the form of 

operational directives. "Every effort must be made to avoid indicating any correlation 

between the source of intelligence and the outcome of These rather basic 

standards amounted to a paraphrase of the long-standing British rules governing GOMINT. 

More elaborate regulations would follow. 

In October Captain Earl E. Stone replaced John Redman as head of OP-20-G and 

Captain Carl Holden replaced Joseph Redman as DNC. During July Admiral Wilkinson 

returned to sea duty and was replaced by Rear Admiral Harold C. Train. Captain Stone's 

title was upgraded to that of assistant director of naval communications for 

communications intelligen~e.~' These deveIopments will be further traced in a following 

section of this chapter. 

THE ARMY-NAVY-FBI COMINT AGREEMENTS, MARCH-JULY 1942 

By mid-1942 the Army, Navy, and FBI had reached an understanding concerning the 

division of COMINT effort and dissemination of product. These basic wartime agreements 

were reached in a roundabout fashion, and, regrettnbly, there is reason to believe that the 

motives behind these negotiations were not entirely those of operational efficiency. This 

story will be described in great detail, because all the U.S. COMINT agencies of the time 

were involved in this complex development of policy. Ultimately the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS) and the president were called upon to render decisions. 
Early in the war there were efforts to coordinate and consolidate U.S. COMINT, 

especially intercept operations. In February 1942 Commander Wenger advised the 

director of naval wmmunications that ". . . there is a movement under way ta consolidate 

all of the various monitoring activities under a single head. . . ."71 This move seems to have 

originatd with the FCC's intercept organization, the RID. Wenger suggested to the DNC 

that coordination was most desirable but consolidation was not, because the Navy had 

intercept problems peculiar to the communications of foreign navies. This required special 

Ci-e., naval) background and training for intercept personnel. Wenger saw no reason to 

alter the existing procedure; the Navy would continue ta work foreign naval tr&c, the 

Army foreign military trac, and they would divide the diplomatic tdEc because of 

mutual interest. He thought that other foreign communications, such as espionage traffic 

and propaganda broadcasts, could be left to the FBI and FCC. 

Pressure for consolidation was also coming from the British. Captain Edward 

Hastings, their C~~~INT representative in Washington (see chapter I), was busily 

establishing good relations with the Army and Navy COMINT organizations, the FCC, 

Coast Guard, ONI, State Department, MID, and FBI. He was in the pipeline of US.- 49 

British COMINT e~change.~' His major objective, thought Commander Krarner, who was 

his pint of contact in OP-204 was to bring about a combined U.S. COMINT organization. 

Kramer also believed that the FCC and FBI were most receptive ta his ideas.73 

Captain Hastings's closest contact in the U.S. COMINT community was with the Coast 

Guard unit. In March 1942, this unit was merged into OP-20-G, where its mission 

remained the same: interception and processing of clandestine radio traffic.74 For some 

time, Hastings had been receiving intercept from the USCG. In early March, Captain 

Hastings, seeking assurance that the British would continue to receive the USCG product, 

sent representatives to discuss the matter with Commander John Redman. Commander 

Redman invited Kramer to the meeting. Kramer suggested to Redman that the first step 

in formalizing this collaboration should be a meeting of the US, agencies working the 

clandestine problem. Kramer proposed that the State Department chair this coordination 

meeting. In the meantime British-USCG exchange mntinued. 

On 28 March 1942, DNI Admiral Wilkinson wrote Assistant Secretary of State A. A. 

Berle proposing an agreement between the COMINT agencies involved in clandestine 

intercept in the Western Hemisphere.7s Admiral Wilkinson noted that a special problem 

to be considered would be how to prosecute espionage agents and stilI protect GOMINT. 

On 2 April a meeting was held in Mr. Berle's office. Among those present were Major 

General Strong, ACS, G-2; Commander John Redman; Chairman James Fly of the FCC; 

and Mr. D. M. Ladd of the The conferees agreed that enemy clandestine radio 

stations, whose trafEc was being exploited by the US., should not be seized unless there 

was an immediate threat to shipping, and that such action would require the approval of 

the War and Navy department^.^ 
Mr. Fly then suggested the consolidation of the various U.S. cryptanalytic 

organizati~ns.~~ He offered the opinion that there was duplication of effort and incomplete 

coverage under existing arrangements. John Redman agreed and suggested as a remedy 

the centralization of the clandestine problem within the USCG COMIAINT unit. He said that 

most intelligence on that problem was already coming from the Coast Guard. Mr. Ladd 

said that the FBI could not agree to dropping its own cryptanalytic capability. Following 

more discussion, Berle recommended that the "Intelligence Committeen be asked to secure 

an executive order from the president that would prevent the establishment of any more 

cryptanalytic organizations and provide for better coordination among the existing ones. 

With that, the meeting was adjourned. 

This extraordinary meeting had touched on a number of different areas, and one 

suspects that those in attendance were not on entirely common ground. Fly seems to have 

been advancing the notion of total centralization, while Redman, at least, wished deal 

only with the clandestine problem. For whatever reason, cryptanalysis alone, rather than 

the total cycle of intercept, cryptanalysis, translation, and exploitation, was at issue. And 

the matter of dealing with the British was not discussed. d 

However, when the IIC met on 8 April 1942 in J. Edgar Hoover's office, Mr. Hoover 

requested a special conference to discuss the complete problem - interception, processing, 

dissemination, and "action."79 The IIC then appointed a committee to carry out this 

suggestion. The designees were D. M. Ladd for the FBI, Colonel John T. Bissell for MIS 

(Counterintelligence Group), Commander John Redman for the DNC, and Lieutenant 

Commander A. D. Kramer for ONI. The committee was to determine if the Army, Navy 

(including USCG), and FBI could handle the entire GOMINT problem to the exclusion of the 

COI, FCC, ". . . and other agencies yet unborn." 

Ironically, the day before this IEC meeting, Louis De LaFleur, the FCC's monitoring 

officer in New York City, had written Colonel John C. Moore, the signal officer for the 

Army's Eastern Defense Command, suggesting the establishment in Washington, D.C., of 

a radio intelligence center, much like that recently established in San Francis~o.'~ De 

LaFleur noted that arrangements were being made for a Bletype connection between the 

FCC, G-2, and ON1 ". . . for instantaneous exchange of radio intelligence information." 

The San Francisco radio intelligence center had been established at the beginning of 1942 

in response to an urgent request from General John De-Witt, commander of the Western 

Defense Command. Its purpose was to locate possible Japanese clandestine transmitters 

in California and the Pacific Northwest and to obtain bearings on enemy radio 

transmissions in the Pa~ific.~' 

The newly formed COMINT committee met on 21 April 1942 at the In attendance 

were Colonel John T. Bissell and Colonel Carter W. Clarke from the War Department; 

Commander John Rdrnan, Commander Joseph Wenger, and Lieutenant Commander A. 

D. Kramer from the Navy; and D. M. Ladd and E. P. Coffey from the FBI. The committee 

discussed coordination and cooperation in cryptanalysis and other processing. There was 
agreement that some type of coordination was needed to pmsenre secrecy, to make the best 

use of the small number of specially trained people available in the field, and to confine the 

work to those agencies with the most experience, i.e., Army, Navy, FBI. The committee 

concluded, rather strangely, that this typa of effort was *. . . definitely investigative 

intelligence, and the investigative jurisdiction in national defense matters rests with these 

agencies. 

The committee drafted a proposed executive order that directed the creation of a 

communications intelligence committee as a subcommittee of the fIC. This committee 

would be empowered to divide the work, prevent duplication, and work out policy matters. 

It would also serve the JIC. The draft exmtive order further directed that cryptanalysis 

be controlld and undertaken by the Army, Navy (including USCGI, and FBI. 

This draft executive order seems not to have reached bsident Rumwelt. Instead, the 

study of the problem continued. The Army's SIS, previously not involved in these 

negotiations (the SIS was not on the IIC), entered the picture. At a 25 May 1942 meeting 

of the committee, the WEV Department was represented not only by Lieutenant Colonel 

Willard Holbrook of MID but also by Colonek Frank Bullock, chief of SIS, and William F. 

Friedman, his civilian assistant. Navy and FBI attendance was the same m at the 21 

April meeting.8q The purpose of this meeting was to study and make recommendations 

about processing and dissemination. Processing was deflned as sorting, preparation, and 

distribution of raw material, decryption or cryptanalysis, traflic analysis, translation and 

correlation, and preparation for dissemination. Intercept was not discussed: The 

committee made these general recommendations regarding dissemination of COMINT: 

Nature of corn Recipients 

Diplomatic 

Enemy naval 

Enemy military 

Western Hemisphere 

clandestine 

International clandestine 

(Other than Western Hemisphere) 

War Department, Navy, State, President 

Navy 

War Department 

War Department, Navy, State 

War Department, Navy, State 

The COI was briefly considered as a proper recipient of international clandestine 

COMINT but then was rejected in favor of the State Department. The committee also issued 

a survey of existing U.S. cryptanalytic organization~.~Vhe survey was a brief historical 

outline of the development of the COMINT components of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, 

and FBI, together with a speculative outline of the eryptaklytic units of the FCC and 

Censorship Office. There was an extensive accounting of each organization's manpower 

- (excluding intercept ogratdrs and &MSEC personnel) in Washington and in the field. The 
agencies described their own current cry ptanalytic undertakings and internal handling as 

fallows: 

War Department: Thia department was working on enemy military, attache, and 

weather systems, enemy diplomatic, enemy commercial, and potential enemy diplomatic 

and commercial. Results were to be furnished to MID. 

Navy Deprtrneni: This department was working on enemy naval (including air and 

weather), enemy diplomatic, enemy clandestine, and potential enemy naval and 

diplomatic. The results were ta be furnished to forces afloat, COMINCH, OM, and State 

Department. ON1 would distribute clandestine GOMINT. 

FBI: This department was working on enemy diplomatic, commercial, 

clandestinelespionage, shore-to-ship communications, and criminal communications. 

These efforts to bring about more orderly cooperation now hit an unexpected snag. On 

5 June, at the weekly communications intelligence meeting btween the Coast Guard 

COMINT unit and Captain Haatings, the latter announced that he would be dealing solely 

with the FBI in the future. Any collaboratjpn with the USCG would have to be through 

the bureau. While this sudden shift by Captain Hastings would prove to be temporary and 

USCGBritish cooperation would soon be cordial again, there seems little doubt that this 

incident further poisoned the atmosphere between the wary services. The Navy was 

concerned about the FBI because of the latter's alleged security violations and disregard of 

basic rules on the uses of COMINT, as well as the FBI's stated position that if prosecution of 

enemy agents required the presentation of COMINT in court, then that would be done. Yet 

another problem was FBI interference in ON1 covert activities in New York City wherein 

the FBI allegedly took advantage of a too-cooperative ON1 officer and then invited the BSC 

tm become invol~ed.~ 

In addition, there was some sentiment within OP-20-G to force the FBI out of the 

COMINT picture (except for purely domestic matters) and to restrict the field to the Army 

and Navy. U.S. intelligence relations with the British were also to be re~onsidered.~~ 

Commander John Redman, in a tentative memorandum for Admiral Horne, took a 

stronger stand.88 Redman suggested that all U.S. cryptanalysis be performed only by the 

Army and Navy, except that the FBI have this responsibility for criminal communications 

li.e., gambling cases). Redman noted that the FBI had been accepted as a partner in 

C~MINT only ,to avoid an impasse and ". . . to get the matter out of the hands of that 

c~rnrnittee."~~ He further suggested that an intercept committee be established consisting 

of the various organizations performing that function, but that all resulting traffic go 

solely to the Army and Navy, who, after processing, would furnish the results in 

accordance with the 25 May dissemination formula.g0 

On 17 June the IIC reconsidered the committee's 25 May report and directed the 

establishment of an allocation committee to make a specific division of the cryptanalytic 
tasks at hand." The reason for appointing a "new" committee is uncertain. The 

membership was the same, though the objective was not confined to allwation. 

At the same time, results of the 25 May report were distilled far the JCS by the Joint 

Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC stated that the informal committee composed of 

"FBI, MIS, and ONI" [sic] had studied the cryptanalytic situation and concluded that the 

three services could handle all COMINT processing. The JIC advised that specific allocation 

of the work would be made. The JCS was asked to obtain presidential approval of these 

arrangements especially because other cry-ptanalytic units existed - in Censorship, FCC, 

and COLW 

The following week the most significant negotiations were undertaken. Commander 

John Redman proposed to the DNC and to Admiral Horne that the Navy drop its 

diplomatic COMNT effort in favor of the Army. There were a number of practical reasons 

for this. While OP-20-G and the SIS had effectively cooperated in this area for two years, 

"this procedure . . . is not conducive to efi~iency.'~ Indeed it was not, for the 1940 

procedures including division of circuits covered and alternate day processing of trafEc 

were still in effect. Redman felt that the Npy had more Japanese naval trfic to work 

than it could handle while the Army had IittIe else to work except diplomatic traffic. The 

Army was most willing ta assume responsibility for all diplomatic coverage and processing 

and would continue to furnish full results to the Navy. The Navy would make its own 

internal dissemination of diplomatic COMINT and would continue to distribute it to the 

president. The thirty-eight OP-20-G personnel working the diplomatic problem would be 

shifted to Japanese naval problems. In all this, Rpdman had obtained the concurrence of 

the DNI. Redman also suggested that there should be an agreement with SIS allowing the 

return of Army-Navy division of diplomatic work at any time, but especially at the end of 

the war. 

Commander Wenger would recall a year later, when reviewing Army-Navy relations, 

that it had been his idea, as far back as February 1942, to give the Army a11 diplomatic 

work, but that this would not necessarily k~ a permanent a~rangernent.~~ While the 

Army's complete takeover of the diplomatic problem would be formalized a few days after 

the Redman memorandum to Admiral Horne, there seems never to have been any 

agreement as to when, or if, the Navy could reenter the picture. The diplomatic COMINT 

records of the Navy were given to the SIS for safekeeping, and OP-20-G turned its main 

attention to foreign naval problems.g5 

On 30 June the "new" Allocation Committee met and agreed on this division of 

cryptanalytic respon~ibilit~.~~ 

Diplomatic 

Enemy naval operations 

Responsible Agency 

Army 

Navy 
Enemy military operations 

Western Hemisphere clandestine 

International clandestine 

(i.e., other than Western Hemisphere) 

Army weather 

Navy weather 

Domestic criminal 

Voice broadcast 

Cover text communications 

Trade codes 

Army 

FBI and Navy 

Navy 

Navy 

FBI 

FBI 

To be assigned by committee 

The report that included the above assignments was signed by the following: 

War Department - Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Colonel Frank W. Bullock, and William 

F. Friedman; Navy Department - Commanfler John R. Redman, Lieutenant Commander 

A. D. Kramer, Commander J. N. Wenger, and Lieutenant Commander Leonard T. Jones; 

FBI - E. P. Coffey and D. M. Ladd. 

One of the committee's recommendations was that a standing committee should be 

created representing the technical organizations, with membership to consist of the chief 

of SIS, officer in charge of UP-20-G, and chief of the FBI Technial Laboratory. It was 

hoped that this standing mmmittee would meet often to exchange information, discuss 

pooling of resources, and eliminate duplication. 

Thus the basic wartime agreements as to production and dissemination' of COMINT had 

been reached. The shortcomings of these agreements are rather obvious. The division of 

Western Hemisphere clandestine cryptanalysis between the Navy (USCG unit) and FBI 

was meaningless without specifk arrangements. Such arrangements would never be 

made, and a shameful antagonism between OP-20-G/ONI and the FBI would grow until 

cooperation of any type almost ceased. The complete disregard of the committee(s) for the 

work of the RID was equally unfortunate. The Navy especially would work to dismember 

the RID, the organizatian that would remain almost the sole source of traffic for the FBI's 

cryptanalytic program. 

Finally, in July 1942 the matter of allocation of COMINT tasks was brdught before the 

president by the JCS with this recommendation: "As the Army, Navy, and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation now have large organizations well-equipped and capable of 

handling the processing of all the raw material currently intercepted, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff recommend that these activities be limited to the three agencies mentioned." The 

president was further advised that the services had reached an agreement on 
On 8 July President Roosevelt issued a brief, and informal, directive to the director of 

the budget.= He sbtd his agreement with the Chiefs of StaB and concluded, "Will you 

please have the proper instructions issued discontinuing tbe cryptanalytical units in the 

off- of the Director of Censorship, the Federal Communications Commission, and the 

Strategic Services. If you are aware of any other agencies having services of this 

chmder, will you please have them discontinued also." 

This directive did not concern intercept or other COMINT activities short of 

cryptamlysis. The FCC had never engaged in organized cryphalytic operations. RID 

chief George Sterling had personally instructed a few of his people in cryptanalysis, and 

they were able to read certain elementary German agent systems. The RID notitied he 

director of the budget that its cryphrdytic e£fort was merely an aid in identifying tcatric. 

This met with no objection." 

Censorship's small cryptanalytic unit, which by mid-1942 was reading some minor 

diplomatic systems, actually seems to have expanded during the war. However, this wa~ 

in regard tm its work on "open codes" rather than on the formal systems of fore& 

governments. .c 

There was a strong protest from William Donovan of the OSS, based more on the 

denial of access to COMINT than on the prohibition against cryphnalysis. As we have seen, 

OSS had no access to COMMT under the 25 May 1942 agreement. In October Donovan 

directed two mgry memorandums to the JIC (of which he was a member), then chired by 

General Strong.lDO Donovan reminded General Strong and the JIC that he had agreed to 

desist from cryptanalytic work because he assumed that ". . . the prmeds resulting from 

the decoding by the Armed Forces would be made available to (the OSS)." As the JCS had 

charged the OSS with operating a secret "espionage service," it seemed unreasonable to 

withhold any intelligence material, particularly where it might aid and protect OSS 

agents on dangerom assignments. The OSS also had an intelligence research and analysis 

mission to perform that would be enhanced by access COMNT. hnovan strongly 

questioned the real motives for the milihry's denial of COM~NT to OSS: was it because the 

"loyalty, diseretion, or intelligence of OSS" was being questioned? 

The reply from the Joint Chiefs was slow in coming. The JCS study group 

recommended continued Army-Navy control of COMLNT dissemination and failed to make a 

clear recommendation about OSS access. On 19 January 1943 the JCS ruled that existing 

JCSlJlC operating procedures already called for free interchange of information between 

MIS, ON], and OSS. Further, the Army and Navy representatives on the OSS stdT could 

obtain for OSS whatever information was needed in accordance with the existing 

The rivalry between the 0% and the services continued through the war, in spite of 

the OSSs alleged integration into the military structure by being placed under the Joint 

Chiefs of SM. As late as 1445, only a few months before the vichry over Germany, th8 
OSS in Europe was still barred from receiving highest-level COMINT (ULTRA), although it 

was receiving and exploiting COMINT related to the German intelligence services. The 

OSS relationship with the Army, Navy, FBI, and British is too complicated far further 

discussion here. Suffce to say at this point that while the OSS mission was ever-changing, 

and it became the premier U.S. agency involved in espionage and irregular warfare, it 

never became a total recipient of COMINT.~~~ 

The standing committee composed of Army, Navy, and FBI COMINT representatives 

seems to have met only a few times. The Fxst meeting, held on 25 August 1942, was a 

stormy one.la3 Mr. E. P. Coffey, the FBI representative, advanced the view that the bureau 

had a definite interest in diplomatic trfic related to the Western Hemisphere. He noted 

that the FBI had useful intelligence contacts in Latin America who could be helpful in 

diplomatic COMINT. Coffey seems to have gotten no commitments from the Army. Coffey 

also raised the point of the assignment of both the Navy (USCG unit) and FBI to the 

Western Hemisphere clandestine problem. He opined that there was duplication of effort. 

He and Commander Jones then agreed that each service would continue to work systems 

each had solved but to consult with one another before beginning work on a new system. 

Coffey agreed to furnish a list of FBI-solved #ystems (this was never done). Coffey was also 

troubled about the dissemination of clandestine COMINT by the Navy. He was told that 

dissemination was to be done by ONI rather than OP-20-G (or the USCG units). 

On the still unresolved question of trade codes, there was some agreement. The Navy 

would handle the enciphered trade codes of Japan, Germany, and Italy, and the FBI those 

of Spain, France, and Portugal. 

The greatest problem before the committee was, according to Commander Wenger, the 

FBI's insistence on learning about specific cryptanalytic results from systems that were 

solely the responsibility of the Navy (or Army). He explained that this violated the longfollowed Army-Navy pmedure. Coffey disagreed with Wenger. He said that if the FBI 

submitted material in an unsolved system to the Navy, then the latter must inform the 

FBI of the cryptanalytic results. Otherwise, the FBI would be compelled to attempt all its 

own cryptanalysis. Not surprisingly, the Army representatives backed the Navy position. 

There was no resolution, though Coffey expressed the hope that decisions could be made 

case-by-case and that a ". . . workable arrangement could, no doubt, be effected." No 

agreement was ever reached. 

The committee met again on 4 September.lo4 Some further arrangements were made 

concerning trade codes. A few minor agreements were made, and the committee adopted a 

new name: Cryptanalysis Coordinating Subcommittee of the Joint fntelligence 

Committee. The tie-in with the JTC was an interesting attempt to place COMINT policy 

within the JCS structure. 

There was no further development of this concept. The subcommittee members agreed 

to meet only "as needed." The Army and Navy, satisfied for the time with their own 
arrangements, saw no need for further formalization, particularly when their unwanted 

partner, the FBI, was a relatively minor participant in COMIMT production.105 

In all of these agreements, as noted before, the FCC's RID was ignored. The RID 

continued its vast intercept operations, sending the results to the FBI, Army, Navy and 

British, as well as to the State Department Board of Economic Warfare (plaintext 

economic traffic). There was an unremitting effort by the Navy to downgrade the RID'S 

work and to force it out of business.lm Although the RID turned out a good and useful 

product, the Navy, especially, resented the existence of a large, well-trained and equipped 

civilian CoMINT organization. That RID in no way infringed upon Op-20-G or SIS 

operations is extremely well documented, as is the fact that RID responded ta numerous 

specifrc requests from all services.lo7 One shortcoming of RTD, shared with the FBI, must 

be noted. The organization allowed, and perhaps sought, publicity regarding some of its 

operations. This did not inspire Army or Navy confidence. 

U.S.-BRITISH COMINT AGREEMENTS IN WASHINGTON - 1942 -! 

The US.-British COMINT relationship prior to Pearl Harbor was described in chapter 1. 

.During the first year of war, the U.S. Navy reached specific agreements with the 

Government Code & Cipher School that were the basis for cooperation well into 1944, 

when they were expanded. The Army was slower to reach major understandings with our 

ally. The Army was well behind the Navy in all phases of COMINT, so internal expansion 

and reorganization were the first order of business. Also the Army's understanding of the 

full potential of cooperation with the British was slow to develop, perhaps because the 

Army's COMINT policy group - the MIS Special Branch - was- rather overwhelmed by the 

analytic work to be done with U.S. material alone. 

British intelligence, including GOMINT, was more centralized than U.S. intelligence. 

This continually placed the US., especially the Army, at a disadvanhge in dealing with 

the British. U.S. officers were aware of this problem, which ultimately acted as a spur 

toward greater cooperation between the Army and Navy. it may be well to outline briefly 

the nature of British intelligence as it existed in 1942. 

Counterintelligence in Britain and the Empire was centralized in the Security Service, 

known during the war as MI-5. Through most of the war, MI-5, under the direction of 

David Petrie, supervised the XX committee, which controlled double-agent operations 

initiated by the regular capture of German agents attempting to infiltrate the U.K. 

COMINT was the major reason these agents were seized and doubled. 

Secret intelligence and counterintelligence outside Britain and the empire were under 

the Secret Service, also known as the Secret Intelligence Service or MI-6. The Chief of the 

Secret Service ICSS) was Brigadier (later Major General) Stuart Menzies. Within the 

Service he was known as "C." He played a significant role in US.-British COMINT 
relations because he was also director - later director general of the Government Code and 

Cipher School, the centralized all-service CoMrm organization of Great Britain. Actual 

day-today controI of GC&CS was under Commander A. G. Dennistun, who later shared 

this function with Commander Edward Travis {the smaller share remained with 

Denniston). 

From 1942 until 1945 GC&CS was divided into two broad groups: civil (under 

Ilenniston) and services (under Travis). The civil organization, often called Berkeley 

Street, after its main location in London, was concerned with foreign diplomatic, economic, 

and certain espionage GOMINT. The services organization, usually called Bletchley Park, 

was concerned with COMINT related to foreign military, air, and naval activity. Supporting 

GC&CS (both Bletchley Park and Berkeley Street) was a vast intercept or "Y" 

organization composed of army, navy, air force, and civilian stations. 

But there was another British COMINT organization not directly under GC&CS. This 

was the Radio Security Service (RSS), the British counterpart to the FCC's radio 

intelligence division. The RSS covered foreign clandestine links worldwide, but the actual 

cryptanalysis was performed by GCLCS. Tbp RSS was under Section V of MI-6; thus it too 

was under Stuart Menzies, the CSS. 

As previously stated, BSC, in New Yock City, was an arm of MI-6; it had an important 

role in British-U.S. COMINT relations, especially as the conduit for traffic exchange. 

From March 1941 to October 1943 the British COMrNT organization was controlled in 

this fashion:lo8 

Chiefs of Staff 

The Y Board 

Chairman: the CSS 

Members: The Army, Navy, RAF directors of intelligence, chairman of the Y 

Committee, representative of home forces 

Function: To retain functions of the former Main Committee and to coordinate 

intercept and cryptanalysis. 

The Y Committee 

Chairman: A senior military officer 

Members: Heads of the Army, Navy, and RAFN organizations, representatives of 

cable censorship {foreign Ofice) and the RSS, deputy head of GC&CS, representatives of 

home forces, Admiralty, War and MI-6 

Functions: general control, study 

Various Subcommittees 
To deal with this impressive organizational structure, the U.S. had the COMINT 

"eornmittee(s)" of the JIC. The JIC was never charged with important foreign liaison 

(certainly not in COMINT); therefore, each service represented itself in dealing with the 

British. 

The SIS and GC&CS had agreed to exchange traffic prior to Pearl Harbor, Details of 

actual exchange in the prewar period are sketchy. However, on 14 December 1941 the SIS 

responded favorably to a British proposal for exchw of traffic in GEC, a principal 

German diplomatic system.lW 

In April 1942, the MIS authorized the SIS to exchange traffic and methods of solution 

with the British and to exchange liaison officers (see Section 2 of this chapter). During 

that period two British COMNT missions came to the U.S. - the Sandwith group to visit 

OP-20-G and the Canadian C~MINT organization, and Lieutenant Colonel John Tiltman to 

visit SIS.'1° Lieutenant ColoneI Tiltman was in Washington from 26 March until 26 April 

1942. He was to effect ". . . a complete interchange of all technical knowledge and in 

particular ta hand over to SIS all our technical documents." There may have been some 

discussion of ENIGMA, though there could nd have been sufficient material from Tiltman 

to allow the SIS to work that high-level problem (for one thing, the SIS lacked German 

military traffic). Tiltman also continued the theme advanced to the SIS before the war by 

Commander Denniston - that the U.S. Army should concentrate on anti-Japanese COMINT, 

leaving German and Italian COMINT to the British."' 

This visit was promptly returned 

by SIS. In May Major Solomon 

Kullback, Chief of B-2 (German 

cryptanalysis) at SIS and Captain 

Harold McD. Brown, also of SIS, went 

to Bletchley Park. They remained 

there into July. Kullback studied the 

organizational structure of GC&CS 

and obtained considerable information 

about its work. He brought back to SIS 

information on various French, Italian, 

German, and Japanese systems, 

including the wiring for the German 

intelligence agents' ENIGMA machine, 

along with some of its trafic and keys. 

Kullback also studied the scanning 

machinery used by GC&CS in 

handling military ENIGMA traffic."" 

Solomon Kullback, chief B-2, SIB 
Upon his return to Washington, Major Kullback recommended that 

1. An experienced SIS officer be assigned to Hut 3 (intelligence production) at 

Bletchley; 

2, A junior SIS cryptanalyst be assigned to Bletchley to work on machine traffic 

{ENIGMA) because "we cannot intercept much of this material and it will be some time 

before we are in a positidn to have the necessary background of information and 

experience and machinery to do the job here"; 

3. SIS Washington contact with Britain be through SISETOUSA. 

In late 1942 Captain Roy D. Johnson of SIS went to Bletchley to continue Kullback's 

studies, and he became the first permanent liaison officer there.'13 

In the meantime, Captain Hastings, the erstwhile British intelligence liaison o&er in 

Washington, was specifically appointed by Commander Travis as the GC&CS 

representative in Washington on matters of policy. Ma,jor Stevens, who had been at SIS 

since the end of 1941, was assigned to e 

A curious high-level exchange occurred during the summer of 1942. On 9 July 

President Ruosevelt wrote General Marshall:"' 

Same time ago the prime minister stated that our cipher experts of the United States and British 

navies were in close touch but that Re was under the impression that there was not a similar 

intimate interchange between our two armies. I wonder if you could take this up with General 

Dill and let me know. 

The result of this rather informal presidential inquiry was in the bureaucratic form, 

predicbble but unfortunate. General Marshall turned to General Strong, ACS, G2, for 

comment. Strong told Marshall that there had been an exchange of technical 

cryptanaly tic information for over a year and that it was satisfactory. If U.S. Navy-British 

exchange seemed more advanced, it was because there had been a greater need.""wo 

days later General Marshall replied to the president, essentially advancing General 

Strong's view (General Marshall also stated that he had discussed the matter with Sir 

John Dill).lL7 

What Strong - and Marshall - stated was correct. But they missed a marvelous 

opportunity to explain to the president that the War Department was not receiving 

highest-level COMINT from the British, nor was the Army receiving sufficient information 

about ENIGMA to begin its own military COMINT program. Indeed, this situation would 

erupt several months later, causing an exceptionally fierce struggle between the War 

Department and Field Marshall Dill. Had the matter been presented to the president at 

the time when the latter (and the prime minister) had sought information on the subject, 

Army C~MINT might have gained sources and methods that were to be denied for more 

than a year. 
Meanwhile, the SIS-GC&CS traffic exchange was in operation via BSC in New York 

City. This method of exchange came to be used by all the COMINT services. Traffic went 

from Washinmn to BSC by mail, radio, or landline teletype. From New York the traffic 

went to the U.K. via the transatlantic cable, by air or ship, or sometimes by radioteletype 

from Montreal. Traffic from GC&CS reversed this procedure. It bears repeating at this 

point that this SES-GC&CS traffic exchange, until well into 1943, involved foreign 

diplomatic, economic, and intelligence service communications, rather than military 

communications. 

The USN-British arrangements regarding anti-Japanese COMINT up to Pearl Harbor 

have already been described in some detail. In February 1942 the British Y Board sent a 

COMINT mission to the U.S. headed by Captain H . R. Sandwith, R.N. All the British armed 

services, and the foreign office, were represented. The Sandwith mission was charged with 

studying U .S. and Canadian COMINT services. l'' 

A conference was held in Washington, 6-17 April 1942, and a detailed report was 

written. The most significant recommendation was for the creation of an Anglo-American 

Y Committee; however, this committee was never created. There were numerous 

technical recommendations, as well as recommendations on the exchange of traffic. 

Among the latter, these were of special interest: 

1. JN-25 material was ta be sent to Washington for processing, but not to London 

(this did not apply to Hawaii or Melbourne); 

2. German naval traffic, including U-boat trafEc, was to be left for future resolution; 

3. German military and air traffic was to go only to London, except that some would 

be mailed to Washington for training purposes. 

Perhaps the Sandwith mission and resulting conference were most notable as an early 

effort to deal, with technical intercept details. The British also had a chance to learn more 

about their U.S. counterparts. Captain Sandwith made a number of interesting 

observations concerning U.S. problems with duplication."# As he saw it, the FCC had the 

largest U.S. intercept operation, and their activities should be coordinated with those of 

the Army, Navy, (and Coast Guard). The U.S. also needed a coordinating group similar to 

that of the British Y Board or Y Committee. As we have seen, this was a recurrent theme. 

The matter of German U-boat and other German naval traffic was never really 

covered by a separate comprehensive USN-British agreement. It was certainly under 

continuous discussion, and notable cooperation did result. During 1942 OP-20-G simply 

undertook its own solution of ENIGMA enciphered traffic and construction of bombes. The 

turning point seems to have been reached in September 1942 when, after conversations 

with Commander Wenger of OP-20-G, Captain Hastings notified London that the U.S. 

Wavy was commencing work on U-boat traffic as the British had "lost" U-boat traff"ic since 

January.l2' Of course, OP-20-G had been working on this traffic before September 1942. 
Prompted by the Hastings message, Commander Travis and Mr. Frank Birch of the 

naval section at GC&CS visited Washington in late September to formalize a naval 

COMINT agreement with OP-20-G. The result was the Holden Agreement of 2 October 

1942.'" This agreement was in the form of a memorandum from Captain Carl Holden, 

DNC, to Commander Travis. Very important understandings were reached: 

1. The British wouId cease their Far East Japanese naval cryptanalytic effort (then 

centered at Kilindini, East Africa), leaving this effort to OP-20-G. This unit, however, 

would "read traffic from recoveries supplied by other units." 

2. The British-U.S. naval C~MINT unit at Melbourne would beeorne a US.-controlled 

operation (i.e., FRUMEL).lZa 

3. OP-20-G would be responsible for ". . . passing naval recoveries and pertinent 

naval information to the Admiralty (GCBCS) for transmittal ta the commander in chief, 

Eastern Fleet and Kilindini." 

4. OP-20-G was to pass all Japanese raw traffic to GC&CS and "to pass to the 

Admiralty (GC&CS) (a) radio intelligenc~ from Japanese naval communications, 

indicating major strategic moves in any area and details bearing upon operations in the 

Indian Ocean area; Cb) all Japanese naval code and cipher key recoveries." 

5. The British agreed in principle to collaborate with OP-20-G on German U-boat and 

other naval cryptane2ysis. The British recognized the U.S. desire "to attack submarine 

and naval problems." 

In summary, then, the Japanese navy was a U.S. Navy COMINT responsibility while 

the Atlantic was to be dealt with cooperatively. According to Mr. Birch, the arrangement 

was by no means satisfactory to the British, as they now seemed dependent on the U.S. 

Navy for intelligence support for the Royal Navy's Eastern Fleet. Subsequent USNBritish agreements only reaEwmed the basic intent of the Holden Agreemer~t.'~~ 

The OP-20-GIRoyal Canadian Navy (RCN) COMINT relationship was well establish'kd 

by late 1942. The RCN "Y" Service was involved in a wide range of activities, including 

interception of German and Japanese naval traffic and DF. The USN-RCN effort involved 

OF-20-G operation of stations in Canada and integration of both countries' naval DF 

networks, particularly regarding German U-boats.124 

A direct relationship between the FCC and the British was proposed in April 1942. On 

16 April Captain Drake, of the office of the Canadian director of military operations and 

intelligence, met with S. W. Norman, temporary chief of RID.125 Drake advised that 

Captain Kenneth J. Maidment of BX, New York, was interested in direct contact with the 

FCC. There had been FCC contact with the British earlier, through Captain Hastings and 

the FBI. But Captain Drake proposed an FCC-BSC teletype link for exchange of technical 

data about German clandestine stations. Chairman Fly, after consulting with the State 

Department, approved the proposal. The BSC took no further action far some months, 
possibly because the FBI held that all BSC contact with U.S. agencies should be through 

the bureau.'% During August, Mr. E. P. Coffey of the FBI Technical Laboratory contacted 

RID to suggest a meeting of representatives of the RID, FBI, BSC, and USCG, to discuss 

clandestine traffic.lS7 The meeting would be limited to a discussion of callsigns, 

frequencies, schedules, trafflc characteristics, and locations of stations. Intelligence 

prduct and policy were not to be considered. 

The Army notified the FBI of its interest and was added to the conference. The first 

meeting was held on 25 August 1942 with the following in attendance: Captain Maidment 

and E. de Bayly, assistant director of oommunications, BSC; Major Robert Schukraft, SIS; 

Lieutenant Commander L. T. Jones, USCG (OP-20-G); Albert Macintosh, RID; and E. P. 

Coffey, P. A. Napier, and R. E. Thornton, FBI. 

These representatives agreed that they did not constitute an "official" committee and 

that "discussion of policy matters was outlawed."1gB Whatever the status of this unofficial 

committee, it met every Tuesday for almost a year. Major Telford Taylor of the MIS 

Special Branch also became a participant sometime later in 1942. 

In the opinion of George Sterling of RIB, there was less than full cooperation among 

members of the committee, and the Army especially tended to block the flow of 

information. On 4 Auguat 1943 the committee dissolved, after the Army and USCG 

representatives withdrew. OnIy the RID and FBI remained, and they, too, agreed to 

dissolution. This in no way hindered the excellent BSC-RID association that had begun 

independent of the unofficial committee, in about October 1942. As Captain Maidment 

told Mr. Sterling, the British RSS considered the RID to be its direct counterpart in the 

u.S.I2' Until the end of the war, there was continuous RID-BSC exchange of intercept and 

technical information under the good okees of George Sterling and A1 MaeIntosh far RID 

and Kenneth Maidment land later Captain J. Lakin) for BSC.lSO 

The unofficial committee did serve to reopen British intelligence contact in the U.S. 

with agencies other than the FBI (see the Captain Hastings affair in "The Army-Navy-FBI 

COMINT Agreementsn section of this chapter). Individual British-U.S. agency contacts 

would continue through the war, often on a friendlier basis than among the US, agencies 

themselves. And there were special channels, too. In London the FBI representative, Mr. 

Cimperton, obtained GOMINT for bureau use directly from the British. This did not please 

the Army or Navy and was instrumental in creating further squabbles between the Navy 

and FBI, as will be noted below. 

NAVY COMINT IN THE PACIFIC 

During the first year of the war, there were three administrative and organizational 

highlights in naval COMINT in the Pacific: the establishment of FRUMEL as a US.- 

controlled joint operation, the establishment of the Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area 
(ICPOA) in Hawaii, and the power struggle at FRUPAC and the replacement of 

Commander Rochefort. These will be treated in summary form here; a detailed amunt of 

FRUMEL, FRUPAC, and ICPOA belongs in the operational history. 

When the former Cast unit relmated in Australia, after a portion of the group briefly 

operated in the Netherlands East Indies, it was within a joint-service group of Royal 

Australian Navy, British, and U.S. personnel, each national group under its own chief. 

The Halden Agreement placed FRUMEL under U.S. command, allowing the U.S. to retain 

such British-Australian personnel as desired and to request additional personnel from 

Kilindini. FRUMEL thus came under the command of Lieutenant Commander Rudolph 

Fabian, who remained in that position until December 1943. FRUMEL was initially 

served by one Australian navy intercept station located near Melbourne. There were U.S. 

Navy personnel at this station, and a second station manned mainly by U.S. personnel was 

later opened near Darwin.13% large DF net was also developed. The processing was done 

at FRUMEL by the multinational group working as a team. 

The purpose of FRUMEL was intelligence support for "General MacArthur's Navy," 

i.e., U.S. naval force9 in the southern Pacific area. FRUMEL was under the military 

control of commander, Southwest Pacific Force, and its successor organization, the 

Seventh Fleet. Admiral Carpender commanded these forces for much of the war. The 

command relationship as seen in the field is aptly summarized by Commander Fabian. "It 

[FRUMEL] received technical support and guidance from OP-204, but that guidance in 

no way detracted from our local responsibility to the fleet commander, the same as [had 

been1 true for Cast unit."lSs Of course, this was not seen exactly the same way by OP-20-G, 

which was at pains then and later to make it clearly knownthat FRUMEL was a field arm 

of OP-20-G in Washington. FRUMEL directly served General MacArthur, who received 

briefings on its product from Admiral Carpender and the latter's intelligence officer (by 

late 19421, Commander Arthur McCollum, the ON1 veteran. Commander Fabian also 

seems to have personally made presentations to the general.134 

In all this, Commander Fabian's work was eased by having Washington support. He 

was held in high regard by the Redman brothers and escaped the drastic Redman-Horneinspired changes that swept away Safford, Rochefort, and ONI's authority in COM~NT 

In Hawaii Admiral Nimitz, as commander in chief Pacific (CINCPAC), received his 

COMINT support from FRUPAC, which was still under the command of Commander Joseph 

Rochefort. Rochefort doubtless viewed his role as did Fabian: regardless of chain of 

command, his first duty was to CINCPAC. 

In an attempt to bring about some centralization of intelligence analysis for Admiral 

Nimitz's command, both ON1 and the Marine Corps advanced the ,idea, in the spring of 

1942, for the creation of a joint intelligence center. From this concept came ICPOA, and 

later in 1943, the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA). 
In April 1942 Commander McCollum, who was still at ONI, was sent to CINCPAC to 

discuss plans then being formulated in the office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps 

and ONI. The plan was to establish the intelligence cenkr at Pearl Harbor with a rather 

large staff. The center would receive and interpret all types of intelligence bearing on 

CINCPAC's sphere of operations. Admiral Nirnitz liked the idea but, disliking large staffs, 

was somewhat resistant on personnel grounds. There followed a great deal of 

correspondence between Pearl Harbor and Washington. ICPOA was, however, created, 

with Commander Hillenkoetter from ON1 as officer in charge. ICPOA was detached from 

the CINCPAC staff and placed under the command of the Fourteenth Naval District (Pearl 

Harbor).13' The ICPOA concept was warmly received by Rochefort, if less so by Nimitz's 

fleet intelligence officer, Captain Edwin Layto~i.'~~ 

The upshot of all this was an elaborate organization, ultimately placed under 

Brigadier General Joseph Twitty, in September 1943, as the JICPOA. ICPOAlJICPOA 

never controlled FRUPAC or other Navy or Army COMINT operations, but used CoMmT in 

a closely controlled way, initially via Commander Layton, the fleet intelligence officer.1s8 

FRUPAC became an ever larger center~harged as before with a full range of COMINT 

functions, from intercept to cryptanalysis, decryption to translation. The analysis and 

dissemination of its product at CINCPAC and Combat Information Center (CIC) were done 

by a very small number of people. In mid-1943 CIC had only ten pe0p1e.l'~ Commander 

Layton's staff was also small. Thus the complex arrangement, at least until later in the 

war, involved rather few people outside FRUPAC itself. Though GOMINT was the most 

valuable secret source available to CINCPAC, the great majority of the ICPOA/JICPOA 

staff was involved with maps and charts, air reconnaissance photos, POW reports, action 

reports, and the like. 

Lieutenant Commander Luther L. L. Diliey, USN 

Cryptanalysis Section, FRUPAC 
By the time the center was fully operational, Commander Fbchefort had been relieved 

by Washington and was replaced by Commander Goggins, in one of the sorriest episodes in 

the annals of U.S. intelligence. As Admiral Nimitz observed, ". . . Rochefort's sin was 

probably one of doing too much rather than too little - a hard thing for which ta condemn a 

man.""' Full details of this affair belong in the operational history, but it must be touched 

on insofar as it reveals the attitudes toward COMNT policy of Admirals Horne and Nirnitz 

and the Redman brothers. 

Within two weeks &r the U.S. victory at Midway, due in large measure to the work 

of FRUPAC (and FRUMEL too), the Rdman brothers and Admiral Horne had determined 

to review the naval COMINT picture. One result was the downgrading of ON1 described in 

the "Navy CoMINT Reorganization and Expansion in Washington during 1942" section of 

this chapter. On 30 June 1942, Joseph Redman, DWC, sent Admiral Horne a lengthy and 

important analysis of COMINT."~ His theme was that technical people, i. e., 

communicators, should totally control CoMmT. Redman noted that in theory all 

intelligence should be under a single director, but that this was not necessarily practical 

because ON1 and noncommunications people ". . . just don't speak our language." Most 

phases of CO~T, he wrote, require comrn&ications skills, and the emerging techniques 

made even greater demands on skilled communications personnel. Among these 

techniques were TINA (identifying enemy radio operators by their manual technique), 

RFP (radio fingerprinting to identify enemy transmitters), and the use of ionospheric data 

to measure distance to enemy transmitters. Thus COMINT must be under naval 

communications. Redman then described the existing command situation and bluntly 

observed that the key center, FRUPAC, was under command of a weak administrator who 

was merely an "ex-Japaneae language student" and who had this command solely on the 

basis of seniority. Neither this person (Rochefort - whom Redman never names in the 

memorandum) nor the fleet intelligence officer (Layton) had any communications 

training. Therefore, Redman concluded that a change of command must be made. 

Rochefort was replaced, and he was denied the decurations recommended by Admiral 

Nimitz for his role in the victory at Midway. 

Following this, there was an unfriendly exchange of correspondence between Admiral 

Nimitz and Admirals King and Horne. On 28 October Admiral King wrote Admiral 

Nimitz that he had heard "unofficially" from sources in Washington and Hawaii that the 

intelligence center had not functioned well because of the resistance of Rochefort and 

Layton. This is why Rochefort had been replaced by Gogghs. Admiral Nimitz replied two 

weeks later praising Layton and the departed Rochefort. A long letter from Admiral 

Horne followed in which he laboriously explained the nature and organization of naval 

COMINT. Home explained that all COMINT was under him through his authority over the 

DNC, and that the Washington unit (OP-20-GI exercised ". . . control as necessary over the 

units at Pearl Harbor and Melburne in order to coordinate all efforts for the maximum 

efficiency of the entire organization." Nonetheless, these field units supported the fleet 
commanders, and these commanders could divert the ha1 COwNT units to spcial tasks 

when required. Home closed with the observation that "the operation of this organization 

in no way comes under ONI.. . ."'& 

Admiral Chester W. Nimik CINCPAC 

Admiral Nimih replied ta Admiral Home on 8 December. He made it clear that he 

understood naval coarrm requirements, as he Id formerly been chief of the Bureau of 

Personnel, where he had worked to insure adequate manpower for OF-20-G. He then 

made it known that the local COMINT unit (FRUPAC) could not automatically bypass him 

in dealing with Washington. He had found that his communications officer held a private 

cipher system which he (Nimitz) did not hold, for the purpose of direct communication with 

the DNC and OP-20-G. This he found intolerable, and henceforth messages to OP-20-G or 

DNC would be cleared through him, an interesting development because his new 

wrnmunications offlcer was none other than John Redman, who in October had been 

replacd as head of OP-20-G by Captain Earl E. Stone. 
GROWTH OF U.S. NAVAL COMfNT IN THE PACIFIC 

Intercept Site Number of Radio Receivers 

December 1941 

Bainbridge Island, Washington 

Hilia, Territory of Hawaii 

Guam 

Corregidor 

Total 

Bainbridge Island 

Imperial Beach, California 

Wahiawa, Territory of Hawaii 

Australia 

Total 

Bainbridge Island 

Imperial Beach 

Skaggs Island, California 

Admiralty Islands 

Wahiawa, Territory of Hawaii 

Guam 

Australia 

Iwo Jima 

Total 

December 1943 

August 1945 

There was also an expansion of radio intercept teams afloat: from 1 operator and 1 

receiver in December 1941 to 8 intercept teams and 120 receivers by the end of the war.14' 
Notes 

1. Reninkcemes ofLiutenant Colonel Harold R. Brown, OCSIgO. 4 August 1945 (classified). 

2. Ibid. At least one became a prisoner of the Japanese, and one or two others became guerrillas, 

3. Interview of George S. Sterling by the author; also Sterling article in Studies in Imklligence; and George R. 

Thompson, Dixie R Harris, Paulins M. Oakes, Dulaney Territt, Ths Signal Corps: The Test (Dec 1941 lo duly 

19431, {OCMH), 298. 

4. The Teat, 123-126. 

5. Sterling interview; aIso Stsrlingarticle. See also box 27, RG 173 for wealth ofmaterial about RID operations in 

Alaska in support of the Army. 

6. Captain Harold Joslin, Cryptologic Spctrum, Spring 1974 (FOUO). Joslin was an operator at Station B and 

was captured. See Wengerfile "HirrtoricaI Review" manuscripf 13-16, for number of receivers, NSAH. 

8. Memorandum from Colonel Carter W. Clarke, assistant chief MIS to Major General Clayton Bissell, 1 

December 1944, ACSI #49, NSAH; alm letter to the author by Carter Clarke, 1976. 

9. General Mauborgne had been personally involved inCDMINT since 1917. His early retirement was allegedly 

prompbd by problems concerning Air Corps communications. See The Emergency, 271-273, for a discussion of 

the reasuns for Mauborgne's early retirsment; alsa PHA, Part 3,1279. For Mauborgne's opinion of Olmstead, 

Memorandum from General Marshall to General Moore. 31 July 1941, Folder BIF25 {Directives - the Deputy 

Chiefof Staff 194141), Marshall Library. For Olmstead's subsequent removal, see chapter 3 of this study. 

10. Rowlett interviews; also Friedman testimony, FHA 

11. Sadtler testimony, FHA. 

12. These various organizational developments are in SSA History,vol. 1,76-78; vol. 2,4 ff. 

13. For the reorganization of 9 March 1942, see Otto L. Nebon Jr., National Socurdy and the Geneml Sfaff, 

(Washington, 19461, and James E. Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamam: Army Orgadtion attd Admtnistmtion, 

1900-1963, (Washington, D.C., CMH, 1975). For the creation of MIS, sea Nshn as well as part five of Bruce W. 

Bidwell, Hisbry of the Malhry InleIligence Division, Department of the Army General Staf, manuscript on file at 

CMH, Washington, D.C. Nelson as a colonel and general officer was on the General Staff 1942-46 and was often 

involved in MIS and SIS matters. 

14. Nelson, 390. 

15. Circular 59 quoted in Nelson, 371 ff. See also Bidwell, b art five, 3 ff. 

16. Colonel Paul M. Minett, Part of the Story 194142,333; 349-50; 374. Thla is the wartime diary of Colonel 

Robinett, an experienced intelligence officer. A typescript of the diary is at the Marshall Library. For a summary 

of General Strong's long career, see Time magazine, 29 July 1940. He had fought Indians and Moros early in the 

century, directed important operations in France in World War I, was an Army judge advocate, and had 

numerous assignments in international aRairs [see chapter 1 for his prewar COMINT role). 

17. Letter to the author by Carter W. Clarke. 

18. Memorandum from McCorrnack to Carter W. Clarke, 15 April 1943, subject: Origin and Functions ofthe MIS 

Special Branch (classified), ACSI f2, NSAH. (Hereafter cited as McCormack Memorandum, Origin and 
Functions). See ah Henry L. Stimson's autobiography (written with the maistance of McGeorge Bdy 1: On 

ActiveSeruice in P- and War, I New York, 19481,454-455. 

19. McCormack Memorandum, Origin and Functions, 7. 

20. Letter to author by Carter W. Clarke. 

2 1. Ibid. Clarke wrote the author that he spent his entire career connected to intelligence except for periods when 

he attended the various service scho~ls. 

22. McCormack Memorandum, Origin and Functions, 7. 

23. From an 8 May 1942 directive to Chrke described in a memorandm from Clarke to Strong, 11 July 1942, 

subject: Signal Intelligence Activities, ACSI #40, NSAH (classified). 

24. Memorandum from Colonel Thomas Betts to Lieutenant Colonel David G. Erskine, Countsrintelligence 

Group, MIS, 22 July 1942, ACSI #40, NSAH. See also Winkler-Bidwell papem in ACSI #6, NSAH. (claaaified) 

The Iatter consists of querhions posed by Mr. Winkler, an ACS and later DIA employee, to Colonel Bidwell on 

Army COMINT histmy. The latter's responses were too highly clamdied to indude in hisown MID his-. 

25. Hisfory of th Special Branch, no author given, 1945, ACSI #2, NSAH, 9-11. 

26. Memorandum from Strong to chief ofstaff, 26 dune 1942, subject: Signal Intelligenoe Service activities, ACSI 

849, NSAH. V! 

27. While the NSAH carbon ofthe Strong memorandum does not show tbe drafter, it may be gtated as a certainty 

that itwas written by Carter W. Clarke. 

28. From a conversation between Colonel Clarke and Colonel Minckler as reported in memorandum from Clarke 

to Major General Clayton Bissell, AGS, G-2, 1 December 194-4 (classified), ACSI #49, NSAH. I have not seen 

contemporary dwumenta containing the actual statad objections to Strong's proposal. 

29. The paculiar nature of special branch is apparent from contemporaj correspondence and MIS organization 

charts. The branch does not always appear in the latter. Clarke reported tn the AGS, G2 and not to he chief of 

MIS. 

30. SSA History, vol. 1,81-86. 

31. Letter from the Adjutant General (TAG) to the CSO, 18 April 1942 (relaying MIS inskuctions), ACSI #49, 

(classifiedl. 

32. Signal Security Divisiun, Aonuali7eport FY 1943. (Hereafter cited as SSI3 FY 19431. 

33. Ibid. 

34. George F. Howe, manuscript history of Army tactical COMINT in the European and Mediterranean theaters, 

NSAH, Chapter 1, 5-6, thereafter cited as Howe Mss.) (classified). 

35. TAG letters of 31 March 1942, Intercspt Directives, ACSI #49, NSAH (classified). 

36. See a document headed "Radio Intelligence Companies LocaLion, 3-20-42" and "Directives dArmy and Navy 

Monitoring Stations," ACSI #49, NSAH. This is an important source document Iisting Army GOMINT ass& 

early in the war. 

37. SSA History, vol. 1, 86-87. 

38. The following contemporary nomenclature will be used: SIS: 1930-1942; SSD: 1942-194; SSS: 1943; SSA: 

mid- 1943-1945. 
39. Al- from Ad&w to TAG. 1 April 1942, ACSI #49 (Mad). 

40. Meaeage from Marsha11 to MacArthur, Clarb drafter, 8 April 1942, ACSI #49 (classified). 

42. Ibid 

43. kwqra from TAG to UI I'ng gweral. Amerium hrmm in the Far E* 30 March 1942. thrbr W. 

Clarke, drafter, ACSl #49 (elaesified). This mge does mt diecarrs cryp-y& or any other detai of 

pmemhg. 

44. See Hhry of CBB, Part 1, tab A, 1945 (no authorjfor an admlniatrative overview. 

47. Fnteniew OfMr. Alhd donm by the aWr. Notea in NSAH. 

48. Howe bIss, chapter 2, !E ff and hphr 6 (unpaged). 

49. Ibid., cbapter 8. 

50. Navigating the Rapids. 

51. Memorandum from %fFord to DNC (& cupy), 23 January 1M2, folder markd "Op-20-G Om ' ' ' np 

NSAH. 

52. McCollum Oral Iiiatary, 483-486. 

53. In later years &&rd would atate that he m forcad out by a conqirncy of mnior officers who wanted him to 

be a scapegoat for Pearl Harbor. See the unpubliled Word manuacriptsl (copy), obtained from the Division of 

Naval Hisbry, on file at NSAH. S&rd prepared the taanuscript in the '508 and '60e. It k a maze of matsrial 

worthy of dose. if highly mutiom, attention. 

54. Mmnorandm Prom J-fi R ELedrnan to all seaion b& 18 February 1942. "0p20-G Organhti~~L" 

55. Oral history of the late John R. Fkdmm (1969). tmnmxipt in pcwmsion of the U.S. Naval Institute, Dr. Jack 

Mason, custodian. (Her%* cited as Redmn OmlHisbwyl. 

56. Admiral Noyes seems to have been a dficult permn. An alternate version of hia relief as DNC is euggeated 

by Mr. Elliott Glunt. NSA employee. Glunt was a LTJC at Op-19 Wavy Department Communications or "Radio 

Centaal") in 1942 and recalled for the author a heated argument that Now had with cartsin senior olficem, 

Nop claimed the right to read all Navy Department as he was the DNC. He was replaced soon after 

this argument. Noyes subsqwntly commamid a mk force in the Bghting off #addad. His nnhappy 

performance there led tn his relief. 

57. For a discussion of the role uf CNO and COMIBINCB, see Rear Admiral Julius A. Furer, USN tRetl 

Administration of ti^ Navy Department in World War 11, (Washinghn, DC, 1959). This book L an exbaustivs 

treatment of Navy organimtion from 1939-1946. 

58. Latter to the author by ON1 hiskian Cap- Wayman Paclrard. USN (Ret), April 1970. 

59. Admiral Hods papers are on file at the Library of Congrem (Courby dthe Naval Histwical Poundation. 

owner of the papers). Regrettably, they contain nothingof ofinterest concerning his wartime activities. 

60. Memorandum hmJohn Redman to Admiral Wibn. 
61. See vol. 1, Allied Conamaniorstwn In&llStsce cad the Battle of the Atlantic, 1945, NSAH, 80 R., for 

information onU-boat circuits and early intercept; Ibid., 21-22,for ENIGMA breakthrough. 

62. For JN-25 we folder "F'Y History: NSAH, especially manuscript draft his tory of GY-1. For merchant codes, 

see a d& in same folder regarding GGY. 

63. These clandestine operatiom, inw the summer of 1942, we discwed by Commander Kramer in Kramer 

memorandum - 8 June 1942. For the SIS noninvolvement, see Rowlett interviews. Mr. Rowlett recalled how 

before the war General Mauborgne admonished the Navy not to undertake any covert operations against the 

Japanese embassy in Washington for fear of oompromising the PITRPLE machine breakthrough. ON1 covert 

operations must partially be deduced, aa Kramer is understandably circumspsd. Ths Japanese merchant 

sbipping code was certainly obtained in this fashion; their attach4 cdedoubtleas was tao. Other sy&m secretly 

copied may have been: Vichy French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Latin American. There is further dimmion of 

this subject in the aforementioned Hbtory of th Signal &cur@ Agency in World War Il - we vol. 2 <General 

Cryptanalysis)for a chapter on this topic by Mr. Rowlett. 

64. "FY Historyn folder, draft manwript of CC history, 16, NSAH. * 

65. This is a confusing subject. Sdce it to say that Op-20-G did control certain CONUS teletype links from the 

beginning of the war, but ovetaeas radio was through Radio Central, which handled all the Navy Department 

traffic to and from Waahingbn. However. Radio Central did not have the special cipher syshms used to 

encryptldecrypt Op-20-G trac. These sygtsms, usi& the external indicators COPEK, CETYH, and GYROF, 

were held only by the COMlNT centers. The ECM was used for encryption of COMB and TUNA collective 

messages. 

66. "FY History ," 12-1 4. 

67. McCollum Oral History, 48041. McCollum recalled that Captain Howard Kingman. the a~stant DNI "was 

just crushed when this decision was made to take it entirely out of ON1 hands because here we'd worked on this 

thing together for all these years." Kingman, like Krarner and M&ollum, was one of the Navy's veteran 

intelligence officers. Be had headed Op20-G for a time during the 30s and had been the district intelligence 

officer for the Third Naval District, New York City. For further light on these changea of June 1942, see 

memorandum from Jmaph Redman to Admiral Horns, 20 June 1942, Op20-G Organization Folder: Redman 

opinedthat naval COMINT must be solely under the DNC. Admiral Horne clearly accepted this. 

68. Memorandum from COMINCH (sign-d by Admiral R. S. Edwards, deputy chief of stam to VCNO, subject: 

Radio Decryption Tr&c, 6 August 1942, folder marked "Op-20-GI." This memorandum is rather muddled, and 

much of it is a restatement of existing COMB addressee arrangements. 

69. Memorandum from Admiral King to CIC, Atlantic Fleet, CIC, Pacific Fleet, subject: Control of 

Dissemination and Use of Radio Intelligence, 20June 1942, in folder marked "RI Dissemination," NSAH. 

70. Captain Safford had by then been relsgatad to tha position of a section chief, subordinate to the newly created 

position of assistant DNC for communications security {who was only a commander!). 

71. Memorandum from Wenger to DNC, 14 February 1942, in "FBI-Coast General File," NSAH, hereafter cited 

as '%enera1 File." 

72. The Kramer memorandum - 8 June 1942. This oft-cited document is the basic source for Captain Hashgs's 

activities during 1942. It is the source for the origin of the Kramer-inspired coordination conferenoe dewribed in 

this section. 

73. Ibid. 
74. The USCG unit was known as Op-20-GU later in the war. For mwt ofthe post-merger, it was headed by 

Commander Leonard T. Jonee, a USCG regular with long experience In COMINT. Elimbeth Friedrnan and other 

USCG adysta continued ta work as a unit, hugh now under 20G auspipas. Mrs. Friedman suggmskd to the 

author a personnel strength in Op-U d-not more than twenty." l"hs of eourwt did not include tbe USCG 

intercept operators {also merged into 20-GI. 

76. Letar from Admiral Wilkinson to Mr. Berle, 28 March 1982, "General File." 

76. Memorandum Aom John Redman to DNI and DNC, 3 April 1942, "General File." 

77. [bid.; also memorandum from Generat Strong to Mr. Berle, 3 April 1442,"Ceneral File." 

78. Redman memorandnm. 

79. Memorandum from 6. B. W. Watler. ON1 to Lieutenant Commander Kramer and Commander Redman, 10 

April 1942, "General File." The preciae connection between the 2 April Berle Conference and this IIC meeting is 

not absolutely certain. Mr. Berle had suggested forwarding the problem to the "Intelligence Committee: which 

parhap meant the dIC, then baing rsviblized. The IlC W~B under Mr. Berlek own infod chairmaPahip, and 

this may be what he meant. The FCC wars not a party btbe IIC ordIC. 

80. Memorandom hm Dw La Pleur to Colonel Moore. 7 April 1942, "Geneml File." 

81. interview ofGeorge Sterling by the author; also exteqnsive material in boxes 5,6, and 7 of RG 173. 

82. Report of the Subcornmike of the In&-ntal InklZigeme Conference Appoinkd to Explore 6h8 

Ctyp&cnalyftcal Work of the War Demnt, Navy Department, and Fe&d Bmv of Inrredgdon, 23 April 

1942. "Ged File." 

83. The chhtinspmbhm was partly investigative. But the committea was suppoeedly studying aL1 WMINT, 

a subject rather broader than counterintelligence investigations. But as the IIC was a counterinblligence body, 

the members may have felt they had to fit their conclusions and recommendations into that framework. 

84. Repori of Confiwem Appointed to Study Processing and DismmiMCion of Radio IdUigence, 25 May 1942, 

"General File." The dech dON1 as a policymaker is evident. Although Commander Kramer wasin atkendance 

as the ON1 representative, he was a9signed full time to Op-20-C and must be considered as a part of the lattsr 

orga~lization. 

85. Ibid. 

86. The Kramer memorandum - 8 June 1942. The operation in New York involved Lieutenant Commander 

Charles RadcliR Haenden, chief of investigations for QNI in the Third Naval District. Haffenden was 

continuing the long-rhanding ONyOpPO-G tacbnique of covertly gaining amem to foreign cryptographic 

materials. Unfortunately - in the eyes of Washington - he allowed the FBI and British to become involved. 

Haffenden would later testify before the Kefauver Committae on the circumstancesl of his recruiting Charles 

"Lucky" Luciano as an ON1 informant. (See U.S. Congress, Senate. Heuriws Befire the Special Committee to 

Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Corn rnerce, Piui 7, New York-New Jersey, March 1950). 1 187-1 199. 

87. Ibid. 

88. Memorandum from Redman to Horne, 12 dune L942, "General File." This memorandum is signed by 

Redman, but, as it is marked "tentative," it is not certain if it was delivered. It undoubtedly was wed in a verbal 

presentation to Horne, however. 
89. This is a remarkable admission and one restabd by the Navy on subsequent occasions. At lea& for Up-20-G, 

the committee was a lesrt than sincers undertaking. Seen another way, Redman's remark does not make sense. 

The Navy had after all initiated the Berle meeting, b which the FBI was logically invited. 

90. Redman, if grudgingly, recognized the FBI, COI, and FCC as intempt organizations. Actually the FBI did 

very little of its own intercept, depending rather on the FCC's RID for radio intercept and the cenaowhip ace for 

mail and cable material. The COYQSS did undertake some radio intercept operatiom during the war, always in 

the face of Army and Navy objectiom. 

91. Extract of minutes of 17 June 1942 IIC meeting, signed by Lieutenant Colonel David G. Erskine, MID, 

"General File." 

92. Memorandum from JIC (signed by Admiral Wilkinson) to JCS, 18 June 1942, subject: Limitation or 

Cryptanalytical Activities,"General File." 

93. Memorandum fmrn John R Redmanto Admiral Horne, via DNC, 25 June 1942, subject: Cryptanalyticaland 

Decryption Operatiow on Diplomatic Traffic, "Generel File." 

94. Msmorandum from Wenger to Op-20-G, 1. June 1943, subject: Future Cooperation Between Army and Navy, 

'General File." 

95. Rowlett interviews. 

96. "Report ofConference Appointed to Study Allocation of Cryptanalysis," 30 June 1942, "General File? 

97. Memorandum for the President, signed by General Marshall and Admiral Horns (far Admiral King), 6 July 

1942. "General File." 

98. Memorandum for director of budget, 8 July 1942, "Censral File." 

99. Miscellaneous papers in box 5, RG 173; also Sterling interview. 

100. Memorandums, of 21 and 22 October 1942, which are endosures to Joint Staff Planners Report, 15 June 

1943, ACSI #50, NSAH. 

101. Joint Staff Planners Report; OPD Disposition Form addressed to G-2,19 Janualy 1943,ACSI W50. 

102. See Vernon Davis for a good account of the development of the OSS mission and its relationship to the Joint 

Chiefs. I have made no effort to see the OSS records on file at CIA because this is peripheral to my subject. 

103. "Report of the first meeting of the Standing Committee for Coordination ofcryptanalytic Work," dated 9 

September 1942, "General File," signed by Colonel Alfred McCormack, MIS; E. P. Coffey, FBI; Commander 

Joseph Wenger, Op-20-G. Also in attendance were Colonel Bullock. and Mr. kiedman of SIS; Commander donas 

and Commander Kramer, Navy. It is to be noted that Colonel McCormack, MIS, acted as chief spokesman for the 

Army rather than the SIS representative. This corrected, it may be supposed, an oversight in the 30 June report. 

104. "Report of Meeting of Cryptanalysis Coordinating Subcommittee of the Joint IntelLigence Committee," 

report dated 15 September 1942, "General File.* In attendance were Commander Wenger, Colonels McCorrnack 

and Bullock. Mr. Friedman,and W. G. B. Blackburn for the FBI. 

105. There is of murse much more to the story of Army-Navy-FBI relations during this period. These matters 

cennot be treated in detail because they were side issues. It should be noted in passing that during December 

1942 and January 1943 the MIS, ONI, and FBI agreed that the Army would operate a DF network in Latin 

America to locate clandestine radio stations. This network was to be run by American Intelligence Sewice, a 

branch of the MIS formed in 1942. The network was really run by the FCC (RID), and the Army role is 

problematical. Op-20-G was ultimately drawn into this arrangement, and the State Department made 
arrangemenu with the host governmente. (Them are various items on this in "General Fie" and in the ACSI 

collections.) 

106. See an -20 survey of FCC activities condub3 as a highest priority pr4fect in duly 1942, in hat marked 

TlX and RI 193&45," NSAH, ah Sterling intemim RG 173 at the NaW Archives; d k&ter hm 

Adtniral Nimih ta Wetary, Joint US. WPIunners. 16 November 1942 in Nimitz Papers (@A PI%AH. 

According to Mr. Starling, the malieiow force behind the Navy's effort against RtD wa~Jowph khan, who,like 

 hi^ brother John, wan a longtime acquaitlhnce of Mr. Sterling. 

107. RG 175 bus hundreds of item pertaining to rque- hm the Army sspecially; ah FM, Qtah Depmrtment, 

BEW, OM, OpaO-G. other Navy, etc. in an entq in his diary on 28 April 1942, At&tant of- A. A. 

Be& praised the FCC for "smasbg the Rio spy ring," a dangerousr German intelligence and shemion 

operatian. Tbis was one ofthe most dramatic RID su~eetzxek 

108. Birch, Naval SIGINT, vol. 1,71-73 (classified). 

109. mferenm to a memge on this subject appats in a mmmary entry in ACSI #45. NSAH. 

11 1. Ibid. This same theme had bean, and would continue to be. advanced C Op-20-G by BCCS. 

112. KullbacKs Report, dated Augwt 1942. ACSI #455 dm a B~itkh background paper, not date4 headed 

"General Marshall's Letter to Field Marshall of 23/12142" in ACSI #44 (claw). 

113. Above-Eited British backgmnnd paper. AocotdiapC to this sow, Cob1 Bictaer {SISETOUSA) and 

General brier, chief of the 8ignal #rpa' Army Cammuniu~tions Service, aiso were ahown the ENIGMA 

exploibtion procem at about this time. 

114. Mewage froml'ravis to War Department, 13 May 1942, ACSI a46 (classified). 

1 16. Memorandum for General Marshall. 9 July 1942. ACSI X45 (clasaifiad). 

1 16. Mernoraodum from Strong ta Madall. 9 Jdy 1942. ACSI #45 (cladiedX 

117. Memorandum Rom Maddl to Redent Roosevelt, 11 July 1942, ACSI 1411 (cldad}. 

118. See Birch. Naual SXGIIYT, wl. S(a1, 176 ff, and vol. Sb), 547666, for a detailed discussion of the Sendwith 

mlkoion from the British point of view snd a reprint of the report of the British-Canadian-U.S. dimwiom, 6-11 

April 1942 (clddl. I was unable to get USN records on thig matter. Records do exkt at the NSG records 

center. Crane, Indiana 

L19. "Notas on US. Naval Ir&i~me Organization," signed by Captain Humphrey R Sadwith, 15 duna 1942, 

Wp-20-G Organidion" folder. 

120. Birch, Nauai SZGINT, vol. 5(a), 179-160 (claa&ed). 

121. Ibid., 179-184 (e-ed). 

122. This is further described in the next section. 

123. Mr. Birch's objections to the agreement are premnted in great detail in his NaualSICINT, vol.5(a), 181-184 

(classified). Subsequent agreements are characterized by detailed attention to means of COMINT 

communications between the Allies. See GC History for a discussion of the various means of Anglo-American 

communicationp. 14-15 and 2W. 
124. "Report on Canadian Naval Y Organization;" prepared by Captain Sandwith, 19 March 1948; also paper 

titled *Canadian HF and DF Stations, stc.," 30 December 1942. Both in Wenger File, NSAH. 

126. Memorandum from S. W. Norman to Mr. deU, 16 April 1942, box 5, RG 173 (Dwla~ified). 

126, Memorandum from Gwrp Sterling to Mr. Jett, 20 July 1943, box 6, RG 173 (folder marked "Chief 

Engineer-194.4" (Declassified). 

128. Ibid. 

129. hid. And me also memorandum from C. A. Elfert, acting chief of RID ta Mr. Jett, 4 August 1943, box 6, RG 

173,for a discuasion of the dissolution of the committee. 

130. See RG 173,boxes 61 and 62 for hundreds of memorandums exchanged between BSC-RID 19424. Much of 

the intercept and technical data are in boxes 63 and boxes 3d-67 of this record group. The official British hhry 

of World War I1 COMINT, CChCS History, the Secret Service SIGINT series, vo1. 1, contains an exceptionally 

cynical commentary on thm RID on pp. 55-57. The suggestion there is that RID was unworthy of truat because it 

was a "political" organization. The documentary evidence, however, suggssts that the BSC-RID a~ociation was 

mutually uaeful and friendly. 

131. Ths author hastens to observe that the compleGty and confuaiotl of these relationship did not prevent the 

accomplishment of the mission. In spite of everything, German intslligencs traffic was generally intercepkd and 

read: clandastine stations and agsnts were exploited or supprewed. Here the Allies were fortunate in the 

snemies' own disarray. Another observation is inorder. While the German intelligencdclandestine traffic was a 

relatively small matter in the COMINT war, the Allied concerns of the time were valid. German adivity in Latin 

America, Wsst AFrka.and Iberia was alarming. 

132. Fabian interviews by Captain Wayman Packard. 

133. Ibid. 

134. McCollum Oral Hkrbry; alm Fabian interviews. Also see Clay Blair, Silent Vicbory, (New York), 1975, 

which is an account ofthe USN ~ubmarine war in the Pacific. This book has incredible detail on a range of topics 

including CORriINT. 

135. Memorandum from Joseph Redman to Admiral Horne, 20 June 1942,Op-20-G Organization Folder. for 

glowing praise of Fabian. 

136. McCollum Oral Histmy, 367 ff.; also unsigned memorandum for Admiral Horne, November i942, subject: 

Personal Letter ofAdmira1 Nimitz, November 5,1942, and other Nirnitz correspondence, all in theNimi& Papers 

folder, NSAH. The memorandum for Admiral Horne recapitulates the matter from March-November 1942. 

137. McCollum Oral History, 357 ff. 

139. SSO Histoty, vol. 4,850, tab A, rnanusript item, no author. (See the Sources section of this study for a 

discussion and explanation of the SSO histories, which are really a collection of individual typescript 

memorandums.) 

139. Ibid. 

140. Letter from Nimitz to Admiral King, 16 November 1942, Nimita Papars folder, PISAH. The story of 

Rochefort's relief and ill treatment is described in much detail in Clay Blair's Silent Victory. 
141. Memorandum from Joseph Redman to Admiral Home, 20 dune 1942, subject: Radio Intelligence 

Organization, Op-20-G Organization folder. 

142. King to Nimitz, 28 kbber 1042; Nimitztu King, 16 November 1942; Horne to Nimitz, 1 December 1942,all 

in Nimitz Papers. 

143. Wenger f~,"Hiasttical Review," 13-16,24, NSAH. 
Chapter 3 

Army-Navy Policy and Organizational 

Development during 1943 

THE COMBAT INTELLIGENCE DIVISION AND OP-20-G 

Though it had now been settled that naval GOMINT was under the control of the DNC, 

the cart had been put before the horse. The decline of ON1 still left the division of 

intelligence responsibility at the top as far as the evaluation and use of CoMrNT and other 

forms of intelligence were concerned. OP-20-G, the intelligence prducing subdivision of 

20-12, provided its product to F-11 (Fleet Intelligence) and F-35 (Operational Information) 

of the COMINCH shff and OP-IGFE (the Far Eat section of ONI). Each of these units had 

a role in the evaluation, dissemination, and use of COMINT albeit ON1 was not involved in 

the Battle of the Atlantic (insofar as C~MINT was concerned.)' 

On 29 April 1943 a management report regarding naval intelligence was forwarded to 

Admiral KingVa There were four recommendations. One dealt with domestic counterintelligence, but the other three are of special interest: 

1. Create a "Combat Intelligence Branchn on the staff of COMINCH, "unifying 

therewith the product of communications intelligence. . . ." 

2. Combine most of the foreign intelligence functions of ON1 and MIS relating to 

preparation of strategic surveys and monographs with the research and analysis branch of 

DSS. 

3. Create a new JIC directly responsible to the JCS. 

Only the first came to pass, although, as may have become apparent, the other 

recommendations were most perceptive and wise. But the time was not yet right for true 

interservice intelligence coordination. 

The study of these proposals was apparently undertaken by Admiral Horne and his 

staff. On 12 June he recommended to Admiral King a variation of the management study 

suggestions. On the 26th Admiral King announced his decision for what was to be the 

final wartime configuration of naval intelligence.' A Combat' Intelligence Division (F-2) 

was to be established on the COMINCH staff. This new organization would be charged 

with evaluation of COMINT for the Navy. To that end OP-16FE (ON11 was no longer to 

receive COMINT. Thus all COMINT at the Navy DepartmentlCOMINCH level would go to 

one place: the Combat Intelligence Division. 
Rear Admiral Roscoe E, Schuermann became assistant chief of staff for combat 

intelligence effective 1 July 1943, when F-2 was formally created. In September 1943 

Admiral Schuermann also became the DWI, though ON1 and combat intelligence retained 

separate staffs. The general line of demarcation between ON1 and F-2 was that the latter 

was responsible for operational or tactical intelligence with full use of GOMINT, while the 

former dealt with counterintelligence and strategic studies with limited access to COMINT. 

The Combat Intelligence Division was divided into two main sections: F-21 (Atlantic) 

and F-22 (Pacific). The principal duty of F-21 was intelligence for the U-boat war. To 

control antisubmarine and convoy operations of the USN, Admiral King had created the 

Tenth FIeet (FX) during the busy summer of 1943. The Tenth Fleet was a desk-hund 

organization that coordinated the movements of convoys and the operations of the ships 

and planes hunting German submarines. F-21 served as the "operations roam of the Tenth 

Fleet, both convoy routing and U-boat plotting information being correlated on common 

charts." 

The duties of F-22 were different because of the different nature of the enemy's naval 

forces. Japan's submarine forces were in no way comparable to Germany's, but Japan had 

(unlike Germany) a full range of surface forces. The general responsibilities of F-22 were 

to prepare daily intelligence summaries for COMINCH and other key personnel, prepare 

weekly compilations of Japanese fleet, aircraft, and merchant shipping distribution, and 

maintain a current situation plot of the Pacific theater.6 

At this point it may be useful to briefly summarize the information OP-20GI prepared 

for F-Zl:7 

1. German naval trafflc ((translated in OP-ZOGI-A) 

U-boat Atlantic 

U-boat non-Atlantic 

Blockade runners 

Naval attache 

2. Japanese naval attach4 

3. German clandestine traff~c 

4. Vichy French, Spanish, Portuguese naval traffic 

5. Diplomatic (from the Army) 

This went to F-21 in several ways: a copy of every translated German message, 

interpretive memorandums, daily summaries of U-boat ULTRA and non-U-boat ULTRA, and 

special studies. 
Just prior to these broad changes in naval inklIigence, Admiral Home had made a 

final definition of the role of OP-20-G vis-A-vis the centers in Hawaii and Australia. This 

was done in a letter to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District (Pearl Harbor) 

and the coder, Seventh Fleek8 While there was little here that was new or was not 

at least tacitly understood, this letter may be considered the definitive Navy Department 

statement on lines of authority and division of the worldwide COMNT effort. The basic 

statement was this: 

The Washinen communiation intelligence cenkr (OP-20-G), under authority of the vice chief 

of naval operatiom, emrciees control over the centers at Pearl Harbor and Melbourne as 

necessmy b coordinate all effort8 for marimum sffieiencg of the organiaation. En& of the latter 

two centwa rmmdy operah in a~~ with geneml policies and slpecfi a~gnments 

outlined by th Washington center and dimminates all information obtained to d-ignated fleet 

commandera, to the other two centars and to other authorities as directed by the vice chief of 

naval operations 

The principle of "cerhin latitude" by the fleet commanders in controlling operations of 

the centers was redErmed, but where the fleet commanders tempmrily diverted the 

centers for special purposes, OP-20-&was to be advised. Existing allocations of 

cryptarialytic tasks were restated or clarified. 

1, Washington was to work new enemy systems and discover initial breaks. The 

other centers were to assist as practicable. 

2. Washiion was also to mlve systems requiring special equipment and a large 

amount of statistical data. 'This will apply to the bulk additive recovery in system dN-25. 

**. n 

3. All centers were to work incomplete systems, operational codes, and search for 

cribs. 

4. Washington was to work on minor and obsolete systems. 

6. All centers were to decrypt current traffic as their primary function. 

The VCNO (DNC) reserved for himself control of personnel strength, transfers, and 

promotions. Personnel strength, current and upper limits, were set as follows: 

Washington 3,000 by early summer 1943; 5,000 upper limit 

Melbourne 204 at present; 300 upper limit 

Hawaii 900 by late summer 1943; 1,149 upper limit 

Inbrcept and DF stations within the CONUS remained under OF-20-G, control being 

exercised through 20-GX, the radio DF and intercept section and 20-GF, the DF control 

section (responsible for the Atlantic).' 

By summer 1943 OP-20-G had become an elaborate organization, Its primary 

intercept stations in the U.S. were Bainbridge (Station S) on the West Coast and Chatham, 
Massachusetts. Chatham had replaced Cheltenham, Maryland, as the primary station for 

interception of U-boat traffic by early 1943. A particularly important development in the 

expansion ,of OP-20-G was the initiation of an exclusively CoMiNT radio net. As was 

described in chapter 2,OP-20-G controlled some CONUS teletype links and communicated 

with the overseas centers via regular Navy Department radio facilities using private 

cipher systems. OP-20-G, formerly limited to encryption-decryption of dispatches and 

messenger activities, twk over the intercept traffic teletypes in June 1943." In August 

the "RE Fox" sched,ule came into being. This was exclusively for radio traffic addressed to 

FRUPAC and FRUMEL by Negat (the Washington center, i.e., 20-G). It was transmitted 

from Station I, Imperial Beach. In October this system was refined with the installation of 

a new teletype circuit, LL7050, exclusively used for transmitting trait from Negat to 

Station I for "RI Fox" radio transmissions to the Paciiic center;; Within a month the whole 

system was further upgraded by the availability to OP-20-G of Army radioteletype from 

the Presidio of San Francisco to Hawaii. 

Every expansion of 20-G communications increased the opportunity for technical 

control and coordination of the Pacific centers. Jf 

THE ARMY COMINT BREAKTHROUGH IN 1943 

What might be called an explosion in Army COMINT occurred during the spring of 

1943. There were so many signxcant developments in these few months that for ease of 

explanation and study they are divided among several parts in this chapter and form the 

whole of chapter 4. 

The Army's COMINT accomplishments into 1943 were by no means 

insignificant. However, there had 

been no breaks into enemy mainline 

military systems after more than a 

year of war. On 1 February 1943, 

Colonel W. Preston Corderman 

replaced Colonel Frank Bullock as 

chief of the Signal Security Service 

(SSS), formerly known as the SIS. 

Bullock had been relieved at his own 

request because he felt that he should 

return to general signal corps duties 

(in fact, he would head the SIS in the 

China-Burma-India [CBII Theater). 

W. Preston Curderman, chief SSS 

(1855 photo as major general) 
He had been considered an excellent partner by MIS as he and Colonel Clarke of Special 

Branch had worked closely in expanding Army GOMINT facilities. At the request of MIS, 

Secretary of War Stimn approached Byron Price, director of censorship, and asked for 

the release of Colonel Corderman, then one of Price's assistants. Price agreed to this.ll 

Corderman was an exceptionally good choice because he had served prewar tours in SIS as 

a student, instructor, and practitioner of cryptanalysis, and he was a section chief in the 

old intelligence division prior tu Pearl Harbor. 

Colonels Clarke and Corderman promptly undertook the study of one of the major 

policy problems of Army GOMINT - the relationship of SSS to the field commands as to 

production of COMINT and dissemination of the finished product. There were two main 

issues here. First there were the SRI companies and the overseas GOMINT headquarters 

(such as SIS ETOUBA and CBB) under the theater or field commands. Then there was the 

matter of dissemination of high-level coMrw to the theaters and commands by the War 

Department (MIS Special Branch). 

On 12 February 1943, Colonel Clarke sent a study of these problems to General 

Strong, the ACS, G-2. His conclusion wasthat all highly skilled cryptanalytic personnel 

then in Australia, the U.K., and North Africa should be called back to SSS headquarters at 

Arlington Hall Station (AHS).'~ Clarke believed that a War Department General ShE 

directive was needed to implement his suggestions. Several weeks later Colonel CIarke 

forwarded a revised study to General Strong. This study had been prepared by Colonel 

Corderman." It was the strongest possible pitch for a completely centralized, worldwide 

Army cryptologic service. These were the main recommendations: 

1. Operational control of all Army COMINT personnel, installations, and units, 

including SRI companies was to be under the War Department (chief signal officer/SSS). 

2. A special COMINT communications system was to be created and eontrolled by SSS. 

3. There was to be wider dissemination of COMINT to theater commanders by the MIS. 

The activities of the overseas centers in Australia, North Africa, and the U.K. were 

criticized on the pounds that they were counterproductive. "It is absurd to expect that a 

local commander in one relatively small theater should be able to solve material with 

which the SSS, with a very large staff and worldwide facilities for intercept coverage, is 

struggling." And further predictions were added, to the effect that CBB could never solve 

Japanese army high command systems any more than the GOMINT units in North Africa 

could read German air force or army high-level traffic. There was frustration at SSS 

because these overseas COMINT headquarters were not sending progress reports to AHS, 

and their activities were almost unknown. Thus even coordination was impossible. 

Behind all this was the nagging example of the Navy, where, as Colonel Corderman 

recognized, the DNC had effective control of all naval COMINT. Nor should we overlook the 
fact that the Navy, perhaps partly as a result of its centralized system, was reading 

Japanese and German high-level naval trai3c. 

The assets of Army GOMINT in early 1943, both SSS controlled and theater controlled, 

were these: l' 

SRI Compunies 

There were approximately thirty-five companies in training or in operation overseas 

or CONUS. The greatest number were in training status or on alert for overseas. 

COMINT frHeadquarters" Groups Overseas 

These were a mixed bag consisting of parties rushed to the field from SIS or organized 

in the theater. The most important were the 837th Signal Service Detachment (the U.S. 

component of CBB) with f~y-six off~cers and enlisted personnel, the SIS ETOUSA, and 

the detachments in North Africa. 

SSS Fixed Stations 

Headquarters and processing center at MS. The detachments of the Second Signal 

Service Battalion were as follows: 

MS-1 Vint Hill Farm Station, Virginia 

MS-2 Two Rock Ranch, California 

MS-3 Fort Sam Houston, Texas 

MS-4 Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii (soon renumbered MS-5) 

MS-5 Fairbanks, Alaska (soon renumbered MS-71 

MS-6 New Delhi, India (not operational) 

This was a complex arrangement to fully integrate, especially during this transitional 

period when SRI companies were en route or newly assigned to theaters. For whatever 

reason, no directive to centralize was forthcoming from the War Department General 

Staff. 

A major new source of traffic came available to SSS during the summer of 1943 with 

the opening of MS-4 (Hawaii became known as MS-5 again) in Asmara, Ethiopia. This 

was operated by a detachment of the Second Signal Service Battalion and provided AHS 

with a priceless source for Berlin-Tokyo traffic. It was one of the most pr-oductive COMINT 

sources of World War II. 

On 7 April 1943 the Army achieved its first break into enemy high-level military 

systems. This was the solution of the Japanese army water transport code (Indicator 

System 2468). On 2 June 1943 AHS published its first formal translation of a water 
transport code message. The break seems to have been made simultaneously at AHS, 

CBB, and the British center in India at the Wireless Experimental Center (WEC).lS 

Thereafter other Japanese military systems were broken and exploited. Even more 

dramatic results were obtained frum the capture of a Japanese army administrative code 

publication at Shio, New Guinea, by Australian forces in January 1944.'~ Naturally this 

break led to further expansion of SSS and the MIS Special Branch. And the development 

of a COMINT c~mmunicationsystem was hastened. The most important sources of this now 

exploitable traffc became Two Rock Ranch (MS2) and CBB. 

A month prior to the 2468 breakthrough, the MIS had given the SSS a revised set of 

priorities for intercept and processing. This superseded the priority directive of 118 April 

1942 and was far more elaborate.17 The priorities were divided into groups A through G, in 

order of imporbnce, and the unreadable systems were ranked by numbers as "special 

research projects." Group A consisted of the following: 

Japanese army Vr#l special research project") 

European and African theater weather traffic 

Diplomatic traffic (including military attach81 between 

Japan-Russia (Japanese traffic) 

Japan-Germany (Japanese, Italian, and German trfic) 

Japan-Italy (Japanese, Italian, and German) 

Japan-Vatican City (Japanese and Italian) 

German military traffic, the top priority in 1942, was placed in Group B as "#3 special 

research project." However, as will be described in chapter 4, this was a very hot issue 

indeed. The placement of German traffic in Group B was an important policy change as it 

recognized the wisdom of placing heaviest U.S. emphasis on Japan. This was in line with 

the USN-British COMINT understanding regarding the Pacific theater. 

Within the MIS Special Branch itself, where Army COMINT policy was formulated, 

there had been a slow growth of personnel, and these were spread exceedingly thin. The 

SSS product was published daily in the Bulletin and delivered to Special Branch (four 

times per day) for analysis and dissemination. For this, Special Branch had only thirtynine officers and civilians, of whom just twenty-seven were available for analysis and 

preparation of the finished intelligence that appeared in the "MAGIC Summary" and 

special studies.'' It is representative of the revolution in Army COMINT, caused by the 

entry into Japanese army codes in 1943 (and the access to ENIGMA described in the next 

chapter), to note that Special Branch had 382 people by June 1944.19 

The demands on personnel were even greater at AHS. The civilian force there had 

grown to 2,300 by April 1943, and there were 766 military personnel. In spite of this 
tremendous growth in only a year and a half, only a fraction of he available traffic could 

be fully processed. This waa not only because Japanese army mdes were unreadable but 

also because the readable tr&c could not be mmpletely handled." The force at AHS 

would more than double during the next year to take advantage of the emerging sources. 

To that end the MIS, through the adjutant general, addressed the commanding general of 

the Army Service Forces on 11 August 1943 directing that the SSS be provided additional 

personnel, equipment, and facilities as scan as possible, ". . . with a view to exploiting to 

the maximum recent successes in obtaining intelligence from certain enemy radio traffic. . . ." And also that ". . . the maximum possible quantity of this intercepted and analyzed 

material be completely processed and that the transmission of the derived intelligence to 

the Special Branch, Military Intelligence Service be expedited."21 

Arlington Hall Station employee at adscipherment machine 

It was again beaming apparent that the subordination of the (newly renamed) Signal 

Security Agency (SSA) to the chief signal officer and the Army Service Forces was a 

problem. This had been recognized by General Strong in 1942 when he attempted to have 

the SIS placed under MIS. The issue was now raised by Colonel Otto Nelson, assistant to 

the deputy chief of staff. On 18 October 1943 he wrote General Strong citing the personnel 

allotment problems of the SSA. He noted that the SSA obtained its personnel through the 

OCSigO and the Army Services Forces, while it existed mainly to serve not these 

organizations, but rather the Special Branch, MIS." Recommendations were sought. 
General Strong replied on 23 October. He suggested that the SSA be removed from the 

Signal Corps and made an independent agency.'' As the SSA was "our most important 

source of secret intelligence," it ought not to be "under the command of those who have no 

concern with the intelligence produced." For administrative purposes, General Strong 

suggested the SSS could be under the Military Ilistrict of Washington, but direct 

operratioml control would be from the chiefof staff acting through the ACS, G-2 (i.e., MIS). 

This was a reasonable proposal and would ultimately be adopted by the Army after 

two more rounds of administrative struggle. But for now the Nelson-Strong exchanges 

came to nothing and the SSA remained under the OCSigO and ASF. It is, however, 

undeniable that more personnel and equipment for SSA were quickly forthcoming. 

By the end of 1943, the field components of SSA, represented by the Second Signal 

Service Battalion, had again been realigned. The detachment at Fort Sam Houston, one of 

the oldest in the Army, was disestablished. The centrally controlled sites were now: 

MS1 Vint Hill 

MS-2 Two Rock Ranch 

MS4 Asmara, Eritrea 

MS5 Territory of Hawaii 

MS7 Fairbanks, Alaska 

MS8 New Delhi (only partially operational) 

CENTRAL BUREAU ERISBANE 

In this section the policy and organizational developments in Central Bureau 

Brisbane, the GOMINT organization of the SWPA theater, will be traced from 1943 to the 

end of the war. (The early story has been described in chapter 2.) Effective 27 January 

1943, the CBB was placed under the direct control of GHQ, SWPA. Its mission was 

specified as follows under GHQ Instruction #27ia4 

1. Supervision, coordination, and operational control of the COMINT activities of the 

theater's ground and air forces 

2. Cryptanalysis, translation, and dissemination of traffic 

3. Traffic analysis and DF. 

Simultanmusly a study committee was created to make recommendations to GHQ on 

the requirements of CBB. The committee recommended, and GHQ approved, general 

expansion, procurement of special equipment, and the formation of seven Australian army 

field sections and eight RAAF wireless units. The latter were the intercept units. As the 

trafYic, which was also the highest priority target of SSA. There were by the end of 1943 

five organizations working this cryptanalytic problem, in by no means coordinated 

fashion: SSA, CBB, GC&CS, WEC, and to a very modest degree, the U.S. Army's SIS-CBI 

in New Delhi. The matter would be resolved in favor of SSA after conferences in Zlondon in 

1943 and Washington in early 1944. 

Prior to considering the undertakings reached in conference, comment is needed on the 

complex method of traffic and technical information exchange used by SSA in 

communication with CBB. At the suggestion of the British (July 1943)' this was done by 

way of Washington to BSC New York and thence to GC&CS?' The SSA messages were to 

employ special prefixes to show how GC&CS was to retransmit to the field. These prefixes 

were 

PRESCO - for GC&CS and WEC, New Delhi, with GC&CS to pass to CBB 

~WNA - for GC&CS, WEC, and CBB 

MERMAN - for GC&CS and CBB 

For this purpose the British TYPEX cryptogwphic machine with special settings was to be 

put in use by CBB, WEC, AHS, and GC&CS. CBB would mute material via GC&CS 

rather than send it directly to Washington. 

On 19 July certain Japanese army systems (JA 3366, 6633, and 3636) were assigned 

exclusively to the WEC in India for cryptanalytic attack.30 Not until March 1944, 

however, was there final agreement between the parties or control of anti-Japanese 

COMINT. From 13 to 24 March the second conference on Japanese army communications 

was held in Washington. The most important agreements were that SSA would be the 

coordinator for cryptanalysis on high-level systems and for allocation of traffic analysis 

studies. Likewise, "requests for coverage and assignment of specific intercept missions 

will be cmrdinated by SSA. . . ."31 Arrangements were made for extensive additions to the 

existing communications system between the various centers. Specific assignments were 

made concerning some of the Japanese army systems. 

These developments were not paralleled in CBB-U.S. Navy (FRUMEL) relations. 

There simply was no significant cooperation between these organizations until almost the 

end of the war. Commander Fabian, head of FRUMEL until December 1943, later opined 

that CBB had nothing to offer FRUMEL as it was a less-advanced organization having, in 

his opinion, entirely different interests and objectives. As Fabian put it, "FRUMEL was 

concerned solely with information on Japanese naval circuits. The Central Bureau was 

not.''5a It was not quite that simple. In fact, the lack of cooperation was such that Captain 

Hastings, the GC&CS representative in Washington, called a conference in March 1943 

with Commander Wenger, Colonels Carter Clarke and A1 McCormack, and Major Harold 

McD Brown to air the views of Major A. W. Sandford, the Australian army's senior officer 

at CBB, who was then passing through Washington en route to London." As Major 
Sandford explained it, CBB had freely made ib product available to FRUMEL until the 

last month. But as FRUMEL consistently declined to reciprocate and "had openly refused 

to have any dealings" with CBB, the contact terminated. Major Sandford believed that 

Commander Fabian had withheld valuable information from CBB (such as a captured 

callsign book) of a type that was not solely of interest to the Navy. 

As Commander Wenger saw the situation, based on correspondence from Commander 

Fabian, there was another side to the story.s4 Fabian had written in mid-1942 that the 

CBB had grandiose plans but few trained personnel. In January 1943 Fabian had reparted 

to OP-20-0 that while CBB had always been anxious to join with FRUMEL, this was 

pointless because the Army had nothing to offer, and worse, employed such pmr security 

practices as to be a "menace." 

This disagreeable controversy may be attributable to other factors too. It seems likely 

that there were serious personality problems involving the relationship of certain British 

and Australian personnel with FRUMEL. Hopefully this had been solved when, by terms 

of the Holden Agreement of November 1942, FRUMEL was placed solely under the USN. 

But one of the British officers of FRUMEL, who was to return to London, went to work 

with CBB instead, thus aggravating the situ3tion. 

Another matter of difficulty was that both CBB and FRUMEL provided COMINT to 

General MacArthur, but did so independently. The matter of competition cannot be 

discounted. But as General MacArthur later told one of the War Department special 

security officers, he did not care where he got COMINT, just so long as he got it. 

More than a year later, in June 1944, the matter of CBB was again discussed htween 

Clarke and Wenger under the auspices of the newly formed Army-Navy COMINT 

Coordinating Committee (ANCICC).~' Clarke told Wenger that the status of CBB as it 

related to the War Department had stilt not been clarified. 

So, CBB and FRUMEL eontinud an their separate paths, the former specializing in 

Japanese naval air and army air and ground communications and the latter on fleet 

circuits. The thread of CBB's relationships will be taken up again in chapter 8 in the 

context of the development of the War Department Special Security Offleer (SSO) system. 

By the end of the war, CEB and its field intercept units had reached a personnel 

strength of 4,339 men and women operating in Australia, the Philippines, New Guinea, 

Borneo, Morotai, and Okinawa. Represented were the U.S. Army, RAAF, Australian 

army. Canadian army, and a few representatives of the British and New Zealand 

services.% Most, though not all, of CBB's processing center had moved forward to Manila 

before the end of the war and CRB processing elements had accompanied MacArthur's 

headquarters in each advance, to Hollandia in August 1944, Leyte at the end of 1944, and 

Manila in March 1945. 
By fate 1944 CBB headquarters had reached its final organizational structure. Since 

1942 it had been headed by General Akin with day-tuday operations remaining under his 

three deputy directors: (1945 ranks) Colonel Abraham Sinkov, USA; Lieutenant Colonel 

A. W. Sandford, Australian army; Wing Commander H. Roy Booth, RAAF. Commander 

Booth was the executive o&er as well as one of the deputy directors. The branches, at the 

time of the final organization, were as follows (this by way of further showing the 

multinational and interservice character of CBB):37 

Designator Description 

Administration 

Solution 

Communications 

Photography 

Traffic Analysis 

Machine 

Translation 

Captain W. G. 3. Casaidy, AIF 

Flight Lieutenant P. F. Ward, RAAF 

Major G. A. Tanner, USA 

Captain T. E. Nave, RN 

Lieutenant Colonel H. L. Clark, USA 

4' 

Flight Lieutenant J. Walsh, RAAF 

Major A. G. Henry, AIF 

Squadron Leader W. J. Clarke, MF 

Major B. E. Small, USA 

Lieutenant K. E. Campbell, USA 

Petty mcer H. L. Stevens, RAAF 

Major S. R. I. Clark, AIF 

Major 2. Halpin, USA 

Lieutenant Colonel Hugh S. Erskine, USA 

General intelligence Captain B. Lehane, AIF 

and liaison 

In acritique of CBB operations written swn after the war, the deputy directors made a 

number of interesting observations on administration and They suggested that 

CBB and G-2 ought to have been combined (presumably under G-2 and control). Their 

reasoning was not unlike that repeated in Washington throughout the war by Carter 

Clarke, George Strong, et al. On the other hand, the deputy directors saw the CBB concept 

of total coordination of both the field effort and the processing as the reason for CBWs 

success. They lefi no doubt where they stood on the question of who should control the SRI 

companies (or similar Australian units) - unless the company could perform all functions, 

including cryptanalysis and translation, control should meet with the center rather than 
the field commander. In that regard there was one peculiar situation that developed late 

in th~ wat. The Army Air Force radio squadrons mobile 0 were an unweIcome and 

un&perative element introduced into the SWPA. As theoretically self-sufficient WMINT 

units, extremely well-equipped, they did not willingly join the CEB team. (The RSMs will 

be briefly discussed in later chapters.) 

This section will dose with a few comments on CBB's dissemination of COWNT. As 

CBB was a creature of the theater commander, General MacArthur, there was never any 

question that the CQMINT product would be promptly and directly given to his G2. When 

the SSO system was introduced in late I943 and greatly expanded in late 1944, the War 

Department gained certain control over COMINT dissemination, especially of ULTRA 

material, the high-level decrypts. Until mid-1944 the policymaking users of CBB C~MINT 

were in one place - first Melbourne and then Bhbme. Tbe mahrial was distributed daily 

by CBB couriers h~ the intelligence staffs of GHQ SWPA, Far East Air Force IFEAFI, 

RAAF, and Australian army.sg More extensive dissemination of CBI3 COM~NT came about 

during 1944 and 1945.40 The daily UBJ report (high-grade decrypts) was disseminated as 

follows during this later period: 

SWPA - G2, USN, General Akin, ~Gstralian MI, Allied air forces 

4 Overseas - War Ileprtment and the Allied Cryptologic Centers 

By then the matter of CoMrm dissemination was governed by regulations common to 

the Army and Navy in dl theaters, and ta the British. 

PROPOSAIS FOR CLOSER ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION 

During 1942 tentative proposals were made by the OCSigO to upgrade the position of 

the Signal Corps by placing the chief signal ofieer on the General SM." General 

Olmstead, the CSO. was only too aware that his authority did not seem to match his heavy 

responsibilities and that, unlike DNC Captain Joseph Redman, he was not really in charge 

of Army communications. 

There were several developments that grew out of this reexamination of Signal Corps 

authority. One was a study of the merger of certain Army and Navy communications 

functions to prevent overlap and duplication. A section of the resulting report, which was 

issued on 19 February 1943, dealt with COMLNT. The ad hoc committee came to the 

conclusion that The intelligence and security activities of the Army and Navy provide one 

of the finest examples of complete coordination and cooperation. There is no evidence of 

any duplication of effor t. "" 

This conclusion, coming as it did from a junior ad hoc group, by no means represented 

the final thinking of the time. A few weeks later, Captain Stone of OP-20-G alerted the 

DNC to "determined efforts" being made by the Army to merge Army-Navy COMINT." 
Stone cited as evidence the Army's recent offer to assist in anti U-bt CUM which bad 

been acmmpaded by a request to OP-20-43 for U-boat trdii. Further, the CBB in 

Australia was seeking to merge with FRUMEL, and of greatest significance were 

statements by General Strong ". . . in which he affirmed positively his belief that there 

should be a single qpkamlytic bureau in ~&hington for the Army and Navy." Stone 

concluded that the Navy would lose in any merger but that OP-20-G assistance to the 

Army's coarrm program was a good idea. 

The matter was of sufficient concern to the Navy for Admiral Horne to forward Stone's 

observations to Admiral King. Horne commented that he agreed with Capbin Stone and 

that the integrity of Navy COhdINT must be preserved under direct Navy control.u Admiral 

King commented, 'This is rt clear case where the Navy can render services to the Army 

that the latter auld not duplicatete" 

The Army had still other proposals for mergers. During March the deputy chief of shff 

and the chief of the air staff suggested tu the Navy that two super agencies be created - an 

Army-Navy Far Eastern Intelligence Service under Navy Department control and an 

Army-Navy Atlantic and Middle Eastern Inklligem Service under the War Department. 

On 1 April the DM advised Admiral Horne that these ideas were not acceptable to the 

Navp 

On 10 May 1943 General McNarney, DCS, appointed a board to study Army 

communications." One ofthe members of the hard was Colonel Carter Clarke. The board 

was created to consider suggestions by General Olmstead that the CSO should have more 

authority and to generally consider the state of Army communications, as there seems to 

have been growing dissatisfaction at high levels. The bard concluded that Amy 

communications were "hadequate, unsatisfactory and confused." In its report issued on 

21 June, the board recommended that a communications and electronics division be 

created and placed on the General SW and that it have wide powers to direct Army signal 

matters, This was disapproved at high levera. A few days after the board concluded its 

work, General Olmstead was dismissed as CSO and forced to retire. He was replaced by 

Harry C. Ingles. 

The board seems not to have studied Army-Navy (30m consolidation. Testimony 

was taken from Joseph Redman, probably to examine the Navy's communication 

management. There was testimony on CoMINT from General Strong, General Stoner, and 

others. Strong testified to the poor equipage and inefficient deployment of the SRI 

companies, which, he sad, should be placed under War Department control. General 

Stoner voiced the usual Signal Corps position that intercept and processing should remain 

in the Signal Corps. 

During the period that khe bard was meeting, General Strong approached Admiral 

Train, the DM, with a new plan for Army-Navy GOMINT cooperation. He submitted to 

Admiral Train the draft of an agreement, for their joint signature, that would establish a 
joint Army-Navy COMINT summary to be written (presumably daily) by MID.47 This 

summary would be distributed within the Army and Navy only. Material to be 

disseminated outside the services would continue to be done by the service that produced 

the intelligence. 

Admiral Train submitted the Strong draft to Joseph Redman. Redman's response was 

negative.M He observed that General Strong's draft was vape in use of terms but, most 

importantly, 'This agreement would practically result in the establishment of the Unified 

Radio Intelligence Organization that General Strong has been promoting, which the Navy 

opposes." Also it would take dissemination away from the COMINT producing agency. So, 

the proposal was rejected. General Strong may not have been proposing anything more 

than a "super MAGIC Summary," an expanded version of the existing MIS Special Branch 

product. Nonetheless, if General Strong was a promoter of a joint COMINT agency, this 

could certainly have been a first step in that direction. 

On 1 June Commander Wenger, possibly prompted by the Strong proposal, prepared a 

study paper for Captain Stone concerning future Army-Navy COMINT cooperation.49 He 

reviewed the circumstances that had led to the Army undertaking all diplomatic COMINT a 

year before. Commander Wenger believed this should now be reviewed and had 

informally discussed this with Colonel Doud of SSS. Doud had told him that the Army still 

looked on diplomatic traffic as their "bread and butter." The matter seems not to have 

been pressed at the time. 

Commander Wenger returned to the matter of Army-Navy moperation a few months 

later when he prepared a comprehensive review of this subject for Admiral King (this 

paper probably did not get beyond the DNC).'' Wenger recommended that the Army and 

Navy create a joint board modeled on the British "Y" boardleommittee. This board would 

consist of three officers from each service with an experienced (in intelligence) general or 

flag officer as chairman. The board would assure better means of COMINT exchange 

between the services and prompt, safe dissemination of product. The board would be 

directly under the JCS and report to the JCS ". . . for all matters of policy in connection 

with the planning and coordination of joint or combined communication intelligence 

operations, including dissemination of intelligence and security measures pertaining." 

Wenger added that he did not favor actual merger of Army and Navy COMINT. Captain 

Stone forwarded Wenger's paper to the DNC. The recommended board was not created, 

but there seems to have been an increased effort by each service to upgrade the exchange 

of COMINT. 

The SSA surveyed the status of traffic exchange in October 1943 and reported to MIS 

that, while exchange was significant, the only joint effort (that is, planned rather than 

incidental) was the Japanese weather problem.51 The Army was routinely forwarding 

Japanese weather and naval attach4 traffic and German naval attache traffic to OP-20-G. 

The SSA was intercepting the naval attache material incidental to its diplomatic coverage. 
The Navy provided SSA with diplomatic traffic, Japanese army traffic on naval circuits, 

and Japanese weather. 

This type of exchange was in keeping with the 1942 agreements. We should also recall 

that certain decrypted and translated material was exchanged, i.e., the Navy received the 

SSA Bulletin and the MIS Special Branch MAGIC or diplomatic summary. 

In December Colonel Clarke wrote (the recently promoted) Admiral Joseph Redman to 

clarify channels of exchange." He urged Admiral Redman to send all Navy GOMINT that 

was to be disseminated within the Army to the Special Branch. Certain items of COMINT 

were being sent directly to General St& offices rather than ta the Special Branch. Of 

course raw trafic was properly exchanged between the cOMINT agencies rather than via 

MIS. 

The time had come to formalize the Army-Navy COMINT relationships. This will be 

described in chapter 7. Before describing that, this study will describe in some detail the 

important climax of U.S.-British COMINT relations. 

Notes 

1. Memorandum fmm OP-20-Gh section heads, 21 May 1943, subject: Disseminationof Information in the Navy 

Department. OP-20-G Organization Folder (classiAed). This document details the 20-GI dissemination system. 

Also, letter ta the author by Captain Packard (based on the latter's historical research). 

2. Report of Mr. Rawleigh Warner to Adrnir~l King, 29 April 1943, subject: Intelligence Function, Ctztalogue, 

2.c.I 12) (classified). 

3, Memorandum from King to Horne, 26 June 1943, "General File," NSAHC (classified). 

4. For much of the information in this section, the author is indebted to Captain Packard. Captain Packard 

studied numerous sources not seen by the author. Also see Furer, Administration of the May Department in 

World War I, 156--167, for an excellent discussion of the egtablishmsnt of F-2. 

5. Letter from Captain Packard. 

6. Furer, 158. 

7. Volume 1, Allied Comm unicratwn Intelligence ancl the Battle ofthe Atlantic, 4-5 (classified). 

8. Latter, VCNO serial 0833920,19 April 1943, Catalog, 2.6.1 1). 

9. OP-20-G Subdivision Order No. 55,16 April 1943, subject: Cognizance and Functions of Sections Under OP20-G, OP-20-G Organization File. 
10. GCHisbory, 25,434. The teletype facilitim then in operation were: 

U7067 - hplex line for Bainbridge 

LL7433 - gimplex line from Bainbridge and Imperial Beach 

U7037 - simplex line from Chatham. Ma~achuseth 

WA52 - 'IWX on which traffic was received from Chatham; Jupiter, Florida, Winter Harbor, Maine, 

~mperial Beach, and Bainbridge. 

11. General Clarke, in a letter to the author, described the departure of Colonel Bullock and his replacement by 

Colonel Corderman. Corderman would head Ule cryptologic service until &r World War 11. He was the fist 

commander of ASA. 

12. Memorandum from Clarke to Stmng, 12 Feb 1943, ACSI #49, HereaRer the term AHS will ba used 

interchangeably with SSSor SSA to mean the Army's cryptologic headquarters. This is in keeping with the style 

of the period 1943-45. 

13. "Control of Signal Security Units in Theaters of Operation," 25 February 1943, ACSI 148. This is a 

significant document and premntp a thorough policy statement from the AHS point of view, though with limited 

mentionof the role of MIS. 

14. Ibid,;Radio IntorceptSurvey forwarded to Colonel mrke by Colonel Corderman, 12 April 1943. There were 

various changea during thicr period in the monitoring stations. The long-time station at Corozal, Canal Zone, the 

former MS4, was cloaed as was Fort Hunt (former MS-7). MS numbers changed from time to time. The amtern of 

giving MS numbers to fiources of traffic outside of SSS (such as the SRK, foreign government, other U.S. se&ee) 

continued. 

15. Memorandum from Colonel Hamid Doud to Colonel Corderman, 9 April 1943, subject: Solution of Indicator 

System 2468 Japanese Army Code, ACSI #49; also, History uf SSA, vol. 4 (Language Branch), 23 ff. Detaih of 

how the break was made and the tirning of who did what are beyond the soope of this study (and the autho& 

undershndiag of cryptanalysia). 

16. History of SSA, vol. 4, 92 ff. Solution of the Japanese army mdea presented incredible difficulties for the 

Allies. Fortunately, Japanese army oommunications were largely Morse, so the problems of intercept were less 

severe than might have been the case had more ~phisticated equipment been available. 

17. Memorandum from Genera1 Stmng. ACS, G-2, to the chiefsignal officer, 8 March 1943, subject: Priorities for 

Operations of the Signal Smurity Service, ACSI #49 (classified). 

18. McCorrnack memorandum, Origin and Functwns, 44-46. McCormack 1W a number d important Special 

Branch analyses prior to April 1943. Among them, (a) oorrect prediction induly 1942 that Japan would not attack 

the USSR; (b) information on the Spanish attitude following the North African invasion: (cl Latin American 

matters to guide U.S. policy there; and (dl Japanese economic plans in the Far East. 

19. Htsiory ofSpecialBmnch, 60 (classified). 

20. Origin and Functions, 2+2l lclassified). 

21. Memorandum from General Strong (Carter W. Clarke, draker) to AGO, 11 Aug. 1943, directing preparation 

of memorandum to CG, ASF. The latter sent to ASF on 13 Aug. 1943, ACST 849 (classified), 

22. Memorandum from 0. L. Nelson to ACS, G-2, 18 Oct. 1943, subject: Signal Intelligence Activities in 

Washington, D.C., ACSI #49 (classified). 
23. Memorandum from strong to deputy chid of staff, 23 Oct IW, subject Signal Intelligence Adpiti# in 

Wwhiwn, D.C. ACSI #49 (clasaiEied). 

24. Hisdory of CBB, tab A, 4-8. 

25. hid., Tab J. The politiw of this situation owht not to be belabored because the Auatdb units may have 

baen able to provide mdicientcwemge up to tbe time of the- imrasion of the Philippines. The hishy of h 125th 

SEU is espe&lly intee. It had operated against Japanese army rxrmmunhtions &m 8 -bet 1941 

from Weat Coast sibs, especially forth^, Washington. It may be w~rd a pmkemor to -2, Two Rmk 

Ranch, as an immt murm ofJapanesa army traffic. 

26. Letter from A. Ginkav to 8. Bullback, January 1943, attached to CBB Progrew Report 14, January 1943, 

NSAH. 

27. -e number Q4101, CBB to War Department {for SSA). Folder 3 115, CXG-114, BII. NSAH. 

28. Mv number Ql489, CBB to Wsr Depmrhnni (#ant ss Akin to EXlBinkoy C Kullbackh 21 September 

1943, in ibid 

29. Msssage from Commader Travis to Colonel O'Connor (GC&CS representative in Washingtun), 3 July 1943 

in ibid. 

30. SSA Routing and Work &a&, 26 July 1943, initia#ed by Lieutenant &lone1 Eade F. Cook and Lieutenant 

CoIonel Hmld McX). Brown, in hid. 

32. Fabian intervim by Captain Wayman Packatd. 

33. Memorandum from Commander Wenger to chief, OP-204, ~ubjeck Collaboration between RI Unit and 

"Central Burealq" Brisbana, 20 March 1943, Cablog 3.g. Detail8 of this conference am well ax background 

information w FRUBdELCBB are arntained in this 8even-page memorandum, which i a detailed exmition of 

the aontrwsrsies in Austdk 

34. mi. 

36. OlrClirt~ #CdIoborafion. a background paper prepared by Commander Wenger, 18 August 1944, Cadolog 

2.c.(l Z), 54. 

96. See the variow appendkeg to tab A,History ofCBB, (Part I), NSAHC. 

37. History of CBB, tab A, appendix B. Lieutenant Colonel Erskine of the translation branch had gone bo 

Austdin io April 1942 with Colonel Sinkov and was thus an original member of CBB. 

38. Critique in Hizhy ofCBB, Part I. This paper wan signed by Booth. Sinkov, and Sandford (clddl 

39. SSO History. vol. 3, tab A: Memorandum prepared by Major John R. Thompwn. deputy special security 

representative bdaaaified). 

40. CBB History, tab A. 

42. A Survey Ming b the Merger of Army aruf Nauy Communications Seruicss, Iniiiaily to 7ttudw Red of 

DupIh$iort od Owrlaps dc., 19 Feb. 1943, Cablog 2.cJ7). l%ia document has a god overview of SSS and OP20-6 otganiaation. The suruey was not mainly directed toward COMINT; however, COMINT was just one of 

many signals arean under canaideration 
43. Memorandum hm Stone to DNC, 9 March 1943, quoted in Wenger'a Oldline of Cdlabomtion (see note 35 

above). We may aasume that Wenger drafted the Stone memorandum (classified). 

44. Note from Horne to King, 10 March 1943, in ibid (classidedj. 

45. This is described in Wenger's Outline of Coiiaboralwn. The Army's DCSat that time was General McWarney. 

He was never satisfied during the war that Army intelligence was properly organized for most eEcient service. 

46. A11 the information on the proceedings of the Board and the relief of Generel Olmstead is from ThB Test, 584- 

563 and Tka Outwme, 614-615. 

47. Memorandum, withattached draft agraement, Strong to Train (classified) 26 May 1943, Catalog 2.c.(8). 

48. Endorsement, Joseph Redman to Train, 2 June 1943 (clasaifiedj in ibid. 

49. Memorandum from Wenger to OP-20-G, 1 June 1943, "Liaisonn folder MSAH (classified). 

50. This memorandum, dated 28 August 1943, is quotad in Wenger's later paper, Outline of Co1Elaborabiars, etc. 

(classified). 

61. Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel H. McD. Brown, SSA to Colonel S. P. Collins, 16 October 1943, ACSI 

#49 (cla~edj. 

52. Memorandum from Clarke tu Joseph R. Redman, 2 December 1943, quoted in Wenger's Outline of 

Colla borntion Iclamified). 
Chapter 4 

The Army-British COMINT Agreements of 1943: 

The ENIGMA Crisis 

THE CRISIS IN BRITISH-US. RELATIONS 

Beginning in late 1942, British-U.S. Army GOMINT relations underwent a most 

difficult period not eased until a general agreement was reached in May 1943. This may 

be considered the "ENIGMA crisis," for it involved determined War Department efforts to 

get full access to ENIGMA material, both means of production and finished product. In the 

end, the British monopoly of ENIGMA ceased, and a full partnership began. 

In January 1943 the routine and long-established British-U.S. Army relationship 

regarding diplomatic traffie was reaffirmed and clarified in a conference at Arlington 

Hall. The formal meeting, which lasted less than two hours, was attended by 

representatives of all interested organizations:' 

U.S. 

Colonel W. W. Murray (Senior Representative) Colonel Bullock (Chief SSS) 

Colonel John Tiltman IGC&CS) 

Major Drake (DM1 mce, Canada) 

Captain Kenneth Maidment (BSC) 

Mr. De F. Bayly (BSC) 

and others 

Lieu tenant Colonel H . Doud (SSS) 

Major Telford Taylor (MIS Special 

Branch) 

Major H. McD. Brown (SSS) 

Captain Ruwlett (SSS) 

Mr. Friedman (SSS) 

Ensign Daniels (OP-20-G) 

The purpose of the meeting was to insure the proper exchange of diplomatic traffic. 

Major Brown of SSS acted as moderator. He proposed that each country submit a schedule 

of coverages (circuits) and material desired. Based on these requirements, a working 

committee composed of Major Brown and Captain Maidment of BSC would make the 

arrangements. There was a discussion of existing channels of communication between the 

parties and agreement that exchange through Captain Maidment had proved a successful 

technique. 

Quite separate from this uncontroversial area of cooperation was a problem that had 

beguna month earlier. On 2 December 1942, Field Marshall Sir John Dill, the British 
chiefs of staff representative in 

Washington, had written a note to 

General Marshall saying that Dr. 

Alan Turing, then in the U.S. on a 

scientific mission, had been denied 

access to a scrambler device being 

tested by the Bell Laboratories. Sir 

John asked General Marshall if he 

c~uld lift this bam2 

This led to several days of study 

and consideration at the War 

Department, mostly within MID. 

Carter Clarke suggested to General 

Strong that the British were acting 

in a suspicious manner because the 

approach to the War Department 

had been made by Captain Haatings, 

the GC&CS representative, through 

Colonel D. M. Crawford of the Signal 

Corps rather than through MID. 

Crawford had hld Captain Hastings 

that the scrambler could not be 

shown to Dr. T~ring.~ On 4 December General Strong suggested to General Marshall that a forceful note be sent to the British protesting these "back door" 

methods.4 This was not done. However, General Marshall seems to have met with Dill, 

because on 8 December the chief of staff told his deputy, General McNarney, that Dill had 

said that Dr. Turing had full access in the U.K. to all secret developments. Therefore, 

Marshall asked McNarney, "would there continue to be objection to his [Turing] being 

allowed to see what is going on?"5 

Dr. Alan Turing, cryptanalyst and mathematician 

McNarney's reply is not known, but perhaps General Strong and Colonel Clarke 

intervened. For on 9 December Marshall wrote to Dill and told him that access to the 

scrambler was restricted, but that this was not unlike the British policy toward the U.S. 

Army for, continued Marshall, ". . . there is not interchange of information regarding these 

ultra-secret de~elopments."~ Marshall expressed his regrets that Dr. Turing had been 

embarrassed and suggested that a new request for access to the project could be made 

through MID. 

General Dill, taking General Marshall's letter to mean that the matter would be 

solved in Dr. Turing's favor, expressed his gratitude to MarshalL7 Dill said that he had 
been "horrified" to learn from Marshall that secret information was being withheld. He 

assured Marshall that he had taken appropriate action and that now "we hide nothing." 

Actually the Turing matter had not been resalved and would rapidly become a forum 

for reviewing the total U.S. Army-British GOMINT relationship. 

Following Marshall's memorandum to Dill on 9 December, the latter seems ta have 

instructed Captain Hastings to communicate with Commander Travis at GC&CS on the 

points raised by General Marshall. On 12 and 14 Decemhr Hastings met with Carter 

Clarke and showed him a aeries of messages from Travis. The theme of these messages 

was that Hastings and Colonel John Tiltman must convince the U.S. that GC&CS was 

withholding nothing. Clarke also learned that at Dill's direction Captain Hastings was to 

formally request MID to grant Dr. Turing access to the scrambler project at Bell Labs. 

Hastings was to secure a clear yes or no answer from MID.' Clarke urged General Strong 

to refuse the requested access. He said that the British were withholding a great deal from 

the US., spwifically German army field traffic, German clandestine traffic, material 

related to "Slavic" nations, and details of the GC&CS "high-speed analyses.'" 

General Marshall apparently agreed' with the Clarke-Strong position. On 23 

Decemkr he again wrote Field Marshal Dill telling him that, according to MID, the 

British were holding back the aforementioned items.'' Dill's response three days later is 

especially interesting.'' The field marshal may have recognized that there was high-level 

confusion at the War Department as to how the British controlled COMINT, while the 

British were equally confused about the U.S. setup. Dill explained that British COMINT 

was centralized under GC&CS headed by Brigadier Stuart Menzies. The latter's 

Washington representative was Captain Hastings, and Colonel Tiltman, in Washington 

for a liaiwn visit, was also a GC&CS official. Dill also stated that GC&CS was under the 

Foreign Office.12 Re acknowledged his own misunderstanding in that Dr. Turing had 

applied for access through the wrong channels, namely, Signal Corps instead of MID. Dill 

did not withdraw his request (through Hastings) on behalfof Dr. Turing. 

On 1 January 1943, General Strong advised Marshall that he had talked with Colonel 

Tiltrnan regarding the US, c~rnplaints.'~ The SSS would directly resolve he issues with 

Colonel Tiltman. But General Strong still believed that the British should be barred from 

the scrambler project. He was supported in this stand by Admiral King, the DNC, and by 

the Signal Corps. Therefore he suggested that General Marshall either ignore the DillHastings-Turing request or explain to Dill that his (Marshall's) technical staff had advised 

him to continue to restrict access to the scrambler. 

General Marshall did not take any action for several days. But there was heated 

communication between the British intelligence representatives in Washington and their 

chiefs on how to satisfy the U.S. and press Dr. Turing's case.ld On 1 January Commander 

Travis wired Tiltman: "Can you not plead with Arlington or G-2 to assist in the matter of 

Turing?" Tiltman replied that the Turing case was being handled at the highest level and 
that a decision would be forthcoming. Tiltman reported that on his own initiative he had 

hld General Strong that the best way to fulfill U.S. Army intelligence needs would be for 

Strong to have an Army represenbative adkl to GC&CS for receipt of all COMLNT and 

related evaluations. Strong had accepted this suggestion and planned to send Colonel A1 

McCormack {Clarke's deputy in Special Branch) on a short mission to the U.K. to study the 

implementation of Tiltman's proposal. 

Colonel Tiltman's suggestion to General Strong would prove, many months hence, ta 

Ix the method adopted. The short-term response was hoatile. On 4 January 1943 Travis 

wired Tiltman that "director does not (repeat not) approve of your suggestion" and that if 

McCommck visited the U.K. he could deal with the British DMI. Fortunately, Captair! 

Hastings intervened with a pmonal message to the CSS (i.e., the director, Brigadier 

Menaries) on 5 January. He made it clear that the London reapow to Tillman's suggestion 

was impolitic and that General Strong was the U.S. Army "kingpin for all 'Y policy," 

Therefore, Colonel MeCormack should be welcomed by WCS ad not diverted to the 

DMI.15 That same day Tiltman wired Travis. He noted that Hastings would send a 

personal message to the CSS. He opined hi one problem now apparent to him was that 

MID was reluctant ". . . to take advice on policy from Arlington experts with whom all our 

contaet has been hitherto. " 

Once again Colonel Tiltman had shown great perception. For while the MID (actually 

MIS Special Branch) had gained authority over Army COmm policy in May 1942, there 

was not yet adequate knowledge, by MIS, of what the SSS was doing in technical areas. 

That lack of knowledge extended to certain SSS and SISETOUSA relations with Britain. 

For example, there is no indication that Carter Clarke or General Strong were fulIy aware 

of the results of SSS liaison training visits to GC&CS during 1942 (i.e,, Kullback's visit; 

Johnson's assignment there). Nor had the British understcad who was in charge for the 

U.S. - that the responsible person was General George Strong, not the chief signal offleer 

or his subordinates. This was further confused by the attitude of SSS. Under Lieutenant 

Colonel Winkler and Colonel Bullock, aceess to SSS spaces for MIS land its predecessor) 

was very limited. Special Branch analysts did not have personal contact with SSS 

cryptanalysts or translators. This was changed when Colonel Corderman took command. 

Colonel Tiltman also revealed to Commander Travis in the 5 January message that 

War Department experiments with a new type of Bombe had only been revealed to him the 

day before. Tiltman reshted the position advanced to General Strong by him and Captain 

Hastings, ". . . we withhold nothing but reserve right to discourage duplication where our 

interests are vitally deded." 

The Dill-Marshall exchange now resumed. On 5 January Sir John formally requested 

Marshall permit Dr. Turing to visit the project at the Bell Labs.la General Marshall's 

reply, made the next day, seriously confused the issues.17 He once again rejected the 

request made on behalf of Dr. Turing. He concluded that other than War Department 

interests were involved and that he could not resolve these in Dr. Turing's favor. General 
Marshall then added his comments on General Strong's desire for more access to British 

COMINT. According to General Marshall, ". . . he (Strong) agrees with me that turning this 

information over to us does actually involve increased hazard. Therefore my opinion is 

that your people should not release to us more detailed data of this kind than they do at 

present. As I said before General Strong agrees with this." 

The stand concerning Dr. Turing was merely a continuation of what had been going on 

for over a month. It was not helpful, but it was consistent. However, General Marshall's 

reversal, and the alleged reversal by General Strong regarding access to highest level 

British COMINT, is impassible to understand. During this period General Marshall's 

attention was turned elsewhere. Lacking other evidence, I conclude that he 

misrepresented the views of General Strong because of some misunderstanding. 

The next day General Marshall and Field Marshal Dill had a meeting about these 

issues. Dill then put his response in writing.'' Like General Marshall's letter, it is not 

completeIy in keeping with known events. Rather than find the apparent Marshall-Strong 

concession an agreeable matter, Dill was angered. Perhaps he thought that the U.S. 

agreement not to push for more COMINT dicess was a sarcastic response or, more likely, 

that it represented a disbelief that all was being shared. Dill wrote, "It seems to me that 

the proposals in your letter derogate from the principle of full reciprocity. Our position, I 

understand, has been made quite clear. We are prepared to show your people everything 

in England [Dill's emphasis], but we reserve the right to refuse to allow 'exploitation' in 

the U.S. of vitally secret traffic where we are chiefly concerned, unless we are satidled as 

to the necessity." Dill noted that the USN had been "allowed" to exploit certain traffic 

[i.e., U-boat ENIGMA] because it was vitally important to the Navy.lg Dill was equally 

strident on the Turing matter. He suggested that if Dr. Turing returned to England 

empty-handed there would be "an unfortunate effect." He noted the great amount of 

mistrust and the need to restore mutual confidence. 

There is another British response that cannot be specifically dated, though it was 

probably an enclosure to Dill's letter of 7 January. This is a background paper probably 

prepared by (or for) Commander Travis, GC&CS, and sent to Dill.ao It is a refutation of the 

points raised by General Marshall, on advice of C arter Clarke,and General Strong, in his 

23 December memorandum to Dill. Among the points disputed were these: 

1. Various U.S. representatives in the U. K. had seen the "high-speed analyses" [i.e., 

the Bornbe]. The U.S. was working on one too but had not shared this fact with the British 

until December 1942. 

2. Several U.S. Army personnel were at Blekhley Park working on German army 

field tra%c (SIS-ETOUSA personnel). 
3. Some German clandestine traffic (within Europe) may have been withheld from 

the U.S. prior to the North African landings, and some of this traffic may have been slow in 

reach-mg General Eisenhower, but "I believe this has been cleared up." 

4. And fdly, no "Slavic" traffic was being withheld. Activities in this area were 

made known to the Sinkov group in 1941, and after the German invasion of Russia "the Y 

Board decided to cease interception of Russian service trdc." [However, the British 

would begin to work some of the Russian problem again during 1943 - and not share 

information with the US.] 

On 9 January 1943, General Marshall left Washington for the Casablanca Conference 

and did not return until 28 January." The degenerating COMINT and Turing negotiations 

now fell to General McNarney, the deputy chief of staff. On the 9th Colonel Tiltman 

received a message from Travis for General Strong's attention.= Travis assured Strong 

that the RSS was giving all ETO tr&ic (clandestine) to General Eisenhower and that in 

general terms of COMINT access "Eisenhower is treated on precisely the same terms as any 

British commander." r. 

Casablanca Conference, January 1943 

The same day General McNarney acted decisively. As Field Marshal Dill had also 

gone to Casablanca, McNarney sent a memorandum to Lieutenant General G. N. 

Macready, British Staff Mission, ~ashington.'~ McNarney wrote that he had directed G-2 

h grant Dr. Turing access to the Bell Labs for the purpose of examining the scrambler. 
Unfortunably, the resolution of the Turing affair did not clear the way for a general 

agreement between the War Department and the British on the ENIGMA. Relations grew 

worse during the next three months. 

On 8 February 1943 Mr. Friedman formally reported to Colonel Corderman that 

Arlington Hall's own "E solving machines" would be installed by 1 April and ready for 

operations soon after." But, warned Friedman, actual exploitation of German army and 

air force ENIGMA enciphered communications would not be possible without specially 

trained personnel, a considerable volume of German service traffic, information from the 

British about their technical means of dealing with ENIGMA, and special channels of 

communication (and attendant cryptographic gear) for Arlington Hall. Special training 

was in progress at Arlington Hall, and special communications presumably could be 

developed. Only the British could provide the German trac and the vitally important 

information on special techniques. The only U.S. Army sources of high-grade German 

traffic were MSl (Vint Hill) and the SRI detachments in Iceland and Newfoundland. 

These sources were inadequate and would remain so primarily because of geographic 

considerations. Therefore, proposed Mr. Triedman, a message should be sent to GC&CS 

announcing the near readiness of Arlington Hall's '% solving equipmentJ' and suggesting 

that ENiGMA exploitation begin there. GC&CS would be requested h furnish the traffic. 

Friedman recognized the British concern for security and the attendant reluctance to 

allow ENIGMA exploitation outside the U.K. The British fears could be overcome by these 

arguments: Arlington Hall could make a real contribution on its own; as there was a large 

volume of traffic to work, it could be divided for better coverage; the German army and air 

force might introduce a fourth wheel into their ENIGMA machines; the Japanese might 

adopt the ENIGMA; and the U.S. needed practical training for future operations. 

This memorandum was shown to Colonel Clarke, and it formed a basis for 

recommendatians made in a memorandum drafted by Clarke that General Strong sent b 

General Marshal! on 17 February." General Strong recounted the chief of staffs 

correspondence with Field Marshal Dill and then advised that the time had come for the 

U.S. Army to exploit ENIGMA communications much as the U.S. Navy was doing, with 

British approval and assistance. General Strong attached a detailed proposal that was 

essentially a restatement of Mr. Friedman's observations and suggestions. He also 

enclosed the draft of a letter for Field Marshal Dill that was also a version of Mr. 

Friedman's ideas. 

En this memorandum to General Marshall, General Strong did recognize that U.S. 

forces in the U.K. and North Africa were "doubtless" receiving intelligence analyses based 

on GC&CS exploitation of ENIGMA. But this was not sufficient for U.S. needs and was not 

an adequate exchange for the U.S. gift of the PURPLE machine two years before. 
German ENIGMA cipher machine exhibited at the 

National Cryptdo& Museum, Fort Meadm, wand 

The memorandum may have reached General Marshall the same day, for late that 

afternoon he had an appointment with His response to General Strong was brief - 

the matter should be resolved through Captain ha sting^.^ 

General Strong's requests of the British (made in his 17 Feliruary memorandum to 

General BkshaIl) were given to Capbin Hastiw, who forwarded them to the director of 

GC&CS, that is, Brigadier Menzies, the CSS. On 26 February the latter wired Hastinp 

that the whole question had been placed before the British chiefs of staffmas 

Brigadier General Hayes Kroner, Strong's deputy, was in London, and the direct 

rcspousibility for negotiating with the British Chiefs of Staff fell on him. He was in an 

unfortunate position, a he came to accept some alspecb of the British pmition, greatly 

displeasing General Strong and Colonel Clarke. During the flst week of March, Kroner 

sent a message to G2 that implied that the dispahh of raw traffic from GC&CS to 

Washington was undesirable on security grounds. On 8 March Strong cabled an 

unmmpro&ing replyam Kroner was to insist upon tr&c from the British. He was to 

"press this point to the limit of your ability,* and he could call upon the SSS liaison off~mr 

at Bletchley Park, Captain Roy Johnson, if he ned technical advice. 
Kroner's reply on 11 March clearly showed how difficult his position ~as.5~ He assured 

General Strong that he had made the very highest contacts short of Prime Minister 

Churchill and that the U.S. position had been fully presented. The British were adamant 

that there could be no exploitation outside of the U.K. because of the danger to security. 

Kroner suggested that the U.S. had no choice other than to participate at BIetchley Park. 

An appeal could be made to the prime minister, said Kroner, but he recommended that 

General Strong wait until the British Joint Chiefs had sent their formal estimations to 

Dill. Perhaps most telling of the points made by General Kroner was his statement that 

the British "lay great store" in Marshall's memorandum to Dill of 6 January 1943 (supra) 

wherein Marshall had written his agreement hat traffic should not be sent to the U.S. 

because of danger to security. Kroner added that he was not even aware of this letter which, 

of murse, put him in the position of advancing a proposal already rejected by his own chief 

of staff." 

Probably unknown to General Kroner, the British Chiefs of Staff had already 

dispatched their instruction to Sir John Dill. Their letter, dated 7 March 1943, refers to 

some of the preceding correspondence and presents, in the form of a joint regulation, 

defmitiona and procedures that are to appl; to highest level of COM~NT.~~ The term special 

intelligence (SI) was to apply to high-grade axis codes and ciphers that had been broken. 

SI was derived from the following: 

All German services' ENIGMA machine ciphers and German secret service and 

attache ENIGMA ciphers 

German secret teleprinter 

Italian Hagelin and SIGMA submarine code 

Japanese military attach6 code 

Exploitation was to be as follows: 

1. Items 1-3 were to be in British hands, although German naval ENIGMA keys would 

continue to be exploited by the British and the U.S. [QP-20-GI. 

2. PURP~ would continue to be mutually exploited. 

3. JN-25 was to be exploited by the U.S. in the SWPA but "coqjointly" with the 

British unit in Australia and the ". . . command area of the CIC, Eastern Fleet. . . ." 

4. Japanese military attache code would continue to be mutually exploited. 
SI would be disseminated to British and U.S. commandem in chief as needed for 

conducting operations. Both the U.S. and Britain would be bound by the same SI 

regulations. 

The author has not been able to determine the date when the British Joint Chiefs 

letter reached Dill and in turn the Combined Chiefs of Skaff, G2. It is interesting to note 

that from 7-14 March General Marshall vacationed in Florida accompanied by Field 

Marshal DilLS By 17 March, the War Department was undertaking the study of severing 

a11 existing -c exchange arrangements with the British.= 

It was a bad time for U.S. Army cryptologic efforts. Not only had the British adopted 

an uncompromidng stand on ENIGMA, but the Army had just recognized that the U.S. 

military attach8 code had been compromised and other U.S. systems were now in doubt.s5 

The War Department seems to have briefly considered a new tack. Perhaps the U.S. 

WWNT units in North Africa could provide German intercept for the SSS, which now had 

equipment that could be used on ENIGMA traie. A series of inquiries were sent to Harold 

G, Hayes, the SIS veteran who was now the senior officer in the U.S. Army COMINT setup 

in North Africa. Hayes made it clear that ~il~m-based COmT was received by AFHQ 

(Eisenhower) in Algiers on a special radio link from Bletchley Park. This SI was given to 

G2 and not to Hayes as "Y service here has nothing to do with it.& The 849th SIS and 

other Army Comrrr units were in no position to provide the SSS with any volume of 

ENIGMA enciphered traffc. 

What was needed now were serious counterproposals to the British from the War 

Department. On 3 April 1943 Colonel Corderman submitted such a detailed alternative to 

Colonel Carter Clarke.s7 Corderman generally accepted the British definition of those 

types or sources of the solved high-grade systems to be known as ST. However, he added 

two more: the Japanese ~plomatic system known as J-19 and the German diplomatic 

keyword system known as FLORADORA. Thereafhr he sidcantly departed from the 

British Joint Chiefs' declaration of common policy. The key portions are quoted in full: 

Special intelligence aad TA intelligence in dl haters will be exploiited cooperativeIy at all 

ezploitation centers with a fuU, he, and frank interchange of raw material. technical data. 

solution data, d mhbral intelligence. 

Research in cryptanalysis and in the devslopment of cryptanalytic, intercept, DF, and TA 

apparatus shall be on an en!&ely reciprocal basis, together with all experiments and findings. 

Specially accredited U.S. representatives will continue to be welcome at all British signal 

intelligence centers, and from them nothing in the field mveted in this paragraph wiH be 

withheld [and the U.S. would reciprocate toward the British]. 

Corderman changed certain British definitions for joint use. As in the British Joint 

Chiefs' declaration, Corderrnan emphasized security of dissemination and operational use 

of SI. 
Corderman's alternative plan was studied at MIS Special Branch by Lieutenant 

Colonel Telford Taylor. Taylor reported his findings to Carter Clarke on 5 April.@ Colonel 

Taylor was favorable toward the Corderman plan but suggested that practical 

considerations would require certain m~d~cations by way of compromise. Nor did he 

limit his observations to the Corderman document, but rather he reviewed the entire 

controversy. He concluded that the severance of U.S.-British CoMIrJT relations would not 

be tolerated by either the U.S. or British Chiefs of SW. Therefore, MIS ought to discard 

that as a serious option. Nonetheless, this was a two-edged sword. Captain Hastings, the 

GCLCS representative, had implied to the U.S. that the British themselves would sever 

the existing GOMINT relationship if the British Joint Chiefs' proposal was not accepted. 

Hastings had combined with this threat a continuing disparagement of PURPLE'S 

importance and had generally downgraded the performance of U.S. Army GOMINT. Taylor 

suggested that this could be turned around and that MIS could show the British and U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff that it was Captain Hastinga and company who were promoting a break in 

relations. 

As Taylor and Corderman saw it, th~British proposal was unacceptable mainly 

because it excluded U.S. Army participation in cryptanalysiddeeryption of German 

ENIGMA and TUNNEY (secret teleprinter communications) and in dissemination of 

resulting SI. The U.S. could not agree to such exclusion and "what we really want at this 

time is to gain a foothold in 'ENIGMA' and develop technical competence and gradually 

develop a supplementary operation so as to improve joint coverage. What we ultimately 

want is independence. . . ." Taylor's specific recommendations to accomplish this are a 

reworking of Corderman's effort. This, combined with some change made by Carter 

Clarke formed the basis for U.S. Army-British COMINT cooperation for the remainder of 

the war.38 The exploitation of ENIGMA and TUNNEY would remain largely a British 

responsibility, while PURPLE, Japanese military attach6 IJMA), and J-19 would be 

primarily the responsibility of the U.S. Army. But there would be mutual exchange of raw 

material, technical data, and solution data in call the foregoing systems. The U.S. GOMINT 

center(s1 " . . . will be able to furnish supplemental coverage at all times and provide 

security against interruptions in British operations." Secondly, there would be full 

exchange of SI, that is, final COMINT product, between the U.S. Army and the British via 

specially appointed officers. This last point recognized the use of the British special liaison 

unit (SLU) system and was the origin of the U.S. SSO system that continues to this day. 

Using this reasonable counterproposal, General Strong placed the matter before 

General Marshall in a memorandum of 12 ApriL4' General, Strong also used this 

opportunity to remind the chief of staff of the fragmented nature of the Army's COMINT 

organization, which compared poorly with the British system. 

General Marshall's response, if any, is not known. But General Strong must have 

received some high-level encouragement, because on 19 April he met with Brigadier 

Redman, secretary of the Combined Chiefs of SM, to whom he presented the U.S. view. 
The next day he sent Brigadier Redman a rather nasty memorandum in which he wrote 

hat he alone (Strong) would determine how CoMiNT would be distributed to U.S. forces 

(except for AFHQ in Algier~).~' 

By now the MISMID feeling toward the British had reached a low point. As Telford 

Taylor suggested to Colonel Clarke, British intelligence played one U.S. organization 

against the other and also enjoyed a direct channel to both Prime Minister Churchill and 

President Raosevelt, something not available to MID.^^ 

AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED 

The great controversy had actually bottomed out, and reasonable steps were now 

taken to reach an acmmmodation. A U.S. mission went to Bletchley Park in late April 

1943, and Commander Travis came to Washington in May.# 

The U.S. mission consisted of Colonel Alfred McCormack, Clarke's deputy, and 

Lieutenant Colonel Telford Taylor. They wese joined by Mr. Friedman of SSS. While the 

author has mt seen their instructions, it is clear that the purpose of the mission was to 

learn everything possible about British CoMINT operations. In this way Field Marshal 

Dill's promise to General Marshall that "we withhold nothing" was f~lfilled.~ 

Arriving in the U.K. on 25 April, the members of the mission went to work at a furious 

pace. From then until McCormack and Friedman left the U.K. on 13 June, there was a 

constant flow of detailed messages sent by them to Colonel Clarke and General Strong 

describing GC&CS organization and technique, the general structure of British 

intelligence, techniques of dissemination, and operational use of COMINT. Mr. Friedman 

later supplemented these with a technical report on ENIGMA operations." 

Colonel McCormack had personal conferences with the CSS himself and with 

Commander Denniston, then deputy director (civil) of GC&CS. While Colonel McCormack 

was not empowered to make genera1 agreements on behalf of the War Department, he 

seems to have reached a verbal understanding with Denniston. The latter reaffirmed his 

oft-stated opinion that the U.S. should concentrate on Japanese military systems. He 

offered the service of GC&CS to fill any gap in diplomatic COMINT that might result from 

". . . a supreme effort on Japanese military by Arlington." Denniston also suggested, and 

McCormack agreed, that Lieutenant CoIonel Taylor remain at GC&CS as liaison officer to 

the civil (diplomatic) portion.46 

In the meantime, Commander Travis came to Washington where he met with Colonel 

Corderman, Colonel Clarke, and General Strong. On 16 May Commander Travis formally 

notified Colonel Clarke that he and Colonel Corderman had worked out most details of 

U.S.-British COMINT collaborati~n.~' The next day Commander Travis and General Strong 

signed the "Agreement Between the British Government Code and Cipher School and U.S. 
War Department." Commander Travis signed on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff. For 

some reamn the agreement was not forwarded to General Marshall until 10 June. It was 

then approved on 15 June by the signature of Colonel Otto T. Nelson, Jr,, assistant'to the 

deputy chief of staff and on behalf of the deputy chief of staff.48 The agreement is 

recognizable as an elaborated-upon version of the Corderman-Taylor-Clarke proposal of 

early April. 

The agreement contained an attempted definition of certain terms, which, however, 

underwent later change and need not be elaborated upon here. The major features of the 

agreement are summarized as follows: 

1. The agreement would pertain to COMIMT derived from Axis military and air forces 

only. Nonservice or neutral traffic was excluded. (Abwehr traffic - German intelligence/oounterintelligence - was included.) 

2. There would be a complete interchange of technical data (including CAI through 

liaison offlcer in Washington and London, with arrangements for dissemination of SI to 

field commanders through special channels in accordance with special regulations. 

3. U.S. personnel would be allowed ko gain experience in ENIGMA solution in the U.K. 

4. The U.S. would undertake Japanese military and air force traffic as its main 

responsibility. The British were to have German and Italian military and air force traffic 

as their prime responsibility. 

6. A11 decrypts would be available to each country's liaison officers. 

6. The SIS and the British Y services would cooperate in and coordinate intercept 

operations. 

7. Regarding German cipher machines (ENIGMA mainly), there were to be special 

provisions, among these: 

a. U.S. liaison officers at GC&CS would examine decrypted messages and 

summaries thereof and select those desired for transmission to the War Department and 

theater commanders. 

b. A U,S, cryptanalytic party would work on these systems at GC&CS and effect 

independent solutions but in coordination, so as to avoid duplication. 

c. Research into new methods of cryptanalytic attack would be made in 

Washington. "Formulas will be supplied by Great Britain for use on machines now at 

Arlington Hall." 

Final high-level British approval preceded the similar U.S. action. On 22 May 1943 

Brigadier Redman informed Captain Hastings that Field Marshal Dill had shown the 

Travis-Strong agreement to the chief of the Imperial General Staff [Field Marshal Sir 

Alan Brooke]. The latter approved, he directed that all further arrangements be worked 
out at a technical level "direct with the American authorities concerned." As Brigadier 

Redman concluded, '"The matter is therefore pas~esed to you out of the hands of the chiefs of 

shffc~mrnittee.~~ 

It now remained to implement this imporhnt agreement. This would be done largely 

through the efforts of Colonel Taylor in London, supported by Colonel Clarke in 

Washington. A new array of special regulations would come into beii, and the SSO 

system would won be created. 

The practical results of US. access to ENEMA and other high-grade German material, 

so important operationaIly, can only be touched on in this study. 

TEiE IMPLEMENTATION OFTHE AGREEMENTS 

The Travis-Strong agreement required two separate areas of development by the War 

Department: technical operations by or through the SSS and selection and dissemination 

of COVINT thrOugh the MIS. .Im 

The technhl portion was in turn divided inta operations conducted at Arlington Hall 

and those in the U.K. Operations at Arlington Hall are well beyond the scope of this study. 

It should be said, however, that significant cryptanalytic operations were conducted there 

that materially contributed to the exploitation of German ENIGMA and other high-grade 

systems, The operations in the U.K. were under the "special cryptanalytic project in SIS 

ETOUSA," codenamed BEECHNUT.'^ I 

In early 1943, during the US.-U.K. 

negotiations described above, 

Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, 

chief of the General Cryptanalytic 

Branch at SSA, and Colonel George 

Bicher of SIS ETOUSA made plans to 

send a small detachment to the U.K. to 

conduct intercept operations and 

cryptanalysis in cooperation with 

GC&CS. The BEECHNUT project was 

authorized by General Strong on 9 July 

During the remainder of 1943, 

several groups were sent to the U.K. Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Rowlett 

Headquarters, Project BEECHNUT, was formed with Major Roy D. Johnson, the SSA 

liaison officer at GC&CS as of£icer in charge and Major William Bundy as operations 

officer. BEECHNUT was in turn subordinate to Colonel Richer's SlS ETOUSA. BEECHNUT 
became operational in January 1944 with about 250 offieera and enlisted personnel 

divided into the following elements: 

Special Intercept Unit 16811 th Special Security Dehchment) 

Machine Section of the Special Cryptanalytic Unit (6812th SSOl 

Special Cryptanalytic Unit (6813th SSO) 

BEECHNUT headquarters was colocated with SIS ETOUSA in London. A total of nine 

Bombes, shipped from the U.S., were in use by BEECHNUT by the summer of 1944. 

Thereafter the BEECHNUT units, working in cooperation with GC&CS, significantly 

contributed to the ENIGMA attack in both intercept and solution. 

Lieutenant Colonel Telford Taylor had remained in the U.K, to implement the TravisStrong agreement for MIS. As he had no assistance until the end of August, he limited his 

activities to studying diplomatic material at Berkeley Street and to learning his way 

around at Hut 3 (intelligence reporting), GC&CS. He cabled a mall amount of material to 

MIS Special Branch - mainly ISK and ISOS+decrypts (German secret service trdI3c)." On 

23 August Colonel Taylor was joined by another Special Branch veteran, Major Seth 

McKee, and they cabled the first CWMSS item to Washington on 27 August. This was the 

first German military ENIGMA message that had ever been available to the War 

Department and may be considered the beginning of cooperation under the Travis-Strong 

agreement. 

A11 did not go well, however, because the CSS, British DMI, and perhaps even General 

Strong had second thoughts about the scope of Colonel Taylor's operations. The record of 

this is murky, but one thing is certain: a new and more specific agreement was made on 25 

September 1943 following a conference between Colonel Taylor, the CSS, the British DMI, 

and Wing Commander Jones, the head of Hut 3.52 It was agreed that Colonel Taylor could 

select CXMSS and other texts, as needed, for transmission to Washington. If the 

intelligence anaIysia/cammentary accompanying the texts was inadequate for Colonel 

Taylor's purposes, he could contact the appropriate British ministry (i.e., war, air) for 

elucidation. The ministries could also on their own initiative provide further comments 

(beyond those prepared at Hut 3) to Colonel Tayl~r.~ 

Colonel Taylor received reinforcements in November-December 1943. In January 

1944 the Taylor operation became known as 3-U.S., the nomenclature being derived from 

the fact that it was a US, contingent working with Hut 3. The duties of 3-US, expanded 

in keeping with the original agreement and with new War Department security 

regulations concerning the handling of COMINT. By the end of January 1944, Colonels 

Taylor and McKee were involved in assigning newly arrivd personnel to SSO portions. 

Major Littlefield, a Special Branch veteran, was working at Berkeley Street on diplomatic 

traffic; Major Calfee, another Special Branch type, was involved in counterintelligence 

exploitation of coni[NT (the Ryder Street operation]; while Major F. W. Hilles was in 
charge of the MIS pup at Blekhley Park. This group included ten or more U,S. 

"advisors" responsible for disseminating high-level COMINT to U.S. field comma- an 

equal number of off~cers studying at GC&CS in preparation for SSO assignments with the 

field commands; and three MIS officers with a civilian assishnt, disseminating COMINT to 

the MIS Speeial Branch in Washington." 

On 15 March 1944, General Marshall formally notified General Eisenhower of the role 

of the SSOs.% The receipt and control of ULTRA, which was now the common British-U.S. 

term for high-level CUMWT, at the field commands would be by SLU personnel under the 

control of the director general of N&CS Ci-e., the CSS, Menziesl. MID personnel would 

work with the SLUs. Each field command authorized to receive ULTE~A would have a MID 

representative who would receive the ULTRA, evaluate it, and ". . . present it in usable form 

to the commanding omcer and to each of his senior staff officers as are authorized ULTRA 

recipients, assist in fusing ULTRA intelligence with intelligence derived from other sources, 

d give advice in connection with making operational use of ULTRA intelligence in such 

fashion that the security of the source is not endangered."ss 

. The remainder of the 3-US, story and fie European SSO program can be briefly told 

here (brevity being dictated by the nature of this study rather than merits of the story). 

The MIDIMIS representatives who went into France in 1944 with the field commands, 

though serving as SSOs, were more commonly known as SSRs (Special Security 

Representatives) or simply ULTRA representations or ULTRA officers. These U.S. ULTRA 

officers received the material from the servicing SLU detachment on varying schedules or 

according to the urgency of the material. The SLU detachments were composed mainIy of 

British personnel, but there were some U.S. oficers trained under the SSO system (by 

MIS, 3-U.S., and GC&CS) in these detachments. Overdl SLU control was by the CSS 

acting through SLU#8 at Supreme Headquarters Army Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) 

under the command of British Lieutenant Colonel Gore-~rown.'~ There seems to have 

been no typical ULTRA officer operation on the continent in 194445 becam of varied 

conditions and the personal styles of these officers (and the commanders and G2s they 

served). There were ULTRA officers with at least the following commands: SH AEF [for air 

operations); Eighth and Ninth Air Force; Ninth Tactical Air Command and other tactical 

air commands; First Allied Airborne; Twelfth Army Group; First, Third, Ninth and 

Fifteenth Armies; Sixth Army Group; Seventh Army, and ETOUSA.* 

Two examples of practical operations are included here, but the reader is again 

cautioned that genesahtin eannot be made. 

Major Ansel E. M. Talbert, USAAF, the UL~ officer at Eighth Air Force, received 

ULrrtA from the SLU detachment located at Eighth Air Force headquarters. This 

detachment was entirely composed of British officers and enlisted men and informally 

functioned as an adjunct of the office of the director of intelligence, Eighth Air Force. The 

SLU deciphered the messages from GC&CS, typed them, and delivered them to Waor 
Talbert several times per day. Talbert then appended his own evaluations, distributed the 

material to a small number of authorized recipients at Eighth Air Force, and kept 

appropriate fdes. 

At Twelfth Army Group, the activities of the ULTRA officers, Lieutenant Colonel 

Charles R. Murmane and Lieutenant Colonel Samuel M. Orr, were somewhat more 

involved. They likewise received typed copies of the GC&CS ULTRA from the servicing 

SLU detachment. After registering the material, they posted the current situation map if 

warranted, updated the German order of battle file, made entries in their topical index, 

and sent messages to the subordinate armies (First and Third) via the SLU link if there 

was reason to believe that the ULTRA officers at these armies needed additional 

background material not provided through their own SLU contacts. Twice daily, Colonels 

Orr and Murmane gave an ULTRA briefing to General Omar Bradley and key members of 

his staff.5g 

By the end of the war, the 3-U.S. operation consisted of forty-three U.S. officers in the 

field with SLUs or as ULTRA officers at the commands and fifteen officers at Hut 3 

Bletchley Park or in Lond~n.~ d 

The latter group continued to select material for transmission to the War Department 

and to the field commands. An appreciation of how complete the U.K.-U.S. Army COMINT 

cooperation had become may be gained by a description of some of the material made 

available to 3-U.S. by GC&CS. All German military and secret service traffic was 

available to the U.S. representatives, and it was a matter of selecting material for 

transmission. The War Department (MIS) was interested mostly in receiving ULTRA 

bearing on German order of battle, long-range plans and policy, and manpower matters. 

Tactical items were also furnished as well as police and secret service traffic. The U.S. also 

received the so-called "C" series, which were special items furnished to the British DM1 

and his counterparts. The "C" Series, later called MCC series, were sent "eyes only" for 

General Marshall, the ACS, G2, and Carter W. Clarke. After G-2 was reorganized in 

June-July 1944, Colonel McCormack, acting in the newly created position of directar of 

intelligence, also was a recipient. Especially instructive of the closeness of cooperation 

was the sharing of the Bay and Stark Series with the War Department and the field 

commands. This included all manner of diplomatic, commercial, and attache material, 

mostly produced at Berkeley Street and published in various logs. Even the RES 

(reserved) series, which was to have been withheld from the US., became available 

following an agreement made between Carter Clarke and Mr. Peter Loxley of the Foreign 

Offwe. This included suck items as Vatican, Jewish Agency for Palestine and French 

secret service traffic. Special procedures for U.S. access to RES remained, but cooperation 

was now complete. 

Before this chapter on U.S. Army -British cooperation is closed, certain technical 

arrangements made by SSA lmd not MIS) will be described. On 24 December 1943 the 

earlier understandings on exchange of diplomatic materials were updated. An agreement 
was signed by Colonels Corderman and Earle F. Cook for SSA and P. W. Filby, E. B. C. 

Thornett, and Colonel H. M. O'Connor for GCtCS. O'Comor had replaced the ambitious 

Captain Hastings mn after the Strong-Travis agreement. Technical understandings 

involved cable exchange of Japanese diplomatic -c, exchange by courier or cable of 

German diplomatic keys, German diplomatic traffic, and translations (both current items 

and back traffic).61 

Working arrangements were made at GC&CS by the SSA liaison officers assigned 

there and by visitors from Washington. In dune 1943 Mr. Robert 0. Ferner and Captain 

John W. Seaman of SSA had been assigned to Bletchley Park to study, and Seam was 

appointed as a regular liaison officer later that year. He was in turn succeeded by Captain 

Walter J. Fried and Albert W. Small. Their work, which seems to have hen separated 

from the large BEECH^ project described above, was to represent SSA's B-111 branch at 

Blehhley Park. They cabled or pouched nonroutine technical items concerning 

wtanalytic research, information on new systems, and special repwts b Arlington Hall. 

Routine exchanges of keys, tables, and the like were made by cable between the operating 

element8 at Arlington Hall and Bletchley P5:k." 

As British-U.S. Army arrangements were involved, it may well be to once again 

introduce the subject of OSS nonaecess to coldim. As late as January 1945, the OSS was 

"carefully excluded from all ULTRA,* except the walled PAIR trafEc - Abwehr and S.D. 

(SS Security Service) traffic." OSS made efforts in the U.K. and Europe to remedy this 

situation by the creation of a counterintelligence war room in London where, OSS officers 

hoped, "some operational ULTRA would be made available." A war room was created, but 

OSS did not get ULTRA by that route because of arrangements made by Telford Taylor with 

GC&CS and Section V of MMIaM 

Notes 

1. Mituadss ofbfetiq of Bririeh, Canadian, and U.S. At-my Repms@nfative~ for Arranging Exchange ofItatermptd 

Dipkmadic Traffic, 15 January 1943, ACSI#44, NSAHC (classified). 

2. Memorandum from Dill to Marshall, 2 December 1942, ACSI#2(a), NSAHC. Dr. Turing, a mathematician, 

was one ofthe great cryptanalysts of the time. He is generally credited with making the GC&CS break intu 

ENIGMA I-. 

3. Mernorandum fm Clarke to brig, 4 Dacember 1942, ACSI #%a) Ictassiaed). 

4+ Memorandum from Strong to Marshall (Carter Clarke, drafter). 6 December 1942. ACSI#ZlaI. Apparently 

Ckke etal. considered the Britishreqmt "backdooP because it was directed to the Signal Corps instead of MID. 

6. Note from 1Y[arshall to General McNarney. DCS, 8 December, in ibid 

6. 'Memorandum from Marshall to Dill, 9 Dw mber 1942, in ibid. (clamihdL 
7. Memorandum ftom Dill to Marahall 15 December 1942, in ibid. 

8. Memoradum from Clarke to Strong, 21 December 1942, in ibid. (c1aasified). 

9. Ibid. 

10. Memorandum from Marshall to Dill, 23 December 1942, in ibid. 

1 I. Memorandum from Dill to Marshall, 26 December 1942, in ibid. 

12. During the war CC&CS was under tbe British Joint Chi&, who acted through Menzies, the CSS, and the 

Joint Intelligence Committee. 

13. Memorandum from Strong to Marshall, 1 January 1943, AGSI#2(a) (clas~ifred). 

14. Copies of these messages or extra& thereof are filed in ACSI #2(a) (classfied). 

16. Haatinga added in this merrsage b CSS that he had finally convinced General Strong that Meneies waa not the 

DMl. Obviously neither side- had yet gained a clear picture of the other's intelligence structure. 

16. Letter from Dillto Marshall, 5 January 1943. ACSI#Z(a) (classified). 

17. Memorandum from Marshall to Dill, 6 January 1843, in ibid. {classified). 

18. Letter from Dill to Marshall, 7 January 1943, ACSI&Q4(chssZmd). 

19. Sir John's use of the word "allow" is not entirely appropriate. Tbe U.S. Navy, at the time of the Holden 

Agreement, advised Britain that it would proceed on its own ENIGMA attack because the GC&CS had "lostm the 

U-boat system for many months and nothing was being read on a current basis. The British then agreed in 

principle that OF-20-Gmuld proceed and that there would be mutual support. 

20. Paper headed *General Marshall's Ietter to Field Marshal 23/12/42," ACS1144. This paper was cited in 

chapter 1 a8 it is a source for prewar British-U.S. Army COMINT relations. 

21. Chief of Staffappointment books for 1943, Marshall Library. 

22. Message, in ACSI#Z(a). 

23. Memorandum from Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney to Lieutenant General Macready, 9 January 

1943, ACSl#Zta). 

24. Memorandum from William F. Friedman to Colonel Corderman, 8 February 1943, ACSI#Z(aj (classified). 

This is a superior exposition of the problem and nffers a wise solution. This memorandum was a basis for many 

later expositions and proposals by MIS and SSA. 

25. Memorandum with two tabs from Strong to Marshall, 17 February 1943, ACSI144. 

26. Chiefof Staffappointment books for 1943. Shows appointment with Dill at 1515,17 February. 

27. Memorandum for General Strong signed by Colonel Robert N. Young, secretary of the General Staff {dictated 

by General Marshall), 22 February 1943, ACSI#44. 

28. Memorandum From Haatings to Strong, 26 February 1943, which repties to Strong's memorandum of 23 

February, (not seen) (classified). 

29. Message from Strong (drafted by Carter Clarke) to Kroner, 8 March 1943, ACSI12Ia). This message 

discusses the previous message from Kroner (not seen by author) Iclassified). 

30. Message from Kroner for Strong (Eyes Only), 11 March 1943 in Ibid. (classified). 
31. General Marshall seemsnot to have had mu& interest in intelligence mattera. There is no lack of evidence to 

support this. Carter Clark, in a Ietter to the author, explained that General Marshall carmidared intelIigeoce a 

nscesmry evil that he preferred b avoid. Experienced MID veterans General Louis J. Fortier and Colonel Paul 

Rubioett have described General Marshall's shortcomings in this area. (See Colonel Robinstt's diary for 1940-41 

andGenem1 Fortier's lettars to Marshall by biographer Forregt Pogue on file at the Marshall Library.) However, 

General Marshall had had many bad experiences with military intalligsnce leadership, from Dennis Nolan in 

World War 1 downthrough Sherman Miles and the Pearl Harbor mess. 

32. Letter to Sir JobDill by theBritish Joint Chiefs ofStufi 7 March 1943, ACSIC44. 

33. Chief of Staff appointment books, 1943 Marshall Library. General tomemell of the ASF alw joined the 

Marshalls and Dills. 

34. Memorandum from Major Harold McD. Brown to Colonel Corderman, 17 March 1943, subject: Traffic 

Exchange with BSC. This lsngthy memorandum is an excellent source for SSS-BSC traffic exchange 

arrangements, U.S. sources of traff~, agreemenh, etc. Its purpose as a study of the practical effects of the Army 

severing the relationships with the British is apparent only upon seeing it in context of the British Joint Chiefs' 

letbr to Dill. As of March 1943, the SSS ad the UK (via BSC) were exchanging Japanese army and a broad 

range of diplomatic traffic only. (No German air or army traffic was involved.) 

35. Memorandum from General Strong acting for the Joint Security Control to chief of staff, 3 March 1943. 

Friedman Papers, NSAHC. y. 

36. Message #I 143 from Hayes, signed by Eisenhower, to WAR, 3 April 1943, ACSIPZ(a1. The actual studp of 

possible ENIGMA intercept by the North African-based SRI companies is contained in other documents in 

ACSI#2(a). 

37. "Agreemant Concerning Cooperation in all Matters Relating to Special and Traffic Analysis intelligence," 3 

April 1943. signed by W. Preaton Gorderm, ACSI844. 

38. Memorandum from Telford Taylor to Clarke, 5 April 1943, subject: Cooperation between United States 

Signal Intelligence Service and British Y Service, ACSI#d4 (classified). 

39. The Taylor memorandum bears various handwritten changes made by Garter Clarke (classi~iedl. 

40. Memorandum from Strong to Marshall, 12 April 1943, ACSIC44 (classified). 

41, Memorandum kom Strong to Brigadier Redman, 20 April 1943, AGSIfZta). This memorandum references 

the 19 April meeting. The memorandum is so harsh that it is possible that it was never actually sent - the copy 

reviewed by the author doea not definitely show that it was dispetched. It was probably drafted by Carter Clarke. 

42. Memorandum from Telford Taylor to Carter Clarke, 16 April 1943, subject: Bletchley Park vs. Arlington 

Hall, ACSI#Z(EI). 

43. 1 have not been able to locate documents that show the immediate sequence of events that led to McCormack 

and Friedman going to Bletchley Park. I suspect that there was a British invitation through Hastings. The 

reader will recall that several months earlier General Strong had proposed sending McCormack to Bletchley 

Park. 

44. See section 1 ofthis chapter. 

45. Many of the McCormack-Friedman-Taylor tnesaages (and other documents! to Carter Clarke are found in 

ACSI#34,NSAHC. Mr. Friedman's "Report on E Operations of the CC&CS at Bletchley Park" is also in NSAHC 

(ribbon copy). These are extremely valuable collectionsofsource material. The McCormack mission undoubtedly 

merits further study. 
46. "Memorandum Describing American Liaimn at Berkeley Street," 12 October 1945, prepared by Major Louis 

T. Stone dr, and included in the SSO History, appendix 111, part 11, NSAHC. Denniston memorandum dwcribing 

Denniston's view, 21 May 1943, is with Major Stone's gaper. Berkeley Street was the common name for the civil 

side of GC&CSmuch as Bletchley Part was the name for the services~de (classed). 

47. Letter from Travis to Clarke. 16 May 1943 (on letkrhead of British Joint Staff Mission, Washington), 

ACSI#d4 [clasaiiied). 

48. The basic agreement, the cover memorandum from Strong (drafted by Clarke) t~ the chief of staff and the 

approval signaturea thereon are in ACSIC46. (These are the only papers bound in NSAfIC's copies of ACSIf46.) 

49. This letter, Brigadier H. Rsdmn to Captain Hastings, is reproduced on page 21 ofArmy and AirFom Sigint, 

vol. 3 (Organization and Evolution of British Army Sigint), GC&CS history (classified). 

50. All the information in thi~ section concerning Projsct BEECHNUT is taken fmm a paper entitled "History of 

Special Project Beechnut, SIS ETOUSA," also referred to as the Rowlett Report, NSAHC. This paper was 

probably prepared in 1946 (classified). 

51. "An Aocount of the Origins and Development of 3-U.S.," a manuscript in vol. 2 SSO Hiatory, 204-05 (bandpaged), prepared by Colonel F. W. Hillezl. 

52. Ibid. Colonel Hilles suggests that General Strong virtually cancelled certain provisions of the Travis-Strong 

agreement, to the detriment of the U.S. I cannot trace ~ alleged development and have therefore proceeded to 

the Wing Commander Jones-Twlfurd Taylor agreement of 25 September. The latter ig quoted by Hilles. It was in 

the form of a letter from Jones to the CSS, DMI, and (I think) RAF intelligence representative. 

53. It should be noted that at the time of the Mfirmack Mission, CXIMSS material was reaching commanders of 

U.S. forces but in the theater only. This matsrial went to AFHQ Algiers, First U.S. Army and the USAAF 

headquarters in the North African theater. But the distribution was in British (SLUI channels. As bas been 

emphasized, none of this information went to the War Department. (See the Friedman Report on E Operations, 

74.) 

54. From a study paper prepared by Cohnel Hilles in vol. 2 oCSSOHisbory, 193 ff, (hand-paged). 

55. Letter from Marshall to Eisenhower, 15 March 1944, ACSI#42, NSAHC. This letter was drafted by MIS 

Special Branch (classSed). 

56. The term MID officers, rather than MIS officers, is used throughout the Marshal' letter. This minor point 

bedevils a person trying to underfltand Army intelligence organization. The best solution Q at all times to 

consider the terms MID and MIS synonymous. General Strong did not like the MIS concept initiated in the 

genera1 War Department reorganization of March 1942. He thought of the entire force under his control as MID. 

(See various discussions of this in Bidwell's History.) 

57. Manuscript entitled "The Use of ULTRA Intelligence by U.S. Army Commands in the European Theater of 

Operations" prepared by hhjor B. R. Shute in 1945, filed in appendix 2, vol. 2, SSO History. 

58. Appendix 2, vd. 2, SSO History (based on the index of manuscripts, memorandum etc. prepared in 1945-46 by 

SSONLTRA officer veterans). 

59. The Talbert and Murmane -0rr operations are in manuscript form in appendix 2, vol, 2, SSO History. 

60. "An Account of the Origins and History of 3-U.S.," manuscript in SSO Hzstoy vol. 2. See 214 ff, (handpaged). 
61. Paper -bed as "SSA-W&CS (Civil) Agreement", 24 December 1943, in a Llder of documents labeled, 

Volume 1 385W, NSAHC. 

62. McCraken Study, ACSI#4Bh 

63. "History of-l Countehbwnee War Room,* a memorandum prepared by Colonel Galfee, 27 August 

1945 In appendix 4, ml. 2, SSO Hm- 
Chapter 5 

British-U.S. Navy COMINT Agreements of 194344 

From the U.S. pint of view, this is a far less complicated subject than that of the 

preceding chapter. For that reason the account is very brief. 

There were three main reasons why the U.S. Navy's cooperation with the British was 

smoother and more orderly than that experienced by the Army. First the naval COMINT 

organization was such that policy matters could be exhaustively addressed by OP-20-G or 

OP-20. This was especially so after the downgrading of ONI in the summer of 1942. 

Second, effective cooperation predated the war, especially in the Far East, and a very 

thorough and far-reaching agreement was made in late 1942 - the Holden Agreement. In 

fact, it would not be far from the mark to say that the Holden Agreement was, for the 

purposes of U.S. naval COllrrlvT policy, if not for all practical applications, all that was ever 

needed to define the relationship with the iritiah. Finally, OP-20-G and its subordinate 

centers were well able on their own to meet most COMINT needs of the U.S. Navy. The 

Pacific theater was a U.S. show, and the Battle of the Atlantic became so too. As we have 

seen, OP-20-G was independently and successfully attacking the ENIGMA enciphered 

communications of the German U-boat networks during 1942, and there was even more 

extraordinary success in the Pacific against Japanese naval systems. 

During July 1943 there were important conferences in London concerning the British 

OP-20-G relationship. At the beginning of the month, Rear Admiral Joseph Redman and 

Commander Wenger visited GC&CS on the invitation of Commander Travis. Wenger met 

with Mr. Birch of the naval section of GC&CS and Commander Laird of the Royal Navy's 

Eastern Fleet to work out more details of Pacific COMINT.' 

The result of these conferences was an understanding reached on 25 July and known tu 

OP-20-G as the Extension Agreement, based as it was on the Holden Agreement of 1942, 

which remained the basic policy document." 

Among the basic provisions of the Extension Agreement were these? 

1. Urgently needed raw material would be interchanged between GC&CS and OP20-G by cable or radio as far as possible. 

2. In the field of cryptanalysis, GC&CS would "pay special attention" to machine 

ciphers, other ciphers ". . . for which British experience and facilities are particularly 

suited," and certain research matters. 

On 1 August further understandings were reached concerning the exchange of 

recoveries and special intelligence. The latter is especially interesting as there was now to 
be direct passage of locally produced COMINT from FRUMEL to Columba and Columbo to 

FRUMEL.4 

The overall relationship was enhanced by improved communications between OP-20- 

G and GC&CS. By November 1943 routine communications (the bulk of the traffic) 

between the two primary centers was handled via a Western Union landlne teletype that 

linked BSC in New York with 20-GC 120-G's GOMINT communications office).' BSC 

communicated with GC&CS by cable or radio. This arrangement relieved the burden on 

existing facilities, one of which had been a system whereby naval went through 

BSC but over a landline from Arlington Hall to New York City.' 

In fact, the BRUSA Agreement of 14 January 1944 may be seen from the U.S. side as 

more of a COMINT communications agreement than a major policy agreement (of the 

Travis-Strong type). From the British standpoint, it was otherwise and perhaps the entire 

matter of British-USN COMINT relations of 1943-44 is more a British policy story than an 

American one. 

The BRUSA Agreement was reached in Washington following negotiations at OF-20- 

G by Mr. F. H. Hinsley, a young intelligence acer of the naval section of W&CS, assisted 

by Colonel O'Connor, Captain Hastings' replacement in Washington. The agreement was 

in the form of a memorandum to Mr. Hinsley signed by Admiral Joseph Redman. The 

British had called for the establishment of a "comprehensive U.S.-British circuit, to be 

called the 'BRUSA' circuit, to be established as early as practicable between Washington, 

Pearl Harbor, Melbourne, Columbo, and GC&CS, incorporating U-S. naval and British 

circuits at present used for the dissemination of RI material.'' This circuit would carry 

technical information, "decryption intelligence," and "trfic intelligence." TrdZc would 

be enciphered on U.S. machines. Changes or modifications to the BRUSA circuit would be 

made only after agreement between Washington and GC&CSV7 

This was generally agreeable to the U.S. except that the Columbo-Melbourne circuit 

was now held to be of doubtful value if FRUMEL was subject to redeployment. And there 

was a rather general "escape" clause inserted by the U.S., which is quoted in its entirety: 

The extent to which radio intelligence information and recoveries can be exchanged between the 

'BRUSA' station will continue to be dependent upon wmmunicatian and othr facilities available 

and on the need for such exchange. 

The BRUSA circuit did not go into effect until 27 June.' It was not really to be a new 

system so much as an expanded version of the existing COMB and TUNA (20-G) 

collections combined with existing Washington-London and London-Columbo links.g On 

12 July, 20-G directed USN stations ". . . to put all decryption and traffic intelligence on 

BRUSA circuits regardless of area inv~lved."'~ This lasted only a few weeks when it 

became apparent to OP-20-G that the facilities were being overloaded. There followed 

some months of discussion, and ultimately a new Pacific theater agreement was reached in 

Waskington on 23 October 1944.'' This agreement, signed by Commander Travis and 
Rear Admiral Redman, recognized certain changes that had taken place since the Holden 

Agreement, but it in no way altered the primacy of the USN in the Pacfic. As stated in the 

preamble, the purpose of the agreement was ". . . to minimize the use of rapid 

communication facilities and to promote proper coordination by the most efficient 

employment of personnel, particularly in the solution and exploitation of those Japanese 

cryptographic systems that require the combined effort of relatively large numbers of 

persons. . . ." The general agreements were these: 

1. The exploihtion centers would be OP-20-G, FRUPAC, and Columbo (FRUMEL 

was being replaced by RAGFOR - Radio Analysis Group, Forward - the COMINT center on 

Guam). 

2. OP-20-G would coordinate the Allied effort and allocate tasks. ". . . Bletchley 

Park, of course, would be free to make suggestions, requests, or complaints at any time." 

3. GC&CS would undertake any tasks assigned by OP-20-G and give these 

assignments "full priority." . 

A few specific cryptanalytic assig9menta (such as JW-25, L-53, and the NAN cipher) 

were made to GC&CS. It was agreed that a minimum of current traffic would be supplied 

to GC&CS by electrical means, unless it was a solved system being actively worked by 

GC&CS. There was no alteration in existing understandings about exchange of 

intelligence - this would continue to go back and forth. The impact, then, was to reduce 

the load on the BRUSA circuit for passage of new traffic to GC&CS. 

Notes 

I. Naval Sigint, vol. 5(a); GC&CS History. 240 ff. 

2. Details of the Extension Agreement are in ibid., 250, and a background paper prepared by Commander Wenger 

on 1 July 1944 entitled "Outline of the Collaboration in Japanese Cryptanalysig Between tha U.S. Navy and the 

British" (especially 8-19]. 

3. Outline, 8. 

4. Naval Scgint, facing 250. 

5. GC History. 20 ff. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Naval Sigint, vol. 5(b), 316 ff. and reprint of the Agreement on 669-61. 

8. These British proposals and others form the first part ofthe Redman memorandum to Mr. Hinsley. 

9. GI: History, 46-49.for a discurnion of BRUSA communications from the 20-G point of view 

1 I. "An Agreement BetweenGCkCS and Negat on Japanese Cryptanalytic Tasks," 23 October 1944, in Catalog 

3.h. 
Chapter 8 

Continued Jurisdictional Problems 

regarding Clandestine Communications 

THE RADIO INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 

In spite of having been frozen out of C~MINT policy matters in 1942 by the Army, Navy, 

and FBI, the Radio Intelligence Division (RID1 of the FCC continued its extensive 

intercept and DF operations against clandestine communications. The signifzmce of the 

RID effort was emphasized by its prominent place in the informal intercept cornmi- that 

met weekly hm August 1942 to August 1943. (See section 5 of chaptar 2.) Nonetheless, 

efforts to dismantle the RED or to incorporate its personnel and equipment into the armed 

forces continued. 4' 

In September 1942 %re- of the Navy Knox had initiated a high-level inquiry into 

RID activity when he posed mrtah questions about "security of military communications 

activities" to the Joint Chiefs.' A JCS study was begun and went on until early 1943. The 

JCS inquiry was an involved one dealing with the communications security of various 

agencies as well as the RID'S place in COMINT. We need note here only one of the opinions 

solicited by the JCS. On 16 November 1942 Admiral Nimitz gave his views following the 

recent smvisit to Hawaii by members of the study group. He stated that dl aspects of 

GOMINT, including intercept operations and DF, should be under the Army and Navy, and 

further, that a "civilian agency could [not] intelligently and efficiently perform any part of 

these functions without benefit of continuous full and complete military information 

which, in the interests of security and the war effort, cannot be entrusted to it.'* On the 

other hand, the Army, which had depended so heavily on the RID, was not as anxious to do 

away with the organi~ation.~ 

The JCS commenh and recommendations went ta Secretary Knox on 1 February 1943 

in the form of a letter signed by Admiral ~eah~? The Corn activities of the Army and 

Navy were broadly described as were those of the FCC. In the JCS view, the FCC was 

intercepting enemy military, naval, and diplomatic traffxc and lcating clandestine radio 

stations. The FCC was also allegedIy monitoring U.S. military communication~l for 

COMSEC purposes and providing bearing aids for lost planes. In the opinion of the JCS, the 

FCC's WWINT activities were expanding and were thus ". . . a substantial drain upon 

available material and personnel." Further, it appears as if these activities were becoming 

less useful *. . . as the art progresses." This lessening of effectiveness could not be reversed 

because the military services could not safely disseminate special information to the FCC. 
Admiral Leahy concluded that FCC personnel and equipment should be transferred to the 

Army, and that this could be accomplished by executive order. 

Secretary Knox favorably reported the JCS position to President Roosevalt on 8 

February 1943 and attached the proposed executive order. The president did not formally 

respond until 7 September at which time he advised Secretary Knox that the RID would 

not be disestablished or transferred to the Army.' Rather, wrote the president, the FCC 

was performing too valuable a service for such civilian agencies as the FBI, State 

Department, Censorship, Bureau of Economic Warfare, Weather Bureau, ad Coordinator 

of Interamerican Affairs. The president suggested that jurisdictional matters should be 

worked out by the Board of War Communications. Actually, the latter bady, chaired by 

Mr. Fly of the FCC, had never had anything to do with COMINT (and would not in the 

future). 

The matter did not rest there, however. Later in 1943 a congressional committee 

looking into the FCC's supervision of the broadcasting industry created some disarray by 

delving into RID activities." Amwe thorough, and equally hostile, scrutiny of RID 

activities took place in congressional budget bearings in January 1944. Both in public and 

closed sessions, Mr. Fly and George Sterling explained the wide range of RID (and FBI1 

operati~ns.~ They claimed that there was no overlap of operations insofar as enemy 

military communications were concerned, as the RID intercepted enemy military 

communications only on the request of the services. Extensive documentation was 

presented on and off the record. The result of all this was that RID did suffer some 

budgetary cuts and had to contract certain of its overseas operations. 

This may not have been unjust because the RID, by early 1944, had ended a number of 

the auxiliary projects it had begun early in the war under the Army, which especially was 

so desperately short of COMINT assets in Hawaii, Alaska, and on the West Coast. In March 

the RID notified OP-20-G that the latter would no longer receive copies of clandestine 

intercepts because operations were being curhiled.* However, the RID continued ta serve 

its other customers, notably the FBI and the British, through the end of the war. At its 

peak in 1944, the RID intercept and DF facilities included twelve primary monitoring 

stations, fdty-nine secondary stations, and eight mobile units. 

Before closing this account of the RID, several more of its operations will be listed to 

again emphasize the diverse work of this organization and the many requests made of it by 

the services. 

1. Throughout 1943 and into 1944, the RID station at San Leandro, California, 

engaged in extensive radio communications with U.S. Army guerrillas in the Philippines. 

This was done at the urgent request of the War Department. 

2. In Alaska the monitoring personnel met requirements levied by RID and the SSA 

in Washington and the G-2, Alaskan Defense Command, Colonel L. V. Castner. The 
Alaskan group also worked deception operations against Japanese naval units and trained 

the 102nd SRI Company personnel on their arrival in Alaska. 

3. It covered Soviet Far East weather and clandestine traffic for the SSA. 

4. It recorded scrambled German voice trdic for SSA. 

5. It periodically, and on spec& request, intercepted German, Japanese, and Italian 

submarine communications for OP-20-G. 

How are we to square the acmmplishrnents of the RID with the abuse from and 

ingratitude of the organizations it so Ioyally served? There were institutional reasons 

which were of paramount importance to the services: the RID was a civilian organization 

outside of my military chain of command and at the same time was (so it was alleged) 

tinged with partisan politics. The latter charge in fact relates only to FCC chairman Fly, 

who was not in any case involved in day-to-day RII) work. The large budget of RID, with 

the resultant availability of modern equipment, must have galled the services. And, 

especially fur the understrength Army COMINT organization, the RID'S wealth of 

experienced and well-trained communications personnel probably seemed a tremendous 

embarrassment. Last and not least, therebere the personality clashes involving those 

same worthy, if irascible, men who were in many a policy fray: Admiral Joseph R. Redman 

and John Edgar Hoover." 

THE NAVY-FBI CONTROVERSY AND THE ATTENDANT 

DISPUTES REGARDING THE BRITISH 

A theme that has run through this study is that the U.S. COMINT services established 

separate and often secret-from-each-other arrangements with British intelligence. These 

arrangements in turn led to a great deal of interservice bickering. As suggested in the 

first chapter, all of this must be seen against the background of the intense passions 

aroused because of the expanding role of the OSS, which often had very special (if not in 

COMINT) understandings with the British. This section will further examine these 

relationships, insofar as they involved the clandestine COMINT picture. 

The U.S. Coast Guard COMINT unit, a part of OP-20-G since 1942, had been designated 

OP-20-GU by the beginning of 1944. In fact, by a subdivision order of 14 April there was 

both a separate staff department known as G-70, office of the Head of Clandestine 

Department, as well as GU, the operating element. The entire operation remained under 

Commander Leonard T. Jones, USCG. The responsibilities of this organization had not 

changed, and it still operated as a semi-independent organization responsible for all 

phases of clandestine work: interception, cryptanalysis, translation, and liaison with 

counterpart British offices. The dissemination of its product, however, was the 

responsibility of OP-20-GI. OP-20-GU remained a rather small organization in 
Washington.'' The intercept came from the USCG operators at, primarily, South 

Hampton, Long Island, and New Smyma, Florida, as well as Winter Harbor, Maine: 

overseas monitoring sites were in the Dominican Republic, Bdl, Peru, and Chile.a 

OP-20-G had continued its tradition of success againat clandestine systems. In fact, its 

independent solution of the "Green" ENIGMA in January 1943 caused great consternation 

in British circles coming as it did in the midst of the tense Army-British COMI~ 

negotiations growing out of the Dr. Turing affair (aee chapter 41." On 1 I February 1943 a 

most secret and immediate message was cabled from the CSS to Captain Hastings asking 

him to look into reports from Captain Maidment, HSC, that the Coast Guard was 

deciphering messages on a Cologne-South America circuit and giving results to the FBI. 

The CSS pointed out that these messages were enciphered in ENIGMA (to which Capm 

Maidment did not have access) and that any action taken on this interqt, or any leaks, 

could jeopardize the entire ENIGMA situation. While it was believed (said the CSS} that, 

because of poor German cryptographic discipline, the messages could be broken without 

knowing the ENIGMA wiring, khe USCG had in fact obtained the wiring information from 

Major Kullback of SSS (this last information reported to CSS by Colonel Tiltman). The 

message concluded "matter is most serious, k'kp me informed of developments." 

Hastings replied to "CSS Only" on 13 February and assured London that the 

significance ofthe U.S. breakthrough was recognized by Commander Wenger and MIS and 

that the results had not been passed to the FBI. 

Clearly, in the eyes of the British as well as the U.S. services, there were limits to what 

could go to the FBI. For a time at least, the FBI my have received disguised summaries 

derived from ENIGMA enciphered traffic, but they never received verbatim translations.16 

In May 1943,OP-20-G tentatively decided to stop disseminating clandestine CoMINT to 

the FBI,17 This move was approved by the DNC. This action was recommended by 

Commander Wenger because the Navy received nothing from the FBI and because there 

were the important restrictions, noted above, for FBI receipt of ENIGMA material. And, 

recalled Wenger , the 1942 agreement had concerned only the Western Hemisphere. Even 

that had been done only to "obtain some measure of control over the cryptanalytic efforts of 

the FBI." In Wenger's opinion, the recent MIS-ONI-FBI agreement about the former 

agency's responsibility for operating a DF network in Latin America nullified the 

clandestine terms of the 1942 agreement. 

Nor was the FBI's situation helped by the knowledge, at least in ONI, that there were 

"side agreements" made in 1943 between the FBI representative in London and the British 

whereby the FBI would receive certain COWNT in the U.K. Allegedly General Strong, the 

ACS, G-2, had not objected to this, although it was not referred to or approved by hi own 

Special Branch, much less ON1 or OP-20-G.la That the FBI was receiving GOMINT from the 

British in London seems to have been known to SSA.lB 
Matters were further clouded by the secalled Colonel Ferguson incident of October 

1943. The real meaning of this flair is uncertain, and we have only the ON1 

On 7 October Tam Welb, an FBI liaison officer, brought to ON1 counterintelligence five 

enciphered intercepts that he said had been received from the FBI representative in 

London, who in turn had obtained them from a Colonel Fergumn, allegedly an officer of 

ON1 (in London). Apparently the FBI wanted the Navy to decipher these me~sages. Also 

the FBI may have used this as a pretext for chiding the Navy about not having given these 

intercepts, which were Western Hemisphere clandestine, directly to the FBI in 

WashingLon. The upshot of all this was the discovery by ON1 that Ferguwn was a British 

MI-6 officer dealing with the FBI in hndon, and that the messages in question had been 

intercepted by OP-20-GU and provided to the British. This incident was seen by ON1 and 

OP-20-G as an example of the devious methods of the FBI andthe British and was cited as 

such in various Navy COMlNT policy reviews in 1944. 

But possibly the FBI had made its point, for on 20 October 1943 the Navy revised its 

recent, tentative policy of nondissemimtion to the bureau. Under the new formula, agreed 

upon by Carter Clarke for the Army and Admiral Schuemmn (DNI) and Captain Stone 

for the Navy, the 1942 agreement would be$b~erved.~l The FBI was entitled to Western 

Hemiaphexe clandestine COMINT. The Army and Navy would now forward clandestine 

material to the FBI in summary memorandums without revealing the source or quoting 

intercepts verbatim. Both MIS and ON1 agreed to tell each other what had been 

disseminated to the FBI. 

The problem was not resolved by this measure. On 8 December 1943 Director Hoover 

sent a grim memorandum to the DNI." He bluntly said that the Navy was not cooperating 

with the FBI, and that the latter, therefore, was unable to fulfill ita counterespionage 

responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere, especially in Mexico and Argentina. The FBI 

had been furnishing the Navy messages, obtained in various ways, "for decoding," but "no 

decodes" were received from the Navy. Hoover recognized that the Navy furnished 

summaries of intelligence that appeared to be from message traffic, but the "information 

furnished is fragmentary, the source which is essential to our investigation withheld, and 

it is by no means a full picture, which is so necessary." Equally intolerable, wrote Mr. 

Hoover, was that certain information was not made available to the FBI in London 

because it was allegedly available to the FBI, via ONI, in Washington. Thus the FBI was 

being blocked from information in various ways. Director Hoover then summarized his 

case: the FBI could be-effective in counterespionage only if it were aware of the identity of 

foreign agents and had access to their channels of communication. Paraphrases or 

summaries of clandestine messages were not adequate. 

The director closed with a threat. If the Navy refused to cooperate, the FBI would 

begin seizing foreign agents in Latin America and closing clandestine radio station3 - this 

in spite of the preferred technique of "controlling" enemy espionage nets by having secret 

access to their communications. 
The response from Admiral Schuermann was not eonciliat~ry.~ The DNI disclaimed 

any lack of cooperation by the Navy and assured Ilirector Hoover that the FBI would 

continue to receive material from clandestine traffic when pertinent. But the Navy would 

not furnish verbatim translations. Admiral Schuermann said that the Navy had no 

information anyway on clandestine stations in Mexim, while COMINT-based orclandestine 

traffic to and from Argentina was "fragmenhry." The DNI requested advance notice 

should the FBI decide to close clandestine stations, but he deplored this action as it would 

surely require the cooperation of Argentine authorities, which was tantamount to 

notifying the Germans. He warned Director Hoover that should Argentine authorities be 

told that clandestine messages were being solved, then Germany would receive 

information of "great value," especially as there were "details in this connection which I 

am not at liberty to divulge." The latter reference, of course, was to the use by German 

agents of the ENIGMA and the total Allid exploitation of itha tystem. 

Hoover did not carry out his threat to close down all clandestine stations and seize 

agents, though stations were dosed and arrests made from time to time, depending on 

local conditions in the particular country. At the end of the war a number of German 

stations that had been located were still operafing (and being monitored). 

In January 1944 the U.S. solicitor general issued a ruling to redefine the authority of 

British Security Coordination in the U.S." In keeping with changed conditions, the covert 

operations of BSC were now severely restricted. The BSC liaison function remained, but 

the use of informants in the U.S. and the independent conduct of investigation was 

forbidden. The principle of considering the FBI as BSC's primary point of cgntact was 

emphasized, and BSC was required to transmit to the FBI "all information pertaining to, 

or which in any way affects the Western Hemisphere.. . ." The solicitor general recognized 

that there were conditions of a purely military nature wherein BSC-USN/USA liaison was 

appropriate. This ruling probably had no real effect on COMINT relationships, and it may 

be doubted if the FBI reaped any new benefits in the COMINT field. 

The story of FBI-Navy noncooperation goes on through 1944 and into 1945. No 

solution was ever reached, and only a few more major events will be described. 

In April 1944,ONI again stopped disseminating COMINT to the FBI, this time because 

of the perceived need to tighten security before the Allied invasion of France." This 

decision was reinforced by the FBI's alleged revelation to the press of its codebreaking 

capabilities vis-h-vis foreign agents, and its inability to keep GOMINT out of court in 

espionage prose~utions.~" 

In May, Colonel Clarke, Admiral Schuermann, and Lieutenant Colonel Cowgill of MI6 formulated the "3-N Agreement," another step in tightening preinvasion security.27 It 

was agreed that COMINT derived from Latin American German clandestine traEc would 

not be disseminated ". . . by telegram or pouch in complete or disguised form to any person 

in South America for information or investigation." Further, any "transcript" of such 
given to the British by the Army or Navy or to the Army and Navy by the British 

would be annotated with the caveat that it was for the personal use of the recipient only 

and that no further dissemination was authorized. Any exceptions to 3-N required the 

mutual agreement of the CSS, the ACS, 0-2, and the DNI. While there is no reference to 

the FBI in this agreement, its terms precluded that agency from receiving the material 

and certainly from bekg able ta use it in Latin American operations. Similarly State 

Deprtment personnel, ON1 MIS, and British officers in Latin America would not have 

received this material to assist in counterintelligence or political maneuvers. 

Commander Wenger tackled the FBI-Navy problem in mid-May 1944 and prepared a 

lengthy appreciation of the situation for Carter Clarke.= Wenger recommended that the 

COM~NT services reach a mw general agreement or obtain a peesidential order. The new 

agreement, or executive order, would limit Western Hemisphere clandestine COMINT 

production to the Navy. AH dissemination of the product to the FBI would be through the 

Army's MIS. If, however, the Navy had to directly diminate COB~INT to the FBI, it would 

be under strictest Navy security regulations, and the F%I would have to make certain 

promises about its security practices. U' 

Nothing came of this because Colonel Clarke opined that the matter of WMIN'T 

allocation should not be reopened. Rather, the Army and Navy should "sit tight" and 

welcome any move by J. Edgar Hoover to appeal to the president." 

The situation was such that by Auguat 1944 Commander L. T. Jones, head of OP-20- 

GU, would write that his organization had had no direct cantact with the FBI or COMINT 

(or at least cryptanalytic) matters for "almost a year and a haIfIfd At the same time, Jones 

described for Commander Wenger the 20-GU capability for taking over the entire 

clandestine field. Jones was aware that the FBI had sources not available to GU - 

interceptmi courier dispatches, certain cable communications, and mail, as well as what 

the FBI derived from the German stations in the U.S. that operated, as double agent 

activities, under FBI control. Jones felt that these sources could be made available to GU 

(except for the FBI double agent operations) if necessary. 

Actually there was no way for the Navy to take control of the clandestine field without 

the assent of the FBI and FCC or an executive order. Instead, OP-20-GU contented itself 

with rearranging its intercept facilities and attempting to get greater coverage of German 

intelligence communications within Europe. 

In the midst of these ongoing controversies, the FBI's own CoWW organization, the 

Cryptanalytic Section of the Technical Laboratory, continued to function. At its peak in 

1944, there were thirty-eight FBI agents, clerks, and special employies at bureau 

headquarters working German clandestine tr&~ under the direction of Special Agent I. 

Wdrow Newpher. The main sources for their traffic were the RID and BSC. Their 

cryptanalytic activities were generally successful; at least this is the evaluation later 

made by Mr. Newpher.= There is no indication, however, that the FBI broke or exploited 
ENIGMA enciphered communi~tions of German agents. The full story of FBI COMINT 

activities remains to be told. FBI cryptanalysis exbted in a vacuum because there wm no 

technical exchange with OP-20-G or the SSA. Even the British do not seem to have 

provided the bureau with ~igdicant technical assbtance in cryptanalysi~.~ 

There was still another thorny area of clandestine comm @icy during 194344, this 

involving the Army and Navy. By late 1943 the SSA began processing Abwehr (German 

Intelligence Service) traffic on instructions of MIS. This seemed to the Navy to violate the 

basic 1942 agreement. The Army response was that Abwehr traffic was not meant to be 

included in the 1942 agreement." The Army position was incorrect in that most 

clandestine tr& from Latin America was, and always had been, Abwehr. The larger 

issue of general Abweh tr8ff~~ in other areas, particularly Europe and Africa, was 

another matter. This tr&c was often other than "clandestinew as there were Abwehr 

links between Germany and German-ooeupid territory. The Army viewpoint was that 

this type of communication was military in nature and therefore not to be processed by, or 

disseminated to, the Navy. Had the basic 1942 agreement used the term "intelligence" or 

"secret service" trac instead of "clande~tin~e" traffic, the ground rules might have been 

clear from the beginning. 

Not until later 1944 did the Army and Navy mme to an understanding on this class of 

Abwehr traffic and freely exchange the rnate~ial,'~ The Navy was probably not deprived of 

any information vital to its operations, but this dispute does expose the odd nature- of the 

U.S. COMINT structure and the rather primitive nature of the basic 1942 agreement. Some 

of the anomalies were not lost on the chief policymakers. During hia visit to GC&CS in the 

spring of 1943 (see chapter 4), Colonel Alfred McCormack learned that while the British 

had offered continental (European) intelligence kmc to the USCG unit, the latter had 

shown little inter&, preferring to concentrate on the Western Herni~~here.'~ Quite 

probably the MIS instructions to SSA to resume work on German clandestine and other 

intelligence systems were made because of Colonel McCormack's findings. The Coast 

Guard was simply not taking advantage of the wealth of information available from 

British sources. Regardless of the arrangements subsequently worked out by OP-20-GU 

and the Army in Washington, from the summer of 1943, once the Army gain& full access 

to the German intelligence communications being exploited by the British, the Army's 

requirements were met. This was accomplished through Telford Taylor's 3-U.S. 

The conduaion must be that OP-20-GU never fully realized the potential available 

through the 1942 agreements. Aside from any question of the narrowness of 20-Gus 

outlook, the technical problems cannot be ignored. The Coast Guard did not have the 

intercept capability to cover certain continental circuits while the British did. What is 

curious, though, is that the RID, operating from monitoring sites in the Western 

Hemisphere was able, like the British, to cover a great deal of Abwehr (and SD) traffic 

within Europe and Afri~a.~ 
Notes 

1. U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Subcommittee of tho Committee on Appropriatioras, House of 

Represedatiues, 78th Congress, Second Session on the Independent Office Appropriation Bill for 1945, 

Government Printing 0fIice:The FCC portion of these hearings appeara on pages 1149-287, testimony taken on 

19 danuary 1944. Among those appearing for the FCC were Chairman Jamea L Fly; E. K. Jett, chief engineer; 

George E. Sbrling, RID. Information on the Knox letter is on pp. 1253--64. 

2. Letter from Nimitz to Secretary, Joint U.S. %ff Plannem, 16 November 1942, subject: Responsibility for 

Conduct and Security of Military Cummunica tions Activities, Nimitz Papers, NSAHC. 

3. See The Test, 445-46, which contains the suggestion that the CSO concurred in President Roosevelt's 

subsequent decision to gresarve the RID. See ah Hearingsfor various item introduced duringthecourse of FCC 

testimony. 

4. Letter from Admiral Leahy to Secrehry Knoa, 1 February 1943, quoted in Hearirqgs, 1253 ff. 

6. Roowelt to Knox correspondence, in ibid. 

6. Thi~ was the GOx Committee. Congramman Cox owned a broadcasting company and did not like Chairman 

James Fly. Cox went to some length to discredit My and the FCC and unnecessarily exposed certain RID 

activities. (Sterling interview; Hearings; miwellanmus material in RG 173). 

7. See ibid., 1253-64, and various files in RG 173, National Archives. 

8. Cited in memorandum from Commander L. T. Jones, OF-20-GU to OP-20-G, 7 September 1944, subject; 

Clandestine Radio Intelligence, General File, NSAHC. This is a detailad account of the clandestine COMINT 

problem, as seen by the Coast Guard Unit. Hereafter cited as Commander Jones memorandum. 

9. See especially Boxes 5 and 27, RG 173; alsoHetaring8; Sterling inhrviews. 

10. George Sterling summarized it this way in the authofls interviews: Admiral Redman was a longtims 

personal friend of Sterling. But the admiral missed no opportunity to downgrade RID, eapecially ta Congress. In 

Sterling's opinion, Admiral Redman felt that the RID, in an unauthorized COMSEG capacity, was monitoring 

U.S. Navy communications. For Mr. Hoover it was a personal matter. He intemely disliked Chairman Fly 

because of an obscure quarrel about the fmgerprinting of radio operators on U.S. merchant marine vessels. 

Hoover and the FBI gave RID no support at the congressional hearings. 

11. OP-20-G Subdivision Order No. 69, 11 April 1944, signed by Captain Philip R Kenney, Chief of OP-204, 

Organization File, NSAHC. 

12. Mrs. Friedman told the author that there were rarely more than twenty people directly working on CA and 

translation. 

13. Memorandum from Commander Jones to OP-20-GI, 25 August 1944, subject: Clandestine Communications, 

General File. 

14. See History ofConst Guard Unit387,231 ff.,for a complete discussion oEGrssn ENIGMA and other ENIGMA 

solutions by the USCG. Sources for the British concern are discussed in the next source note. 

15. A copy of this message and the reply massage are in General File. The message numbers ara CXG358 and 

CXG 898. 

16. Commander Jones memorandum. 
17, Memorandum from Wewr to OP-20-G (Captain Stone), 28 May 1943, General File. This memorandum 

contains a favorable endorsement by Stom as well as the notation of DNC approval. 

18. Memordumhm Captain Wh S. Wharton. OP-1&3-7 to DM, 19 December 1944. sub* Control of 

Dissemination oflntelligem Derived fxom Radio Intemption to Civilian Agenek oftba United States. General 

File (hified). Thk docmnent, hedr cited as Wbarton memorandum, is an involved amount of Navy-FBfBritish intdigence relations. "Buck" Wharhn was a reserve offxer with political connections in the Pacific 

Northwest. He headed ON1 oounhrintelligence (B-7) through mod of the war. This memorandum md be read 

with some cantion because ON1 was no longer involved in Navy COMINT policy and Id am= to COMlNT only 

in counterintelligence mattem. Tbe author's efforts to trace the F+BI-Britkh "side agreement" of 1943 through 

FBI T~EO* was M. 

19. Rowlett interview. Mr. Rowlett ad& that the FBI representative in London was Mr. Simperton. A Mr. 

Thurston M8 ah an FBI repremmtative there. 

20. Memorandum fmm Captain Wallace Wharton to DNI. 12 Odber 1943, General File. 

21. Memorandum from Captain Stone b DM aia DNC, 20 Oetobr 1943, Gem1 File. See aha Wharton 

memorandum 1cMikdI 

22. Memorandum from Hoover b Admiial Schuarmann. 8 December 1943, Genaral File (chdiied). 

28. Memorandum from Schuermaaato Hoover, 10 ~ecezber 1945,Gemral File (cMed). 

24. htter from Hugh B. Cox, mistant mlicitor geneml to BSC, 22 January 1944. !h -ah the Whartan 

memoraodum 

25. Wharton memorandum. 

27. Agreement dated 1 May 1944, in General File. See also Wkbn memorandum. 

23. Paper entitled Odim of Conirouemy Betmen the Navy and &iW1,17 May 1944. General File (cIaasified). 

29. Memorandum from Clarke to Wenper. 20 May 1944, General File (classified). 

SO. Memorandum from L. T. Jonea to OP-20-G10,26 August Z944,General File. 

31. Memorandum from Kinmy to variow subdivision heads, 3 1 August 1944, General File. 

32. Commander Jones memorandum. 

33. Author'sinterview ofMr. Newpher, 1975. 

34. Vol. 1, Secret Service Sigint, GC&CS History, 55-56 Iclasaified). 

35. Memorandum from L. T. donss ta OP-20- G. 18 November 1943. General File CcWiedl. 

36. Wn memorandum; see atso hmruander Jones memorandum for a good discwion of the meaning ofthe 

terms involved. 

97. Sw variousitems in ACSI C34, especiaIly the report headd Coast Guard Liaison wiih British on Clan&sline 

Traffic. 

38. Sterling interview and Sterling article,"The U.S. Hunt for Axis Agent Radios." 
Chapter 7 

The Amy and Navy Move toward 

Full Cooperation, 194445 

THE ARMY AND NAVY FORMALIZE COOPERATION 

A recurring and major theme of this study has been the development of Army-Navy 

CoMINT cooperation. The culmination of these trends, the creation of the Army-Navy 

COMINT Coordinating Committee (ANCICC) and the Army-Navy Communications 

Intelligence Board (ANCIB), will be described in this chapter. Although the Army's 

continuing attempts to put its own COMINT structure in order are important in considering 

interservice cooperation, these will be treated separately in the next chapter. 

While General Strong had long favored more cooperation or even consolidation of the 

Army and Navy COMINT services, the actual agreement that was the first step in that 

direction was based on a Navy concept. The credit probably goes to Commander Wenger 

who, though opposed to outright merger of the C~MINT services, had during 1943 prepared 

sound proposals for better coordination and high-level planning. 

By the end of 1943, the Army had access to information of undoubted operational value 

to the Navy. This was from the now-exploitable Japanese army codes. From the 

standpoint of MIS Special Branch, the Navy had never properly reciprocated for the steady 

volume of material that came from the Army in the form of Special Branch MAGIC 

Summaries, SSA's Japanese diplomatic translations, material obtained by MIS from the 

British. Colonel Clarke decided that Japanese army material would not be made available 

to the Navy unless a reciprocal agreement was reached.' 

This led to an exchange of views between MIS and OP-20-G, the former represented by 

an ad hoc committee composed of Clarke, Colonel A1 McCormack, and Major Perdue. They 

sought a "simple traffic exchange" type of agreement (actually an exchange of translations 

rather than raw traffi~).~ The Navy countered with the suggestion that liaison officers 

should be exchanged and that these officers would have free access to the other service's 

COMINT files. The Navy proposal became the basis for the agreement that was in the form 

of a document signed by Admiral King on 4 February 1944 and forwarded to General 

Marshall. The latter signed on 12 February 1944, making it effecti~e.~ 

This agreement, hereafter referred to as the King-Marshall Agreement, was to apply 

only to anti-Japanese COMINT matters and only among the various headquarters agencies 

in Washington. This was a practical first step given the U.S. primacy in the Pacific both in 

the narrower world of COMINT and in the wider arena of high-level strategy. Such an 
agreement did not have to consider the British position. The basic terms of the KingMarshall Agreement were these:4 

1. Army Wn ohm would deal with the Pacific don W-22) of the Navy's 

Combat Intelligence Division and have access to OP-20-G files coneerring anti-Japanese 

COABINT. 

2. The Navy liaison fioers would have similar access to MIS Special Branch and 

SSA. 

3. The= liaison offrcem would take whatever information they needed, but the 

service producing the COMIMT would mntinue to control handling, diemination, and use. 

4. There would be common rules governing the security of ULTRA (i-e., highest-level 

COMINT). 

Colonel Clarke, who had not favored the exchange of liaison ofKcera in the first place, 

was, not surprisingly, unhappy with the early applications of the King-Marshall 

Agreement.We gave the Navy liaison officer full access, without restrictions, to Spacial 

Branch material, and copies could be mad; of any material. Major Snow, the Special 

Branch liaison officer to the Navy, was unable to copy all material, as the Navy remrved 

the right to debrmine what the Army could have. Clarke suggested to the ACS, G2, that 

the Army perhaps should recomider the agreement. 

But as this agreement had been signed by the chiefs of st&, it was not to be discarded 

at the first sign of trouble. Rather the ofbsuggested, by each service, idea of a COMINT 

coordinating body was resurrected. One may be confident that the idea came from 

Commander Wenger, though the author has found MI record. 

On 18 April 1944, the ANCICC came inb being. Its first meeting was attended by 

Colonel Clarke of MIS, SSA chief Colonel Corderman, Commander Wenger and his chief 

Captain Kinney, from the Navy, and Captain Smith-Hutton of F-22. They agreed that 

their purpose would be to coordinate future plans in the PacSc, cmrdinate relationship 

and agreementa with the Allies, and consider postwar plans6 The following month an 

ANCICC charter was drawn up defining its purpose as ". . . to improve the general 

collaboration of the Army and Navy communication intelligence organizations by 

coordinating plans and agreements affecting joint operating arrangements in support of 

properly approved poLicies, preparing recommendations for desirable changes in policies, 

and settling such controversial matters as can be resolved without reference b higher 

authority. 

Nowhere was there criticism of the King-Marshall Agreement or a suggestion that it 

had not become a basic C~MINT agreement. The MIS continued its regular assignment of 

liaison officers to the Navy, and the latter did likewise. At Ieast by June 1944, the SSA 

had a technical liaimn officer, Captain John N. Seaman, at OP-20-G.' The WOP-20-G 
liaison waa vigorously pursued, and a wealth of sensitive technical data was freely 

Meanwhile, a separate technical agreement had been made on 7 April 1944 between 

tbe SSA and OP-20-G for mLlaImration on Japanese weather S~S~.'~ Each service 

would freely exchange intercepts as well a~ eryptanalytic data. The Navy would be 

rq~nsib1e for primary work on the main Japanese weather system, JN-37. This 

agreement, which just predated the fmt ANCICC meethg' seems to have been made 

without reference to MIS or the Combat Intelligence Division. 

THE WORKINGS OF ANCICC AND THE CREATION OF ANCIB 

The members of ANCICC promptly plunged into a number of jurisdictional problems 

of mutual concern. At the Grst meeting on 18 April, the members had decided to withhold 

clandestine COMINT from the FBI." This decision, as was shown in the preceding chapter, 

was put into effect by ONI. The committee&o resolved to again discourage OSS attempts 

to enter the COMINT field and to take no action on the relationship of FRUMEL and CBB 

until the responsibilities of the latter were made clear. 

While a meeting-by-meeting account of ANCTCC's work in 1944 will not be given here, 

some of the highlights will be shown in the following paragraphs. These illuatrah the 

remarkable degree of cooperative effort that had come into being.I8 

Although the King-Marshall Agreement had called for free exchange of all material of 

interest via liaison officers, this seems to have been slow in coming about (at least 

according to Colonel Clarke - see seetion 1). However, at the 10 May 1944 meeting 

ANCICC specified that all Japanese military attach8 and all Japanese naval attach8 

(JNA) CoMINT would be exchanged between the services. At this same meeting, the 

committee went so far as to undertake preliminary planning for a complete Army-Navy 

COMINT merger. Commander Wenger and Colonel Earle F. Cook of SSA were appointed as 

a subcommittee to consider this. The specific details of this early merger planning do not 

appear in the ANCICC minutes, but it is likely that the inkent was to consider postwar 

organization rather than anything in the near future. 

Legal aspects of COMINT, of no great concern since Pearl Harbor, were also considered 

by ANCICC. At issue were the existing U.S. communications laws (specifically the 1934 

law that had, among other things, created the FCC) that seemed to prohibit many COMINT 

activities.'' A legal matter that had been of continuing concern was how to protect COhmJT 

from unauthorizd disclosure. The ANCICC recognized that specific Iegislation was 

needed and draft legislation, initiated in the committee, ultimately reached the chiefs of 

st& This, however, is a postwar story. 
Immediate wartime needs were of course discussed. Colonel Clarke, at Navy urging, 

agreed to dispatch Special Branch oMicers to serve as SSOs at JICPOA, (actually CIC) 

Pearl Harbor. The activity and employment of U.S. Army Air Force Radio Squadrons 

Mobile and the all-service integration and coordination of radio fingerprinting IRFP), 

intercept, and DF were studied and discussed. These discussions resulted in specific 

cooperative operations in the Pacific. 

In November, ANCICC, in regular operation for six months, moved toward still 

greater formalization of its activity and an expansion of responsibility. Extensive 

subcommittees involving off~cers of MIS, SSA, OP-20-G, and Combat Intelligence Division 

were formed.14 The authority of ANCICC was now ". . . to determine the major policies and 

to take such action as may be necessary to coordinate methods, procedures, operations, and 

equipment - in all matters involving communication intelligence," and "ANCICC has the 

authority to implement its decisions except on matters of major policy, which will require 

the approval of higher authority." The regular members of ANCICC would now be:'' 

Position 

Commanding Officer, SSA 

Deputy Chief, MIS 

Assistant Director Naval 

Communications, DP-LO-G 

OIC, Naval Communications Annex 

Jncurnbent on 10 November 1944 

Colonel W. P. Corderman 

Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke 

Captain J. N. Wenger 

Captain Phillip R. Kinney 

Assistant, Combat Intelligence Division Captain W. R. Smedberg I11 

The subcommittees included Intercept and DF, TA, COlllINT Communications, 

Collateral Information, Cryptanalysis, Intercept Coordination, Research, and 

InteI~igencelSeeurity? 

Whether or not by design, the ANCICC did not make any new general agreement to 

replace the allocation and dissemination agreements of the summer of 2942. To do so 

would pr~bably have required the participation of the FBI, a most unlikely circumstance. 

This is of more than passing interest, because as late as December 1944,OP-20-G and SSA, 

through individual representatives rather than through the ANCICC, debated the 

meaning and authority of the 1942 agreement as it applied to "trade codes." Throughout 

much of the war, the SSA had worked Japanese commercial, that is, economic messages, 

although the 1942 agreement allotted Japanese "trade codes" to OP-20-G.17 

At the end of 1944, the Navy taok the initiative once again and suggested that 

ANCICC, which had originated with discussions at the COMINT and intelligence services 

level only, should become even more formal and permanent and have the approval of 

Admiral King and General Marshal. The exact sequence of events that led to the creation 
of what would be known as ANCIB is not clear, but it cannot be too wrong to see Captain 

Wenger and Capbin W. R, Smedberg (who found interservice i&ghting intolerable) as 

inspiring the move. 

A draft proposal establishing the new organization was prepared for Admiral King's 

signature on 22 December 1944 but was not sent to him, probably because more discussion 

with the Army was needed. Another version was signed by Admiral King on 14 February 

1945 and sent to General MarshallaL8 The Navy proposal noted that ANClCC had operated 

successfully for almost a year but as "an unofficial committee." As the results had been 

good, a permanent, formal committee was needed because "war experience has 

demonstrated the logic of centralizing control and coordination of this most valuable but 

very easily lost source of intelligence in an [Army-Navy] committee. . . ." The proposed 

body, to be known as ANCIB, would be outside the framework of the JCS, the Joint 

Intelligence Committee, or the Joint Communications Board. ANCfB would be 

responsible directly to the chief of staff and the COMINCH/CNO. ANCIB would consist of 

two off~cers from each service, and Admiral King intended to name the DNC and the 

assistant chief of staff for combat intelligence (who was also the DNI) as his JI 

representatives. 

The King proposal went to the MIS for recommendations. The response from 

Brigadier General ~artei~larke, sent to the deputy chief of staff, was extremely negative 

and seems to have been a low point in the formulation of COMlNT policy. But it must be 

said that General Clarke was probably weary from the struggles he had just completed 

regarding operational control of the SSA (to be discussed in the next chapter). Clarke's 

first response, a draft dated 24 February and intended for the DCS, does not seem to have 

been signed by the ACS, G-2, General Bissell. The next effort was far more detailed and 

was signedby General Bissell on 2 March 1945.19 In this memorandum, Clarke and Bissell 

agreed that the proposed ANCIB was a worthy idea, comparable to the British Signal 

Intelligence Board. However, U.S. COMINT was not as centralized as that of the British, 

and there were these factors to consider: 

1. Navy COMINT was centralized under the DNC. Army COMINT was fragmented with 

SRls and RMSs under theater control; semi-independent theater SIS groups; and the SSA, 

which was partly under MIS control. The SSA, though the main processing center and 

having its own intercept stations, still depended on units not under its control for the bulk 

of its traffic." 

2. The King proposal was good for the long range. 

3. ". . . The Army can hardly participate in an interservice project of this sort as long 

as its own signal intelligence activities remain as decentralized as they now are." 

The recommendation was for a noncommittal response to Admiral King and an Army 

staff study before making a final reply. 
This was most displeasing to General Thomas T. Handy, the deputy chief of shff. In 

two bristling memorandums to General Bissell on 7 March, he suggested that the- lawr's 

objection to the King proposal were not valid,21 He suggested (in the second memorandum) 

that Bkll's negative comments were ". . . due to what you conceive to be faulty 

organization within the Army - a view that is not accepted by other responsible agencies. 

Such reasoning does not appear to be sound." A draft acceptance was therefore dird 

On 9 March 1945 General Marshall sent a brief memorandum to Admiral King 

accepting the establishment ofANCI3. He alao enclosed an agreement that he had signed, 

which required Admiral King's signature. Admiral King signed the ANCIB agreement on 

10 March.= 

The ANClB was established effective immediately with the following membership: 

Major General Bissell ACS, G2 Rear Admiral Joseph Rdman, DNC 

Colonel W. Preston Corderman, 

Commander, SSA 

Because of the Merent organizational structures of the Army and Navy and by virtue 

of Admiral King's initial suggestion regarding the membership of ANCIB, neither 

General Clarke nor Captain Wenger was on the board, while Colonel Coderman, actually 

subordinate to Clarke, was. But the ANCIB agreement called for the creation of a "new" 

ANCICC that was to be the working committee of the ANCIB. PrdctabIy the memkrs of 

the "new" AEaCICC were aa before; Clarke and Corderman for the Army; Wenger, Kinney, 

and Smedberg for the Navy. 

The ANCIB charter as stated in the agreement was as follows: 

2. With respect to ail mattem pertaining ta collection. research. productton, compilation. 

dhmihtion, and wurity of communication intelligence, the Board wilk 

a. CooArab the plans and operationsof the communication intelligence organimtions 

ofthe Army and Navy. 

b. Formulate joint agreements as b pdure~ pertinent thereto. 

c. Negotiate and coordinate with other intelligence organizations. 

3. The Board will function outside the framework of the Joint Chiefs of Staff snd report 

directly to the chief of st&, US. Army, the mmmander in chief US. Fleet, and the chief of 

naval operations. 

The creation of ANCIB was a logical development, if some three years late. In fact, 

ANCIB belongs to the postwar period rather than to World War 11, as it was the U.S. 

framework for interservice COMINT cooperation that preceded the formation of the Armed 

Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in 1949. Although attempts to draw exact parallels are 
probably useless, it is worth saying that ANCIB brought the U.S. GOMINT services into an 

organizational and policy position reached by the British ten years before. 

Notes 

1. Memorandum from Carter W. Clarke to Major General Clayton Biawll, ACS, F2, 4 March 1944, subject: 

Army-Navy Agreement Regarding ULTRA, ACSI R42. This is a lengthy document filled with complaints about 

the hckof cooperation since the beginning ofthe war. 

3. Joint Army-Navy Agreement for theEchangeofComrnunicatwn Intelligenos in Catalog, 2.c.(9). 

4. Ibid 

5. Clarke to Biassll, d March 1944, see footnote 1. 

6. OutEiraeofCollabratwn(pmpared by Wenger), 33 ff. 

8. Routing and Work Sheet with entry for 1 June 19a in SSA file folder marked Reports (Liaison with Navy), 

NSAH. 

9. See Reports (Liaison withNauyl folder. There are forty-eight reports on fde prepared by Captain Seaman and 

his swesaors, Captain Walter J. Fried and C. P. Colh. Most are addressed to Colonel Rawlett and deal with 

such matters as the Nauy Bombe, German clandestine traffic, attache and diplomatic traffic, GC&CS, and U.S. 

machine processing. There is a great volume of detail on specific cryptanalytic processes in these reports. 

10. Joint Army-Navy Conference Concerning Japramae Wather 7nformafaon, 7 April 1944, signed by Colonel W. 

Preston Gordermm end Commander J. N. Wenger, Catalog, Z.c.(lO). 

11. Outline of Coilobomtion, 33 ff. The promedings of many of the 1944 meetings of ANCICC are reproduced in 

thia study by Commander Wenger. 

12. All the examples are from Wenger'a Outline ofCoilaboration. 

23. In the prewar perid, there is no doubt that the V.S. intelligence services understaod that at least diplomatic 

COMINT operations were illegal under the 1934 law. However, COMIWT activities had been authorized by 

President Roosevelt, the secretaries of the ssrvices, the CNO, and chief of staff. Aceording to the thinking of the 

time, that was sufficient legal justification. Once war began, the president's war powers caused any legal 

queation to evaporate. 

14. All information on the November expansion of ANCICC is from Army-Navy Communication 1ni.elEigence 

Coordinating Committee General Informtion -No. I, Nok by Secretaries, 10 November 1944. signed by J. V. 

Connorton, Lieutenant, USN, and Rhea M. Smith, Captain, USA, in Catalog 4.b. 

15. Ibid. Wenger had replaced Captain Kinney as head of OP-20-G and as an ADNC on 6 November. This will be 

discussed in the next chapter. 

16. The subcommittee roster contained in the 10 November document is an interesting "Who's Who" of the 

COMINTcornmunity late in the war. Joseph J. Rochefort had returned to favor in the COMINT business and was 

appointed to the IntelligencelSecurity St~bmmmittee. 
17. Repod ofMeebitzg between Army an$ Navy on Allocation of Commercial Trafic, 13 December 1944, signed by 

Lieutenant B. K. Buffham, SSA, in Catalog, 2.c.(13). In February 1945 a similar discussion arose between Army 

and Navy representatives ov0r definition of diplomatic COMINT. See SSA History, vol. 1,100-103, and Rowlett 

interviews, tape #3. 

18. Memorandum to chief of staff, subject: Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board - Establishment of, 

14 February 1945, in Catalog, 4.d. 

19. The unaent draft and the 2 March 1945 version are in ACSI #4, both drafted by Carter W. Clarke for the 

signature of General Bismll. 

20. I am not sure if this was correct unless traffic from the British is munted. CBB was the largest source of U.S. 

Army trmc aftar the SSA's own tramc. 

21. Thew two memorandums from Handy to BisseI1, both 7 March 1945, are in ACSI #4. 

22. Memorandum from MarAall to King, 9 March ID&, and Agreement (no date), both in Catalog 4.e. The date 

of 10 March For the ANCIB agreement is in the Winkler-Bidwell material in ACSI #6. The ANClB Agreement 

was in the form of a memorandum to tbe DNC, DNI, ACS, G-2, and commanding general, a. 
Chapter 8 

Internal Army and Navy 

Organizational Developments, 194445 

SSOS IN THE PACIFIC 

Having seen in the preceding chapter how the Army and Navy, beginning in early 

1944, found a regular means for cooperation and exchange, we return to the organizational 

and policy developments within each service. The ordering of this topic has been mcult 

as it precedes some of the developments just described in chapter 7, but, on the other hand, 

it continues beyond the creation of ANCIB (March 1945) b the end of the war. Unhappily, 

there is a certain timelessness to some of the events that follow, for there has been a 

repetition to the present day. JI 

The watershed of any history of Army COMINT during World War-11, be it one of policy 

and organization or of operatiuns, is March-May 1943, when the first breaks into the 

Japanese army codes were made and when the Army gained full access to the British 

exploitation of ENIGMA. Among the administrative results was the creation of the Special 

Security Officer ISSO) system to securely distribute and control ULTRA information and a 

series of War Department regulations that sought to safeguard ULTRA in accordance with 

British and U.S. Navy standards. A serial description of the Army COMINT regulations is 

tao tedious a matter. Suffice it to say at this point that the first ULTRA (or ULTRA Dexter) 

regulations were promulgated in September and October 1943, and that the role of the 

SSOs was specifically, if narrowly, stated in the latter regulation: 

Special Security OEcers assigned to the staff of a command shail have sole charge of bringing 

ULTRA Dexter intelligence to the attention of the commander and shall advise the commander 

on all problems of security in connection with the receipt, transmission, handling, and use of 

ULTRA Dexter intelligence. Recommendations made by such officers concerning security shall 

be followed. 

The European Theater version of the SSO system, under the direction of Colonel 

Telford Taylor, has already been described in detail. Beginning in the fall of 1943, SSOs 

were sent from MIS to the oher theaters: Majar James Ashly ta SWPA, Captain John F. 

B. Runnals to CBI, and Major Edwin E. Huddleston Jr. to Pacific Ocean areas (Hawaii). In 

order to familiarize the commands with the SSO system, Colonel Clarke visited the 

Pacific-Asian theater prior to the dispatch of the aforementioned officers. He met 

personally with General MacArthur and overcame the general's objections to having a 
War Deplmmkontmlled officer in his command.' The matter of War Department 

control of the red a sensitive issue in the SWPA 

By spring 1944 the MIS undertook the selection and kabhg of additional acers for 

SSO positions in the Pacific. This was because major offensives were to commence against 

Japan, and there would be a greater need to dissemhta ULTRA below the level of theater 

commander. In July the War Deputmunt ULTRA regulations applicable ta the Pacific and 

Asian theaters were revised to allow dissemination to numbered armies and the 

equivalent USAAF commands and to corps that might operate independently. This new 

group of SSOs (abut twenty off~ers) went overseas in September 1944. Ultimately there 

were War Department SSOs not only at bbddhur's headquarters but also with the Sixth 

and Eighth Armies in the Philippines, the Far Air Foree (FEAF) and its subordinate 

elements, the Pi, Thirteenth, and (much later) Seventh Air Forces. In Hawaii, SSQs 

were with naval intelligence offlcers at JICPOA and the advance headquarters in Guam. 

In the CBI, SSOs were at various headquarters in Ceylon, India, and China. At least two 

SSOs went into Obwa during the invasion? In theory, all these ohrs were under 

Carter W. Clarke, originally when he was cw of Special Branch ad later when he was 

deputy chief of MIS and SSO War Department. 

The operations of tb SSOs in the P&e and Asian theaters are too varied for an easy 

summary ad are a part of the operational history of comm. Certain adminhkative and 

policy arrangements must be descxibd, however. 

The expanded SSO system, still under War Department control, was resisted by 

General MacArthur. In June 1944 he had sent a message to General Marshall decrying 

khe principle of having officers not under his command in his theater. He said that he 

supported the idea of an SSO system and the new security and dissemination procdures 

but not Washington control. His conclusion was grandly put: "Many disasters in history 

can be charged directly to such long distance cuntml offunctions that properly telong to a 

responsible field commander."' General Marshall did not directly respond, but he did 

order the dispatch of the new ULTRA regulations and the attendant SSO augmentation. 

The experience of Major John R. Thompson tends to show how General MacArthur's 

views were acted upon! Thompson and four assistant SSOs were sent U SWPA to serve at 

the Central Emu. The GHQ SWPA and the FEAF (both served by SSOsl had already 

moved forward to Hollandia and thence ta the Philifines, The Thompson group was to 

select CBB and MIS ULTRA material for transmission from Brisbane to the forward area. 

However, General Richard K. Sutherland, General MacArtbds chief of std, purportedly 

at the urging of Spencer Akin, squelched this procedure. General Sutherland told 

Thompson that the War Department ULTRA regulations altowed the SSOs to merely advise 

on ULTRA security and to decipherlencipher ULTRA product messages. Only SWPA G-2 

officers would select and disseminate CBB material. In the end, the SSO team, with the 

aid of an SWPA G2 type, did the ULTRA selection, editing, and transmission anyway. 
In the China-Burma-India ICBI) theater, the SSO was at first colocated with the 

theater SIS in New Delbi. His duties included typical SSO operations, as well as liaison 

and mrdi&tion for the War Department with the large British GOMINT organization in 

India {the WEC).7 CBI SSOs were assisted by the theater G-2 personnel in order of battle 

work but nonetheless maintained control over ULTRA information and, as elsewhere, held 

their own private crypto systems. The SSOs in the CBI seem to have been welcomed by the 

command, and their duties extended to evaluation of COMINT as well as secure 

dis~emination.~ 

Lest the SSO function become too involved in the telling, these points are made to 

place it in context: 

1. The SSOs personally received all ULTRA produced in Washington and 

disseminated by MIS. In other words, the Signal Security Agency, through intercept 

received from, mainly, MS2 at Two Rock Ranch and CBB, produced ULTRA for the Pacifie 

and Asian theaters. This was evaluated and fnrwarded to the SSOs by MIS Washingkon. 

2. Locally produced ULTRA - as by CB$or SIS New Delhi - was usually, by late 1944, 

disseminated by the, SSOs. 

3. The SSOs disseminated Navy-produced ULTRA; Navy ULm available to the Army 

was extensive and of highest value. 

Ifthese operations seem rather too extensive for a few dozen SSOs, we should note that 

lower-level GOMINT, called Pearl (solved low-level cryptographic systems1 and Thumb (TA 

and DF), as obtained for CBB by the SRI companies and independently by the USAAF 

Radio Squadrons Mobile, did not necessarily go through the SSOs. A substantial portion of 

the COMINT was in the Pearl and Thumb categories, and the term "low-level" ought not to 

be interpreted as "low signzcance." 

DEVELOPMENTS AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT 

General Strong had been ACS, G-2, for almost two years when illness incapacitated 

him in February 1944. He was replaced by Major General Clayton D. Bissell, a 

controversial Air Force officer without intelligence experience. Strong had never favored 

the MIS concept and ran G2 as though the MID sW and MIS were one and the same. 

Within days of his departure, a board headed by John J. McCloy undertook a study of the 

reorganization of G-2. Serving with McCloy on the board were General Bissell, General 

John Smith, the Army representative to OSS, and General Otto L. Nelson, who had been a 

prime mover in the March 1942 reorganization of MID. General Nelson, a fixture on the 

General Stttff since the beginning of the war, was almost certainly the force behind this 

reorganization too.8 The McCloy Board had the following objecti~es:~ 
1. a renewed attempt to separate MID and MIS 

2, an end to extreme compartmentation 

3. emphasis on anti-Japanese and German intelligence 

4. maximum exploitation of productive intelligence activities 

5. establishment of an intelligence specialist system 

The end to extreme cornpartmentation was surely directed at the 

Special Branch, which, it may be 

recalled, was a product of the thinking 

of Secretary of War Stimson, Mr. 

McCloy himself, and his former law 

partner Colonel A1 McCormack. The 

personnel growth c+f the Special Branch 

was probably a factor too. By June 

1944 the branch had a strength of 382 

officers, enlisted, and civilians (a 

substantial portion in all categories 

being women), while the rest of MIS in 

Washin@on numbered only 356. This 

seemingly odd situation was actually 

an honest recognition that COMIW was 

the most valuable type of intelligence. 

But it had led to the development of 

parallel subdivisions: there was a 

Special Branch unit (B section) 

analyzing Japanese military matters 

and preparing the '3apanese Army 

Supplement" to the daily MAGIC 

Summary, while at the same time the 

"other," i.e., non-COMINT portion of 

MIS also had a Japanese military section.1° It was often difficult for Special Branch's 

Japanese and German order of battle analysts to'deal with their MIS counterparts who 

were not authorized access to ULTRA. t 

Major Gener J Clayton Bisslell 

assistant chief of sW,G-2 

The reorganization and establishment of a new MISLMID did not take place until July 

1944. The former Special Branch disappeared and its COMmT analysts were divided 

among specialists' desks and research units of the new intelligence division of MIS headed 

by Colonel A1 McCormack, as director off intelligence (or director of information). A new 

Special Branch was created to supervise COMINT liaison and the SSO program. Carter 

Clarke became deputy chief of MIS and was soon promoted to brigadier general. Army 
COmNT policy remained the personal responsibility of General Clarke, and, as the SSO 

War Department, he directly controlled the new Spcial Branch too." Once again MID was 

separated from MIS as a pure policy and staff agency. Both MIS and the MID staff 

remained as before under the ACS, G-2. 

The McCloy Board had also considered the matter of control of Army COMINT.~~ The 

hard had forwarded its overall recommendations to the deputy chief of smon 23 March 

1944. Included was the apparent advocation of the merger of SSA into the MIS.'' 

Unfortunately, this-advocacy was hedged in that certain questions requiring staff study 

were posed. 

General Bissell answered these questions in a memorandum to General Marshall on 

15 June 1944. His case (perhaps prepared by Carter Clarke) was that unified control of 

Army COMINT was needed, and that could be accomplished by placing SSA and its 

monitoring stations under MIS. General Bissell requested authority to take that action at 

the appropriate time but *not immediately" as MIS was too deeply involved in critical 

intelligence production and was receiving good support from the Signal Corps. The 

landings in Normandy had taken place"on1y nine days before, and the general 

reorganization of MID/MIS was in progress too. 

We cannot know what might have happened if General Bissell had asked for 

immediate control of SSA. What followed were months of interminable wrangling within 

the War Department. The matter is too repetitive to recount memorandum by 

memorandum, argument by counterargument. Certain highlights are instructive, and the 

basic concepts must be described because there has never been a thorough resolution in the 

intelligence community. 

John J. McCloy saw General Bissell's memorandum to the chief of staff. He urged 

General Marshall to have G-2 immediately take control of SSA.14 But it was General 

Nelson, the assistant deputy chief of staff, who responded to General Bissell on 22 June. 

He asked for specifw plans to implement the G-2 assumption of control over SSA and for an 

analysis of the effect on other Signal Corps activitie~.'~ 

Carter Clarke reviewed the matters faced by Nelson, and a reply to the oMice of the 

deputy chief of staff was made on 11 July." The response did not include detailed plans, 

but rather the proposal that the transfer would take place thirty days after it was approved 

and that the Army regulation IAR 105-5) giving the CSO COMINT and COMSEC 

responsibilities would be changed, as would S@nal Corps and MIS personnel allotments. 

Detailed plans for a MIS-SSA integration and reorganization would come after the 

transfer.17 

The commanding general, Army Service Forces, and the CSO were quick to answer 

this challenge. General SDmervell wrote the chief of staff on 22 July to enter his strong 

objection to the G2 propasal. He reassured him that several previous G-2 attempts to take 

over the SSA had been disapproved and that this latest effort had neither increased 
efficiency or better organization to recommend it. He recommended that there be no 

change in the existing setup and that "the subject [[should] remain closed for the duration." 

Included with General Somervell's memorandum to General Marshall was a lengthy 

exposition of the matter prepared by General Harry Ingles, the CSO.'' General Ingles 

raised these objections to the transfer of SSA from the OCSigO to MIS: 

1. MIS was not like the Signal Corps, an established branch of the Army, authorized 

by Congress. 

2. MIS would gain control of only the SSA and Second Signal Service, leaving the 

Signal Corps to still train and man the numerous other Army GOMINT elements (i.e., the 

SRI companies, ete.). 

3. MIS could not train the specialists needed for COMINT. 

4. The production of CQMINT was largely a signals undertaking. Similarly, 

cryptographic processes were a signal matter. 

5. If the SSA, operating under the OCSigO had not fulfilled its mission, the MIS 

should state its complaints to the CSO. Theraad been no complaints. 

General Ingle's arguments were in turn subjected to predictable rebuttals from Carter 

Clarke.'' Of greater interest were the observations of Mr. McCloy, made in a 

memorandum to General McNarney, the DcS." McCloy wmte that he was in complete 

disagreement with Generals Somervell and Ingles because the entire GOMINT operation 

belonged "under one roof." But he went beyond the immediate circumstances and looked 

toward the postwar period. He wrote: 

In my judgment one of the chief pillars of our national security sygtem after the war must be an 

axhnsive intercept servica. If we are to be a military power or, indeed, ifwe are to take an active 

role in world affairs, we cannot afford to leave this field entirely ta the Britiah and the 

Continental powers. If is OM of the best sources of i&lZigsnce that there is and1 mdd hke it out 

of any existing seruice agency immediately in the hope and belief tht if would develop into can 

organization which wouldstand a betler chance ofperpetuation inpeacetime. 

Mr. McCloy then went on to the personnel problems of military intelligence. He 

observed that "the curse of our so-called intelligence service to date is the attachment to it 

of only those offlcers who have social acceptance and means enough to enable them to 

pursue a life of relative ease." He concluded that the best example to follow was that of the 

British who, he believed, had brought together under actual control all the elements that 

make up communications intelligence. 

Assistant Secretary McCloy simply lacked the authority to implement his 

recommendations. There is no record, unfortunately, to show where Secretary of War I' 

Stimson stood. So the arguments and counterarguments returned to military channels. 
The MIS position was given to the DCS in greater dehil in September in a paper 

possibly prepared by Colonel McCormack and signed by General Ei~sell.~' The entire 

GOMINT prmess, from intercept through analysis and dissemination, was described as a 

single intelligence operation that should be in the hands of intelligence officers, not 

divided between signal and intelligence off~cers. The successful British system was given 

as an example of the wisdom of consolidation. The existing system impeded overall Army 

COMINT, placed the U.S. in a weak position in dealing with the British, and worsened the 

". . . present unavoidable division among the Army, the Navy, and the FBI of responsibility 

for U.S. signal intelligence activities." A new feature was introduced into the MIS 

argument. Under the present system, sophisticated forms of radio deception, beyond mere 

manipulation of traffic volume could not (or would not) be carried out by SSA. The British 

were able to practice real deception based on their knowledge of what communications the 

enemy could exploit. With MIS planning and control, the U.S. too could enter this field. 

At the end of November 1944, the CSO offered a compromise. The SSA would remain 

under the OCSi, but the MIS could communicate directly with that agency and would be 

given some authority over transfer of key+wrsonnel.2"he matter of direct MIS-SSA 

contact was not as elementary a matter as it seemed. Most correspondence from MIS had 

had to pass through the OCSigO en route to SSA. And as late as 1943 the MIS Special 

Branch analysts had been forbidden by Signal Corps policy from dealing person to person 

with the translators or editors in SSA. The contact was in writing at the level of chief, 

Special Branch-Chief SSA. Colonel Corderman had, however, dropped these restrictions 

long before this offer of compromise by the 

The CSO's compromise was not acceptable to G2. Likewise an offer by General IngIes 

to work the matter out through a personal discussion with Carter Clarke was rejected.24 A 

few days later General Ingles tried again. He presented the new DCS, General Thomas T. 

Handy, a document for signature that would give operational control of the SSA to the 

ACS, G-2, leaving the CSO the "command and administration" of the SSAlSecond Signal 

Servi~e.~' The new delineation between the authority of the ACS, G-2, and the CSO was 

set out in some detail, and while certain arrangements were simplified and were in favor of 

G-2, the dual control remained. 

General Handy must have liked the Ingles proposal because, over the objection of 

General Bissel, he directed the latter to prepare a draft order transferring operational 

control of the SSA and Second Signal Service to G-2 but leaving these organizations under 

the CSO for administration, training, and General Handy signed the directid on 

10 December 1944 making the new arrangement effective on that date. It was not just a 

rewrite of General Ingles's draft, but it was far from what G-2 had wanted. The main 

points were these:'? 

1. "Operational cgmmand and control" of the SSA and the Second Signal Service was 

transferred to the ACS, G-2. 
2. Activities charged to the CSO under AR 105-5 would continue to be performed by 

SSA and the Second Sial Service. 

3. COMINT liaison with U.S. and foreign agerieies was to be the respnsibility of the 

ACS, G-2. 

4. The ACS, G-2, was to have control over personnel transfers where intelligence 

operation might be affected. G-2 was also authorized to shift personnel between MIS and 

SSA for reasons of intelligence production. 

5. The CSO was to continue to be responsible for the SSA and Second Signal Service 

other than as specscally excepted by this directive. 

Upon assuming operational control of these organizations, General Bissell notified the 

CSO that he would exercise this control through the MIS.= The major commands and the 

British CSS were notified of these changes on 16 December 1944.m 

Neither the MIS nor the Signal Corps was completely pleased with the outcome. 

While MIS had been given adequate authority to regulate the COMiNT production of SSA, 

the CSO and the Army Service Forces remaified in the SSA chain of mmmand. From the 

not insignificant standpoint of careerism, it must have been a trying situation for regular 

Signal Corps officers assigned to SSA. General Frank Stoner, chief of the Army 

Communication Service, later summarized the Signal Corps position this way?' 

[Only the Signal Corps] could have handled the vast construction of highly specialized plant 

required for this operation. At no time during ib operation by the Signal Corps was any 

requirement by G2 unfilled and all initiative for new action and pioneering csrne from the 

Signal Corps. The most awkward condition, if any, was caused by havingto fqht four rear gumd 

actions with C-2 to preserve the general value &the war effort. 

Nat surprisingly, this is not how the MIS saw it. There were some concrete and almost 

immediate intelligence gains made now that MIS was in charge. Certain Japanese 

circuits in Southeast Asia, which were overcovered by SSA, were dropped in favor of 

hitherto untouched Japanese trdc bearing on the home islands, Korea, China, and 

Manchuria. In the field of cryptanalysis, MIS insistence that lower-level Japanese 

systems be attacked reaped considerable benefits. And more selectivity was introduced 

into SSA translation efforts.31 

ATTEMPTED ARMY CONSOLIDATION 

IN THE THEATERS AND THE CREATION OF ASA 

L 

The 10 December 1944 directive that gave the ACS, G-2, operational control of SSA 

and its intercept sites did not result in the centralization of Army GOMINT. The tactical 

intercept units (the SRI companies, RSMs, etc.) remained under theater, Army, or Corps 

control, and the CBB and SIS New Oelhi were likewise under the theaters. But now the 
ACS, G2, and the MIS were in a more favorable position for direct contact with the 

theaters on COMINT matters. In reality the MIS effort for complete worldwide control of all 

Army CQMINT units and activities never ceased. Generals Clarke and Bissell remained in 

the forefront of this effort. 

Aside from the activities of 3-U.S. and its SSOs and the BEECHNUT Group, Army 

GOMlNT in Europe was to remain under the mmmander there. The bulk of high-level 

intercept and COMINT production remained a British show. While there is some evidence 

that the MIS after the 10 December directive sought to centralize Army COMINT in Europe 

under the War Department, this did not come to pass.32 

The tactical coMrwr organization, though not under central direction, expanded 

tremendously after the Normandy assault. Curiously, the structure that had been 

building in the U.K. in preparation for D-Day was supplanted by a provisional one, almost 

at the last moment in at least one case. A month before D-Day there were eight SRI 

companies in the U.K.33 However, these units were perhaps too large and inflexible for the 

assault and beachhead phase of the Normandy operation. Several months before the 

invasion, First U.S. Army was authorized, by the theater commander, to form three d 

provisional tactical COMINT companies. The units, known as Signal Service Companies, 

went into France as follows:s4 

Assault Corps 

VII 

XIX 

Signal Service Company in Support 

The experience of the 3252nd Signal Service Company exemplifies the organizational 

structure and the COMINT doctrine of the last year of the war in E~rope.~' 

The 3252nd was organized by First Lieutenant Albert Jones, who commanded the unit 

through the end of the war. He obtained his cadre from the 124th SRI Company, stationed 

in the U.K., and filled the unit with personnel from other SRI companies and with men 

arriving from the US. Rapid training and requisition of equipment followed. The unit 

reached France five days after D-Day with a complement of 7 officers and 121 enlisted 

men. The unit had intercept operators, cryptanaly sts, DF personnel, and translators. 

Their mission was, and remained, to intercept and fully process German army tactical 

communications in direct support of Corps' combat operations. Thedmpany was directly 

under the Corps' or Army Signal Office for general administration and signal support. 

However, intelligence requirements came from G2, XIX Corps, and the resulting COMINT 

was furnished directly ta Corps G-2 by telephone, messenger, or, very rarely, radio. As the 

company was able to read the intercepted German field codes. total processing was 

possible. The company remained "on the line" until the German surrender. At no time did 

Lieutenant Jones receive any instruction or requirements from the CSO, the MIS, or the 
MIS representatives (3-U.S.) in London. He was not aware of the SSO-SLU system or that 

high-level ciphers were being e~ploited.~' 

By late summer 1944 there were nine SRI companies in the theater supporting 

Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, and the numbered armies. There were also fifteen 

Signal Service Companies supporting the various corps.57 Most of these units were under 

the administrative control of the appropriate Army or Corps Signal Officer, but the real 

working relationship was with, and the operational direction came from, the G2. There 

was also Colonel Bkher's Signals Intelligence Service, European Theater of Operations, 

SID ETOUSA, Headquarters, SI Division, 59 Weymouth Street 

The initial reply to General Sultan was merely one of acknowledgement end assurance 

that the matter was already under considerati~n.~ General Bissell was prompted, 

however, to review the suggestion that he had made to the DCS in March.& 

The chief -1 officer reentered the policy struggle as his comments on the MarchApril memoranda d messages had been requested by General Hodes. Not without 

caustic and perceptive humor, General lngles noted that the ACS, G2's propDsals seemed 

to suggest that the Army should adopt the Navy's mode of centralized COMINT.~ As the 

Navy's centralization was under the director of naval communications, he wrote G-2 could 

hardly k. recommending the same procedure for the Army. General Ingles repeated his 

previous position that the Signal Corps should run Army COMINT, especially during the 

postwar pried when funds for this type of activity might not be available to G-2. The 

existing situation with the Signal Corps running COMNT activity through G2 operational 

supervision seemed satisfactory. Ingles also found that the role of the SRI companies was 

misunderstood (by MIS). Their purpose was to provide immediate tactical intelligence for 

theater, Army group, and Army commanders, and, thus, these units should not be 

transferred to SSA. On the other hand, General Ingles was in accord that all high-level 

COMiNT should now be centralized in SSA. + 

The response from Bisseli and Clarke was that the SRIs should indeed be under 

central control because their operations had been rife with problems and inefficien~y.'~ 

On 8 May the War Department went directly to the theater commanders with the 

proposal that all Army COMIrsT units engaged in the war against Japan should be 

centralized. Thia would mean mnsolidation of SSA, the SRls, RSMs, and theater signal 

intelligence services (i.e., CBB and SIS New Delhi).48 The purpose of this action was to 

ensure fullest Army-Navy-British coordination, to avoid duplication, and to make best use 

d scarce skills, especially Japanese linguists. Comments were solicited. 

Generals Wedemeyer and Sultan expressed their approval although the latter opined 

that the personnel involved should remain under the theater commander.49 General 

MacArthur, whose operations were far more affected, did not c~ncur.~ He objected to 

"absentee control" of CoMINT from thousands of miles away and the likely disruption of 

CBB operations and the excellent CBB-theater headquarters relationship. Most 

important, he might not get COMINT as fast as needed. 

In all this, General Sultan's original proposal for having the centralized COMINT 

headquarters in Lwon seems to have been lost. Undoubtedly that would have appealed to 

~eniral MacArthur. General Bissell gathered arguments to counter General MacArthur's 

fears, and in a paper prepared for General Bisse~probably by General Clarke) two rather 

interesting points were made.51 First, more Japanese army MU: was being intercepted 

at MS-2, Two Rock hch, California, than anywhere ebe. This material was processed at 

Arlington Hall Station and sent to the theaters. Second, though CBB considered alone was 
a good operation, its activities were "wasteful" since "they are uncoordinated with other 

much more extensive signal intelligence operations of the U.S. Army and the British." 

The 1944 Signal Corps-MIS struggle was now to be repeated, this time involving 

disputes between various parts of the General Std as well as Machthur's headquarters 

(now known as Army Forces Pacific-AFPAC). Once again it is too tedious to include every 

detail of the conflicting opinions. 

General Bissell, having reviewed the theater comments, two of three being favorable, 

proposed sending messages to the Pacific- Asia commanders implementing the War 

Department centralization plan. General John Hull, chief of the Operations Division of 

War Department General Staff (WDGS), did not concur. Rather, the SRIs and the related 

units should, he said, remain under theater control while the "cryptanalytic bureaus of the 

fixed station type" should come under War Department control." General Hull put his 

podtion and that of General Handy this way: "We must provide the field commander with 

the means under his direct control of obtaining signal intelligence as perbins to the area 

under his influence. This, I am sure, is the principle upon which General Handy bases his 

objection to your proposal. . . ." + 

In line with General Hull's position, new messages to the commands were drafted in 

MIS and forwarded to Operations Division (OPD) for consideration on 14 June.= The 

revised messages were never sent, for reasons shown below, but are sufficiently significant 

to outline here. The theater commanders were to be told that the SRls, RSMs, and Signal 

Service Companies would remain under their command. Fixed stations and personnel and 

facilities devoted ko high-level cryptanalysis and high-level TA would be placed under the 

command of chief, MIS. The SRIs and related units would accept intercept missions 

assigned by MIS, when not otherwise occupied. Subject to the authority of ANCIB, the 

ACS, G-2 would be responsible for coordination of Army COMINT, in the Pacific-Asia area, 

with the U. S. Navy and Allies. Specific orders would be issued progressively. 

All of this would have meant placing CBB and SIS New Delhi under MIS but leaving 

the intercept units under the commanders. Ambiguities were not lacking. In any event, 

War Department action was defended. 

At this point General Bissell departed for London presumably for conferences on the 

postwar role of the MIS in Europe. While he was there, General Akin sent a message to 

the War Department suggesting that General Bissell attend a GOMINT conference in the 

Philippines to work out policy differences. In spite of General Clarke's advisory to the 

contrary, General Bissell proceeded to ~acArthur's headquarters." There he was won 

over by General MaeArthur, and with the latta's concurrence, he radioed a new position 

to the War Department on 5 July.= He reported that General MacArthur considered that 

the creation of a worldwide, centralIy controlled Army COMI~ organization was essential 

but that AFPAC units should not be absorbed in such a system until the "decisive 

operations" in the Pacific were completed. Until then the AFPAC COmNT units were to 
rehin their existing oetional stnzcture. Bissell reported that Mdrthur was 

agreeable to continuing electrical hns&sion to AHS of all Japanese Me intercepted 

by AFPAC, and that he wanted to receive solution data d results by. the fastest means. 

The AFPAC units would contribute to overall intercept coverage to the maximum extent 

possible. 

Bissellns message was prly received by Generals Marshall, Handy, and Clarke. 

General Marshall's reply to General Bissell is quoted in full? 

Your summary of the ~w-BisseU conference of duly 4 and 5 leave attuution in atus qw. 

This ia mde- here b be mvml of views yon had when you left the United Stah and that 

you no longer recommend cemtion at this time. If mch is case do you d&re to withdraw 

your previou re command st ion^ and your progoad platl for centrali%ationP 

General Clarke followed this with a personal message to General Bissell urging him to 

hold to his previous stad and that "your position both personal and flcial will be much 

stronger if you adhere to your recommendation and are overruled by higher authority, 

than it wiil be if you withdraw your previous rec~rnrnendation.~~~ 

General MacArthur's stand and hem1 Biasell's acaeptance thereof can hardly be 

faulted. While MatArthur was not told of the existence of the atomic bomb until shortly 

before the first one was dropped on Hiroshima 18 August), he had probably concluded at 

the time of his conference with Bissell that a sudden Japanese surrender was quite 

possible soon. There was COMINT to that effect.% It would therefore have been 

unreasonable to reorganize AFPAC intelligence in the midst of decisive decisions. But 

then General MacArthur had always been resistant to War Department interference. 

General Bissell, in a follow-up message on 10 July, replying to the criticism from 

Marshall and Clarke, had some interesting observation^.^ He was prepared to modify his 

position based on what he had learned in the field. He still favored a centralized, 

Washingtun-controIled COMINT organization, but "such a system would prduee maximum 

results only if fully accepted and loyally supported by Army signal intelligence elements 

in MaeArthur'e area." As MacArthur had enough to worry abut, said Bissell, the War 

Department ought to assist him in the manner that he (MacArthur) thought most helpful. 

Two paragraphs of General Bissell's message provide such a useful, if highly 

judgmental, hishri-1 perspective of COMINT in the SWPA that they are quoted in full: 

Akin has built a signal intelligence empire in Central Bureau which in my opinion, judged by 

redu in other areas and by other agencies, is not very efficient. It must bave much support from 

Wa&ington if it is to produce. We have been and will continue to give it all possible support. 

MacArthur has hld me d at he has been very well satisfied with the intelligence furnished to 

him for his operations and stated that he has always hwn the enemy's shength, dispositions. 

and usually enemy intentions in sufficient time to take appropriate action. MacArthur is not 

much wncerned with where the intelligence comes rrom as long ae he continues to receive 

promptly all that can be provided from every source. 
A month later, on 14 August, Japan agreed to surrender. No time was wasted in MIS, 

and the next day General Bkell wrote the chief of sta£€ calling hia attention once more to 

the centralization of Army COMINT.~ He reminded General Marshall that General 

MacArthur had agreed to centralization when the war ended. General Bissell 

recommended that the chief of staff immediately approve cenmhtion of Army COMINT 

and COWC activities, ad that directives to the field commanders be issued. The 

approval came from the office of the deputy chief of sM, after OPD concurrence, on 23 

August!' 

During the first weeks of September, implementing directives were prepared by MIS. 

By Adjutant General's Office (AGO) letter of 6 September 1945, the Army Security Agency 

(MA) waj3 eskblished effective 15 September 1946. ASA as a War Department agency 

was to comprise all GOMINT and coaas~c units of the Army including SSA and Second 

Signal Se*; the SRIs, RSMs, signal Service Com~s, and detachments; FtI phhns 

and all other units d activities performing COMINT Molls. ASA would be reqmnsible 

for all Army COMm and COMSEC?~ On 19 September the command relationship was 

des~ribed:~ 

Cod of the Army Security Agency will #B exercised by the War Department through the 

chief, Military Intelhgenm %mice, who k ~i8caliy charged with the direct slqrenriaion of the 

Army-ts Aww* 

So the Clarkd3kll formula of complete and direct MIS control of all Army COMINT 

and WMSE~ came into being. The creation of ASA was no more than a name change 

because the MIS had intended to exercise its centralized control through an enlarged SSA. 

IIEVELOPMENTS IN NAVY COMINT ORGANIZATION 

IN WASHINGTON AND THE PACIFIC 

A certain amount of repetition may seem to be present in this section. This is because 

the Navy's COMINT position in the Pacific was, by late 1944, augmented by full Army 

eration. Thus, Army CoMINT and the role of the USAAF COMINT unik is reintroduced. 

OP-20-G underwent a major reorganization in November 1944 and also received 

additional duties. Effective 6 November, Joseph N. Wenger, recently promoted to captain, 

became head of OP-20-G as assistant &r&r (naval communications) for communications 

intelligence. Captain Kinney, until then head of 20-G, became OIC of the Washington 

Supplementary Activity and the Naval Communications Annex." This command change 

gave final and formal recoeition to the fact that Captain Wenger had been running 20-G 

shce the replacement of Captain Word in early 1942. 
Cnptak Joseph N. Wenger, assb-t director naval cgmmanicatlww, Op-W 

A useful organktional principle was also recognized - the Washington COMINT 

center, Negat, hereafter known as Supplementary Radio Activity, Washington. OP-20-G 

would be one of the Navy's COMINT centers, theoretically on a par with FRUPAC, carrying 

out tasks assigned by the now separate 20-G. The "new" OP-20-G retained stdT and 

supehry functions but few operational ones. In spite of the odd renumbering of the 

Supplementary Radio Activity Washington as OP-20-3, which seemed to place it 

somewhere under OP-20, the DNC, rather than 20G, Wenger's authority was clear: he 

would wpllan and operah the entire communication intelligence organi~ation.~~ Or as the 

final division order stated, he had "supervision of the entire U.S. naval communication 

intelligence organization.'& OOP-20-3 in reality served as more than another center as it 

amid out many of the worldwide control and coordination functions, as well as the 

COMINCWCNO-support COMINT production that OP-20-G had performed. The bulk of 

the Washington-based 20-G people went into the new OP-20-3, making the change 

somewhat illusory. 

At the same time, by authority of Admiral King, a f acific strategic intelligence unit 

was established within OP-20-3. It was to study, compile, and disseminate strategic 

information, derived from COMIPJT, pertaining to the war to the Pacific.67 This unit, known 

as OP-20-3-G-61, Strategic Tnformation Coordinator, seems to have been created b ensure 

that sources of strategic information would be available at, or mrdinated from, one place. 

This meant appropriate cony with 3-GI, F-22,OP-16-FE, within the naval intelligence 
structure, and externally with MIS ad the British. Needless to say, the prestige of the 

md ma6m~ organization was fkbher enhaneed by this move.w 

The OP-20-G Gowrw~ communication nehork continued to expand to meet the Navy's 

own nwds and to support the BRUSA agreement. There were important developments 

during the spring and summer of 1944. In May it became possible to exchange encrypted 

raw MU: by &teletype between the Washington and Pearl Harbor WMNT cenbrs as 

well as the advanad center at Kwrtjalein. By the end of the year, Navy #m sites at 

Adak, Bainbridge, Guam, and Melbourne were involved in this radioteletype setup.ss Allso 

in May the Army made available to 20-G certain communications facilities (primarily 

radioteletype) between San Fmncim, Hawaii, and Austraiia. At the same time, the Army 

gave the 20-G a duplex radioteletype circuit on its Washington-tondon multichannel 

circuit." Thus 20-G had access to andlor controlled a vast COMIW communications 

network. This was all added to the important and long existing CONUS landline taletype 

syskm that linked 20-G to its primary intercept sites at Chatham, Massachusetts, 

Bainbridge, Wmhington, and to BSC, New York. 

There were new developments in the"fie1d by late 1944. Pearl Harbor (FRUPAC) 

became the sole major CoMINT center in the Pacific. The former center FRUMEL had been 

downgraded -use of changing conditions. FRUPAC continued to serve the commander 

in chief Pacifll and his hrdinate elements in the Pacific via an etaborate intelligence 

gathering, analpis, and dissemination !ay stem (C IC-JICFQA-fleet intelligence officer). 

After the capture of Guam in August 1944, plans were made to create a forward jointservice CoMINT correlation center on the island. Commander Linwood S. Howeth, a 20-43 

veteran, was appointed to supervise this operation?' 

This operation, known as RAGFOR (Radio Analysis Group, Forward) seems to have 

started up by late 1944. A CICFOR {Combat Intelligence Center, Forward) was in 

operation on 16 January 1945.7% Both RAGFOR and CIC were Navy controlled but 

interservice in manning and overall operation. They were established as forward 

elements of FRUPAC arad CICJICPOA, and their role became extremely important when 

Admiral Nimitz himself moved to Guam in early 1945. 

RAGFOR was charged by CINCPAC/CINCPOA with examination of all *local" 

intercept accomplished at Guam (or subordinate areas) by the two Army SRI wmpanies, 

the 130th and the 11 lth (a detachment thereof); the Air Force's Eighth RSM; a Second 

Signal Service Detachment operating MSl I; and the Navy's own intercept site, Station A. 

From this intercept, RAGFOR would select certain high-priority items, especially relating 

to Japanese air operations, and conduct the necessary processing and exploitation of "any 

enemy low-level cryptographic systems capable of being processed in the field. . . .m The 

processed material would then b furnished to the local evaluating and disseminating 

agency and to the Army and Navy COMINT organizations in Washington and HawaiiT4 

The 1-1 evaluation-disseminating units were CICFOR and the SSO representatives. The 
duties of CICFOR went beyond handling the RAGFOR prduction and included dealing 

with coMINT from CIC Hawaii, and other Army and Navy 

That these activities on Guam were truly cooperative and joint-service is apparent 

&om the identr~ation of the intercept sources serving RAGFOR. Further, CICFOR had 

both Army and Navy watch officers, teletype operatore, and clerka. The importance of this 

experience was not lost on Commander Richard W. Emory, the CICFOR commanding 

oEcer, who wrote at the time of the Japanese surrender:'' 

War experience haa proved it eawntial that the Army and Navy combine their CIC personneland 

information to form aaingle intelligence organiaation.. . . At CIC Pearl since August 1944and at 

CICFOR during ite brief existence. the Army and Naw have functioned as one.. . . 

War experience bas proved the absolute necesity of combining all sources of information into a 

single inteIligence product. 

Joint service developments were also present in the Philippines though not on so 

extensive or form1 a basis. There an SSO was assigned to the headquarters Seventh Fleet 

at Tolosa, Leyte, in January 1945. It was the experience of SSOs in the Philippines, 

especially those supporting FEAF and its subordinates that the ULTRA available from the 

Navy was "the primary source of intelligence of immediate tactid use."n The experience 

there suggested to one SO, as it had to Commander Emory, that a single "ULTRA Agency" 

ought to be establishedTB 

Had it been necessary to invade Japan, there were plans to establish a COMINT center 

an Okinawa under USAAF auspices and in connection with RAGFOR and Central Bureau 

in Lu~on.~' This would have involved "low-level" COMINT and might or might not have 

developed into an all-service advanced center. The Navy planned to support the invasion 

of Japan with the existing COMINT facilities and some twelve intercept and analysis teams 

doat on flagships. These were to provide early warning of air attacks. 

This final look at Navy COUINT policy and organization, though brief, may help to 

again emphasize the relatively consistent developments within that service, based on 

policies established early in the war by highest-level directive and tacit understanding. 

Naval CoMrm remained under the DNC in Washington, without interference from any 

other organization. At the same time the center in the Pacific served Admiral Nimitz 

according to his needs. This could not have been otherwise considering the rapid growth of 

his reputation and his good standing with Washington. 

Notes 

I. AG 312.1,14 October 1943, Security of ULTRA Dexter Iaklligence. A oopy of this regulation, and the other 

ULTRA regulations, is filed in SSO History, vol. 1, behind Tab A. 

2. Seven-page manuscript entitled History of the ~pemtions of Special Security Umars Attached to Field 

Commands, undated, no author, at the beginning of SSO History, vol. 1. I have not found a detailed account of 
Colonel Clarke's trip. While it ia certain from thia source thmt ha met with General AdacArthur, I am lem sure of 

hisvisitsto Hawaii and CBI. In a Ltter to the author, Clarke mentions being in the CBI in December 1943. 

3. Ibid. Varioun manuscript acxounts in vol. 4 of SSO Hieb0ry. 

4. Mesrrage +BG290, mdate, For Clarkefrom OiConnell, Eyes Alone of Marshall from MacArthur,ACSI #33. 

5. See various War Department papersof early July 1944, filed in AGSI 833. 

6. Manuacript of EAapr John R. Thompsan in Tab A, vol. 3,350 HistDry. 

7. Manuacript entitled ReporfofSpecial Security Operations in the Chh-Burma-India Theater, etc., no date, no 

anther, vol. 6, SSO NietPry. 

8. Letter to the author by Carter W. Clarke; Nelson's own book National Security ad the Gewrul Staff, 626 ff,: 

Bidwell,HWryofth Midibry InteUigence Dwkwn,PartFive, 1%13,15,26,216 ff. 

9. Nelson, 526 ff. 

10. Hisdory ofspsclol Branch, 52,6043. 

11. Part 3(?) of Hietory of Special Branch, a document that deala with the period 1944-45. The author of this 

document is unkuown, NSAH. "I 

12. Bemuse of the top secret nature of thk work of the McCloy Board, there k no discussion of it in Nelson's 

NutiodSecluity and th General Stoff. 

13. I have not seen the Mdloy Board report. But see Memorandum from Biasell ta chief of Btaff, 15 June 1944, 

subjject: Reorganization of the Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, 23 March 1944, in ACSi #49, and alsa the 

Winkler-Bidwell material in AGSI I6, (especially 9-1 I), (classified). 

14. Mdloy to chief of st&, 20 June 1944, ACSI R49 (classified). 

IS. Memorandum from Nelmn to Biwl1,22 June 1944,ACSI#49 (classified). 

16. Memorandum fmm Bissell b DCS (drafted by Carter W. Clarke), subject: Intercept Facilities. I1 July 1944, 

ACSI #49 (classified). 

17. In a subsequent memorandum (Bissell to DCS, Clarke drafter, 14 July 1944, ACSI #49), there is an 

awounting of the personnel to be affected by the transfer. As this is a statement of SSAlSecond Signal Service 

strength as of July 1944, it is reproduced here to show how large this Washmgton-controlled portion of Army 

COMINT had became and that the transfer of personnel to MIS was no small matter: 

STATION 

AHS 

VHFS (MS- I ) 

Two Rock Ranch (MS-2) 

Miami (MS-3) 

Asrnara (MS-4) 

Hawaii {MS-5) 

OFFICERS WARRANT OFFICERS 

729 4 

39 3 

CIVILIANS 

5.853 
Long Island WB9) 

San Francko (Signal Center 3 

COMINT Communications~ 

Hq Alaakltn Dept. 

TOTALS 

18. Memorandum from Somerwell to chiefof staff, 25 July 1944 (clamifi&>, and attached copy of memorandum 

from Ingles to ASF, rrame date, all in ACSI #49 (chssfid). 

19. Varwus papers in ACSI #49. 

20. Memorandum from MoCloy to McNarney. 22 August 1944, ACSII49 (classifiedl. 

21. Memorandum from Bisgell to DCS, delivered to General Nelson by Colonel McCarmack, 8 September 1944. 

subject: Intempt Facilities, ACSI #49 {clamifd). Attached to this is a paper entitled Anaplifiafdon ofReamns 

fir the Tm~fer ofsipal &cu& Agency from Signal Corps lo fhr3 Military Imklligeme Service (classified). 

22. Dr& agreement prepared by CSO for signature of CSO and ACS, G-2, 30 November 1944, ACSI 849 

(classified). u? 

23. See Part 3CI) Hiatory of Special Bmmh. 

24. See especially memorandum from Clarke to Biasell, 30 November 1944, for General ingle's approach to 

Clarke and the lattefs avoidance of the CSO. 

25. Draft paper prepared by General Inglesl, 4 December 1944, ACSI #49 (classified). 

26. Memorandum from Bissell to DCS, 7 Dacember 1944, subject: Signal Security Agency and Second Signal 

Service Battalion, ACSI #49 (classified). This memorwdum acknowledges General Handybverbal instructions. 

27. Memorandum from Handy to ACS, 43-2 and CSO UlruCGASF, 10 December 1944, ACSI #49. 

28. Memorandum from Bissellto CSO thru CGASF, 15 December 1944, ACSl#49. 

29. Various memorandums d measages in AGSI #49. 

30. Memorandum by GenemlStouer prepared for OCMH, quoted in Th Outcome, 615,footnote 17. 

3 1. History of Special Branch, 6M2, ACSI #2. 

32. In a letter to the author, General Clarke has said that General Marshall delayed centralization in Europe 

because of British pressure. Clwke said that this is "one bell of a story" but that he would not disclose it. If this is 

the case, it is undoubtedly documented in some War Department records not seen by me. 

33. Howe, Mss., chapter 7, no page numbers. Dr. Howe's study will be the authoritative account of U.S. Army 

tactical COMlNT in Europe. I have drawn heavily on his work. 

34. Howe, MM., chapter 9, no page numbers. 

35. This account ofthe 3262nd is based on interviews by the author and Henry F. Schorreck of Mr. Albert Jones, 

U.S. Army (bt) and an NSA employee. 
36. Jone~ wm m SIS veteran who had been a charter member, aa an enlisted man, of the Second Signal Service 

Company in 1939. His COMIMT experience predated the activation of that unit. ARer mmmisrtioning in i M2, he 

went to the U.K.for assignment to Colonel Bicher'a SIS ETOUSA. 

37. Howe, Mm. chapter 9, no page. 

38. See How*, Mas, chapter 9 and elsewhere for the ongoing role of SISETOUSA, SID, and SID "D." 

39. Howe,Mk, chapte~ 7. I have found no reports from permanent SSOa in Italy. 

40. Memorandm from Biwell to Handy, Garter Clarke drafter, 11 March 1945, subject: ANCIB, ACSI #4. 

{clclasS~ed). 

41. Ibid 

42. See varioua memoranda in ACSlI4, March-April 1945. 

43. Me-ge KRA8663, b Marshall from Sultan, 12 April 1945. ACSI #4 (classified). 

44. Measage #WAR67602 drafted by Carter Clarke,for Sultan from Marshall, 12 April 1945, ACSI 84. 

45. Memorandum from Biasdl to DCS, 14 April 1945, subject: Centralized Control of Signal Intelligence 

Activities in the Pacific and Far East, ACSI #4 (classified). 

46. Memorandum &om Ingles to Handy, 27 April 1945pACSI #4 (claaified). 

47. Memorandum from Bissell to DCS (Clarke drafter), 5 May 1945, ACSI X4. 

48. Message fWARX78834 for MacArthur, Sultan, and Wedemeyer from Marshall, drafted by Carter Clarke, 8 

May 1045, ACSI #4 (classified). 

49. These replies are in a memorandum from Bissellto chief of ataff, 1 June 1B45, ACSI #4 (classified). 

50. Ibid. 

51. Ibid, and inan ahched pager, which iaan elaboration to the basic memorandum. 

52. Memorandum from Hull to Bissell, 7 duns 1945, subject: Centralized Cantsol of Signal Intelligence Units, 

ACSZ #4 (classified). 

53. Memorandum from Biswllto Hull, 14 June 1945, and drafts of mmeages,ACSI #4 (classified). 

64. Memorandurn for General Biasell from Colonel Hilles (MIS, London) quoting a message received from Carter 

Clark~, 19 June 1945, ACSI #QO. Clarke recommended to Bissell that he force a command decision at the War 

Department rather than visit General Akin {cIassiFred). 

55. Message from Bissell for Marshall and Handy quoted in memorandum from Carter Clarke to Handy, 5 July 

1945, ACSI #4 (classified). 

56. This message ispuoted in an unsigned rnernora~~dum of 7 July 1945. The message had been released at 1810, 

6 July, ACSI 140 (classified). 

57. This message is quoted in an unsigned memorandum of 7 July 1945. The message was released at 1945,6 

duly, ACSI ## (classifled). 

68. D. Clayton James, The Years of MncArthur, vol. 2, (Boaton, 19751,770-776. 

59. Message from BisselI to Clarke for Marshall and Handy, quoted in memorandum from Clarke to Handy, 10 

July 1945, ACSI #4 (classZ~d). 
60. Medm hm BhaU to chidof staff, 116 Auguat 1946, subject Centralizd Control of Signal 

Inteuigem ActivItias. ACSI #4. 

61. ~pproval is in the form of signatures on Ibid. of General Hode (for Handy) and General Hull of OPD. 

62. Memorandum from Kill to Adjutaat General, 4 September 1946, subject EatablIabment of tbe Army 

Security *,AGO le-r 6 Ssptamber 1946 to ar " rg gene& af the W, AGF, mmmader 

in chief AFPAC; commading gsnerals of theatsrs; Defense CommmaS; AIassaa department; MDW-, 

bdepdent mmnw& ACSI #4. 

%3. AGO letter 19 wmber 1945 b the Chidof ASA and Chief &MIS, ACSI P4. 

64. Memormdwn br Captain Kinney and Captain Wenger from Captain J. V. Murphy. the deputy director of 

communications, 2 November I W, atso Commuuicatiom Division Order No. 10644,13 Nov. 1944. signed by 

-in Roy k Gaw. ADNC, OP-204 Oqaniza~n Folder. 

67. Supplement A (COhZINT) to HWry of Naval InfeUigew, A-11 Ian interim study prepared by Captain 

Pachrd). 

68. Tbe hctions dt&e organizatic-ns with the rutval inWigenoe -may be mviewed here. 3-GI, formerly 

OP-aO-GI, was the intelligenm correhting, raportins, and -tion subdivision of the naval COMINT 

-tiam The Far Eastern Sdioo of OM was offleiall J hwn aa OP-l&PE. As has been explained. OP-16- 

EX Iwt itn role in COMINT evaluation in 1948. F-2!2 wa9 tbe Mc branch uf F-aO. the Combat InWigenee 

Division. Perhapa Pacific &atagic intelligmce was placed under 20-G beam F-22 was properly fully involved 

in immediate, operational intelligence. In any case, the best information waa COMINT, so strategic COMlNT 

production and mmpilation were combined in the same place. 

71. By CINCPAWNCKbA memorandum, aerial 000793, 9 September 1844 (not seen) referenced in a 

CINCPACCINClWA memorandum of 9 danw 1945 addmsmd to th commander, Forward Area, Central 

Pacific; commanding general, U.S. Army Forma Pacilic Oman Araas; Island Commtder, Guam; OIC, Joint 

Communications Activitiw , Guam, in C&logue, 2.4 4). 

72. Ibid. Sme aIm memorandum OIC ClCFOR to OIC Supplemenbry Radio Station ABLE, 20 A- 1945, 

subject: CICPOB His-, etc. Manwxipt in vol. 4, Tab F, SSO Hisbry. 

73. The 9 January 1945 GINCPACKINCPOA memorandum. 

74. Did. The Army,dmurse. did not haw a COMINT center in Hawaii but SS& were there. 

75. The OIC CICFWR memorandum. 

76. Ibid. 

77. Manuscript report of Captain B. J. Merriam, Tab B, vol: 3, SSO Hisfary. 

78. Ibid 

79. AG Latter 312.1.24 dune 1945, ad attached paper headmd "Conferenm on Low Isvel Signal Intelligence," 

same date, Caw 6.i 
ACNO 

ACS 

ADNC 

AFPAC 

AFS A 

AHS 

ANCIB 

ANClCC 

ASA 

ASF 

BP 

BRUSA 

BSC 

CA 

CBB 

CBI 

CIC 

CICFOR 

CINCPAC 

CINCPOA 

COT 

COMlNCH 

COMlNT 

COMSEC 

CONUS 

CNO 

CSO 

CSS 

CZ 

DF 

Glossary of Abbreviations 

Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 

Assistant Chief of Staff 

Assistant Director of Naval Communications 

-Amy Forces Pacific 

Armed Forces Security Agency 

Arlington Hall Station 

Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board 

Army-Navy COMINT Coordinating Committee 

Army Security Agency 

Army Services Forces 

Bletchley eark 

British-U. S. 

British Security Coordination 

Cryptanalysis 

Central Brisbane Bureau 

China-Burma-India (theater of operations) 

Combat Information center 

Combat Intelligence Center, Forward 

Commander in Chief, Pacific 

Commander in Chief Pa&c ocean area 

Coordinahr of Information 

Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet 

Communications intelligence 

Communications security 

Continental United Skates 

Chief of Naval Operations 

Chief Sil Officer 

Chief of Secre t Service 

Canal Zone 

Direction finding 
DM1 

DNC 

DNI 

ETOUSA 

rnAF 

FBI 

FCC 

FRUMEL 

FRUPAC 

FUSA 

Gc&CS 

GHQ 

ICPQA 

IEC 

JCS 

JIG 

JICPO A 

JMA 

JN 

JNA 

MI 

MID 

MIS 

MS 

NI30 

OCSigO 

ON1 

OPD 

OSS 

RAAF 

RAGFOR 

RCN 

Dir&r of Military Intelligence 

Director of Naval Communications 

Director of Naval Intelligence 

European Theater of Operations U.S. Army 

Far East Air Force 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Federal Communications Commission 

Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (Australia) 

Fleet Radio Unit Pacific [Hawaii) 

First United States Army 

Government Code and Cipher Schml 

General Headquarters 

Intelligence Center PaciW0cean Area 

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Intelligence Committee 

Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area 

Japanese Military Attach6 

Japanese naval 

Japanese Naval Attach6 

Military intelIigence 

Military Intelligence Division 

Military Intelligence Service 

Monitoring station 

National Defense Organization 

Office of Chief Signal Officer 

Office of Naval Lntelligence 

Operations diviaion 

Office of Strategic Services 

Royal Australian Air Force 

Radio Analysis Crroup, Forward 

Royal Canadian Navy 
RES 

RFP 

RI 

RID 

RN 

RSM 

RSS 

SHAEF 

SI 

SID ETOUSA 

SIGlNT 

SIS 

SIS ETOUSA 

SLU 

SMI 

SRI 

SSA 

SSR 

SSC 

SSD 

sso 

SSS 

SWPA 

TA 

USCG 

VCNO 

VHFS 

WDGS 

WEC 

Reserved 

Radio fingerprinting 

Radio intelligence 

Radio Intelligence Division 

Royal Navy 

Radio Squadrons Mobile 

Radio Security Service 

Supreme Headquarters Army Expeditionary Force 

Special intelligence 

Signal Intelligence Division European Theater of Operations, U. S. 

Army 

Signals intelligence 

Special Intelligence Service 

Signal Intelligenc~Service European Theater of Operations, U. S. 

Army 

Special Liaison Unit 

Safeguarding Military Information 

Signal Radio Intelligence 

Signal Security Agency 

Special Security Representatives 

Signal Service Company 

Signal Security Division 

Special Security Officer 

Signal Security Service 

Southwest Pacific Area 

Trait analysis 

United States Coast Guard 

Vice Chief of Naval Operations 

Vint Hill Farm Station 

War Department General Staff 

Wireless Experimental Center 
Sources 

1. Unpublished Official Records 

a. National Archives. 

Record Group 173, "Federal Communications Commission: Radio Intelligence 

Division." (Portions of RG173 remain classified. The aukhor had full access to all records.) 

Record Group 165 "Military Intelligence Division." 

b. NSA Historical Collection (NSAHC) maintained in the Center for Cryptologic 

History ICCH), S542. 

(1) Army Records 

A Chronology of Coopration Between the SSA and the London Ofice8 of GCLCS, .c 

prepared under the direction of the chief signal officer, 2 June 1945. A compilation of 

documents, mostly phot~opies. 

Cooperation with GC&CS 1940-45. A folder containing many ribbon copy 

memoranda. 

British Liaison 19404.5, uol. I. A folder containing many ribbun copy memoranda 

and agreements. It supplements the previous two collections. 

History of the Central Bureau Brisbane: Technical Records. In two parts. 

Prepared at the Axmy Security Agency, 1949. 

History of th Signal Security Agemy in World War II. Prepared at the Army 

Security Agency, undated. See especially volumes 1 through 4. This is an extremely 

valuable work prepared by numerous contributors. It is, however, not greatly concerned 

with policy, liaison, or MIS, and any hint of controversy is absent. 

Signal Security Division Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1943. 

SSA Folder 31 1.5 CXG-114 BII. This is a folder containing messages between SSA 

and Central Bureau Brisbane mainly during 1943. 

Historical Reports of Monitoring Stations MS-2 to MS-10. These reports, which 

are not consistent in depth of content or general organization, are dated up to June 1944. 

History of the Special Project Branch, SIS ETOUSA, also known as the 

BEECHNUTReport. This was prepared by Colonel Frank 3. Rowlett in 1945. 
History of Special Security Operations Oversgas 

Volume I: 

Volume 2: 

Volume 3: 

Volume 4 

History of Supervisory Activities, MIS 

History of European Theater 

Armed Forces - Pacif~c Area 

Pacific Ocean Areae 

Volume 5: India-Burma and China Theaters 

These five volumes are a collection of memoranda from the various SSOs to MIS in 

which these officers describ their e~periences and make evaluations and occasional 

recommendations. Most were written in late 1946. This is an incredible colIection of 

primary source material for Army COMNT hiatory 194345. Volumes 1,3, and 4 are riblwn 

copy d appear to ?E the only copies in exishnee. This compilation was directed by 

General Carter W. Clarke. 

ACSI (Asahfatti Chief of StufilnteUigemI Books. These am numbered folders marked 

"ACSI #2," etc. The bob were obtained in 1972 by the Cryptologic History Department 

from ACSI-USASSG (U.S. Army Special ~ecuiit~ Group) Ales, the Pentagon, and were 

photocopied. The bks contain MIS correspondence, studies, and interoffice notes from 

1940 (pre-MIS) to 1M, relating to Army Corn. This is an unparalleled course of 

information, and the author has heavily depended on the hundreds of documents therein. 

Winkler-Bidwell Papers. This is actually a part of ACSI Book #6 and is in the form of 

a document headed "Answers to Questions Provided by Colonel Bruce W. Bidwell." It wasl 

prepared by Mr. Winkler (an ACSI and lakr DLA employee) in, perhaps, 1957. Colonel 

Bidwell was then writing an official hishry of MID {see blow). Colonel Bidwell provided 

. an excellent outline of MIS Special Branch operations 194245 and of the steps leading W 

the creation of ASA. 

Report on E Operatiow of the GC&CS d Bktchky Park. Submitted to SSA by Mr. 

WiUiam F. Friedman, 12 August 1943. 

Spacial Branch Historiea~. There are three separate items which I have numhered as 

follows; 

Part 1 is Origin and Functions of MIS Special Branch prepared by Colonel A1 

McCormack, deputy chief of the branch, in the form of a memorandum to Carter W. 

Clarke, 15 April 1943. This is a fascinating, personalized, and interpretive account of 

great historic value. It is included in ACSI Book #2. 

Part 2 is entitled History of the Special Branch, MIS. It is undated and more 

formal than Part I and covers the period from spring 1942 to June 1944, no date, no author 

(but quib possibly Colonel McCormack) . It is found in ACSI Baok #2.a. 
Part 3 is entitled History of Special Branch MIS, June 19444eptember 1946. 

Again thereis no authoror date. It toois found in ACSl Book #2. 

U.S. Cryptologic Actiuitiss 194146, Part 2: Intercept ad Processing. This was 

prepared by the Histmian, NSA, 12 May 1953. There does not seem to IM a Part 1. This 

study is by no means complete but does contain a great deal of data on tr&c volume and 

the evolution of the various monitoring stations of SSA. 

Reminiscences of lieutenant Colonel Howard R. Brown. A manuscript prepared 

under the auspices of the chief signal off~er, August 1945. 

(2) Navy and Coast Guard Records 

FBI-Coast Gwd General File. This is a folder from Op-20-G files containing a 

major oollection of COMINT-related correspondence regarding Op-204, ONI, Coast Guard, 

FBI, Army, FCC, and the British. Many of the items are ribbon copy. This was the most 

valuable source for the Navy view of C~MINT policy and administration, especially 1941- 

43. It contains the of't-cited Kramer memorandum. .c 

FCC and RI 194345. This is an Op-20-G correspondence file relating primarily to 

Navy-FCC COMINT relations from 194245. 

Up-20-G Organization Fik 

Op-20-G File 

GC Section History (tentative). This was written during 194-6. It is an extremely 

detailed, if confusing, account of naval COMINT communications. 

Wenger File - Canadian Y Organization 

GY History File. This is a ribbon copy draft history of OpZO-G's attack on various 

Japanese codes and ciphers. It was probably prepared in 1945; it is unedited and 

somewhat disorganized, a1 though very useful. 

Nimitz Papers. These are co~~~~-related extracts from the Nirnitz Papers, Naval 

History Division, Personal Papers Series XIII, Item #40 (Personal Official Correspondence 

with Military mcers). 

Th Organimtion of US. Naud Communicutions Intelligence, Revised Edition, 15 

November 1944. 

Allied Communication Intelligence and the Battle of the Atlantic, 5 volumes, prepared 

by Op-20-C in 1945, no author. An exhaustive account of US. naval COMIPTT and the Uboat war. There are probably only two or three copies. 
History of Coast Guard Unit #387,194M. Copy #2 of 5. Prepared at Op-20-G in 

1945 (?I, no author. This is a detailed amount of every German intelligence ccde and 

cipher (including ENIGMA) worked by the Coast Guard. 

History of Naval Intelligence, Supplement A. (Prepared by Captain W. F. Packard, 

USN (Ret) as the comw supplement to an ongoing general history of naval intelligence.) 

Crakdog of Papers. This is a large ;elledion of dwuments assembled at NSA in the 

early 1950s and covering Army and Navy COMINT policy matters from the 1930s through 

World War 11. 

c. FBI Files 

No general search of FBI records was made. See the footnotes and the 

correspondence and interviews .portions of the sources section for additional information. 

d. Center for Military History (CMH), Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 

A Histbry of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945. 

Prepared by the Military Intelligence Division% 1946. No author. 

Histoty of the Milihry IrateEligeneeDivision, Department of the Army Gener~l StaffThis manuscript was prepared by Colonel (Ret) Bruce W. Bidwell during 1957-61, in five 

parts. Part Five covers World War 11. This history seems to have been intended for 

eventual inclusion in the Army mcial History series, but this did not take place. It was 

declassified by the adjutant general in 1973(?). 

2. Correspondence with the Author 

Brigadier General IRet] Carter W. Clarke, former chief, Special Branch, MIS. 

ColoneI (Reserve) Abraham Sinkov, former head of the U.S. Army contingent, Central 

Bureau Brisbane. 

Captain Wayman F. Packard, USN (Ret). Captain Packard provided the author with 

the results of his own ongoing research into naval intelligence. Of special interest were 

the transcripts of his interviews of Captain Rudolph Fabian, USN (Ret), former head of 

CAST and FRUMEL units. 

3. Interviews and Oral History Programs 

a. NSA Historical Collection - Interview notes or transcripts. 
Albert Jones, retired NSA employee who began his career in Army GOMINT in 1937 

(interviewed by the author and Mr. Henry F. Sehorreck). 

Edward W. Brumble, retired NSA employee who began his Army COMINT career in 

1939 (interviewed by th~ author). 

George E. Sterling,. former head of the Radio Intelligence Division, FCC 

[interviewed by the author and Mr. Earl J. Coates). 

Frank B. Rowlett, retired NSA employee who loomed large in U.S. COMINT from 

1930-62 (interviewed by Messrs. Vincent Wilson, David Goodman, Earl J. Coates, and 

Henry F. Schorreck in various sessions during 1975 and 1978). 

I. Wdrow Newpher and Paul Napier, retired heads of World War 11-era FBI 

COWINT (interviewed by the author). 

A. D. Krarner, Captain, USN IRet). Transcript of a speech given at NSA in 1962. 

Fred Welden, Captain, USN (Retl, who was in ON1 September 1941 to the end of 

the war [interviewed by the author). *. 

Elliott Glunt, NSA employee who was assigned to Op19 (Radio Central, Navy 

Department) in 1941-44. 

b. U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) 

Bound transcripts of interviews conducted by Dr. John Mason, Oral History 

Director for USNI: 

Rear Admiral Arthur J. McCollum, USN (Ret) 

Rear Admiral John Redman, USN (Ret) 

4. British Official Records 

Gouernrnent Code and Cipher School Histories, a multivolume work concerning 

GC&CS, 1939-45 (with signifcant earlier items too), prepared after the war. The specific 

volumes used are cited in the footnotes. This series is an unmatched record of intelligence 

organization, policy, and operations. Some of the volumes are superbly written and the 

authors, especially Frank Birch, show no hesitancy in describing controversy and 

personalities. 
5. Congressional Reports And Hearings 

U. S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriatiom, House of Representatiues, Seventy-eighth Congress, Second Session on the 

Independent Ofices Appropriatiun B ill for 1945,1149-1287. 

6. Published Official Histories 

Cam, Stetson; Fairchild, Byron. The Framework of Hemisphere Defense. Washington, 

D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military Histmy, 1960. 

Davis, Vernon E. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War IZ. 2 volumes. 

Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972. 

Sterling, George E. 'The U.S, Hunt forkxis Agent Radios." Studies in Intelligence 

(CIA), Spring 1960. 

Terrett, Dulaney. The Sigd Corps: Tk Emergency. Washington, D.C.: Qffice of the 

Chief of Military History, 1956. 

Thompson, George R.; Harris, Dixie R.; Oakes, Pauline M.; Terrett, Duianey. The 

Signal Corps: The Test (December 1941 to July 1943). Washing-ton, D.C.: mice of the 

Chief of Military History, 1957. 

Thompson, George R.; Harris, Dixie R. ThP Signal Corps: The Outcome (Mid-lM3 

through 1945). Washington, D.C.: oflice of the Chief of Military History, 1966. 

Troy, Thomas F. "The Coordinator of Information and British Intelligence," Studies in 

Intelligence (CIA), Spring 1974. 

7. Secondary Sources 

Berle, Beatrice B.; Jacobs, Travis B., ed. Navigating the Rapids (from the Papers of 

Adolf A. Berle). New York, 1973. 

Kmp, Theodore F. Weapon of Siknce. Chicago, 1946. 

Montgomery-Hyde, H. Room 3603. New York, 1965. 

Nelson, Otto L. Jr. National Security and the General Stuff. Washington, 1946. 

Stimson, Henry L.; Bundy, McGeorge. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York, 

194-8. 
Index 

Abwehr traffic--10 114 

Agreement between GC&CS and War Department--108-109 

"Agreement Regarding Special Materialn--1 0 

Akin, Colonel Spencer--3,10-12,17-18,20,31-32,33,38,40,89,90,142,153,154 

Akin-Friedman proposals on U. S.-British GOMINT cooperation--1 6- 17 

Alaskan Command--32,124- 125 

Allen, Captain Archer-SO 

Allocation Committee--52 

Anderson, Rear Admiral Walter S.--DNI, 10,13,17 

Arlington Hall Station-- 37,41,42,81,84,97,100,103,108,109,110,114,120, 152 

Army--1,2,6,8,9,10,11-18, 20,23 

Army Communications Service--33 

Army-Navy agreement on mlIection--13 

Army-Navy ~0~1~~Cmrdinating Committee (ANC1CC)--88,193,134,13fi,136,137,138 

Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board EANCIBI--133,137,138,139,141,151, 

153 

Army-Navy dissemination agreement (1939)--14,153 

Army Security Agency (ASA), establishment of--155 

Army Services Forces (ASFI--34,84 

Ashly, Major James--141 

Assistant Chief of Staf'f (ACS), G2--1,10,13,16,34-36,40,48,49,59,81,100,103-104,113, 

126,129, 134,137,138,143,145,147-149,151-153 

Australia--31,40,46,63,67,79,81,85,88,91,105,157 

Australian Army--40,88,90 

Bearce H.F.--as chief &Mexican diplomatic section, SIS, 3; as part of SIS Unit B, 33 

BEECHMJT (Project)--llO,lll, 114,149 

Berle, Assistant Secretary of State Adolph A.--1,31,43,48,49 

Bertolet, Commander Sam--45 

Betts, Lieutenant Colonel (MID)--23 

Bicher, Cdonel George--41,110,150,151 

Birch, Frank--61,119 

Bissell, Colonel John T.--49 

Bissell, Major General Clayton-- 137,138,143,145,147,148,149,161,152,153,154,155 

Blackburn, W. G.3.--(head of FBI cryptanalytic section), 9 

Bletchley Park--14,19,20,57,58,59,101,104,105,106,108,112,113,114,121,151 
The Bornbe-100,101,111 

both, Wing Commander H. Roy--89 

Brawn, Lieutenant Colonel Rufus (MIDI-22,23 

British Joint Chi&lOS,106, t 07 

British Secret Service (also see Secret Intelligence Service and MI-6) 

British Security Coordination (BSCI-1,14,15,51,57,60,61,62,87,97,120,126,128,129, 

157 

Brown, Captain Harold McD.-58,87,97 

Brown, Lieutenant Harold R (commanded MS-6)-31,68,87,97,11,12 

BRUSA Agreement, 1944-120,121,157 

Bullock, Coloml Frank--36,37,50,53,80,97,100 

Bundy, Major William--1 10 

Burnett, Lieutenant Comma&r--20 

"C" (see Stuart Menzies) 

Calfee, Major--1 11 

Campbell, Lieutenant K .E .--89 

Carpender, Admiral--63 

kidy, Captain W.G.B.-&9 

Cast-6,7,14 20,31,32,46,63 

*her, Colonel L.V. (6-2, Alaskan Defense Command1-124 

Central Bureau (see Central Bureau Brisbane) 

Central Bureau Brisbane (CBB)--40,81,82,83,36,86,87,88,89,90,91, 135,142,143, 

148,151,162,153 

Chappell, Walter IOND-2 

Cbdle, Major John R. W.K. liaison to SISI-22 

China-Burma-India (CBI) theater-80,87,141,142,143 

Churchill, Winston--14,105,IOS 

CICFOR (Combat Intelligence Center, Forward)-157,158 

Clandestine ~eolleetio11-8~ 13,46,48, a, 50,51,53,66,57,6l,62,78,99,102,123- 

131 

Clark, General Mark--151 

Clark, Lieutenant Colonel H.L.49 

Clark, Major S.R.1.--89 

Clarke, Carter W.-35,36,37,39,40,49,53,81,87,88 89,91,93,98,99,1M1,101,102, 

103,104,106,107,108,110,113,127,128,129,133,134,135,136,137,138,141, 

142,144,145,146,147, 149, 152,153* 154,155 

Clarke, Squadron Leader W. J.--89 

"COMBn4, 120 

Combat Inform~tion Center CCIC)-64,105,138,157,158 

Combat Inblligenee Divihn @'-2) - 77,78,134,135,136 
COMINCH-45,46,47,51,77,78,137,156 

Coordhhr of Information (CO1)--1,3,8,21,49,50,52 

Cook, LieutenanVCaptainlCoTonel Earle F.--12,22,114,135 

Corderman, Colonel W. Preston--80,81,100,~03,106,107,IO8,109,114,134,136,138, 

147 

Corregidor-6,31 

Cowgill, Lieutenant Colonel, MI-6--128 ' 

Crawford, D.M.--98 

Currier, Prescott--19,45 

Daniels, Ensign--97 

DeBayIy, B.--62,97 

De LaFleur, Louis-49 

Delimitations Agreement--l,8 

Dennis, Lieutenant Commander Jefferson--20 

Denniston, Commander Alfred--21,22,57,58,108 

Densford, Lieutenant Commander--43 * 

DeWitt, General John-49 

Dill, Field Marshall Sir John--59,97,98,99,100,101,102,103 ,104,105,106,108,109 

Dimtion finding sites--6 

American Samoa 

Guan tanamo, Cuba 

Point St. George, California 

Poyners Hill, North Carolina 

Director of Naval Intelligence (DN1)-I, 10,14,17,43,47,48,52,78,91,127,128,129,137 

Donovan, William J.--64 

Doud, Major Harold--33,92,97 

Drake, Major--81,97 

Driwll, Mrs. Agnes--45 

Dusenberry, Lieutenant Colonel--23 

Eastman, Colonel Clyde--17 

849th SIS-41,42,106,151 

Eighth Company, Presidio, San Francisco--3 

Eighth RSM (Air Force)--157 

Emmons, General Delos C.-16 

Emory, Richard W. (CICFOR Communications Meer)-- 158 

 ENIGMA-.^^, 20,22,46,68,59, a, 83,97,101,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111, 

119,126,128,130,141 

Erskine, Hugh--40,89 
European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ET0USA)-4,41,42,69,81,82,100,102, 

110,111,112,161 

Evensson, Msjor Eric--33 

Extension Agreement--1 19 

EWT COP-204 material mnt to GCCSr-21 

Fabian, Lieutenant Rudolph-?, 63,87,88 

Federal Bureauofhvestigation ~I)--1,2,7,8,9,10,12,13,14,15,47,48,49,50,51,63,65, 

66,6l, 62,123,124,125,126,127,128,129,130,135,136,147 

Federal Communication~i Commiseion (FCC)-9,12,37,48,49,50,62,54,60,61,123,124, 

129,135 

Fergumn (Colonel) incident-127 

Ferner, Robert 0.-114 

Pilby, P. W.-114 

First Radio Intelligence Company-3 

Fleming, Commsnder Ian-21 

FLQRADORA--108 4 

Fly, James L. (FCC chairman)-9,10,48,49,61,124,125 

Ford, Lieutenant Commnnrlnr-45 

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey-3,17,18,32,37 

Fried, Captain Walter 5.-114 

Friedman, Elizebeth--7,9 

Friedman, Wil1iamF.--3,4,7,16,17,19,22,36,50,53,97,103,108 

FRESCO (trau: forwading code)--87 

FRUMEL (Fleet Radio Unit Melbo~~ne)-4s,61,62,63,6#,80,87,88,91,120,121,136, 

157 

FRUPAC Fleet Radio Unit Paci&~--46,63,64,65,66,80,87,88,91,120,121,135,157, 

Gardner, Lieutenant Commander E.R.--12 

GC&CS (Government Code and Cipher School) -- 14,60,98,99,100,101,103,104,107, 

108,109,110,111,112,113,114 

German diplomatic mc-58, 1 TO, 114 

"Germanm station, Long Island-10 

Ghormley, Rear Admiral Robert-16.19 

Glodell, Lieutenant Larry M.-34 

Godfrey, Admiral John H.--21 

(hggh, Commander--65 

Gore-Brawn, Lieutenant Colonel--1 12 

"Green" ENIGMA-1 26 

Greenwalk, Lieutenant jg-12 

Guam-1,6,32,67,121,142,157 
Halpin, Major 2.--89 

Handy, General Thomas T.--138,147,161,163,154 

Hastings, Captain Edward G. {U.K. co~rm Rep. in Washington)--21,48,51,59,60,61, 

87,98,99,100,101,104,107,109,114,126 

Hawaii--1,3,6,10,23,24,3L, 46,60,63,65,67,79,80,82,85,123,124,141,142,157,158 

Hayes, Captain Harold G.-22,33,41,106 

Henry, Major A.G.--89 

Hillenkoetter, Commander--64 

Hilles, Major F.W. --I11 

Hinsley, F.H.--120 

Hodes, Brigadier General Henry--151,152 

Holbrook, Lieutenant Colonel Willard--50 

Holden Agreement--61,63,88,119,121 

Holden, Captain Carl--47 

Hoover,d. Edgar--2,9,49,126,127,128,129 

Home, Vice Admiral Frederic 5.--43,44,45> 47,51,52,83,65,66,77,79,91 

Howeth, Linwood S.-- 157 

Huddleston, Major Edwin W.--141 

Hull, General John--153 

Hyde, Captain H. Montgomery--15 

Hw-31,32 

Ingles, Colonel Harry C.--33,91,146,147,152 

Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area CICP0A)--63,64 

Intercept sites, OP-20-G-6 

Station A, Shanghai, China--6,157 

Station B, Guam--6,32 

Station C, Corregidor, Philippine Islands--6 

Station G, Amagansett, New York--6 

Station H, Heeia, Territory of Hawaii-6 

Station J, Jupiter, Florida--6 

Station M, Cheltenham, Maryland--6,46 

Station 0, San Juan, Puerto Rico--6 

Station S, Bainbridge, Washington--6,79 

Station W, Winter Harbor, Maine--6 

Station U, Toro Point (previously Balboa), Canal Zone--6 

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (110- 1,49,50,51 

Italian diplomatic trfic--3 

Japanese Army tr&dcdes--4,31,38,39,81,82,83,84,86,87,93,133,141,152 
Japanese diplomatic tr&~--3,4,7,9,12,13,17,23,31,133 

Japanese naval systems-%, 7,20,23,45,46,52,61,87,88,119,136 

Japanese navy fleet oflkm' cab-7 

Japanese Water Tramport M4-82,86 

Jett, E.K.--10 

JN-25--7,20,45,46,60,79,105,121 

JN-5&46 

Johnson, Major Roy D.-S9,104,110 

Joint Chiefs of SM47,63,54,123,138 

Joint Intelligence Center Pdi Ocean Area (JICPOA)--63,64,136,142,167 

Joint Intelligence Commitbe WICI-2,6O, 52,54,56,58,77 

Jones, Commander Leonard T.--63,55,62,125,129 

Jones, Lieutenant Albert-149 

Kinunel, Admiral Hwband-6 

Kirmey, CaptainPhillip R.--134,t36,138,155 

King, Admiral Ernest J.--46,47,65,77,78,91,99 

King-Marshall Agreement--133,134,135 

Kirk, Captain Alan--15,17 

Knox, Secretary of the Navy--123,124 

Kramer, Lieutenant Commander A.D. -23,46,48,49,53 

Kroner, Colonel Hayes--23,34,104,105 

Kullback, Solomon-3,22,33,58,59,100,126 

Ladd, D.M. (FBI)--48,49,53 

LA system--4 

Layton, CommanderlCaptain Edwin T.--7,64,65 

Leahy , Admiral-1 23,124 

Lee, ColoneVGeneral Raymond E.--2,16,19,34 

Lehane, Captain 3.--89 

Littlefield, Major-111 

Lothian, Lord (British ambassador to U.SJrequersts exchange of "technical informationn-- 

16 

Loxley, Peter-1 13 

Machine Section 3 the Special Cryptanalytic Unit (68 2th SSOI--111 

MacArthur, General huglas--B,31,32,40,433,86,88,90,141,142,151,152,153,154,155 

Madntosh, Albert--62 

MAGIC--13,23,36,46,83,92,93,133,144 

Maidment, Cap& Kenneth J.-61,62,W, 126 
Marshall, General George C-36,59,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107, lW, 

109,112 

Mason, Redfield--7 

Mauborgne, General--11,12,13,17,18,32,33 

McCabe, Colonel E.R.W.-lO,13 

Mecloy, John J. --35,143,144,145,146,151 

McCloy Board-143,144,145,146 

McCollum, Commander Arthur--21,23,43,47,63,64 

McCormack, Alfred--35,36,87,100,10&, 113,130,133,144,147 

McGrail, Major A.J. --33 

McKee, Major Seth--11 1 

McNarney, General--34,91,98,102,103,146 

Menzies, Stuart--56,57,99,100,104,112 

MERMAN (traffic forwarding code)--87 

Mexian diplomatic traffic--3 

MI-5-46 

Miles, Sherman--13,14,17,18,20,22,23,34. 

Military Intelligence Division (MID)--l,2,4,10,13,14,17,18,19,22,23,32,34,35,36,46, 

48,50,51,92,98,99,100,108, 112,143,144,145 

Military Intelligence Service--34,36,37,39,40,42,52,54,56,58,62,77,81,83,84,85,86, 

92,93,100,107,108,110,111,112, 113,126,127,129,130,133,134, 135, 136,137, 

141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150, 151, 152, 153,155,157 

Minekler, Lieutenant Colonel Rex--22,32,36 

Monitoring shtions (MS)--3 

MS-1: Fort Monmouth, NJ-3,32,37,38,82,85,103 

MS2: The Presidio of San Francisco--3,32,37,39,82,83,85,143,152 

MS3: Fort Sam Houston--3,82 

MS-4: Corozal, Canal Zone--3,82,85 

MS5: Fort Shafter, Hawaii--3,31,39,82,85 

MSG: Fort McKinley, Philippines--3,4,6,7,31,82,85 

MS-7: Fort Hunt, Virginia--3,37,82 

MS-8--85 

MS-11--157 

MS-15-39 

MS-91-39 

Moore, Colonel John C. (signal officer for Army Eastern Defense Command)--49 

Murmane, Lieutenant Colonel Charles R.--113 

Murray, Colonel W.W.--97 

Napier, Paul--8,62 

National Defense Organization (see alsa Radio Intelligence Division) 
Nave, Captain T.E .--89 

Navy-1,2,6,7,8,9,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,23 

Navy Department--7,23,79,80,91 

Negat--80,156 (see also Supplementary Radio Activity, Waahizlgbn) 

Nelson, ColoneYGeneral Otto L.--84,109,143,145,151 

Newpher, Woodrow--129 

Nimitz, Admiral--63,64,65,66,157,158 

Ninth Company, Fort Shafter--3 

Norman, S.W.--61 

Noyes, Admiral Leigh--ll,IZ, 13,17,43,44 

O'Connor, Colonel H.M.--114,120 

OaCice of Naval Intelligence (ONI)--l,2,7,10,13,14,21,23,36,43,45,46,47,48,49,61, 

52,63,54,56,63,64,65,66,77,78,119,126, 127,128,129,135 

W1ce of Strategic Services (0SS)--1,2,54,56,77,114,125,135,143 

Olmstead, Major General Dawson--32,33,36,90,91 

OP-16FE (ON[)-77 d 

OP-1946 

OP-20-G--6,7,10,12,14,17,19,21,22,23,24,32,43,44,46,46,47,48,51,52,53,55,56, 

68,60,61,62,63,65,66,77,79,80,88, 90, 91,92,105,119,120, 121, 124,125,126, 

130,133,134,135,136,155,156,157 

OP-20-GI--78 

OF-20-GU (Coast Guard COMINT unit)-125,127,129,130 

OF-20-K--43 

OP-20-Q--43 

OP-20-3- 156 

Orr, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel M.--113 

PacXic Fleet--6 

PAIR traffic--114 

Panama--1,3,18,33,39 

Panama Signal Company, Canal Zone--3 

Parke, Lieutenant Commander L.W.--45 

Patterson, Assistant Secretary of War Robert P.--16 

Pearl (low-level cryptographic systems)--143 

Pearl Harbor--2,3,4,6,7,9,14,20,22,23,32,33,34,35,43,56,58,60,64,65,79,81,120, 

136,136,157 

Perdue, Major--133 

Petrie, David--56 

Philippines--l,3,4,6,14,20,31,32,40,46,88,124,142, 153,158 

Picking, Captain Sherwood--21 
Portugal, diplomatic codes, tWi-4,55 

Pound, Admiral Sir Dudley-21 

PQR (GCCS material sent to OP-20-G-21 

Prather, ~~34 

Puerto Rko-l,6,10 

PU~PLE sy~tedmachine-4,5,?, 12,13,14,18,19,20,45,~03,105,107 

Radio Intelligence Division (RID)--lO,32,39,48,53,64,56,61,62,123,124,125,129,130 

Radio Security Service (RSSI--67,62,102 

RAGFOR (Radio Analysis Group, Forward)--121,157,158 

Raven, Lieutenant Frank4 

Redman, Brigadier--1M,108,109,110 

Redman, John-#, 44,47,48,49,51,52,53,63,65,66 

Redman,Joseph43,44,47,63,65,90,91,92,93,119,120,121,126,138 

RED system-4,5,12 

Regnier, Colonel W.M.--18 

RiMwn, Admiral James 0.--6 Y 

Rochefort, Lieutenant Joseph-7,63,64,65 

Roosevelt, President--1,8,13,14,16,20,50, W, 59,108,124 

Rosen, Lieutenant &19,22 

Rowlett, Frank B.-3,22,97,110 

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)--40,85,86,88,89,90 

Royal Aus tralim Wavy--63 

Royal Canadian Navy--61 

Royal Marines-21 

Royal Navy-1461,119 

RunnaL, Captain John F.B.--141 

Sadtler, Colonel Otis K.--33 

Safeguarding Military Information (SMI) section--35 

Word, Commander hurance-7,1O,11,12,17,43,63,155 

Samoa-l,6 

Sandford, Lieutenant Colonel A.W.-87,88,89 

Sandwith, Captain H.R.-58,60 

Scherr, Major Joseph--31,40 

Schuermann, Admiral hoe E.--47,78,127,128 

Schukraft, LieutenantlCaptain Robert E.--12,33,34,62 

Seaman, Captain John W .-I 14 

Second Signal Service Batblion--37,82 (detachments), 85 (realignment) 

Second Signal Service Company--3.33 
Second Signal Service Detac hrnenb-157 

SERENA (traffic forwarding cod@)--87 

Services of Supply (see Army Services Forces) 

Seventh Company, Fort Sam Houston--3 

$ID "Dm--151 

Signal Entelligenm Detachment 9261-A--41 

Signal Intelligence Service Division (see Signal Security Agency) 

Signal radio intelligence (SRI) companies--38,39,#, 41p42,81p82,86,91,103,137,143, 

146,148,149,16O, 161,152,153p 155 

102d SRI: 39,125 

111th" : 86,157 

112th": 86 

114th" : 151 

117th": 42 

118th" : 151 

121at" : 86 

122d" : 41 

123d" : 42 

124th " : 149 

126th " : 39,Bd 

126th " : 40,86 

128th " : 41 

130th " : 157 

Signal Security Agency--40,84,143 

Signal Security Division (see also Signal Security Agency) 

Signal Security Service (see also Signal Security Agency) 

Signal Service companies ISSCI--38,149 

Sinkov, Abraham--3,19,22 33,40 86,89,102 

Sinkov-Rosen mission to UK--19,20 22 

Sixteenth Naval District-6 

SLU detachments--107,112,113,150,151 

Small, Albert W.-- 114 

Small, Major 13.E.--89 

Smedberg, Captain W.R. 111-136,137,138 

Smith, General John--143 

Smith-Hutton, Captain--1 34 

Snow, Major (Special Branch liaison officer to the Navy)--134 

Somervell, Lieutenant General Brehon B.--34,245,146 

Southwest Pacific theater (SWPA)--38,40 

Spain, diplomatic codes/trafEa-4,55 
Special 3ranch--35,36,56,81,83,84,92,93,100,1M,111,112,126,133,134,136,144, 

145,147 

Special Cryptanalytic Unit (6813th SS0)-111 

Special Intelligence Service CSISI--l,3,4,6,7,9,10,12,13,14,16,19,21J 22,31,32,33,34, 

35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,45,48,50,52,53,56, 58,59,60,62, 80, 8lpW,84,lQ0- 

102,106,109,110,1I1,137,143, 148, 151, 152, 153 

Special Intercept Unit I681 1th Special Security Detachment)--111 

Special Service Branch (see Special Branch) 

SSO (Special Security Wfcer system)--&&,go, 107,110,111,112,136,141,142,143,144, 

145,149,160,151,157,158 

SSRs (Special Security Repreaentativesl-112 

Station Glenn--8 

Stephenson, William-S,14 

Sterling, George--lO,54,62,124 

Stevens, Major Geoffrey--22,69 

Stevens, Petty mcer H. L.49 

Stimson, Henry L.--13,22,35,81,144,146 

Stone, Captain Earl E.--47,66,90,91,92,127 

Stoner, Brigadier General Frank-33,36,91,148 

Strong, General George VV.--16,17,18,19,36,36,48,54,59,81,84,85,89,91,92, 98,99, 

100,101,102,103,104,105, 107J 108,110,126,133,143 

Sultan, Lieutenant General Dan--151,152 

Supplementary Radio Activity, Washington (see also Negat)-155,156 

Sutherland, General Richard K.--142 

Talbert, Major Ansel E.M.--112,113 

Tanner, Major G.A.--89 

Taylor, Telford-62,97,1M, 108,110,111,114,130,141 

Tenth Company, Fort Mills, Philippines-3 

Thompson, Major John R.--142 

Thomett, E.B.C.--114 

Thornton, R.E.--62 

3-N Agreement--128,129 

3250th Signal Service Company--149 

3251st Signal Service Company--149 

3252d Signal Service Company--149 

3-U.S.--111,112,113,130,149,150,151 

Thumb (TA and DFI--143 

Tiltman, Colonel John--58,97,99,100 

TINA--65 

Tizard, Sir Henry--16 
Train, Rear Admiral Harold-47,91,92 

Travis, Sir Edward--57,61,99,100,101, 102,108,109 

Travis-Strong Agreement--109,110,111,114,120 

TUNA (collective address)--46,120 

TUNNEY--107 

Turing, Dr. Alan-98,99,10Q, 101,102,103,126 

Turner, Admiral R.K.--23 

Twitty, Brigadier General Joseph--64 

TWO Rock Ranch--37,38,39,82,83,85 

ULTRA--141 

ULTRA Dexter--141 

ULTRA officers-112,113 

United States Coast Guard (USCG~--7,8,10,12,13,14,37,48,49,50,51,53,55,60,62, 

125,126,130 

U.S. Army Forces British Isles (see European Theater of Operations U.S. Army (ETOUSA) 

US.- British COM~NT conference in singap&--20 

USCGFBI relations--10 

Vichy France traffic--4,6,9,37,45,78 

Vint Hill Farm Station (VHFS)--37,41,42,82,85,103 

VW TEST-AOR CW--~ 

Walsh, Flight Lieutenant 5.--89 

Ward, Flight Lieutenant P.F.--89 

War Department-16,17,18,34,36,37,39,40,49, SO, 51,53,59,81,82,86,88,90,91,97, 

98,99,101,103,106,108, 1W, 110, 111, 113, 124,141,142,143,145,149,151,152, 

153,154,155 

WEC--87,143 

Weeks, Robert--19 

Welb, Tom (FBI)--127 

Welker, Lieutenant Commander--43,45 

Wenger, Joseph-44,46,88,49,52,53,55,6O,87,88,92,119,126,129,133,134,135,136, 

137,138,155,156 

Western Defense Command--32,39,49 

Wilkinson, Admiral T.S.-43,47,48 

Wireless Experimental Center (WECI--83,&7,143 

Wrangham, Archie--21 
Yardley, Herbert 0.-22 

Y Board--57,60,102 

Y Committee-67,60 

Y Northwest Africa Committee-41