U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

60–799 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

TO RECEIVE AN UPDATE ON SELECTED REGIONAL ISSUES TO INCLUDE: COLOMBIA AND U.S. POLICY; LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

IN HAITI AND U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL; STATUS OF COUNTERDRUG FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS; U.S. CUBA COUNTERNARCOTICS COOPERATION PROPOSAL; CHINESE INFLUENCE IN

THE PANAMA CANAL; POLITICAL EVENTS IN VENEZUELA; AND

STATUS OF U.S. PROPERTY CLAIMS IN NICARAGUA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

SEPTEMBER 29, 1999

Serial No. 106–64

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(
(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

MATTHEW MARTINEZ, California

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director

DAVID ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member

KELLY MCDONALD, Staff Associate
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

WITNESSES

The Honorable Peter F. Romero, Ambassador, Acting Assistant Secretary

of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State . 7

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:

The Honorable Peter F. Romero ............................................................................. 34

Material submitted for the record:

Article Printed by the Washington Post Titled 20,000 Troops Later, Submit

by Honorable Benjamin Gilman ......................................................................... 47

Question submitted by Honorable Cass Ballenger to Honorable Peter F. Romero concerning the untilization of Mexican Helicopters in Colombia and

response thereto ................................................................................................... 49

Article printed by the Washington Post titled Choppers to Colombia, Submit

by Honorable Benjamin Gilman ......................................................................... 51

Question submitted by Honorable Cass Basllenger concerning chinese Army

involvement in Hutchinson-Whampoa and response thereto ........................... 52

Letter, dated October 6, 1999 to Honorable Peter F. Romero, submitted by

Honorable Robert Wexler .................................................................................... 53
(1)

TO RECEIVE AN UPDATE ON SELECTED REGIONAL ISSUES TO INCLUDE: COLOMBIA AND U.S. POLICY; LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN

HAITI AND U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL; STATUS OF COUNTER-DRUG

FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS; U.S. CUBA COUNTER-NARCOTICS

COOPERATION PROPOSAL; CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE PANAMA

CANAL; POLITICAL EVENTS IN VENEZUELA; AND STATUS OF U.S.

PROPERTY CLAIMS IN NICARAGUA

Wednesday, September 29, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:33 p.m., in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLEGLY. If everyone will please take their seats.

Why don’t we put the poster over there?

Today the Subcommittee will receive testimony updating us on

several issues facing the Hemisphere and how U.S. policy is addressing these issues.

When we sent our letter of invitation to the Department we

asked the Secretary to address seven specific issues. Some of these

issues will serve as a follow-up to the recent visits of Presidents

Chavez of Venezuela and Pastrana of Columbia. Others were added

at the request of Members of this Committee.

We are pleased to welcome Acting Assistant Secretary of State

Peter Romero to present the Department’s views.

On a personal note, Mr. Secretary, I know the past few months

have been both a little frustrating and disappointing to you as you

have awaited Senate confirmation of your nomination to be Assistant Secretary. Those of us who know you know of your high qualifications for this position and appreciate the information and insights you have provided our Subcommittee throughout your time

as Acting Secretary. I hope the other body will expedite your confirmation.

That being said, there have been complaints both from within

Congress and from Latin Americans themselves that the U.S.

seems to have placed Latin America on the so-called ‘‘back burner’’

willing only to express our interest in times of natural disasters or

when drugs are concerned.

As you say in your remarks, ‘‘more than anywhere else in the

world, problems in this Hemisphere have a way of intruding directly and immediately on our lives and livelihood’’. Yet, issues involving the guerrilla war in Colombia, the future of the Panama

Canal, democracy in Haiti, political instability in Ecuador, political

developments in Venezuela and important national elections in
2

Mexico, Guatemala, Argentina and Peru, which can have serious

and long-lasting impacts on the United States, do not seem to be

a high priority within this Administration.

It is no wonder, then, that we hear all kinds of speculations,

rightly and wrongly, that nations such as China and Cuba are telling our neighbors how little we care about the region hoping to

raise their own levels of influence in the Hemisphere.

Again, Mr. Secretary, we do appreciate your willingness to appear before the Committee to address some of these issues. I hope,

through this appearance today, the Administration will signal a renewed interest in the region beyond drugs and disasters, and that

we will continue to recognize the importance of our neighbors and

partners to the south.

Before turning to the Secretary it is my pleasure to defer to the

Ranking Member, Mr. Ackerman, for any opening remarks. Mr.

Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your

opening remarks.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join you this afternoon in welcoming Assistant Secretary Peter Romero before the Subcommittee.

Peter has served throughout his career with distinction, playing

key roles in the Peru-Ecuador Peace Agreement and in negotiating

the Peace Accords in El Salvador. I join with you, Mr. Chairman,

in the hope that Peter will soon be able to remove the ‘‘Acting’’

from his title so that we can benefit fully from his expertise.

We are here today to discuss a variety of hemispheric issues of

concern to the United States. While the issues the Chairman mentioned in his invitation letter are important, there are other things

that are going on that I hope we can discuss today as well. For instance, there are elections on the horizon in Argentina, Chile and

Mexico. These elections carry with them further signs that democratic processes are deepening and opening in Latin America. In

Mexico in particular the long dominant PRI has moved to a primary system to select its Presidential candidate.

But even as democratic institutions expand there is widespread

discontent with the results of democratization and economic liberalization. As the article in Monday’s Wall Street Journal noted, many

in Latin America are worse off than they were before economic reforms and, for better or worse, they are beginning to doubt democracy’s promise.

While I don’t think there will be movement backwards toward

authoritarian regimes, there has been a noticeable slowing of economic reforms as the political support for free market capitalism

wanes. I hope that the United States will continue to be engaged

and to do what we can to encourage developing nations to continue

on the path of economic and democratic reforms. Having a confirmed Assistant Secretary would be a very nice start.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I look forward to Secretary Romero’s testimony.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman.

The gentlelady from Florida.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Gallegly, for holding this very

timely hearing. The issues to be addressed today are critical items
3

to the U.S.-Hemispheric relations as they impact upon our foreign

economic and security policy toward the region.

Due to time restraints, I would like to focus on the Nicaraguan

property issue and on the Castro regime’s involvement in narcotrafficking.

There are three areas of claims, Mr. Romero, which I hope that

you will address today; and they require a prompt resolution: First,

the CORNAP cases; second, those cases in which the property has

been returned in name but in which the owner cannot occupy the

property; and, third, where there is an existing court judgment.

These cases in Nicaragua require the full attention of the State

Department. They need to be raised within the context of discussions at the international financial and lending institutions, and

they must be resolved expeditiously. American citizens should be

able to depend on their government to defend their property rights

and their right to indemnification and just compensation.

Just compensation does not include payment in bonds, which at

current levels are valued at about 14 cents on the dollar. I would

like the Secretary to address the Department’s position on this

practice and what actions have been taken to raise this issue with

the Nicaraguan authorities and elaborate on the achievements in

the conversion of compensation bonds to a standardized format, the

creation of special courts to deal with property cases, and the creation of alternatives to the compensation bonds.

Turning to the issue of Cuba and the drug trade, the Clinton Administration is making every attempt to justify cooperation and engagement with the Castro dictatorship, citing the inability of the

regime to interdict the drug trade supposedly and ignoring the

facts and the history of the regime’s complicity and participation in

narco-trafficking networks.

This position of the Administration is outrageous. Given that the

Castro regime exerts absolute control over its territory, over its

people and its ruling structure; given the attack on the Brothers

to the Rescue planes in 1996 by the Castro air force; given the attack on the 13 de Marzo tugboat by the Cuban coast guard, the arrest of Cubans trying to flee the island in makeshift vessels; given

the intelligence resources of the Castro regime which enabled a spy

ring to penetrate U.S. military installations and espionage network

classified as sophisticated and efficient by our very own FBI, it is

unconscionable that anyone could believe that this regime has neither the knowledge nor the ability to prevent the use of its land,

air and water for the drug trade.

It is beyond logic how the Administration can rationalize an arrangement which would entail sharing of U.S. information and intelligence with a terrorist regime which is a declared enemy of the

U.S.

Specifically, I would like to ask Secretary Romero during his

presentation to update our Subcommittee on the status of the investigation on the seizure of over seven metric tons of cocaine

seized in Cartagena on December 3rd of last year that was supposedly destined for Cuba. Without divulging specific details, which

we understand, Mr. Secretary, if you could share any information

concerning cooperation with the Spanish and Colombian authori-
4

ties and the sharing of data to prove that this shipment was destined for Cuba.

Has the Department accessed the Cuban police investigation

which contradicts the Castro regime’s account of the seizure? Is the

Department working with other agencies on this investigation? If

so, is it all coordinated by the Department and why?

We welcome the Secretary with us today. We look forward to his

testimony and especially the explanation for the Department’s acceptance of the Castro regime’s version of the events. We welcome

him today, especially since he is a south Floridian. So thank you,

Peter, for being with us today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentleman from New York, the Chairman of the Full Committee, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Chairman Gallegly, for scheduling this

timely hearing. The broad agenda reflects the fact there are a number of visible and highly important foreign policy concerns in our

Western Hemisphere. We welcome Acting Assistant Secretary Romero to come before us once again, and we look forward to hearing

his thoughts as he shares his views with regard to some of these

critical issues.

With regard to Colombia, during his recent visit, President

Pastrana announced a $7.5 billion plan to reinforce Colombia’s

military forces to fight drug trafficking and strengthen the presence of the state in the lives of the citizens throughout his country.

The outline of his plan makes sense. It is broad-based. It seeks

to rectify important weaknesses that undercut the legitimate authority of the state. But the Administration has been so preoccupied with avoiding being involved in Colombia’s

counterinsurrgency effort that it has permitted the situation in Colombia to deteriorate.

The Administration did have some encouraging words for President Pastrana’s plan. Key officials traveled to Bogata to consult

with the Colombia team that wrote the plan. However, there is no

word on when or even if the Administration is going to send a request for emergency supplemental appropriations for Colombia to

Congress for how much or what will be included in that request.

As we wind down this session in the last few weeks, I think it

is critically important for our government to expedite the delivery

of assistance which has already been funded and is now languishing in the pipeline.

With regard to Haiti, Haiti is back on the front pages of our

newspapers once again. The Haitian National Police is being corrupted by drug trafficking and the manipulation by former Haitian

army officials that are tied to former President Aristide.

Haiti’s legislative and municipal elections face further delays and

some serious challenges, and we are troubled by the lack of highlevel attention from our government to just what is going on in

Haiti.

Prime Minister Preval has become hostile to the electoral council

he appointed and is engaging in stalling tactics. Street violence fomented by former President Aristide’s Lavalas Family Party
5

threatens freedom of assembly, threatens freedom of speech and

may threaten the elections as well.

The Haitian National Police don’t appear to have a comprehensive plan to provide security during the forthcoming election. The

electoral council faces significant logistical hurdles to provide critically important voter identification cards and meet the type of electoral calendar that it has established.

No progress has been made toward privatizing Haiti’s stateowned telephone monopoly. On Tuesday, the state-owned cash cow

arbitrarily shut down a private Internet provider, Alpha Communications Network, cutting off Haitian access to the Internet. I urge

the State Department to investigate and protest that kind of outrageous action.

The permanent deployment of our troops in Haiti will end and

periodic New Horizons exercises are going to take their place. Our

colleague Porter Goss, the Chairman of Intelligence Committee,

published an article in today’s Washington Post on Haiti which refers to our troop withdrawal.

Without objection, I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that it be included in the record of this hearing.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. GILMAN. With regard to Panama, last March, Speaker

Hastert and Senate Majority Leader Lott sent President Clinton a

letter urging him to make a major effort this year to negotiate an

extension of the U.S. military presence in Panama. In a very disappointing response dated April 19th, the President said the Administration has concluded that the new government in Panama

will not have time to negotiate such an extension and win the necessary support of the Panamanian people for it. His response basically implied that the Administration wasn’t going to do anything

in this regard unless some Panamanians come to us and virtually

beg us to stay.

Since that time, the Administration’s alternative to Panama, the

so-called Forward Operating Locations, have proven disappointing.

In addition, there have been some very encouraging signals from

the new government about their possible interest in working out an

extension of our military presence there. In particular, I believe

they may be interested in the approach suggested by the legislation

I introduced last year, the United States Panama Partnership Act,

to give them various trade and other benefits in exchange for affording our military continued success in Panama.

I hope you will comment, Mr. Secretary, whether the Administration will be pursuing their interest on their part. I will be very disappointed if you tell us that there has been no change in the Administration’s position since last April. It would be truly reckless

to let such an opportunity slip away.

In addition, I note that a growing number of our Americans are

deeply upset that a Hong Kong company with ties to communist

China has been granted leases to ports at both ends of the Panama

Canal. If our government has any evidence that these leases were

influenced or obtained through any corruption, that information
6

should be provided to the government of President Moscoso without

delay.

So I thank the Chairman for this time. I look forward to sharing

some thoughts with Secretary Romero. We appreciate your being

here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I Thank the Chairman, Mr. Gilman.

Are there any other opening statements?

Mr. BURTON. If I might, real quick.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON. I won’t take a great deal of time, but I do want to

discuss with Mr. Romero some statements he made before the Government Reform and Oversight Committee regarding developmental assistance to the FARC guerrillas when he appeared before

our Committee.

We believe there are some inconsistencies in what you told my

Committee and what was actually the case. We have before us

today secret documents that I subpoenaed from the White House

and the State Department, and I hope that you will take seriously,

reconsider what you told our Committee when you testified before

it, because we find strong inconsistencies in your memos and what

you told the Committee. If that continues, there is very likely going

to be a contempt of Congress citation that you will have to deal

with.

I am also concerned about Title IV of the Helms-Burton law. It

is your responsibility, I understand, to issue letters of determination or sanctions again the companies that violate the embargo.

There are 21 plus foreign companies in violation of the embargo.

I guess you have issued advisory letters against three hotel companies who are in violation of the embargo, but 21 plus are in violation that you have not contacted.

I also would like for you to explain the Cuban spy Fernando Garcia Belsa—I think I pronounced his name correctly—who supports

terrorism and espionage and who has worked with the guerrillas

in Puerto Rico who were recently released by the President of the

United States.

The last thing I would like to talk to you about is what the

Chairman of the Full Committee, Mr. Gilman, just talked about,

and that is the danger to the Panama Canal and the United States

as a result. The FARC guerrillas are within 100 miles of the Panama Canal, and it is my understanding they could move in that direction at any time with virtual impunity, and at the same time

we have got the communist Chinese about to control both ends of

the canal. Since it has a direct impact on the economy of the

United States and possibly the security of the United States, we

would like to know what you and the Administration plan to do

about that.

With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. GALLEGLY. No other opening statements.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Secretary, your full written text will be

placed in the record, without objection, in its entirety, and you are

welcome to proceed in any manner you see fit. Mr. Secretary, we

welcome you.
7

STATEMENT OF PETER F. ROMERO, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. ROMERO. Thanks for the promotion, Mr. Chairman; and I

really appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee.

I would like to thank you for your opening remarks and those of

your distinguished colleagues here, and I hope to get to all of those

questions and more. But permit me to at least frame briefly where

I see and where we in the Department of State see the Hemisphere

going and our relationship with it.

While acknowledging the many challenges before us I believe the

countries of the Western Hemisphere are at a very promising juncture. We have, arguably, the best relationships with our neighbors

throughout the region than we have ever had. Geography, trade,

travel, migration and technology have all combined to produce an

unprecedented level of integration and interdependence and cooperation. This means that hemispheric issues, crime or immigration or economic growth or natural disasters, quickly tend to become domestic U.S. issues that resonate in our local communities.

More than ever, strong U.S. leadership is absolutely critical.

Organizationally, another manifestation of this deepening integration is the change in the old Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

With the addition of Canada, we are now the Bureau of Western

Hemisphere Affairs. The incorporation of Canada into our Bureau

not only reflects an economic and geopolitical reality but has the

beneficial effect of causing us to regularly rethink how we look at

the totality of our relationships and our goals in the Hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, the questions that you submitted to me are very

important questions, and I hope to have all opportunities to be able

to engage the Members of your Committee in discussing them. But

often times when you look at the challenges ahead, you tend to

view the glass as half empty, if you will. What I would like to do

is to just briefly go through the Hemisphere just to talk about some

of the high points.

Within the next couple of weeks, Mr. Chairman, there will be an

unprecedented act that will probably go relatively unnoticed in

Uruguay. That is the signing of a multilateral evaluation mechanism that has been agreed upon by every single member state of

the OAS. And what that will do will be to take much of what we

had accomplished with respect to the certification process and move

it about 15 steps ahead in terms of having a hemispheric process

that will not only evaluate performance, counternarcotics performance, in each country, along the full range of counternarcotics

issues, but also provide recommendations and issues that should be

supported internationally. This follows a hemispheric strategy that

had been agreed upon about two years ago, and this really puts the

rubber on the road, if you will, Mr. Chairman, in terms of hemispheric cooperation on counternarcotics.

Beyond that, we have got excellent cooperation which has been

improving with the Mexican Government on law enforcement

issues but particularly as they relate to counternarcotics.

Virtually unnoticed in the press a couple of days ago there was

a combined U.S.-Mexico law enforcement operation which resulted

in the arrests of 93 Americans and Mexicans and others both inside
8

the United States and in Mexico. The key component of that was

the fact that this investigation and the operation was two years in

the making. Law enforcement on both sides of the border kept to

a need-to-know strategy, and they were able to spring this operation on 93 very unsuspecting criminals. This was an operation

that yielded a lot of cocaine and millions of dollars worth of cash.

In Mexico, in addition to that, you are seeing a primary process

which for the first time has opened up the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) of Mexico to a U.S.-style type primary that will

be held before the end of the year. I think that this shows promise.

It shows that democracy is taking root not just in Mexican institutions but, obviously, in the political party atmosphere. You can go

to Mexico at any given time, turn on the television set and see debates within the PRI, candidates who would not have debated publicly the issues before.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the President was largely chosen in

a very closed-circle back room before. And now you have got debate

largely on all the air waves in Mexico, on key issues and you have

got a little bit of mud-slinging going on at the same time. But

clearly a turn toward democracy.

Throughout the region, beyond the greater cooperation that we

have on counternarcotics, that cooperation has begun to yield real

results. In Peru over the last couple of years we have witnessed a

52-percent decline in cocoa production. In Bolivia, the Bolivian people have adhered to a strategy under the current president, President Banzer, to rid the country of cocaine by the Year 2002. Not

only are they on schedule for that, but they are ahead of schedule

in terms of eradication of cocoa production in that country.

Elsewhere, we had a very nasty turn of events, Mr. Chairman,

over the last couple of months in Paraguay. Luckily we and the

other friends of Paraguay were able to work together to continue

or to have Paraguayans continue on the course of constitutional

order. There was an assassination of a vice president there. But

the constitution did hold, and a new president was elected, or assumed office, and was seated. We are hoping for greater cooperation in Paraguay, but they are off to a very good start.

As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, we are seeing elections unfold

or campaigns unfold toward elections in Chile and Argentina. We

have spoken in depth on our issues to all major candidates and believe that we can work with all major candidates to advance our

common goals in the Hemisphere and bilaterally in both countries.

We were able to assist in the forestalling of economic collapse and

chaos in Brazil. We were able to support President Cardoso in his

drive to structurally reform the state and to avoid dire economic

circumstances. The Treasury, the IMF, State Department, we all

worked hand in glove to prevent that from happening; and, quite

frankly, it was a whole lot better than the most dire predictions before the Brazilian Government was able to see headroom.

Elsewhere around the region we have begun to see a plethora of

robust regional groupings, whether it be SICA (Central American

Intelligence System) in Central America or Caricom in the Caribbean or Mercosur in the south. The Andean Pact has redefined

itself and is calling itself the Andean Union. There is definitely a
9

drive toward free markets and shared views toward democratic institutions and goals and objectives.

Let me—before I leave that, let me just say that, in terms of Ecuador and Peru, the United States played a very strong role in ending a border dispute that arguably went on for about 140-years,

and now both of those countries can turn toward more peaceful

pursuits.

Then finally, Mr. Chairman, while the free trade issue gets debated and perhaps even heats up in the course of campaigns in the

United States, let me just throw out a little fact and that is that

our leading trading partner is a NAFTA partner and our second

leading trading partner is a NAFTA partner. Canada and the

United States do almost $1 billion worth of trade a day. And Mexico our other partner in NAFTA has superceded Japan as our second most trading partner. The benefits are manifest of free trade,

Mr. Chairman.

The timing of my appearance here is very opportune. I spent

much of last week and parts of this week in New York in the U.N.

General Assembly where I met with a variety of hemispheric leaders and discussed many of the same issues that concern all of us

here today.

COLOMBIA

On Colombia, among those I spoke with was Colombia President

Pastrana, who met with President Clinton on September 21st.

President Pastrana faces some of the most difficult internal challenges of any leader in the region, and I say that with a historical

perspective also. In response, the government of Colombia has unveiled a good, comprehensive plan that provides a strategic vision

outlining how the government of Colombia intends to address its

national challenges.

The Plan Colombia, plan for peace, prosperity and strengthening

of the state, is an ambitious package of mutually reenforcing policies to revive Colombia’s battered economy, strengthen democratic

institutions, and promote the peace process while more aggressively moving against narcoproducers and traffickers. The plan covers five critical themes: the peace process, counternarcotics, the judicial system, democratization, human rights and social development and economic policy.

The government of Colombia recognizes the imperative to regain

the confidence of the Colombian people by strengthening democratic and social institutions, particularly those assisting Colombian victims of the country’s violence and drug trade. The government of Colombia will promote greater respect for human rights,

assist those displaced by the internal conflict, implement alternative development programs, combat corruption, strengthen local

government and provide sustainable development assistance to conflictive areas.

Guerrilla and right-wing militia violence has taken a very heavy

toll on Colombia both in terms of human life and in terms of the

economic losses. Moreover, both the guerrilla and right-wing militias are increasingly tied to the narcotics industry. We believe that

President Pastrana is correct in making peace a major priority by

folding it into a robust security strategy.
10

Measures which aid in settling Colombia’s internal conflict will

also help in other areas. For example, Colombia’s internal fighting

discourages domestic and foreign investment which is vitally needed to restart an economy currently suffering from the worst downturn since the 1930’s. We intend to support Colombia’s peace process through contributions to alternative development in areas controlled by the government, strengthen respect for human rights

and measures to promote good government at the local government

level.

We need to help the Colombian Government succeed. The likely

price of a failure would be further disintegration of the Colombian

state, higher levels of paramilitary and guerrilla violence and a

worsened narcotics situation. Such a failure would have dire consequences for the United States and the region as a whole.

THE STATUS OF OUR FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS

Tracking the narcotics air and maritime operations is an essential component of our interdiction strategy. With the closing of our

military bases in Panama we have adopted a new tool called Forward Operating Locations. U.S. counternarcotics aircraft have been

operating out of temporary FOL’s in Curacao, Aruba, and Manta,

Ecuador, since last April, under interim accords negotiated with

the Dutch and Ecuadorian Governments. We are now finalizing negotiations with both governments for long-term, 10-year-plus agreements.

While there has been some degradation in aerial counternarcotics

coverage, we anticipate that when the third FOL is established,

coverage will likely exceed what we had at Howard Air Force Base.

We plan to establish a third FOL site in Central America at an appropriate location as conditions warrant and obviously as funding

permits.

U.S.-CUBA COUNTERNARCOTICS COOPERATION

Geography dictates that a narcotics interdiction strategy include

a strong Caribbean component. Cuba’s Caribbean location between

South America and the U.S. market means we have to consider

Cuba as we design our strategy and as we refine the same.

Given that Cuban air space and territorial waters are at risk of

being used by traffickers smuggling drugs into the United States

our law enforcement community has begun exploring ways to plug

these interdiction gaps. Toward that end, we had technical and exploratory talks with Cuban officials in Havana last June but did

not reach any formal agreements whatsoever.

Directly relevant to our counternarcotics engagement with Cuba

is the issue that was brought up earlier in the statements: the 7.2

ton cocaine shipment bound for Cuba that was seized by Colombian

authorities in December 1998. The intelligence community is conducting an all-source assessment of that shipment and possible

Cuban Government complicity in it. We will consider the results of

that assessment as we determine our future narcotics control relationship and strategy with Cuba.

The meeting of our working level counternarcotics experts in

Cuba was governed by our desire to address a drug threat. For
11

many years we have engaged in a case-by-case strategy of cooperation with Cuba, when it is or when it was in our national interest

to do so.

The counternarcotics talks do not signify a change in U.S. policy

toward Cuba. We continue to press the Cuban regime to democratize and to respect human rights while seeking to engage and assist the Cuban people in order to promote the peaceful transition

to democracy. Evidence of this was our successful effort to score

Cuban human rights practices earlier this year at the Human

Rights Commission in Geneva.

PANAMA CANAL AND THE CHINESE INFLUENCE OVER IT

In 1996, the government of Panama initiated a process to privatize the operations of ports at both ends of the Canal. We protested vigorously what we considered a flawed bidding process

which resulted in a port concession being awarded to a division of

the Hong Kong-based company Hutchison-Whampoa.

Since that time, the process leading to the award to HutchisonWhampoa has been reviewed by, inter alia, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff delegation and the Federal Maritime Commission. These studies concluded that though the bidding process

was at best unorthodox, there did not appear to be discrimination

against U.S. companies.

Concern has been expressed over Chinese influence in Panama

as a result of the Hutchison-Whampoa concession, and we have

taken a very close look at this issue and will continue to follow it

very, very closely. We have concluded that the presence of

Hutchison-Whampoa in the ports of Balboa and Cristobal does not

represent a threat to Canal operations or to U.S. interests this

Panama.

THE STATUS OF U.S. PROPERTY CLAIMS IN NICARAGUA

Seeking resolution of U.S. citizens’ claims for property confiscation during the Sandinistan regime remains our most important

and most difficult bilateral issue with the government of Nicaragua. Successive Nicaraguan Governments have made encouraging progress in stepping up and accelerating the pace of claims

resolutions.

In July, Secretary Albright issued the sixth annual waiver of

Section 527 provisions which, had they not been waived, would

have prohibited most forms of bilateral aid to Nicaragua. Her decision was based on the fact that Section 527 would have provoked

disastrous results for Nicaragua’s economic reform process, particularly in the wake of the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch.

Her decision also reflected our sense that the government of Nicaragua under President Aleman is making good progress in resolving claims.

While we are making solid progress on the property issue, we

must maintain constructive pressure on the government of Nicaragua. Americans have been patient in seeking resolution and deserve a fair shake. Like many of you, and like many U.S. citizen

claimants, I am frustrated with this difficult and slow process. But
12

with perseverance and insistence I believe we can eventually find

acceptable resolutions of these claims.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN VENEZUELA

Following Hugo Chavez’ election as president of Venezuela in December 1998, Venezuelans again returned to the polls in April and

voted overwhelmingly to create a National Constituent Assembly

the ANC, to draft a new constitution. Elected on July 25th, a vast

majority of the ANC supports President Chavez. The ANC was

given six months to complete a draft of the new constitution. However, President Chavez has requested that the ANC finish its work

within the next three months.

The process got off to a difficult start with turf conflicts between

the ANC and the legislature and the courts. The Assenbly’s claim

to originating powers (in essence, establishing its superiority to the

existing branches of government) was indirectly upheld in a Supreme Court opinion, and the President of the Court resigned in

protest. A clash between the Congress and ANC—with the ANC

issuing emergency decrees limiting Congress’s powers—was resolved in an agreement brokered by the Catholic Church.

Most Venezuelans believe that profound change is needed to save

their democracy. We agree with that. And they have tasked the

ANC with that responsibility. We recognize the importance of that

undertaking. At the same time, we have cautioned that changing

the rules of democracy, must, itself be done democratically in the

context of open, inclusive debate and that, that process respect

checks and balances and fundamental democratic principles.

In addition, we believe that the current focus on political and institutional issues has obscured the dire need for Venezuelan Government engagement on economic policy. Pressing economic problems must be addressed forthrightly and quickly even as the ANC

continues its work on the proposed new constitution.

HAITI

Finally, Mr. Chairman, on Haiti, the elections and the status of

U.S. and U.N. forces there. September marks the fifth anniversary

of the U.S.-led effort that restored elected and constitutional government to Haiti. And although Haiti’s political and economic

progress has been impeded by a prolonged and devisive political

impasse, we in the Administration remain committed to helping

the country achieve sustainable democracy, and a level of economic

growth that will lift the Haitian people out of abject poverty.

The U.S. military support group has contributed significantly to

U.S. objectives in Haiti and provided outstanding assistance to the

Haitian people. Plans are under way for the redeployment home in

early 2000 of the nearly 400 strong U.S. military support group in

Haiti. However, we will continue to be engaged militarily and are

currently reviewing proposed activities including temporary training exercises under what Chairman Gilman mentioned earlier and

that is the New Horizons program.

The four year-old Haitian National Police, despite its many defects, and some of those defects were catalogued in an article in

The Washington Post yesterday, is the best police force that Haiti’s
13

ever had. The U.N. International Civilian Police Mission, or

MIPONUH, has been critical in helping Haiti develop an increasingly credible police force. MIPONUH’s mandate is due to lapse in

November of this year, November 30th, and we are currently working with the U.N. and other donors to obtain passage in the United

Nations General Assembly of a new mandate for a smaller and restructured U.N. police assistance mission, one that would mentor

and monitor at the same time, combine both functions.

In a few months from now, Haiti will hold legislative regional

and local elections. These elections are critical to fully restoring the

Parliament that lapsed January 11th of this year. We are urging

the Haitians to hold these elections as soon as possible in a free,

fair and transparent manner. We appreciate, Mr. Ackerman, your

concerns about preparations for those elections and I would be

happy to address that later.

The U.S. and international community are actively engaged in

helping Haiti prepare for the upcoming elections and will continue

to remain engaged in that preparation.

Mr. Chairman, I have attempted to respond to the seven areas

that you have asked me to address. I look forward to answering

any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee

might have and thank you for this opportunity.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Romero appears in the appendix.]

Mr. GALLEGLY. The Chairman has a previous commitment and if

there is no objection I will defer to him as he has one or two questions he would like to ask. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to go to another

meeting, and I appreciate this opportunity. I just have two brief

questions.

We thank Secretary Romero for his oversight of all of the major

issues that he is aware of.

President Pastrana has come and gone with his plan in Colombia

that the Administration asked him to develop. Our own drug czar,

General McCaffrey, describes the situation in Colombia as critical

and the proliferation of illegal drug trafficking a disaster.

Congress is going to be leaving town soon, hopefully. Time is

running out for an emergency supplemental for Colombia. Can you

tell us when and if ever the Administration is going to send up its

Colombia emergency supplemental aid request?

Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that my sincerest

hope would be that it would be very soon. But let me just talk a

little bit about some of the work that needs to be done.

The Pastrana Administration has put a price tag on the Plan Colombia of about $7.5 billion. We helped in the construction of much

of that plan, particularly as it related to counternarcotics and as

it related to the social development side. It is the intention of the

Pastrana Government to reach out to all potential international donors. They believe that they have the wherewithal, notwithstanding an incredible contraction of their economy and, of course,

the revenue of the government that falls as a result of that, to fund

about $4 billion, which would leave about $3.5 billion for the international community to fund.
14

What we are doing right now, Mr. Chairman, is talking to them

in an effort to determine where they believe other international assistance will come, whether it be on alternative development or

whether it goes to reforms, and all kinds of other things that will

be needed to regain ground in Colombia. Once we have worked out

with them, what they will be funding—and they want to bear the

lion’s share of this, which I think is a very good prognosis—but

they also want us to be able to work with them in helping to coordinate an international donor appeal on this. Once we have

worked through what, where, they will plug in where we the U.S.

can plug in and obviously where others can. Then we will be better

prepared to talk a little bit more in terms of numbers. But Mr.

Chairman, we are more than prepared to talk with you, any Members of this Committee, any members of your staff in terms of your

concerns about where money and resources and attention and focus

should be placed.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, Secretary Romero, we are interested to know

just what the Administration is proposing, where the money will

come from, and for what purposes it will be used. I understand the

IMF is about to approve a $3.5 billion loan for Colombia. Is that

correct?

Mr. ROMERO. I am not sure about the figure, but I know the IMF

is working on a loan.

Mr. GILMAN. I thought we were asking our delegation to be the

leaders in that loan for Colombia.

Mr. ROMERO. We are. I don’t know what the dollar figure, sir,

Mr. Chairman, is to that loan, but I do know that Undersecretary

Larson is working very closely with folks in the Treasury and at

the IMF.

Mr. GILMAN. I just want to remind you, Mr. Secretary, we have

very limited time, if you are going to try to do something before we

wind up this session. Otherwise, it will have to go over to January

or February.

Mr. Secretary, why aren’t you talking to the Panamanians about

maintaining a U.S. security presence at key facilities in Panama

after 1999? Again, we are running out of time. When are we going

to start talking to the new government that is interested in re-establishing our presence in Panama?

Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me just to finish

or close the loop on your question relative to Colombia.

Mr. GILMAN. Yes, please.

Mr. ROMERO. I think that it is very important to look at Colombia and what has happened in a very deliberate, careful way. I appreciate your need for speed, and we are working as fast as we possibly can in support of the Colombia Government on this. The Colombia Government has been able to put a strategy together, Mr.

Chairman, in about three weeks, which I think is astounding when

you look at the breadth and scope of what they have begun to put

together. We will be working with them.

The issues are deep and go very, very wide, and they have to do

with focusing on the southern part of Colombia and not just a police, not just a military, and not just a civilian presence but all of

them combined, with alternative development strategies toward village banking, to win back these whole chunks of Colombia some of
15

which have never really been within the grasp of the Colombian

Government in terms of local government and others in other times

have been lost to narcoguerrillas who operate in those areas.

On Panama, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the assessment

of our military planners, those engaged in counternarcotics planning, is that with the possible introduction of a third FOL, Forward

Operating Location, somewhere in Central America, that we could

probably be up, as I mentioned earlier, to about 120-percent of our

coverage and our time on station as it related to our operations out

of Howard before we were forced to close those down.

Mr. GILMAN. Do we have any Central American proposal?

Mr. ROMERO. I think that there are a number of possibilities

with respect to the case of Panama. We haven’t discarded the possibility. We have spoken to the Panamanian Government, the new

government of President Moscoso, about this. And, Mr. Chairman,

what we have begun to put into motion is a more intensive bilateral mechanism whereby we talk about lots of bilateral issues with

respect to things that they are really looking for in terms of housing and other kinds of things, but particularly focus on law enforcement issues and the kinds of things that the Panamanians will

need over the years to better secure Panama.

I broached that subject a couple of weeks ago with the Panamanian foreign minister when he was here. We are set to begin those

talks probably in Washington, but they will begin within the next

couple of weeks. Those kinds of issues, security issues, law enforcement issues, and then of course the FOL issue in conjunction with

our counternarcotics policy through the region will be discussed.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. ROMERO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary.

Let me ask you in two different veins, first on Colombia, what

benchmarks—I asked President Pastrana when he was here, and

I really didn’t get a sense from his answer, so now I want to know

from our perspective, from our government, what benchmarks are

we establishing for our decisionmaking in the context of what will

very clearly be a very significant participation, notwithstanding

what you said about Colombia and the other international partners, clearly we will have a rather significant participation. What

benchmarks are we establishing for ourselves internally to decide

whether or not we are going to participate in these endeavors?

As we do participate in these endeavors, I happen to be one of

those who believe that it is in the interests of the United States

to work with Colombia in terms of these issues for both national

security and other national interests. Nevertheless, I question myself when we are looking at these large amounts of money what

type of benchmarks are we establishing to determine whether or

not true progress is being made in the context of good negotiations

by the FARC and the ELN and others.

Mr. ROMERO. Thank you, Congressman Menendez. Excellent

questions.

Let me just say that the benchmarks are still a work in progress

in terms of what it is we would be asking the Colombians to do
16

with whatever amount of resources we are able to apply to the

problem. Let me just sketch broadly what those benchmarks would

be.

First of all, we would insist that there be greater integration of

forces, both the police but also military and other forces, toward

the increasing threat in southern Colombia.

If I might, if you look at the map, essentially we have been working in this area of Guaviare over the last several years, and most

of the work that we have been doing has been aerial eradication.

Much of Guaviare and northern Caqueta has been sprayed with

very good results.

Notwithstanding excellent results there, notwithstanding excellent results in Peru and in Bolivia, narco-production or cocoa cultivation has mushroomed in the areas south of there in the

Putamayo and southern Caqueta areas. Unfortunately, that has coincided with a very big guerrilla presence in just that same area.

So, consequently, what we are looking for is a focus in that area

which is a major area of cocoa production, an integrated approach

using police and all branches of the military, an effort to put a civilian government presence on the ground.

We know from Central America, we know from other kinds of

insurgencies that police and military are not enough. You need to

have—you need in this case to bring the fabric of those societies

and those small towns and villages back into the national fabric,

under government control.

As a result of that, there is going to have to be a combined set

of benchmarks which includes continued improvement on human

rights. The military has shown great improvement on human

rights, better integrated intelligence and operations, joint operations in this southern—southeast Colombian area, but also putting the machinery in place on the civilian side to ensure that

there is alternative development, that there is work generation,

that there is access to credit in terms of village banking, and that

all of this is woven tightly.

Mr. MENENDEZ. If I can interrupt you, just because my time is

returning out. I have other questions. But none of what I have

heard, and I understand all that, and I appreciate it as well, but

none of it is interrelated with the response by the guerrillas in any

of these attempts at negotiation, and so none of our benchmarks

will focus on the response by the guerrilla movements in the context of the Colombian Government’s effort to negotiate with them,

we are not going to judge any benchmarks in that regard?

Mr. ROMERO. I think the negotiations are up to the Colombian

Government to pursue. We have supported them in many, many

different ways in terms of what has worked and what has not

worked in the context of places and other negotiations with guerrilla groups. We continue to be there for advice and recommendation on this.

But let there be no mistake, this is an issue that they are leading. Quite frankly, they have told us that they want to leave the

door open to negotiations, and they have. I think that they have

been exceedingly forthcoming and some would say even too forthcoming, but they have reflected the fact that the Colombian people,

after 38 years of bloodshed, want peace; and they are adopting a
17

policy that enables them to work smarter, and at the same time

keep the door open to the prospects for peace.

Right now the peace is bogged down in issues related to a commitment by the largest guerrilla group, the FARC, to an international observer presence in this safe haven zone that the government has extended to them at least temporarily, and their unwillingness to allow observers to come in.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have other questions. If there is a second round, I would appreciate it.

Mr. GALLEGLY. We will have a second round. I would like to

move to Panama just for a minute if we can, Mr. Secretary. What

authority, if any, has Panama granted the Hutchison-Whampoa

company to operate or control the operation of the canal?

Mr. ROMERO. Well, Mr. Chairman, the entry of HutchisonWhampoa into Panama was by virtue of part of the Panamanian

Government’s privatization program, privatization of facilities and

installations at the canal. Our Embassy and the U.S. Government

has characterized that privatization process, particularly that bidding process in the case of Hutchison-Whampoa, as at best irregular. It seemed to be what those in the business call a ‘‘semi-blind

auction’’ rather than a true bid, and it disadvantaged some of those

who were bidding.

Essentially what happened was Hutchison-Whampoa, as I am

told, put a full-page ad in a Panamanian paper, essentially saying

that they would outbid by a long shot all other bidders in this

thing. I don’t know whether there was inside information or what.

They came in millions of dollars above the next highest bidders and

subsequently got the bid.

We are told that the reason why Hutchison-Whampoa wanted to

operate ports on both sides of the canal was for business reasons.

They have a container port, I am told, in the Bahamas, and this

complemented their activities in the area.

I know that there was a Senate Foreign Relations staff, though,

that went down and took a look at the situation. I am told that our

Federal Maritime Commission went down and investigated, and essentially their findings were that while it was an irregular process,

there doesn’t seem to be anything about that process and the winner of that process which would challenge U.S. security interests.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Secretary, to your knowledge, does

Hutchison-Whampoa’s Chairman, Li Ka-Shing, have ties to the

Chinese Communist Party or the People’s Liberation Army to your

knowledge?

Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman, I know that he is or was a Hong

Kong businessman. Hong Kong is now part of PRC. This company

has been in operation, I am told, since the middle 1800’s, and while

it was a Hong Kong company—now it is obviously a PRC company,

and I cannot describe nor do I know anything about any kinds of

contacts he might have with high-ranking PRC government and

military officials.

Mr. GALLEGLY. OK. In the Department’s view, does the Panama

Canal Treaty ensure that the United States can intervene in the

canal if its operation is jeopardized by internal or external threats?

Mr. ROMERO. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I believe written

into the language of the Canal Treaty itself, there is a neutrality
18

clause and also one that provides for the free movement of ships

through the canal without prejudice, and I believe also that there

is a part of that agreement which talks about the use of the canal

during a time of need by U.S. warships, a preferential use of that

canal by U.S. warships.

In terms of Hutchison-Whampoa, just to reiterate, we will be

looking—I have asked the intelligence community to use all sources

to look at any threats to the canal and where those threats might

be coming from. There is a classified report, Mr. Chairman, and I

can’t get into the details of that report, but it essentially concludes

that the business arrangement, this particular business arrangement of Hutchison-Whampoa, does not constitute a threat to canal

operations. We continue to watch very closely.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The gentlelady from

Florida Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would like to get you and the State Department on the

record regarding the Cuba drug issue, and I have a 5-part question

I would like for you to answer.

Do you agree or disagree that the Castro regime exerts absolute

control over its territory and activities inside its territory?

Do you believe that senior Cuban military officials, as was alleged by the Castro regime with the General Ochoa case and the

de la Guardia brothers could actually be involved in

narcotrafficking, yet be acting independently, and without the

knowledge of the regime?

Do you believe that senior regime officials could be involved in

the drug trade, as was reported in the rumor concerning former

Cuban Foreign Minister Robaina without Fidel or Raul Castro’s

knowledge?

Also, given the attack on the Brothers to the Rescue, international flights of humanitarian nature in 1996, the shootdown by

the Castro Air Force, do you believe that Cuban air space can be

used by narcotraffickers without the knowledge and the consent of

the Castro regime?

Given the attack on the tug boat by the Cuban Coast Guard and

the arrest of the Cubans who were trying to flee the island in

makeshift vessels, do you believe that narcotraffickers can use

Cuban territorial waters without the knowledge and the complicity

of the regime?

Finally, given the intelligence resources of the Castro regime

which enabled, as you know, a spy operation to be penetrating a

U.S. military installation, an espionage network which was classified by our FBI as sophisticated and efficient, do you believe that

the regime is unaware of the trafficking that is using its own territory?

Mr. ROMERO. Let me just say that for a long, long time, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, and growing up in Miami, I have often

thought about your question, even before I entered government,

about how absolute the control is of the Castro regime over every

facet of life in, over, and around Cuba. I have to say that while we

can sit here and others can debate Marxism and Leninism and all

the rest of it, that really what we are talking about when it comes

to Cuba is Castro’s control over his people. There is very little that
19

resembles a Marxist/Leninist paradise in Cuba except for Fidel

Castro’s authoritarianism, but there is very little that resembles it

on the economic side and that sort of thing when you look at how

Fidel Castro has tried to accommodate his loss of benefactors from

the Soviet Union and elsewhere to what has become part of the

Cuban economy.

That having been said, I think it would be a stretch to say that

the Castro regime knows everything that happens in Cuba or every

vessel that passes around or inside or skirts its territorial waters

or perhaps even flies over its country or skirts the country. We are

looking at the latest target of opportunity, if you will, and that is

the 7.2 metric ton shipment that was shipped from Cartegena, Colombia, to Cuba or through Cuba. We don’t know the answer to

that yet to determine whether there was any high-level Cuban involvement in that, and we will adjust our policies and our strategies accordingly, depending on the outcome of that assessment.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Romero, just related to that seizure,

where does most of the cocaine that is coming to the U.S. transit

through? Isn’t it through Mexico? Mr. Mica just had a Subcommittee hearing yesterday where Mr. McCaffrey testified about

the trade going through Mexico. Isn’t it true that, as to the December 1998 seizure of those tons of cocaine Colombia cosigned to

Cuba, that there is a possible Mexico link?

Mr. ROMERO. Well, there is no doubt that there is a major trafficking route that starts in southern Colombia and works its way

up the Central American isthmus into Mexico and then subsequently into the United States. There is no question about that.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Are you questioning the Mexican officials

about the Cuba link, the Colombia, the three transit points? What

information can you share with us about these discussions about

the Cuba-Mexico-U.S.-Columbia links?

Mr. ROMERO. I think that in this particular case of this shipment, and that is really pretty much what we are keying off of

right now, we are looking at a shipment that went from Colombia

to Cuba. We are continuing to engage the Colombian people or,

pardon me, the Colombian Government, particularly law enforcement authorities, in an effort to determine what they knew and

what they know about this particular shipment, and to do all that

we possibly can to help the Colombians investigate this in Colombia.

Obviously, we will be using all sources of information. I can’t

characterize how the intelligence community is conducting its investigation, since I have neither the results of that investigation or

a recent readout as to where it is even going, but we are expecting

a report. I expect one on my desk within the next couple of weeks

in terms of this particular shipment, and we will adjust our policies

accordingly.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Castro knows everything that is going on down

there. They have got a block cap system set up, and they have got

informants on every block to watch out. So when you say it is a
20

stretch for him, knowing everything that is going on in Cuba, that

is not a stretch, and you know that.

As far as those containers, the drugs were not sent to Cuba, the

7.2 tons. One of the containers was earmarked for Mexico. It had

it on the container. So we have a pretty good idea that those drugs

weren’t going to Spain. They were going to a company in Mexico,

and then going to be shipped up further to the United States of

America, but that is not the issue I want to start with.

The issue I want to start with are these property claims. There

are still 1,000 U.S. citizens who are being denied what is rightfully

theirs, their property, in Nicaragua. The Supreme Court has ruled

twice in favor of several of the claimants, and even though the Supreme Court has made their decision, nothing has been resolved.

We granted a fifth waiver, and I know the hurricane is a tragedy

down there, but we granted them a fifth waiver and they still

aren’t making restitution on a lot of these claims that are very important, and I just hope that the State Department will take a

close look at that because I think it is very important. A lot of

these people have come to the United States and are suffering.

Some aren’t but some are, and those claims need to be resolved.

Now, I want to talk to you about an issue that I feel very strongly about. You appeared before one of my Subcommittees and you

were asked questions about whether or not the State Department

was negotiating with the FARC guerrillas last December. I asked

you four times, and I have got a list of the questions I asked you.

In fact, I will read them to you real quick.

‘‘did you talk about alternative developmental aid?

‘‘Ambassador ROMERO. This was a component of the conversation

that the Government of Colombia wanted us to talk to them about,

that the government could in no way enter into an agreement that

would impede those counternarcotic operations or suffer loss of

USAID, and the Government of Colombia wanted us to tell them

and we did.

‘‘so you didn’t talk about alternative development aid, though?

‘‘not to my knowledge, no; but our line on alternative development is that it cannot go to guerrillas in the absence of significant

movements toward a peace agreement.’’.

This is me again. ‘‘and there was no alternative development aid

discussed?

‘‘not to my knowledge, no.’’.

So on four separate questions you said that you didn’t discuss developmental assistance. Do you stick to that statement?

Mr. ROMERO. I think if you went back, Mr. Chairman, and you

looked at the record, you get a very clear sense for the fact that

I began that statement by saying I don’t have the memorandum of

conversation in front of me, and I am at a loss to characterize it.

I would like to say that I don’t have the memorandum of conversation in front of me right now, and I am not going to characterize

it.

But let me just add something here, Mr. Chairman, if I might.

As soon as I left for my office, I went back, I started a process to

declassify the memorandum of conversation so that you could get

access to it as soon as possible so that you could see for yourself

the record on this thing. You are taking a piece of what was dis-
21

cussed and essentially making it appear that, that was the central

part of the conversation that I had or, pardon me, that my folks

had——

Mr. BURTON. Let me just interrupt here, because, Mr. Romero,

lying to the Congress of the United States is something that is not

going to be tolerated. I am about to move to hold you in contempt

of Congress because you answered four separate questions, and I

have three secret memos before me that I can’t go into, and you

know that, it took us five months to get them from you and from

the State Department. If you are not going to tell us the truth now,

I will move in our Committee to hold you in contempt of Congress.

Now, did you talk to the FARC guerrillas about developmental

assistance or did any of your contemporaries do that?

Mr. ROMERO. I believe that they talked about alternative development in the context of a much larger discussion related to the

welfare and whereabouts of American citizens who have been missing in Colombia for over three years and the necessity of the accountability of those Americans before we would be able to have

further conversations.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Romero, I said to you clearly, ‘‘and there was

no alternative development aid discussed,’’ and you said not to my

knowledge, no. Now, is that a correct statement? Did you know

about developmental assistance being discussed?

Mr. ROMERO. I did not recall alternative development.

Mr. BURTON. I have three separate memos, two from you; one to

the Secretary of State from you, talking about developmental assistance; one from you to the Secretary; one from Romero to Pickering; and one from Chicola to Romero. You don’t remember; is

that what you are saying?

Mr. GALLEGLY. Pardon me, Mr. Burton. The text of the issue that

you are discussing, you can’t go into detail.

Mr. BURTON. I am not going into detail.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I understand that, and I think in fairness to the

Committee, since you can’t go into detail regarding that, you have

pretty well gone on record as it relates to—you both seem to know

what each other is talking about. It might be more appropriate to

meet one on one, since we can’t make it——

Mr. BURTON. Well, let me just finish, Mr. Chairman, and I will

wind up. If we don’t get a straight statement from Mr. Romero, I

will go back to the Government Reform Committee, and we will

hold a Committee hearing, and I will move to hold you in contempt

of Congress.

Now, all I want you to say today is that you knew about the negotiations with the FARC guerrillas on developmental assistance.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, a point of inquiry.

Mr. BURTON. Did you know? Let me finish with my time.

Mr. MENENDEZ. I am asking a point of inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Is it appropriate for Members of this Committee to threaten the

witnesses without the Committee having any basis of substantiation for which such threats would be made? I mean, I have a

great deal of respect for the distinguished gentleman, but it is impossible for me because in essence what he is doing to the Secretary is impugning his credibility, not only on that issue but on

everything he has testified, because if he lied once, ostensibly then
22

he would lie again. It is impossible for me to sit here in the Minority and expect that in fact we could have such accusations made

without a substantiation to the rest of the Committee for the Committee to understand the validity of whether or not his charges are

warranted.

Mr. BURTON. He interrupted. Let me finish, Mr. Chairman,

please.

Mr. GALLEGLY. First of all, let me respond to the inquiry. As the

Chairman of your respective Committee, you have the right to say

what you are going to do in your Committee. However, I do think

it is difficult for us to participate in this dialogue here when we

don’t have the actual document to which you are referring.

Mr. BURTON. I am not asking anybody on the Committee to do

anything. Mr. Chairman, I am not asking anybody on the Committee to do anything, and if you want to see the documents we

have them here. They are Top Secret. I will be glad to share them

with anybody. But what I am trying to do today is to get Mr. Romero to give us a straight answer about this issue because it bears

upon our foreign policy. That is all I am asking for, and I will ask

him one more time. Did you discuss developmental assistance with

the FARC guerrillas?

Mr. ROMERO. I did not.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The time of the gentleman has expired, and the

Secretary has on the record answered the question.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Ballenger.

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got a couple

of real quick questions I would like to try out on helicopters, which

I have been involved in for about two or three years. First of all,

Mexico returned 50 of their old Hueys to this country. Is there a

possibility that those old Hueys can be used to be upgraded into

Huey IIs? I don’t know who owns them. Does Mexico still own them

or do we own them, or what?

Mr. ROMERO. I think they are part of a fleet of over 100 or so

helicopters that through the years have been shipped down to Mexico. The Mexican Government has had a hard time with finding the

expertise and spare parts, et cetera, to maintain those in an appropriate fashion in terms of readiness, and I think that what we have

attempted to do is to try to use the spares from some of those that

are really not in terrific shape, to cannibalize them to use with others in order to get a greater number of these up and running.

Mr. BALLENGER. What I am wondering is, you know, to upgrade

into a Super-Huey or a Huey II, you have got to have an old Huey

to start with, and there are 50 of them that they sent back. If we

cannibalize 50 and produce 10 old Hueys, that is all you have got,

you have got 10 old Hueys. But is there not a possibility those 50

can be used and upgraded quickly because of their ability, since

they exist, to get them back to Colombia?

Mr. ROMERO. I think that in terms of lift, there have been a

number of Blackhawk helicopters, both purchased by the Colombian Government and——

Mr. BALLENGER. Really I am talking about the 50 Hueys.

Mr. ROMERO. Right. But what I am saying, Congressman

Ballenger, is that there are a number of helicopters that have been

delivered over the last couple of months, more that will be deliv-
23

ered, including 18 UH1Ns that we are purchasing from the Canadian law enforcement or Canadian military. I can’t assess, Congressman Ballenger, whether the ones that the Mexican Government, the helicopters that the Mexican Government will not be

able to fly, whether they will be applicable or even usable in a Colombia context.

Mr. BALLENGER. Well, could I ask you to look it up and see if it

is possible?

Mr. ROMERO. Sure.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me ask you another question. The delivery

system for the helicopters that are being rebuilt in Alabama or

Mississippi, one of those places, I forget which one, is based on the

fact that you can’t ship any until you get six. Then you take all of

them apart and put them on a big plane and fly them to Colombia

and take them back out of the thing and put them all back together again. As it occurred the last time, one of them didn’t get

quite put back together properly. Is there no way to fly those

things down there?

Mr. ROMERO. I can’t answer that, Congressman Ballenger. I do

know that we have gotten a lot of experience shipping these aircraft and even more experience shipping them to Colombia, but I

just don’t know the mechanics behind it.

Mr. BALLENGER. A couple of things, Mr. Chairman, I have got a

request here from Chairman Gilman. In last week’s Washington

Post, Chairman Gilman laid out a plan of action for Colombia that

is worthy of both the Administration as well as the Pastrana Administration, and I ask unanimous consent for that to be included

in the record of these proceedings if that is proper.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BALLENGER. Now, having been down to Venezuela and having met with Mr. Chavez and knowing the overflight situation,

have we found out anything? Where do we stand on the overflight

situation?

Mr. ROMERO. As you and perhaps other Members of the Committee will recall, a couple of months ago President Chavez, in response to a press statement or press question, responded that he

is in charge of essentially who and where and how—he, Chavez,

who and where and how other governments fly over Venezuela in

terms of their own aircraft.

We have been working with the Venezuelan Government over

the last couple of months to try to put together what we consider

and they consider obviously a good formula for overcoming the

issue related to sovereignty. We have offered a number of formulas,

and there has been some progress, particularly as it relates to

issues of hot pursuit. In other words, when our aircraft are chasing

aircraft, narcoaircraft, and they happen to duck into Venezuelan

air space, what have you, there has been a workable agreement

that has been established in that case. In terms of just normal

transit, we haven’t gotten there yet, and we are still continuing to

work with the Venezuelan Government and hope that we can get

there very soon, but it is a high priority.

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
24

Mr. GALLEGLY. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, one

last comment on Colombia so I can move on. For myself, as one of

those people who is generally supportive of assisting Colombia—

and we have heard anywhere between 500 million to $1.5 billion—

I think some of us are going to have to see some form of benchmarks established beyond those which you describe, particularly if

any of our aid is used in pursuit in the negotiations with La Guerrilla toward accomplishing some of those negotiated goals, assuming that any of them can actually be negotiated successfully.

So some of us are going to have see that, or we may be very well

withdrawing our support, and I just want to commend it to your

attention.

Let me turn to Cuba, and I want to echo one comment by Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. It is impossible to believe, even though

I see all of the statements, both in your statement and the Administration, about we are not normalizing relationships and we are in

fact committed to our policy.

I believe that consistently we undermine that policy in a variety

of ways, and when I hear that in fact we are not willing to make

a very clear and transparent statement that when Castro can

clearly shoot down U.S. civilian planes in international air space,

when he can sink a civilian tug boat who is simply looking to leave

its coastline in search of freedom, when he can in fact have some

of the most sophisticated spying facilities that both the Russians

and now the Chinese are seeking to use for U.S. commercial as well

as military intelligence, it is impossible for some of us to accept

that the overflights over his air space can be accepted as something

that just happens and he can do nothing about it. He must have

unique technology that can zero in on U.S. civilian aircraft but that

can consistently let overflight take place from what is clearly narcotics trafficking.

What I would like to ask you, and if you could give me a yes or

no because my time is limited: Do we have as a government any

independent verification system when the Cuban Government actually has a seizure? Do we have any independent verification of

what they do in terms of disposing of that seizure?

Mr. ROMERO. I am sorry, Congressman Menendez, I don’t know

that. I would assume that the intelligence community has sources

and methods that would be directed toward confirming or not

Cuban Government seizures, but I just don’t know.

Mr. MENENDEZ. This is part of our problem. Everybody who I

have asked who has appeared before the Committee one way or another, who has had relationship to this issue, cannot tell the Committee that in fact there is an independent way in which to verify

seizures. Therefore, we wonder what happens to the substances

once they are seized.

Second, can you tell me the working group that meets in terms

of Cuba and that particularly pursues Title II of Helms-Burton

with reference to our efforts to develop civil society and promote

human rights and assist dissidents inside of Cuba? I sense, as the

author of that provision, I sense that there is a continuing movement by the working group to fund exchanges, and the problem
25

with that is everything I have seen of these exchanges to date are

no more than junkets. They have very little itinerary.

They have, to a large degree, no real communication at the level

of those in civil society that we seek to create, as we did in Poland

with Solidarity, as we did with Vaclav Havel in his country. Is this

the focus now of the State Department, to use all of these Title II

moneys for these type of exchanges?

Finally, so that you can answer this question for Mr. Ackerman

who asked me to ask it on his behalf, in the context of Bolivia, with

all this talk about assisting Colombia, there is a concern that Mr.

Ackerman has. Do you think Bolivia will meet its goal of being coca

free by 2002, and will the additional assistance that we intend to

provide to Colombia have an impact on the assistance levels we are

able to provide to Bolivia?

Those are Mr. Ackerman’s questions he asked me as the Ranking

Democrat to ask you.

Mr. ROMERO. Congressman Menendez, what I would like to do is

take the Bolivia question first, and that is, I think that Bolivia has

been an enormous success story when it comes to counternarcotics

and just generally good stewardship of their economy and investment strategies. Over the last couple of years, there has been huge

foreign investment in gas pipelines in Bolivia. There is a general

sense that the Banzer Government wants to make Bolivia kind of

the center of energy in the southern cone of South America, and

they are off to a very, very good start. Obviously, there are things

that need to be done.

In the context of all of that, what President Banzer and Vice

President Quiroga have done is to put together a strategy that has

been really bought and accepted by the Bolivian people, and that

is not to eradicate coca or to interdict or move against

narcotraffickers or cultivaters because of foreign pressure, but because Bolivians want to get out from under the reputation of being

considered coca producers. They have come up with the plan for national dignity, and not only has the government been able to vigorously move out in terms of eradication and interdiction and score

some magnificent successes over the last couple or two years, but

more importantly, they have been able to bring in the Bolivian people in terms of getting a buy-in and getting the Bolivian people as

stakeholders, that they want more for their country than to be considered or to have been considered the coca capital of the world.

They are on track. I just met with the Bolivian Foreign Minister

yesterday, and he really did impress me with not only their determination but their track record in terms of even being early on

eradication.

Your question is a good one with respect to how any kind of Colombia supplemental would impact on Bolivia. Certainly any component that you would request for Colombia would have to have a

component for its neighbors, even if it were small and over an extended period of time. That would have to include not only Venezuela and Ecuador, who border along or who are on borders that

are pretty delicate and fragile, but also places like Bolivia. There

would have to be consideration, better consideration, more consideration given to Bolivia, largely because you don’t want the spill-
26

over to then just go south again and repeat the problems that we

faced in the eighties in Bolivia.

In terms of Cuba, your question, Congressman Menendez, related

to?

Mr. MENENDEZ. The working group and this predisposition now

to fund, instead of civil society efforts, independent journalists,

independent economists, human rights activists, to now fund exchanges where we are actually going to pay for junkets for people

to go down with very little of an itinerary, no feedback of any consequence, and not meeting the people who Title II is intended to

do.

Mr. ROMERO. As you know, Congressman Menendez, this has become part of our people-to-people measures that began after the

Pope’s visit in Cuba and to which we have announced additional

measures in January 1999. In terms of the actual exchanges, my

understanding of the process is that there needs to be a request

made, that request goes to the Department of Treasury.

In many cases, if not most cases, it is reviewed by our folks on

the Cuba desk in my bureau, and one of the tests of all of that is

that they need to show that, if this is a U.S. group or organization

going down to Cuba, that they are meeting with counterparts and

that this is a principal part of their visit down there.

Mr. MENENDEZ. You have got my question wrong, and I just,

with the indulgence of the Chairman, just to finish on this point.

I am talking about funding that we are providing under Title II,

AID’s Cuba Project, where as part of the inter—whatever you call

it.

Mr. ROMERO. The people-to-people?

Mr. MENENDEZ. No, no. The State Department, NSC, Treasury,

the interworking group, Interagency Working Group, there now is

a focus, as I understand, because I follow this very carefully, of

using those Title II moneys that the Congress specifically set aside,

about $2 to $3 million for the purposes of trying to promote civil

society inside of Cuba—independent journalists, independent

economists, political dissidents, human rights activists—and instead, of using that funding, official funding of the United States,

for exchanges.

Now, exchanges that others want to do with their own money

through their own organizations is one thing, but to use the money

of the U.S. Government for these purposes is clearly beyond every

intention that the Congress had both in the law and in the Committee report language, and certainly the intention of this author,

who authored it.

So I want to commend to you that we will raise holy hell about

it because that is not why we provide funds, to send people on junkets to Cuba that have no civil society connection whatsoever.

Mr. ROMERO. Point taken, Congressman Menendez, and I will

look into that. I am a little at a loss for words here in terms of

these exchanges because I don’t think we have even begun to look

at this kind of exchange yet, as far as I know, but I will keep your

words in mind.

Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. That word ‘‘yet’’ is worrisome.
27

Mr. Secretary, to followup on two issues that you discussed in

your statement: Nicaragua property claims resolutions and true

electoral reforms in the upcoming elections in Haiti.

For those of us in south Florida, as you know, those are not

international concerns but very real domestic issues. I think we

have moved beyond some of the more simple cases, and now we are

doing the more difficult resolution of those property cases. There

are many cases that have been supposedly resolved through the

court system, yet the property owners, the American property owners have not been properly compensated.

What action would you be taking to make sure that those claims

are respected and honored and that the resolution is actually more

than the check is in the mail, that these owners will be compensated?

On the second part, on the electoral reforms, we have many

American lives that have been dedicated to the reform of Haiti’s

Government and a lot of manpower went in there, a lot of U.S.

funds. We have a lot invested in Haiti, and it is of ongoing concern

to us that with those elections around the corner, they actually be

honored and internationally supervised and true reforms take

place.

How optimistic are you that with the substantial U.S. investment

that we have already made in Haiti that something real will come

out of these elections?

Mr. ROMERO. Thank you, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. If I

might just take a step backwards and look at the Nicaraguan property claims issue somewhat in the aggregate, that is, that over the

last two years where we have issued waivers for the Government

of Nicaragua, they have resolved over 900 U.S. citizen claims. The

pace of claims resolution has accelerated under the Aleman Government. As of August 1999, last month, there were 894 pending

claims as registered by our Embassy Managua data base, and of

these, only 276 were filed by claimants who were American citizens

at the time their property was confiscated.

I mention that largely because the universe—I was around back

when this all started and property claims were being registered—

and the universe of those claimants who are registering now as

American citizens has expanded and mushroomed over the years.

We do think that the Government of Nicaragua is not only doing

its job but an even better job in accelerating the pace of these adjudications over the last couple of years.

I can’t think of a meeting that I have been in or have had others

prepare for where the issue of Nicaraguan or U.S. property claims

has not been a central focus and feature of those discussions. We

continue to press the Nicaraguan Government. We will continue to

do that, and we will continue to push for even more acceleration

in the adjudication process.

In terms of Haiti, of course you know very well that the elections

in, I believe it was March 1997, were disrupted; some of the outcomes unclear, particularly on some of those Senate seats. We believe it is very important for the renewal of democracy in Haiti that

they hold elections as soon as possible, and we are also very, very

mindful over the fact that you need adequate preparations for elections. We have sponsored various NGO’s through our aid programs
28

down there that have worked on elections and elections preparation

and all of the other kinds of things that go into them, and we are

hoping to see elections the first part of this coming year because

we believe they can be held in a peaceful environment and be held

with a certain degree of integrity to that process.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. BALLENGER. [Presiding.]—Mr. Burton, I hope you can keep

it cool. Pardon me, I am sorry.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This information I have

received indicates that the property settlements in Nicaragua have

been, the properties—granted. It is a substantial number, but as

far as monetary settlements, it is very small compared to the outstanding settlements that are still waiting to be settled. So, you

know, it is kind of misleading when you say, well, they have settled

almost 1,000, there are only 800-and-some left. The major ones are

the ones that are left.

Let me get to the issues at hand. We talked to Jack Leonard and

Phil Chicola, and those two diplomats told us that so-called alternative development aid was discussed in December with the rebel

leaders. When I talked to you before our Committee, you insisted

that these were meetings and not negotiations. Now, when I read

the documents that were finally delivered to me after five months,

it was clear that there were memos to you and from you that clearly indicate these were negotiating sessions. It is very clear, and

when I talked to you before our Committee, I was talking about—

and I can get the entire transcript, if you like—I was talking to you

about the State Department’s discussions, the people who were

down there from the State Department discussing alternative developmental aid.

You said when I asked you the question, ‘‘So you didn’t talk

about alternative developmental aid, though,’’ meaning the State

Department people who were down there, you said, ‘‘Not to my

knowledge, no.’’.

Then I went on to say, ‘‘And there was no alternative development aid discussed,’’ and you said, ‘‘Not to my knowledge, no.’’.

The memos that we have before us indicate that you did know,

you did know that alternative development aid was being discussed. Now, this is very, very important because we are talking

about a narcoguerrilla group that occupies an area about the size

of Indiana as a demilitarized zone, that is killing people all over

the place down there, and they are terrorists, they are known terrorists. We acknowledge they are terrorists, and we are not supposed to negotiate with terrorists. What I was trying to find out at

our hearing and am still trying to find out is, were we negotiating

with them?

Now, if we were talking about developmental assistance, and if

you read these memos, and I can’t make them public, but if you

read these memos, it is clear we were talking about if you do this,

we will do this. There were negotiations taking place.

So I want to ask you one more time. To your knowledge, was developmental aid discussed in those meetings?

Mr. ROMERO. After review of the memorandum of conversation,

I can say to you now that the issue of alternative development was
29

discussed. It was not in any way negotiated. It was discussed in

the context of many other issues.

Mr. BURTON. And did you know that before you appeared before

my Committee?

Mr. ROMERO. I did not recall it. As I mentioned to you at that

time, and as you, Mr. Chairman, have just reiterated, I said ‘‘not

to my knowledge.’’ I did not recall every facet of that conversation.

Mr. BURTON. Developmental assistance is a pretty important

thing when you are talking to these FARC guerrillas, and the

memos were prior to our hearing, some of them. So it is kind of

disappointing that you just failed to remember. That is what you

are saying.

Mr. ROMERO. I don’t think we are talking about developmental

assistance as much as alternative development which is a little bit

different. Those memos that you have before you are internal deliberations, none of which were part of what was actually discussed

with the guerrillas.

The memorandum of conversation which I declassified and which

was sent to your office now several weeks ago is, I believe, an accurate rendering of the exact language of what was used, and there

is no way that I can see that anyone reading that language in that

memorandum of conversation, Mr. Chairman, can construe the exchange as in any way a negotiation. Since that memo has been declassified, I think anyone here would be available to have you read

the passage to us.

Mr. BURTON. Oh, I will be happy to, if you would like. Sure. We

have three separate memos if you like.

Mr. ROMERO. I am talking about the memorandum of conversation from the one meeting that was held.

Mr. BURTON. You don’t want me to read these then?

Mr. ROMERO. There is an unclassified—we declassified the document. You have had it for several weeks, and if you would like to

make reference to what you consider to be a negotiation on alternative development, I would like to see what the language is that

disturbs you.

Mr. BURTON. I will be happy to show it to you, but the fact of

the matter is, the things you declassify don’t shed light on this as

much as the classified documents, and you know I can’t go into

those.

Mr. ROMERO. But the memorandum of conversation, Mr. Chairman, that you have in your hand is an accurate rendering of what

transpired between two State Department representatives and a

FARC member in the context of a much wider conversation over

American citizens. Now, you can read the unclassified version of

what was actually said, and if you have problems with some of the

language that was used by our people, I would be happy to entertain what problem you had.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Would my friend yield? And I would simply ask,

Why don’t you include the declassified memo into the record so we

can all read it?

Mr. BURTON. I will do that, and I will be happy to read it, but

the classified version is also very important because it goes into

more detail, and I think it makes the case that I am making, and

I will read it.
30

It says, ‘‘Participants also revisited’’—revisited—‘‘the issue of

agrarian reform and alternative development. Reinforcing the

FARC’s basic position, Hernandez explained that in the past GOC

infrastructure, development had followed the cash crops.’’ .

So they did discuss alternative development, and they went into

more detail in the classified versions which I can’t go into.

Mr. MENENDEZ. But that was the FARC speaking. Would the

gentleman yield? I know your time has expired, but since the Chair

is being gracious, that is the FARC speaking that you just read.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman is very—he can come down and

read the classified version. You are cleared for Secret. I will let you

read them. Both sides were discussing it, not just the FARC.

Mr. MENENDEZ. But what you just read was the FARC, was it

not?

Mr. BURTON. That was the unclassified version. They declassified

that because they knew it didn’t cause them any heartbreak.

Mr. ROMERO. If I might clarify this, what you have before you,

Mr. Chairman, is the totality of what was discussed with the

FARC.

Mr. BURTON. On both sides.

Mr. ROMERO. As best we rendered it immediately after when that

memorandum of conversation was written, and all of that has been

declassified. So there wasn’t anything else that occurred other than

what is in that one piece of paper.

Mr. BURTON. Let me finish. Mr. Romero, I am not going to belabor this point. I just want you to know when you appear before

my Committee, I don’t want you hedging in the future. If I subpoena you to come before our Committee, as a Member of the Congress and Chairman of one of our Committees, I want you to be

very clear and very forthright, and what you did before our Committee I think is very clear, and I hope that never happens again.

Thank you.

Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I very much regret not being able to recall that this was a component of that conversation, but I hope that you have an accurate rendering now of

what was said by both sides in that conversation.

Mr. BALLENGER. If I may, just a couple of quick ones before we

adjourn, unless you have another. Earlier this year, the former Andean desk officer, David Passage, testified that Section 660 of the

Foreign Assistance Act prohibited the U.S. from providing training

for police forces. Does our U.S. Government have the authority now

to train and support the Panamanian National Police for

counterinsurgency and counternarcotics activity on the border with

Colombia?

Mr. ROMERO. I don’t know of any provision, Mr. Chairman, that

would prevent us from working with police along the whole facet

of law enforcement issues. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, my sincerest hope through this consultation with the Panamanian Foreign Minister would be to develop a much closer, more cohesive relationship between our law enforcement and their law enforcement

over the years ahead as well.

Mr. BALLENGER. Does that include military assistance as well?

Mr. ROMERO. There is no military in Panama. Certainly, if they

needed certain kinds of equipment, we could look into that, yes, sir.
31

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me ask you, in 1997 Nicaragua witnessed

a protest by farmers over property titles and debts. Later that

same year, the FSLN and the Aleman Administration reached a

compromise on the issue of disputed properties that culminated in

Nicaraguan Property Law Number 278. Under the provisions of

this law, were settlements of U.S. property claims made more complicated and would the settlement of U.S. property claims, would

they provoke further strife according to this regulation?

Mr. ROMERO. The property law, Property Law 278, has made it

more complicated to settle some of the U.S. citizen claims. The law

was intended to make it easier for the government to take property

away from occupants and hopefully return it to the original claimants who are not paying taxes or who were otherwise in violation

of the agreement by which they came to occupy that particular

property. However, it contains clauses which grant certain legal

protections to occupants who hold a national agrarian reform title.

It also reduces the documentary requirements to prove that one

holds such a title, which in some cases has made it more difficult

for legitimate claimants to win cases in court.

Mr. BALLENGER. If I may, we have heard that the government may have made a $1 million cash payment which no one is talking

much about, is that true, the Nicaraguan Government?

Mr. ROMERO. To whom?

Mr. BALLENGER. I guess to the Cernas.

Mr. ROMERO. To whom?

Mr. BALLENGER. Cernas.

Mr. ROMERO. A $40 million payment.

Mr. BALLENGER. No, 1 million.

Mr. ROMERO. I have heard that figure but I can’t verify it.

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me just ask one more thing. Since

Hutchison-Whampoa is a traded stock, is there any way—I mean,

if it was a United States listing and so forth, you would know who

the owners were and what percentage of the ownership and so

forth. Since it is Hong Kong, is there any way to know who actually

controls that operation?

Mr. ROMERO. Hutchison-Whampoa is a fairly well-known company worldwide, and their establishments are well-known to U.S.

Government, U.S. Embassy people. Our folks in our consulate in

Hong Kong have known Hutchison-Whampoa people for a long,

long time, and I think that their view and our view is that this is

straight business transaction and that there was a need that the

company had expressed for a presence in the area, the Panama

Canal, for container purposes, and this gave them a leg up in that

regard, and that when it comes to the actual or perceived threat

to the canal, that it doesn’t come from this particular commercial

venture.

As I said, we will have the intelligence community continue to

look very closely at this, but the treaty does call for a free navigation, free transit in the canal, but more importantly, even the neutrality of the canal is guaranteed.

Mr. BALLENGER. Again, I ask the question, since they are a traded company, is there any way to know if the Chinese Army, or

whatever you want to call it, actually owns control of that company?
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Mr. ROMERO. I am told from our embassy reporting, that is not

the case, but I would have to get back to you on that.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BALLENGER. Well, as far as I am concerned, we thank you—

whoops, here we go. Oh yeah, I would ask unanimous consent for

Mr. Wexler to submit a statement for the record, and without objection, so done. And again, thank you very much.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
(33)

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 21, 1999
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