Filed 5/19/15 In re E.P. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re E.P., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 H041576

 (Monterey County

 Super. Ct. No. J47380)

MONTEREY COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF SOCIAL AND EMPLOYMENT 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

H.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2013, the Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services 

(Department) filed a petition to bring E.P. (child) within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 

court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.1 Following a hearing, the court 

granted physical custody of child to his noncustodial father (father) and terminated its 

jurisdiction. H.P. (mother) appealed, contending that the court erred because substantial 

evidence did not support its finding that continued supervision was not necessary and that 

it erroneously denied her reunification services. We agreed with mother and remanded 

the matter to the juvenile court, directing it to hold a hearing to address the issues of 

continued supervision and reunification services.

 

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

Following remand, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on whether continued 

supervision was necessary. Ultimately, the court found supervision was unnecessary and 

reactivated its prior order terminating jurisdiction. In so doing, the court relied on a letter 

and documents filed by the Department, which included evaluations and progress reports 

documenting child’s care in Kansas, where father had previously lived. At the time of 

the hearing, father had moved to Florida. Mother has now appealed for the second time. 

She argues the juvenile court failed to comply with this court’s directions on remand, 

because it did not afford her a full hearing and it relied on outdated information when

making its decision. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree and affirm the order 

terminating jurisdiction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

The First Appeal

On June 26, 2014, this court filed its unpublished opinion in E.P., supra, 

H040334. In E.P., mother argued the juvenile court erred when it terminated jurisdiction 

and denied her reunification services, because there was no substantial evidence to 

support the court’s finding that continued supervision was not necessary. 

We reversed and remanded the matter back to the juvenile court, concluding the 

court’s determination that supervision was unnecessary was unsupported by substantial 

evidence. (E.P., supra, H040334.) We noted the record showed child had significant and 

untreated developmental issues. Although father had stated he planned to enroll child in

a child care program and had educated himself about child’s problems, there was no 

 

2 Our unpublished decision in mother’s prior appeal (Monterey County 

Department of Social and Employment Services v. E.P. et al. (June 26, 2014, H040334)

(E.P.)) contains a more detailed account of the facts and procedure of the underlying 

dependency case. Mother filed a request for judicial notice of both the record in that 

prior appeal and this court’s opinion, which we previously granted. Since our prior 

opinion summarizes the history of the case, we will not repeat those facts again here.
3

evidence that he had child formally evaluated, or if there was appropriate treatment in 

Wichita, Kansas, where father had recently moved. An evaluating psychologist and the 

social worker expressed no concerns about father, but their opinion was based only on 

seeing father and child together for approximately one hour. Additionally, the social 

worker’s conclusion that father’s husband could be a positive influence on child’s life 

was based on one phone call. 

We also concluded that the court’s failure to consider reunification services was 

based on its erroneous decision to terminate jurisdiction. 

Thereafter, we reversed and remanded the matter to the juvenile court, directing it 

to “hold a hearing addressing the issues of continued supervision and reunification 

services” and to “render a decision addressing those issues based on the facts as they 

exist[ed] at the time of the hearing.” (E.P., supra, H040334.)

Subsequent Proceedings

After we issued the opinion in the prior appeal, the Department filed a letter with 

the juvenile court on July 31, 2014. The social worker wrote that she had called father on 

July 8, 2014, and had informed him that she was seeking information about the services 

child had received while under his care. Father and child had recently relocated to 

Florida, and father believed child was doing well. Father was still waiting to get services 

provided in Florida due to the recent move.

The social worker spoke with a secretary at the school in Florida where child was 

enrolled, who confirmed that child was set to attend an autism class. The social worker 

left a message for child’s pediatrician but had not received a call back. However, the 

social worker was able to confirm that child was scheduled for a dental exam. 

The social worker contacted Caitlin Smith, who worked at Small Talk Pediatric 

Speech Therapy in Wichita, Kansas. Child had taken classes at the facility, and Smith 
4

expressed the opinion that father was “outstanding” with child, and that the two had a 

“wonderful” relationship. Smith said father was very loving with child.

Attached to the Department’s letter were various documents, test reports, and 

photographs that chronicled child’s life with father, which included the following: 

1. Audiology services evaluation dated January 9, 2014: The evaluation 

determined that child had hearing loss in his left ear. 

2. Speech therapy evaluation dated January 9, 2014: The assessor noted that child 

had a severe delay in speech and language development and social communication skills. 

The evaluation recommended that child receive speech and language therapy twice 

weekly to address these issues. 

3. Occupational therapy discharge note dated May 28, 2014: Child had received 

occupational therapy while living in Kansas. The occupational therapist noted that father 

worked well with child on home program suggestions and assisted child with being as 

independent as possible. Child was progressing, but additional occupational therapy was 

recommended for child’s fine motor, visual motor, self-help, and play skills.

4. Individualized education program dated December 16, 2013: Child’s prior 

school in Wichita, Kansas, had developed an individualized education program for child

to address his needs.

5. Psychological evaluation report: Child had been evaluated by a licensed 

psychologist. The psychologist interviewed child on January 20, 2014 and tested him in 

February 2014. Child was diagnosed with autism and global development delay. The 

psychologist recommended that father consider looking into early childhood programs at

schools close to their home in Wichita and that the school develop an individual 

education plan to customize a curriculum. Occupational and speech therapy were 

recommended. 
5

All of these attached reports were from programs and specialists in the Wichita, 

Kansas area, where father and child had lived before their move to Florida.

On August 5, 2014, the court held a setting hearing where it continued the matter 

and ordered briefs from the parties to be due on August 14, 2014. 

On August 14, 2014, mother filed a declaration regarding the appropriate 

procedure required for the juvenile court upon remand. On August 19, 2014, the court 

held a hearing but continued the matter to receive the remittitur from this court. On 

August 26, 2014, the court continued the hearing to October 14, 2014. 

On October 14, 2014, the date of the hearing, mother filed a document titled 

“Mother’s Position in Response to Remittitur” and a declaration in support of her 

position. Mother posited that the juvenile court currently had no information about who 

was living in father’s household and what responsibility the other household members 

may have regarding child’s care. For example, mother pointed out that there was no 

information about whether father still lived with his husband. Additionally, since 

jurisdiction was terminated father had no obligation to provide updates or information 

about how child was progressing in school. After the move to Florida, there had been no 

further updates about whether child’s medical and psychological needs were being met, 

or who was taking care of child when father was working or away. Mother also declared 

that father had limited her ability to see and talk to child over Skype. Mother asserted 

that father only provided her with cursory information about child’s well-being. 

The court held a hearing on October 14, 2014, during which it invited argument 

from the parties. The Department noted that it had filed a packet of papers, including the 

letter and the attached reports, in July of that year, and that the court had all the 

information it needed to render a decision on the matter. Mother asserted that her 

position was that this court had ordered the juvenile court to hold a hearing to address the 

issue of continued supervision and reunification services. 
6

Thereafter, the court asked mother’s counsel if she had anything further she 

wished to add, or if she would like to submit on the documents she had already provided. 

Mother’s attorney never expressly responded to the court’s query but did not object when 

the court asserted that it would “rule by the end of the day” based on the documents 

already submitted by the parties.

That same day, the court issued an order finding that continued supervision was

not necessary, terminating the dependency. The court never reached the issue of 

reunification services. Mother appealed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, mother argues the court failed to comply with this court’s directions on 

remand; therefore, its order terminating jurisdiction is void. In the alternative, she argues 

that substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that continued supervision 

was unnecessary. We reject mother’s arguments and affirm the juvenile court’s order.

1. Compliance with Remand

On remand, this court directed the juvenile court to conduct a hearing addressing 

the issues of continued supervision and reunification services based on the facts as they 

existed at the time of the hearing. Mother claims the juvenile court’s procedures failed to 

comply with this court’s directions, because she was not given an opportunity to be heard 

at the hearing held on October 14, 2014, and because the court’s decision was based on 

documentation filed by the Department that largely consisted of purportedly outdated 

reports prepared in January and February 2014. 

a. Applicable Law

“When there has been a decision upon appeal, the trial court is reinvested with 

jurisdiction of the cause, but only such jurisdiction as is defined by the terms of the 

remittitur. The trial court is empowered to act only in accordance with the direction of 

the reviewing court; action which does not conform to those directions is void.” 
7

(Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 655.) In other words, “[w]hen an 

appellate court’s reversal is accompanied by directions requiring specific proceedings on 

remand, those directions are binding on the trial court and must be followed. [Citations.] 

Where the directions to the trial court are ambiguous, they are interpreted in accordance 

with the views, reasoning, and holdings expressed in the opinion as a whole.” (In re 

Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1434-1435.)

b. The Remand

The parties dispute the nature of this court’s remand. First, mother argues that 

when this court directed the juvenile court to hold a hearing on the issue of continued 

supervision, we required the juvenile court to hold a full, evidentiary hearing. 

Furthermore, she claims that this court also directed the juvenile court to make its 

determination based on the facts that existed at the time of the hearing, which it failed to 

do since many of the Department’s submitted documents were several months old. 

We disagree with mother on both points. First, mother did not request an 

additional evidentiary hearing on the matter. During the October 2014 hearing, the court 

specifically asked mother’s attorney if she was willing to submit on the documents she 

had already filed and if she would like to make any additional comments. Mother’s 

counsel never responded to the court’s query, and did not make any objection when the 

court asserted it would rule on the matter by the end of the day based on the documents 

submitted by the parties.3

“ ‘[I]ssues not properly raised at trial will not be considered on appeal.’ ” (In re 

Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1, 15.) “A party forfeits the right to claim 

 

3 Mother claims the juvenile court did not give her an opportunity to respond. 

However, the record reflects that she did not object when the court informed the parties 

that it was going to rule on the matter based on the submitted documents. We are not 

persuaded by mother’s interpretation of the reporter’s transcript.
8

error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the 

trial court. [Citations.] Forfeiture, also referred to as ‘waiver,’ applies in juvenile 

dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until 

the conclusion of the proceedings.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-

222.) Had mother voiced an objection to the way the proceedings were unfolding, the 

juvenile court could have considered her arguments and decided whether to hold a further 

hearing on the matter at that time. Her failure to do so forfeits her argument on this point.

Second, there is nothing in section 361.2, subdivision (a) that specifically requires 

a juvenile court to conduct a full evidentiary hearing on the issue of continued 

supervision. “With respect to the conduct of [a] hearing, it has long been held that 

juvenile proceedings need not be ‘conducted with all the strict formality of a criminal 

proceeding.’ ” (In re Lesly G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 904, 914.) Although it did not 

hold a full evidentiary hearing where the parties put on witnesses, the court allowed the 

parties to submit documents and invited argument from counsel. Therefore, the juvenile 

court did comply with our directions on remand and did conduct a hearing on the 

necessity of continued supervision. 

Next, mother claims that the juvenile court failed to comply with our remand, 

because it did not conduct a hearing that considered the facts as they existed at the time

of the hearing. She insists that the juvenile court failed to consider the most recent facts 

related to child’s care, such as information about the services child was receiving in 

Florida. Therefore, she maintains that the court’s consideration of the Department’s letter 

submitted in late July 2014 was insufficient.

In essence, mother seems to believe that the court failed to comply with our

remand because it did not consider current facts at the hearing. We find this proposition 

strained. Mother herself provided updated information to the court, which she submitted 

by declaration on the date of the hearing. Her declaration outlined some of her concerns, 
9

including the lack of information about the services child may or may not be receiving in 

Florida. Through her declaration, she also informed the court about how father was 

purportedly limiting her visits over Skype with child.

Furthermore, the update letter provided by the Department, along with the 

attached reports, contained facts relevant to the issue of whether continued supervision 

was necessary. Although these items were several months old, they detailed the care 

child had received throughout the past year while he lived with father and provided the 

court with vital information about father’s ability to provide for child and obtain services 

to address child’s special needs.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court complied with our directions 

on remand. 

2. The Juvenile Court’s Order Terminating Jurisdiction

Mother alternatively claims the court’s finding that continued supervision is 

unnecessary is unsupported by substantial evidence. 

a. Applicable Law

Section 361.2, subdivision (a) requires the juvenile court to place a dependent 

child with a previously noncustodial parent who requests custody, unless placement with 

the noncustodial parent would be detrimental to the child’s safety, protection, or physical 

or emotional well-being.

If the child is placed with the noncustodial parent, section 361.2, subdivision (b) 

gives the juvenile court three options. It may (1) order that the previously noncustodial 

parent become the legal and physical custodian of the child and terminate its jurisdiction 

over the child; (2) order that the previously noncustodial parent assume custody subject 

to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and require that a home visit be conducted within 

three months; or (3) order that the previously noncustodial parent assume custody subject 

to the supervision of the juvenile court. (In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 
10

461; § 361.2, subd. (b).) The decision whether to terminate jurisdiction or continue 

supervision is committed to the juvenile court’s “very broad” discretion. (In re Sarah M.

(1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1486, 1496.) However, “before terminating its jurisdiction, the 

juvenile court must make a factual finding that supervision is no longer necessary.” (In

re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1134; In re Sarah M., supra, at p. 1496, 

disapproved on other grounds by In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 204.) 

b. Standard of Review

We review the decision to terminate dependency jurisdiction for an abuse of 

discretion. (In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1082; In re A.J. (2013) 214 

Cal.App.4th 525, 535, fn. 7.) When a decision is “committed to the sound discretion of 

the juvenile court, [its] ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of 

discretion is clearly established.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) To 

warrant reversal, the challenged determination must exceed the bounds of reason. (Id. at 

pp. 318-319.)

We review the court’s factual findings--including its underlying finding as to the 

need for continuing supervision--for substantial evidence. (In re A.J., supra, 214 

Cal.App.4th at p. 535, fn. 7; In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 [appellate 

court reviewed record for substantial evidence indicating whether there was a need for 

continuing supervision].) “Under the substantial evidence rule, we have no power to pass 

on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or determine 

where the weight of the evidence lies.” (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 

1135, disapproved on another point in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 

748, fn. 6; see also, e.g., In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1177.) “The 

appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial 

nature to support the finding or order.” (In re Diamond H., supra, at p. 1135.)
11

“The burden of proof on the issue of termination rests with the party seeking to 

terminate jurisdiction and the decision whether to terminate jurisdiction falls within the 

sound discretion of the juvenile court.” (In re Robert L. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 789, 

794.)

c. Termination of Jurisdiction

Mother argues the court erred in terminating jurisdiction, because there was no 

substantial evidence that showed continued supervision was unnecessary. Specifically, 

mother claims there was a dearth of evidence in the record concerning child’s welfare, 

such as the services, care, and education he was receiving in Florida. 

Mother notes there are gaps in the record. For example, there is nothing indicating

whether child is receiving treatment for his hearing loss, nor is there any record of a 

reevaluation following any treatment. There is also nothing indicating that child is 

continuing to receive occupational therapy in Florida. The social worker had confirmed 

with child’s school in Florida that his individualized education program had been 

addressed, but the only education program included in the record is the one prepared by 

the school in Kansas. There is no other documentation detailing the education program 

implemented by child’s school in Florida.

Additionally, mother raises valid concerns about the lack of information regarding

father’s husband, a concern this court shared in her prior appeal. The reports submitted 

by the Department and the Department’s letter make no mention of father’s husband. 

Accordingly, there is no information about whether he is still in child’s life, or if father is 

now taking care of child alone. 

Therefore, we agree that there is evidence that supports mother’s argument that 

continued supervision was necessary. However, there is sufficient evidence supporting

the juvenile court’s contrary conclusion that continued supervision was not necessary. 
12

Although there was nothing in the record that detailed the exact type of services 

father was receiving in Florida, the attached reports and documents submitted by the 

Department indicated that father had been taking good care of child since child had begun 

living with him. In Kansas, father brought child for evaluations at the occupational and 

speech therapist and was described by these therapists as loving and supportive. For 

example, the social worker talked with the speech therapist in Kansas who had observed 

the relationship between father and child, describing it as “wonderful.” 

The social worker also spoke with father himself. Father said that he and child 

were doing well, and they were waiting to receive services in Florida, because they had 

recently moved. Father also informed the social worker that he was arranging medical 

and dental appointments for child. The social worker was also able to confirm with the 

Florida school that child would be attending an autism class. Based on all of this 

information, the social worker opined that father had demonstrated his ability to meet 

child’s needs without court supervision and remained committed to providing child with 

the care he requires. 

“Under the substantial evidence standard of review, the appellate court does not 

reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or draw inferences contrary to 

the findings of the trial court.” (In re J.F. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 202, 209.) There is 

support for mother’s position, but our inquiry ends since we find substantial evidence 

supporting the juvenile court’s determination that supervision is no longer necessary. 

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. 

3. Reunification Services

Lastly, mother claims the juvenile court failed to consider the issue of 

reunification services during the hearing. 

Section 361.2, subdivision (b)(3), states that if the court orders that a previously 

noncustodial parent is to assume custody subject to supervision by the juvenile court, it 
13

may order reunification services be provided to one or both parents including the parent 

from whom the child is being removed. There is no requirement that reunification 

services be offered to a formerly custodial parent when the court terminates jurisdiction 

under section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1). (In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 

1455.) However, reunification services can be ordered if the court continues jurisdiction 

and orders a parent assume custody subject to the court’s supervision. (§ 361.2, subd.

(b)(3).)

Here, the court did not contemplate whether to offer mother reunification services, 

because it determined that continued supervision was not necessary and terminated 

jurisdiction. Since this finding was not an abuse of discretion, reunification services were 

not required and the court’s failure to address this issue was not error.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order reactivating its prior order terminating jurisdiction is 

affirmed. 
Premo, J.

WE CONCUR:

Rushing, P.J.

Elia, J.