"ft ,1,

• Ap t>n 

Ew 3) 8) 975

EMER GENC Y SUPPL EMENTAL APPRO PRIAT IONS FO.

ASS ISTA NCE TO THE REPUB LIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM

/ $ / / , ^ government

' Storage

GOVERNMENT

Storage FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975

MAY 19 1 9 7 5

BEFORE

SUBCOM MIT TEE S OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESE NTATIVE S

NINE TY -FO UR TH CONG RESS 

FIR ST SE SS IO N

Print ed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

EMER GENC Y SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR

ASS ISTA NCE TO THE REPUB LIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM

FOR FISCAL YEA R 1975

H E A R I N G S

BEFORE

SUB COM MIT TEE S OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATION S 

HOUSE OF REPRESE NTA TIVE S

NIN ETY-F OU RTH CONG RESS 

FIRST SESSION

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

51-260 O

U.S . GOVERNM ENT PRINTING OFFIC E

WASHING TON : 1975
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

GEORGE H.

JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi 

ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida 

OTTO E. PASSMAN, L ouisiana 

JOE L. EVINS, Tennessee 

EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts 

WILLIAM H. NATCHER, Kentucky 

DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania 

TOM STEED, Oklahoma 

GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, Illinois 

JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia 

JOHN J. FLYNT, Ja., Georgia 

NEAL SMITH, Iowa 

ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut 

JOSE PH P. ADDABBO, New York 

JOHN J. McFALL, California 

EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey 

CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland 

SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois 

BOB CASEY, Texas 

FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin 

EDWARD R. ROYBAL, California 

LOUIS STOKES, Ohio 

J. EDWARD ROUSH, Indiana 

GUNN MCKAY, U tah 

TOM BEVILL, Alabama 

BILL CHAPPELL, Florida 

BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri 

BILL ALEXANDER, Arkansas 

EDWARD I. KOCH, New York 

YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, 

California

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania 

BOB TRAXLER, Michigan 

ROBERT DUNCAN, Oregon 

JOSEPH D. EARLY, Massachusetts 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana

MAHON, Texas, Chairman

ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan 

ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois 

SILVIO O. CONTE, Massachusetts 

GARNER E. SHRIVER, Kansas 

JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania 

MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota 

BURT L. TALCOTT, California 

JACK EDWARDS, Alabama 

ROBERT C. MCEWEN, New York 

JOHN T. MYERS, Indi ana 

J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia 

CLARENCE E. MILLER, Ohio 

LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, Pennsylvania 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florid a 

JACK F. KEMP, New York 

WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado 

RALPH S. REGULA, Ohio 

CLAIR W. BURGENER, California

Keit h F. Mainland, Clerk and Sta ff Director

(II)
I l l

Gordon E. Casey

Nichola s G. Cavarocchi

George E. E vans

Robert B. F oster

J ohn M. Garrity

Aubrey A. Gunnels

Charles G. Hardin

F. Mich ael Hugo

Thomas J. King field

Robert L. Knisely

Edward E. Lombard

Richard N. Malow

Americo S. Mico ni

Staff Ass ist an ts

Dempse y B. Mize lle

F red Mohrman

E nid Morrison

P eter J. Murphy, J r. 

Henry A. Neil , Jr. 

Robert C. Nich ola s III 

Byron S. Nielson

J ohn G. Osth aus

F rederick F. P fluger

J ohn G. P lashal

E dwin F. P owers

Samuel R. P reston

Donald E. Richbou rg

E arl C. Silsby

G. Homer Skarin

C. Will iam Sm it h

Charles W. Snodgrass

H unter L. Spillan

Beverly Thi erwe ch ter

P aul E. Thomson

George A. Urian

Derek J. Vander Schaaf

Mich ael S. Weinberger

E ugene B. Wilh elm

J. David Willson

Surveys and I nvestigations

C. R. Anderson, Ch ief

David B. Sch mid t, Direc tor

Den ni s F. Creedon, F ir st A ss is ta n t

Marion S. Ramey, Se co nd A ss is ta n t

Note.— The Su rvey s an d In ves ti gat io ns su pe rv is or y staf f Is su pp le men ted by se lected per ­

sonn el bo rro wed on a re im bu rs ab le ba sis fo r va ry in g le ngt hs of tim e from var io us ag en cies 

to sU lf up spe cific studi es an d in ves tigat io ns. The curr ent av er ag e an nual fu ll- tim e pe rs onne l eq uiv al en t is ap pr ox im at el y 42.

Adm inistrativ e Support

Barbara L. Chambers Marcia L. Matts Chris ti ne Stockman

Gerard J. Chouinard F rances May Ann M. Stull

P aul V. F armer Geneviev e A. Mealy Betty Lou Taylor

Diann e F rum Lawrence C. Mill er Randolph Thomas

Sandra A. Gilbert Dale M. Shulaw Gemma M. Weib lin ger

P atricia A. Kemp Mich ael Slevin Toni Will iams

Anna L. Manning Austin G. Smith

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR

ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM

FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975

Monday, April 21,1975.

WITNESSES

HON. HEN RY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OP STATE

Robert McCloskey, as sis ta nt se cr et ar y for con gressional

RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PH ILI P C. HABIB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA AND

PACIFIC AFF AIRS, DEPARTME NT OF STATE

DANIEL PARKER, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATION AL

DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GENERAL FREDERICK C. WEYAN D, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNIT ED

STATES ARMY

ERICH VON MARBOD, PRINC IPAL DEPUTY ASSISTAN T SECRETARY

OF DEFEN SE (COMPTROLLER)

Mr. Mahon. The committee will come to order.

Last week we celebrated happenings at Concord in April 1775, the 

event which called forth the poet’s famous words,

“By the rude bridge that arched the flood,

Their flag to Ap ril’s breeze unfurled,

Here once the embattled farm ers stood 

And fired the shot heard round the world.”

Our forebearers probably did not realize the full significance of what 

they had done. Maybe we in the Congress and on the Appropriations 

Committee do not always realize the national and international implications of what we do.

I would now like to make a brief p reliminary statement here about 

this meeting.

As a result of the action of Congress last year there is now an u nfunded authorization for economic aid to South Vietnam in the sum 

of $170 million, and an unfunded authorization of military aid to 

South Vietnam in the sum of $300 million.

The House Committee on Appropriation s and the Congress itself 

has the responsibility of deciding what, if anything, to do about the 

funding of these authorizations.

The question of aid to South Vietnam is of course, and this is an 

understatement, highly controversial. Prior to the recent collapse of 

certain segments of the South Vietnam forces, I had discussed on many 

occasions with representatives of the Executive Branch the matter of 

additional aid to South Vietnam, realizing the difficulty o f securing 

additional aid.

(1)
2

In view of the prevailing sentiment in the Congress and in the country, I interpreted the consensus to be that it would be best to make 

the determination as to what further aid, if any, to provide South 

Vietnam in the fiscal 1976 app ropriation bill for defense and for foreign assistance.

Those bills for the coming fiscal year have not been finalized as yet. 

As a result of the dramatic recent developments in Vietnam, the prior 

determination needs to be reassessed.

It is obvious that the United States would not send combat troops 

back into Vietnam. That is certainly obvious and tha t massive military and economic aid over an unlimited period of time would not be 

provided by the Congress.

The question is, at this critical moment should the United States 

do anything at all to help the South Vietnamese and, if so, what?

The Un ited States has sought over a period of 25 years to help prevent a Communist military takeover of South Vietnam. We have been 

dedicated to the containment of communism, including Southeast 

Asia.

We are familiar with the costs in blood and money. The fall of South 

Vietnam seems almost inevitable and at an early date, of course. Russia and China are giving necessary military support to Hanoi. Shall 

we in the form of at least a gesture of concern now provide some additional aid, knowing of course tha t it might not be effective and that 

it might not even be delivered ?

With the Communist nations providing the North Vietnamese with 

ammunition, shall the United States in effect dictate a surrender of 

South Vietnam by not providing any additional ammunitioin at all ?

Such action would seem to mandate a surrender of Saigon under the 

most favorable circumstances possible.

General Weyand, we are pleased to have you and Mr. von Marbod 

here before us and others. We realize tha t your assignment to testify 

before this committee is a very difficult assignment, and we realize that 

there are many things you might want to say that ought to be off the 

record from the standpoint of security and welfare of the United 

States.

It would seem to me that the discussion of evacuation of our people, 

about 2500 of them in South Vietnam is probably not something that 

should be discussed in open session, but I hope th at most of the things 

tha t you have to say to us in response to our questions and otherwise 

can be on the record. If there are questions th at you feel should be 

responded to off the record, we can vote to close the meeting and have 

those questions asked at a later moment during this hearing today.

So I might say it has been obvious for some time that the Congress 

would not give massive additional assistance to South Vietnam and 

tha t the American people and the Congress are tired of the war in 

Vietnam and of the problems which have grown out of it.

We have had pending before the Appropriations Committee for 

many weeks a request for 300 million additional dollars already authorized for military assistance. It was thought, as I said earlier, that 

the best time to resolve the question of further aid to resolve the question of further aid to South Vietnam should come on the regular bill. 

But in view of the dramatic developments, of course we are confronted 

with a different situation.
3

I would like to say to members of the committee that I have today 

introduced a bill providing for an appropriation of $200 million in additional aid, military aid to South Vietnam, and providing an additional amount of authorized foreign assistance appropriation, economic assistance I should say, humanitarian assistance I should say, in 

the sum of $165 million. It is just a ten-line bill.

This gives the vehicle, if the Committee on A ppropriations and the 

Congress and if the leadership decides to make some move, it does give 

a vehicle upon wThich we could move.

I realize th at there are pros and cons and differences of opinion and 

very great problems involved here. But we felt Members should have 

an opportunity to hear you and the committee should have an opportunity, if it desires to do so, to provide additional aid.

Now, how would you like to proceed, General ?

General Weyand. Well, Mr. Chairman, I just might make a few 

comments and then take your questions. I think your statement outlined the situation very well.

I did go to Vietnam a t the end of last month, on the 28th of March, 

and returned from there on the 4th of April. Tha t has been almost 

three weeks ago.

I reported to the President upon my return tha t the military situation in that country was critical, tha t the Government of South V ietnam was on the brink of total military defeat; that, however, they 

did have the will and intention to resist and to continue to defend 

tha t vital area of South Vietnam tha t remained in their hands, tha t 

is, that they intended to do tha t to the limit that their resources would 

perm it; and tha t at that time they were, and still are, totally dependent upon support from the United States for their military equipment. I reported to the President that I believe that we owed them that 

support.

As you know, subsequently I did review the Government of South 

Vietnam’s plans for defense, I modified them to the extent tha t I 

thought they deserved that, reduced them, and recommended $722 

million in assistance. That was to assist to rebuild some of the units 

tha t they had recovered from the N orth and to upgrade the capability 

of th eir very light in fantry units tha t had been used to safeguard the 

people in the hamlets and the villages that is, their territorial forces.

Also, I think the record will show tha t that recommendation, or that 

which was based upon a capability of reconstituting those units was 

overtaken by events, something on the order of a week ago.

On the 11th of April I received a message from the Chairman of 

the South Vietnamese Jo int General Staff in which he said they were 

trying to stabilize the situation and as quickly as possible to reform 

the units coming from the 1st and 2nd Corps, which are their two 

regions to the north. He said, as of this moment, one division and two 

regiments are ready to fight. H e expects to have three by the end of 

the month. I t is a race against the clock since we know that the enemy 

will not give us any more time than he has to. Then he went on to 

describe some fairly violent attacks w’hich the enemy had launched 

just the day before.

Since that date, the North Vietnamese Army has indeed pressed its 

attack. As of this morning, our time, last night South Vietnamese
time, the enemy has some three corps of three to four division s each 

in assembly-areas, n or th an d west of Saigon , rang ing fro m a d istanc e 

of some 15 m iles awa y fro m th e ou tsk irts of t hat city. In one in stance 

they have some e lements as close as five to six miles fro m the city . So 

the s itu ati on f or the South V ietnamese, militarily, is indeed desperate.

When I reporte d to the Pr esiden t, I said th at I t ho ug ht there were 

at least three issues involve d. One was the questio n of wh eth er the y 

had the will to resist. I ha d conc luded th at the y did have th at will. 

The heav y fighting a ll thro ug h the year 1974 d em onstrate d th at to me 

when they were losing th ei r you ng men, killed a t some 600 a week a nd 

some 3,000 a week wounded, and they were holding t he ir own ag ain st 

very heavy enemy attack s then.

I th in k the more recent fig hti ng th at we hav e seen, as the y hav e 

att em pte d to res ist thi s onslaught, has also ill us tra ted and dem onstr ated th eir will to resist. More recently, coming to my att entio n, the 

fac t th at in Ma rch some 57,000 young South Vietnam ese volunteered 

for th eir arm ed forces and some 10,000 were c ons crip ted, tells me th at 

those young men ha d the w ill and the desire to resist.

The second issue w as : I s the re any hope for the m ? An d of course 

th at was difficult to ans wer because I think all of us, looking at th at 

military situation, ha d to say th at militaril y there was rea lly very 

lit tle hope, but I concluded th at t here was hope for a s ettlem ent someth in g oth er th an the y wou ld get from ou trig ht mili tary conquests, 

som ething in the way of a neg otiate d settleme nt if the South Vietnamese could, fo r any period of time, s tabilize th at m ili tary s itu ati on 

by blun tin g the att ack an d sto pp ing the momen tum of the No rth 

Vietnamese.

Ho pe is a very difficult th in g to define. I su ppose t hat you would say 

th at hope is when people fight on and die, even when the odds are 

ag ain st them , and the oth er day as I appeare d before one o f the committees of Congress, I th in k we all pr etty well agreed th at the situ ­

ation was hopeless, in our view, and y et, when I retur ne d to the Pen ta ­

gon I had two messages fro m South Vietnam ese ou t the re who said 

there is s till hope.

So from th eir stan dp oint there is hope a nd the re is hope for some sort 

of a solution sh ort of all-out su rre nd er and all th at th at entails, and 

I con tinu e to believe t hat we shou ld not take t hat hope away f rom them .

Fina lly , the last issue was, do the y need our mate ria l assistance? 

An d I do not hav e to go int o th at. I think here again we all agreed 

th at if the y were, if they ha d any chance of defen din g again st these 

attack s, th at i t would have t o be assistance from the Un ite d States.

Now, as of tod ay, I believe i t was at 8 :30 in the evening , S aigon time, 

and 8:30 this mo rning our time. Presiden t Th ieu has resigned. The 

gov ern me nt is in the hands of Vice Presiden t Hu ong, who is very 

well-kno wn to most of you, and a very fine, ou tstandin g, moderate 

lead er. Wh ere th at politica l situatio n will move from this po int I do 

not know, but I know the Se cre tar y of St ate will be a pp ea rin g before 

you later and undoubted ly will have fu rthe r inf orma tio n. I can only 

say th at certa inl y th at sit ua tio n is very fluid. So we have a political 

sit uatio n, th at has a lo t of movement in i t ; we have a m ili tary situati on 

in which our f riends a re in despera te s tra its , but the y still have hope o f 

some so rt of a settleme nt based upo n wh at measure of str en gth they 

are able to ga the r.
5

Now, I believe, sir, that a t this point Mr. von Marbod could discuss 

the $300 million appro priation request and what is entailed in tha t 

and then we could take questions.

Mr. Maiion. We have had a hearing earlier in the year with Mr. 

von Marbod and also with Mr. Habib and others, and we had one 

April 9 also, of course, with you, General Weyand, with Mr. von 

Marbod.

General Weyand. We realize there is a changed situation since that 

time. Why do we not listen to you briefly, Mr. von Marbod.

Mr. von Marbod. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 

indicate the distribution of the $300 million supplemental appropriation as we see it today, assuming tha t these funds, in fact, would be 

spent. I must emphasize this point, because at this juncture I do not 

know exactly what expenditures I would make from that supplemental appropriation.

But again, for the record, I have indicated $219 million of tha t 

amount would be for ground and air communication; $16.5 million 

would supply the minimum essential weapons and equipage of South 

Vietnamese units tha t are being reconstituted; $10.4 million is for 

fuels, gasoline, aviation fuel tha t sort of thing; $8.5 million is for 

medical supplies; $43.1 million for overhead of transportation, packing, crating and handling of the ammunition and supplies to be delivered ; and $2.5 million for increased adm inistrative costs of our Defense Attache Office, which is caused by the reduction of employees 

there, payment of their severance pay and their retu rn trave l to the 

United States.

I have nothing further on tha t subject, sir.

Mr. Mahon. In order to stop the fur the r expansion of communism 

in Southeast Asia, we have, of course, app ropriated as much as $155 

billion over a period of 25 years. We have been very generous in our 

expenditures, and of course also in the lives of our citizens, in an 

effort to contain communism in that area of the world, thinking it was 

in the best interests of the United States. So we have not shortchanged 

these people. We provided more than a billion dollars la st year fo r the 

current fiscal year for South Vietnam.

Now you have just indicated to us th at if we provide an additional 

appropriation, it may never be expended at all, it all depends upon 

the course of events.

Mr. von Marbod. Yes, tha t is correct.

Mr. Mahon. Now, General Weyand, I believe we were told tha t they 

had about five weeks supply of ammunition available; is tha t correct?

General Weyand. Sir, they now have sufficient amounts of some 

types of ammunition tha t will extend until the 15th of May. There 

are other articles or types of ammunition that they are short of and 

completely deficient in in some units right now.

I would say if we were to take an across-the-board cut at it, tha t 

we are talking about something toward the end of May.

Mr. Mahon. Well, if the situation can be at all stabilized and the 

fall of Saigon can be prevented, is there any way to provide m ilitary or 

economic assistance to the South Vietnamese? How would you do it?

General Weyand. Well, sir, there is a way to do that, which is the 

way we have been doing it, that is by both aircra ft and by ship. The 

situation is changing day-by-day out there.

5 1 -2 50 0 - 75 - 2
6

I think our co mm itment to you, the Execu tive B ranc h’s comm itment 

to you is th at nothi ng would go out there th at could not be utilize d 

effectively, an d th at mean s it would have to be delivered, not jus t to 

warehouses an d not just to docks, bu t to units, th at could use thi s 

equ ipm ent in a tte mpting to stave off complete defeat.

As you hav e ind icated , if th is sit uatio n continu es to det eriora te 

rapidly, the o rders are th at t here would no t be much th at was ap propr iated th at w ould reach South Vietn am and we w ould have to insu re 

th at that would be the case.

Mr. Maiio x. Now, wh at impac t, if any, from the sta nd po int of 

morale in South Vie tnam would the passage of legisla tion show ing 

concern in rega rd to the problem which is now pre sen ted —would 

there be any value to that ?

Gen eral Weyand. S ir, all I can tell you is t hat as a soldie r I would 

have to say th at the impact would be great, ind eed: and the reverse 

would be tru e. These men are fighting fo r th ei r lives, an d for tK r ’ country , for their fa milies. The spectacle, or th e view t hat that man has 

th at at some po int in tim e he is g oin g to be out of ammu nition or o ut 

of equipm ent with which to wage th at b att le, does inde ed have a very 

serious adverse effect on his mora le. In fac t, I th in k we will see the 

will to resist decline very sh arply in South Vietn am in the absence 

of any sign of assistance fro m us.

Mr. Mahon. Now the bill which I have introd uce d, and aga in, it is 

introd uced as a vehicle in which th e C omm ittee on App ropriatio ns and 

the House could work its will, p rov ide s $200 million fo r m ilitary assistance, which migh t o r m igh t not be he lpf ul, o the r t ha n from the stand ­

point of mo rale; otherwise, it migh t be very im po rta nt to tak e such 

action.

Now, some are say ing let’s have hu man ita ria n aid, let’s have economic aid , le t’s have aid of d iffe rent t ype s, but no mili tary aid.

If Saig on falls, we pro vide h um an ita ria n aid , economic a id, it would 

seem th at perhap s it could only be administered by the No rth Vi etnamese, and t hat would be intole rab le and wholly unacceptable.

W ha t could you do with economic aid in the e vent the re is no need 

fo r military assistance and the country totally collapses?

Gen eral Weyand. Unless the y are able to pro vide a viable defense 

for Saigon and fo r the peop le in the Delta, Mr. Ch airma n, the re is 

no thing th at we could do th at would be of any significant value in 

ter ms of economic or hu man ita ria n aid to them.

As you have ind icated , those two typ es of aid , mili tary aid and 

hu m an ita rian aid are ine xtr ica bly bound tog eth er. We hav e to find 

some so rt of a reas ona bly s tab iliz ed s itu ati on w ith which the n we can 

ad mi nis ter those fun ds o ut th ere an d that assistance.

Mr. Mahon. Well, it is sa id, an d this gives us concern, t hat much of 

the equip me nt which we have pro vid ed has in recent day s been tak en 

over by the o ppo sition. If we should pro vid e military aid o r economic 

aid, is t here any assu rance th at t his would be used exclusively for the 

people of South Vie tnam or could it fall into th e hands of th e opp osition and therefore t hw ar t the pu rpo se of the C ongress an d t he people ?

General Weyand. Well, as you have ind ica ted , t here is a gr ea t deal 

of equ ipm ent and ma ter ial out there now th at is in da ng er of falling 

into th e hands o f the Comm unists. I can only say wi th resp ect to addi-
7

tio nal equ ipm ent th at ce rta inly we wou ld not wan t t o send equip me nt 

out there unle ss we thou gh t there was some cha nce of it bei ng used 

effectively.

Mr. Mahon. Tha t would pr incipa lly mean am mun ition an d sp are 

pa rts, I assume.

Ge neral Weyand. Th at is correct.

Mr. Maho n. You would no t tr y to send tank s an d hea vy ar tille ry ?

Ge neral W eyand. Sir, it is too la te fo r th at .

Mr. M ahon. Do you h ave a ny th in g to ad d t o t hat , M r. von Marb od ?

Mr. von Marbod. No. I certainly ag ree with th at .

Th e logistics system in being now, since the So uth Vietnamese are 

reco ns tituting the ir forces in the S ou th, re quires delivery directly from 

the ship or from th e air cr af t to th e using unit. We a re no t b uilding u p 

depot stocks. Th ere is no tim e fo r th at an d the financial reso urces are 

sim ply not av ailabl e to do th at .

You have rea d rec ently or he ard repo rts th at Bien Ho a, the major 

ai rp ort fo r th ei r tactical ai r forc e, is un de r fire. Th e So uth Vi etn am ­

ese have reloca ted th ei r tac tic al ai rc ra ft to Ta n Son Nhu t A ir port i n 

Sai gon. Of course the ai r mun ition s supp ly is at Bien Ho a, an d par t 

of ou r fu nd ing in the fu tu re should inc lud e shipm ents of ai r mun itio ns to T an Son N hut. Thi s would be done to the exten t t hat they a re 

no t able to rea rm t he ir a ir cra ft a t Bien H oa o r back-ha ul tho se mun itio ns o ut of ran ge of the 130 m illim eter a rtille ry t h at the Nor th V ietnamese Ar my is usin g.

Mr. Mahon. We ll, I, to repe at som ewhat, I would say th at it ha d 

been th ou gh t t hat th e issue w ith respect to w ha t do we do from now on 

fo r So uth Vietn am would be f ou gh t o ut in conn ection w ith th e ap pr opr iatio n bil l fo r defense a nd f or economic as sistance fo r the fiscal year 

1976. I t was an tic ipa ted , undoubted ly, because th is seemed to be the 

consensus in t he Ee xcutive as well as the L egislati ve Br anch.

Ho w do you expla in th is sud den tu rn which ha s brou gh t th is issue 

to such a climactic p oint ?

Ge neral Weyand. W ell, Mr. Ch air man, th at goes back to t he Par is 

Peace Agree ment, ou r hop e, an d finally ou r relian ce on the fa ct th at 

th at agr eem ent wou ld be sel f-e nforc ing , which it was n ot. I t was v iolat ed from the very be gin ning af te r we got ou r priso ne rs back , which 

was a very i mpo rta nt p art of th at agre em ent . I t was vio lated by N or th 

Vietn am . They tested ou r pro bable resp onse to fu tu re vio lation s repeatedly . W e d id no t re spo nd.

Th e South Vie tnamese them selves were str etch ed to the breaking 

po int m ili tarily when th is offensive beg an ea rlier th is year. The ir 

str ateg ic concept was bas ed upon one of sa fe gu ar di ng t he ir pacificatio n prog ram, and of course tu rn ed out to be en tir ely inap pr op ria te 

for th e ty pe of massive in vasio n that th ey were fac ed wit h.

Now , as you k now, fro m t he time of the lau nc hing of t hat i nva sion, 

the m il it ary . events mov ed very, very rapidly. Pr es id en t Th ieu an d 

his lea dersh ip att em pted to con solida te th ei r defenses and th ei r resources and w ere unable to do tha t, pa rtly because of inadequate lea de rship, va cilla tin g lea dersh ip at the top , over very critica l decisions, 

suc h as wh eth er to hold a n im po rtan t area or c ity like H ue, which was 

th ei r c ul tu ra l c ente r.
8

I n othe r ways they defea ted them selves by very inep t imple me nta ­

tio n of difficult mili tary ma neuvers ; in this case to re trea t from the 

hig hla nds.

Th e Nor th Vietnamese atta ck gaine d momentum and we see tod ay 

the fina l result of wha t I wou ld con sider to be sim ply an overwhelm ing massive mili tary attack ag ains t th e So uth Vietnamese. 

Th ey were ne ith er po stu red no r equ ipp ed fo r this type of attack .

Mr. Maho n. Had th e No rth , Ha noi, North Vietn am , obeyed the 

Par is Accords, w ha t would have ha ppened ?

Ge ner al Weyand. W ell, of c ourse, the Par is A ccords pro vid ed t hat 

the demi litari zed zone wou ld be con sidered as a n eu tra liz ed zone, t hat 

un its would rem ain in place, th at there wou ld be no increase in the 

size of the forces of either side wi thin So uth Vietn am , othe r th an 

one-for-one rep lacem ent of equ ipm ent. Al l of those pro vision s were 

vio lated by the No rth . Th e Un ite d State s and So uth Vi etn am adhere d 

to the pro vision s of the agreem ent , fo r exa mple, th at provide d for 

sup erv ision by the In te rn at io na l Co ntr ol an d Su pervision Com missio n; the movem ent of resources, manpo wer, added equip me nt fro m 

the Nor th was never sup erv ised no r was it pe rm itted to be supe rvised by th e C ommunists.

Th erefore, in effect, wh at we le ft the So uth Vietnamese with, in 

ret rospect, was a Tro jan horse, an d we hop ed, an d the hop e was 

vain, th at th at Tro ja n horse would be con tain ed. As a m at ter of 

fact, i t was not.

I know that we blam e o urselves, we blam e the S outh Vietnam ese for 

the debacles th at we hav e se en ; ourselves fo r some—some people believe we en cou raged t hi s by giving them equ ipm ent. B ut in m y opinio n, 

the r eal element in t his lies w ith the N orth Vietnam ese, w ith the Soviet 

Un ion , wi th the People’s Re public of China . W ith the attack th at 

I saw, I might ju st say fina lly, Mr. Ch air ma n, the attack t hat I hav e 

witnessed, even if the Gover nm ent of Vietn am ha d no t attem pte d to 

with draw from Hu e and the hig hla nd s, the m ili tary sit uatio n tod ay 

would be ju st about wh at we are witnessing. By th at I mean the 

no rthe rn p art of t he countr y wou ld be lost, th e enemy would be a t the 

gates of Saigon , an d the So uth Vie tnamese forces wou ld have been 

cut a bo ut to ha lf of th e n orma l “ peacetime ” st reng th.

Mr. M ahon. Al l rig ht. Tha nk yo u very much .

Now, of course i t is im practic al to hav e a very o rderly h earin g with 

55 members of the committee. I am not going to ask any more questions. 

I am going to yield to Mr. C ede rberg.

Of course we have a five-minute r ule w ith respect to all members of 

the committee being able to p ar tic ip ate in the ea rly ph ase of a h earin g. 

I will y ield to one on my ri ght and two on my left as the time p erm its. 

I t is no t of course five mi nutes for everybody. I t is a matter of who 

feels it is u rg en t t hat certai n questio ns be asked.

I wou ld sug ges t a gain th at we not discuss in this open h earin g pla ns 

fo r the e vacua tion of Am erican forces in South Vie tnam.

Mr. Ceder ber g ?

Mr. Cederberg. G ene ral, I assum e from wh at you have said , t hat it 

is qu ite u rgen t t hat th e S ou th Vietn amese receive some signal from the 

Un ite d State s as to our su pp ort and th at , lac kin g th is evidence of 

su pp ort, you th in k the s itu ation will even get more hope less t ha n it is
9

now, and tha t if we do take some affirmative action, even though the 

funds may not be used, th at it will have the potential for stabilizing 

the situation so that some kind of meaningful negotiation might take 

place. Is that a correct assumption ?

General Weyand. Mr. Cederberg, I agree with tha t entirely. I 

think I have used the word “stabilizing” and some people have given 

it a permanency beyond what I intended. But in any event I doubt 

tha t we can stabilize tha t situation for very long, but the hope is that 

we can arrive at a balance of political and military power there th at 

will give these people something better than we see in the offing now.

But basically, what you say is exactly right.

Mr. Cederberg. I realize tha t it has only been a matter of hours 

since President Thieu resigned, but do you know of any communications tha t we may have received from the new government, if it has 

been formed in fact, tha t indicates tha t they still are concerned about 

the United States takin g affirmative action in this area?

General Weyand. No, I do not, sir, but I believe—are you going to 

hear Secretary Kissinger later ?

Mr. Mahon. At three o’clock.

General Weyand. All right, sir.

Mr. Cederberg. To your knowledge, we do not ?

General Weyand. No, sir. I talked to them on the phone out there, 

but the people I was talkin g to were not in position to be aware of 

anything like that.

Mr. Cederberg. I suppose it is a question you cannot answer, but as 

I look at the situation, we have a large number of Missing in Action 

over there and the situation has deteriorated now, I suppose, to the 

point where there is little or no hope about any accounting for the 

MI As. Is tha t correct ?

General Weyand. Well, I simply cannot give up on the hope that 

there is something that we can do along those lines.

I have—we have over a thousand tha t are still missing in action. 

There are some of those that we have information that they were alive 

after capture, and then we have not heard anything further from 

them.

We know that the provisional revolutionary government, the Viet 

Cong, have the remains of some 57 of our m en; and they have refused 

to release those to us. Whatever comes out of this, I believe that we 

must press to get an accounting for our missing in action.

Mr. Cederberg. Well, I certainly agree with th at and I hope we will 

continue to press. I do not suppose this would be a subject tha t we 

could even request that be par t of the negotiation th at might take place 

between the North and the South, but if it was possible, I would hope 

something would be done.

General Weyand. Sir, I do not know why we could not do that, at 

least request i t and pursue it. Aft er all, it is a provision of the P aris 

Peace Agreement. I suspect tha t whatever political settlement does 

come out of this will be within the framework of that Paris Peace 

Agreement.

Mr. Cederberg. Well, I would hope that th at would be the position 

and I am delighted tha t is the position you are ta king on this matter. 

I really do not have any further questions, Mr. Chairman.
10

Mr. Mahon. I would like to say for the record that I inadvertently 

referred to the evacuation of American forces, I believe, from South 

Vietnam. I meant American citizens there.

General Weyand. I took care of that other thing a couple of years 

ago, sir.

Mr. Mahon. Very well.

Questions on my left ?

Mr. Whitten. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a sad day, however. In 5 minutes, those of us on this side of the table could only give 

our thoughts, some statements, because a man on your side of the table 

can take up 5 minutes mighty quickly.

I cannot see how any of us, as sad as this day is, could have helped 

but see it was bound to happen when we pulled our troops out 2 years 

ago, because definitely, if South Vietnam could not win with our help, 

and our military might—I could not see how any of us could kid ourselves that the South Vietnamese had any chance to win by themselves.

By adhering to the tune tha t the South Vietnamese could win, I 

wonder how much we may have contributed to the present-day situa ­

tion by leading them on. Th at fact we cannot escape.

T^e n ^fie next fact we must acknowledge is that the pipeline now has 

millions of dollars in it, much of which it is impossible of delivering. 

So if we go through the motions of another appropriation, its value 

would be limited to whatever value, if any, of showing in the press that 

we have made another effort.

. The next fact we must accept is tha t if you were to deliver the military aid as you pointed out, it would doubtless be used, as Communist 

China did with American equipment, to subjugate the country to control of the Communists. All this being true, is there any basis for your 

request, except to maintain an appearance, perhaps in the press and 

in the news media, when we know the end is inevitable ?

General Weyand. Well, sir, let me say th is: that sometimes the style 

w ith which we do things, or the appearance, as you say, are equally as 

important as substance, particularly when we are talking about people.

I understand your feeling about how much did we contribute towards leading them on to this path, which has now ended in apparent 

disaster for them. I think all of us have wondered about tha t from time 

to time. But our involvement out there went much deeper than that. I 

do not thin k it is a case of us just leading them on by giving them military equipment.

Mr. Whitten. Could I interru pt you ?

General Weyand. Yes, sir.

Mr. Whitten. At this point—when we have been told by General 

Westmoreland, by General Davis I believe, that the name, South Vietnamese is a name of our making. They are a series of villages or cities, 

which in actuality they never had a central government. We have 

designated presidents, not the people, though we went through the 

motion. But as a matter of fact, from your side of the table, it has been 

testified repeatedly by our top military officers that the people of 

South Vietnam were citizens of this village, th at village, this city, that 

city, and actually, throughout history they have not had wThat we think of as a central government on the United States style.
11

So if they have been telling us the facts, and I have every reason to 

think they were, when we talk about a government, we are talking 

about a select few who we identify and recognize and who get our aid, 

but insofar as the coordinated central group that controls the country 

on the order of our system in the United States, they have never had i t; 

is tha t r igh t ?

General Weyand. Well, I think tha t is right, sir. We gave them, 

though, a vision, or more than a vision, we gave them an example of 

a way of life. I guess I should not even say we gave them that. T hat is 

what they developed under our guidance and example. Almost everything has to be by comparison with what ? And these folks have had 

their electoral process. I know we all can debate about whether the 

president was elected in all fairness and all that, but they have had— 

they have found a political system tha t they like. They prefer that to 

any other system in spite of all its deficiencies.

Economically they prefer a free enterprise system. That land reform 

program tha t was finally culminated out there a couple of years ago 

was probably the most effective land reform program, individual property ownership program, ever undertaken anywhere in the history of 

the world.

So what I was going to say is th at it is not tha t we have led them 

along with military assistance. In spite of all the deficiencies in the 

system tha t they have, they prefer it so much to the other system that 

they have been willing to die and to bleed for it, and I do not think 

it is just us, I think we gave them a glimpse of howT to do it, in some 

cases, and they did tha t of their own free will. No one in the United 

States forced them into these programs.

Mr. Whitten. I would comment, or say that I have not tried to give 

all my points in the limited period tha t I have, or to say that is the 

sole cause. But sometimes when you give a people a glimpse of the impossible, which runs counter to what they have had for centuries and 

centuries and centuries and centuries, it could be cruel and could be 

the cause of what the people of South Vietnam are going throug h today. To have shown a glimpse of the unattainable, may leave us with 

responsibility for present conditions.

General Weyand. I understand, sir.

Mr. Maiion. Mr. Sikes?

Mr. Sikes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, if there is any lesson to be learned from this situation, it 

should be not to get into a war that we do not intend to win.

Let me ask you this, General: Is a portion of South Vietnam now 

in the hands of government forces militarily defensible in the face of 

the heavy odds which exist out there ?

General Weyand. No, sir.

Air. Sikes. Have the Communists indicated any real interest in negotiating a settlement? There has been ta lk, but is there any basis for 

tha t talk?

General Weyand. Sir, I haven’t been in a position to judge that other 

than, as you say, we have seen the reports tha t the Viet Cong have 

called for Thieu’s removal, and if he is removed then I thin k they ask 

for the removal of most of the Americans. This is all public. I don’t 

know what has been going on in the back rooms.
12

Mr. Sikes. So any information tha t you have is th at th e resignation 

of Mr. Thieu may be a preclude to a puppet government and a takeover 

by the Communists ? Is his resignation a p art of a pa ttern ?

General Weyand. Not tha t I know of, sir. I think the South Vietnamese are attempting to find a group tha t can negotiate a settlement 

and they probably, including President Thieu himself, decided th at 

there was no possibility that he could do that, so what I suppose we are 

seeing is a group coming in there that believe, from the conversations 

they have had, unknown to me, but I have known they have had them, 

with the other side, they believe they can negotiate some sort of a 

settlement.

Mr. Sikes. It seems tha t you have been saying tha t they need the 

morale boost th at favorable congressional action can give them. They 

need this very much. I t would give them the will to continue to resist 

with the hope that something better th an conquest and destruction and 

sort of havoc can be forthcoming ?

General Weyand. That is right, sir.

We are committed to a principle. We have stuck with it all through 

the years of our own history, tha t men should not have their way of 

life dictated to them by force. I guess tha t why we have stayed with 

Vietnam through all this agony and the horrendous cost that it has 

been to us, is not because of those people, but because of tha t principle, 

and I believe that we are still firmly committed to that principle and 

will remain so even after all of this is finished.

Mr. Sikes. I think what is proposed is too little and too late, but I am 

glad it is proposed and I am certainly going to support it.

Mr. Michel. General Weyand, at one time South Vietnam had the 

fourth largest air force in the world. With the withdrawal to the 

immediate Saigon area I assume there are hundreds of planes and 

copters that can be utilized with sufficient fuel, ammo, and spare parts 

to inflict heavy damage upon the attackers or help considerably in 

prolonging the defense of Saigon.

But, if the end is inevitable, as you suggested it is, are there contingency plans to salvage what we can rather than letting it all fall 

into the hands of the Viet Cong? For me that would be a most important consideration. If the appropriation is enough to provide 

defense to be able to extricate one plane valued at $10 million to $15 

million or more times the number that are there, then it wouldn’t take 

long to recover a billion dollars in equipment. That would make it 

more acceptable to vote considerable sums for the aid tha t we g,re 

talking about.

General Weyand. Sir, I think I should respond to th at in executive 

session.

Mr. Michel. If so, Mr. Chairman, most of my questions would fall 

into tha t category and I will withhold them.

Mr. Mahon. All right.

We will get that when we get into executive session.

Mr. Passman ?

Mr. P assman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Weyand, I would assume that we are in accord at this point 

tha t humanitarian assistance without military assistance would be 

absolutely useless, would it not ?
18

General Weyand. I believe so. I think it is inappropr iate, sir, to 

have one without the other.

Mr. P assman. In other words, it is a package. Any degree of success tha t the South Vietnamese may have in gettin g some kind of 

negotiated settlement within the framework of the Par is Agreement 

would depend upon both types of assistance or none.

General Weyand. Yes, sir.

Mr. P assman. Mr. Chairma n, I feel very strongly about this situ ation. It has been my privilege to handle the economic pa rt of this p rogram for some 21 years. I have a lot of sympathy for the South Vietnamese people and I thin k I would feel a lot better by jus t saying th at 

I am going to support this measure which calls for milit ary and 

humanita rian aid. I feel in all probab ility it will be used wisely and I 

hope it is provided in time so it could at least assist them in working 

out a better settlement than they could withou t any aid.

I yield back the balance of my time. I will s upport and vote with a 

clear conscience for th is measure.

Mr. Mahon. Questions on my left ?

Mr. Evins. General Weyand, after expenditure of 155 billions of 

dollars in Vietnam, and after the loss of 55, 000 American lives, and 

afte r we have seen the abandonment of a billion dollars in equipment 

and weapons, and aft er we have seen television reports of soldiers pushing women and children off the helicopters to escape, do you still think 

there is the will to resist ?

In the early days of the war there was a big debate in the Congress 

tha t they didn’t have the will to fight, tha t it was the Americans 

doing ali of the fighting. Aft er all this expenditure of life and money, 

and afte r what we have seen in the evacuation, do you still think 

there is a will to resist ?

General Weyand. Sir, I have to say yes. I thin k the very fact 

that they are fighting testifies to that. The fact tha t they are fleeing 

from the north tells me that . Tha t will to resist is going to erode 

quite rap idly as the last vestige of hope is removed.

Mr. E vins. General, i f we provide a dditional military and economic 

aid what assurance do we have tha t it will fall into the hands of our 

friend s ?

General Weyand. I don’t thin k any assurance other than what 

you would expect from reasonable men on our side who have charge 

of a program like that, knowing full well tha t the Congress is deeply 

concerned about the economic problems in our own country, tha t I 

am deeply concerned as the Chief of Staff of the Army about shortages of equipment in my Army, and certainly none of us has any 

intention of sending equipment or other materials over there and 

letti ng it fall into the hand s of the enemy.

Mr. Evins. We have no assurance tha t if we take action to provide 

additi onal milit ary and economic aid tha t it would fall into the 

hands of our friends ?

Mr. Mahon. I f I may inte rrup t, if Members would go and answer 

the call quickly and come back, I thin k it would be helpful. Many 

of us will stay here and go later, but we won’t suspend the hearing 

on account of the rollcall.

Mr. Evins. I have only one fur the r observation, Mr. Chairman.

51-250 0 - 75 - 3
14

Ge neral, we respec t ou r gr ea t defe nse establ ishme nt. We honor ou r 

heroes and our mili tary men. Our coun try is fo rtun ate to hav e them, 

bu t does it ever occur th at on occasion the m ili ta ry might be wrong?

I re fe r to a repo rt of the CIA th at there were 600,000 Vie tcong in 

numb ers bu t the m ili ta ry adv ised the Pr esiden t th at there were only 

250,000. T hey s aid th is is th e cei ling num ber , t hat th ere are casualties, 

th at th ere are deserters, and so the n um ber is going to be 250,000. A ft er 

all w’e h ave accepted we are at th e end o f the tun nel. We see the lig ht 

at the end of th e tunnel.

Whil e we respec t ou r mili tary , does it eve r occur th at the y make a 

mista ke ?

Ge neral W eyand. I thi nk we have made too many mis takes, sir , and 

ce rta inly in t his situation whe n t he postmo rtems come in I believe you 

are g oin g to find th at t he re is plen ty of th at to be vis ite d on all of us.

Mr. E vins. Than k you, M r. Ch air ma n.

Mr. Mahon. Are the re furt her questions on my right ?

Mr. Conte?

Mr. Conte. Than k yo u, M r. C hairm an.

Ge neral, I was inter ested in he arin g you mention the South Vi etnamese land reform p rogram , which I ag ree w ith yo u was an excellent 

land ref orm, second only to the lan d r efo rm in Taiwan.

Ge neral Weyand. Yes, s ir.

Mr. Conte. A nd of course you can ta lk about the new Vie tnamese 

ele cto ral process, an d othe r reform s. The th in g th at tro ubles me 

thou gh , and it has tro ub led me fo r a lon g tim e, is if the South Vi etnamese people hav e such an interest in preservin g th ei r governm ental 

system and way of life , why don’t the y fight bette r ag ain st the N or th 

Vietnamese ? He re is a ba nd o f men th at cam e down th ro ug h the n or th 

on the Ho Chi Minh tr ai l wi th th ei r pac ks on th ei r backs, tra ve lli ng 

fo r weeks, bu t able to cause thes e treme ndous setb acks to t he south .

W ha t is the reason fo r th at ? Consider t he fire power th at we gave 

them. Th e ai r forc e of S outh Vietn am is v astly s up erior to t hat o f the 

no rth and th eir fire power is mu ch g rea ter .

W ha t is the answer to th at ?

Ge neral W eyand. Well, I th in k the ans wer, first of all, is t he ir s ystem wh ich feeds on a m ili ta ry syste m. I t uses us, the c ap ita listic system, 

as a foil. W e ar e th e d evil in th ei r system, so to speak, and we are essential to th ei r mo tivation, an d so they hav e a very stro ng sense of purpose an d they h ave perfe cte d, as you well know, technique s to ins ure 

th at th ei r people are mo tiv ate d much more so th an you find in othe r 

systems.

I th in k a second elem ent was the un stin ting su pp ort fro m the 

Sov iet Un ion an d the Pe op le’s Republic of Ch ina . I know , as you 

sai d, they come dow n wi th thei r packs on th ei r backs and we h ave th e 

vision o f them in t hei r Ho Chi Minh s andals an d all of t ha t, bu t wh at 

I see are some 600 to 800 tan ks , 122 millim eter an d 130 millim ete r, 

lon g-r ange ar til lery , su rfa ce-to -air missiles of a ty pe th at we cer ­

ta in ly wou ld nev er have dre am ed of giving So uth Vietn am , an d on 

an d on and on, so the re is a gr ea t lis t o.f s ophis tic ate d equ ipm ent an d 

wh at we are seeing in the no rth is a con ven tional arm y in the ter ms 

th at you wou ld recognize.

Mr. C onte. Do n’t you a gre e t hat we ga ve the m mo re fire p ower th an 

they ha d up n or th? You sp eak of th ose tank s. Th e Isra elis ha d Am eri-
15

can tanks, and were terrifically outnumbered by the Arabs, who had 

Soviet tanks. As a matter of fact, the Arabs had the same sophisticated types of tanks they had up in North Vietnam. Can you respond 

to tha t ?

General Weyand. You have been reading something different than 

I have been reading then.

Mr. Conte. We were in Israel about 10 days ago in the Golan Heights 

and that is what we were told.

General Weyand, you make a valia nt argument in favor of a bad 

case. I hope we have a recorded vote on this, but I want to make it 

clear for the record tha t I am opposed to furthe r military assistance 

for South Vietnam. The conflict in Indochina has already cost the 

United States over 56,000 lives and nearly $150 billion. I don’t want to 

see one more life or one more dollar spent by the United States to support continued hostilities in Indochina. Than k you, Mr. Chairman.

General Weyand. I don’t know why they were asking me for about 

a thousand tanks and if they can do it with 118 I sure would have 

loved to have heard it earlier.

Mr. E dwards. H ow much is in the pipeline, General? We have been 

hearing a lot of figures around here today. How much money is 

actually in the pipeline ?

General Weyand. I have Mr. von Marbod.

It is $80 to $100 million, but Mr. von Marbod can talk about that.

Mr. von Marbod. The pipeline has been moving, as you know, at a 

fast rate and we have obligated all of the appropriation received. 

There is probably $80 to $100 million in the pipeline, but I would 

emphasize tha t some of that money would not directly benefit the 

military situation there because it covers the overhead activities of 

our Defense Attache Office and the costs of administering the 

program.

Mr. Edwards. How much of the last quarter allocation for fiscal 

’75 is still unexpended?

Mr. von Marbod. I don’t have an exact figure on that, sir. But in 

usable financial resources we are working on $80 to $100 million now. 

We are deobligating some requirements to fund more high prio rity 

items.

Mr. Edwards. And, General, assume, as you did a while ago, th at 

$200 million could stave off complete defeat, to use your own words. 

You didn’t use the figure b ut you used the term, “stave off complete 

defeat.”

Wh at them ?

I think the big question th at the Congress is concerned about, whatever you give in the way of m ilitary aid, and assume that it does stave 

off complete defeat, then what ? What else will Congress be called on 

to do?

General Weyand. Sir, I doubt there will be much more th at Congress would be called upon for considering the likely outcome of tha t 

situation. I think what we are doing is keeping faith with a principle, 

and as long as that principle is valid, then we would use this support, 

but I don’t foresee, and I doubt tha t you do, any possibility of largescale continuing assistance.

Mr. E dwards. I will depart the premises and be back shortly.

[Brief recess.]
16

Mr. Andrews. General, earlier we touched briefly on and passed 

over those of our soldiers missing in action. Will this bill enhance our 

chances of identifying and locating these missing in action? Will it 

have any effect on this issue that has been driftin g since the Paris 

Peace Accords ?

General Weyand. Sir, I really don't know. I guess I have been thinking of our assistance, and our refusal by our assistance to accept this 

violation of the Paris Agreements as an unchallenged act, to keep 

alive the hope that we could still do something about our missing-inaction, that we would still have a voice at the table, whatever it is. And 

I must say, admittedly, t hat is pretty tenuous thinking. That is what 

I have been basing it on. If we pack up and turn our backs on this 

situation I don’t see any hope for it, so this is one of the many reasons, 

none of which I admit will stand alone, but one of the many why I 

would like to see us give tangible support to our friends until all hope 

is gone if that time comes.

Mr. Andrews. In other words, in your opinion this would help 

rather than hur t the cause of locating, identifying, and eventually 

freeing any missing-in-action that are still over there ?

General Weyand. Yes, sir.

Mr. Andrews. How much extra time will this appropriation bill give 

to negotiate or to evacuate or whatever ? Obviously we are dealing in 

time since you said a moment ago that the situation as it now stands, 

the portion of the South Vietnam that is left, is not defensible, so we 

know what we are faced with. In essence we are trying to buy time 

to give them a chance to negotiate their way out, which in the long 

run would undoubtedly save lives and give those people a greater 

option to pick their future.

How much time will this give?

General Weyand. Sir, I think we are obviously talking about something th at is, on the short end of it, just a matter of days and it could 

be weeks. I think tha t the longer term will depend upon the outcome 

of this political movement tha t we see going on now, but I guess I 

just have to say the short of it is I just don’t know. I think it could go 

very rapidly, though.

Mr. Andrews. But with the resignation of President Thieu today 

and with the stated platform of the North Vietnamese tha t they would 

refuse to negotiate as long as he is there—now he is gone—this additional time might give the time to negotiate and to have an orderly 

evacuation with a minimum amount of bloodshed?

General Weyand. I would surely hope so, sir. I n fact, I would think 

tha t would be the great benefit from it.

Mr. Andrews. I appreciate your comments, General.

Mr. Steed. General, th at is one phase of this t hat is bothering me a 

little bit. I got a telegram last week from an American air lift contracto r, apparently working under contract with the Vietnamese Government, insisting that I vote for this appropriation because he had 

lost his planes and equipment when they fled from Danang and he 

didn’t think the Vietnamese Government would be able to indemnify 

him for the loss of that equipment unless we appropriated them some 

more money. Do you know of any way th at any of this money, if it is 

made available, could be used to indemnify American contractors who 

probably are going to lose their shirts if South Vietnam is defeated?
17

General Weyand. I am sorry, sir, I don’t. He was, I assume, one of 

those who took on tha t risk and with the guarantees from the Government of Vietnam as opposed to other insurance possibilities, but 

there is nothing in this package here, sir, tha t relates to that. T hat is 

not to say tha t something like that couldn’t be provided for, but I 

don’t have any knowledge of it.

Mr. Steed. That couldn’t be covered in any unexpected funds already available in the so-called pipeline or anything similar to tha t 

tha t you know of ?

General Weyand. No, sir.

Mr. Steed. Are there any non-m ilitary contractors, working directly for the American Government tha t would have an indemnity 

problem in the event of the defeat of Vietnam ?

General Weyand. Sir, I know that Air America was under contract 

to, I believe it was to U SAID, which is a government agency, but beyond tha t I just don’t know the details of it. I hear, but it was just 

newspaper reports, tha t some of our own airlines had been denied 

insurance in there by their insuring companies, but tha t is a different 

sort of a situation. Right now, for example, we are using military 

airc raft for all of the movement of Americans in and out of Saigon.

Mr. Steed. What are some of the potential problems and actions 

tha t could or may arise in the event that a massive evacuation of 

American and friendly Vietnamese takes place ?

General Weyand. Sir, I think I should discuss that in executive 

session. So far we have been reducing very significantly the number of 

Americans who are not essential, not absolutely essential to whatever 

activities are going on in there, but when we get into evacuation plans, 

I will have to discuss those in an executive session, sir.

Mr. Steed. What I was referring to specifically is t ha t it seemed to 

me from what I read tha t the evacuation from Phnon Penh was very 

smooth, very well organized and without incident. Would it be your 

expectation, with more warning in Vietnam than they had in Cambodia, that an equally orderly evacuation could occur?

General Weyand. Sir, the situation is entirely different from tha t 

tha t we faced in Cambodia and there are so many different possibilities, situations that could arise there, tha t again I thin k we best discuss them in executive session.

Mr. Steed. Could you give us any information as to what percent 

of the Americans curre ntly in Vietnam are there on official business 

or by virtue of our government’s actions and how many are just civilians over there on their own ?

General Weyand. Sir, again, I will have to apologize because th at 

is not in my area, and I follow it in a general sense, th at is, the reductions, but I do not have the breakout of those t hat remain, but Dr. 

Kissinger will have them when he appears before you shortly. I do 

know t hat there were 2,167 remaining as of yesterday, and as I say, 

Secretary Kissinger will give you tha t when he appears before you.

Mr. Steed. What munitions and arms that this appropriation would 

pay for do you now have available? How quickly could delivery be 

made i f this money were made available ? Are we talking about days, 

weeks, or months ?
18

Mr. von Marbod. If the situation holds and if we do make deliveries 

from the supplemental appropriation we are discussing today, some 

deliveries could be made within days, sir.

Mr. Steed. Would you consider then these shortages of various 

types of ammunition to be a critical thing tha t could be supplied 

quickly ? Is that the kind of thing you are talking about ?

Mr. von Marbod. Some of the shortages of critical items of ammunition like fragmentation grenades and certain classes of ammunition could be quickly filled. As far as overall shortages, I don’t see 

any way of meeting these needs, and I am really referring to tactical 

vehicles, tanks, howitzers, and heavy equipment that is urgently 

needed.

Mr. Steed. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mahon. Any further questions on my left?

The gentleman from New York.

Mr. Addabbo. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Just following up the last question of my colleague from Oklahoma, 

you are talking about tactical weapons, and General Weyand said 

we are not talking about that. It is too late for tanks.

Mr. von Marbod. That was my testimony, Mr. Addabbo, th at we are 

not talking about tanks. I was addressing ammunition only. I did not 

mean to imply that we would deliver heavy equipment.

Mr. Addabbo. Did I misunderstand you ? Then you said you would 

not be delivering under the supplemental ?

Mr. von Marbod. We would not be, sir.

Mr. Addabbo. J ust ammunition?

Mr. von Marbod. Prima ammunition, sir.

Mr. Addabbo. We have heard a great discourse and it is almost a 

story we have heard whenever we had a Southeast Asia appropriation bill before the committee, tha t we have to sustain, we have to 

help, tha t the only way we are going to get a negotiated peace in 

Southeast Asia is by additional aid.

Now, we since the so-called cease-fire in 1973 gave $2.2 billion in 

military aid, almost a half billion dollars, .57 billion dollars, in 

economic aid. In 1974 we gave $1.1 billion m ilitary aid and $602 million in economic aid, and in 1975 we gave an additional $700 million 

in military aid and $400 million in economic aid.

In addition to the 1975, and $700 million, through manipulations 

and change of calculations within the Pentagon, almost an additional 

$150 million to $200 millon was funneled into Vietnam.

Mr. von Marbod. Mr. Addabbo, there were no manipulations in the 

Pentagon and I think the record is clear on that.

Mr. Addabbo. There was something like $36 million funneled out 

of Laos that we found we didn’t have to spend in Laos.

Mr. von Marbod. Tha t was held by counsel to be legal and proper 

and I would also say that the Senate Armed Services Committee has 

joined us in our interpretation.

Mr. Addabbo. But in addition to the $700 million available, there 

has been an additional perhaps $150 million—

Mr. von Marbod. Mr. Addabbo, there was no manipulation in the 

Pentagon.

Mr. Addabbo. Was there an additional $150 million in addition to 

the $700 million?
19

Mr. von Marbod. It was not additional, sir. It was authorized and 

appropriated prior to fiscal year 1975.

Mr. Addabbo. Fo r Laos and other countries?

Mr. von Marbod. For Laos and for Vietnam.

Mr. Addabbo. In addition to th at money and the aid we have given, 

and when this committee and the American people were told tha t the 

South Vietnamese are strong and they are fighting, they are killing the 

enemy three to one, five to one, 600 South Vietnamese, 10,000 North 

Vietnamese, they have tanks, they number five to one, the fourth grea test air force in the world, all of this equipment, all these men, all -this 

manpower, yet we have no accord.

Now you tell this committee and you tell the American people if you 

give another $300 million, if you give another $300 million, now we 

are going to get an accord. Accord could not be reached afte r $150 

billion, 50,000 American lives, no accord, but now give them a little 

more, give them a little more, and we will see the end of the tunnel, not 

the light, we will see the possible end of the tunnel, we will see the 

accord.

Is this what the American people are being told?

Mr. von Marbod. Mr. Addabbo, let the record indicate since the 

signing of the Paris Peace Agreement on the 27th of Jan uar y 1973 

there have only been two programs authorized and appropriated by 

the Congress for the government of South Vietnam.

For fiscal year 1974, the Administration requested $1.6 billion. $1 

billion went to South Vietnam. For fiscal year 1975 the Adm inistration 

requested $1.6 billion. We received an appropriation of $700 million, 

and I would say to you today, sir, tha t the most t hat can be hoped 

for as a result of this supplemental appropriation is the negotiation 

of some basic humanitarian concessions for the citizens of South 

Vietnam.

Mr. Addabbo. Which they could not achieve with the billions of 

dollars, $1 billion, $700 million additional money, men and everything 

else, could not be achieved prior to this, but now you say with the $309 

million supplemental, moneys that probably you will not have to spend, 

just so that we say it is there, is that correct, that now North Vietnam 

will say, “Okay, America is backing you for $300 million. Forget 

about all of what happened before. We feel tha t now we will be able 

to work out a peace with you.”

Is tha t what you are telling me, in committee, and the American 

people ?

Mr. von Marbod. I think the situation rests entirely with the two 

opposing parties, Mr. Addabbo. I am saying tha t the only hope is 

tha t the supplemental appro priation, if it is spent, would give the 

South Vietnamese the assurance that we were not abandoning them 

and that it might possibly improve their position to negotiate basic 

humanitarian concessions.

Mr. Addabbo. Are you hoping that this committee will give $300 

million additional supplemental aid and then tha t the Congress will 

also pass a hum anitarian aid also which calls for the abrogation of the 

restrictions of reintroduction of American forces into Southeast Asia, 

tha t with the combined two we are back to where we were p rior to 

1973?

Mr. von Marbod. Mr. Addabbo-----
20

Mr. Mahon. The time of the gentleman has expired. You may finish your response.

Mr. von Marbod. I would like to say tha t we do not sit here proposing the reintroduction of American forces if tha t was your statement.

Mr. Mahon. Any furth er questions on my left ?

The gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. Giaimo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, in response to a question from Mr. Cederberg you said that 

the giving of military assistance would provide for a balancing of the 

strengths, I believe was your expression.

Is tha t correct?

General Weyand. Not a balancing in the sense of evening the 

strengths.

Mr. Giaimo. What ?

General Weyand. It provides a better balance between the two 

forces, hopefully. In other words, what we are talking about is one 

side being completely overrun, overwhelmed, by the other side, and 

having no position of streng th, so it is simply a matter of relative 

strengths.

Mr. Giaimo. W hat you are saying to me then is even if they were 

given the materiel, i t still would not provide for a balance.

General Weyand. No way, sir. It will provide them increased will 

to resist, and I have no guarantee tha t tha t will will continue to remain strong. It will provide them with increased material strength.

Mr. Giaimo. In response to a question from Mr. Sikes as to whether 

or not the Saigon redoubt area would be militarily defensible, I think 

you stated categorically tha t it would not be defensible.

General Weyand. T hat is rig ht, sir.

Mr. Giaimo. S o then in effect if you combine those two statements 

what you are really saying is th at irrespective of the amount of military assistance given, in your best estimate as a soldier, evaluating 

the military situation over there, in your best estimate the military outcome is most likely predictable, irrespective of whether or not military 

aid is given, but that the withdrawal or denial of military assistance 

would undoubtedly lead to the total and immediate collapse of the 

spirit of South Vietnam to defend itself?

Is that the correct interpreta tion ?

General Weyand. That comes very close, sir.

I would say the options open to the enemy are almost limitless now 

in military terms. They have the capability within some period of time 

of overwhelming the South Vietnamese.

Now, whether or not they will take tha t option I am sure will depend 

upon their perception of the cost to them and the relative advantages 

and disadvantages of going on with tha t course of action; and with 

some modicum of strength on the South Vietnamese side it is quite 

likely tha t the North will choose an option less drastic than the one 

I just mentioned.

Mr. Giaimo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Maiion. The gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. F lynt. General Wevand, what reason is there to believe that the 

North will be any more willing to negotiate now than they were when 

we had 550,000 American troops, several United States armored divi-
21

sions, and a substantial number of Marines and a substantial segment 

of the United States Air Force.

General Weyand. When you say “negotiate,” I don’t think they ever 

did negotiate in good faith, so I would have to say I doubt that there 

is anything other than what they might hope to gain in their own 

self-interest, and they may be willing, and I think Secretary Kissinger 

is much more skilled and knowledgeable in this sort of thing than I am, 

but I was going to say they might be willing to pay some price for 

gettin g Saigon or at least some reasonable control of it and of the rest 

of South Vietnam with something less than continued fighting.

After all, taking over all of the Delta, taking over Saigon, if they 

should press i t to the point where large portions of th at city and what 

industrial base it has were destroyed, might be something tha t they 

would prefer to avoid, but T don’t think any of us really know what 

they are going to do, nor do we know what might entice them into 

giving up some.

Mr. F lynt. It is history, of course, th at the Paris Peace Accords 

were finally signed around th e end of Janu ary 1973. At tha t time there 

was hope both here and abroad that that would signal the end of introduction of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam and the return of American military forces from South Vietnam.

General Weyand. Tha t is right, sir.

Mr. F lynt. But almost immediately, less than 30 days thereafter, 

history now tells us that the North Vietnamese began to test the agreement and to test what the United States intended to do about it.

Now we are informed—and if this is not the proper subject for you 

to respond because of the agreement made earlier, please withhold 

your answer until we go into executive session—almost immediately 

we are told within less than 30 days after the Paris Accords were signed 

tha t the North Vietnamese began to test the agreement and thereby 

to test the United States.

By some time in March we are told tha t the North Vietnamese were 

moving troops in truck convoys toward the South in what can only 

be described as a contemptuous violation of the Paris Accords.

These troop movements and movements of equipment were recorded 

on film and they were presumably transm itted immediately to Washington where they were reviewed and inspected at the highest levels. 

We are further told tha t there was a tentative agreement reached 

to respond with a vigorous reaction to the violation of the Accords 

by the North Vietnamese.

I describe that agreement as a tentative agreement because it is one 

which has been very cautiously guarded. There are indications tha t the 

only unresolved question as to how to respond was a question of 

whether the saturation bombing by the United States A ir Force on the 

areas of the troop concentrations and the troop and convoy movements 

would last for a period of five days or whether it would last for a 

period of seven days.

Suddenly the discussion of that, we are told, broke off, and to some 

tha t appears to have been the signal as far back as March of 1973 that 

the United States had no fu rth er interest in what took place in Vietnam, tha t the United States had no further interest in whether the 

Paris Accords were respected or contemptuously violated and tha t from
22

tha t point forward there has been a continuous inflow of North Vietnamese troops and equipment without intervention, and tha t largely 

tha t what we are seeing now is the result of the inability to reach a 

decision in March of 1973.

Do you wish to comment on that?

General Weyand. Sir, I couldn’t relate tha t to that specific time or 

tha t specific event.

Mr. F lynt. I recognize tha t you were Commander of American 

Forces and were not at th at time a member of the Join t Chiefs of Staff.

General Weyand. That is right, sir.

Mr. Flynt. But if you have information on that and could supply 

it for the record I wish you would.

General Weyand. Yes, sir.

As you know, the North Vietnamese never acknowledged during the 

negotiations that they had troops in the South and they maintained 

tha t position all through up until the signing of the Paris Peace 

Accords.

They consistently promoted the fiction tha t this conflict in South 

Vietnam was a civil war. Of course, they were there all the time and 

they are there in great strength now.

Mr. F lynt. Do you know of your own knowledge whether they did 

increase their troop strength and equipment or supplies during the 

February to March period to which I just referred ?

General Weyand. Sir, as I recall, they began violating that agreement almost immediately. I am not certain about the period of February to March and I guess that is the period you are relating to because they were evident in March 1973. I believe that they did, but I 

would have to go back to the record.

Mr. Flynt. Thank you, General.

Mr. Mahon. I am not undertaking to follow the seniority rule. We 

can’t yield to everybody. Is there anybody who wants me to yield to 

him on the rig ht ?

The gentleman from California.

Mr. Talcott. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, with two quorum calls I may have missed something, but it 

appears to me th at we have made our decisions in South Vietnam. We 

made them previously. Some of them were noble. Some of them were 

wrong. Some of them were political. Some of them were compassionate. Some of them were all of these things.

But i t seems like we started making them back at the time of the Addabbo amendment, the Fly nt amendment, and the Paris Peace Accords and the tolerance of the Paris Peace Accords, and now we are 

confronted with this chaotic, desperate situation.

I think we have to make our decisions now from right here rather 

than from the past, and you said the objective, as I understood you, 

was simply to gain some precious time to work out a settlement.

I would like to ask whom you would work this settlement out with.

General Weyand. The two sides that I guess openly will be discussing this will be the PP G and the Government of Vietnam representatives. Whether the North Vietnamese will be involved in that I don’t 

know, but I am sure if they are not they will be close at hand.
23

Spe cifically, sir, I do n’t know who the spokesmen for the PR G are, 

bu t a numb er of the people who are now com ing into power in the 

Go vernm ent of Vietn am hav e been in c ontac t wi th the othe r side, but 

beyond th at , ag ain I wou ld say th at Se cretary Ki ssing er m ay be able 

to giv e yo u t he deta ils o f t ha t.

Mr. T alcott. You mentioned in yo ur tes tim ony ea rli er toda y th at 

the agr eem ent th at we make ought to be self-e nforc ing whe n we are 

deali ng w ith th e Comm unists, and ce rta inly h ist ory bea rs t hat o ut an d 

ce rta inly we made some agr eem ents with the Com munists an d they 

di dn ’t w ork an d now you are sug gesting th at we t ry to make some ot her 

agr eem ent w ith th e C ommunists.

I don’t see h ow it can possibly work unless there is some thing s elfexecuting. Th e only th in g th at I can see t hat was s elf-ex ecuting at t he 

tim e of the Par is Peace Accords was public opinion. We d id n’t int end 

to use ou r m ili ta ry might again an d the public opinion th at we were 

countin g on to be ou tra ge d in the case of violation s was th e Un ite d 

Na tions, the IC C, the media, the chu rches aro un d the world, the free 

countries of the world, an d no t one of the m responded at the tim e of 

the clear, inte nti on al, continuous viola tions o f th e P ar is Peace Accords.

Ho w could you pos sibly exp ect to e nter into a n agree me nt now th at 

is going to be kept more th an a few days or a few hours af te r we settle 

with whom among the Comm unists th at we are going t o tr y to s ettle 

wi th?

Gener al Weyand. S ir, I don’t t hi nk any of us can foresee wh at s ort 

of an agr eem ent these folk s might come up with. It will pro bably be 

some thing th at w ill be peculiarly Vietn amese, in th at th ey are the p arties th at will be argu in g with each other, an d there are so ma ny 

fac tio ns inv olve d in th is on th e other side.

You ha ve North V ietnam or Ha no i, as we call it . You ha ve t he PR G 

or the Viet Cong. Th ey, general ly spe aki ng, follow the same pa th b ut 

they h ave differences. Th e VC con sider them selves to be the ones who 

hav e made the gr ea t sacrifice and are the rev olu tionaries of South 

Vie tna m.

We have the Pe op le’s Republic o f C hina a nd t he Soviet Union with 

dif fer ing inte res ts in the fate o f South V iet nam and in th eir deg ree of 

influence over N orth V ietnam, and then we hav e w ith in So uth Vietnam 

a so-called th ir d forc e of fa ir ly inf lue nti al peop le at a fa irly bro ad 

politica l base of n ati on ali sts .

So wh at I am s aying is th at I d on’t th in k any of us can foresee w hat 

will come out of all of th at when you pu t all those ing red ien ts into a 

po t and it is n ot g oin g t o be a c lear-cut thing. I t is n’t goin g to be an yth in g th at we can foresee w ith gr ea t precision.

Al l I am alluding to is th at the re is o nly one ou t o f all o f t hose eleme nts th at is friend ly to ou r way of life whose valu es are sim ila r to 

ours, whose princ iples are the same as those held by us, and I sim ply 

wou ld lik e to see them in as str on g a position as possible whi le I recognize t hat t he ir pos itio n fro m our sta nd po int is s till virtu ally hopeless.

Mr. T alcott. M r. Ch airm an , I have an oth er question b ut I yie ld to 

the gen tlema n.

Mr. Maho n. Yo ur time has expired.

Th e g entlema n from Io wa .
24

Mr. Smith. General, you said that in the Saigon area the North has 

three corps, three or four divisions, and all the divisions are not the 

same size.

My question is this. What are the relative troop levels, including 

army, air force, navy, of the two sides and is there a threat to the air 

superiority of the South ?

General Weyand. Sir, let me take that last one first.

To this date there is not a threat to air superiority, but you probably have been reading of the surface-to-air missile systems that Hanoi 

is bringing south. They are in Military Region II I, some five transporters of the SA-2 which we have noted in recent days.

The South Vietnamese Air Force bombed two elements of that system. I don’t know what the results were. I know tha t they did knock 

out some of the transporte rs, so we do see defensive systems coming 

into the Saigon area. I don’t have the breakout with me of the relative 

strengths, but let me give it to you in broad, and th at is th at it is probably about three or four to one now in favor of the North Vietnamese 

in the area of real concern.

With the Vietnamese Air Force having complete air superiority, 

they are unchallenged other than by these defensive systems th at I 

have mentioned and they have been doing a good job.

Mr. Mahon. Further questions on my left ?

The gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. Long. General Weyand, before this collapse did the South Vietnamese fail because of lack of money or better equipment ?

General Weyand. Sir, I thin k their failure is attribu table to a whole 

litany of things, of which over a long period of time, shortages or not, 

well, levels—let me put it tha t way—of ammunition and of POL 

petroleum products.

Mr. Long. Didn’t we at all times give them all the money that we 

were asked? Isn ’t it true tha t the South Vietnamese had at least as 

good average level of equipment as the North Vietnamese?

General Weyand. No, sir. I think t hat will turn out in retrospect to 

be a myth, tha t they did not have the heavy equipment nor the fire 

power tha t the North had.

Mr. Long. What about the air force ?

General Weyand. The air force was very fine, sir. They did not 

have the-----

Mr. Long. The South Vietnamese Air Force was clearly superior 

to the North Vietnamese; isn’t that true ?

General Weyand. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Long. Doesn’t that weigh for something in the balance?

General Weyand. I t surely does.

Mr. Long. W hat about numbers? Didn ’t the South Vietnamese ou tnumber the North Vietnamese during most of this war?

General Weyand. Until this last invasion started, sir, and then it 

shifted very rapidly in favor of the North Vietnamese.

Mr. Long. General Weyand, several times during the course of 

your testimony you said there is hope, and then most recently you said 

the situation is virtually hopeless.

Isn’t th at a contradiction of terms ?

General Weyand. It surely is, sir.
25

Mr. L ong. Well, we are being asked to vote $360 million, I believe, 

altogether for a hope. Tha t amounts to $750,000 for every Member of 

Congress, every Member on this committee. I think most of us would 

say that we could offer something better than a hope if that money were 

spent in our district.

General Weyand. There is no doubt about t hat in my mind either, 

sir. I would say what we are talking about here is support of a principle and the chances of gaining what we want to gain out of it are 

going to be slim.

I would say if we do not gain what we have in mind, the cost is going 

to be insignificant to us. I t will not be anything like $300 million.

Mr. Long. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mahon. I don’t think your answers were complete as to the 

nature of the equipment on each side. Will you amplify tha t for the 

record.

General Weyand. Yes, sir.

[The information is classified and has been provided to the Committee on Appropriations.]

Mr. Maiion. Are there fu rther questions on my left ?

Mr. Myers. General, I will try to be brief.

Charges frequently are made t ha t the South Vietnamese wasted the 

equipment and materials tha t we supplied them and tha t much of it 

was turned over to the enemy. In your brief stay in South Vietnam was 

there much evidence th at there was unreasonable waste or loss?

I think everyone knows in a retreat situation or withdrawal situation 

tha t equipment is lost. Was it unreasonable ?

General Weyand. Sir, by my standards, I would have to tell you that 

it was unreasonable in tha t it was a poorly planned operation but, in 

terms of what history has shown us, it was not unreasonable. B ut it is 

something that, as a general officer, I would have found intolerable 

in my own command, but again I say t hat history has, we have seen 

repetitions, or this is a repetition of similar events in history. They are 

always messy, they are alway loused up, there is always fantastic waste, 

and this was an example of that.

Mr. Myers. You mentioned history. Again, the charges are made 

tha t absenteeism, AWOLs, desertion are high in the South Vietnamese 

Army.

As you are a student of history, again you know it has been a situation of where you happen to be.

At Valley Forge our desertions were really high, our absent-withoutleave rate was high. Again, were their AWOLs and desertions unreasonable ?

General Weyand. No. Considering what they were facing, tha t is 

the lives of dependents in particula r, we can find excuses for them.

Mr. Myers. Thank you.

Mr. Mahon. The gentleman from Texas.

Mr. Casey. General, you placed a lot of emphasis on the fact tha t 

if we do pass a bill in the order as the Chairman has offered as a vehicle, tha t this would raise the morale now. Is the news coverage over 

there—or does the public pretty well cover the news, and would the 

troops get this news?

General Weyand. Well, you would be amazed at how closely they 

do follow events here. This has been one of my problems, since I have
26

become a figure of some sort in this, is that things T say here will have 

a directly adverse impact in South Vietnam.

When I was in South Vietnam, I was quoted at a particular locale 

where I was with Vietnamese troops, they wanted some sign of encouragement and T guess just as I would with my own troops, I 

would tell them tha t there was hope, T would tell them they could 

defeat the enemy, but back here that went over like a ton of b ricks; 

some general over in South Vietnam telling those people they could 

throw the North Vietnamese back to Hanoi.

Well, that is the sort of thing—but they do follow it very closely. 

I was surprised up in Nha T rang to find there was a resolution pending over in the Senate and one of the commanding officers told me, if 

tha t resolution is passed, the morale of my troops will sink very 

rapidly.

Well, I suspect it would have been more the case of his morale sinking rapidly rather than his troops, but they follow events quite well.

Mr. Casey. Tha t leads me to the next question t hat I have and ask 

for your observations.

In view of that, since you have testified here tha t their position is 

rath er hopeless, and we are asked to make this gesture, let it be known 

then by the news media and by the people over there, th at it is nothing 

more or less than a gesture and that the case is hopeless, I would think 

tha t would have the inverse effect th at you are referring to, th at they 

would realize that their plight is a hopeless one and tha t the North 

Vietnamese would take advantage of it at the same time.

General Weyand. Well, I understand tha t, sir.

As I mentioned at the outset, when we say it is hopeless, they are 

still saying there is hope.

Duan Van Minli, so-called Big Minh, the other day, two days ago, 

he said there is hope. Tran Van Duong, who has been a member of 

this third force and they have now installed him as Minister of Defense, he says there is hope.

I guess really all I am saying, and you have touched on it, is that 

as long as they think there is hope, as long as they, our friends, are 

willing to die for whatever tha t hope is, I think tha t this principle 

that we have been holding to, not a commitment to the South Vietnamese people but a commitment to principle, is still a valid one for 

us to hold to.

I have, as you have, the lives of, for example, 55,000 of my men, 

almost 300,000 wounded, I do not want all of tha t to have been in 

vain, and I realize at this point in time there is really not much I can 

do about it.

I do believe that when those sacrifices were made they were not in 

vain and they were not in vain because they were given for a principle, t hat has made this country great. Now if, having followed tha t 

principle in this instance in history, it turns out that we lost, the other 

system won the upper hand, I still believe th at our adherence to th at 

principle was a cause that permits me to tell the wives and the mothers 

and the fathers of these young men tha t tha t was not in vain.

Mr. Casey. General, as I understood earlier, they have sufficient munitions and so forth to hold out for possibly another month or six 

weeks, is tha t correct ?
21

Mr. von Marbod. I n some classes, yes, sir.

Mr. Casey. In some classes. Well, is tha t going to be sufficient to 

bring about this possible political settlement and be of sufficient 

amount to—I would think tha t within a month or six weeks or less 

tha t this whole thing is going to be jelled one way or the other.

General Weyand. I think you are right, sir. The problem out 

there is one of distribution in p art and one of the, as Mr. von Marbod 

mentioned earlier, serious shortages of some essential items of ammunition. Of course we would not send out there those types of ammunition tha t they have in ample quantity, but there are others tha t 

they need.

The picture tha t I p aint for you is tha t there are South V ietnamese 

units on the field of battle now that are short of ammunition.

Mr. Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mahon. Furthe r questions on my left?

The gentleman from Colorado ?

Mr. Evans. I just had one question.

General, reference was made previously to sums of munitions tha t 

were in the pipeline. Could you clarify tha t and tell us how much, 

in materials and munitions, is in the pipeline and could you also tell 

us what you mean by “in the pipeline” ?

Mr. von Marbod. The pipeline is the actual logistics movement of 

supplies to that country by ship or by air. Again, the testimony was 

tha t we have in the neighborhood of $100 million for all supplies 

and all services.

However, p art of t hat money is committed against fixed costs, like 

the payment of our overhead costs in Saigon and the administration 

of the program in accordance with statute.

Mr. Evans. Does this sum represent a significant amount of munitions tha t is still in this country and not yet shipped ?

Mr. von Marbod. The pipeline is in motion. There are some items 

within tha t amount that have not left the continental United States, 

primarily heavy equipment items whose requirements are being reexamined.

Mr. E vans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Whitten. Mr. Robinson?

Mr. Robinson. General, if you did not cover during our absence 

while we were voting, would you amplify briefly on your statement 

to the effect that m ilitary and humanita rian aid are inextricably bound 

together ?

General Weyand. Well, in that if we do not provide them with military assistance, there is not going to be any security or secure situations tha t would permit the administration of humanitarian aid. It 

is difficult to separate one from the other because all of these people 

are attem pting to flee to a place of sanctuary or a place of some security and safety. And those places are disappearing. So it is just tha t 

simple, sir.

I think tha t to provide humanita rian aid, of course, we would like 

to have it channeled into the refugees and just a simple act of getting 

tha t assistance translated from money into clothing and food and 

shelter at the right place is going to be impossible unless there is some 

degree of military security provided.

Mr. Robinson. T hank you, Mr. Chairman.
28

Mr. Maiion. Let me make this statement to the committee.

General Weyand, can yon stay with ns for a while longer?

General Weyand. I was almost ready to say I would be happy to, 

sir, but yes, sir.

Mr. Maiion. Secretary Kissinger is here and I would like to say to 

the members of the committee that it would seem to me that when we 

interrogate the Secretary, we should give the people who have not had 

an opportunity to interrogate General Weyand an opportunity to 

interrogate the witnesses before we start again on a questioning period.

If there is no objection we will follow that procedure. J

We will stand in recess for about three or four minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. Maiion. We will resume the hearing.

General Weyand is going to stay with us and we want to move 

along as well as we can.

Mr. Secretary, we welcome you before the committee. We are glad 

to see you, Secretary Habib. We have been talking about what to do, 

if anything, by way of providing additional funds for military and 

economic humanitarian aid for South Vietnam.

I had introduced earlier today a bill providing for an approp riation 

of $200 million additional in military assistance and $165 million additional in economic or humanitarian assistance, realizing of course 

tha t it might become impossible to deliver any of this assistance, but 

thinking perhaps under all the circumstances consideration should be 

given to this approach.

Of course you know, Mr. Secretary, that the recent events in Southeast Asia had not been predicted, at least within the time frame, that 

the collapse of parts of South Vietnam has happened. And it was 

thought th at perhaps on the regular appropriation bill for defense and 

the regular foreign assistance appropriation coming from the Passman 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations th at these funds could be—these 

problems could be considered at tha t time. But events have changed 

tha t picture.

Now, as you know, the President has made a request some time ago, 

a short time ago, for $972 million in additional aid, including $742 

million, I believe—is that the righ t figure—in excess of $700 million 

in military assistance.

There has been no authorization of large parts of that request, but 

there is existing authorization for some military assistance and for 

some economic aid.

Now what do we do a t this point in history? We realize that this 

is a difficult time, you are very busy with the problems of the Secretary of State, and we realize that there is a lot of uncertainty in the 

equation.

What can you say to us now and do you have any recommendation 

to make at this moment as to anything meaningful which we might do, 

however uncertain the results might be ?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen: I appreciate this opportunity to testify before your committee. I have a brief 

formal statement which I can supply for the record, or which I can 

read, whichever you prefer, and then I can answer your question, or 

should I go right to the question which you put to me ?
29

Mr. Maiion. I thin k it would be good for you to make an overall 

statement without interruption, in regard to this situation.

Secretary Kissinger. Right.

Well, then, let me make this brief, rather general statement.

Mr. Mahon. Sure.

Secretary Kissinger. And then I will address the specific question 

tha t you put to me, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it is unnecessary for me to speak at g reat length this 

afternoon since my views with respect to the new and difficult s itua ­

tion are well-known to the Congress. I merely wish to reiterate briefly 

what we see as the essential issues remaining before us at this late 

hour in South Vietnam.

Events have moved with great rapidity. In the ten days since the 

President addressed the Congress and the American people, the th reat 

to South Vietnamese continued existence has become ever more grave. 

Hard and bloody battles have been waged and despite resistance by 

the South Vietnamese Army, the p atte rn of these encounters has been 

one of gradual but steady Communist advance.

This has prompted some to conclude that our discussion of assistance to South Vietnam is therefore meaningless. In my judg ment, 

however, the issue remains relevant. The ultimate outcome is yet to be 

determined and it would serve no purpose for me to speculate on that 

matter at this time.

There is another equally compelling aspect of the tragedy in South 

Vietnam : the hundreds of thousands of refugees in tha t country, 

people who have abandoned their homes and their land to flee the 

advancing Communist Armies. These people have suffered unimaginably. Indeed, in many ways they symbolize the blind sorrow of warfare. 

We have been providing food, shelter, and medical care.

I am confident that America will continue to respond to their plight 

with the generosity so characteristic of our national tradition.

In addition to requesting emergency military and humanitarian 

assistance for South Vietnam, the President also asked the Congress 

to clarify existing legislation governing the use of American forces 

in Indochina.

Here, too, I believe the need is obvious. So tha t should the worst 

come to pass, our forces would be available to assist in an evacuation of 

Americans and of South Vietnamese whose lives would be clearly in 

danger.

Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, much of our discussion during the 

last two weeks has focused on the United States objectives in South 

Vietnam. But what can we hope to achieve in this immensely difficult 

situation when our range of choices obviously is extremely limited. We 

have spoken of the possibility, however remote, tha t by giving South 

Vietnam the military aid it so desperately needs, the momentum of 

North Vietnamese advance might be blunted and conditions thereby 

established which could allow South Vietnam to work towards a n ore 

equitable and more humane solution than one which is imposed upon 

it totally by force.

We have not said tha t this will come about. Whether a controlled 

solution can be achieved by any means is yet to be determined. The 

tran sfer of power and formation of a new government following
30

President Thieu’s resignation appears to be taking place in accordance 

with constitutional processes.

For that government to pursue its objectives, which we assume will 

be announced in due time, it will need our support. Thus our objectives 

in the military or political sense are indeed limited, as they must be. 

But however limited, those objectives must be pursued with urgency 

for, despite the complex history of this conflict and our role in it, the 

fundamental issue we now face is quite clear: South Vietnam h° 

nowhere else to turn. Without our help it has no hope even of 

moderating the pace of events which it has bravely resisted for many 

years.

Our long association with South Vietnam in tha t painful and 

tr ad e endeavor does not permit us to look away.

Now this is my formal statement, Mr. Chairman. If I could add 

perhaps some extemporaneous remarks.

Since the President has submitted his request, in all the testimony 

tha t we have made before various congressional committees, we have 

stated tha t no one under the conditions existing could guarantee a 

particular military outcome. But our argument has been th at, whatever the outcome one foresaw, it was in our interest, it was in the 

interest of the lives of Americans that were still involved as well as 

those thousands of Vietnamese who, in reliance on us, worked with 

us for a decade and a half, tha t we achieve to the greatest extent 

possible a controlled situation in which there were individuals 

whom we could deal who could be responsible for actions.

This attem pt to achieve a controlled situation is as urgent, if not 

more urgent today than i t was previously. And for those reasons, any 

action by the Congress to meet the President’s request would be an 

enormous help to those of us who are attem pting to bring about these 

controlled circumstances.

Mr. Mahon. What, in your opinion, will be the impact on American 

foreign policy, worldwide, if we do not take proper action with respect 

to South Vietnam at this time ?

And what is your rationale for your position ?

Secretary Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, I have stated two seemingly 

contradictory propositions.

One is, the impact of events in Indochina on our international positions has been serious, and the failure of the Congress to vote any 

assistance would complicate that situation.

On the other hand, I have also stated tha t we are determined to 

master the situation and, even without aid, we are determined to master it, but without aid it will be somewhat more difficult, if the United 

States projects the impression of abandoning people who have dealt 

with us for so long totally to thei r fate without making any effort to 

achieve control over the situation, it would not help our international 

position.

But I do not want to contribute to a worldwide impression tha t 

However it ends, the United States is not capable of mastering events.

Mr. Mahon. Well, am I to conclude that you feel that some economic 

aid and some military aid would be in the best interests of the United 

States at this time, in your opinion ?

Secretary Kissinger. In my opinion, yes, Mr. Chairman.
31

Mr. Mahon. O f course you would agree tha t the effectiveness and 

our capacity to deliver such aid might be in question, but you still 

would favor some action by the Congress ?

Secretary Kissinger. I would still favor some action by the Congress, Mr. Chairman, and if events should turn out that it cannot be 

delivered, we will at least have done what we could in this difficult 

circumstance.

Mr. Mahon. It has been said th at m ilitary aid is not desirable under 

the circumstances, but tha t humanita rian aid might be more 

appropriate.

I would like to know whether in your opinion there would be some 

way to deliver humanitarian aid in the event of the collapse of Saigon 

and the South Vietnamese Government ?

Would you then be without any opportunity to deliver the humanitarian aid ? Or do you think they have to go side-by-side with respect 

to this matter?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have many objectives 

in South Vietnam. When the President spoke of stabilizing the military situation, at least for long enough to permit a controlled outcome—if the new government attempts a negotiation, and I cannot 

speak for it since it has not yet even technically been formed, but if it 

attempts a negotiation, the conditions on the ground will have at least 

to some extent an effect on the outcome of these negotiations.

As the situation disintegrates, or if the situation disintegrates 

totally, the h umanitarian needs will rapid ly escalate and the capacity 

to deal with it will rapidy disintegrate.

In addition to this, our ability to extricate those whom we are trying 

to evacuate will of course progressively diminish as the situation gets 

out of control, and this is our principal reason for attem pting to 

achieve the maximum control over the situation.

Mr. Mahon. I would like to say to the members of the committee 

that some of the members have had no opportunity to ask any questions 

of the General, of the Secretary. I would yield—I am not going to ask 

a number of questions myself at this time, I would yield to the gentleman on my left, Mr. Yates.

Mr. Yates. Mr. Secretary, peace was achieved, or an effort to achieve 

peace was made at the time that you negotiated with Lee Due Tho 

and the representatives of the North Vietnamese forces. Has an effort 

been made at this time to communicate with them to try to establish 

any kind of an agreement for peaceful term ination of hostilities?

Secretary K issinger. Well, there are various negotiating efforts going on, but it would be inappropriate for me to discuss them at this 

moment.

However, we are of course aware of the fact th at we have supported 

it, tha t a negotiated outcome would offer the best possibility for achieving the objectives th at I have described.

Air. Yates. Are efforts being made to use the Soviet Union or the 

Chinese Communists for the purpose ?

Secretary Kissinger. I don’t think it appropriate for me at this 

time to discuss how we are conducting the negotiations. “Negotiate” 

is perhaps an incorrect word. What efforts we are making in the diplomatic field.
32

Mr. Yates. Would the funds tha t you have requested for the purposes th at you have outlined support the efforts fo r negotiations tha t 

you say are being undertaken ?

Secretary Kissinger. Yes. The funds would be a big help in any 

diplomatic efforts that are being or may be undertaken.

Mr. Yates. Can you tell us in what way they would assist you?

Secretary Kissinger. Fo r one thing they will sustain the morale of 

the government in Saigon that will have to maintain control over the 

situation tha t I have described earlier. Certainly they would ease the 

human suffering th at has been described to you. Thirdly, while they 

will not permit a redressing of the military situation, they will offer 

at least a possibility for some local balances that may enable and tha t 

may create an incentive f or the kind of negotiations now foreseeable.

Mr. Yates. Does the President in your judgment need congressional approval to use American forces to help evacuate Americans in 

South Vietnam ?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, it is a fine point on the strictly legal 

interpretation. He has not asked for congressional authority. He has 

really asked for clarification because there is a slight confusion in the 

law between the War Powers Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 

1973. I would think, however, tha t the President, in case of doubt, 

would resolve it in favor of using American forces to evacuate Americans in the confidence th at he would be sustained by the Congress.

Mr. Yates. I have the impression that the War Powers Act acknowledged the President’s right to act under such a circumstance, limited, 

however, by the provisions of the War Powers Act.

Secretary Kissinger. That is right. The W ar Powers Act is not the 

problem. The problem is the resolution. It is the Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1973 with respect to Indochina, not with respect to other areas 

of the world. There is some ambiguity there but some of the lawyers, 

anyway, feel that the President can be assumed to have residual powers 

to exercise in protecting the lives of Americans and th at this would be 

sustained.

Mr. Yates. If the President does have that power as a constitutional 

righ t to protect American citizens in other lands, the efforts of any 

congressional legislation would probably be unconstitutional then, 

would it not, which sought to abridge tha t power ?

Secretary Kissinger. That is the argument that is being made, but 

we thought tha t it would be helpful to have congressional clarification at this point as it applies to Indochina, but, if necessary, we would 

have to resolve it along the lines th at you indicated.

Mr. Yates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mahon. Furth er Questions on my left ?

The gentleman from California.

Mr. Roybal. Mr. Secretary, it is quite evident, based on the testimony we heard this afternoon, tha t the military options open to the 

North Vietnamese are limitless. Now, if this is so, is it possible tha t 

within the next few days, a week at the most, th at the North Vietnamese would have prevailed ?

Secretary Kissinger. I don’t want to speculate on the possible military outcome, but i t is clear, the military balance as it exists in South 

Vietnam at this moment and for the foreseeable future is clear, and
33

I am sure has been described by General Weyand. We are talkin g now 

about achieving the most humane and the most controlled outcome 

tha t is obtainable under these conditions.

Mr. Roybal. The reason for this appropriation then is more for the 

psychological tha n the military effect; isn’t tha t correct?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, it is not possible to separate these totally, but no one is think ing now of the purely military outcome.

Mr. Roybal. In other words, your contention is tha t the military 

outcome has already been determined ?

Secretary K issinger. My contention is tha t in any negotiation tha t 

may be attempted, or better, whatever negotiations may be attempted, 

will depend in part on the judgment of the various parties involved 

as to what other options the other side still has and in this respect it 

would be of some utility if the Congress appropriated some of the 

funds we have asked.

Mr. Roybal. I f we were to appropriate this money, the Government 

of South Vietnam might enter into some kind of negotiations. But 

since, the Vice President of Vietnam has now taken over, this is exactly 

the same government that they have had for years. Now, should tha t 

make any difference then as to the advisability of our making available 

this money ?

Secretary Kissinger. The outcome of the political changes that have 

begun in South Vietnam today can not be predicted and may take 

many forms, and in our judgment in all probability will lead to some 

form of negotiation. In our view the willingness of the Congress to 

appropriate the funds we have requested will assist the speeding of 

these negotiations and the ability to bring matters to a controlled 

solution.

Mr. Roybal. What negotiations, Mr. Secretary ?

Secretary Kissinger. Whatever negotiations may be attempted.

Mr. Roybal. But those negotiations now in your mind are still up 

in the air? You don’t know exactly what those negotiations will be?

Secretary K issinger. I don’t think I can talk about a process which 

will have to await the formation of the new government th at is going 

to emerge in Saigon.

Mr. Roybal. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mahon. Furthe r question on my right?

The gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Secretary, will you give us your thoughts on South 

Vietnamese chances now that within the last less than 24 hours President Thieu has decided to resign.

Secretary Kissinger. Wha t do I think about th e chances of-----

Mr. Miller. Will you give us your thoughts on South Vietnamese 

chances now that President Thieu has decided to resign.

Secretary Kissinger. The m ilitary situation is of course very grim. 

It has frequently been stated tha t the presence of President Thieu was 

an obstacle to negotiations and tha t if he would step down a negotiation could be achieved. Now, the next few days may test whether 

tha t hypothesis was correct. In any event, the existence of a government in Saigon will contribute to the other objectives we also have 

in South Vietnam, which is to evacuate, if the worst comes to pass, 

all of the Americans and those South Vietnamese to whom we have 

a particula r moral obligation.
34

Mr. Miller. As I u nderstood in yo ur p relim inary rem ark s, you said 

we hav e been furnish ing food, shelter, an d medicine to So uth V ietnam. 

Can we contin ue th at witho ut the a pp ropr iatio n fo r h um an ita ria n aid 

th at is requ ested here to day ?

Se cre tar y Kissinger. We can certa inly not con tinu e it at the level 

th at is now needed.

Mr. Miller. W ha t is th e possibility of t he United State s fu rnish ing 

the m ilitar y, economic and hu man ita ria n assistance, and in delive ring 

th at assistance becoming involve d again in a new war in South 

Vie tnam ?

Secre tar y Kissinger. Mr. Miller , the pos sibility of ou r becoming 

involved in a nothe r w ar in South Vietnam belongs to the rem ote st conting encies th at thi s country faces. Ou r objective now is to achieve a 

sit uatio n in which we can pro tec t, if the wor st comes to pass, those 

South Vietnam ese whose lives quite literally have dep end ed on us 

an d to extricate those Am eric ans rem aining . There is no possibility 

of our beco ming invo lved mili taril y aga in.

Mr. Miller. No possibi lity?

Secre tary K issinger. No possibility.

Mr. Miller. W ha t amount of mili tary ha rdwa re th at we furnish ed 

South Vie tnam has fal len int o the hands of the No rth Vietnam ese?

Secre tary K issinger. G ener al W eyand will be able to give you the 

figures, bu t a very s ubsta nti al percen tage, I am sure.

Mr. Miller. Than k you, Mr. Chairma n.

Mr. Maho n. F ur th er questions?

Th e gentlem an from W est Virg ini a.

Mr. Slack. Tha nk you, Mr. C hairm an.

Mr. Secre tary, if money is app ropr iated fo r hum an ita ria n aid would 

you propose to use w hatev er a mount is necessary to finance th e e vacuations of the Am eric ans an d the Vietnam ese ?

Secre tar y K issinger. Yes ; we would use par t of this to finance the 

evacuation.

Mr. Slack. Mr. Secre tary, as you know, the State D ep artm en t p res ­

ently has an ap prop ria tio n th at can be used to cover eva cuation expenses. Do you plan to use those fun ds also ?

Secre tary K issinger. Well, the sum th at is lef t in t ha t ap prop ria tio n 

is so sm all and has to cover so ma ny rem ain ing contingencie s for this 

fiscal year th at it could not be used fo r th is purpo se.

Mr. Slack. Thank you. Th an k yo u ve ry much.

Th an k you, M r. C hai rman.

Mr. Maiio n. The gent lem an from Wisconsin .

Mr. Obey. Mr. Secre tary, let me j ust ask one question. General Weyand has indicated th at the military situatio n is pr et ty hopeless. You 

ind icated th at our efforts were aimed at achieving an ab ility to modera te the pace of events, I th ink yo ur words were. You m ade reference 

to hope s of achieving some ty pe of negotiations. Let me just ask t his as 

a pers on who has con sistently oppo sed ap pr op riat in g addit ion al 

am oun ts of money to Vietnam . I might be willing to conside r ap pr opr ia ting the kin d of money you are ask ing for here if I could un de rsta nd exa ctly to wha t end those neg otiations would be undertaken. 

Are you talking abou t in fact an orderly tran sf er of power, as some 

people ha ve used those words aro und here, to imply a tr an sf er of powe r
35

eventually to the North Vietnamese, or are your talking about some 

other realistic outcome? What would the goal of those negotiations be?

Secretary Kissinger. I hope you understand the difficulty I have 

in commenting about what a 'government tha t has not yet been 

formed and tha t has not yet announced its program and with which 

we have not yet been in touch may do. But given General Weyand’s 

assumptions and given the fact tha t the conditions th at brought about 

the resignation of President Thieu will be clearly understood by 

this new government, it is reasonable to assume tha t one of its objectives would be to bring about the most humane impact of this 

sequence of events, and t ha t is an effort we would certainly support.

Mr. Obey. Well, what does that mean, Mr. Secretary ? I would really 

like to help you, but I honestly don’t know what all these words 

mean.

Secretary Kissinger. It would mean attempting, for example, to 

avoid a battle for the city of Saigon if that could be done by some 

effort.

Mr. Obey. No more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Kissinger. And to avoid some of the situations that 

apparently happened in Phnom Penh afterward.

Mr. Mahon. Furthe r questions on my right?

The gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Secretary, I would like to try and clarify the 

amount of military and humanitarian aid tha t is available presently 

from already appropriated funds. General Weyand indicated there 

was about $100 million worth of military aid obligated, in the pipeline. It has been said there is another $175 million in military aid 

tha t has been appropriated but not obligated. Is th at correct?

Secretary Kissinger. I don’t th ink that is correct, but, at any rate, 

General Weyand would know these figures better than I do. I am 

told tha t all the money that is being appropriated has been obligated.

Mr. Coughlin. All the money tha t has been appropriated to date 

has been obligated so tha t the only aid available now is what is 

already in the pipeline?

Secretary Kissinger. On the economic side there are $5 million 

that are unobligated.

Mr. Coughlin. On the economic side there is $5 million unobligated 

and how much in the pipeline ?

Secretary Kissinger. I don’t know.

Mr. P ark er is really in a better position to answer this than I am.

Mr. Coughlin. If it is going to take this long perhaps we can provide it for the record.

Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Secretary, one further question.

I am concerned about people, both Americans and South Vietnamese who have been of assistance to us and who have worked 

with us. Certainly the experience in Cambodia would lead you to 

feel that you don’t have to worry about political prisoners afte r this 

because they seem to execute the political prisoners on their side, 

and you don’t have to worry about knowing much about what goes on 

because the media seem to be the first thin g to go, and I am concerned whether the amount of money that you are asking does cover 

the protection of those South Vietnamese who have been of pa rticu lar 

assistance to us and have worked with us particula rly.
36

Secretary Kissinger. Our difficulty, our problem, in the last ten 

days has been to conduct ourselves in such a manner tha t we can 

save the maximum number of lives without at the same time creating 

a panic which would prevent the saving of any lives.

If you understand this is the basic principle of our policy over the 

last ten days, it will be a key to many thin gs that have been done. So 

in this situation where a great deal depends on the psychological impact, I believe that the congressional action can help us in this effort 

of preventing a panic and helping stabilize the situation for the purposes that I have described.

Mr. Coughlin. Are the funds sufficient, for example, to cover the 

evacuation of South Vietnamese who have been of assistance to us?

Secretary Kissinger. The funds t hat your committee is now considering ?

Mr. Coughlin. The funds you have asked for.

Secretary Kissinger. The funds we have asked for would be sufficient, yes.

Mr. Coughlin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mahon. Mr. Roush.

Mr. Roush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have heard the figures of the Chairman’s bill but I 

have not heard from the witness table the funding tha t you are requesting for military, economic, and humanitarian assistance.

Are you staying with the figure proposed by the President of ten 

days ago in his message to the Congress ?

Secretary Kissinger. As you know, the White House today announced that the President maintains his full request.

However, we would feel tha t under the circumstances tha t exist 

today if the committee voted the funds tha t the Chairman has proposed tha t this would be a contribution towards the objectives th at I 

have outlined and we would therefore support it.

Mr. Roush. Then, Mr. Secretary, to follow up on the question of the 

evacuees and where we draw the line, for a long time we have been 

making decisions under the threat tha t there would be a blood bath 

in South Vietnam if we did not provide the funds necessary for assistance by the South Vietnamese.

In the past few days and weeks much of South Vietnam has fallen 

to the North Vietnamese. Do you have at this time any evidence of any 

atrocities or of a blood bath in any portion of South Vietnam recently 

taken over by the North Vietnamese, and I am referring to a recent 

atrocity or a recent blood bath ?

Secretary Kissinger. As was pointed out, as soon as the North Vietnamese take over, the ability to collect information becomes extremely 

restricted. We have reports of atrocities in various areas that have 

been occupied by the North Vietnamese. They usually come from 

people who escaped these atrocities so by definition there aren’t too 

many witnesses tha t can escape to the areas that are not yet controlled 

by the Communists.

But if one puts together these reports with the demonstrated record 

of the North Vietnamese and their operation of tyranny, one can expect 

tha t the lives of a substantial number of people will be in jeopardy and 

the liberty of an even larger number of people will be in jeopardy, 

and I think that there can be no reasonable estimate made.
37

Mr. Roush. Do you have any evidence of an extensive blood bath 

having taken place ? You speak of atrocities, about there would be one 

or two atrocities, but are there many ?

Secretary Kissinger. The evidence we have is too fragm entary for 

me to assert tha t there is an extensive blood bath going on. The evidence we have indicates, which is extraord inarily fragm entary, I must 

point out, there are many towns from which we get no reports whatsoever one way or the other.

Secondly, you have to remember tha t the political control apparatus 

of the North Vietnamese is not yet in full control, that this is mostly 

the North Vietnamese Army tha t has taken over, but I would repeat 

if one puts together the reports we have already received with the 

record of the North Vietnamese in other periods of the war, plus their 

basic approach to the problem of political power, I thin k it is only 

reasonable to assume t hat the lives of a substantial number of people 

who were associated directly or indirectly with our effort will be in 

jeopardy.

Mr. Roush. In view of tha t assumption, how many South Vietnamese 

do you contemplate evacuating from South Vietnam?

Secretary Kissinger. This depends entirely on the conditions tha t 

will exist when the evacuation takes place. In a totally uncontrolled 

circumstance, the number that can be evacuated will be extremely 

small.

All our efforts will have to concentrate on Americans.

Mr. Whitten. Mr. Chairman, would you yield to me fo r one question?

Secretary Kissinger. If we achieve a controlled situation, then of 

course we can do a more reasonable job. In an uncontrolled situation 

we are not talkin g about huge numbers.

Mr. Mahon. The gentleman from Indiana yields to the gentleman 

from Mississippi.

Mr. W hitten. Mr. Secretary, all of the discussion to this point has 

been along the line that if Congress goes along with this request introduced by the Chairman, the $300 million-plus, that it will prolong 

the fighting and give hope and hopefully will enable the South Vietnamese to do better.

Nobody has touched on the probable reaction on the other side by 

the North Vietnamese. You remember that in World Wa r II when 

President Truman saw the Japanese were drag ging the war out, he 

ordered the bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and most 

people agree as devastating as this was it caused less loss of American 

lives and perhaps of Japanese.

What is there to keep you and General Weyand from believing th at 

at this late stage, when the Communist read the United States has appropriated $722 million to drag the war out, that you won’t thereby 

invite an all-out blood bath by North Vietnamese using the same argument that we Americans used in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, saying they did it so as not to prolong the fighting? To save more 

human lives. This reaction seems equally as likely and probable as 

the one you espouse.

What is your thought as to that? Would you accept the responsibility if this results from what you recommend?
38

Se cre tary K issinger. T his is, of course, the sort of ju dg men t t hat is 

involve d here. T he blood ba th has two components.

Mr. Whitt en . You rec all t he Tr um an action.

Sec retary Kissinger. I recall it. I do n’t th ink it is exa ctly paralle l, 

but I see y our point. But wh at I wou ld like to po int out is th at t here 

are two aspe cts of th e question o f th e blo od ba th.

The first is the casualties t h at will be suffered in pro lon gatio n of a 

war. The second is the numb er of individu als who will be killed as a 

res ult of a politica l ta keo ver. Those ind ivi duals ar e independent of the 

acti ons th at are conduc ted du ring the war because those are specific 

tar ge ts, and the ab ility to evacuate the m depends to some exten t on 

our a bility to con duct ne gotiation s.

Mr. W iiitt en . One f urther statem ent, Mr. Chairm an.

Secre tary K issinger. S o I w ould say the two, i f they a ct like P re sident Tr um an acco rding to you------

Mr. Wiii tt en . W e hav e misjudged the Asiatic mind, it strike s me, 

fro m the beginning.

W ha t I am tryi ng to direc t yo ur att en tio n to is the basis on whi ch 

you decide th at No rth Vi etn am would n’t decide to do like Pr esiden t 

Tr um an did.

Secre tary K issinger. We ll, if North Vietn am does wh at Pr esiden t 

Tr um an d id, it would be in a military o peration , af te r which it would 

hav e unc ontrolled pow er and it would, the ref ore , be in a position to 

work its will, any way .

W ha t we are tryi ng to b rin g about is a s itu ati on wh ere th at does no t 

hap pen .

Mr. Wiiitt en . I am tryi ng to dir ect yo ur a tte ntion to the fact t ha t 

this r esu lt may well follow, Mr. Chairm an.

Secre tary K issinger. I t depen ds on the judg men t one makes on how 

the y are motivated.

Mr. Maiio n. Furt her question s on my l eft ?

Th e gen tlem an from Utah.

We will move sho rtly, I hope, to an executive session to disc uss some 

of the aspects of this m atter with the Secre tar y and with Gen eral 

Weya nd.

Mr. McKay. Mr. Secre tary, assum ing th at m ili taril y South Vietn am 

sho uld fal l, wou ld there be a request fo r economic aid eit he r to the 

North or the S ou th for hum an ita ria n purposes?

Secre tar y K issinger. W ell, I do no t foresee any possibility of a request for aid for hu man ita ria n purpo ses fo r the No rth . As fo r the 

South , I think we sho uld assess th at in the lig ht of the con ditions 

whi ch the n exist and the con duct of wh ate ver gov ernment emerges.

Mr. McKay. Do you feel that if no military assistance is fort hcom ing 

and th at the military con dition which has been described prevails, 

and South Vie tnam falls, th at you could effectively admi nis ter hu ­

man ita ria n aid ?

Secre tary K issinger. We ll, I th ink we have to separate two circumstances—one, a con dition in which the re is an ind ependent South 

Vietnam or a c ond ition in which South V ietn am is overrun.

If the re is an ind ependent South Vietn am or a par t of it, we t hink 

th at aid could be administered in confo rm ity with the purpo ses for 

which it is given. What wou ld happen un de r oth er circums tanc es, we 

would have to wait to see w hat form the Government would ta ke.
39

The economic aid tha t we are now requesting is for immediate and 

mainly humanita rian needs between now and October. It is not for 

long-term purposes.

Mr. McKay. Is it necessary to appropriate military aid in order 

tha t humanitarian aid might be effectively administered?

Secretary Kissinger. We thin k it would be helpful to appropriate 

the military aid that we have requested, yes, sir.

Mr. McKay. Regarding the number of those you intend to evacuate you have talked about a controlled situation in South Vietnam 

versus a noncontrolled situation. How many persons does the U.S. 

plan to evacuate in either one of those situations ?

Secretary Kissinger. They have been given in executive session. If 

there is to be an executive session, I prefer to discuss it then.

Mr. McKay. Have contingencies been made so that those evacuated 

will have a place to be taken to.

Secretary Kissinger. Well, yes, we have extensive plans that we 

have been in touch with many governments as to their willingness to 

receive some of these evacuees.

Of course at this moment we have no estimate whatever as to likely 

numbers.

Mr. McKay. Do you know, how many South Vietnamese have 

worked in key positions with the U.S. as well as where they are 

located ?

Secretary Kissinger. No, no.

Yes, we have lists and we have identified them and we would know 

what to do if the conditions come about at various levels of danger to 

them and at various levels of our logistics capability.

If the evacuation has to take place under conditions such as at 

Phnom Penh, the number is of course extremely—it is limited as compared to other circumstances.

Mr. Mahon. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Passman. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question ?

Mr. Mahon. The gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. Passman. Mr. Secretary, would it be possible for the United 

States to participate in these negotiations to bring about a coalition 

government o r some other type of peace settlement, without this country having to commit itself to a massive foreign aid program ?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, I do not want to say now what the outcome of any negotiations might be, and I am not saying tha t there are 

negotiations at this moment going on between the Vietnamese.

The particular role the United States should play in the negotiations is a complicated one. I would rather reserve any questions dealing with negotiations for an executive session, if you do not mind, 

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mahon. All right.

Mr. Passman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mahon. The gentleman from Florida.

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, tha nk you very much.

Mr. Secretary, did we know in advance tha t President Thieu was 

going to resign, and when that resignation would be forthcoming?

Secretary Kissinger. We had some advance information, yes.

Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, do we have any advance understanding 

or agreement with the Communists as to what the effect of the resignation might be, what they might be willing to do?
40

Secretary Kissinger. No, we did not.

Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, I have two related questions and will propose them in just one part.

It seems to me there is a question th at we are all going to have to 

answer. It seems to me that the American people and the people in all 

of the free countries, are going to have to decide whether or not we 

are going to stand up to the spread of communism or not, and, if so, 

where are we going to draw the line?

In view of what has been happening around the world recently, and 

I understand in the spirit of detente possibly we might not go into it 

in too much detail, but as we see these developments unfolding 

throughout the world, I thin k we have to make this decision: Are we 

going to stand up to communism ? And if we are, where ?

Secretary Kissinger. I think the question you have asked is a very 

important one. I think the United States has to—under the circumstances of recent events has a particular necessity to make clear tha t 

those commitments it makes it will stand by, and tha t no aggressor 

can move against our interests with impunity.

I agree with you that this necessity is very great.

Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

I was advised by a so-called usually reliable source that after today 

all commercial flights into and out of Saigon would be suspended. Do 

you have any knowledge of this ?

Secretary Kissinger. I have not heard of this yet. I am not—I do 

not think it has been decided as yet.

Mr. Young. Thank you very much.

Secretary Kissinger. I am not familiar with that.

Mr. Mahon. Any fu rther questions on my left ?

Mr. Long. Questions for the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mahon. The gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. Bevilj,. Mr. Secretary, would it be fa ir to summarize your testimony tha t with this $300 million, plus other funds, tha t there is hope, 

but without it no hope?

Secretary Kissinger. I thin k with it, there is a better hope for 

achieving the objectives which I have outlined, which are the most 

humane evolution that we can now foresee, plus the maximum evacuation of those whose lives are in danger, as well as the safest possible 

evacuation of Americans.

Mr. Bevill. Do you have any judgment how long this $300 million 

would last ?

Secretary Kissinger. I have no good judgment on that.

Maybe General Weyand has.

Mr. Giaimo. Would you yield?

Do I infer from what you just said th at the number of people to be 

evacuated depends upon, in any degree, upon the amounts of money 

which are forthcoming from the United States ?

Secretary Kissinger. No. The number of people to be evacuated 

depends on the circumstances th at can be created on the ground. And 

to th at the amount th at is appropriated is relevant. No one has blackmailed us-----

Mr. Giaimo. Tha t is what I am trying to get from you.
41

Se cretary K issinger.------and as you know , we have been ste adily

an d very subs tantially red ucing the numb er of Am erican s in South 

Vietn am wi thou t any opposition , bu rea uc rat ic or o therwise, fro m the 

So uth Vie tnam ese Gover nm ent . But con dition s could de terio rate t o a 

po int where nobody h as c ontrol of the situ ation an d t hat is w ha t we are 

tryi ng to av oid.

Mr. Giaimo. You a re saying th at t he infu sio n of add ition al m ili tary 

assistance would, at least, ad d to the sta biliz ati on of the area so th at 

you could hav e an easier job o f with draw ing no t only Am erican s, bu t 

perha ps So uth V ietn amese also ?

Se cre tar y K issinger. Th at is correct.

Mr. Giaimo. Than k you.

Mr. Mahon. Fu rt her question s on my left?

Th e ge ntlem an fro m Fl or id a.

Mr. Chap pel l. Fo llo wi ng up on Mr. Yo un g’s question, wha t commitments were mad e, to So uth Vietn am at the time th e Par is A cco rds 

were signed ?

Se cre tar y Kissinger. Th e com mitments th at were made to So uth 

Vietn am are all on the public record. It was sta ted publicly , as well 

as in the disc ussions th at were taki ng place at the tim e, th at if the 

So uth Vie tnames e w ould pe rm it us to w ith draw ou r forces an d thereb y 

enable us to re tu rn ou r pri soners, and if they acce pted t he pro vision s 

of the P ar is A ccords, that un de r those con dition s it was our—th e A dminist ratio n wou ld supp ort and it was ou r belief th at the Con gress 

would go along, an a dequate level of economic assistance. Th e m ili ta ry 

assistance alw ays dep end ed on the pro vision s of ch ap ter—a rti cle 7 o f 

the agreem ent, which me ant it depe nded on the level of combat.

Th is was sta ted by me when I exp lained th e agreem ent s in a press 

conference, it was st ate d i n m any p ress confer ences by Presid en t N ixo n 

by Secre tar y of Defense , then Se cre tar y of Def ense Richard son, and 

myself, and we can sub mit a sta tem ent of the public record on th is 

matter which sta ted ou r views, an d there were no othe r com mitments, 

and they were in the form of a s tat em ent of inte ntions.

Mr. Chap pell. Mr. Se creta ry, was there any intenti on to attempt 

to enforce this agreeme nt ag ains t Nor th Vi etn am in case of its vio latio n?

Se cre tar y K issinger. When th e Un ite d States signs an agreem ent , 

it is no t generally believed th at i t can be vio lated w ith im punity. An d 

there fore, there was a presum pti on th at the U nited States wo uld make 

an effort to enforce the agree me nt an d there were statem ents on the 

public record th at the Uni ted States would no t look lig htly at vio latio ns of the agreem ent.

All o f th ese statem ents wer e m ade------

Mr. C hap pel l. W ha t d id that m ean, Mr. Se cretary ?

Se cretary K issinger. W ha t it m ean t was lef t am bigu ou s; p ar tly fo r 

its im pact on H anoi, because it makes a g reat dea l of difference w hether 

the o ther side t hink s you prob ably will not, o r i t knows t hat b y Ac t o f 

Congress you ce rta inly can not. I t will certa inly affec t the degree to 

which it will commit its elf.

So th is is the ex ten t of t he form al—the word “commitment” is no t 

an exa ct exp ression in any event. It is a sta tem ent of a n intention to 

maintain the a greement . An d one has to sa y t hat it cannot be assumed,
42

and it should not be assumed in the future that when a nation signs a 

solemn agreement with the United States tha t it can then be broken 

with total impunity; for the future this must remain a very special 

case due to the particular domestic situation tha t developed on the 

issue of Vietnam.

Mr. Chappell. Was the presence of the Air Force in Thailand in 

any way to be a deterrent to the North Vietnamese not to violate the 

agreement ?

Secretary Kissinger. It was one of the factors, yes.

Mr. Chappell. Was it in any way a part of the understanding?

Secretary Kissinger. No, no, there was no understanding to tha t 

effect.

Mr. Mahon. The gentleman from New York.

Mr. Kemp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ’ll wait for the Secretary 

to finish his statement.

Secretary Kissinger. It is a ha rd question as it was not part of the 

agreement because the Air Force was in Thailand anyway and there 

was no expectation of reducing it. So tha t issue, to the best of my 

recollection, never came up.

Mr. K emp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I realize one 

cannot negotiate in a fishbowl and there are many things that you cannot talk about with regard to your negotiations around the world here 

today until we go into an executive session. But it’s also true you 

cannot conduct foreign policy without public support.

It is obvious to those of us in the Congress that there is not a great 

deal of public support for more military assistance to South Vietnam, 

but if you made the public aware of the impact of this issue on the 

credibility of American negotiations I believe the American people 

would support it. I support additional assistance and want to be on 

record as supporting military aid to South Vietnam. I strongly support the Chairm an’s humane legislation, tha t is, to provide $200 million of military aid. I thin k it would be counterproductive to give 

economic aid without military aid, at least to help stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia. I believe in the principle th at General Weyand 

and you both have testified to, in tha t we have told the world, and our 

allies th at if they are willing to fight in their own defense that we are 

willing to provide some assistance on a military basis in lieu of American combat troops. If t hat principle had been followed in the early 

1960’s wTe would not have had this tragedy.

My question is this. Could you discuss for just a moment, as someone who is involved in very sensitive negotiations around the world 

involving the vital interests of the United States, what effect it is 

going to have upon our ability to negotiate if Congress turns dowrn 

any military assistance to an ally who was given our word at Par is 

tha t we would not turn our back upon them, should an invasion take 

place?

Secretary Kissinger. The problem tha t is created by the situation 

in Indochina, in terms of our international situation, is tw ofold:

One, iudgments tha t other nations may make with respect to our 

past actions, their wisdom, their coherence, their constancy, their credibility, about th at we can do nothing today.

The second question is, the conclusions we draw from these events, 

but that we can do something.
43

Now, it has seemed to the Administration tha t to turn our back at 

this moment of its maximum travail on a country with which we have 

been associated for 15 years would have serious consequences on the 

perception of many other areas.

Now I know there is a school of thought tha t says that predicting 

this makes it come true. These arguments are made only by those 

people who do not read the cables. And every day, from the most 

unexpected corners of the world, these questions which I put here are 

being asked.

We have, therefore, urgently to re-establish some unity between the 

Congress and the Executive. In this period, when the possible outcomes are, after all, fairly limited, as I said in my statement, to work 

together to try to achieve that outcome which saves most lives and the 

most humane objectives.

I think in this sense the impact abroad would not be helpful.

Mr. Kemp. There are reports tha t some of our allies in Southeast 

Asia, to-w it: the Philippines, T hailand, Japan, Malaysia, and others, 

who are beginning to make statements in public doubting our commitment, and perhaps it cannot be discussed here, but is it possible to 

maintain our word and our credibility with those nations who are 

affected by our commitments, if this aid is not forthcoming from the 

Congress in this moment of desperation ?

Secretary Kissinger. As I said earlier, Mr. Kemp, it will make our 

job more difficult. In candor, I must say we have an obligation to deal 

with the problem in any event and we will deal with it. But it would 

make our job more difficult if the Congress refused any assistance.

Mr. McEwen. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. Chairman, General Weyand is waiting and I understand Secretary Kissinger is to be questioned in executive session. May I ask 

the Chair when we will have that executive session.

Mr. Mahon. We should move into it as soon as reasonably possible. 

If we could give people who have—if we have members who have 

questions they feel are urgently needed to be asked, we might pursue 

this fu rthe r before we go into the executive session.

Mr. McEwen. Mr. Chairman, some of us have deferred asking 

questions, believing our questions would only be answered in executive session. Many members have already asked questions to which 

answers have been reserved for tha t session. So I would hope-----

Mr. Maiion. I s there any objection to going into executive session 

at this time, any objection to going into executive session?

Mr. L ong. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert some questions fo r 

the record, if I could.

Mr. Mahon. Without objection, the questions will be inserted.

Que st ions I nserted by Congress ma n Long T o Be Answered by Secretary

Kissing er

1. Dr. Kissinger, last June you told this Committee t hat both the Soviets and 

communist Chinese “were helpful in some aspects” of the Vietnam peace negotiations ; how were these countries “helpful” in achieving the January, 1973 Paris 

Accords?

2. Did you or President Nixon extra ct or try to extra ct a commitment from 

either the Soviets or Chinese to decrease their military support for the North 

Vietnamese and Vietcong? Please elaborate.
44

3. Dr. Kissinger, considering the fact the Soviets have increased their militar y 

materi al supp ort for Hanoi “fourfold" since January , 1975, as Robert Shaplen 

reports in the April 21 New Yorker, where does this leave our gran d policy of 

detente?

4. Will you supply this Committee with all pertinent documents—such as 

lette rs exchanged between Pre sidents Nixon and Thieu, unilateral declarations 

of intent to observe the Vietnam ceasefire, and a summary of oral exchanges— 

relatin g to any commitments und erta ken with the 1973 P aris accords?

5. When you signed the 1973 Paris accords, which said nothing 'about the 

North Vietnamese troops remaining with in South Vietnam, did you lead the 

South Vietnamese side to believe the United States had stru ck a deal with the 

Soviets and Chinese to reduce milita ry supp ort for these communist troops, so 

they would not represen t a ma jor threat to the South Vietnamese government?

6. When Congress halted all U.S. milita ry activities in Indochina as of 

August, 1973, did the United States und ertake any diplomacy with the South 

Vietnamese and Cambodians in regards to the possible U.S. response should the 

communists launch a new milita ry offensive? Please describe how you communicated this new provision in the law forbidding U.S. combat actions to our 

allies, and what course they were encouraged to pursue, if any, towards a 

negotiated settlement.

7. Would you please comment on the a rticle by Sam Adams in the May H arpers 

th at the Administration, the military, and the CIA consistently und erstated the 

numbers of men fighting with the Vietcong and the Khmer Rouge and th at all 

atte mp ts to reveal the tru e figure were rebuffed?

[Answers to the questions submitted by I)r. Long had not been 

received by the time the hearing went to press.]

Mr. Mahon. Without objection, we will now go thro ugh the necessary procedure to have an executive session.

The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for a motion.

Mr. Whitten. Mr. Chairman, I have a motion.

Mr. Mahon. The clerk will read the motion.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Whitten moves th at the balance of the session 

of the full committee of today, pursuant to clause 2(g)(1) and of 

rule XI of the House of Representatives be held in executive session.

Mr. Mahon. This requires a roll call. The clerk will call the roll. 

Those favoring an executive session will vote aye, those opposed vote 

no.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Addabbo ?

Mr. Addabbo. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Alexander ?

Mr. Alexander. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Andrews ?

Mr. Andrews. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Armstrong?

Mr. Armstrong. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Baucus ?

Mr. Baucus. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Bevill ?

Mr. Bevill. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Boland ?

(No response.)

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Burgener?

Mr. Burgener. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mrs. Burke?

Mrs. Burke. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Burlison ?

Mr. Burlison. Aye.
45

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Casey?

Mr. Casey. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Cederberg?

Mr. Cederberg. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Chappell ?

Mr. Chappell. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Conte ?

Mr. Conte. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Coughlin ?

Mr. Coughlin. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Duncan?

Mr. Duncan. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Early?

Mr. Early. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Edwards?

Mr. E dwards. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Evans of Colorado ? 

Mr. E vans. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Evins of Tennessee? 

Mr. E vins. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Flood?

Mr. F lood. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. F lynt?

Mr. F lynt. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Giaimo?

Mr. Giaimo. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Kemp ?

Mr. Kemp. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Koch ?

Mr. Koch. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Long?

Mr. L ong. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. McDade ?

Mr. McDade. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. McEwen?

Mr. McEwen. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. McFall ?

(No response.)

Mr. Mainland. Mr. McKay ?

Mr. McKay. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Mahon ?

Mr. Mahon. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Michel ?

Mr. Michel. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Miller?

Mr. Miller. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Murtha?

(No response.)

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Myers ?

Mr. Myers. Aye.
46

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Natcher?

Mr. Natcher. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Obey ?

Mr. Obey. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Passman ?

Mr. Passman. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Patten?

Mr. Patten. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Regula?

Mr. Regula. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Robinson ?

Mr. Robinson. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Roybal ?

Mr. Roybal. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Shipley ?

Mr. Shipley. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Shriver?

(No response.)

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Sikes ?

Mr. Sikes. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Slack ?

Mr. Slack. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Smith ?

Mr. Smith. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Steed?

Mr. Steed. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Stokes?

[No response.]

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Talcott?

[No response.]

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Traxle r ?

Mr. Traxler. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Whitten ?

Mr. Whitten. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Yates?

Mr. Yates. Aye.

Mr. Mainland. Mr. Young?

Mr. Young. Aye.

On this vote there were 49 yeas and no nays and the committee is 

now in executive session.

The staff will please clear the room.

General, I wish you w ould stay with us.

o