[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Renner v. Athens Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-356.]

 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-356

THE STATE EX REL. RENNER v. ATHENS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Renner v. Athens Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip 

Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-356.]

Elections—Mandamus—Writ sought to compel board of elections to certify 

relator’s name to primary-election ballot—Board of elections did not abuse 

its discretion or act in disregard of applicable legal provisions in 

invalidating relator’s declaration of candidacy and petition—Relator did 

not correctly withdraw her candidacy under R.C. 3501.38(I)(2)(a)—

Relator’s attempt to file a second declaration of candidacy and petition was 

prohibited under R.C. 3501.38(I)(1)—Writ denied.

(No. 2024-0078—Submitted January 30, 2024—Decided February 1, 2024.)

IN MANDAMUS.

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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Per Curiam Opinion announcing the judgment of the court.

{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relator, Amy Renner, seeks a writ of 

mandamus compelling respondent, the Athens County Board of Elections, to certify 

her name to the March 19, 2024 Democratic Party primary ballot as a candidate for 

the seat on the Athens County Board of Commissioners commencing January 2, 

2025. Alternatively, Renner seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the board to 

examine and determine the validity of the signatures on her petition, and thereafter 

certify her name to the ballot. We deny the writ.

I. BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} Renner is a resident and a qualified elector of Athens County, and she 

is the current mayor of the Village of Chauncey. She seeks to run in the Democratic

Party primary election as a candidate for the seat on the Athens County Board of 

Commissioners commencing January 2, 2025. R.C. 3513.05 provides that “[e]ach 

person desiring to become a candidate for a party nomination at a primary election 

* * * shall, not later than four p.m. of the ninetieth day before the day of the primary 

election, file a declaration of candidacy and petition.” Renner was therefore

required to file her declaration of candidacy and petition with the board by 4 p.m. 

on December 20, 2023, which was 90 days before the March 19, 2024 primary 

election. The Ohio Secretary of State has prescribed Form No. 2-G (“2-G form”)

as the form that meets the requirements of R.C. 3513.05 that a person making his 

or her declaration of candidacy can file with the board of elections. This declaration

is made on the top half of the 2-G form, and qualified electors sign the “petition for 

candidate” on the bottom half of the form.

{¶ 3} On December 15, 2023, Renner filed a 2-G form (“first petition”) with 

the board, declaring, “I desire to be a candidate for nomination to the office of 

County Commissioner in the County of Athens, Ohio as a member of the 

Democratic Party for the: full term commencing 1/1/2025.”
January Term, 2024

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{¶ 4} There are two seats on the Athens County Board of Commissioners 

that are up for election in November 2024, but, contrary to what Renner set forth 

on her first petition, neither seat has a term that commences January 1, 2025. 

Rather, a term for one of the seats commences January 2, 2025, and the other 

commences January 3, 2025. See R.C. 305.01(B) (staggering the commencement 

dates for county-commissioner terms).

{¶ 5} Renner attests that on December 18, 2023, the board’s director 

informed her of the mistake on her first petition relating to the incorrect 

commencement date. Renner then filed a document (“the withdrawal letter”) with 

the board on December 18, asking it to “[p]lease withdraw [her] petitions filed on 

12/15/23 for County Commissioner.” The board had not taken any formal action 

on Renner’s first petition between the time that she filed it—December 15—and 

the time that she attempted to withdraw it—December 18.

{¶ 6} On December 20, Renner filed a new 2-G form (“second petition”) 

with the board, this time declaring, “I desire to be a candidate for nomination to the 

office of Athens County Commissioner in the County of Athens, Ohio as a member 

of the Democratic Party for the: full term commencing 1-2-2025.”

{¶ 7} On December 27, the board held a regular meeting during which it 

addressed Renner’s first petition, withdrawal letter, and second petition. At that 

meeting, the board did not check the signatures on Renner’s first petition, because 

it contained a “fatal error,” namely, Renner’s identifying the office she sought as 

commencing on January 1, 2025. Also at that meeting, the board’s legal counsel 

explained to the board his view that Renner’s attempt to withdraw her first petition

through her withdrawal letter and then submit a second petition was ineffectual 

because she did not withdraw her candidacy; rather, Renner had only attempted to 

withdraw her petition. In support of his position, the board’s counsel invoked R.C. 

3501.38(I)(2)(a), which provides that “[n]o declaration of candidacy, nominating 

petition, or other petition for the purpose of becoming a candidate may be 
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withdrawn after it is filed in a public office. Nothing in this division prohibits a 

person from withdrawing as a candidate as otherwise provided by law.”

{¶ 8} Counsel also observed that because Renner did not withdraw her 

candidacy, her second petition constituted an attempt to alter, correct, or add to her 

first petition, which is prohibited under R.C. 3501.38(I)(1). Counsel thus 

recommended that the board disapprove Renner’s first petition because it contained 

a “fatal error” and disapprove Renner’s second petition as a prohibited alteration,

correction, or addition to her first petition. A member of the board moved to follow 

counsel’s recommendation to reject both of Renner’s petitions, and the motion 

passed unanimously.

{¶ 9} On January 16, 2024, Renner brought this expedited election action 

in mandamus against the board. Renner asks that this court issue a writ of 

mandamus ordering the board to certify her name to the ballot as a Democratic 

Party candidate for the office of Athens County Commissioner commencing 

January 2, 2025, or, alternatively, ordering the board to determine the validity of 

the signatures on her second petition and thereafter certify her to the primary ballot. 

As directed by this court’s expedited scheduling order, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-

Ohio-153, __ N.E.3d __, the board answered Renner’s complaint, and the parties 

filed their evidence and briefs.

II. ANALYSIS

{¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Renner must establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that (1) she has a clear legal right to the requested relief, 

(2) the board has a clear legal duty to provide it, and (3) she does not have an 

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Linnabary v. 

Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 13. Renner lacks 

an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law due to the proximity of the 

election, and she therefore meets the third element. State ex rel. LaChapelle v. 

Harkey, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-2723, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 8. An analysis under 
January Term, 2024

5

the first two elements requires us to determine “whether the board engaged in fraud 

or corruption, abused its discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable law. 

State ex rel. Brubaker v. Lawrence Cty. Bd. of Elections, 168 Ohio St.3d 211, 2022-

Ohio-1087, 197 N.E.3d 548, ¶ 10. According to Renner, the board clearly 

disregarded applicable law and abused its discretion in failing to certify her to the 

ballot.

{¶ 11} The board determined that Renner’s first petition contained a “fatal 

error.” And it further determined that it could not certify her to the ballot based on 

her withdrawal letter and second petition, principally relying on R.C. 

3501.38(I)(2)(a). As we now explain, Renner has not shown that the board abused 

its discretion or acted in clear disregard of applicable law in making these 

determinations.

A. Renner incorrectly characterizes her first petition as constituting a nullity

{¶ 12} Renner first argues that there should have been no impediment to the 

board’s consideration of her second petition because, she says, her first petition was 

a nullity. Implicit in Renner’s argument is the notion that the board should have 

ignored her first petition and proceeded straight to considering the validity of her 

second petition. Had the board done so, the argument runs, there would have been 

no need for it to have considered the first petition’s effect on the second petition. 

Renner is mistaken.

{¶ 13} In support, Renner points to a line of decisions from this court that 

have construed R.C. 3513.08 within the context of a specified class of judicial 

elections. The first paragraph of the statute provides that “[e]ach person filing a 

declaration of candidacy for nomination at a primary election as a candidate for 

election to” specified judicial offices “shall, if two or more judges of the same court 

are to be elected at any one election, designate the term of the office for election to 

which he seeks such nomination by stating therein, if a full term, the date of the 

commencement of such term.” Id. The second paragraph of R.C. 3513.08, which 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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Renner does not dispute applies to her under these circumstances, contains 

language that is equivalent in all material respects to the class of judicial elections 

to which the first paragraph of R.C. 3513.08 applies. It provides that “[e]ach person 

filing a declaration of candidacy for nomination at a primary election as a candidate 

for election to the office of county commissioner * * * shall, if two or more 

commissioners of the same county are to be elected at any one election, designate 

the term of the office for election to which he seeks the nomination by stating 

therein, if a full term, the date of the commencement of the term.” Id.

{¶ 14} In enacting R.C. 3513.08, “the General Assembly recognized that 

because of the staggered dates such information is necessary for an accurate 

description of the office.” State ex rel. Hanna v. Milburn, 170 Ohio St. 9, 14, 161 

N.E.2d 891 (1959). Thus, “[w]here a public office is of such a nature that in 

accurately describing [the office] it is necessary to state not only the title but also 

the time of its commencement, then failure to accurately state the date of 

commencement of the term will invalidate a nominating petition.” Id.

{¶ 15} In State ex rel. Calhoun v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections, 36 Ohio St.3d 

164, 522 N.E.2d 49 (1988), a board of elections invoked R.C. 3513.08 in its

refusing to place a prospective judicial candidate on the primary ballot who had

failed to specify the date of the commencement of the full term of the office he 

sought. This court denied the candidate’s request for a writ of mandamus to place

his name on the ballot, observing that the statute “ ‘specifically requires a primary 

candidate to designate both the judicial office and the term for which he seeks 

nomination, and makes provision for setting forth the full term * * * with dates 

thereof. The requirements of that section are mandatory.’ ” (Emphasis added in 

Calhoun.) Calhoun at 165, quoting State ex rel. McGinley v. Bliss, 149 Ohio St.

329, 331, 78 N.E.2d 715 (1948).

{¶ 16} In State ex rel. Clinard v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Elections, 51 Ohio St.3d 

87, 554 N.E.2d 895 (1990), this court applied our reasoning in Calhoun to a factual 
January Term, 2024

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setting that is almost identical to the one featured here. There, a prospective judicial 

candidate filed a declaration of candidacy and petitions to gain a place on the 

primary ballot, but he mistakenly indicated that the term of the office he sought 

began on January 1 rather than January 2. Relying on our interpretation of R.C. 

3513.08 in Calhoun, this court observed that the candidate had a mandatory duty to 

state in his declaration of candidacy the commencement of the term sought. 

Clinard at 88. Because the candidate had not accurately set forth the 

commencement date, we concluded that the board of elections had not disregarded 

the law in invalidating his declaration of candidacy and petitions. Id.

{¶ 17} Based on the caselaw construing the first paragraph of the statute, it 

follows that under the analogous second paragraph of R.C. 3513.08, Renner had a 

mandatory duty to accurately state in her first petition the commencement date of 

the term of the office she sought. Because she did not do so, her first petition was 

invalid. Renner’s contrary argument that her petition was a nullity fails. The only 

authority Renner cites in support of her position is a dissenting opinion in Thornton 

v. Salak, 112 Ohio St.3d 254, 2006-Ohio-6407, 858 N.E.2d 1187, in which the 

author wrote that “the better reasoning is that an invalid petition is a nullity and 

cannot and should not affect anything,” id. at ¶ 34 (McMonagle, J., dissenting). A 

dissent does not command this court’s adherence.

{¶ 18} Therefore, we reject Renner’s argument that her first petition was a 

nullity.

B. Renner’s contention that she did not seek multiple offices at the same election 

fails to demonstrate that the board erred in rejecting her second petition

{¶ 19} Renner next argues that even if her first petition is not declared a 

nullity, the board still erred because she did not seek multiple offices at the same 

election. Renner bases this argument on R.C. 3513.052, even though the board did 

not specifically invoke that statute in making its determination to not certify her 

name to the ballot. Even so, Renner surmises that it is necessary to discuss R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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3513.052 because the “unstated conclusion underpinning [the board’s] counsel’s 

advice seems to be that [Renner] is not permitted to file multiple candidate petitions 

for the same election.” This argument, as we understand it, is a variation on her 

“nullity” argument.

{¶ 20} In Renner’s view, because no office on the Athens County Board of 

Commissioners commenced January 1, 2025, her first petition did not seek a county 

“office” within the meaning of R.C. 3513.052. Therefore, she argues, the statute’s 

“multiple-offices-candidacies prohibition,” see State ex rel. Coble v. Lucas Cty. Bd. 

of Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 132, 2011-Ohio-4550, 956 N.E.2d 282, ¶ 31, fn. 3, 

does not apply to her.

{¶ 21} Renner relies on State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Jennings, 57 Ohio St. 415,

425, 49 N.E. 404 (1898), in which this court quoted High, Extr. Rem., Section 625,

for the proposition that an “ ‘office * * * may be defined as a public position, to 

which a portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive, or 

judicial, attaches for the time being, and which is exercised for the benefit of the 

public.’ ” (Emphasis added.) But in Jennings we did not have before us the 

statutory scheme we face in this case and thus, it does not control.

{¶ 22} A more sound approach lies in the view that an “office” is simply a 

“position of duty, trust, or authority, esp. one conferred by a governmental authority 

for a public purpose <[as in] the office of attorney general>.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1254 (10th Ed.2014). This meaning of “office” squares with the way 

the word is used in R.C. 3513.08’s second paragraph, which directs a person in 

Renner’s shoes to “designate the term of the office for election” sought. (Emphasis 

added.) Adopting Renner’s argument—that is, by construing “office” to 

encompass a time period—would render meaningless the statute’s use of “term.” 

See Rhodes v. New Philadelphia, 129 Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d 

782, ¶ 23 (“We must give effect to every term in a statute and avoid a construction 

that would render any provision meaningless, inoperative, or superfluous”).
January Term, 2024

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{¶ 23} The fact that R.C. 3513.08 also requires a declaration of candidacy 

to specify the term of office does not signify that a failure to specify the term means 

no “office” was sought. In the end, this argument, like Renner’s claim that her first 

petition was a nullity, lacks merit. Moreover, it does not help Renner to overcome 

the effect of R.C. 3501.38(I)(2)(a).

C. Renner’s withdrawal letter did not effect a valid withdrawal of her candidacy

{¶ 24} For her last argument, Renner asserts that even if this court were to 

conclude that her first petition was not a nullity, she nevertheless made an effective 

withdrawal of her candidacy. The crux of Renner’s argument is that the words she 

used in her withdrawal letter were sufficient to withdraw her candidacy even though

the letter sought only to withdraw her “petitions.” For its part, the board argues 

that the letter’s reference to “petitions” is not sufficient to effect a withdrawal of 

her candidacy.

{¶ 25} R.C. 3501.38(I)(2)(a) provides that “nothing in this division 

prohibits a person from withdrawing as a candidate as otherwise provided by law.” 

As noted, this is the statute the board relied on in reaching its decision that Renner’s 

second petition was invalid. We conclude that the board did not abuse its discretion 

or clearly disregard applicable law in applying the statute.

{¶ 26} Renner claims that the steps she took in this case to withdraw are 

“on all fours” with those that this court considered in Coble, 130 Ohio St.3d 132, 

2011-Ohio-4550, 956 N.E.2d 282. In that case, a prospective judicial candidate 

filed his nominating petition with the board but was informed by a board employee 

that his petition was three valid signatures short of the statutory requirement. Our 

opinion in Coble states that the candidate “withdrew his candidacy,” id. at ¶ 4, but

does not specify how. The candidate then filed a new nominating petition for the 

same office and the same election and was told this time by a board employee that 

his petition was acceptable. Thereafter, the board rejected the candidate’s petition 

and refused to certify his name to the ballot.
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{¶ 27} The candidate petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus ordering

the placement of his name on the ballot, and we granted his request. We observed 

that under R.C. 3513.261, a board of elections could not accept a nominating 

petition of a person seeking to be a candidate for a municipal office if that person 

had already filed a petition to be a candidate for the municipal office at the same 

election. Coble at ¶ 12-13. Because the candidate had filed a nominating petition 

for the same municipal office for the same election, we concluded that absent an 

applicable exception, R.C. 3513.261 would bar the second nominating petition. 

Coble at ¶ 18. This court, however, identified an exception in R.C. 3513.052(G), 

which provided that, R.C. 3513.261 notwithstanding, a board of elections could not 

disqualify a person from being a candidate for office if that person “timely 

withdraws” as a candidate. Coble at ¶ 21, citing R.C. 3513.052(G). We concluded 

that because the candidate withdrew before the applicable filing deadline and timely 

submitted a subsequent nominating petition for the same office before the deadline, 

the candidate had made a “timely withdraw[al]” as that phrase is defined under R.C. 

3513.052(H). Coble at ¶ 27. In reaching that conclusion, we distinguished our

earlier decision in State ex rel. Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 

Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 757, in which this court had 

concluded that R.C. 3513.052 would not protect a candidate who had filed a second 

nominating petition for the same office at the same election after the first 

nominating petition had been ruled invalid by a board of elections.

{¶ 28} Here, Renner says that she withdrew her candidacy when she filed 

her letter with the board asking that it “withdraw [her] petitions filed on 12/15/23 

for County Commissioner.” Because she then filed her second petition before the 

December 20, 2023 filing deadline, she reasons that under Coble, she effected a 

timely withdrawal.

{¶ 29} Coble, however, did not address the question Renner poses about the 

sufficiency of an attempt to withdraw as a candidate, because we did not expressly 
January Term, 2024

11

say what it was about the candidate’s paperwork that led us to conclude that he 

“withdrew his candidacy,” id., 130 Ohio St.3d 132, 2011-Ohio-4550, 956 N.E.2d 

282, at ¶ 4. Perhaps recognizing this, Renner invokes R.C. 3513.052(H)(2)’s

definition of “timely withdraws.” As defined, “timely withdraws” means 

“[w]ithdrawing as a candidate before the applicable deadline for filing a declaration 

of candidacy * * * for which the person is seeking to become a candidate at the 

same election.” R.C. 3513.052(H)(2)(a).

{¶ 30} In urging us to conclude that her withdrawal letter constituted a valid 

method for withdrawing her candidacy, Renner observes that the statute does not 

mandate the use of any particular language for withdrawing as a candidate and, she 

adds, there apparently is no form for doing so. Further, she invokes Secretary of 

State Directive 2023-34, Section 14.07, which provides that “a withdrawal of 

candidacy must be made in writing and filed with the election officials with whom 

the declaration of candidacy * * * was filed.”1 Renner points out that this directive 

contains no specific directions concerning what must be in the “writing” to 

effectuate a withdrawal of candidacy.

{¶ 31} Renner thus argues that in the absence of further guidance, drawing

a distinction between the act of withdrawing a petition (which her withdrawal letter 

expressly conveyed) and one’s candidacy (which her withdrawal letter did not 

expressly convey) is illogical because, she says, the withdrawal of either the 

petition or candidacy necessarily terminates the other. Renner’s declaration of 

candidacy and petition were on the same instrument, i.e., a 2-G form. And so, she 

says, a person’s request to withdraw a petition suffices to withdraw the person’s

candidacy.

1. See Ohio Secretary of State, Directives, Advisories, Memo & Tie Votes, available at 

https://www.ohiosos.gov/elections/elections-officials/rules/ (accessed Jan. 31, 2024).
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{¶ 32} However, as the board points out, R.C. 3513.30(B) provides that a 

withdrawal of a person’s candidacy before the primary election “shall be effected 

and the statement of withdrawal shall be filed in accordance with the procedures 

prescribed in division (D).” In turn, R.C. 3513.30(D) provides that the “withdrawal 

may be effected by the filing of a written statement by such candidate announcing 

the candidate’s withdrawal and requesting that the candidate’s name not be printed 

on the ballots.” Here, the withdrawal letter that Renner filed with the board did not 

announce the withdrawal of her candidacy and did not request that her name not be 

printed on the ballots. In failing to meet these requirements, it follows that Renner 

has not shown that she “effected” a valid withdrawal of her candidacy under R.C. 

3513.30(B).

{¶ 33} In response, Renner does not dispute that R.C. 3513.30(B) applies to 

her, but she denies that she was required to follow all of R.C. 3513.30(D)’s 

requirements. She says that division (D) focuses on those who have been certified 

to appear on the ballot because it speaks to those who have been “nominated in a 

primary election,” R.C. 3513.30(D). She then reasons that because her name has 

not appeared on the ballot, she was not required to request that her name not be 

printed on the ballot.

{¶ 34} To begin, that argument would not cure Renner’s failure to file a 

written statement announcing her withdrawal as a candidate. In any event, 

Renner’s ballot-focused argument falters. R.C. 3513.30(B) provides that a person 

who desires to withdraw shall follow “the procedures” of R.C. 3513.30(D), not 

“some” of those procedures. Adopting Renner’s argument would require us to 

insert words the General Assembly did not prescribe. See State ex rel. Steele v. 

Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 30 (courts

cannot delete words from or insert words into a statute).

{¶ 35} In summary, Renner’s arguments do not show that she correctly

withdrew her candidacy as “otherwise provided by law,” R.C. 3501.38(I)(2)(a), or 
January Term, 2024

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that she is entitled to the benefit of our decision in Coble, 130 Ohio St.3d 132, 2011-

Ohio-4550, 956 N.E.2d 282. Nor does Renner advance any meaningful analysis 

against the board’s determination that in the absence of a valid withdrawal, her 

second petition was a forbidden attempt to “alter[], correct[], or add[]” to her first 

petition, see R.C. 3501.38(I)(1). Given all this, we conclude that the board did not 

clearly disregard applicable law or abuse its discretion in rejecting both of Renner’s 

petitions.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 36} For the foregoing reasons, we deny the writ. Because Renner has 

not shown that the board of elections clearly disregarded applicable law or abused 

its discretion, we need not reach the board’s argument that Renner’s action is barred 

by laches.

Writ denied.

KENNEDY, C.J., and DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur.

FISCHER, DEWINE, and DETERS, JJ., concur in judgment only.

BRUNNER, J., not participating.

_________________

Brunner Quinn, and Patrick M. Quinn, for relator.

Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and N. Zachary 

West, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.

_________________