UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4238

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHAMON MONAIR GOINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Chief District Judge. (3:17-cr-00134-FDW-DSC-20)

Submitted: October 17, 2019 Decided: October 21, 2019

Before MOTZ and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Timothy V. Anderson, ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Shamon Monair Goins pled guilty to conspiracy to participate in racketeering 

activity (RICO conspiracy), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), 1963(a) (2012), and was 

sentenced to 210 months in prison. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which counsel discusses the correctness of the district 

court’s decision to calculate Goins’ Sentencing Guidelines range based on his conspiracy 

to commit second degree murder, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) 

§§ 2A1.2(a), 2E1.1(a)(2) (2012). Goines has not filed a pro se supplemental brief despite

receiving notice of his right to do so, and the Government has declined to file a response 

brief. We affirm.

We review the factual findings underlying a district court’s application of a 

Guidelines cross-reference for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States 

v. Ashford, 718 F.3d 377, 380 (4th Cir. 2013). A RICO conspiracy conviction corresponds 

to a base offense level of 19 or the offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering 

activity—in this case, conspiracy to commit second degree murder. See USSG § 2E1.1(a) 

(2012). Section 2A1.2(a) provides for a base offense level of 38 if the murder would have 

constituted second degree murder, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012). Section § 1111, 

in turn, defines first degree murder as “the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 

aforethought[,]” and defines second degree murder as “[a]ny other murder . . . .” The 

Government need only prove a cross-referenced offense by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See United States v. Davis, 679 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 2012). After reviewing 

the evidence presented at Goins’ sentencing hearing, we discern no error in the district 
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court’s decision to apply the murder cross-reference in this case. See, e.g., Rita v. United 

States, 551 U.S. 338, 361-62 (2007) (recognizing that appellate courts must “give due 

regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to 

accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous, and to give 

due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have 

found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Goins, in writing, of his right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Goins requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a 

copy thereof was served on Goins. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED