[Cite as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Pryatel, 135 Ohio St.3d 410, 2013-Ohio-1537.] 

CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. PRYATEL.

[Cite as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Pryatel, 135 Ohio St.3d 410, 

2013-Ohio-1537.] 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Misuse of client funds—Knowingly making false 

statement to tribunal—Charging excessive fee—Engaging in conduct 

involving dishonesty or misrepresentation—Indefinite suspension with 

reinstatement only upon specified conditions. 

(No. 2011-1727—Submitted January 9, 2013—Decided April 24, 2013.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-023. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Respondent, Mark Robert Pryatel of Euclid, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0019678, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1983. In 

February 2011, relator, the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, filed a twocount complaint charging Pryatel with misuse of client funds and other 

professional misconduct involving two client matters. Pryatel did not file an 

answer—even though he had initially cooperated with relator’s investigation and 

received notice of the complaint by certified mail. Relator moved for an entry of 

default, and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline appointed 

a master commissioner, who found that Pryatel had committed most of the 

charged misconduct. The board adopted the master commissioner’s findings of 

fact and misconduct and, as a sanction, recommended permanent disbarment. 

{¶ 2} While the board’s final report was pending before this court, 

Pryatel filed motions to remand for a hearing before the board and to supplement 

the record, arguing that previously undiagnosed psychological issues interfered 
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with his capacity to defend himself against the disciplinary charges. In January 

2012, we remanded for a hearing, but we limited the board’s review on remand to 

consideration of mitigation evidence and limited supplementation of the record 

accordingly. Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Pryatel, 131 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2012-

Ohio-79, 959 N.E.2d 537. A three-member panel of the board thereafter 

conducted a hearing and, upon review of the new mitigation evidence, 

recommended reducing Pryatel’s sanction to an indefinite suspension. The board 

agreed, and neither party has filed objections to the board’s recommendation. 

{¶ 3} We accept the board’s recommendation and indefinitely suspend 

Pryatel from the practice of law in Ohio. 

Misconduct 

1. Count One—The Troyan Matter 

{¶ 4} Based on the sworn affidavit of grievant Richard J. Troyan, 

Pryatel’s precomplaint deposition testimony, and other evidence, the board found 

that Troyan retained Pryatel to represent him in several criminal matters, 

including a motion for judicial release. Troyan informed Pryatel that he was 

permanently disabled and unable to secure employment upon his release from 

prison. Nevertheless, Pryatel wrote in the motion for judicial release that 

“Defendant Troyan has arranged for employment upon his release.” Pryatel later 

described this language as “boilerplate” and predicted that it would make Troyan 

“look better to the judge.” But Troyan claimed that Pryatel misrepresented his 

ability and intent to secure employment upon his release from prison. Even after 

ascribing “some tenuousness to the credibility of Troyan, an apparent career 

criminal,” the board found, and we agree, that Pryatel had violated Prof.Cond.R. 

3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact 

or law to a tribunal). 

{¶ 5} In addition, while in prison, Troyan received a $50,000 settlement 

check from the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. Pryatel deposited the 
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check into his personal bank account, rather than a client trust account. Over the 

course of his representation of Troyan, Pryatel deducted over $29,000 in legal 

fees from the settlement proceeds, including $7,000 for responding to 70 letters 

from Troyan while he was in prison. And at the time of the default proceedings 

below, Pryatel had not returned the remainder of the settlement proceeds to 

Troyan, despite his repeated requests for the money. 

{¶ 6} Based on these findings, we agree with the board that in addition to 

his violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1), as noted above, Pryatel violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit advance legal fees and 

expenses into a client trust account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees 

are earned or expenses incurred), 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an 

agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee), and 

8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 

2. Count Two—The Martich Matter

{¶ 7} Based on the sworn affidavit of grievant Luis A. Martich and other 

evidence, the board found that Martich retained Pryatel to seal his criminal 

records. Martich’s father paid Pryatel $2,025 to settle an outstanding restitution 

order, satisfy court costs, and cover Pryatel’s legal fees. Pryatel, however, never 

filed the motion to seal Martich’s records, nor did he settle the restitution order or 

pay the court costs. Pryatel also failed to respond to Martich’s repeated attempts 

to contact him, and at the time of the default proceeding below, he had not 

returned the money to Martich’s father. As a result of Pryatel’s neglect, Martich 

also claimed that he lost his eligibility to seal his records. 

{¶ 8} The board found, and we agree, that Pryatel’s conduct violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a 

client), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a 

client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about 
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the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as 

practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client), 1.15(c), and 

8.4(c). We also agree with the board’s recommendation to dismiss the remaining 

charge under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 

that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) relating to Martich’s allegation 

that Pryatel’s neglect resulted in the permanent loss of his eligibility to seal his 

records. Whether Martich lost eligibility to seal his records is a legal 

determination, and therefore the allegation in Martich’s affidavit alone is 

insufficient to warrant a finding that Pryatel’s conduct violated this rule. 

Accordingly, we dismiss this charge. 

Sanction 

{¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

several relevant factors, including the ethical duties violated, the actual injury 

caused, the existence of any aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD 

Proc.Reg. 10(B), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. 

v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 

N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. We have already identified Pryatel’s ethical breaches to his 

clients and the legal profession. The board determined that four of the nine 

aggravating factors weighed in favor of a more severe sanction, including 

committing multiple offenses, failing to make restitution, refusing to acknowledge 

the wrongful nature of his conduct, and failing to cooperate in the disciplinary 

process. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d), (e), (g), and (i). Initially, the board 

found only one mitigating factor in Pryatel’s favor—the absence of a disciplinary 

record—and recommended that we permanently disbar him. 

{¶ 10} However, on remand, the board determined that Pryatel 

demonstrated the existence of several mitigating factors that, along with our 

relevant case law, justify a reduction in the original recommended sanction to an 
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indefinite suspension. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the board’s 

recommendation. 

1. Pryatel’s Mitigation Evidence 

{¶ 11} On remand, Pryatel argued that all eight of the mitigating factors 

listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2) weighed in his favor. Specifically, to 

demonstrate an absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, he submitted voluminous 

records from the Troyan matter—including copies of 141 letters between him and 

Troyan—to justify the legal fees that he charged for the 23-month representation. 

Pryatel also called Martich’s father as a witness, and he testified that Pryatel was 

never dishonest or selfish with him. To demonstrate that he had attempted to 

rectify the consequences of his misconduct, Pryatel proved that he had refunded 

$20,000 to Troyan between June 2010 and April 2012 and that he had repaid the 

full $2,025 to Martich’s father in September 2011. 

{¶ 12} Pryatel further testified that he had cooperated with relator’s 

investigation by timely responding to relator’s initial inquiries, meeting with 

relator’s investigator on three occasions, sitting for two days of depositions, and 

providing all the documents requested by relator relating to those depositions. 

Pryatel blamed his subsequent failure to answer relator’s complaint and 

participate in the disciplinary proceedings on his previously undiagnosed 

generalized anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder, from which he was 

suffering in January 2011 when he received relator’s notice of intent to file the 

complaint. The psychiatrist who diagnosed Pryatel with these disorders also 

testified that the prolonged illness and death, in 2011, of Pryatel’s mother—for 

whom Pryatel was the primary caregiver—contributed to his depression. The 

psychiatrist further concluded that Pryatel’s depressive disorder was in remission 

and that Pryatel is capable of returning to the ethical and competent practice of 

law as long as he receives treatment for the disorders, including establishing a 

relationship with a treating psychiatrist. In addition, in December 2011, Pryatel 
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entered into a three-year contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program 

(“OLAP”), which requires him to, among other things, attend group therapy, seek 

individual counseling, and make contact with OLAP three times a week. 

{¶ 13} As to Pryatel’s character and reputation, three judges of the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas submitted letters praising Pryatel as 

professional, competent, and reputable. Judge Ronald Suster stated that Pryatel is 

respected for “filling a critical need in our criminal justice system by frequently 

representing poor defendants facing the possibility of significant prison terms.” 

Similarly, three criminal-defense lawyers testified as to Pryatel’s lengthy career, 

honesty, good character, and professional reputation in the criminal-defense field. 

{¶ 14} Finally, Pryatel informed the hearing panel that in April 2012, he 

pled guilty to a first-degree misdemeanor for aggravated theft relating to the 

Troyan matter, and in May 2012, he was sentenced to jail for six months, all 

suspended, and ordered to serve one year of probation, perform 100 hours of pro 

bono work for Cleveland Legal Aid, and pay a fine of $1,000. 

2. The Board’s Treatment of the Mitigation Evidence 

{¶ 15} The board found, and we agree, that Pryatel demonstrated the 

existence of only four of the eight mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B)(2)—specifically, an absence of a disciplinary record, good professional 

character and reputation, imposition of other penalties and sanctions, and other 

interim rehabilitation, such as the OLAP contract. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), 

(e), (f), and (h). 

{¶ 16} Despite the testimony from Martich’s father, Pryatel did not 

establish an absence of a dishonest or selfish motive under BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B)(2)(b)—mostly because he pled guilty to theft. Similarly, we cannot 

conclude that Pryatel made a “timely good faith effort” toward restitution under 

BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c), when he waited four years to repay Martich’s 

father and did not complete restitution to Troyan until well after the disciplinary 
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complaint was filed. We likewise cannot find that Pryatel exhibited a 

“cooperative attitude” toward the disciplinary process when it resulted in a default 

proceeding against Pryatel. 

{¶ 17} Finally, Pryatel’s recent mental-disorder diagnoses do not qualify 

as a mitigating factor. While the psychiatrist who diagnosed Pryatel concluded 

that his mental disorders contributed to his failure to cooperate in the disciplinary 

proceedings, the doctor did not conclude that the disorders contributed to the 

professional misconduct charged in this case, as required by BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B)(2)(g)(ii). Further, as the board determined, BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B)(2)(g)(iv) requires a prognosis that the lawyer will be able to return to the 

competent, ethical, and professional practice of law under “specified conditions.” 

The psychiatrist here testified that the specific conditions under which Pryatel 

could return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law would 

need to be determined by a psychiatrist with whom Pryatel had established a 

relationship. But at the time of the remand hearing, Pryatel admitted that he had 

not yet established a relationship with a treating psychiatrist. 

3. Applicable Precedent 

{¶ 18} We have previously recognized that permanent disbarment is the 

appropriate sanction for cases involving the misappropriation of client funds. See, 

e.g., Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Kafantaris, 121 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009-Ohio-1389, 

904 N.E.2d 875, ¶ 14 (“misappropriation of client funds carried a ‘presumptive 

sanction of disbarment’ ”), quoting Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 

490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 769 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 15. However, we have also previously 

imposed indefinite suspensions in misappropriation cases, based in part on the 

existence of mitigating factors. Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandman, 125 Ohio 

St.3d 503, 2010-Ohio-2115, 929 N.E.2d 442 (indefinite suspension for an 

attorney who misappropriated client trust funds when mitigating factors included 

lack of prior disciplinary record, cooperation with the investigation, significant 
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remorse, and payment of restitution); Akron Bar Assn. v. Dietz, 108 Ohio St.3d 

343, 2006-Ohio-1067, 843 N.E.2d 786 (indefinite suspension for an attorney who 

misappropriated client funds when mitigating factors included payment of 

restitution, waiver of earned fees, lack of prior discipline during career of more 

than 20 years, and good character). 

{¶ 19} In addition, as the board noted in its report, we have imposed 

indefinite suspensions on attorneys for misconduct that was substantially more 

egregious than Pryatel’s. See, e.g., Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Pritchard, 131 

Ohio St.3d 97, 2012-Ohio-44, 961 N.E.2d 165 (indefinite suspension for 

misconduct involving 20 clients, including numerous instances of accepting fees 

for work not performed, neglecting clients’ legal matters, failing to respond to 

client inquiries, and refusing to refund unearned retainers). And we have also 

imposed indefinite suspensions on attorneys who suffered from mental illness or 

substance abuse but who failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that 

their condition qualified as a mitigating factor pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv). Columbus Bar Assn. v. Van Sickle, 128 Ohio St.3d 

376, 2011-Ohio-774, 944 N.E.2d 677, ¶ 14, and cases cited therein. “This 

sanction serves to protect the public while leaving open the possibility that with 

proper rehabilitation, the sanctioned attorney might one day be able to resume the 

competent, ethical, and professional practice of law.” Id. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 20} Having reviewed the record, and the aggravating and mitigating 

factors, and having considered the sanctions previously imposed for comparable 

conduct, we agree with the board that the appropriate sanction is an indefinite 

suspension. Pryatel’s serious misconduct is tempered by the mitigating factors 

cited in the board’s report. Accordingly, Mark Robert Pryatel is hereby 

indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio. Any future 

reinstatement is conditioned on the submission of proof that Pryatel has complied 
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with the terms of his OLAP contract, has obtained treatment from a psychiatrist 

for his mental disorders, has fulfilled all follow-up care and reporting 

requirements imposed by OLAP and his treating psychiatrist, and has paid the 

costs of this proceeding. Upon petitioning for reinstatement, Pryatel shall also be 

required to submit a statement from a qualified mental-health professional 

demonstrating that he is capable of returning to the competent, ethical, and 

professional practice of law. Costs are taxed to Pryatel. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY,

FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

Ian N. Friedman and Ronald Frey, for relator. 

Richard C. Alkire and Dean Nieding, for respondent. 

______________________