IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 08–0859

Filed July 9, 2010

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

VICTOR SERRATO,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Mark J. 

Smith, Judge.

The State seeks further review of the court of appeals opinion 

reversing the defendant’s convictions for first-degree murder and 

nonconsensual termination of a human pregnancy. DECISION OF 

COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT 

AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, 

Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich and Laura M. 

Roan, Assistant Attorneys General, Gary R. Allison, County Attorney, 

and Alan R. Ostergren, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
2

BAKER, Justice.

The State seeks further review of the court of appeals opinion 

reversing the defendant, Victor Serrato’s, convictions for first-degree 

murder and nonconsensual termination of a human pregnancy. The 

State claims the court of appeals erred in finding there was insufficient 

evidence establishing that any of the conduct constituting the 

defendant’s alleged offenses had occurred in Iowa, and thus the State 

had failed to establish territorial jurisdiction. Serrato resists the State’s 

claim and further argues that the State failed to prove he was even the 

individual who killed the victim, Mimi Carmona, and ended her 

pregnancy. After reviewing all the evidence, we find that, taken as a 

whole, substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict and to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Iowa had territorial jurisdiction to 

prosecute Serrato for first-degree murder and nonconsensual 

termination of a human pregnancy. Serrato’s conviction is affirmed.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On November 9, 2006, Victor Serrato was initially charged by trial 

information with the first-degree murder of Mimi Carmona in violation of 

Iowa Code sections 707.1, 707.2(1), and 707.2(2) (2005); kidnapping in 

the first degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 710.1 and 710.2; and 

nonconsensual termination of a human pregnancy in violation of Iowa 

Code section 707.8(1).1

 1The State later amended the trial information and dropped the kidnapping 

charge and the felony murder alternative of the first-degree murder charge.

 All of these charges stem from a series of events 

that took place between Serrato, Carmona, and Serrato’s pregnant 

girlfriend on the evening of October 21 and the early morning hours of 

October 22. Many of these events took place in Muscatine, Iowa, a town 
3

bordering the Mississippi River. Carmona’s body, however, was found in 

a rural area in Illinois, directly across the river from Muscatine.

Serrato filed a motion to dismiss the remaining charges claiming 

the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he murdered 

Carmona or that any of his alleged crimes occurred, in whole or in part, 

within the State of Iowa. The motion was denied.

A jury trial was held, and after the State rested its case, Serrato 

moved for a verdict of acquittal, arguing that the State provided 

insufficient evidence that Serrato caused the death of Carmona and, 

alternatively, that any part of the offenses charged took place in Iowa. 

The State resisted arguing there was sufficient evidence tying Serrato to 

the murder and that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury 

could infer that his intent to kill with premeditation and malice 

aforethought were formed in Iowa. The district court denied Serrato’s 

motion.

The jury found Serrato guilty of all counts. Serrato filed a motion 

in arrest of judgment and a motion for a new trial, claiming the evidence 

was insufficient to prove the crimes took place in Iowa and insufficient to 

convict him of the crimes. The court denied his motions. He appealed.

The appeal was routed to the court of appeals. The court of 

appeals concluded that the element of intent was sufficient to invoke the 

state’s territorial jurisdiction; however, the court found the State failed to 

present sufficient evidence that Serrato formed the intent to kill and 

malice aforethought necessary to invoke Iowa’s territorial jurisdiction

while he was in Iowa. The court reversed the jury’s verdict and 

remanded for dismissal. The State then filed an application for further 

review with this court, which we granted.
4

II. Discussion and Analysis.

A. Scope of Review. The principles governing our review of a 

district court’s denial of a criminal defendant’s motion for judgment of 

acquittal are well-established. State v. Henderson, 696 N.W.2d 5, 7 (Iowa 

2005). A motion for judgment of acquittal is a means of challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence, and we review such claims for correction of 

errors at law. Id. A guilty verdict must be supported by substantial 

evidence. Id.

“ ‘Substantial evidence’ is that upon which a rational trier of 

fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” In conducting our review, we consider all the 

evidence, that which detracts from the verdict, as well as 

that supporting the verdict.

State v. Hagedorn, 679 N.W.2d 666, 668–69 (Iowa 2004) (quoting State v. 

Pace, 602 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Iowa 1999)). “However, in making such 

determinations, we also view the ‘evidence in the light most favorable to 

the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may 

fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’ ” State v. 

Quinn, 691 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v. Biddle, 652 

N.W.2d 191, 197 (Iowa 2002)).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Prove Serrato Was the 

Perpetrator. In his appeal, Serrato claimed that the State failed to 

present sufficient evidence that he was the perpetrator of the charged 

offenses, and his convictions should be vacated. After reviewing all of the 

evidence in the record, we conclude that the jury’s verdict is supported 

by substantial evidence.

The jury found Serrato guilty of first-degree murder and 

nonconsensual termination of a human pregnancy. The jury was 

presented with the following evidence. On October 21, sometime 
5

between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m., friends Esmerelda Perales and Angelica 

Chavez went to the Escorpion Bar in Muscatine, Iowa. At the bar, the 

women encountered Chavez’s former friend and roommate Carmona. 

Both Carmona and Chavez were pregnant at the time. Carmona 

approached the women and tried to give Chavez a hug, but Chavez put 

up her hand blocking Carmona’s attempt. Carmona asked Chavez if she 

was mad at her, to which Chavez replied, “I have nothing to say to you.” 

A few minutes later, Carmona slapped Chavez, and a fight ensued. The 

fight was quickly broken up by the bartender and the owner of the 

establishment. Carmona was escorted outside by the bartender but ran 

back inside a few minutes later to continue the fight. Chavez and Perales 

left the bar soon afterwards. Carmona remained at the Escorpion Bar.

The two women were fighting over the paternity of their unborn 

babies. During the argument, Perales overheard Carmona say to Chavez, 

“We have the same baby” and “[o]ur babies have the same blood running 

through their veins.” To these comments Chavez replied, “Whose blood? 

Chutarro’s or Juan’s?” Chutarro is the nickname of Serrato, Chavez’s 

boyfriend at the time. Juan was the defendant’s brother.

On the drive home, Chavez and Perales decided to call Serrato to 

tell him about the fight with Carmona. After several failed attempts to 

contact Serrato on his cell phone, the women decided they were going to 

drive to West Liberty, Iowa, where Serrato was attending a dance. 

However, Serrato called Perales’s cell phone just as the women reached 

the outskirts of Muscatine. Phone records place this call at 12:47 a.m. 

on October 22. Perales relayed the details of the physical altercation to 

Serrato. Serrato told the women to meet him at Chavez’s house in 

Muscatine. Perales and Chavez arrived at the house around 1:00 a.m.
6

Serrato arrived at Chavez’s house sometime between 1:00 and 1:30 

a.m. Serrato was upset when he arrived at the residence. Neither 

Chavez nor Perales would tell him more about the altercation at the 

Escorpion Bar. Perales estimated that he was at the residence for about 

ten minutes; he then left without telling either woman where he was 

going.

At around 1:30 or 1:45 a.m., Marciela Garcia, a friend of Carmona, 

and four passengers in her car, saw Carmona with Serrato in the parking 

lot of the Escorpion Bar. Serrato and Carmona were standing beside a 

little black truck. Serrato was on the driver’s side of the truck and 

Carmona on the passenger side. Garcia got out of her car and 

approached Carmona. When Carmona turned around, Garcia could see 

she had been crying. Garcia asked Carmona why she was upset. 

Carmona replied, “Because this bastard is denying my baby” and pointed 

to Serrato. Serrato, who had been on the driver’s side of the truck, came 

around the vehicle and approached Carmona at this point. He mumbled 

something in Spanish to the effect of, “Are you sure this is my baby?” 

whereupon Carmona smashed her cell phone into his face and kicked 

him in the shin. The couple physically struggled, Carmona attempting to 

hit Serrato and he attempting to grab Carmona’s hands and push her 

against the truck. At this point, a passenger in Garcia’s car, a man 

named Dago, got out of her car and grabbed Serrato, throwing him to the 

ground. Dago told Serrato, “You’re never to hit a woman when—

especially when she’s pregnant.”

Fearing that the police would be called, Garcia told Dago to get 

back into her car. Before leaving, Garcia told Carmona not to move, that 

she would be right back. Garcia drove to a convenience store 

approximately a block away where Dago was supposed to meet a friend 
7

to catch a ride to Iowa City. Garcia left Dago there and returned to the 

parking lot of the Escorpion Bar, but Carmona, Serrato, and the little 

black truck were gone.

According to Perales, Serrato returned to Chavez’s home 

approximately twenty-five minutes after leaving or sometime around 2:00 

or 2:15 a.m. Chavez also testified Serrato was gone for approximately 

thirty minutes. She stated that when he returned he had a scratch on 

his face and several scratches on his arms. Perales then left Chavez’s 

residence and returned home. Cell phone records show that Serrato 

received a call from Chavez at 2:04 a.m., and Chavez received a call from 

Serrato at 2:06 a.m. According to Chavez, Serrato spent the rest of the 

night at her house, and the couple slept in until about 1:00 p.m. the next 

day.

At around 6:30 p.m. the next evening, Carmona’s body was found 

by two motorists in a rural area in Illinois across the Mississippi River 

from Muscatine. Her body had been thrown in a ditch, her clothes were 

partially pulled off, and her body was badly bruised and scraped. A 

plastic bag was caught in her hair. Her shoes, a beer bottle with her 

DNA on it, and a postal receipt later connected to the defendant’s 

brother, Edgardo Serrato, were scattered near the body.

Forensic pathologist, Mark Peters, performed an autopsy on 

Carmona’s body and determined the cause of Carmona’s death to be 

asphyxia due to manual strangulation. He further opined that a “great 

deal of force” was used to kill Carmona, as the hyoid bone in her neck 

was broken. She had a crushing injury to her liver, a hemorrhage 

underneath her scalp, and several dark abrasions on her abdomen. She 

was approximately six months pregnant at the time of her death, and the 

fetus was dependent upon Carmona’s circulation and died as a result of 
8

her death. Based upon lividity, Peters testified that her death could have 

occurred anytime before 6:00 a.m. on October 22.

The police launched an investigation into Carmona’s death. 

Serrato was interviewed several times. At first, Serrato claimed he had 

not seen Carmona in the last three to four weeks, but eventually he 

confessed to investigators that he had argued with her in the parking lot 

of the Escorpion Bar on the night of her disappearance. However, he 

claimed he had left her in the parking lot with another Latino man. He 

also told police he had sex with her eight months prior to her murder.

The plastic bag found caught in Carmona’s hair was sent for DNA 

testing. No fingerprints were found, however, dried flakes of blood were 

found inside the bag. The flakes contained a mixture of DNA from two 

different sources. The DNA matched the profiles of both Carmona and 

Serrato. Testing also revealed that Serrato was not the father of 

Carmona’s baby. The authorities located the little black truck Carmona 

was last seen standing beside in the parking lot of the Escorpion Bar in a 

police impound lot in Chicago; however, the police were not able to 

obtain any useful evidence from the vehicle which had been exposed to 

months of winter weather.

The jury had the following evidence to support its conclusion that 

it was Serrato who killed Carmona. First, Serrato had ample motive. 

Carmona had just assaulted Serrato’s pregnant girlfriend and accused

him of being the father of an unwanted child. Second, he had the 

opportunity to kill Carmona. Serrato was the last person seen with her 

alive. In addition, his whereabouts were unaccounted for during a period 

of time that coincides with her time of death, a gap of approximately 

twenty-five minutes. Finally, there was physical evidence linking Serrato

to Carmona’s death. His DNA was comingled with Carmona’s blood in 
9

the plastic bag found tied to her hair. Serrato points out several 

inconsistencies in the evidence; however, when viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the State, we find that substantial evidence 

exists upon which the jury could find that Serrato was the perpetrator of 

the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

C. Territorial Jurisdiction. Alternatively, Serrato argued, and 

the court of appeals found, that the evidence was insufficient to prove 

Serrato formed the intent to kill and malice aforethought necessary while 

in Iowa to invoke the state’s territorial jurisdiction. We disagree. 

Territorial jurisdiction to prosecute a criminal offense generally rests in 

the courts of the state where the offense was committed. State v. Liggins, 

524 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Iowa 1994). It is an essential element of every 

crime, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution requires the State to prove it beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. at 184–85; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 

99 S. Ct. 2781, 2787, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 571 (1979). Iowa’s criminal 

jurisdiction statute is found in Iowa Code section 803.1. This section

provides, in pertinent part:

1. A person is subject to prosecution in this state for 

an offense which the person commits within or outside this 

state, by the person’s own conduct or that of another for 

which the person is accountable, if:

(a) The offense is committed either wholly or partly 

within this state.

. . . .

2. An offense may be committed partly within this 

state if conduct which is an element of the offense, or a result 

which constitutes an element of the offense, occurs within 

this state. If the body of a murder victim is found within the 

state, the death is presumed to have occurred with the state

. . . .
10

Iowa Code § 803.1 (emphasis added). Carmona’s body was found in 

Illinois; therefore, the presumption in the second sentence of subsection 

(2) does not apply.

Iowa’s criminal jurisdiction statute expressly provides for 

prosecution of offenses committed partly within Iowa. Id.; see also State 

v. Wedebrand, 602 N.W.2d 186, 189 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). Under this 

language, the State need only prove the occurrence in Iowa of one of the 

essential elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt in 

order to confer territorial jurisdiction upon the State of Iowa. See 

Liggins, 524 N.W.2d at 184–85 (declaring that the state must prove 

territorial jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt). “A constituent 

element of a criminal offense may be either an actus reus element or a 

mens rea element.” State v. Anderson, 695 N.W.2d 731, 747 (Wis. 2005).

The jury found Serrato guilty of first-degree murder and 

nonconsensual termination of a human pregnancy. To commit murder 

in the first degree, Serrato must have acted with malice aforethought and 

have killed Carmona willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. Iowa 

Code §§ 707.1, .2(1). The offense of nonconsensual termination of a 

human pregnancy requires that Serrato have terminated a human 

pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant person while committing 

a forcible felony. Id. § 707.8(1). The fetus was dependent upon the 

circulation of Carmona’s body and died as a result of her death;

therefore, the forcible felony required by Iowa Code section 707.8(1) 

would be the murder of Carmona.

In analyzing the issue of Iowa’s territorial jurisdiction, the court of 

appeals focused on the element of specific intent. While specific intent is 

a necessary element of first-degree murder, it is not the only state–of–

mind element required by Iowa’s first-degree murder statute. To commit 
11

first-degree murder in Iowa one must not only have the specific intent to 

kill, but must also act with malice aforethought. Id. § 707.1; see also 

State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 257, 264 (Iowa 2008) (“Malice aforethought 

is an essential element of first-degree murder.”). Unlike specific intent, 

malice aforethought is

“a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to 

another existing prior to the act complained of; it need not be 

shown to have existed for any length of time before, but only 

requires such deliberation as makes a person appreciate and 

understand at the time the act is committed its nature and 

probable consequences as distinguished from an act done in 

the heat of passion . . . .”

State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 142, 126 N.W.2d 285, 290 (1964)

(quoting State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 833, 28 N.W.2d 475, 482 (1947)). 

Malice to support a first-degree murder conviction “must be ‘formed 

before . . . the injury’ . . . . [and] must result in the homicidal act.”

Bentley, 757 N.W.2d at 265 (quoting Hofer, 238 Iowa at 833, 28 N.W.2d 

at 482).

Because it is a state of mind, malice aforethought often evades 

direct evidence. See, e.g., State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa 

1992) (declaring states of mind are difficult to prove by direct evidence). 

However, similar to intent, malice aforethought may be inferred by 

conduct. Compare id. (“Intent is a state of mind difficult of proof by 

direct evidence. It may, however, be established by circumstantial 

evidence and by inferences reasonably to be drawn from the conduct of 

the defendant and from all the attendant circumstances in the light of 

human behavior and experience.” (quoting State v. Erving, 346 N.W.2d 

833, 836 (Iowa 1984))), with Gramenz, 256 Iowa at 142, 126 N.W.2d at 

290 (stating evidence of malice aforethought “may be express or implied 

from the acts and conduct of the defendant”). Thus, when a person’s 
12

state of mind, i.e., knowledge, intent, or malice aforethought, is an 

essential element of the crime charged, acts by that person occurring 

within Iowa, which indicate his or her state of mind at the time, 

constitute conduct upon which the requirements of section 803.1 are 

satisfied. See Wedebrand, 602 N.W.2d at 189 (stating “proof of the 

requisite intent or malice aforethought may be accomplished by 

inferences made from the acts and conduct of the defendant and the 

means used in doing the wrongful and injurious acts”); see also

Anderson, 695 N.W.2d at 747 (noting it is sufficient “that the defendant 

committed an act in this state that manifests an intent to kill”).

We agree with the court of appeals, that under the language of 

Iowa Code section 803.1, conduct or actions occurring in Iowa which 

establish a mens rea element of the offense are sufficient to subject a 

defendant to Iowa’s territorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wedebrand, 602 

N.W.2d at 189 (finding that Iowa’s territorial jurisdiction may be properly 

invoked by evidence of conduct which evidences the intent to kill).

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish Iowa’s Territorial 

Jurisdiction. To determine whether evidence is sufficient to prove an 

element of the crime, the question is “ ‘whether, after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’ ” Casady, 491 N.W.2d at 787 (quoting Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 318–19, 99 S. Ct. at 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573). Our review 

“must be based on all of the evidence in the record,” and the evidence 

presented “must at least raise a fair inference of guilt as to each essential 

element of the crime.” Id.

There were no eyewitnesses to Carmona’s death, her body was 

found in Illinois, and the State of Iowa did not produce any evidence 
13

documenting the exact location where Serrato allegedly strangled 

Carmona. A review of the evidence, however, reveals that a jury could 

find Serrato engaged in the following conduct on the evening of October 

21 and the early morning of October 22.

1. Serrato called Perales’s cell phone at 12:47 a.m. on October 

22. Serrato told the women to meet him at Chavez’s house 

located at 514 Spring Street in Muscatine.

2. Serrato arrived at Chavez’s house sometime between 1:00 

and 1:30 a.m.

3. Serrato left Chavez’s house sometime between 1:10 and 1:40 

a.m.

4. At around 1:30 or 1:45 a.m., Marciela Garcia, a friend of 

Carmona’s, and four passengers in her car, saw Carmona

and Serrato physically fighting in the parking lot of the 

Escorpion Bar.

5. At approximately 1:50 a.m. Garcia left the parking lot of the 

Escorpion Bar. Serrato and Carmona were still in the 

Escorpion parking lot.

6. Cell phone records show that Serrato received a call from 

Chavez at 2:04 a.m. and Chavez received a call from Serrato 

at 2:06 a.m.

7. Serrato returned to Chavez’s home approximately twenty-five 

minutes after leaving or sometime around 2:00 or 2:15 a.m.

From these facts, the jury could have inferred that from the time 

Serrato was informed of the physical altercation between Chavez and 

Carmona, sometime shortly before 1:00 a.m., he knew he had a problem

that must be addressed. The situation was only exacerbated when

Serrato arrived at Chavez’s home to find an upset pregnant girlfriend and 

further escalated when Serrato confronted Carmona in the parking lot of 

the Escorpion Bar, culminating in a screaming match with Carmona that 

turned physical and had to be broken up by a third party. From the 

timeline, the jury could also find that Serrato’s presence was only 
14

unaccounted for from approximately 1:50 a.m. until approximately 2:15 

a.m. It was within this twenty-five minute window that the State posits 

Serrato formed the intent to murder Carmona, murdered Carmona, made 

a call to Chavez at 2:04 a.m. and received a call from Chavez at 2:06 

a.m., traveled to Illinois, and returned to Chavez’s home in Iowa.

At trial, Dr. Peters testified that death by strangulation takes 

approximately three to four minutes, a relatively short amount of time. 

While Carmona also had a crushing injury to her liver, a hemorrhage 

underneath her scalp, and several dark abrasions on her abdomen, it is 

unclear how many times she needed to be struck to cause these injuries

or the length of time required to cause these injuries. From the evidence 

presented, the jury could have inferred that the death occurred prior to 

the two phone calls made between Chavez and Serrato. This timeline 

leaves a very short window of time for Serrato to form the malice 

aforethought and intent necessary to kill Carmona, murder her, and be 

back in Muscatine by no later than 2:15 a.m.

We find there is sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer 

that Serrato formed “ ‘a fixed purpose or design to do some physical 

harm to [Carmona]’ ” when he took her from the parking lot of the 

Escorpion Bar sometime between 1:50 a.m. and 1:53 a.m. Gramenz, 256 

Iowa at 142, 126 N.W.2d at 290 (quoting Hofer, 238 Iowa at 833, 28 

N.W.2d at 482). Just prior to the couples’ departure, several witnesses 

had seen another man stop Serrato from striking Carmona. This is 

specific conduct from which the jury could infer Serrato’s intent to harm 

Carmona.

As in provocation cases, the issue is “whether ‘the blood has had 

time to cool.’ ” Finn v. Stoddard, 179 Iowa 904, 910, 162 N.W. 1, 3 

(1917) (quoting Thrall v. Knapp, 17 Iowa 468, 471 (1864)). We believe 
15

that human nature is such that anger does not immediately subside, and 

the jury could have inferred that Serrato hatched a plan to harm 

Carmona, evidencing malice aforethought, while still in the parking lot of 

the Escorpion Bar in Muscatine, Iowa. The jury could further infer that 

as part of that plan Serrato enticed Carmona or forced her to take a ride 

with him in his vehicle with the intent to kill her and terminate the 

pregnancy. See, e.g., People v. Betts, 103 P.3d 883, 893 (Cal. 2005).

Iowa’s jurisdiction statute “is satisfied if the defendant, with the 

requisite intent, does a preparatory act in [Iowa] that is more than a de 

minimus act toward the eventual completion of the offense.” Id. 

Serrato’s act of confronting Carmona, physically struggling with her, and 

then leaving the parking lot with her were not merely de minimus acts, 

but ultimately furthered the completion of the charged offense, first–

degree murder. See id. (finding preparatory acts sufficient to establish 

jurisdiction over a defendant’s crimes when the acts furthered the 

completion of the charged offense by removing the victims from the 

protection of others and providing the defendant with the opportunity to 

commit the crimes).

We find that, taken as a whole, the circumstantial evidence—

Serrato’s motive to kill Carmona (an unwanted pregnancy), the physical 

altercation between Serrato and Carmona in Iowa immediately before her 

murder, the act of enticing or forcing her into his vehicle, and the short 

timeline—provide substantial evidence to support an inference that 

Serrato engaged in conduct which manifested malice aforethought to kill 

Carmona and terminate the pregnancy while in the State of Iowa. When 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, this 

constitutes substantial evidence to prove the jurisdictional element 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Iowa therefore had territorial jurisdiction to 
16

prosecute Serrato for first-degree murder and nonconsensual 

termination of a human pregnancy.

III. Motion for New Trial.

Serrato also claims that the district court’s denial of his motion for 

new trial was in error because the verdict was contrary to the weight of 

the evidence. The standard of review on a motion for a new trial is 

different than that required for a motion for judgment of acquittal. State 

v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Iowa 1998). On a motion for judgment of 

acquittal we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Id.

“On a motion for new trial, however, the power of the 

[trial] court is much broader. It may weigh the evidence and 

consider the credibility of witnesses. If the court reaches the 

conclusion that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the 

evidence and that a miscarriage of justice may have resulted, 

the verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted.”

Id. at 658–59 (quoting 3 Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King & Susan R. 

Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure § 553, at 245–48 (2d ed. 1982)). 

We review the district court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial for an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 2003). 

To establish an abuse of discretion, Serrato “must show that the district 

court exercised its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable 

or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id. Our “review is limited to a 

review of the exercise of discretion by the trial court.” Id. at 203. This 

discretion “should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the 

evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 

659.

The jury determined that Serrato was the perpetrator of the 

offenses charged and that Serrato engaged in conduct which manifested 

malice aforethought to kill Carmona and terminate the pregnancy while 

in the State of Iowa. We find the trial court properly applied the law and 
17

determined that the jury’s guilty verdict was not contrary to the weight of 

the credible evidence. Id. We hold that it was within scope of the trial 

court’s discretion to deny Serrato's motion for new trial.

IV. Disposition.

After reviewing all the evidence, we find that, taken as a whole, 

substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict finding Serrato 

guilty of first-degree murder and nonconsensual termination of a human 

pregnancy. We conclude that under the language of Iowa Code section 

803.1, conduct or actions occurring in Iowa which establish a mens rea 

element of the offense are sufficient to subject a defendant to Iowa’s 

territorial jurisdiction. We also conclude that sufficient evidence exists to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Iowa had territorial jurisdiction to 

prosecute Serrato for first-degree murder and nonconsensual 

termination of a human pregnancy, and that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Serrato’s motion for a new trial. We, therefore,

vacate the court of appeals’ contrary decision and affirm Serrato’s 

conviction.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.