PEACE OPS 

MULTI-SERVICE 

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, 

AND PROCEDURES FOR 

PEACE OPERATIONS 

ATP 3-07.31[FM 3-07.31] 

MCWP 3-33.8 

AFTTP 3-2.40 

NOVEMBER 2014 

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release, 

distribution is unlimited. 

*Supersedes FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, dated 26

October 2003, including all changes. 
FOREWORD 

This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication is a project of 

the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center in accordance with the memorandum of 

agreement between the Headquarters of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force 

doctrine commanders directing ALSA to develop MTTP publications to meet the 

immediate needs of the warfighter. 

This MTTP publication has been prepared by ALSA under our direction for 

implementation by our respective commands and for use by other commands as 

appropriate. 

THOMAS S. JAMES, JR. WILLIAM F. MULLEN, III 

Major General, US Army Brigadier General, US Marine Corps 

Director Director

Mission Command Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Directorate 

STEVEN L. KWAST 

Lieutenant General, US Air Force 

Commander 

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine 

 Development and Education 

This publication is available through the following websites: 

ALSA (http://www.alsa.mil/); 

US Army (https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html); 

US Marine Corps (https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil); 

US Navy at Navy Doctrine Library System (https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil); 

US Air Force at Air Force E-Publishing System (http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/); 

and Joint Electronic Library Plus (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=0). 
ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1 

Change No. 1 Headquarters 

Department of the Army 

Washington, DC, 17 April 2015 

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND 

PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS 

1. Change ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, November 2014, as follows:

Change distribution to Public Release.

Remove old pages: Insert new pages: 

Cover Cover

v through ix v through ix 

Authentication Page Authentication Page 

2. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release, distribution is 

unlimited.
ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

Official: 

DISTRIBUTION: 

Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: Not to be distributed. Electronic 

means only.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force 

STEVEN L. KWAST 

Lieutenant General, USAF 

Commander and President 

Air University 

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing Web site 

at www.e-publishing .af.mil for downloading or ordering. 

RELEASABILITY: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release, 

distribution is unlimited. 

PIN: 104715-001

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff

GERALD B. O’KEEFE 

Administrative Assistant to 

the Secretary of the Army 

1510503
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 i 

PREFACE 

1. Purpose

This publication provides a single source multi-Service tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (MTTP) manual that focuses on conducting peace operations (PO) at the 

tactical level. 

Note: For the Army, the term “mission command” replaced “command and control.” 

Mission command now encompasses the Army’s philosophy of command (still known 

as mission command) as well as the exercise of authority and direction to accomplish 

missions (formerly known as command and control). 

2. Scope

Use this publication at the tactical level for training, planning, and conducting joint or 

multi-Service PO. It serves as the focal point guiding readers to existing TTP and 

provides TTP where gaps exist. In general terms, the tactical level refers to those 

operations conducted by tactical units or task forces at the O-6 level of command. This 

publication offers readers a basic understanding of joint and multinational PO, an 

overview of the nature and fundamentals of PO, and a detailed discussion of selected 

military tasks associated with PO. To a limited degree, this publication provides training 

objectives for the proper execution of PO for commanders and their staffs. This 

publication has worldwide application and supplements Joint Publication 3-07.3, Peace 

Operations. 

3. Applicability

It applies to all commanders, leaders, staff, and warfighters participating in joint 

operations. In addition, it assists a joint force commander, Service component 

commanders and their staffs, and anyone responsible for force protection of personnel 

and resources. 

4. Implementation Plan

Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility will review this 

publication, validate the information and, where appropriate, reference and incorporate 

it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows: 

Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the TTP 

contained herein into the United States (US) Army Doctrine and Training Literature 

Program as directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC). Distribution is in accordance with applicable directives listed on the 

authentication page. 

Marine Corps.

1

 The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication 

in US Marine Corps doctrine publications as directed by the Deputy Commandant, 

Combat Development and Integration (CD&I). Distribution is in accordance with the 

Marine Corps Publication Distribution System. 

1

 Marine Corps PCN: 143 000144 01 
ii ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Air Force. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication in 

accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance with Air 

Force Instruction 33-360, Publications and Forms Management. 

5. User Information

a. US Army Combined Arms Center; HQMC, Deputy Commandant, CD&I; Curtis E.

LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education (LeMay Center); and Air 

Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with the joint 

participation of the approving Service commands. ALSA will review and update this 

publication as necessary. 

b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control

organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in 

Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, is 

incorporated in revisions to this document. 

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your

comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each 

recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to: 

Army 

Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center 

ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D 

Fort Leavenworth KS 66027-6900 

DSN 552-4885 COMM (913) 684-4885 

E-mail: usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil 

Marine Corps 

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration 

ATTN: C116 

3300 Russell Road, Suite 204 

Quantico VA 22134-5021 

DSN 278-3616/6233 COMM (703) 784-3616/6233 

Air Force 

Commander, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education 

ATTN: DDJ 

401 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428 

DSN 493-7864/1681 COMM (334) 953-7864/1681 

E-mail: LeMayCtr.DDJ.wrkflw@us.af.mil 

ALSA 

Director, ALSA Center 

114 Andrews Street 

Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA 23665-2785 

DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902 

E-mail: alsadirector@us.af.mil 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for Peace Operations. 

This revision, February 2014: 

Updates: 

Chapter I 

• Changes references from psychological operations (PSYOP) to military

information support operations.

Chapter II 

• Discusses the operational and information environments using the following

tools:

o Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time

available.

o Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time

available and civil considerations.

o Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

o Political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure.

• Combines previous Peace Operations (PO) MTTP information on media,

PSYOP, and combat camera as “information-related capabilities.”

• Enlarges information on negotiations and interpersonal engagement.

• Enhances emphasis on the importance of force protection and civil-military

operations.

• Rearranges and reprioritizes tasks on medical information.

• Changes internal “displaced persons” to “internally displaced persons (IDPs).”

Chapters III and IV 

• Combines and reorganizes previous PO multi-Service tactics, techniques, and

procedures (MTTP) tasks in chapters III and IV reinforcing the following tasks

identified under “Creating a Secure Environment.” This consolidation includes:

o Military tasks.

o Observing and reporting.

o Patrolling.

o Separation of forces and interpositioning.

o Site security and protected areas.

• Searches.
iv ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

o Individual.

o Vehicles.

o Homes.

• Verification of weapons and forces.

• Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

• Public security and civil disturbances.

o Rule of law.

o Curfews.

o Demining and unexploded ordnance.

o Refugees and IDPs.

o Environmental protection and restoration.

o Nonlethal weapons.

• Convoys.

Chapter IV 

• Adds Chapter IV, “Control of Large Areas,” with the following military tasks:

o Movement control measures.

o Checkpoints.

o Roadblocks.

o Controlling borders.

Chapter VI 

• Refines doctrinal discussion on civil administration.

Chapter VII 

• Moves the information from Appendix D in the previous MTTP, “Information

Operations,” into chapter VII, and updates the relationship between information

operations and informing and influencing relevant audiences to ensure

successful PO.

Appendices 

• Updates appendices reflecting current doctrine and tactics, techniques, and

procedures.

• Adds a mass atrocity response operations (MARO) appendix, and identifies

MARO as a subset of peace enforcement operations.
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. 

*Supersedes FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, dated 26 October 2003, including all changes.

v 

*ATP 3-07.31 [FM 3-07.31]

MCWP 3-33.8 

AFTTP 3-2.40 

ATP 3-07.31 [FM 3-07.31] US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia 

US Army Combined Arms Center 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

MCWP 3-33.8 Headquarters, USMC, Deputy Commandant, CD&I 

Quantico, Virginia

AFTTP 3-2.40 Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine 

Development and Education 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

1 November 2014 

PEACE OPS 

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR 

PEACE OPERATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ X

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION TO PEACE OPERATIONS ............................................. 1

1. Background ........................................................................................................ 1

2. Characteristics of Peace Operations .................................................................. 2

3. Information Operations ...................................................................................... 3

4. Fundamentals of Peace Operations ................................................................... 3

5. Transition ........................................................................................................... 4

CHAPTER II DESIGN AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS ....................................... 5

1. Background ........................................................................................................ 5

2. Creating a Secure Environment ......................................................................... 6

3. Staff Considerations for Personnel .................................................................... 7

4. Staff Considerations for Intelligence .................................................................. 7

5. Staff Considerations for Operations ................................................................... 8

6. Staff Considerations for Logistics ..................................................................... 12

7. Staff Considerations for Communications ........................................................ 13

8. Other Staff Considerations ............................................................................... 13

CHAPTER III PEACE OPERATIONS TASKS .............................................................. 19

1. Background ...................................................................................................... 19
vi ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1 17 April 2015

2. Military Tasks ................................................................................................... 19

3. Site Security ..................................................................................................... 30

4. Protected Areas ............................................................................................... 31

5. Establishing Search Operations ....................................................................... 32

6. Conducting Personnel Searches...................................................................... 36

7. Conducting Vehicle Searches .......................................................................... 38

8. Building Search (Inhabited) .............................................................................. 45

9. Building Search (Uninhabited) ......................................................................... 48

10. Search of Rural Areas .................................................................................... 49

11. Verification of Weapons and Forces .............................................................. 49

12. Military Movements and Exercises ................................................................. 50

13. Convoy Operations ........................................................................................ 50

14. Convoy Security ............................................................................................. 53

15. Populace Control Measures ........................................................................... 53

16. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reconciliation ......................................... 53

17. Civil Disturbances .......................................................................................... 55

18. Curfews .......................................................................................................... 59

19. Demining and Unexploded Ordnance ............................................................ 61

20. Dislocated Civilian Operations ....................................................................... 61

21. Environmental Restoration ............................................................................. 63

22. Nonlethal Weapons ........................................................................................ 63

23. Search Operations ......................................................................................... 65

CHAPTER IV CONTROL OF LARGE AREAS ............................................................. 69

1. Background ...................................................................................................... 69

2. Gaining Control of an Area .............................................................................. 69

3. Movement Control ............................................................................................ 72

4. Roadblocks ...................................................................................................... 72

5. Checkpoints ..................................................................................................... 74

6. Controlling Urban Areas ................................................................................... 76

7. Controlling Underground Areas ....................................................................... 79

8. Controlling Rural Areas .................................................................................... 81

CHAPTER V FORCE PROTECTION ............................................................................ 83

1. Background ...................................................................................................... 83

2. Definition .......................................................................................................... 83
17 April 2015 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1 vii 

3. Threat Assessment .......................................................................................... 84

4. Threat Countermeasures ................................................................................. 85

5. Terrorist Tactics ............................................................................................... 85

6. IO and Force Protection ................................................................................... 86

7. Intelligence ....................................................................................................... 87

8. Medical Role in Force Protection ..................................................................... 87

9. Force Protection Checklist ............................................................................... 87

CHAPTER VI CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ............................................................ 89

1. Background ...................................................................................................... 89

2. Objectives of CMO ........................................................................................... 90

3. Support to Civil Administration (SCA) .............................................................. 92

CHAPTER VII INFORMING AND INFLUENCING ...................................................... 105

1. Background .................................................................................................... 105

2. The Information Environment ......................................................................... 105

3. Information Operations .................................................................................. 105

4. Commander Tasks ......................................................................................... 106

5. Information-Related Capabilities .................................................................... 107

6. IO Training and Predeployment Considerations ............................................ 108

7. Information Support Agencies ........................................................................ 109

CHAPTER VIII CONFLICT RESOLUTION ................................................................. 111

1. Background .................................................................................................... 111

2. Conflict Resolution Training ........................................................................... 111

3. Negotiations ................................................................................................... 112

4. Mediation ....................................................................................................... 114

5. Arbitration ...................................................................................................... 115

APPENDIX A SETTING UP AND CONDUCTING MEETINGS .................................. 117

1. Background .................................................................................................... 117

2. Commander and Staff’s Role in Developing the Engagement Strategy ......... 117

3. Meeting Types and Purposes ........................................................................ 118

4. Principles of Engagement .............................................................................. 120

5. The Operations Process Applied to Meetings or Engagements ..................... 121

APPENDIX B LIAISON OFFICER .............................................................................. 125

1. Background .................................................................................................... 125

2. Functions ....................................................................................................... 125
viii ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1 17 April 2015

3. Liaison Responsibilities .................................................................................. 125

APPENDIX C INTERPRETERS .................................................................................. 127

1. Background .................................................................................................... 127

2. Selecting an Interpreter .................................................................................. 127

3. Training the Interpreter .................................................................................. 129

4. Communication Techniques When Employing an Interpreter ........................ 129

APPENDIX D CIVIL COMPONENT ANALYSIS AND TEMPLATING ........................ 133

1. Background .................................................................................................... 133

2. Civil Considerations ....................................................................................... 134

3. PMESII ........................................................................................................... 134

4. ASCOPE ........................................................................................................ 137

5. Cultural Environment ..................................................................................... 141

APPENDIX E INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ............................................................... 145

1. Background .................................................................................................... 145

2. Organizations ................................................................................................. 145

APPENDIX F JOINT COMMISSION ........................................................................... 151

1. Background .................................................................................................... 151

2. Objectives of Joint Commissions ................................................................... 151

APPENDIX G MASS ATROCITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS .................................. 153

1. Background .................................................................................................... 153

2. MARO Considerations ................................................................................... 153

3. Actors ............................................................................................................. 156

4. Perpetrators ................................................................................................... 156

5. Victims ........................................................................................................... 157

6. Interveners ..................................................................................................... 157

7. Others ............................................................................................................ 158

8. MARO Planning and Operations .................................................................... 159

9. MARO Approaches ........................................................................................ 161

APPENDIX H KEY DOCUMENTS .............................................................................. 163

1. Background .................................................................................................... 163

2. Mandate ......................................................................................................... 163

3. Status of Forces Agreement .......................................................................... 163

4. Terms of Reference ....................................................................................... 163

5. Rules of Engagement (ROE) ......................................................................... 164
17 April 2015 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40, C1 ix 

6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement ........... 164

7. General Orders .............................................................................................. 165

8. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Documents ................................. 165

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 167

GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................ 169

List of Figures 

Figure 1. Control Zones ............................................................................................ 23

Figure 2. Armistice Demarcation Line ....................................................................... 26

Figure 3. Deployment of PO Forces Along an Armistice Demarcation Line .............. 27

Figure 4. Withdrawal of Disputing Forces Behind Lines of Demarcation .................. 28

Figure 5. Establishment of Buffer Zones ................................................................... 29

Figure 6. Establishment of Areas of Limitation ......................................................... 30

Figure 7. Suggested Roadblock in Urban Areas ....................................................... 34

Figure 8. Suggested Roadblock in Rural Areas ........................................................ 35

Figure 9. Suggested Mobile Roadblock .................................................................... 36

Figure 10. Diagram of Passenger Vehicle .................................................................. 40

Figure 11. Truck Diagram ........................................................................................... 43

Figure 12. Diagram of Buses and Coaches ................................................................ 44

Figure 13. Typical Organization for Search Operations .............................................. 45

Figure 14. Conduct of Search ..................................................................................... 47

Figure 15. Isolate the Disturbance .............................................................................. 55

Figure 16. Controlling Road Networks ........................................................................ 56

Figure 17. Deploying a “Snatch-and-Grab” Team ....................................................... 57

Figure 18. Search Operations ..................................................................................... 68

Figure 19. Civil-Military Operations Relationships ...................................................... 89

Figure 20. Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Areas ..................................................... 93

Figure 21. Operations Process ................................................................................. 121

List of Tables 

Table 1. Quick Body Search Considerations ................................................................. 37

Table 2. Detailed Body Search Considerations ............................................................. 38

Table 3. Vehicle Search Areas ...................................................................................... 40

Table 4. Force Protection Checklist .............................................................................. 88

Table 5. Meeting Worksheet Example ......................................................................... 123

Table 6. PMESII and ASCOPE Matrix ......................................................................... 140

Table 7. Cultural Matrix ............................................................................................... 141

Table 8. MARO Approaches ....................................................................................... 162

Table 9. Sample Rules of Engagement Card .............................................................. 164
x ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

PEACE OPS 

Peace operations (PO) are crisis response and limited contingency operations, 

including international efforts and military missions containing conflict, redressing the 

peace, and shaping the environment supporting reconciliation, rebuilding, and 

facilitating the transition to effective governance. PO includes peacekeeping operations, 

peace building, post conflict actions, peacemaking processes, conflict prevention, and 

military peace enforcement operations. Conduct PO under the sponsorship of the 

United Nations, an intergovernmental organization, within a coalition of agreeing 

nations, or unilaterally (Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, Peace Operations). 

Chapter I Introduction to Peace Operations 

Chapter I describes 5 PO categories and 15 joint fundamentals of PO. The chapter 

discusses transition planning for PO missions, and other PO categories for relieving 

forces, and civilian agencies. 

Chapter II Design and Planning Considerations 

Chapter II sets the conditions for successful nonmilitary peace building activities. It 

provides design and planning factors commanders and staffs must consider when 

undertaking PO. It highlights factors that account for capability differences between 

United States (US) forces, multinational forces, and civilian agencies. 

Chapter III Peace Operations Tasks 

Chapter III describes tactical-level tasks for PO forces. This includes six types of 

patrols, mobile or fixed observation techniques, and movement control with roadblocks 

and checkpoints. It provides techniques for vehicle, personnel, and urban searches. In 

addition, the chapter presents techniques for controlling civil disturbances and handling 

refugees or displaced persons. 

Chapter IV Control of Large Areas 

Chapter IV focuses on methods for controlling large areas and separating opposing 

forces, including but not limited to, interposition, establishing areas of separation, buffer 

zones, border control, and demilitarized zones. 

Chapter V Force Protection 

Chapter V provides checklists and basic considerations for force protection. This 

includes threat assessment, force protection condition procedures, and potential 

terrorist tactics. The chapter focuses on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for 

intelligence usage, preventive or reactive medicine, and military information support 

operations (MISO). 

Chapter VI Civil-Military Operations 

Chapter VI lists the principles of civil-military operations and the aspects of governance 

associated with PO. It provides TTP integrating civilian and military activities for foreign 

humanitarian assistance, civil affairs operations, and election support. Additionally, this 

chapter provides special considerations and restrictions for military support to the rule of 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 xi 

law, including legal restrictions on the use of restraints, assistance to police, and 

support to judiciary or penal systems. 

Chapter VII Informing and Influencing 

Chapter VII discusses the importance of information operations (IO), and informing and 

influencing relevant audiences to ensure successful PO. IO is the integrated 

employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert 

with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making 

of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13, Information 

Operations). IO works in tandem with PA to shape the information environment to 

operational advantage. IO synchronizes such information-related capabilities as military 

information support operations, combat camera, civil affairs/civil military operations, 

operational security and others to influence a range of audiences, particularly 

indigenous populations in the area of operations to support PO and its various lines of 

effort.. 

Chapter VIII Conflict Resolution 

Chapter VIII provides techniques and considerations for conflict resolution focusing on 

negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. 

Appendix A Setting Up and Conducting Meetings 

This appendix provides the purpose for conducting meetings and interpersonal 

engagements and provides TTP for effective planning and execution. 

Appendix B Liaison 

This appendix provides an overview of the role and responsibilities of liaison officers 

and approaches they use that contribute to effective coordination and collaboration 

among various agencies involved in PO. 

Appendix C Interpreters 

This appendix discusses the vital role interpreter’s play in facilitating interactions and 

negotiations between the local or indigenous population and US forces. 

Appendix D Civil Component Analysis and Templating 

This appendix describes the process commanders and their staffs use to analyze the 

civil component of an area of operations and determine how it can help, hinder, or affect 

PO. 

Appendix E Intergovernmental Organizations and Nongovernmental 

Organizations 

This appendix gives a brief description of various intergovernmental organizations and 

nongovernmental organizations that work with PO forces. 

Appendix F Joint Commissions 

This appendix discusses joint commissions and how they facilitate more effective PO. 
xii ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Appendix G Protection of Civilians and Mass Atrocity Response Operations 

This appendix provides TTP on ways PO forces can protect civilians and effectively 

respond to mass atrocity situations. 

Appendix H Key Documents 

This appendix highlights important PO documents. 

Appendix I Training 

This appendix provides training considerations and opportunities for the preparation of 

PO. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP 3-2.40 xiii 

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS 

The following commanders and agencies participated in creating this publication: 

Joint 

Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Norfolk, VA 

Joint Information Operations Warfare Center, Lackland AFB, TX 

United States (US) Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL 

US European Command, Vaihingen, GE 

US Joint Forces Command, J7, Suffolk, VA 

US Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI 

US Southern Command, Miami, FL 

US Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL 

US Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, NE 

Army 

US Army Civil Affairs Command, Fort Bragg, NC 

US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS 

US Army Information Proponent Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS 

US Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, AZ 

US Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA 

US Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 

US Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 

US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA 

US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA 

Marine Corps 

4th Civil Affairs Group, Washington, DC 

Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, Quantico, VA 

Marine Corp Capabilities Development Directorate, Quantico, VA 

Navy 

Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, Naval Support Facility Indian 

Head, MD 

Navy Warfare Development Command, Norfolk, VA 

Office of Naval Intelligence, Suitland, MD 

Air Force 

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, 

Maxwell Air Force Base, AL 

HQ Air Force Security Forces Center, Lackland AFB, TX 

 
xiv ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

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1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP 3-2.40 1 

Chapter I 

INTRODUCTION TO PEACE OPERATIONS 

1. Background 

a. The United States (US) participates in a broad range of military operations 

(ROMO), including counterinsurgency, crisis response, and contingency operations, 

necessitating interaction with indigenous populations and institutions. Peace 

operations (PO) are crisis response and limited contingency operations, including 

international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and 

shape the environment in support of reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitating the 

transition to legitimate governance. 

Note: The US adopted the term peace operations while others such as the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted the term peace-support operations. 

b. PO include peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace enforcement operations 

(PEO), conflict prevention, peacemaking processes, and peace building post conflict 

actions. Conduct PO in conjunction with various diplomatic activities necessary in 

securing a negotiated truce and resolving the conflict. 

(1) PKO are military operations, undertaken with the consent of major parties 

involved in a dispute. They monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement 

(ceasefire, truce, or other agreements) and support diplomatic efforts reaching 

towards a long-term political settlement. 

(a) PKO can prohibit intelligence gathering and military information support 

operations (MISO). 

(b) In some PKO missions, there is limited interaction with nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), local 

populations, or agencies, because this gives the perception of the PKO units 

providing services and not the host country. 

(2) PEO apply military force, or the threat of its use, and is pursuant to 

international authorization, compelling compliance with resolutions or sanctions 

designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Examples of PEO include the 

following air operations: Operations DENY FLIGHT, NORTHERN WATCH, and 

SOUTHERN WATCH. 

(3) Conflict prevention employs complementary diplomatic, civil, and military 

means to monitor and identify the causes of a conflict, and takes timely action to 

prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Chapter VI of the 

United Nations (UN) Charter covers activities aimed at conflict prevention. 

Conflict prevention includes fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, 

inspections, and monitoring. An example of military support to conflict prevention 

is Operation ABLE SENTRY. 

(4) Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other 

forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the 

issues that led to the conflict. 
2 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(a) Military support to the peacemaking process includes military-to-military 

relations, security assistance, or other activities, which influence disputing 

parties to seek a diplomatic settlement. 

(b) An example of military support to peacemaking was the involvement of 

the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Joint Staff plans directorate 

during the development of the Dayton Accords by the presidents of Bosnia, 

Croatia, and Serbia outlining a General Framework Agreement for Peace in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

(5) Peace building consists of stability actions, predominately diplomatic and 

economic, that strengthen governmental infrastructure to avoid a relapse into 

conflict. 

(a) Military forces have a limited role in supporting peace building. Peace 

building begins while PKO or PEO are underway, and continues after 

concluding PKO and PEO. 

(b) Military support to national elections in Afghanistan and Iraq are 

examples of operations in support of peace building. For more information, 

see Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, and JP 3-57, CivilMilitary Operations. 

2. Characteristics of Peace Operations 

a. The typical PO operational area is characterized by complex and ambiguous 

situations and may possess the following: 

(1) Asymmetrical threats. 

(2) Failed states. 

(3) Absence of rule of law. 

(4) Gross violations of human rights. 

(5) Collapse of civil infrastructure. 

(6) Presence of dislocated civilians (DCs). 

b. Political mandates or constraints affect tactical operations and operations at the 

tactical level can have strategic implications. 

c. Risk management is a key consideration. PO are dangerous and leaders at every 

level must continuously assess the risk to their forces and take appropriate risk 

mitigation actions. 

d. PO involve multiple agencies within the US Government (USG) including the 

Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), United States Agency 

for International Development (USAID), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Civilmilitary operations (CMO) are a central focus of PO with military in a supporting role. 

e. Most PO are multinational in character. This creates challenges because each 

nation contributes its individual perspectives and unique capabilities. 

f. US national policy determines US participation in PO. The US may participate 

with regional organizations (e.g., NATO) under the auspices of the UN, in 

cooperation with other countries or unilaterally. Refer to Appendix H, “Key 

Documents,” for additional information on PO mandates. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP 3-2.40 3 

g. There is no standard mission for PO. Each PO is unique, with its own political, 

diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics. 

3. Information Operations 

a. The definition and interpretations of information operations (IO) have evolved 

over time. IO is the integrated employment, during military operations, of 

information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations with the 

objective of influencing, disrupting, corrupting, or usurping the decision making 

process of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13, 

Information Operations). 

b. PO rely on the ability of commanders and their staffs to shape perceptions, 

attitudes, and behaviors, across varied audiences, to achieve the commander’s 

desired end state. Aligning higher-level themes and messages with actions, words, 

and images allows them to complement and reinforce each other. This includes 

recognizing events that drive positive or negative messaging e.g., lethal actions, 

medical operations, convoys, and interpersonal engagements. Failure to align what 

the joint force does with what it verbalizes may place the PO at risk. 

4. Fundamentals of Peace Operations 

a. Establishing a civil-military presence during PO inhibits hostile actions among 

disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. 

b. There are fifteen fundamentals under three major actions for PO listed below and 

discussed in depth in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations. 

(1) Apply the Following Principles: 

(a) Objective and end state. 

(b) Current and sufficient intelligence. 

(c) Civil-military unity of effort. 

(d) Mutual respect and cultural awareness. 

(e) Flexibility and adaptability. 

(f) Perseverance. 

(g) Impartiality. 

(h) Transparency. 

(i) Credibility. 

(2) Requires: 

(a) Restraint and the minimum use of force. 

(b) Freedom of movement. 

(c) Unity of effort. 

(3) Cultivate Within All Partners and Audiences: 

(a) Consent. 

(b) Legitimacy. 

(c) Security. 

(4) The end state of PO is codified and framed at the strategic and operational 

levels, but is executed at the tactical level. Proper planning for execution of PO 
4 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

must begin with the end state. The synchronization of strategic, operational, and 

tactical objectives is essential to success. Actions at the tactical level can have 

positive and negative strategic implications. For instance, the incidents of Abu 

Ghraib or the Koran burnings in Afghanistan are examples of how actions of 

individuals affect the strategic security environment. 

(5) The goal is to maximize strategic goals, and minimize unintended tactical 

mistakes by being culturally astute and respectful of local traditions, norms, 

customs, and modes of collaboration that promote principles of impartiality, 

transparency, and credibility. Nonetheless, unintended events may occur; 

however, it is incumbent upon leaders to effectively manage crises, and keep 

their chain of command informed of unfolding events that may have detrimental 

consequences. 

(6) Through the application of the fundamentals of PO, US forces reinforce 

mutual respect, trust, and credibility. This engenders the perceptions of fairness 

and legitimacy to the local populace. 

5. Transition

a. Effective PO conclude with the transition of responsibility from US forces to other

authorities or sanctioned organizations, such as the UN, African Union, NATO, or 

host nation (HN) civil authorities. Similar to a traditional relief-in-place, the PO forces 

must carefully plan, coordinate, and manage the transition to the relieving force, 

agency, civilian police (CIVPOL), or other legitimate authority. 

b. Commanders plan for the transition phase before deployment or during the initial

phase of PO. Transitions between military forces take the form of relief-in-place or 

transition-by-function (e.g., medical and engineer services, communications, 

logistics, and security). Examples of transition types include the following: 

(1) A transition from a UN-led coalition occurred in East Timor with Australian 

forces taking over the lead role from coalition forces. 

(2) When the implementation force initially entered Bosnia in 1995, it was a 

peace enforcement operation. By 2000, the mission transitioned to a 

peacekeeping stability force with a reduced force structure. 

(3) Transitions may involve the transfer of certain responsibilities from military to 

civilian control. Examples include passing DC assistance missions to 

international organizations (i.e., the United Nations Office of the High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), or passing military law enforcement 

missions to CIVPOL.
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 5 

Chapter II 

DESIGN AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

1. Background 

a. This chapter outlines the considerations the PO planning staff addresses during 

each phase of PO. The operating environment (OE) where military elements conduct 

PO is complex. PO present unique challenges for commanders and staffs that 

require careful analysis, planning, and accountability. US forces work with foreign 

militaries, various agencies, and organizations in the international community. 

b. A PO staff develops a firm grasp of the OE and IE. Staffs use planning tools such 

as mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time 

available (METT-T); mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support 

available—time available and civil considerations (METT-TC); areas, structure, 

capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE); and political, military, 

economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) to ascertain variables that 

may affect tactical, operational, and strategic-level operations. 

c. Many agencies and organizations participate in PO. Commanders and global 

organizations work on establishing and maintaining effective PO. There are multiple 

agencies and organizations in a country during a conflict and many stay after military 

PO forces are withdrawn. Their agendas cover a wide range of issues. 

Organizations focus on issues, which include human rights, refugee resettlement, 

disaster relief, economic development, election support, education, child welfare, 

and other areas. Communication between PO organizations is essential. Many 

international organizations want distinct and independent consideration from one 

another, and separation from military PO forces. Units are aware of military PO 

activities relating to these agencies because they understand affiliating with military 

forces can critically affect their ability to act autonomously. A commander cooperates 

with international agencies and establishes common civilian-military goals. A greater 

appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of these organizations is achieved 

through briefings, talking with leaders, and conducting training together prior to 

deployment. 

d. The PO staff develops the concept of operations as soon as possible. Staffs 

identify capabilities and deficiencies through planning. Higher headquarters’ (HHQ’) 

PO staffs include the following: 

(1) Foreign policy advisor (FPA) or political advisor (POLAD). 

(2) Joint military commission structure. 

(3) Combined press information center. 

(4) IO cell. 

(5) Force protection working group. 

(6) Other working groups. 

e. The staff anticipates activities and coordinates augmentation required to 

complete the mission. This ensures effective coordination within the multinational or 

interagency environment common to PO. 
6 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Note: Military personnel anticipate a close working relationship with the in-country UN 

mission. 

2. Creating a Secure Environment 

a. The goal of a peace force is the creation of a secure environment. It sets the 

conditions for political, economic, and humanitarian stability allowing a transition 

from military to civil control. Peace force tasks are separating and neutralizing 

belligerent forces ensuring public security, establishing or maintaining freedom of 

movement, and protecting humanitarian assistance (HA) activities. Principles for 

creating a secure environment include: 

(1) Focus operations at the tactical level. 

(2) Sustain consent for the operation. 

(3) Keep the operation transparent. 

(4) Act as liaison to key parties and local authorities. 

(5) Understand adversary participation is required in the peace process. 

(6) Ensure the PO force has freedom of movement. 

(7) Observe, report, and monitor. 

(8) Maintain law and order. 

(9) Employ IO and create a desired effect through the integration of informationrelated capabilities. 

b. Military tasks of the peace force (see Chapter II, “Design and Planning 

Considerations,” and section 2, of this multi-Service tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (MTTP) for more information) include: 

(1) Establish control over urban and rural areas through physical occupation. 

(2) Separate belligerent forces. 

(3) Disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate. 

(4) Control weapons. 

(5) Control borders. Commanders regulate the movement of persons or goods 

across ground and maritime borders and establish clear guidance regarding the 

permitted or prohibited movements of people, units, or goods. 

(6) Secure key sites. 

(7) Establish control measures that are visible and known to the local population. 

(8) Ensure freedom of movement. 

(9) Establish secure base(s). 

(10) Establish and maintain presence in the area of operations (AO). 

(11) Establish protected areas. 

(12) Ensure public security. 

c. Planning considerations for a peace force. 

(1) Commanders and staffs conduct a thorough analysis of the peace 

agreement. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 7 

(2) Commanders use legal advisers during planning and operations to delineate 

operational legalities. 

(3) Urban environments require special considerations. 

(4) Joint military commissions provide the cornerstones for settling problems 

associated with establishing a secure environment. 

3. Staff Considerations for Personnel 

a. PO are inherently fluid and require flexibility when conducting operations. Many 

PO include multinational personnel, and leaders must be prepared to integrate these 

personnel. The personnel staff officer faces multinational issues for attached units. 

For example, the personnel officer understands and anticipates requirements i.e., 

emergency leaves or unit rotations for their respective country. 

b. Due to the multinational nature of PO, consideration is given to national caveats 

that stipulate what coalition partners can and cannot do based on their own national 

interests and laws. 

c. Other considerations for integrating other nations into a military PO force include 

rank structure, language, and training differences. For example, some countries 

assign rank based on the knowledge of a Service member, rather than based on 

time in grade. Language and training differences also apply to the integration of 

other components. The key for successful integration is to harness the strengths of 

each contributing nation or organization and avoid focusing on differences. 

4. Staff Considerations for Intelligence 

a. Intelligence is critical to the success of PO. The principal difference between 

intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) for conventional war 

and PO is the focus of the intelligence analysis. PO considers political, economic, 

linguistic, ethnic, and other. Use this information in shaping operations and align 

activities for successfully attaining a commander’s desired end state. 

b. Other Intelligence Sources for PO Planning. 

(1) Special Forces, civil affairs (CA) units, and military information support (MIS) 

units have access to useful historical studies on the AO, and other organizations, 

which have been in the area for many years. 

(2) The leaders of the disputing parties. 

(3) Military and political leadership from the regions bordering the AO. 

(4) Civilian populations (including expected level of support, indifference, or 

hostility to the force, and the potential for violence between different segments of 

the population). 

(5) Insurgent elements. 

(6) Police and paramilitary forces. 

(7) Personnel from NGOs, international organizations, and the UN. These 

organizations provide general information and corroborate other sources. 

However, active collection against these types of organizations is discouraged. 
8 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

c. Use these other intelligence sources to determine: 

(1) Patterns of criminal activity. 

(2) Historical context (i.e., relationships, cultural, ethnic, and religious factors). 

(3) Economic conditions. 

(4) Unique environmental threats. 

(5) Internal and external political factors. 

(6) Tracking and recording. The peace mandate often stipulates mandated 

activities for the disputing parties. 

d. Only release classified US information in accordance with multinational sharing 

agreements. 

e. A successful intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan leverages 

the unique capabilities of CA, combat camera, military police (MP), criminal 

investigation division (CID), Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Naval Criminal 

Investigative Service, MISO, multinational partners, and the use of biometrics. 

Biometrics is a powerful nonlethal enabler providing the means for effectively 

separating combatants from the populace in an unobtrusive way. 

f. Intelligence and information gathering is critical for effective operational 

assessments, enabling a commander and staff to determine whether or not 

operations are proceeding as planned and make adjustments as necessary. Ensure 

effective assessment data integration for sensors or other collection assets to assist 

in identifying areas requiring adjustment. It is important to remember PO rely heavily 

on changing perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of audiences or actors, and takes 

time to plan. 

g. Synchronization Considerations. 

(1) Understand information management and intelligence sharing issues. 

(2) Consider multinational participants, who do not have intelligence sharing 

agreements with the US. 

(3) Direct special attention toward integrating NGOs, IGOs, HN police, CIVPOL, 

and others into the intelligence process. 

(4) Pay special attention to human intelligence (HUMINT) organizations. For 

example, PO forces may develop an allied military intelligence element. 

h. Situational development relies on situational awareness (SA). Situational 

awareness is the process of continually collecting and integrating intelligence and 

information. Units maintain SA by producing and updating the intelligence estimate. 

5. Staff Considerations for Operations 

a. Staff members conduct at least two predeployment site surveys to assess the 

changing nature of operations. 

b. Surveys include NGOs and IGOs, representatives from the HN, and an 

examination of the relationship with neighboring countries. Planners coordinate with 

multinational military forces contributing to the PO effort eliminating redundancies. 

Additionally, analyze surveys and studies done by the UN, International Committee 

of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNHCR, and other organizations who have historical 

engagements in the area. Surveys identify potential tasks for providing support to 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 9 

civil missions such as infrastructure and DC. See Appendix D, “Civil Component 

Analysis and Templating,” of this MTTP for more information. 

c. The design of the command structure and physical location of the command carry 

significant meaning in PO. Selecting the participation of certain nations, and the 

location of ground contingents, either enhances or impedes the peace process. The 

local political reality and the desires of each contributing nation significantly influence 

the creation of these regions. 

d. Force protection is a key command consideration when designing PO (see 

Chapter V, “Force Protection,” of this MTTP for more information). 

e. Military commanders address the inherent civil considerations in PO early in the 

planning process (see Chapter VI, “Civil-Military Operations,” of this MTTP for more 

information). 

f. Commanders consider HN politics when determining the following: 

(1) Which forces are better at gaining rapport with the HN? 

(2) Local political, social, and economic agendas. 

(3) PO force boundaries, which capitalize on the administrative and political 

boundaries of the HN. 

g. The operations officer continuously assesses the following: 

(1) The threat to US forces. 

(2) How to accommodate the agendas of contributing nations. 

(3) The compatibility of other national military structures with US systems. 

(4) Bilateral or multilateral agreements with the US requiring support and 

funding. 

(5) Historical connections between the HN and other nations. 

(6) Rules of engagement (ROE) for the forces participating in the mission. 

h. Organizational staffs prepare transitional records when PO last for several years. 

These records capture the civilian-military work the unit has conducted and provide 

context for the next commander. 

i. . Commanders and staffs ensure a seamless transition of functions to appropriate 

civilian organizations. 

j. Chapter VIII, “Conflict Resolution,” has more information on the need for 

successful negotiation and interpersonal engagements by commanders and their 

staffs. 

k. Information-related capabilities are tools, techniques, or activities affecting any of 

the three dimensions of the IE (JP 3-13). Joint and Army forces use informationrelated capabilities to create effects in the IE. Multinational forces may also use the 

term information activities. Information activities are actions designed to affect 

information or information systems. Anyone can perform these actions including 

protection measures. 

l. The integration of information-related capabilities is essential and are planned and 

executed deliberately and methodically. IO does not focus on ownership of individual 
10 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

capabilities, but using those capabilities as force multipliers and creating a desired 

effect. 

m. The IE is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, 

process, disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of three 

interrelated dimensions, which continuously interact with individuals, organizations, 

and systems. The three dimensions are physical, informational, and cognitive. 

n. Commanders ensure special operations forces (SOF) missions are compatible 

with their capabilities, based on the following characteristics: 

(1) SOF personnel are uniquely trained and maintain a high level of competency 

in more than one military specialty. Most special operations personnel are 

regionally oriented; however, cross-cultural communication skills are part of their 

training. Selected special operations personnel survey, assess local situations, 

and rapidly report the assessments. 

(2) SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces. Depending on mission 

requirements, SOF operates independently or in conjunction with conventional 

forces. SOF assists and complements conventional forces to achieve the 

objectives. For more information, see FM 6-05/MCWP 3-36.1/NTTP 3-

05.19/AFTTP 3-2.73/USSOCOM Pub 3-33 MTTP for Conventional Forces and 

Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability and Interdependence. 

(3) The special skills and low-visibility capabilities inherent in SOF also provide 

an adaptable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precise, 

focused use of force. For additional information, see JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint 

Special Operations. 

o. The hazardous materials (HAZMAT) and chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear (CBRN) officers are responsible for the following: 

(1) CBRN staff officers provide advice on toxic industrial materials (TIM) and the 

collection, packaging, storage, disposal, and cleanup of hazardous materials and 

waste. The latter capability was important during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, 

where environmental assessment and reconnaissance teams’ encountered 

hazards associated with the misuse and improper disposal of industrial hazards 

and their by-products. 

(2) There is a requirement for specialized HAZMAT, environmental and technical 

escort teams during the recovery and reclamation of TIM that poses a hazard to 

US forces. Damaged or abandoned medical facilities, universities, and industrial 

facilities may contain material that poses a significant hazard to individuals 

performing PO and the local populace. Additional guidance and response 

procedures are available in JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Environments. 

p. Engineering officers contribute the following to PO: 

(1) Military engineers play a significant role in the initial stages of PO, but over 

time, their role transitions to civilian contractors (logistics augmentation programs 

or other sustainment contractors). In addition, direct engineers to avoid 

“overbuilding” and ensure good stewardship of resources. As PO progresses and 

activities transition to local control, modified force structures and availability of 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 11 

materials and equipment result in changes or the closing of many engineering 

activities. 

(2) Engineer organizations are one of the sources for intelligence information 

and can satisfy priority intelligence requirements. Conducting on-site 

reconnaissance and discussions with local officials, civil engineers determine the 

viability of local infrastructure supporting military operations and enhancing 

engineer planning. 

q. Medical personnel are aware of the following: 

(1) The medical concept for supporting HA. See FM 8-42, Combat Health 

Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations and Chapter VI, “CivilMilitary Operations,” of this MTTP, for more information. 

(2) Civic action programs include medical, dental, and veterinary care and 

operate in rural areas of a country. Unit awareness of these programs allows 

them to demonstrate the benefits to the civilian populace. Biometrics aids in 

managing medical care provided to the populace by enabling positive control 

when distributing medical assistance, ensuring people do not receive inoculations 

twice, or receive medicine they do not need. 

(3) Special technical agreements with other Services on casualty evacuation and 

emergency care and medical logistics. 

(4) The health support estimate, which includes: 

(a) Number of troops to support. 

(b) Population at risk. 

(c) Expected casualty or combat intensity rates. 

(d) Expected disease and non-battle injury casualty rates. 

(e) Bed availability. 

(f) Expected admission rates. 

(5) The theater evacuation policy states the maximum period injured military 

members or patients, not expected to return to duty, remain within the theater for 

treatment before evacuation. 

(6) Force protection requirements for forensic data and unexploded ordnance 

(UXO). Provide the following information to support UXO and explosive ordnance 

disposal (EOD) teams: 

(a) Priorities. Staffs prioritize tasks for dealing with UXO. For example, 

remove the wounded and fatalities, act to prevent loss of life and property 

damage, or remove hazardous munitions or explosives. 

(b) Area security. 

(c) Medical support. 

(d) Firefighting support. 

 
12 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Note: For more information on UXO, see ATTP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-

02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12 MTTP for Unexploded Ordnance. For more information on EOD, 

see ATTP 4-32.16/MCRP 3-17.2C/NTTP 3-02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32 MTTP for Explosive 

Ordnance Disposal. For information on nonlethal weapons (NLW), see FM 3-

22.40/MCWP 3-15.8/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.45 MTTP for the Tactical 

Employment of Nonlethal Weapons. 

6. Staff Considerations for Logistics 

a. Logistics planning and support for PO have an increased demand for food, water, 

billeting, waste disposal, movement control, environmental and safety concerns, and 

HN supplies and services than typical military operations. The exact amount 

depends on the magnitude of the dislocated civilian situation, status of the nation’s 

infrastructure, and requirements mandated in the peace implementation agreement. 

Note: In coalitions, logistical challenges arise due to differing multinational logistics 

processes. 

b. Contractors provide a range of support, expertise, and assistance to the military 

and civil organizations in PO. The staff is responsible for oversight and discipline of 

contractor personnel including private security forces. 

c. Logistics staffs have the following fiscal responsibilities: 

(1) Determine the military’s authority for providing coalition support to the local 

procurement process. Determine the additional financial support needed for 

peace-related programs. 

(2) Recommend proactive measures to determine the amount of UN or alliance 

fiscal shortfalls. 

(3) Understand common funding arrangements. 

d. Transportation requirements may result in third country national or HN resource 

contracts. Include integrating them into convoys as a planning consideration. 

e. The logistic support concept includes multinational force support and anticipated 

NGO and international organization requirements. In addition, it identifies what areas 

fall under multinational control, US unilateral control, and what areas remain under 

HN control. 

f. Understanding the logistics capabilities of the multinational force assists in 

organizing and structuring logistical support. Other considerations for the logistical 

organization and structure are as follows: 

(1) The requirements, shortfalls, and necessary arrangements, including support 

for multinational elements and civil-military operations. 

(2) The availability of HN support and contracting. 

(3) Redeployment and recovery plans for transitioning to a UN force, if 

appropriate. 

(4) Special agreements, such as environmental cleanup, exemption from 

customs duties, HAZMAT storage, and transit restrictions. 

g. Technologically advanced equipment improves the ability of the force to perform 

its mission. This equipment improves the probability of detecting violations of 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 13 

agreements, enhancing weapons verification, supporting weapons destruction, and 

enhancing force protection. Support to the zones of separation, check points (CPs), 

and observation posts (OPs) require special equipment. 

h. DCs pose a significant logistical challenge. Coordination with NGOs and IGOs is 

critical when planning logistical support for DC. 

i. The presence of the force may stimulate growth in the local economy, but there 

are potential negative impacts. Consider economic impacts of leave, pass, liberty, 

and rest and relaxation policies. Develop procedures reducing the negative impacts. 

Two examples are regulating the amount of US dollars personnel may convert to 

local currency, and keeping pay for local civilians hired to support the peacekeeping 

(PK) force the same as prevailing wages for the area. 

j. Movement planning responsibilities. 

(1) Limited availability of movement and transport resources require planning, 

coordination, and cooperation among all participants. Multinational deployments 

are difficult to coordinate because each nation is responsible for obtaining 

movement resources, planning, and controlling the movement of their forces, 

their components of multinational forces, and, when acting as a lead nation, the 

multinational headquarters (HQ) group. This requires coordination with the HN 

preventing nations from deploy redundant capabilities, such as port operations 

forces. 

(2) If the peace effort is a NATO-led operation, a US and NATO joint movement 

center (JMC) exists. In this case, the NATO JMC (sometimes called the 

multinational deployment agency), is the lead agency. 

k. In other multinational operations, the US JMC and liaison officers (LNOs) from 

national contingents coordinate directly with the JMC. 

7. Staff Considerations for Communications 

a. Communications connectivity in PO include standard communication architecture 

and extends support to civil-military operations. These operations require multiple 

liaison teams with communications capabilities that require integrating military and 

civilian communication systems. 

b. Interoperability is constrained by the least technologically advanced nation. 

Meeting mission requirements depend on availability, compatibility, and security. 

Many multinational units do not have adequate communications equipment. This is 

an issue for units operating under US control. 

8. Other Staff Considerations 

a. FPA/POLAD. 

(1) The FPA or POLAD is a representative of the DOS who advises the PO 

commander on matters of policy and political implications of PO. The FPA or 

POLAD is included in all major geopolitical decisions. 

(2) The FPA or POLAD is the primary for interagency communication and 

collaboration between the DOS and DOD. FPA and POLADs provide political 

advice to the PO commander, but the FPA or POLAD represent the DOS. The 

FPA or POLAD is the principle liaison between the US military and other 

diplomatic members of the international community. 
14 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(3) The PO commander uses the FPA or POLAD as a sounding board, advisor, 

salesperson, and marketer. One of the FPA or POLAD’s responsibilities is 

offering advice, which enables the PO commander to develop approaches 

demonstrating political awareness and understanding. 

(4) The FPA or POLAD is a source of information for how other nations or 

international organizations perceive the PO mission. This information contributes 

to unit assessment efforts. 

(5) The FPA or POLAD serves as a conduit when promoting or socializing a 

policy within nonmilitary circles. Gauging the reaction from the diplomatic or 

nonmilitary establishment is crucial to developing and implementing successful 

PO. 

b. Chaplains. In addition to their traditional missions, chaplains have a key and 

unique role in PO. Most PO include significant religious issues. The chaplain assists 

the commander by serving as a liaison with the support of CA to local religious 

leaders, NGOs, and international organizations. 

c. The responsibilities of the Provost Marshal include the following: 

Note: For the purposes of this publication, MP encompasses the terms “military police,” 

as used by the Army, and “security forces,” as used by the Air Force. 

(1) The provost marshal for each level of command advises the commander on 

MP support for PO across the spectrum of the core MP functionalities: maneuver 

and mobility support operations, area security, police intelligence operations, law 

and order, and internment and resettlement operations. 

(2) MP support the commander through maneuver and mobility support 

operations in a variety of ways including: 

(a) Supporting straggler and displaced persons (DPs) operations. 

(b) Conducting route reconnaissance and surveillance. 

(c) Enforcing regulations along main supply routes within the AO. 

(d) Performing presence patrols throughout the AO. 

(e) Assisting in the collection of information for analysis by military 

intelligence. 

(3) MP operations within the mission of area security include: 

(a) Reconnaissance operations. 

(b) Area damage control. 

(c) Conducting area and base security operations. 

(d) Applying antiterrorism measures. 

(e) Implementing physical security (PHYSEC) procedures. 

(f) Conducting critical site, asset, and high-risk personnel security (PERSEC) 

including security for convoys and very important persons (VIPs). 

(g) Providing early force protection to an initial aerial port or seaport of 

debarkation. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 15 

(h) Providing mobility, firepower, communications, reconnaissance, 

information-collection, and response-force capabilities to the command. 

(4) Police intelligence operations are a MP function integrated within all MP 

operations, and support the operations process. 

(a) Analysis, production, and dissemination of information collected because 

of police activities enhance situational understanding, protection, civil control, 

and law enforcement effectiveness. 

(b) MP collect information during operations which contributes to filling the 

commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs); intelligence-led, timesensitive operations; and policing strategies necessary for forecasting, 

anticipating, and preempting crime and related disruptive activities to maintain 

order. 

(5) Law and order operations in PO ensure stability and security is maintained 

throughout the AO. MP perform various tasks under this function: 

(a) Conduct law enforcement missions throughout the AO, including 

coordination of joint security patrols with host-nation assets. 

(b) Conduct criminal investigations by coordinating and synchronizing with 

CID assets. 

(c) MP are the appropriate force for conducting crowd and riot control 

operations, including the extraction of mob leaders. MP also control 

antagonistic masses engaged in rioting, looting, and demonstrating. 

(d) Coordinate US customs support. 

(e) Conduct HN police training, support, and police engagement. 

(f) Employ forensics analysis capabilities. 

(6) Resettlement operations provide security and support for DCs. DC is a broad 

term that includes a DP, an evacuee, an expellee, an internally displaced person 

(IDP), a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. DCs are civilians who left their 

home for various reasons. Their movement and physical presence hinders 

military operations. They require some degree of aid, e.g., medicine, food, 

shelter, and clothing. DCs may not be native to the area or country where they 

are residing. The following are DC subcategories. 

(a) DPs refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively. DPs 

may have been dislocated because of political, geographical, environmental, 

or threat situations. 

(b) Refugees are people who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for 

reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 

or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality, and are unable 

or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. 

(c) Evacuees are civilians removed from their place of residence by military 

direction because of risk to their personal security or requirements of the 

military situation. 

(d) Stateless person are not considered as a being a national of any state 

under the operation of its law. 
16 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(e) War victims are civilians suffering injury, loss of a family member, 

damage, or destruction of their homes because of war. 

(f) Migrants are workers who move from one region to another by chance, 

instinct, or plan. 

(g) IDPs are people forced to flee or leave their home or places of habitual 

residence to avoid the effects of armed conflict, natural or human-made 

disasters, situations of generalized violence, or violations of human rights. 

They have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. 

(h) Expellees are civilians outside the boundaries of their country of 

nationality or ethnic origin forcibly repatriated to that country or a third country 

for political or other purposes. 

d. Public affairs officer (PAO) should: 

(1) Develop a relationship with the media and assist the PO commander on 

issues relating to public relations. 

(2) Develop an open environment with a minimum of ground rules, but 

maintaining operational security. 

(3) Develop media policy before deployment and update periodically. 

(4) Deploy sufficient public affairs (PA) assets early. A robust PA element is 

necessary for handling high volumes of media calls. It is better to deploy more PA 

assets and scale back, rather than lose initial control of media impact on 

operations. 

(5) Ensure the PAO is part of the planning process and advise the commander 

on all PA implications to the operation. Ensure the PAO is part of the joint 

targeting process, and coordinate PA operations within the operations 

coordination group. 

e. Space support includes the following: 

(1) Space operations provide space-related tactical planning and support, 

expertise, advice, and liaison regarding available space capabilities. 

(2) Space operations personnel should: 

(a) Determine space support requirements and request, plan, and integrate 

space capabilities into operations (see JP 3-14, Space Operations, for space 

support resources). 

(b) Coordinate space support with national, Service, joint, and theater 

resources. 

(c) Prepare the space support plan. 

(d) Provide space products to support planning. 

(e) Provide estimates on the status, capabilities, and limitations of spacebased ISR, weather, navigation and timing, and communication satellites for 

friendly, threat, and commercial systems. 

f. Legal and financial considerations for PO. 

(1) PO involves a myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations, both 

foreign and domestic. Some instances involve conflicting bodies of law. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 17 

Operations require commanders at all levels become involved with local 

governments and participate in negotiations between competing factions. 

(2) Commanders determine the legal and fiscal restraints involved in logistics 

and material assistance to nonmilitary organizations and other nations’ forces. 

Commanders proactively seek assistance for obtaining the authority to execute 

the mission in a multinational and interagency context. 

 
18 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

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1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 19 

Chapter III 

PEACE OPERATIONS TASKS 

1. Background 

The development of military tasks during PO has evolved since the UN initiated 

peacekeeping in 1948. Traditional peacekeeping tasks (interpositioning, observing and 

reporting, and patrolling) have expanded significantly since the end of the cold war. The 

international community has reached agreement on taking a more concerted action in 

PO, diminishing gender-based violence, human rights violations, trafficking in persons, 

and mass atrocities. 

2. Military Tasks 

a. A peace force has the following responsibilities when occupying key terrain and 

establishing control in urban and rural areas. 

(1) Establish secure bases for observing and reporting. 

(2) Patrol. 

(3) Separation of forces (interpositioning). 

(4) Site security and protected areas. 

(5) Searches. 

(a) Individuals. 

(b) Vehicles. 

(c) Homes. 

(6) Movement control measures. 

(a) CPs. 

(b) Roadblocks. 

(c) Control borders (see Chapter IV, “Control of Large Areas”). 

(7) Verification of weapons and forces. 

(8) Disarmament, demobilization, and remobilization (DDR). 

(9) Public security and responding to civil disturbances. 

(a) Curfews. 

(b) Demining and UXO. 

(c) Refugees and IDPs. 

(d) Environmental restoration. 

(e) NLWs. 

(f) Convoys. 

(10) Rule of law. 

(a) Basic public protection and security (community policing). 

(b) Initial penal operations. 

(c) Judicial support. 

b. Observing and reporting. 
20 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(1) An OP is the basic working platform for military observation. Observing and 

reporting are the cornerstones of PO. Observers, military and nonmilitary, 

observe and report information on activities within their AO. Observers provide 

timely and accurate reports on every situation or incident that develops in their 

operational area. Factual and impartial reporting constitutes the basis of all 

successful PO and, when required, includes maps, field sketches, diagrams, 

videotapes, photographs, and references to specific agreements or instructions. 

Inaccurate and biased reporting adversely affects the operational situation, 

damaging the image and credibility of the PO force. Observation requires a 

complete understanding of the situation and the political and military implications 

resulting from PO actions. 

(2) Observation tasks commonly cover: 

(a) The status of military installations. 

(b) Activities within the operational area related to personnel or weapons. 

(c) Violations of international agreements or conventions. 

(d) Observance of buffer zone (BZ) and demilitarized zone (DMZ) 

restrictions, and adherence to approved local agreements by the parties of 

the dispute. 

(3) Observers report any violations of agreements, such as: 

(a) Movements of disputing forces. 

(b) Shootings, hostile acts, or threats made against the PO force or civilians. 

(c) Improvements to disputing party’s defensive positions, and overflights by 

military or civilian aircraft when air movement in the BZ is restricted. 

(4) Observers exercise discretion when communicating official information in the 

course of their duties. 

(5) Accomplish observing and reporting using OPs. The purposes of OPs are to: 

(a) Demonstrate the presence of the peace force to all parties and the 

population. 

(b) Enhance confidence in the peace process. 

(c) Monitor, record, and report actions supporting the stipulations of the 

peace agreements, and preventing violations. 

(6) Principles of observing and reporting. 

(a) Only report observations. 

(b) In the event of uncertain observations, submit clear, unambiguous, and 

timely reports. 

(7) Types of OPs. 

(a) Static. A static OP is semi-permanent site established for long-term 

observation. 

(b) Mobile. A mobile OP is temporary and useful for detecting and deterring 

violations of the peace agreements including smuggling and infiltration. 

(8) Site selection planning consideration criteria answer the following questions: 

(a) What observations are tasked? 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 21 

(b) Where are the opposing parties located? 

(c) Where are the borders and frontiers? 

(d) Where are the villages and camps of refugees or DPs? 

(e) What is the geography of the location? 

(f) Where are the access routes? 

(g) Is the site tactically and logistically supported? 

(h) From what distance can the site be seen? 

(i) How many people will see it? 

(j) What are the traffic and movement patterns of the locals? 

(9) Preparation of the OP. 

(a) Inform the conflicting parties and local population of the location and 

purpose of the OP. 

(b) Develop manuals of instructions for the OP including ROE and the quick 

response force (QRF). 

(c) Select the site and obtain materials. 

(d) Conduct risk assessment of the site. 

(10) Establishment of the OP. 

(a) Occupy the site. 

(b) Clearly mark the location. 

(c) Establish communication. 

(d) Establish force protection procedures. 

(e) Rehearse initial reaction force responses. 

(11) Improvement of the OP. 

(a) Continue to improve the position. 

(b) Maintain contact and an active information program with the local 

community and dissenting parties. 

(c) Maintain constant, reliable, redundant, and secure communications with 

the next higher authority and other OPs as the situation dictates. Timely 

reporting of activities is the key to success. Plan for communication security. 

(12) The type and amount of equipment and support depends on the mission 

and the following general guidelines: 

(a) Maintain sufficient observation equipment to support a 24-hour mission. 

(b) Keep sufficient supplies on hand to sustain the OP if cut off from support. 

This includes Class I (food), Class III (fuels, petroleum, oils, and lubricants 

(POL)), Class IV (construction materials), and Class V (ammunition). The unit 

commander determines appropriate levels. 

(c) Locate firefighting and first aid material onsite. 

(d) Provide power and lighting support, if necessary. 

(e) Provide signs and identification markings. 

 
22 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(13) Command and Control (C2). 

(a) Establish clear lines of C2, especially with a multinational OP. 

(b) Conduct reaction drills ensuring everyone understands the authorities and 

responsibilities of the OP. This includes a media plan addressing 

informational content for any type of crisis. 

(c) Rehearse and understand ROE. 

c. Patrolling is the foundation of operations in a hostile area. Its primary purpose is 

acquiring information, identifying and apprehending persons, and neutralizing hostile 

groups. The kind of patrol depends on the mission and is either mounted or 

dismounted. Types of patrols include the following: 

(1) Combat Patrols. In situations where PO forces may encounter armed groups, 

it is necessary to conduct combat patrols. Imposing a curfew helps prevent 

placing a combat patrol at a disadvantage. Conducting combat patrols during 

daylight hours in stabilized areas when there is no threat to forces and behaving 

in a nonthreatening manner shows the population forces are in the area. 

(2) Ambush Patrols. Conduct ambush patrols for detaining hostile personnel 

when the situation dictates. Mission planning includes controls designed to limit 

the impact of these patrols on uninvolved civilians. 

(3) Reconnaissance Patrols. Reconnaissance patrols enable PO forces to visit 

outlying communities, acquire information, and provide reassurance about the 

presence of the security force. The patrols can search areas and set up hasty 

roadblocks. 

(4) Naval Patrols. Naval assets provide operational support, including patrolling 

inland waterways to major ocean coastlines. Other missions commonly 

performed include search and rescue (SAR) operations, observation and 

reporting on pollution damage to the marine environment, and combined training 

missions with ground elements of the PO force. Examples of training missions 

include insertion and extraction of personnel at coastal remote sites, resupply, 

SAR exercises, small arms live fire exercises, and familiarization rides, which 

encourage mutual understanding and cohesion among contingents. Naval 

patrolling activities ensure round the clock presence in their area of responsibility 

while concurrently performing joint training missions. 

(5) Technology Enhanced Patrols. Unmanned aircraft systems, unmanned land 

systems, and space assets enable units to cover large or otherwise inaccessible 

areas and quickly gain certain types of information. For instance, the use of 

thermal imaging cameras gains timely information, both day and night, for 

monitoring movement and activity. The threat of applying lethal air power can 

limit movement of hostile forces. 

d. Separation of forces (interpositioning). 

(1) Means of Separation. Figure 1 displays geographical separation in any 

environment. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 23 

Figure 1. Control Zones 

(2) Cease-hostilities Line. This is the location where the fighting stopped. This 

line marks the forward limit of the positions occupied by the troops of the 

opposing sides at the suspension of hostilities. The exact location of this line is 

often contentious and a topic of discussion during the peacemaking process. This 

is just a reference point and not a control measure, unless otherwise negotiated 

during the settlement agreement. 

(3) Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL). A geographically defined line from which 

disputing or belligerent forces disengage and withdraw to their respective sides 

following a truce or cease fire agreement. The agreement of cease-fire paves the 

way for establishing a BZ, area of separation, or DMZ, and the withdrawal of 

forces. 

(4) BZ or Area of Separation. A defined area controlled by a PO force and 

excluding disputing or belligerent forces. A BZ creates an area of separation 

between disputing or adversarial forces and reduces the risk of conflict. A BZ 

may contain residences, farmland, or other assets which forces patrols to monitor 

and ensure delivery and protection of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). If it 

is the sovereign territory of one of the adversaries, coordinate the administration 

and policing of the inhabitants. The supervising authority controls and limits 

access to the BZ. Maritime zones specify infringements on international shipping 

rights. 
24 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(5) DMZ. A defined area, which prohibits the stationing or concentration of 

military forces, or the retention or establishment of military installations of any 

description. 

(6) Line of Demarcation. A line that defines the boundaries of a buffer zone or an 

area of limitation. A line of demarcation also defines the forward limits of 

disputing or belligerent forces after completion of each phase of disengagement 

or withdrawal. 

(7) Areas of Transfer. Transfer these areas to one of the parties involved. These 

areas do not relate to the ADL. 

e. The following principles apply for means of separation: 

(1) Focus the operation at the tactical level. 

(2) Sustain consent to the separation. 

(3) Keep entire operation transparent. 

(4) Liaison is essential with key parties and local authorities. 

(5) Full participation of the adversaries is the only hope of success. 

(6) The peace force must have full freedom of movement. 

(7) Observing, reporting, and monitoring are essential tools. 

f. The PO force separates adversaries by physically occupying a corridor between 

the two parties. 

(1) Establish and mark the ADL, DMZ, and BZ. The initial and most important 

task is accurately determining the locations of the ADL, DMZ, and BZ and 

marking them. The unit commander negotiates the details with the belligerent 

forces. 

(a) The trace follows identifiable natural or fabricated terrain features. 

(b) Survey and physically mark the ground using an acceptable means, e.g., 

placing painted barrels, oil drums, stakes, single strand wire, or coiled wire 

along the lines. A Global Positioning System (GPS) assists units with 

accurate marking. 

(c) Clearly identify markers so they are visible from 100 meters in daylight 

and from both directions of travel. Permanently locate the markers in heavily 

trafficked areas. 

(d) When belligerent forces place the markers, they gain a sense of 

ownership in the peace process and provide labor for quickly marking the 

area. 

(e) Belligerent forces provide maps and overlays of the disposition of their 

forces and equipment. 

(f) Ensure all elements of the PO force have communication with the 

belligerent forces and liaisons are located in the tactical operation centers of 

the peace operation. 

(2) Establish control measures. 

(a) Make all control measures visible and known to the local population. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 25 

(b) Supervise the withdrawal of belligerent forces via designated routes to 

assembly areas where initial disarmament takes place using control 

measures. 

(c) Move adversaries to barracks. Transfer confiscated weapons to 

cantonment, weapons storage sites, or destroy them. 

(d) Establish CPs, OPs, access routes, belligerent assembly areas, and 

weapons cantonment sites, where necessary. 

(3) Clear key areas of mines, obstacles, and fortifications. Minefields, craters, 

tank ditches, berms, bunkers, and fortifications block roads and access into and 

out of the zones. The PO force cannot separate belligerent forces or establish 

freedom of movement until cleared areas are established. The PO force 

supervises and assists the belligerents in clearing minefields and removing 

obstacles, bunkers, and fortifications. PO forces may provide material to the 

belligerent forces to accomplish this task. 

(a) Establish surveillance, verification, and collection systems to monitor and 

demonstrate progress. One technique is establishing an ISR board modeled 

after a targeting board, whose function is synchronizing ISR assets and 

developing ISR requirements into a workable and comprehensive plan. 

(b) Coordinate the efforts of ground, air, maritime, and technical assets for 

the participating nations. The collection plan focuses on named areas of 

interest and monitors key belligerent force locations. 

(4) Control the BZ. A series of observation and control measures supported by 

active ground, air, and maritime patrolling is essential for controlling the 

separation zones. Clearly defined guidelines outline who and what transits or 

stops in the zones and state the authority and role of CIVPOL in the zones. The 

observation and control measures also regulate agricultural activities inside the 

zones. They also describe procedures for handling violators, confiscated 

weapons, and ammunition. The measures establish clear communication 

between participants. Joint military commissions or other consultative bodies 

settle disputes, which arise from controlling the zones. 

g. PO interposition tactics to separate the forces. 

(1) Interpositioning places PO forces between the disputing parties in an effort to 

supervise the withdrawal of the disputing parties’ forces and establish a BZ. This 

operation requires careful and accurate timing to reduce the inherent risks to the 

PO force. Interpositioning aids in defusing sensitive or explosive situations and 

allows withdrawal of the disputing parties without either side gaining an 

advantage. The PO force interposes as the parties in the conflict disengage, 

taking advantage of the lull in hostilities and maintaining credibility and 

impartiality. 

(2) When interpositioning occurs after disengagement or withdrawal has begun, 

accomplish it quickly to prevent clashes leading to a renewal of the conflict or a 

general breakdown in the cease-fire. 

(3) After a truce or cease-fire is in effect, the disputing parties reach agreement 

on the trace of an ADL, as shown in figure 2; also called a cease-fire line. 
26 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Figure 2. Armistice Demarcation Line 

(4) PO forces deploy along the ADL between the disputing forces as shown in 

figure 3 and supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of the disputing forces 

behind their respective sides of the ADL. The ADL becomes the forward limit for 

the disputing forces. The purpose of interpositioning is establishing a presence 

and place a buffer force between disputing forces. Carefully planned 

interpositioning considers the following implied tasks: 

(a) The trace of the ADL follows identifiable natural or fabricated terrain 

features. Artillery or engineer survey-qualified PO force personnel are 

responsible for carrying out demarcation duties. Monitoring the line is required 

to prevent moving the markings. PO forces use ADL markers because they 

are difficult to remove and have a GPS signature. 

(b) Make the size of the interpositioning force sufficiently credible to provide 

the disputing parties with the confidence needed to disengage and withdraw 

safely from their positions. 

(c) Use precision during initial interpositioning because there is a strong 

possibility of disagreements and misunderstandings. Commanders may 

employ mine clearance operations for the safe deployment of PO forces 

along the line. 

(d) Commanders promptly mediate localized disagreements and address 

potential clashes at the lowest practical level to prevent a recurrence of 

conflict. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 27 

Figure 3. Deployment of PO Forces Along an 

Armistice Demarcation Line 

(5) After the forming the BZ, PO forces establish lines of demarcation on each 

side of the ADL. The PO force supervises the withdrawal of disputing forces to 

positions behind their respective lines of demarcation, as shown in figure 4, and 

prepare for the establishment of the BZ. The lines of demarcation are now the 

forward limits for each of the disputing forces. 
28 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Figure 4. Withdrawal of Disputing Forces Behind 

Lines of Demarcation 

(6) PO forces establish the BZ, begin observation, and patrol activities as shown 

in figure 5. UN PO refer to the BZ as the area of separation. A BZ is an exclusion 

zone or area for disputing forces. OPs provide visual coverage within the BZ. 

Patrols supplement the OP by patrolling areas out of effective visual coverage. 

Access to the BZ is restricted to the PO force or observer group. Commanders 

negotiate special arrangements between the disputing parties and the PO force, 

which allows restricted access for local civilians, such as farmers or anglers. 

Commanders permit people or vehicle traffic to pass into or through a BZ. 

Peacekeepers control access with a CP and can restrict the operating hours only 

to daylight. Commanders determine staffing of CPs based on their analysis of the 

mission and other factors. 

 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 29 

Figure 5. Establishment of Buffer Zones 

(7) Based on negotiated diplomatic agreements, the disputing parties may agree 

to extended areas of supervision called areas of limitation (AOL), as shown in 

figure 6. An AOL allows peacekeepers to inspect the strength and fortifications of 

disputing parties. A typical arrangement is when disputing parties agree to 

maintain equal numbers of small, lightly armed forces in the area immediately 

adjacent to the BZ. Agreements between disputing parties allows larger forces in 

other areas of the AOL, but the agreement specifies an upper limit for the number 

and type of formations, tanks, antiaircraft weapons, and artillery (by caliber) 

permitted in the area. The PO force or observer group monitors the compliance of 

each side. Lines of demarcation define outer boundaries of the AOLs. The AOLs 

constitute an additional measure for improving security of the BZ and increasing 

confidence in the process by the disputing parties. 

 
30 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Figure 6. Establishment of Areas of Limitation 

(8) The BZ eventually becomes a DMZ following further diplomatic activity. PO 

forces do not occupy DMZs, but observe and patrol with observer groups. A DMZ 

creates neutral areas free from military occupation and activity. Generally, a DMZ 

is in an area claimed by two or more disputing sides and control by one party 

constitutes a direct threat to the others. Lines of demarcation define DMZ 

boundaries. These boundaries are easily recognizable and do not run counter to 

locally accepted political and cultural divisions. The airspace over a DMZ is 

restricted from disputing party aircraft. 

3. Site Security 

a. PO forces provide site security at various locations within their AO. Units at these 

sites effectively shape and manage the messages their presence sends. These sites 

include, but are not limited to: 

(1) Religious sites, e.g., mosques, temples, churches, or shrines. 

(2) War crime sites. 

(3) Governmental buildings. 

(4) Election sites. 

(5) Schools. 

(6) Culturally or historically significant sites. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 31 

b. Commanders conduct a thorough IPOE of the AO and determine which sites 

require security. Based on threat conditions and forces available, the commander 

conducts a risk assessment and determines what security is required. 

c. . Commanders combine and vary fixed site security techniques according to the 

local situation. 

(1) Periodic observation by patrols, including overflights. 

(2) Obstacles. 

(3) Electronic monitoring. 

(4) Guards—periodic or permanent. 

(5) Patrols make periodic, random checks of guard posts; however, the checks 

are part of the unit’s overall patrol plan and involve coordination with the 

elements operating the guard posts. Commanders use QRFs as part of checks 

during rehearsals and route recons. Depending on the size and location of the 

guard force required, security of fixed sites may require area reconnaissance 

patrols on a periodic basis. 

(6) The type of site requiring security determines the amount of coordination 

required with local authorities, owners, NGOs, and international organizations. 

The situation may require entrance rosters for sites with limited access, such as 

war crimes sites. School and church officials assist guards at entrances during 

periods of high volume (e.g., start and end of the school day and scheduled 

services). 

(7) If not instituted by local authorities, commanders encourage and formalize 

relations with neighborhood watch programs. Create this relationship through the 

local police or international police monitors. 

4. Protected Areas 

a. Commanders may require the PO force to establish and maintain a protected 

area. A protected area is a geographic area where the military force provides 

security and facilitates humanitarian aid for at risk people. Other names for protected 

areas include security zone, safe area, and humanitarian zone. 

b. Principles for protected areas. 

(1) The commander may compel compliance through force. The PO force uses 

the appropriate ROE and capability for the situation. 

(2) The local population perceives the PO force as impartial. This will require a 

significant IO plan and constant command attention. 

(3) Aggressively enforce military prohibitions within the demilitarized zone. 

(4) The PO force enforces freedom of movement to and from the area. 

(5) The commander builds consent using all means to eliminate the need for a 

protected area. 

c. Military tasks in a protected area. 

(1) Establish the protected area. 

(2) Establish and enforce weapons exclusion zone. 

(3) Establish and maintain cantonment areas and weapons holding areas. 
32 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(4) Dominate avenues of approach. 

(5) Establish CPs, OPs, and other control access measures. 

(6) Establish curfew. 

(7) Conduct presence patrols. 

(8) Develop and rehearse reinforcement contingency plans. 

d. Planning principles for protected areas. 

(1) The commander provides clear and unambiguous guidance, mission 

objectives, and criteria for success. 

(2) The military commander provides input regarding the military feasibility of 

maintaining the protected area. Political factors significantly influence the 

selection of protected areas. 

(3) Commanders establish QRFs and criteria for their employment. The 

commander understands and rehearses the use of the QRF. 

(4) Coordinate humanitarian support with NGOs, international governmental 

organizations, and HN. Adjust the size and mix accordingly if the military assists. 

(5) Coordinate and understand the responsibilities for villages and towns within 

the area. 

(6) Understand the media plan. 

(7) Understand and rehearse ROE. 

(8) Establish an LNO with local law enforcement officials. Establishing liaisons is 

important to PO because it produces trust on all sides involved. 

5. Establishing Search Operations 

a. Insertion Drill. The procedures for an insertion drill are below: 

(1) The patrol commander conducts a visual check of the area, and decides to 

put all teams on the road, have one team in a watch location, or a team 

conducting satellite patrol activity. 

(2) The patrol commander’s team, the road party, remains in an overwatch 

position while cutoff personnel move into place. 

(3) Cutoff personnel approach locations, establish positions, and carry out 

clearance checks on their positions. The patrol commander and lead service 

member (or team member) occupy a position by the road. The remainder of the 

patrol covers the road position from the overwatch location. The lead scout 

positions barriers across the road while everyone remains concealed. The tactics 

the commander employs dictate what personnel go to each location. 

(4) The road party conducts a check of their position. Detailed tasks include: 

(a) Using a radio, running vehicle registration checks, and selecting vehicles 

for search. The patrol leader has an alternate signal (e.g., a whistle), which 

notify the cutoff personnel to move into position. 

(b) Halting vehicles, speaking with the occupants, and completing the 

appropriate forms. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 33 

(c) Removing personal web gear and weapon, and leaving them with the 

individual who is covering the vehicle. Conducting a search of the vehicle and 

occupants. 

(d) Observing vehicle occupants from a concealed position and protecting 

the searcher's equipment. The road party stays spread out in case a problem 

arises. 

b. Extraction Drill. Normal extraction drill procedures are: 

(1) Road party moves to an overwatch position. 

(2) Cutoff personnel regroup, collect roadblock equipment, and extract from their 

positions. 

(3) Consider using deception when moving away from the search location. 

Hostile persons have the opportunity to pinpoint the patrol during the search 

process. 

c. Action Drills at Roadblocks or CPs. Below are historical occurrences encountered 

during a search operation and their associated response tasks: 

(1) Discovery of illegal items and persons: 

(a) Inform the operations center. 

(b) Arrest, search, bag, restrain, and consider the application of minimum 

force in accordance with ROE. 

(c) Treat the vehicle as a crime scene. 

(d) Consider forensic evidence preservation. 

(e) Cutoff personnel cordon off the area until they receive assistance. 

(2) Person refusing to allow search. If a person refuses to have their vehicle 

searched, the patrol commander does the following: 

(a) Inform the operations center and request police assistance. 

(b) Ask again for agreement to search the vehicle. 

(c) Take action against the person in accordance with standard operating 

procedures (SOPs). 

(d) If nothing is found in the search, complete a report form (driver retains a 

copy), and allow the driver to continue. 

(e) Report complete details upon returning to base. 

(3) Persons try to leave vehicle while search is in progress: 

(a) Ask the individuals to stay with the vehicle. 

(b) Explain legal powers of the search personnel. Use common sense. 

(c) Use minimum force to keep the occupants with their vehicle until the 

search is complete. 

(d) Keep the operations center updated. 

(e) Arrest or detain as necessary. Always attempt to transfer to local 

authorities. 

(f) Several suggestions are provided below for roadblocks in urban areas 

(figure 7), rural areas (figure 8), and for a mobile roadblock (figure 9). 
34 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Figure 7. Suggested Roadblock in Urban Areas 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 35 

Figure 8. Suggested Roadblock in Rural Areas 
36 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Figure 9. Suggested Mobile Roadblock 

6. Conducting Personnel Searches 

a. Conduct searches in accordance with the appropriate authority. Make search 

personnel aware of the extent and limits of the authority. Authority for conducting 

personnel searches includes: 

(1) When persons voluntarily request entry to a building or area, a search is a 

condition of entry. 

(2) At a security or post incident CP. 

(3) When reasonable grounds for suspicion exist (e.g., possible possession of 

illegal or prohibited items). 

(4) When taking a person into custody. 

(5) As a precautionary measure while in custody. 

b. Due to allegations of brutality or unethical behavior, take care when conducting 

personnel searches. Adversaries attempt to use these allegations when discrediting 

the PK force. Conduct operations demonstrating professionalism and courtesy at all 

times. Factors to consider when conducting personnel searches: 

(1) Ensure search circumstances are legally justified. 

(2) Follow predetermined procedures minimizing accusations by adversaries. 

(3) Conduct same sex searches when possible. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 37 

c. Constraints when conducting personnel searches include: 

(1) Same sex searches are important. When possible, conduct same gender 

searches; however, this is not always possible due to speed and security 

considerations. Therefore, perform mixed gender searches in a respectful 

manner, using all possible measures to prevent interpreting actions as sexual 

misconduct or assault. 

(2) There is no legal authority requiring removal of clothing other than outer 

garments in public (e.g., coat, jacket, or gloves). Obtain legal authority in 

situations where removal of more than outer garments is required. 

d. The two categories for searching persons are the quick body search (in public 

view) and a detailed body search (out of public view). 

(1) Quick body search (in public). Searches carried out when dealing with a large 

number of people. They can be part of a detailed search focused on detecting 

anything that may cause harm to the searcher, searched person, or others. Using 

the quick body search preserves evidence that is quickly disposed or destroyed. 

(2) Procedure. Work in pairs, one person doing the physical search, the other 

observing (both the searcher and the subject). The second person acts as cover 

for the first. Table 1 shows pertinent points to consider. 

Table 1. Quick Body Search Considerations 

DO NOT stand directly in front or behind the subject to avoid confrontation. 

DO NOT become distracted. Avoid eye contact with subject. 

WATCH for nonverbal communications (e.g., increased nervousness or silent 

gestures to others). 

DO NOT cross the line of fire of the cover man. 

POSITION the subject with legs slightly apart and arms extended parallel to the 

ground. DO NOT spread eagle the subject as this may interfere with the 

collection of forensic evidence. 

CONDUCT the search quickly and systematically from head to toe, down one 

side and up the other, covering all body parts, front, and back. PAY ATTENTION 

when searching the small of the back, armpits, crotch areas, and closed hands. 

USE a stroking, squeezing movement when searching. Use both hands with 

thumbs and index fingers touching when searching limbs. This method increases 

the chances of detecting foreign objects through the clothing. 

SEARCH and be respectful of any baggage or removed clothing. 

Note: Using metal detectors or X-ray machines is a force multiplier especially 

when searching large groups (e.g., checkpoint operations). 

(3) Detailed body search (not in public). Carried out when reasonable doubt 

exists. 

(4) Procedure. Conduct a detailed body search using the same procedures as 

the quick body search, considering the points in table 2. 
38 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Table 2. Detailed Body Search Considerations 

ESTABLISH identity of the subject and ownership of baggage and other articles. 

INVITE the subject to empty all pockets and remove all items. 

Note: If it is necessary to remove clothing during a lawful search in public, 

remove only the outer coat, jacket, and gloves. The removal of other clothing only 

occurs during a lawful search in a private area. Record the subject’s consent if 

the subject has consented to the search. 

PAY ATTENTION to every detail (i.e., clothing seams, waistbands, belts, collars, 

lapels, padding, shirt, and trouser cuffs). Socks and shoes provide easily missed 

hiding places. Always suspect medical dressings. Medical personnel should 

examine all dressings. 

DO NOT SHOW EMOTION upon finding illegal or prohibited items. Do not 

separate significant articles from others but ensure all are out of reach of the 

subject. 

e. Maintain a record for all categories of search, apart from initial searches a good 

record contains: 

(1) Details of the person. 

(2) Reason for the search. 

(3) Probable cause for the search. 

(4) Date and time group. 

(5) Location. 

(6) Details of anything significant. 

(7) Details of damage or injury to person or property. 

Note: If conducting a search in conjunction with an investigation, do not identify search 

team members. Use call signs or other identification. 

7. Conducting Vehicle Searches 

a. Passenger Vehicle Search. Divide search techniques into three categories. The 

categories vary according to the intensity of the search. There is no clear boundary 

between the categories and the extent of the investigation. Each stage depends on 

the level of suspicion aroused during the search. Categories include: 

(1) The initial check is the first part of the search process carried out on all 

vehicles and used to select vehicles for a more detailed examination. Carry out 

this check without the occupants dismounting, although search personnel may 

ask the driver to open the trunk and hood. Search personnel at the entrance to 

barracks and other installations if there is a threat from large vehicle-mounted 

bombs. Up to three personnel are required for the search, and the search takes 

about 3 minutes per vehicle. 

(2) The primary search is a detailed search conducted when any search member 

becomes suspicious, for any reason, during the initial check. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 39 

(3) The secondary search is a thorough search of highly suspect vehicles. 

Search unit members work in pairs, examining the relevant sections of the 

vehicle. Search the occupants after exiting the vehicle. 

(4) Hostile parties use all types of vehicles for resource movement. Searching 

vehicles at CPs or other types of vehicle control points deters movement and 

increases the chance of acquiring evidence used in criminal prosecution. The 

high volume of vehicles makes search operations appear difficult. Intelligence 

analysis targets criminal vehicle types and driver traits, reducing the number of 

searches. This involves coordinating with police records personnel and vehicle 

registration authorities. Suspicious persons try to avoid searches. Search 

personnel should watch for the following: 

(a) People avoiding the search and signaling others (e.g., flashing brake 

lights or using radios). 

(b) Vehicles that exit the search lanes before reaching the CP. 

(c) Disturbances causing congestion at the CP. 

(5) Consider the techniques during a search: 

(a) Be quick, thorough, and efficient. This reduces complaints. 

(b) Ensure children, pets, elderly, young women, and injured persons do not 

deter operations. If necessary, request special or additional assistance. 

(c) Do not damage vehicles. 

(6) Train searchers on what general vehicle appearances indicate a vehicle is 

suspicious. Searchers use the following: 

(a) Use common sense. Look for anything unusual (e.g., scratched screw 

heads, repaired upholstery, new bodywork, etc.). 

(b) Remember details of searched vehicles. This is useful in future 

operations. 

(7) Figure 10 is a diagram of a passenger car. Vehicle searches are divided into 

area 1 (exterior), area 2 (trunk), area 3 (engine compartment), area 4 

(undercarriage), and area 5 (interior). 
40 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Figure 10. Diagram of Passenger Vehicle 

(8) Table 3 lists guidelines for searching privately owned vehicles or passenger 

cars. 

Table 3. Vehicle Search Areas 

Area 1: Exterior Vehicle Inspection 

Check the following: 

Headlights, sidelights, rear lights. Alignment—leave as found. 

Bumpers. 

Wheel trims and hubs. Tire pressures. Bleed a small amount of air and smell for unusual odors. 

Under wheel arches, bolt-on mud deflectors. 

Signs of recent welding or new undercoating (Is it soft?). Tampering with bolts on mud deflectors. 

Does the inside shape of the of the vehicle match the outside? 

Signs of adaptation to bodywork and roof. 

Front and rear panels and spoilers. 

Area 2: Trunk Vehicle Inspection 

Before searching, stand back and look at the contents. Check the following: 

Contents are the same as described by the driver. 

Glue, undercoating, popped rivets, etc. 

Spare gas tanks or false tank. 

Spare wheel—deflate, check thoroughly. 

Floor, roof, back, and sides of trunk. 

Remove all mats, carpets, etc. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 41 

Table 3. Vehicle Search Areas (cont’d) 

Signs of welding, new paint, or lack of dirt. 

Double skins and carpet stuck to the trunk frame. 

Space between the trunk and rear seat. 

Spaces in wings of station wagon-type cars. 

Natural false floor. 

Space in tailgate. 

Area 3: Engine Compartment Vehicle Inspection 

Areas to check: 

Under battery tray. 

Windshield washer bottle. 

Heater and ventilation hoses and vents. 

Heater and ventilation motor. 

Air filter. 

Hood. 

Sound-deadening material under the hood or heat shield. 

Area 4: Undercarriage Vehicle Inspection 

Areas to check: 

Chassis sections. 

Drain plug seals. 

New welding or undercoating. 

Exhaust system. 

Oil pan. 

Gas tank. Tampering in this area is hard to detect; however, watch how the fuel gauge behaves on a full 

tank. Ensure the tank type matches the vehicle. 

Area 5: Interior Vehicle Inspection 

Ensure search team members are clean. Areas to check: 

Roof linings. Access gained by removing door-sealing strips, or if there is a sunroof fitted by removing 

trim. 

Sun visors. 

Front, rear, and center window or door pillars. 

Door panels. 

Lower window first. Conduct the search without removing trim if possible. Avoid damage. 

Rear side panels—two-door vehicles, etc. 

Remove panels and check the area between the back seat and the trunk. 

Back seat. 
42 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Table 3. Vehicle Search Areas (cont’d) 

Cushions. 

Back rests. 

Front seats. 

Space under seats. 

Check inside padding. 

Dashboard area. 

Check battery connection—look for extra or unusual wiring, etc. 

Behind dashboard panels. 

Ventilation and heater hoses. 

Radio, speakers, etc. 

Glove compartment—behind and above. 

Ashtray—contents. 

Console area. 

Front foot wells. 

Remove panels—access to wing space, door seals, etc. 

Floor. 

Remove carpets—mats. 

Check for signs of false floor—welding, etc. 

b. Commercial Vehicle Search. Search commercial vehicles in the same manner as 

passenger vehicles, displayed in figure 11. Commercial truck drivers often live in the 

cabin section of their trucks. When conducting searches of commercial trucks, be 

aware you are searching the driver’s “home.” Pay particular attention to the 

following: 

(1) Fifth Wheel. There is a hollow compartment above the trailer hitch, or fifth 

wheel, on most trailers. Gain access underneath the trailer and check the 

compartment with a flashlight and mirror. Fiber-optic search instruments, when 

available, are recommended for searching the fifth wheel area; they are simple to 

use and more versatile than a flashlight and mirror. Sometimes the only way into 

the compartment is by removing the floorboards inside the trailer. 

(2) Fuel Tanks and Side Lockers. Some trailers are fitted with belly tanks for 

driving extended ranges. Check for a space between the top of the tank and the 

floor of the trailer. Also, check the tank for recent welds or bolted panels. Often 

there is space between the back of the side lockers and the chassis. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 43 

Figure 11. Truck Diagram 

(3) Spare Wheel. Mounted under the trailer (positions vary), this is a prime place 

for concealment. 

(4) Chassis Cross Members. Trailers are constructed with two ”U” section 

girders. Drivers construct a large concealment area by placing boards on the 

reverse ledges bridging the gap between the girders. 

(5) Battery Boxes. There is space behind the battery. Remove the wing nuts to 

open the box. 

(6) Crash Bar. Located at the rear end of trailers, the crash bar is hollow and 

plugged at each end with rubber plugs. Remove the plugs to gain access. 

(7) Open Trailers. Where the wiring goes from tractor to trailer, the connections 

on the trailer are contained in a triangular-shaped plate. 

(8) Refrigerator Motors and Refrigerated Trailers. Refrigerator motors consist of 

a diesel engine mounted outside the trailer on the front bulkhead. The motor 

drives a cooling unit mounted on the inside of the bulkhead. 

(9) Engine Compartment. Open the engine compartment and the compartment 

behind the switch panel for inspection. Panels held in place by screws require a 

half turn with a screwdriver to release. The size of this concealment area varies. 

(10) Inspection Panel. There is an inspection panel on the interior unit, which 

contains a concealed space. Drivers use cold air plastic hoses to conceal illegal 

or prohibited items. 

(11) Search Door Panels and Side Panels at the Rear of the Cab. Some cabs 

have space behind the roof linings. 

(12) Console. Check the space behind the console, glove compartment, and the 

space behind radio speakers. 

(13) Air Filters. Accessible from beneath the vehicle. Clips hold the cover in 

place. 
44 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(14) False Floors and Bulkheads. Found in single units. 

(15) Belly Tanks. Any sign of recent welds or a clean tank or trailer. 

(16) Loads. Excess packing and using pallet spaces indicate previous 

concealments. Others are under and inside tractor units and trailers. 

WARNING 

Switch off the whole unit before searching. Switch off the motor. 

Units are thermostatically controlled and will turn on when the 

temperature rises. The exposed fan is particularly dangerous. 

c. Camper-type Vehicles (bus or coach). Figure 12 displays the construction of 

camper-type vehicles. Campers are ideal for concealment. Consider the following 

concealment locations: 

(1) Unusually thick panels. 

(2) Operable refrigerator with insulation intact. 

(3) Adapted gas (butane or propane) bottles. 

(4) Water tanks contain water. 

(5) Occupied toilet. 

(6) Access to space between skins. 

(7) Other general points to consider include: 

(a) Smell of fresh glue, paint, etc. 

(b) Smell of illegal substances such as cannabis, etc. 

(c) Towing trailer or boat. 

Figure 12. Diagram of Buses and Coaches 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 45 

8. Building Search (Inhabited) 

a. Cordon and Search Overview. This section discusses the principles of command 

and control, and procedures for cordon-and-search. A cordon-and-search operation 

occurs when intelligence identifies a search requirement. Use police when practical. 

Base the search on probable cause and act on a warrant issued by the appropriate 

legal authority. In circumstances that are dangerous (e.g., PEO), emergency laws 

and regulations may temporarily dispense with some legal protections. Use the least 

severe method when accomplishing the mission. Use care and preserve evidence 

for future legal action. 

b. Cordon and Search. Plan this operation like a raid. Divide built-up search areas 

into zones with search parties assigned to each. A search party consists of the 

following: 

(1) Security element (encircles the area, prevents entrance and exit, and secures 

open areas). 

(2) Search element (conducts the search). 

(3) Reserve element helps as required (see figure 13). 

Figure 13. Typical Organization for Search Operations 

c. Establishing the Cordon. An effective cordon is critical for achieving a successful 

search. Cordons prevent escape and protect forces conducting the operation. 

Forces limit detection by establishing the cordon in remote areas. In volatile urban 

areas, forces use a double cordon, one to protect the operation from outside threats, 
46 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

and the other to prevent the escape of persons inside the cordon. Search operations 

use plans for handling detained personnel. The unit accompanies police and 

intelligence forces that identify, question, biometrically enroll, and detain suspects. 

The principal role of the unit is reducing resistance that develops and providing force 

security. It also conducts searches and assists in detaining suspects. Keeping the 

use of force to a minimum and rapid deployment is important, especially if 

adversaries remain in the area. The security element surrounds the area while the 

search element moves in and executes the searches. Members of the security 

element focus on people evading the search, but also monitor and stop adversarial 

reinforcement efforts. CPs and roadblocks are established. If possible, secure and 

search subways, sewers, and other subsurface routes of escape. 

d. Conducting the Search. Conduct searches of built-up areas and limit the 

inconvenience to the populace. Actions discourage adversaries and sympathizers 

from remaining in the locale. A large-scale search of a built-up area is a combined 

civil police and military operation. Plan and rehearse this type of search in detail. Do 

not conduct a physical reconnaissance of the area immediately before a search. 

Obtain terrain information from a variety of sources, including aerial photographs. In 

larger towns or cities, local police have detailed maps showing building sizes and 

locations. A successful operation uses a simple and swift search plan. Organize the 

element into teams. These teams include personnel and special equipment for 

handling prisoners, interrogations, documentation (using a recorder with a camera), 

demolitions, MISO, CA, mine detection, fire support, employment of military working 

dogs (MWDs), and tunnel reconnaissance (see figure 14). Three methods for 

searching populated areas include: 

(1) Assemble Inhabitants in a Central Location. This method provides the most 

control, simplifies a thorough search, denies an opportunity to conceal evidence, 

and allows for detailed interrogation. The disadvantage is looting may occur while 

homes are vacated, increasing the potential for ill feelings. 

(2) Restrict Inhabitants to their Homes. This prohibits movement of civilians, 

allows them to stay in their dwellings, and discourages looting. The 

disadvantages are that control and interrogation are difficult and gives inhabitants 

time to conceal evidence. 

(3) Control the Heads of the Households. Detain the head of each household in 

front of the house while bringing everyone else in the house to a central location. 

During the search, the head of the household accompanies the search team. This 

method allows the head of the household to observe the search team in 

operation, giving confidence that the searchers respect the dwelling. This is the 

best method for controlling the populace during a search. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 47 

Figure 14. Conduct of Search 

e. Objective. The objective of a house search is looking for controlled items, and 

screening residents through biometrics collection and tactical questioning, 

determining if they are adversaries or sympathizers. Assign search parties with at 

least one local police officer, a protective escort, a female searcher, and an 

interpreter. Arrange escort parties and transportation before the search. Forced 

entry may be necessary if the property is vacant or the occupant(s) refuse entry. To 

prevent looting, secure a house before departing if searching while the occupant(s) 

are away. If necessary, the commander arranges for security of the houses until the 

occupant(s) return. 

f. Other Considerations. Pay attention to anything appearing out of place (e.g., 

freshly excavated ground, etc.). 

(1) Reserve. Assign mobile forces as the reserve, and position them in nearby 

areas if possible. 

(2) Booby Traps. Treat any material found as booby-trapped until proven 

otherwise. 

(3) Below Ground. Search underground areas and waterways thoroughly. Use 

mine detectors to locate metal objects underground and underwater. Use 

explosive detection dogs to locate firearms, ammunition, and explosives. 

g. Aerial Search Operations. Leverage helicopters and fixed-wing assets when 

possible; they provide exceptional search capabilities. Commanders and staff factor 

in the psychological impact helicopters have on the indigenous population. 

 
48 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

9. Building Search (Uninhabited) 

a. Assume all buildings are booby-trapped. Booby traps catch the unwary and focus 

on maiming or killing search personnel. They create uncertainty, lower morale, and 

hinder movement. Constructed from household items (e.g., clothes pegs, 

mousetraps, flashlight batteries, etc.), they are usually set off by opening a door, 

switching on a light, or walking on the floor. Traps activate in several ways, 

including: 

(1) Pull—opening a drawer. 

(2) Pressure—standing on a floorboard or sitting in a chair. 

(3) Release or antilift—picking up an object. 

(4) Tilt—turning an object on its side to look underneath. 

(5) Tremor—vibration or movement. 

(6) Collapsing circuit—cutting or breaking a circuit. They also go off when the 

battery expires. 

(7) Light sensitive—functions when either exposed or hidden from light. 

(8) Antisubmerge—placing in water activates the device. 

(9) Antiprobe—relies on a search probe or prodder to complete the circuit. 

(10) Combination—has more than one means of activation. 

b. Procedures for approaching and entering an unoccupied building include: 

(1) Initiate a visual reconnaissance of the building and area. 

(2) Check for wires leading to a command-detonated device. 

(3) Team leader sets up a control point and decides upon a place of entry. 

(4) Detail a two-person team to enter and check for booby traps. 

(5) Enter building through one of the main entrances, saving time and making 

subsequent access easier if cleared early. 

c. Clues assisting search teams in the identification of booby traps include: 

(1) Attractive items in the open. 

(2) Spoils, wrappings, sawdust, etc. in unlikely places. 

(3) Out of place pegs, wires, or lengths of cord. 

(4) Loose floorboards, window ledges, or stair treads. 

(5) Fresh nails or screws. 

(6) Lumps or bulges in chairs or under carpets. 

d. After checking for booby traps, the search team performs a detailed and 

systematic search. If the search personnel cannot use the front door, they clear a 

path to another door. The team leader clears the outside of the door and opens it, 

preferably using some device to protect search personnel from a possible blast (e.g., 

pulling cable). While clearing for traps, consider the following points: 

(1) Never open any door until both sides are clear of traps. 

(2) Leave all doors, drawers, and cupboards open after checking. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 49 

(3) Make extensive use of tools (e.g., pulling cable or weights for remote opening 

of doors, etc.) ensuring the safety of search personnel. 

(4) Clearly mark routes cleared of traps with white tape. 

10. Search of Rural Areas 

a. Open areas are used as hiding places because adversaries have the advantage 

of observing from nearby dwellings without being detected. Although associated with 

a rural environment, open spaces also occur in an urban setting (e.g., parks, 

gardens, or vacant lots). 

b. Area searches are dependent on good planning. The IPOE process is essential 

before conducting a search and does the following: 

(1) Ensure the area’s boundaries are recorded and its center location is notated 

using eight-digit coordinates (with addresses if possible). 

(2) Identifies the owner or tenant. 

(3) Gains intelligence using ISR resources. 

(4) Obtains relevant information on local adversaries and sympathizers. 

c. Divide area into sections and assign teams. Hedges and ditches are terrain 

features that clearly define boundaries. Plan the search balancing team speed and 

thoroughness. 

d. Other considerations: 

(1) Ensure engineers are present; not only to detect mines and obstacles, but 

also to repair damages to structures caused by the search. 

(2) Consider using a MWD trained in detecting explosives. They are useful to 

speed up searches, especially around outside areas. 

(3) Take a sufficient number of metal detectors. 

(4) Record everything on a digital camera, not just for evidence, but also for IO. 

(5) Take large quantities of forms to document confiscated items and property 

damage. 

(6) Take gloves and other protective garments, many search situations are 

unsanitary. 

(7) Insist personnel maintain their professionalism and under no circumstances 

remove property for personal gain or as souvenirs. 

e. Consider using aerial assets for reconnaissance, security, and information for 

units on the ground in urban areas. 

11. Verification of Weapons and Forces 

a. Overview. This section addresses verification of the location, movement, 

readiness, and numbers of weapons and forces specified by agreements. 

Commanders understand their responsibilities under these agreements. Peace 

agreements or subsequent international accords establish the parameters for 

verification of weapons and force reductions. 

b. Principles. 

(1) HNs and belligerent forces are responsible for compliance and accountability 

with the agreements. 
50 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(2) The PO force is responsible for verifying compliance, and in the case of 

peace enforcement, compelling compliance. 

(3) The PO force has total access to all sites and locations. This is a 

fundamental issue for freedom of movement. 

c. Weapon and Force Levels. Divide cantonment and storage sites into four 

categories: 

(1) Combat sites consist of heavy weapons, air defense (AD), airfields, naval 

ports, barracks, operational munitions stocks, and combat loads. 

(2) Infrastructure sites consist of support activities such as logistics, 

communications, HQ, and depots. 

(3) Police sites consist of weapons, vehicles, and munitions. 

(4) Ordnance sites consist of civilian production plants and factories, production 

storage, and new weapons holding areas. 

d. Procedures. 

(1) Commanders establish the priority of inspections based on the four 

categories listed above. Combat sites and police sites have the highest priority. 

(2) Schedules for inspection include a combination of pre-inspections, 

announced inspections, and unannounced inspections. 

(3) The program of inspection is available to all parties of the agreement. 

(4) A verification board coordinates the inspection and develops a collection 

plan. 

(5) The reporting system, when feasible, includes nonmilitary organizations such 

as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International 

Police Training Force (IPTF), or representatives of international bodies 

overseeing the agreement. 

12. Military Movements and Exercises 

a. PO forces have ongoing operational and training requirements that cause them to 

move in and between population centers, which requires careful planning and 

coordination. Commanders and staffs are sensitive to perceptions of the local 

populace surrounding all movements or operations. 

b. Considerations when planning movements, training exercises, or support to civic 

events, include: 

(1) Protecting property rights of landowners. 

(2) Avoiding damage to structures or other vehicles, especially cultural or 

religious buildings or shrines. 

(3) Observing protocol and practices of the local population. 

(4) Avoiding the potential for civilian casualties. 

(5) Adhering to local national laws. 

13. Convoy Operations 

a. Overview. The PO forces organize convoys ensuring the safe movement of 

forces, humanitarian supplies, and support for civilian or commercial movements, 

authorized or required to implement peace agreement(s). Convoys are allocated 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 51 

road space in accordance with theater policy, standardization agreements, and the 

law of the HN, as applicable to the situation. JP 4-09, Distribution Operations, 

provides more detail regarding movement control procedures. See ATP 4-

01.45/MCRP 4-11.3H/NTTP 4-01.3/AFTTP 3-2.58 MTTP for Tactical Convoy 

Operations for basic convoy techniques. 

b. Types of Convoys. Convoys occur on highways, roads, rivers, and along 

coastlines. 

(1) Organize ground convoy elements into march units, serials, and columns as 

described in ATP 4-11, Army Motor Transport Operations. Other countries use 

the term “packet” to describe the concept of march and serials. 

(2) ATTP 4-15, Army Water Transport Operations, and NTTP 3-06.1, Riverine 

Operations, describe watercraft convoy operations. 

c. Security Elements. 

(1) Advance Elements. The column head is the first vehicle of each column, 

serial, or march unit. The advance guard is the security element positioned with 

the column head. The advance guard serves as the point element for the convoy 

and consists predominantly of security vehicles. It travels far enough ahead to 

enable clearing of small obstructions without getting the main body involved (the 

US Army MP standard is 3–5 minutes ahead of the main body). A point patrol 

element is positioned in front (but within visual range) of the advance guard and 

provides surveillance of the route, monitors CPs before arrival of the convoy, and 

detects mines or booby-trapped areas. 

(2) The Main Body. The main body includes cargo and passenger-carrying 

vehicles or vessels. Intersperse escorts with or on board these elements. A 

typical order of march is: 

(a) Armored vehicles. 

(b) Convoy vehicles and VIP vehicles. 

(c) Armored personnel carrier containing the column commander. 

(d) Mounted infantry. 

(3) The Rear Guard or Trail. The trail is equipped for providing recovery, 

maintenance, and medical support. When the threat is high, locate a rear guard 

security force with the trail. The rear guard defends the rear of the convoy and 

prevents infiltration from the rear. It also assists the advance guard or main body 

if a local counterattack is required. The rear guard moves far enough behind the 

main body to allow freedom of action if a delay or attack occurs to the main body. 

The commander tasks a helicopter-borne QRF as a reserve force. This includes 

at least two helicopters, which allows greater flexibility of movement and action. 

(4) Command and Control. Establish clear lines of C2 for each convoy. This is 

difficult with multinational or mixed civilian and military convoys. Civilian elements 

of the convoy are not part of the military C2 structure; however, the convoy 

commander exercises control over their actions. This is true regardless of the 

rank of military or civilian VIPs traveling with the column. 

(5) Communication. Convoy commanders command the column from their 

position in the convoy. Maintain secure radio communication throughout the 
52 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

column and with the local security force, any mobile reserve forces, supporting 

artillery, aircraft, and other security forces operating on or astride the route. Use 

light signals and colored smoke grenades with prearranged codes for passing 

information and indicating targets. 

(6) Operations Security (OPSEC). The PO forces avoid establishing regular 

patterns of movement. Create irregular patterns in routes, convoy composition 

and organization, vehicle speeds, and convoy timing. Failure to do this places 

lives and equipment at risk. Never divulge plans in advance to anyone without a 

need to know; always consider deception measures. 

(7) Liaison. The staff responsible for arranging the movement coordinates with 

local commanders concerning protection measures for the convoy as it passes 

through their areas. This includes the means of travel, route, timing, size of the 

escort, and presence of soft-skinned vehicles. 

(8) Intelligence. Convoy planners obtain timely, accurate intelligence to support a 

predictive estimate of potential adversarial capabilities, intentions, and hostile 

activity on proposed routes. Intelligence aids planning for the convoy, while the 

convoy itself gathers intelligence. If necessary, use deception to mask the 

reconnaissance effort. Aerial imagery and photographs assist the collection 

process. Collect and process information from all convoy commanders, drivers, 

operators, and security elements at the completion of each mission. When 

possible, use military grid reference system coordinates to report the following: 

(a) Identification of all relevant information concerning the status of CPs 

along the route (such as their location, manning levels, and the affiliation, 

ethnicity, sect of the occupants). 

(b) Identification and location of adversarial elements. 

(c) Problems or hazardous areas along the route. 

(d) Areas where crowds are likely to assemble. 

(e) Local weather conditions. 

(f) Road or sea conditions along the route. 

(9) Recovery and Repair of Vehicles. Plans for the prompt recovery and repair of 

vehicles include having recovery vehicles in large convoys and vehicle 

mechanics in each group. The recovery and repair policy is included in convoy 

orders. A convoy element halts long enough to take a broken down vehicle in 

tow, to hand it over to a recovery section traveling with the convoy. Forces deal 

with circumstances when it is necessary to abandon a vehicle rather than hold up 

the convoy. 

(10) Medical Assistance. Include medical vehicles in any large convoy with 

medical personnel in each group. The medical policy is included in the convoy 

orders. In case of emergency, consider the possibility of casualty evacuation by 

helicopter. 

 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 53 

14. Convoy Security 

a. Convoy defense techniques are described in MTTP Tactical Convoy Operations; 

ATP 4-11, ATTP 4-15, and NTTP 3-06.1. Security forces accompany convoys when 

contact with hostiles is likely. 

b. The composition of the escort depends on the threat, size of the vehicle column, 

and forces available. High threats require the use of combined arms escort forces 

comprised of armor, infantry, artillery, aviation, and engineer elements for ground 

convoys. 

c. Water convoys require escort forces comprised of patrol boats and aviation 

assets. 

d. Position security elements where they best support the convoy. If only one 

security element (or vehicle) is available, place it at the rear of a ground convoy 

column; it is easier for vehicles to move forward on a road in reaction to a threat. 

e. Plan and rehearse for ambushes along the route. FM 3-90-1, Offense and 

Defense, describes ambush tactics. 

f. Convoy commanders ensure the following are included in the mission rehearsal: 

(1) Movement using maps, photographs, and terrain models. 

(2) Communications procedures. 

(3) Reaction drills ensuring everyone understands the ROE and procedures for 

individual and collective action or reaction to potential situations. 

15. Populace Control Measures 

a. Populace control measures implemented during PO directly support the 

reestablishment of a safe and secure environment and set conditions for progress 

towards a long-term political settlement. 

b. The authority to impose populace control measures originates from the political 

mandate that established the force. Mission-specific ROE refines the authority. 

Populace control measures include: 

(1) Control measures for urban and rural areas, including identification cards, 

biometric enrollment, watch list checks, and barrier systems. 

(2) Establish and enforce curfews. 

(3) Control measures supporting the separation and neutralization of belligerent 

forces. 

(4) Establish indigenous population movement restrictions, including travel 

passes, control points, licensing, and registration of vehicles. 

(5) Control the borders preventing external support to a conflict. 

(6) Place restrictions on civilian assembly. 

16. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reconciliation 

a. DDR. Demilitarization or arms control is a task given to military forces under the 

terms of its mandate, or they are local, tactical initiatives, which attempt to reduce 

tension in a specific area. The possibility of demilitarization and arms control 

measures arise once a cease-fire or peace agreement is in place. 
54 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

b. Methods of Demilitarization and Arms Control. Demilitarization and arms control 

are a progressive process. Steps in the process, which require considerable 

verification and policing by the military force, are shown below: 

(1) Withdrawal from Front Lines. Following a cease-fire agreement, deploy 

military forces along the ADL. The first stage of demilitarization is withdrawal from 

wartime positions, either to barracks or behind a BZ. The aim of this zone is 

moving the adversaries back, beyond small arms range, and beyond line of sight. 

(2) Withdrawal of Heavy Weapons. Withdrawing heavy weapons, a specified 

distance from the cease-fire line, offers a significant confidence-building 

measure. Heavy weapons include main battle tanks, towed and self-propelled 

artillery pieces, mortars, and all types of armored fighting vehicles. 

(3) Decommissioning of AD Weapons. Neutralize all active AD systems and 

remove as soon as possible because they pose a significant threat to all types of 

aircraft. 

(4) Return to Barracks or Cantonment Sites. After separating the former 

adversaries, the next step is returning the troops to barracks or new cantonment 

sites. The aim is to move troops to peacetime locations that PO forces can 

monitor. This assists in the demilitarization of civilian population as weapons are 

collected. Cantonment sites are ad hoc because there are rarely sufficient tailormade military barracks available, which can accommodate all troops and 

equipment in the assigned areas. Base the cantonment sites around large public 

buildings, factories, or tented camps. Sites that use the civilian infrastructure may 

cause problems for community recovery if military forces continually occupy 

them. Depending on the mandate or the peace agreement, military forces may or 

may not have authority to allocate sites. 

(5) Force Levels and Restructuring. Restructuring former adversaries into 

peacetime organizations is the next stage in demilitarization and arms control. 

Force levels are determined at the national level, often as part of a cease-fire or 

peace agreement. The senior military HQ directs the restructuring process and 

involves suitability assessments, verification, and advice from units at the tactical 

level. 

(6) Restructuring. Restructuring includes the following elements: 

(a) Setting a ceiling on military personnel by unit or location. 

(b) Confining arms to designated armories. 

(c) Separating arms and ammunition. 

(d) Obtaining military approval for proposed sites after conducting a threat 

assessment. 

(e) Relocating heavy weapons to authorized sites. 

(7) Verification. Verification depends on the requirements listed in the mandate. 

If the situation allows, military forces restrict all military movement and training. 

Authorized activities are monitored ensuring compliance. Military forces inspect 

and monitor activities within barracks and cantonment sites. This provides an 

assessment of readiness, capability, intent, morale, and identifies attempts to 

deploy forces. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 55 

(8) Enforcement. Enforcement depends on restrictions in the mandate on a 

faction’s military activity, training, or movement. This includes punitive inspections 

or confiscations of weapons and equipment. 

17. Civil Disturbances 

a. The threat of civil disturbances during PO is high. How the PO forces handle 

incidents, has a decisive effect on mission accomplishment. Poorly handled 

reactions to civil disturbances quickly escalate situations out of control with potential 

long-term negative effects for the mission. Conversely, a well-handled situation 

leads to an enhanced view of the PO force’s discipline, professionalism, and results 

in fewer incidents. The use of NLWs enhances the PO force’s ability to respond 

appropriately to civil disturbances and afford the commander additional options 

when containing and de-escalating situations. Further information on the use of 

NLWs in response to civil disturbance is found in FM 3-22.40/MCWP 3-15.8/NTTP 

3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45, MTTP for Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons. 

b. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) during civil disturbances include 

isolating, dominating, maintaining common situational awareness, and employing 

multidimensional and multi-echelon actions. 

(1) Isolate the trouble spot from outside influence or interaction. Unit tactical 

operation centers in theater develop TTP that isolate riots or demonstrations and 

keep them from spreading into bigger and more violent explosions of emotional 

expression. The goal is to isolate the location and close access in and out of the 

demonstration locality with CPs (see figure 15). Once access is closed, rioters 

decrease in violence within hours and the demonstration dies down, eventually 

resulting in a peaceful conclusion. Figure 16 provides a technique for controlling 

major road networks into and out of the demonstration area. This technique 

increases their effectiveness if the riot escalates. 

Figure 15. Isolate the Disturbance 
56 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Figure 16. Controlling Road Networks 

(2) Dominate the situation through force presence and control of information 

resources. Units demonstrate an overwhelming show of force at CPs, and 

dispatch attack helicopters and conduct overflights above demonstrations and 

massing civilian mobs. Using appropriate air assets gives commanders a bird'seye view of events on the ground. Overflights provide real-time situation reports, 

ensuring units know the "ground truth" at all times. This knowledge gives 

commanders a decisive advantage in negotiations with potentially hostile 

elements and tactical maneuvers. 

(a) Units dominate a civil disturbance using NLWs. It is important to consider 

force protection issues. Lethal munitions and an employment capability 

always accompany NLWs. One technique is for the M-203 grenadiers to carry 

sponge rounds (or similar nonlethal rounds) while other personnel carry the 

same equipment and ammunition used in combat. If aviation assets are 

available, attack helicopters provide a show of force. 

(b) The minimum required task organization for responding to a civil 

disturbance is an infantry rifle company, or like-sized unit; augmented with 

battalion scouts and snipers; a CA team; and a tactical MISO team. Position 

one platoon either to prevent collateral damage or to separate opposing 

factions. One platoon assists with the linkup of local police or the IPTF, and 

one platoon serves as a QRF. If aviation is available, it provides a bird's-eye 

view of vehicles entering and exiting the location of the civil disturbance. The 

rotor wash of a helicopter is an excellent nonlethal technique for effectively 

dispersing crowds. 

(c) Dominate a civil disturbance by detaining group leaders or instigators. An 

instigator is a person who "prods" others into committing disruptive acts or 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 57 

orchestrates the group’s actions. Often, an instigator carries a bullhorn or 

handheld radio. Forcibly snatching instigators from demonstrations or riots 

alleviates organized violence in a crowd. The nonlethal TTP developed for a 

unit conducting riot-control operations, is the positive identification of 

instigators, followed by sending in a "snatch-and-grab" team to remove them 

forcibly. Use nonlethal marking systems to identify the instigator for the 

snatch-and-grab team. 

(d) The size of the unit to conduct snatch-and-grab technique must be large 

enough to support and reinforce a four-man snatch and grab team. Before a 

platoon deploys to quell a riot, identify a four-person snatch-and-grab team, 

two persons to secure the individual and two for security. After identifying an 

instigator in a hostile crowd, the snatch-and-grab team deploys into the 

crowd, grabs the assailant, and returns behind the friendly picket line. Figure 

17 portrays this technique. 

(e) The four-person snatch-and-grab team must wear the Kevlar helmet with 

face shield and flak vest, but does not bring weapons or load-bearing 

equipment with them into the crowd. The four-person team only carries 

batons into the crowd. The snatch-and-grab team remains in contact with the 

adjacent PO forces on the line formation as they pass through. The formation 

remains ready to respond to any crowd actions that threaten the snatch-andgrab team. After the snatch-and-grab team has apprehended the riot 

instigator, it proceeds directly to a secure location out of the crowd's line of 

sight. 

Figure 17. Deploying a “Snatch-and-Grab” Team 
58 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(f) Employing MWD teams in conjunction with riot-control formations 

increases the crowd's apprehension about approaching or engaging the 

formation. Place the MWD teams behind the crowd-control formation, in plain 

sight of the crowd, and in front of the command element. The MWD teams 

work back and forth behind the formation as an intimidation measure. The 

presence of MWDs, coupled with the presence of personnel prepared to 

conduct civil disturbance operations, produces a profound psychological 

effect on the crowd. 

CAUTION 

MWD teams must depart the area before using riot control agents 

(RCAs). MWD teams must move a safe distance from the crowd 

ensuring the safety of the dogs. 

(g) Per Executive Order 11850, the President of the US must approve the 

use of RCAs in war. The US policy is to employ RCAs in limited 

circumstances during PO or armed conflict, but never as a method of warfare. 

Commanders are aware that using RCAs poses a risk of escalation or public 

panic and invites the erroneous perception of the military using chemical 

weapon. 

(h) Combat camera personnel are a crucial element for successful civil 

disturbance operations. They document events and provide accountability for 

personnel, factions, and gangs or groups. Control of the IE through the 

synchronized efforts of the PAO, staff judge advocate (SJA), MISO, and CA 

offices ensures presenting the right message. 

(3) Maintain awareness through timely, accurate, and complete multisource 

reporting. Commanders receive reports from a broad spectrum of sources. Unit 

CPs, air assets, and close liaison with international police and other civil monitors 

contribute to an accurate assessment of any situation. In addition, use of 

unmanned aerial vehicles, such as Predator and Pioneer, aids in the observation 

of large sectors of an AO. Analyze and relay reports to each unit in the operation. 

(4) Multidimensional or multiecheloned actions require the following 

considerations: 

(a) Policy and legal issues. 

(b) ROE. 

(c) Standards of conduct. 

(d) Crowd dynamics. 

(e) Communication skills for leaders who manage aggressive and violent 

behavior of individuals and crowds. 

(f) Use electronic warfare (EW) to monitor and control belligerent C2 and 

communications. 

(g) Tactics. 

(h) Lethal overwatch. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 59 

(i) Search and seizure techniques. 

(j) Apprehension and detention. 

(k) Neutralization of special threats. 

(l) Recovery team tactics. 

(m) Cordon operations isolating potential areas of disturbance. 

18. Curfews 

a. Commanders impose general curfews over a wide, but clearly defined, area (e.g., 

a city, district, or region) or restrict it to a small area (e.g., a town center, a housing 

estate, or a particular series of streets). Commanders work with HN civil authorities 

to establish and enforce curfews rather than imposing them unilaterally. Effective 

curfews require large numbers of police and troops. The size of the area and 

duration of the curfew is dependent on the situation. 

b. Commanders use curfews to accomplish the following: 

(1) Assist security forces in reestablishing control after rioting and serious 

disturbances, by restricting civil movement and allowing tempers to cool. 

(2) Prevent civil movement in a selected area while conducting a search or 

incident investigation. 

(3) Disrupt hostile groups by making movement of individuals difficult. 

(4) Allow security forces greater freedom of operation. 

CAUTION 

Do not impose a curfew for punitive reasons or use as an 

intimidation threat. The population usually obeys a curfew, but 

boredom, shortage of food, or the feeling that the curfew is unfair 

or ineffectively enforced can lead to curfew breaking and 

consequential incidents. Planning based on a good understanding 

of local conditions is essential. 

c. Guidance. 

(1) Clearly define the boundaries of the curfew. In towns where houses are close 

together and streets narrow, it is necessary to enlarge the area under curfew until 

forces achieve a clearly defined perimeter, or prohibit movement onto streets that 

make up the boundary. The integrity of the perimeter of the curfew area is 

essential for exercising full control. Civil authorities, in conjunction with security 

forces, decide on the size and location of curfew areas. 

(2) Prolonged curfews cause difficulties for innocent civilians. A study of the 

pattern of local conditions is helpful when determining effective and feasible 

timelines. Forces need to know: 

(a) The time inhabitants wake up, go to work, and return home. 

(b) The time shops open and close. 
60 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(c) The amount of time it takes to implement the curfew after making the 

public announcement. 

(3) Implementing curfews swiftly and with little advance warning disrupts the 

planning processes and operational cycle of hostile groups. Unpredictable 

curfews avoid undesirable street gatherings where agitators influence people to 

break curfew. OPSEC is essential when planning a curfew. 

(4) Example sequence of events for a curfew. 

(a) Civil authorities, in consultation with police and military commanders, 

decide to impose a curfew. 

(b) Make plans that include timing, area, boundaries, required troops, and 

administrative arrangements. 

(c) Avoid overt reconnaissance of the area. 

(d) Cordon parties, road and static patrols move rapidly into position. 

(e) Announce the curfew and control instructions by the appropriate means 

(e.g., press, radio, siren, and police announcements via a bullhorn). Forces 

use helicopters and light aircraft to make public announcements. 

(5) Civil administration and the police are responsible for issuing passes. 

Specific people, such as doctors, nurses, clergy, and workers in essential 

services, require freedom of movement. Civil authorities devise a pass system, 

well in advance of curfew implementation, that troops and civilians can easily 

understand. 

(6) Mobile patrols and static posts enforce the curfew. Once operational, reduce 

the number of static posts and maintain the curfew by mobile patrols. Forces use 

standing patrols on rooftops to watch for illegal movement between houses and 

help cover street patrols. 

(7) Surveillance devices assist in enforcing the curfew and reducing the number 

of static posts. 

(8) Imposing curfews strands some residents outside the area. Unit SOPs 

delineate a process for dealing with stranded individuals. 

(9) In coordination with HN civil authorities, clearly define the actions troops take 

against curfew breakers, e.g., detain, search, and hand them over to civil police. 

Record evidence of the offense as well as and the arrest. This ensures evidence 

is available for subsequent prosecution in court. 

(10) The police are responsible for the following: 

(a) Announcing the curfew to the public. 

(b) Issuing any curfew passes. 

(c) Detaining curfew breakers, including any arrested by PO forces. 

(d) Providing police patrols, in coordination with military forces in the 

operational area. 

(11) Civil authorities are responsible for devising measures to address 

administrative difficulties arising during an extended curfew period. The types of 

problems that arise are: 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 61 

(a) Lack of water in houses. 

(b) Shortage of food in shops. 

(c) Shortage of essential food in homes. 

(d) Essential food deliveries in areas with no shops. 

(e) Clearance of refuse from houses and streets. 

(f) Fuel supplies for lighting, cooking, and heating houses. 

(g) Treatment of the sick and maternity cases. 

(h) Care of animals. 

(i) Lack of indoor sanitation. 

(j) Homelessness. 

19. Demining and Unexploded Ordnance 

ATTP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12, MTTP for Unexploded 

Ordnance covers demining and UXO issues in more detail. 

20. Dislocated Civilian Operations 

a. The term DC refers to several categories of civilians, such as a DP, an evacuee, 

an IDP, a migrant, a refugee, a stateless person, a returnee, a resettled person, or a 

war victim. Legal and political considerations define these categories and each has 

specific rights under international humanitarian law. DCs removed from or departing 

their residence for reasons such as fear of persecution or to avoid the effects of 

armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural 

or man-made disasters, or economic privation. DC operations may occur across a 

ROMO, but are most prevalent during PO and FHA limited interventions and combat 

operations. Refer to JP 3-57 and JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 

b. The UN or other IGOs and NGOs build and administer DC camps and provide 

basic assistance and services to the affected population. However, when US military 

support is requested, DC support missions include security; camp organization 

(basic construction and administration); provision of care (food, supplies, medical 

treatment, and protection); and placement (movement or relocation to other 

countries, camps, and locations). An important priority for the management of DCs is 

using non-DOD services and facilities, if possible. DC operations are often long term 

and require resourcing that is not immediately available through DOD sources. 

c. Responsibilities. 

(1) DC. The UNHCR, whose mandate specifically charges the organization with 

responding to the needs of refugees, serves the interests of IDPs and other 

categories of DCs on a case-by-case basis. The UN Office for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs works to ensure the UN system protects and assists 

persons not covered by other UN mandates. This office coordinates the 

humanitarian response to emergencies, and advocates the interests of the 

internally displaced community. 

(2) Population Movement. 

(a) A fundamental point of population movement is that it does not occur 

without reason. Indicators highlight that individual rights are now, or in the 
62 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

near future, in jeopardy. They request the military provide intelligence support 

and assist in determining the direction and magnitude of these movements. 

(b) The stages of movement are preflight and flight, arrival, asylum, 

repatriation, and reintegration. 

• Preflight and Flight. Call on military forces to provide intelligence 

support used when determining the timing, magnitude, and direction of 

the population movement. 

• Arrival. Depending on timing and the security at the arrival location, call 

on the military to assist international organizations, NGOs, and the HN 

during the initial arrival of the refugees. 

• Asylum. Army forces provide asylum for DC camps and settlements in 

the host country while simultaneously assisting in the stabilization of DCs’ 

country of origin. 

• Repatriation. When conditions in the operational area improve, and the 

displaced community returns to its native country, they need military 

support for securing repatriation crossing points, screening points, transit 

sites, and returnee movement to local communities. 

• Reintegration. Reintegration is the final phase. During this phase, 

commanders require military forces to assist with the security of 

returnees, as they are absorbed into their local communities. This support 

is critical in the absence of a capable HN public safety establishment or 

the presence of active resistance to resettlement. International CIVPOL 

assumes primary responsibility for community law and order. 

(3) Resettlement Conditions. The UNHCR has established the following five 

conditions for resettlement: 

(a) Security. 

(b) Shelter. 

(c) Adequate local infrastructure. 

(d) Functioning institutions. 

(e) Economic potential. 

(4) Controlling Movement. Coordinate the following with UNHCR, NGO, or 

international governmental organization community. 

(a) Selection of Routes. CA personnel, in coordination with MP and the 

transportation officer, coordinate routes with the international support 

community. 

(b) Identification of Routes. After identifying the movement routes, CA 

personnel coordinate the marking of the routes with UNHCR and the HN. 

Mark them in languages and symbols the civilians, US forces, and allied 

forces understand. MISO units, HN military, and other allied military units help 

mark the routes, CA, the international support community, and HN authorities 

establish control and assembly points at selected key intersections. 

Coordinate with the provost marshal and movement control center for the 

locations of these points and inclusion in the traffic circulation plan. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 63 

(c) Emergency Rest Areas. UNHCR or ICRC establishes these points. CA 

personnel coordinate with them and determine if water, food, fuel, 

maintenance, and medical services are available. 

(d) Local and National Agencies. Use of local and national agencies is 

essential for three reasons. First, it conserves military resources. Second, 

civilian authorities with legal status are best equipped to handle their own 

people. Third, using local personnel reduces the need for interpreters or 

translators. 

21. Environmental Restoration 

Effective environmental stewardship programs emphasize compliance, restoration, 

prevention, and conservation. Units engaged in PO place particular emphasis on the 

task of environmental restoration. The combined efforts of engineer, CBRN, CA, and 

other specialized units are required to restore the environment to acceptable levels 

within the AO. 

22. Nonlethal Weapons 

a. NLWs are weapons, devices, or munitions explicitly designed and primarily 

employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, 

permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target 

location or surrounding environment. NLWs are not required nor expected to have a 

zero probability of producing fatalities or permanent injuries. NLWs significantly 

reduce the probability of fatalities or injuries as compared with traditional military 

weapons. NLWs add flexibility to all types of operations, and are especially useful in 

civil disturbances and PO because they limit the risk of unnecessary casualties and 

collateral damage. 

b. NLWs expand the number of options available to commanders confronting 

situations where the use of deadly force poses problems. They provide flexibility by 

allowing US forces to apply measured military force with reduced risk of serious 

civilian casualties, while still providing force protection and effect compliance. 

Commanders can respond to an evolving threat situation more rapidly by employing 

NLWs at a lower threshold of danger. This allows US forces to retain the initiative 

and reduce their own vulnerability. 

c. Planning considerations for employing NLWs: 

(1) Employment of any weapons capability into the operational environment has 

the potential to create intended and unintended consequences throughout the 

operational environment. Prior to employment, coordination at all planning levels 

occurs, ensuring the plan meets the desired objectives. 

(2) Recent conflicts have highlighted the importance of understanding the human 

environment. Operational planners and intelligence personnel achieve maximized 

effects and mitigate collateral effects on target personnel and materiel by 

participating in the process. 

(3) Space limitations and mission requirements affect distribution of larger 

nonlethal capability set (NLCS) NLWs. Some NLCS require large containers and 

dedicated vehicles for transport to the user. Due to the large size of the NLCS, 
64 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

each subordinate unit commander performs an analysis to decide which 

components of the NLCS are required for each mission. 

(4) According to lessons learned from exercises and operations, use of multiple 

types of nonlethal capabilities in a layered approach is more effective than 

employment of a single type of NLW in isolation. 

(5) Leaders set conditions for executing the escalation of force (EOF) TTP. They 

understand critical aspects of a successful EOF, such as early warning for people 

approaching a position; clear intent of what actions personnel take when 

approaching a position; and clear triggers for executing EOF TTP. These criteria 

lead to success in training, resourcing, establishing, and reinforcing standards 

increasing confidence in Service members executing EOF measures. For more 

information on EOF, see FM 3-39, Military Police Operations. 

(6) EOF TTP require continuous assessment and refinement, ensuring 

appropriate responses within the context of the threat and civil environment. Each 

EOF incident is unique and requires assessment. 

(7) NLW employment enables the tactical commander to use proportional force 

when facing an uncertain threat that is free from imminent danger. When 

planning for tactical engagements, leaders should determine the anticipated 

threat as well as what lethal and nonlethal capability mix is necessary for 

protection of the force. 

(8) Detailed and innovative planning, staff oversight, and proper troop-leading 

procedures extend EOF reaction time, allowing Service members to mitigate 

potentially volatile engagements. Lethal and nonlethal means of force are part of 

the mission planning. Achieve optimal results by weighing and adjusting follow-on 

effects and tactics during execution. Planning for the use of force protection 

equipment enhances security and is a proactive measure increasing reaction 

time during EOF situations. This requires analyzing the suitability of NLWs for 

operational environments and missions, ensuring proper training in these 

capabilities, rehearsing their employment, and maintaining adequate 

maintenance and inspection schedules. 

d. The Services are procuring NLCSs that are versatile packages comprised of 

commercial off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf equipment and munitions. In 

addition to addressing contingency requirements, the Services’ NLCS address 

training requirements by providing limited sustainment training ammunition and 

appropriate sustainment training equipment. Services divide NLCS components into 

four distinct categories: personnel protectors, personnel effectors, mission 

enhancers, and training devices. The following examples of NLCS are not allinclusive: 

(1) Personnel protectors include ballistic face shields and riot shields that protect 

the individual from blunt trauma injuries inflicted by thrown objects, clubs, etc. 

(2) Personnel effectors include riot batons, malodorants, stingball grenades, 

pepper sprays, and other kinetic rounds (e.g., sponge grenades) designed to 

discourage, disorient, or incapacitate individuals or groups. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 65 

(3) Mission enhancers include bullhorns, spotlights, and caltrops. These items 

facilitate target identification and crowd control, and limit personnel and vehicular 

movement. 

(4) Training devices include training suits, rounds, batons, and inert pepper 

sprays. They facilitate realistic hands-on scenario training in preparation for 

operations. 

e. The core capabilities associated with nonlethal effects fall into two major 

categories: counter personnel and counter materiel. 

(1) Counter personnel capabilities include: 

(a) Nonlethal counter personnel capabilities facilitate the application of 

military force with reduced risk of fatalities or serious injury with the desired 

effects being to move, deny, suppress, or disable individual noncombatants 

or, in some instances, among enemy forces. 

(b) PO forces require the capability to suppress or disable personnel without 

inflicting death or serious injury. This distracts, disorients, or degrades an 

individual’s ability to perform an unwanted action. Means to achieve these 

effects include optic, acoustic, blunt trauma, directed energy, irritants, and 

malodorants. 

(c) US forces require a nonlethal capability to deny personnel access to an 

area. This capability includes the use of physical barriers or systems that 

produce physical or mental discomfort to those who enter the denied area. 

Nonexplosive, nonlethal area denial technologies have none of the 

restrictions applied to conventional land mines. They provide new possibilities 

for barrier planning in any type of military operation. 

(d) The nonlethal tasks of denying access into or out of an area, moving 

individuals through an area, and suppression, or disabling of personnel by 

nonlethal means in conjunction with other TTP facilitate the seizure or 

apprehension of targeted individuals. 

(2) Counter materiel capabilities refer to the following: 

(a) The ability of PO forces to stop or disable vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft 

on the ground, divert aircraft in the air, and deny access by a vehicle or 

aircraft to a facility through designated entry points. 

(b) PO forces require the capability to stop or disable maritime vessels and 

deny access to facilities such as canal locks or pier slips. A combination of 

counter personnel and counter materiel nonlethal capabilities has the 

potential to facilitate visit, board, search, and seizure operations. 

23. Search Operations 

a. General. Security forces have the initiative in searches and decide when, where, 

and how to act. The purpose of search operations is to: 

(1) Protect potential targets. 

(2) Gain intelligence and information. 

(3) Deprive adversaries of resources. 

(4) Gain evidence for subsequent prosecution. 
66 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(5) Force adversaries to move illegal and contraband items, thereby increasing 

their risk of discovery. 

b. Joint Search Operations. Execute search operations in coordination with local 

police forces with the following objectives: 

(1) Capture wanted persons, arms, explosives, or other equipment. 

(2) Disrupt hostile activities (e.g., bomb making or weapon manufacture). 

(3) Eliminate influence of belligerent parties in a specific locality. 

c. Area Assessment. An area assessment is required before conducting search 

operations. Detailed procedures depend on the environment, benign or hostile, and 

the technical threat. The following factors require assessment: 

(1) Civil or military primacy. 

(2) Level of opposition to law and order. 

(3) Level of civilian support for opposition. 

(4) Level of technical expertise and degree of extremism of adversaries. 

(5) Access to arms and other combat-related materials. 

(6) Ability of civil authorities to handle crises. 

d. Considerations. Search operations require planning and liaison with other units. 

Tenets of a successful operation include: 

(1) Operation based on accurate intelligence. 

(2) Surprise based on good OPSEC. 

(3) Adequate numbers of search teams and equipment. 

(4) EOD team availability, if required. 

(5) Executed at the most opportune moment. 

(6) Availability of adequate cordon and protection troops. 

e. Search Pattern Planning Factors. Planning factors assume adversaries are 

observing and documenting every operation. Rigid search patterns violate OPSEC, 

place search teams at risk, and invite surprises for search teams. The recommended 

planning factors for a search operation are: 

(1) The Objective. Coordinate the search objective with other military operations 

during the same period. This consideration provides the guidelines of time and 

duration for the search. 

(2) OPSEC. Introduce commanders and staffs to the plan according to their need 

to know. 

(3) Deception Plan. A deception plan is paramount for achieving surprise or 

protecting sources. Planners may deem it necessary to conceal the true nature of 

the operation from the participants until initiation to minimize the chance of 

compromise. 

(4) Intelligence. Reliable intelligence is the basis for search operations. When 

unavailable, use other intelligence assessment tools. 

(5) Tasking. Clear direction describing the operational, legal, and political 

considerations is required before any searching commences. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 67 

(6) Training. The mission dictates the requirements for training and types of 

specialists. If training requirements are beyond unit resources, obtain advice and 

support from applicable subject matter experts. 

(7) Systematic Work Pattern. This applies to the planning and conduct of search 

operations. In order to avoid error or oversight, carefully and systematically 

approach executing search operations. 

(8) Thoroughness of Work. Search operations require a high degree of 

thoroughness before, during, and upon completion of any task. 

f. Search Sequence. When planning the sequence of a search, as depicted in figure 

18, consider the following: 

(1) Anticipate Hostile Action. The commander determines whether the search 

forces make themselves targets or antagonize the local populace. 

(2) Isolate the Target Area. Recommend the use of a cordon or other form of 

protection party. Do not allow any person in or out of a search area once the 

operation has started. 

(3) Coordinate Action. Coordinate all actions to ensure a systematic and 

integrated search operation. Coordination includes: 

(a) Interaction within a search team and between different teams. 

(b) Coordination between search teams, troops, and the local authorities. 

(4) Minimize Risks. A search is most dangerous upon or soon after arriving in the 

area. If adversaries are surprised, violent action may rapidly ensue. If civilians are 

involved, attempts to distract or delay the search may occur. Once establishing 

military control, risks occur if searches move out of sequence or a sudden “find” 

leads to neglecting procedures. Be aware that “find’s” acting as decoys are a way 

to divert attention from more valuable targets. 

(5) Maintain Records. Records are invaluable in the case of finds and providing 

evidence in subsequent prosecutions. Records provide information about the 

area and are useful for future operations. If a search uncovers evidence, record 

and preserve the evidence in compliance with established procedures. 
68 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Figure 18. Search Operations 

 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 69 

Chapter IV 

CONTROL OF LARGE AREAS 

1. Background 

a. PO are land operations that resolve conflicts or disputes between nations or 

factions within or across borders. PO involve controlling rural and urban expanses 

(or both) and are often quite large. Each has its own challenges. Cities and towns 

have larger, more diverse populations and are the focus of economic and political 

power. Rural areas have a more homogenous population with more entrenched 

cultural and social viewpoints. Adversaries and agitators hide and stir up trouble in 

both. 

b. Control of land areas involves varying intensities of operations and varies from a 

passive level, designed to curtail hostile activities so community life can continue, to 

a highly active level involving military forces moving against activists and their 

supporters. PO commanders at all levels, in concert with the international community 

and HN authorities, carefully consider the level of intensity when conducting 

operations, and continually adjust as necessary. 

c. Operating bases launch operations focused on establishing and expanding 

controlled areas, optimizing and balancing force protection, decreasing reaction 

time, and increasing situational awareness. In the early stages of PO, PO forces 

clear specific areas and shape the environment in a way favorable to peace. Local 

paramilitary forces eventually take over cleared areas. When possible, HN 

paramilitary forces, with their local knowledge, collaborate with US or international 

forces to carry out or assist with initial clearing operations. Although activists may 

penetrate controlled areas, their opportunities lessen as the civilian population 

transitions their support to the local government. As areas are cleared and secured, 

the need for forward operations bases declines and troops are available for other PO 

tasks and operations. 

2. Gaining Control of an Area 

a. General. In an area where hostile forces prevent the civil administration and local 

police from conducting their duties, mount specialized operations to reintroduce 

control. The following directly influences the planning and conduct of area control 

operations: 

(1) Strength and organization of the hostile activity. 

(2) Support given to hostile forces, whether this comes from outside the country 

or is internally self-supported, is dependent on efficient PO. 

(3) The nature of the countryside, its accessibility, and density of population. 

(4) The available forces. 

(5) The operating mandate. 

b. Concept of Operations. The aim of PO is creating stable conditions, respect for 

the rule of law where the civil administration functions without the backing of security 

forces, and the local community moves and lives freely. This requires a dual 

approach, with an overall objective of separating or marginalizing hostile elements 
70 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

from the population. The following tasks are complementary and require a careful 

assessment of priorities and allocation of resources; their combined purpose is to: 

(1) Neutralize hostile forces and make their influence ineffective. 

(2) Protect the population by denying or severely limiting free movement or 

access for hostile forces within the operational area. The area denial applies to 

their physical and their psychological presence. 

c. Attrition. Achieve area control by denying, marginalizing, and restricting the 

presence and influence of adversarial forces. Successful attrition requires constant 

close surveillance of suspected organizations, entities, or persons and those who 

support them. Surveillance plans are coordinated with relevant agencies and full use 

is made of the range of techniques and available equipment. 

d. Surveillance. Based on the information from surveillance operations, PO forces 

maintain constant pressure on adversarial or agitating forces by instituting specific 

search operations and using selective personnel checks, head checks, house 

searches, area searches, and screenings. Effective surveillance helps gather 

information on activists in order to track, neutralize, or prosecute them by law. 

e. Denying Free Movement to the Adversary. This task is important because it 

contributes to sealing off the activists from their bases of support, forcing them to 

take risks, and limiting their ability to take aggressive action. This task includes 

extensively using roadblocks and CPs; covering main lines of communications; 

border patrols; and implementing special measures to combat specific tactics, such 

as train and vehicle hijackings. 

f. Planning. The planning principles applied to area control operations are similar to 

those for other operations, but they must account for a greater dispersion of forces. 

Additionally, they consider: 

(1) Carefully planning and controlling all operations and making optimum use of 

resources, using the best information and intelligence gathered on hostile tactics 

and habits. 

(2) Mutual support is often difficult to achieve across large or dense expanses, 

and PO forces can easily become isolated. Therefore, commanders balance the 

requirements for applying sufficient strength for countering threats and navigating 

specific types of terrain, while maintaining adequate reserves at all times. 

(3) Commanders do not rule out the use of infantry support weapons, artillery, air 

power, and naval capabilities to support PO. The force commander provides 

ROE, and obtains approval from each contributing nation, for using these 

weapons in a PO situation. The tactical deployment and use of troops is similar to 

conventional warfare. For instance, artillery is required to support selective 

patrols, reinforce or protect OPs, and provide support for large-scale operations. 

g. Patrolling. Patrols do not ensure control of an area; they are an essential means 

for establishing and sustaining force presence, gathering information and 

intelligence, assessing progress, and detecting problems. 

h. Control Measures. 

(1) Control measures, such as CP or curfews, are implemented when necessary, 

to protect the people and enable effective governance. They are developed and 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 71 

coordinated with civil authorities and international partners before 

implementation, unless immediate harm is a result of their absence. Employ 

control measures to facilitate the following: 

(a) Conduct safe and controlled operations by security forces. 

(b) Separate sects or factions who incite violence. 

(c) Redress grievances. 

(d) Deter hostile activity, particularly subversion. 

(e) Encourage sharing information and providing other vital resources. 

(f) Allow “cooling-off” time for the populace after a riot or other disturbance. 

(2) Explain the reasons for imposing control measures to the affected population, 

but discontinue the measures if they fail to produce the desired results. Measures 

include: 

(a) Banning all political activities. 

(b) Registering civilians for elections and population census. 

(c) Inspecting identity cards, permits, and passes at irregular intervals. 

(d) Controlling or rationing food, crops, arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs, 

and medicines. 

(e) Restricting civilian movement. 

(f) Establishing curfews. 

i. Protected or Safe Areas. 

(1) The requirement for establishing and supervising a protected or safe area 

arises when a community is at risk from persistent attack. Ensure the population 

within the safe area is disarmed. Provide clear guidance for any force tasked with 

establishing and supervising a protected or safe area. Conduct efforts countering 

the accusations from adversaries or agitators, within and outside the safe area. 

After receiving guidance on the nature of the operation, resolve other tactical 

questions, such as how to protect the area and the nature of the threat. 

Answering these and other relevant questions guide’s decisions on the protecting 

force’s presence, profile, and posture. 

(2) Protected or safe areas contain residents, refugees, DCs, and one or more of 

the belligerent forces. PO forces establish and supervise areas and provide 

support and assistance to other organizations within the safe area. The first stage 

in a PO designed to protect or make an area safe is demilitarization of the area. 

This requires enforcement actions. Other specific military tasks include: 

(a) Establishing, monitoring, and enforcing weapon exclusion zones. 

(b) Establishing and maintaining cantonment areas and weapon holding 

areas. 

(c) Occupying the ground. 

(d) Dominating avenues of approach. 

(e) Conducting patrols and searches. 

(f) Manning CPs and other control measures. 
72 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(g) Developing reinforcement and extraction plans. 

3. Movement Control 

a. Roadblocks and CPs are a means of controlling movement on roads, tracks, and 

footpaths. Use a roadblock for blocking or closing a route to vehicle or pedestrian 

traffic. CPs have a limited and specific purpose and type, such as vehicle CPs, 

personnel CPs, etc. Roadblocks are set up for one or more of the following reasons: 

(1) Maintain a broad check on road movement increasing security and 

reassuring the local population. 

(2) Frustrate the movement of arms or explosives. 

(3) Assist the enforcement of movement control for people and material. 

(4) Gather information and related data on suspected persons, vehicles, and 

movement. 

b. Use the following criteria when choosing a roadblock or CP site: 

(1) Avoid bends of the road, brows of a hill, etc., this allows vehicles sufficient 

time to stop after seeing the roadblock or CP. 

(2) Place the roadblock or CP in an area with no turnoffs before the vehicle 

operators see it. 

(3) Establish cutoffs, where military members from the roadblock or CP can give 

early warning, allowing time to add extra blocking equipment if needed. 

(4) Allow for mutually supported patrols. 

(5) Conduct a thorough check of the area before use. 

4. Roadblocks 

a. Types of roadblocks listed below: 

(1) Deliberate. Permanent or semi-permanent roadblocks placed on a main road, 

near a border, on the outskirts of a city or on the edge of a controlled area. View 

deliberate roadblocks as a deterrent to movement. After the positions and 

activities of the roadblocks are in place for a period, they are less likely to 

produce information or contraband material. 

(2) Hasty. Impromptu roadblocks established for a specific purpose and limited 

time, are easy to set up and dismantle. Ground troops, already on patrol, or a 

rapid reaction force deployed by helicopter, deploy the roadblock. Two vehicles 

placed diagonally across and road with a search area in between is a simple 

roadblock. In a rural area, heliborne forces place hasty roadblocks, or forces 

improvise obstacles, such as narrow bridges or level crossing gates blocked with 

a single coil of barbed wire. 

(a) Triggered. This is a variation of the hasty roadblock, and is effective in 

defeating convoys or reconnaissance vehicles used by hostile groups. 

Allowing a suspected “scout car” to pass through the roadblock triggers the 

capture of the target vehicle. Units operating the roadblock occupy covered 

and concealed positions and wait for selected targets. They stop and search 

personnel out of sight of anyone approaching on the road. A covert protection 

force and helicopter-borne reaction force are required. Foot and vehicle 

insertion, from a carefully sited patrol base, are most common. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 73 

(b) Reactionary. This is a version of the hasty roadblock, but used in reaction 

to an incident or attack in another area. Ground- or helicopter-based, this 

roadblock is useful for interdicting hostile activity following the occurrence. 

b. Tactical guidelines for setting up a deliberate roadblock include: 

(1) Concealment. Locate the roadblock tactically where people cannot see it 

from more than a short distance away. Sharp bends or dips in the road provide 

good positions, but should meet the requirements of road safety. Leave no room 

for an approaching vehicle to turn, leave the road, or reverse direction. 

(2) Security. Assign enough troops to protect the roadblock, particularly during 

the initial occupation. Place sentries to act as backstops on both sides, well clear 

of the search area, to watch approaching traffic and prevent evasion. Whenever a 

threat of an attack on a roadblock is likely, the block must have a backup force. 

(3) Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device (IED). A roadblock is vulnerable 

to attack by a vehicle-borne IED. Counters to these devices include: 

(a) Stopping vehicles well short of the block. 

(b) Using rock ramps to shake up the vehicles. 

(c) Using means to puncture tires. 

(4) Roadblock Vulnerabilities. A roadblock is vulnerable to attack by IEDs, booby 

traps, and ambushes. 

(a) Check roadblock sites against booby-trapping and ambushes. 

(b) Avoid patterned use of roadblocks. 

(c) Be aware of possible snipers. 

c. Construction and Layout. A simple construction is two parallel lines, each with a 

gap across the road approximately 50 meters apart. Use the enclosure as a search 

and administrative area. The search area contains: 

(1) Separate male and female search areas. 

(2) Vehicle waiting area. 

(3) Vehicle search area. 

(4) Holding area for detaining persons waiting for transfer to the local authorities. 

(5) Roadblock HQ. 

(6) Administrative area. 

d. Manning. The number of troops depends upon the number of roads and expected 

volume of traffic. If searching women, forces must have female searchers and 

provide special accommodations. The CP commander possesses, where possible, 

the rank of sergeant or above. Maintain a HN police presence at a military 

roadblock, whenever possible, especially when military powers of search, arrest, or 

control of movement are limited. Interpreters are useful. A platoon-sized element 

operates a control point. At a minimum, operate the roadblock with the following: 

(1) Control Point Headquarters. Commander, signaler, and runner. 

(2) Barrier Sentries. One noncommissioned officer for each blocked road or lane 

of traffic, and one sentry for each barrier. 

(3) Covering Party. Two military personnel covering each set of barrier sentries. 
74 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(4) Assault Force. A designated unit is critical in the event an element breaks 

through a roadblock or CP. 

e. Overwatch. Where possible, operate an overwatch on a nearby rooftop. 

(1) Surveillance Devices. Early warning devices are valuable and give warning of 

approaching vehicles. Use of airborne surveillance assets assists in warning of 

approaching vehicles. 

(2) Search Equipment. Forces searching heavy vehicles or certain types of loads 

need additional special search equipment. 

(3) Communications. External communications are essential for providing 

revised instructions to searchers. Communications allow rapid report information 

about wanted persons and incidents at the roadblock. Internal communications 

within a large roadblock speed reaction time. 

f. Legal Issues. Troops operating roadblocks know their powers and duties under 

the law regarding search, arrest, and use of force. 

5. Checkpoints 

a. Principles. Routinely establish CPs to check and control traffic, and prevent 

movement of illegal items (e.g., weapons, drugs, or persons). 

b. Missions. Establish CPs pursuant to the following: 

(1) Monitoring actions. 

(2) Security actions. 

(3) Separation of forces. 

(4) Route opening and maintenance. 

(5) Presence or relief actions. 

c. Types. There are two types of CPs: 

(1) Static CPs. Static CPs are associated with fixed- or semi-fixed structures 

(e.g., guard shacks, barriers. etc.). When planning the location of a static CP, 

consider road network and traffic patterns in and out of the AO by one or more of 

the belligerent parties. 

(a) Position static CPs where walking and mounted traffic cannot bypass it. 

Narrow valleys, routes through marshy areas, embankments, dams, and 

bridges are well suited for a static CP. Craters, pits, 50-gallon drums, or 

barbed wire entanglements are examples of obstacles for channeling traffic 

towards a CP. Static CPs are established or positioned on or near the 

following: 

• Existing borders or frontiers (internationally recognized). 

• Cease fire lines. 

• Infiltration routes. 

• Towns and villages. 

• Vital ground. 

(b) Establish static CPs where unit personnel can observe and react to traffic 

in a timely fashion. Conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the area 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 75 

determining if a minor shift in the CP location is required. Unlike the traditional 

warfighting scenario, clearly mark CPs in a PO for easy recognition from both 

the ground and air. This practice also applies to OP, but it is important for 

CPs because belligerents frequently set up illegal CPs. 

(c) Interim Static Checkpoint. Establish an interim static CP as soon as 

possible. However, only construct semi-permanent or permanent facilities 

after the best CP location is determined. An example of an interim CP 

consists of a vehicle (tank or other armored vehicle with crew) and a couple of 

signposts. Do not confuse an interim CP with the mobile CP established if a 

sudden need arises for monitoring traffic in a particular area. 

(2) Mobile CPs. Mobile CPs are effective because belligerents do not know when 

and where PO forces establish them. Based on information received from OPs, 

other units, patrols, or the local populace, a mobile CP is established where 

suspected mandate or treaty violations occur. The unit has the capability of 

establishing a mobile CP on short notice (within 30 to 60 minutes). Locate the 

mobile CP where it creates complete surprise for the motorist, similar to a 

CIVPOL speed trap. It is important to clearly mark the CP. Place it where 

approaching traffic only sees it close to the CP. Locations immediately following a 

hairpin turn or other concealing terrain feature are ideal. Approaching traffic must 

have no chance of bypassing the CP. Move to a new location for a compromised 

mobile CP. 

d. Collocation. Collocation of CPs and OPs is an effective technique in PO. Terrain 

features or fields of observation that preclude the relocation of the OP to a CP site 

determine the location of an OP. Collocating the OP and CP is beneficial due to the 

synergistic effect of increased security for both. Organizing a combined OP and CP, 

instead of two separate posts, conserves forces, equipment, and facility 

considerations (e.g., communication equipment, generators, shelters, water tanks, 

showers, and latrine facilities). 

e. Manning. CPs operate on a 24-hour basis. Commanders may decide to operate 

the site by only day or night. When establishing a 24-hour CP with relief, use no less 

than four personnel, two on duty, and two resting (reserve). If positioning OPs near a 

CP, it is advisable for CP personnel to live on the OP and commute from there. This 

conserves resources. Heavily trafficked CPs require an increased number of 

personnel to properly carry out their duties and who are prepared to quickly deny 

passage to anyone trying to force their way through or bypass CPs. 

f. Procedures. The frequency of checks and CP locations are part of a cease-fire 

agreement. Alternating the CP type of search is important. Total and spot-check 

methods are effective, especially spot checks, because incoming traffic is unaware 

which procedure is being used. Categorize CP operations as individual personnel 

checks or vehicle checks. Further categorize operations by method of search. 

(1) Total check searches everyone passing through the CP. This form of 

checking is hard on resources (time and personnel) and is performed only when 

the CP is located on borders, frontiers, etc. (e.g., national frontiers or cease-fire 

lines). 
76 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(2) Spot checks refer to searching a certain number of persons or vehicles. The 

remainders pass freely, stop briefly for questioning, or show their identity cards. 

Over a period, spot checks prove effective in curtailing illegal movement of 

people or material in the AO. This method conserves resources compared with 

the total check method. 

(3) HHQ determines the criteria for individual and vehicle checks. Guidelines 

when determining the criteria include: 

(a) Type of persons and vehicles transiting a CP. 

(b) Required forms of identification. 

(c) Illegal items (e.g., weapons, ammunition, explosives, narcotics, etc.). 

g. Communication. Unit SOPs cover communication requirements and each CP 

possesses reliable communications with HHQ and adjacent units. Communication is 

important for a variety of reasons (e.g., advanced warning of vehicles attempting to 

force passage). 

h. Equipment. CP equipment type and amount of materiel depends on the mission 

and is listed in the unit SOPs. After establishing a CP, equipment requirements 

change based on the environment. Additional equipment includes: 

(1) Technical manuals for dismantling and stripping vehicles. 

(2) Lists or diagrams of hiding places in vehicles. 

(3) Tools, jacks, mirrors, etc., for vehicle checks. 

i. Organization. Organize a CP with the following: 

(1) Observation towers or platforms to monitor surroundings. 

(2) Speed-limiting capabilities (e.g., speed bumps, oil drums, and sign posting). 

(3) Barriers, gates, etc., to close or open CP. 

(4) Check areas. 

(5) Waiting areas. 

(6) Living quarters (rest, recuperation, cooking, showers, latrines). 

(7) Shelters. 

(8) Local defense positions. 

(9) Generators. 

(10) Signaling technologies such as ocular hail and warning devices and 

acoustic hailing devices. 

(11) POL stockpile. 

(12) A helicopter landing site. 

6. Controlling Urban Areas 

a. Adversarial Tactics. The adversary adopts a wide range of tactics in an urban 

area, including: 

(1) Disrupting industry and public services by planning strikes or directing 

sabotage. 

(2) Generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of 

security forces. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 77 

(3) Attacking resupply routes by damaging roads, bridges, rail links, or air bases. 

(4) Provoking military forces in the hope, they overreact and provide material for 

hostile propaganda. 

(5) Sniping at roadblocks, static posts, and sentries. 

(6) Attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars. 

(7) Planting explosive devices against specific targets, or indiscriminately 

causing confusion, destruction, and lowering public morale. 

(8) Ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters. 

(9) Attacking sympathetic members of the civilian population or employees. 

b. Need for Alertness. PO forces in an urban area are constantly alert to avoid 

exposing themselves as targets and protecting civilians. Sentries, observers in OPs, 

foot and mobile patrols, and administrative vehicles present attractive targets. 

Support military movement with available fire support. Make troops aware of 

dangers associated with discussing anything military in nature, including names, 

locations, or any type of movements, with casual civilian acquaintances. 

c. Basing. Two broad basing alternatives exist. The first is basing troops outside the 

urban area where they operate (or on its outskirts), or basing them within their 

operational area. Both have advantages and disadvantages and one is not 

necessarily better than the other. The situation and real word environment dictate 

which best supports the mission. The advantages and disadvantages of each are: 

(1) Bases outside the area. 

(a) Advantages. Commanders set up a secure base where off-duty forces 

relax, rest, and enjoy recreational facilities. Fewer sentries and fewer 

defenses protect the base. It is accessible to administrative transport, with the 

ability to resupply, repair, and maintain equipment on site. 

(b) Disadvantages. Reaction time to incidents within the urban center is 

longer and, therefore, commanders may have to keep reserves on short 

notice and possibly deploy them in anticipation of their need. If unable to 

return to base between patrols, etc., consider sending some administrative 

transport forward into the operational area, which will require an escort and 

possibly provides a target. The roundtrip travel time to the base decreases 

the time available for rest and personal administration. 

(2) Bases in the area. 

(a) Advantages. Commanders rapidly deploy reserves in response to events, 

reducing the need for a QRF, on relatively short notice. Troops gain familiarity 

with the area and improve their knowledge of the local population, detailed 

geography, and habits of adversary groups. 

(b) Disadvantages. PO forces face constant exposure to attack. Local 

protection requires more forces. Administrative traffic requires an escort and 

puts a strain on PO forces. 

d. Additional Basing Considerations (urban and rural operations). Mount operations 

from a base that meets as many of these factors as possible, and as appropriate to 

the situation and mission: 
78 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(1) Collocated with local civil administration, or nearby. 

(2) Accessible by land over easily secured routes. 

(3) Provides a helicopter landing point if a suitable airstrip is unavailable. 

(4) Easily defensible with the minimum of force, surrounded by natural obstacles. 

(5) Large enough to accommodate the necessary logistic and transport support, 

but small enough to defend. 

(6) Provides physical protection commensurate with the prevailing threat. 

e. Inter Unit Boundaries. Assign units and subunits to an operational area. Clearly 

define boundaries between areas. When a boundary runs down a street, assign only 

one unit responsibility for the street. Boundaries of local or United Nations police 

(UNPOL) districts are an important consideration when establishing unit boundaries. 

If possible, these boundaries should align. 

f. Tactics. Plan, rehearse, and implement the following tactics: 

(1) Guarding bases and installations. 

(2) Creating roadblocks and CPs. 

(3) Establishing control points. 

(4) Enforcing curfews. 

(5) Initiating search operations. 

(6) Employing crowd dispersal and riot control. 

(7) Conducting basic aspects of surveillance. 

g. Snipers. Devise and rehearse immediate action drills for responding to a patrol 

coming under sniper fire. This is a difficult situation, because the sniper is hidden. 

Depending on the situation, it may be appropriate to improve force protection 

procedures and prevent this from occurring or mount a quick cordon and search 

operation of known potential sniper locations. In certain circumstances, deploy 

friendly snipers to provide quick response and counterfire to adversarial snipers. 

h. Control of Movement. Banning vehicle movement and parking in shopping and 

other public amenity areas is necessary to limit places where activists employ 

explosives to terrorize and disrupt the public. It is also necessary to require a search 

of all pedestrians entering these areas. While these efforts control movement and 

help to canalize hostile activity, it is labor intensive and increases public resentment 

because it limits their freedom of movement. It also limits the PO force’s freedom of 

movement. 

i. Night Operations. Conduct night patrols on foot when possible because vehicle 

movement is obvious on quiet streets. Many built up areas are noisy and busy at 

night and mobile support is a vital backup to foot patrol activity. Street lighting is an 

advantage but it makes unobtrusive patrolling difficult. 

j. Helicopters. Helicopters hover to see into narrow streets and enclosed areas, 

making them vulnerable to missiles and sniper fire. However, these and other fixedwing assets are useful for observing crowds as they form and move. They act as 

airborne command posts, rebroadcast stations, resupply and reinforce standing 

rooftop patrols, and evacuate casualties. When possible, install surveillance devices 

such as optical and terminal image sights, video cameras, and night vision goggles 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 79 

on helicopters. The prolonged use of helicopters over localized areas, particularly at 

night, results in protests from the population. See ATP 3-06.1/MCRP 3-35.3A/NTTP 

3-01.04/AFTTP 3-2.29 MTTP for Aviation Urban Operations. 

7. Controlling Underground Areas 

a. Operations Below Ground. Movement below ground is feasible in main towns and 

cities, and is possible in smaller urban and suburban areas. Underground passages 

provide additional approaches and escape routes, which commanders take into 

account when planning installation defense. Most underground tunnels have a 

circular cross section. If they carry any sort of roadway or rails, there is flat decking 

with a space beneath it. This space is big enough for movement, and provides hiding 

places for people and equipment. Tunnels have access points, usually at both ends 

and at intervals throughout, allowing fresh air to circulate. Access points or fresh 

airshafts may, be sealed up in disused tunnels. There is danger from accumulated 

gases and foul air in any tunnel. Provide PO forces working in the area with 

breathing apparatus. 

b. Types of Subterranean Systems. Underground systems include the following: 

(1) Sewers. These are the most common underground systems and exist in 

every large urban area. They are as much as 6 meters in diameter and have 

frequent access points. Some incorporate roadways, enabling speedy movement 

by large parties. 

(2) Railway Tunnels. Most underground railways are in large cities or under high 

ground in the country. Passage of trains and the presence of maintenance crews 

make such tunnels hazardous to anyone attempting to pass through them. 

(3) Pipeline Subways. Tunnels designed to carry gas, water, and electricity are 

normally too small to admit the passage of a person. They have frequent access 

points and are up to 4 feet in diameter, allowing the opportunity to hide weapons 

and other supplies. 

(4) Cellars and Connection Passages. Cellars are common in urban areas. 

Constructing connection doors and passages makes an extensive underground 

system. This requires the cooperation or coercion of the owners. 

(5) Mineral Mining Operations. Coal or other mineral mining operations are 

common and occur anywhere. Access depends on the type of mining operation 

and how the shafts are connected. 

(6) Subterranean Rivers. Any large town built in a valley has streams and small 

rivers within its boundaries. If enclosed to carry off storm water or similar 

purposes, they have frequent access points. 

(7) Road Tunnels. Road tunnels are open to the public; they do not offer a 

covered approach for clandestine movement. Surprise attacks occur in road 

tunnels below key or vulnerable points. 

(8) Natural Caves and Catacombs. In some areas, there are extensive 

handmade and natural caves under towns and villages. 

c. Intelligence. The surveyors or public works departments of the local government 

possess maps of underground systems, including accessibility details. The officials 

responsible for the services using the tunnels, and for their maintenance, provides 
80 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

valuable information on physical characteristics such as, fresh air supplies, volume, 

rate, time of flow (if an underground waterway), and useful control and blocking 

points. Supplement the information gained from civil sources with reconnaissance. 

Check if other individuals or groups have accessed the underground systems. 

d. Denial of Access. Deny adversarial access either by sealing entry points or 

making the system unusable. The methods vary based on the type of underground 

tunneling and success depends on the ability of military forces to maintain 

observation. Some methods include: 

(1) Spot welding access points where only occasional access is required. 

(2) Installing remote sensors or intruder alarms. These need maintenance and 

communications, and employees using the tunnel system know of their existence. 

(3) Sealing off parts of the system by erecting internal barriers. Forces have to 

weld these into place. 

(4) Flushing out the system with crowd suppressor smoke at low concentration 

or by flooding with water (ROE dependent). Forces permanently neutralize parts 

of a tunnel system using this method. 

e. Patrolling Underground Passages. This is necessary in any system (e.g., sewers 

or an underground railway), which forces cannot seal. It has the dual advantage of 

discouraging unauthorized use and enabling security forces to become familiar with 

the tunnel system. 

f. Clearance Operations. If hostile groups use an underground system in spite of the 

precautions listed above, forces have to mount operations to clear the tunnels. The 

main points to note are: 

(1) Locating Unauthorized Users. Comprehensive maps are essential. If there 

are no indications of where to look for unauthorized users, then systematically 

search the tunnel systems. Guard each section after clearing. Coordinated 

surface patrolling supports subterranean patrols. 

(2) Flushing Out. Selectively use water or crowd suppressor smoke at low 

concentration, in different parts of a tunnel system to force escapees into the 

open rather than into other tunnels (ROE dependent). Exercise strict control over 

the use of riot control agents in confined spaces. 

(3) Siege. If possible, block all escape routes and wait for cold and hunger to 

take effect. 

(4) Physical Assault. Apply ordinary tactical principles in a cramped and unusual 

environment. 

g. C2. C2 is difficult to maintain underground. The following points and suggested 

solutions are below: 

(1) Communications. Radio does not work well and communication requires 

laying communication lines. Maintain good communication between troops 

working underground and those on the surface. 

(2) Orientation. It is easy to lose all sense of direction when underground. 

Supplement good maps with gyrocompasses and overt signposting. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 81 

(3) Combat Identification. Good communication and strict control of badges, 

insignia, or special items of clothing helps avoid clashes between different parties 

in the security forces. 

8. Controlling Rural Areas 

a. Rural Operations Characteristics. The characteristics of rural operations are 

below: 

(1) The adversary relies on force of arms, stealth, or field craft for protection. 

(2) Forces find it difficult to distinguish between neutral and hostile members of 

the population. After identifying hostile groups who commit an aggressive act, 

forces engage them with less chance of involving innocent people. 

(3) The relatively open nature of the countryside provides more scope for mobile 

operations and the use, where justified, of heavier weapons and aviation. 

(4) Rural communities are often small, isolated, more vulnerable to local 

intimidation, and difficult to protect. This makes it easier to impose hostile control 

over a scattered rural community than over a neighboring town. In areas where 

the authority of elected government is not recognized, hostile groups operate with 

relative freedom because local people live in fear of intimidation and reprisal. The 

following are two broad types of rural operations: 

(a) Control by the authorities still exists, and PO forces use relatively minor 

operations to control, if not eliminate, the threat of hostile activity. 

(b) Authority of officials and freedom of movement is absent. Control of an 

area lies in hostile hands. This requires a wider scale of operation with the 

need for measures falling just short of those employed in full-scale military 

operations. 

b. Local Defense. Give the responsibility for local defense to a subunit because the 

commander concentrates on operations throughout the operational area. 

c. Intelligence. Close-knit rural communities are difficult to penetrate, making 

intelligence gathering difficult in the early stages of operations. Setting up a base on 

the edge of an already controlled area is helpful because information on the 

operational area initially comes from sources within the controlled area. When 

operations start achieving success, information becomes more plentiful, and 

measures are implemented providing means for people to get in touch with security 

forces without undue risk. 

 
82 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

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1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 83 

Chapter V 

FORCE PROTECTION 

1. Background 

Force protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of a force, providing a 

commander maximum force at decisive times and places. The political dynamics of PO 

place enormous pressure on commanders to avoid casualties. Commanders have the 

inherent responsibility of protecting the force, but must recognize and account for risks. 

Commanders accomplish the mission while minimizing loss of life. Preparing for worstcase scenarios helps commanders attain these goals. 

2. Definition 

a. JP 3-0 defines force protection as, “Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile 

actions against DOD personnel (including family members), resources, facilities, and 

critical information.” 

b. Force protection in PO consists of actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile 

actions against PO forces, resources, and facilities. Adversaries seek to frustrate 

military operations by resorting to asymmetric means, weapons, or tactics because 

they are unable to challenge US forces in conventional combat. Force protection 

develops remedies to counter these threats. 

c. Force protection at all levels minimizes losses due to hostile action. Aggressive 

counterintelligence activities, comprehensive threat assessments, and appropriate 

follow-on actions decrease the vulnerability of friendly forces. Effective OPSEC 

keeps adversaries from exploiting friendly information. Proper dispersion and 

standoff reduce losses from belligerent action. Camouflage discipline, local security, 

and field fortifications do the same. At the operational level, rear area and base 

security contributes to force protection. 

d. Field Discipline. Commanders ensure combat operational stress control 

measures are in place and practiced by unit leaders. Field discipline protects 

personnel from the physical and psychological effects of the environment. 

Oppressive environments sap troop strength and morale more quickly than enemy 

action. Commanders take every measure and precaution to keep their forces healthy 

and maintain their morale. Actions include securing equipment and supplies from 

loss or damage. Commanders ensure systems are in place for adequate health 

support (include preventive medicine) and quick return to duty of minor casualties. 

They provide effective systems for maintenance, evacuation, and rapid replacement 

or repair of equipment. 

e. Safety. Operational conditions impose significant risk to the lives and health of 

military members and make equipment operation difficult. Trained crews and 

operators know the capabilities, limitations, and best employment of their weapons 

systems. When designing operations, commanders consider the limits of human 

endurance, and balance the benefits of sustained, high-tempo operations against 

the risks. 

f. Fratricide Avoidance. The destructive power and range of modern weapons 

increases the chance of fratricide. Leaders are responsible for positive weapons 
84 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

control and controlled troop movements. Adherence to well-conceived ROE and 

disciplined operational procedures contributes to avoiding fratricide and its 

detrimental psychological after-effects. 

3. Threat Assessment 

a. Conduct a Threat Assessment. The first step in developing a force protection 

program is identifying and characterizing potential threats to the force. 

Understanding the threat enables US personnel to assess their vulnerability to attack 

and develop effective protective and response measures. US forces follow basic 

security planning steps and principles when planning force protection. These steps 

and principles apply whether planning at the individual, team or unit level. They also 

apply to teams conducting mobile operations or operating from a fixed site. The 

focus is on all threats the force may encounter. 

b. Conduct a Vulnerability Assessment. A vulnerability assessment addresses the 

susceptibility of the force to threats identified during the threat assessment. This 

essential step helps the identification and prioritization of the resources required for 

defeating the threat. The assessment provides a basis for determining antiterrorism 

measures that protect personnel and assets from attacks. The vulnerability 

assessment applies to fixed sites and mobile operations. It is an ongoing process 

that includes all three dimensions: OPSEC, PHYSEC, and PERSEC. 

(1) OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and analyzing friendly 

actions attendant to military operations and other activities; identifying actions 

that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. 

(2) PHYSEC is the part of security concerned with physical measures designed 

to safeguard personnel; prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, 

material, and documents; and safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, 

damage, and theft. 

(3) PERSEC is the application of standards and criteria determining whether an 

individual is eligible for access to classified information, qualified for assignment 

to or retention in sensitive duties, and suitable for acceptance and retention in US 

forces consistent with national security interests. 

c. Determine Appropriate Countermeasures. Countermeasures are measures taken 

by a unit or individual countering a specific threat at a specific time and place. 

Countermeasures take many forms. They include specialized procedures, personal 

equipment, unit or team equipment, facilities, and training. They may require 

reorganization of land use; reorientation of roadways, security improvements to 

installation entries and existing structures and the surrounding site area; and 

coordination with HN military and CIVPOL. They also require the creation of 

specialized elements that are task organized to mitigate threats, respond to threats, 

and recover from the aftermath of threats. Some threats require the identification of 

multiple scenarios or alternatives for achieving the desired goal. Alternatives 

undergo a suitability analysis that accounts for factors limiting the feasibility of an 

action or project. Limiting factors consist of physical, resources, and political 

constraints such as land area restrictions, limited availability of construction 

materials, and HN or civilian sensitivities. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 85 

d. Implement Countermeasures. Implement countermeasures as soon as possible 

after identifying a threat. Incorporate the least costly and most effective protection 

measures during the planning phase. Implementing appropriate force protection 

measures at the planning stage precludes the need for piecemeal and costly 

security enhancements later in the mission. 

e. Evaluate Effectiveness of the Countermeasures. Over time, threats change as 

situations change. Countermeasures effective yesterday may no longer be effective 

today. 

4. Threat Countermeasures 

a. When the threat of terrorism exists, commanders implement and enforce 

measures according to the force protection condition (FPCON) procedures outlined 

in JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, and Department of Defense Instruction O-2000.12, DOD

Antiterrorism (AT) Program. 

b. FPCON NORMAL exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists 

but warrants only a routine security posture. 

c. FPCON ALPHA applies when there is an increased general threat of possible 

terrorist activity against personnel or facilities, the nature and extent of which are 

unpredictable. ALPHA measures must be capable of indefinite sustainment. 

d. FPCON BRAVO applies when an increased or more predictable threat of terrorist 

activity exists. Sustaining BRAVO measures for a prolonged period may affect 

operational capability and relations with local authorities. 

e. FPCON CHARLIE applies when an incident occurs or intelligence indicates likely 

terrorist action or targeting against personnel and facilities. Prolonged 

implementation of CHARLIE measures may create hardship and affect the activities 

of the unit and its personnel. 

f. FPCON DELTA applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has 

occurred or when receiving intelligence that terrorist action against a specific 

location or person is imminent. Declare FPCON DELTA as a localized condition and 

for shorter periods. 

5. Terrorist Tactics 

a. When considering terrorists or other human threats, threat identification focuses 

on three components: person, weapons, and tactics. 

(1) Person. Terrorists generally perform hostile acts against people, facilities, 

and equipment. Their objectives include: 

(a) Inflicting injury or death on people. 

(b) Destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources. 

(c) Stealing equipment, material, or information. 

(d) Creating publicity for their cause. 

(2) Weapons. Terrorists use various tools, weapons, and explosives when 

achieving their objectives. Examples are listed below: 

(a) Forced entry, vehicles, and surveillance methods. 

(b) Weapons, such as incendiary devices, small arms, antitank weapons, 

man-portable air defense systems, and mortars. 
86 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(c) Explosives, such as homemade bombs, hand grenades, and IEDs. 

(d) Weapons of mass destruction. 

(3) Tactics. Tactics refer to the offensive techniques employed by adversaries, 

reflecting their capabilities and objectives. Some of the common tactics include: 

(a) Place IEDs in an improvised manner, which incorporate destructive, 

lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals, and are designed to 

destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. They are emplaced, person-borne, 

vehicle-borne, bicycle-borne, or applied via other unexpected means. 

(b) Detonate stationary IEDs by time delay or remote control. 

(c) Execute follow-on IED and deception attacks designed to target first 

responder and recovery forces. 

(d) Conduct exterior attacks at close range to a facility or exposed asset 

using clubs, rocks, improvised incendiary devices, hand grenades, or handplaced bombs, to inflict destruction and death. 

(e) Execute standoff weapon attacks using military or improvised direct- and 

indirect-fire weapons, such as antitank weapons and mortars. 

(f) Attempt covert entry by entering the facility using false credentials. The 

adversary may carry weapons or explosives into the site or facility or remove 

items or information from the site. 

(g) Deliver small bombs or incendiary devices incorporated into envelopes or 

packages disguised as mail and delivered to the targeted individual or facility. 

(h) Deliver bombs or incendiary devices, larger than mail bombs, 

incorporated into various containers, and delivered to facilities or installations. 

(i) Contaminate the air supply of a facility or installation using chemical or 

biological agents, or radiological particles. 

(j) Contaminate the water supply of a facility or installation using chemical, 

biological, or radiological agents. 

6. IO and Force Protection 

a. Commander use IO to support force protection by assessing the IE and 

determining the most effective application and integration of information-related 

capabilities, including operations security, to deny adversaries critical information 

and observable indicators. 

b. Examples of ways IO enhances force protection include: 

(1) Using MISO and PA to emphasize the legitimacy of the PO force’s mission 

and presence in the AO. 

(2) Minimizing casualties through the dissemination of checkpoint or other 

procedures involving EOF and applying lethal action. 

(3) Using MISO and PA to explain undertaking specific programs, activities, and 

events. 

(4) Employing OPSEC to ensure protection of critical information, while 

simultaneously promoting transparency. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 87 

(5) Using tactical transmitters or radios-in-a-box to disseminate information 

rapidly promoting overall safety and security or reporting on malign actors or 

influencers who threaten safety and security. 

(6) Employing EW systems to protect personnel and equipment from IEDs. 

(7) Establishing and enforcing unit requirements for local security (using 

biometrics for access control). 

7. Intelligence 

a. Each Service maintains its own terrorist threat analysis capability. Differences in 

perspective among Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Services, or combatant 

commanders’ threat analysis lead to divergent conclusions about specific terrorist 

threats. While the threat to all DOD assets in a country may be at one level, a local 

commander may decide PO forces face no threat in other locations. 

b. Unit commanders rely on local intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to 

provide warnings and indicators about specific and general threats to the 

installations, resources, and personnel. The DIA identifies threats and sets watch 

conditions outside the continental US for DOD installations and provides 

recommendations to combatant commanders for force protection levels. The 

information, coupled with the vulnerability assessment discussed in the following 

section, influences decisions on the application of force protection measures. 

8. Medical Role in Force Protection 

a. Medical Response and Consequence Management Program. Medical personnel 

play an active role in force protection. Commanders integrate the medical response 

and consequence management program into the force protection plan. 

b. Preventive Medicine Measures. Commanders ensure preventive medicine 

measures are undertaken as necessary (e.g., protection from and education on 

insects or rodents which carry diseases; weather-related injuries from heat, cold, 

wind, or humidity; unsafe or contaminated food or water; importance of good 

personnel hygiene) and include these threats in their force protection plan. 

c. Combat and Operational Stress Control. Part of the commander's overall force 

protection program. PO result in extended periods of boredom and inactivity for 

peacekeepers. In addition, PO forces exposed to atrocities and the aftermath of 

mass devastation places the force at higher risk for combat stress injuries. 

Commanders should include stress inoculation training specific to the mission, 

combat and operational stress awareness and resilience building training, emphasis 

and minimizing exposure to tragic events where possible. 

9. Force Protection Checklist 

Use the force protection checklist (Table 4) during PO when not all parties in conflict 

have consented to the imposition of a PK force. The belligerents have military and 

paramilitary organizations capable of employing implements of war including highperformance aircraft and CBRN weapons, requiring PO forces to take necessary force 

protection precautions. Compare the checklist with published ROE and the status of 

forces agreement for any limitations and constraints. 
88 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Table 4. Force Protection Checklist 

TASK STANDARDS: 

1. Unit conducts risk assessment to manage risks. 

2. Unit defines threats, determines attack probability, identifies vulnerabilities, and develops effective 

countermeasures. 

3. Unit develops, disseminates, and updates force protection policy to mitigate threats. 

4. Unit leaders recognize force protection as the most important element of the peacekeeping mission. 

5. Unit adheres to rules of engagement (ROE). 

6. Unit conducts information operations (IO) to ensure understanding and acceptance of and support for protection 

efforts, measures, and outcomes, and mitigate unintended consequences.

SECONDARY STANDARDS GO NO GO

1. Unit develops a force protection policy that balances— 

a. Attack probability. 

b. Cost of adequate protection. 

c. Cost of inadequate protection. 2. Unit concentrations, compounds, sites, and facilities evaluated. Evaluations 

include— 

a. Protection against vehicle-delivered explosives. 

b. Protection against exterior attack. 

c. Protection from standoff weapons attack. 

d. Protection from covert entry or insider compromise attack. 

e. Electronic and acoustical eavesdropping denial. 

f. Visual surveillance denial. 

g. Prevention of mail- or supply-truck-delivered explosives. 

3. Unit develops plans to react to demands to search vehicles. 4. Unit OPSEC measures (active and passive) are consistent with higher headquarters 

policy. 

5. Unit establishes and sustains a situational awareness program (e.g., mine awareness, 

regional political, military, and contingency force posture. 

6. Unit establishes and enforces requirements for local security. 7. Unit ensures guards are prepared to perform their duties.

All guard posts have special instructions for that specific post. It may include special ROE 

instructions.

 

8. Unit develops and enforces safety guidelines. It includes high-risk countermeasures for the 

following— 

a. Weapons handling and clearing procedures. 

b. Use of stoves, fuels, and combustibles in personnel areas. 

c. Driving. 

d. Weather extremes. 

9. Unit considers weapon effects and fratricide reduction measures in base defense planning. 

10. Unit provides adequate field hygiene and sanitation resources. 11. Commander determines arming posture for personnel executing their duties and when in the 

compound. 

a. Secure arms when not in possession of peacekeepers to prevent theft. (1) Weighs effect of centralized security (arms room) versus decentralized (squad hut 

weapon rack) on defense reaction time. 

(2) Considers peacekeeper sense of vulnerability. 

b. Unit develops procedures for ammunition storage and authority for issue. 

12. Commander designates and assigns security and safety duties to specific individuals. 13. Unit develops an IO synchronization matrix to ensure effective integration of informationrelated capabilities. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 89 

Chapter VI 

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS 

1. Background 

a. Within PO, CMO foster a cooperative relationship between military forces, civilian 

organizations participating in the operation, governments, and populations in the 

operational area (see JP 3-57). Tactical-level CMO include support of stakeholders 

at local levels, and promoting the legitimacy and effectiveness of US presence and 

operations among locals, while minimizing friction between military and civilian 

organizations in the field. These operations include local security operations, 

processing, and movement of DCs, project management and nomination, civil 

reconnaissance, and basic health service support. 

b. Properly executed CMO provide an environment that enables military 

commanders at all levels of command to achieve unified diplomatic, information, 

military, and economic objectives of PO. CMO supported by civil affairs operations 

(CAO), are an information-related capability when integrating with other informationrelated capabilities, and provides the commander the ability to affect the operational 

environment, as depicted in figure 19. 

Figure 19. Civil-Military Operations Relationships 

c. Unity of effort is a central feature of CMO and enhances the credibility of the PO 

force, promotes consent and legitimacy, and encourages the parties in the conflict to 

work toward a peaceful settlement, thereby facilitating the transition to civil control. 

Unity of effort involves the coordination, integration, and synchronization of civil and 

military efforts and actions aimed at building the peace. At the tactical level, timely 
90 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

and effective coordination with all relevant stakeholders is essential for mission 

success. Establishment of committees and action groups, supports coordination and 

robust liaison with agencies and organizations involved in the operational area, and 

builds respect for their roles and missions. Commanders assist in the coordination of 

activities by creating a civil-military operations center (CMOC), or a NATO civilmilitary cooperation center that is a potent resource for tactical level commanders to 

effect coordination and ensure unity of effort. 

d. CMO serve the larger purpose of shaping the operational and information 

environments and achieving the commander’s intent and desired end state. 

e. A complete discussion of CMO and related functions is in JP 3-57. Commanders 

and staffs use the CA area assessment and study contained in FM 3-57, Civil Affairs 

Operations, as the basis for all planning analysis and mission execution. 

2. Objectives of CMO 

a. CMO activities establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military 

forces, governmental and civilian organizations, authorities, and the civilian populace 

in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area facilitating military operations and 

achieving operational US objectives. Military forces perform CMO activities and 

functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. 

These activities occur prior to, during, or after other military actions. They also occur, 

if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Designated CA units, other 

military forces, or a combination of CA and other forces, perform CMO. 

b. CMO integrates civil and military actions while conducting: 

(1) Support to Civil Administration (SCA). SCA helps stabilize management by a 

governing body of a foreign nation’s civil structure by assisting an established 

government or establishing military authority over an occupied population. SCA 

consists of planning, coordinating, advising, and assisting with activities that 

reinforce or restore a civil administration, which supports PO objectives. An 

example of tactical level SCA is providing security to local civil authorities or 

infrastructures until they have the capacity to fulfill their duties or functions and 

speed the peace restoration process. 

(2) Populace and Resources Control (PRC). PRC assists HN governments or de 

facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, mitigating 

problems that hinder PO mission accomplishment. PRC measures identify, 

reduce, relocate, or access population resources that impede or otherwise 

threaten peace or its restoration. PRC measures are the responsibility of HN 

governments; however, a joint force may implement them, as necessary, when 

HN civil authorities or agencies are either unable or unwilling to undertake this 

responsibility: 

(a) Populace control provides for security of the populace, mobilization of 

human resources, denial of personnel availability to the adversary, and 

detection and reduced effectiveness of enemy or agitating agents. Populace 

control measures—many executed at the tactical level—include curfews, 

movement restrictions, travel permits, identification and registration cards, 

and voluntary resettlement. DC operations involving populace control require 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 91 

extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary 

organizations. 

(b) Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of materiel 

resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy or 

adversary. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or 

guidelines, checkpoints (e.g., roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, 

and inspecting facilities. Implement most of these controls at the tactical level. 

(3) FHA. FHA operations are DOD activities, in support of the USAID or DOS, 

conducted outside the US, its territories, and possessions, to relieve or reduce 

human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA provided by US forces is 

limited in scope and duration. The primary planning consideration is available 

funding from the primary USG agency. The foreign assistance supplements or 

complements the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that have primary 

responsibility for providing FHA. 

(a) FHA operations are inherently complex operations and require a 

significant amount of interagency coordination. Unity of effort facilitates 

coordination through entities such as the CMOC, HA coordination centers, 

and humanitarian operations centers. 

(b) The USAID is the lead federal agency for coordinating FHA. Within 

USAID, the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the lead 

office in the USG for facilitating and coordinating USG emergency assistance 

overseas. The OFDA formulates US foreign disaster assistance policy in 

coordination with other government agencies. JP 3-29 covers command, 

control, and coordination of FHA in more detail. 

(4) General Procedures. The following are general procedures for assessing and 

executing FHA tasks: 

(a) Understand the command’s overall objectives and the end state for the 

political military operation. 

(b) Understand the legal and fiscal restrictions. 

(c) Determine and establish contact with local authorities and NGO(s) in the 

region. 

(d) Establish coordination and communication processes for synchronizing 

the relief effort. For instance, CMO operations as part of PO is required to 

coordinate and synchronize efforts through organizations such as USAID, 

resident UN offices, other IGOs, UNHCR, or a lead NGO such as Cooperative 

for Assistance and Relief Everywhere. 

(e) Plan and execute the operation in accordance with internationally 

recognized standards for FHA. 

(f) Consider purpose, short- and long-term goals, consequences, and 

perceptions of local populace, HN authorities, international community, 

others. Depending on US goals and objectives, it is prudent to include HN 

civilian and military resources in civil-military action projects, to promote the 

legitimacy of the local government. 

(g) Integrate IO into all projects. 
92 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(5) Nation Assistance (NA). NA is civil or military assistance (other than HA) 

rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, 

crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements between the US and 

another nation. NA operations support a HN by promoting sustainable 

development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is promoting longterm regional stability. NA programs often include, but are not limited to, security 

assistance, foreign internal defense, and humanitarian and civic assistance. 

Integrate all NA actions into the US Ambassador’s mission strategic plan. NA 

may or may not be a part of PO at the outset of operations, but evolves as the 

political and diplomatic situation dictates. Tactical-level NA is often characterized 

by training support to HN or foreign nation institutions or through civic action 

programs designed to assist HN forces in improving living conditions. 

(6) Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA is the set of DOD activities that 

contribute to unified action by the USG supporting the development of capability 

and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions. 

FSF are organizations and personnel under HN control with the mission of 

protecting the HN’s sovereignty from internal and external threats. Elements of 

FSF include full-time, reserve, auxiliary military forces, police, corrections 

personnel, border guards (including the Coast Guard), or other similar capabilities 

from the local up to national level. Supporting institutions of FSF include 

government ministries or departments, academies, training centers, logistics 

centers, and other similar activities at the local through national levels that 

provide doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel, facilities, and policy support to the FSF. 

(7) Civil Information Management (CIM). CIM contributes to increased 

interagency, IGO, and NGO situational awareness. CIM is a CA planning 

consideration. CIM is the process where civil ASCOPE information is gathered, 

analyzed, and entered into a central database. The timely availability of 

information is a result of fusing the information with the supported JFC, HHQ, 

DOD, and joint intelligence organizations, and other USG departments and 

agencies, interagency partners, NGOs, and the private sector. The raw 

information used for analysis receives the widest possible dissemination. 

3. Support to Civil Administration (SCA) 

a. SCA covers a wide array of factors, including rule of law, health, information, 

policing, and infrastructure. Establish a civil administration, in some PO, to exercise 

some local government authorities. In many instances, the commander on the 

ground may be responsible for civil administration tasks. PO may mandate support 

to civil administration or may temporarily occur in the PO. In most cases, the military 

will assist an established or interim government (see JP 3-57). 

b. The US Army’s civil affairs command (CACOM) provides force structure 

specifically designed to support the civil administration mission. CACOM plans and 

helps set the conditions for transitioning the missions of stabilization, reconstruction, 

and development to civil authority. Additionally, they conduct short-term support to 

civil administration, enable HN government functions, and routinely support IGOs 

and interagency core capabilities in indigenous government capacity building and 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 93 

delivery of government services. The CACOM provides three organic functional 

specialty cells with functional experts that plan and enable HN government 

operations across six CA functional areas (see figure 20) and are suited for the civil 

administration mission. The six CA functional specialty areas are rule of law, 

economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, and public 

education and information. All six functional specialties are interrelated, and 

specialists often work together. 

Figure 20. Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Areas 

(1) The functional specialty cells and their mission are discussed in the following 

six CA functional areas: 

(a) Rule of law pertains to the fair, competent, and efficient development, 

application, and effective enforcement of the civil and criminal laws of a 

society through impartial legal institutions and competent corrections 

systems. This functional area includes judge advocates trained in 

international and comparative law and CA specialists in related subjects. 

(b) Economic stability pertains to the efficient management (example. 

production, distribution, trade, and consumption) of resources, goods, and 

services ensuring the viability of a society’s economic system. This discipline 

includes CA specialists in economic development, civilian supply, and food 

and agriculture. 

(c) Infrastructure pertains to designing, building, and maintaining the 

organizations, systems, and architecture required to support the utilities 

transportation, water, communications, and power. This discipline includes 

CA specialists in public transportation, public works and utilities, and public 

communication. 

(d) Governance pertains to creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining 

the institutions and processes that govern, protect, and bring prosperity to a 

society. This discipline includes CA specialists in public administration, 

environmental management, and public safety. 

(e) Public health and welfare pertains to the systems, institutions, programs, 

and practices that promote the physical, mental, and social well-being of a 

society. This discipline includes CA specialists in public health and cultural 

relations. 
94 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(f) Public education and information pertains to designing, resourcing, and 

implementing public education and public information programs and systems 

through media and formal education institutions. This discipline includes CA 

specialists in public education and civil information. 

c. Rule of Law. 

(1) Background. The purpose of rule of law operations is creating security and 

stability for the civilian population by restoring and enhancing the effective and 

fair administration and enforcement of justice. Rule of law is important for 

stability. Rule of law operations are particularly significant in the immediate 

aftermath of major ground combat operations, when it is imperative to restore 

order to the civilian population in the vacuum that results when combat disrupts 

the routine administration of society. Close coordination is critical between the 

rule of law section and governance section for synchronization and synergy 

between efforts to restore, reform, and assist the court and legal system and 

efforts to restore, reform, and assist the public safety system. A judicial system is 

powerless without an effective public safety system, whereas a public safety 

system is not legitimate without a fair and efficient judicial system. For further 

information, see the USJFCOM Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and 

Security Sector Reform, 13 June 2011. 

(2) Measures. 

(a) Provide for the restoration of order in the immediate aftermath of military 

operations. 

(b) Restore and enhance the operation of the court system, including vetting 

and training judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, legal advisors and 

administrators, and restoring and equipping court and administrative facilities. 

(c) Restore and reform the HN civil and criminal legal system, including 

reviewing and revising statutes, codes, decrees, and other laws ensuring 

compliance with international legal standards, and adopting interim measures 

for the immediate administration of justice. 

(d) Provide an effective corrections system that complies with international 

standards, including selecting, vetting, and training corrections officials, and 

constructing or renovating appropriate facilities. 

(3) Considerations. This task is primarily a civilian function and involves 

providing assistance to design new institutions, drafting new legislation giving 

legal institutions the authority to function effectively, training professionals 

working in the new institutions, and educating the public on what the rule of law 

means. Rule of law operations are seldom exclusively a military or USG activity. 

Rule of law operations are a collaborative effort involving the following: 

(a) U.S. military assets, including military police, engineers, combat forces, 

logistics elements, legal personnel, and CA personnel. 

(b) Other agencies of the federal government, including DOS, DOJ, and 

USAID. 

(c) IGOs. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 95 

(d) Coalition and other national elements, including military and civilian 

agencies. 

(e) NGOs engaged in judicial and legal reform. 

(f) HN legal professionals, including judges, prosecutors, defense 

counselors, legal advisors, legal administrators, and legal educators. 

(g) HN law enforcement personnel, including administrators, police, 

investigators, and trainers. 

(h) Other HN government officials. 

(4) Functions. In CA organizations and task-organized forces similar to CA 

organizations, judge advocate personnel, CA public safety specialists with law 

enforcement backgrounds, and others with backgrounds in judicial administration, 

corrections, and other relevant areas carry out rule of law operations. 

Commanders detail rule of law section personnel to work with an HN interagency, 

international, or other group carrying out rule of law operations. The judge 

advocates in the rule of law section have extensive training in international, 

comparative, and human rights law. 

(a) Many activities conducted in rule of law operations involve the practice of 

law, and attorneys must perform these activities. These activities include the 

following: 

• Evaluating and assisting in developing transitional decrees, codes, 

ordinances, and other measures intended to bring immediate order to 

areas where the HN legal system is impaired or nonfunctioning. 

• Evaluating the reform of HN laws ensuring compliance with international 

legal standards and providing appropriate assistance to the drafting and 

review process when necessary. 

• Evaluating legal training given to HN judges, prosecutors, defense 

counselors, and legal advisors, and providing appropriate training when 

necessary. 

• Evaluating legal training given to police and corrections officials 

ensuring compliance with international human rights standards. 

• Serving as judges, magistrates, prosecutors, defense counselors, and 

legal advisors for transitional courts. 

• Evaluating legal and administrative procedures ensuring compliance 

with international law, the law of the power administering the territory, and 

the law of the supported country. 

• Determining which HN offices and functions have legal authority to 

evaluate, reform, and implement the law. 

• Advising US military commanders, US international, and HN authorities 

on the status of the HN legal system and its compliance with international 

standards, and providing recommended reforms. 

• Advising others and US military commanders on the application of 

international law, US domestic law, and HN law to the process of 

restoring and enhancing rule of law in the HN. 
96 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(b) The SJA is a senior judge advocate (typically a lieutenant colonel or 

colonel) assigned to act as the SJA and senior rule of law officer for the 

organization conducting CAO. The SJA or senior rule of law officer is the legal 

advisor to the commander and is the chief of the rule of law section. The SJA 

or senior rule of law officer provides staff supervision over rule of law 

operations and other legal activities of judge advocates in the organization. 

The SJA or senior rule of law officer is under the technical supervision of the 

higher-level command or task force SJA. 

(5) Capabilities. Organize the rule of law section to: 

(a) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of the HN legal systems and 

their impact on joint force CMO strategy. 

(b) Evaluate the HN legal system, including reviewing statutes, codes, 

decrees, regulations, procedures, and legal traditions for compliance with 

international standards. Advising and assisting the HN and other rule of law 

participants in the process of developing transitional codes and procedures 

and long-term legal reform. 

(c) Evaluate personnel, judicial infrastructure, and equipment of the HN court 

system and determining the requirements for training, repair, construction, 

and acquisition. 

(d) Provide support to transitional justice system, including acting as judges, 

magistrates, prosecutors, defense counselor, legal advisors, and court 

administrators when required. 

(e) Coordinate rule of law efforts involving US and coalition military, other US 

agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and HN authorities. 

(f) Assist the SJA in educating and training US personnel in the indigenous 

legal system, obligations, and consequences. 

(g) Advise and assist the SJA in international and HN legal issues as 

required. 

(h) Assist the SJA regarding status-of-forces agreement and status-ofmission agreement issues. 

(i) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for 

government public safety systems supporting administration of the penal 

systems. 

(6) Additional Considerations. 

(a) Include public security issues in CCIRs. Obtain the advice of the SJA, 

MP, CID, and other national and international experts when determining what 

information or evidence could assist in future criminal investigations. 

(b) Establish a fusion cell with links to the special advisor for rule of law or 

the coordinating body established by the task force or the international 

authority for coordinating public security. This cell integrates information from 

deployed military units, special Gendarmerie (French) units, special police 

units, UNPOL, DOJ trainers, and other public security organizations. Share 

actionable intelligence among military, policy, judiciary, and penal authorities. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 97 

d. Economic Stability. The economic stability section consists of functional 

specialists in economic fields and business administration. It provides technical 

expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command. The 

section assesses government, corporate, and private resources and systems. Using 

these assessments, based on the civilian skills of its members, the team determines 

how to help efficiently manage resources, goods, and services enhancing viability of 

the society’s economic system. The economic stability section provides 

recommendations and, when appropriate, directions to maintain, sustain, and 

improve economic systems and services. Skills found in this section include 

economists, bankers, civilian supply and distribution technicians, business 

administrators, entrepreneurs, agriculturalists and farmers, food specialists and 

technicians, marketing and distribution specialists, and other officer and enlisted 

personnel whose civilian skills make them suitable for improving a nation’s economic 

system. 

(1) Functions. 

(a) Develops plans, policies, and procedures and provides operational 

oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing food and agricultural 

systems, and agencies for producing, processing, storing, transporting, 

distributing, and marketing. 

(b) Coordinates the use of indigenous government and commercial food and 

agricultural resources for military use, CMO, and supporting government 

administration. 

(c) Assists in coordinating indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), IGOs, 

NGOs, and US assistance and resources supporting food and agricultural 

systems as part of CMO (e.g., crop and livestock improvement, agricultural 

training, and education). 

(d) Develops plans, policies, and procedures and provides operational 

oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing economic and 

commercial systems, agencies, and resources. 

(e) Develops and implements plans reducing or mitigating black-market 

activities. 

(f) Conducts liaison efforts and coordinates with local government 

administration agencies and commercial enterprises in support of CAO. 

(g) Ensures compliance with international laws, and conventions, in 

coordination with the SJA, regarding use of local labor and when acquiring 

and using local resources (supplies, equipment, and facilities). Develops 

plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or 

establishing government and commercial supply systems and facilities. 

(h) Facilitates the coordination of government, commercial, and private 

property, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use, 

CAO, and government administration. 

(i) Establishes policies and procedures, in coordination with the SJA, on the 

custody and administration of public and private property. 

(2) Capabilities. 
98 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and 

assessing food and agriculture systems, agencies, services, personnel, 

resources, and facilities. 

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of food and agricultural 

systems and the impact of those systems on CAO. 

(c) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for food and 

agricultural resources (livestock, poultry, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish, fiber, 

and forestry) management supporting government administration. 

(d) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and 

maintaining food and agricultural systems and agencies. 

(e) Assist in coordinating IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and US assistance and resources 

supporting food and agricultural systems as part of CAO (crop and livestock 

improvement, agricultural training, and education). 

(f) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in monitoring and 

assessing the indigenous economy, economic systems, commercial activities, 

agencies, services, personnel, and resources. 

(g) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of economic systems and 

the impact of those systems on CAO. 

(h) Advise and assist with budgetary systems, monetary and fiscal policies, 

revenue-producing systems, and treasury operations. 

(i) Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating 

economic and commerce systems, agencies, and organizations. 

(j) Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements of 

employing economic controls (price controls, rationing programs, prevention 

of black-market activities, monetary and fiscal policies, and labor). 

(k) Advise and assist in employing local commercial resources, including 

labor, supporting government administration, CMO, and military use. 

(l) Assist in coordinating IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and US assistance and resources 

supporting local economic development as part of CMO. 

(m) Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials concerning 

indigenous peoples’ cultural intricacies. 

(n) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and 

assessing public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services, 

personnel, resources, and facilities. 

(o) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems 

and the impact of those systems on CAO. 

(p) Determine the availability of local supplies. 

(q) Identify private and public property available for military use. 

(r) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining 

government and commercial supply systems and agencies. 

(s) Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements for 

government and commercial supply resources supporting government 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 99 

administration (transportation, storage, distribution including rationing, and 

using captured and salvaged items). 

e. Infrastructure. The infrastructure section consists of functional specialists in 

public works, transportation, utilities, and communications. It provides technical 

expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command. The 

section assesses the indigenous public infrastructure and systems. Using these 

assessments and the civilian skills of its members, the team, in coordination with the 

US Army Corps of Engineers, USAID, HN officials, and vetted contractors, 

determines methods to design, build, and maintain the organizations, architecture, 

and systems for supporting transportation, water, sanitation, communications, and 

power. The infrastructure section provides recommendations and, when appropriate, 

directions to maintain, sustain, and improve the indigenous public systems and 

services, such as transportation, utilities, and postal systems. Skills required in this 

section include engineers (civil, mechanical, electrical, and environmental); water 

and sanitation specialists; electrical distribution specialists and administrators; road 

construction, telephone, radio, and television specialists; and other officers and 

enlisted personnel whose civilian skills make them suitable for improving a nation’s 

basic infrastructure. 

(1) Functions. 

(a) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in 

rehabilitating or establishing transportation equipment, facilities, and systems. 

(b) Facilitates the coordination of government and commercial transportation 

resources for military use, CAO, and supporting government administration. 

(c) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in 

rehabilitating or establishing public works and utilities equipment, facilities, 

and systems. 

(d) Facilitates the coordination of government and commercial public works 

and utilities equipment, facilities, and systems for military use, CAO, and 

supporting government administration. 

(e) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in 

rehabilitating or establishing communication equipment, facilities, and 

systems. 

(f) Facilitates the coordination of government, commercial, and private 

communication equipment, facilities, and systems for military use, CAO, and 

supporting government administration. 

(2) Capabilities. 

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and 

assessing foreign nation (FN) or HN public and commercial transportation 

systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources. 

(b) Determine capabilities and effectiveness of transportation systems and 

the impact of those systems on CAO. 

(c) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for 

government and commercial transportation resources supporting government 
100 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

administration (motor vehicles and roads, trains and railways, boats and 

waterways, aircraft and airports, and pipelines). 

(d) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining 

government transportation systems and agencies. 

(e) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and 

assessing FN or HN public and commercial works and utilities systems, 

agencies, services, and facilities. 

(f) Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities 

systems and the impact of those systems on CAO. 

(g) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for 

government and commercial works and utilities resources supporting 

government administration (electric power; natural gas; water production and 

distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; sanitation; and public 

facilities). 

(h) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and 

maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies. 

(i) Assist in employing (coordinating) public works and utilities resources 

supporting government administration and CAO. 

(j) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and 

assessing government and commercial communication systems, agencies, 

services, personnel, resources, and facilities. 

(k) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems 

and the impact of those systems on CAO. 

(l) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for 

government and commercial communications resources supporting 

government administration (postal services, telephone, radio, television, 

computer systems, and print media). 

(m) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining 

government communications systems and agencies. 

f. Governance. The governance section consists of functional specialists in public 

administration and services (excluding public health and welfare, cultural relations, 

and education). It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance 

to the supported command in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the 

institutions and processes that govern, protect, and bring prosperity to a society. 

Skills required in this section include public administrators, public safety 

administrators and managers, environmental administrators and managers, and 

other administrators whose civilian duties include upper-level management of any 

public institutions at various levels (example, city, county, local, state, federal). 

(1) Functions. 

(a) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in 

rehabilitating or establishing public administration systems, agencies, and 

resources. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 101 

(b) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in 

rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities. 

(c) Assists in employing public safety resources supporting government 

administration, CAO, and military use. 

(d) Coordinates with HN government administrators and agencies supporting 

CAO. 

(e) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in 

rehabilitating or establishing environmental resource management systems, 

agencies, equipment, and facilities. 

(f) Coordinates HN government and private environmental management 

resources for the following: 

• Military use. 

• CAO. 

• Support of the government administration to mitigate, prepare, respond 

to, and recover from environmental activities. 

(2) Capabilities. 

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and 

assessing FN or HN public administration systems, agencies, services, 

personnel, and resources. 

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public administration 

systems and the impact of those systems on CMO. 

(c) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and 

assessing indigenous public safety systems, agencies, services, personnel, 

and resources. 

(d) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and 

the impact of those systems on the supported commander’s mission. 

(e) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for 

government public safety systems supporting government administration 

(police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, and emergency 

rescue). 

(f) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining 

government public safety systems and agencies. 

(g) Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating 

public government systems and agencies. 

(h) Advise and assist in developing technical administrative requirements, 

policies, and procedures for providing government services to the local 

population. 

(i) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and 

assessing FN environmental and pollution control systems, agencies, 

services, personnel, resources, and facilities. 

(j) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of environmental and 

pollution control systems and the impact of those systems on CMO. 
102 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(k) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for 

environmental management services and resources supporting government 

administration (plans, policies, and procedures to protect natural resources 

and provide pollution control). 

(l) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and 

maintaining government environmental management systems and agencies. 

(m) Advise, assist, and support the coordination of IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and US 

assistance and resources supporting local government environmental 

management as part of CMO. 

g. Public Health and Welfare. The public health and welfare section consists of 

functional specialists qualified in public health and medical services. It provides 

technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command 

in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes 

through which a society maintains the physical, mental, and social health of its 

people. Professions required in this section include doctors, dentists, hospital 

administrators, nurses, veterinarians, public health specialists, environmental 

scientists and specialists, museum curators, archivists, and others whose civilian 

duties include health and welfare management in addition to arts, monuments, and 

archives. 

(1) Functions. 

(a) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in 

rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and 

facilities. 

(b) Coordinates the use of IPI government and private sector health 

resources for use in CMO and supporting HN government administration. 

(c) Assists in coordinating IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and US assistance and 

resources supporting local government public health systems as part of CMO. 

(d) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in 

rehabilitating or establishing public welfare systems, agencies, equipment, 

and facilities. 

(e) Assists in familiarizing, educating, and training US personnel in the FN or 

HN social, cultural, religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior, and 

language. 

(f) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in 

protecting, preserving, and restoring significant cultural property and facilities 

(religious buildings, shrines and consecrated places, museums, monuments, 

art, archives, and libraries). 

(g) Assists in locating, identifying, and safeguarding cultural property and in 

determining ownership. 

(2) Capabilities. 

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and 

assessing IPI public and private health systems, animal husbandry systems, 

sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 103 

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation 

systems and the impact of those systems on CAO. 

(c) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public 

health services and resources supporting government administration (clinics, 

hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance 

transportation, skilled personnel, and education). 

(d) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and 

maintaining government public health systems and agencies. 

(e) Advise and assist IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and US agencies in preventing, 

controlling, and treating diseases among human and animal populations 

(education, immunization, and sanitation). 

(f) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public welfare systems 

regarding the most vulnerable portion of the population (mentally 

handicapped, aged, infirmed, women, and children) and the impact of those 

systems on CAO. 

(g) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and 

maintaining government public welfare systems and agencies. 

(h) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public 

welfare services and resources to support government administration. 

(i) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on HN social and 

cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on social wellbeing of the society and the effects on CAO. 

(j) Advise and assist in locating, identifying, preserving, and protecting 

significant cultural property. 

(k) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for 

government, community, and private systems and agencies to protect, 

preserve, and restore cultural property. 

(l) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining 

cultural property systems and agencies. 

h. Public Education and Information. The public education and information section 

consists of functional specialists in education and information services. It provides 

technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command 

in designing, resourcing, and implementing public education and information 

programs and systems through media and formal education institutions. Skills 

required in this section include educators at all levels, education specialists, school 

administrators, public relations personnel, media and marketing specialists, and 

others whose civilian duties include education and information management. 

(1) Functions. 

(a) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in 

rehabilitating or establishing public education systems, agencies, facilities, 

and resources. 
104 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(b) Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in the 

use of HN mass communication supporting CAO and the supported 

commander’s inform and influence objectives. 

(c) Recommends information control and civil censorship policies in the 

controlled territory. 

(2) Capabilities. 

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and 

assessing HN public, parochial, and private education systems, agencies, 

services, personnel, and resources. 

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of education systems and 

the impact of those systems on CAO. 

(c) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for the public 

education system supporting government administration (primary, secondary, 

post-secondary, and technical educational systems). 

(d) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining public 

education systems and agencies. 

(e) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of government, commercial, 

and private mass communication systems and determine the impact of those 

systems on the populace and the effects on CAO. 

(f) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and 

assessing mass communication themes and the impact on inform and 

influence objectives. 

(g) Advise and assist HN institutions in developing and coordinating public 

relations activities supporting government administration and the “single 

voice” message. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 105 

Chapter VII 

INFORMING AND INFLUENCING 

1. Background 

Achieving PO objectives requires commanders and PO forces to understand how to 

integrate information-related capabilities into joint operations creating effects and 

operationally exploitable conditions necessary for achieving the joint force commander’s 

objectives. 

2. The Information Environment 

a. In PO, the involved factions, friendly or adversarial, use information for their own 

advantage and employ tactics such as censorship, propaganda, misinformation, and 

disinformation to gain an advantage. 

b. Local and international media are operating before, during, and after PO forces 

arrive and depart, and are one of the contributing factors in the military’s 

engagement. 

c. Allies and coalition member countries participating as a multinational force may 

have troops engaged before US military involvement, and their ongoing IO campaign 

must reconcile with the US campaign. Successful operations result from aligned and 

reconciled competing narratives. 

d. Individual Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines broadcast information and 

shape perceptions by interacting directly with the media or online through social 

media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. The messages either enhance or 

inhibit operational objectives. Commanders balance transparency with security when 

deciding whether to manage or restrict these activities. 

e. Minor or local events have rapid international significance as the global media 

broadcasts them across multiple platforms, and operate around the clock. 

f. Enemies and adversaries exploit gaps between what PO forces say and do. 

3. Information Operations 

a. IO is the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related 

capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or 

usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting 

US interests. IO is chiefly focused on affecting adversary decision making but 

recognizes that influencing foreign, most especially indigenous audiences in the 

area of operations, is a means to this end. 

b. The aim of IO in PO is reassuring, persuading, and influencing communities 

within the operational area to support PO efforts toward attaining a sustainable 

peace. 

c. The fundamentals of transparency and legitimacy demand military commanders 

engage openly and routinely with multiple audiences gaining support for PO. 

d. PO forces carefully consider the effects of actions, operations, and activities 

before undertaking them and avoiding unintended consequences. For example, 

destroying a belligerent’s radio or television broadcast capability diminishes their 
106 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

means of propaganda making and brings favorable tactical results, but it also has a 

destabilizing effect on the peace process. 

e. If the population is subject to propaganda by adversaries, PO forces quickly 

provide the population with objective, factual, and credible information. 

4. Commander Tasks 

a. Commanders drive operations through a clear articulation of their intent and 

desired end state. Commanders frame the narrative used by the entire force, 

speaking with one voice, and interacting with the right audiences and shaping the IE 

in favor of the commander’s intent. 

b. In PO, commanders are often chief negotiators and the focus of media in 

sensitive situations. 

c. Actions commanders take unifying the IO effort includes: 

(1) Establish critical information requirements. 

(2) Ensure development of a media policy including media guidelines, embed 

procedures, and support to media while in the AO. 

(3) Provide guidance on message and talking point development. Ensure these 

messages nest with higher-level themes and objectives across all PO partner 

nations and agencies. 

(4) Designate a qualified individual to serve as the staff IO planner if one does 

not exist. Additionally, appoint a qualified individual for each IRC capability as 

necessary. 

(5) Chair the IO working group, as available, and invite relevant participants to 

participate, including interorganizational and HN partners, when appropriate. The 

composition of the working group changes depending on the situation. 

(6) Augment IO personnel with expertise and a work force that focus on local 

nationals, interpreters, and media analysts. 

(7) Support IO with intelligence. Without detailed intelligence, encompassing the 

complete spectrum of cultural, social, political, and economic issues, units cannot 

properly plan or execute IO. The IO planner requires nodal and link analysis 

based on accurate and up-to-date intelligence. Intelligence assets assist in 

obtaining assessment data. 

(8) Establish and sustain an integrated team approach. Successful IO requires 

unifying the effects of all participating organizations, units, or entities involved in 

the peace process, including nonmilitary agencies. 

(9) Keep the IO planner, PAO, and MIS team leaders abreast of operational 

changes and upcoming operations. 

(10) Anticipate and respond with speed, accuracy, and truth offsetting 

propaganda efforts, correcting misinformation, or setting the record straight. 

Employ the PA rule of maximum disclosure and minimum delay, but remain 

mindful of OPSEC considerations and PA policy guidelines concerning release of 

information. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 107 

(11) Disseminate relevant information, including bad news and mistakes, as 

quickly as possible gaining and maintaining credibility with international media 

and the HN. 

(12) Involve every military member. The most powerful way to influence 

populations is for every member of the force to be an information transmitter and 

receiver. Ensure all members of the force understand the IO plan and clearly 

articulate its messages and talking points to others. 

(13) Obtain appropriate approvals. The chain of command approves certain 

aspects of IO, particularly MISO and military deception. Certain approvals exist at 

higher headquarters and take time to process, requiring advanced planning. 

d. The following are operations planner tasks for PO: 

(1) Integrate, coordinate, and synchronize all information-related capabilities 

executed as part of the commander’s IO efforts. 

(2) Lead or chair the IO working group when the commander, deputy 

commander, chief of staff, and executive officer are unavailable. 

(3) Develop and maintain a combined information overlay and an IO running 

estimate. 

(4) Monitor execution of approved activities by maintaining the IO 

synchronization matrix and other staff tools. 

(5) Assess measures of performance and effectiveness against the intended 

plan. 

(6) Advise the commander and staff when the assessment requires adjustments 

in the plan. 

(7) Provide information requirements for the information collection plan. 

(8) Advise the commander on how subordinate commanders help shape an 

operational environment. 

(9) Provide training to subordinate leaders and PO forces on IO, such as 

conducting interpersonal engagements and media interview techniques. 

(10) Maintain master key leader or Soldier and leader engagement plan, and 

submit nonlethal targets to the targeting board. 

5. Information-Related Capabilities 

a. Commanders delegate specific organic capabilities and request others 

capabilities that support their objectives in shaping their operational environments. 

Per JP 3-13, many military capabilities contribute to IO and commanders consider 

using the following capabilities during the planning process. 

(1) Strategic communication. 

(2) Joint interagency coordination group. 

(3) PA. 

(4) CMO. 

(5) Cyberspace operations. 

(6) Information assurance. 

(7) Space operations. 
108 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(8) MISO. 

(9) Intelligence. 

(10) Military deception. 

(11) OPSEC. 

(12) Special technical operations. 

(13) Joint electromagnetic spectrum operations. 

(14) Key leader engagement. 

b. Information-related capabilities support a commander’s ability to inform and 

influence audiences across the ROMO and shape desired outcomes. IO integration 

specialists or planners synchronize and integrate information-related capabilities 

bringing about and enhancing desired effects within the IE. Theoretically, all 

capabilities send a message or make an impression. Therefore, commanders 

consider all capabilities when devising solutions and plans. Although PA is an 

information-related capability, it should be considered distinct from IO, given the 

statutory prohibition against influencing the U.S. domestic audience. However, its 

efforts and effects must be coordinated and de-conflicted from other informationrelated capabilities. In PO, the commander and staff regularly use the following 

designated information-related capabilities to inform and influence audiences: 

(1) PA. 

(2) MISO. 

(3) Combat camera. 

(4) CAO or CMO. 

(5) Human environment system or human environment teams. 

(6) OPSEC. 

(7) Military deception. 

c. Other capabilities that support IO include the following: 

(1) Cyber electromagnetic activities. 

(2) EW. 

(3) Cyberspace operations. 

(4) Electromagnetic spectrum management operations. 

(5) Special technical operations. 

(6) Presence, posture, and profile. 

(7) Physical attack. 

(8) PHYSEC. 

d. For more information about these capabilities, see JP 3-13, FM 3-13, Inform and 

Influence Activities, and FM 3-36, Electronic Warfare. 

6. IO Training and Predeployment Considerations 

a. Begin, when alerted, an IO running estimate for the anticipated AO. 

b. Commence analysis of the AO’s IE, with particular emphasis on cultural 

considerations affecting the way audiences perceive, receive, and transmit 

information. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 109 

c. Undertake language and cultural awareness training, as available. 

d. Prepare and train for IO before deployment. Send personnel to training, such as 

the Army’s Tactical IO course. 

7. Information Support Agencies 

Several agencies are established and structured to support the IO process. Each of the 

agencies provides support to operational and strategic commands but selectively 

supports the tactical level. Work through HHQ IO planning cells when requesting 

assistance and representatives. Below are examples of agencies able to support PO 

commanders, either directly or indirectly. 

a. The First Information Operations Command (Land) is under the command of US 

Army Intelligence and Security Command and is located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia 

(VA). The First Information Operations Command’s mission is providing fullspectrum IO support to Army commands, specifically tailored to support the land 

component commander. The First Information Operations Command: 

(1) Deploys tailored field support teams helping operational and tactical battle 

staffs integrate IO with plans and operations within PO. 

(2) Provides access to DOD intelligence and IO-related intelligence from other 

government agencies. 

(3) Coordinates multidisciplined intelligence and other support for PO planning 

and execution. Its mission areas include IO database support, HUMINT, and 

counterintelligence. 

b. An IO operations group provides limited information-related capabilities subject 

matter expertise to the Army Service component command and its subordinate 

commands. The units affiliate with the National Guard and Reserve Components of 

the US Army. There are currently four IO groups in the Army with two in the US 

Army Reserve and two in the Army National Guard. The IO groups support the joint 

and Army missions with IO planning, preparation, coordination, and assessment 

capabilities. Across the ROMO, they provide the warfighting commander with a 

scalable capability focused on the region and culture. 

c. The Marine Corps Information Operations Center provides operational support to 

the Marine components and Marine air-ground task forces and provides IO subject 

matter expertise supporting US Marine Corps IO advocates and proponents 

enabling effective integration of IO into Marine Corps operations. 

d. Navy Information Operations Command advances IO warfighting capabilities for 

naval and joint forces by providing operationally focused training and planning 

support; developing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; advocating 

requirements supporting future effects-based warfare; and managing functional data 

for IO. 

e. Air Combat Command, 8th Air Force, and 67th Network Warfare Wing provides 

Air Force IO. These organizations provide reach back support to IO teams and other 

entities supporting Air Force, combatant command, and national tasking’s. Assets 

include electronic systems security assessment centers, network operations support 

centers, an information aggressor flight, and the Air Force Information Operations 

Center. 
110 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

f. The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center, subordinate to the Joint Staff, 

provides expertise to combatant commands by providing IO teams to assist in the 

planning, coordination and execution of IO. 

 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 111 

Chapter VIII 

CONFLICT RESOLUTION 

1. Background 

a. This chapter provides techniques that assist military members in resolving 

situations requiring two or more parties to find a mutual agreement. Knowledge of 

these techniques does not qualify a military member to act as a hostage negotiator 

or a negotiator for international, national, or regional agreements. Those types of 

agreements require specific expertise and legal status beyond the normal scope of 

PO activities. There are three basic methods for reaching an agreement: negotiation, 

mediation, and arbitration. 

(1) Negotiation is reaching an agreement by disputing parties directly conferring, 

discussing, or bargaining. 

(2) Mediation is reaching decisions between disputing parties with the assistance 

of a neutral third party. 

(3) Arbitration is the conflict resolution method where a neutral party makes the 

final decision for the disputing parties. 

b. When resolving disagreements between parties, military members display a 

combination of patience, tenacity, creativity, and focus. They show integrity, 

tolerance, patience, innovation, flexibility, and resourcefulness to succeed. The 

military member shows respect to all parties, takes charge, expects change, and 

works toward a mutual agreement. Perseverance is critical for long-term success. 

Examples of conflict resolutions requiring military personnel include: 

(1) Getting local leaders to implement a “stay put policy” preventing displaced 

civilian movement during combat operations. 

(2) Appeasing competing vendors who disagree with HN support contracts. 

(3) Assisting former belligerents in resolving relocation agreements during post 

hostilities operations. 

(4) Deconflicting military HA activities with those of NGOs and IOs. 

c. A successfully negotiated agreement is fair, efficient, wise, and enduring. 

(1) Fairness implies treating all sides without bias. 

(2) Efficiency refers to producing a desired outcome with minimum of effort. 

(3) Wisdom pertains to following the soundest course of action. 

(4) Endurance refers to the stability of the agreement or the ability of the 

agreement to last. 

2. Conflict Resolution Training 

a. Negotiation, mediation, and arbitration training is essential for military leaders in 

PO. Training includes all levels of leader and subordinate hierarchies. CA personnel 

are instrumental in this area, but the nature of PO means all leaders need conflict 

negotiation skills to accomplish the mission. 

b. Leaders need a conceptual foundation for conflict management and resolution, 

and conceptual skills helping them analyze and select the correct approaches when 

dealing with conflicts. Ideally, organizations participating in PO include negotiation 
112 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

education as part of leader development prior to a pending deployment. 

Commanders, staff officers, and selected leaders greatly benefit from this type of 

training. Military training centers also offer training opportunities for resolving specific 

conflicts. 

c. The following institutions provide expertise in the various types of conflict 

resolution. Instructors are available to travel to units. Additionally, some courses are 

online. 

(1) The West Point Negotiation Project conducts mobile training for requesting 

units on an as-available basis. The breadth of training content covered is 

dependent on the amount of time available for training, but includes determining 

the appropriate goals for a negotiation, identifying and challenging assumptions, 

negotiating with difficult counterparts, conducting cross-cultural negotiations, and 

negotiating in multiparty contexts. More information is available at 

http://www.usma.edu/wpnp/SitePages/Training.aspx, via e-mail at 

wpnp@usma.edu or by calling 845-938-3177. 

(2) The Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence (NCE) recognizes 

negotiations are a key Air Force leadership skill. The NCE designs and delivers 

culturally adaptable education, training, and research in negotiation methods and 

techniques fostering collaborative relationships, building partnerships, and finding 

interagency solutions. The NCE program is practitioner oriented, and located at 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/negotiation_ctr/. 

(3) The Foreign Service Institute is part of the DOS and located in Arlington, VA. 

It offers one-week Negotiation Art and Skills courses several times a year. More 

information is available at http://www.state.gov/m/fsi. You may also call the 

course director at 703-301-7186. 

(4) The US Institute of Peace is located in Washington, DC. It is an independent, 

nonpartisan conflict management center created by Congress to prevent and 

mitigate international conflicts without resorting to violence. It’s Center for 

Mediation and Conflict Resolution offers various online and onsite courses on 

conflict resolution. More information is available at http://www.usip.org/educationtraining or via phone at 202-457-1700. 

(5) The Executive Education Program at the Kennedy School of Government at 

Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts (MA) offers different conflict 

resolution courses on an evolving basis. More information is available at 

https://exed.hks.harvard.edu// or via phone at 617-495-1142. 

(6) The Harvard Negotiation Institute located at the Harvard Law School in 

Cambridge, MA, offers several courses under its program of instruction for 

lawyers, and is open to everyone. More information is available at 

http://www.pon.harvard.edu/category/courses-and-training/harvard-negotiationinstitute-5-day/ or via phone at 617-495-3187. 

3. Negotiations 

a. Conduct negotiations at several levels. There are negotiations among 

departments and US agencies; between multinational partners; between the military 

and UN agencies; and between military leaders on the ground and local leaders. 

Negotiations require the following to build consensus: tact, diplomacy, honesty, open 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 113 

mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, 

and careful planning. The Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence provides 

negotiations training, and published the “Practical Guide to Negotiating in the 

Military,” located at http://Culture.af.mil/NCE/. 

b. Commanders and subordinate leaders serve in the role of a negotiator during 

PO. Acting as a negotiator is similar to acting as a mediator, but military leaders are 

interested in an outcome consistent with the unit’s missions and objectives. Military 

members negotiate for rites of passage; barter for use of facilities, buildings, roads, 

and services; negotiate between hostile factions; or seek compliance with a curfew 

without resorting to using force. 

c. When a military member is a party in a negotiation, the other parties see them as 

a competitor, and not a disinterested party. If the military member surrenders 

impartiality and actions become suspect, it is very difficult to overcome suspicion 

and mistrust, even by subsequent representatives or US actions. 

d. The following four considerations guide preparations for negotiations. 

Negotiations do not exist in a vacuum. Negotiations are an exercise in persuasion. 

Study the alternatives to negotiating an agreement and be attuned to cultural 

differences. 

(1) Understand the broader issues of the conflict. Leaders must understand the 

broader issues of conflict and their changing nature. This includes maintaining 

dialogue with all parties, groups, organizations, and civil authorities. Prevent one 

incident from destroying dialogue (even if force is applied). Creating a hostile 

atmosphere does not lead to a resolution. 

(2) Get input from the disputing party. Negotiation is an exercise in persuasion 

and a method to advance US interests through jointly decided action. Both 

parties must fully cooperate. 

(3) Determine each party’s alternatives to a negotiated settlement. 

(4) Be attuned to cultural differences. The negotiating parties’ culture shapes 

how they reason, what they accept as fact, and what principles they apply to 

decision making. Words and actions have different connotations to members of 

other cultures. At meetings, nonverbal behaviors such as symbolic rituals or 

protocols are important. 

e. For successful negotiations, base procedures on the following nine steps. 

(1) Establish communications. 

(2) Identify common ground for building meaningful dialogue. 

(3) Consider cultural aspects of negotiations. 

(4) Set clear goals and objectives. 

(5) Set clear and reasonable code of conduct for the negotiation process. 

(6) Develop a plan and diagram the results of the analysis. 

(7) Determine composition of negotiating forum and decision-making 

mechanisms. 

(8) Establish a neutral venue. 

(9) Implement the agreement. 
114 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

4. Mediation 

a. During mediation, the military acts as a facilitator guiding the disputing parties 

toward an agreement. The agreement should not conflict with goals of the USG. The 

mediator does not represent the aspirations of any of the disputing parties, but 

furthers the goals of lasting peace, stability, and cooperation within the framework of 

the military commander's intent and international agreements. 

b. Considerations for mediation. 

(1) The mediator assumes some level of resistance from the parties. Numerous 

groups or individuals, either actively or passively, hamper attempts to establish 

peace. The US military member understands all positions, but does not advocate 

for the aims or goals of either party. Keeping an impartial position helps reduce 

the likelihood of animosity and aggression directed at US forces or civilian 

organizations. 

(2) The mediator anticipates participants’ behavior and outlines all possible 

outcomes if mediation fails. The mediation process carries the risk of upsetting a 

participant, but also prevents long-term friction through effective communication. 

c. During most mediation efforts, the mediator negotiates with one party of a dispute 

at a time finding common ground among the parties. Mediators address the following 

items and ensure impartiality: 

(1) Facilitation. Mediators provide practical assistance to all parties by passing 

messages; providing a hot line; or securing a safe, practical venue for a meeting 

or further discussion. Mediators ensure the parties understand the meaning of 

agreements they reach, and the resulting obligations of the international 

community and parties when implementing the agreements. 

(2) Incentives and Disincentives. Support mediation by identifying a 

comprehensive range of incentives and disincentives, which encourage positive 

steps and dissuade parties from taking action detrimental to the peace effort. This 

“carrot and stick” approach varies according to circumstances. Identifying 

effective incentives and disincentives is vital in the preparatory stage of the 

mediation strategy. 

(3) Languages. The mediator places a premium on basic language skills for 

effectiveness. For most tactical-level mediation, a commander and subordinates 

work through interpreters. This procedure improves through training. Using locally 

recruited interpreters provides a short-term solution; however, commanders 

should not rely on this procedure indefinitely. There are pitfalls to using local 

interpreters (e.g., ethnic identifications, political orientation, and social standing). 

Local interpreters may cause unintended consequences because military 

members can never be sure if the interpreter is working in concert with the PO 

force, or has an alternative agenda. In the long term, PO negotiations and 

mediation require the military commander to emphasize language training for the 

peace forces. 

(4) Location. The mediator conducts meetings and negotiations at a site viewed 

as neutral by both parties. The individual negotiating on his “home turf” has the 

upper hand. The following locations are commonly used: 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 115 

(a) UN locations. 

(b) Embassies. 

(c) Other neutral sites. 

(5) Mediation Site Factors. Consider the following factors when selecting a 

mediation site: 

(a) Security. The forces are physically able to secure the venue with 

protection provided by the host authorities or another appropriate agency. 

(b) Accessibility. Do not waste time traveling to remote venues unless this 

promotes either secrecy or a positive approach to the negotiations. 

(c) Communications. If necessary, the negotiating team provides 

communications facilities parties use to liaise with their authorities. 

(d) Comfort. During protracted negotiations, ensure a basic level of comfort 

to facilitate a successful outcome. 

(6) Techniques. Use the following factors to leverage the mediation process: 

(a) Identify the decision makers at negotiations. 

(b) Use and exploit the media during and after negotiations. 

(c) Maintain secrecy and confidentiality. 

(d) Recognize political and military parties to negotiation. 

(e) Use interpreters and translators. 

(7) Competencies. Effective mediators develop competencies in conflict style 

management, the dynamics of conflict, verbal communications skills, and cultural 

awareness. 

5. Arbitration 

a. Arbitration is a formalized process of dispute resolution involving the appointment 

or designation of a neutral party by an appointing authority (commander), or 

representative, in a dispute resolution procedure. Two or more parties with opposing 

views meet to resolve their differences in a formal setting similar to the less formal 

methods of negotiation and mediation. The central goal of arbitration is resolving 

controversy between parties after negotiation or mediation efforts fail. 

b. Arbitration is a method of conflict resolution where the military members act as a 

judge, and make decisions that adversely affect one or more parties. Military 

members conduct arbitration at a higher level than the other forms of conflict 

resolution. Gaining adherence to the arbitrator’s decision is difficult. Without mutual 

support for the decision, the local military commander loses influence with advisors 

who feel slighted by the decision. 

c. At the outset of the dispute resolution process, the parties in the dispute agree 

formally, in writing (if culturally acceptable), to the arbitration process as the chosen 

means of dispute resolution. This includes agreeing to the appointment of an 

arbitrator, abiding by the rules and procedures of the arbitration proceeding, and 

agreeing to respect and comply with the final decision of the arbitrator. Appointment 

to this position by a key leader whom both parties find agreeable adds to the 

arbitrator’s credibility and helps support the overall decision. 
116 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

d. The arbitrator convenes sessions or hearings necessary to document the 

arguments of the opposing parties, listens to witness testimony, and reviews all 

available evidence. At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator renders 

a final decision based on the facts presented by the parties. The arbitrator also 

prepares a written decision, complete with a summary of the evidence supporting 

the decision. Provide the arbitrator’s final decision to the appointing authority and the 

parties in dispute. The guiding principle of arbitration is that the decision of the 

arbitrator is final. 

e. The arbitration procedure is a useful tool in reaching finality, resolving complex 

issues, unusual factual questions, or matters where the parties reach an impasse, 

despite the application of less formal negotiation sessions. Important considerations 

in arbitration are the structured nature of the method, selection of an impartial and 

trained arbitrator, willingness of each participating party to accept the finality of the 

arbitrator's decision-making power, and the formal nature of the arbitration process 

(adherence to strict rules and procedures). Two forms of arbitration are binding and 

nonbinding: 

(1) Binding arbitration refers to situations where local representatives agree to 

comply with the arbitrator's decision before the proceedings. 

(2) Nonbinding arbitration refers to situations where parties are not compelled to 

comply with the arbitrator's decision.
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 117 

Appendix A

SETTING UP AND CONDUCTING MEETINGS 

1. Background 

Interpersonal engagements and meetings are essential for successful accomplishment 

of peace operations (PO) objectives. Meetings facilitate establishing personal and 

professional relationships and set conditions for future negotiations. Successful 

outcomes of meetings are functions of thorough preparation and meeting management 

techniques. 

Note: For the purpose of this publication, the term engagement describes interaction 

with the populace of a foreign country, including interaction with military and civil 

authorities. It does not replace the definition of military engagement found in JP 1-02, 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, but is meant to 

supplement it by including the populace in general. For more detailed information on 

engagement operations, see Air Land Sea Application Multi-Service Tactics Techniques 

and Procedures for Engagement Teams. 

2. Commander and Staff’s Role in Developing the Engagement Strategy 

a. A commander sets the tone for all engagements conducted by subordinates 

through the establishment and expression of a vision on host nation (HN) personnel 

interaction. The commander promotes engagement by adhering to the following 

guidelines: 

(1) Develops a robust engagement strategy. 

(2) Provides a guided purpose, intent, and desired end state for engagements in 

support of the unit mission. 

(3) Develops and disseminates unit themes and messages. 

(4) Fosters a culture of engagement and interaction. 

(5) Develops reporting requirements supporting the gathering of atmospheric 

information. 

(6) Ensures pertinent information gathered from engagements is properly 

transmitted, disseminated, and analyzed both up and down the chain of 

command (e.g., civil information management, key local leader contact 

database). 

(7) Resources and organizes the staff to facilitate engagements (e.g., staffing, 

funds, time). 

(8) Employs information-related capabilities, public affairs, or military information 

support operations for advice and assistance. 

(9) Personally conducts engagements. 

(10) Develops engagement-training requirements (e.g., culture, language, 

negotiation). 

(11) Provides guidance for collaborating with joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, and multinational partners. 
118 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

b. Commanders are key “engagers” within a unit because their position and 

authority has the greatest degree of credibility and access. Commanders maximize 

interactions with the local populace to accomplish the following: 

(1) Assess attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors first hand. 

(2) Sense shifts in perceptions, positive and negative, and take appropriate 

action. 

(3) Engender trust and confidence of the local populace. 

(4) Understand social networks in the area of operations (AO). 

(5) Identify local key leaders and trusted, credible voices, formal and informal. 

(6) Bolster confidence in and consensus behind deserving local leaders. 

(7) Deliver messages. 

(8) Assess how effectively units synchronize words, images, and actions and 

make appropriate refinements. 

(9) Counter adversary information and disinformation quickly. 

(10) Ensure subordinate leaders are effectively engaging the populace. 

c. The commander’s intent, guidance, and mission narrative provide the foundation 

for the staff to develop plans and orders using engagements for shaping and 

supporting operations. The staff: 

(1) Develops an overall engagement strategy supporting the commander’s line of 

effort. 

(2) Coordinates information capabilities supporting planning and execution of the 

engagement strategy and avoiding information fratricide. 

(3) Assists the commander in writing mission narrative and themes. 

(4) Utilizes a targeting process, integrates and synchronizes deliberate 

engagements, and ensures deconfliction. 

(5) Analyzes target audiences or individuals of interest; providing information on 

targeted audience. 

(6) Develops military information support products and delivery. 

(7) Collects and maintains engagement information. 

(8) Assesses results of engagement strategy. 

(9) Recommends, coordinates, and refines future engagements and 

reengagements. 

3. Meeting Types and Purposes 

a. Meetings or engagements range from informal one-on-interactions to large 

group gatherings. The meeting types below include the following aspects: 

(1) Introduction. Commanders or their designated representative introduce 

themselves to prominent leaders (political, social, religious, etc.,) and encourage 

continual dialog between and among all parties. The purpose is getting to know 

the key influencers in the AO and fostering a habitual relationship. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 119 

(2) Coordination. The PO mission coordinates with a broad range of local 

leaders or influencers facilitating access to areas, structures, people, etc., 

supporting a detailed assessment, survey, or operation. 

(3) Periodic or Habitual. Transparency, trust, and credibility rarely happen after a 

single meeting. Undertake efforts engaging key leaders or influencers on an 

ongoing basis. Interagency, interorganizational, and intergovernmental 

relationships and cooperation benefit from engagement. 

(4) Deliberate. Meetings with key leaders or influencers are deliberate. They are 

scheduled, planned, rehearsed in advance, and follow a set format and agenda. 

(5) Dynamic. At the individual Solider, Sailor, Airman, and Marine level, meetings 

or engagements are spontaneous or impromptu. For example, meetings occur as 

a natural consequence of a unit conducting a patrol or convoy. 

(6) Joint Committees. Establish joint committees in the peace agreement or 

accord assisting its implementation. 

b. Meetings enable the following desired outcomes: 

(1) Give voice to local concerns or grievances and priorities. Stability, credibility, 

trust, and consent are possible when addressing local issues or, at the very least, 

hearing them. Active listening is a powerful means fostering cooperation and 

advancing conversation in positive ways. 

(2) Allow discussion on mutual concerns. It is rarely possible to achieve PO 

objectives forcibly. They come about because ongoing dialog enables all sides to 

express their concerns and desires and work in cooperation to find common 

ground among competing interests and priorities. 

(3) Enable rapid communication of incidents, accidents, and emergencies and 

promote unified action to resolve them. Meetings are especially necessary when 

a serious incident has occurred involving coalition or United States (US) forces 

and military investigators must work with local authorities on the incident 

investigation. 

(4) Serve as opportunities to inform and influence key leaders or influencers on a 

range of issues. In many cultures, face-to-face meetings are the most effective 

means of influencing outcomes that align with PO unit objectives. In addition, the 

best way to disseminate information out to wider audiences is through key 

leaders or influencers. 

“Commanders must build teams—joint and interagency partners—and they must 

be able to understand complex environments and information (that are available) 

to influence friends and adversaries.” 

 LTG Robert L. Caslen, Jr. 
120 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

4. Principles of Engagement 

a. The six principles of engagement are: 

(1) Consistency. 

(2) Culturally attuned. 

(3) Adaptive. 

(4) Credible. 

(5) Balanced. 

(6) Pragmatic. 

b. Consistency. Engagements are consistent and communicate the same essential 

meaning as other operational activities. When audiences perceive engagement 

dialogue (words) as inconsistent with observable behavior (actions), individual 

Service members, US leaders, and the US government lose credibility. 

c. Culturally Attuned. Conduct engagements in the context of local cultural 

customs, beliefs, and methods of communicating. This builds understanding and 

cooperation while mitigating insensitivities and mistrust. Developing messages 

unilaterally from US cultural perspectives and simply translating them into the local 

languages is ineffective because concepts are lost in translation or the message 

conflicts with local views or norms. Leveraging key leaders or actors from target 

audiences allows units to draw on their familiarity and credibility with those same 

key audiences. It increases the likelihood that an interaction informs or influences 

audiences as desired. Units balance using these individuals against security 

concerns. 

d. Adaptive: Adaptability is the ability to shape conditions and respond to a 

changing environment with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions. Effective 

engagement depends on adaptability. Adaptability relies on leaders who think 

critically and use reasonable judgment, are comfortable with ambiguity, are willing to 

accept prudent risk, and have the ability to adjust to evolving situations. Recognizing 

the interpersonal and often cross-cultural nature of engagement, adaptability 

requires a commitment to learning. Successful adaptation requires acknowledging 

that in-depth understanding of the target audience improves communication. 

Engagement characterized by an assumed superiority—a conviction that a 

message’s inherent rightness disqualifies it from audience scrutiny—fails to support 

the conditions necessary for discovering and adopting effective communication 

approaches. Thus, effective engagement is more about dialogue and advising rather 

than dictating expected behavior. 

e. Credible. Successful engagement depends on trust. A fundamental criterion for 

trust is the degree of confidence the populace has in the credibility of the US armed 

forces with whom they interact. Credibility results from an observable, sustained, 

and consistent pattern of factually accurate words and principled deeds attuned to 

the local culture. Openness and transparency, with consideration for operations 

security, are fundamental to this effort. 

f. Balanced. A balanced approach to engagements helps ensure both parties 

benefit from the event. Balance engagement efforts between the inclination to 

create the desired effect and the requirement to actively listen and understand the 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 121 

other’s point of view. Perceptions that an audience’s ideas are irrelevant, 

disrespected, or marginalized are significant obstacles to future engagements and 

achieving a commander’s intent. 

g. Pragmatic. Leaders must have a realistic, “down to earth” approach to 

engagements. Pragmatic engagement accepts the unpredictable nature of personal 

interactions and communications and operates with realistic expectations. HN 

officials do not always act in the people’s best interest due to corruption, 

incompetence, or both, may be uncooperative. Leaders accept prudent risk and 

understand that small setbacks may occur. Leaders cannot control how others 

interpret messages and actions. 

5. The Operations Process Applied to Meetings or Engagements 

Figure 22 is an overview of the operations process for meetings or engagements. 

Figure 21. Operations Process 

a. The following list is a useful guide for the time prior to a meeting or engagement. 

In preparing for meetings or engagements, plan and address the following issues: 

(1) Location of the meeting. 

(2) Security needs. 

(3) Parties in the engagement. 

(4) Reason for the engagement. 

(5) Attendees of the meeting. 

(6) Desired outcomes of the meeting. 
122 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(7) Ways the desired outcomes are achieved. 

(8) Meeting setup (space and personnel). 

(9) Agenda. 

(10) Designate person to keep agenda on track. 

(11) Designate person to observe, take notes, and track promises or 

commitments made during the meeting. 

(12) Designate person to record meeting minutes and enter appropriate 

information into the management system. 

(13) Develop talking points. 

(14) Time of the rehearsal. 

(15) Assign an interpreter if needed, 

(16) Determine accepted cultural norms and protocols. 

(17) Determine important information the personnel; likes or dislikes, biases, 

connections with other key leaders, etc. 

(18) Determine the required frequency of engagement. 

(19) Determine if a follow-up meeting necessary. 

(20) Review existing promises or commitments and determine person 

responsible for follow-up. 

(21) Complete an after-action review. 

b. Table 5 is an example of a worksheet for planning the meeting and capturing 

information. 

 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 123 

Table 5. Meeting Worksheet Example 

Contact: Name/Provincial 

Governor 

Total Miles Used Date, Time: Copy 1 of 1 

Intended Outcome: Provincial Governor agrees to conduct operation establishing........................ 

Intended Outcome or Strategy: 

• Occupy population centers within two 

months 

Counterparts’ Predicted Intended Outcome or 

Strategy: 

• Increase political standing by allowing 

occupancy of population centers 

Information Operations Message: The population becomes supportive of the government as security 

increases. 

Talking Points Supporting Intended 

Outcome 

• Greater security allows progress 

• Increased public sentiment increases 

confidence in leadership 

Order of Events: 

1300: 

1330: 

1445:

Possible Impasse Issues: Offers: 

Counterpart Biography: Exit Strategy: Apologize for only having 2 hours for 

the meeting due to other issues

Coordination Measures: 549th Military Police Company: 1LT Ewing (1st Platoon), 1LT Wilkes (2nd

Platoon), 1LT Harris (3rd Platoon), and 1LT Weisner (4th Platoon) provides area security in designated 

areas of canal zone near Fort Clayton.

Previous Promises Made: 

Promises Kept: 

 
124 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

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1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 125 

Appendix B

LIAISON OFFICER 

1. Background 

a. Liaison is contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of 

military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of 

purpose and action. Effective liaison is critical for peace operations (PO). Create 

unified action between various military, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental 

organizations. 

b. The liaison officer (LNO) is a special staff officer or noncommissioned officer 

responsible for representing the commander at the headquarters (HQ) of another 

organization to effect coordination, integration, and cooperation between the two 

organizations. LNOs establish and maintain physical contact and communications 

between elements of military forces and nonmilitary agencies during unified action. 

Liaison activities ensure cooperation and understanding among commanders and 

staffs of different HQ. Liaison creates understanding of implied or inferred 

coordination measures to achieve synchronized results. 

2. Functions 

LNOs perform several critical functions that are consistent across a range of military 

operations. The allowable extent of performance in a PO is dependent on the mission 

and the charter established by the providing organization’s commander. The four basic 

LNO functions are to monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist. 

(1) Monitor. The LNO must monitor the operations of the sending unit and the 

receiving organization and understand how each affects the other. At a minimum, 

the LNO must monitor the current and planned operations, understand and 

monitor pertinent staff issues, and anticipate potential problems. 

(2) Coordinate. The understanding and procedures the LNO builds while 

monitoring the situation helps synchronize the providing unit’s operations or plans 

with those of the receiving organization by coordinating the communication 

process. 

(3) Advise. The LNO is the receiving organization’s expert on the sending 

command’s capabilities, limitations, and intent. The LNO must be able to advise 

the receiving organization commander and staff on how to synchronize to the 

maximum extent possible with the command they represent. 

(4) Assist. The LNO must assist on two levels. First, the LNO must act as the 

conduit between the sending command and the receiving organization. Second, 

by integrating into boards, meetings, and planning sessions, the LNO can ensure 

those groups make informed decisions. 

3. Liaison Responsibilities 

a. LNOs need to understand the strategic, operational, and tactical aims of the PO. 

An LNO represents a commander and must have the commander’s full confidence 

and experience for the mission. The professional capabilities and personal 

characteristics of an effective LNO encourage confidence. When possible, liaison is 

reciprocal among higher, lower, supporting, and supported organizations. Each 
126 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

organization sends a liaison element to the other. It should be reciprocal when 

placing US forces under control of a headquarters of a different nationality. 

b. The following is a list of tasks for liaison personnel to perform before departing 

the sending unit. 

(1) Understand the sending commander’s intent. 

(2) Receive a briefing from operations, intelligence, and other staff elements on 

current and future operations. 

(3) Receive and understand the tasks from the commander’s staff. 

(4) Obtain the correct maps, traces, and overlays. 

(5) Arrange for transport, communications and cryptographic equipment, codes, 

signal instructions, and the challenge and password—including their protection 

and security. Arrange for replacement of these items as necessary. 

(6) Complete route-reconnaissance and time-management plans so the liaison 

team arrives on time at the designated location. 

(7) Ensure liaison team and interpreters have security clearances and access 

appropriate for the mission. 

(8) Verify the receiving element received the liaison team’s security clearances 

and will grant access to the level of information the mission requires. 

(9) Verify orders. 

(10) Know how to destroy classified information in case of an emergency during 

transit or at the receiving unit. 

(11) Inform the sending unit of the LNO’s departure time, route, arrival time, and, 

when known, the estimated time and route of return. 

(12) Pick up all correspondence designated for the receiving element. 

(13) Conduct a radio check. 

(14) Bring accredited information systems needed to support liaison operations. 

(15) Pack adequate rations and water for use in transit. 

(16) Arrange for the liaison party’s departure. 

c. See ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, for a detailed discussion 

of liaisons for more detailed information.
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 127 

Appendix C

INTERPRETERS 

1. Background 

a. During peace operations (PO), achieving trust, legitimacy, and consent requires 

PO forces to interact with the local populace by speaking their native tongue and 

adhering to their local customs, norms, and traditions. In most instances, individual 

Service members and civilians lack the linguistic ability to communicate personally 

and effectively with the local populace; therefore, using linguists and interpreters 

becomes essential for mission accomplishment. Identifying, selecting, employing, 

and caring for linguists and interpreters require command emphasis and ongoing 

involvement. 

b. A linguist is an expert, not simply in translation, but in the nature of language 

itself, its origins, and history. Linguists do more than simply translate; they strive to 

understand deeper meanings and nuances. Choose linguists when translating 

agreements and other significant documents or for conducting media analysis. They 

typically work at higher levels. This chapter focuses on interpreters. 

c. An interpreter is someone able to translate from one language to another. Some 

are more adept at translating written products, others at verbal exchanges, and 

some at both. 

2. Selecting an Interpreter 

a. Selecting an interpreter is an opportunity for PO forces to influence the outcome 

of the mission. Interpreters come from a number of sources including Service 

members or government civilians with the requisite language skills or training or 

contractors hired before the deployment or immediately after arriving in the area of 

operations (AO). The following guidelines are critical for successful mission 

accomplishment. 

b. Considerations for selecting an interpreter: 

(1) Native Speaker. Find interpreters who are fluent in the language of the AO, 

and the localized dialect. The interpreter’s speech, background, and mannerisms 

are completely acceptable to the target audience so the content is the focus 

rather than the interpreter’s “otherness”. 

(2) Social Status. In some situations and cultures, if the interpreter is perceived 

as having a lower social standing than the audience has, the interpreter is 

ineffective. This includes significant differences in military rank or membership in 

an ethnic or religious group. Regardless of the PO unit’s feelings on social status, 

the job is accomplishing the mission, not to act as an agent for social reform. 

Accept and work with local prejudices. 

(3) English Fluency. An often-overlooked consideration is how well the 

interpreter speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands PO forces and 

PO forces understand the interpreter, then the interpreter’s command of English 

is satisfactory. Check the interpreter’s level of understanding by asking them to 

paraphrase a native-language statement in English. 
128 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(4) Intellectual Agility. Find interpreters who are quick, alert, and responsive to 

changing conditions and situations. An interpreter must be able to grasp complex 

concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence. 

Although education does not equate to intelligence, the better educated the 

interpreter, the better the interpreter is able to perform due to exposure to diverse 

concepts. 

(5) Technical Ability. In certain situations, PO forces need an interpreter with 

technical training or experience in special subject areas. The interpreter needs to 

translate the meaning as well as the words. The interpreter also needs to know 

the specialized vocabulary of the subject matter. For example, a native speaker is 

fluent in both languages but unversed in terminology for medical, mechanical, 

engineering, or military operations. 

(6) Punctuality. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In many 

countries, time is relatively unimportant. Make sure the interpreter understands 

the military’s concern with punctuality. 

(7) Loyalty. If the interpreter is a local national, it is likely the interpreter’s first 

loyalty is to the host nation, or subgroup, and not the US military. Consider the 

security implications when dealing with the interpreter. 

(a) Certain tactical situations require using uncleared indigenous personnel 

as "field expedient" interpreters. Be aware of the increased security risk 

involved in using these personnel and carefully weigh the risk versus potential 

gain. 

(b) If uncleared interpreters are used, keep sensitive information to a 

minimum. 

(8) Gender, Age, and Race. Gender, age, and race of the interpreter affect the 

mission. One example is the status of females in Muslim society. In 

predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions affect the allowable gender 

of the interpreter. Another example is the Balkans, where ethnic divisions limit the 

effectiveness of an interpreter from outside the target audience’s group. Since 

traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, it is important to check 

with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or favorable 

characteristics for interpreters. 

(9) Compatibility. PO forces and interpreters work as a team. The target 

audience is quick to recognize personality conflicts between team members, 

which undermines the effectiveness of the communication effort. If possible, 

when selecting an interpreter, PO forces look for compatible traits and strive for a 

harmonious working relationship. 

(10) Number. Choose more than one interpreter. If several qualified interpreters 

are available, select at least two. Interpreting is an exhausting job; 4 hours is the 

maximum active interpreting time for an interpreter’s peak efficiency. Whatever 

the mission, with two or more interpreters, PO forces provide quality control and 

assistance to the active interpreter. Additionally, this technique is useful when 

conducting coordination or negotiation meetings, as one interpreter is active used 

in an interpreting role and the other pays attention to body language and side 

conversations. Many times, PO forces gain important side information that aids 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 129 

negotiations from listening to what others are saying outside of the main 

discussion. 

(11) Knowledge of Target Population. A careful analysis of the target population 

is necessary. Mature judgment, thoughtful consideration of the audience as 

individuals, and a genuine concern for an accurate information exchange is 

important for accomplishing the mission. 

(12) Reputation and Social Standing. Hire honest interpreters who are free from 

unfavorable notoriety among the local inhabitants, and whose reputation or 

standing in the community is such that persons of higher rank and standing do 

not intimidate them. 

(13) Mutual Respect and Rapport. The interpreter is a vital link to the target 

audience. An uncooperative or unsupportive interpreter jeopardizes the mission. 

Mutual respect and understanding between PO forces and the interpreter are 

essential to effective teamwork. Establish rapport early in the relationship and 

maintain it throughout the joint effort. 

3. Training the Interpreter 

a. As part of the initial training, tactfully convey the military member always directs 

the interview. Put the interpreter’s role in proper perspective; ensure the interpreter 

understands they are there to facilitate the conversation rather than to participate in 

it. Stress the interpreter’s importance as a vital communication link between the 

military member and the target audience. Appeal to the interpreter’s professional 

pride by clearly describing how the quality and quantity of the information is directly 

dependent upon their interpreting skills. 

b. Some interpreters, because of cultural differences, attempt to "save face" by 

concealing a lack of understanding. The interpreter may attempt to translate without 

asking for a clarification or vice versa. Because this results in misinformation and 

confusion, and impacts credibility, PO forces emphasize the need to ask questions 

when there is doubt. 

c. Initially, direct the interpreter to translate literally or directly. After building trust 

with the interpreter and the target audience, ask the interpreter for an idea-to-idea 

versus a literal translation when appropriate. 

4. Communication Techniques When Employing an Interpreter 

a. An important first step in communicating through an interpreter is polishing 

personal English language skills. The clearer the English, including diction, the 

easier it is for the interpreter to translate. 

(1) Avoid using profanity, slang, idioms, colloquialisms, and military jargon. In 

many cases, these expressions do not translate easily. If they do translate, they 

do not always retain the desired meaning. Examples such as "Gee Whiz" or 

"Golly" are hard to translate. In addition, if using a technical term or expression, 

be sure the interpreter conveys the proper meaning in the target language. 

(2) Speak in low context, simple sentences. For instance, the military member 

adds words usually left off (such as “air” to the word “plane”). This ensures the 

meaning is obvious, and does not refer to the Great Plains or a wood plane. 

Avoid flowery language. 
130 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(3) Think about what to say, break it down into logical bits, and say it in short 

sentences. Use short, simple words, and low context for quick and easy 

translation. As a rule of thumb, never say more in one sentence than the 

interpreter can easily repeat word for word immediately after saying it. Each 

sentence contains a complete thought. 

(4) Use transitional phrases and qualifiers sparingly, because they confuse the 

audience and waste valuable time. Examples include “for example,” “in most 

cases,” “maybe,” and “perhaps.” 

(5) Be cautious of using American humor. Cultural and language differences lead 

to misinterpretations by other cultures. The peacekeeper works with the 

interpreter and determines what is easiest to understand and translate 

meaningfully early in the training process. 

(6) Identify cultural restrictions before interviewing, instructing, or conferring with 

particular foreign nationals. For instance, when is it proper to stand, sit, or cross 

one's legs? Gestures vary from culture to culture. The interpreter relates these 

cultural restrictions, and the Service member uses them, whenever possible, in 

working with a particular group or individual. 

(7) Speak slowly and clearly. This requires conscious effort for most Americans, 

who tend to speak quickly. The individual in the conversation may have some 

formal training in English, but not enough for them to be comfortable conversing 

without an interpreter. By speaking slowly and enunciating your words, the 

individual has a much better chance of understanding the meaning directly. 

Speaking slowly also gives the interpreter time to process and translate the 

words accurately. Repeat statements as often as necessary. 

b. Techniques for working with an interpreter: 

(1) Position the interpreter by the peacekeeper’s side (or even a step back). This 

keeps the subject or audience from shifting their attention or fixating on the 

interpreter. 

(2) Always look at and talk directly to the subject or audience. Guard against the 

tendency to talk to the interpreter. 

(3) Do not address the subject or audience in the third person through the 

interpreter. Avoid saying, "tell them I'm glad to be their instructor." Rather say, 

"I'm glad to be your instructor." Address the subject or audience directly. 

(4) Speak to the individual or group as if they understand English. Be 

enthusiastic and employ the gestures, movements, voice intonations, and 

inflections that an English-speaking group uses. 

(5) Side comments to the interpreter that are not for translation create the wrong 

atmosphere for communication and are a distraction. 

(6) While the interpreter is translating and the subject or audience is listening, 

avoid doing anything distracting. Do not pace the floor, write on the blackboard, 

teeter on the lectern, drink beverages, or carry on other distracting activity while 

the interpreter is actually translating. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 131 

(7) Periodically check the interpreter’s accuracy, consistency, and clarity. Ideally, 

have another American, fluent in the language, sit in on a lesson, or interview. 

This assures the translation is not distorted, intentionally or unintentionally. 

(a) If multiple interpreters are available, one technique is using another 

trusted interpreter to verify the interpretation and discretely report 

discrepancies after the engagement is complete. Another way is learning the 

target language, which allows a check of the interpreter’s loyalty and honesty. 

(b) Check with the audience if military members suspect they are 

misunderstood, they stop immediately and clarify the information. Using the 

interpreter, ask questions eliciting answers that let the military member 

determine if the point is clear. If it is not clear, rephrase the instruction and 

illustrate the point again. 

(c) Use repetition and examples whenever necessary facilitating learning. If 

the class asks few questions, this may mean the peacekeeper or the 

interpreter are not getting the message across. 

Note: When military members acquire effective interpreters, make them feel like 

valuable members of the team. Give interpreters recognition commensurate with the 

importance of their contribution. 
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1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 133 

Appendix D

CIVIL COMPONENT ANALYSIS AND TEMPLATING 

1. Background 

a. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) is the process 

commanders and their staffs follow to analyze an enemy (threat) situation and its 

effect on military operations. Civil component analysis is the process by which 

commanders and their staffs analyze the civil component of an area of operations 

(AO) determining how it can help, hinder, or affect military operations. During peace 

operations (PO), the military has civil-military components supporting nation 

assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, and support to civil administration 

operations. 

b. IPOE is a function of all staff members, with the staff intelligence officer taking the 

lead in guiding the staff through the process. Civil component analysis is also a 

function of all staff members, but civil component analysis is most effective when 

guided by the civil-military operations (CMO) staff officer. 

c. Analysis of the civil component of the operational environment includes 

developing information critical to planning PO populace control measures. While not 

all-inclusive, answering the following questions provides a common framework for 

civil information requirements: 

(1) What is the characterization of the operational environment (permissive, 

uncertain, or hostile)? 

(2) What is the status and character of the indigenous civil government? 

(3) Do the civil government public safety authorities have the capability and 

capacity to maintain public order within the AO? 

(4) What are the numbers, ethnicities, demographics, religious affiliations, and 

concentrations of the indigenous population within the AO? 

(5) Does a significant dislocated civilian (DC) population currently exist? 

(6) What are the numbers, ethnicities, demographics, points of origin, directions 

of movement, and modes of transportation of the DC population? 

(7) What is the assessment of key indigenous organizations influencing the 

population (political, religious, economic, and private sector)? 

(8) What is the attitude of the indigenous population (supportive, neutral, or 

hostile)? 

(9) What is the assessment of key intergovernmental organizations and 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the AO? 

(10) What amount and type of physical damage is affecting the civil government, 

particularly in the areas of medical, transportation, public utilities, and 

communications infrastructure? 

(11) What authority exists for the implementation of populace control measures? 

(12) Do the existing rules of engagement address populace control, such as 

crowd and riot control, criminal activity, and looting? 
134 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

d. A simple technique for analyzing civil considerations is for the commander or 

planner to answer the following questions: 

(1) What civilians are in the AO? 

(2) What activities are civilians engaged in affecting CMO? 

(3) How do the CMO affect civilian activities? 

2. Civil Considerations 

a. Civil considerations influencing military operations include fabricated 

infrastructure, civilian institutions, and the attitudes and activities of the civilian 

leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO. At the operational and tactical 

levels, civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on 

the operational knowledge of the civil component, and enhance the commander's 

decision process for selecting objectives, locations, movement, control of forces, use 

of weapons, and force protection measures. 

b. Civil considerations affect larger, long-term diplomatic, economic, and 

informational issues. Discounting issues taxes military or government resources and 

hinders transition of operations to follow-on elements. If the military mission is 

supporting civil authorities, the civil considerations listed above define the mission. 

c. Civil considerations are continually analyzed. CMO planners (civil-military 

operations staff section: J-9), coordinate with numerous organizations and provide 

conduits for information sharing and support requests. The CMO staff also 

synchronizes and integrates civilian activities with military operations, compiles 

relevant information on the civil environment, and performs analysis supporting the 

commander's assessment. CMO planning eases the transition to civilian control from 

the outset of an operation. 

d. CMO planners ensure their input to the planning process supports the 

commander’s objectives by factoring civil vulnerabilities into unit operations. They 

analyze the following variables in an AO: political, governance, military, security, 

economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) identifying operational 

conditions in the local area. Strategic and operational factors focusing on the 

population include areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events 

(ASCOPE). 

3. PMESII 

a. PMESII describes specific variables of an AO, and helps staffs determine the 

strengths and weaknesses of forces while estimating the effects military actions 

have on the AO across these variables. 

(1) Political. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and 

power at all levels of governance. Political structures and processes enjoy 

varying degrees of legitimacy with populations from local through international 

levels. Formally, constituted authorities and informal or covert political powers 

strongly influence events. Political leaders use ideas, beliefs, actions, and 

violence to enhance their power and control over people, territory, and resources. 

Many sources of political motivation exist. These include charismatic leadership; 

indigenous security institutions; and religious, ethnic, or economic communities. 

Political opposition groups or parties also affect the situation. Each cooperates 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 135 

differently with the United States (US) or multinational forces. Understanding the 

political circumstances helps commanders and staffs recognize key organizations 

and determine the aims and capabilities of the organizations. 

(a) Understanding political implications requires analyzing relevant 

partnerships—political, economic, military, religious, and cultural. This 

analysis captures the presence and significance of external organizations and 

other groups, including groups united by a common cause. Examples include 

private security organizations, transnational corporations, and 

nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance. 

(b) A political analysis also addresses the effect of will. Will is a primary 

intangible factor; it motivates participants to sacrifice and persevere against 

obstacles. Understanding what motivates key groups (for example, political, 

military, and insurgent) helps commanders understand the groups’ goals and 

willingness to sacrifice to achieve their ends. 

(c) The political variable includes the US domestic political environment. 

Mission analysis and monitoring the situation include an awareness of 

national policy and strategy. 

(2) Military. The military variable includes the military capabilities of all armed 

forces in a given operational environment. For many states, an army is the 

military force primarily responsible for maintaining internal and external security. 

Paramilitary organizations and guerrilla forces influence friendly and hostile 

military forces. Militaries of other states not directly involved in a conflict also 

affect them. Therefore, analysis includes the relationships of regional land forces 

to the other variables. Understanding these factors helps commanders estimate 

actual capabilities for each armed force. Analysis focuses on each organization’s 

ability to field and use capabilities domestically, regionally, and globally. Military 

analysis examines the capabilities of enemy, adversary, host-nation, and 

multinational military organizations. Capabilities analyzed include: 

(a) Equipment. 

(b) Manpower. 

(c) Doctrine. 

(d) Training levels. 

(e) Resource constraints. 

(f) Leadership. 

(g) Organizational culture. 

(h) History. 

(i) Nature of civil-military relations. 

(3) Economic. The economic variable encompasses individual and group 

behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources. Specific 

factors include the influence of the following on the economic variable: 

(a) Industrial organizations. 

(b) Trade. 

(c) Development (including foreign aid). 
136 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(d) Finance. 

(e) Monetary policies and conditions. 

(f) Institutional capabilities. 

(g) Geography. 

(h) Legal constraints (or the lack of them) on the economy. 

Note: Indicators measuring potential benefits or costs of changing a political-economic 

order enhance a commander’s understanding of the social and behavioral dynamics of 

friendly, adversary, and neutral entities. Differences in local economies significantly 

influence political choices, including individuals’ decisions to support or subvert the 

existing order. Many factors create incentives or disincentives for individuals and groups 

to change the economic status quo. 

(4) Social. The social variable describes societies within an operational 

environment. A society is a population whose members are subject to the same 

political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share 

a sense of identity. Societies are not monolithic. They include diverse social 

structures. Social structure refers to the relations among groups of persons within 

a system of groups. It includes institutions, organizations, networks, and similar 

groups. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, discusses socio-cultural factors 

analysis and social network analysis. 

(a) Culture comprises shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and 

artifacts society members use to cope with their world and with one another. 

Societies have a dominant culture and may have many secondary cultures. 

Different societies share similar cultures, but societal attributes change over 

time. Changes occur in any of the following areas: 

• Demographics. 

• Religion. 

• Migration trends. 

• Urbanization. 

• Standards of living. 

• Literacy and nature of education. 

• Cohesiveness and activity of cultural, religious, or ethnic groups. 

(b) Social networks, social status, and related norms and roles supporting 

and enabling individuals and leaders require analysis. This analysis also 

addresses societies outside the operational area whose actions, opinions, or 

political influence affect the mission. 

(c) People base their actions on perceptions, assumptions, customs, and 

values. Cultural awareness identifies points of friction within populations, 

builds rapport, and reduces misunderstandings. It improves the commander’s 

insight into individual and group intentions and enhances the unit’s 

effectiveness. However, US forces require training in cultural awareness 

before deploying to an unfamiliar operational environment and continuous 

updating while deployed. Commanders develop their knowledge of the 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 137 

societal aspects within their areas of operations to a higher level of cultural 

awareness. This gives them an understanding of how their operations affect 

the population and prepares them to meet local leaders face-to-face. 

(5) Information. Joint doctrine defines the information environment as the 

aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, 

disseminate, or act on information (see Joint Publication 3-13, Information 

Operations). The environment shaped by information includes leaders, decision 

makers, individuals, and organizations. The global community’s access and use 

of data, media, and knowledge systems occurs in the information shaped by the 

operational environment. Commanders use information activities to shape the 

operational environment as part of their operations. 

(a) Media representatives significantly influence the information shaping the 

operational environment. Broadcast and Internet media sources rapidly 

disseminate competing views of military operations worldwide. Media 

coverage influences US political decision making, US popular opinion, and 

multinational sensitivities. Adversaries often use media coverage to further 

their aims by controlling and manipulating how audiences perceive a 

situation’s content and context. 

(b) Global telecommunications networks provide immense amounts of 

information. Observers and adversaries have unprecedented access to 

multiple information sources. They attempt to influence and counter opinion 

by providing their own interpretation of events. Televised news and 

propaganda reach many people. However, in developing countries, 

information flows by less sophisticated means such as messengers and 

graffiti. Commanders need an understanding of the nature of information flow 

within their AO and apply the best available methods when communicating 

with the local populace. 

(6) Infrastructure. Infrastructure comprises the basic facilities, services, and 

installations a society needs to function. Degrading infrastructure affects the 

entire operational environment. Infrastructure includes technological 

sophistication—the ability to conduct research and development and apply the 

results to civil and military purposes. 

(a) Not all segments of society view infrastructure in the same way. Others 

may perceive improvements viewed as beneficial by some as a threat. For 

example, introducing cellular networks helps a local economy, but offends 

influential and conservative local leaders who view it as permitting access to 

salacious material. 

(b) Actions affecting infrastructure require a thorough analysis of possible 

effects. 

4. ASCOPE 

ASCOPE is population-focused in contrast to a traditional area assessment. ASCOPE 

organizes and examines strategic and operational factors for their relevance to local 

stability. 
138 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

a. Areas. Areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s AO 

not typically categorized as militarily significant. Failure to consider key areas 

seriously affects the success of the military mission. A commander analyzes key 

areas from two perspectives: how do these areas affect the military mission, and 

how do military operations affect civilian activities in these areas? At times, the 

answers to these questions dramatically influence the courses of action considered 

by the commander. Examples are: 

(1) Locations of government centers. These areas are richer, more populated, 

better educated, and contain greater and more advanced infrastructure than 

outlying areas. They are frequently the center of influence over the populace in 

outlying areas. Depending on mission priorities, commanders may consider 

aggressively engaging these areas rather than bypassing them. 

(2) Areas defined by political boundaries (e.g., districts within a city, or 

municipalities within a region). Political boundaries are often well defined and 

respected by political leaders and the area’s population. Commanders consider 

overlaying unit boundaries on political boundaries for practical control purposes 

during long-term operations. 

(3) Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves. These are sources of potential 

problems and may threaten force protection. 

(4) Agricultural, mining regions and trade routes. Routine economic activities 

hinder the movement or staging of military resources. Interfering with operations 

related to the economy of an area places an unnecessary burden on military units 

or logistical resources in the area. 

(5) Potential sites for temporary settlement of displaced persons (DPs) or other 

civil functions. The same considerations making a site ideal for positioning a 

military unit also make it ideal for a DC camp or other types of settlement. 

Commanders consider the long-term practical and environmental consequences 

of occupying specific civil areas. 

b. Structures. Existing structures take on many significant roles. Some, such as 

bridges, communication towers, power plants, and dams, are traditionally high payoff targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals, are 

cultural sites generally protected by international law or other agreements. Others 

are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, 

television stations, radio stations, and printing plants and are useful for military 

purposes. Analyzing structures involves determining their location, function, 

capability, and application supporting military operations. It involves weighing the 

consequences of removing them from civilian use in terms of political, economic, 

religious, social, informational implications, reactions of the populace, replacement 

costs, etc. 

c. Capabilities. View capabilities from several perspectives. The term capability 

refers to the following: 

(1) Existing capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, through public 

administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agricultural 

systems. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 139 

(2) Capabilities the populace needs assistance with, such as public works and 

utilities, public health, economy, and commerce. 

(3) Contract resources and services supporting the military mission, such as 

interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local 

vendors, the host nation (HN), or other nations provide these resources and 

services. In hostile territory, military forces take and use civil capabilities and 

resources consistent with international law. 

(4) Civil affairs (CA) identifies the capabilities of partner countries and 

organizations involved in the operation. They make recommendations on 

addressing shortfalls and capitalizing on strengths and capabilities. 

d. Organizations. Organizations are organized groups affiliated with government 

agencies. They include church groups; fraternal, patriotic, or service organizations; 

community watch groups, and NGOs. Civil organizations assist the commander by 

keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and 

influencing the actions of civilians. They form the nucleus of self-help programs, 

interim-governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities. 

e. People. Individually or collectively, nonmilitary personnel affect a military 

operation positively, negatively, or in a neutral manner. The term “people” includes 

all the civilians in or around an AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence 

affect the military mission. In PO, US forces prepare to work closely with civilians of 

all types. When analyzing civil considerations, consider the questions listed below. 

(1) What types of civilians do PO forces encounter in the AO? There are many 

different kinds of civilians living and operating in and around a given AO; it is 

useful to separate the term into distinct categories. In foreign operations, these 

categories include local nationals; HN civil authorities; expatriates; foreign 

employees of multinational corporations; international relief organizations; US 

Government and third nation government agency representatives; United Nations 

representatives; contractors; morale welfare and recreation personnel; 

Department of Defense (DOD) civilians; and the media. 

(2) What activities are civilians engaged in affecting operations? The type of 

environment in which activities occur dictates civilian activities. Consider each 

category of civilian activity separately, because activities have different effects, 

positive and negative, on planning factors and warfighting functions. 

f. Events. Many categories of civilian events affect the military mission. Some 

examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations 

(voluntary and involuntary), creating DPs. Military events also affect the lives of 

civilians in an AO. Some examples are combat operations, including indirect fires, 

deployments and redeployments, and payday. Once an analyst determines what 

events are occurring, it is useful to analyze the events for their political, economic, 

psychological, environmental, and legal implications. Table 6 shows the relationship 

between PMESII and ASCOPE when they are used to assess the AO. 

 
140 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Table 6. PMESII and ASCOPE Matrix 

P 

Political Governance: 

Political actors, 

agendas, government 

capability, and 

capacity. 

A 

Areas: Key elements of 

the formal, informal, 

and shadow systems of 

government, which 

significantly influence 

the local population. 

Why is the factor relevant to 

the local population? How 

does it affect stability? 

M 

Military or Security: 

Capabilities in the area 

of operations (e.g., 

equipment, mission, 

and resource 

constraints). 

S Structures: Key 

elements influencing 

the security situation. 

Why is the factor relevant to 

the local population? How 

does it affect stability? 

E 

Economic: Trade, 

development, finance, 

institutional 

capabilities, 

geography, and 

regulation. 

C 

Capabilities: Key 

elements influencing 

economic activity in the 

area. 

Why is the factor relevant to 

the local population? How 

does it affect stability? 

S 

Social: Demographics, 

migration trends, 

urbanization, living 

standards, literacy and 

education level, etc. 

O 

Organizations: Key 

elements describing or 

influencing traditional 

social dynamics in an 

area. 

Why is the factor relevant to 

the local population? How 

does it affect stability? 

I 

Infrastructure: Basic 

facilities, services, and 

installations. 

P 

People: All civilians 

within an AO (the 

populace) as well as 

those outside the AO 

whose actions, 

opinions, or political 

influence can affect the 

mission. 

Why is the factor relevant to 

the local population? How 

does it affect stability? 

I 

Information: Means of 

communicating using 

media, 

telecommunications, 

and word of mouth. 

E 

Events: Events are 

routine, cyclical, 

planned, or 

spontaneous activities 

that significantly affect 

organizations, people, 

and military operations. 

Why is the factor relevant to 

the local population? How 

does it affect stability? 

 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 141 

5. Cultural Environment 

The cultural matrix in Table 7 assists in the identification of major groups. Efforts to 

understand local conditions, grievances, and norms; cultural characteristics; and 

religious beliefs are important. 

Table 7. Cultural Matrix 

Major Cultural 

Groups Interests 

Cultural Codes, 

Traditions, and 

Values 

Traditional Conflict 

Resolution 

Mechanics 

Identify the major 

cultural groups in 

the area of 

operations. 

Identify the things 

cultural groups care 

about or consider to 

be valuable, both 

material and 

intangible. 

Identify cultural codes, 

traditions, and values 

the major cultural 

groups live by. 

Identify how conflicts 

between individuals 

and groups have 

been traditionally 

resolved. 

Traditional Authorities Disruption of Authorities and 

Mechanisms 

How Malign Actors and 

Stabilizing Forces Leverage 

Cultural Factors 

Identify the traditional 

authorities to whom the 

locals give respect or 

normally turn to for 

assistance. 

Describe what new actors or 

conditions have disrupted the 

traditional conflict resolution 

mechanisms or undermine the 

influence of traditional 

authorities. 

Describe how malign actors 

leverage or exploit these 

cultural factors to their 

advantage. Also, consider how 

peacekeeping forces could 

leverage these factors. 

a. Local nationals are town and city dwellers, farmers, other rural dwellers, and 

nomads in the AO. Answering the following questions provides data for analyzing 

the people factor. 

(1) Do they face disruption in their daily lives to the point they require outside 

assistance or are the local nationals going about their daily activities peacefully? 

(2) Are they evacuating their homes for safer rear areas, clogging the major 

supply route, and placing a burden on limited resources to sustain them? 

(3) Are they staying put in basements and other temporary shelters? 

(4) Are they supportive or unsupportive of US military presence? 

(5) What resources do they have available for purchased or obtained by contract 

to augment our logistics needs? 

b. HN civil authorities are elected or appointed and traditional leaders serve at all 

levels of government. The following questions help in evaluating the leadership 

situation: 

(1) How much influence do the leaders have over their constituents? 

(2) Are they supportive of US military presence or are they inciting the local 

nationals against the military? 

(3) Do the leaders have viable civil defense plans and the capability to 

implement the plans? 

(4) Are they seeking direct assistance to alleviate their plight? 
142 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

(5) Can they provide useful information about the AO? 

c. Use the following questions to evaluate the involvement of United Nations (UN) 

representatives: 

(1) What UN agencies are present and what are their charters? 

(2) What is the relationship between military and UN operations? 

(3) Are very important persons expected in the AO? 

d. US agency and third nation government representatives are members of the 

country team. The following questions will help with integration: 

(1) What US and third nation government agencies are in the AO and how do 

their operations relate to the US military? 

(2) What useful information do they have? 

(3) Are liaison officers needed? 

e. Contractors consist of US citizens, local nationals, and third nation citizens 

providing contract services to military operations. The following questions will help 

with integration: 

(1) What contractors are present and what support activities are they providing? 

(2) Do they need US military resources such as security, subsistence, real 

estate? 

(3) DOD civilians are not contractors. DOD civilians play a role in combat support 

and combat service support. How many DOD civilians are in the AO and what 

roles do they play in the organization? 

f. Use the following questions to evaluate the media including journalists from print, 

radio, and visual media: 

(1) Are they self-sufficient, or do they require support such as transportation and 

security? 

(2) Does coverage of military activities help or hinder the overall mission? 

(3) What aspects of the area is the focus of the media? 

g. Military operations affect civilian activities in various ways. In PO, commanders 

consider the political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal impacts of 

their operations on the categories of civilians they have identified in their AO. The 

following are examples of the types of questions CA personnel and staff planners 

consider for the warfighting functions' activities in foreign operations. 

(1) Political. 

(a) Do operations support the overall political objective of the military 

mission? 

(b) Do actions improperly or inappropriately favor one group faction or leader 

over another? 

(c) Can opposing political groups, factions, or leaders exploit military actions? 

(2) Economic. 

(a) Is military seaport, airport, or highway traffic interfering with commercial or 

developmental traffic in the AO? 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 143 

(b) Are military operations attracting large numbers of vendors to the AO? 

(c) Is the local community truly benefiting from the military presence or are 

the actual beneficiaries’ inappropriate or criminal elements? 

(3) Psychological. 

(a) Do military efforts mitigating hardship influence the amount of cooperation 

the military receives from the populace? 

(b) Are military forces doing everything possible ensuring proper care for 

innocent victims? 

Note: Negative public sentiment directed toward US forces often creates force 

protection issues from asymmetric threats. Commanders consider this in the operations 

security plans. 

(4) Environmental. 

(a) What effect are military operations having on shelters, infrastructure, and 

subsistence mechanisms in the AO? 

(b) Does PO planning properly take into account contractor and DOD civilian 

ability to support the mission? 

(c) Do contractors have enough freedom of movement throughout the AO to 

be effective? 

(5) Legal. 

(a) During all overseas operations, US forces adhere to customary 

international law (CIL) and the law of war minimizing harm to noncombatants 

and their property. The commander’s primary responsibilities are the 

successful completion of the mission and protecting PO forces. 

(b) Pursuant to the law of armed conflict (e.g., Geneva Conventions and 

CIL), US forces are under no affirmative legal obligation to provide food, 

water, or shelter to any noncombatants, detainees, or refugees who are not in 

the custody of US forces; unless there has been a declaration of occupation 

ordered by higher headquarters as part of a PO mission. In all other cases, 

the responsibility is with local civil authorities and international relief agencies. 

 
144 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

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1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 145 

Appendix E

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 

1. Background 

a. During peace operations (PO), there are occasions when United States (US)- 

military forces work closely with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs are 

often critical to the overall success of peace operations, and especially important in 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief scenarios. It is imperative US military 

forces understand how to communicate with NGOs as well as their roles, strengths 

and weaknesses. 

b. NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are civilian organizations that 

do not fall into a military-style chain of command structure. They often have limited 

exposure to the military, and it is important to educate them on how the military 

operates. 

c. The number of NGOs and IGOs operating in PO varies from small to very large. 

There are approximately 350 agencies capable of conducting some form of 

humanitarian relief operation. The United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID) collaborates with NGOs and IGOs delivering assistance 

across all regions. USAID publishes a yearly report, entitled “Voluntary Foreign Aid 

Programs” describing the aims and objectives of each registered organization. This 

appendix provides a brief description of several IGOs and NGOs working alongside 

PO forces. 

d. The basic consideration for planners is remembering IGOs and NGOs try to 

preserve their neutrality. For detailed information of specific NGOs, refer to Joint 

Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. NGOs 

and IGOs consist of the following four groups: 

(1) Humanitarian organizations. 

(2) Human rights. 

(3) Civil society and democracy building. 

(4) Conflict resolution. 

2. Organizations 

a. The following list of organizations supporting humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief is representative of many of the larger organizations potentially 

present in PO. 

b. United Nations (UN) Organizations. UN organizations primarily concerned with 

PO include the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 

United Nations disaster management team (UN-DMT), and the United Nations Office 

for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The UN resident 

coordinator (UN-RC) creates a UN-DMT coordinating disaster response. The 

UNHCR has a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees, and displaced 

persons. Except in special circumstances, they conduct material assistance activities 

through national or local authorities of the concerned country, other organizations of 

the UN system, NGOs, IGOs, or private technical agencies. Coordination with the 
146 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

UNHCR is critical for any humanitarian relief effort. Failure to coordinate with 

UNHCR before and during the operation, or failure to meet UNHCR standards, 

precludes the UNHCR from accepting transfers of equipment, supplies, and facilities 

as the military disengages. To preclude this, a commander establishes a working 

relationship with UNHCR immediately upon notification of a mission with UNHCR 

(http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html). 

c. The UN-DMT is the primary agency responsible for coordinating assistance to 

persons compelled to leave their homes because of disasters, natural and 

otherwise. The highest-ranking UN official in a country is the UN-RC. The UN-RC is 

responsible for creating a UN-DMT, to coordinate, exchange information, and seek a 

consensus on disaster-related initiatives. The following UN IGOs help form the UNDMT when mobilizing the UN system to assist in an emergency: The following 

descriptions are on each organization’s website: 

(1) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) promotes the long-range 

incorporation of disaster mitigation in development planning and funds technical 

assistance for all aspects of disaster management. The UNDP appoints a senior 

member as a regional coordinator and serves as the UNOCHA in-country 

coordinator. UNDP also provides administrative assistance support to the 

resident coordinator and to the UN-DMT 

(http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html). 

(2) World Food Programme (WFP) is the food assistance branch of the UN. It 

provides targeted food aid and supports rehabilitation, reconstruction, and riskreducing development programs. Targeted food aid is special subsistence 

aligned to a specific segment of the population. This organization mobilizes and 

coordinates the delivery of complementary emergency and program food aid from 

bilateral and other sources (http://www.wfp.org/). 

(3) United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is a relief-oriented organization. It 

attends to the well-being of children and women, especially child health and 

nutrition. The activities of this organization include social programs; food, in 

collaboration with WFP; water supplies; sanitation and direct health intervention, 

in coordination with the World Health Organization (WHO). UNICEF provides 

related management and logistical support (http://www.unicef.org/). 

(4) The WHO is involved in long-range programs providing advice and 

assistance for all aspects of preventive and curative health care. This assistance 

includes the preparedness of health services for rapid response to disasters 

(http://www.who.int/en/). 

(5) The Food and Agriculture Organization is involved in long-range programs. It 

provides technical advice in reducing vulnerability and helps in the rehabilitation 

of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. The organization emphasizes local food 

production. It also monitors food production, exports, and imports, and forecasts 

requirements for exceptional food assistance (http://www.fao.org/index_en.htm). 

d. The UNOCHA is the focal point for disaster management in the UN system. It 

mobilizes and coordinates international disaster relief, promotes disaster mitigation 

(through the provision of advisory services and technical assistance), and promotes 

awareness, information exchange, and the transfer of knowledge on disaster-related 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 147 

matters. UNOCHA is responsible for maintaining contact with disaster management 

entities and emergency services worldwide, and is able to mobilize specialized 

resources. The appointed UNOCHA resident coordinator has a crucial role in 

providing leadership to the UN team at the country level and coordinates locally 

represented NGOs. The resident coordinator convenes the UN-DMT at country 

level, seeking unity of effort among all the various NGOs and agencies 

(http://www.unocha.org/). 

e. The following NGOs are among the most active worldwide in supporting

humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peace operations. The following 

descriptions are on each organization’s website: 

(1) ActionAid International. They work in partnership with poor and excluded 

people to eradicate poverty and injustice. Their programs focus on advancing 

women's rights, the right to education, food, security during conflict and 

emergencies, to live with dignity in the face of the human immunodeficiency virus 

(HIV) or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), and the right to just and 

democratic governance (http://www.actionaid.org/). 

(2) The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Their motto is “Every person 

deserves to live a healthy and productive life.” Its Global Development Program 

explores the opportunities to help the world’s poorest people lift themselves out of 

hunger and poverty. The Gates Foundation’s Global Health Program leverages 

advances in science and technology to save lives in developing countries 

(http://www.gatesfoundation.org/). 

(3) The American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction). They 

are an alliance of more than 190 US-based international development and 

humanitarian NGOs. InterAction seeks to shape important policy decisions on 

relief and long-term development issues, including foreign assistance, the 

environment, women, health, education, and agriculture. Members are at the 

forefront in responding to humanitarian crises and disasters worldwide and 

InterAction acts as a hub for these efforts (http://www.interaction.org/). 

(4) American Friends of Action Internationale Contre La Faim. They promote 

development efforts and provide emergency assistance in Africa, Asia, and the 

Caribbean. It focuses on primary health care, potable water, environmental 

sanitation, and agriculture-based income generation. The most basic commitment 

is enhancing local capacities at the community and central levels. 

(5) Catholic Relief Services (CRS). They carry out the commitment of the 

Bishops of the United States (US) assisting the poor and vulnerable overseas. 

Their goals is promoting human development by responding to major 

emergencies, fighting disease and poverty, and nurturing peaceful and just 

societies, and live their faith in solidarity with people around the world 

(http://crs.org/). 

(6) Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE). CARE conducts 

relief and development programs in over 40 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin 

America, and the Caribbean. CARE promotes lasting change by strengthening 

capacity for self-help, providing economic opportunity, delivering relief in 

emergencies, and influencing policy decisions at all levels. Programs are carried 
148 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

out under three-way partnership contracts among CARE, private or national 

government agencies, and local communities in the areas of health, nutrition, 

AIDS, population management, natural resources management, agriculture, 

small economic activities, and emergency assistance. CARE provides technical 

assistance, training, food, other material resources, and management in 

combinations appropriate to local needs and priorities. Their particular strength is 

in food distribution, emergency transport, and general logistics 

(http://www.care.org/). 

(7) Concern Worldwide is an international humanitarian organization dedicated 

to working with the world’s poorest people to transform their lives. They work in 

partnership with vulnerable communities tackling poverty and suffering. Concern 

Worldwide uses its knowledge and experience to influence decisions made at 

local, national, and international levels to reduce extreme poverty 

(https://www.concern.net/). 

(8) Doctors without Borders/Médicines Sans Frontières. They provide medical 

assistance to victims of disasters, accidents, and war. The US organization is 

closely associated with its counterparts in Belgium, Holland, Spain, and France. 

Medical relief teams depart on over 700 yearly missions to areas of conflict, 

refugee camps, national disaster sites, and areas lacking adequate health care 

facilities. Their particular areas of expertise are emergency medicine, 

vaccinations, and basic hygiene services (http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/). 

(9) The International Medical Corps (IMC). They are a global humanitarian 

nonprofit organization dedicated to saving lives and relieving suffering through 

health care training and relief and development programs. Established in 1984 by 

volunteer doctors and nurses, IMC is a private, voluntary, nonpolitical, 

nonsectarian organization. Its mission is improving the quality of life through 

health interventions and related activities building local capacity worldwide. The 

IMC provides health care and establishes health-training programs in 

undeveloped countries and distressed areas. It specializes in areas where few 

other relief organizations operate. The goal of IMC is to promote self-sufficiency 

through health education and training. Its particular areas of expertise are 

immunizations and primary health care (https://internationalmedicalcorps.org). 

(10) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, 

neutral, and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is 

to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of 

violence and to assist them. The ICRC assists refugees and internally displaced 

victims of war and civil strife. Services range from refugee resettlement in the US 

to emergency relief and assistance programs. In addition, it provides emergency 

medical support, public health, and small-scale water and sanitation capabilities 

(http://www.icrc.org/eng/). 

(11) International Rescue Committee (IRC). They serve refugees and 

communities victimized by oppression or violent conflict worldwide. Founded in 

1933, the IRC is committed to freedom, human dignity, and self-reliance 

(http://www.rescue.org/). 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 149 

(12) The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 

(IFRC) is the world's largest humanitarian organization, providing assistance 

without discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political 

opinions. The IFRC seeks to prevent and alleviate human suffering, and 

contribute to maintaining and promoting human dignity and peace in the world. 

This society assists other federation members through their international alliance 

provisions (http://www.ifrc.org/). 

(13) Lutheran World Relief (LWR). They provide financial, material, and 

personnel support, usually through counterpart church-related agencies, in the 

areas of disaster relief, refugee assistance, and social and economic 

development. LWR also provides health care (http://lwr.org). 

(14) Save the Children. They are the world's leading independent organization 

for children. They work in almost 120 countries to save children's lives, fight for 

their rights, and help them fulfill their potential. This organization concentrates on 

supplementary feeding, seeds, tools, and general infrastructure 

(http://www.savethechildren.org/site). 

(15) Mercy Corps. They alleviate suffering, poverty, and oppression by helping 

people build secure, productive, and just communities 

(http://www.mercycorps.org/). 

(16) Partners in Health. They provide quality health care to the world's poorest 

and most vulnerable people by working with local partner organizations and 

ministries of health to build and staff hospitals and clinics that treat patients 

regardless of ability to pay (http://www.pih.org/index.php/). 

(17) OXFAM International. They have a vision of a just world without poverty. 

They seek to influence decisions that allow citizens of the world to be valued and 

treated equally (http://www.oxfam.org/). 

(18) World Vision Relief and Development, Inc. They are a Christian relief and 

development organization dedicated to helping children, families, and 

communities worldwide reach their full potential by tackling the causes of poverty 

and injustice. They work in nearly 100 countries, including the US, through 

interventions such as nutrition and safe drinking water programs, poverty relief 

and community development programs, disaster assistance, and more. 

Development programs include child survival, vitamin A, prosthetics and 

handicap rehabilitation, child development, and AIDS prevention and education 

(http://www.worldvision.org/). 

 
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Appendix F

JOINT COMMISSION 

1. Background 

a. The techniques and procedures in this appendix are applicable to military units 

and help when working with host nation leaders and the local populace to bring 

about mutually agreed upon peace arrangements through joint commissions. 

b. In peace operations, joint commissions generally seek to create an opportunity 

for disputing parties to negotiate and implement a peace agreement or a formal 

treaty settlement. A joint commission is composed of two or more governmental, 

nongovernmental, and military entities working together developing an agreement 

reducing, preventing, or countering conflict. 

c. Joint commissions operate at national, regional, and local levels and focus on 

solving political, military, economic, and humanitarian issues. Because joint 

commissions occur at various levels, commanders attend commission meetings at a 

higher headquarters or other locations deemed appropriate. 

2. Objectives of Joint Commissions 

Joint commissions synchronize efforts to implement a joint peace agreement through 

the joint commission system. The terms of a settlement provide mechanisms initiating 

and sustaining a peace process. When military forces seek to implement peace 

mechanisms, they coordinate and work with joint commission members. Joint 

commissions serve the following three functions: 

a. Translate Political Agreements into Actions on the Ground. Gaps and ambiguities 

exist in peace agreements to achieve agreement by all parties. Military forces work 

within the guidelines of these gaps to implement the agreement. 

b. Act as a Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Joint commissions are a way for parties 

to resolve disputes that arise over the course of time. Some disputes are appropriate 

for the joint commission military channels to resolve. However, some disputes are 

purely civil in nature and are not resolved through the joint commission military 

channels. Commanders refer these issues to long-range planning staffs and joint 

commission civil channels for resolution. 

c. Assist in Peace Building. Joint commissions act as vehicles in the reconciliation 

process to help build a sustainable peace. 

(1) Joint commissions identify and support structures that consolidate peace and 

advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. These efforts 

include disarmament programs, restoration of order, repatriating displaced 

civilians, and advisory and training support for security personnel. Additionally 

they advance efforts protecting human rights, reforming or strengthening 

governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of 

political participation. 

(2) At the local level, military forces use this process of teamwork to build other 

mechanisms or institutions promoting a sustainable peace; however, subsequent 

agreements may contribute to other disputes while implementing the peace 

agreement. 
152 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

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1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 153 

Appendix G

MASS ATROCITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS 

1. Background 

a. A mass atrocity refers to widespread and systematic acts of violence against 

civilians or other combatants including killing, causing serious bodily harm, or mental 

harm. Mass atrocities include acts of genocide intended to eliminate a group. 

b. Mass atrocity response operations (MARO) are military activities preventing or 

halting mass atrocities. Incorporate MARO efforts during any phase of a joint 

operation or theater campaign plan in response to concerns about actual or potential 

mass atrocities. 

c. Mass atrocity situations may be difficult to distinguish from other circumstances 

such as political violence, massacres, or violations of human rights, especially during 

the early stages of a conflict or when lower levels of violence have occurred for an 

extended period. Political leadership determines the categorization of situations, as 

an actual or potential mass atrocity. Military commanders incorporate MARO 

considerations in their planning and operations whenever appropriate. 

d. For more information on MARO, reference the MARO publication titled, Mass 

Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook, by the Harvard 

Kennedy School Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the United States (US) 

Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. 

2. MARO Considerations 

a. A MARO is a complex operation, and planning addresses several unique factors. 

Situational understanding, unity of effort, information operations (IO), and 

operational design are all significant planning factors. A MARO combined joint task 

force (CJTF) requires a comprehensive and continuously updated understanding of 

the strategic objectives, operational environment, relevant actors, and conflict 

dynamics. Effective management of information from a variety of nontraditional 

sources is critical for successful planning. 

b. During the early stages of a MARO, strategic guidance for the operation may be 

vague, delayed, incomplete, changing, or conflicting. The military commander 

provides recommendations regarding the guidance. Strategic guidance provides 

clarity on the following issues: 

(1) Actions taken against the host nation (HN) government or its military (if they 

are complicit in the atrocities). 

(2) MARO forces focus on the apprehension of perpetrators. 

(3) Which partners MARO forces coordinate with and in what manner. 

(4) Anticipated actions once the atrocities halt. This addresses any 

responsibilities for post-conflict stabilization, governance, and reconstruction 

including transitioning responsibilities to other actors. 

c. A high degree of political-military interaction in the MARO planning process is 

critical. Civilian authorities resolve most of the issues related to a MARO (e.g., 

identifying perpetrators and addressing the symptoms or root causes). 
154 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

d. Understanding the operational environment provides a situational understanding 

of key geographic and political, military, economic, social, information, and 

infrastructure (PMESII) factors. This identifies significant actors, critical nodes, and 

grievances contributing to the MARO situation. Identification of resiliencies and 

opportunities is important to capitalize on later in the operation. 

(1) The region’s physical features, such as rivers, mountains, coastlines, and 

deserts, significantly affect the MARO crisis and CJTF operations. Perpetrators 

use restrictive terrain such as jungles to facilitate or conceal mass atrocities. 

Mountains, deserts, and cold climates hinder victim survival. Some geographical 

particularities are at the root cause of or serve as flashpoints for conflict. For 

example, river areas are primary sources of water and fertile agricultural land, are 

concentration points for population, and are sources of conflict. 

(2) MARO situations are inherently political. National, transnational, and 

subnational political dynamics affect the crisis and resolution efforts. Political 

dynamics give the planner insight into the main goals of a perpetrator’s actions. 

Key elements include the country’s political structure, political doctrine, centers of 

political power, level of competence, extent of control, and factions complicating 

the problem. The country may be a failed or fragile state with limited central 

government control, or have a totalitarian regime with virtually absolute power. 

Political leaders may attempt to foster ethnic tensions to consolidate power and 

seek scapegoats. Other potential issues affecting the MARO situation include 

levels of corruption, key charismatic leaders, secessionist tendencies of factions, 

and existing peace agreements. It is important to understand who is politically 

dominant and who is subordinate, and who stands to gain from the atrocities. 

(3) The perpetrators may be regular military units operating under the direction of 

the state, rogue military units operating independently, temporary paramilitary 

units, police units, internal security forces, or other armed groups such as rebels, 

militias, gangs, or private armies. Other armed factions may be aligned with 

victim groups (who have developed their own self-defense militias) or uninvolved 

in the mass atrocity. The CJTF needs an understanding of all armed entities; not 

all armed groups may be involved in the mass atrocities, but they can act as 

adversaries or potential partners during a MARO intervention. Security forces, 

including secret police, may be the primary orchestrators of mass atrocities, and 

rival organizations compete with the military and each other for the leader’s favor. 

This accelerates tendencies toward mass atrocities or, alternatively, creates 

vulnerable divisions MARO forces can exploit. The military assessment includes 

identifying actors such as the United Nations (UN), regional peacekeeping forces, 

and neighboring countries, and an overview of their military capabilities relating to 

a MARO intervention. 

(4) The economic assessment identifies economic grievances and drivers of 

conflict affecting the operation; mass atrocity situations develop over a struggle 

for control and access to natural and strategic resources, or because the majority 

resents an economically advantaged minority. The analysis includes key 

considerations about agriculture, manufacturing, trade, gross domestic product, 

natural resources, income distribution, poverty, unemployment, corruption, black 

marketing, narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and humanitarian assistance 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 155 

(HA) needs. If not controlled, HA supplies are at risk for appropriation by 

criminals, military forces, or other armed groups and fuel black market activities. 

The assessment identifies key trading and investment partners, their roles in the 

situation, and their support for and advantage over the government. Consider 

economic sanctions as a means of prevention and response. 

(5) Contrary to conventional wisdom, religious or ethnic diversity itself does not 

necessarily create a greater likelihood for genocide or mass atrocity. The 

manipulation of differences related to tribal, ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, or 

regional differences by perpetrators convincing members of the perpetrating 

group and internal and external bystanders, to participate in or provide support 

for mass atrocities. Planners identify refugee and internally displaced person 

(IDP) camps. They account for previously established camps, either formally or 

spontaneously, and note their populations, conditions, and who controls them. In 

the early stages of a mass atrocity situation, the flow and encampment of 

displaced persons is not evident or easily recognizable. Internal gangs often run 

refugee and IDP camps to the detriment of the refugees and IDPs, or serve as 

safe havens for insurgents and incite government action against the camps. 

Additionally, the camps provide lucrative targets for mass atrocities. Another 

significant societal characteristic is the fear of foreigners (xenophobia), which 

galvanizes national resistance against outsiders, even if the intervention is well 

intentioned. Social issues such as crime, drug use, child soldiers, and human 

trafficking have direct linkages to MARO situations. Finally, the analysis includes 

significant health issues such as diseases, which affect the population and the 

CJTF. 

(6) Analysis address infrastructure relevant to MARO operations, CJTF support, 

and related humanitarian operations and logistics. Key considerations include 

power generation and distribution, road and rail networks, ports, airfields, medical 

systems, water sources, and communications systems. It is useful to prioritize 

new infrastructure projects or old infrastructure requiring replacement, when 

assisting the CJTF’s intervention. Port capacities, airfield capacities, and rail 

capacities are particularly important when deploying and sustaining the operation, 

and are significant to other actors such as nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs). 

(7) An analysis of information handling, both internationally and locally, is critical 

for understanding the dynamics of a mass atrocity, planning a response, and 

deciding the most advantageous use of media and information. International 

media reports about an unfolding mass atrocity are a catalyzing agent for 

response, and shape the perception and prioritization of various elements of an 

operation. Perpetrators and victims act and respond to the situation based on 

how they perceive the international community responds. They are heavily 

influenced by perceptions of international and local media. Perpetrators are less 

likely to conduct mass killings in the direct presence of international observers, 

peacekeepers, or foreign media. Perpetrators attempt to control, or decisively 

shape, the information environment (both international and local). Local and 

national media—whether it is radio, television, word-of-mouth, village 

loudspeakers, or the Internet—are an important part of a perpetrator’s efforts. 
156 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Victim groups use media to campaign for a response or for retribution against the 

perpetrators. Both groups use media to recruit from any group dispersed outside 

their traditional homeland (Diasporas). Information analysis includes details about 

media outlets, i.e., are open or restricted, balanced or partisan. The language 

and rhetoric advanced by perpetrators and victim groups are closely monitored 

by the US (or other relevant) country team, and the CJTF. They focus on 

identifying hate media, inflammatory speeches, and the dehumanization of victim 

groups. They also examine the potential for dissuading or blocking inflammatory 

information and promoting other messages. Planners consider the need for 

additional surveillance and reconnaissance elements. The identification of key 

national, regional, and international audiences and appropriate themes is 

required to support the IO plan. 

3. Actors 

Actors include individuals, organizations, nations, or identity groups based on 

characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, gender, tribe, education, political affiliation, 

economic class, or region. In a MARO situation, the populace views actors as 

perpetrators, victims, interveners, or as bystanders, positive actors, and negative actors. 

Many actors do not fall permanently in a category, and some are simultaneously 

identified as falling into more than one category (for example, a tribal group are victims 

and perpetrators of mass atrocities). 

4. Perpetrators 

a. Perpetrators include those conducting or likely to conduct mass atrocities against 

civilians, and are state or nonstate actors. When the perpetrator is a state, the 

intervening force faces issues of HN no consent, delays, and the potential 

requirement for forcible intervention against organized militaries. State control of a 

mass atrocity may be at the highest level, or the result of decisions made by lowerlevel figures. States use their security forces, paramilitary groups, or proxy forces to 

conduct mass atrocities. Alternatively, independent perpetrators receive informal 

support from the government or operate beyond the government’s control or original 

intentions. Nonstate actors operate without government involvement or in spite of 

government efforts to halt the perpetrators. In failing or fragile states, nonstate actors 

act independently of, or in opposition to, the government because they have 

sufficient local power to do so. Nongovernmental perpetrators are identity-based, 

such as tribal groups, or reflect common ideological factors. 

b. In some situations, multiple belligerents instigate mass atrocities; the level of the 

violence against civilians is uneven or unequal among the parties. Understanding a 

perpetrator’s motivations is essential for determining how to counteract the violence. 

Perpetrators are motivated by identity factors, perceived historical wrongs, territorial 

claims, racism bred out of fear, desire to extend political control or impose a political 

ideology, economic issues, support for criminal enterprises, or establishing a reign 

by terror. Rebel groups conduct mass atrocities to intimidate populations, undermine 

the government’s legitimacy, or provoke a disproportionate response. 

c. Perpetrators adopt a range of strategies; mass atrocities appear to be relatively 

spontaneous and intensely violent, or they evolve incrementally over an extended 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 157 

period initially using lesser measures such as expropriation of possessions, 

relocation, isolation, and gradually reducing resources necessary for survival. 

5. Victims 

a. Victims are civilians who are the direct or indirect targets of the perpetrators’ 

actions, or are at risk. Identifying all the real and potential victims is not a 

straightforward task, and “who is a victim” may shift, depending on the perpetrators 

and interveners’ actions. Displacement or government negligence could cause 

victims to be vulnerable to a variety of indirect threats in addition to direct attacks. 

Victims are easily targeted when concentrated in specific locations or “safe havens.” 

When displaced from their homes for extended periods they will likely become more 

susceptible to disease, starvation, or dehydration. 

b. Women are vulnerable to rape and being forced into slavery. In many societies, 

they face a grim future if they become widows. Rape is a weapon of war in some 

cultures and regions in the world, and commanders need to have appropriate 

reporting and medical procedures in place dealing with these circumstances. 

c. Children are vulnerable to abuse and being forced into slavery. They face an 

uncertain future if they become orphans. Commanders need to have appropriate 

reporting and medical procedures in place dealing with these circumstances. 

d. Victims seek to survive through hiding in place, fleeing to perceived safe havens, 

or organizing resistance. Victimized groups may have, or may develop, some means 

of defense. Large numbers of victims seek security or HA from CJTF units and 

establish camps at their bases. 

e. In the aftermath of an intervention, victims require significant HA and want to 

return to their land, seek justice and retribution against the perpetrators, and 

determine what happened to family members or acquaintances that disappeared 

during the crisis. In many cases, perpetrators target leaders, teachers, doctors, and 

other members of the educated elite, making it difficult for victim groups to selforganize after the violence ceases. This impairs the CJTF’s ability to coordinate with 

victims, and it may need to identify suitable representatives. 

f. Victims and perpetrators may change roles during a conflict—atrocities committed 

by one side may inspire retaliatory atrocities by another, particularly if the MARO 

intervention significantly weakens the initial perpetrators. 

6. Interveners 

a. Interveners include external military forces with a role in the intervention as 

independent actors. In addition to the CJTF, a UN or other international 

peacekeeping force may already be present. This creates unity-of-effort challenges, 

because each force has a separate chain of command. Additionally, a country may 

have units in the CJTF and units in one of the other peacekeeping forces, and 

retains de facto control over all these units. 

b. Regular or irregular forces from neighboring countries may also conduct 

operations in the crisis area for various reasons. The intervening forces may request 

CJTF support. In some situations, their presence complicates matters and they 

become perpetrators themselves. 
158 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

7. Others 

a. Divide the “other actors” category into three subgroups: bystanders, negative 

actors, and positive actors. It includes previously uninvolved populations in the 

country, neighboring populations or leaders, regional organizations, UN agencies or 

political missions, local and international NGOs, and portions of the media. 

b. The key to the “others” category analysis is understanding the likelihood of these 

actors turning into perpetrators, victims, interveners, or remaining neutral or passive 

bystanders. In many cases, their actions are decisive in the crisis’s eventual 

outcome, and one goal of a MARO is encouraging constructive contributions from 

these other actors, while discouraging them from playing a negative role. 

(1) Bystanders. 

(a) Bystanders are motivated by perceived self-interest and are risk-averse. 

HN bystanders are referred to as the “soft middle;” they are swayed or 

coerced by perpetrators into complicity with the mass atrocities, and could 

become targets. Alternatively, it is possible to persuade bystanders to support 

the victims or interveners, particularly if assuring the intervention’s legitimacy, 

capability, and their own protection. 

(b) Key international bystanders that facilitate or impede a MARO include 

regional countries, global powers, and intergovernmental organizations. In 

some fragile state situations where the government is not directly complicit in 

mass atrocities, it assumes a bystander role because it is unwilling or unable 

to confront the perpetrators. 

(2) Positive Actors. 

(a) Nonmilitary actors, such as UN agencies, NGOs, and parts of the media, 

have a direct and significant influence supporting the intervention. However, 

their need to preserve “humanitarian space” limits the ability of many NGOs to 

interact with an intervening military force. This generally motivates them to 

maintain a distance between themselves and military forces. The agencies 

listed above maintain a separation of their actions from military actions to 

retain access to vulnerable populations and adhere to their mandate of 

impartial assistance. The different end states of humanitarian NGOs and a 

MARO force affect the ability of the two groups to cooperate closely. Political 

objectives drive military actions. Mass atrocity or genocide is one of the few 

situations where humanitarian NGOs support a military intervention, and 

override their general opposition to coordinating with military forces. 

(b) The CJTF’s goal is achieving “unity of effort” within the MARO operational 

environment (OE). When the CJTF and NGOs understand each other’s 

missions and end state, operating rules, constraints, and restraints they are 

able to operate optimally within the MARO OE. NGOs are more comfortable 

dealing with other civilian agencies such as the United Nations, the United 

States Agency for International Development, Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams, or Field Advance Civilian Teams, even if these relationships may be 

limited. These entities are effective intermediaries between the CJTF and 

NGOs. 

(3) Negative Actors. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 159 

(a) Negative actors have a negative influence on the situation, including 

supporters of the perpetrators or criminal groups exploiting the chaotic 

conditions. Other countries could become negative influences by providing 

diplomatic, military, or economic support to the perpetrators or by opposing 

the intervention. 

(b) Actions against third party enablers are vital to disrupting, undermining, or 

influencing perpetrators. Many of these actions are nonmilitary in nature and 

conducted in other countries. CJTF commanders prepare recommendations 

for these situations. 

(c) A critical factors analysis of key actors is useful for identifying centers of 

gravity, critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. 

Actors may switch categories because a MARO situation is dynamic; for 

example, bystanders join with perpetrators or support the interveners. One of 

the keys to a successful MARO plan is influencing relevant actors to have a 

positive influence on the situation, while preventing them from becoming 

perpetrators or victims. 

8. MARO Planning and Operations 

a. The commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) include the possibility 

of mass atrocities. The following priority intelligence requirements and friendly force 

information requirements are essential questions to answer when developing CCIRs: 

(1) Priority intelligence requirements. 

(a) What are the locations, composition, activities, capabilities, weaknesses, 

and intention of perpetrators or other adversaries? 

(b) Who is providing support to lawless perpetrators and what support are 

they providing? 

(c) Have there been new mass atrocity incidents or significant acts of 

violence against civilians? 

(d) Has the HN government had a change in its composition or policies? 

(2) Friendly force information requirements. 

(a) Have there been any relevant policy changes in the US, UN, regional 

organizations, or other key countries? 

(b) Are there any significant changes in the capability of the MARO force or 

its partners? 

(c) What significant problems and successes are the MARO force and its 

partners experiencing? 

(d) What are the plans for the MARO force subordinates, supporting 

command, and partners? 

(e) What additional resources are required? 

b. MAROs are addressed within the doctrinal construct of six phases (shape, deter, 

seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority). 

(1) Phase 0: Shape. Phase 0 is the steady-state situation where mass atrocities 

are neither being committed nor appear imminent; however, a mass atrocity 

situation could develop. Emphasis is on prevention by diplomatic, economic, or 
160 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

informational means. Military activities support these efforts while preparing for 

possible contingencies. Preparations include plan development, establishing and 

monitoring indications and warning (I&W), planning, and exercises. Theater 

security cooperation activities support broader national policy goals in the region, 

but may have MARO relevance. This phase ends when I&W suggest mass 

atrocities in the concerned region are likely and warrant additional deterrent 

measures. 

(2) Phase I: Deter. This phase begins when I&W show mass atrocities are 

occurring or may be imminent. The intent is to conduct targeted activities or 

provide military support to diplomatic crisis management, defusing the situation 

and deterring escalation, while preparing for an intervention if necessary. While 

mass atrocity indicators are context-specific and not an exact science, common 

indicators appear and include sporadic acts of violence, inflammatory speeches 

by political leaders, and other examples of hate media. 

(a) As a mass atrocity builds, policymakers want options for interrupting the 

escalation of violence. Military flexible deterrent options (FDOs) supplement 

diplomatic, economic, and informational measures and are employed to 

expose perpetrators to international scrutiny, establish the credibility of a 

potential intervention, build capability, isolate perpetrators, protect potential 

victims, dissuade or punish perpetrators, or build and demonstrate 

international resolve. 

(b) FDOs require different levels of resources, risk, and intrusion to the target 

country’s sovereignty. Military measures include activating commands 

participating in the intervention; establishing necessary bases; mobilizing and 

deploying forces; conducting shows of force; increasing intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance operations; or conducting a noncombatant 

evacuation operation. Stronger measures include imposing no-fly zones or 

blockades, or deferring implementation until later. 

(3) Phase II: Seize Initiative. This phase begins on D-Day and initiates 

operations to halt actual or imminent mass atrocities, by directing the MARO 

force to execute the planned mission. Diplomatic, economic, and informational 

measures intensify, but the main features of the phase are force employment in 

the country and the commencement of full-spectrum operations. Key to success 

in this phase is attaining a foothold in the area of operations (AO) and 

establishing the force’s credibility as a capable actor. Employ air power as a 

temporary shield when ground forces are not available in sufficient numbers to 

protect vulnerable populations. Achievement of low-cost “quick-wins” is 

instrumental in gaining the initiative and establishing the credibility of the 

intervention. 

(4) Phase III: Dominate. This phase begins when the MARO force is prepared to 

expand its operations from its initial lodgments throughout the AO. The CJTF 

completes the deployment of all forces, reinforces them as required, secures the 

desired freedom of operation, and achieves the results necessary to end mass 

atrocities and secure vulnerable populations. If required, the MARO force 

establishes a transitional military authority over parts of the country. 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 161 

(5) Phase IV: Stabilize. This phase begins as transition of responsibility to civilian 

authority commences. In addition to addressing any residual security challenges, 

transfer interim control of the area to designated civilian authorities (HN, 

Department of State, UN, or some other entity) during this phase. Civilian 

authorities begin “rebuilding” preventing a relapse to conditions that prompted the 

intervention. The military supports the initial efforts of the civilian authorities in 

establishing governance and rule of law, providing essential services, and 

beginning economic recovery. 

(6) Phase V: Enable Civil Authority. This phase begins when a legitimate HN 

government (or other designated authority) assumes responsibility for 

governance. Emphasis in this phase is on resolving the root causes of the conflict 

and establishing conditions supporting transitional justice and long-term peace, 

stability, and development. A long-term peacekeeping force may be required. The 

UN or a regional organization provides the necessary forces. The military focus 

during this phase includes peacekeeping operations; security force assistance; 

security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and 

redeployment, marking the end of the phase and operation. 

9. MARO Approaches 

a. Joint forces use one or more of the seven approaches listed in table 8 when 

conducting a MARO. These approaches include the following: 

(1) Area security—secure a large area with sufficient force deployed in unit 

sectors. 

(2) Shape-clear-hold-build—systematically secure limited areas and expand 

when able. 

(3) Separation—establishes a demilitarized zone or similar buffer zone between 

perpetrators and victims. 

(4) Safe areas—secure concentrations of vulnerable populations such as IDP 

camps. 

(5) Partner enabling—provide advisors, equipment, or specialized support such 

as deployment or airpower to coalition partners, HN, or victim groups. 

(6) Containment—influence perpetrator behavior with strikes, blockades, or nofly zones. 

(7) Defeat perpetrators—attack and defeat perpetrator leadership and 

capabilities. 

b. More than one employment option exists, and it is appropriate to emphasize 

different approaches as the operation progresses across the AO. For example, the 

containment approach is appropriate as an initial effort when speed of response is at 

a premium. 

 
162 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

Table 8. MARO Approaches 

Approach Characteristics Considerations 

Approach 1 

Area Security 

• Wide area control 

• Unit sectors 

• Mobile patrols 

• Quick Response Forces (QRFs) 

• Outposts 

• Mobile Operating Bases 

• Similar to Counterinsurgency 

operations (COIN) in Iraq 

• Requires adequate forces, extensive 

logistics, and a weak adversary 

• Suitable when victim population is widely 

dispersed 

• Extensive stability operations necessary 

Approach 2 

Shape-Clear-HoldBuild 

• Focused, systematic advance within 

capabilities 

• “Mobile” forces clear 

• “Static” forces maintain security 

• Based upon classic Galula COIN 

approach 

• Fewer forces required than area security 

• Suitable with strong perpetrators and 

concentrated victim populations 

• Cedes territory to perpetrators 

• Extended commitment 

Approach 3 

Separation 

• Controlled buffer zone between 

perpetrators and victims 

• Outposts, patrols, QRFs 

• Supporting fires as required 

• Similar to traditional peacekeeping or 

demilitarized zone operations 

• Limited forces required 

• Suitable when perpetrators and victims are 

separated 

• Cedes territory to perpetrators 

• Forces may be caught between belligerent 

groups 

• Potential long-term division 

Approach 4 

Safe Areas 

• Protect internally displaced person 

camps 

• Secure areas of victim concentration 

• Defensive posture 

• Security on migration routes 

• Expect increased numbers of civilians 

seeking protection 

• Limited forces required 

• Suitable when victims are concentrated 

• Cedes territory to perpetrators 

• Large humanitarian assistance burden 

• May inadvertently “reward” perpetrators 

Approach 5 

Partner Enabling 

• Most ground forces from coalition 

partners or victim groups 

• United States (US) provides security 

force assistance, equipment, or key 

enablers (deployment, air, special 

operations forces (SOF)) 

• Similar to East Timor or Northern 

Alliance operations 

• Partners bear most of the burdens 

• Minimizes US footprint 

• Helps build indigenous capability 

• Partners have capability limitations 

• US relinquishes control of effort 

Approach 6 

Containment 

• Reliance on air, maritime, cyber power, 

and SOF 

• No-fly zones, blockades, strikes 

• Integrated with diplomatic and 

informational efforts 

• Similar to 1990s Iraq containment 

• Capitalizes on US military strengths (air 

and sea) 

• Limited in country presence 

• Does not provide direct protection of 

victims 

• Increased risk of collateral damage 

• Precursor to other approaches 

Approach 7 

Defeat Perpetrators 

• Offensive focus against perpetrators 

• Defeat perpetrator leadership and 

military capability 

• Regime change or collapse if 

necessary 

• Iraq 2003 model 

• Large force required 

• May be required for long term resolution 

• Extensive reconstruction and stabilization 

effort required 

• Potential for high casualties and collateral 

damage 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 163 

Appendix H

KEY DOCUMENTS 

1. Background 

The following is a list of key documents for conducting peace operations (PO). Not all 

documents are applicable to every operation nor are they all-important at every level. 

2. Mandate 

a. Mandates are in the form of a United Nations Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR). The PO force conducts operations based on a mandate describing the 

scope of operations. 

b. A mandate addresses the following points: 

(1) Role of the peace operation. 

(2) Mission of the peace operation organization. 

(3) Tasks or functions. 

(4) Size and organization of the force or mission. 

(5) Appointment of the commander, any special mediators, and their terms of 

reference (TORs). 

(6) Nomination of the office responsible for supervising the operation. 

(7) General arrangements for financial and logistical support. 

(8) Division of sponsoring organization and national responsibilities. 

(9) Time limit of the mandate. 

(10) Terms or conditions the host nation (HN) is imposing on the force or 

mission. 

(11) Statements of the rights and immunities of force or mission members. 

c. Current and former United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) 

mandates are located at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/. 

d. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, Peace Operations, Appendix A, provides more 

detail on UN involvement in peace operations. 

e. The UN charter is located at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml. 

3. Status of Forces Agreement 

A status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) defines the legal position of a visiting military 

force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of 

visiting military forces are bilateral or multilateral. Agreements between the HN, military 

forces, and other governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders contribute to 

developing the SOFA. For more information, see JP 3-07.3. 

4. Terms of Reference 

Based on the mandate and situation, develop TORs governing implementation of PO. 

The TORs describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, 

accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of military units 

and personnel assigned or detailed to the PO force. In addition, the TORs require the 

endorsement of all parties in dispute. For more information, see JP 3-07.3. 
164 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

5. Rules of Engagement (ROE) 

a. ROE are directives issued by a competent military authority, delineating the 

circumstances and limitations under which United States (US) forces initiate or 

continue combat engagement with other encountered forces. For more information, 

see JP 3-07.3. 

b. Individual nations have different ROE, and this causes confusion and tension. In 

addition, PO forces have multiple missions each with a separate ROE. US Service 

members understand this dynamic and know US ROE takes precedence for US 

Service members. Table 9 is an example ROE card. 

Table 9. Sample Rules of Engagement Card 

Note: Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your right to take 

appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit 

• Service members have the right to use force to defend against attacks or threat 

of attack. 

• Hostile fire is returned effectively and promptly to stop hostile acts. 

• When attacked by hostile elements (mobs, rioters, etc.), United States (US) 

forces use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and 

proportional to the threat. 

• Protect property with less than deadly force. 

• Do not seize the property of others to accomplish the mission. 

• Detain civilians for security reasons or in self-defense. 

REMEMBER 

• The US is not at war. 

• Treat all persons with dignity and respect. 

• Respect local customs and traditions of the host nation. 

• All persons must report suspected violations of the law of war committed by US, 

friendly, or enemy force. Notify the chain of command, Judge Advocate, 

Inspector General, military police, or appropriate Service-related investigative 

branch. 

6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement 

a. The standing rules of engagement (SROE) apply to US forces during military 

operations and contingencies, including PO. Commanders augment the SROE for 

specific operations. Commanders assess the capabilities and intent of other forces 

and make recommendations for supplemental ROE through the chain of command. 

Clearly state the ROE in simple language. For additional ROE guidance, refer to 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of 

Engagement or Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces. 

b. Use SROE for the following: 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 165 

(1) Implementing the right of self-defense, this is applicable worldwide, at all 

echelons of command. 

(2) Providing guidance governing the use of force consistent with mission 

accomplishment. 

(3) Using SROE in peacetime operations other than war, during transition from 

peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict in the absence of 

superseding guidance. 

7. General Orders

Commanders issue general orders for various reasons, including conduct of personnel 

participating in PO. 

8. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Documents

a. The following NATO documents comprise the orders and ROE implementation

process for operations. The NATO orders process, as expressed in MC 133/3, 

NATO’s Operational Planning Systems, 6 September 2000, includes three NATO 

requests or orders and three responses by the nations. These document formats are 

NATO Classified. 

(1) Activation Warning (ACTWARN). A decision taken by NATO bringing the 

organization to a new state of military preparedness by allowing nations to 

identify available militaries if operations take place. Answered by nations with 

informal force offers. 

(2) Activation Request. A decision taken by NATO preparing previously identified 

military assets for action. This decision generates a formal force generation 

process by issuing a statement of requirements. This formalizes the informal 

request for forces made in the ACTWARN phase. This is not a political decision 

to use military force. Answered with a final force preparation (FORCEPREP). 

(3) FORCEPREP. Statements by the nations to a NATO strategic commander of 

their commitment to provide forces for a specific operation. 

(4) Activation Order. A NATO order authorizing the execution of a military 

operation and requesting nations transfer authority of forces committed via the 

final FORCEPREP. Approval of this order is the final political decision by the 

North Atlantic Council (NAC) required before executing a military operation. 

(5) Transfer of Authority. Statement by the nations transferring authority of units 

committed via the FORCEPREP to a NATO security committee for execution of a 

specific operation. 

b. The NATO ROE process includes three requests or orders.

(1) ROE Request. Request by a NATO security committee to the NAC for

authorization implementing ROE measures previously approved in an operation

plan (OPLAN). Only request measures listed in the OPLAN.

(2) ROE Authorization. Approval by the NAC to a NATO security committee

authorizing implementation of the requested ROE measures.

(3) ROE Implementation. Order by a NATO security committee to forces

implementing ROE measures previously authorized by the NAC. The NATO
166 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

security committee is not required to implement all authorized ROE measures. 

The ROE implementation includes any known national caveats.
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 167 

REFERENCES 

JOINT PUBLICATIONS 

CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force 

for US Forces, 18 June 2008

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 15 

October 2013 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011 

JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 16 July 2014 

JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 14 March 2014 

JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 1 August 2012 

JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 June 2011 

JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, 4 

October 2013

JP 3-13, Information Operations, 27 November 2012 

JP 3-14, Space Operations, 29 May 2013 

JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, 16 July 2013 

JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010 

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 3 January 2014 

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 11 September 2013 

JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations, 21 February 2013 

JP 4-09, Distribution Operations, 19 December 2013 

ARMY 

ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011 

ATP 4-02.42, Army Health System Support to Stability and Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities Tasks, 9 June 2014 

ATP 4-11, Army Motor Transport Operations, 5 July 2013 

ATTP 4-15, Army Water Transport Operations, 11 February 2011 

FM 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, 25 Jan 2013 

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, CH 1, 2 June 2014 

FM 3-36, Electronic Warfare, 9 November 2012 

FM 3-39, Military Police Operations, 26 August 2013 

FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 31 October 2011 

FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense, 22 March 2013 

FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 5 May 2014 

NAVY 

NTTP 3-06.1, Riverine Operations, February 2008 

AIR FORCE 

USAF Negotiation Center of Excellence, (accessed on 5 March 2014) 

http://culture.af.mil/nce/PDF/cnsworksheets/1_multipage.pdf 

 
168 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

MULTI-SERVICE PUBLICATIONS 

ATP 3-06.1/MCRP 3-35.3A/NTTP 3-01.04/AFTTP 3-2.29 Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations, 19 April 2013 

ATP 4-01.45/MCRP 4-11.3H/NTTP 4-01.3/AFTTP 3-2.58 Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations, 18 April 2014 

ATTP 4-32.16/MCRP 3-17.2C/NTTP 3-02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32 Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 20 September 2011 

ATTP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance, 20 September 2011

FM 3-22.40/MCWP 3-15.8/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons, 24 

October 2007

FM 6-05/MCWP 3-36.1/NTTP 3-05.19/AFTTP 3-2.73/USSOCOM Pub 3-33 MultiService Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special 

Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability and Interdependence, 13 March 2014 

OTHER PUBLICATIONS 

Department of Defense Instruction O-2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, 1 

March 2012, incorporating change 1, 9 September 2013 

Executive Order 11850, 8 April 1975 

MC 133/3, NATO’s Operational Planning Systems, 6 September 2000 

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945 

United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Carr 

Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School: Mass Atrocity Response 

Operations: A Military Planning Handbook, May 2010 

USJFCOM Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform, 

13 June 2011 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 169 

GLOSSARY 

A 

ACTWARN activation warning 

AD air defense 

ADL armistice demarcation line 

AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures 

AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 

ALSA Air Land Sea Application (Center) 

AO area of operations 

AOL area of limitation 

ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and 

 events 

ATP Army tactical publication 

B 

BATNA best alternative to a negotiated agreement 

BZ buffer zone 

C

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CACOM civil affairs command 

CAO civil affairs operations 

CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement 

CD&I Combat Development and Integration 

CEMA cyber electromagnetic activities 

CID criminal investigation division 

CIL customary international law 

CIM civilian information management 

CIVPOL civilian police 
170 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CJTF combined joint task force 

CMO civil-military operations 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

COA course of action 

CP check point 

D

DC dislocated civilian 

DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DMZ demilitarized zone 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOS Department of State 

DP displaced person 

E

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

EOF escalation of force 

EW electronic warfare 

F

FDO flexible deterrent option 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FM field manual 

FN foreign nation 

FORCEPREP force preparation 

FPA foreign policy advisor 

FPCON force protection condition 

FSF foreign security forces 

 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 171 

G

GPS Global Positioning System 

H

HA humanitarian assistance 

HAZMAT hazardous materials 

HHQ higher headquarters 

HN host nation 

HQ headquarters 

HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps 

HUMINT human intelligence 

I

I&W indications and warning 

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 

IDP internally displaced person 

IE information environment 

IED improvised explosive device 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IMC International Medical Corps 

IO information operations 

IPI indigenous populations and institutions 

IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

IPTF International Police Training Force 

IRC International Rescue Committee 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

J, K

JMC joint movement center 

JP joint publication 

L

LeMay Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and 

 Education 
172 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

LNO liaison officer 

LWR Lutheran World Relief 

M

MA Massachusetts 

MARO mass atrocity response operations 

MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 

METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support 

 available—time available 

METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support 

 available—time available and civil considerations (Army) 

MIS military information support 

MISO military information support operations 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MP military police (Army and Marine) 

MTTP multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures 

MWD military working dog 

N

NA nation assistance 

NAC North Atlantic Council 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NCE Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NLCS nonlethal capability set 

NLW nonlethal weapon 

NWDC Navy Warfare Development Command 

O

OE operational environment 

OFDA Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance 

OP observation post 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPSEC operations security 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 173 

P

PA public affairs 

PAO public affairs officer 

PEO peace enforcement operations 

PERSEC personnel security 

PHYSEC physical security 

PK peacekeeping 

PKO peacekeeping operations 

PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and 

 infrastructure 

PO peace operations 

POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants 

POLAD political advisor 

PRC populace and resources control 

PSYOP psychological operations 

Q

QRF quick response force 

R

RCA riot control agent 

ROE rules of engagement 

ROMO range of military operations 

S

SA situational awareness 

SAR search and rescue 

SCA support to civil administration 

SFA security force assistance 

SFOR Stabilization Force 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SOF special operations forces 

SOFA status-of-forces agreement 
174 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

SOP standard operating procedure 

SROE standing rules of engagement 

T

TIM toxic industrial materials 

TOR term of reference 

TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

U

UN United Nations 

UN-DMT United Nations disaster management team 

UNDP United Nations development programme 

UNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees 

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 

UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

 Affairs 

UNPOL United Nations police 

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 

US United States 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USG United States Government 

UXO unexploded ordnance 

V

VA Virginia 

VIP very important person 

W, X, Y, Z

WFP World Food Programme (UN) 

WHO World Health Organization (UN) 

ZOPA zone of possible agreement 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 175 

PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

buffer zone—A defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which 

disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded. Also called area of 

separation in some United Nations operations. Also called BZ. See also line of 

demarcation; peace operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3) 

casualty evacuation—The unregulated movement of casualties that can include 

movement both to and between medical treatment facilities. Also called 

CASEVAC. See also casualty; evacuation; medical treatment facility. (JP 1-02. 

Source: JP 1-02) 

civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, 

trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to 

support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See also civil-military operations. 

(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-57) 

civil-military operations— The activities of a commander performed by designated 

civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit 

relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by 

directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or 

maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called CMO. (JP 1-

02. Source: JP-57)

civil-military operations center—An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, 

established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of 

the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, 

intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational 

forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force 

commander. Also called CMOC. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-57) 

combat camera—The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support 

of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations 

and during joint exercises. Also called COMCAM. See also visual information. 

(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-61) 

commander’s critical information requirement—An information requirement 

identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision 

making. Also called CCIR. See also information requirements; intelligence; 

priority intelligence requirement. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0) 

conflict prevention—A peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, 

and, when necessary, military means, to monitor and identify the causes of 

conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or 

resumption of hostilities. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3) 

detainee—A term used to refer to any person captured or otherwise detained by an 

armed force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-63) 

Diaspora—the movement, migration, or scattering of a people away from an 

established or ancestral homeland. (Source: Merriam-Webster dictionary)
176 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

displaced person—A broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced 

persons collectively. See also evacuee; refugee. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-29) 

force protection—Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against 

Department of Defense personnel (including family members), resources, 

facilities, and critical information. Also called FP. See also force; force protection 

condition; protection. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0) 

force protection condition—A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved 

standard for identification of and recommended responses to terrorist threats 

against US personnel and facilities. Also called FPCON. See also antiterrorism; 

force protection. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1-02) 

foreign humanitarian assistance—Department of Defense activities, normally in 

support of the United States Agency for International Development or 

Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and 

possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. 

Also called FHA. See also foreign assistance. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-29) 

host nation—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or 

NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its 

territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-57) 

human intelligence—A category of intelligence derived from information collected and 

provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0) 

humanitarian and civic assistance—Assistance to the local populace provided by 

predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. 

This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 

401, and funded under separate authorities. Also called HCA. See also foreign 

humanitarian assistance. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-29) 

intergovernmental organization—An organization created by a formal agreement 

between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to 

protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Also called 

IGO. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-08) 

international organization—An intergovernmental, regional or global organization 

governed by international law and established by a group of states, with 

international juridical personality given by international agreement, however 

characterized, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of 

fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims. (JP 4-08. Source: AAP-06) 

interoperability—The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems 

or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services 

can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. 

The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. 

(JP 1-02. Source: JP 6-0) 

joint task force—A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of 

Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint 

task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1) 
1 November 2014 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 177 

law of war—That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed 

hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. See also rules of engagement. 

(JP 1-02. Source: JP 1-04) 

line of demarcation—A line defining the boundary of a buffer zone used to establish 

the forward limits of disputing or belligerent forces after each phase of 

disengagement or withdrawal has been completed. See also buffer zone 

disengagement; peace operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3) 

mass atrocity response operations—Military activities conducted to prevent or halt 

mass atrocities. Also called MARO. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3) 

military information support operations—Planned operations to convey selected 

information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 

motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 

organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s 

objectives. Also called MISO. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-13.2) 

multinational operations—A collective term to describe military actions conducted by 

forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a 

coalition or alliance. See also alliance; coalition. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-16) 

nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization 

dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health 

care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and 

conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic 

institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-08) 

nonlethal weapon—A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed so as 

to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury 

to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Also 

called NLW. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-28) 

operations security—A process of identifying critical information and subsequently 

analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities. 

Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-13.3) 

peace building—Stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that 

strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions to avoid a 

relapse into conflict. Also called PB. See also peace enforcement; peacekeeping; 

peacemaking; peace operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3) 

peace enforcement—Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally 

pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or 

sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. See also peace 

building; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-

07.3) 

peacekeeping—Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a 

dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement 

(cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to 
178 ATP 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 1 November 2014 

reach a long-term political settlement. See also peace building; peace 

enforcement; peacemaking; peace operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3) 

peacemaking—The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of 

peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that 

led to it. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peace 

operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3) 

peace operations—A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational 

crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of 

national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and 

shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the 

transition to legitimate governance. Also called PO. See also peace building; 

peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peacemaking. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.3) 

reconnaissance—A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other 

detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or 

adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or 

geographic characteristics of a particular area. Also called RECON. (JP 1-02. 

Source: JP 2-0) 

repatriation—The release and return of enemy prisoners of war to their own country in 

accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 

Prisoners of War. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1-0) 

rules of engagement—Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate 

the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate 

and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called 

ROE. See also law of war. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1-04) 

status-of-forces agreement—A bilateral or multilateral agreement that defines the 

legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. 

(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-16) 

terrorism—The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce 

governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or 

other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually 

political. See also antiterrorism; combating terrorism; counterterrorism; force 

protection condition. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.2) 

unexploded explosive ordnance—Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, 

armed or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped, 

launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to 

operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded either 

by malfunction or design or for any other cause. Also called UXO. See also 

explosive ordnance. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-15). 
*ATP 3-07.31 [FM 3-07.31]

MCWP 3-33.8 

AFTTP 3-2.40 

1 November 2014 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army 

Official: RAYMOND T. ODIERNO 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

GERALD B. O’KEEFE 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 

1428203 

DISTRIBUTION: 

Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve. Not to be distributed; 

electronic media only. 

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force 

STEVEN L. KWAST 

Major General, USAF 

Commander and President 

Air University 

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at 

www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading or ordering. 

RELEASABILITY: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release, 

distribution is unlimited. 

* Supersedes FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40 dated 26 October 2003, including all

changes.
MARINE CORPS PCN: 143 000144 01 PIN: 104715-000