U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

60–545 CC WASHINGTON : 1999

TAIWAN, THE PRC, AND THE TAIWAN SECURITY

ENHANCEMENT ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

SEPTEMBER 15, 1999

Serial No. 106–61

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(
(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

PETER T. KING, New York

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

JOHN MCHUGH, New York

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL GILLMOR, Ohio

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

MICHAEL P. ENNIS, Subcommittee Staff Director

DR. ROBERT KING, Democratic Professional Staff Member

MATT REYNOLDS, Counsel

ALICIA A. O’DONNELL, Staff Associate
(III)

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

The Honorable Craig Thomas, A U.S. Senator from State of Wyoming and

Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign

Relations Committee ............................................................................................ 1

Dr. Susan Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific

Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................................... 12

Dr. Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security

Affairs/Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ....................... 15

The Honorable Caspar Weinberger, Chairman, Forbes Magazine (Formerly

Secretary of Defense) ........................................................................................... 24

The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Partner, Shea & Gardner (Formerly Director of Central Intelligence Agency) ..................................................................... 27

Dr. David M. Lampton, Director, Chinese Studies, School of Advanced International States, Johns Hopkins University ....................................................... 31

APPENDIX

Prepared Statements

The Honorable Doug Bereuter, A U.S. Representative in Congress from the

State of Nebraska ................................................................................................. 44

The Honorable Craig Thomas, A U.S. Senator in Congress from the State

of Wyoming ........................................................................................................... 47

The Honorable Eni Falemomavaega, a Delegate in Congress from American

Samoa .................................................................................................................... 50

Dr. Susan Shirk ....................................................................................................... 52

Dr. Kurt Campbell ................................................................................................... 61

Dr. David M. Lampton ............................................................................................ 66
(1)

HEARING ON TAIWAN, THE PRC, AND THE

TAIWAN SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT

Wednesday, September 15, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. BEREUTER. The Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee will come

to order.

I would ask unanimous consent, in order to accommodate the

schedule of our distinguished colleague from the Senate, Senator

Thomas, to revise the agenda for today. We will move directly into

the hearing on Taiwan. Then, my intention is to take the testimony

from Senator Thomas and return to the East Timor markup, at

which time the Ranking Democrat and this Member will have an

opportunity for their opening statements on the Taiwan resolution.

Without objection, that will be the order.

I will hold for future minutes a full statement about the Taiwan

hearing, which we are moving to directly for the moment today,

and just say that the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific meets

today to examine its security requirements of Taiwan in the face

of increased tension with the People’s Republic of China and receive testimony regarding the proposed Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.

I am extremely pleased to have our distinguished former House

colleague, Senator Thomas, with us today. He serves as the Chairman of our counterpart subcommittee, the East Asian and Pacific

Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

We appreciated your involvement in our joint hearing last week on

East Timor, Senator Thomas, and we appreciate your testimony

today.

Your entire statement will be made part of the record, if you

have a written statement. You may proceed as you wish and, again

welcome back to the House side.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. CRAIG THOMAS, SENATOR FROM

THE STATE OF WYOMING

Senator THOMAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate being able to participate and particularly thank you for your

holding the hearing today on Taiwan.
2

I appreciate the opportunity to testify, and I believe this is one

of the most important foreign issue policies that we will face in this

Congress. Our triangular relationship with Taiwan and the PRC is

the most complex and challenging that we have in Asia. We have

a compelling interest in a stable, bilateral relationship with the

People’s Republic, and in maintaining a close relationship with Taiwan.

Unfortunately, historic circumstances have often made those interests mutually exclusive and made the job of maintaining both

the relationships simultaneously like walking on a slippery tightrope.

Beijing and Taipei both favor intervention in cross-straits relations by the United States but on their own terms. There is little,

if any, support for true mediation on our part. Every one of our actions is scrutinized by each side to determine whether it is pro-Beijing or pro-Taipei, and we are condemned for our action on the losing side.

Putting the United States in the middle serves no useful purpose. The two sides tend to walk through us and talk to each other,

but through us. This is a matter that needs to be resolved by the

Taiwanese and the PRC in a peaceful manner without being triangulated.

As you are well aware, Mr. Chairman, this relationship has only

gotten more worrisome in the past 3-months since President Lee’s

statement about the state-to-state relations between the PRC and

Taiwan. The reaction from the PRC was predictably strident. It is

unclear whether the PRC will have a reaction over and above the

rhetoric, such as a movement of troops to provinces bordering the

Taiwan Straits, military exercises, or, as in 1996, missile tests

north and south of the islands.

This latest deterioration in cross-straits relations and more particularly its timing are very unfortunate. Recently the two sides

had resumed their high level contacts after a 5-year hiatus. The

PRC representative was scheduled to visit Taiwan this fall. This

resumption is important because nothing is ever going to be resolved by the two sides sitting on the opposite shores of the Taiwan

Straits staring glumly at each other.

Despite all these challenges, however, the United States, through

both Republican and Democrat Administrations, has managed to

strike a balance between the two competing interests, a balance reflected in the three U.S.-PRC joint communiques and in the Taiwan Relations Act. The communiques have enabled us to develop

a workable, if sometimes bumpy, bilateral relationship with the

People’s Republic of China.

The Taiwan Relations Act has allowed us to continue our close

and long-standing relationship with the government and the people

of Taiwan. Helping to guarantee Taiwan’s security has enabled it

to become the economically vibrant, multiparty democracy that it

is today. It isn’t perfect, it isn’t always tidy, but it does seem to

work.

I think one of the things we really need to perfect is the idea that

each of us, including the President of the United States as he goes

to these countries, is saying the same thing. Sometimes we see the

interpretation of the communiques being used a little differently in
3

one setting than in another. I think that is a difficult thing to overcome.

For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I am not supportive of S. 693,

the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, and its counterpart in the

House, H.R. 1838. If these bills are enacted, I think it would

threaten the delicate balance we have achieved in these relationships. Rather than enhance Taiwan’s security, I believe it would actually endanger Taiwanese security by making the PRC more belligerent and destabilize the region. The bills would be interpreted

by Taiwan and the PRC, and correctly so, as a significant revision

of the Taiwan Relations Act and a partial repudiation of the joint

communiques. By mandating the establishment of more high level

military-to-military ties, in essence an official formal military relationship, the bill would be seen as a reversal of 20-years of our

commitment to maintaining only unofficial ties with Taipei.

Coming at a time when relations across the Straits are already

severely strained by what Beijing perceives to be Taipei’s repudiation of the one-China policy, it would be read in Beijing as a

major U.S. policy shift aimed at bolstering Taiwanese independence

status.

In addition, the bill places Congress in the position of supporting

sales of particular weapon systems to Taiwan. The Administration

has already decided against furnishing Taipei with several of the

systems because they do not meet the criteria set out in the Shanghai Communique of being purely defensive. By putting its prospective seal of approval on the sale of the systems, the Congress would

in effect be suggesting that the President act counter, not only to

the spirit, but to the letter of the communiques.

Moreover, while I am certainly not a constitutional expert, nor

a defender of the constitutional prerogatives of this President, it

does seem to me that several sections of the bill are constitutionally suspect, for example, section 4(b), 5(b), and 5(c). By directing that he take specific military-related action seems to me to infringe on the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief, Article

II of the Constitution.

Mr. Chairman, we are all concerned about Taiwanese security.

We are all in agreement with the proposition that Beijing must remember that any attempts to settle the Taiwan question with the

barrel of a gun is the threat to the peace and stability of East Asia,

and thus a direct threat to U.S. interests. But these bills are designed to fix something that has generally worked and in the process would make things even more difficult between us and the

PRC, between the PC and Taiwan.

No one from the government in Taiwan has come to me and said

they feel that the Taiwan Relations Act is in need of fixing. Our

challenge, I believe, is to make it work.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to share my views

on this, and I am pleased you are having this hearing and we will

look forward to your other witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thomas, appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Chairman Thomas, thank you very much for your

direct and very clear statement of your objections and concerns

about the pair of bills that are pending, one of which is in part the
4

topic of our hearing today. We will weigh your comments very carefully, and very seriously. I know you have thought about this subject a great deal, as I have, and the reason I thought a hearing was

appropriate is because the proposed legislation is in fact very significant in the changes proposes it.

I would ask my colleagues if there is anyone among you who

would ask questions of Senator Thomas. I see the gentleman from

Arizona. We will proceed under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. SALMON. Senator Thomas, I really appreciate your comments. I was able to go to Beijing and Tibet about 4-months ago

and I recently completed a trip to Dharamshala, India, to meet

with the Dalai Lama, because I have been concerned about the

Tibet issue. I know we are not here to discuss that. But I think the

relationship, obviously you know as well as I do that the PRC’s biggest concern is Taiwan, and I think not so far behind it would probably be the Tibet issue as well. I think they are both very, very important.

I had the luxury of serving a mission for my church in Taiwan

from 1977 to 1979, where I really grew to love and admire and respect the people of Taiwan and the evolving democracy in Taiwan.

That having been said, I appreciate your comments immensely, because I think it is, as you said, a very delicate balance.

I for one am very frustrated about what I perceive to be downright irresponsible comments by the president of Taiwan, Lee

Teng-hui, regarding the independence issue. This government, and

I believe this Congress, is very, very supportive of Taiwan, as it

should be, and will be on into the future. I think we have tried to

be as unambiguous as we possibly can with the PRC regarding our

involvement should they ever decide to become involved militarily.

I think the Congress has spoken loud and clear on that even

though the Administration may not have.

I think an admonition I would like to throw out yet one more

time is if Taiwan expects us to stand by in the way that we have

and will continue to in the future, the president of Taiwan has got

to be a little bit more responsible when it comes to some of the

comments that are made. I am just interested in your thoughts on

that.

Senator THOMAS. I happen to agree with that. I think sometimes

Taiwan has taken a little advantage of the fact that we are there,

and we are there to support them, to kind of tweak the PRC, when

it is probably not necessary. I was probably impressed as much as

anything over the last several years in Singapore talking to the

senior minister, whose admonition was, you know, we just ought to

try and keep things kind of quiet for a while, for a number of years,

it may even take a generational change in leadership before this

problem is solved. But to try to move quickly to solve it, one side

or the other, is probably not a very successful kind of a thing to

do. I appreciate what you are saying and I agree.

Mr. SALMON. Ultimately I think we have adhered to a one-China

policy in this country steadfastly over the years, and it is something that we have all pretty much come to accept and will go on

into the future. We all hope there is a peaceful reunification, but

this kind of saber rattling on either side, in my estimation, is completely irresponsible. You think it is time Congress stands up. I
5

know we are strong allies when it comes to Taiwan. But friends

have to be plain-spoken sometimes with friends and telling them

you are not being productive.

Senator THOMAS. I agree.

Mr. BEREUTER. Are there further questions for Senator Thomas?

Thank you, Mr. Salmon.

Senator, as you know it is U.S. policy not to act as negotiator on

Taiwan-PRC relations, and I think the question then is as follows:

How does Congress, as one of our elements of the U.S. Government, appropriately influence Taiwan-PRC relations without becoming an arbiter? I am not going to ask you to respond to that,

but I would say that you and I and our Democratic counterparts

need to sit down quietly and discuss this. I look forward to doing

that with you.

Senator THOMAS. I think that is a good idea. We ought to talk

about it, we ought to kind of come to some resolution among ourselves, and each of us sort of say the same thing as we go about

it.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Senator, for your time today. We appreciate your testimony. I am sorry. I didn’t see a question here.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman, is recognized for

questioning.

Mr. BERMAN. Senator, it is good to have you here. Thank you,

Mr. Chairman.

I know from your interest in your position in the Senate how involved you have been on this. I missed your testimony, but, in

reading your prepared testimony, you say that one of the reasons

you are critical of the legislation is because it proposes specific

weapons systems be sold which the Administration, for whatever

reason, has already decided not to sell.

Am I understanding that correctly?

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

Mr. BERMAN. You talk about specific systems. Are you talking

about missile defense systems or are you talking about with more

specificity than that?

Senator THOMAS. Let’s see, where was that. Just a second.

Mr. BERMAN. I can also wait until the Administration is here.

Senator THOMAS. I think there are some fairly specific things—

diesel powered submarines, for example, anti-submarine systems—

those kind of things that are specifically laid out there.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I want to thank Senator Thomas for his

statement. We certainly welcome him being here. Just one basic

question I do have for the Senator. In his mind, does he know of

any provisions in the current U.S.-Taiwan Relations Act that you

find deficient in terms of this security relationship currently existing between the United States and Taiwan? It seems to me as you

have pointed out in your testimony, it is not a lack of commitment

on our part. To me there is part of our security agreement with

Taiwan. But to be adding more fuel to the fire that is unnecessary,

I am concerned about that issue as well. I was just wondering from

the Senator if he knows of any provision under the current rela-
6

tionship or the act that raises a question of us lacking in our commitment to support Taiwan, if there is an emergency of such?

Senator THOMAS. It seems to me that it makes it pretty clear

that our position is that we will urge whatever changes that need

to take place in a peaceful way, and if they are not done peacefully,

then we are prepared—even though it could be more specific in the

Taiwan Relations Act, there is no question about that, you would

think we have interpreted that properly that we are there, and I

think the appearance of a U. S. Navy vessel in the Straits last time

indicated that we do recognize that we are going to help them in

case—we are going to help their defense in case of military action.

So I think it is clear enough.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will make this very quick. Senator Thomas,

isn’t this a right time to doing something that the Chinese communist regime will understand? How much more do they have to

do before we do something that the communist Chinese in Beijing

will understand that we are in this position, that we are supporting—not an independent Taiwan necessarily, but a Taiwan

that is independent of threats of force and violence from the mainland? How much more does the regime in Beijing have to do before

we have to do something more definitive?

Senator THOMAS. You know, I think we can be definitive, Dana,

the way we are, and we can be definitive. We have the backup in

this Taiwan Relations Act, in my judgment, to support what we do.

I think we make that very clear. They are going to continue to do

some of these things. That is just the way they operate. They are

going to continue to have missiles on the Straits and so on, because

that is sort of their way of sending messages. But I don’t think we

ought to be stampeded by that. I think we ought to continue. We

know what our position is, and we simply need to be prepared to

stand there.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Because the Chairman admonished me, I will

leave it at that.

Senator THOMAS. Well, let me just say, I don’t see any particular

reason to restate this, to do something to make this tension higher

than it is now.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I don’t think America’s position is clear. I

think this Administration has been unclear about what our position

is, and I think that perhaps then it means the Members of Congress have to be clear, and I believe that we as a body should reaffirm our commitment to that democratically elected government

there in Taipei that they will not be victimized by force and violence without the United States there to help them out.

Senator THOMAS. I couldn’t agree with you more, but I think we

ought to do it in the way the Chairman suggests, which is kind of

get together, because we have the authority to do that now. Thank

you.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the Chairman. I do thank the gentleman

from California. We are going to be returning to two additional

panels shortly and will have plenty of time to discuss these very

important issues. Senator Thomas, thank you very much.
7

Pursuant to the revised meeting notice circulated in accordance

with the unanimous consent request earlier approved, we will recess the hearing on Taiwan and move to the first item on the agenda today, the markup of H. Res. 299, the resolution on East Asia

Timor.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the Subcommittee proceeded to other

business.]

[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the Subcommittee resumed the hearing.]

Mr. BEREUTER. We will now return to the item on the agenda,

the Taiwan hearing, which we briefly recessed a few minutes ago.

I did not give an opening statement. I am going to make an opening statement, turn to Mr. Lantos, and then to any other Members

of the Subcommittee or Members of the Committee who wish to

make a statement. I will then call Dr. Shirk to the table in a few

minutes. She can come forward.

I think there should be no question of U.S. support for Taiwan.

I really think that is the case. Taiwan has developed into a fullfledged, multi-party democracy that respects human rights and

civil liberties. Taiwan has grown into one of the strongest and most

developed economies in East Asia, and it is America’s 7th largest

export market. Students from Taiwan study at virtually every

American college and university. I have former students back in

Taiwan doing what they are supposed to be doing with their cities.

These ties with Taiwan are strong and forged by mutual respect

and cooperation.

Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States provides Taiwan with the equipment and expertise to provide for its

self-defense. However, the issue of Taiwanese security has assumed

greater importance in recent weeks as relationships between Taipei

and Beijing have become increasingly strained. In July, Taiwan’s

President Lee remarked that Taiwan-mainland relations should be

on the basis of state-to-state relations. While these comments have

proven popular among some people in Taiwan and elsewhere, including some Americans, they have drawn harsh criticism in Beijing. The Chinese Foreign Minister has labeled President Lee a

troublemaker and complained that his remarks are a stumbling

block in the improvement of China-U.S. Relations.

Just as disturbing, we have witnessed an increase in military

tension between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. The

PRC is in the midst of a series of military exercises, including amphibious landing exercises that can be seen as provocative. Beijing

also seems to have engaged in a dangerous series of probes of Taiwan’s airspace. A supply ship to Taiwan’s outer islands was halted,

and there is an increased deployment of such offensive ballistic

missiles in Fujian Province, just across the strait from Taiwan. It

seems that missiles clearly are designed to threaten or act against

Taiwan. Not surprisingly, many on Taiwan are alarmed by such

blatant attempts at intimidation.

The question before the Subcommittee today is whether the Taiwan Relations Act continues to provide adequate security for the

people of Taiwan. While the TRA has provided solid direction and

consistency in our relations with Taiwan over the past 20-years,

significant changes have occurred on both sides of the Taiwan
8

Strait since its enactment. Taiwan is far different today than it

was in 1979; so, too, is the PRC. Do we need, as some Americans

urge, to modify the Taiwan Relations Act, or to adjust our longstanding foreign policy position in order to reflect the changes in

Taiwan? Is it time to establish deeper, more formalized military-tomilitary ties with Taiwan?

Certainly there are some who wish to sell a greater range of

weapons systems to Taipei and to increase the quality and quantity

of official contacts. But will an altered relationship actually enhance Taiwanese security? It is a very important and basic question. Most importantly, would such a change be in our national interest?

We have heard Senator Thomas’ testimony already. The Subcommittee learned yesterday that the President has requested that

Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth remain with him for the

remainder of the post-APEC Summit meetings. Assistant Secretary

of State Roth, who was to have been representing the position of

the Administration today, was detained. Therefore, testifying in his

stead will be the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Susan Shirk.

Dr. Shirk most recently testified before the Subcommittee in

April on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. Dr. Shirk, I hope you might be able to provide the Subcommittee a summary of the weekend’s bilateral discussion between the President and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, particularly on the discussions related to the security of Taiwan. I know

it is a big order. You may not be able to. That is my hope.

Representing the Department of Defense is Dr. Kurt Campbell.

As the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Dr. Campbell is responsible for Asian policy and specifically

focuses on the defense provisions in the TRA. Dr. Campbell has

testified before the Subcommittee several times. We both participated last week in an Australian-American leadership dialogue. I

am pleased to have you back before the Subcommittee as well, Dr.

Campbell.

On our panel of private witnesses, we are very privileged to welcome the Honorable Casper W. Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense and Chairman of Forbes Magazine. Secretary Weinberger remains a prolific commentator on a wide range of national security

issues including East Asian security. Welcome, Mr. Secretary.

The Honorable R. James Woolsey also has a long, distinguished

career of public service as Ambassador, an arms control negotiator,

and, most recently, as President Clinton’s initial Director of Central Intelligence. Director Woolsey is presently a partner at the law

firm of Shea & Gardner.

Finally, Dr. David M. Lampton is Director of China Studies at

the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Dr.

Lampton is a widely published international authority on China

and East Asia. It is good to see you and to hear your testimony

today. I enjoyed our time together in conference in China.

Without objection, your full statements will be made part of the

record, for both panels. Consistent with the practice we are going

to ask for some limit on time, I would now like to turn to the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos, and then turn to the

Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Gilman, for their comments.
9

Mr. CHAIRMAN Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding

this hearing, and, since you are anxious to get our distinguished

witnesses’ testimony, I shall be very brief.

Whenever we deal with China and Taiwan, there is a frivolous

interplay of symbolism and substance. Those of us in the Administration by virtue of the fact that they represent the government of

the United States are always heavy on symbolism, and those of us

in Congress who don’t have the restrictions that are placed upon

our governmental representatives in the executive branch prefer to

deal with substance.

Let’s take the words ‘‘one-China policy.’’ Well, it depends on how

you interpret one-China policy. One way of interpreting one-China

policy is to say as things evolve on the mainland and China becomes a full fledged political democracy, there will be a peaceful

resolution of the Taiwan-Mainland China conflict by these two

democratic societies merging into one-China.

Yet at the same time it is sort of self-evident that Taiwan is very

much a country. As a matter of fact, Taiwan is a model of what

we had hoped destitute, dictatorial, underdeveloped societies will

develop into. Taiwan is developed, prosperous, and democratic.

What more can you ask for? And the support that Taiwan enjoys

in the Congress and among the American people is a reflection of

the admiration the American people have for these incredible

achievements.

My first visit to Taiwan was many decades ago when Taiwan

was destitute, dictatorial and undemocratic. Recent visits to Taiwan demonstrate to anybody that it is a democratic, prosperous,

market-oriented, pro-American society.

So it is important not to be confused by this frivolous interplay

of substance and symbolism which confuses and permeates the dialogue we have, both among ourselves and with the Administration

on the subject of Taiwan and China.

I would like to say a word about President Lee, who precipitated,

or he is claimed to have precipitated, the most recent crisis.

Awhile back, President Lee was offered an honorary doctorate

from Cornell University, his alma mater, where he received a Ph.D.

in agricultural economics, and our Administration decided to deny

him a visa to visit his alma mater. When I found out about it, I

literally went through the roof and I introduced a resolution which

went through the Subcommittee, the Full Committee, and then the

House, and I believe unanimously was approved. President Lee visited Cornell, received his degree, and the world is still spinning

around.

Now, this was a crisis that was not of President Lee’s making.

As a distinguished graduate of a distinguished American university, he was offered an opportunity to give a speech, and he took

full advantage of it.

The current crisis is, to some extent, of his making, and while

I think he stated in terms of substance a reality, it, nevertheless,

is important for President Lee and our friends in Taiwan to clearly

understand that if they want to continue to enjoy the support they

receive from the Congress and from the Administration, they have
10

to display a degree of self-imposed responsibility, which was clearly

not present in this instance.

So I think it is critical for all of us at all times in this very nebulous, amorphous, difficult to define situation, where Taiwan is

clearly a country with its own foreign policy, with its own internal

democratic political system, and with its enormous economic success, to show some degree of restraint in stating things which,

while true, may not necessarily serve any cause by publicly being

repeated.

At a more fundamental level, it is extremely important for us to

realize that our commitment to Taiwan’s security is unshakeable,

and the people in Beijing better clearly understand this. We are

committed to Taiwan’s territorial integrity. We are committed for

the people of Taiwan to continue to be able to live in a free, open,

democratic society. This is a fundamental commitment which no

degree of trashing the American embassy in Beijing will undo.

My hope is that this eventual one-China evolution, namely the

merger of two democratic entities, will unfold at least in the lifetime of some of us, but we are committed, without any reservation,

to insisting, irrevocably, that changes in the relations between Taiwan and mainland China be undertaken by peaceful, democratic

dialog, and military threats have no room whatever. They are unacceptable, and they are counterproductive.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. The Chairman of the

Committee, Mr. Gilman, is recognized.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend the

Chairman for holding what I consider to be a very timely hearing

with regard to the situation across the Taiwan Strait and H.R.

1838, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, that was introduced

in the House by Mr. Delay.

Many of us in the Congress are increasingly concerned about

China’s military modernization, by its refusal to renounce the use

of force against Taiwan, about its overwrought saber rattling and

the deleterious effect it has on regional stability. Our nation should

without question continue to steadfastly continue to meet its security commitments to Taipei as stipulated in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.

Some analysts have characterized our nation’s Taiwan policy as

a strategic ambiguity. Any failure to provide for Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs could lead to Beijing’s misunderstanding of

America’s interests, could foster misperceptions of Taiwanese vulnerability, could increase the likelihood of Chinese miscalculation.

It could lead to conflict with our Nation over its adventurism. Ensuring and enhancing Taiwan’s ability to defend itself increases the

prospects for continued peace and stability in Northeast Asia and

supports our own national interests.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I fully support this legislation’s efforts to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capability, and I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses. I am cosponsor of the bill, it has an impressive array of bipartisan supporters,

and I hope that we can consider it before our Committee at an

early date.
11

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing this issue before us at

this timely moment.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you for your timely statement. We will

place your entire remarks in the record, but I also would like the

cooperation to trying to move to our witnesses and questions. We

will go to the Democratic side, Mr. Ackerman from New York.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Taiwan Relations Act for 20 years has provided the framework for our relations

with Taiwan.

TRA along with our 5 mutual defense treaties in the region has

also contributed to the peace, stability, and security of East Asia.

Clearly the TRA envisions that the United States will continue to

play a role in Taiwan security as Taiwan and the People’s Republic

of China pursue a resolution to the question of reunification.

Against this policy backdrop, we find ourselves again in the midst

of a serious tension across the Taiwan Strait. President Lee Tenghui’s suggestion that cross-strait relations should be conducted as

a special ‘‘state-to-state relationship’’ and the predictable outrage

from the People’s Republic of China has again raised tensions in

the region and heightened concern that the PRC might respond

militarily. On this question the United States must be clear. Only

peaceful means should be used to resolve the dispute between the

PRC and Taiwan. But the United States must be equally clear that

we will respond to armed aggression against Taiwan.

Mr. Chairman, I would urge the PRC not to overreact to President Lee’s statements and to review them in the contact of Taiwan’s domestic political debate, the audience for which they were

mainly intended. Similarly, Mr. Chairman, I would urge caution

among our colleagues as we examine the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.

I support the U.S. obligation to, as is written, provide Taiwan

with arms of a defensive character, but I have also always believed

that it was a better strategy not to tell your adversary exactly what

you were going to do. I think strategic ambiguity has served us reasonably well in East Asia. I believe that the listing in the statute

of specific weapon systems that we will provide to Taiwan is profoundly bad policy. China’s continued refusal to renounce the use

of force as a solution to reunification requires the United States to

have a more vigorous military exchange with Taiwan, and the Congress should be involved to a greater extent in the review of Taiwan’s defense needs. I hope the Administration will take that admonition to heart.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the distinguished witnesses who will be brought before us.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would like to submit my statement, and I

would like to associate myself with the statement made by the distinguished Minority Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Lantos.

[The information referred appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. The gentleman from California.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will try to be brief, Mr. Chairman. I don’t

think strategic ambiguity serves this country well at all. I think

the communist Chinese regime in Beijing needs to know exactly

where we are coming from. And, in case they have not surmised
12

it, the United States of America will not tolerate the use of force

or violence against Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China in

Beijing. And if they use force or violence against Taiwan, which is

a democratically elected government in Taiwan, the United States

will use military force and the people of our country will support

that use of military force in order to back up those people who believe in democracy and are trying to have an elected government

on the island of Taiwan. There should be no ambiguity about that,

and all of our treaty obligations with Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China permit us to sell defensive weapons to the people

of Taiwan so they can defend themselves. There should be no ambiguity or misunderstanding about that.

We assert our right through treaty obligation and international

rights as a country to sell defensive weapons to the people of Taiwan in order to deter military action against them by a communist

dictatorship on the mainland of China. There is no moral equivalency between democratically elected governments and dictatorship,

there is no strategic ambiguity about our position or what position

the people of the United States will support when it comes to combating that type of aggression.

Unfortunately, I noticed in a recent meeting between our President and the leader of the People’s Republic of China, the day before that meeting communist China held large military landing

drills on the coastal areas directly opposite Taiwan and where

thousands of PLA and militia personnel simulated landing on a

well-defended coastal area. This is the type of coercion that you get

from bullies, and either we stand strong and let the bullies know

where we are coming from, we may have to face some type of action that we would not have to face otherwise if we were strong

and put forth a determined position.

With that I thank the Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman. Dr. Shirk and Dr. Campbell, would you come to the table. The distinguished witnesses from

the Administration were introduced just a few minutes ago. I

would like to call upon Dr. Shirk first. You may proceed as you

wish.

STATEMENT OF DR. SUSAN SHIRK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Dr. SHIRK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure

to be here with you and the Committee Members again to talk

about Taiwan security and how to best enhance it.

I will submit my written statement for the record. I would like

to give a brief summary here highlighting two aspects: First of all,

what the Administration has done in response to the increase in

cross-strait tension since July as guided by the Taiwan Relations

Act. Second, I would like to address the central question that you

raised in your own introductory remarks which is: will this proposed legislation, clearly intended to enhance the security of Taiwan, actually do that or will it have the opposite effect? I will express the Administration position that indeed we believe it would

have a detrimental rather than enhancing effect.

Let me start off by saying that since the increase in cross-strait

tension in July, the United States has responded with consistent
13

public and private statements in an effort to calm tensions and encourage a peaceful resolution of the dispute. All of our public and

private statements have been steady and consistent and designed

to make clear that our own policies are unchanged. That means

that our own one-China policy is unchanged, that we have an abiding interest that there be a peaceful approach by both sides to resolving differences, and that we believe that face-to-face dialog is

the best way for those differences to be peacefully resolved.

We have made these three pillars of our policy very, very clear,

both in our private communications with the two sides and in our

public statements as well. The President articulated this in a telephone conversation with Jiang Zemin and in a White House press

conference. We sent Richard Bush and Stanley Roth, both former

employees of this Committee, to both sides to listen to the leaders,

to reiterate U.S. policies and to urge both sides to undertake flexible statesman-like efforts in order to preserve the possibility of dialog, which we believe is the best means for peaceful resolution.

When President Clinton met President Jiang in Auckland last

week, the message again was very clear and consistent. The Secretary of State also met with her counterpart at the same time and

sent the same message. In other words, we made clear our continued commitment to a one-China policy, our insistence on the peaceful resolution of differences and on the value of dialogue.

The President and the Secretary urged China to avoid any militarization of the dispute that might risk accidents or miscalculations. President Clinton told President Jiang that there would be

grave consequences here in the U.S. if China resorted to military

force. The message was clear and consistent.

Now, where does this leave us today? There has been no sign of

imminent hostilities, but as a number of Committee Members have

noted, PRC military activity has been somewhat elevated since

July, and the rhetoric is quite bellicose. The risk of accident or miscalculation and escalation remains. The visit of Wang Daohan to

Taiwan that I think we all hope will happen has not been officially

canceled, but the PRC has said that retraction of President Lee’s

state-to-state formulation is a precondition for that visit to occur.

We certainly hope that the two sides can find a way for this meeting to take place. It is precisely when tensions are high that dialogue is most needed.

In the meantime we have also been reminding the two sides that

they need to take steps to reduce the risk of accidents as their Air

Forces continue their activities over the Strait.

Now, this is the context in which we must consider the proposals

included in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.

I recognize that the authors of this bill and the Members who

support it believe that this legislation will help us honor our commitment to the people of Taiwan that we all feel very strongly

about. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, and I say it with all due respect

to the supporters of this bill, the Administration believes that this

legislation could have serious unintended negative consequences

that could weaken Taiwan security and impinge on our own security interests in the region. These consequences arise because this

legislation will be interpreted by Taiwan and by the PRC as a significant revision of the Taiwan Relations Act, which has success-
14

fully governed the U.S. role in cross-strait issues for 20 years. It

will be seen as an effort to reverse our commitment to an unofficial

relationship and to recreate in its place a formal military relationship with Taiwan.

Several provisions of the bill lead to this perception. For example, the mandate of operational communication links between the

military headquarters of Taiwan and the United States in Hawaii,

a linkage more indicative of formal military ties than an unofficial

relationship; also the requirement that the Secretary of Defense

permit the travel of flag rank officers to Taiwan. Avoiding such

senior military travel has helped this and previous Administrations

of both parties to have successful working-level contacts while

avoiding the cloak of officiality that could be a hindrance to effective exchange.

Equally troubling is the specific authorization that the U.S. provide ballistic missile defense. As you know, Mr. Chairman, this Administration as a matter of policy does not preclude the provision

of TMD to Taiwan in the future, but to make this determination

now, as the bill suggests we should, when the systems are still

under development and not even yet available to U.S. forces certainly is more symbolism than substance. It is certainly premature.

By nature, providing these systems to Taiwan would be a decision with significant implications for Taiwan security, regional security, and the security of the United States. That decision will

need to be made, as we make all decisions about arms transfers to

Taiwan, on the basis of Taiwan’s actual defensive needs and the

context of regional security at that time.

We are also talking with the PRC about its own missile deployments in a very direct way, and we are telling the PRC that its

interests would be best advanced by a decision to check or scale

back its own missile deployments opposite Taiwan.

While I can’t tell you how successful we will be, and certainly

this is an effort that has to be undertaken over a period of time,

I can assure you that enactment of the language in this proposed

legislation will reduce the incentives for the PRC to show restraint

and make it harder rather than easier for us to succeed.

Mr. Chairman, the bill also puts Congress on record as endorsing

the sales of specific weapons, as Members have previously noted,

including several which the Administration has denied because

they didn’t meet the criteria of strictly defensive weaponry in the

TRA.

We see a danger that the bill could be the first step in a process

whereby Congress would attempt to mandate specific arms sales,

thereby abrogating the longstanding and effective arms sale process that now exists.

We also believe, and I can get into this in response to questions

if you would like, that certain elements of the bill raise constitutional concerns having to do with the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.

So as we consider the potentially serious problems with the proposed legislation, Mr. Chairman, I think we really need to step

back and say. ‘‘Do we need this act? Has the Taiwan Relations Act

failed in assisting Taiwan in its own security and stability? ’’ And
15

it seems to me that the track record of four Administrations says

no. In fact, it has been a very impressive success.

It has been a great success in creating a stable, secure environment for Taiwan to develop into the kind of strong market economy

and democracy that it is today. It is creating a context for extensive

economic ties between the two sides which certainly are a force for

peace to develop. And it has created a shared prosperity between

the PRC and Taiwan. And of course that has all been possible in

part because Taiwan has been able, with the support of the United

States under the TRA, to strengthen its self-defense capability. The

United States has provided a wide range of defensive military

equipment to Taiwan, as is detailed in my written testimony.

The TRA has worked. Taiwan has never had a stronger defense

capability as it has today. Because of the success of the TRA, we

believe that the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act is not needed

and that it will produce no benefits for Taiwan security and in fact,

especially given the context of a tense relationship across the Strait

today, could aggravate cross-strait problems and be detrimental to

Taiwan security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Shirk appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Shirk. Dr. Campbell, you may

proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. KURT CAMPBELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY FOR ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Dr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter, and thank you for inviting us to speak about your very important proceedings about

cross-strait relations. Let me associate myself with both Dr. Shirk’s

and the remarks made by Senator Thomas made earlier today.

I would like to say a couple of words about the issue that you

were talking about before this hearing convened about East Timor

because I think it is extraordinarily important, and we will talk

with you about this later today and later this week.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, late last night the United Nations

Security Council approved an Australian-led force to go into East

Timor almost immediately. As we speak, Australian troops in Darwin are preparing to move to East Timor in the next day or so.

They have come to us and explained in significant detail the nature

of their involvement. It is the largest involvement of Australian

armed forces since the Second World War.

When they talk about it, they talk about it in terms of the greatest national security challenge that they have faced in 50 years.

They talk about it like they talk about Coral Sea.

They have come to us and spoken to us about some specific,

unique potential contributions that they hope that the United

States would be prepared to make in the realm of logistics, tactical

transport, and some other areas associated with their force. I want

to say from my perspective as we look back over the last 50 years,

every single time we have asked Australians for assistance in security challenges, they have been there for us. This is the first time

that they have come to us and said that they need some help. I
16

think their request is appropriate. The way that I define ally

means we need to be there for them.

The Department will be up to describe carefully what we think

are prudent steps that we are prepared to take to support our

friends in Australia in Timor.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Campbell, I think you are going to be able

to expect a positive bipartisan response.

Dr. CAMPBELL. We appreciate that and so do the Australians,

Mr. Chairman.

Let me say a few words about the subject before us today.

First of all, I would judge, and I think that most observers would

judge, the Taiwan Relations Act as the most important and significant incidence of legislative leadership in foreign policy in our history. I think it has been enormously successful in sustaining not

only peace and stability across the dynamic Taiwan Strait, but in

securing American leadership in that region. I think that leadership has a critical ingredient in peace and stability.

If you look at the Taiwan Relations Act in its entirety, it gives

us every necessary legal authority to do our job. Over the last several years, succeeding and successive Administrations have taken

every advantage of this authority. I think, as Dr. Shirk has indicated, by the provision of defensive weaponry and other forms of

dialog we have made clear our commitment to the maintenance of

peace and stability.

It underscores three key commitments that the United States

stands by. Not only is the Taiwan Relations Act the law of our

land, it is also excellent policy and we follow it not only because

it is the law but because we think that it is in our national interest.

The first requirement of the Taiwan Relations Act is for us to

continually judge the security environment of the Taiwan Relations

Act, to consult with Congress and also to inform friends in Taiwan.

We have obviously been involved with that over the last several

weeks and months, as Dr. Shirk indicated.

The second is to provide appropriate defensive weaponry where

necessary to Taiwan. As I indicated, this Administration and previous Administrations have stood up and provided what we think

are appropriate, prudent but also extensive military sales to Taiwan to meet their legitimate defensive needs.

Third, of course, what is often forgotten or overlooked in the Taiwan Relations Act is the request and requirement that the United

States maintain forces available to respond should there be a challenge to the peaceful status quo. And if you listen and look carefully at the provisions of the East Asian strategy report and the

statements of the President of the United States, we have for several years maintained 100,000 forces for deployment to the Asian

Pacific region to be able to respond to potential challenges like this.

When we look at the situation on the ground and in the air and

on the water in the Taiwan Strait over the last several months, I

think we see a couple of areas of concern when it comes to the People’s Republic of China and the People’s Liberation Army. I will put

them in three categories. First, generally speaking, in terms of deployments and procurements—and I think what we have seen of

course over the last several years are China’s decisions to purchase
17

sophisticated weaponry from Russia and also developing their own

high-tech capabilities—China is becoming a more modern military.

We have to watch that closely into the next century.

The second areas are both exercises which are provocative on occasion and also activities. Here I think the activities that we have

seen both by the Taiwan Air Force and the PLA Air Force over the

last several weeks and months have been provocative and

unhelpful, and we are very concerned that these activities have the

potential for causing an accident or an unintended event. It is not

clear whether that would trigger a larger confrontation. My own

sense is that is unlikely. However, those kinds of activities are imprudent and they send the wrong messages.

Third is the area that I am most troubled about is that in the

last year or so we have begun to see a change in the strategic

thinking not only in the PLA but among much of the intelligentsia

about strategic issues. You see increasingly in Chinese military

writing and other strategic literature references to Taiwan in a

very hostile way, thinking of Taiwan as a military target. I think

that direction, that kind of thinking about Taiwan, sends exactly

and precisely the wrong message to the people of Taipei. One of the

things that we always urge in our discussions with the PLA and

with the PRC is what is necessary is trying to develop dialogue and

promoting confidence. These actions are sending precisely the opposite signal and, in fact, degrade confidence, undermine trust, and

engender very real concern among the people of Taiwan.

Let me just say very quickly about our robust unofficial relationship. We have provided, as I said, I think very prudent but extensive hardware to Taiwan over the years in every area. We can talk

about that in my answers. In my written testimony, I detail that

very clearly.

In the last few years we have developed more human contacts

that are prudent in the unofficial channels that we have. These are

designed to build what we call software, greater dialogue on critical

security challenges that Taiwan faces.

Let me just close by saying that I take very much to heart the

statement that Mr. Ackerman has made and I take that to heart

myself personally. I think we have to do a better job in dialogue

and discussion with Congress about cross-strait dynamic situations,

and I intend to myself work harder at that in the coming months.

I must say, however, that the Taiwan Relations Act has been superb legislation. I think not only is the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act unnecessary, but it also is potentially counterproductive,

potentially even dangerous given the very delicate situation that

we are facing in the Taiwan Straits. Frankly, I share many of the

sentiments of the authors of this bill, but I also believe that we are

doing what is necessary to meet the legitimate security concerns of

the democratic government of Taiwan.

And with that, I think I will conclude, Mr. Chairman. And of

course Dr. Shirk and myself will be happy to address any questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Campbell appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Dr. Campbell.
18

I recall in 1979, my first year in Congress, how the Carter Administration opposed the Taiwan Relations Act in many ways and

how, in fact, it is the product of the initiatives of the Democratically-controlled Congress, but with strong Republican bipartisan

effort. If it is to be commended, as I think it should, it has done

its job remarkably well. It had a very heavy Congressional involvement despite being contrary to the views of the Administration at

that time.

Now I am faced with a situation where I have the Chairman of

the Subcommittee and others in the leadership, including Mr.

DeLay and Mr. Cox, are sponsoring or cosponsoring the legislation.

Democratic Members like Mr. Deutsch, Mr. Andrews, and Mrs.

Lowey were initial cosponsors, and others have been added on both

sides of the aisle, including others on this Committee such as Mr.

Rohrabacher. Senator Thomas asked to come and testify today. He

is not here at my request, but he is certainly entitled to present

his view. He was quite candid and very specific, and his written

statement even more so.

I think it is important first of all that we have this hearing. We

looked carefully at the concerns expressed and at outright objections to it.

From you, Dr. Campbell, I would hope that you could give me

some very specific responses to questions that I would like to provide you on sections 3, 4 and 5, which will perhaps answer some

of the concerns of the authors of this legislation as quickly as possible. I will share your responses with the Subcommittee, and the

Committee, and others, including the authors of the legislation.

That would be helpful.

I think also it is important that we see if we can arrange for the

Administration to meet with the people most interested in this subject area, including Members of this Subcommittee and Committee

and the authors, in a very candid, closed classified setting so that

Members can fully examine and understand the depth and details

of our relationship with Taiwan now.

I do not think that has happened despite your efforts and the efforts of others on the Hill. We can do that better, and that might

be helpful. All of these Members, as I am sure you are aware and

would agree with me, are not intending to create serious unintended negative comments or impacts upon Taiwan security.

I would say, however, that there is a great deal of uneasiness on

the Members of the House and, undoubtedly, the Senate as a result

of the President’s visit to China and of some statements that were

made at that time.

I think also uneasiness has been triggered by the revelations of

the Cox Committee, on which I serve, about the depth of the success of espionage that the Chinese conducted against the Department of Energy weapons laboratories and some of the subsequent

comments that some of their officials have made about the neutron

bomb and its relevance to Taiwan. All of these things together (and

others) are creating some concern about Taiwan-American relations

and about the potential conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.

I want to tell you what I think is behind the various levels of

concern and how we might begin to approach some of those issues.
19

At this point, I will simply desist and not ask more specific questions.

If you have any response to what I have said, I would welcome

it.

Dr. CAMPBELL. First of all, I appreciate very much the comments,

Mr. Chairman. I think the most helpful thing that I can imagine

is the opportunity to come up and brief Members in a highly classified environment on some of the issues that you have raised. I

think that would be extraordinarily helpful. Thank you.

Dr. SHIRK. I might add that Dr. Campbell and I have been as a

team talking with staff on the Hill from time to time about these

issues, and we certainly would welcome the chance to talk with

Members as well, in the kind of setting that you have described.

That would be very constructive.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. In regular order, we will proceed with

the 5 minute question period. We will turn first to Mr.

Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Have there been

any recent communications from the People’s Republic of China or

Taiwan to the Administration, any real concerns about the exercises or whatever, the buildup that China has been making in the

past couple of weeks or even months?

Dr. SHIRK. No, there have not been. In fact, they have gone to

great pains to state publicly that they don’t see any military risks

inherent in the situation at the moment; that they feel quite confident that despite the rhetorical saber rattling, there is nothing

extraordinary going on and no preparations for actual aggression.

Dr. CAMPBELL. I agree with that. You see, of course, where this

potentially leads. Some senior officials in Taiwan say to try to reassure their public, don’t worry, we see nothing of concern in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC, who is trying to send a message that they

are very concerned about developments that Taiwan has taken politically, think gee, we have to make sure that we have their attention.

I think it is fair to say that we have had communications with

the Taiwanese about developments. We have seen actions that are,

I think as the Chairman indicated, unhelpful and provocative, and

we have urged both sides to not do this in this environment and

to try to get back to the table.

Most of the activities that we have seen, the exercises, the

flights, some of the statements, are meant to signal in this case.

I think it is fair to say that in 1996 there was a time, a couple of

days here and there, where we were uncertain what exactly was

about to develop. We have not seen any of those situations now,

Congressman. We don’t see—we have not seen any indication of

anything other than an attempt to signal.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Has there been any indications from the

Taiwanese officials since the introduction of this legislation in May

in support of this proposed bill?

Dr. SHIRK. Not explicitly. In fact, we are, of course, always very

interested in their views of whether or not our unofficial relationship under the Taiwan Relations Act is working well from their

perspective. Although certain requests they have made have been

denied, and some of the things that we have allowed they have cho-
20

sen not to buy, but by and large, what we hear from them is that

they feel quite positive about our unofficial defense relationship

with them.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I don’t think that my question was clear.

Let me try again.

Dr. CAMPBELL. I think I understand your question. Let me try

to answer it.

First of all, I think what Dr. Shirk said is exactly right. Even

among senior Taiwan military officials, the people that I work with

the most in this context, there is I think a relatively sophisticated

appreciation that their ultimate security cannot be purchased

through simply the provision of weapons.

It would be fair to say that the military, like many militaries, is

a relatively conservative institution. They want to be loyal to the

political establishment, and I think some of the statements, some

of the developments in Taiwan, some of the maneuverings have left

them concerned. They are not exactly sure about the security environment. They feel the military is very strongly supportive of our

unofficial relationship, and I don’t think they are generally in favor

of unnecessarily provocative actions or statements.

I think to the extent that they have spoken about this particular

bill, what they have said is that they share many of the sentiments

of the authors. With me at least they have not talked directly about

the particulars.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The point that I want to make, Mr. Secretary, in the 11 years that I have been a Member of this Committee, I don’t think that my position has ever changed about the

security of Taiwan. But the problem here that I have is that it

makes me feel like maybe we are lessening or there is some deficiency in our current relationship with Taiwan that got this proposed bill on the make.

So that is why I wanted to ask you if there has been anything

that I am not aware of that has given the impression to my good

friend, the gentleman from Texas, to propose the bill. Are we deficient in our current relationship with Taiwan if there is a threat

tomorrow?

Dr. CAMPBELL. We don’t think that there is a deficiency and in

our discussions, and we have had many discussions with Taiwan

officials, both civilian and military, they have not led me or others,

I believe, to think that there is a deficiency.

However, as in many countries, including Asian countries, I am

not sure that they would necessarily tell us if there were.

As important as our dialogues are, and I think they are legitimate and very strong, it is possible that there are other sources of

communication. However, I think we feel very strongly that we

have the kind of relationship that is necessary. Again, in our conversations, they have been very strongly supportive of the TRA and

indeed suggested that this other legislation is unnecessary.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Some of our colleagues have asked me about

this bill, but I responded by saying that I wanted to check with you

and your basic position. Certainly you are more knowledgeable

than I in terms of having briefings that a lot of times we are unable to accompany you, and I just wanted to get your wisdom and
21

understanding if there has been a problem over the past several

months as to why we end up with a bill like this.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman from America-Samoa. He

heard my discussion about some of the genesis of the uneasiness,

and I think the hearing is helpful. It is going to help me make up

my mind. I think a very important and closed briefing could follow.

The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Dr. Campbell, let me get this straight. Your

testimony to us today is that high level officials in Taiwan are telling you that they don’t want these weapons and they don’t want

us to sell them these weapons? Is that what you are telling us?

Dr. CAMPBELL. Having been before this Committee before, I am

always worried when you begin a question with ‘‘let me get this

straight.’’ usually you are about to be on the hot seat.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are already on the hot seat.

Dr. CAMPBELL. I really do appreciate that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So let’s get to the question.

Dr. CAMPBELL. I will.

Let me say that our Taiwan military friends always ask for more

in terms of military hardware. Always. I think they leave our meetings with two sentiments—they are partially satisfied and partially

dissatisfied. My sense is that they are more partially satisfied, but

again those are my discussions with them.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It would take a real diplomat to understand

what you just said.

Let’s get to the question. Are you testifying that high level officials in Taiwan have told you that they don’t want to buy these

weapon systems?

Dr. CAMPBELL. No. I think the bill is about more than simply

weapon systems. When you talk about weapon systems per se, yes,

they always want more. That is a statement of fact.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is cool. I thought you were testifying—

I don’t know how I got that impression that some high level people

in Taiwan didn’t really want these weapons because every time I

have been over there, that is what they want.

Dr. CAMPBELL. Congressman, another point, there are also times

that they ask for systems that we think are important and we say

yes, and then they don’t buy them. And more recently, we are in

an environment where we are telling them that there are things

that they need to purchase because we have looked carefully at

their armed forces that they are reluctant to do. When you talk

about this, this is not us saying ‘‘No, no, no.’’ It is more of a dialogue.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let’s go to the ‘‘no, no, no’’ part. Aren’t we

saying ‘‘no, no, no’’ when they want to buy submarines and Aegis

systems? Don’t the Chinese have this missile buildup on the coastline, and they don’t have a 64 to 4 advantage on the Taiwanese?

And aren’t we saying ‘‘no, no, no’’ to the elected government rather

than the dictatorship?

Dr. CAMPBELL. You have raised an important issue. Let me try

to handle both of them if I can.

First of all, in terms of anti-submarine warfare, we think that

mission is among the most important missions that the Taiwan

military faces, and we have sold an array of military equipment,
22

to include helicopters, ships, and airplanes that are designed to address the submarine threat. You are correct, Congressman Rohrabacher, that we have not sold submarines. However, we believe

that the mission is critical, and we have provided a lot of time and

a lot of effort to address this particular issue.

Now, the second point that you raise about Aegis, I can address

publicly because it has been in the public. We actually agreed and

urged Taiwan in 1992 to purchase Aegis. We sold licenses. We

went out publicly. We worked with them on this, and they decided

not to go ahead with this.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we are not opposed to selling Aegis systems to Taiwan?

Dr. CAMPBELL. I am not going to answer that question specifically because our policy is an ongoing discussion with the Taiwan

government.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, I am not getting very definitive answers here. This is sort of like the strategic ambiguity right

here in Congress.

Let me ask you this——

Dr. CAMPBELL. What I would suggest is that in the private session that the Chairman has spoken about, we can have a useful

discussion about Aegis.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have had too much ambiguity in our policy. When you are dealing with a bully, the bully has to know the

price he is going to pay if he starts a fight. We are giving the

wrong signals with all of this ambiguity. Someone should not have

to translate answers when you are talking English, and the people

on the other side they have to translate into Chinese. They don’t

even know what the position you are talking about and what the

position of the Administration is.

We have an unelected communist dictatorship with the mainland

of China, and you have a country that is struggling to be democratic on Taiwan. Unfortunately, it seems to me what we have here

is an Administration that is trying to base its policy on some sort

of moral equivalency between the two regimes. You are condemning the two sides when it is only the communist dictatorship

that is threatening military action.

Listening to your testimony, both sides this and both sides that.

It is not both sides that is creating the threat of war, it is the communist Chinese belligerents and the fact is that if they had a

democratic government on the mainland, they would not have a

problem right now because the people of Taiwan would not be so

afraid of this talk about reunification.

I will tell you, if we continue to have this strategic ambiguity

that you are talking about, we are going to lead this United States

of America into a conflict because the bully is not going to know

what we are willing to fight for.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman from California for his

comments.

I will interject by saying that since Nebraska is very close to the

coast, I follow submarine issues. [Laughter.] Of course we do not

produce any diesel submarines in the United States and have not

for years. Germany and Sweden do. It is always interesting that

people want the United States to sell diesel subs, and we simply
23

do not produce them. That might upset our nuclear-powered submarine Navy.

The gentleman from Louisiana, who is a little closer to the shore.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have several questions and would prefer brief answers. In this

situation it is obvious that all of the parties involved are Chinese.

There is not a racial issue or ethnic issue like we have had to deal

with that we have sent our people out to. But the differences are

political, and they have been affected by different political models

and economic models. It appears to me that a lot of the problem

gets back to the fact that these differences are articulated by politicians.

Do you feel that some of the problems that are going on right

now are similar to some of the problems that we have in this city?

Where we have people of different political parties throwing unnecessary bombs at each other, verbal bombs? In fact this Committee

met earlier this morning, and I thought I was going to have to separate the Chairman and the Ranking Member. Do you feel that

some of this is just politics or the politicians?

Dr. SHIRK. I think that the problems across the Strait between

the PRC and Taiwan reflect very deep rooted nationalist sentiment.

It is not simply a matter of domestic politics on the two sides.

Mr. COOKSEY. There is an election going on next year between

the KMT and the DPP, and I can’t help but feel that is a factor.

Dr. Campbell, let me ask you a question. What have you told the

people of Taiwan that they need that they in fact have not bought?

I am quoting your statement from a few moments ago.

Dr. CAMPBELL. If I may, Congressman, I would like very much

to give a very detailed lay down on some specific military issues

that require going into some classified material. So because the

Chairman has offered the opportunity for that kind of a setting,

what I would like to do in that setting is first of all lay down what

we think are the security challenges specifically now and what we

speculate over the next 10 years, the kinds of discussions that we

have had with our Taiwan friends, the kinds of communications

that we have had with the PLA and the PRC about our concerns.

I would like to go through very specifically what kind of defensive

technologies, systems that we have provided to the Taiwanese.

Mr. COOKSEY. You will do that in another session?

Dr. CAMPBELL. I am available to come up at any time to brief in

any detail on these issues.

Mr. COOKSEY. I was intrigued by the statement that you made

that we have advised them to get some weapon systems and they

have turned them down.

Dr. CAMPBELL. I will tell you that Taiwan is a small place. Taiwan has very real security needs. It also has a limited budget. And

if you look over a period of about 10 years, first of all the amount

of weaponry that has been approved is much, much larger than the

actual kinds of weaponry that were purchased.

In addition, because there has been a bit of cultural change in

the way that we try to interact, in the last few years we have tried

to be more specific about areas that we think that Taiwan needs

to change and adapt. We see some of that adaptation, but it is very

slow.
24

Mr. COOKSEY. In Taiwan?

Dr. CAMPBELL. In Taiwan.

Mr. COOKSEY. But it is ahead of the PRC? They were both dictatorships 10 years ago, is that correct?

Dr. CAMPBELL. When you say ahead of, I think in terms of political developments. As the Congressman has indicated, Taiwan has

I think one of the most remarkable and exciting democracies in the

world. Their military organizations still have, I think, areas where

reform and change are needed. You have a system that is still very

much dominated by the Army. I think it doesn’t take—yes, that is

in Taiwan. It does not take a rocket scientist to understand that

in the coming arena of 21st century warfare for Taiwan or as it

thinks about potential challenges, it is going to be more naval and

air issues, and those changes are happening.

We have had in the last number of years a number of important

reforms, like Goldwater-Nichols, which changed the way that our

military operations work together and work with the civilian apparatus. Taiwan has not had any of those things.

In our discussion I would like to talk about some of the politics,

the military politics, not larger politics, but the military politics

make this an interesting proposition.

Mr. BEREUTER. The time of the gentleman has expired. I think

that I am going to try to schedule that session next week, including

the prime sponsors of the legislation and the Subcommittee. I think

it will be very helpful. We will try to make it the kind of environment in which we can have the optimal discussion.

Dr. CAMPBELL. We will be available next week.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much for your testimony. We appreciate your help to the Subcommittee. We now have a third distinguished panel. I ask that they come to the table. These witnesses have been introduced before, but I briefly want to mention

their names again. Our third panel will consist of the Honorable

Caspar Weinberger, the Honorable R. James Woolsey, and Dr.

David Lampton.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your patience. We look forward to your testimony. Your entire statements will be made a

part of the record.

You may proceed as you wish. Mr. Secretary, Secretary Weinberger, we will turn first to you for your comments.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CASPAR WEINBERGER,

CHAIRMAN, FORBES MAGAZINE, FORMER SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE

Mr. WEINBERGER. Thank you very much. It is a great honor to

testify before the Committee, and I am deeply conscious of that

honor today. I had a novel and pleasant experience of hearing all

of the statements made at the opening of the hearing from both

sides of the aisle of the Committee, with which I found myself in

full agreement. This euphoria faded a bit after the Administration

witnesses, but let me try to be as helpful as I can and tell you some

of the views that I have as to really why we should have a clarifying bill such as the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.
25

I would like to start with a point, and incidentally I do not have

a fully written out statement, just a note or two, but I would supply anything that the Committee asks for later.

I would feel that our commitments to Taiwan have not been

made clear. We have fostered a policy and stayed with a policy, and

I was pleased and somewhat surprised to hear the praise for the

Taiwan Relations Act by the Administration witnesses, but we

have fostered a policy of ambiguity. We always took the basic position that we understood what the People’s Republic of China claim

was. We understood their position, and we understood the Taiwanese position and that was as far as we went.

We did in the Taiwan Relations Act say that we would regard

any attempt to interfere or change that relationship by force would

be viewed with the greatest consequences. That carries out the policy of ambiguity because that could mean actually anything from

a proper response, military response to seeking a U.N. resolution.

It leaves it open, and I think it is extremely important that the

People’s Republic of China understand the depth and the strength

of our commitment as one of the classic means of deterrence.

So I think that the act has been useful but has had a great deal

of ambiguity and a great deal of difficulty. For example, when I

was Secretary I had to meet with any officials from Taiwan in

some country club. We were not allowed to have them in the Pentagon, and nonsense like that, which I think encourages the People’s Republic of China to believe our commitment is not serious

and discourages Taiwan from believing that our commitment is

very serious.

So I think the clarification of that is an extremely important part

of the relationship.

The ambiguity that we had relied on, to my mind, was pretty

well shredded by President Clinton’s visit to the People’s Republic

last year in which he seemed to endorse fully; rather than simply

saying he understood, he seemed to endorse fully the People’s Republic position on a great many items and left it in very considerable doubt as to whether or not we had any commitment of any

kind of any value really left to Taiwan. The ambiguity was no

longer there. We went way beyond saying we understood each other’s position. We endorsed the People’s Republic’s position through

his statements which I thought were very ill advised and probably

had been made without even discussion with his own people.

But the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act that we are talking

about now would really restore those commitments and would

make it clear that the position that had been gravely weakened by

the President’s statements was going to be restored.

I cannot see how emphasizing to the People’s Republic of China

and to Taiwan and to the world that our commitment to Taiwan,

should they be attacked, is absolute, is going to be in any way

harmful to the security of Taiwan. I think that the deterrent capabilities that we have and that we should have are well-known and

I think that if there is any doubt whatever that those deterrent capabilities would be exercised to the fullest, then you have encouraged the People’s Republic to believe that we would have a response that would be far less than we should have, should they

make any overt actions attacking or leading toward an attack of
26

Taiwan, including the islands of Ma-tsu, Quemoy, and one of them

changed its name now, but they are the area where that sort of activity could start.

A number of people have said that the communique of August

17th, 1982, basically changed our position and strengthened our relationship with the People’s Republic and weakened our relationship to Taiwan.

I would in that connection simply want to point out that a communique is just that, it is just a summary of talks. It can never

change or supersede the meaning of a statute enacted by the Congress. A communique is ambiguous, but it does require us to keep

on helping Taiwan maintain defensive capabilities, and it is the removal of some of that ambiguity that is essential now, now that the

ambiguity we were carefully maintaining was stripped away by the

President last year.

Communiques are almost always written, as you know, before

the event, so that the event is held so that the communique can

be issued, and consequently their value I think is somewhat degraded as a result of that.

Also there was no Defense Department participation in that communique. It appeared very suddenly on the horizon, based on the

assumptions that the PRC would also remove and reduce their armaments and their forces. The PRC, of course, has not only done

neither; it has moved in the opposite direction.

Then I think we have to take into consideration some of the

changes that have occurred since then, and I think China’s

changed attitude, the People’s Republic changed attitude, is important to take in mind. They now seem to be interested in offensive

strengths. I made two or three trips while in office at their request.

We discussed defensive capabilities, how they would defend their

1800-mile long border with the then Soviet Union. We discussed

the modernization of some of their defensive weapons, and we had

a very good military to military relationship.

They seemed to want at that time only to strengthen that defensive capability. Since then, they have adopted what I consider to

be a very aggressive foreign policy in connection with the Spratly

Islands, with dropping missiles into Taiwan waters before their

election, adding and acquiring an additional nuclear and neutron

bomb capability with the technology that was described and detailed in the very able Cox report. They have expressed their deep

anger at our renewal of our Japanese-U.S. security pact, a purely

defensive alliance. They have expressed their fury at our working

with Japan and Taiwan on missile defense. They have had a heavy

increase in arms and submarines facing Taiwan, and they have

flown air patrols, certainly provocatively close to Taiwan, and keep

doing that, and also made a certain number of noises with respect

to the islands.

All of that to my mind emphasizes the need for the clarity and

strength set out in the Helms-Torricelli bill, which calls for lifting

restrictions on arms sales to Taiwan so you don’t have to ask

whether each bullet or pistol is going to be within the ban or not,

and certainly for ending the ban on high level military exchanges

between the two countries and for providing Taiwan with key

weapons systems, including theater missile defenses that would
27

make it much harder for the Chinese military to use or even to

threaten force against Taiwan.

I would just make one closing comment, Mr. Chairman, and that

is that President Lee’s statements with regard to, two equal sovereign states and a state-to-state relationship, which we have basically attacked and which we have urged him to withdraw and done

a number of other things that indicated to the People’s Republic

and the world that we felt that he was complicating the situation,

simply recognizes the facts as they are. The forces that the PRC

have created in China only emphasize China’s aggressive intentions to win Taiwan back and Taiwan’s needs for support. President Lee supports the unification when China changes, and he has

been very clear about that for a number of years. It would seem

to me that is established and that our attacking President Lee for

making this sort of statement by itself expresses a partiality, a

support for the People’s Republic, that I think is incorrect and improper. I do think that it would be far more useful if President

Clinton at least many times before and certainly now, being together with the President of China in New Zealand, if he had made

it quite clear that we need to have from the People’s Republic a

firm agreement that there will be no attack on Taiwan, that there

will be no attempt to gain Taiwan by force, and that it would be

quite essential that be understood by the President of China, by

the Taiwanese, and by the world.

I do think that the danger is that China rather than Taiwan is

going to misjudge our steadfastness if we persist not only in what

was the murkiness and the ambiguity, but now if we persist in the

feeling of condemning President Lee as opposed to recognizing that

it is important that we make it clear that our commitment is to defend Taiwan and that has to be understood by the Chinese, and defending Taiwan would mean a great deal more than going to the

United Nations for the resolution. It would mean use of appropriate force to counter whatever force the Chinese would exert.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here

with you, and I would be glad to answer any questions you might

have.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Secretary Weinberger.

Director Woolsey, we look forward to your comments now. You

proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE R. JAMES WOOLSEY, PARTNER, SHEA AND GARDNER, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As always, it is a

pleasure to appear before you and before this Committee. I appreciate the Committee staff’s indulgence in letting me speak from a

few notes rather than submitting a prepared statement.

I support the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, and I believe

that under current circumstances this package is generally a reasonable one. The increase in staff at the American Institute in Taiwan, the required Presidential report on Taiwan, defense requests,

reassertion of the primacy of the TRA over the 1982 communique

regarding arms sales, enhancement of operational training and exercises, establishment of the secure communications channel be-
28

tween the United States and Taiwanese military commands, and

support for certain arms sales. I would not support mandating such

sales, but some indication of support seems to me to be entirely appropriate.

It does give me some pause that this list is rather detailed. I

served as general counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee

for 3 years as well as serving as a Presidential appointee in both

Democratic and Republican Administrations in the Navy Department, the State Department, and the intelligence community, and,

frankly, I can teach this issue of Executive versus Congressional

prerogatives either round or flat.

I am generally of the view that the detailed implementation is

best left to the Executive and there may be one or two aspects of

this bill that it would be wise to compromise on. But I am also well

aware of Lord Bryce’s dictum that the United States Constitution

in the field of foreign policy is essentially just an invitation to

struggle. And whereas here the Executive branch’s policy is both,

in my judgment, wrong-headed and dangerous, Congress has a

duty to the country to try to correct it.

The current situation—really since last spring—I believe continues to be a dangerous one. The PRC has sent modern fighter

aircraft into the Straits, it has seized a Taiwanese ship, it has fired

its new ballistic missile, the DF–31, on which the United States

taxpayers should perhaps receive licensing fees. This followed last

spring’s stage-managed damage by bussed-in crowds to attack the

U.S. embassy, a massive crackdown on the threat posed by middleaged people who like to do breathing exercises, and brutal sentencing of those who seek to organize true democracy for China.

I would submit that although the triggering incidents leading to

this series of events seemed diverse, our tragic mistake in bombing

the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, President Lee Teng-hui’s comment about state-to-state relations being the proper basis for PRCTaiwan negotiations, and the silent demonstration in Beijing by

the Falun Gong sect, the underlying sources of the PRC’s behavior

are, I believe, essentially two:

First, a fear of potential political unrest stemming from economic

change in China, and, second, U.S. policy itself.

First, the disestablishment of the large state-owned enterprises

over the long run as sponsored by Zhu Rongji and others will bring

some economic freedoms over time to China that, in my judgment,

will help begin to change Chinese society and ultimately making

China more conducive over time to political freedom. But in the

short run, the unemployment which this disestablishment produces

can lead to instability. Thus, there is a temptation for Beijing to

play the nationalism card as a way of reducing the chances of that

instability and enhancing Beijing’s own hand.

I am glad to see support for normal trade relations between the

PRC and the United States. I am sorry to have seen the Administration some months ago delay the negotiations on the WTO, especially in light of Zhu Rongji’s efforts last spring to compromise with

American positions. In light of some criticisms that I will offer in

a moment of the Administration for being too lenient with the PRC,

I would suggest that here on the WTO last spring it was too rigid.

It is almost as if they were embodying the pointed line from Bishop
29

Cranmer’s Book of Common Prayer, ‘‘we have left undone those

things which we ought to have done and we have done those things

which we ought not to have done.’’

The second determinative, I believe, of Beijing’s behavior is U.S.

policy. Although I do think in the above instance last spring that

the Administration offered insufficient encouragement to Zhu

Rongji and other reformers, nonetheless, in many other steps, several of them regarding Taiwan, the Administration in the last year

or so I believe has appeased China.

Now, I don’t believe there is any other word for the Administration’s behavior. Until 1939, in September, that word merely meant

compromising or accommodating, but since that date it now, of

course, suggests undercutting a small nation’s ability to resist aggression by compromising one’s own principles.

When I used this word before a Senate Committee last month,

the Administration’s State Department spokesman James Rubin

said ‘‘Woolsey is no China expert.’’ But I would call to the Subcommittee’s attention that I was not talking about Chinese behavior. I was talking about U.S. Government behavior, and I still

think appeasement is the right word to use.

In effect, the Administration’s policies have encouraged the most

hard line of the PRC factions, particularly vis-a-vis Taiwan. In reversing its campaign criticism of the Bush Administration for being

too accommodating to the ‘‘butchers of Tiananmen,’’ the Administration has declared a strategic partnership with Beijing, a phrase

that given the military source of the word ‘‘strategic,’’ would mean

to 99.9-percent of the people in the world a de facto military alliance, something which vastly overstates our relationship with the

PRC.

The President has echoed Beijing’s formulation during his visit

there of the ‘‘three noes’’, without clearly declaring at the same

time, although he has brought it up since, that it was unacceptable

for the PRC to use force in the Taiwan Straits.

The Administration has subordinated relations with the regions’

democracies—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—by acquiescing, for

example, to the PRC’s pressure that the President not visit Japan

on his trip last year to the PRC. Traditionally, Japan is a stopover

either going to or coming from Beijing for American presidents and

senior officials of all sorts.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Shirk said that the President has expressed a ‘‘continued commitment’’ to the one-China policy, but like

Secretary Weinberger, my impression is that what he has rather

done is explicitly adopted the formulation of the one-China policy

as set forth by the PRC, rather than doing what had been done in

the past, beginning in 1972: namely, acknowledging that both governments at that time on both sides of the Strait had a one-China

policy. They just disagreed on who should govern China.

I can’t pin down exactly when this formulation changed to acknowledging something that two other entities were saying to

adopting the formulation, but it is not a negligible change in American policy.

The President has spoken favorably of the PRC’s takeover of

Hong Kong as a model for relations between the PRC and Taiwan,
30

and that situation is not entirely comporting with the original

guarantees by the PRC.

The Administration has severely restricted arms sales, even of,

I think clearly, defensive weapons, to Taiwan. The Administration

has, instead of apologizing once clearly for the tragic bombing of

the PRC embassy in Belgrade, apologized so many times and so

profusely at so many levels as, I think, to cheapen the coin of an

American government apology.

Now a number of these steps have undercut what I believe was

the laudable, if somewhat delayed, dispatch of the two aircraft carriers to the waters near Taiwan in the spring of 1996 at the time

of the last crisis.

Mr. Chairman, I believe this is a very dangerous stance that the

President and the Administration have either chosen to move to or

have drifted into. It is potentially even a tragic stance.

When dictatorships see prey, such as, for example, Germany

viewed Czechoslovakia in 1938, they need to be deterred in order

for peace to be protected. The sort of ambiguity the Administration

espouses was the heart of Britain’s and France’s position with respect to Germany’s Eastern neighbors in the 1930’s. Strategic ambiguity it was. Needless to say, that did not work very well, probably because no one was more surprised than Hitler when the indecisive Western governments that had abandoned Czechoslovakia

decided to stand by Poland in 1939, and World War II began.

The ambiguity of a number of European powers’ guarantees to

one another by the time of August 1914 also famously contributed

to the outbreak of World War I.

Taiwanese status as prey is sharpened in the PRC’s eyes because

of the island’s democratic reforms of recent years. As a vibrant and

prosperous democracy with political and economic freedom, Taiwan

constitutes an affront to Beijing. It is a living, breathing proof that

the self-serving nonsense put out by autocratic and dictatorial leaders in Asia and those who are sympathetic to them that democracy

is inconsistent with Asian values is quite false. Taiwan is an affront to the PRC in exactly the same way that in the fall of 1989

Solidarity Poland was an affront to the U.S.S.R.

I take the Administration’s points—that military sales are not

everything and that good U.S.-PRC relations redound to Taiwan’s

benefit. I also acknowledge that President Lee Teng-Hui’s recent

remarks departing from the fictitious and stale but diplomatically

useful old one-China formulation, have given Beijing an excuse for

saber rattling. It is worth noting that one of the most skillful and

successful diplomats in history, Talleyrand, once said that language was given to man to conceal thought. And however understandable President Lee’s comments were in the context of Taiwan’s vigorous and free political debate, I would advance the somewhat old-fashioned notion that there are some things best left unsaid by those who head governments.

But the key point is that we need to be polite and diplomatic, I

believe, with Beijing, but we also need to acknowledge and reward

the efforts of some in the PRC government who seek to work with

us, such as the efforts of Zhu Rongji, that brought proposals this

past spring on the WTO negotiations. But over the long run, it is

very dangerous to meet the aggressive moves of dictatorships
31

against their potential prey with appeasement. Appeasement may

buy you some time in the short run. Chamberlain was sure the

sellout of Czechoslovakia in Munich in 1938 would bring peace in

our time. It did. But his time only lasted one year.

I believe that clear, not ambiguous, American support for Taiwan’s right to be protected from the use of force by Beijing is an

essential part of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Straits. The Administration has turned instead to ambiguity and I would say appeasement. In the interest of peace, the Executive Branch needs to

be brought up short and forced to change this very shortsighted

policy. This bill in some form can help bring that about and I

would urge Congress to move forward with it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Director Woolsey. Now we

would like to hear from Dr. David Lampton.

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID M. LAMPTON, DIRECTOR, CHINESE

STUDIES, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Dr. LAMPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today and share my views on the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.

Mr. Chairman, your Subcommittee has played a major and constructive role in our relations with the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan over the last years, and I want to thank you for that role and

your colleagues as well.

With respect to the business at hand, however, relations with the

PRC and Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act, the Taiwan Relations Act was passed by Congress during the Chairman’s first term,

20-years ago. The TRA has contributed to stability in East Asia

and fostered an environment that has both allowed the United

States to develop relations with Beijing, and permit the people of

Taiwan to make stunning social, economic and political progress

over the last two decades, progress we all admire.

Therefore, it is with considerable forethought that I say that the

proposed legislation will undo the good work of the TRA, and I

must say that I agreed fully with your opening statement, Mr.

Chairman, and certainly Senator Thomas’. I was quite interested

to hear Congressman Lantos say that our friends sometimes have

to have some self-imposed restraint. I thought those were interesting comments, and I was quite struck by Congressman Salmon’s

comments, having lived in Taiwan, to say that sometimes friends

have to stand up with friends and give them their best judgment,

even if it is not particularly welcome.

Were the proposed legislation to become law, it would make

unachievable the principal objective of the TRA, which was ‘‘to help

maintain the peace, security and stability in the Western Pacific.’’

The question came up earlier, just parenthetically, does the TRA

need to be amended, and then the issue was what do people in Taiwan want in that regard, and what is the range of opinion about

that? I think many people I have talked to in Taiwan are afraid

to tamper with the TRA at all, afraid that might get out of control.

So that is one issue. I don’t know any serious person in Taiwan at

least that I have talked to who wants to amend the TRA.
32

My areas of concern with respect to the proposed legislation fall

into six broad categories. First, the TRA, in conjunction with the

three communiques and other statements and correspondence,

have provided a very successful framework for managing a complicated and sensitive three-way relationship. The proposed legislation is, therefore, unnecessary in my view. The 20-years since the

adoption of the TRA have witnessed enormous progress on Taiwan.

With respect to cross-Strait relations and security, while there are

worries, and we have talked about them—the missile deployments,

the landing exercises and so on—there is also progress to report.

Put bluntly, Mr. Chairman, if security were so tenuous on Taiwan and cross-Strait relations were so perilous, why is it that

40,000 Taiwan firms have contracted to invest $40 billion U.S. dollars on the mainland? Why is it that Taiwan is sourcing a large

chunk of its computer components in the PRC? Indeed, one-third

of the Taiwan information industry’s total output is produced in

plants on mainland China. Moreover, in 1997, if one includes goods

exported from Taiwan through Hong Kong to the PRC, China was

Taiwan’s largest market, and Taiwan was China’s first ranking

supplier.

This legislation it seems to me also is unnecessary because considerable legislative authority proposed in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act already exists in the TRA, particularly those provisions relating to defensive weapons sales. We can go into that

more, but I think the basic point is that the President has the authority to do most of what is proposed in the weapons sales area.

The operative word in the bill is to ‘‘authorize’’ the President, and

he is already authorized.

Further, the premise that weapons sales have been inadequate

is undermined by the figures on past and current arms sales and

deliveries to Taiwan presented in my written testimony. These

sales and/or deliveries have included F–16s, the Patriot missile,

Perry and Knox class frigates, and, most recently, early warning

radars. Indeed, many analysts in our defense and intelligence agencies argue that Taiwan’s problem now is absorbing the weapons,

training the people, and maintaining the equipment they have already acquired.

Figures provided in my written testimony show that in 1997, deliveries under foreign military were 8.5 times the 1981 level in constant dollars.

My second problem with this piece of legislation is as follows. I

was part of a group that met with President Lee Teng-hui on June

24th. The American group that met with him made the point that

we need to focus not simply on military prowess and hardware, but

also on the incentives for Beijing to not employ coercion.

In short, I think it is a profound mistake to think that Taiwan’s

security is going to be principally achieved by weapons. Taiwan is

too close to 1.3 billion people for that to be a feasible long-term

proposition.

Conceding, and I would be the first to concede that there is an

important role for deterrence, (Beijing does need to be deterred), we

need to ask why has Beijing not for the most part exerted force

against Taiwan during the last three decades? An important part

of the answer lies in U.S. ICM military power and credibility.
33

But that is only part of the answer. The more comprehensive

part of the explanation I believe is that there has been a balanced

framework of three considerations in Beijing’s mind. First, the

United States must be credible and constant. I believe that in

1995–1996, Beijing launched its missiles thinking that the United

States would not respond. I think they were surprised by our response. If they don’t believe us, that is a real problem.

Second, however, Beijing must also believe that time is not working against eventual reunification. In short, there at least has to

be some hope that the trend line isn’t toward certain independence.

Third, Beijing must have a stake in a positive framework of cooperation with us and our allies in the Pacific and in Europe.

Frankly, the proposed legislation upsets the delicate balance

among these three considerations by giving the PRC less of a stake

in good relations with the United States and by signalling to many

in China that time is eroding any possibility of reunification. Most

fundamentally, I believe Beijing will initiate conflict even knowing

it will lose—which I believe it will, I am certain it will lose—rather

than acquiesce to an independent Taiwan.

Fourth, the proposed legislation would amount to a substantial

restoration of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty and thereby be inconsistent with the cornerstone of the normalization agreements of

December 1978. In the interests of time, I will just leave that point,

but I think it would undermine the basis of normalization that was

agreed to in 1978.

My fifth problem with the legislation, another area of concern,

relates to the bill’s provisions with respect to theater missile defense. To be talking about authorizing the provision of high altitude upper-tier anti-missile systems that have not yet gone beyond

testing or the drawing board is both premature and unwise. It is

premature because usually before encouraging the sale of weapons,

we want to fully understand what we are proposing to transfer,

both in terms of its technology and the obligations that it may impose on the United States.

The bill’s provisions are unwise because if enacted, those provisions would accelerate the already worrisome growth of missiles,

short range missiles in the PRC, and provide incentives for a regional arms race.

Sixth, the timing of the bill is very unfortunate, given all of the

events in the context of our relations, and I will not go into that

more. But this will certainly not get us on a productive track with

the PRC. We have some hopes coming out of the recent meeting between Presidents Jiang and Clinton. This is not very timely.

Finally, it seems to me that at this moment in U.S.-PRC relations, Washington ought to be pursuing available opportunities

that will enhance the security and the welfare of people, both in

Taiwan and in the United States, as well as the PRC. I think a

much better avenue, Mr. Chairman, to follow right now is to exploit the possibilities that may exist in getting not only the PRC

into the WTO, but Taiwan as well. Quite frankly, as much as we

all might wish it differently, I believe Taiwan will not enter the

WTO until the PRC does because of Beijing’s policy.

By way of concluding then, I would just say let’s for the moment

concentrate on the opportunities for cooperation. Let’s not exacer-
34

bate things further. Finally, this may surprise you, given the tone

of my comments to this point, but I have another principal recommendation, and that is as follows: I do think there is some ambiguity in the current structure of the three communiques and all of

the various statements that have been issued and the Taiwan Relations Act. There is a possibility for miscalculation, potentially very

serious miscalculation, in both Beijing and Taipei.

The Executive Branch, in my view, therefore, would be well advised to continue to reduce ambiguity, to some extent. More particularly, the Executive Branch should make it clear that not only

will an attack on Taiwan not be tolerated and will encounter resistance, but Taiwan also must understand that there will be a price

attached to actions that increase regional instability and show no

regard for American interests. The United States should, in short,

oppose unilateral actions that upset the status quo, whatever their

source.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lampton appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Dr. Lampton, and thank

you, gentlemen, for your statements. I think we have had a balanced presentation by the panels together. We have certainly heard

differing views on the legislation offered by Congressman DeLay

and many others and by a counterpart in the Senate.

I do recall, Dr. Lampton, your last comment made me think of

my visit to China with Speaker Gingrich and how he said to President Jiang that the United States will come to the defense of Taiwan if China attacks Taiwan. President Jiang, instead of giving us

the usual lecture to which I had become accustomed on Taiwanese

issues, said that China does not intend to attack. We then went on

to more productive discussions.

When that same Congressional delegation went to Taiwan,

Speaker Gingrich was equally candid with President Lee about not

doing things that are provocative and that are beyond what they

should reasonably expect us to tolerate on their part. President Lee

offered no direct comment, but I think the message was taken.

Dr. LAMPTON. I have always had very high regard for the Speaker’s trip. I thought those were very useful statements.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. I think so, too, frankly. I am interested in your statement that perhaps there is ambiguity that the

Administration needs to correct. Of course, this is one of the things

that we can do here as a Congress, too. We obviously need to do

this very carefully. I do not know of a more important matter that

has come before the Subcommittee in the terms I have been here.

I would like to ask any of you gentlemen to comment on whether

or not you have seen (I do not think the Administration could have

answered this candidly) indication that China is using its knowledge as leverage? We now as a country understood that the President made a mistake in sending Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji home

without agreeing to the WTO accession agreement. Are you seeing

this in any fashion played in a larger context by the PRC? Are they

trying to use this information as leverage now in any respect?

Mr. WOOLSEY. The one thing that I have seen just in the last day

or two, Mr. Chairman, and just some sketchy press reports, seems
35

to suggest that the PRC is playing quite tough with respect to the

terms of the WTO deal, not fully going along, for example, with

some of the concessions that Zhu Rongji made in April.

My hunch is that they are of the view right now that we need

improved relations with them more than they need improved relations with us and they will be far more hard to bargain with on

the exact terms of the deal than they would have been in April.

Mr. BEREUTER. That may well be their perception, and I think

that is just exactly the wrong perception for them to have. If we

as a country or government somehow have contributed to that, we

need to rectify that.

Mr. WEINBERGER. There was a specific incident to that about 2

days ago in which the Chinese official responsible for the foreign

investment in some of these industries say there was no question

whatever that foreign investment would not be permitted with respect to any ownership of any kind of systems involving the Internet or the Web or any of those things, and that was a clear step

backward from what they had presumed to offer prior to the earlier

negotiations on the WTO.

Dr. LAMPTON. Mr. Chairman, I think we are seeing a little kabuki from Beijing here, mixing my nationality metaphor a bit. But

I think they are very highly motivated to get in WTO, and I think

they are holding out the prospect of taking back some of their April

8th offer because the Administration is trying to get a few new

things from Beijing to have justified its delay. My guess is that if

we could accept the April 8th offer, the Chinese would stick. That

is just my guess—right now that we are seeing posturing.

Also, I think we ought to be pretty confident of our position inasmuch as I think the Chinese believe they need to be in WTO. They

are highly motivated for economic reasons. Their foreign direct investment is declining and they want to reassure the foreign investing communities. Also their exports have not grown nearly as rapidly as they need to sop up the unemployment that Jim Woolsey

mentioned. I think we ought to recognize the Chinese want in for

economic reasons. They are holding back some of their offer so that

they can use it as leverage so we don’t ask for any more. But I am

hopeful that we can hang in there pretty much with what looked

like April 8th, if that is acceptable to the Congress.

Mr. BEREUTER. I do want China to be in the WTO but under the

right agreement. I have offered the idea, knowing frankly that it

is not likely to happen, that Taiwan could come in ahead of time

if, necessary, since they meet the requirements. I do think I certainly would approve it.

If my colleague would give me two additional minutes here, I will

try to make it up to the gentleman. Is there objection?

I will just conclude by sneaking in a question. Dr. Woolsey, you

mentioned the reluctance of the Administration to sell certain

arms. Perhaps you heard Dr. Campbell talk about the Army dominance the lack of training, and, in fact, the lack of purchasing some

weapons recommended. I would like to ask any of you if you would

make comments now about the arms sales issue—the Administration’s reluctance, ability, or willingness—and what the Congress

should do to push for the right kind of attitude in that respect, if

anything?
36

Mr. WOOLSEY. I imagine the Taiwanese are of a view that they

made a bad mistake in going for those French frigates some years

ago rather than the Aegis destroyers. Secretary Campbell said that

he had classified information to give the Committee in private on

that. There may be a number of issues with respect to that we out

here are not knowledgeable of.

But I have thought that both our declining to permit them to buy

submarines that have American subsystems on them, in light of

the situation in the Taiwan Straits, has been a bad decision. They

are so outnumbered in submarines, and submarines are excellent

anti-submarine platforms. The chance that the Taiwanese could

use diesel submarines offensively, for example to blockade the PRC,

is just ludicrous.

So I have often been perplexed over the last number of years at

our lack of willingness to go along with submarine sales, presumably built in other countries but with American systems on them.

Mr. BEREUTER. Just a clarification, do you wish to say the American system or the Australian system, which have the benefit of

American technology, might be an adequate way of dealing with

the fact that we don’t produce submarines?

Mr. WOOLSEY. I think so.

Mr. BEREUTER. Any further comments?

Dr. LAMPTON. Well, it would just seem to me as a realistic statement, I can’t speak for all our allies, but it is not clear to me who

would want to sell Taiwan submarines, taking the heat they would

probably feel they are going to take from the PRC. That is an empirical question. But our allies have frequently shown a lot less

courage on weapons sales to Taiwan than we have.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think also, Mr. Chairman, it is important to

bear in mind that missile defense is something that Taiwan and

the United States urgently need I thought the testimony of the Defense representative today to the California Congressman was very

revealing because it is essential that they have that kind of capability. We are the ones who would be able to supply it to them, and

our refusal to do so could do nothing but encourage the mainland

to believe that they are going to be free to make missile attacks

against a country which has no defense against them.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman. There are other questions. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. First of all, my greetings to former Secretary

of Defense Weinberger.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We worked together in the Reagan Administration. During that time, of course, there was a great evolution toward democracy on the mainland, something that President

Reagan consciously fostered, and a lot of people don’t take into consideration now. They forget that during the Reagan years it appeared that China was on the way toward a type of reform that we

saw take place on Taiwan.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think the real turning point there, Congressman Rohrabacher, was the death of Deng Xiaoping when I had the

privilege of meeting with him several times when I was over there.

He understood better I think than anyone the vital necessity and
37

some of the requirements of improving the relationships between

the two countries. I think he apparently always had strong opposition to some of the things he was trying to do. But when he died

and after he died, there still is a period of some, I think fair to say,

some uncertainty as to what the future of China’s policy will be.

But at the moment I think it does seem to be in the hands of people who feel they can apply a military solution to Taiwan and that

we will not do anything about it. That is why I think it is so essential that we not leave any ambiguity and why I think the HelmsTorricelli Act proposal, although it may not be necessary—it may

be in the words of one of the witnesses today—it may not add anything new or be required. Failure to pass it would be sending another very bad signal.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that what we are talking about here

is that when we see the potential conflict in that region, it is that

we are mistaking the fundamental cause and the fundamental reasons for the potential upheaval. The potential problem doesn’t arise

from the fact that there is an overabundance of sentiment for independence on the island of Taiwan. That is not the problem. The

problem is a lack of democracy on the mainland of China.

Mr. WEINBERGER. That is exactly right, yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If there was a democratic government on the

mainland of China, there would not be this friction and this potential catastrophe and complication we are worried about.

Mr. WEINBERGER. You had it exactly right, sir. There is no possibility of Taiwan attacking the mainland, and there is no possibility

of any overt actions of that kind. They want to be left alone to prosper as they have with the feeling that they will be secure against

outside attack. President Lee has never supported independence.

His party never has. One of the opposition parties talked about it.

They have even come pretty close to abandoning that as I understand it now. But, again, the furor and the anger that the mainland greeted President Lee’s very simple statement, which simply

stated the facts, is again an indication to me that, as with the case

of the unfortunate bombing of their embassy in Belgrade, that they

are seizing any opportunity to try to get us in an apologetic, defensive mood in which we will not be as supportive of Taiwan as we

should be.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, when we are talking about WTO,

Mr. Woolsey, I don’t know why we want Al Capone to join the Chicago Chamber of Commerce. I don’t know why we want the worst

gangster in the world to be part of our bodies here of governing

trade——

Mr. WEINBERGER. That is an extremely valid point, because once

in, there are no provisions for getting anybody out. Any single

member can cause a very substantial amount of difficulty, delay

and ultimate damage to any policies that we may want to have. So

it is not I think an organization to which people should be lightly

admitted.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I appreciate that thought. Mr. Secretary. I

think, again, back to fundamentals, and, Mr. Woolsey, to be fair,

you know, your remarks were based on a recognition that what we

are dealing here with is not with a government by the definition

of what America believes a government is. A government is a body
38

that has the consent of the governed, and this is not the basis of

power of that small group, that clique, that holds power on the

mainland of China. To the degree that we try to treat governments

like Taiwan in the same way that we treat a gangster regime like

on the mainland, as moral equals. We are sending out the wrong

signals to the world. They wonder why those tough guys who don’t

believe in the democratic rights that we believe in, don’t believe in

the freedoms that we believe in, who have power in the mainland,

no wonder they think that we are weak when we send out these

kinds of signals. No wonder they push us to the limit because they

perceive this as ambiguity, they perceive this lack of principle on

our part as weakness.

Mr. WOOLSEY. Congressman, I see the WTO issue somewhat differently. There are, of course, countries in the WTO that are not

democracies, and the political and economic freedoms tend to be

connected. But they certainly don’t march along hand-in-hand with

one another. We do have examples of countries that have liberalized economically and then sometime later political change may

take place. Taiwan is actually one example of that. Taiwan had

partially free and then a free economy while it was still a dictatorship a decade or so ago, and that economic freedom tended to bring

about political freedom. I think the same thing happened in South

Korea.

So this is a tactical matter, as far as I am concerned. I think the

question with respect to the WTO should be how hard a bargain

can we drive in opening up China’s economy and how much can we

successfully use greater integration into the world economy to undermine the positions of those whom I think we both disfavor in

Beijing, and to, relatively speaking, advance the positions of those

such as Zhu Rongji, who are trying to open up the economy. I think

it is a tactical question and I see it, I guess, differently than you

and Secretary Weinberger.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. One last thought. You used two examples of

anti-communist regimes, and you can use perhaps even Chile, as

far as I know, in terms of countries that were dictatorships evolving into democracies. I don’t think there are any examples of communist governments that were reformed by economic reform first.

In fact, it seems that was just the opposite direction when it comes

to those type of dictatorships.

Mr. WOOLSEY. That is a fair point.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Mr. BEREUTER. I saw Dr. Lampton wanted to respond to one of

your questions earlier, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh.

Dr. LAMPTON. I want to say the first time I went to the PRC was

in 1976. Mao had just died. If you want to see a dictatorship and

authoritarian regime, that was the time and place to go. I think

one has to look at the trend line, the direction of change. I think

if you had all the China experts and all of the people who had been

to China from 1976 and before in a room and asked would China

be a major trading power, would it be in the World Bank, would

it be a constructive member of the IMF, would it be a member of

the comprehensive test ban treaty and all this, there wouldn’t have

been a person in the room or in the world that claimed to know
39

about China that would have thought that was remotely possible

20 years from 1976.

So I think what we have to do is not only look at what we dislike

in China, and there is much to dislike, but what are the tools we

have available to push it in a direction we like and what is the

trend line?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Some of us still are not happy with them

being in those organizations.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, gentleman. Dr. Cooksey, you have

the last 7 minutes. Then we are going to adjourn.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate

your testimony. It is good to have some people that come in and

give direct testimony that is clear and you can understand your position. I agree with 99 percent of what you said on your positions,

but I have some questions. I will tell you this, quite frankly, I was

bothered by the practiced ambiguity and tendency of acquiescence

that is reflected by the people that testified in front of you, but I

think that is a reflection of the person that is their leader.

Would it be unreasonable for Taiwan to be admitted to the WTO

simultaneously with the PRC? It is my understanding that Taiwan

has met all the criteria for admission to the WTO. It is my understanding that the PRC has not, but they are working on it. I think

that both of them should be.

Mr. WOOLSEY. I would have no objection to that, Congressman.

I think that is reasonable.

Mr. COOKSEY. Is that a reasonable demand for Members of Congress to make, that they both be admitted simultaneously? My concern is if one is admitted before the other, one might prevent the

other from coming in.

Dr. LAMPTON. I believe there is an agreement worked out between the parties that they will either enter simultaneously, or so

close, you will need a photo finish to figure out who went across

the line first. That is already worked out, I think. The real issue

is whether or not to push for Taiwan’s entry first if we can’t reach

agreement with the PRC. I think the world economic organizations

ought to reward those who meet the criteria. That is what I think.

But if I make an objective analysis of the capacity of the PRC

to leverage the body that will vote on accession, I don’t think Taiwan is going to get in until the PRC does. I think our European

Union friends, Pakistan, and Bangladesh will assure that Taiwan

does not enter before the PRC.

I would just say in the context of this hearing and the proposed

legislation, that the simultaneous entry of both of them into WTO

might be a useful way to get the cross-Strait dialogue going, because they are going to have to both try to be WTO compatible in

their cross-Strait economic relationship. In a kind of funny way,

WTO simultaneous entry helps us at least get some discussion

across the Strait.

Mr. COOKSEY. Contrary to what Dr. Shirk said, and I appreciated

her brief answer, even though she disagreed with my position, and

my position is that I blame most of the problem on politicians. I

don’t know what Dr. Campbell said. I don’t know if he knows what

he said. But contrary to their position, I feel the business people

in these two entities and the people can work together. They are
40

brothers, they are cousins, they are distant relatives. I really feel

like that is a proper approach, and obviously Taiwan has got $35

to $40 billion worth of investment there. I think it can work, and

I think it should work.

In lieu of that, however, I really feel that at the end of this century, the time for saber rattling is over, and I think that the war

of words is all we should have. If either side, whether it be Taiwan

or the PRC, continues the saber rattling, then I feel we should do

everything to make sure that the TRA stands as it is, and, if necessary, to reinforce it with the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.

I know that is not exactly your position, but do you feel it is unreasonable to give Taiwan defensive weapons? It is just I feel like anyone should be able to defend themselves.

Dr. LAMPTON. We are required under law. The Taiwan Relations

Act requires us to provide defensive weapons, weapons of a defensive character, to help Taiwan as it assures its own security. So I

don’t think that is even a question.

I think when you get to submarines and particular weapons systems, you get into a kind of debate about what is an offensive

weapon versus a defensive weapon. Of course, that is often in the

eyes of the beholder, I guess. But I don’t think anybody here on

this panel, I haven’t heard anyone serious even argue we shouldn’t

be selling weapons to Taiwan. The issues are what to sell, how

much to sell, and who ought to have the final say.

Mr. WEINBERGER. It is that very question, Congressman, of what

is within the Taiwan Relations Act or isn’t that needs to be clarified. Because with this kind of situation, the saber rattling that

you have spoken about which we believe should stop, which the

People’s Republic apparently doesn’t believe should stop, that you

are narrowing the time in which Taiwan would be able to get the

kind of defensive capabilities that would stop the saber rattling. I

think it is essential that we do clarify the Taiwan Relations Act

with respect to what is a defensive weapon and put it much more

on the basis of what are Taiwan’s need to protect itself.

Mr. COOKSEY. Does this clarify it, do you think?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think so. I haven’t seen the final version, but

the earlier versions I saw did.

Mr. COOKSEY. Again, thank you for appearing. I did appreciate

very clear and clairvoyant testimony. It is good to know there is

still someone in Washington that can present that kind of intelligent testimony. I don’t know if we can get all these people together without a war, and I wish they would sit down and drink

some rice wine and eat some great Chinese food and get it over

with, because I think they are all good people. But I do have a

problem with the current political model that is being used in the

PRC, and I think it needs to be changed and that it needs to be

fast forwarded to catch up with Taiwan. Then I think that a lot of

this will occur. I give up minutes of my time, if I have any left,

since the Chairman did.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. I agree with the gentleman’s comments about the

helpfulness, clearness, and directness of the testimony provided by

the third panel. Thank you very much, gentleman, for spending so

much of your day here. It is very valuable to us. I appreciate it.
41

Thank you. The Subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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