UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE DI STRI CT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) L EE J OHNSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 09-1390 (PL F) ) EDWARD F. REI L L Y, J R. et al. , ) ) Def endants. ) ____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Plaintiff, a District of Columbia prisoner c urre ntly confine d at the F eder al Correc tional I nstitut ion in Cum berla nd, Mary land, sues the United States Par ole Commiss ion (“U SPC ”) f

or alleg edly

violating the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution during his parole pr ocee dings. H e cla ims that the USP C applied its own guide lines issued in 2000 when it should have applied guidelines issued by the forme r District of Columbia Parole B oard in 1987 in conjunction with the Boa rd’s 1991 policy

g uideline. See74 FR 58540-01 (Nov. 13, 2009). Plaintiff seeks a de clar ation that the “a pplication of the 2000 guidelines to [hi m] violates the Ex Post Facto Clause” and “a new Par ole Hea

ring ” utiliz ing the 1987 g uidelines. Compl. at 8-9. Def endants move to dismiss on the gr ound that the claims ar e moot [Dkt. No. 14]

. Plaintiff, having now had the r equeste d hear ing, move s for summary judgme nt [ Dkt. No. 11]. The Court ag ree s that the initial claims are moot and f inds that plaintiff is not entitl ed to judgme nt on the supplemental cla im. I t theref ore w ill gra

nt defe ndants’ motion to dism iss and deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgme nt.I . BA CKGROUND Plaintiff is serving an ag g reg ate se ntence of 10 y ear s and 8 months to 38 y ear s for a number of of

fense s – including voluntar y manslaug hter, c arr

ying a pistol wit hout a license , conspirac y

to commit murder, conspira cy to obstruct justice, and possession of a firea rm during a crime of violence – c ommitt ed on August 4, 1993, and May 2, 1994. Compl. at 1-2. Plainti ff appea red be fore a par ole examiner for an initial parole he aring

on April 26, 2005, and for a par ole

rec onsideration hea

ring on J une 18, 2008. Plaintiff alleg es that ea ch time, the par ole examiner applied the 2000 guidelines. Id . at 19, 24. 1

On Dec ember

17, 2009, the USPC, having amended its reg ulations applicable to D.C. Code offe nders, he ld a par ole re consideration hearingfor plaintiff utilizing the 1987 g uidelines. By

notice of January

5, 2010, the USPC denied parole a nd set a re consideration hear ing f or an unspe cified da

y in Dece mber 2010. Pl.’s Mot., Attachment (“ Pl.’s Attach.”) (Notice of Ac tion). The USPC departed upw ard f rom the guidelines that, based on pla intiff’s total point score of

3, would otherwise ha

ve author ized his release to parole. Id

. I I . DI SCUS SI ON Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive a nd decla ratory relief are moot because the par ole hear ing c onducted on De cembe r 17, 2009 provided the equitable r elief soug ht by plaintiff in his complaint. See D el Monte Fre sh Produce Co. v. U

nited States , 570 F.3d 316, 321 ( D.C. Cir. 2009) (“ A ca se is moot when ‘the c halleng ed conduc t cea ses such that ther e is no rea sonable The USPC assumed authority over pa role de terminations of District of Columbia 1 prisoners in August 1998. See F ranklin v. District of Columbia , 163 F.3d 625, 632 ( D.C. Cir. 1998) (a cknowledg ing ne w law tra nsfer ring parole authority

from the f

ormer D .C. Boar d of Parole); Sellmon v. Re illy , 551 F. Supp. 2d 66, 68-73 (D .D.C. 2008) (discussingorig inal and revised r egulations and g uidelines). 2expectation that the wrongwill be repe ated’ in circumstanc es whe re ‘ it becomes impossible for

the cour t to gr ant any

eff ectua l relief whateve r to the pre vailing pa rty .’ ” ) (quoting United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. , 566 F.3d 1095, 1135 ( D.C. Cir. 2009)) (other citation omitted); Fletche r v. United States Parole Commission , 550 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D .C. 2008) (“Acase is considere d moot either whe n the issues prese nted ar e no long er ‘ live’ or the pa rties lack a

leg ally cog nizable interest in the outcome.” ) (quoting Powell v. Mc Cormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)); see also Sellmon v . Reilly , 551 F. Supp. 2d 66, 84 (D.D .C. 2008) (“Were these plaintiffs to pre vail in their ex post facto challeng e, they would g ain at most a newparole hear ing. . . .” ) (c itation and internal quotation marks omitted).

I n his moti on for summary judgme nt, plaintiff acknow ledg es that the USPC utiliz ed the 1987 guidelines at his most rece nt parole he aringbut now claims that the par ole examiner “re commended that parole be denied [] for rea sons unauthorized by the 1987 Reg ulations.” Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 4. Contrary to plaintiff’s asser

tion, the 1987 regulations authorized the USPC “to depa

rt upwar d based on a

prisoner’ s risk to society .” Phillips v. Fulwood , ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 3063754 at *5 (D.C. Cir., Aug . 6, 2010) (c iting D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 28 § 204.22 & a

pp. 2-1, at 2-34) . Her e, the USPC found “that at this time there is a rea sonable probability

that y ou would not obey

the law if r elea sed and your re lease would endang er public safe ty .” Pl.’s Attach. It rea soned: [Y] ou wer e convicted of t wo separ ate offe nses that resulted in the death of two individuals. The second victim was a witness in a murder trial and was killed on order s from the targ et of the investigation. Your involvement in t his conspirac y and obst ruction of justice makes you a more serious risk if rele ased to the community at this time. Additionally , y our instit ution misconduct is deeme d

3to be serious and inclu d es past acts of threa tening staff on two occa sions and eng ag ing in a fi gh t with another inmate. Id

. Be cause the USPC’s decision is rationally supported, plaintiff ha s prese nted no g rounds for g rantingjudgme nt in his favor. See E dmundson v. Turner , 954 F.2d 510, 512- 13 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining that c ourts “have limit ed jurisdiction to reviewParole Commission deter minations. Congre ss has expressly decla red that the Commi ssion's de cisions to gr ant or de ny parole are ‘ac tions commit ted to ag ency discretion for

purposes of [the judicial re view provisions of the Administrative Proce dure A ct].’ ") (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4218(d)) (br acke ts in original) ;

acc ord Slader v. Pitzer , 107 F.3d 1243, 1246 ( 7th Cir. 1997) (“The inquiry is not whether the Commi ssion's de cision is supported by the pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e, or e ven by

substantial evidenc e; the inquiry

is only whether there is a rational ba sis in the recor d for the Commission's conclusions embodied in its statement of re asons.”) ; cf. with Rockingham v. U nited States Parole Commission , 523 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D .C. 2007) (“Acourt' s role in re viewinga par ole

revoc ation decision is limit ed. The court de termines only whether the re vocation dec ision was ‘either totally lackingin evidentiary

support or [was] so i rrational as to be fundamentally unfair.’ ”) ( quoting Singletary v. Re illy , 452 F.3d 868, 872 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) (other c itations omitted) (bra ckets in orig inal).

For the fore g oing r easons, de fenda nts’ motion to di smiss i s g rante d and plaintiff’ s motion for summary

judgme nt is denied. A sepa rate Orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion. /s/________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN DATE: August 26, 2010 United States District J udg e 4