This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2020 UT 37

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BENJAMIN ARRIAGA,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent.

No. 20180870

Heard September 20, 2019

Filed June 23, 2020

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Third District, West Jordan

The Honorable Charlene Barlow

No. 120404690

Attorneys:

Emily Adams, Bountiful, for petitioner

Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Mark C. Field, Asst. Solic. Gen.,

Salt Lake City, for respondent

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE HIMONAS, 

JUSTICE PEARCE, and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:

Introduction

¶1 Petitioner Benjamin Arriaga pled guilty to first-degree 

murder. After sentencing, he filed a pro se petition under the 

Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA),1 arguing that his guilty plea 

_____________________________________________________________

1 UTAH CODE §§ 78B-9-101 to -503.
ARRIAGA v. STATE

Opinion of the Court 

2

was unknowing and involuntary and that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court granted the State’s 

motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. 

We granted petitioner’s writ of certiorari. Because Mr. Arriaga has 

failed to identify a material dispute sufficient to rebut the State’s 

showing that he was not prejudiced by his guilty plea or the State’s

showing that his trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, we 

affirm.

Background

¶2 In 2010, Mr. Arriaga shot and killed Mr. Benacio Herrera. 

Mr. Arriaga confronted Mr. Herrera over an affair Mr. Herrera

allegedly had with Mr. Arriaga’s wife. During the confrontation, the 

two men exchanged punches, and Mr. Arriaga pulled out a gun. 

Mr. Arriaga told police officers that he shot Mr. Herrera only after 

Mr. Herrera lunged for the gun. Mr. Herrera was shot five times—

once in the leg, once in the abdomen, twice in the back, and once in 

the back of the head. Although Mr. Arriaga admitted that he killed 

Mr. Herrera and that he was angry with Mr. Herrera over the alleged 

affair, he told police that the killing was accidental and that he never 

intended to kill Mr. Herrera.

¶3 The State brought three charges against Mr. Arriaga: 

first-degree murder, possession or use of a firearm by a restricted 

person,

2 and obstruction of justice. Mr. Arriaga indicated, through 

trial counsel, that he would agree to plead guilty to first-degree 

murder in exchange for the dismissal of the other two charges.

¶4 Before the plea hearing, trial counsel prepared and reviewed 

a Plea Affidavit with Mr. Arriaga. The elements of murder were 

written in the Plea Affidavit as follows: “Def. did knowingly and 

intentionally cause[] the death of another.” The following facts were 

listed as the sufficient basis for the district court to accept 

Mr. Arriaga’s plea: “On 4/4/10, in SL Co, I, while confronting a man 

who slept w/ my wife, fought with the man and subsequently shot 

him, killing him.” Mr. Arriaga’s native language is Spanish, and 

while trial counsel did not provide an interpreter in client meetings, 

the Plea Affidavit was written in both English and Spanish.

_____________________________________________________________

2 Mr. Arriaga was prohibited from possessing or using a firearm 

after having previously pled guilty to three third-degree felonies: 

possession of a controlled substance, and two counts of 

endangerment of a child.
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Opinion of the Court

3

¶5 In the plea hearing, Mr. Arriaga stated he was satisfied with 

his trial counsel and understood everything trial counsel discussed 

with him. When discussing the factual basis for his plea, however, he 

made two statements to the district court suggesting he may have 

acted in self-defense when he shot Mr. Herrera. The transcript of the 

hearing contains the following exchange:

The Court: Okay. Counsel, can you give me a factual 

basis?

[Trial Counsel]: Your Honor, on April 4th[,] 2010 in Salt 

Lake County [Mr. Arriaga] confronted a man who had 

been sleeping with his wife. An argument and 

subsequent fight took place at which time he pulled 

out a firearm and he shot the man killing him.

The Court: Is that what happened, [Mr. Arriaga]?

[Mr. Arriaga]: I defended myself. It was not my 

intention. I never thought about hurting him.

The Court: Okay. Does that change the plea at all, 

counsel?

[Trial Counsel]: Your honor, we had – we had 

discussed the imperfect self-defense concept and that 

he did pull out a gun to get the man to confess to his 

sleeping with his wife. And that the man charged at 

him but he was unarmed. So that is why he used a gun.

The Court: I will find that that is a sufficient factual 

basis.

[Mr. Arriaga]: He was drugged and drunk and I didn’t 

know if he had a weapon, a knife and that’s why I . . . .

After this exchange, the district court asked Mr. Arriaga if he 

“understood that by pulling the trigger [he] knew that [he] could 

cause the death of [the victim],” to which Mr. Arriaga responded, 

“Yes.”

¶6 The court determined this was a sufficient factual basis to 

accept Mr. Arriaga’s plea. Through trial counsel, Mr. Arriaga 

requested that the court sentence him immediately. The court 

granted this request and sentenced him to fifteen years to life in 

prison. He did not appeal.

¶7 Mr. Arriaga timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief 

in which he raised two arguments: first, his plea was unknowing and 

involuntary because he did not understand that the absence of 
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4

imperfect self-defense was an element of murder; and second, he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel because of a language 

barrier with trial counsel. The post-conviction court held an 

evidentiary hearing on Mr. Arriaga’s claims, but suspended the 

hearing to allow him time to file a second amended petition. After 

Mr. Arriaga filed his second amended petition, the State filed a 

motion for summary judgment, which the post-conviction court 

granted, denying Mr. Arriaga’s petition for post-conviction relief. 

The court of appeals upheld the post-conviction court’s decision.3

¶8 We granted Mr. Arriaga’s petition for certiorari. We have 

jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a).

Standard of Review

¶9 Mr. Arriaga asks us to determine whether the court of 

appeals erred in affirming the post-conviction court’s denial on 

summary judgment of the two claims he raised in his petition for 

post-conviction relief.

¶10 “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 

appeals . . . for correctness and give its conclusions of law no 

deference.”4 “We affirm a grant of summary judgment when the 

record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.”5 On review, “facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom [must be viewed] in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.”6

Analysis

¶11 Mr. Arriaga raises two grounds for relief in his PCRA 

petition. First, he claims that his “conviction was obtained . . . in 

violation of the United States Constitution” because his plea was 

unknowingly and involuntarily made.7 Second, he claims that he 

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3 Arriaga v. State, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 21, 436 P.3d 222.

4 Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90, ¶ 9, 173 P.3d 842 (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

5 Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ¶ 18, 293 P.3d 345 (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

6 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

7 See UTAH CODE § 78B-9-104(1)(a).
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Opinion of the Court

5

received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did 

not provide an interpreter when he met with Mr. Arriaga prior to the 

plea hearing.8

¶12 Mr. Arriaga bears the burden of pleading and proving that 

he is entitled to relief under the PCRA.9 But in cases such as this one 

where the State responds to a PCRA petition by filing a motion for 

summary judgment, it is the State that must show it “is entitled to 

judgment and there is no genuine issue of material fact that would 

preclude summary judgment in [its] favor.”10 “[T]he moving party 

always bears the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of 

material fact, but the burden of production of evidence may fall on 

the nonmoving party”—in this case Mr. Arriaga—“[]if that party 

will bear the burden of production at trial[].”11 “[W]here the burden 

of production falls on the nonmoving party, . . . the moving party

may carry its burden of persuasion without putting on any evidence 

of its own—by showing that the nonmoving party has no evidence 

to support an essential element of a claim.”12

¶13 Under this standard, we affirm the court of appeals’

decision to uphold the post-conviction court’s grant of the State’s 

motion for summary judgment on both of Mr. Arriaga’s claims. 

Although we conclude that Mr. Arriaga has produced sufficient 

evidence in support of his claim that his plea was unknowingly and 

involuntarily made, we ultimately affirm the court of appeals 

because he has not produced evidence that he was prejudiced as a 

result.

¶14 And on Mr. Arriaga’s second claim—that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel—we conclude that there is no

genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether his trial 

counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, 

we affirm the court of appeals on Mr. Arriaga’s second claim.

_____________________________________________________________

8 See id. § 78B-9-104(1)(d).

9 See Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶ 81, 344 P.3d 581.

10 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39, ¶ 29, 284 

P.3d 630).

11 Salo v. Tyler, 2018 UT 7, ¶ 2, 417 P.3d 581.

12 Id.
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I. Mr. Arriaga’s Claims Were Properly Preserved

¶15 The State asserts Mr. Arriaga failed to preserve the theory

that his misunderstanding of the implications of imperfect 

self-defense rendered his plea invalid. “[I]n order to preserve an 

issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial court in 

such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that 

issue.”13 Appellate courts consider three factors when determining 

whether an issue was properly raised before the district court: “(1) 

the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be 

specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting 

evidence or relevant legal authority.”14

¶16 In his petition,15 Mr. Arriaga alleged his “conviction was 

obtained by a plea of guilty that was . . . not made voluntarily with 

[an] understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences 

of the plea.” He stated that his trial counsel “failed to advise [him] to 

go to trial” where he could have presented his “self-defense” theory 

and challenged the State’s “lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 

to all elements of the murder charge.” And he attached the transcript 

of the plea hearing, which provided evidence he was confused about 

the implications of self-defense to his guilty plea. We conclude that 

Mr. Arriaga preserved this claim by raising it in a timely manner 

with supporting evidence, and we can address it on the merits.

II. Mr. Arriaga Has Not Produced Evidence to Support 

His Claim That He Was Prejudiced by His Unknowing and 

Involuntary Plea 

¶17 Mr. Arriaga argues the court of appeals erred in affirming 

the post-conviction court’s determination that his guilty plea was 

knowingly and voluntarily made. He claims he did not understand 

that the absence of imperfect self-defense was an essential element of 

murder. He further argues he was prejudiced by this 

misunderstanding because, had he understood the significance of a 

potential imperfect self-defense claim, he would not have pled 

guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.

_____________________________________________________________

13 Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶ 14, 48 

P.3d 968.

14 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

15 The post-conviction court suspended an evidentiary hearing to 

allow Mr. Arriaga to file a second amended petition.
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Opinion of the Court

7

¶18 We conclude that there is a genuine dispute of material fact 

as to whether, at the time he entered his plea, Mr. Arriaga 

understood the implication an assertion of imperfect self-defense 

may have had on the charges against him. Accordingly, there is a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether his plea was knowing 

and voluntary. But we further conclude that Mr. Arriaga has failed 

to produce evidence showing that he was prejudiced. As a result, we 

affirm the court of appeals’ affirmance of summary judgment.

A. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Arriaga’s plea 

was knowing and voluntary

¶19 Mr. Arriaga has produced evidence sufficient to avoid 

summary judgment on the issue of whether his guilty plea was 

unknowing and involuntary because he did not understand the 

essential elements of murder. A guilty plea is constitutionally valid 

only if it is made “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, with 

sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 

consequences.”16 A plea is knowing and voluntary when the accused 

demonstrates an understanding of the nature of the charge, such that 

their plea can “stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.”17 In order 

to have a complete understanding of a charge, the accused must 

have “an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.”18

¶20 The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide further 

guidance for district courts in determining whether the accused has 

a complete understanding of the nature of the charge.19 Rule 11 

provides that a defendant must “understand[] the nature and 

elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial 

the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those 

elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 

admission of all of those elements.”20 If a defendant is unaware of an 

element the State has to prove, “a defendant cannot intelligently 

weigh the risks and benefits of going to trial versus pleading 

_____________________________________________________________

16 State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 16, 279 P.3d 371 (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

17 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

18 Id. ¶ 29 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

19 Id. ¶ 17.

20 UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(4)(A).
ARRIAGA v. STATE

Opinion of the Court 

8

guilty.”21 Mr. Arriaga has thus provided sufficient evidence at the 

summary judgment stage to support his assertion that he did not 

understand the implications of imperfect self-defense for his murder 

plea. Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact exists, and the 

post-conviction court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that his 

plea was knowing and voluntary.

¶21 The essential elements of first-degree murder include 

(1) intentionally or knowingly (2) causing the death of another, and 

if the accused has offered some evidence of an affirmative defense, 

(3) the absence of that affirmative self-defense, including the 

affirmative defense of imperfect self-defense.22 Imperfect self-defense 

is available when the defendant “caused the death of another . . . 

under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal 

justification or excuse for the conduct although the conduct was not 

legally justifiable or excusable under the circumstances.”23 And a 

successful claim of imperfect self-defense “reduces murder to 

manslaughter.”24 So, at trial, the State would have had to prove the 

lack of a valid imperfect self-defense claim in order to convict

Mr. Arriaga of first-degree murder.25 The record demonstrates that 

_____________________________________________________________

21 Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 30. In order to determine what the 

defendant understood upon entering his or her plea, appellate courts 

are not limited to the plea colloquy or plea affidavit but may also

look to the “surrounding facts and circumstances.” Id. ¶ 31 (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

22 UTAH CODE §§ 76-5-203(2)(a), (4)(a). The State argues that the 

absence of imperfect self-defense is not an element of murder. 

However, in State v. Low, we held that after legislative amendments 

in 1999, imperfect self-defense is no longer a lesser included offense 

but an “affirmative defense[] to murder.” 2008 UT 58, ¶ 24, 192 P.3d 

867. Once the accused has offered evidence of an affirmative defense, 

the absence of that defense is an element of murder that the State 

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ¶ 45.

23 UTAH CODE § 76-5-203(4)(a).

24 Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 22.

25 A “defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the factual record 

supports an affirmative defense instruction is relatively low,” State v.

White, 2011 UT 21, ¶ 22, 251 P.3d 820, and “only a minimum 

threshold of evidence” is required to “establish the affirmative 

defense.” Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ¶ 29, 293 P.3d 345. So even 

(Continued)
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Opinion of the Court

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there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Arriaga 

understood this.

¶22 Mr. Arriaga points to three pieces of evidence in the record

to argue his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made. First, he 

argues the statements he made during the plea colloquy negate the 

essential elements of murder. Second, he argues the Plea Affidavit 

does not include the absence of imperfect self-defense as an element 

of murder. And third, he argues trial counsel did not adequately 

explain imperfect self-defense in relation to the facts of his case. We 

conclude that there is a genuine dispute as to whether he understood 

that the absence of imperfect self-defense is an element of murder.

¶23 The transcript of the plea colloquy suggests Mr. Arriaga did 

not understand the relationship between his murder charge and 

imperfect self-defense. During that colloquy, he made statements 

that could conceivably support an imperfect self-defense theory. 

Trial counsel stated that Mr. Arriaga initiated the encounter with 

Mr. Herrera, but pulled out a gun only to scare Mr. Herrera after the 

two had already been fighting. And Mr. Arriaga claimed he thought 

Mr. Herrera may have been on drugs and may have been armed. 

Additionally, Mr. Arriaga informed the district court that he 

defended himself, and never thought about hurting Mr. Herrera. 

This suggests that Mr. Arriaga may not have understood that 

imperfect self-defense, if presented and proven at trial, could 

prevent him from being convicted of first-degree murder. And this 

misunderstanding was not clarified by the district court or by 

Mr. Arriaga’s trial counsel.

¶24 In an attempt to clarify the meaning of these statements, the 

district court asked Mr. Arriaga if he understood that “by pulling the 

trigger [Mr. Arriaga] knew [he] could cause the death of the 

[victim],” to which Mr. Arriaga replied that he did. But even though 

the court’s statement was meant to clarify that Mr. Arriaga had the 

 

though the use of lethal force is not legally justified when the 

defendant “provokes the use of force . . . with the intent to use force 

as an excuse to inflict bodily harm,” Utah Code section 

76-2-402(3)(a)(i), or when the defendant is the aggressor and does not 

withdraw from the encounter, id. § 76-2-402(3)(a)(iii), Mr. Arriaga’s 

self-defense statements were sufficient to show a genuine issue of 

material fact in this regard.
ARRIAGA v. STATE

Opinion of the Court 

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requisite intent to commit murder,26 it, together with Mr. Arriaga’s 

reply, did not contradict Mr. Arriaga’s statements that he acted in 

self-defense. A defendant may pull the trigger, knowing that doing 

so will cause the death of another, but if the defendant acted in 

self-defense, he or she would be guilty only of manslaughter, not 

murder.27 So in asking whether Mr. Arriaga knew that pulling the 

trigger could cause Mr. Herrera’s death, the court did not address 

the question of whether Mr. Arriaga pulled the trigger to defend

himself.

¶25 Additionally, trial counsel’s statements at the plea colloquy 

did not clarify that Mr. Arriaga understood imperfect self-defense. 

When the district court requested a factual basis for the plea, trial 

counsel’s response included specific factual statements that did not 

eliminate the possibility that Mr. Arriaga acted in self-defense.28 The 

district court then questioned Mr. Arriaga, and he confirmed that he 

acted in self-defense.29 When the court asked trial counsel to clarify 

Mr. Arriaga’s response, counsel stated that he “discussed the 

imperfect self-defense concept”30 with Mr. Arriaga, “that the man 

_____________________________________________________________

26 Adding further confusion, the district court’s use of the verb 

“could” indicates a reckless, rather than knowing, mens rea. See State

v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 373–74 (Utah 1996) (holding the plain 

language of Utah’s aggravated murder statute required an 

intentional and knowing mental state despite one statutory factor 

that included a “lesser mental state”—the actor “knew, or reasonably 

should have known, that his act or acts would create a great risk of 

death to human life”). But because neither party raises this issue, we 

decline to address it.

27 See Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 34; see also UTAH CODE §§ 76-5-203(4)(a), 

(c); id. § 76-2-402(3)(a).

28 Specifically, trial counsel stated that Mr. Arriaga “confronted a 

man who had been sleeping with his wife. An argument and 

subsequent fight took place at which time he pulled out a firearm 

and he shot the man killing him.”

29 The district court asked Mr. Arriaga if trial counsel’s statement 

was in fact what happened. Mr. Arriaga replied, “I defended myself. 

It was not my intention. I never thought about hurting him.”

30 “[F]or a plea to be knowing and voluntary, a defendant must 

possess more than a conceptual understanding of the nature of the 

(Continued)
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Opinion of the Court

11

charged at him but [] was unarmed” which was “why [Mr. Arriaga] 

used a gun.” So trial counsel continued to present facts to support, 

rather than disprove, the theory that Mr. Arriaga acted in 

self-defense. Because these statements call into question trial 

counsel’s understanding of imperfect self-defense in relation to the 

facts of Mr. Arriaga’s case, trial counsel’s assurance that he discussed 

the imperfect self-defense concept with Mr. Arriaga does not prove 

that Mr. Arriaga correctly understood the concept when making his 

plea.31

¶26 In sum, during the plea colloquy, Mr. Arriaga made 

statements that strongly suggest he did not understand the role an 

imperfect self-defense theory could have played in his murder trial. 

And nothing the district court or Mr. Arriaga’s trial counsel said 

clarified this apparent misunderstanding. For this reason, the plea 

colloquy does not demonstrate that Mr. Arriaga was adequately 

informed of the essential elements of murder.

¶27 Second, the Plea Affidavit does not prove that Mr. Arriaga 

understood that the absence of imperfect self-defense is an element 

of murder. As to the elements of the charge, the affidavit states that 

Mr. Arriaga “knowingly and intentionally caused the death of 

another.” As to the factual basis for the plea, the affidavit states that 

Mr. Arriaga fought with Mr. Herrera prior to shooting him. Neither 

of these statements are inconsistent with an imperfect self-defense 

theory. And, significantly, the Plea Affidavit does not include or 

describe the absence of imperfect self-defense as an element of 

murder, nor does it provide evidence that Mr. Arriaga understood 

how imperfect self-defense applied in his case.

 

offense; he must have ‘an understanding of the law in relation to the 

facts.’” Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 35 (citation omitted).

31 “[T]he court usually may rely on . . . counsel’s assurance that 

the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and

elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.” Bradshaw v.

Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). But reliance is not appropriate when 

trial counsel’s own statements misstate the law. See Hicks v. Franklin, 

546 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that a when the trial 

court misstated the law on an additional charge in the plea colloquy 

and defense counsel failed to correct the error, the “presumption that 

defense counsel properly explained the charge to the defendant 

seems unwarranted”).
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Opinion of the Court 

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¶28 Finally, nowhere else in the record is there any indication 

that Mr. Arriaga was adequately informed that the absence of 

imperfect self-defense was an element of murder. In Mr. Arriaga’s 

initial police interview, he maintained that he did not intend to kill 

Mr. Herrera but acted in self-defense. And in the PCRA evidentiary 

hearing, the State’s attorney testified that the only defense trial 

counsel discussed with the State was the extreme emotional distress 

defense. During this hearing, the State’s attorney referred to 

manslaughter as a “lesser charge,” which indicates the State did not 

view it necessary to negate Mr. Arriaga’s affirmative defense to 

prove an element of murder. And when Mr. Arriaga’s PCRA counsel 

began questioning trial counsel about other potential defenses that 

could have been raised, the State objected, stating it was outside the 

scope of Mr. Arriaga’s petition. The post-conviction court suspended

the evidentiary hearing to allow Mr. Arriaga to file a second 

amended petition. Thus, the other evidence in the record strongly 

suggests that Mr. Arriaga was not informed that an imperfect 

self-defense affirmative defense could have been used to defeat the 

State’s first-degree murder charge.

¶29 In sum, evidence in Mr. Arriaga’s plea colloquy, Plea 

Affidavit, and elsewhere in the record suggests he did not 

understand the concept of imperfect self-defense or realize that its 

absence is an element of the murder charge to which he pled guilty.32

Because Mr. Arriaga provided sufficient evidence that he did not 

understand the absence of imperfect self-defense was an element of 

murder, we hold that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to 

whether his plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. Accordingly, 

the majority of the court of appeals erred on this point.33

_____________________________________________________________

32 See Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶¶ 33–37 (holding that the 

defendant’s plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made when the 

record—including the preliminary hearing transcript, Plea Affidavit, 

plea colloquy transcript, amended charging documents—did not 

“demonstrate that [the defendant] was informed of or understood 

the essential elements” of the crime).

33 We note that our analysis on this point accords with Judge 

Pohlman’s concurring opinion. Judge Pohlman concurred in the 

result of the court of appeals’ opinion because Mr. Arriaga failed to 

establish prejudice, but she questioned whether the district court 

“adequately remedied the conflict between the statements in 

[Mr. Arriaga]’s plea affidavit and his self-defense assertions during 

(Continued)
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Opinion of the Court

13

B. Mr. Arriaga has not produced evidence to support his claim that 

he was prejudiced as a result of his unknowing and involuntary plea

¶30 Although Mr. Arriaga has provided evidence sufficient to 

avoid summary judgment on the issue of whether his plea was 

unknowing and involuntary, we nevertheless affirm the court of 

appeals because he has not produced evidence that he was 

prejudiced as a result. To obtain relief under the PCRA, it is not 

enough for a petitioner to show his or her conviction was obtained in 

violation of the United States Constitution.34 A petitioner must also 

show he or she suffered prejudice as a result of this constitutional 

error.35

¶31 Under the PCRA, a petitioner demonstrates prejudice by 

showing “a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in 

light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed 

with the evidence and facts introduced at trial or during 

sentencing.”36 This standard is equivalent to the prejudice analysis 

courts use to assess ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.37 So in 

 

the plea colloquy.” Arriaga v. State, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 22, 436 P.3d 

222 (Pohlman, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).

34 Showing that a conviction was obtained in violation of the 

United States Constitution is one of several “grounds for relief” a 

petitioner may establish under the PCRA. See UTAH CODE

§ 78B-9-104(1)(a).

35 Id. § 78B-9-104(2).

36 Id.

37 These two standards are equivalent because the language of the 

PCRA statute is the same as that of the harmfulness prong under our 

plain-error analysis, which itself is equivalent to the prejudice 

analysis of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Compare Low, 

2008 UT 58, ¶ 43 (“An error is harmful if it is ‘of such a magnitude 

that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 

the defendant.’”(citation omitted)) with UTAH CODE § 78B-9-104 

(“The court may not grant relief . . . unless the petitioner establishes 

that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 

outcome . . . .”). This test is a legal term of art. And “[w]hen the 

legislature ‘borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal 

tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows 

and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed 

word in the body of learning from which it was taken.’” Maxfield v.

(Continued)
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Opinion of the Court 

14

determining prejudice under the PCRA, we look to 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel case law to determine the merits of 

Mr. Arriaga’s claim.

¶32 In order to prove there is a “reasonable likelihood of a more 

favorable outcome”38 in a plea case, a defendant must show “there is 

a reasonable probability that, but for [the] error[], he would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”39 In other 

words, we consider the effect the constitutional error at issue had on 

a defendant’s decision to plead guilty rather than go to trial. In most 

cases, a defendant’s decision to plead guilty will “turn[] on [his or 

her] prospects of success” at trial.40 And when it does, defendants 

must show they “would have been better off going to trial” in order 

to establish prejudice.41

¶33 In order to survive summary judgment, Mr. Arriaga had to 

produce evidence that he would not have pled guilty had he known 

about the possibility of bringing an imperfect self-defense claim at 

trial. But he provides “no evidence to support an essential element 

of” his theoretical imperfect self-defense claim.42 In fact, he concedes 

that his “chances at trial may have been slim.” Because he fails to 

provide evidence that he would have succeeded on his imperfect 

self-defense claim at trial, no genuine issue of material fact exists as 

to whether there was “a reasonable probability that, but for [the] 

error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial.”43

¶34 Instead, Mr. Arriaga argues he does not have to show that 

he would have succeeded on his imperfect self-defense claim, 

 

Herbert, 2012 UT 44, ¶ 31, 284 P.3d 647 (quoting Morissette v. United

States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)). So we assume that, by incorporating 

the “reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome” language 

into the PCRA, the legislature intended to incorporate the 

accompanying well-developed body of 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence.

38 UTAH CODE § 78B-9-104(2).

39 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

40 Lee v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017).

41 Id. at 1965.

42 Salo v. Tyler, 2018 UT 7, ¶ 2, 417 P.3d 581.

43 Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
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Opinion of the Court

15

because his decision to plead guilty did not “turn[] on his prospects 

of success” at trial.44 He argues, relying on the United States 

Supreme Court’s decision in Lee v. United States,

45 that there is “a 

reasonable probability that, but for [the] error[], he would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial” because it 

affected his understanding of the consequences of his plea.46 But, 

under the Supreme Court’s decision in Lee, a misunderstanding 

regarding a potential affirmative defense is not enough to support a 

finding of prejudice.

¶35 In Lee, the Supreme Court explained that, in limited 

circumstances, a defendant may rationally reject a plea deal where 

“special circumstances”47 suggest that “there is more to consider 

than simply the likelihood of success at trial.”48 And the Court 

explained that where these “special circumstances” exist, defendants 

need not demonstrate a likelihood of success at trial.49 Rather, they 

need only show that if “properly advised, [they] would have opted 

to go to trial.”50 But the Court cautioned that “special circumstances” 

arise only when a defendant provides “substantial and 

uncontroverted” evidence that something other than a more 

favorable outcome at trial was a determinative issue at the time the 

plea decision was made.51

¶36 Mr. Arriaga argues that his case involves special 

circumstances similar to those in Lee. But we disagree for two 

reasons: (1) Mr. Arriaga fails to persuade us that his 

misunderstanding regarding his imperfect self-defense claim 

constitutes a “special circumstance[]” and (2) he fails to provide 

_____________________________________________________________

44 Lee, 137 S.Ct. at 1965.

45 Id. at 1958.

46 Id. at 1969 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).

47 Id. at 1965 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 60).

48 Id. at 1966.

49 Id. at 1965 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 60).

50 Id. at 1966; see also Hill, 474 U.S. at 60. In so doing, a defendant 

attempts to convince the court that something other than his or her 

prospect at trial was a “determinative issue” in the decision to plead 

guilty rather than proceed to trial. See Lee, 137 S.Ct. at 1967.

51 Lee, 137 S.Ct. at 1969.
ARRIAGA v. STATE

Opinion of the Court 

16

substantial and uncontroverted evidence his imperfect self-defense 

claim was a determinative issue in his plea decision at the time he 

entered his plea.

¶37 Mr. Arriaga does not show how his imperfect self-defense 

claim was a “special circumstance[]” that would have given him a 

rational basis to reject his plea deal.52 As the Court in Lee explained, 

in limited circumstances, a defendant may rationally reject a plea 

deal because “there is more to consider than simply the likelihood of 

success at trial.”53 In that case, Mr. Lee convinced the Court that his 

decision to go to trial “without any viable defense”54 was rational 

because, under the circumstances, “the consequences of taking a 

chance at trial were not markedly harsher than pleading” guilty.55

This was so because the determinative issue for Mr. Lee was not the 

length of a potential prison sentence, but his desire to avoid 

deportation.56 Mr. Arriaga fails to point to any such “special 

circumstance” in this case.

¶38 Mr. Arriaga points to his plea-colloquy statements as 

evidence that he desired to maintain his imperfect self-defense claim. 

But a desire to maintain a potential trial defense could rationally lead 

a defendant to forego a plea deal and risk a harsher sentence at trial 

only if there was a reasonable likelihood of the defendant succeeding 

on that defense. This is because the purpose of asserting imperfect 

self-defense is to avoid or reduce time spent in prison.57 And since 

Mr. Arriaga fails to produce evidence that he would have succeeded 

_____________________________________________________________

52 Hill, 474 U.S. at 60.

53 Lee, 137 S.Ct. at 1966.

54 Id.

55 Id. at 1969; see also id. at 1968 (“[P]reserving the client’s right to 

remain in the United States may be more important to the client than 

any potential jail sentence.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)).

56 Mr. Lee’s trial counsel told him on multiple occasions that his 

plea would not lead to deportation, which the State conceded was 

deficient performance. Id. at 1964. 

57 See Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 22 (“[T]he assertion of a successful 

affirmative defense of . . . imperfect self-defense reduces murder to 

manslaughter”).
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Opinion of the Court

17

with his imperfect self-defense claim at trial,58 it would have been 

irrational for him to forego his plea deal for the sole purpose of 

maintaining that defense. So, unlike the defendant in Lee, 

Mr. Arriaga has not met his burden of showing it would have been 

rational to forego his plea deal under the circumstances of his case.

¶39 Also unlike the defendant in Lee, Mr. Arriaga fails to 

provide substantial and uncontroverted evidence that his imperfect

self-defense claim was a determinative issue in his decision. In Lee, 

Mr. Lee provided three pieces of evidence to support his claim that, 

had he known about the deportation consequences at the time of his 

plea, he would have risked going to trial. First, he explained that he 

had lived in the United States for most of his life, owned two 

businesses in Tennessee, and was the “only family member in the 

United States who could care for his elderly parents.”59 Second, he 

explained that, after the trial court “warned him that a conviction 

‘could result in . . . being deported’” at the plea colloquy, Mr. Lee 

told the trial court this affected his decision to plead guilty, but that 

he nevertheless proceeded with his plea only because his trial 

counsel erroneously assured him that he would not be deported as a 

result of pleading guilty.60 And third, he testified that he “asked his 

attorney repeatedly whether there was any risk of deportation from 

the [plea] proceedings.”61 In fact, both he and his trial counsel 

testified in the evidentiary hearing that, had Mr. Lee known of the

deportation consequences, he “would have gone to trial.”62 So 

Mr. Lee pointed to contemporaneous, substantial, and 

uncontroverted evidence that he would not have pled guilty absent 

the error. Mr. Arriaga does not make as compelling a case.

¶40 Although he points to two pieces of evidence to support his 

claim, we find neither persuasive. First, Mr. Arriaga states in his 

PCRA affidavit that, had he understood the nature of his plea, he 

would not have pled guilty. And second, he points to his 

self-defense statements at the plea colloquy, which he argues 

demonstrate that, to him, maintaining his theory of imperfect 

_____________________________________________________________

58 See supra ¶ 33.

59 Lee, 137 S.Ct. at 1968.

60 Id.

61 Id. at 1967–68.

62 Id. at 1968.
ARRIAGA v. STATE

Opinion of the Court 

18

self-defense was a determinative issue. But this is not the kind of 

“substantial and uncontroverted” evidence identified in Lee, and it 

fails to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

Mr. Arriaga’s imperfect self-defense claim was the determinative 

issue in his decision to plead guilty.

¶41 Mr. Arriaga’s first piece of evidence is not persuasive 

because it is nothing more than a “post hoc assertion . . . about how 

he would have pleaded but for [the error].”63 Courts “should not 

upset a plea solely because of” such assertions, but “should instead 

look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s 

expressed preferences.”64 Because Mr. Arriaga points to no 

contemporaneous evidence to support his position that he would not 

have pled guilty had he known he could have raised an imperfect 

self-defense claim, we are left with only his after-the-fact assertion 

that he would have done so. This is not enough to persuade us to 

upset his plea.

¶42 Mr. Arriaga’s second piece of evidence is similarly 

unpersuasive. Although Mr. Arriaga’s statements during the plea 

colloquy demonstrate his confusion regarding a potential imperfect 

self-defense claim, he did not request clarification from the district 

court or trial counsel, or refuse, without further clarification, to 

proceed. So even though Mr. Arriaga now claims that his

“determinative issue” was maintaining his claim of imperfect 

self-defense, the plea colloquy provides evidence only of his 

confusion regarding the role an imperfect self-defense claim might 

play at trial. It does not provide evidence that Mr. Arriaga’s desire to 

raise an imperfect self-defense claim was of such “paramount 

importance” that he would have foregone his guilty plea had he 

properly understood that element.65 For this reason, Mr. Arriaga’s 

second piece of evidence fails to persuade us to upset his plea.

¶43 In sum, Mr. Arriaga fails to provide substantial, 

uncontroverted, and contemporaneous evidence that his case 

presents the kind of “special circumstances,” identified in Lee, such 

that it would have been rational for him to forego his plea despite 

not having a reasonable likelihood of success at trial. In other words, 

_____________________________________________________________

63 Id. at 1967.

64 Id.

65 Id. at 1968.
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Opinion of the Court

19

he has failed to show that, had he understood that the absence of 

imperfect self-defense was an element of murder, he would have 

elected to proceed to trial rather than accept the plea deal. As a 

result, there is no genuine issue of material fact on the question of 

whether Mr. Arriaga was prejudiced as a result of his plea. We 

therefore affirm the court of appeals.

III. Mr. Arriaga Has Failed to Produce Evidence That His Counsel’s 

Performance was Deficient

¶44 Mr. Arriaga also argues that the court of appeals 

erroneously affirmed the post-conviction court’s determination that 

he is not entitled to post-conviction relief because his trial counsel’s 

performance was not deficient.

66 He asserts that his counsel was 

deficient in failing to obtain an interpreter, even though Mr. Arriaga 

is a native Spanish speaker. And he argues that, as a result of trial 

counsel’s failure to obtain an interpreter, he did not understand trial 

counsel’s advice about the plea, or that he was innocent until proven 

guilty at trial. Because Mr. Arriaga does not produce evidence that 

his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonable professional judgment, we affirm the court of appeals’ 

conclusion that no genuine issue of material fact exists on this point.

¶45 In order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claim under the PCRA, Mr. Arriaga must first meet his burden of 

proof as articulated in Strickland v. Washington.

67 Under Strickland, 

Mr. Arriaga must demonstrate that counsel “rendered deficient 

performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable 

professional judgment.”68 Additionally, he must show he was 

prejudiced as a result of trial counsel’s deficient performance.69

Because we reject this argument on the ground that Mr. Arriaga 

failed to meet his summary judgment burden of production on his 

claim that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonable professional judgment, we need not address 

_____________________________________________________________

66 See UTAH CODE § 78B-9-104(1)(d).

67 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

68 State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ¶ 20, 984 P.2d 376 (citation 

omitted); see also Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, ¶ 21, 88 P.3d 353 

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

69 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 

(1985).
ARRIAGA v. STATE

Opinion of the Court 

20

whether Mr. Arriaga was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s 

performance.70

¶46 Mr. Arriaga has failed to produce evidence that his trial 

counsel’s failure to obtain an interpreter constituted deficient 

performance falling below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

Although a trial counsel’s failure to obtain an interpreter could fall 

below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment in a 

number of ways,71 Mr. Arriaga fails to produce evidence it did so in 

this case. This is because, at the plea colloquy, Mr. Arriaga swore 

that he fully understood his trial counsel’s advice and, on appeal, he 

_____________________________________________________________

70 State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Utah 1994) (“Because [the 

petitioner] has not satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test, we 

do not need to determine whether he has satisfied the second 

prong.”).

71 First, it may violate rules of professional conduct because trial 

counsel must “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 

permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 

representation.” UTAH R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.4(b). This rule requires 

that a client have “sufficient information to participate intelligently 

in decisions.” Id. cmt. 5. A language barrier between counsel and a 

defendant may prevent a defendant from making an intelligent and 

informed decision regarding a plea agreement. So counsel’s failure 

to obtain an interpreter when a language barrier exists could raise 

constitutional concerns.

This is because a failure to provide an interpreter in criminal 

proceedings may violate a defendant’s right to due process. See Ling

v. State, 702 S.E.2d 881, 883 (Ga. 2010) (“[F]ailure to provide adequate 

interpretation services to a defendant in criminal proceedings 

implicates due process concerns.”). Additionally, where a defendant 

cannot comprehend the proceeding, he or she may not be 

constitutionally present. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) 

(stating that the federal Due Process and Confrontation Clauses “as 

applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment” guarantee

criminal defendants be present at all stages of the trial where their

absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings) (quoting 

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Furthermore, it may be difficult for trial counsel to

adequately explain criminal proceedings and charges, and 

subsequently prepare a defendant for a plea hearing, when such a 

language barrier exists.
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Opinion of the Court

21

fails to rebut the presumption of truthfulness the law accords this 

sworn statement.72

¶47 At multiple points in the plea process, Mr. Arriaga had the 

opportunity to inform trial counsel or the district court that, as a 

result of a language barrier, he did not understand trial counsel’s 

advice. But through an interpreter at the plea hearing, Mr. Arriaga 

affirmatively informed the district court that he (1) understood 

everything counsel had talked to him about; (2) was satisfied with 

the advice and assistance of trial counsel; (3) went through the Plea 

Agreement with trial counsel prior to the hearing; and (4) was not 

forced by anyone to enter a guilty plea. Mr. Arriaga also signed and 

attested to the contents of the Plea Agreement, written in both 

Spanish and English, agreeing that he read the Plea Agreement, 

discussed the contents with trial counsel, and was satisfied with the 

advice and assistance of trial counsel. These statements, taken 

together, indicate that Mr. Arriaga did not need the assistance of an 

interpreter in communicating with his trial counsel, and Mr. Arriaga 

fails to provide contrary evidence on appeal. 

¶48 The “‘truth and accuracy’ of a defendant’s statements 

during the [plea colloquy] ‘should be regarded as conclusive in the 

absence of a believable, valid reason justifying a departure from the 

apparent truth of his [plea colloquy] statements.’”73 Mr. Arriaga does 

not raise a believable, valid reason for doubting the truth of his 

statements at the plea colloquy. An interpreter was provided at the 

plea colloquy in which he made those statements. And Mr. Arriaga 

does not provide any evidence to indicate that he had trouble 

communicating with his trial counsel in any of his previous 

attorney-client meetings. In fact, Mr. Arriaga does not allege or 

provide any evidence that he requested an interpreter when 

interacting with his trial counsel.

_____________________________________________________________

72 See Oliver v. State, 2006 UT 60, ¶ 13, 147 P.3d 410 (stating that a 

court may rely “on the defendant’s own assurance . . . that the 

defendant’s mind is clear” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) 

(“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of 

verity.”).

73 United States v. Weeks, 653 F.3d 1188, 1205 (10th Cir. 2011) 

(citation omitted).
ARRIAGA v. STATE

Opinion of the Court 

22

¶49 In sum, Mr. Arriaga fails to provide a plausible or valid 

reason for disbelieving his affirmative statements, both in the Plea 

Agreement and during the plea colloquy, that he understood 

everything trial counsel informed him of before the plea hearing. So 

Mr. Arriaga has not produced evidence that his trial counsel’s failure 

to obtain an interpreter constituted deficient performance. For this 

reason, we affirm the court of appeals’ conclusion that no genuine 

issue of material fact exists.

Conclusion

¶50 Although Mr. Arriaga provided sufficient evidence to avoid 

summary judgment on whether he understood the nature of his plea, 

he fails to provide sufficient evidence that he was prejudiced by this 

misunderstanding. So his claim that his plea was unknowing and 

involuntary fails because there is no genuine issue of material fact as 

to whether he was prejudiced as a result. Additionally, we conclude 

that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether his trial 

counsel’s performance, in not obtaining an interpreter, fell below an 

objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. As a result, 

we affirm the court of appeals.