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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DESHAWN TYSON

(AC 40468)

Prescott, Bright and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been on probation in connection with his conviction

of the crime of sexual assault in the first degree, appealed to this court

from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation and imposing

a sentence of nine years of incarceration. He claimed that the trial court

improperly admitted into evidence details of his prior criminal history

and abused its discretion in revoking his probation and imposing the

entire nine year period of incarceration remaining on his underlying

sentence. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

into evidence details of the defendant’s prior criminal history: it is well

settled that probation proceedings are informal and that strict rules of

evidence do not apply to such proceedings, and the factual details of

the prior offenses committed by the defendant were plainly relevant to

the court’s discretionary determination of whether it should revoke the

defendant’s probation, impose a new sentence, or continue the defendant

on probation; moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

revoking the defendant’s probation and imposing the remainder of the

underlying sentence, that court having found that the defendant, while

on probation, committed a sexual assault in the first degree, which was

the same criminal behavior for which he was originally sentenced, and

given the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and the risk he posed

to the public, the court acted well within its discretion in concluding

that the defendant was no longer amenable to probation and imposing

the remainder of his original sentence.

Argued January 15–officially released February 19, 2019

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

violation of probation, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford and tried to

the court, Markle, J.; judgment revoking the defendant’s

probation, from which the defendant appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Laila M.G. Haswell, senior assistant public defender,

for the appellant (defendant).

Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state’s attorney, with

whom were Kevin D. Lawlor, state’s attorney, and, on

the brief, Cornelius P. Kelly, assistant state’s attorney,

for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The defendant, DeShawn Tyson,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court revoking

his probation and sentencing him to nine years of incarceration. See General Statutes § 53a-32. On appeal, the

defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly

admitted into evidence details of his prior criminal history, and (2) abused its discretion in concluding that

he was no longer amenable to probation and imposing

the entire period of incarceration remaining on his

underlying sentence. We disagree and, accordingly,

affirm the judgment.

On January 24, 2006, the defendant pleaded guilty to

sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1). The court subsequently sentenced him to eighteen years of incarceration, execution suspended after nine years, and ten years of

probation. On March 1, 2013, the defendant was

released from incarceration and began serving his probation.

On March 16, 2016, the defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant charging him with violating his probation. Specifically, the state alleged that the defendant

violated his probation by, among other things, committing a forcible sexual assault on May 6, 2014, on the

victim at the Marriott Hotel in New Haven. Following

a violation of probation hearing, the trial court found

by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had committed a sexual assault in the first degree

as alleged by the state and, thus, had violated one or

more conditions of his probation. The court also concluded that the defendant posed a risk to the public

and would not benefit from an additional period of

probation. Accordingly, the court sentenced the defendant to the remaining nine years of incarceration

imposed as part of his original sentence. This appeal

followed.

The defendant’s claims on appeal do not merit extensive discussion. With respect to his claim that the court

improperly admitted evidence regarding the details of

prior crimes he had committed, the defendant recognizes that ‘‘the Connecticut Code of Evidence does not

apply to proceedings involving probation. Section 1-1

(d) (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence specifically

provides: The Code, other than with respect to privileges, does not apply in proceedings such as, but not

limited to the following . . . [p]roceedings involving

probation. . . . Furthermore, [i]t is well settled that

probation proceedings are informal and that strict rules

of evidence do not apply to them.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tucker, 179

Conn. App. 270, 276–77, 178 A.3d 1103, cert. denied,

328 Conn. 917, 180 A.3d 963 (2018). ‘‘The evidentiary

standard for probation violation proceedings is broad.
. . . [T]he court may . . . consider the types of information properly considered at an original sentencing

hearing because a revocation hearing is merely a reconvention of the original sentencing hearing.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Megos, 176 Conn.

App. 133, 147, 170 A.3d 120 (2017). All that is necessary

is that the information presented to the court is relevant

and ‘‘has some minimal indicia of reliability.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Shakir, 130 Conn.

App. 458, 464, 22 A.3d 1285, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 931,

28 A.3d 345 (2011). We review a trial court’s rulings

regarding the admissibility of evidence at a violation of

probation hearing for an abuse of discretion. Id.

Here, the factual details regarding other offenses

committed by the defendant were plainly relevant to

the court’s discretionary determination regarding

whether it should revoke the defendant’s probation,

impose a new sentence, or continue the defendant on

probation. Moreover, the evidence of the details of his

other crimes was probative and had a minimal indicia

of reliability because the defendant himself testified

to the details during cross-examination by the state.

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse

its discretion by admitting this evidence.

The defendant’s second claim is equally devoid of

merit. After concluding that a defendant has violated

his probation, the trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine whether the defendant should be continued on probation, or whether probation should be

revoked and all or some of the original sentence be

imposed. State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 185, 842 A.2d

567 (2004); State v. Corringham, 155 Conn. App. 830,

837–38, 110 A.3d 535 (2015). ‘‘In determining whether

there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable

presumption should be given in favor of the correctness

of the court’s ruling; reversal is required only where

an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice

appears to have been done.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Tucker, supra, 179 Conn. App. 284.

In the present case, the court found that the defendant, while on probation, committed a sexual assault

in the first degree, the same criminal behavior for which

he originally received a significant period of incarceration and a lengthy period of probation. Given the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and the risk he

poses to the public, the trial court acted well within its

broad discretion to sentence him to the remaining nine

years of his original sentence.

The judgment is affirmed.