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2019 MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 

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CONTENTS 

Secretary’s Preface .................................................................................... I

Executive Summary ................................................................................. III

I. Introduction ....................................................................................... 1

II. The Evolving Threat Environment ............................................................ 5

Current and Emerging Threats to the Homeland ......................................... 8

Threats to U.S. Forces Abroad, Allies, and Partners .................................... 14

Potential Adversary Missile Defense and Antisatellite (ASAT) Advancements...... 20

Missile Proliferation Concerns .............................................................. 23

III. Roles, Policy, and Strategy .................................................................... 25

The Diverse Roles of U.S. Missile Defense ............................................... 26

Principles Governing U.S. Missile Defense ............................................... 30

Elements of Missile Defense Strategy ...................................................... 32

IV. U.S. Missile Defense Programs and Capabilities .......................................... 39

U.S. Homeland Defense ...................................................................... 41

Regional and Transregional Missile Defense .............................................. 45

Regional Active Defenses .................................................................... 47

Regional Active Defenses Against Cruise Missile Threats .............................. 53

Preparing for Emerging Offensive Missile Threats and Uncertainties ................ 54

Attack Operations for Missile Defense ..................................................... 60

V. Missile Defense Management and Testing ................................................... 61

Accelerate Missile Defense Acquisition Timelines ....................................... 62

Managing Pre-Launch Attack Operations Capabilities .................................. 63

Rigorous Testing .............................................................................. 63

VI. Working With Allies and Partners .......................................................... 65

Indo-Pacific ..................................................................................... 66

Europe and NATO ............................................................................ 69

The Middle East – Gulf Cooperation Council ............................................ 73

The Middle East – Israel ...................................................................... 74

South Asia ....................................................................................... 76

North America ................................................................................. 76

Allied and Partner Interoperability ......................................................... 77

VII. Conclusion ...................................................................................... 79
 

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I 

MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Secretary’s Preface 

Over the course of the past half-century, the armed services of the United States have made 

material contributions to international stability and global prosperity. While the costs and 

burden of that role were not insignificant, the benefits in terms of peace and prosperity have 

been enormous, both for ourselves and all who share our values and ideals. 

Yet, we must remind ourselves that our technological advantages can be fleeting. Military 

superiority is not a birthright granted to us; it is the product of diligence, creativity, and 

sustained investment. We must now apply the same level of effort and ingenuity to pass on to 

future generations the same relative security and military advantages that have been the 

bedrock of peace and prosperity. 

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that the Defense Department’s “enduring 

mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the 

security of our nation.” This 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) is fully aligned with the NDS. 

It was conducted pursuant to public law and executed in order to support the clear national 

interests defined by the President in the 2017 National Security Strategy. 

The 2019 MDR sets the guidelines for the Department-wide effort to strengthen the defense 

of our homeland and the Joint Force’s posture. It presents the policies, strategies, and 

capabilities that will guide the Department’s missile defense initiatives and programs over the 

coming decade to enhance the protection of the American people, defend our sovereignty, 

and meet our international obligations and commitments to our allies and partners. We must 

anticipate the evolution of adversary offensive missile capabilities, and develop and field the 

U.S. missile defenses that fit the needs of this era. 

As noted in the 2018 NDS, sharpening the competitive edge of our Joint Force is a must. By 

this I mean enabling our force to deploy and employ in the face of the developing missile 

threat. This requires thinking creatively and acting with greater urgency. We will generate 

innovative solutions that expand the competitive space, and create vulnerability gaps and 

dilemmas for future adversaries. In the face of rising competition, we must proactively work 

to better defend the homeland, and enhance deterrence to adapt to the needs of this era. We 

need institutional processes to generate lethal capabilities with greater affordability at the 

speed of relevance. These guidelines for U.S. missile defense are particularly critical today 

given the continuing proliferation of offensive missile technology and the dynamics of an 

increasingly competitive strategic environment. 

The logic of the 2018 NDS is simple; a more lethal and agile Joint Force, coupled with a more 

robust system of allied and partner capabilities that are designed to be interoperable with ours, 

will preserve an international order that is most conducive to peace and prosperity. The 

defense strategy stresses the readiness of today’s armed forces and prioritized development of 

future capabilities. 
 

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Missile defense is accorded a high priority in our investment plans because the need to do so 

is evident from our rigorous diagnosis of the strategic environment and detailed intelligence 

forecast of potential adversaries’ emerging and projected offensive missile developments. 

They seek to use offensive missile threats to coerce us, our allies and partners, and are adding 

new and unprecedented types of offensive missile capabilities to their arsenals. 

In the past several years, for example, North Korea rapidly advanced and expanded its 

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program. Iran extended the range of its ballistic 

missile systems and may seek to field an operational ICBM. While Russia and China pose 

separate challenges and are distinct in many ways, both are enhancing their existing offensive 

missile systems and developing advanced sea- and air-launched cruise missiles as well as 

hypersonic capabilities. 

Missile defenses are a key element of our strategy given this proliferation of offensive ballistic 

and cruise missiles and emerging hypersonic weapons technologies that markedly raise threats 

to regional balances and to our major allies and partners. Our missile defense systems 

constitute a cornerstone of our efforts to deter a missile attack by a rogue state on the U.S. 

and make a clear contribution to our alliances. They must be robust, ready, and fit for our 

times. 

The 2019 MDR presents a comprehensive and layered approach to prevent and defeat 

adversary missile attacks through a combination of deterrence, active and passive missile 

defenses, and attack operations to destroy offensive missiles prior to launch. This 

comprehensive approach to missile defense strengthens our ability to protect the U.S. 

homeland, U.S. forces abroad, allies, and partners; deters adversary threats and attacks; 

assures allies and partners; engages in diplomacy from a position of strength; hedges against 

future risk; and preserves our freedom of action to conduct regional military operations in 

defense of our interests. 

The scale and urgency of change required to renew our conventional and missile defense 

overmatch should not be underestimated. To protect the American people and secure our 

forward deployed forces with our allies and partners, we will redouble our efforts in this 

domain. Failure to do so would erode deterrence, undermine U.S. credibility, and cede 

influence to the coercive pressure of competitors who seek to exploit gaps in our capabilities 

and those of our allies and partners. 

This will not happen on our watch. Our research and development community, acquisition 

agencies, and the Joint Staff and Services will work together in a concerted manner to ensure 

success. I have every confidence in the superb men and women of our armed forces and their 

ability to preserve our security and pass the freedoms we enjoy intact to the next generation. 

 Patrick M. Shanahan 

Acting Secretary of Defense 
 

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Executive Summary 

I. Introduction 

The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) states, “Our fundamental responsibility is to protect 

the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life.” Missile defense is an 

essential component of U.S. national security and defense strategies. It contributes to the 

deterrence of adversary aggression and the assurance of allies and partners. It also strengthens 

U.S. diplomacy, protects against missile attacks to limit damage, supports U.S. military 

operations if deterrence fails, hedges against future uncertainties and risks, and helps to 

preserve U.S. and allied freedom of action to meet and defeat regional adversary aggression. 

This 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) is consistent with the 2017 NSS, the 2018 National 

Defense Strategy (NDS), and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). It describes the policies, 

strategies, and capabilities that will guide the Department of Defense (DoD) missile defense 

programs to counter the expanding missile threats posed by rogue states and revisionist powers 

to us, our allies, and partners, including ballistic and cruise missiles, and hypersonic vehicles. 

It recognizes and highlights the important changes that have taken place in the security 

environment since the previous 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review was conducted, as well as 

the considerable uncertainties about the future threat environment. 

This 2019 MDR is based on recognition that the threat environment is markedly more 

dangerous than in years past and demands a concerted U.S. effort to improve existing 

capabilities for both homeland and regional missile defense. This effort will include a vigorous 

science and technology research program in addition to the exploration of innovative concepts 

and advanced technologies that have the potential to provide more cost-effective U.S. defenses 

against expanding missile threats. 

This 2019 MDR also emphasizes that the missile threat environment now calls for a 

comprehensive approach to missile defense against rogue state and regional missile threats. 

This approach integrates offensive and defensive capabilities for deterrence, and includes active 

defense to intercept missiles in all phases of flight after launch, passive defense to mitigate the 

effects of missile attack, and attack operations during a conflict to neutralize offensive missile 

threats prior to launch. 

II. The Evolving Threat Environment 

The 2018 NDS emphasizes that today’s security environment is “more complex and volatile 

than any we have experienced in recent memory.” Potential adversaries are investing 

substantially in their missile capabilities. They are expanding their missile capabilities in three 
 

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different directions simultaneously: increasing the capabilities of their existing missile 

systems; adding new and unprecedented types of missile capabilities to their arsenals; and, 

integrating offensive missiles ever more thoroughly into their coercive threats, military 

exercises, and war planning. 

New ballistic missile systems feature multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles 

(MIRV) and maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV), along with decoys and jamming devices. 

Russia and China are developing advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic missile capabilities 

that can travel at exceptional speeds with unpredictable flight paths that challenge existing 

defensive systems. These are challenging realities of the emerging missile threat environment 

that U.S. missile defense policy, strategy, and capabilities must address. 

Current and Emerging Missile Threats to the American Homeland 

North Korea. While a possible new avenue to peace now exists with North Korea, it continues 

to pose an extraordinary threat and the United States must remain vigilant. In the past, North 

Korea frequently issued explicit nuclear missile threats against the United States and allies, all 

the while working aggressively to field the capability to strike the U.S. homeland with nucleararmed ballistic missiles. Over the past decade, it has invested considerable resources in its 

nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and undertaken extensive nuclear and missile testing in 

order to realize the capability to threaten the U.S. homeland with missile attack. As a result, 

North Korea has neared the time when it could credibly do so. 

Iran. Iran views U.S. influence in the Middle East as the foremost barrier to its goal of 

becoming the dominant power in that region. One of Iran’s primary tools of coercion and 

force projection is its missile arsenal, which is characterized by increasing numbers, as well as 

increases in accuracy, range, and lethality. Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the 

Middle East and continues the development of technologies applicable to intercontinentalrange missiles capable of threatening the United States. Its desire to have a strategic counter 

to the United States could drive it to field an ICBM, and progress in its space program could 

shorten the pathway to an ICBM. 

Russia. Russia considers the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) to be the principal threat to its contemporary revisionist geopolitical ambitions and 

routinely conducts exercises involving simulated nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland. 

Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the coercive and potential military uses of nuclear 

weapons, particularly including nuclear-armed, offensive missiles, and has sought to enable 

this strategy through a comprehensive modernization of its strategic and theater missile 

arsenals. As counted under the 2010 New START Treaty, Russia is permitted a total of 700 

deployed ICBMs, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and heavy bombers, and 1,550 

deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Russian leaders also claim that Russia possesses a new 

class of missile, the hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), which maneuver and typically travel at 

velocities greater than Mach 5 in or just above the atmosphere. 
 

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China. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and reorder the 

region to its advantage. Offensive missiles play an increasingly prominent role in China’s 

military modernization, its coercive threats, and efforts to counter U.S. military capabilities 

in the Indo-Pacific. It has deployed 75-100 ICBMs, including a new road-mobile system and a 

new multi-warhead version of its silo-based ICBM. Beijing also now possesses 4 advanced JINclass ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), each capable of carrying 12 new submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles (SLBM), the CSS-N-14. Consequently, China can now potentially threaten 

the United States with about 125 nuclear missiles, some capable of employing multiple 

warheads, and its nuclear forces will increase in the coming years. Beijing also is developing 

advanced technologies, such as MaRVs and HGVs. 

While the United States relies on deterrence to protect against large and technically 

sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile threats to the U.S. 

homeland, U.S. active missile defense can and must outpace existing and potential rogue state 

offensive missile capabilities. To do so, the United States will pursue advanced missile defense 

concepts and technologies for homeland defense.

Missile Threats to U.S. Forces Abroad, Allies, and Partners 

Potential adversaries are also fielding an increasingly diverse, expansive, and modern range of 

regional offensive missile systems that can threaten U.S. forces abroad, allies, and partners. 

These include multiple types of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles intended to 

provide coercive political and military advantages in regional crises or conflict. Expanding and 

modernizing U.S. regional missile defenses is an imperative to meet these ongoing adversary 

advancements in their regional offensive missile systems. 

North Korea. Over the past decade, North Korea accelerated its efforts to field missiles capable 

of threatening deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners in the region. Since 2015, North 

Korea test-launched, from numerous locations throughout North Korea, over two dozen 

regional missiles. It has fielded more regional missiles and diversified its already large regional 

ballistic missile force, including delivery systems with road-mobile and submarine launching 

platforms. 

These wide-ranging North Korean offensive missile systems have given North Korea the 

capability to strike U.S. territories, including Guam, U.S. forces abroad, and allies in the 

Pacific Ocean. They are the tools North Korea has used to issue coercive nuclear preemptive 

threats, and potentially could use to employ nuclear weapons in the event of conflict in Asia. 

Iran. Iran continues to develop more sophisticated missiles with improved accuracy, range, 

and lethality. It fields an array of increasingly accurate short- and medium-range ballistic 

missile systems capable of threatening deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners. Iran’s 

medium-range systems can threaten targets from Eastern Europe to South Asia, and Iran has 

transferred missile systems to terrorist organizations, which in turn have used Iranian-supplied 
 

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missiles against U.S. Middle East allies and partners. It has also flight-tested a short-range 

ballistic missile (SRBM) in an anti-ship role that can threaten U.S. and allied naval vessels in 

the Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, and has displayed a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) 

that has a claimed range of 2000 kilometers (km). 

Russia. Moscow is fielding an increasingly advanced and diverse range of nuclear-capable 

regional offensive missile systems, including missiles with unprecedented characteristics of 

altitude, speed, propulsion type, and range. These missile systems are a critical enabler of 

Russia’s coercive escalation strategy and nuclear threats to U.S. allies and partners. It is 

developing a new generation of advanced regional ballistic and cruise missiles that support its 

anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy intended to defeat U.S. and allied will and capability 

in regional crises or conflicts. Since 2015, Russia has demonstrated its advanced cruise missile 

capability by repeatedly conducting long-range precision strikes into Syria, and has fielded a 

ground-launched, intermediate-range cruise missile, the SSC-8, in violation of the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 

China. China is also developing missile capabilities intended to deny the United States the 

capability and freedom of action to protect U.S. allies and partners in Asia. A key component 

of China’s military modernization is its conventional ballistic missile arsenal designed to 

prevent U.S. military access to support regional allies and partners. China is improving its 

ability to strike regional targets, such as U.S. bases and naval assets, at greater ranges with the 

addition of the growing number of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This 

includes sophisticated anti-ship ballistic missiles that pose a direct threat to U.S. aircraft 

carriers. 

China also has ground- and air-launched LACMs, and is developing HGVs and new MaRVs. 

These and other wide-ranging developments in China’s expansive offensive missile arsenal 

pose a potential nuclear and non-nuclear threat to U.S. forces deployed abroad, and are of 

acute concern to U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Potential Adversary Missile Defense and Antisatellite (ASAT) Advancements 

Despite frequently criticizing the United States and allies for developing and fielding missile 

defense systems, potential adversaries have long made substantial investments in their own 

missile defense systems. Russia and China are also developing ASAT capabilities that could 

threaten U.S. space-based assets. 

For example, Russia maintains and modernizes its longstanding strategic missile defense 

system deployed around Moscow, including 68 nuclear-armed interceptors, and has fielded 

multiple types of shorter-range, mobile missile defense systems throughout Russia. In 

addition, Russia is developing a diverse suite of ground-launched and directed-energy ASAT 

capabilities, and continues to launch “experimental” satellites that conduct sophisticated onorbit activities to advance Russian counterspace capabilities. 
 

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China is aggressively pursuing a wide range of mobile air and missile defense capabilities, 

including the purchase of S-400 systems from Russia, each with four interceptor missiles, and 

is developing additional theater ballistic missile defense systems. China also has announced 

that it is testing a new mid-course missile defense system. Further, China is developing a suite 

of antisatellite weapons, continues to launch “experimental” satellites that conduct 

sophisticated on-orbit activities to advance counterspace capabilities, and has conducted 

multiple ASAT tests using ground-launched missiles. 

North Korea has acquired Russian missile defense technology and is developing its own mobile 

missile defense capabilities, specifically, a mobile air and missile defense system. While 

indigenously produced, its interceptors and radar system share similarities with Russian 

systems. 

Russia has been instrumental in Iran’s development of a mobile air and missile defense 

capability. In 2016 Russia delivered 16 S-300 launch vehicles to Iran, each armed with four 

interceptors. Iran also is developing its own missile defense system, the Bavar 373, to provide 

additional missile defense capability. 

III. Roles, Policy, and Strategy 

Diverse Roles of Missile Defense 

The diverse roles of missile defense advance the national strategy and goals articulated in the 

2017 NSS, 2018 NDS, and 2018 NPR: 

The protection of the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. If potential adversaries 

miscalculate and deterrence fails, missile defense limits the number of adversary missile 

warheads that strike their targets. This is critical to defending the territorial integrity of the 

United States, saving lives, limiting damage to critical infrastructure, and enabling operational 

success in regional conflict. Today’s U.S. missile defenses provide significant protection 

against potential North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile strikes against the U.S. homeland, 

and will improve as necessary to stay ahead of missile threats from rogue states. 

The deterrence of attacks against the United States, allies, and partners. Missile defense contributes 

directly to tailored U.S. deterrence strategies for regional missile threats and for rogue state 

ICBM threats to the U.S. homeland. Missile defenses can undermine potential adversaries’ 

confidence in their ability to achieve their intended political or military objectives through 

missile threats or attacks. An adversary’s uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of its attack 

plans, combined with the prospect of an effective U.S. response to aggression, provide strong 

incentives for adversary restraint if ever contemplating missile attacks. By shaping an 

adversary’s decision calculus in this way, missile defense diminishes the perceived value of 

missiles as tools of coercion and aggression, thus contributing to deterrence. Missile defense 
 

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also provides additional time and options for U.S. leaders when considering their options for 

responding to aggression, and thus contribute to the U.S. ability to respond to and stabilize 

crises or conflicts. 

The assurance of allies. Missile defense plays an increasingly important role in assuring allies and 

partners, and reinforcing the indivisibility of U.S. and allied security. It does so by helping to 

protect allied territory, strengthening U.S. military operations in support of allies and partners 

abroad, and, by helping to counter adversary strategies attempting to coerce the United States, 

allies and partners with missile threats. U.S. missile defense deployments and cooperative 

missile defense activities strengthen relations with allies and partners and reduce their 

vulnerability to coercive threats and attacks. They also provide opportunities for cooperative 

allied burden-sharing and defense collaboration. 

Strengthening U.S. diplomatic efforts in peacetime and crises. The United States is committed to 

diplomatic efforts that advance U.S., allied, and partner security. Missile defenses provide 

U.S. leaders a position of strength from which to engage potential adversaries diplomatically 

in peacetime or crises. This was important in the past, and likely will be so in the future. 

The United States also is committed to non-proliferation. Rogue states seek to develop missile 

delivery systems through illicit procurement pathways for the acquisition of critical 

technologies and components, often in violation of United Nations Security Council 

resolutions. The proliferation challenge posed by potential adversaries may worsen in the 

future and lead to diverse unanticipated missile threats to the United States, allies, and 

partners. 

As U.S. missile defense capabilities improve to stay ahead of missile threats, they may also help 

dissuade missile proliferation among potential adversaries by reducing the political and military 

value of their missiles. And, by supporting the credibility of U.S. assurance commitments, 

missile defense can contribute to U.S. nonproliferation goals by assuring allies and partners of 

their security in the absence of their own independent nuclear capabilities. 

Missile Defenses are Stabilizing. Missile defense capabilities provide the U.S., allies, and partners 

the ability to prevent or limit damage from an adversary offensive missile strike. They provide 

an additional option to offensive strikes to prevent damage to the United States, deployed 

forces, allies, and partners. 

Hedging against future risks. The pace and scale of proliferation and future missile threats is 

uncertain. U.S. missile defense capabilities and planning must take into account the potential 

for continuing missile proliferation among potential adversaries, including the proliferation of 

advanced missile capabilities. Hedging strategies incorporating missile defense help reduce 

risk and mitigate offensive missile threats that emerge over time, both geopolitical and 

technical. The U.S. capacity to hedge contributes to deterrence and to the U.S. diplomatic 

position of strength by helping to reduce potential adversary confidence of a political or 

military advantage via an expansion or even “breakout” of its missile capabilities. This hedging 
 

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against possible future missile threats also contributes to the assurance of allies and partners by 

strengthening their confidence that U.S. missile defense capabilities will not be overtaken by 

adversary offensive threat developments. 

Enabling Regional and Transregional Military Operations. Missile defense supports U.S. and 

coalition military operations across multiple regions. It helps preserve U.S. freedom of action 

by limiting adversary capabilities to inhibit or disrupt U.S. regional military operations abroad 

through missile attacks on U.S. forward deployed forces, allies, or critical in-theater 

infrastructure. Indeed, missile defense is an element of the U.S. capability to counter A2/AD 

strategies that seek to deter or prevent the United States from supporting allies in contested 

regions. This role for missile defense also provides critical support for the deterrence of 

attacks and the assurance of allies and partners. 

Principles Governing U.S. Missile Defense 

U.S. Homeland Missile Defense Will Stay Ahead of Rogue States’ Missile Threats. It is imperative that 

U.S. missile defense capabilities provide effective, continuing protection against rogue state 

missile threats to the homeland, now and into the future. The United States is technically 

capable of doing so, and has adopted an active missile defense force-sizing measure for 

protection of the homeland. DoD will develop, acquire, and maintain the U.S. homeland 

missile defense capabilities necessary to effectively protect against possible missile attacks on 

the homeland posed by the long-range missile arsenals of rogue states, defined today as North 

Korea and Iran, and to support the other missile defense roles identified in this 2019 MDR. 

This force-sizing measure for active U.S. missile defense will require the examination and 

possible fielding of advanced technologies to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. active missile 

defense capabilities, including space-based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities. It calls 

for a missile defense architecture that can adapt to emerging and unanticipated threats, 

including by adding capacity and the capability to surge missile defense as necessary in times 

of crisis or conflict. 

Consequently, the United States will not accept any limitation or constraint on the 

development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland 

against rogue missile threats. Accepting limits now could constrain or preclude missile defense 

technologies and options necessary in the future to effectively protect the American people. 

U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide continuing effective protection of the 

U.S. homeland against rogue states’ offensive missile threats. The United States relies on 

nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese 

intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to deter attacks from any source 

consistent with long-standing U.S. declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR. 
 

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Missile Defense Will Defend U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad and Support the Security of Allies and Partners. 

Defending U.S. forces abroad, allies, and partners, and helping them better defend themselves 

against the full range of regional missile threats is a vital element of U.S. regional security 

strategy in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The United States will strengthen regional 

missile defense capabilities and cooperative relationships with allies and partners on a broad 

range of missile defense activities, and encourage additional allied investments in missile 

defense, including co-development and co-production efforts to better share the burden of 

common defense. The United States will not accept any limitations on the development or 

deployment of missile defense capabilities. 

The United States Will Pursue New Concepts and Technologies. Modernization and innovation are 

critical to ensure the continuing effectiveness of missile defenses. The United States will invest 

in advanced technologies to meet the increasingly complex threats posed by larger missile 

inventories and improved countermeasures. Successful science and technology initiatives may 

lead to operational prototypes that will be evaluated outside the standard acquisition process 

in order to develop successful technologies more quickly, while also ensuring that unsuccessful 

efforts are avoided before consuming scarce funding. 

Elements of Missile Defense Strategy 

Comprehensive Missile Defense Capabilities. Effective deterrence is the preferred strategy to 

prevent missile attack. However, a broader approach is required to address the increasingly 

complex missile threat environment. The United States will field, maintain, and integrate 

three different means of missile defense to identify and exploit every practical opportunity to 

detect, disrupt, and destroy a threatening missile prior to and after its launch. These include: 

first, active missile defense to intercept adversary missiles in all phases of flight; second, passive 

defense to mitigate the potential effects of offensive missiles; and third, if deterrence fails, 

attack operations to defeat offensive missiles prior to launch. 

This multi-layered approach to preventing and defeating missile attacks will move the United 

States towards a more flexible and balanced overall defense posture that provides the broadest 

set of options in a crisis or conflict and improves the overall likelihood of countering offensive 

missile attacks successfully. To do so, the United States will integrate active missile defenses 

with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike capabilities to counter 

regional offensive missile threats and rogue missile threats to the homeland. 

Flexibility and Adaptability. With more than 20 states possessing offensive missile technology, 

and many expanding and modernizing their capabilities, it is clear that future adversary 

offensive missile threats and U.S. defensive goals will be diverse and dynamic. Flexibility and 

adaptability will enable the United States to tailor its missile defense strategy to potential 

adversaries to deny them the benefits they seek from offensive missile threats or employment. 

Consistent with an emphasis of the 2018 NDS, this MDR emphasizes the need for flexibility 

and adaptability in U.S. missile defense design, research, and acquisition programs. Because 
 

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the U.S. missile defense posture must be capable of being flexibly deployable and adaptable to 

meet future threats as they emerge, DoD will continue to seek ways to shorten the time 

required to develop and field responsive missile defense systems. 

Tighter Offense-Defense Integration and Interoperability. The United States must maintain the 

ability to deploy rapidly and sustain its operational plans in an A2/AD environment in which 

adversaries seek to use ballistic and cruise missiles to coerce both in peacetime and crisis, and 

to overwhelm U.S. forces in the event of conflict. Integrated missile defense plans, force 

management, and operations support will emphasize global coordination and enable 

engagement from the best interceptor using the best sensor data. Toward that end, it is 

necessary to pursue more integrated approaches to the missile defense mission that leverage 

the full range of assets available. 

The United States will pursue greater integration of attack operations with active and passive 

missile defenses, and homeland and regional missile defense assets. In addition, as allied and 

partner missile defense capabilities grow in size and sophistication, a strong commitment to 

interoperability will maximize their contribution to the missile defense mission and enable a 

more effective collective response to missile attacks. 

Importance of Space. The exploitation of space provides a missile defense posture that is more 

effective, resilient and adaptable to known and unanticipated threats. Space-based sensors, for 

example, can monitor, detect and track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on 

the globe – they enjoy a measure of flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by the 

constraints that geographic limitations impose on terrestrial sensors, and can provide “birth to 

death” tracking that is extremely advantageous. 

As rogue state missile arsenals develop, the space-basing of interceptors may provide the 

opportunity to engage offensive missiles in their most vulnerable initial boost phase of flight, 

before they can deploy various countermeasures. Space-basing may increase the overall 

likelihood of successfully intercepting offensive missiles, reduce the number of U.S. defensive 

interceptors required to do so, and potentially destroy offensive missiles over the attacker’s 

territory rather than the targeted state. DoD will undertake a new and near-term examination 

of the concepts and technology for space-based defenses to assess the technological and 

operational potential of space-basing in the evolving security environment. 

IV. U.S. Missile Defense Programs and Capabilities 

The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) provides active defense of the U.S. homeland 

and deployed forces, allies, and partners. The BMDS is an integrated, layered ballistic missile 

defense architecture that provides multiple opportunities to destroy missiles and their 

warheads before they can reach their targets. The architecture includes land-, sea-, and spacebased elements to track, target, and destroy offensive ballistic missiles of different ranges, 
 

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speeds, and sizes after their launch. Some elements of the BMDS also have capabilities to 

defend against cruise missiles. 

The United States will develop innovative approaches and new technologies that stay ahead of 

the rapid advances in rogue states’ offensive missile threats to the U.S. homeland and provide 

the needed defense against regional missile threats. To do so, DoD will increase investments 

in and deploy new technologies and concepts, and adapt existing weapons systems to field new 

capabilities rapidly at lower cost. In addition, DoD will leverage investments in existing 

defensive systems and the knowledge gained from prior missile defense research and 

development to expand U.S. defensive capabilities to new domains, achieve greater 

integration, and strengthen U.S. capabilities for attack operations to destroy offensive missiles 

prior to their launch. 

U.S. Homeland Defense 

Defending the U.S. homeland against missile attack helps to deter adversaries, assure allies and 

partners, and provide U.S. leaders with a position of strength to engage adversaries and project 

power in support of national objectives. The United States is protected against a limited ICBM 

attack as a result of investments made in the Ground-Based, Mid-Course Defense (GMD) 

system. The GMD system is designed to defend against the existing and potential ICBM threat 

from rogue states such as North Korea and Iran, but in the event of conflict, it would defend, 

to the extent feasible, against a ballistic missile attack upon the U.S. homeland from any 

source. 

The GMD system engages adversary long-range ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase of 

flight using Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI). GBIs destroy attacking missiles by striking 

them at high speeds with a kinetic kill vehicle. Forty GBIs are deployed at Ft. Greely, Alaska, 

and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. 

DoD is investing in the expansion and modernization of current U.S. homeland missile defense 

capabilities to help counter advanced offensive missile threats for the next decade. This 

decision is in line with Congressional intent as expressed in the 2017 National Defense 

Authorization Act that we will “maintain and improve an effective, robust layered missile 

defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States, allies, deployed forces, 

and capabilities against the developing and increasingly complex ballistic missile threat.” We 

are now improving the reliability and lethality of current missile defense forces and enhancing 

the ability of U.S. active missile defenses to track, target, and destroy adversary offensive 

missiles with greater precision. These efforts and priorities are reflected in the 

Administration’s recent budget requests and actions. For example, Congress appropriated 

approximately $15.3 billion in FY18 for homeland and regional missile defense, including an 

emergency appropriation of $4 billion to further expand and enhance U.S. missile defense 

capabilities against North Korean missile threats to the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, 

and partners. 
 

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DoD programs to improve the capability and reliability of the GMD system include equipping 

recently-deployed GBIs with an advanced booster and a more capable Exoatmospheric Kill 

Vehicle (EKV). DoD is also building a new GBI interceptor field in Ft. Greely, Alaska, and 

will increase the number of deployed GBIs from 44 to 64 beginning as early as 2023, and is 

strengthening the performance of existing missile defense sensors and fielding new sensors for 

even greater discrimination capability. Taken together, these enhancements will result in 

improved performance, reliability, and lethality against offensive ballistic missile threats to the 

U.S. homeland. 

More complex offensive missile threats to the homeland, such as HGV and advanced cruise 

missiles, are on the horizon. DoD is enhancing ways to collect and process information from 

existing space-based and terrestrial sensors to track current and emerging cruise missile and 

HGV threats. Enhancing our ability to track these emerging threats will make defending 

against cruise missile and HGV threats possible. 

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a combined Command of 

the United States and Canada that provides aerospace warning and protection for North 

America. It is pursuing a three-phase plan to improve the defense against cruise missiles for 

the United States and Canada. In addition, NORAD and the U.S. Air Force are upgrading 

aircraft that monitor the U.S. airspace with new sensors capable of tracking and targeting 

challenging offensive air threats like advanced cruise missiles. 

Regional and Transregional Missile Defense 

Potential adversaries continue to expand the capability and capacity of their regional offensive 

missile inventories. The United States will strengthen its efforts to deter and counter them. 

The global offensive missile threat environment represents a sea-change in the operational 

setting that U.S. forces will have to navigate in future regional conflicts. The United States 

and allies can no longer assume the capacity to concentrate forces in secure, forward locations 

and launch military operations against adversaries from these secure locations. Defending 

effectively against offensive missile threats will help deter adversaries, assure allies and 

partners, preserve U.S. and allied freedom of action, limit the potential for coercive adversary 

missile threats, and reduce the effects of potential adversary regional missile strikes. 

Strengthening U.S. regional defenses in this environment is not only an active missile defense 

challenge. Given the large inventory of adversary regional missiles relative to our more 

limited inventory of active defenses, the United States will leverage investments in platforms, 

weapons, and military expertise to develop complementary attack operations. U.S. 

Combatant Commanders will plan and conduct active missile defense and attack operations as 

an overall joint campaign employing the full range of U.S. capabilities. In addition, the United 

States will seek to integrate U.S., allied, and partner capabilities for active missile defense and, 

as appropriate, attack operations capable of striking the entire range of infrastructure 

supporting adversary offensive missile operations. 
 

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Regional Active Defenses 

The United States continues to make significant progress in the development, deployment, 

and modernization of regional active missile defense capabilities. DoD currently fields a 

number of regional active defense systems to intercept potential adversary regional offensive 

missiles, including mobile sensors and interceptors that can be surged to zones of crisis or 

conflict and, if they are interoperable with allied and partner assets, can support combined 

defensive operations. The regional missile defense posture is increasingly flexible and 

adaptable to meet evolving threats and new classes of offensive missiles as they emerge, 

including advanced, extended-range cruise missiles and HGVs. 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): The THAAD system engages short-, medium-, 

and intermediate-range ballistic missiles using hit-to-kill technologies. At this time, the 

United States possesses seven THAAD batteries, including one in Guam and one in the 

Republic of Korea (ROK). DoD is continuing to develop software upgrades for THAAD to 

provide advanced capability against emerging threats. These activities will enable the 

expansion of both THAAD system interoperability with air and missile defense systems and its 

defended area against future threats. 

Aegis Sea-based Missile Defense: The Aegis Weapon System for active missile defense provides 

protection at sea and ashore against regional ballistic missiles. The United States is testing 

improved variants of both the Aegis SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, and fielding a new sensor, to 

significantly increase Aegis missile defense capabilities. Multi-mission Aegis BMD-capable 

ships are highly maneuverable and survivable, and will be surged as needed during crisis and 

conflict. The combination of increased ship numbers and capability will result in a more 

flexible and resilient Aegis force with significantly greater missile defense capability. 

Aegis Ashore: The Aegis Ashore is the land-based version of the Aegis Weapon System and is 

operated by the U.S. Navy as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). An 

Aegis Ashore site in Romania is operational, armed with the SM-3 interceptor, and provides 

continuous defense of European NATO territory against Middle East missile threats. It is 

currently operating under NATO command and control. An Aegis Ashore site in Poland is 

under construction and will become part of NATO ballistic missile defense upon completion. 

These Aegis Ashore sites will soon be equipped with the SM-3 Blk IIA, significantly 

strengthening their defense of NATO territory. 

Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): The Patriot air and missile defense system has a proven 

combat record. It can launch several interceptor variants, and is now deployed with U.S., 

allied, and partner forces in multiple theaters to defend against SRBMs and cruise missiles. 

Since the initial deployment of Patriot in 1982, the United States has continuously improved 

the system. 

 
 

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Congress provided funding in FY17 and FY18 to procure additional Patriot, THAAD, and SM3 interceptors. These missile procurements are part of an emergency funding request by the 

Administration to take immediate measures to protect the U.S. homeland, forces deployed 

abroad, allies, and partners. They are additive to the current program, and will increase the 

growing inventory of U.S. missile defense interceptors available in a crisis. 

Preparing for Emerging Offensive Missile Threats and Uncertainties 

DoD is taking steps consistent with the annual budget process to improve or adapt existing 

systems, relocate or surge mobile systems, and, build new systems, including some on a 

relatively short timeline. These steps advance the goals of staying ahead of rogue state 

offensive missile threats to the homeland, meeting the diverse range of regional offensive 

missile threats, and hedging against future threats. Developing and fielding the means to 

defend against emerging HGVs, for example, will be critical to address concern over the 

erosion of U.S. regional military advantages expressed in the 2018 NDS. 

Improve or adapt existing systems. The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intended as part of the regional 

missile defense architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important “underlay” to 

existing GBIs for added protection against ICBM threats to the U.S homeland. This 

interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease the burden on 

the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U.S. homeland against rogue states’ 

long-range missile capabilities. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will test the SM-3 Blk IIA 

against an ICBM-class target in 2020. 

Adapting existing capabilities to perform new missions for homeland and regional missile 

defense also will be necessary. For example, DoD’s newest tactical aircraft, the F-35 

Lightning II, can track and destroy adversary cruise missiles today, and, in the future, can be 

equipped with a new or modified interceptor capable of shooting down adversary ballistic 

missiles in their boost phase. Another repurposing option is to operationalize, either 

temporarily or permanently, the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, 

to strengthen the defense of Hawaii against possible North Korean missile attack. 

The Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) is a next generation kinetic kill vehicle for the GBI 

designed to improve the ability to engage ICBM warheads, decoys, and countermeasures using 

a single defensive interceptor. While the number of GBIs is limited, MOKV could improve 

the performance of the GMD system by increasing the probability of successfully intercepting 

the warhead. 

Relocating/surging mobile systems. DoD will surge missile defense capabilities promptly in a 

crisis or conflict, as needed, and ensure that doing so is featured in operational planning. For 

example, Patriot and THAAD systems, and multi-mission Aegis BMD-capable ships armed 

with the SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor will be moved into position quickly in a crisis to strengthen 

the defense of the homeland against rogue state missile threats. In the future, additional missile 
 

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defense capabilities, such as the F-35 and boost-phase defenses could also contribute to U.S. 

mobile capabilities to be surged as necessary in crisis or conflict. 

Building new systems. The United States may decide to increase further the capacity of the GMD 

force beyond the currently planned force size of 64 GBIs. The missile base in Ft. Greely, 

Alaska, has the potential for up to an additional 40 interceptors. In addition, building a new 

GBI interceptor site in the continental United States would add interceptor capability against 

the potential expansion of missile threats to the homeland, including a future Iranian ICBM 

capability. The decision to do so, and site selection, will be informed by pertinent factors at 

the time, particularly emerging threat conditions. 

Intercepting offensive missiles in their boost-phase would increase the likelihood of 

successfully countering missile threats, complicate an aggressor’s attack calculus by reducing 

its confidence in its missile attack planning, and reduce the number of midcourse or terminal 

active defense interceptors needed to destroy the adversary’s remaining offensive missiles. 

Developing scalable, efficient, and compact high energy laser technology holds the potential 

to provide a future cost-effective capability to destroy boosting missiles in the early part of the 

trajectory. Doing so would leverage earlier technological advances, including for example 

advances in beam propagation and beam control. DoD is developing a Low-Power Laser 

Demonstrator to evaluate the technologies necessary for mounting a laser on an unmanned 

airborne platform to track and destroy missiles in their boost-phase. 

Space-basing for sensors provides significant advantages. Such sensors take advantage of the 

large area viewable from space for improved tracking and potentially targeting of advanced 

threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise missiles. 

The space-basing of interceptors also may provide significant advantages, particularly for 

boost-phase defense. As directed by Congress, DoD will identify the most promising 

technologies, and estimated schedule, cost, and personnel requirements for a possible spacebased defensive layer that achieves an early operational capability for boost-phase defense. 

Attack Operations for Missile Defense 

If deterrence fails and conflict with a rogue state or within a region ensues, U.S. attack 

operations supporting missile defense will degrade, disrupt, or destroy an adversary’s missiles 

before they are launched. Such operations are part of a comprehensive missile defense strategy 

and increase the effectiveness of active missile defenses by reducing the number of adversary 

missiles to be intercepted. DoD will invest in the capabilities necessary for attack operations, 

such as improved attack warning intelligence, ISR, time-sensitive targeting, as well as the longrange precision and air-, land-, and sea-strike capabilities necessary for destroying mobile 

missiles prior to their launch. 
 

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V. Missile Defense Management and Testing 

In 2002, DoD directed MDA to use flexible acquisition approaches to develop capabilities 

quickly and directed the Services to field missile defense elements as soon as practicable. This 

decision to pursue missile defense systems on an accelerated timeline enabled the United States 

to field an initial operational homeland missile defense system by the fall of 2004, prior to 

North Korea’s Taepodong-2 ICBM/SLV test in 2006. 

Given the worsening missile threat environment, DoD must prioritize speed of delivery, 

continuous adaptation, and deliver enhanced performance at the speed of relevance. To do 

so, DoD must adopt processes and cultures that enable MDA and the Services to streamline 

and refine acquisition processes, ensure flexibility in the development, testing, and fielding of 

missile defense, and swiftly adapt systems once fielded. Services and Combatant Commanders 

should be involved early in the missile defense capability development process to identify 

needed system performance requirements and to establish the conditions and timeline for 

transferring the program from MDA to a Service. In addition, as transregional missile threats 

increase, missile defense planning will be global in nature and coordinated across geographic 

combatant commands. 

DoD and MDA will pursue a rigorous test program that enables us to counter evolving 

offensive missile threats, to include increasing the frequency of test events given the speed of 

adversary innovation. Ground and flight tests provide data needed for highly advanced 

modeling and simulation activities that allows DoD to measure and predict the performance 

of all missile defense technologies. They provide learning opportunities to characterize and 

potentially optimize the performance of each element. Even tests that are not fully successful 

may be useful by providing valuable information to assess the performance of the system. We 

must not fear test failure, but learn from it and rapidly adjust. 

VI. Working with Allies and Partners 

The 2017 NSS emphasizes that strengthening our alliances and long-term security partnerships 

is a top U.S. priority. As offensive missile capabilities continue to proliferate, missile defense 

cooperation with allies and partners has gained increasing importance to advance missile 

defense architectures for our common protection, deterrence and assurance. This cooperation 

will leverage our joint contributions and focus on expanding opportunities for collaboration 

on missile defense programs; deepening interoperability in missile defense systems and 

operations; expanding burden sharing among the United States and its allies and partners; and 

limiting the proliferation of advanced offensive missile technologies and components. 
 

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Allied and Partner Interoperability 

The United States will pursue enhanced missile defense cooperation with allies and partners, 

place a renewed emphasis on interoperability, and seek to integrate capabilities as appropriate. 

Successfully operating in today’s complex missile threat environment demands that we detect 

launches as soon as possible, track them, and intercept them as early in flight as feasible. This 

requires interoperability among various missile defense capabilities to include command and 

control networks, sensors, and Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) systems. Moving 

towards networks of interoperable IAMD systems can take advantage of cost-sharing and help 

distribute the burden of common defense to better address adversary A2/AD strategies. 

For our common defense, DoD will encourage allies and partners to invest in their own air 

and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with U.S. capabilities. DoD will also 

prioritize requests for U.S. military equipment sales, accelerating foreign partner 

modernization and the ability to integrate with U.S. forces. The United States has already 

taken steps to streamline procedures for our allies and partners to acquire U.S. defense 

capabilities. 

Indo-Pacific 

The cornerstone of our security and diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific region is our strong bilateral 

alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, and emerging security relationships with 

others such as India. Japan and South Korea are each working with the United States to build 

missile defense systems that are increasingly interoperable with U.S. defenses and increasingly 

capable against regional offensive missile threats and coercion. This cooperation includes 

bilateral missile defense training exercises with the United States. Australia participates in a 

trilateral discussion on missile defense with the United States and Japan. The United States 

and Australia meet annually to discuss bilateral missile defense cooperation. New areas of 

focus include joint examination of the challenges posed by advanced missile threats. 

Europe and NATO 

Missile defense plays a critical role in the NATO Alliance’s defense of Europe from coercion 

and aggression. Interoperable NATO active missile defense systems will improve the 

Alliance’s collective defense capabilities. The United States is committed to completing the 

deployment of EPAA, which is the U.S. contribution to NATO ballistic missile defense and 

will expand defensive coverage against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile 

threats from the Middle East. 

In addition to these EPAA capabilities against medium- and intermediate-range threats, 

individual NATO Allies are also fielding national air and missile defense systems designed to 

defend against shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles. These allied active defenses will play 

a crucial role in countering missile strikes that underpin potential adversaries’ A2/AD 
 

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operations. The Alliance is also making progress towards enhanced missile defense 

interoperability among national systems and integration of missile warning to support 

combined missile defense operations. A “deepening of interoperability” will enable the 

Alliance’s forces to act together more coherently and effectively to counter missile strikes. 

The Middle East – Gulf Cooperation Council 

The United States is working closely with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners to 

encourage them to acquire and deploy missile defense capabilities that, when integrated over 

time, would provide the basis for a networked, layered defense across the region. U.S. 

Central Command maintains a series of regular engagements with GCC air and missile defense 

forces. These important exchanges are establishing the foundation for joint missile defense 

planning and operational cooperation. 

The Middle East – Israel

The United States will sustain its strong missile defense partnership with Israel, underpinned 

by a new U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that includes a commitment of 

$500 million for Israeli missile defense each year beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 through 

FY 2028. Under this MOU, DoD will sustain extensive cooperation with Israel, and seek 

increased opportunities to take advantage of Israeli research and development efforts for 

similar U.S. defense missions. 

South Asia 

A number of states in South Asia are developing an advanced and diverse range of ballistic 

and cruise missile capabilities. Within this context, the United States has discussed potential 

missile defense cooperation with India. This is a natural outgrowth of India’s status as a 

Major Defense Partner and key element of our Indo-Pacific Strategy. 

North America 

Since NORAD’s establishment in 1958, significant progress has been made toward countering 

evolving air and missile threats to the United States and Canada. NORAD routinely maintains 

forces on alert for homeland air defense, including cruise missile defense. The United States 

will continue to work with Canada to modernize NORAD’s ability to counter cruise missile 

threats and detect, track, warn and defend against advanced missile threats. The United States 

and Canada are conducting a joint examination of options to renew or replace the North 

Warning System, a bilateral integrated network, and adapt this capability to new threats. 
 

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VII. Conclusion 

For the past 17 years, the United States has devoted significant effort to developing and 

deploying a layered missile defense system. These efforts have enabled the continued 

improvement in U.S., allied, and partner missile defense performance and affordability. With 

further planned investments, these improvements will continue well into the future. 

This 2019 MDR establishes a policy framework for U.S. missile defense that is responsive to 

new threats and exploits new approaches to the defensive mission. It adopts a balanced and 

integrated approach to countering missile threats through a combination of deterrence, active 

and passive missile defenses, and attack operations. This framework emphasizes the priority of 

protection for the American homeland against emerging and future rogue states' missile 

threats, in addition to robust regional missile defense for U.S. forces abroad, allies, and 

partners against all potential adversaries. 

Moving forward, the United States, allies, and partners will pursue a comprehensive missile 

defense strategy that will deliver integrated and effective capabilities to counter ballistic, 

cruise, and hypersonic missile threats. Doing so will sustain and strengthen our capabilities to 

protect the homeland, deter adversaries, protect and assure allies and partners, and hedge 

against future threats in all domains. It will also help enable the United States to project power 

into contested environments in support of allies and partners and provide U.S. leaders with a 

position of strength in their diplomatic engagements to reduce tensions and limit security 

challenges. 

The U.S. BMDS must be continuously strengthened and expanded given the growing 

challenges posed by potential adversaries, particularly rogue states, who are contesting the 

established international order and deploying greater numbers of increasingly sophisticated 

offensive missiles. The men and women of the Defense Department and our Armed Forces 

stand ready to meet this challenge, both today and in the future. 
 

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I. Introduction 

“The Secretary shall initiate a new Ballistic Missile Defense Review to identify ways of 

strengthening missile defense capabilities, rebalancing homeland and theater defense priorities, 

and highlighting priority funding areas.” 

- President Donald Trump, 2017 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Missile defense is an essential component of U.S. national security and defense strategies. It 

contributes to the deterrence of adversary aggression and the assurance of allies and partners. 

It also strengthens U.S. diplomacy, protects against missile attacks to limit damage, supports 

U.S. military operations if deterrence fails, hedges against future uncertainties and risks, and 

helps to preserve U.S. and allied freedom of action to meet and defeat the regional aggression 

of potential adversaries. 

This 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) describes the policies, strategies, and capabilities that 

will guide Department of Defense (DoD) missile defense programs over the next decade. It 

provides a roadmap to counter the expanding missile threats posed by rogue states and 

revisionist powers to us, our allies, and partners, including ballistic and cruise missiles, and 

hypersonic vehicles. It highlights priority areas and provides guidance to strengthen both 

current missile defense programs and future capabilities. 

Consistent with the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2018 

National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 

an emphasis in this 2019 MDR is the need for flexible and adaptable U.S. 

missile defense capabilities that enable tailored deterrence and responses 

to aggression. U.S. missile defense strategy has evolved over decades in 

response to shifts in the security environment and corresponding shifts in 

U.S. missile defense goals, developments in the offensive missile 

capabilities of potential adversaries, and advances in technologies. Because 

the strategic context is not static, U.S. missile defense policies, priorities 

and programs must also be dynamic. 

This MDR looks at, and beyond, the contemporary threat environment to consider emerging 

missile challenges and their implications for U.S. missile defense roles and requirements. It 

recognizes and highlights the important changes that have taken place in the security 

environment since the previous Ballistic Missile Defense Review was conducted in 2010, as well 

as the considerable uncertainties about the future threat environment. Those changes and 

uncertainties shape the direction of this MDR for U.S. missile defense policies, strategies, and 

capabilities. 

The expanding military capabilities of revisionist powers, particularly including their offensive 

missile capabilities, now challenge our ability to deter or defeat aggression and coercion in key 

“The United States and our allies have the demonstrated capabilities and

unquestionable commitment to defend ourselves from an attack.” 

- Then-Secretary of Defense, James Mattis 

Press Statement, August 9, 2017 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

strategic regions. Russia illegally occupies territory outside its borders, seeks to coerce and 

destabilize its neighbors, and flouts treaty obligations. China has adopted an increasingly 

assertive posture in disputes with its neighbors, many of whom are U.S. allies or partners. 

These include disputes over territorial boundaries, claims to contested island territory, and a 

campaign to build and militarize islands in the South China Sea. The military forces and 

doctrines of these and other states feature offensive missile capabilities that are growing rapidly 

in size, sophistication and prominence. 

Of particular concern are advances and investments by rogue states such as Iran and North 

Korea in offensive missile systems with the potential to strike the U.S. homeland. Iran, 

through its Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) program, has established the technical foundation to 

shorten the timeline to acquire an ICBM capability. North Korea has launched 17 long-range 

ballistic missiles since the beginning of 2016, including three intercontinental-range ballistic 

missile (ICBM) tests, and has also conducted six nuclear weapons tests since 2006. 

This MDR focuses on improving U.S. capabilities to protect the homeland against potential 

missile attacks from rogue states, while also continuing to invest in fiscally sustainable and 

rigorously tested missile defense capabilities to project power in support of national objectives 

and protect U.S. forces deployed abroad, allies, and partners. The United States will increase 

its overall investment in missile defense, and, after a significant decline over much of the past 

decade, U.S. missile defense investment will once again place increasing emphasis on 

homeland defense for the American people. The increase in the Missile Defense Agency’s 

(MDA) budget for homeland defense is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 

Figure 1. Homeland Defense Budget FY01-19 appropriations for Missile Defense Agency. 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

This MDR is based on recognition that the threat environment the United States, our allies, 

and partners now face is markedly more dangerous than in years past, and as such, demands a 

concerted U.S. effort to improve existing capabilities for both homeland and regional missile 

defense. This effort will include a thorough exploration of innovative concepts and advanced 

technologies that have the potential to provide more cost-effective U.S. capabilities to defend 

against expanding missile threats. It also emphasizes that the missile threat environment now 

calls for a comprehensive approach to missile defense against rogue states and regional missile 

threats. This approach must integrate offensive and defensive capabilities for deterrence, and 

include active defense to intercept missiles in all phases of flight after launch, passive defense 

to mitigate the effects of missile attack, and attack operations during a conflict to neutralize 

offensive missile threats prior to launch. 

The fundamental starting point and guidelines for the 2019 MDR follow from principal 

emphases found in the 2017 NSS, the 2018 NDS, and the 2018 NPR: 

 The threat environment faced by the United States has become more complex and volatile, 

marked by the return of Great Power competition, including Chinese and Russian 

revisionism and military expansion, in addition to the destabilizing ambitions of rogue 

states. 

 The United States will protect the American people and defend the homeland against 

missile threats, and restore a position of strength from which our diplomats can negotiate. 

 The United States will not allow potential adversary threats of escalation to prevent us from 

defending our deployed forces abroad, allies, and partners. 

 The United States will tailor deterrence as necessary to best protect against a range of 

potential adversaries and threats. 

 The DoD will prioritize the flexibility, adaptability, and integration of U.S. missile defense 

capabilities, and the exploitation of advanced technologies to hedge against future risks and 

uncertainties. 

 The United States will strengthen existing alliances and attract new partners, deepening 

interoperability, increasing resiliency, and bolstering partners against coercion. 

 The United States will work with NATO and other key allies and partners to improve 

integrated air and missile defense capabilities. 

 The DoD’s acquisition processes will reform to deliver performance at the speed of 

relevance, rapidly deploying and integrating innovations. 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

II. The Evolving Threat 

Environment 

“State efforts to modernize, develop, or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their 

delivery systems, or their underlying technologies constitute a major threat to the security 

of the United States, its deployed troops, and allies.” 

- Director of National Intelligence, 

Daniel Coats 

2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment 

 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

The United States, allies, and partners confront a security environment that is, as emphasized 

in the 2018 NDS, “more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent 

memory.” In today’s emerging threat environment, U.S. missile defense capabilities have 

taken on an even greater importance than in the past. Today, over 20 states possess offensive 

missiles and potential adversary missile capabilities are becoming increasingly complex and 

lethal. Potential adversaries are investing substantially in their missile capabilities, enhancing 

their ground- and sea-launched missile arsenals with short-, intermediate-, and 

intercontinental-range systems, in addition to fielding mobile missiles to challenge the U.S. 

ability to detect their launch preparations. To further complicate our capability to identify 

and respond to missile threats, Russia, China, and North Korea have each developed and 

deployed dual-capable offensive missile systems able to employ conventional or nuclear 

warheads. 

Potential adversaries are expanding their missile capabilities in three different directions 

simultaneously. They are increasing the capabilities of their existing missile systems, adding 

new and unprecedented types of missile capabilities to their arsenals, and integrating offensive 

missiles ever more thoroughly into their coercive threats, military exercises, and war planning. 

New ballistic missile systems feature multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles 

(MIRV) and maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV), along with decoys and jamming devices 

– all intended to challenge U.S. missile defense capabilities. Russia and China are developing 

advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic missile capabilities that can travel at exceptional 

speeds with unpredictable flight paths that challenge our existing defensive systems. And 

finally, Russia has threatened nuclear first-use strikes against U.S. allies and partners. These 

are the challenging realities of the emerging missile threat environment that U.S. missile 

defense policy, strategy and capabilities must address. 

“Russia already possesses such [hypersonic] weapons.” 

‐ President, Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin 

Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, 

1 March, 2018 

“China has also tested a hypersonic glide vehicle.” 

‐ Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats 

2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Figure 2. Current and Future Potential Adversary Offensive Missile Capabilities. 

 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Current and Emerging Threats to the Homeland 

The 2017 NSS states, “our fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, the 

homeland, and the American way of life.” In the past, North Korea issued explicit nuclear 

missile threats against the United States and allies, and worked aggressively to field the 

capability to strike the U.S. homeland with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Further, Iran’s 

desire to have a strategic counter to the United States could drive it to field an ICBM, and 

progress in its space program could shorten the pathway to an ICBM as space launch vehicles 

use inherently similar technology. Noting this, it is increasingly evident that U.S. homeland 

missile defense must both outpace rogue state offensive missile capabilities and hedge against 

possible future threat developments. To do so, the United States will pursue advanced missile 

defense concepts and technologies for homeland defense. 

While a possible new avenue to peace with North Korea now exists, North Korea continues 

to pose an extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the 

United States. The United States must remain vigilant, especially concerning ICBM threats to 

the homeland. The intentions of potential adversaries can change directions unexpectedly and 

more rapidly than we can develop and field defensive capabilities. 

Russia and China also are expanding and modernizing their strategic offensive missile systems, 

including the development of advanced technologies. The United States relies on nuclear 

deterrence to prevent potential Russian or Chinese nuclear attacks employing their large and 

technically sophisticated intercontinental missile systems. 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Figure 3. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Select missiles shown for illustrative purposes. 

Figure 4. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles. Select missiles shown for illustrative purposes. 

 
 

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North Korea 

In the past, North Korea engaged in highly provocative actions and undertook extensive 

nuclear and missile testing over the past decade. It invested considerable resources, much to 

the detriment of its long-suffering population in order to realize the capability to threaten the 

U.S. homeland with missile attack. It may even mistakenly have believed that by threatening 

the U.S. homeland with nuclear missile attack it could prevent the United States from 

supporting its Asian allies in a crisis or conflict. 

On September 3, 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth and most powerful nuclear test to 

date, in violation of five United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolutions specifically 

prohibiting its nuclear program. In addition, over the past several years, North Korea rapidly 

accelerated its ICBM development program and showcased several ICBM variants. On July 

28, 2017, North Korea flight-tested its new road-mobile ICBM, the Hwasong-14. Only 

months later, on November 28, 2017, it tested the Hwasong-15, which may have the potential 

to range the entire United States. As a result of these test programs, North Korea now has 

the capability to threaten the U.S. homeland with a nuclear-armed missile attack. The United 

States will remain vigilant, while also seeking to address this potential threat diplomatically. 

Figure 5. North Korean Strategic Missile Systems. 
 

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Iran

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stated that, “America is the number one 

enemy of our nation.” Iran views U.S. influence in the Middle East as the foremost barrier to 

its goal of becoming the dominant power in that region, a goal it is pursuing through the use 

of terrorism, coercion and armed force to destabilize and attack its neighbors, including U.S. 

allies and partners. One of Iran’s primary tools of coercion and force projection is its missile 

arsenal, which is characterized by increasing numbers of deployed missiles, as well as increases 

in their accuracy, range, and lethality. 

Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the Middle East and continues the development 

and fielding of a wide range of missile capabilities, including development of the technologies 

applicable to intercontinental-range missiles capable of threatening the United States. In July 

2017, Iran launched the Simorgh SLV, which could help Iran to achieve ICBM range. 

Figure 6. Iranian Strategic Missile Systems. 

 

“Tehran’s desire to deter the United States might drive it to field an ICBM.

Progress on Iran’s space program, such as the launch of the Simorgh SLV in 

July 2017, could shorten a pathway to an ICBM because space launch 

vehicles use similar technologies.” 

‐ Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats 

2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Russia 

Russia considers the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be 

the principal threat to its contemporary revisionist geopolitical ambitions and routinely 

conducts exercises involving simulated nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland. In a 

televised speech on March 1, 2018, President Vladimir Putin included animation of a nuclear 

strike on the United States. Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the coercive and potential 

military uses of nuclear weapons, particularly including nuclear-armed, offensive missiles, and 

has sought to enable this strategy through a comprehensive modernization of its strategic and 

theater missile arsenals. Russia mistakenly assesses that its threat of nuclear first use or actual 

nuclear first use could compel the United States and NATO to capitulate in a crisis or conflict 

on terms favorable to Russia. This mistaken Russian perception increases the prospect for 

dangerous Russian miscalculations and escalation. 

As counted under the 2010 New START Treaty, Russia is permitted a total of 700 deployed 

ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and heavy bombers, and 1,550 

deployed strategic nuclear warheads. With its robust warhead production infrastructure and 

the substantial payload of its ICBM force, Russia has the ability to expand the number of its 

deployed missile warheads. 

Russian leaders also claim that Russia possesses a new class of missile, the hypersonic glide 

vehicle (HGV), that enables Russian strategic missiles to penetrate missile defense systems. 

HGVs challenge missile defense capabilities because they are maneuvering vehicles that 

typically travel at velocities greater than Mach 5 and spend most of their flight at much lower 

altitudes than a ballistic missile. 

Figure 7. Russian Strategic Missile Systems. 
 

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China 

China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and reorder the region to 

its advantage. China’s missiles play an increasingly prominent role in its military 

modernization, its coercive threats, and efforts to counter U.S. military capabilities in the 

Indo-Pacific. 

China continues to have one of the most active and diverse ballistic missile development 

programs in the world. It has deployed 75-100 ICBMs, including a new road-mobile system 

and a new multi-warhead version of its silo-based ICBM. Beijing now possesses four advanced 

JIN-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), each capable of carrying 12 new SLBMs, the 

CSS-N-14. Consequently, China can now potentially threaten the United States with about 

125 nuclear missiles, some capable of employing multiple warheads, and its nuclear forces will 

increase in the coming years. Beijing is also developing advanced technologies such as MaRVs 

and HGVs. 

 

Figure 8. Chinese Strategic Missile Systems.
 

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Threats to U.S. Forces Abroad, Allies, and Partners 

Potential adversaries are also fielding an increasingly diverse, expansive, and modern range of 

regional offensive missile systems that can threaten U.S. forces abroad, allies, and partners. 

Their regional offensive missile systems include multiple types of short-, medium-, and 

intermediate-range missiles intended to provide coercive political and military advantages visà-vis the United States, allies, and partners in regional crises or conflict. Expanding and 

modernizing U.S. regional missile defenses is an imperative to meet ongoing adversary 

advancements in their regional offensive missile systems.

Figure 9. Short-Range Ballistic Missiles. Select missiles shown for illustrative purposes. 

 
 

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Figure 10. Medium- and Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles. Select missiles shown for illustrative 

purposes. 

North Korea 

Over the past decade, North Korea accelerated efforts to field missiles capable of threatening 

deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners in the region. It not only fielded more such missiles, 

but also improved the performance of existing systems and developed new capabilities. It 

diversified its already large regional ballistic missile force that includes delivery systems with 

road-mobile and submarine launching platforms. Since 2015, North Korea has test-launched, 

from numerous locations throughout North Korea, over two dozen regional missiles capable 

of targeting U.S. forces, allies, and partners in Asia, including several launches of SCUD, No 

Dong, and new missile systems. In 2017, North Korea conducted a near-simultaneous ballistic 

missile salvo launch of five missiles, including four into the Sea of Japan, and announced that 

the missiles simulated the mission of targeting U.S. bases in Japan. North Korea has also 

conducted multiple missile launches over Japan and into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone. 

Taken together, these provocative activities highlighted North Korea’s commitment to 

diversifying and improving its regional offensive missile forces, strengthening their 

survivability, and engaging in coercive regional nuclear threats. 
 

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North Korea has augmented these forces through an aggressive intermediate-range ballistic 

missile (IRBM) testing campaign. These efforts have included numerous Hwasong-10 

(“Musudan”) test launches and, in 2017, two Hwasong-12 IRBM launches over northern Japan. 

In addition to these liquid-fueled systems, in February 2017, North Korea launched a new 

solid-propellant medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that appears to be a land-based 

variant of its SLBM. This SLBM, Bukkeuksong, is a relatively recent development, having first 

been tested in 2016. 

These wide-ranging North Korean offensive missile systems give North Korea the capability 

to strike U.S. territories, including Guam, U.S. forces abroad, and allies in the Pacific Ocean. 

These missiles are the tools North Korea has used to issue coercive nuclear preemptive threats, 

and could use to employ nuclear weapons in the event of conflict in Asia. 

 

Figure 11. Selected North Korean Regional Missile Systems. 
 

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Iran 

Iran is accelerating efforts to field missiles capable of threatening deployed U.S. forces, allies, 

and partners. It is continuing to develop more sophisticated missiles with improved accuracy, 

range, and lethality. 

Iran is increasing its ballistic missile force with next-generation short-range ballistic missiles 

(SRBM) and MRBMs. It fields an array of increasingly accurate short- and medium-range 

ballistic missile systems, including Fateh-110 class SRBMs and Shahab-3 MRBMs. In late 2015, 

Iran announced it successfully test-fired the Emad, a new precision-guided MRBM. Iran’s 

medium-range systems can threaten targets from Eastern Europe to South Asia. It has also 

flight-tested a Fateh-110 ballistic missile in an anti-ship role that can threaten U.S. and allied 

naval vessels in the Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. 

Iran also has a ground-launched land attack cruise missile (LACM), the Soumar, that can target 

U.S., allied, and partner interests in the region. Iran claims the Soumar has a 2000 kilometer 

(km) range. Iran could develop alternate launch modes for this missile, including aircraft or 

naval platforms. 

In its quest for hegemony in the Middle East, Iran has devoted major resources to develop and 

deploy a spectrum of missile capabilities, which, in addition to the use of terrorism and proxy 

forces, threaten U.S. allies, partners, and interests in the Middle East and beyond. Iran has 

launched missile strikes in the ongoing Syrian conflict. 

Figure 12. Selected Iranian Regional Missile Systems. 

“In the Middle East, Iran is competing with its neighbors, asserting an arc of influence

and instability while vying for regional hegemony, using state-sponsored terrorist 

activities, a growing network of proxies, and its missile program to achieve its 

objectives.” 

- 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 
 

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Russia 

Not only is Moscow expanding and modernizing its strategic offensive missile forces, it also is 

fielding an increasingly advanced and diverse range of nuclear-capable regional offensive 

missile systems that threaten deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners. These missile systems 

are a critical enabler of Russia’s coercive escalation strategy and nuclear threats to U.S. allies 

and partners. 

Russian offensive missile modernization programs go well beyond traditional ballistic missiles, 

to include missiles with unprecedented characteristics of altitude, speed, propulsion type, and 

range. Russia is developing a new generation of advanced, regional ballistic and cruise missiles 

that support its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy intended to defeat U.S. and allied 

will and capability in regional crises or conflicts. Indeed, Russia has demonstrated its advanced 

cruise missile capability since 2015 by repeatedly conducting long-range precision strikes into 

Syria. 

Russia has also fielded a ground-launched, intermediate-range cruise missile, the SSC-8, in 

violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. These highly effective 

LACMs fly at low altitudes below a radar’s line-of-sight, which presents a potentially major 

threat to U.S. regional military operations and deterrence goals. While the majority of 

LACMs presently fly at subsonic speeds, in the future it appears that some will be able to reach 

hypersonic speeds. 

   

Figure 13. Selected Russian Regional Missile Systems.
 

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China 

China is also developing missile capabilities intended to deny the United States the capability 

and freedom of action to protect U.S. allies and partners in Asia. A key component of China’s 

military modernization is its conventional ballistic missile arsenal designed to prevent U.S. 

military access to support regional allies and partners. China is augmenting its SRBM force as 

well as improving its ability to strike regional targets, such as U.S. bases and naval assets, at 

greater ranges with the addition of a growing number of medium- and intermediate-range 

ballistic missiles. This includes sophisticated anti-ship ballistic missiles that pose a direct threat 

to U.S. aircraft carriers. 

China also has ground- and air-launched LACMs, and is developing HGVs and new MaRVs. 

These and other wide-ranging developments in China’s expansive offensive missile arsenal 

pose a potential nuclear and non-nuclear threat to the U.S. forces deployed abroad, and are of 

acute concern to U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Figure 14. Selected Chinese Regional Missile Systems. 

“A simple comparison of missile ranges with geography suggests where Chinese missiles

would most likely be targeted – SRBMs against Taiwan and U.S. carrier strike groups 

operating at sea, IRBMs against U.S. bases in Japan and Guam, and ICBMs against the 

continental U.S. China’s pursuit of advanced hypersonic missile technologies portends 

even greater challenges over the next few years.” 

- Then-Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris 

Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, February 14, 2018 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Potential Adversary Missile Defense and Antisatellite (ASAT) Advancements 

Despite frequently criticizing the United States and allies for deploying missile defense 

systems, potential adversaries have made substantial investments in their own missile defense 

systems. Russia and China are also developing ASAT capabilities that could threaten U.S. 

space-based assets, including sensors that support U.S. missile defense. 

Russia 

Russia maintains and modernizes its longstanding silo-based strategic missile defense system 

deployed around Moscow, which includes 68 nuclear-armed interceptors, and has fielded 

multiple types of shorter-range, mobile missile defense systems throughout Russia. These 

include hundreds of S-300 and S-400 launch vehicles, each capable of firing four interceptor 

missiles. Russia also is developing the S-500 as an even more modern and technologically 

advanced air and missile defense system to augment the S-300 and S-400. In addition, Russia 

has transferred missile defense technology to China and Iran, both of which are expanding and 

modernizing mobile missile defense capabilities. Finally, Russia is developing a diverse suite 

of ASAT capabilities, including ground-launched missiles and directed-energy weapons, and 

continues to launch “experimental” satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities to 

advance counterspace capabilities.

China 

China is aggressively pursuing a wide range of mobile air and missile defense capabilities, 

including the S-300 and domestically produced HQ-9 missile defense systems. China has 64 

S-300 missile defense launchers, each with four interceptor missiles. It is modernizing and 

expanding its missile defense capabilities with the purchase of S-400 systems from Russia, each 

Figure 15. Russian Missile Defense Systems. 
 

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with four interceptor missiles. These are expected to be delivered to China in 2018. China 

also has announced that it is testing a new mid-course missile defense system with plans to 

develop sea-based mid-course ballistic missile defense, and is developing additional theater 

ballistic missile defense systems. Since July 2017, China has conducted at least two tests of its 

mid-course missile defense system. Further, China is developing a suite of ASAT weapons, 

including ground-launched missiles and directed-energy weapons, and continues to launch 

“experimental” satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities to advance counterspace 

capabilities. China has conducted multiple ASAT tests using ground-launched missiles, and, 

in fact, destroyed a satellite in orbit in 2007.

North Korea 

North Korea has acquired Russian missile defense technology and is developing its own mobile 

missile defense capabilities, specifically, a mobile air and missile defense system. While 

indigenously produced, its interceptors and radar system share similarities with Russian 

systems. 

Figure 16. Chinese Missile Defense Systems. 

Figure 17. North Korean Missile Defense Systems. 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Iran 

Similar to Russian-Chinese missile defense cooperation, Russia has been instrumental in Iran’s 

development of a mobile air and missile defense capability. In 2016, Russia delivered 16 S300 launch vehicles to Iran, each armed with four interceptors. Iran also is developing its own 

missile defense system, the Bavar 373, to provide additional missile defense capability. 

Figure 18. Iranian Missile Defense Systems. 

“The S-300 is a very powerful system and plays a very important role in the security

of the country...we are also moving along this path [of self-sufficiency] and 

developing our systems for use at various altitudes.” 

‐ Defense Minister, Iran, Amir Khatami 

April 5, 2018 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Missile Proliferation Concerns 

U.S. missile defense capabilities and efforts for the future must consider and hedge against the 

potential for continuing missile proliferation, including the proliferation of advanced missile 

capabilities. Rogue states may continue to pursue missile delivery systems through illicit 

procurement pathways for acquisition of critical technologies and components in violation of 

U.N. Security Council resolutions. The proliferation challenge may worsen and lead to 

diverse unanticipated missile threats to the United States, allies, and partners. 

Since the Soviet era, Moscow and Russia-based entities have provided offensive missile strike 

expertise and technology to China, North Korea, Iran, and Syria. They also have provided 

missile defense expertise and technology to China and Iran. In some cases, their arms transfers 

violated U.N. sanctions and international norms. In many cases, the Soviet-exported offensive 

missile systems provided the basis for today’s missile capabilities fielded by China, North 

Korea, and Iran. Russian-made offensive missile systems, and those derived from Russian 

technology, are now fielded globally and employed in multiple conflicts around the world. In 

addition, Russia markets cruise missiles in standard shipping containers to foreign buyers. 

Chinese entities have assisted Iran, North Korea, and others in developing their missile 

programs. For example, the wheeled chassis used by North Korea for its mobile ICBM 

launchers were originally obtained in 2011 from Chinese sources. In turn, expertise and 

technology provided to these states by Chinese sources could be transferred to additional state 

and non-state actors. 

The North Korean missile program – which over decades has benefitted from expertise and 

technological assistance from abroad – also presents a significant proliferation threat. North 

Korea has been the source of ballistic missile-associated sales to numerous countries, 

particularly in the volatile Middle East. It has assisted Iranian and Syrian missile programs, and 

it may well attempt further sales of its missile technology in the future. North Korea also 

provided fissile material production technology needed for nuclear weapons to Syria. Effective 

“Ballistic missile proliferation and lethality continues to increase as more countries

acquire greater numbers of ballistic missiles and are increasing their technical 

sophistication to specifically defeat U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. In the past 

year, we continue to see missile tests from North Korea and Iran that cause us and 

our allies continued concerns.” 

- Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, General John Hyten 

Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 4, 2017 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

U.S., allied, and partner missile defenses will help protect against the potential consequences 

of the North Korean missile proliferation network, and could possibly undercut demand for 

North Korean missile sales. 

Iran, like North Korea, also is proliferating its offensive missile technology, presenting 

additional threats to the U.S., allies, and partners. U.N. reports describe repeated instances 

of Iranian weapons transfers and ballistic missile activity in violation of U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 2231. Iran has made extensive use of smuggling networks, managed both by its 

security forces and proxies, to provide advanced missile delivery systems to its clients. It has 

transferred rockets and guided ballistic missiles, including close-range ballistic missiles 

(CRBM) and SRBMs, to Hizballah in Lebanon and Syria, and to the Houthis in Yemen. The 

Houthis have launched over 100 missiles at Saudi Arabia. Iran’s emerging missile proliferation 

network poses a growing threat to U.S. forces, allies, and partners in the Middle East and 

beyond.

“Aid from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard to dangerous militias and terror groups is

increasing. Its ballistic missiles and advanced weapons are turning up in warzones 

across the region. It’s hard to find a conflict or a terrorist group in the Middle East 

that does not have Iran’s fingerprints all over it.” 

‐ Former U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., Ambassador Nikki Haley 

Remarks at a Press Conference on Iranian Arms Exports, December 14, 2017 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

“U.S. missile defence can critically reduce an attacker’s confidence in the prospects for

success in its offensive strike planning. Given the inherent and irreducible uncertainties of 

war that should fuel doubt in such plans, the additional uncertainty imposed by U.S. 

missile defence should prove decisively deterring in the attacker’s calculations.” 

- Professor Colin Gray, 2018

III. Roles, Policy, and Strategy 
 

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The Diverse Roles of U.S. Missile Defense 

Missile defense provides critical support for U.S. national security and defense strategies by 

contributing to: 

 The protection of the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners against the 

spectrum of adversary missile strikes; 

 The deterrence of attacks against the United States, allies, and partners; 

 The assurance of allies, which also strengthens U.S. nonproliferation efforts; 

 U.S. diplomatic efforts in peacetime and crises; 

 Greater stability and options other than offensive strikes; 

 The U.S. capacity to hedge against future risks; and, 

 The effectiveness of U.S. and allied regional military operations. 

Together, the diverse roles of missile defense advance the national strategy and goals 

articulated in the 2017 NSS, 2018 NDS, and 2018 NPR. 

Protection. If potential adversaries miscalculate and deterrence fails, missile defense limits the 

number of missile warheads that strike their targets. This is critical to defending the territorial 

integrity of the United States, saving lives, limiting damage to critical infrastructure, and 

enabling operational success in regional conflict. The single greatest loss of life during 

Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 occurred when a conventionally-armed Iraqi SCUD 

missile struck a U.S. barrack in Saudi Arabia, killing 27 U.S. service members. If adversary 

missiles are armed with nuclear warheads, missile defense may help prevent or mitigate the 

worst outcomes. Today’s U.S. missile defenses provide significant protection against potential 

North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile threats to the U.S. homeland, and will improve as 

necessary to stay ahead of missile threats from rogue states. 

“Over the next two decades, there will be a significant evolution in long-range strike weapons 

capable of ranging the U.S. homeland...The purpose of state adversary investments in global 

strike assets capable of reaching North America is to threaten key targets within the United 

States during a conflict...Adversaries will threaten the homeland not to physically destroy the 

United States, or even in anticipation of materially hindering its economic or military 

potential, but rather to change the decision calculus of leaders or the public’s appetite for 

foreign military operations.” 

‐ Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Joint Operating Environment 2035
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Deterrence. Missile defense contributes directly to tailored U.S. deterrence strategies to 

prevent attacks on the United States, and extended deterrence to prevent attacks on U.S. 

forces abroad, allies, and partners. Missile defenses, in concert with other U.S. conventional 

forces, and with U.S. nuclear forces, support both deterrence and extended deterrence. They 

undermine potential adversaries’ confidence in their ability to achieve their intended political 

or military objectives through missile threats or attacks, including by contributing to the 

survivability and effectiveness of potential U.S. responses to aggression. An adversary’s 

uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of its attack plans, combined with the prospect of an 

effective U.S. response to aggression, provide strong incentives for adversary restraint if ever 

contemplating missile attacks aimed at the United States, allies, and/or partners. By shaping 

an adversary’s decision calculus in this way, missile defense diminishes the perceived value of 

missiles as tools of coercion and aggression, thus contributing to conventional deterrence. 

Missile defense also provides additional time and options for national leaders when considering 

their options for responding to aggression, and thus contribute to the U.S. ability to respond 

to and stabilize crises or conflicts. 

Assurance. Missile defense plays an increasingly important assurance role in combination with 

other means for assuring allies and partners facing growing threats. It does so by helping to 

protect allied territory, strengthening U.S. military operations in support of allies and partners 

abroad, and, by helping to counter adversary strategies attempting to coerce the United States 

and our allies and partners with missile threats. Correspondingly, missile defense helps to 

reinforce the indivisibility of U.S. and allied security. 

U.S. missile defense deployments and cooperative missile defense activities also are concrete 

expressions of U.S. security commitments; they strengthen relations with allies and partners 

and reduce their vulnerability to coercive threats and attacks. They also provide opportunities 

for cooperative allied burden-sharing and defense collaboration. 

By so supporting the credibility of U.S. assurance commitments, missile defense also 

contributes to U.S. nonproliferation goals by assuring allies and partners of their security in 

the absence of their own independent nuclear capabilities. 

“Our missile defense forces here, are vital to our national defense and the world

should know that they’re ready.” 

‐ Vice President Michael Pence 

Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, 2018 
 

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Strengthening U.S. Diplomacy. U.S. missile defenses provide U.S. leaders a position of strength 

from which to engage potential adversaries in peacetime or crises. For example, missile 

defenses enable U.S. leaders to engage North Korea diplomatically, confident that U.S. missile 

defense capabilities help sustain effective deterrence of aggression, provide protection for the 

United States, allies, and partners in the event of conflict, and help protect against noncompliance with any potential agreement. The importance of this missile defense role is 

reflected in then-Secretary of Defense Mattis’ emphasis that the United States must, “ensure 

our diplomats who are working to solve problems do so from a position of strength,” and that, 

“Our response to this [North Korean] threat remains diplomacy-led, backed up with military 

options available to ensure that our diplomats are understood to be speaking from a position 

of strength.” 

The United States is committed to diplomatic efforts that advance U.S., allied, and partner 

security, including the U.S. diplomatic initiative with North Korea. Some Russian officials, 

including President Putin, assert that U.S. missile defense is an obstacle to further arms control 

success. However, there is ample evidence that U.S. missile defenses can contribute to, rather 

than undermine, U.S. efforts to negotiate arms control agreements or other diplomatic 

initiatives. 

For example, in 2001, when the United States announced its withdrawal from the 1972 AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to facilitate the U.S. deployment of homeland defense against 

rogue state missile threats, Russian President Putin explicitly said: “This step has not come as 

a surprise to us...I can say with full confidence that the decision made by the President of the 

United States does not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.” This 

point was repeated by numerous Russian officials. Closely following the U.S. withdrawal 

from the ABM Treaty and the subsequent U.S. announcement of its decision to deploy 

homeland missile defense, Russia and the United States ratified the 2002 Moscow Treaty, 

which mandated the most extensive strategic nuclear force reductions of any such treaty. 

Following the subsequent initial U.S. deployment of homeland missile defense, they further 

negotiated and ratified the 2010 New START Treaty. 

“The United States will seek areas of cooperation with competitors from a

position of strength, foremost by ensuring our military power is second to none 

and fully integrated with our allies and all of our instruments of power. A 

strong military ensures that our diplomats are able to operate from a position of 

strength.” 

‐ 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

The United States also remains committed to non-proliferation, the Missile Technology 

Control Regime that is intended to help limit offensive missile proliferation, and the Nuclear 

Non-proliferation Treaty. There is bipartisan recognition of the potential role missile defense 

can play in dissuading rogue states from pursuing ICBMs. The 2010 BMDR noted that through 

the U.S. commitment to missile defense, “the United States seeks to dissuade [rogue] states 

from developing an intercontinental ballistic missile.” As U.S. missile defense capabilities 

improve to stay ahead of missile threats, they may also help dissuade missile proliferation 

among potential adversaries by reducing the value of their investments in ballistic and cruise 

missiles as effective instruments of coercion or war. If so, this dissuasive effect, together with 

other counterproliferation measures such as sanctions, will contribute to U.S. diplomatic 

efforts to limit proliferation, assure allies, and hedge against future missile threats. 

Missile Defenses are Stabilizing. Missile defense capabilities provide the U.S., allies, and partners 

the ability to prevent or limit damage from an adversary offensive missile strike. They provide 

an additional option to offensive strikes to prevent damage to the United States, deployed 

forces, allies, and partners. 

Hedging. The pace and scale of future proliferation and missile threats to the United States, 

U.S. forces abroad, allies, and partners is uncertain. The potential ease with which missile 

expertise and technology can move across borders creates significant concerns that offensive 

missile threats will rapidly expand and become more complex. Hedging strategies help reduce 

risk and mitigate offensive missile threats that emerge over time, both geopolitical and 

technical. Consequently, developing and integrating where possible multiple U.S., allied, and 

partner missile defense capabilities, and the ability to quickly modify those capabilities to hedge 

against emerging and unanticipated missile challenges, is essential to U.S. security and that of 

our allies and partners. 

For example, U.S. missile defense capabilities provide an important hedge against evolving 

rogue state missile threats to the United States, allies, and partners, such as Iran seeking to 

acquire nuclear weapons and ICBM capabilities absent continued U.S. participation in the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action. This hedging against possible future missile threats also 

contributes to the assurance of allies and partners by strengthening their confidence that U.S. 

missile defense capabilities will not be overtaken by adversary offensive threat developments. 

The U.S. capacity to hedge against future missile threat developments also contributes to 

deterrence and to the U.S. diplomatic position of strength by helping to reduce potential 

adversary confidence of a political or military advantage via the expansion of, or even an 

unexpected “breakout” of, their offensive missile capabilities. 

Enabling Regional and Transregional Military Operations. Missile defense supports U.S. and 

coalition military operations across multiple regions. It also helps preserve U.S. freedom of 

action by limiting adversary capabilities to inhibit or disrupt U.S. regional military operations 

abroad through missile attacks on U.S. forward deployed forces, allies, or critical in-theater 

infrastructure. Indeed, missile defense is an element of the U.S. effort to counter A2/AD 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

strategies that seek to deter or prevent the United States from supporting allies in contested 

regions. Again, this role for missile defense provides critical support for the deterrence of 

attacks and the assurance of allies and partners. 

Principles Governing U.S. Missile Defense 

U.S. Homeland Missile Defense will Stay Ahead of Rogue States’ Missile Threats 

Technology trends point to the possibility of increasing rogue state missile threats to the U.S. 

homeland. Vulnerability to rogue state missile threats would endanger the American people 

and infrastructure, undermine the U.S. diplomatic position of strength, and could lead 

potential adversaries to mistakenly perceive the United States as susceptible to coercive 

escalation threats intended to preclude U.S. resolve to resist aggression abroad. Such 

misperceptions risk undermining our deterrence posture and messaging, and could lead 

adversaries to dangerous miscalculations regarding our commitment and resolve. 

It is therefore imperative that U.S. missile defense capabilities provide effective protection 

against rogue state missile threats to the homeland now and into the future. The United States 

is technically capable of doing so and has adopted an active missile defense force-sizing measure 

for protection of the homeland. DoD will develop, acquire, and maintain the U.S. homeland 

missile defense capabilities necessary to effectively protect against possible missile attacks on 

the homeland posed by the long-range missile arsenals of rogue states, defined today as North 

Korea and Iran, and to support the other missile defense roles identified in this MDR. 

This force-sizing measure for active U.S. missile defense is fully consistent with the 2018 NPR, 

and in order to keep pace with the threat, DoD will utilize existing defense systems and an 

increasing mix of advanced technologies, such as kinetic or directed-energy boost-phase 

defenses, and other advanced systems. It is technically challenging but feasible over time, 

affordable, and a strategic imperative. It will require the examination and possible fielding of 

advanced technologies to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. active missile defense 

capabilities, including space-based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities. Further, 

because the related requirements will evolve as the long-range threat posed by rogue states 

evolves, it does not allow a static U.S. homeland defense architecture. Rather, it calls for a 

“Our fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, the homeland,

and the American way of life.... A layered missile defense system will defend our 

homeland against missile attacks.” 

‐ 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
 

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missile defense architecture that can adapt to emerging and unanticipated threats, including by 

adding capacity and the capability to surge missile defense as necessary in times of crisis or 

conflict. 

In coming years, rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland will likely expand in numbers 

and complexity. There are and will remain inherent uncertainties regarding the potential pace 

and scope of that expansion. Consequently, the United States will not accept any limitation 

or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to 

protect the homeland against rogue missile threats. Accepting limits now could constrain or 

preclude missile defense technologies and options necessary in the future to effectively protect 

the American people. 

As U.S. active defenses for the homeland continue to improve to stay ahead of rogue states’ 

missile threats, they could also provide a measure of protection against accidental or 

unauthorized missile launches. This defensive capability could be significant in the event of 

destabilizing domestic developments in any potential adversary armed with strategic weapons, 

and as long-range missile capabilities proliferate in coming years. 

U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide continuing effective protection of the 

U.S. homeland against rogue states’ offensive missile threats. The United States relies on 

nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese 

intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to deter attacks from any source 

consistent with long-standing U.S. declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR. 

Missile Defense will Defend U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad and Support the Security of 

Allies and Partners 

Defending U.S. forces abroad, allies, and partners, and helping them better defend themselves 

against the full range of regional missile threats is a vital element of U.S. regional security 

strategy in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The United States will strengthen regional 

missile defense capabilities and cooperative relationships with allies and partners on a broad 

range of missile defense activities, and encourage additional allied investments in missile 

defense, including co-development and co-production efforts to better share the burden of 

“In 2035, the United States will confront an increasing number of state and nonstate actors with the will and capabilities to threaten targets within the homeland 

and U.S. citizens with the ultimate intention to coerce.” 

‐ Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Joint Operating Environment 2035
 

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common defense. Consequently, the United States will not accept any limitations on the 

development or deployment of missile defense capabilities. 

The United States will Pursue New Concepts and Technologies 

Modernization and innovation are critical to ensure the continuing effectiveness of missile 

defenses over time. Consequently, the United States will invest in advanced technologies to 

meet the increasingly complex threat posed by larger missile inventories and improved 

countermeasures. Successful science and technology initiatives may lead to operational 

prototypes. These prototypes could be evaluated outside the standard acquisition process in 

order to develop successful technologies more quickly while ensuring that unsuccessful efforts 

are avoided before consuming scarce funding. 

Elements of Missile Defense Strategy 

Comprehensive Missile Defense Capabilities 

Effective deterrence is the preferred strategy to prevent missile attack. To address the 

increasingly complex missile threat environment, however, a broader approach is required. 

The United States will also field, maintain, and integrate three different means of missile 

defense. These include: first, active missile defense to intercept adversary missiles in all phases 

of flight; second, passive defenses to mitigate the potential effects of offensive missiles; and 

third, if deterrence fails, attack operations to defeat offensive missiles prior to launch. This 

multi-layered approach to preventing and defeating missile attacks will improve the overall 

likelihood of countering offensive missile attacks successfully. 

The goal of this comprehensive strategy is to identify and exploit every practical opportunity 

to detect, disrupt, and destroy a threatening missile, prior to and after its launch, and to 

maximize the combined missile defense effort. To do so, the United States will integrate 

active missile defenses with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike 

“I am confident the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system can currently defend

the United States from the threats posed by North Korea, but we must take prudent 

steps to remain in a position of relative technological advantage... Together with 

our allies and partners, I am confident we will continue to adapt, innovate, and 

fulfill the sacred responsibility of defending our great nations.” 

‐ Then-Commander, U.S. Northern Command, General Lori Robinson 

Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 15, 2018 
 

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capabilities to counter regional offensive missile threats and rogue missile threats to the 

homeland. 

Given the increasing scale of potential adversary regional missile threats, and their integration 

of offensive missiles with other military capabilities, U.S. missile defense systems must be 

more tightly integrated to other U.S. capabilities in the Joint Force. The fusion of ISR, air and 

missile defenses, and offensive strike systems will be key. During future conflicts it will be 

necessary for missile defense systems to counter the initial missiles launched at the U.S. forces, 

allies, and partners -- while our offensive systems strike remaining adversary missile systems 

before additional missiles are launched. 

This comprehensive approach to U.S. missile defense reflects the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint 

Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) doctrine to prevent an adversary from effectively 

using its offensive air and missile weapons through the integrated combination of deterrence, 

active and passive defenses, and attack operations. It takes greater advantage of weapon system 

investments, reduces potential seams and gaps in the defense architecture, enables allied and 

partner participation, in addition to complicating and undermining adversary missile attack 

planning. A more integrated set of offense and defense capabilities will also move the United 

States towards a more flexible and balanced overall defense posture that provides the broadest 

set of options in a crisis or conflict. 

If deterrence fails and the United States must enter into regional armed conflict, attacking 

adversary missiles prior to their launch would be a part of ongoing combat operations and fall 

under a Combatant Commander’s mission authorities pursuant to the President’s or Secretary 

of Defense’s orders. Attack operations to locate, target, and destroy mobile missiles prior to 

launch as well as their supporting infrastructure can reduce the burden on U.S. active defenses 

for post-launch intercept – thereby helping reduce the likelihood that an adversary’s offensive 

missile attack will succeed. The capability to destroy mobile ballistic missile threats prior to 

their launch requires additional emphasis on prompt strike capabilities; persistent overhead 

coverage and all-weather ISR; and rapid processing, exploitation, and dissemination of 

targeting information. 

DoD efforts to reduce vulnerability to regional missile strikes will also include investments in 

the passive defense elements of hardening, dispersal, deception, redundancy, and enhanced 

resilience of bases, logistics, and other key facilities and functions. These passive measures 

will contribute to the defense of key bases and facilities in allied and partner nations in the face 

of adversary A2/AD strategies. DoD is also working with the Department of Homeland 

Security to improve the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s notification process for 

missile attack against the U.S. homeland. 

In addition, the United States is pursuing counterproliferation efforts in conjunction with our 

allies and partners to prevent rogue states from acquiring the technology and components 

necessary to develop advanced missile delivery systems, collaborating with other rogue states 
 

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on such programs, or proliferating such systems as they are developed. These measures 

contribute to countering rogue states’ efforts to threaten the United States, allies, and partners 

with offensive ballistic missiles. 

Without sustained investments in active and passive missile defenses, capabilities for more 

integrated and effective attack operations supported by integrated ISR, and 

counterproliferation efforts, the United States risks being outpaced by the continuing 

expansion of adversary offensive missile capabilities. 

Flexibility and Adaptability 

From the Cold War until today, the United States has had diverse missile defense goals. Over 

past decades, these goals have occasionally been revised more rapidly than the corresponding 

adjustments in programs. Moving forward, with more than 20 states possessing offensive 

missile technology, and many expanding and modernizing their capabilities, it is clear that 

future adversary offensive missile threats and U.S. defensive goals will be diverse and dynamic. 

Consistent with an emphasis of the 2018 NDS, this MDR emphasizes the need for flexibility 

and adaptability in U.S. missile defense design, research, and acquisition programs. 

Adaptability enables U.S. missile defenses to adjust to changes in the threat environment and 

possible shifts in missile defense missions, such as addressing the emerging threat posed by 

HGVs and advanced cruise missiles. This may include the need to counter potential 

geopolitical or technological surprises, such as unanticipated increases in the number of 

adversaries and the quantity or quality of their offensive missile systems. Flexibility applies to 

near-term challenges and conflict, including missile defense mobility, the capacity to surge 

capability as needed, and the ability to integrate rapidly with allied and partner systems. 

Because the U.S. missile defense posture must be capable of being flexibly deployed and 

adaptable to meet future threats as they emerge, consistent with rigorous testing, DoD will 

continue to seek ways to shorten the time required to develop and field responsive missile 

defense systems. Together, the policies and capabilities needed for flexibility and adaptability 

will enable the United States to tailor its missile defense strategy to potential adversaries to 

deny them the benefits they seek from offensive missile threats or employment. Doing so will 

strengthen the deterrence of attack and the assurance of allies, and also provide the most 

effective basis for responding to a missile attack if deterrence fails. Missile defense flexibility 

“Develop a lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment. Force posture

and employment must be adaptable to account for the uncertainty that exists in the 

changing global strategic environment.” 

‐ 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 
 

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and adaptability also are key components of the U.S. capacity to hedge against geopolitical and 

technological risks that emerge in unpredictable ways. 

Tighter Offense-Defense Integration and Interoperability 

Potential adversaries are making advances across a broad range of offensive missile capabilities 

that threaten the ability of U.S. forces to project power and respond to aggression in contested 

environments. The United States must maintain the ability to deploy rapidly and sustain its 

operational plans in an A2/AD environment in which adversaries seek to use ballistic and 

cruise missiles to coerce both in peacetime and crisis, and to overwhelm U.S. forces in the 

event of conflict. 

Integrated missile defense plans, force management, and operations support will emphasize 

global coordination, but will be regionally executed and designed to enable engagement from 

the best interceptor using the best sensor data. Toward that end, it is necessary to pursue 

more integrated approaches to the missile defense mission that leverage the full range of assets 

available. For example, addressing emerging transregional offensive missile threats requires 

interoperable missile defense systems comprised of networked sensors, shared intelligence, 

interceptors, and a command and control structure coordinated among multiple combatant 

commands. 

Enhanced integration will proceed in at least three ways: 

Integrating Offenses and Defenses. The United States will pursue greater integration of attack 

operations with active and passive missile defenses. The United States will seek to use the 

same sensor network to both intercept adversary missiles after their launch, and, if necessary, 

strike adversary missiles prior to launch. Improvements in Indications & Warnings (I&W) will 

enhance the effectiveness of both attack operations and active defense capabilities. 

Homeland-Regional Integration. The integration of homeland and regional missile defense assets 

will improve both missions and reduce overall system costs by leveraging the range of U.S., 

allied, and partner assets. Missile defense sensors that operate overseas can provide earlier or 

additional tracking information on missiles directed at the United States, allies, and partners. 

For example, the U.K.’s Fylingdales Upgraded Early Warning Radar can support the defense 

of the United States against Iranian long-range missile threats while also supporting the defense 

of Europe from potential IRBM threats. Earlier detection and tracking of incoming offensive 

missiles allows the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to engage threats earlier 

in their flight, improving the likelihood of destroying incoming offensive missiles. The missile 

defense radars the United States has deployed in Japan provide enhanced early warning and 

tracking of missiles launched from North Korea toward the United States or Japan. Going 

forward, DoD will work with allies and partners to prioritize these types of missile defense 

integration opportunities that contribute to more effective protection of the United States, its 

allies and deployed forces. 
 

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Missile Defense Interoperability. Fielding a more integrated missile defense system depends on 

continued progress in achieving greater interoperability between U.S. forces and those of our 

allies and partners. As our allied and partner missile defense capabilities grow in size and 

sophistication, complementary capabilities, and fielding schedules, a strong commitment to 

interoperability will maximize their contribution to the missile defense mission and enable a 

more effective collective response to missile attacks. 

Given the growing complexity of the threat, isolated systems for information sharing and 

command and control cannot provide required levels of capability. DoD will work towards 

fusing and exploiting available sources of information and data, including early warning and 

intelligence systems to create an integrated air and missile threat picture. This will enable 

effective operations against combined attacks involving aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, 

and hypersonic vehicles. 

Sharing information and data among U.S. and allied missile defense systems will strengthen 

the combined military coordination necessary to negate missile threats while minimizing gaps 

and seams in U.S. led regional defense architectures. The United States tailors its missile 

defense cooperation strategy and investments to the unique geopolitical situation of our allies 

and partners, and encourages them to invest in missile defense capabilities – sensors, 

interceptors and command and control systems – that can be networked together with U.S. 

systems. 

Importance of Space 

As rogue state missile arsenals develop, space will play a particularly important role in support 

of missile defense. The exploitation of space provides a missile defense posture that is more 

effective, resilient and adaptable to known and unanticipated threats. Space-based sensors, for 

example, can monitor, detect and track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on 

the globe – they enjoy a measure of flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by the 

constraints that geographic limitations impose on terrestrial sensors. 

In addition, unlike land-based sensors, space sensors do not require basing rights or agreements 

with foreign states. This enables them to be placed where necessary to achieve the ideal 

viewing geometry for launch detection, missile tracking, threat discrimination, and intercept 

detection/kill assessment of missile threats to the U.S. homeland, our forces abroad and to 

our allies and partners. Such “birth to death” tracking of incoming missile threats from space 

is extremely advantageous. Missile defense sensors in space also possess inherent capabilities 

for other essential missions, including theater missile warning and technical intelligence. 

The unique benefits and attributes of space sensors, including persistent and global access to 

missiles launched from almost any location, may extend to the basing of defensive interceptors 

in space. For example, the space-basing of interceptors may provide the opportunity to engage 

offensive missiles in their most vulnerable initial boost phase of flight, before they can deploy 
 

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various countermeasures. Space basing may increase the overall likelihood of successfully 

intercepting offensive missiles, reduce the number of U.S. defensive interceptors required to 

do so, and potentially destroy offensive missiles over the attacker’s territory rather than the 

targeted state.

Much has changed since the United States last considered space-based interceptors in a 

potential architecture, including major improvements in technologies applicable to spacebasing and directed energy. Given the rapid advancement and diffusion of offensive missile 

threats and technology, and in response to the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), DoD will undertake a new and near-term examination of the concepts and 

technology for space-based defenses. This examination may include on-orbit experiments and 

demonstrations. New DoD analysis will evaluate the possible effectiveness of space-based 

interceptor technologies and their cost-effectiveness when compared to other systems based 

on land, sea, and in the air. This examination will provide an informed contemporary 

foundation for assessing the technological and operational potential of space-basing in the 

evolving security environment. 

 
 

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IV. U.S. Missile Defense 

Programs and Capabilities 

 

“We are committed to protecting and defending our nation, its warfighters, friends and allies

against all ranges of ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.” 

- Director, Missile Defense Agency, Lt Gen Samuel Greaves, 2018 
 

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Today, the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) provides active defense of the U.S. 

homeland and deployed forces, allies, and partners, particularly against rogue states. The 

BMDS is an integrated, layered ballistic missile defense architecture that provides multiple 

opportunities to destroy missiles and their warheads before they can reach their targets. The 

architecture includes land-, sea-, and space-based elements to track, target, and destroy 

offensive ballistic missiles of different ranges, speeds, and sizes after their launch. Some 

elements of the BMDS also have capabilities to defend against cruise missiles. 

The United States will develop innovative approaches and new technologies that stay ahead of 

the rapid advances in rogue states’ offensive missile threats to the U.S. homeland and provide 

the needed defense against regional missile threats. To do so, DoD will increase investments 

in and deploy new technologies and concepts, and adapt existing weapons systems to field new 

capabilities rapidly at lower cost. In addition, DoD will leverage investments in existing 

defensive systems, and the knowledge gained from prior missile defense research and 

development to expand U.S. defensive capabilities to new domains, achieve greater 

integration, and strengthen U.S. capabilities for attack operations to destroy offensive missiles 

prior to their launch. 

The recent increases in MDA’s budget for active missile defense appear in Figure 19 below. 

Figure 19. Missile Defense Agency Budget. Total Obligation Authority FY 2001 through 2019 actuals. 
 

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U.S. Homeland Defense 

Current Posture 

Defending the U.S. homeland against missile attack helps to deter adversaries, assure allies and 

partners, and provide U.S. leaders with a position of strength to engage adversaries and project 

power in support of national objectives. The United States is protected against a limited ICBM 

attack as a result of investments made in the ground-based, mid-course defense (GMD) 

system, the employment of which is planned and executed by U.S. Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM). The GMD system is designed to defend against a limited ICBM attack 

from rogue states such as North Korea (see Figure 20) and potentially Iran, but in the event of 

conflict, it would be used to defend, to the extent feasible, against a ballistic missile attack 

upon the U.S. homeland from any source. The GMD system engages long-range ballistic 

missiles in the mid-course phase of flight using Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI). This system 

destroys attacking missiles by striking them at high speeds with a kill vehicle. This is referred 

to as “hit-to-kill.” 

Figure 20. North Korean Offensive Missile Range Rings. Provided by the National Air and Space Intelligence 

Center. 
 

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Today’s GMD system consists of a globally-integrated network of sensors, interceptors, and 

command and control centers. Forty GBIs are deployed at Ft. Greely, Alaska, and four at 

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. An extensive network of terrestrial and space-based 

sensors provides launch detection, tracking, and discrimination information to the GMD 

system to enable GBIs to find and destroy their targets. This sensor network includes launch 

detection satellites; the COBRA DANE radar at Shemya, Alaska; Early Warning Radars in 

California, the United Kingdom, and Greenland; forward-based X-band radars in Japan; Aegis 

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) destroyers; and a Sea-Based X-band radar in the Pacific Ocean. 

U.S. military personnel operate the GMD system 24/7 at command and control centers in Ft. 

Greely, Alaska, and Colorado Springs, Colorado. Two existing Early Warning Radars will be 

upgraded for missile defense operations in the near future, one at Clear Air Force Station, 

Alaska and the other in Cape Cod, Massachusetts. DoD is also conducting an analysis-ofalternatives (AoA) to determine how best to modernize the national early warning 

architecture. 

Figure 21. Current Homeland Defense Architecture. 

In addition, DoD is investing in the expansion and modernization of current U.S. homeland 

missile defense capabilities. It is improving the reliability and lethality of current missile 

defense forces and enhancing the ability of U.S. active missile defenses to track, target, and 

destroy adversary offensive missiles with greater precision. DoD is also investing in the 

technology needed to counter advanced offensive missile threats for the next decade. 
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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

These efforts and priorities are reflected in the Administration’s recent budget requests and 

actions. In September 2017, Congress approved a DoD request to reprogram almost $400 

million in FY 2017 funds to provide an initial increase in U.S. near-term capabilities to defend 

against North Korean missile capabilities. Congress appropriated approximately $14 billion 

in FY 2018 for homeland and regional missile defense, including an emergency appropriation 

of $4 billion to further expand and enhance U.S. missile defense capabilities against rogue state 

potential missile threats to the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. 

DoD programs to improve the capability and reliability of the current homeland defense 

system include equipping recently-deployed GBIs with an advanced booster and a more 

capable Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) to improve system reliability and performance. 

Both the upgraded booster and EKV were successfully tested against an ICBM-class target in 

2017. 

DoD is also building a new GBI interceptor field in 

Ft. Greely, Alaska, and will increase the number of 

deployed GBIs from 44 to 64 beginning as early as 

2023. The new GBIs will consist of an upgraded 

booster and will carry a new kill vehicle called the 

Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) that is more 

effective, reliable, and affordable. These new 

interceptors will undergo flight testing prior to 

deployment to demonstrate their improved 

operational capability and reliability. DoD is also 

investing in the infrastructure required to maintain 

the operational fleet of 64 GBIs into the future. 

These improvements will enable the United States to defend against an increased number of 

rogue state ICBMs. 

DoD is also strengthening the performance of existing missile defense sensors and fielding new 

sensors for even greater discrimination capability. The service life of the multi-mission 

COBRA DANE radar will be extended into the next decade and the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) 

radar will receive software upgrades. Software algorithms in existing sensors will be modified 

to improve their discrimination capabilities and their capacity to determine if the attacking 

offensive missile has successfully been destroyed. 

The Long-Range Discrimination Radar under construction at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska, 

is a multi-mission radar that will strengthen U.S. homeland defense and be available in the 

2020 timeframe. This radar will provide persistent long-range mid-course discrimination, 

precision tracking, and hit assessment. Additionally, a homeland defense discrimination radar 

in Hawaii, projected to be operational in the 2023 timeframe, will provide increased 

protection for the defense of Hawaii. The United States also plans to deploy a new missile 

Ground-Based Interceptor
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defense radar in the Pacific region by 2025. Taken together, these enhancements will 

reduce the number of identified offensive targets for each defense interceptor launched, and 

the quantity of interceptors required to ensure intercept, increasing missile defense 

efficiency and effectiveness. 

Sensors used for missile defense increasingly support multiple missions. DoD must work to 

ensure that the necessary command and control relationships exist to support the optimal use 

of these sensors for multiple missions. 

DoD is also investing in and deploying improved capabilities to confirm that a U.S. missile 

defense interceptor has destroyed the attacking warhead, a process called “kill assessment.” 

With the Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) program, DoD is deploying a network of spacebased infrared sensors that will provide an improved kill assessment capability to the missile 

defense system. Adding a reliable post-intercept assessment capability will enable 

USNORTHCOM to examine alternate engagement strategies, such as “shoot-assess-shoot,” 

and will assist in consequence management efforts if needed. A network of SKA sensors will 

be placed on orbit by the end of 2018. 

More complex offensive missile threats to the homeland, such as HGVs and advanced cruise 

missiles, are on the horizon. Early warning, detecting and tracking of emerging HGVs and

advanced cruise missiles that threaten North America are essential to providing timely warning 

of attack to the U.S. leadership. DoD is pursuing enhanced ways and options to collect and

process information from existing space-based and terrestrial sensors to track current and 

emerging cruise missile and HGV threats, and warn of an impending attack. This effort, which 

is now regionally focused, is a first step toward modernizing the U.S. early warning system 

against advanced missile threats to the homeland. Commander U.S. Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM), as DoD Enterprise Lead for Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3), 

shall, in coordination with Air Force and MDA, lead an assessment of the command and control 

capabilities and concepts of operation needed to provide early warning and attack assessment for advanced 

ballistic missile, cruise missile, and HGV threats. This assessment will be delivered to Under Secretary of 

Defense for Research and Engineering (USDR&E), Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP), Director 

Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (CAPE), and the Joint Staff within nine months of the release of 

the MDR. At the completion of the study, Director CAPE will initiate an Analysis of Alternatives for 

materiel solutions to provide early warning and attack assessment against these advanced threats, and 

their integration into the NC3 architecture.

In addition, the United States and Canada will evaluate alternative options jointly to replace 

the North Warning System. This new system will be designed to enhance the U.S. capability 

to maintain effective air surveillance of missile threats approaching North America. 
 

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The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a combined Command of the 

United States and Canada, is responsible for defending key North American targets and vital 

infrastructure against air-breathing threats, including cruise missiles. NORAD is analyzing 

efforts to meet the increasingly sophisticated offensive cruise missile threat to North America. 

NORAD’s efforts will improve defenses in the approaches to North America and within the 

United States and Canada. 

NORAD has a three-phase program to strengthen the defense of North America against cruise 

missiles. Under the first phase now underway, NORAD is improving defensive coverage of 

the National Capital Region (NCR) by incorporating advanced sensors into the existing 

architecture. In Phase 2, also underway, NORAD is expanding surveillance capabilities 

around the NCR. Phase 3, which is in the early planning stages, will incorporate emerging 

technology and explore new options to expand surveillance and tracking of cruise missiles for 

the rest of North America. In addition, NORAD and the U.S. Air Force are upgrading aircraft 

that monitor the U.S. airspace with new sensors capable of tracking and targeting challenging 

offensive air threats like advanced cruise missiles. 

The FY 2017 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to designate a Service or Defense 

Agency with acquisition authority with respect to the capability to defend the homeland against 

offensive cruise missiles. To meet this requirement, the USDR&E and the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition and Sustainment (USDA&S), in coordination with the USDP, and the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), shall recommend the organization to be designated by the Secretary of Defense 

to have this acquisition authority within six months of the release of the MDR. The designated 

organization will be responsible for acquiring U.S. capabilities to defend the homeland against cruise 

missiles using the existing requirements generation process.

Regional and Transregional Missile Defense 

“By working together with allies and partners we amass the greatest possible strength

for the long-term advancement of our interests, maintaining favorable balances of 

power that deter aggression and support the stability that generates economic 

growth. When we pool resources and share responsibility for our common defense, 

our security burden becomes lighter.” 

‐ 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

The United States, allies, and partners face complex regional offensive missile threats. Potential 

adversaries present a broad array of missile threats that, if left unaddressed, would significantly 

undermine the U.S. ability to deter aggression and assure allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle 

East. Defending effectively against these offensive missile threats will help deter adversaries, 

assure allies and partners, provide U.S. leaders with a diplomatic position of strength, and also 

provide the United States with freedom of action to project power in support of national 

objectives. 

Potential adversaries continue to expand the capability and capacity of their regional offensive 

missile inventories. Russia, for example, has developed and fielded ballistic missiles and landattack cruise missiles that can strike targets throughout Eurasia. China has the world’s most 

active ballistic missile development program, and is developing HGVs capable of striking 

targets across multiple regions. The United States will continue to strengthen its efforts to 

deter and counter these rapidly advancing regional offensive missile capabilities, and those of 

North Korea and Iran. 

This increasing global offensive missile threat environment represents a sea-change in the 

operational setting that U.S. forces will have to navigate in future regional conflicts. The 

United States and allies can no longer assume the capacity to concentrate forces in secure, 

forward locations and launch military operations against adversaries from these secure 

locations. When combined with other U.S. capabilities, however, active missile defenses can 

help preserve U.S. and allied freedom of action, limit the potential for coercive adversary 

missile threats, and reduce the effects of potential adversary regional missile strikes. 

Strengthening U.S. regional defenses in this environment is not only an active missile defense 

challenge. Active missile defenses provide U.S. commanders time and space to bring other 

capabilities to bear, but alone are not adequate to enable U.S. or coalition forces to prevail in 

a conflict. Given the existing advantage potential adversaries have with their large inventory 

of missiles relative to our current more limited inventory of active defenses, the United States 

will leverage investments in platforms, weapons, and military expertise to develop 

complementary attack operations to counter growing regional offensive missile threats. 

“We have observed Russia and China operating hypersonic missiles...testing

hypersonic capability”. 

‐ Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, General John Hyten 

34th Space Symposium, April 17, 2018 
 

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Potential adversary offensive missiles may be launched from one geographic region to attack 

targets in a distant region (see Figure 22). U.S. Combatant Commanders will plan and 

conduct active missile defense and attack operations as an overall joint campaign employing 

the full range of U.S. capabilities. To do so, the United States must integrate attack operations, 

active and passive defensive measures, and a common air and missile threat picture. In 

addition, the United States will seek to integrate U.S., allied, and partner capabilities for active 

missile defense and, as appropriate, attack operations capable of striking the entire range of 

infrastructure supporting adversary offensive missile operations. 

Figure 22. Iranian Offensive Missile Range Rings. Provided by the National Air and Space Intelligence 

Center. 

Regional Active Defenses 

The United States currently fields a number of regional active defense systems to intercept 

potential adversary regional offensive missiles, including cruise missiles. U.S. regional active 

missile defense systems that are relocatable and mobile offer the benefit of being able to shift 

locations and regions as needed. Mobile sensors and interceptors can be surged to zones of 

crisis or conflict and, if they are interoperable with allied and partner assets, support combined 

defensive operations. For example, the interoperability of U.S. and Japanese mobile and fixed 

missile defense capabilities enable combined operations in times of crisis or conflict. Mobility 
 

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also makes it more difficult for an adversary to observe the locations of U.S. and allied missile 

defense assets to target them. 

The United States continues to make significant progress in the development, deployment, 

and modernization of regional active missile defense capabilities as summarized below: 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): The 

THAAD system engages SRBMs, MRBMs, and 

IRBMs using hit-to-kill technologies in the terminal 

phase of flight in either the endoatmosphere or the 

exoatmosphere. At this time, the United States 

possesses seven THAAD batteries, including one in 

Guam and one in the Republic of Korea (ROK). 

DoD is continuing to develop software upgrades for 

THAAD to provide advanced capability against 

emerging threats. These activities will enable the 

expansion of both THAAD system interoperability 

with air and missile defense systems and its defended area against future threats. 

The current Army-validated requirement for THAAD was established two decades ago. Given 

missile threat developments since then, the need for THAAD batteries deployed abroad on an 

enduring basis may well demand more than the current force of seven batteries. The U.S. 

Army, Joint Staff, and MDA will prepare a report to be delivered to CJCS, USDR&E, USDA&S, and 

USDP within six months of the release of the MDR that provides a current assessment of the required 

number of THAAD batteries to support needed worldwide THAAD deployments, including potential 

deployment timelines, and basing and deployment options. 

Aegis Sea-based Missile Defense: The Aegis Weapon 

System (AWS) for active missile defense uses the 

SM-3 and SM-6 guided missiles to provide 

protection at sea and ashore against regional ballistic 

missiles. The United States is testing improved 

variants of both the SM-3 and SM-6 missiles and 

fielding a new sensor. These new missiles and sensor 

will significantly increase Aegis missile defense 

capabilities. Multi-mission Aegis BMD-capable 

ships are also highly maneuverable and survivable, 

and will be surged as needed during crisis and 

conflict. 

Today there are 38 operational multi-mission Aegis BMD-capable ships divided between the 

Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, with plans to increase that number to 60 by the end of FY 2023. 

Some of these multi-mission Aegis BMD-capable ships will be upgraded with new software, 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ship 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Launcher 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

and thereby provide greater missile defense capability. The combination of increased ship 

numbers and capability of each ship will result in a more flexible and resilient Aegis force with 

significantly greater missile defense capability. 

Figure 23. Notional Aegis Defensive Areas. Notional depiction of the area that can be defended by Aegis 

vessels. 

The United States and Japan are collaborating closely to develop the SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor, 

which will provide a new missile defense capability against MRBMs and IRBMs. Japan is 

developing key components of the SM-3 Blk IIA. The integration of the SM-3 Blk IIA into 

land- and sea-based platforms will provide greater regional defense coverage against threats to 

U.S. forces, and allies and partners. Initial fielding is planned for the 2018 timeframe. The 

United States will deploy the SM-3 Blk IIA to the fleet and will also deliver this interceptor 

and AWS upgrades to support the U.S. contribution to NATO ballistic missile defense. 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Aegis Ashore is similar to the sea-based version of the AWS and is operated by the U.S. Navy as 

part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). An Aegis Ashore site in Romania is 

operational, armed with the SM-3 interceptor, and provides continuous defense of NATO 

territory against Middle East missile threats. It is currently operating under NATO command 

and control. An Aegis Ashore site in Poland is under construction and will become part of 

NATO ballistic missile defense upon completion. These Aegis Ashore sites will soon be 

equipped with the SM-3 Blk IIA, significantly strengthening their defense of NATO territory. 

Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): The Patriot 

missile defense system has a proven combat 

record, as demonstrated in 2003 during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is capable of 

launching several interceptor variants and is now 

deployed with U.S., allied, and partner forces in 

multiple theaters to defend against SRBMs and 

cruise missiles. Currently, eight battalions with 

33 batteries are stationed in the United States 

while seven battalions with 27 batteries are 

stationed overseas. 

Since the initial deployment of Patriot in 1982, 

the United States has continuously improved the 

system. The original missile designed to engage 

air-breathing threats was redesigned to be effective against short-range ballistic missiles using 

hit-to-kill technologies, which is the Patriot PAC-3 missile that is now deployed globally. The 

latest variant, called Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE), has a more powerful rocket motor 

and larger fins for increased range and lethality. The Patriot radars have been upgraded to 

provide greater power and survivability, and the ground control and launching stations have 

been modified to enable increased operational flexibility. 

The Army continues to make qualitative upgrades to the Patriot system, including the 

development of a new Lower Tier air and missile defense sensor and upgrading older PAC-2 

launchers to enable them to launch newer PAC-3 and MSE missiles. 

 

Patriot System Missile Launcher. 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Figure 24. Current THAAD and Patriot Batteries. THAAD and Patriot Batteries are equipped with a variable 

number of interceptors.

Congress provided funding in FY 2017 and FY 2018 to procure additional GBI, Patriot, 

THAAD and SM-3 interceptors. These missile defense procurements are additive to the 

current program and will increase the growing inventory of U.S. missile defense interceptors 

available in a crisis to protect the U.S. homeland, forces deployed abroad, allies, and partners. 

Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2) Radars: The United 

States has designed and fielded the AN/TPY-2 for ballistic missile defense. The AN/TPY-2 is 

capable of tracking all classes of ballistic missiles and 

identifying small objects at long distances. In the 

forward-based mode, this radar plays a vital role in the 

BMDS by acting as a forward-based sensor, detecting 

ballistic missiles early in their flight and providing 

precise tracking information for use by the system. In 

the terminal mode, the AN/TPY-2 can provide 

surveillance, tracking, discrimination and fire control 

support for THAAD. There are five AN/TPY-2 radars 

deployed to the Indo-Pacific and Southwestern Asia. This capability can quickly detect foreign 

missile launches, helping the U.S. and its allies respond with active missile defenses. 

AN/TPY-2 Transportable Radar 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Figure 25. Select U.S. Missile Defense Assets in 

Europe (2018). 

 Figure 26. Select U.S. Missile 

Defense Assets in East Asia (2018). 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Figure 27. Select U.S. Missile Defense Assets in the Middle East (2018) 

Regional Active Defenses Against Cruise Missile Threats 

The regional U.S. missile defense posture is increasingly flexible and adaptable to meet 

evolving threats and new classes of offensive missiles as they emerge, including advanced, 

extended-range cruise missiles and HGVs. Current cruise missile defense capabilities for 

regional conflict span land, air, and maritime domains. At sea, Aegis platforms are capable of 

intercepting current cruise missile and aircraft threats with the SM-2, SM-6, Evolved Sea 

Sparrow Missile (ESSM), and the Close-In Weapon System. U.S. combat aircraft can 

independently target cruise missiles with Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles 

(AMRAAM) and Sidewinder missiles. 

Army Patriot systems also are capable of intercepting cruise missiles and the Army is 

developing the Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) for additional defense against air 

threats, including cruise missiles. IFPC Increment 1 will include one or more interceptor 

types, a fire control system, and a multi-mission launcher. The Army will explore adding 

more capability in Increment 2, including additional interceptor types.
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Preparing for Emerging Offensive Missile Threats and Uncertainties 

Meeting emerging missile threats and hedging against future uncertainties are essential 

elements of our missile defense strategy. To do so, DoD is taking steps consistent with the 

annual budget process to improve or adapt existing systems, relocate mobile systems, and 

build new systems, including some on a relatively short timeline to counter North Korean and 

potential Iranian ICBM capabilities. These broad efforts reflect DoD’s commitment to 

advanced capabilities and maintaining the science and technology foundation necessary to push 

the boundaries of active missile defense. They will support the goals of staying ahead of rogue 

states’ offensive missile threats to the homeland, meet the diverse range of regional offensive 

missile threats, and contribute to the U.S. capability to hedge against future threats. 

Improve or Adapt Existing Systems 

Today there are 38 operational multi-mission Aegis BMD-capable ships, with plans to increase 

that number to 60 by the end of FY 2023. The Navy and MDA will jointly develop a plan to convert 

all Aegis destroyers to be fully missile defense capable, including against ballistic missiles, within 10 years. 

This plan will be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E, and USDP within six months of the release of the 

MDR.

Figure 28. BMD-Capable Aegis Ship Count. 

“I believe [GMD is] adequate for the threat we face today, but I think that much

more needs to be done for the threat that we’ll face in two to three years.” 

‐ Then-Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, February 14, 2018 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intended as part of the regional missile defense architecture, 

but also has the potential to provide an important “underlay” to existing GBIs for added 

protection against ICBM threats to the homeland. This interceptor has the potential to offer 

an additional defensive capability to ease the burden on the GBI system and provide continuing 

protection for the U.S. homeland against evolving rogue states’ long-range missile capabilities. 

Congress has directed DoD to examine the feasibility of the SM-3 Blk IIA against an ICBMclass target. MDA will test this SM-3 Blk IIA capability in 2020. Due to the mobility of seabased assets, this new underlay capability will be surged in a crisis or conflict to further thicken 

defensive capabilities for the U.S. homeland. Land-based sites in the United States with this 

SM-3 Blk IIA missile could also be pursued. 

U.S. missile defense tracking and discrimination sensors for homeland defense could hedge 

against expected and unanticipated missile threat developments. MDA, in coordination with 

USNORTHCOM, will prepare a plan, to be delivered to the USDR&E and USDP within six months of 

the release of the MDR, to accelerate efforts to enhance missile defense tracking and discrimination sensors, 

to include addressing advanced missile threats. 

Adapting existing capabilities to perform new missions for homeland and regional missile 

defense also will be necessary. The SM-6 guided missile is an example of an existing capability 

originally developed as an air and missile defense weapon, but has since been adapted to also 

perform tactical strike operations. Similarly, existing intelligence-gathering sensors have a 

demonstrated capability to track offensive missiles precisely and may be incorporated into both 

U.S. homeland and regional missile defense architectures. 

DoD’s newest tactical aircraft, the F-35 Lightning II, has a capable sensor system that can 

detect the infrared signature of a boosting missile and its computers can identify the 

threatening missile’s location. The F-35 also can transmit tracking data to the Joint Force for 

network centric warfighting. It can track and destroy adversary cruise missiles today, and, in 

the future, can be equipped with a new or modified interceptor capable of shooting down 

adversary ballistic missiles in their boost phase and could be surged rapidly to hotspots to 

strengthen U.S. active defense capabilities and attack operations. To this end, the U.S. Air Force 

and MDA will deliver a joint report to the USDA&S, USDR&E, USDP, and the CJCS within six months 

of the release of the MDR, on how best to integrate the F-35, including its sensor suite, into the BMDS 

for both regional and homeland defense.

Another repurposing option is to operationalize, either temporarily or permanently, the Aegis 

Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, to strengthen the defense of Hawaii 

against North Korean missile capabilities. DoD will study this possibility to further evaluate 

it as a viable near-term option to enhance the defense of Hawaii. The United States will 

augment the defense of Hawaii in order to stay ahead of any possible North Korean missile 

threat. MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an Emergency Activation 

Plan that would enable the Secretary of Defense to operationalize the Aegis Ashore test site in Kauai within 
 

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30 days of the Secretary’s decision to do so, the steps that would need to be taken, associated costs, and 

personnel requirements. This plan will be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E, and USDP within six months 

of the release of the MDR. 

The Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) program is a 

next generation kinetic kill vehicle for the GBI 

designed to improve the ability to engage ICBM 

warheads, decoys, and countermeasures using a single 

defensive interceptor. While the number of GBIs is 

limited, MOKV could improve the performance of 

the GMD system by increasing the probability of 

successfully intercepting the warhead. 

Relocating Mobile Systems 

DoD will surge missile defense capabilities promptly 

in a crisis or conflict, as needed, and ensure that doing 

so is featured in operational planning. For example, 

Patriot and THAAD systems and multi-mission Aegis 

BMD-capable ships armed with the SM-3 Blk IIA 

interceptor will be moved into position quickly in a 

crisis to strengthen the defense of the homeland 

against rogue state missile threats. Repositioning 

existing sensors, such as an AN/TPY-2 radar or the 

SBX, will enhance radar coverage on short notice by 

strengthening U.S. capabilities to track adversary missile launches. In the future, additional 

missile defense capabilities, such as the F-35 and boost-phase defenses could also contribute to 

U.S. mobile capabilities that will be surged as necessary in crisis or conflict. 

 

Multi-Object Kill Vehicle 

“Pacing the threats we face in the region is not an option in my playbook. 

We must work hard and invest the money to outpace the competition by developing 

and deploying the latest technology...” 

- Then-Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris Statement before the 

House Armed Services Committee, February 14, 2018 

Sea-Based X-Band Radar 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Building New Systems 

The United States may decide to increase further the capacity of the GMD force beyond the 

currently planned force size of 64 GBIs. The missile base in Ft. Greely, Alaska, has the 

potential for up to an additional 40 interceptors. 

Building a new GBI interceptor site in the continental United States is also an option for added 

homeland defense capability. This new site, known as the CONUS Interceptor Site (CIS), 

would add interceptor capability against the potential expansion of missile threats to the 

homeland, including a future Iranian ICBM capability. DoD has already prepared an 

Environmental Impact Statement evaluating candidate locations in the eastern United States. 

The completed Environmental Impact Statement will enable DoD to shorten the deployment 

timeline should the United States determine that threat conditions warrant building a new 

interceptor site. In the event of such a decision, the location selected for the site will be 

informed by multiple pertinent factors at the time. 

Intercepting offensive missiles in their boostphase (before the re-entry vehicle separates 

from the booster) using kinetic interceptors 

and/or directed energy would increase the 

likelihood of successfully countering the 

threat, complicate an aggressor’s attack 

calculus by reducing its confidence in its 

missile attack planning, and reduce the 

number of midcourse or terminal active 

defense interceptors needed to destroy the 

adversary’s remaining offensive missiles. 

Developing scalable, efficient, and compact high energy laser technology, and integrating it 

onto an airborne platform holds the potential to provide a future cost-effective capability to 

destroy boosting missiles in the early part of the trajectory. Doing so would leverage 

technological advances made earlier in DoD’s Airborne Laser Program, including for example 

advances in beam propagation and beam control. MDA is developing a Low-Power Laser 

Demonstrator to evaluate the technologies necessary for mounting a laser on an unmanned 

airborne platform to track and destroy missiles in their boost-phase. 

UAV-mounted lasers for boost phase intercept and 

midcourse tracking 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

In accordance with the FY 2017 NDAA, DoD is preparing a strategic roadmap for the 

development and fielding of directed energy weapons and key enabling capabilities. When 

completed, this roadmap will inform high-energy laser investments in the preparation of the 

President’s Budget Request for FY 2020. 

Given the significant advantages of space-basing for sensors, and potentially interceptors, particularly for 

boost-phase defense, MDA will study development and fielding of a space-based missile intercept layer 

capable of boost-phase defense and provide a report to USDR&E, and USDP within six months after the 

release of the MDR. It will identify the most promising technologies, and estimated schedule, 

cost, and personnel requirements for a possible space-based defensive layer that achieves an 

early operational capability for boost-phase defense. This examination and a boost-phase study 

directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense will inform DoD considerations, including 

budgetary, with regard to the pursuit of a space-based missile intercept layer for boost-phase 

defense. 

DoD also is taking steps to build a new ground-based radar in the Asia-Pacific region to 

strengthen active defense of the homeland against any potential North Korean missile threat. 

In addition, Congress has directed by the end of 2020 DoD will deploy a long-range 

discrimination radar, or other appropriate sensor capability, optimized to defend against 

Iranian missiles. MDA is evaluating the optimal sensor and site. 

DoD is examining the value of existing missile defense systems as well as emerging new 

technologies and concepts for defense against the potential threats posed by adversary HGVs. 

As with defenses against today’s ballistic and cruise missiles, developing the means to defend 

against HGVs deployed regionally will be critical in the future to address concern over the 

erosion of U.S. regional military advantages expressed in the 2018 NDS. 

Building on this success, DoD has established a HGV defense program led by MDA. DoD has 

successfully demonstrated a limited capability to defend against HGVs in the terminal phase, 

and is pursuing new capabilities for early warning and tracking of HGVs. MDA is now 

conducting an AoA to assess defensive architectures to defeat hypersonic threats. Phase one 

of this effort evaluates the efficacy of existing sensors and weapons systems to address this 

“It was feasible to deploy boost-phase defenses, particularly against a nation

with the geography of North Korea, it was feasible many years ago to do it. 

What we have lacked in the missile defense arena, until recently, is the will, not 

the technology and not the means.” 

‐ Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Michael D. Griffin 

Nomination Hearing with the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2018
 

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threat. As required by Sec. 1687 of the FY 2017 NDAA, the Director of MDA is assigned the 

responsibility of Executive Agent for the development of capabilities to counter HGV and 

conventional prompt strike threats. In addition, MDA will provide a plan identifying the resources, 

testing, and personnel requirements necessary for defense against hypersonic threats to USDR&E and 

USDP, within six months of the release of the MDR. MDA will leverage the hypersonic work taking place 

at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the U.S. Air Force.

Space-based sensors provide enhanced capability to track, discriminate, and target more 

complex missile threats and enable more effective and efficient use of interceptors. DoD is 

undertaking initiatives to explore new space sensors to take advantage of the large area 

viewable from space. The wider view from space allows for improved tracking and potentially 

targeting of advanced threats such as HGVs, which fly at lower altitudes than ballistic missiles 

and can maneuver throughout their trajectories to avoid some radar coverages. This capability 

would also provide the ability to track the dim upper stage of some ballistic missiles. This 

capability will be necessary to provide the tracking information needed for defense against 

HGV threats in the future. 

Figure 29. United States Homeland Missile Defense Growth. 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Attack Operations for Missile Defense 

If deterrence and diplomacy fail, and conflict with a rogue state or within a region ensues, U.S. 

attack operations supporting missile defense will degrade, disrupt, or destroy an adversary’s 

missiles before they are launched. Such operations are part of a comprehensive missile defense 

strategy. They help to ensure that the United States has the broadest set of options available 

to counter adversary missile attack. They also increase the effectiveness of active missile 

defenses by reducing the number of adversary missiles to be intercepted. DoD is placing added 

emphasis on the capabilities needed for such attack operations. 

Congress approved additional funding in FY 2017 and FY 2018 focused on the North Korean 

missile threat. More than $700 million of these funds were for new or ongoing capabilities to 

rapidly locate, target, and destroy North Korea’s mobile missiles and for use in other regional 

operations. The President designated this added funding, reflecting the Administration’s 

commitment to rapidly and effectively address the North Korean missile capabilities. 

This funding request is a beginning. DoD will sustain investments in the capabilities necessary 

for attack operations, such as improved attack warning intelligence, ISR, time-sensitive 

targeting, as well as the long-range precision and prompt strike capabilities necessary for 

destroying mobile missiles prior to their launch. To this end, DoD will continue to investigate 

options to promptly strike fleeting targets at stand-off ranges, including currently available 

capabilities and new concepts. 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

V. Missile Defense Management 

and Testing 

 

“As adversaries continue to pursue credible and advanced capabilities, we too must evolve

our missile defense capabilities to outpace increasingly complex threats...Foundational to 

our confidence in the Ballistic Missile Defense System, and how we operationally employ it, 

are robust test and sustainment programs.” 

- Then-Commander, U.S. Northern Command, 

General Lori Robinson, Statement before the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services, April 6, 2017 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

In 2002, then-Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, changed the name of the Ballistic 

Missile Defense Organization to the Missile Defense Agency, and directed it to develop and 

field a layered missile defense system to meet the emerging rogue state ballistic missile threat. 

The then-Secretary directed MDA to use flexible acquisition approaches to develop capabilities 

quickly, and directed the Services to field missile defense elements as soon as practicable. This 

decision to pursue missile defense systems on an accelerated timeline meant that the United 

States had an initial operational homeland missile defense system in place by the fall of 2004, 

prior to North Korea’s Taepodong-2 missile test in 2006. 

Accelerate Missile Defense Acquisition Timelines 

As discussed in the 2018 NDS, given the challenging and dynamic missile threat environment, 

DoD must prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent modular 

upgrades, and deliver enhanced performance at the speed of relevance. To do so, DoD must 

adopt processes and cultures that enable MDA and the Services to deliver missile defense 

capabilities faster, learn from failure and rapidly adjust, and swiftly adapt systems once fielded. 

DoD cannot meet this goal by returning MDA to the standard acquisition and requirements 

generation processes. DoD must instead continue to streamline and refine acquisition 

processes and ensure flexibility in the development, testing, and fielding of missile defenses. 

Services and Combatant Commanders should be involved early in the missile defense capability 

development process to identify needed system performance requirements and to establish the 

conditions and timeline for transferring programs from MDA to a Service. Missile defense 

requirements are determined through the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP). The WIP 

effectively sets initial capability standards and engages the participation of warfighters early 

and throughout the development process. To ensure that Service and Combatant Commanders 

involvement occurs as early as possible in the capabilities development process, USDR&E, USDA&S, USDP 

and CJCS, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), will review the 

current process within six months of the release of the MDR and determine if there is a need for 

improvements to this process.

Potential adversaries have missiles that can be launched in one geographic region and threaten 

U.S. interests and territory in another, even distant region. As these transregional threats 

evolve, U.S. missile defense planning will be global in nature and coordinated across 

geographic combatant commands. Today, multiple regional Combatant Commanders are 

involved in defending against transregional missile threats. In times of escalating tensions or 

conflict, allocation of limited missile defense resources and prioritization of missile defense 

efforts across regions must occur rapidly and effectively. DoD must ensure the management 

and testing of these programs is aligned with policy objectives and supports operational needs 

in a timely manner. Missile defense roles, responsibilities, and authorities must be clearly 

aligned to achieve greater optimization and integration of U.S. missile defense capabilities. 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Therefore, the CJCS in coordination with the Commander, USSTRATCOM, in accordance with Strategic 

Command’s missile defense responsibilities under the Unified Command Plan; the USDP; and other 

Combatant Commanders, will examine and make recommendations regarding optimal roles, 

responsibilities, and authorities for achieving greater transregional missile defense integration within six 

months of the release of the MDR.

Managing Pre-Launch Attack Operations Capabilities 

The FY 2017 NDAA contains a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to designate a Service 

or Defense Agency with acquisition authority pertaining to pre-launch attack operations 

capabilities for missile defense. To ensure institutional focus on the resources, technologies, 

and capabilities needed to provide more effective and lethal attack operations, DoD will 

examine and clarify roles and responsibilities among its components and identify an entity to 

take lead responsibility for attack operations capability development, employment concepts, 

and operational integration. USDR&E, USDP, and the CJCS, in coordination with the Commander 

USSTRATCOM, will identify the organization to take this lead responsibility and report their 

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense within six months after the release of the MDR. The 

organization so designated will work with the Joint Staff, Services, and Combatant Commanders to review 

and update, where required, operational doctrine regarding the role of pre-launch attack operations in 

Joint IAMD doctrine. 

Rigorous Testing 

Rigorous testing is a DoD priority because testing is a crucial part of the development and 

fielding of effective missile defense capabilities. DoD and MDA will respond to the 

increasingly sophisticated offensive missile threat to the United States, allies, and partners with 

a rigorous test program that enables us to counter evolving offensive missile threats, to include 

increasing the frequency of test events given the speed of adversary innovation. 

Ground and flight tests provide data needed for highly advanced modeling and simulation 

activities that allows DoD to measure and predict the performance of all missile defense 

technologies. They provide learning opportunities to characterize and potentially optimize 

the performance of each element. Successful flight tests in particular give the U.S. military 

greater confidence in the system’s capabilities. Testing new missile defense capabilities is 

essential to characterize performance and demonstrate reliability in support of the fielding of 

effective, suitable, and survivable missile defense systems. 

MDA’s test program provides critical data to demonstrate the operational effectiveness, 

suitability, survivability and security of the BMDS elements. Successful testing can also 

contribute to both deterrence and U.S. nonproliferation goals by sending a very credible 

message to the international community of our ability to intercept ballistic missiles in flight, 
 

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thus reducing their value to potential adversaries. Even tests that are not fully successful may 

be useful by providing valuable information to assess the performance of the system. We must 

not fear test failure, but learn from it and rapidly adjust. 

The MDA’s missile defense test program uses cost effective models and simulations in all 

aspects of testing. Models and simulations allow repeated assessments of performance, 

provide a statistical determination of effectiveness, and satisfy assessment objectives that 

cannot be accomplished in ground or flight tests due to safety issues and cost constraints. 

Missile defense tests are planned and conducted in partnership with the Director of 

Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), the Director of Developmental Test and 

Evaluation, and with the Army, Navy, and Air Force Operational Test Agencies to embed 

operational test and military requirements in the test program. The U.S military, which 

operates the deployed system, ensures that tests use operational doctrine and real world 

constraints while evaluating new concepts of operations and exercising tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. Testing provides U.S. military commanders with confidence in the basic design 

of the BMDS, its hit-to-kill effectiveness, and its inherent operational capability and value. 

MDA will use consistent, disciplined, and collaborative engineering and test processes to 

ensure all missile defense capabilities are rigorously tested in ground tests and flight tests. It 

will employ accredited modeling and simulation to support testing and produce operationally 

realistic assessments of BMDS performance. MDA, in coordination with DOT&E and 

Combatant Commanders, will annually update and execute a test program that supports 

military assessment needs and MDA program decisions. Finally, MDA will annually evaluate 

software and algorithms to meet the increasingly complex and maneuverable flight paths of 

potential adversary missiles, updating them as necessary. 

. 
 

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VI. Working With Allies 

and Partners 

 

“There are two things that make the United States’ military unique and make us able to say

we have a competitive advantage. The first is at the strategic level and it’s the network of 

allies and partners that we have around the world and we’ve built up since World War II.” 

- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

General Joseph Dunford, July 22, 2017 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

The 2018 NDS affirms that alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. security, providing a 

durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match. It states, “By 

working together with allies and partners, we amass the greatest possible strength for the longterm advancement of our interests, maintaining favorable balances of power that deter 

aggression and support the stability that generates economic growth.” 

As offensive missile capabilities continue to proliferate, missile defense cooperation has gained 

increasing importance. The United States will pursue cooperative relations with allies and 

partners to reinforce and advance missile defense architectures for our common protection, 

deterrence, and assurance. This cooperation will focus on expanding opportunities for 

collaboration on missile defense programs, deepening interoperability in missile defense 

systems and operations, expanding burden sharing among the United States and its allies and 

partners to confront shared threats, and limiting the proliferation of advanced offensive missile 

technologies and components. Together, these efforts will enhance our defenses against 

regional offensive missile threats by leveraging our joint contributions to effectively expand 

our defensive capabilities. 

As is emphasized in the 2017 NSS, strengthening our alliances and long-term security 

partnerships in these key regions is a top U.S. priority. 

Indo-Pacific 

The cornerstone of our security and diplomacy in Indo-Pacific region is our strong bilateral 

alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, and emerging security relationships with 

others such as India. Japan and South Korea are each working with the United States to build 

missile defense systems that are increasingly interoperable with U.S. defenses and increasingly 

capable against offensive missile threats and coercion. This cooperation includes bilateral 

missile defense training exercises with the United States. 

“It is not an exaggeration to say that the security environment surrounding

Japan is at its severest since World War Two. I will protect the people’s lives 

and peaceful living in any situation.” 

‐ Prime Minister, Japan, Shinzo Abe 

New Year’s News Conference, 2018 

“I highly appreciate the fact that President Trump has made clear that the 

United States will take every necessary measure to protect its allies...” 

‐ Prime Minister, Japan, Shinzo Abe, 2017
 

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Japan is one of our strongest missile defense partners, and 

works together with the United States to strengthen 

cooperative missile defenses against regional missile threats. 

Japan’s current layered ballistic missile defense system 

includes Aegis BMD ships with SM-3 interceptors, PAC-3 

batteries, early warning radars, and command and control 

systems. It is also expanding its missile defense capability by 

upgrading additional ATAGO-class Aegis destroyers to BMD 

capability with certification scheduled for FY 2019 and is 

building additional Aegis BMD ships, which would increase its 

inventory of BMD-capable ships. Two Aegis Ashore systems 

are also scheduled for fielding in the 2023 timeframe which 

will add to Japan’s layered defense posture and provide 

greater flexibility in deploying mobile missile defense 

systems. As noted earlier, one of the most significant 

cooperative efforts with Japan, and an example of mutually 

beneficial burden sharing, is the co-development of an 

advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3 Blk IIA. 

Japan also hosts two U.S. AN/TPY-2 X-Band radars that are 

fully interoperable in a manner that supports both Japanese and U.S. regional missile defense 

operations as well as U.S. homeland missile defense. 

To strengthen defense against potential offensive missile threats, South Korea is enhancing its 

sea- and land-based ballistic missile defense systems. DoD is working with South Korea to 

upgrade its PAC-2 batteries to the more advanced PAC-3 system. We are also examining 

together how South Korea’s future active 

missile defense systems can be capable of 

operating with U.S. systems to defend South 

Korean territory. South Korea and the U.S. 

already share warning data from their 

respective ground- and space-based sensors in 

accordance with an agreement concluded on 

data sharing. 

The United States and South Korea also have 

recently taken steps to strengthen missile 

defense of the Korean Peninsula. In 2017, 

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command implemented the 

joint U.S.-South Korean decision to deploy a 

THAAD battery to South Korean territory to 

The first elements of the Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense (THAAD) system arriving in the ROK, fulfilling 

the Republic of Korea - U.S. Alliance decision to install a 

THAAD system on the Korean Peninsula. (Seventh Air 

Force Public Affairs photo) 

Japan destroyer JS ATAGO (DDG177) launches a Standard Missile -3 

Block IB Threat Upgrade during Japan 

Flight Test Mission-05, September 

12, 2018. (Missile Defense Agency 

photo) 
 

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complement U.S. PAC-3 units already on the peninsula. This adds an important new layer to 

defend against missile attack. 

In addition, the United States and Australia are long-term allies with a history of close missile 

defense consultation. Annual discussions on missile defense offer new possibilities for bilateral 

cooperation as the offensive missile threats in the region expand and threaten deployed military 

forces. New areas of focus include joint examination of the challenges posed by advanced 

missile threats. Australia also participates in a trilateral discussion on missile defense with the 

United States and Japan. 

Figure 30. Select Foreign Missile Defense Assets in East Asia (2018).  

 
 

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Europe and NATO 

Missile defense plays a critical role in NATO’s defense of Europe from coercion and 

aggression. Interoperable NATO active missile defense systems will improve the Alliance’s 

collective defense capabilities. 

The United States is committed to 

completing the deployment of EPAA, which 

is the U.S. contribution to NATO ballistic 

missile defense. EPAA has three phases 

intended to address threats to NATO Europe 

originating from Iran. EPAA Phase 1 and 

Phase 2 include the stationing of four multimission Aegis BMD-capable ships in Rota, 

Spain, positioning of a forward-based 

AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey, and deployment 

of the first operational Aegis Ashore system in 

Romania, equipped with the SM-3 Blk IB 

interceptor. Implementation of Phase 3 of 

EPAA, which features an Aegis Ashore system 

in Poland, is underway. Using the SM-3 Blk 

IIA missile, it will expand defensive coverage 

against medium- and intermediate-range 

ballistic missile threats. 

Naval Support Facility Poland – Construction. European 

Phased Adaptive Approach Phase 3 will enhance the 

defensive coverage against medium- and intermediate-range 

threats will be enhanced with the delivery of an Aegis Ashore 

capability to Poland. The ground-breaking ceremony for 

Aegis Ashore-Poland was conducted on May 13, 2016. On 

October 1, 2016, Naval Support Facility (NSF) Redzikowo, 

Poland was established. (Missile Defense Agency photo)

“We will work with NATO to improve its integrated air and missile defense capabilities

to counter existing and projected ballistic and cruise missile threats, particularly from 

Iran.” 

‐ 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

 

NATO Missile Defense Progress 

“Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies’ forces, territory and populations. Missile defence 

forms part of a broader response to counter this threat... Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied 

security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session to develop options for a comprehensive 

missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the 

United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision.” 

‐ 2008 Bucharest Summit 

“As missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat, we have decided that the Alliance will 

develop a missile defence capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. The aim of a NATO missile defence 

capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against 

the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles...” 

‐ 2010 Lisbon Summit 

“We are pleased today to declare that the Alliance has achieved an Interim NATO BMD Capability. It will provide 

with immediate effect an operationally significant first step, consistent with our Lisbon decision, offering the 

maximum coverage within available means, to defend our populations, territory and forces across southern NATO 

Europe against a ballistic missile attack.” 

‐ 2012 Chicago Summit 

“The threat to NATO populations, territory, and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles continues to 

increase and missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter it...Missile defence will become an integral 

part of the Alliance’s overall defence posture and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.” 

“Today we are also pleased to note that additional voluntary national contributions have been offered, and that 

several Allies are developing, including through multinational cooperation, or are acquiring further BMD capabilities 

that could become available to the Alliance. Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD 

that can provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces.” 

‐ 2014 Wales Summit 

“As a means to prevent conflict and war, credible deterrence and defense is essential and will continue to be based on 

an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities.” 

“Russian statements threatening to target Allies because of NATO BMD are unacceptable and counterproductive.” 

‐ 2018 Brussels Summit 
 

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In addition to these EPAA capabilities against medium- and intermediate-range threats, 

individual NATO Allies are also fielding national air and missile defense systems designed to 

defend against shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles. These allied active defenses could 

play a crucial role in countering missile strikes that underpin potential adversaries’ A2/AD 

operations. The United States will encourage NATO Allies to improve their missile defense 

capabilities by investing in interceptors and sensors, expanding data sharing and integration, 

and taking other appropriate steps to counter existing and projected ballistic and cruise missile 

threats. 

There has been recent progress in this regard; Spain, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands have 

deployed missile defense systems to Turkey in response to the ongoing Middle East conflict. 

Spain is also strengthening its air and missile defense capabilities by acquiring additional Patriot 

systems from Germany. In addition to hosting an Aegis Ashore site, in November 2017 

Romania signed an agreement to acquire the Patriot system, Phase One of which is valued at 

$756 million. In addition, in March 2018 Poland signed an agreement valued at $4.75 billion 

to acquire Patriot systems. Several NATO Allies also have modern surface combatant ships 

that are being equipped with BMD sensors and, in the future, may be equipped with 

interceptor capability upgrades. The Netherlands, for example, is upgrading the SMART-L 

radars on four of its frigates. Denmark, in addition to hosting an Upgraded Early Warning 

Radar (UEWR) in Greenland, has committed to develop a sea-based sensor that could 

contribute to NATO missile defense capabilities. 

In its 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the United Kingdom (UK) committed to invest 

in a ground-based radar for ballistic missile defense and has participated in ballistic missile 

defense tests using its Type 45 destroyer. In addition, the UK’s Fylingdales UEWR, an 

element of the U.S. homeland missile defense system and a key component of U.S. capabilities 

to counter potential Iranian long-range missile threats, is manned and operated almost 

exclusively by UK personnel. France, in cooperation with Italy, has developed the SAMP/T 

air and missile defense system, which was fielded in 2013, and could potentially be offered to 

support NATO missile defense. France also is planning to develop a long-range radar to 

contribute to NATO territorial missile defense. Additionally, France and Italy have developed 

the sea-based Principal Anti-Air Missile System (PAAMS), a European equivalent to Aegis. 

The Alliance is also making progress towards enhanced missile defense interoperability among 

national systems and integration of missile warning to support combined missile defense 

operations. NATO’s BMD Operations Center (BMDOC) at Ramstein Air Force Base is now 

NATO’s Command and Control center for missile defense and links national BMD assets 

together. As allies acquire and field additional missile defense systems in the future, the 

BMDOC will facilitate a “deepening of interoperability” allowing the Alliance’s forces to act 

together more coherently and effectively to counter missile strikes. 
 

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In October 2017, a sub-set of NATO nations, the 

Maritime Missile Defense Forum, conducted 

Formidable Shield 17, the purpose of which was 

to improve allied interoperability in a live-fire 

IAMD environment using NATO command and 

control reporting structures. The UK hosted this 

exercise. Other participants included Canada, 

France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 

and the United States. It involved live-fire 

launches of the SM-2, SM-3, and ESSM. 

Formidable Shield 17 broke new ground 

enhancing NATO’s ability to integrate IAMD 

capabilities and operations. 

Figure 31. Select Foreign Missile Defense Assets in Europe (2018). 

Allied ships participating FS17. In October 2017, 

NATO Allies conducted Formidable Shield (FS)-17 at 

the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Hebrides 

Range in Scotland. This exercise included a successful 

intercept test of an SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade 

(TU) missile against an MRBM target, fired from an 

Aegis BMD destroyer. (U.S. Navy Sixth Fleet photo) 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

The Middle East – Gulf Cooperation Council 

The United States is working closely with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners to 

encourage them to acquire and deploy missile defense capabilities that, when integrated over 

time, would provide the basis for a networked, layered defense across the region. Indeed, the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE) has procured the THAAD system to complement its earlier 

purchase of Patriot systems. Saudi Arabia and the United States are negotiating a potential 

THAAD Foreign Military Sales agreement. Saudi Arabia is also in the process of upgrading its 

existing Patriot batteries to the PAC-3 configuration, and is pursuing additional air and missile 

defense capability. Kuwait is acquiring Patriot PAC-3 batteries and Qatar is expected to field 

the Patriot system in 2018 or early 2019. UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait all have successful 

combat experience with the Patriot system. 

U.S. Central Command maintains a series of regular engagements with GCC air and missile 

defense forces. These important exchanges are establishing the foundation for joint missile 

defense planning and operational cooperation. GCC investments and participation in these 

exchanges are a positive trend and will be expanded, particularly with respect to missile 

defense interoperability and information sharing among GCC partners. 

 

Middle East: “We will help partners procure interoperable missile defense and other

capabilities to better defend against active missile threats.” 

‐ 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 

“The conflict in Yemen has opened opportunities for Iran, which continues to provide 

support to the Houthis with the aim of building a proxy to pressure the Saudi-led coalition 

and expand its sphere of influence. This support enabled the Houthis to launch missiles at 

Saudi Arabian and Emirati cities and target ships in the Bab al Mandab and Red Sea on 

multiple occasions in the last year, threatening Americans and our partners and raising the 

risk of broader regional conflict.” 

‐ Commander, U.S. Central Command, General Joseph Votel 

Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 

February 27, 2017 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Figure 32. Select Foreign Missile Defense Assets in the Middle East (2018). 

The Middle East – Israel 

The United States will sustain its strong missile defense partnership with Israel, underpinned 

by a new U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that includes a commitment of 

$500 million for Israeli missile defense each year beginning in FY 2019 through FY 2028. 

Under this MOU, DoD will sustain extensive cooperation with Israel and seek increased 

opportunities to take advantage of Israeli research and development efforts for similar U.S. 

defense missions. U.S. longstanding support of Israeli ballistic missile defense programs now 

includes co-development and co-production of the David's Sling and Arrow-3 missile defense 

systems. DoD also continues to support co-production efforts for the Iron Dome program to 

provide critical defense against short-range rocket, artillery, and mortar attack. Taking 

advantage of various opportunities to conduct bilateral exercises, such as JUNIPER COBRA, 

the United States and Israel continue to improve their capability to cooperate operationally to 

address offensive missile threats in the region. 
 

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MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

Figure 33. Select Foreign Active Missile Defense Assets (2018). 

“With its population centers exposed to rocket attacks and with diplomacy

achieving only shaky, short-lived cease fires, Israel had no other response option 

except escalation. The need for an alternative, non-escalatory strategy became 

obvious to Israeli planners in the mid-1990s.” 

‐ Former Director of the Israeli Missile Defense Organization, Uzi Rubin, 2018 
 

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South Asia 

The threats posed by offensive missile capabilities are no longer limited to a few regions around 

the world. There are now a number of states in South Asia that are developing an advanced 

and diverse range of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities. Within this context, the United 

States has discussed potential missile defense cooperation with India. This is a natural 

outgrowth of India’s status as a Major Defense Partner and key element of our Indo-Pacific 

Strategy. 

North America 

Since NORAD’s establishment in 1958, significant progress has been made toward countering 

evolving air and missile threats to the United States and Canada. NORAD routinely maintains 

forces on alert for homeland air defense, including cruise missile defense. The United States 

will continue to work with Canada to modernize NORAD’s ability to detect, track, warn, and 

defend against air-breathing threats, including advanced cruise missiles. The United States and 

Canada are conducting a joint examination of options to renew or replace the North Warning 

System, a bilateral integrated network, and adapt this capability to new threats. 

“U.S. advantages are shrinking as rival states modernize and build up their

conventional and nuclear forces. Many actors can now field a broad arsenal of 

advanced missiles, including variants that can reach the American homeland.” 

- 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 

“We will deepen our strategic partnership with India and support its leadership role in

Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region.” 

- 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
 

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Allied and Partner Interoperability 

The United States will pursue enhanced missile 

defense cooperation with allies and partners, 

place a renewed emphasis on interoperability, 

and seek to integrate capabilities as appropriate. 

Successfully operating in today’s complex 

missile threat environment demands that we 

detect launches as soon as possible, track them, 

and intercept them as early in flight as feasible. 

This requires interoperability among various 

missile defense capabilities, to include 

command and control networks, sensors, and 

IAMD systems. Moving towards networks of 

interoperable IAMD systems can take 

advantage of cost-sharing and help distribute 

the burden of defense to better address 

adversary A2/AD strategies. 

For our common defense, DoD will encourage allies and partners to invest in their own air 

and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with U.S. capabilities. DoD will also 

prioritize requests for U.S. military equipment sales, accelerating foreign partner 

modernization, and the ability to integrate with U.S. forces. The United States has already 

taken steps to streamline procedures for our allies and partners to acquire U.S. defense 

capabilities. 

Additionally, information-sharing is critical to this undertaking. The United States is currently 

sharing early warning missile threat information derived from the U.S. missile warning 

satellite system with dozens of allies and partners. Data and security standards for indigenous 

allied and partner missile defense systems 

must permit operational integration and 

improve collective defense against missile 

threats. 

Another important component of building a 

more effective networked missile defense 

posture involves combined U.S., allied, and 

partner missile defense training and exercises, 

and greater allied and partner participation in 

U.S. missile defense tests. These activities 

will foster greater confidence in missile 

defense systems and create opportunities for 

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS 

Barry (DDG 52) transits past Mt. Fuji as it arrives at Fleet 

Activities Yokosuka in Japan. (U.S. Navy photo) 

Senior Leaders gathered at the NATO headquarters in 

Brussels, Belgium, on September 12-13, 2018 to collaborate 

on the NIMBLE TITAN 18 integrated air and missile defense 

campaign of experimentation. (NATO photo)
 

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further cooperation. Events such as U.S. Strategic Command’s NIMBLE TITAN series – with 

participants from 24 countries and four international organizations – are an important means 

to advance multinational collaboration, including in the experimentation of operational 

integration concepts to enhance deterrence and defense against missile attacks. 

 

“Our allies and partners multiply our capabilities. We are much greater than

the sum of our parts.” 

‐ Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Paul Selva, 

National Defense University, June 7, 2018 
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VII. Conclusion

For the past 16 years, the United States has devoted significant effort to developing and 

deploying a layered missile defense system. The U.S. BMDS must be continuously 

strengthened and expanded given the growing challenges posed by potential adversaries who 

are contesting the established international order and deploying greater numbers of 

increasingly sophisticated offensive missiles. Moving forward, the United States, allies and 

partners will pursue a comprehensive missile defense strategy that will deliver integrated and 

effective capabilities to counter ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats. 

Increased U.S., allied, and partner missile defense investments and integration will counter 

potential adversaries’ offensive missile capabilities now and into the future. Doing so will 

sustain and strengthen our capabilities to protect the homeland, deter adversaries, assure allies 

and partners, hedge against future threats in all domains, and project power in support of 

national objectives. It also provides U.S. leaders with a position of strength in their diplomatic 

engagements to reduce tensions and limit security challenges. 

This 2019 MDR establishes a policy framework for U.S. missile defense that is responsive to 

new and anticipated threats, and exploits new approaches to the defensive mission. This 

framework emphasizes the priority of protection for the American homeland against emerging 

and future rogue states’ missile threats, in addition to robust regional missile defense for U.S. 

forces abroad, allies, and partners against all potential adversaries. The emphasis on protection 

of the U.S. homeland is an imperative given existing rogue state ICBM capabilities, and the 

challenge they could otherwise pose to U.S. capabilities to defend the homeland, deter attacks, 

and assure allies. 

While the United States today is postured to counter a number of rogue state offensive ballistic 

missiles directed against the homeland, to stay ahead of the possible evolution of these threats 

requires a concerted effort to develop and field increasingly advanced and effective homeland 

defense capabilities. Doing so will provide needed protection for the American people, help

deter coercive nuclear threats, and provide continued U.S. diplomatic strength. It will also 

provide a measure of protection against the prospect of accidental or unauthorized missile 

launch by potential adversaries. 

Increasingly effective regional missile defense will contribute to the defense and assurance of 

allies and partners. It will enable the United States to project power into contested 

environments in support of allies and partners by integrating the full range of U.S., allied and 

partner military capabilities to defeat adversary A2/AD goals. Leveraging allied and partner 

capabilities through the sharing of information, burden sharing, and coordinated command and 

control will increase overall missile defense effectiveness. 

This 2019 MDR adopts a balanced and integrated approach to countering missile threats 
 

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through a combination of deterrence, active and passive missile defenses, and attack 

operations. The goal is to provide the optimal mix of capabilities to protect against the 

spectrum of increasingly lethal and complex missile threats. Toward this end, the United 

States will: 

 Examine, develop, and exploit advanced and innovative missile defense concepts and 

technologies, including advanced technologies for boost-phase defense, to stay ahead of 

growing offensive missile threats, including cruise and hypersonic missiles; 

 Place greater emphasis on countering a regional adversary’s missiles prior to launch in the 

event deterrence fails and conflict ensues, in order to enhance overall regional missile 

defense effectiveness, and advance a more comprehensive and balanced approach to the 

missile defense mission; 

 Develop and field missile defenses on a timeline to stay ahead of current and emerging 

threats; 

 Strengthen the integration of U.S. homeland and regional missile defense capabilities, active 

defenses and attack operations, as well as the interoperability of U.S., allied, and partner 

missile defense systems; 

 Strengthen regional defenses that protect U.S. Allies, partners, and deployed forces, against 

offensive missile threats from any source; 

 Strengthen cooperative relationships with allies and partners to better address a more 

challenging and dynamic offensive missile threat environment; and 

 Ensure missile defense programs are rigorously tested, and that the management of these 

programs enables DoD to shorten the time required to field improved and new capabilities. 

The United States, allies, and partners have made great progress in our missile defense 

programs over the past 16 years since U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002. This 

progress has enabled the United States, allies, and partners to field defensive systems with 

significant capabilities, including the U.S. capability to defend the homeland against today’s 

offensive missile threat from rogue states. It has strengthened and expanded the space-basing 

of sensors for active missile defense. 

These advancements have enabled the continued improvement in U.S., allied, and partner 

missile defense performance and affordability. With further planned investments, these 

improvements will continue well into the future. 

It is a strategic imperative that the United States, allies, and partners continue to make further 

strides in the development, testing, fielding, and integration of our missile defense capabilities 

to address today’s expanding offensive missile threats, and to hedge against future risks. 

Effectively doing so will require innovation, improved collaboration, and a fusion of offense 

and defense capabilities across the Joint and allied force. The men and women of the Defense 

Department and our Armed Forces stand ready to meet this challenge, both today and in the 

future. 
 

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