[Cite as State v. Brewer, 2020-Ohio-881.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

 : Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

BRADLEY L. BREWER : Case No. 2019 CA 0044 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 2018-CR-0998 N 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: March 6, 2020 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

JOSEPH C. SNYDER R. JOSHUA BROWN 

38 South Park Street 32 Lutz Avenue 

Mansfield, OH 44902 Lexington, OH 44904 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0044 2 

Wise, Earle, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Bradley Brewer, appeals his May 2, 2019 conviction 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio. Plaintiff-Appellee is state of 

Ohio. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} On November 6, 2018, appellant's adult son was out with three friends from 

work. He had an 11:30 curfew. A few minutes past curfew, appellant texted his son and 

told him to return home. The three friends drove him home. Upon arriving at the home, 

one of the friends attempted to speak with appellant. Appellant yelled at the friend and 

told all three friends to get off the property. The friends returned to the vehicle and parked 

in the alleyway adjacent to the home, as they were concerned for their friend. 

{¶ 3} Eventually an altercation occurred between appellant and his son. The son 

got into the vehicle with his friends and one of the friends called the police. Responding 

to the scene was Mansfield Police Patrolman Paul Webb. He spoke with the son and his 

friends out on the street. He then approached the house and attempted to speak with 

appellant, but appellant was handling his dog, Jax. Patrolman Webb instructed appellant 

to not release the dog. The dog got free and lunged at Officer Webb three times, one 

time biting his right shoulder. Patrolman Webb fired his gun, striking the dog two times. 

The dog survived. 

{¶ 4} Patrolman Webb and another officer that had arrived on the scene 

attempted to arrest appellant, but appellant resisted and punched Patrolman Webb. 

Eventually the officers were able to handcuff appellant and place him under arrest. 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0044 3 

{¶ 5} On December 11, 2018, the Richland County Grand Jury indicted appellant 

on two counts of felonious assault in the first degree in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) 

and (2), one count of assault in the fourth degree in violation of R.C. 2903.13, and one 

count of obstructing official business in the fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2921.31. The 

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) felonious assault count was later amended to attempted felonious 

assault in the second degree. 

{¶ 6} A jury trial commenced on April 2, 2019. At the end of the trial, appellant 

moved for a Crim.R. 29 acquittal of the R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) felonious assault count. The 

trial court denied the motion. The jury found appellant guilty as charged. By sentencing 

entry filed May 2, 2019, the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of four 

years in prison. 

{¶ 7} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for 

consideration. Assignment of error is as follows: 

I 

{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION 

FOR ACQUITTAL." 

I 

{¶ 9} In his sole assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in 

denying his motion for acquittal. We disagree. 

{¶ 10} Crim.R. 29 governs motion for acquittal. Subsection (A) states the 

following: 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0044 4 

 The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the 

evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of 

acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or 

complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such 

offense or offenses. The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for 

judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's case. 

{¶ 11} The standard to be employed by a trial court in determining a Crim.R. 29 

motion is set out in State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261, 381 N.E.2d 184 (1978), 

syllabus: "Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of 

acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as 

to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt." 

{¶ 12} Appellant challenges his conviction of felonious assault in the first degree 

in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) which states: "No person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause 

or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another's unborn by means of a deadly 

weapon or dangerous ordnance." "Deadly weapon" as defined in R.C. 2923.11(A) 

"means any instrument, device, or thing capable of inflicting death, and designed or 

specially adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as a weapon." 

"Whether a weapon constitutes a deadly weapon depends on the facts and circumstances 

of each particular case." In re Fortney, 162 Ohio App.3d 170, 2005-Ohio-3618, 832 

N.E.2d 1257 (4th Dist.), ¶ 38. Dogs have been determined to be "deadly weapons" given 

the facts and circumstances of the case. State v. Vinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 87056, 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0044 5 

87058, 87060, 2006-Ohio-3971; State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83402, 2004-

Ohio-4085. 

{¶ 13} Appellant argues his dog does not constitute a deadly weapon as defined 

in R.C. 2923.11(A) because no evidence was presented that Jax was trained to be an 

attack dog, kept as an attack dog, or had previously attacked anyone upon command. 

{¶ 14} After driving the son home, the three friends got out of the vehicle and one 

of them attempted to speak with appellant who was standing outside. T. at 380-381. 

Appellant ordered the three friends off his property, and threatened to go get Jax. T. at 

385, 477-478, 564-566. They were scared because the dog was "known to be vicious." 

T. at 385, 478, 568-569. Jax is a "shepherd/rot mix." T. at 828. The three friends testified 

Jax was an aggressive dog, not playful or friendly. T. at 366-368, 472-473, 565-566. 

{¶ 15} After Patrolman Webb arrived, he spoke with the son and his friends and 

then approached appellant to speak with him. T. at 628. Patrolman Webb observed 

appellant attempting to open the outdoor dog kennel. T. at 631. Patrolman Webb told 

appellant multiple times not to open the kennel door. T. at 627-628, 631-633. Several 

witnesses testified appellant opened Jax's kennel and ordered the dog to "Get 'em." T. 

at 423, 436, 454, 499, 580-581, 646, 710. It sounded like a command. T. at 499-500. 

Jax then charged Patrolman Webb and lunged at him three times, one time biting him on 

the shoulder. T. at 647-649, 653, 747-748, 751. 

{¶ 16} Appellant testified as Patrolman Webb was approaching, he was holding on 

to Jax's collar and the dog started to pull away from him so he told his son to "come get 

'em," the dog that is. T. at 838, 852-853, 866. Appellant testified the dog broke free from 

his grasp. T. at 839, 866. He stated the dog lunged at Patrolman Webb because the dog 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0044 6 

thought it was playtime. T. at 839. Patrolman Webb was carrying a flashlight and the 

dog often played "flashlight tag" for a treat. T. at 839-840. Appellant described the dog 

as playful, friendly, and very loving. T. at 833. 

{¶ 17} Following his arrest, appellant was taken to the hospital due to receiving 

injuries in the altercations. While at the hospital, appellant told hospital personnel if 

Patrolman Webb had not been trespassing, he would not have had to sic his dog on him. 

T. at 798. Appellant also stated, "That's why I got the dog, to protect me. He did what he 

was trained to do." T. at 533, 535, 798-799. Appellant admitted a 120 pound dog like 

Jax could rip out a person's throat and kill them. T. at 884-885. 

{¶ 18} In denying appellant's motion for acquittal, the trial court stated the following 

(T. at 915): 

 The court will agree with the State in this matter. There are a lot of 

items, not, per se, deadly weapons, however, used in a certain context, 

obviously become so. The fact that the dog had not previously bitten 

anyone, no evidence of that or such like that. But the court does find in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party that reasonable minds could 

come to the conclusion that the dog had been trained to attack another in 

order to protect the owner of that dog, so the court is going to overrule the 

Rule 29 motion at this time. 

{¶ 19} We concur with the trial court. The state presented sufficient evidence, via 

appellant's own statements as well as witness testimony, to overcome the Crim.R. 29 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0044 7 

standard. Testimony was presented that appellant gave an attack command, the dog 

recognized the command, and the dog immediately attacked Patrolman Webb. In light of 

this evidence, under a Crim.R. 29 standard, reasonable minds could have reached 

different conclusions as to whether each material element of the crime of felonious assault 

had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including whether Jax was used as a 

"deadly weapon." 

{¶ 20} Upon review, we find sufficient evidence was presented to survive a Crim.R. 

29 motion and have the matter decided by the jury. The trial court did not err in denying 

appellant's motion for acquittal. 

{¶ 21} The sole assignment of error is denied. 

{¶ 22} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is 

hereby affirmed. 

By Wise, Earle, J. 

Wise, John, P.J. and 

Baldwin, J. concur. 

 

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