U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

31–263 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

S. Hrg. 115–440 

ADAPTING TO DEFEND THE HOMELAND AGAINST 

THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST 

THREAT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 6, 2017 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

JON TESTER, Montana 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire 

KAMALA D. HARRIS, California 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

GABRIELLE D’ADAMO SINGER, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL J. LUEPTOW, Senior Counsel 

ELIZABETH E. MCWHORTER, Senior Professional Staff Member 

M. SCOTT AUSTIN, U.S. Coast Guard Detailee 

MARGARET E. DAUM, Minority Staff Director 

JULIE G. KLEIN, Minority Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

BONNI E. DINERSTEIN, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 1 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 2 

Senator Peters .................................................................................................. 14 

Senator Harris .................................................................................................. 16 

Senator Hassan ................................................................................................. 19 

Senator Daines ................................................................................................. 24 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 31 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 32 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2017 

Mark E. Mitchell, Acting Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/LowIntensity Conflict, U.S. Department of Defense ................................................ 4 

Lora Shiao, Acting Director for Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence ............................................ 6 

Nikki L. Floris, Deputy Assistant Director for Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice ............................................ 8 

Mr. Robin Taylor, Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .................................................... 10 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Floris, Nikki L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46 

Mitchell, Mark E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36 

Shiao, Lora: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40 

Taylor, Robin.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

APPENDIX 

BBC Article submitted by Senator Hassan ........................................................... 53 

Mr. Mitchell’s response to Senator McCaskill ....................................................... 63 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record: 

Mr. Mitchell ...................................................................................................... 60 

Ms. Shiao ........................................................................................................... 66 

Ms. Floris .......................................................................................................... 77 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 85 

(1) 

1The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 31. 

ADAPTING TO DEFEND THE HOMELAND 

AGAINST THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL 

TERRORIST THREAT 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Johnson, Lankford, Daines, McCaskill, Tester, 

Heitkamp, Peters, Hassan, and Harris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. Good morning. This hearing is called to 

order. I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony and for 

coming and appearing before our Committee today. 

I ask that my written opening statement be entered into the 

record,1 and I will keep my opening remarks brief. We have four 

witnesses here. 

The concept of this hearing was pretty simple. Certainly, in my 

lifetime, I have seen terrorism evolve. My first awareness of terrorism springing from the Middle East was the Munich Games and 

Palestinians slaughtering Israeli athletes. 

Then we had in the 90s, the attempt to bring down the Twin 

Towers the first time in the bombing. I think six people were 

killed, a number of people—hundreds injured. That was a new 

phase. We basically addressed it as a law enforcement problem. 

Then 9/11 happened, and we had wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and obviously, those wars continue in some way, shape, or form. 

Then we had Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It is good 

that we have, by and large, taken away the physical caliphate, but 

as we will hear in the testimony today, we have in no way, shape, 

or form denied them the cyber caliphate. And that may be a more 

persistent long-term threat. So we have representatives from the 

Department of Defense (DOD), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and also 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Department of Justice 

(DOJ) really to determine, discuss about what is this new phase of 

terrorism going to look like, what do we need to do to counter it, 

what type of changes potentially in our laws and our tactics should 
2 

1The prepared statement of Senator McCaskill appears in the Appendix on page 32. 

we be contemplating and potentially enacting into law to address 

this generational problem. I hate to say that, but this is not going 

away anytime soon. 

So, again, I want to thank our witnesses for appearing here 

today. I am looking forward to a good hearing. I am looking forward to learning an awful lot. 

So, with that, I will turn it over to Senator McCaskill. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL1

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, and thank 

you to the witnesses for being here today. 

Congress’ is focused now on funding the government, and with 

the budget season shortly upon us, this hearing provides a welltimed opportunity to examine the Administration’s counterterrorism (CT) strategies and priorities. 

Since 9/11, we have we have relentlessly pursued a multifaceted 

counterterrorism campaign to protect our homeland from foreign 

threats. While this Committee generally focuses on security efforts 

here at home, today offers an opportunity for members who do not 

serve on the defense committees to engage with the Department of 

Defense on how DOD is taking the fight to the enemy abroad. 

We will also get another chance, coming on the heels of our annual threats hearing in September, to hear from the FBI and the 

National Counterterrorism Center on their agencies’ vital work. 

This hearing is titled ‘‘Adapting to Defend Homeland Against 

Evolving International Terrorist Threat.’’ For that reason, I invited 

the Department of Homeland Security to provide a witness, since 

its primary mission, as set in its statute, is to ‘‘prevent terrorist attacks within the United States and reduce the vulnerability of the 

United States to terrorism.’’ 

On that note, on Monday, the Senate advanced Ms. Nielsen’s 

confirmation vote, and I am pleased that DHS will soon have permanent leadership. 

Mr. Taylor, I look forward to your testimony on behalf of the Department. 

NCTC Director Nick Rasmussen testified before this Committee 

in September that the most immediate threat to the United States 

is from homegrown violent extremists (HVE), meaning people living in the United States who become radicalized and conduct attacks here at home. 

At that same hearing, DHS Acting Secretary Elaine Duke discussed how attackers’ techniques are evolving as they opt for, ‘‘simple methods,’’ to conduct attacks, using guns, knives, vehicles, and 

other common items to engage in acts of terror. 

Preventing radicalization, as well as preventing and responding 

to attack, demands training, support, and other resources for State 

and local governments, law enforcement, and first responders. 

I am deeply concerned that many essential counterterrorism programs that provide that very support were reduced or outright 

eliminated in the President’s Fiscal Year (FY) budget. 

To prevent Americans from becoming radicalized, DHS administers the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Grant Program 
3 

that assists States, local governments, and nonprofit institutions in 

providing alternatives for individuals who have started down the 

road to extremism. Although Congress appropriated only $10 million for DHS to award in grants, the Department received applications for 10 times that amount, demonstrating the overwhelming 

interest communities have in tackling this problem. Despite that, 

the President’s Fiscal Year budget requested zero funding for the 

CVE grant program. 

I have mentioned this before, but it is worth repeating that in 

July, DHS announced 29 awards through the Complex Coordinated 

Terrorist Attacks (CCTA) Grant Program. That is CCTA. Kansas 

City and St. Louis were both awarded money. I am very familiar 

with how these resources are being used, and they are being used 

wisely and appropriately. Programs like this are essential to bolstering security in our cities, but the President’s budget proposed 

eliminating this grant program as well. 

During her nomination hearing, I asked DHS Secretary nominee 

Kirstjen Nielsen if New York City relied on these resources it got 

from any of the DHS counterterrorism grant programs to respond 

to the Halloween ramming attack. She had no doubt that they did. 

Communities count on programs like the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams; Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI); Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Grant Program; 

and the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program to protect Americans from terrorist attacks and keep our country safe. 

But this Administration is reducing and outright eliminating 

funding for these types of initiatives. This Administration has to 

start following the advice of its own agencies, experts, and our 

State and local officials on the ground who understand the threats 

our communities face. 

I am glad you are here today to talk about the essential work 

you and the women and men in your departments do every day to 

fight terrorism. I appreciate your service to our country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in witnesses, so if 

you all stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear the testimony you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the 

whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. MITCHELL. I do. 

Ms. SHIAO. I do. 

Ms. FLORIS. I do. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Please be seated. 

Our first witness is Mark Mitchell, and Mr. Mitchell is the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict. In his role, he supervises DOD’s special operations and low-intensity conflict activities, including counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and civil affairs. Mr. Mitchell. 
4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell appears in the Appendix on page 36. 

TESTIMONY OF MARK E. MITCHELL,1 ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. MITCHELL. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking 

Member McCaskill, and Members of the Committee. I am grateful 

for the opportunity to appear before you this morning with my colleagues from our other departments, and I would like to discuss 

the changing threat landscape with respect to the destruction of 

the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s physical caliphate and then 

efforts by the Department of Defense to counterterrorist threats 

within this changing landscape. 

The liberation of Raqqa and remaining ISIS strongholds in the 

Euphrates River Valley are important milestones in our fight 

against the scourge of ISIS. Our Iraqi and Syrian Democratic 

Forces (SDF) partners deserve much of the credit for the success 

of these efforts. Nevertheless, the elimination of the physical caliphate does not mark the end of ISIS or other global terrorist organizations. Their defeat on the battlefield his dispelled ISIS’s claims 

of invincibility, but their ideology remains. Their branches and affiliates will continue to seek opportunities to spread their toxic ideology and attack all those who do not subscribe to it. 

As ISIS loses territory in Iraq and Syria, its operations will become more distributed and more reliant on virtual connections. 

Their terrorist cadres will migrate to other safe havens, where they 

can direct and enable attacks against the United States, our allies 

and our partners, and our global interests. They will also continue 

to radicalize vulnerable individuals and inspire them to conduct 

lone wolf or, as I prefer to call them, stray dog attacks. We will 

continue to see ISIS and al-Qaeda threats to our homeland as well 

as our allies and partners from locations in Afghanistan, the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Balkan States, among 

other locations. 

Right now, the United States and its allies and partners, including 74 members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, must continue to defeat this threat with a shared commitment against our 

common enemies. We must continue to deny ISIS and other organizations safe havens where they can plan attacks and prey on vulnerable populations. 

We will continue to do this work through credible, indigenous 

voices. To delegitimize their ideology, we must discredit their narrative so they cannot recruit and radicalize vulnerable populations, 

and finally, to achieve enduring results, we must ensure that our 

successes on the battlefield are complemented by well-resourced 

post-conflict stabilization efforts. These efforts principally led by 

the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are critical to cementing the military gains and 

preventing terrorist organizations from reestablishing themselves. 

As we look back on our recent operations, we have learned a couple major lessons. Defeating the group requires a whole-of-government approach and cannot be achieved through military efforts 

alone. Our ‘‘by, with, and through’’ approach with local partners 

continues to be effective, and ISIS remains a global terrorist threat. 
5 

I will turn now to what DOD is going in the counterterrorism 

realm. I want to reiterate that the enduring defeat requires a 

whole-of-government effort. We must continue to promote and support that whole-of-government effort, including political, developmental, economic, military, law enforcement, border security, aviation security, and other elements. 

With respect to military efforts, of course, DOD maintains the 

world’s premier counterterrorism force, the finest and most capable 

special operations force in the world. Those forces are capable of 

conducting focused direct action against terrorist threats around 

the globe, including precision air strikes and other CT activities, 

wherever they are required. I would be happy to provide additional 

information on that in a closed session. 

Our other CT efforts focus on building our partner capacity and 

capability and enabling their operations. Our approach is characterized by the term ‘‘by, with, and through,’’ and what we mean by 

that is that our military operations against terrorist organizations 

are generally conducted by our host nation partners. U.S. forces 

work with our partners to train, equip, advise, enable, and when 

authorized accompany them on actual operations to improve their 

effectiveness and their professionalism. And through this cooperative relationship, the United States can our allies and partners 

achieve our shared strategic goals. 

Secretary Mattis has placed a significant emphasis on building 

and strengthening these partnerships. In addition to bilateral relationships with individual countries, we also work through regional 

security organizations and collective security missions, such as the 

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the G5 Sahel 

Task Force. We also work closely with the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) Alliance to help ready other partners for a 

variety of CT efforts. Together, all these partners help reduce the 

requirement for U.S. forces overseas. 

Our ‘‘by, with, and through’’ approach provides the foundation of 

our CT efforts and capacity building in key regions such as Africa’s 

Lake Chas region, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa, and increasingly in Southeast Asia. 

As we build the capacities of these partners to bring the fight to 

these violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in the short term, we 

are also shaping and helping sustain their own security for the 

long term. Ultimately, filling the security void in these regions will 

help advance our desired end State. 

All of these challenges require flexible, adaptable tools, and the 

Department is grateful for Congress’ efforts to provide DOD and 

the Department of State a variety of authorities. For instance, the 

efforts to reform the security cooperation authorities in the 2017 

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) have led us to be able 

to streamline our CT assistance. 

Regarding legal authorities, the 2001 authorization for the use of 

military force remains a cornerstone of our ongoing U.S. military 

operations and continues to provide us the domestic legal authority 

that we need to use force against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, their associated forces in the Islamic State. 

Finally, while focused principally on operations against terrorists 

abroad, DOD also supports its Federal law enforcement partners in 
6 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Shiao appears in the Appendix on page 40. 

this shifting threat environment. One of the ways that we do that 

is through robust information-sharing processes, including biometric data. These information-sharing agreements contribute to the 

government’s expanded screening and vetting efforts, biometric 

data collected on the battlefield, whether by the United States or 

our international partners, is provided through DOD databases to 

Federal law enforcement agencies. 

Similarly, DOD retains a robust antiterrorism force protection 

posture based in part on information provided by the FBI, gleaned 

from its own investigations. That may have bearing on DOD personnel and facilities. 

In closing, I would like to say thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Committee on this critically important 

topic, and the Department of Defense appreciates your leadership 

and oversight in this area. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. 

Our next witness is Lora Shiao. Ms. Shiao is the Acting Director 

for Intelligence at the National Counterterrorism Center. In this 

role, she oversees NCTC’s efforts to analyze, understand, and respond to the terrorist threat and provide insight and situation 

awareness of developing terrorism-related issues around the world. 

Ms. Shiao. 

TESTIMONY OF LORA SHIAO,1 ACTING DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE 

OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Ms. SHIAO. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member 

McCaskill, and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here 

with my colleagues from DOD, FBI, and DHS. 

As we have said in previous testimony, the terrorist landscape 

we face today involves more threats in more places for more terrorist actors than at any time in the past 16 years. Both ISIS and 

al-Qaeda have proven to be extremely resilient organizations. 

To successfully meet the challenges of the counterterrorism and 

terrorism prevention mission spaces, we will need to respond with 

agility and flexibility, far more of both than our enemies can muster, and adopt collaborative approaches with State and local law 

enforcement, with our foreign partners, and with the private sector. 

I will begin by addressing the current threat picture starting 

with ISIS and its continued setbacks on the battlefield. Though the 

group has lost a number of senior leaders, it has been expelled 

from almost all of its territorial strongholds and has suffered other 

significant defeats in the heart of its so-called caliphate. 

These losses are depriving the group of what was once a key part 

of its global narrative, but it is worth noting that ISIS takes a long 

view of the conflict, and the group’s leadership sees itself as having 

overcome hardships before. 

The group has already adapted its narrative to compensate by 

portraying the struggle as a long-term process that will test the 

fortitude of its followers. So we expect that ISIS will revert to the 

model of its predecessor organization, al-Qaeda and Iraq, and be-
7 

come an insurgency, with the long-term goal of attempting a resurgence. 

Meanwhile, the group’s external operations capabilities have 

been building and entrenching over the past 2 years, and as we 

have seen, ISIS has launched attacks in periods where it held large 

swaths of territory and also when it has been under significant 

pressure from the Defeat ISIS Campaign. 

And unfortunately, we do not see ISIS’s loss of territory translating into a corresponding reduction in its inability to inspire attacks. ISIS has either claimed or been linked to at least 20 attacks 

against western interests worldwide since January. The group has 

inspired attacks in the United Kingdom (UK) and throughout Europe, and of course, most recently in the United States, in New 

York City on Halloween. 

The number of arrests and disruptions we have seen worldwide 

tells us that ISIS’s global reach remains largely intact, even as the 

group is being defeated on the battlefield. 

When speaking about the global threat, as focused as we are on 

the challenges from ISIS, al-Qaeda has never stopped being a top 

priority for the counterterrorism community. We remain concerned 

about al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria. We know that there are veteran al-Qaeda operatives there, some who have been part of the 

group since before September 11, 2001. 

The various al-Qaeda affiliates have also managed to sustain recruitment, maintain local relationships, and derive sufficient resources to enable their operations. 

So we see this continued revolution of al-Qaeda as evidence of its 

resiliency, and we know that it retains the intent to carry out attacks against the United States and our interests. 

I have outlined this dynamic threat that we face from ISIS and 

al-Qaeda, but it is worth reiterating that here in the United States 

we are most concerned about homegrown violent extremists, especially as extremist propaganda encourages simple tactics and readily available weapons that do not require specialized training and 

present fewer opportunities for law enforcement detection. 

When it comes to tackling a threat of those mobilized extremist 

violence particularly here in the United States one of the areas 

where we as a counterterrorism community have made great 

strides and where we continue constant improvements is in sharing 

intelligence across national security organizations and with a full 

array of State, municipal, local and law enforcement and first responder professionals as well as with our foreign partners. 

We at NCTC bring to bear our unique access to all sources of 

counterterrorism information and a whole-of-government coordination function, and those are capabilities that become even more important in an increasingly diverse threat environment like the one 

we are facing today. 

Our tactically focused analysts are constantly pursuing non-obvious and unresolved threads that could yield relevant information, 

and passing intelligence leads to our partner agencies who can act 

on them. Our strategically focused analysts look for trends and context that can be shared with those serving our first lines of defense 

against terrorism. 
8 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Floris appears in the Appendix on page 46. 

In the strategic planning realm, our efforts provide governmentwide coordination and integration of department and agency actions on key lines of effort, ensuring that all instruments of national power are being leveraged against the threat. 

We are focused on improving the counterterrorism toolkit beyond 

the hard power tools of disruption and believe it requires greater 

investment in terrorism prevention, specifically in the United 

States to stop the recruitment of American youth, and to ensure we 

are equipped to respond and prevent all forms of violence. 

By leveraging Federal, State, and local partners, including the 

private sector, we can create a culture of prevention and a greater 

degree of resilience in our communities across the Nation. 

I will end there, Mr. Chairman, and thank you and the Committee for your continued support to the outstanding officers who 

are dedicated to the counterterrorism mission. I look forward to 

your questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Ms. Shiao. 

Our next witness is Nikki Floris. Ms. Floris is the Deputy Assistant Director for Counterterrorism for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In her role, she oversees domestic and international terrorism financing operations, strategic operations, and counterterrorism analysis. Ms. Floris. 

TESTIMONY OF NIKKI L. FLORIS,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Ms. FLORIS. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member 

McCaskill, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to discussing 

the changing threat landscape with respect to the destruction of 

ISIS’ physical caliphate and efforts by the FBI and its partners to 

counterterrorist threats within this changing environment. 

I have been working in the Counterterrorism Division in the FBI 

for the better part of the last decade, and I have watched this organization continuously evolve to address the most concerning and 

imminent threats posed by extremists. Preventing terrorist attacks 

has been and remains the FBI’s top priority. 

The FBI assesses that ISIS and homegrown violent extremists, 

pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the homeland and 

abroad. With ISIS, we are dealing with a group that at one point 

was able to coordinate and direct external attacks from its safe 

haven in Syria and Iraq while simultaneously advocating and propagating lone wolf attacks in western countries. Though degraded, 

we are now faced with these threats as well as the possibility of 

foreign fighters returning to their home countries, some having 

gained valuable battlefield experience in a network of like-minded 

extremists. 

At home, we are faced with a continuing threat of HVEs, those 

inspired by the global jihad movement though not directly collaborating with a foreign terrorist organization. HVEs can plan and 

execute an attack with little to no warning due to their operational 

security and familiarity with the intended target. 
9 

The compartment and nature of lone offender attack planning 

challenges the ability of security services to detect preoperational 

activity and disrupt attack preparation, while complicating the intelligence community’s (IC) efforts to determine potential overseas 

connections and motivations. 

As I said, the FBI has evolved, and we must continue to do so, 

not just evolve to face new threats, but old threats that use new 

and creative tactics, techniques, and procedures. Probably, more 

than ever, the rapid evolution and the way the world uses technology is impacting the way we work to keep America safe. 

As technology advances, so too does terrorist use of technology to 

communicate, both to inspire and to recruit. Their widespread use 

of technology propagates the persistent terrorist message to attack 

U.S. interests here and abroad. 

Many foreign terrorist organizations use various digital communication platforms to reach individuals they believe may be susceptible and sympathetic to extremist messaging. However, no group 

has been as successful as drawing people into its perverse message 

as ISIS. 

ISIS uses high-quality traditional media platforms as well as 

widespread social media campaigns to propagate its extremist ideology. We have even seen ISIS and other terrorist organizations 

use social media to spot and assess potential recruits. 

Through the Internet, terrorists overseas now have direct access 

to our local communities to target and recruit our citizens and 

spread the message of radicalization faster than we imagined just 

a few years ago. Unfortunately, the rapid pace in advances in mobile and other communication technologies continues to present a 

significant challenge to conducting electronic surveillance of criminals and terrorists. There is a real and growing gap between law 

enforcement’s legal authority to access the digital information and 

our technical ability to do so. 

The FBI refers to this growing challenge as going dark, and it 

impacts the spectrum of the work we do in the FBI. In the counterterrorism context, for instance, our agents and analysts are increasingly finding that communications between groups like ISIS 

and potential recruits occur in encrypted private messaging platforms. As such, the content of these communications is unknown. 

As a threat to harm the United States and U.S. interest evolves, 

we must adapt and confront these challenges, relying heavily on 

the strength of our partnerships, partnerships within the intelligence community, with State and local partners, with foreign 

partners, and increasingly with the private sector. 

The FBI will continue to evolve promoting a culture of innovation 

and using all lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat these terrorist threats to the United States. 

We will continue to collect, exploit, and disseminate intelligence 

to inform and drive our operations on a daily basis. In doing so, 

we will remain agile in our approach to combating threats by realigning resources as necessary in the current dynamic threat picture. 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and Committee 

Members, I thank you for the opportunity to testify concerning the 

evolving threats to the homeland and the challenges we face in 
10 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor appears in the Appendix on page 50. 

combating these threats. I am happy to answer any questions you 

might have. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Ms. Floris. 

Our final witness is Robin Taylor. Mr. Taylor is the Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) at the Department of Homeland Security. In this role, Mr. Taylor is responsible for key intelligence activity supporting DHS; State, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners; and the intelligence 

community. Mr. Taylor. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBIN TAYLOR, ACTING DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. TAYLOR. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and Members of the Committee. I would like to take 

a moment to thank you for the invitation to speak before you today 

regarding DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ unique role in 

sharing information and intelligence with our Homeland Security 

partners in order to better prepare them and inform them of CT 

activities occurring within the Nation. It is truly an honor to be 

here. 

My testimony has been submitted for the record,1 and with your 

permission, I will have a few opening remarks. 

First, let me make a comment and thank the dedicated men and 

women of the Department of Homeland Security and specifically 

those at the Office of I&A for their relentless service to our Nation. 

They have an enormous task or mission focus, are passionate, and 

work tirelessly every day to shield our Nation from terrorists and 

other threats, and for that, they deserve our thanks and recognition. 

DHS shares the concerns as previously expressed by my colleagues today. Our perspective that the terrorist threat to our 

country is changing, as such we need to change and adjust as well. 

While the threat of carefully planned large-scale operations that 

are plotted by global jihadist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda remain a concern, the trend of homegrown violent extremism, such 

as we saw in New York City on Halloween, are alarming. 

As Acting Secretary Duke recently testified before this Committee, DHS is rethinking homeland security in the new age. The 

line between the home game and the away game is now blurred. 

The dangers we face are more dispersed, with the threat of networks that proliferate across our borders, both physically and in 

the cyber realm. 

As a result, DHS is changing its approach to homeland security. 

We are working to better integrate our intelligence and operations, 

to enhance and streamline inner-agency engagements, and to boast 

our engagement and information sharing with both our international and domestic partners. 

It is a critical time, and we must work to build as complete a 

threat picture that is facing our Nation as possible to enable our 
11 

front-line officers the ability to respond to and mitigate to these 

new threats. 

In support of these efforts, I&A works to provide our homeland 

security enterprise partners the most timely and relevant information and intelligence needed to keep the homeland safe, secure, and 

resilient. 

As you are aware, I&A is the only member of the U.S. Intelligence Community statutorily charged to deliver intelligence to our 

State, local, tribal, and private-sector partners. In meeting this obligation, we endeavor to develop and share unique homeland-focused intelligence and analysis from DHS and our other IC partners at the lowest classification level possible to ensure our stakeholders are informed of the persistent CT threat, thereby allowing 

them to better identify, disrupt, and respond to the developing 

threats occurring within their areas of responsibility. 

Working along with our FBI and other IC colleagues, we assess 

motivations of HVEs, identify and observe behaviors, and report 

and share developing terrorist tactics and techniques with our 

partners. We are committed to this effort. 

Let me conclude the terrorist threat is dynamic, and those who 

operate individually or are part of a terrorist organization will continue to challenge our security measures here and abroad. No single agency or organization can accomplish this mission of keeping 

the homeland safe alone, nor can any one person, organization, or 

program do everything possible to prevent the next terrorist attack. 

But when we work together, we share information, utilize tools 

and programs that are collaborative, we are stronger, and we make 

a difference. 

DHS will continue to work alongside of our colleagues from the 

FBI, NCTC, and DOD, and along others across the Federal Government and with our State and local partners to identify potential 

threats that are risking our interest abroad and our community 

here at home. 

Again, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, thank 

you for the opportunity to speak before you today. I look forward 

to your questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. 

Again, I want to thank all the witnesses for your testimony and 

for your service to this Nation. I appreciate the fact that you also 

acknowledge the service to all the men and women that serve in 

your agencies, and we certainly want to acknowledge and recognize 

that as well. 

Again, to be respectful for other Members’ time, I appreciate 

their attendance, so I will just defer my own questioning until the 

very end. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

As I indicated in my opening statement, I am really worried 

about the cuts that have been proposed by this Administration to 

the very programs that address everything you all talked about. 

Let me ask you first, Mr. Taylor. Has the White House through 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—the budget that is 

gone over for the next fiscal year, your Department put together, 

and this has all been under the Administration of Donald Trump, 

and the people that are there at the top levels of that Department 
12 

are in fact people who were put there by the President. So you all 

have sent a budget over to the Office of Management and Budget. 

Have they agreed with you on the amounts that you have request 

to fight terrorists in the United States for the next fiscal year? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Senator, thank you for your question. 

I am aware of the letter in which you recently sent last week to 

the Department, and it is my understanding that the Department 

is working expeditiously to answer and meet your deadline of December 20. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is a different—I am talking about you 

all put together your budget, and the way this works is you send 

it over for them to then weigh in. So you all have sent over to OMB 

a budget, what you think is necessary to fight terrorism in this 

country. My question to you is, Have you heard back from them? 

Do they agree with your request as it relates to fighting terrorism? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Madam, as I was mentioning, I do not have any direct visibility on the ongoings of that process. I was not part of 

that. 

Now Secretary Nielsen has identified in her proceedings before 

you that she was concerned of the submission, and she would review that. I would just propose that as they are pulling together 

the final details to submit, in response to your letter, I need to 

defer to them. I just do not have the insight that you are asking 

for to provide you with—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am just curious because if I were in your 

job and we sent over a request for funding for the things that you 

directly work with every day—and it would appear to me that if 

OMB came back with ‘‘yes, we agree,’’ that would be something 

that would resonate through the agency, or if they came back and 

said, ‘‘No. We are doing away with all the VIPR teams. We are 

doing away with all of that stuff,’’ that would also be something 

that would resonate through the agency. Are you telling me there 

has been no word through the agency, one way or another, how the 

Administration has made a determination for the budget request 

that you all submitted a few months ago? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Madam, I can just advise you that I have not had 

any visibility, nor was anything passed to me prior to the hearing 

today. 

I think your concerns are certainly relevant. The impact of the 

billions of dollars that have gone to State and locals over the years 

have certainly built a capacity for preparedness and response, and 

any cuts to that are additionally a concern. But with that said and 

not understanding the calculus that was placed into the proposal 

that was submitted to the budget or to the President, I would have 

to say I am confident that what is proposed at least weighed and 

strived to manage the threats that are relevant in those areas that 

need to still be pushed forward for capacity building—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. The place I am going to be concerned 

is if we learn that, in fact, what the agency has asked for has been 

cut significantly. That is what is going to worry me. 

I see the first year when the budget was prepared by another Administration, but if the folks that are there now that the President 

has expressed confidence in have said, ‘‘This is what we need to 

fight terrorism,’’ and OMB comes back and says, ‘‘No, not so fast,’’ 
13 

1The response from Mr. Mitchell appears in the Appendix on page 63. 

especially something like a VIPR team—a VIPR team is something 

that is used in our airports effectively. 

Would anyone disagree the VIPR teams are effective in the airports? Any disagreement from any of the witnesses? 

OK. How important in your opinion for—Secretary Mitchell, how 

important is the State Department’s work in terms of counterterrorism? 

Mr. MITCHELL. I think the State Department plays an important 

role overseas in aiding our counterterrorism efforts. They have a 

number of programs that support DOD’s efforts, and DOD likewise 

supports the State Department’s efforts. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If you know for the record, now, but if not, 

if you would get back to me—I know this is not your Department, 

but we do not have anyone here from the State Department. There 

has been $10 billion of cuts to the State Department. What, if any, 

impact has that had on the work that they are doing that is so 

vital in terms of diplomacy and other efforts in terms of augmenting what the Department of Defense is doing? 

Mr. MITCHELL. I will have to take that as a question for the 

record——1

Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And finally, for the FBI, first of all, let me 

just say for both the intelligence community and the FBI that is 

represented here today, let me tell you that most Americans do not 

see the men and women who work in your agencies. They do not 

wear a police uniform, but they are just as much on the front lines 

as any first responder, law enforcement agent in the country. And 

anyone who denigrates the men and women who risk their lives in 

intelligence or in the FBI is undermining the foundation of rule 

and law in this country, and please carry back to all the men and 

women that work in both of your agencies how much we respect 

the service they give to this country. And that when people denigrate them for political purposes, many of us disagree with that. 

And I do have a question about domestic terrorism, but I will 

save it to the next round because I am out of time. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Peters. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Oh, wait. I have 52 seconds. I can get it in. 

[Laughter.] 

FBI, I know you all have identified domestic terrorism movements, and you work in terms of trying to track those movements 

and the dangerous activities, violent activities that they sometimes 

engender. Would it be helpful to have a statute? You all have no 

statute to deal with domestic terrorism that would be similar to the 

international terrorism statutes that we have on the books, and 

that is hard for me to understand the rationale between that difference. Could you speak to that? 

Ms. FLORIS. Sure. And first, thank you, ma’am, for your comments concerning the FBI and the intelligence community. Greatly 

appreciated. 

Regarding domestic terrorism, you are absolutely correct. There 

is not a statute. We cannot charge someone with material support 
14 

to a domestic terrorism group, and we actually do not have designated domestic terrorism groups. 

Whether or not that statute would help, I would certainly defer 

to my colleagues at the Department of Justice, but absolutely, I believe that would help as another tool in defending the Nation 

against domestic extremists, absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Because we certainly have had more domestic extremist attacks in this country over the last several years 

than we have had terrorist attacks; is not that correct? 

Ms. FLORIS. I would have to go back, ma’am, and look at the 

exact numbers. I know on the disruption front, on both domestic 

terrorism and international terrorism over this last year, over a 

hundred, both domestic terrorism and over 100 international terrorism disruptions in the United States. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, for calling this hearing, and to our witnesses, thank you for 

your testimony today. And thank you for being on the front lines 

of thinking how we deal with this threat that affects us each and 

every day. 

In listening to your comments, I certainly noted the trends that 

you are seeing with ISIS and Syria and Iraq and that we have been 

very effective. I just got back from a trip to Iraq, and I know we 

have been very effective in taking territory away from them and 

certainly changing the narrative that they use as a result of that, 

but as was mentioned, they still pose a significant threat to us in 

the cyber domain. And it is certainly my belief and I think it is 

probably the belief of each and every one of you that probably the 

most significant national security risk we face as a country comes 

from the cyber threat that we must deal with. 

Given that, there was a recent blog post by former Secretary of 

Defense Ashton Carter, and I would love to have each of you respond to his comments. And in that blog post, he stated that he 

was ‘‘largely disappointed in cyber command’s effectiveness against 

ISIS.’’ He assessed that the U.S. Government failed to produce any 

effective cyber weapons or techniques to counter the ISIS threat. 

Just curious as to your reaction to that. Are we producing effective weapons? If not, what do we need to do? 

We will start with you, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you for the question, Senator. 

I think we have been effective against the Islamic state in their 

cyber realm, in their media production. Most of that has come, 

though, on the battle field, but we have also done some efforts that 

I think exceed the classification of this forum and would be glad 

to talk about those in a different arena. 

Senator PETERS. Well, I appreciate that, and we do not need— 

the question was not asking those types of questions, but generally, 

are we resourcing this properly enough? Do we need to do more as 

a Committee that can work with you to make sure that we are 

dealing with the issue effectively? 
15 

Mr. MITCHELL. I think the one area—again, cyber is not my portfolio within the Department. It belongs to Ken Rapuano, who I 

think this Committee is familiar with. But the one area where I 

do see an issue is defining what constitutes traditional military activities in cyberspace where there are no boundaries and identifying the proper role of various departments and agencies with respect to those operations. 

I think it is less a question from my perspective of weapons and 

authorities as it is permissions and delineation between the respective departments. 

Senator PETERS. Ms. Floris, I will jump to you on this question. 

As you answer this, but in particular, I would like you to elaborate 

on a comment that you made during your testimony, whether we 

need to find real partners in the private sector if we are going to 

effectively deal with the cyber threat. Obviously, with some of our 

social networking providers like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 

others have made some positive steps forward, but I assume they 

need to do more as well as other sites. So would you elaborate on 

how we deal with the cyber threat here in our country by actively 

engaging private enterprise? 

Ms. FLORIS. Absolutely, sir. As I mentioned, we are increasingly 

looking to build our relationships with the private sector partners, 

these companies that have access to data, to individuals, to algorithms that are really on the front line of some of the individuals 

that we are looking to identify. 

I think one of the biggest gaps right now is what we like to call 

identifying the unknowns. Who are those individuals who are not 

necessarily on the radar of the intelligence community right now, 

and do these private-sector companies have access to information 

that could essentially identify someone that then would be of investigative concern to the FBI? So really looking at retail sectors, 

banking sectors, individuals out in the community who have expressed a willingness to work with the U.S. Government when it 

comes to national security concerns. 

Thank you. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you. 

Mr. Shiao, I want you to answer this question too. I want to pick 

up and have you expand on a comment you made in your testimony. Although ISIS has lost territory, we have not stopped their 

effectiveness to potentially strike the homeland. I assume that is 

through the cyber threat, but if you could elaborate on that comment while addressing the cyber question? 

Ms. SHIAO. Absolutely. Well, from a purely cyber perspective, I 

think it is worth emphasizing that ISIS really has minimal hacking 

skills. They are able to deface websites. They have put out hit lists 

of personally identifiable information (PII) on westerners, but this 

is primarily for intimidation. It is not a key strength for them. So 

I just want to make that distinction and then talk a little bit about 

the propaganda space, where obviously they have had much more 

impact. 

One thing I will say about the propaganda space and in terms 

of HVEs in particular, there is a lot of information out there. We 

can say it is thick in the HVE bloodstream already, so to speak. 

So even as we are able to degrade some capabilities to continue to 
16 

put out and sustain the pace of media releases, we are aware that 

there is plenty of extremist content out there already in cyberspace. 

In terms of particularly the companies, as you mentioned, Twitter and Telegram and several others have really worked on their 

capability to automatically identify and delete ISIS-related content, 

but they are very challenged because ISIS is quickly able to reconstitute those accounts and to migrate to new platforms. 

We had seen them in the past relying on Twitter and Telegram 

to spread their extremist content, but they are using other platforms now. They are using something called Baaz, which is a social 

media app that is geared toward the Middle East, and we have 

seen them kind of adopt this widespread use of private groups and 

encrypted apps as well. They share their video content largely on 

free file-sharing sites. Archive.org is one of those. 

When it comes to working with the companies, we think that 

they have great intent to want to tackle this, but sometimes they 

lack the CT expertise. So we at NCTC have reached out to them 

and been engaging on ways we can be helpful in terms of providing 

education and sharing insight, and of course, as I alluded to in my 

remarks, making sure that there are alternate narratives available. 

Senator PETERS. Mr. Taylor, we have limited time, but I would 

love to hear your thoughts. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Senator. 

I think on two fronts. One, of the cyber threat aspect, DHS’s Office of National Protection Programs Directorate (NPPD) really 

leads our response in working with the critical infrastructure component as it comes to the private sector. 

DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis informs them through 

identifying the threat that is posed to the critical infrastructure 

and then allowing them to work with the private sector to identify 

and mitigate the threat, what is the appropriate response, and 

what are long-term vulnerabilities associated with it. 

I would also just comment very quickly on the propaganda aspect 

that DHS has been working with the tech companies on the Global 

Internet Forum to combat terrorism, which is really trying to help 

them learn to police themself and identify the terrorist content that 

is posted and allow them to quickly remove it from the Internet. 

Senator PETERS. With that, I will yield my time. I appreciate it. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Harris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRIS 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

Ms. Flores, a few questions for you, but first, I hope you will 

relay to the men and women of the FBI that we deeply and profoundly appreciate their work, their professionalism, and their 

service to this country, the work that they do that ranges from enforcement of laws as it relates to human trafficking and 

transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to the work that they 

do contributing to our national security. It is critical work. They do 

it often without any recognition. They leave their homes knowing 

that they are putting themselves and their family at risk and all 

in service to our country. So please relay to the men and women 
17 

of the FBI how much we appreciate their work and their service 

to our country. 

So the question that I have, as you know, ISIS has been successful over the years in radicalizing people online through jihadist 

propaganda. The New York Times has reported that until recently, 

hundreds of hours of Anwar al Awlaki’s talks were on social media 

within easy reach of anyone with a phone or a computer. 

At the same time, we are witnessing growing social media use 

through official and personal accounts of some of the highest officials in the White House and the Federal Government. This heightened social media usage can have far-reaching implications for our 

foreign policy with our allies and can shape the extremist propaganda used by our enemies. 

So my question is, Has the FBI examined the role that social 

media posts or videos from our own government officials affect the 

online recruitment tactics used by ISIS? Have you done that assessment, and what is it? 

Ms. FLORIS. First, ma’am, thank you again for your comments regarding the work of the FBI. 

Regarding posts specifically by members of the government and 

how that impacts radicalization, we have not looked into that. We 

have looked at how the Internet plays a role in radicalization writ 

large and certainly concur with my NCTC colleague that the Internet is the primary vehicle of which our subjects use to radicalize 

and then mobilize. 

As it relates specific to your question, ma’am, we just do not have 

that data available. 

Senator HARRIS. And have you counseled or advised our own 

Federal Government officials about their use of social media as it 

relates to the content that could be used for jihadist propaganda? 

Ms. FLORIS. Within the Counterterrorism Division, we have not, 

but I can certainly take that question back to see if any of my colleagues within the FBI have. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

As jihadist propaganda increasingly makes its way on to social 

media and the Internet, has the FBI considered issuing any guidance to companies to curb online recruitment and homegrown violent extremism? 

Ms. FLORIS. So the FBI specifically has not directed these companies to take down extremist material. We have seen companies do 

it on their own accord, but it is not at the direction of us, more in 

concert with our efforts. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

Ms. FLORIS. Sure. 

Senator HARRIS. Ms. Shiao, you testified that the number of ISIS 

fighters in Iraq and Syria has significantly decreased, and I have 

been to Iraq, as has Senator Peters and most of us I think on this 

Committee, to see the remarkable effort that your agency has made 

and the great work of our U.S. servicemembers and coalition partners as we counter ISIS. 

However, ISIS still maintains a number of branches, as you 

know, outside of Iraq and Syria, notably in North Africa, West Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. In your testimony, as Senator 

Peters mentioned, you asserted that despite the progress that has 
18 

been made on the battlefield against ISIS that its capacity to carry 

out terrorist attacks has not yet been sufficiently diminished because of the robust social media capability and ability to reach 

sympathizers around the world. 

As warfare evolves from physical to online, I have heard people 

talk about it as a bloodless war. Has our national security strategy 

kept pace with this shift? 

Ms. SHIAO. Well, I can definitely talk about some of our efforts 

on terrorism prevention, and I would invite DHS to chime in as 

well because they are the lead on many of those efforts, but at 

NCTC, we have developed tools. We have a community awareness 

briefing. It is designed to catalyze community efforts, to prevent individuals from mobilizing. We have presented that to audience 

around the United States and also overseas, not just law enforcement and public safety, but also directly to communities. And then 

we are training locals to be able to do that same kind of engagement. 

And another important effort is the Terrorism Prevention Planning Workshop. That is also in cities around the United States and 

that is really taking a particular scenario of an individual, 

radicalizing to violence, and then bringing together the community 

voices and law enforcement to talk it through, to identify the gaps 

that there are, and to create an action plan for when something 

like this can happen in reality and to just promote trust between 

them in general. 

But I would defer to DHS to talk a little bit more on terrorism 

prevention. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Senator, thank you very much for the question. 

There is two folds when it comes to the prevention piece. Last 

week, Acting Secretary Duke identified a new organization which 

is the Office of Terrorism Prevention and Partnership, which is a 

re-tool of a previous office within I&A, and the real goal is that it 

is trying to, one, create awareness within the communities of what 

threats that are there and many of which that may be facilitated 

through the Internet, but informing the resources that are there 

trying to change the message when it comes to the radicalization 

that is also being promulgated on the Internet, and work with 

those voices that are within the communities and that are credible 

in order to try to change the ground game when it comes to the 

State and locals that are there. 

The other aspect of this is also trying to better identify early 

warning type of things, trying to work with the State and local law 

enforcement, and also with those community partners in order to 

ensure that they have as much information as we can provide them 

with what those threats are coming and being promulgated from 

the Internet so that they can take action. And that goes through 

training and just community awareness. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

My final question is for Ms. Floris. As Attorney General in California, we implemented an implicit bias training for law enforcement in the State. It was a collaboration of leaders in law enforcement and others, because we understand that no one is immune 

from biases, and as you know, implicit bias should not be inferred 
19 

as accusing someone of being racist or it should not be assumed to 

be a criticism. We are all subject to bias. 

So my question is that it is my understanding that Director 

Comey required FBI agents and analysts to receive this training. 

Has the FBI continued this mandatory policy of providing implicit 

bias training for the agents and the lawyers of the agency? 

Ms. FLORIS. Thank you. I do remember that training. I would 

have to go back and see if it is continuing under Director Wray’s 

leadership. 

Senator HARRIS. OK. And please follow up with this Committee. 

Ms. FLORIS. Yes, ma’am. Sure. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

I have nothing else. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Hassan. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN 

Senator HASSAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McCaskill, for holding this hearing. 

Thanks to all of the witnesses today for not only being here but, 

as importantly, if not more importantly, for your work, and I will 

add my thanks to the thanks you have heard from other Members 

of the Committee for the women and men under your leadership 

for everything they do to protect our country. We are very grateful. 

I wanted to start with a question, Ms. Shiao, for you because I 

want to discuss the thread of foreign fighters. 

Last year, then FBI Director Comey alluded to the possibility 

that there would be a flight of ISIS fighters after Raqqa fell. These 

fighters would return to their countries of origin or to other countries and carry out attacks against the West, was the theory. 

Before this Committee in September, NCTC Director Rasmussen 

gave the impression that the intelligence community’s assessment 

was that ISIS foreign fighters would treat Raqqa as their Alamo 

and fight to the death to defend this so-called caliphate. 

Since that hearing, Raqqa has fallen, but news reports have indicated that rather than fighting to the death, many ISIS fighters 

fled the city. For instance, the Department of Defense’s own news 

service published an article on October 10 entitled ‘‘ISIS Fighters 

Continue to Flee, DOD Spokesman Says.’’ So, Ms. Shiao, can you 

set the record straight on the current ISIS foreign fighter threat, 

now that Raqqa has fallen? 

Ms. SHIAO. Absolutely. Thank you for the question. 

So we still expect that many foreign fighters have and will stay 

to fight in the theater and possibly die there, as we have seen in 

previous battles, but at least some will leave. 

This does not mean that they are necessarily going to return to 

their countries of origin, however, nor that they are going to congregate in a particular conflict zone. In fact, in terms of trend analysis, we have not seen either of those things yet. 

But it is worth remembering, I think, in this discussion that it 

is not actually very easy to leave that region. So the foreign fighters would have to cross basically three hurdles. One, they would 

have to escape ISIS control, which is not an easy thing to do. ISIS 

often requires that they ask permission to leave areas of control 

and threatens retaliation against them as well as their families. 
20 

1The news article appears in the Appendix on page 53. 

The second thing they would have to do is evade the military forces 

in the region. 

Senator HASSAN. Yes. 

Ms. SHIAO. And the third thing is secure travel documents and 

financial support to get out as well. 

So I think it is worth noting that Turkey has worked with the 

United States to secure large portions of the border with Syria. 

They have deported individuals that they assess belong to ISIS, 

and they have added more weapons and manpower as well along 

areas of the border. 

Senator HASSAN. So do we have our own strategy for dealing 

with the ISIS foreign fighter threat post fall of the caliphate? 

Ms. SHIAO. Well, certainly, when it comes to foreign fighters, we 

have been engaged in working to ensure with DOD and with our 

foreign partners that we have as much information about terrorist 

identities as possible, so we can feed that into NCTC’s Terrorist 

Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). TIDE is the basis by 

which all individuals trying to enter the United States through any 

form of immigration benefit, whether it is the refugee program, 

whether it is visas are screened against. So we work with our partners to make sure that that information is as robust as possible. 

And as Mr. Mitchell mentioned, one of the key areas that we are 

continuing to work on in that screening arena is biometric information, which will be a leap forward. 

Senator HASSAN. Right. Thank you for that answer, and let me 

turn to Mr. Mitchell because this next question really falls right on 

what Ms. Shiao was just talking about, because I want to touch on 

the report from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) from 

November 13 that indicated that the United States approved a deal 

to allow ISIS fighters and their families to flee Raqqa. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter that news story into 

the record.1

Chairman JOHNSON. Without objection. 

Senator HASSAN. Thank you. 

Here are a couple of the key points from the news story. The convoy, according to one of the drivers interviewed, was 6 to 7 kilometers long, included almost 50 trucks, 13 buses, more than 100 

of ISIS’s own vehicles, and tons of ISIS weapons and ammunition. 

The convoy included scores of foreign fighters from ‘‘France, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi, China, Tunisia, Egypt.’’ 

It also reportedly included some of ISIS’s most notorious members. 

A Pentagon spokesman indicated that this was not a U.S.-orchestrated deal, but that an agreement had been reached to screen ISIS 

aged males who were leaving as part of the convoy. 

It is clear that anyone who left Raqqa as part of that ISIS convoy 

could potentially be a future terrorist threat, and especially any 

foreign fighters among them. Therefore, it is critical that the 

United States take proper precautions to screen and collect fingerprints for everyone on that convoy. 

So I would like to drill down on exactly what kind of screening 

took place. First, to you, Mr. Mitchell, who agreed to this deal and 
21 

this process, and did we administer the screening? And did all 

members of the convoy have their fingerprints collected? 

Mr. MITCHELL. I thank you for the question, Senator. 

I am not familiar with the BBC report. I do recall the discussions 

of the convoy, but I did not have any insight. Those decisions were 

made by the tactical commanders on the ground. 

Senator HASSAN. OK. 

Mr. MITCHELL. And I would be glad to get back to you with additional information to answer that question. 

Senator HASSAN. That would be terrific. Thank you. 

Mr. MITCHELL. But what I do want to address is one of the 

things that we have done on the battlefield—— 

Senator HASSAN. Yes. 

Mr. MITCHELL [continuing]. Is we have equipped our SDF partners and our Iraqi partners, even folks that were not actively with 

biometric screening tools, so that every fighter they encounter on 

the battlefield is being biometrically screened and enrolled, and 

that information is being passed to us. So that is the first thing 

that we are doing. 

The second thing is the Department of Defense in 2014 stood up 

an effort to address really at that time the flow of foreign fighters 

in, but it has since shifted to the flow of foreign fighters out. Jordan has over 24 international partners, both military, law enforcement, and international organizations. That is a forum where we 

not only share information, principally unclassified publicly available information, and we help these other partners to take their 

proprietary information from their country about individuals who 

might have left to look at social media and other publicly available 

information, to combine it with that. They share all that with the 

United States, and then they have an opportunity to share with 

other partners. 

Again, it is specifically focused on identifying that flow of foreign 

fighters. It is complementary to the work that is done in the intelligence communities. 

Senator HASSAN. Yes. 

Mr. MITCHELL. But I would be happy in a different forum to provide some information on the successes that we have enjoyed there. 

Senator HASSAN. Well, that would be great, and my time is up. 

So I will just say that I have some follow up questions for you all 

about how this information is coming back to our watch list and 

the like, and I would look forward to submitting those questions on 

the record and getting your responses. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Hassan. 

Ms. Shiao, I was encouraged by your testimony in terms of the 

flow of the dead-enders, I guess. Outside, it is very difficult to do. 

What are the primary escape routes? We had the migrant flow 

when Turkey was not really enforcing its borders. Has that been 

the most significant reason we have been able to clamp down on 

that? What are other escape route potentials? 

Ms. SHIAO. Certainly, Turkey has been a key area of concern. 

The migrant flow into Europe has improved in the last year or so. 

As you know, ISIS sent several operatives into Europe for attacks 

back in 2015 by exploiting that migrant flow of both refugees and 

migrants themselves, and it has been difficult for our European 
22 

partners to fully vet each individual, but there have been increased 

border controls put in place since that time. And the EU-Turkey 

Migration Agreement, which was signed back in March 2016, we 

think that also stemmed the flow a bit. 

And I would just reiterate when we talk about this, I mentioned 

already the fact that we work very closely with our foreign partners to make sure that all of the information that is available on 

terrorist identities becomes part of TIDE and is useful in terms of 

screening. 

But I also just want to emphasize that unlike in the European 

space, in the United States applicants who are applying for things 

like refugee benefits have little or no control over where they are 

going to go. They apply through the United Nations (U.N.), and the 

U.N. determines where they are going to refer them based on many 

factors, things like their health, whether they have family in a particular place. So that in conjunction with the robust screening that 

I have mentioned is definitely something that I think puts us in 

better stead that our European partners, but some of the challenges that they face to disruption are very similar in terms of the 

use of secure mobile messaging apps and the fact that these days, 

we are seeing an emphasis in propaganda on using widely available materials that make it more difficult for law enforcement to 

detect sort of a lower barrier of entry into that space. 

Chairman JOHNSON. The biggest risk of ISIS fighters escaping 

the war zone in Syria was really through Turkey, correct? There 

is really not—— 

Ms. SHIAO. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. Very attractive escape routes 

elsewhere, correct? 

Ms. SHIAO. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Can you just assess the current relationship 

between al-Qaeda and ISIS? 

Ms. SHIAO. The current relationship between al-Qaeda and ISIS, 

well, there will be rivalries there, but that is definitely the case. 

And in some places, for instance, Somalia, there is open hostilities 

between ISIS elements and al-Qaeda-aligned elements like 

Shabaab. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But there are also areas of potential agreement and cooperation, and will that relationship continue to 

evolve? 

Ms. SHIAO. Sure, it will. 

I mean, I do think in terms of—a good point to make about 

HVEs, because we talk about the two groups as being very separate, the typical HVE, both here or someone who is self-radicalizing 

and inspired by on the Internet, these distinctions between which 

group, whether it is ISIS or al-Qaeda, whether it is current propaganda or whether it is something very historic like the Awlaki 

things that are available in large abundance online is not necessarily important. It is the resonance of the material and the overall message, some of the themes coming against the United States 

and the West as fundamental enemies, which are probably what is 

going to resonate most with those kinds of individuals. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Mr. Mitchell, in a hearing in the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman Corker talked about 19 
23 

different nations or countries that we have a Defense Department 

presence trying to combat this type of terror threat. Which are the 

most likely failed States that could be set up as a new base of operations for either ISIS or al-Qaeda? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you for the question, Senator. 

I think the areas that we have seen that are the most troubling 

and provide the most potential for ISIS in particular to establish 

a new base, first of all, would be Yemen, which has—I think everyone on the Committee is well aware, it has a failed government 

and is racked by civil war. Even when it was not civil war, there 

was extensive conflict within the society and support for al-Qaeda, 

and now we have seen some support for the Islamic State there in 

Yemen. 

Libya, another failed State already. We have seen ISIS attempt 

to establish a foothold there. They have not been successful. We 

have managed to strike some of their training camps and set them 

back pretty significantly, but it is an area where I think we will 

see them continue. 

And then in the Sahel, Southern Libya, Mali, Niger, the vast 

ungoverned spaces there are areas that we are particularly concerned with. 

Chairman JOHNSON. What is the threat within Southeast Asia? 

Mr. MITCHELL. We have seen a—first of all, within the Philippines, Marawi City, and the ISIS seizure of that and a siege that 

lasted several months. So that is an area of increased concern. 

And then Indonesia increasingly has become a haven for Islamist 

extremists. And we have seen it not just in the—society at large 

but also in the government. One of the challenges that we face with 

a country like Indonesia and foreign fighters returning is that they 

do not have the domestic legal authorities to arrest and charge 

these people with anything, so that—they come, they go into society. Some of them do get arrested for other crimes, but we are concerned that prisons are serving as a source of radicalization. So the 

threat in Southeast Asia is definitely a concern for us. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So based on our historical experience, we 

basically allowed al-Qaeda to develop a base of operation in Afghanistan, and then we allowed ISIS to rise in the ashes of what 

was al-Qaeda in Iraq. Would it be safe to say that a top priority 

of the Defense Department and really of our U.S. policy would be 

to prevent the buildup to a point where they have a pretty strong 

presence in a failed State? I mean, is that, first of all, the first step, 

a top priority in these 19 nations? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Absolutely. That is one of the reasons, for example, why we are in West Africa and why we have been in Somalia 

and North Africa—because we recognized years ago that these 

were potential areas, and we are trying to get there, get ahead of 

the extremists movements there. Same within the Philippines and 

other parts of Asia. And so that is definitely part of the Department strategy. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. I am going to have another line of 

questioning. 

Senator Daines, are you ready to ask your questions? 
24 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAINES 

Senator DAINES. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Go ahead. 

Senator DAINES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

McCaskill. 

Thank you all for testifying here today. 

Since 9/11, the United States has made great progress in curbing 

terrorism around the globe, and we are thankful for that. As U.S.- 

backed forces regained control in Raqqa, President Trump aptly 

noted that—and I quote—‘‘The end of the ISIS caliphate is in 

sight.’’ Yet our homeland remains very vulnerable. In fact, within 

days of the victory in Raqqa, a young man from Uzbekistan drove 

a truck down a bicycle lane in New York City killing eight, wounding a dozen others, in the name of Allah. This was noted by the 

Heritage Foundation as the 100th terror plot on U.S. soil since 

9/11, just blocks away from One World Trade Center. 

Defending the homeland is arguably more difficult than fighting 

terrorism abroad, given the patchwork of authorities and capabilities each agency provides as well as the inherent complexities of 

protecting civil society, without compromising constitutional liberties. 

Over the past decade, extremist groups, such as ISIS, have increasingly leveraged social media to recruit as well as to radicalize. 

Fox News recently reported how Facebook is using artificial intelligence and machine learning to detect as well as filter these 

threats. 

Mr. Taylor, you touched on this in your testimony. My question 

is, How can the government incentivize and leverage this activity 

among private businesses while at the same time preserving First 

Amendment rights? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir, for the question. 

I would say homeland security, as you know, is a shared responsibility, so it is not one entity, whether it is the FBI or NCTC, 

DOD, that is going to be able to respond and protect all aspects of 

the threats that are facing the country. 

I think our biggest part from DHS’s perspective is partnerships. 

It is a responsibility and one of the things that is in our core competencies is to work with our private sector, our State and locals, 

in order to best identify and provide them with the information 

that is relevant so that they can take action, so that they can police 

themself when it comes to some of these areas, while also protecting people’s First Amendment’s rights for comments. 

I think it is a significant challenge working with the private sector, whether it is with the critical infrastructure sector, which is 95 

percent owned by private industry, in order to leverage the data 

that we own or we possess within the IC informing them at the 

level in which it can be actually actioned, so that they can take action to mitigate threats that they face, or to also identify whether 

it is insider threats, etc., that wish to do them harm. 

Senator DAINES. The FBI has identified the Internet and social 

media as two of the greatest factors contributing to the terrorism 

threat landscape. In fact, one company in my hometown of Bozeman, Montana, has developed advanced technologies to deny, disrupt, and defend against advanced cyber risks, which were used ex-
25 

tensively, in fact, during the last presidential election, and they 

helped identify four ISIS members in Germany this time last year. 

Ms. Floris, how does the FBI’s counterterrorism strategies address these threats, and how is the agency leveraging private-sector companies, new technologies, such as HOPLITE, to identify and 

investigate potential threats? 

Ms. FLORIS. Thank you, sir. 

I can certainly say that from the Counterterrorism Division’s perspective, the increases in use in social media to radicalize and inspire individuals has certainly been a concern of ours, especially 

with the rise of ISIS, and we have significantly shifted resources 

to address this change and how they essentially reach individuals 

here in the United States. 

I would say in the 2015 timeframe, this became more apparent 

than any other timeframe that we were tracking ISIS. 

We continue to have outreach to the private-sector companies, 

dialogue about what the threat picture is, how relevant social 

media is to the increased threat picture we face here in the homeland. 

Propagating terrorist messaging in and of itself is not a crime, 

so we are certainly limited based on what we can and cannot do 

with First Amendment-protected rights. 

That being said, socializing these private companies to the threat 

and to how their companies in social media is being used to propagate the message then empowers them to do something on their behalf with the tools that they have in place within their own companies, and we have certainly seen some successes in the private sector industry, a more willingness to work with the U.S. Government, 

and essentially be part of the solution when it comes to thwarting 

these national security threats. 

Senator DAINES. Having been one who spent 13 years in a cloud 

computing startup, I went from a small company to a world-class 

enterprise software operation. I am grateful that we are keeping an 

eye on some of these fast-moving, fast-developing startups. Oftentimes the greatest innovation is found—they always say nobody 

gets fired for buying—you fill in the blank—your large enterprise 

software company. I will not make anybody mad here by putting 

a name in there, but I think sometimes we see the best solutions 

coming out of the private sector and some of these smaller companies. 

I want to shift gears here and talk about some cyber attacks, one 

that was very relevant to my State, and a clandestine cyber attack. 

These have become the preferred weapon of our adversaries to adversely affect Americans here at home. 

We had a recent attack on a Montana school in Columbia Falls 

by an overseas actor. It forced the closure of several schools. It affected over 15,000 students. 

Ms. Shiao, how is the intelligence community staying ahead of 

these threats, and is the information gathered being used in meaningful ways to reduce these types of attacks? 

Ms. SHIAO. I can definitely speak to this from the perspective of 

terrorist use of the Internet, and at NCTC, we coordinate wholeof-government integrated action on terrorist use of the Internet, 
26 

particularly ISIS, as part of the larger defeat-ISIS strategies that 

we develop. 

In the analytic community, it is obviously a large focus of our attention to make sure that we accurately assess all terrorist cyber 

capabilities. As I had said, earlier, we do not see hacking skills as 

one of ISIS’s core strengths in particular. For them, we worry 

about the propaganda space, but I am happy to defer to DHS or 

others who cover cyber more broadly than just from a terrorism 

perspective. 

Senator DAINES. Thoughts on that, Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, I would say from DHS’s perspective, part of our 

goal is to inform those, whether it is State and local government 

or private-sector entities, of the threat that has been identified 

from the IC, getting it into a level that it can be shared and passed 

on to the State and local network defenders, etc. so that they can 

take the proactive or mitigation activities in order to eliminate the 

threat. 

It is something in which our National Protection and Programs 

Directorate does every day with taking that information and working with those sectors, and with those State and locals, whether it 

is by the deployment of cert teams that are going out to help the 

mitigation of vulnerabilities, or threats that have occurred, or attacks that have happened to help them reconstitute their activities, 

so that is from the DHS aspect. 

Directly to your question on the events at the Montana school, 

I would defer to the FBI. 

Senator DAINES. OK. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Daines. 

I just have a couple lines of questioning, and then we will close 

out the hearing. 

When we talk about the cyber caliphate, in my mind, it is really 

split in two categories. One is encryption being used, but quite honestly, I am not sure there is much of anything we can really do 

about it. 

By the determined terrorists, people are already part of the organization, people they have identified that they want to help direct, 

and then you just have the more broad use of the social media platforms. And I think both of those really represent totally different 

risks and aspects of this. 

We have talked about social media companies trying to identify 

automatically, take down some of these materials. I want to talk 

a little bit—and it is one of the reasons I asked Justice Department 

to be part of this—the legal authority we have, and I want to do 

it in the framework of what we currently do with the laws in the 

books, for example, to combat child pornography versus what legal 

authorities we have to combat instructions on how to commit terrorist acts. 

Can you just kind of speak to the difference between those two 

aspects? Do we need expanded legal authority to be able to force 

this—well, first of all, to make it illegal, the use of it, the 

downloading of it? 

Can you speak to that, Ms. Floris? 
27 

Ms. FLORIS. So as far as expanding authorities, I would have to 

defer that line of questioning to my colleagues at the Department 

of Justice. 

I will say that right now, possessing, downloading, storing any 

sort of radicalizing material in and of itself is not a crime, again, 

because the protection of the First Amendment. That being 

said—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, again, child pornography is. 

Ms. FLORIS. Absolutely, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So we have a real distinction there. OK. 

Ms. FLORIS. Absolutely. And whether we need and/or are pushing 

for legislation on the idea of extremist propaganda, I certainly cannot speak to that, but I am happy to take that question back. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Because the fact of the matter is, if we 

make it more difficult to obtain this, we make it illegal to download 

it, again, we certainly have not removed all child pornography off 

the Internet, but it is probably far less prevalent on the Internet 

than some of this ISIS inspiring-type material, correct? I mean, is 

that basically a true statement? 

Ms. FLORIS. You are absolutely right. We being the FBI have not 

taken down any sort of extremist propaganda. As I said, some companies are doing it on their own accord, and we have seen some 

successes in removing extremist content from these social media 

platforms. 

What we are doing is continuing to work with our IC partners 

and certainly our partners in DOD to identify individuals involved 

in the production of this media, individuals we know are definitively tied to foreign terrorist organizations, individuals that we 

can actually go out there and charge with some sort of material 

support clause. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Would any other witnesses want to command on that particular point? 

Mr. MITCHELL. I would just say from the Department of Defense 

perspective, we have very actively sought to identify and to target 

those individuals and those nodes, particularly within Iraq and 

Syria, the leadership and their lower echelons that are involved in 

that production, and I think we have done that very effectively. We 

have seen a significant decrease in there propaganda output. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, again, without giving away any State 

secrets on this, is it possible for us to identify where this is coming 

from and pretty effectively target it, or is it pretty difficult because 

it is very difficult to identify the source within the World Wide 

Web? 

Mr. MITCHELL. I think there are some efforts that we can identify, and this is another area where our efforts under the Operation 

Gallant Phoenix in Jordan become very important because if we 

can identify them and they are one of those countries that we are 

partnered with, we can share that information with their law enforcement agencies and identify those individuals and hopefully 

bring them to justice. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Again, I am centering on this because this 

is the new caliphate in cyberspace. 
28 

For example, Ms. Floris, I just want to ask you the question. 

ISIS has claimed responsibility for the Las Vegas attack. Have you 

uncovered any evidence that would lend credence to that claim? 

Ms. FLORIS. No, sir, we have no evidence at this point that Las 

Vegas was ideologically motivated. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. 

Ms. Floris, also in your testimony, you spoke about the Section 

702 authority expiring at the end of this year. I will ask all the witnesses. Is there any evidence? Has there been any claim of an 

abuse, civil liberties abuse under Section 702 since it has been enacted? Because that is obviously one of the pushbacks of reauthorizing that program. 

And then I would also ask you to talk about why you think it 

is pretty important to reauthorize that. 

Ms. FLORIS. Sure. I can start and certainly turn it over to my colleagues. 

To your first question, sir, not that I am aware of that there has 

been any abuses of this tool, and I will say that the FBI strongly 

supports renewal of 702 collection. It is one of the most valuable 

tools, I would say, in our toolkit when it comes to thwarting the 

national security threats that we face today. 

In the world we live in today, we are finding just one piece of 

intelligence can lead to a complete disruption. In my mind, we need 

to be cognizant to maintain whatever we have to make sure that 

we are well placed to identify those nodes of intelligence. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, again, without revealing any classified 

information, are there any metrics you can point to of how effective 

Section 702 has been, attacks thwarted, that type of thing? 

Ms. FLORIS. Not off the top of my head, sir, but I am certainly 

happy to take that question back. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Can you say that there have been attacks—— 

Ms. FLORIS. There have been, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON. There have been attacks thwarted because 

of Section 702? 

Ms. FLORIS. Yes, sir. There is one example that comes to mind 

that I can certainly speak to in a classified setting. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. 

I would just ask, Mr. Taylor, you do have—DHS does have—and 

the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has the legal authority to 

collect and disseminate this type of threat information. Part of the 

reason DHS was established was after the 9/11 incident, the attack. There were reports of stovepipes within these different agencies, and this is an attempt to knock down those stovepipes. 

First of all, how effective have we been at eliminating those 

stovepipes? Are they still in existence? Are they being built back 

up? What is the current State of information sharing within our 

agencies? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Senator, for the question. 

I would say within DHS, there is certainly a new review from top 

to bottom as far as integrating, better integrating intelligence and 

operation within the Department as a whole. 

Whether it is daily conferences that the Secretary will host with 

the operation components to ensure when the threat information 
29 

has been identified from the IC that there is appropriate mitigation 

response, and what are long-term vulnerabilities identified from 

the Department aspect. 

Working closely with our State and locals, that is an everyday 

activity that the deployed personnel of the Department, whether 

from I&A proper or from the other operation components, generally 

tried to leverage the entities that are deployed around the country, 

whether you are in southwest Texas, southeast Texas, etc on the 

information that they have—State and locals, that is relevant to 

the IC and pulling that information back to ensure it is appropriately shared. 

But it is a two-way street. It is the responsibility of our Department to ensure that the information from the IC that is relevant 

to our State and local partners is put into a form that can be 

shared at the appropriate classification level so that they can take 

actions to mitigate responses and threats within. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And I would say that is the pretty consistent complaint I have from State and local is send a lot of information up, do not get nearly as much back down. I understand 

there is a real issue there too. 

So any other of the witnesses want to comment on that? Are you 

particularly identify problems that need to be addressed. 

Start with you, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I thank you, Senator. 

I am not aware of any significant problems. I think our overall 

inter-agency communications are working very well and better 

than they have in a long time. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So it has been improved significantly since 

9/11? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, absolutely. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Ms. Shiao. 

Ms. SHIAO. I absolutely agree, and I would just emphasize that 

at NCTC, we see it as a very core and critical part of our mission 

to keep State, local, and tribal officials completely informed of the 

threat picture. So all of our analysts when they are sitting down, 

even to write for the most senior customers, are also thinking 

about how they can tell that story at the lowest classification level, 

get it out to the unclassified arena, and figure out how to inform 

that audience in particular. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Ms. Floris. 

Ms. FLORIS. I would certainly echo the comments of my colleagues. Information, intelligence sharing, whether it is across the 

community or with our partners, is absolutely paramount to our 

mission, and you can look at any one of the hundreds of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) we have across all 56 of our field offices as really a primary example of this inter-agency collaboration 

and collaboration with our State and local partners as well. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Thank you. 

Well, again, I want to thank the witnesses for taking the time 

to testify, the answers to our questions, your testimony, for your 

service to this Nation. Please convey the gratitude of this Committee and quite honestly I think every American to the men and 

women in your agencies that are doing everything they can to keep 

this Nation safe and secure, so our sincere gratitude and thanks. 
30 

With that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days until 

December 21, 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and questions for the record. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
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