### NUM BER 13-08- 0025 4-CV 

## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS CORPUS CHRI ST I - E DI NBURG
KA TH RYN A NN RA CK LE Y, A pp ellan t,
v . A DVA NCED CYCLING CONCEPTS I NC. D/B /A PU M P ITU P, A pp ellee.
On ap pe al f rom th e 4 4th D istrict Co urt of D allas Co un ty , T exas . 

## ME MOR A N D U M OP I N I ON B efo re C h ie f Ju st ic e Va ld eza n d J u st ic es G arza a n d V el a

M em o ra n d u m Op in io n b y J u st ic e Ga rza Appel lan t , K a t h ry n Ann Rac kl ey , app eal s from a s ummary j udg ment g ra nted in fav or of appell ee, A dv anced C y cl ing C oncep ts, Inc . d/ b/a P ump ItU p ( “A CC”)

. B y o ne i ss ue, Rac kl ey co ntends that the tr ial co urt er re d i n g ra nti ng AC C’ s mot ion for s ummary j udg ment becau se AC C faile d to conc lus iv ely es tabl is h i ts aff ir mati v e defenses of re lea se and
ex pres s a s s um pt i on o f r i s k

. W e affi r m. I. B A CKGRO UND On or aboutM ay

6, 2006, Rac kl ey

sustai ned pers onal i nju ri es at a chi ldren’ s p arty“ P u m p It U p ” is a c h a in o f c h ild r e n ’s p a r ty v e n u e s f e a tu r in g in f la ta b le h o u s e s , s lid e s , a n d o b s ta c le 1 cour ses. T he com pany ’ s pr om ot i onal w ebsi t e expl ai ns: “ Pum p I t U p ha s di scov er ed t he m i ssi ng i ngr edi ent i n c h i l d re n ’ s p a rti e s
. A i r.
. . . J u s t g o t a b u n c h o f k i d s ? W e l l , w e ’ v e g o t a h a p p y ta s ti c p l a c e to s e t t h e m l o o s e .” See A bo ut P um p I t U p, htt p:/ / w w w
. pu m pi t up pa rt y
. c om / A bo utP I U P ag e.as px (l as t vi s i t ed M ar. 13 , 20 09 ). 2 at one of A CC ’s “P ump It Up” facil it ies in Dal las , Tex as. R ack ley co ntends thatsh e w as 1 hel pin g her

y oung so n on a s li de w hen “[A CC ]’ s e mploy ees faile d to keep the b ase of the sl ide cl eared, c a u sing [R ack ley] t o ex itthe sl ide from i ts si de i n order to av oid y oung chi ldren atthe base of the s li de.” Rac kl ey filed sui t on Apr il 2, 2007, all eg ing that AC C w as neg li g ent i n: (1 ) faili ng to proper ly and cont inu ousl y

super v is e a dang erous act iv ity ”; ( 2) “ faili ng to w ar n [R ack ley] of the u nsafe c ondi ti on” ; and ( 3) “ faili ng to ins pect , di sc ov er y [si c], and re medy the c ondi ti on of th e s l i de .” Ac c ordi ng to R ac k l ey , th es e fai l ures c au s ed he r to s uffer “ s er i ously[sic] inj ur ies to her

r ig ht k nee and body

i n g eneral. ” On Apri l 1 3, 2 00 7, A C C fi l ed i ts o r i g i na l a ns w er , g en eral l y d en y i ng R ac k l ey ’s allegation s and asserting the af f irmative defense s o f

e x press assum ption o f risk, w aiver,
re lea se, and cont ri butor y negl ig ence. AC C noted that, pr ior to usi ng the facil ity , R ack ley had sig ned a release form sta ting as fo llow s: In conside ration of b eing all ow ed to enter into the play area and/or partici pate in any party and/or program at Pump It Up of Dalla s, TX, the undersigne d, on his or h e r o w n behalf, and/or on behalf of the par ti cip ant (s ) id ent if ied belo w , ack no w led ges, ap preciat es, a nd ag rees to t he fo llo w in g con di ti on s: I, the pare nt/le gal guardian of the participan t(s), agree th at th e pa rticipant (s) and I shal l compl y w it h the sta ted and cus tomar y ter ms, ru les and condi ti ons fo r p a rt i c i p a t i o n i n a n y

p a rt y a n d / o r p ro g ra m a tP u mp I tU p
. I n a d d i t i o n , i f I obser v e any haz ard dur ing our

par ti ci pati on, I w il l br ing i t t o the att enti on of t h e n e a re s to f

f ic ia l i m m e d ia t e ly; I am a w are tha t par

ti ci pati on i n Pump It Up prog ra ms, par ti es, and/ or

us e of th e p l a y a r e a a n d i n fl a t a b l e e q u i p me n tc r e a t e s a r i s ko f i n j u r y , a n d I , on beh alf of myself and the participa nt’s [sic], knowingl y and f reely assum e all suc h r is ks , bot h k now n and unkno w n, ev en i f ari si ng from t he neg li g ence of others; and, I, for myself

and the pa rticipant (s), and ou r respe ctiv e he irs, assig ns, admini strators, personal represent ati v es, and next of ki n, he re by rele as e and hold harm less A.C.C., In c. dba Pum p It Up and PIU Mana geme nt, L LC, the ir aff il iat es, off ic ers, members , ag ents , empl oy ees, othe r par ti ci pants , andR ackl ey pr ov i ded t he f ol l owi ng r esponse s t o t wo i dent i cal r equest s f or adm i ssi ons: 2 R EQ U ES T FO R A D M I SS I O N S N O
. 17: Y o u r e a d th e d o c u m e n t a tt a c h e d h e r e to a s E x h ib it “A ” [th e re l e a s e fo rm ] p rio r to s i g n i n g i t. R ESPO N SE: A dm i t t e d.

. . . . R EQ U ES T FO R A D M I SS I O N S N O
. 25: Y o u r e a d th e d o c u m e n t a tt a c h e d h e r e to a s E x h ib it “A ” [th e re l e a s e fo rm ] p rio r to s i g n i n g i t. R ESPO N SE: D en i ed , n o t i n i ts en ti rety. (E m p h a s i s i n o rig i n a l .)

I n i t s am ended m ot i on f or sum m ar y j udgm ent , AC C asser t ed t hat R ackl ey ’ s cl ai m “i s bar r ed by t he 3 aff i r m at i v e de f ense ofassum pt i on o fr i sk

. ” W e no t e, howev er , tha t i m pl i ed assum pt i on o fr i sk has been a b o l i s h e d a s a c o m p l e te a ff i rm a ti v e d e fe n s e i n T e x a s
. Far l ey v. M M C at tl e Co. , 529 S

. W

. 2d 751, 759 ( T ex. 1 9 7 5 ); see Davis v. G reer , 940 S. W

. 2d 5 82, 582 ( T ex. 199 6)

. Accor di ngl y , w e c on s t rue AC C ’ s am ended m o t i o n a s a s s e r t i n g t h e a ff i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e o fe x p r e s s a s s u m p t i o n o fr i s k. 3 spons or ing ag enci es from and ag ain st any and all cl aims , i nju ri es, l iab il it ies or dam ages arising outof or related to participa tion in any and all Pum p It Up programs, activ ities, pa rties, the use of the pla y

area an d/o r infla tab le eq uip ment. (E mphasi s i n or ig ina l. ) In he r re spons e to re q uest s for admi ss ion propounded by AC C, R ack ley

admi tted that she si g ned the re lea se form, but g av e c onfli cti ng ans w ers a s t o w hether sh e read t he form i n i ts enti re ty

pri or to si g nin g i t. R ack ley

al so admit ted t hat s he w atc hed a “P ump It 2 Up safety v ide o” pr ior to enter ing the pla y area and that she “d id not follo w the ru les and/ or ins tr uct ion s a s s et forth” i n the vide o
. F u rt h er , des pit e the co ntent ion s made i n her ple adi ng s, Rac kl ey

deni ed th at s he “ ex it ed the sl ide by cl imbi ng ov er

the si de of the sl ide .” AC C mov ed for tradi ti onal s u m m a ry j udg ment on September 24, 2007, ass erti ng that itw as enti tl ed to j udg ment as a mat ter of law on i ts af f irm a ti ve d e f ense of rel ease. AC C subs eq uentl y

fil ed an amended mot ion for t ra dit ion al summar y j udg ment on Novembe r 28, 20 07, add ing a conten tion tha t it h ad a lso esta blished its af f irmative defense of ex press ass umpti on of r is k. On Janua ry 31, 2008, the tr ial cour t re n d e re d ju dg ment 3 grant ing ACC’ s ame nde d m o t ion “in all respects” an d stat ing that Rackley’s negligence cl aim “fai ls as a mat ter of law .” Thi s a ppeal foll ow ed.4 II. D I S CUS S I ON A
. St and ard o f Rev iew W e rev iew

a tri al cour

t’ s g ra nt or

deni al of a tradi ti onal moti on for summar y j udg ment under a de nov o s tandard of rev iew

. Cr editwatch, Inc. v. Ja ck

son , 157 S.W .3d 8 14, 8 16
n .7 (T e x. 20 0 5 ) (ci ti n g Schn eider Nat’ l Car ri er s, Inc . v . Ba tes , 147 S.W .3d 264, 29 0 n.1 37 (Tex . 200 4) ); Ala n iz

v. Hoyt , 105 S.W .3d 3 30, 3 45 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 2003, no pet .). To o bta in relief

v ia a traditio nal m otion fo r s u m m aryjudgmen t, the movant m ust est abl is h tha t no mater ial f actiss ue ex is ts and that it is entitl ed to judg ment as a matter of law

. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 166a( c) ; Garza v. Exel Lo gistics, Inc. , 1 6 1 S

. W

. 3 d 4 7 3 , 4 7 5 n
. 1 0 (T e x. 2 0 0 5 ) (“[ A ] d e fe n d a n t m o vin g fo r s u m m a ry j u d gm e n to n a n a f f ir m a t ive d e fe n s e m u s tp ro ve each elem entof

its def ense as a ma tter of law , leaving no issues o f mat erial fact.”); Mow bray v. Avery , 76 S. W .3d 663 , 690 (T e x. A p p
. –Corpu s Christi 200 2, pe t. de nied ). After the mov ant p ro duces ev ide nce suffici ent to show it is enti tl ed to summary j udg ment, the n on- mov ant mus t then pres ent ev ide nce ra is ing a facti ss ue. See W alker v. Harris , 924 S.W .2d 3 7 5, 37 7 ( Tex . 199 6)

. In de ci din g w hether there i s a di sput ed fact is sue that precl udes summar

y jud g ment, ev ide nce fav orabl e to the non- mov ant w il l be tak en as tr ue. Am . Toba cco Co. v. Grinne ll , 9 5 1 S. W .2 d 42 0 , 4 2 5 (T e x. 19 9 7 ) (ci ti n g Ni xon v. Mr

. Pr op. Mg m t. Co. , 6 9 0 S .W .2d 5 46, 5 48- 49 ( Tex . 198 5) ). Ev ide nce fav orabl e to the mov ant, how ev er , w il l not be c onsi dered unl ess i t i s u ncont ro v erted. Gr eat Am . Res er

ve Ins . C o.
v. San A ntoni

o Plum bin g Supp ly

C o. , 391 S.W .2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1965 ). M oreo v er, every
re asona ble inference must be ind ulg ed in fav or of the n on- mov ant a nd any doubt s resol v ed in it s fav or
. Grinne ll , 9 5 1 S. W .2 d at42 5 (cit in g Ni xon , 690 S.W .2d at 549 ). B. A pp licab le L aw A n a gr e e m e n tp u rp o rt in g t o a b s o lve a p a rt yo f t h e co n s e qu e n c e s o f it s o wn neg li g ence is not enforc eabl e unl ess i t c onforms to the tw in fair noti ce re q uirements of (1 )
cons pic uou sn e ss and (2 ) the e x press neg li g ence doct ri ne. Dr ess er Indu s., Inc . v

. Pa ge Pet roleum, Inc. , 853 S .W .2d 5 05, 507 (Tex. 1993 ); Ens er ch Cor p. v . Pa rk er , 794 S.W .2d5

2, 9 (Tex . 199 0)

. A co n tractw hic h fail s t o s ati sfyei ther of the fai r noti ce re q uirements
w hen t hey

are i mposed is unenfor ceabl e as a matt er of law

. Sto rage & Processo rs, Inc.
v. Rey es , 1 3 4 S

. W

. 3 d 1 9 0 , 1 9 2 (T e x. 2 0 0 4 ). Ho we ve r, if b o t h co n t ra c t in g p a rt ie s h a ve act ual kn ow led g e of the cont ra ct’ s t er ms, the fair noti ce re q uirements need not be s ati sfied. Id. ( ci ti ng Dresser Indus. , 853 S.W .2d at 508 n.2). The cons pic uousn ess req uirement manda tes that “s omethi ng must appear on t he face of the [co ntract ] to attra ct the attent ion of a reas onabl e person w hen he loo ks at it .” Id. (quo ti n g Dresser Indu s. , 853 S.W .2d a t 508 ); Am tech Elevato r Servs. Co. v. CSFB 199 8-P1 Buffa lo Spe edway Office Ltd. P’ ship , 248 S.W .3d 3 73, 3 77 ( Tex . Ap p.–H oust on [1s t D is t.] 2007, no p et.)

. A te rm is cons pic uous w hen iti s w ri tten, di spl ay ed, o r present ed
suc h tha t a re asona ble person ag ain st w hic h it is to operate oug ht t o hav e not ic ed i t. T EX
. B US
. & C OM
. C OD E A NN
. § 1.2 01(b )(10) (Vernon Supp . 200 8) (li sting w ays to make a term consp icuou s). Und er the ex press negl ig ence doct ri ne, a n i ntentto re lea se one of the par ti es from the c onseq uence s o f its ow n negl ig ence “ must be speci fical ly stated in the four

co rn ers o f the docu me nt.” Rey

es , 13 4 S. W .3 d at19 2 (quo ti n g Ethy l Cor p. v . D aniel Con str

. C o. , 725 S

. W

. 2 d 7 0 5 , 7 0 7 ( Te x
. 1 9 8 7 )) ; Am tech , 2 48 S. W .3d a t 377

. Mo re ov er , t he i ntentto release “must be ex presse d in una mb iguous term s.” OXY U SA, Inc . v . Sw. Ener

gy Pr od. Co. , 161 S.W .3d 2 77, 282 (Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 2005, pet. deni ed) ; see als o ALC OA v. Hydroche mIndu s. Servs. , No. 13- 02- 00531- CV , 2005 T ex . App. LE X IS 2 010, at * 20- 21 (Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti M ar . 17, 2005, pet. deni ed) (m em. op. , notdes ig nated for pub lication) ( “Ex press negli gence does no t ma nda te th at in orde r fo r an inde mn ity clause to be enforcea ble it mu st be th e be st or the brief est po s s ib le s t a t em entof the pa rties’ inten tions, only tha t it specif ically def ine th e pa rties’ intent .”). W hether an a g re ement meet s e it her fair noti ce re q uirement is a q uest ion of law for the c our t. Dresser Indu s. , 853 S.W .2d a t 5 0 9 . The re q uirements appl y to any ag re ement—whet her

l abel ed as an i ndemni ficat ion , rele ase, w aiv er , or othe rw is e—t hatI n Enserch , th e s u p re m e c o u rt c o n s i d e re d w h e th e r a n i n d e m n i ty p ro v i s i o n w a s “c o n s p i c u o u s .” I ts 4 f i ndi ngs, equ al l y app l i cabl e t o t he r el ease f or m i n t he i nst ant case, wer e as f ol l ows:

T he ent i r e cont r act

. . . consi st s of one page; t he i ndem ni t y l angua ge i s on t he f r ont si de o f t he co nt r act and i s not hi dden undera separ at e he adi ng. T he e xcul pat or y l angua ge a nd t he i ndem ni t y l angua ge, al t hough cont ai ned i n sep ar at e sen t ences, app ear t oget her i n t he sa m e pa rag r aph and t he i ndem ni t y l angua ge i s not sur r ounde d bycom pl et el y unr el at ed t er m s. C o n s e q u e n tl y , t h e i n d e m n i ty l a n g u a g e i s s u ff i c i e n tl y c o n s p i c u o u s to a ff o rd “fa i r n o ti c e ” o f i ts exi st ence. Enserch Cor

p. v. Par

ker , 79 4 S

. W

. 2d 2, 9 (T ex
. 19 90 ). 6 pur por ts to s hift t he r is k o f the defendant’ s n eg li g ence to t he pl ain ti ff

. Id. at 508, 509. They must be sat is fied in order to est abl is h the d efenses of rel ease and ex press as sumpti on of ri sk

. See i

d. at 509 ( appl y ing fair

noti ce re q uirements to re lea ses ); Po lley v. Odom , 957 S.W .2d 9 32, 9 38 ( Tex . Ap p.–W aco 1997, n o p e t.) ( appl y ing fair noti ce re q uirements to ag re ement un der

w hic h pla in ti f

f agreed t o “ ass ume al l ri sk of los s” ), vac ated on ot her gr ounds , 963 S.W .2d 917 , 918 (Tex. App. –W aco 1 998 , no pe t.). C. A nal ysis Rac kl ey does not dis pute that the rele ase form meets the fair noti ce re q uirement of
cons pic uousn ess
. See Enserch , 794 S.W .2d at 9. Mo re ov er , R ack ley co ncede d i n her 4
re spons es to ACC ’s req uestfor admi ss ion s t hat s he s ig ned t he rele ase form pr ior to usi ng ACC’s fac i l i ti es an d s us ta i ni ng he r i nj ur i es
. The s ol e q ue s ti on be fore us , th erefo r e, i s
w he th er t he rel ea s e for m co mp l i es w i th t he e x pres s n eg l i g en c e do c tr i ne
. R ac k l ey c l ai ms tha t the form d oes n ot so com ply, not ing that “it req uires the reade r to in fer t hat[ ACC] is bein g release d for its ow n ne gli gence, a nd requires the read e r t o infer thatRackleyis
ass uming the ri sk

of inj ur y from [AC C] ’s ow n neg li g ence. ” Rackley directs us to two passages in the release form a nd a sserts tha t the y each f a il t o c o mp ly

w ith the ex press ne gli gence do ctrine. First, Rackley point s to the third para graph of

the relea se form, w hich sta tes th at “I . . . knowi n gl y a n d f reely assum e all
suc h r is ks , bot h k now n and unkno w n, ev en i f ari sing f ro m the neg ligence of oth ers
. . . ” (emp hasis ad ded ). R ackley cl aim s t hatt his state me nt doe s not com port wi th th e express neg li g ence doct ri ne bec ause it“ re fers to t he neg li g ence of third par ti es, and not t o the7

neg li g ence of [AC C] .” In s uppor

t of this contenti on, Rac kl ey cite s tw o cases w here c our ts hav e s ug g est ed tha t the phrase “the ne gli gence of oth ers” refers strictly to the neglig ence of

third parties. See Farme rsT

e x
. Count

y Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin , 8 6 8 S

. W

. 2 d 8 6 1 , 8 6 5 -6 6 (T e x. App .–Dallas 1 993 , w rit denied ) ( in v olvi ng uninsu red/u nde rinsured m oto rists ( “UIM” )
cov erag e i n aut omobil e i nsurance pol ic ies ); Scar bor ough v. Em

ployer s Cas . Co. , 820 S.W .2d 3 2, 34 ( Tex . Ap p.–F ort W orth 1991, w ri t den ied ) (s ame). R ack ley urg es that the thi rd parag ra ph of the re lea se form l ik ew is e appl ies only to the n eg li g ence of third par ti es and notto the n eg li g ence of ACC

. W e di sag re e. Both cas es ci ted b y

R ack ley are i nappos ite here. In Scar bor ough , the a ppel lan t insured w as inj ured i n an acc ide nt i n w hic h her hus band, w ho w as cov ered unde r appel lan t’ s p oli cy , w as the d ri v er
. 820 S. W .2d a t 33. Th e a p p ell ant c ontende d tha t t he terms o f he r

p ol i c y , w hi c h de ni ed U IM c ov erag e, v i ol at ed a rti c l e 5. 06

- 1 of t he i nsura nce code. Id. ; see T EX
. I NS
. C OD E A NN
. art 5. 06- 1, § 1 ( Ver non 198 1)

. The appel lan t urg ed th e
cour t t o c o n sid e r the p oli cy arg ument made in an ear li er ca se that, by

purchas ing U IM
cov erag e, “‘ the ins ured has ex press ed an int ent not o nly to protec t ot hers from hi s o r her own negli gence bu t also to p rotectthatperson ’s own f am ily a nd g uest s from the
n e g l i g e n c e o f oth ers .’” Scar bor ough , 8 2 0 S. W .2 d at34 (quo ti n g Strace ner v. United Servs. A u to
. A s s ’n , 777 S.W .2d 378, 384 (Tex

. 1989) ) (e mphasi s in or ig ina l)

. The cour t hel d tha t the p olicy

t erms w ere notviolativ e of the sta tute , not ing that “[t]h e insta nt case is fact ually di fferen t [from Str

acene r ]

. . . a s t h e a p p e ll a n to r h e r h u s b a n d d ri ve r i s t h e a b o ve ‘o wn family ,’ and w e see the neg li g ence of ‘ others’ as meanin g the n eg li g ence of strang ers t o the policy hold er’s fa mily, not app ellant ’s husba nd. ” Id. Rackley interp rets this hold ing as an indication tha t the w ord “oth ers” in a contract
canno t refer t o an y p a rt y to that cont ra ct; w e di sag re e. Al thoug h the Scar bor ough court hel d tha t “ others” co uld not re fer to an ins ured’ s family member w ho w as als o an ins ured
u n d e r t h e p o li c y, t h e co u rtd id n o tsa y t h a tt h e wo rd co u ld n o tre fe r t o a n y oth er party to t he8

i n s u ra n c e p o l i c y , s u c h a s t h e i n s u r e r i t s e l f. The Griffin ca se is si mil ar ly unhel pful to ou r anal y si s. The c our t i n tha t c ase sta ted tha t in the co nte xt of

UIM insuran ce coverage, the word “ oth ers” m ust me an th ird parties; other w is e “ UI M cov erag e w oul d aut omati cal ly bec ome a s econd l ay er of li abi li ty

i nsurance, prote cting fa mily me mb ers f rom e ach o the r’s negli gent driv ing.” Griffin , 868 S.W .2d a t 868

. Here, t he pl ain m eani ng of the thi rd parag ra ph of

the re lea se form i ndi cat es that itappl ies t o cl a i ms w h i c h ma y

ar i s e fr o m t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f any p arty other than Rac kl ey , i ncl udi ng AC C. There i s n o reason , as there may be in the cas e of UIM i nsurance cov erag e, t o i nfer that “t he neg li g ence of ot hers” ex cl udes the n eg li g ence of the ot her par ty to the c ontract

. W e find that the t hird paragraph of the re lea se form i s u nambig uous and s ati sfies the
ex press neg li g ence doct ri ne. T he se cond passa ge of the relea se form th at Rackley takes issue wi th is the form’s f inal clause , w hich sta tes th at A CC i s r e lease d “f rom a nd a gainst any and all claims, i nj ur i es , l i ab i l i ti es or

dama g es ar i s i ng outo f or rel at ed t o pa rti c i pa ti on i n an y a nd a l l P um p It U p p ro g ra ms , a c t i v i t i e s , p a rt i e s , t h e u s e o f t h e p l a y a r e a a n d / o r

i n fl a t a b l e e q u i p me nt.” Rackley claims th at th e lack of the w ord “neglig ence ” or any of its cognates in the clause
re nders i t une nforce abl e under the ex press neg li g ence doct ri ne. Ag ain , w e di sag re e. Thoug h i t i s t ru e th a t the f ina l cl ause does not c ontai n the w ord “ neg li g ence, ” Rackley has p oin t e d t o n o au tho rity stating thatinclusion of this w ord is specif ically
neces sar

y for th e c la use to be enforc eabl e. Ins tead, the law merely prov ide s t hat t he int ent t o s hift t he r is k o f one par ty ’s neg li g ence to t he ot her par ty be “ spec ific all y

st ated, ”
see Rey es , 134 S.W .3d at 192 , and “unam biguous, ” see OXY US A , 161 S.W .3d at 28 2. T h e f in a l c la u s e sp e c if ic a ll y st a t e s t h a t it a p p li e s t o “a n y a n d a ll cl a im s ” R a c k le y m a y h a ve against ACC arising outof her use of

the Pu mp It Up facilit y. Mo re o ve r, the clau se is unambi g uous— not onl y does it absol v e AC C of the c onseq uence s o f its ow n neg ligence , but i t al so rel eases ACC f ro m li abi li ty w it h resp ectto cl aims bas ed on any othe r theor

y ofR ac k l ey no t es co rr ec t l y t ha t A C C c ou l d ha ve l eft n o do ub t a s to the e nfo rce ab i l i t y of t he rel ea s e fo rm 5 had i t si m pl y i nser t ed t he a phr ase ak i n t o “ i ncl udi ng cl ai m s ar i si ng out oft he negl i gence ofA C C , i t s off i cer s, agent s and em pl oy ees. ” However , t he f act t hat the fo rm w as i m per f ect l y dr af t ed h as no bea r i ng o n t he q u e s ti o n o f w h e th e r i t p ro v i d e d s p e c i fic a n d u n a m b i g u o u s “fa i r n o ti c e ” o f A C C ’ s i n te n t. 9 recovery
. Becau se the inten t to shif t the risk of

ACC’s negligence to Rackley is specif ically 5 and una mb iguously state d in the rele ase form, t he form sa tisf ies the ex press ne gli gence doct ri ne. See R eyes , 134 S.W .3d a t 192 ; OXY US A , 161 S.W .3d a t 282

. W e c oncl ude t hat t he rele ase form met b oth fai r noti ce re q uirem e n ts; therefore, AC C est abl is hed i ts aff ir mati v e defenses as a m a tt e r o f law

. Fur ther , bec ause itw as
uncon trov erted t hat R ack ley e xecuted the rele ase form pr ior to usi ng AC C’ s faci li ty and
sus tai nin g her

i nju ri es, there are no outs tandi ng iss ues of materi al fact. Acc ordin g ly , t he tr ial cour t did not e rr

i n g ra nti ng AC C’ s a mended moti on for tradi ti onal su mmary j udg ment. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 166a( c) ; G a r za , 161 S.W .3d a t 475 n.10 ; Mowbray, 76 S.W .3d a t 690

. Rac kl ey ’s so le is sue is ov er ru led

. III
. C ONCL US I ON W e aff ir m the jud g ment of the tr ial co urt.

DO RI C ON TRERAS G AR ZA, J u s t i c e Me moran dum Opi nio n del iv ered and filed thi s t he 19t h day

of Ma rc h, 20 09.