THE JOINT STAFF 

 

The Quadrant Conference: August 1943 

The third historic meeting of Allied leaders in 1943 (Casablanca and Trident occurred earlier in 

the year), the Quadrant Conference (also called the Quebec Conference) was held from August 

14 to 24 in Quebec City, Canada. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister 

Winston S. Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) attended the conference, and 

Canadian prime minister Mackenzie King served as host. Several significant strategic decisions 

for the combined war effort were made at this important series of meetings. 

The opening of a second front in northern France, code-named Operation Overlord, was 

extensively discussed at the conference. Ultimately, the Allied leaders decided that Overlord was 

to be the main effort in Europe for the next year, with a target invasion date of May 1, 1944. In 

the Pacific, one important decision reached at Quadrant was the establishment of the Southeast 

Asia Command in the China-Burma-India Theater. Another major Allied focus in the Pacific was 

planning strategic bombing operations for the defeat of Japan using B-29 Superfortresses. 

Quadrant was one in a series of high-level conferences held by the US and British leaders 

in Washington, DC; Casablanca; Quebec; Cairo; Tehran; Malta; Yalta; and Potsdam to formulate 

the Allied grand strategy. At the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet leader 

Joseph Stalin was also in attendance and played an important role. Reports, memorandums, 

position papers, and maps were prepared by the CCS for the conferences, and minutes were 

taken at the accompanying CCS meetings. Taken together, these documents address virtually 

every policy and strategy issue of the war, from troop deployments, to debates about the location 

and timing of key Allied offensives, to discussions about postwar occupation boundaries. Thus, 
they record the early years of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve as an indispensable primary 

source on the planning and conduct of World War II. 

Originally highly classified, the conference materials were declassified on October 3, 

1973. The Joint History Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is publishing these documents as 

eBooks and web-ready PDFs to make them widely available to historians, faculty and students at 

the joint and service schools and other institutions of higher learning, and the general public. 

In addition to Quadrant, the other conferences are available as eBooks in Mobi, ePub, and 

PDF formats: 

Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), December 24, 1941–January 14, 1942: ISBN 

978-0-16-093887-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093886-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093888-7 (PDF) 

Post-Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), January 23–May 19, 1942: ISBN 978-0-

16-093890-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093889-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093891-7 (PDF) 

Casablanca Conference (Morocco), January 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093893-1 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093892-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093894-8 (PDF) 

Trident Conference (Washington, DC), May 12–25, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093879-5 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093878-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093880-1 (PDF) 

Sextant Conference (Cairo, Egypt), Eureka Conference (Tehran, Iran), and the Second 

Cairo Conference (Egypt), November 22–December 7, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093885-6 (Mobi); 

ISBN 978-0-16-093884-9 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093926-6 (PDF) 

Octagon Conference (Quebec City, Canada), September 12–16, 1944: ISBN 978-0-16-

093925-9 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093927-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093928-0 (PDF) 
Argonaut Conference (Malta and Yalta, Soviet Union), January 30–February 11, 1945: 

ISBN 978-0-16-093930-3 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093929-7 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093924-2 

(PDF) 

Terminal Conference (Potsdam, Germany), July 17–August 2, 1945: ISBN 978-0-16-

093923-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093931-0 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093932-7 (PDF) 

David B. Crist, PhD 

Director for Joint History 
QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

AUGUST 1943 

PAPERS 

AND 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE 

OFFICE, U. 5. SECRETARY 

OFFICE OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1943 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRFX 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. 

222/4 Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic . . . . . 

246/1 Movement of the “QUEENS’ . . . . . . . . . . . 252/2 TIDALWAVE Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

270/5 Land Airport Facilities in the Azores . . . . . . . . (Memorandum by the Representatives of the 

British Chiefsof Staff) 

270/6 Land Airport Facilities in the Azores . . . . . . . . (Memorandum from the US.Chiefsof Staff) 

272/1 Logistic Organization to Improve Mobility of 

Anti-Submarine Squadrons . . . . . . . . . . . 

Formation by US.Assault Forces for Operation OVERLORD 

(Memorandum by the US.Chiefs of Staff) 

Formation of U.S.Assault Forces for Operation OVERLORD 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

28813 Quadrant Conference Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . 300 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1943-1944, 

PaciAc-Far East Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300/1 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1943-1944, 

European-Mediterranean Area . . . . . . . . . . 301/3 Specific Operations in the PaciAc and Far Em,1943-1944 . 303 Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe . . (Memorandum bg the U.S.Chiefsof Staff) 

303A Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe . . (Memorandum bg the US.Chiefs of Staff) 

303/3 StrategicConcept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe . . (Resolutions of the Combined Chiefsof Staff) 

304 Operation OVERLORD -Outline Plan . . . I . . . . 

305 EffectofIndianFloodsonBurmaCampaign . . , . . . (Message from General Auchinlech) 

305/1 Effect of Jndian Floods on Burma Campaign . . . . . (Report of ad hoc committee) 

PAGE 

1 

5 

7 

11 

15 

17 

25 

29 

31 

35 

45 

63 

71 

85 

91 

107 

113 

i 
u.s.SEm 

BRITZSII MfXT SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

306 Rome an Open City ............... 115 

307 ArtificialHarborsforComb~~Operatio~...... 117 

308/3 Southeast Asia Command. ............ 123 

309 POINTBLANK ................. 129 

310 Propaganda Committee ............. 137 

311 Italian Peace Feelers .............. 141 

312 Pipeline from India to China ........... 145 

(Note by the US.Chiefsof Staff) 

312/1 Pipeline from India to China ........... 151 

(Memorandum from ad hoc committee) 

313 Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan ..... 153 

(Summaryof Appreciation and Outline Plan) 

313/1 AppreciationandPlanfortheDefeatof Japan ..... 171 

(Menwrandumfromthe US.Chiefsof Staff) 

314 Allocation of Landing Craft (Operation OVERLORD- Vehicle Lift) ................ 173 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff) 

314/1 Allocation of Landing Ships and Craft - American Production ............. 177 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

314/2 Allocation of Landing Shipsand Craft - American Productii ............. 181 

(Memorandurnfromthe US.Chiefsof Staff) 

314/3 Allocation of Landing Craft (Operation OVERLORD- Vehicle Lift) ................ 183 

(Memorandumby the U.S. Chiefsof Staff) 

315 HABBAKUKS.. ............... 185 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff) 

315/2 HABBAKuK8 ................. 199 

(Raolutionsof the Combined Chiefsof Staff) 

316 The PLOUGHForce ............... 201 

ii 
u.5. SECBET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 

317 

317/1 

317/2 

317/3 

318/1 

319 

319/2 

319/5 

320 

321 

32211 

323 

324/1 

325 

326 

327 

328/1 

m/2 

M-128 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals . (Study by the US.Staff Planners) 

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals . (Menwrandum by the US.Chiefsof Staff) 

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals 

(Memorandumby the British Chiefsof Staff) 

Sardinia,Fifth Column Activities . . . . . . . . . 

ProgressReport to the President and Prime Minister . . (Pertaining Principally to the European Theater) 

ProgressReport to the President and Prime Minister . . (Defeatof Japan) 

F’inalReporttothePresidentandPrimeMinister . . . 

RANKIN.................. 

Policy Towards Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . Policy Towards Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . , . 

Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan . . . . . . . . . Ftehabilitation of Occupied and Liberated Territories . . Supply Routes in Northeast India . . . . . . . . . 

Amphibians for OVERLORD . . . . . . . . . . 

Operations from India . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . 

Directive to General Eisenhower . . . . . . . . . . Implementation of Assumed Basic Underhkings and 

SpecificOperationsfor the Conduct of the War, 1943-1944 

Messages to Marshal Stalin and GeneralissimoChiang 

Kai-shek, at the Conclusion of Quadrant . . . . . . 

PAGE 

205 

217 

219 

221 

223 

225 

233 

249 

265 

277 

283 

287 

301 

305 

313 

317 

321 

325 

387 

iii 
u.s.fjm.nET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

1st Meeting at the Citadel ................ 395 

Review of ProgressReport (European Theater) 

Occupation of the Azores 

The War Against Japan 

2nd Meeting at the Citadel ................ 405 

Facilities in the Azores Islands 

Emergency Operations to Enter the Continent 

Operation OVERLORD 

Operations in Italy and Southern France 

The War Against Japan 

Operations in the India-Burma-China Theater 

Southeast Asia Command 

Spain 

Turkey 

Meeting of Dr. Soong with the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

C.C.S. 106th Meeting .................. 415 

Conduct of the Conference 

ConAnnation of Sections I,11and 111,C.C.S. 242/6 

Agenda 

The European Theater 

C.C.S. 107th Meeting .................. 423 

The War Against Japan 

C.C.S. 108th Meeting ............... .. 431 

Rome -an Open City 

Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe 

Operation OVERLORD -Outline Plan 

“Synthetic” Harbors 

Air and Navzl Command -Operation OVERLORD 

iv 
U.S. SECIIET 

BRITISli MOST SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 109th Meeting .................. 439 

Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe 

POINTBLANK 

C.C.S. 110th Meeting .................. 445 

Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe 

Italian Peace Feelers 

SpeciAc Operations in the Pacific and Far East, 1943-1944 

Operations Against Japan from India, 1943-44 

C.C.S. 111th Meeting .............. o o e 451 

Italian Peace Feelers 

Operations Against Japan from India, 1943-44 

Production of Landing Craft 

Southeast Asia Command 

Deception Plan for the War Against Japan 

The U-Boat War 

Operation ALACRITY 

C.C.S. 112th Meeting ................ 459 

Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister 

HABBAKTJKS 

Landing Craft 

Use of PLOUGH Force 

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals 

Special Operations in Sardinia 

C.C.S. 113th Meeting .................. 465 

Naval and Air Commanders for Operation OVERLORD 

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals 

Sardinia -Fifth Column Activities 

Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan 

Immediate Operations in the Mediterranean 

Military Considerations in Relation to Spain 

Military Considerations in Relation to Turkey 

V 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

Military Considerationsin Relation to Russia 

“Synthetic” Harbors 

C.C.S. 114th Meeting .................. 475 

Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister 

Southeast Asia Command 

Speciffc Operations in the Pacific and Far East, 1943-44 

Supply Routes in Northeast India 

Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan 

C.C.S. 115th Meeting ................. 479 

Draft Final Report to the President and Prime Minister 

Japanese Treatment of Prisoners 

Pipeline from India to China 

Operations from India 

Movement of the “QUEENS” 

Amphibians for OVERLORD 

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals 

Operation RANKIN 

Rehabilitationof Occupied and Liberated Territories 

Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic 

Meeting with Major General Rooksand Major General Whiteley 

Future Meetings 

C.C.S. 116th Meeting .................. 485 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister 

Mediterranean Operations 

Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic 

Meeting with Dr. T. V. Soong 

Relation of Resources to Plans 

Southeast Asia Command 

Propaganda Committee 

Message to Stalin 

Concluding Remarks 

INDEX ....................... 497 

vi 
u.a. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 22214 

FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC 

References: 

CCS 115th Meeting,Item (11) 

CCS 116th Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.S. 22212, circulated a study prepared by the Combined Military 

Transportation Committee on its own initiative, which was presented for 

consideration by the Combined Chiefs of SW, 20 August 1943. 

The Combined Chiefs of SW, in their 116th Meeting approved the 

recommendations of an ad hoc committee (C.C.S. 222/3) as amended. Final 

approved paper subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 22214. 

1 
C.C.S. 222f4 24 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC 

Note by the Secretaries 

"he Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the Enclosure regarding 

future convoy arrangements in the Atlantic. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC 

1. a. C.C.S. 22212 indicates that convoy UGS 16,sailing 26 August, has 

91firm presenters as against a convoy lit of 80 ships. 

b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been requested by the Combined 

Military Transportation Committee to give a decision on one of two 

alternatives: 

(1) To raise the limit of UGS convoys. 

(2) To indicate the priority which should be assigned the presenters involved so that 80 ships can be selected. 

2. a. With regard to alternative (l), the Commander in Chief, U.S.Fleet, 

has established the limit on the number of ships in UGS convoys at 80 for 

security reasons. 

b. The immediate problem in priorities has been solved in large part by 

the withdrawal of six U.S.Army vessels and two B.M.W.T. vessels from 

the list of presenters. The convoy limitation of 80 ships now is exceeded 

by three. 

c. It is quite possible that, of the remaining 83 vessels at least three may 

fail to meet the convoy sailing date. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

3. It is recommended that: 

a. Three vessels be nominated for withdrawal from the convoy, if necessary, in the following priority: 

First withdrawal -1B.M.W.T. vessel 

Second withdrawal -1W.S.A. vessel 

Third withdrawal -1B.M.W.T. veSSel 

Vessel or vessels to be selected by the agency concerned. 

b. All vessels should be prepared to sail. 

4. In view of the fact that indications point to a recurrence of this problem

in subsequent months, it is recommended that the U.S.Navy fix the earliest 

practical date when a program of four UGS convoys per month will be established with due regard to the general set-up of convoys in the Atlantic. 

5. It is further recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Stafl delegate 

to the Combined Military "ransportation Committee the executive authority 

to act on similarproblems in the future with regard to UGS convoys in accordance with the following priority, unless otherwise agreed: 

a. U.S.and British ships destined for forces commanded by the Allied 

Commander in Chief in Mediterranean. 

b. U.S.and British ships destined for India. 

c. U.S.and British ships destined for Allied forces in Middle East. 

d. U.S.and British ships carrying civil supplies for occupied territorie8 

in Medit.erranm. 

e. Ships destined for Persian Gulf. 

f. Lend lease to Turkey. 

g. Miscellaneous. 

3 
4 
U. S. SECRET 

BRlTISa MOST SECREF 

C.C.S. 246/1 

MOVEMENT OF THE "QUEENS" 

References: 

C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (6) 

C.C.S. 246/1 was circulated, 21 August, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of StaZ. In their 115th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staft 

approved the recommendation contained therein. 

5 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 246/1 21 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MOVEMENT OF THE “QUEENS” 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

At the 94th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the 

TRIDENT Conference, approval was given to the “QUEENS” running on a 

2%day cycle as at that time the urgency of lifting personnel was not as great 

as it is now. 

It is understood that a situation is developing in which it is essential 

to lift as many personnel as possible, and in view of the longer nights we 

recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now approve that the 

“QUEENS” should revert to running on a 21 day cycle. 

6 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 25212 

TIDALWAVE AIR FORCE 

References: 

C.C.S. 109th Meeting, Item (3) 

C.C.S. 252/2 was circulated on 12 August for consideration by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 109th Meeting considered this 

paper in connection with the progress report on POINTBLANK (C.C.S. 309) 

and deferred decision. Subsequently, by informal action the C.C.S. agreed 

that the three B-24 groups shall revert to the operational control of the 8th 

Air Force. 

7 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S.252/2 12 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAF'F 

TIDALWAVE AIR FORCE 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosure is a message received from General Eisenhower recommending further use of the TIDALWAVE Air Force in the Mediterranean. 

It has been referred to the Combined Staff Planners for study and will be 

placed on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Agenda when the report of the 

Planners is received. 

H. REDMAN, 

J .R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE 

WAR DEPARTMENT 

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER 

INCOMING MESSAGE 

URGENT 

From: Algiers. 

To : WAR W 7138NAF 319 

USFOR London No. 

12th August 1943. 

In view of the critical situation in Italy we consider that the B-24 force 

which carried out the attack on TIDALWAVE and which is now awaiting suitable weather conditions for attack on JUGGLER coordinated with B-17 force 

from 8th Bomber Command should, immediately on completion of JUGGLER, 

be concentrated on targets in Italy. We consider that at this juncture every 

available force should be brought to bear against Italy and the German in 

Italy. Once we are established in Italy follow up attacks on TIDALWAVE 

will from every point of view be easier to carry out than they now are from 

African bases. 

9 
10 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISHMOSTSECRET 

C.C.S. 27015 and 27016 

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 111th Meeting, Item (8) 

1st Citadel Meeting 

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (1) 

A memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of St-, 

C.C.S. 270/5, was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 9 August 1943. 

The reply from the U.S.Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 270/6, was circulated, 11August 

and both paperswere considered at Quadrant in the 111thMeeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Final action on the subject was taken in C.C.S. 319/5. 

11 
9 August 1943 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 270/5 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES 

Memorandum the Representatives 

of the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. Further information has now been received from the British Chiefs 

of Staff in relation to the subject of the facilities in the Azores. 

2. As you know, both diplomatic and neutral channels have been concerned and we feel that perhaps a brief summary of the action that has taken 

place in this matter may be of value. 

3. As long ago as 29 June the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs handed 

the U.S.Ambassador in London a message from the Prime Minister for the 

President, informing him of the progress then made in connection with our 

request to the Portuguese for facilities and in particular of Salazar’s stipulation that under no circumstances could he agree to admit forces other than 

British, except perhaps in the event of Portugal becoming fully involved in the 

war. In this message hope was expressed that in view of approach to the Portuguese being made on the basis of Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the President 

would agree that we should conclude an agreement with the Portuguese on 

the lines desired by Salazar. At a later stage it should be possible to secure 

Portuguese assent to the use of the facilities by the forces of other of the 

United Nations. No reply had ever been received previously, indicating the 

views of the President, and in the absence of any expression of disagreement, 

it was reasonable to assume that no seriousU.S.objection was seen to any of 

the proposals. The U.S.Government have been kept fully informed of the 

trend of the negotiations. 

4. Subsequently, you will remember, came the U.S.proposal set out in 

C.C.S. 270. This proposal, which was to the effect that landing rights should 

be granted to American land planes in the Islands, might have raised mculties in the delicate negotiations that were then in progress and at the request of the British the U.S.Government agreed that their proposal should 

not to be pressed at the present time since no great diWculty was anticipated in 

arranging landing rights for American aircraft as soon as the negotiations 

were satisfactorily concluded. It was then decided on 16 July that this matter 

12 
U.S.SECRET 

BRKTISIi MOST SECRET 

of landing rights for American aircraft should be left over pending the conclusion of the present negotiations and a notification to this effect WBS given 

through both diplomatic and military channels. 

5. It was in the light of the above, therefore, that the following decisions 

were taken: 

a. To seek the inclusion of reference to transit facilities for aircraft of 

the United Nations in the agreement but not to press proposal so far as to 

risk breakdown on this issue. 

b. Not at this stage to ask for full operational facilities in the Islands 

for U.S.military, air ferry and transport operations. 

c. To seek to extend benefit of our arrangements to the U.S.immediately we ourselves have entered the Islands. 

6. We hope that this will make the situation clear. We have every intention of insuring that such facilities as may become available shall be at the 

disposal of both the U.S.and the British. The approach, however, is a delicate 

one and is based on the long-standing Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Once the 

scruples and fears of the Portuguese have been overcome we feel that everything should soon progress steadily. 

13 
14 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SEGRET 

C.C.S. 270/6 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

11 August 1943 

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES 

Memorandum From the U.S. Chiefsof Staff 

1. The U.S.Chiefs of Staff have noted the progress of the British-Portuguese negotiations and also certain decisions taken by the British regarding 

these negotiations which are set forth in C.C.S. 270/5. They wish to reiterate. 

with the approval of the President: 

a. That any British-Portuguese agreement limitingthe use of facilities 

in the Azores to British Empire aircraft is not acceptable to the United 

States. 

b. That regardless of what may be agreed as to other United Nations 

forces, it is of vital importance that Azores facilities be made available for 

U.S. military, air ferry and transport operations. 

2. The US.Chiefs of Staff are convinced that the sense of all discussions on 

this subject held at the TRIDENT conferences sustains the United States view. 

This is perhaps best expressed in the final report to the President and Prime 

Minister in Section N,paragraph 1, as follows: 

“The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the 

Azores is essentialto the efRcient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set forth in the annex. The preparation of this plan is a responsibility 

of the British, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their 

authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination 

of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from 

the United Kingdom and that, in the first place, the islands of Fayal and 

Terceria should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions 

will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting 

factor regarding date, and as far as can be seen at present, the earliest date 

for arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the end of August. It is 

agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities will be available to all United 

Nations forces. 

“The possibility of an earlier move on the Azores will receive further 

study. Meanwhile, the political decisions involved will be settled by the two 

governments.” 

15 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

3. In the recommendations sent from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the 

President and Prime Minister,the Combined Chiefs of Staff stated: 

“In submitting this recommendation, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made, forces should 

be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy 

fails.” 

4. From the above, it appears evident: 

a. That the use of the facilities of the Azores was to be obtained by the 

forces of the United Nations. 

b. That this end was to be attained by force if necessary, and that in any 

event force was to be used if diplomatic means failed. 

c. That the political questions involved are to be settled by both the 

United States and British Governments. 

5. From the information set forth in C.C.S. 270/5 the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

feel that diplomatic negotiations have failed of achieving the results which it 

was agreed are necessary. 

16 
u. 5. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 272/1 

LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION TO IMPROVE 

MOBILITY OF --SUBMARINE SQUADRONS 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 111th Meeting, Item (7) 

C.C.S. 272/1 was circulated, 12 August 1943, for consideration by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff at QUADRANT. 

In their 111th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the 

recommendations of tne U.S. Chiefs of Staff contained in C.C.S. 272/1, and 

final action was noted in C.C.S. 319/5. 

17 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C C.S. 272/1 12 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION TO IMPROVE 

MOBILITY OF ANTI-SUBMARINE SQUADRONS 

Reference: a. C.C.S. lOlst Meeting, Item 5 

Memorandum from the U.S.Chiefs of Staff 

1. There is transmitted herewith the report of the Allied Anti-Submarine 

Board submitted in obedience to conclusion a of reference a. 

2. It is noted that the Board has so far concerned itself almost wholly 

with U.S. sea frontiers. 

3. The US. Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that t.heBoard should complete 

its directive by appropriate survey and recommendations as to transfer of 

anti-submarine air units between the US.,Canada, Great Britain, N.W. Africa, 

W. Africa, etc. 

4. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff suggest that the services concerned (British, 

Canadian, U.S.) should take appropriate steps to implement, where applicable 

and not already in force, the recommendations of paragraph 22 of the report 

pending the survey and recommendations indicated in paragraph 3 above. 

5. As to paragraph 23 of the report, the US. Chiefs of Staff are in accord 

with the view that if each service concerned plans and perfects its own supply 

and maintenance organization and promulgates this information to other 

services, all will have been accomplished that conclusion b of reference a was 

calculated to achieve, and they therefore recommend the cancellation of 

conclusion b. 

18 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITlsH MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE 

Secret 

serial: 0010 6 August 1943. 

From: Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board. 

To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. 

Subject: Logistic Organization to Improve Mobility of Anti-Submarine 

Squadrons. 

Reference: (a) Cominch Secret Serial 001425 of 15 July 1943. 

1. In accordance with the reference the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey 

Board have considered conclusion (a) of the reference which is quoted: 

“Agreed to refer this problem to the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey 

Committee (KaufPman-Mansfield Committee) for study and recommendation as to the mobility requirements for anti-submarine squadrons.” 

2. In considering this problem the Board has visited Norfolk and conferred 

with Commander Air, Atlantic and his staff. 

3. Whatever type of U-Boat offensive is adopted by the enemy adequate 

and timely counter measures depend entirely on an organization which will 

permit newly threatened areas to be quickly and efficiently reinforced. 

4. From the surface aspect quick reinforcement is now possible due to the 

etsablishment of the “Support Group” system. The air on the other hand has 

no support group system except for the “CVE’ and must depend therefor on 

the mobility of individual squadrons or parts of them. 

5. All Frontier Commanders are thus liable to have additional A/S air 

squadrons sent to them at short notice. Their prime consideration must be to 

ensure that these squadrons can be accommodated and become fully operative 

without delay. 

6. In considering mobility generally operational authorities should bear 

in mind the fact that climatic conditions effect rapid movement. To winterize 

a squadron of B-24’s for instance takes 7-10 days. Movements between extremes 

of temperature should be avoided, therefore, as far as the tactical situation 

permits. 

19 
u.s. SECBFT 

BRITISH MOST SECREI’ 

7. From the logisticpoint of view the requirements necessary for improving 

the mobility of A/S squadrons are shown under the following headings: 

(a) Strategic Air Fields. 

(b) Supply and Maintenance. 

(c) Standardization of A/S aircraft. 

(d) Squadron Organization. 

8. (a) Strategic Air Fields. 

It is clear that each Frontier has certain A/S air flelds which are best 

suited to handle reinforcements. The Board recommends that Frontier Commanders designate these air fields and make known the maximum number of 

A/S aircraft that each could (a) accommodate normally, and (b), operate 

in an emergency. 

9. It is further necessary that the capacity of the remaining A/S air fields 

within each Frontier be carefully reviewed with the idea of being able to 

accommodate additional aircraft in an emergency. 

10. (b) Supply and Maintenance. 

With regard to supply and maintenance, this Committee has, during 

the course of its extended travels, Seen for itself the general unsatisfactory 

position regarding aircraft spares. Before making any further recommendations under the above heading therefore it is desired most strongly to represent 

the action be taken at once by the High Command to improve the situation 

regarding “spares.” 

11. The arguments against any flattening in the curve of production and 

the high desirability at this stage of the war of keeping to a peak production 

are well known. It is however considered essential that a temporary adjustment 

be accepted in order that the spare parts situation may be improved. 

12. The opposition that will be put forward by the War Production Board 

to this recommendation is also realized, but it is desired to emphasize in the 

strongest possible terms that until definite action is taken to ensure that the 

situation with regard to “spares”keeps pace with that of production, maximum 

availability of aircraft and true Mobility of aircraft can NOT be obtained. 

13. Despite the above, the supply, maintenance, and repair organization 

necessary to fulfill the requirements of mobility, render it a matter of prime 

20 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

importance that aircraft spares (to include engines), aircraft handling 

equipment, and ordnance stores, etc., be so situated that they can be made 

available to any air field with the minimum delay. 

14. The distances over which A/S air forces are distributed on this side 

of the Atlantic are such that, under the present organization, an unacceptable 

delay will occur in transporting spares and equipment from the Supply Depot 

to the aircraft. In extreme cases it might be necessary to transport up to 2,000 

miles. The Board recommends that this possibility be overcome by holding, at 

one particular air field within each frontier, a quantity of non-critical spares 

and articles of equipment. If the location of these Frontier supply centers is 

coordinated between Frontiers it should be possible to ensure that any air field 

is within, say 500 miles of a supply of necessary equipment. 

15. Transport of Spares. The present general lack of transport aircraft 

is well known but there can be no doubt that if and when more planes become 

available,the ideal, to achieve best mobility, would be for a number of transport

planes to accompany a squadron ordered to move at short notice to reinforce 

a certain area. Much benefit to the spare part situation would accrue were it 

possible, when more planes are available, to allocate two or three U.S.Navy 

transport planes for the speciflc purpose of supplying “spares,” returning 

damaged parts to the overahul centers and in general servicing squadrons 

located outside continental U.S. 

16. (c) Standardization of A/S Aircraft. 

It is considered that mobility of A/S squadrons should be conAned to 

certain types of aircraft which are common to various Allied services. These 

should be Liberator (B-24, PB4Y),Ventura (PV-1) ,Mariner (PBM-3),Catalina 

(PBY5or 5A). Aircraft peculiar to one country only (i.e. Sunderland) can only 

be truly mobile within the sphere of operations of its own service. 

17. While the types of aircraft at present employed on A/S Warfare are 

few, the majority of incividual types vary in internal layout to a marked degree 

and contain equipment which, although fulfilling one duty only, differs considerably in design or construction. The situation is being further complicated 

by squadrons continually embodying modifications of their own. This 

accentuates maintenance difficulties and is especially confusing to maintenance personnel employed in specialist trades such as Radar and Ordnance. 

18. The Board recommends that the ciosest cooperation be maintained 

between operational planners, Aircraft Contractors, and Modification Centers, 

and that every effort be made to arrive at a definite policy regarding the 

21 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

equipping and layout of A/S aircraft. While not in any way suggesting that 

squadrons be discouraged from experimenting locally, local experiments and 

improvements must be made known to higher authority so that they can be 

coordinated and, if found to be of value, adopted as standard. 

19. Furthermore, it is understood that certain parts of B-24 aircraft produced by Consolidated and Ford are not interchangeable. It is therefore most 

desirable that all B-24 aircraft destined for A/S Warfare should come off the 

production line of the Consolidated Company, as a major proportion of 

Liberators now in service as A/S aircraft are from this line. 

20. (d) Squadron Organization. 

There is no doubt that mobility must also depend to a considerable 

extent upon the organization of the squadrons themselves. The Board recommends that, as far as possible, A/S squadrons be maintained on a mobile basis. 

By this the Board does not mean that each squadron should carry a vast 

amount of additional spares and equipment but that each squadron should 

have a plan which will enable it to pack up and get underway without delay. 

These plans should be evolved by squadron commanders in consultation with 

their tactical and base commanders. The importance of having such plans 

cannot be overstressed. Instances have occurred in which squadrons have been 

prevented from moving at short notice by such trivial deficiencies as a lack of 

packing cases. 

21. Squadron Commanders must also assure that each aircraft when under 

orders to move takes with it the maximum possible number of key personnel,

key spares and equipment. On no account should aircraft be loaded up with 

large amounts of personal equipment. All non-immediate equipment can 

follow. 

22. The following recommendations tare made: 

(a) That dellnite and immediate step be taken to rectify the existing

deplorable situation in regard to aircraft spare parts at the expense, if 

necessary, of curtailing new production. 

(b) That only types of aircraft in common use in various services be 

considered mobile, namely Liberator, Venturas, Catalinas and Mariners. 

22 
U. S. SECRET 

BRXTISH MOST SECRET 

(c) That Frontier Commanders designate the air fields in their commands best suited to handle emergency reinforcements. 

(d) That all Frontier Commanders prepare plans immediately for the 

handling of additional aircraft at each of these air Aelds in an emergency. 

(e) That the normal and emergency capacity of all air fields operating 

A/S squadrons should be generally promulgated. 

(f) That operating authorities consider delays consequent on climatic 

conditions when planning movement of A/S squadrons on short notice. 

(g) That one air Aeld be established in each Frontier as a “Strategic 

Supply Center.” 

(h) That the desirability of allocating a few U.S. Navy transport planes 

for the sole purpose of ferrying aircraft spares, etc., to and from outlying 

A/S air bases should be taken note of. 

(i) That orders be issued with a view to achieving better standardization in modification of A/S aircraft after they leave the production line. 

(j) That all B-24 aircraft for A/S squadrons should come from one 

production line; namely from the Consolidated Aircraft Company. 

(k) That all squadrons engaged in A/S Warfare be maintained on a 

mobile basis and that plans to achieve this be drawn up by individual squadron and base commandersnow. 

(1) That whenever possible the movements of A/S squadrons be confined within their own service areas and bases. 

23. With reference to conclusion (b) which reads as follows: 

“Agreed that upon approval of the recommendations received as a result 

of sub-paragraph (a) above this Committee would be directed to study 

and submit recommendations concerning the logistical requirements 

necessary to attain the desired mobility.” 

While this Board can make recommendationsof a very general character, 

it is desired to point out that detailed recommendations on the logistics side 

of mobility can only be given by technical experts which it would be necessary 

to call from the U.S.Navy, R.A.F. (Coas+klCommand), R.C.A.F. and the supply 

23 
U.8. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

organization of the three countries. Moreover it is the Board's considered 

opinion that even with all the technical experts necessary it is unlikely that 

any common answer which would be satisfactory to all services could be arrived 

at. The only solution appears to be for the various services to plan and perfect 

their own individual supply and maintenance organization and to promulgate

the results to all concerned. 

/s/ J. M. MANSFIELD, /s/ J. L.KAW", 

Rear Admiral, R.N. Rear Admiral, U.S.N. 

copy ta: 

First Sea Lord. 

C,N.S. Ottawa. 

24 
u. 5. SECBET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 28612 and 28613 

FORMATION BY U.S.ASSAULT FORCES FOR 

OPERATION “OVERLORD” 

References: 

CCS 112th Meeting, Item (4) 

CCS 314 Series 

Subsequent to the memorandum presented by the U.S.Chiefs of Staff, 

7 August 1943 (C.C.S. 286/2), the British Chiefs of Staff circulated their reply, 

18 August, for consideration at QUADRANT. 

In their 112th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to the 

modified proposal put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 2 

of C.C.S. 28613. 

25 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 28612 7 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FORMATION BY U.S.ASSAULT FORCES FOR 

OPERATION OVERLORD 

Reference: C.C.S. 28611 

Memrnandum bg U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

1. In C.C.S. 28611 the British Chiefs of Staff advise that, in order to meet 

the manning stringency in OVERLORD, they find it necessary to ask that the 

American Navy take over and man the following British assault, support, and 

special craft designated by the Allied Naval Commander in Chief to Assauk 

Force “0,”the American Naval Assault Forces based in Plymouth Command:­

16 L.C.S. (M)

15 Hedgerow fitted L.C.A. 

12 L.C.T. (2) 

5 L.C.G. (L) 

11 L.C.F. (L) 

48 L.C.P. (L) fitted for smoke laying 

60 L.C.A. 

2. The personnel required to man the above craft, including flotilla and 

squadron staff, and reserve to scale, is 215 officers and 2283 ratings, of which 

192 are communication ratings and 227 tradesmen (artificers). 

3. It is presumed that the ship-borne types of the British landing craft 

listed above, namely, 16 L.C.S.(M)’s, 60 L.C.A.’s, and 48 L.C.P.(L)’s, will be 

carried on British combat loaders during assaults. If this is correct, the admixture of American boat crews on British ships would bring about a situation 

more undesirable than the one to be corrected. 

4. The landing craft in question, British designed and fitted with British 

equipment, should be manned by crews trained with that type of craft. There 

is none of these types in this country available for training purposes. It would, 

therefore, be necessary to send personnel to the UNITED KINGDOM for 

training. At the same time the British are bringing officers and crews to the 

UNITED STATES to man and tram themselves in the use of UNITED STATES 

built landing craft. 

26 
U. S. SECRET 

BXITISR MOST SECRET 

5. 110 LST's, U.S.manned, are allocated to OVERLORD,-83 are assigned 

to US.troop lift-, the remaining 27 to allow for casualties and, it now appears, 

to assist in British troop lift. From 20 to 24 of these should be available for the 

assault and, if assigned to British troop lift, this will result in about 168 officers 

and 1512 men of the US. Navy participating in the operation with British 

Assault Forces. 

6. In C.C.S. 244/1 the British have indicated the need of additional L.C.I. 

(L)'s (the number dependent upon the losses in HUSKY) to be furnished 

from UNITED STATES production for British usein OVERLORD. In furtherance of this need, the British have submitted a lend-lease requisition for 18 

L.C.I.(L) 's from UNITED STATES production. 

7. In addition to delivery of the above-mentioned landing craft (as well 

as other landing craft), there are being delivered from UNITED STATES' 

production 20 merchant ships per month up to 150 to 200, to be manned by 

British personnel. 

8. It would appear that the need of personnel for British produced landing 

craft should take precedence over the manning of craft requested from 

UNITED STATES' production. 

9. In view of the above consideration, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff feel that 

subject landing craft should be manned and operated by British personnel. 

27 
28 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISX MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 2861’3 18 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FORMATION OF US. ASSAULT FORCES FOR OPERATION “OVERLORD’ 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs ofStan 

1. The British request that the Americans man all the craft allocated to 

Assault Force “0,”the American Naval Assault Force for OVERLORD based in 

the Plymouth Command, was considered by the U.S.Chiefs of Staff who declined to undertake thiscommitment for the reasons given in C.C.S.286/2. 

2. There has been an opportunity during QUADRANT for this matter to 

be further investigated by the Combined Staffs. As a result, we now wish to put 

forward a modified proposal. We withdraw the request that the U.S.should 

man the shipborne types of landing craft, namely 16 L.C.S.(M) ,15 Hedgerow 

fitted L.C.A. and 60 ordinary L.C.A., as these will be carried in British ships. 

However, in view of the fact that the remaining craft will be assigned to, and 

will train with, the American Naval Assault Force under a U.S. Naval Commander, we suggest that it would be reasonable that U.S.crews be provided. 

“&craft involved are 12 L.C.T.(R), 5 L.C.G.(L), 11 L.C.F.(L), 48 L.C.P.(L) 

fitted for smoke-laying and not hoistable, and the personnel required amount 

to 135 officers and 1,511 men. 

3. We ask the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to reconsider the decision conveyed in 

286/2 to this extent. 

29 
30 
U.S. SECRET 

BFZTISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 2aa/3 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

AGENDA 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 106th Meeting, Item (3) 

C.C.S. 288/3, Agenda for the Quadrant Conference, was prepared by the 

Combined Secretariat at the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 

106th Meeting. 

31 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 288/3 14August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

AGENDA 

Note by the Secretaries 

The following subjects will be considered by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff in the sequence in which they are listed. A detailed agenda will be issued 

daily. 

A. EUROPEAN THEATER 

1. STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 303) 

2. “OVERLORD” 

a. Outline Plan and Covering Note by British Chiefs of Staff. 

b. Air and Naval Command. 

3. “POINTBLANK” 

(Paper by the Chief of the Air Staff) 

4. MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 

5. “RANKIN” 

(Progress Report) 

B. THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

6. APPRECIATION AND PLAN (LONG TERM) 

7. OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN 1943-44 (Short T-) 

(In the PaciAc.) (Paper by U.S.Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 301) 

8. OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN 1943-44 (Shwt T-) 

(From India) 

9. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

10. DECEPTION PLAN FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

32 
u.a SECRET 

0RlTlSE MOST SECRET 

C. THE U-BOAT WAR 

11. GENERAL 

12. “ALACRITY” 

D. MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS 

13. “HABBAKUK” 

(Memorandumby the British Chiefs of Staff) 

14. LANDING CRAFT 

a. Allocation. 

b. Manning. 

15. USE OF “PLOUGH” FORCE 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.) 

16. EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES, FRIENDLY NEUTRALS 

17. CIVIL AFFAIRS MATTERS 

E. FINAL STAGES 

18. RELATION OF RESOURCES TO PLANS 

19. FINAL REPORT TO PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT 

20. PREPARATION AND APPROVAL OF ANY DIRECTIVES ARISING 

FROM QUADRANT DECISIONS, AND OF ANY REPORTS TO OTHER 

ALLIES 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat 

33 

U.9. SECRET 

BXlllSH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 380 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-44, 

PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA 

Reference: 

CCS 107th Meeting 

C.C.S. 300 was circulated, 6 August 1943, for the information of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff and as a basis for discussion at QUADRANT. 

35 
v. s.SECRET 

BRlTISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S.300 6 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-44, 

PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA 

Memorandum by the US.Chiefs of Staff 

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff submit herewith an estimate of the enemy 

situation, 1943-44, Pacific-Far East Area for consideration by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff at the QUADRANT Conference. 

ENCLOSURE 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-44 

PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA 

(As of 20 July 1943) 

1. BASIC FACTORS IN THE JAPANESE SITUATION, 

a. Japan's basic objective is to establish undisputed control of an area 

in East Asia and the Western Pacific which shall be militarily secure and 

as nearly self-sufficient economically as possible. The area now occupied 

by her approximates the territorial requirements of this objective, but is 

deflcient in three respects, as follows: (1) the possession of eastern 

SIBERIA by a latently hostile power; (2) the existence in CHINA of 

unoccupied areas within bombing range of Japan and of important 

Japanese communications; and (3) the presence of United Nations forces 

in the Japanese defensive perimeter in the MELANESIA area and the 

ALEUTIANS. Other territories beyond the limits of present occupation 

may be objects of ultimate Japanese aspiration, but only those specified are 

essential to the immediate basic objective. 

b. Relationship to the Axis. Japan's connection with the Axis is a matter 

of expediency only. Her action will be coordinated with that of Germany 

only insofar as she estimates that such coordination will contribute to the 

realization of her basic objective or -in the long run -to her security. 

36 
U. S. SECRET 

BRfiIsH MOST SECRET 

c. Relations With Russia. There exists between Russia and Japan 

a basic conflict of interest. Japan cannot enjoy complete strategic security 

without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. Russia is 

determined to hold that region, the strategic security of which requires 

the ultimate expulsion of Japan from the mainland of Asia and from 

southern Sakhalin. For the present, however, both Russia and Japan desire 

to avoid war with each other in order to be free to direct their efforts 

against their respective enemies. Russia is likely to intervene in the war 

against Japan at some stage, but not before the German threat to her has 

been removed. After that, she will make her decision in the light of her 

own interests and will intervene only when she reckons that Japan can be 

defeated at a small cost to her. 

d. Time. Japan will take maximum advantage of such time as is left 

to her to consolidate and, if possible, to improve her present position, 

hoping that, in the eventual reckoning, the United Nations, wearied by 

the war in Europe and perhaps divided among themselves, will attack her 

ineffectively or compromise to her advantage. We estimate that from mid1943 to mid-1944 totalJapanese industrial production will increase approximately ten per cent. However, the production of many critical categories 

-notably merchant ships, aircraft, trucks, and armored vehicles -will 

increase by more than ten per cent. Japan should expect that ultimately 

greatly superior forces can be directed against her. 

2. THE EXISTZNG OVERALL SITUATION. 

a. General. Japan is on the strategic defensive. We estimate the 

present strength of her armed forces to be as follows: (1) NAVAL, 10 BB, 

6 CV,4 ACV, 14 CA, 16 CL, 81 DD, 84 SS; (2) AIR, 1400 fighters, 1450 

bombers, 850 other types. Of the total, 390 flghters and 120 bombers are 

ship-based; (3) GROUND, 64 divisions, 17 independent mixed brigades, 1 

infantry brigade, 3 cavalry brigades, 18 tank regiments and many independent units, totaling in round numbers 3,000,000 men (this tatal 

includes naval, ground, and air personnel, but not Puppet Troops. 

Japan’s position, facing United Nations forces from the North Pacific 

around to India, is one of great natural strength but requiring secure and 

sufficient ocean transport over long lines of communication. At this time, 

her position in China is secure because of the present inability of either 

China or the other United Nations to mount large-scale operations there. 

Russian commitments in Europe and Japanese strength in Manchuria 

insure for the time being the security of Japan’s northern flank. Japan is 

37 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

able at present to direct her maximum effort toward building up her 

economic and military strength. 

b. Limitations on Japanese Striking Power. 

(1) Shipping. The margin of Japanese shipping, after allowing 

for essential trade and the maintenance of Japan’s many distant 

overseas commitments, is small and continues to fall. Additional 

tonnage might still be found for new operations by diverting it from 

trade, and, provided such diversions were temporary, this need not have 

serious effects on Japan’s capacity to wage war. Since, however, Japan’s 

rate of building, though on the increase, cannot keep pace with the 

present rate of sinkings, she would be reluctant to risk adding further 

to her shipping commitments or incurring losses such as she would 

have to expect from any further large-scale sea-borne offensive 

operations. Although attempts are being made to improve the position 

by building a large number of small and medium-size wooden ships, 

the general shipping position is becoming increasingly difficult and 

may well become precarious in 1944. 

The situation in regard to tankers is more critical. Japan is 

attempting to meet a deflciency in this respect by the use of dry-cargo 

ships as oil carriers. 

(2) Air Power. We believe that lack of sufficient air strength will 

prevent Japan from engaging in more than one major operation at 

one time. 

(3) Naval Requirements. Japan’s naval strength is adequate for 

present requirements, but must be carefully husbanded for future 

decisive action. Her extended lies of communication already entail a 

large commitment of naval strength for the protection of essential 

shipping. Their further extension, or indecisive action entailing heavy 

attrition, might well be unacceptable. 

(4) Military Requirements. A large proportion of Japanese ground 

forces is required for occupational duties and for concentration 

in Manchuria to balance Russian forces in Siberia. Japan, however, 

has ample ground forces for any probable combat requirements, 

inasmuch as the insular character of much of the occupied area and 

the topography of New Guinea, the Indo-Burmese frontier and China 

limit the scale of ground operations in those areas. Her ability to move 

her strategic reserve is limited by shortage of shipping. 

3a 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

3. THE EXISTING LOCAL SITUATION ON VARIOUS FRONTS. 

a. North Pa&@. Japan holds an exposed outpost at Kiska, but will 

not risk major forces in order to prevent its fall. We believe the Japanese 

are preparing for a determined defense in the Kuriles. 

b. Manchuria. Japanese forces in Manchuria and Russian forces in eastern Siberia-Outer Mongolia are roughly in balance. Japan has the advantage in strategic position, equipment, and supply, but is deterred from 

aggression by a healthy respect for Russian armed forces; the vulnerability 

of Japan to bombing and submarine attack; and the additional strain 

which such a commitmentwould impose on her resourcesin general,including the strain on her shipping. 

c. Chinu (Except Yunnun). The front has been largely stabilized 

for years, with the Japanese in possesion of the country’s principal 

productive areas and communications lines. The Japanese are deterred 

from further expansion primarily by logistical difficulties and secondarily 

by Chinese resistance. On occasion the Japanese engage in minor offensive 

operations to season inexperienced troops and accomplish limited 

objectives such as the temporary denial of facilities to the Chinese. 

Although nominally in overwhelming numerical strength, the Chinese 

forces are at present so poorly equipped, supplied, and trained that they 

are unable to prevent these forays or to undertake other than local 

aggressive action. This Chinese military weakness springs in large part 

from China’s generally anemic condition, which has resulted from loss of 

productive areas, disruption of internal communications, isolation from 

outside support, and war-weariness. Although a formal separate peace is 

highly improbable, it is possible that, if China’s condition is not effectively 

relieved, an ‘‘undeclared peace” may eventually result. 

d. Yunnan. Active operations are not indicated. The inconsiderable 

Japanese forces on the Indo-China and Burma frontiers are separated 

from Kunming by extremely rugged terrain. Malarial conditions in the 

area would impose a high rate of attrition on any troops operating there. 

8. Bunna. The wet monsoon precludes major operations from May to 

October. Present Japanese strength is sufficient for only local offensive 

action. 

f. Southwest Pacific. The build-up of ground and air strength 

in the Timor-Inner Seas area and northeastern New Guinea appears to 

39 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

have been defensive in character. No important ground force movements 

have occurred since 1 March. 

g. CentraZ Pacific. Of the heavy naval units withdrawn from Truk to 

Japan at the time of the capture of Attu, some have returned to Truk. Air 

strength in Micronesia is being reinforced, but attrition and reinforcement 

are approximately in balance. 

h. Strategic Reserves 

(1) Naval. Normally Japan maintains her battleship and carrier 

strength in home waters and at Truk, shifting the center of gravity

according to circumstances. A formidable striking force, which can 

reach any threatened point of the defensive perimiter in from six to 

nine days, can be quickly assembled in either of these central areas. 

However, destroyer shortgage is becoming critical. 

(2) Air. We believe no strategic reserve exists as such, but Japan’s 

ability to fly even fighter planes to practically any part of her position 

enables her to reinforce quickly any threatened front at the expense of 

other theaters. 

(3) Ground. Surplus ground strength in Central China constitutes 

Japan’s initial reserve. If hard pressed, she can also draw surplus 

strength from Japan and North China and in extremity from 

Manchuria. 

i. Puppet Troops. 

(1) Manchuria, Strength. 

(a) In Manchuria there are reported to be 328,000 Puppet Troops. 

They are organized both as combat divisions and as garrison troops.

Only in recent years have they received automatic weapons and 

artillery and, in view of apparent Japanese shortages in both these 

categories of weapons, it is not thought that the puppet units are 

completely equipped. 

(b) Disposition. About 12,000 Manchurian Puppet Troops are 

reported to be in China. The mass of Manchurian Puppet Troops are 

stationed along the Siberian border, near the larger cities, and in 

strategic locations generally but never without sufficient Japanese 

units in the vicinity to keep them under control. 

(c) Eflect on Japanese Strategy. In the past the Manchurian 

Puppet Army has been maintained principally for political reasons, 

40 
u.s SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

to maintain internal order,and to prevent former soldiers from resorting to banditry. However, in the event the Japanese-Soviet situation 

remains unchanged Japan may replace two or three of her divisions 

in Manchuria with Puppet Troops. 

(2) (a) China and Mongolia. Strength. At present there are reported to be 366,000 Nanking Government Puppet Troops in China. 

They consist mainly of numerous small commands readily controlled 

by the Japanese. There are indications that these troops are now being 

reorganized into infantry divisions of three regiments each with a 

divisional strength of about 6,000. It is reported that light artillery 

and heavier machine guns will now be issued to Puppet Troops 

whereas these weapons were denied them in the past. Because of the 

unreliability and defection of Nanking Puppet Troops in the past, we 

believe that the Japanese will hesitate to increase them beyond 

500,000 during 1943-1944.Rather than increase the Nanking Puppets, 

it is more likely that Manchurian Puppets will be brought south for 

garrison duties. 

(b) Disposition of Puppet Troops. About 209,000Puppet Troops 

are located in Central China, 93,000 in North China, 48,000 in South 

China, and 16,000, mostly cavalry units, in the Chahar-Suiyuan area. 

Future dispositions will not change radically except that the distribution of new contingents will be influenced by the location of the 

Japanese troops which they relieve. 

(c) Eflect on Japanese Strategy. Nanking Puppet Troops have 

been used as garrison troops for maintaining internal order and have 

been employed in no offensive to date. We believe that the Japanese 

may by the end of 1944 further reduce their forces by four divisions 

in North China and by two divisions in Central China, replacing them 

with Nanking and Manchurian Puppet Troops. At all times a nucleus 

of Japanese forces must remain in all strategic centers to keep the 

Puppet Troops in line. 

4 CHINA. 

a. Strength. While China is reported to have over 300 divisions including Communist divisions, of about 7,000 men each, problems of equipment, 

training, leadership, supply, and loyalties to local military leaders make 

it improbable that one-fifth of that number are better than fairly reliable 

troops capable of defensive operations on any front. Even fewer are sufficiently well equipped, trained, and led to undertake offensive operations. If 

41 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

sufficient supplies get through and the United Nations program for equipping and training some of the Chinese is successful (the 30 division plan), 

the situation may improve and more of China’stremendous manpower may 

be effectively available for United Nations operations. However,it is improbable that the effect of this, at best, could be felt strategically before the summer of 1944. 

China’sguerrillas,estimated at some 500,000men, in addition to many 

of her divisions are rendering excellent service in compelling Japan to keep 

a large occupational force in China. 

b. Capabilities. If given adequate United Nations air support China 

may be able to defend her own strategic areas against anything but an allout Japanese offensive. If given strong United Nations air support China 

might be able to execute a very limited objective offensive. It is doubted that 

she would have the ability to hold such an objective, if attained, against a 

determined Japanese counter offensive. 

c. Probable Intentions. The Chinese probably intend to remain on the 

defensive and concentrate on reequipping and retraining their army for 

offensive action at a later date. 

5. PROSPECTIVE OVERALL DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH 194. 

a. Naval strength. Disregarding attrition, we estimate that Japanese 

naval strength should increase as a result of new construction, as follows: 

BB CV ACV CA CL DD SS 

15 June 43 10 6 4 14 16 81 84 

1 Nov. 43 12 8 7 16 18 93 102 

1 May 44 13 10 10 18 20 105 120 

b. Air strength. Aircraft production is expected to continue to increase 

gradually during 1943 and 1944.Present increase is balanced by present 

attrition. 

c. Ground strength. It is expected that by the end of 1944the strength 

of the Japanese army will have increased to 72 divisions and 14independent 

mixed brigades, three cavalry brigades, and 20or more tank regiments. 

d. War production. During 1944Japanese munitions and other war production is expected to show a substantial increase over 1943,provided that 

ocean shipments can be maintained and that industrial plants escape 

42 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

bombing. The overall rate of industrial production may increase by about 

10 per cent. In addition to overall increased production, Japan is continuing to develop uneconomic production of materials in the “Inner Zone”* 

(such as oil, coal, iron, aluminum) for strategic reasons. This work should 

be well advanced by the end of 1944. 

e. Shipping. Despite Japan’s strenuous shipbui!ding efforts estimates 

of the rate of loss and rate of construction of steel ships indicate that the 

Japanese may suffer a net loss of 1,500,000G.R.T. of steel operating tonnage 

from 1June 1943to the end of 1944.However,construction of wooden vessels 

and further substitution of land transport may offset a part of the estimated net loss of steel ships. 

f. Morale. Japanese morale will remain high until, through an effective 

attack on vital areas or a major defeat which cannot be concealed, faith in 

their leaders has suffered severe impairment. 

6. FORECAST FOR 1944. 

a. General. Japan will probably remain on the strategic defensive except 

in one or more of the following circumstances: (1) if convinced that Russia 

had decided to attack her or to grant to the other United Nations the use 

of Siberian air bases, Japan would strike first; (2) if convinced that there 

was real danger of serious United Nations operations against her from 

China, Japan would strike first; (3) if Japan had inflicted a severe defeat 

upon United Nations forces operating against her in the Pacific, she might 

follow up offensively; (4)if Russia met with serious reverses on the Western 

Front, Japan might take the opportunity to attack the Soviet. 

b. North Pacific. We believe that Japan will continue to strengthen her 

defenses in the Kuriles asmeans become available, but is not likely to depart 

from the defensive except in case of war with Russia, in which case she 

would probably try to seize Kamchatka. 

c. Manchuria. We believe that Japan will continue to seek to avoid war 

with Russia in all circumstancesexcept those indicated in a (1) above. She 

will continue to match Russian strength in Siberia, reducing her forces in 

Manchuria only in case of extreme necessity. 

d. China (including Yunnan). We believe that Japan will continue to 

seek a satisfactory solution in China by political means, but will probably 

4. Japan Proper, Korea, Manchuria,North China, Formosa, and Karafuto 

(Japanese Sakhalin). 

43 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRGT 

engage in no decisive military operations there except in the circumstances 

indicated in a (2) above. In that case, her most likely objective would be 

Kunming and probably the dekrmining factor would be relative air 

strength there. 

e. Burma. We believe that Japan will remainon the strategic defensive. 

f. Southwmt and Central Pacijlc. We believe that Japan will remain on 

the strategic defensive,continuing to build up her local defensive forces and 

facilities and her naval striking force. 

44 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 300/1 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION 1943-1944 

EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA 

Reference: 

C.C.S.106th Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.S. 300/1 was circulated, 7 August 1943, for the information of the 

CombinedChiefsof Staffand asabasisfar discussion at QAVDRANT. 

45 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 300/1 7 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-1944, 

EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The enclosure is submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff at the QUADRANT Conference. 

ENCLOSURE 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-1944, 

EUROPEAN AREA 

(Asof 30 July 1943) 

NOTE: In view of very recent developments in Italy, the ultimate consequences 

of which are as yet unpredictable, related paragraphs of this paper 

must be regarded as tentative. 

1. BASIC FACTORS IN THE EUROPEAN SITUATION. 

a. Predominance of Germany. The enemy situation in Europe must be 

estimated in terms of the German situation. Italy, Hungary, Rumania, 

Bulgaria, and Finland are merely satellites of Germany and, to a considerable degree, prisoners of circumstances. None of them could offer 

prolonged resistance without effective German support; any of them would 

now dissociate itself from Germany if it could do so without fear of Germsny 

or of the U.S.S.R. Italy’s special position as a nominally equal partner with 

Germany would, however, make her surrender mare impressive than that 

of any of the others. 

b. Gemany’s Basic Task is now to defend “Festung Europa,”* with 

such assistance as she can extort from satellite and occupied countries. 

* As herein conceived, “Festung Europa” consists of an essential core 

(roughly Gerniany itself, most of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania), surrounded by outer defensive and auxiliary areas. 

46 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Although she may no longer expect to impose her will on the U.S.S.R., Great 

Britain, and the United States in combination, she can still hope to avert 

surrender and even to gain an advantageous negotiated peace by dividing 

her enemies politically (in particular, by dividing the U.S.S.R. from Great 

Britain and the United States),by beating off their attacks, or by making 

her defeat so costly as to dissuade them from the task. This hope, as long as 

it persists, will justify and support a determined resistance. 

c. “Festung Europa.” Germany now controls, directly or indirectly 

all of continental Europe west of the Russian front, except the territories 

of five neutral states (Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey). 

This control extends to include the Baltic, Adriatic, and Aegean Seas and 

the Mediterranean islands of Corsica, Sardinia, Crete and Rhodes. This 

whole area is encircled by blockade, but contains within itself the requisites 

of a practical military self-sufficiency. 

The western and southern faces of this position are subject to invasion 

only by difficult amphibious attack (assuming the continued neutrality 

of Spain and Turkey).The western face has been strengthened by extensive 

fortification; the southern face is backed by formidable mountainous terrain. Major industrial areas in western territory under German control, 

however, are subject to heavy aerial attack. 

The eastern face of “Festung Europa” is without clear natural definition. For that reason, and because of the immense forces deployed by the 

U.S.S.R., the eastern front must continue to be Germany’s chief preoccupation in land operations. 

Despite the best efforts of German propaganda, the inhabitants of 

“Festung Europa” are not united in its defense. That fact entails not only 

the employment of considerab!e occupational forces, but also the necessity 

of bolstering wavering allies. 

2. THE EXISTING OVERALL SITUATION. 

a. Ground Forces. The Axis armies are now all at or near peak strength 

in number of combat divislons -German, 311; Italian, 74; Rumanian, 27; 

Hungarian, 21; Bulgarian, 20; Croat, 8; Slovak, 4; total, 465. The German 

Army in particular has been brought to such strength only by lowering 

47 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

physical standards, combing out industrial personnel hitherto deferred, 

and enlisting considerable numbers of non-Germans. In consequence, the 

average quality of German divisions has declined and war production will 

be adversely affected. Replacement of future losses will augment those 

tendencies and may be inadequate to maintain existing strength. 

b. Air Forces. We estimate that the total first-line strength of the 

German Air Force (asof 31 July 1943) is approximately 4,600aircraft. Of 

these, approximately 1,500are on the Western Front, 1950 in the Russian 

Front and 1125in the Mediterranean.In addition, approximately 450 are in 

Germany for refitting. In structure the German Air Force lacks strength 

in depth because it has no substantial Stored Reserves of aircraft to back 

up the first-line units. Opposed upon all fronts by United Nations air forces 

greatly superior in numbers and in offensive power, the German Air Force 

has been forced to adopt a defensive role but this defensive role is rendered 

even more difficult due to its extended commitments. In an effort to meet 

this situation its defensive strength has been increased by concentration 

upon production of fighter types at the expense of other categories. Because 

of the comparative ease of manufacture of the fighter type, this has resulted 

in a slight upward trend in total production and has improved the defensive 

power of the German Air Force while the offensive power has further deteriorated. Due largely to the shortage of trained crews, the efficiency of the 

long-range bomber force is at its lowest point since the beginning of tine 

war. In equipment some improvement in present types is noted, but no 

important production of radically new types is expected. 

We estimate that the totel first line strength of the Italian Air Force 

(as of 31 July 1943) is approximately 1,400 aircraft, of which 1,050 are 

disposed in the Central Mediterranean and 350 in the Eastern. In addition 

approximately 250 are in Italy for refitting. During the past year this air 

force has been deteriorating in numerical strength, in rate of new production, in pilot and crew training, and in combat efficiency. Due to these 

factors the figures given should be discounted by at least 30% for purposes 

of comparing the fighting effectiveness of the Italian Air Force with that of 

the German. Under existing conditions continuance of this downward trend 

in overall effectiveness is to be expected. 

c. Naval Forces. 

(1) Submarines. As of 27 July 1943,the estimated numbers of European Axis submarines were 436 German and 74 Italian. Of these 211 

German and 45 Italian were operational and were in the Atlantic or 

Mediterranean or in waters accessible to those areas, 43 German were 

43 
V. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

used only for training purposes, and 176 German were undergoing trials, 

training, or repairs in the Baltic. The average rates of completion of new 

submarines are estimated to be 25 German a month, or possibly a few 

more, and between one and two Italian (if construction still continues). 

(2) Surface Vessels. As of 27 July, all effective German major units 

(2BB, 4 CA,and 4 CL) were divided between the Baltic and Norwegian 

waters. All effective German light forces (40 DD, and perhaps 150 PT) 

were in waters from the Bay of Biscay northward, except for perhaps 45 

PT in the Mediterranean. It is possible that the experienced personnel 

have been largely transferred from the major units other than TZRPZTZ, 

SCHARNHORST, LUETZOW (the three in northern Norwegian waters) 

to the submarine service and that the newly completed aircraft carrier 

GRAF ZEPPELIN has been laid up. Subject to that, the effectiveness of 

both the major units and light forces, especially the latter, is believed to 

be high. The new construction of combatant surface vessels is believed 

to be confined to about 21 DD and a large but uncertain number of PT. 

As of 27 July, the larger portion of the effective Italian surface 

forces (consistingof 2/3 BB, 1CA,5 CL,15/20 DD, and perhaps 40 PT) 

were in the Western Basin of the Mediterranean. Except for a few motor 

torpedo boats in the Black Sea, the rest (consisting of 3/4 BB, 1 CL, 

15/20 DD,and perhaps 60 PT) were in the Eastern Basin. The effectiveness of the major units is believed to be low. The effectiveness of the light 

forces, especially the motor torpedo boats, is believed to be fairly high. 

Repair work on combatant surface vessels and new construction (if still 

continuing) is believed to cover 0/1 BB, 1 CA,3 CV (under conversion 

from other types), and 1 CL-all in the Western Basin; 112 BB and 

2/3 CL -all in the Eastern Basin; and an uncertain number of DD 

and PT in each basin. 

d. Munitions Production. There is no reason to believe that decline 

in munitions production has as yet affected German tactical efficiency.

However, labor shortage and bomb damage have more than balanced 

German progress in organizing the exploitation of non-German labor and 

facilities. Even with further civilian sacrifices,output of finished munitions 

may have declined about five percent net from the 1941-42 peak. The capacity of the area integrated under German control would have permitted a 

substantial expansion of output if the manpower shortage and bomb 

damage had not interfered. 

A scale of military activity involving attrition at 1942 rates could be 

maintained only by drawing on stocks of most major items. Output of 

49 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

fighter aircraft, however, is increasing and has been well in excess of 

wastage in recent months. Fighter wastage could increase by one-third to 

one-half during the coming year without occasioning a decline in fighter 

strength. 

e. German Morale. The two big factors in German morale are the 

attitude towards (1) the outcome of the war and (2) the treatment of 

Germany in the event of her defeat. There is evidence that a considerable 

part of German military personnel still believe that (3ermany will not be 

defeated, but belief in total victory seems to be fading. Civilian morale is 

undoubtedly lower than military morale, but has demonstrated no positive 

tendency toward defeatism. Morale is supported by the widespread conviction that Germany would be ruined if defeated and German propaganda 

zealously engenders this belief. In consequnce, most German civilians 

appear reconciled to the prevailing standard of living, which is far from 

intolerable, for as long as is necessary to secure an acceptable peace. Morale 

is being increasingly affected by air attack. There are indicationsof growing

uneasiness over the presence of so many foreign workmen and prisoners 

of war in Germany. Continuation of reverses may weaken German morale 

further by spreading conviction of inevitable defeat. 

3. THE SITUATION BY FRONTS. 

a. The Russian Front. Since early spring two-thirds of Germany's 

ground strength (203divisions) has been on the Russian front, with very 

heav offensive concentrations near Orel and Belgorod. It is believed that 

the Germans planned an early operation to pinch off the Kursk salient at 

least, but that it was suspended on account of the sudden collapse in 

Tunisia. On 5 July, the Germans launched a violent attack northward and 

eastward from Belgorod, which failed, apparently with severe losses. A 

complementary attack southward from Orel made no headway. The 

Russians seized the initiative and launched a heavy converging attack on 

Orel, where the German position now appears to be precarious. This situation, if not preliminary to more extensive operations (as was the Russian 

Kharkov otfensive in the spring of 1942), marks a new phase in the war 

in the east, with the Russians conducting a mid-summer offensive and the 

Germans professing to welcome a positional battle of attrition. 

On the whole front, Russian ground strength is to the German as 

three to two. The superiority of German communications, staff work, 

and fighting skill may yet compensate for this disparity. Russian staff 

planning, however, has improved since 1941-42. 

50 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Germany has, on the Russian front, some 2,000 aircraft, of which 1,170 

are bombers of all types. Available information indicates that the U.S.S.R. 

air strength is numerically superior in the ratio of approximately two to 

one. But due to a large proportion of obsolescent aircraft and to a low rate 

of serviceability its overall effectiveness has until recently been low. As 

a result, the Germans have been able to prevent the U.S.S.R.from 

establishing effective air superiority in any large sector. This advantage is 

rapidly being lost as the proportion of first-line aircraft is increased and 

combat efficiency improved. 

b. Mediterranean Front. The Axis forces available for the defense of 

this front are for the most part Italian, although Germmy has recently 

sent ground reinforcements to both Italy and the Balkans. Axis ground 

strength in this area is believed to be disposed as follows (28 July) : 

Italian divisions German Bulgarian 

Field coastal divisions divisions 

French Coast 5 2 6 

Corsica 2 2 - Sardinia 3 2 1 

Sicily 

Italy

Balkans-Aegean 

5* 2** 

11 6 

31 -

3% 

3 

-

-

20' 

* Four badly depleted. One fresh regiment has arrived. 

:t * Three others have disintegrated.

*** Six defensive. 

Axis air strength in this area was approximately as follows (24 July) : 

Italian German 

Total (Fighter) Total (Fighters) 

Central Med. 1050 (475) 945 (320) 

Eastern Med. 350 (100) 180 ( 45) 

The Italian battleships and cruisers seem likely to continue inactive. 

Naval defense will depend primarily on Italian and German submarines, 

motor torpedo boats, and possibly destroyers. 

Movement of German ground forces into and within Italy has hitherto 

indicated an intention to defend the peninsula. Twelve additional divisions 

are available in France for reinforcement. However,the apparent reluctance 

of the Italians to fight, and the instability of the internal situation in Italy 

51 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

brings the capability into question. The repercussions of an Italian collapse

would be particularly serious in the Balkans. 

c. Western Front. Germany has fortified the coast from Hendaye to 

Petsamo and can offer formidable resistance to any attempted landing. She 

cannot, however, prevent heavy aerial bombardment of the industrial bases 

of her military power in western Germany. 

The coastal defenses are particularly strong and in depth from Brittany to Holland (the area in which a landing could be supported by landbased fighters) and are backed by two interior defensive zones in advance 

of the reversed Maginot Line and the West Wall. There are in France and 

the Low Countries 44 German divisions, 14 more than the estimated 

defensive minimum. 

In Norway (exclusive of the Kirkenes area) there are 12 German 

divisions supported by approximately 200 aircraft. German defensive 

capabilities are enhanced by the presence of major naval units (TZRPITZ, 

SCHARNHORST, and LUETZOW). 

d. The Bomber Offensive. The scale of bombing attacks on Germany’s

vital centers is steadily increasing. Due to improvements in equipment 

and bombing technique the weight of bombs now being dropped monthly 

is more than three times that of a year ago. Far greater precision, penetration and saturation of targets is being achieved. This rising scale of effectiveness must be considered in any assessment based upon past results. 

In the Ruhr, where German heavy industry is principally concentrated, the bomber offensive has effected a reduction of about 30% in normal 

production. In Axis Europe as a whole, it is believed to have effected a gross 

reduction in mine and manufacturing output of between 5 and 10%. Due 

to the fact that the reduction in industrial production to date has been 

largely confined to primary and semi-fabricated materials, its effect upon

the military potential cannot be expected to be immediate and direct. However, since no considerable relocation of vital war industries is practicable, 

and since the range of bombing flights is increasing, the results so far 

achieved justify the expectation that the long-range effects of bombing 

attacks, if continued and intensified, will seriously impair the ability of the 

Axis to equip and supply its forces in the field. 

The possibility of offsetting production losses in part by utilizing 

spare capacity exists in the coke and iron and steel industries as well as 

certain branches of the chemical industry; cuts in non-military consumption of some chemical products can be made without serious sacrifice. 

52 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Of great importance in a general assessment of the results of the 

offensive, is the consideration of the imponderable effects upon the civil 

population. Increasing casualties, extensive destruction of housing (about 

16% of the population of the Ruhr have already been made homeless), 

disruption of transportation and public services with consequent food and 

water shortages, constant fear and nights of sleeplessness, have greatly 

increased the strain upon the people. With no prospect of relief from 

continuous and more intense bombing, and with hope of ultimate victory 

waning, further deterioration in morale may be expected. 

e. The War Against Shipping. The destruction of shipping by the 

European Axis, after rising to almost two million G.R.T. during the second 

quarter of 1942 and continuing near that level during the two remaining 

quarters of the year, dropped sharply to 1.3 million G.R.T. during the first 

quarter of 1943 and to 0.6 million during the second. Attacks by German 

and Italian submarines accounted during each of these periods for 80 to 

95% of the destruction of tonnage by the European Axis -90% or more 

during the last three -and for 70 to 80% of the combined destruction of 

tonnage by the European Axis and by Japan. 

The net results of all efforts at destruction by the European Axis 

and by Japan, of the losses of vessels from all other causes, and of new 

construction, on the tonnage available to the United Nations have been 

approximately as follows: 

(1) The tanker tonnage available on 1July 1943 was less by 700,000 

G.R.T.than at the beginning of 1942, but was greater by 400,000 G.R.T. 

than at its low points reached during that year. This tonnage increased 

300,000 G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1943 (new construction of 

470,000 less lossesof 170,000 G.R.T.). 

(2) The non-tanker tonnage available was greater by nearly four 

million G.R.T.on 1July 1943 than at the beginning of 1942. This tonnage 

increased 2.6 million G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1943 (new 

construction of 3.3 less losses of 0.7 million G.R.T.). 

A great increase has unquestionably occurred during the past year 

or more in the difficulties and hazards experienced by Axis submarines in 

locatingand attacking suitable shipping targets. This has resulted, not only

in a marked downward trend in the rate of destruction of shipping, but also 

in a marked upward trend in the rate of loss of submarines. During May,

June, and July of this year the losses of German submarines may have 

equalled their average rate of production; and the losses of Italian Sub-
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECIWZ 

marines probably exceeded theirs. Another result in evidence during July 

has been a marked shift of German and Italian submarines from the main 

convoy routes to other areas where targets, though fewer, tend to be less 

well protected by anti-submarine forces. 

No marked drop in the morale of German submarine personnel can 

be said to have occurred, though there have been various indications of 

some degree of deterioration, especially in security consciousness. There 

are many indications of a shortage of well trained personnel. 

Whatever step Germany may now take to overcome her loss of 

headway in the war against shippingmust be taken in face of large increases 

in the advantage and momentum gained by the United Nations and in face 

of the persistent tendency of technical developments to be more favorable 

to the anti-submarine forces than to the submarine. But by continuing 

her submarine warfare against shipping Germany can at least prevent

the United Nations from diverting to other channels the huge amounts of 

manpower, energy, and materials which they must then devote to counter 

measures. 

4. THE SITUATION IN THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES. 

a. Italy. The fall of Mussolini is indicative of the unstable situation in 

Italy. The immediate purpose of Badoglio’s appointment appears to have 

been to arrest serious internal disintegration. Although he may succeed 

in rallying the Italians for the time being, increased resistance, even with 

German reinforcement, cannot now protect Italy from the ravages of war, 

and so offers no escape from the predicament which produced the internal 

crisis. On the other hand, the presence of German forces and absence from 

the peninsula of the greater portion of the Italian Army (45 out of 57 flrstline divisions) may prevent Badoglio from escape by negotiation with the 

United Nations. If effective relief from Allied attack is not soon obtained, 

the internal situation will continue to disintegrate. 

b. Hungary and Rumania. Because of the vital importance to her of 

Rumanian oil and of Hungarian communications and oil,Germany will 

maintain a Arm grip on both countries as long as she is able, but each would 

be glad to escape (unlessthe tide turns toward Germany). Both fear the 

U.S.S.R. Each is hostile toward the other. Each would seek terms guaranteeing protection against the other and against the U.S.S.R. as well as 

against Germany. 

54 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

c. Bulgaria has undertaken no more than the defense of her sphere of 

interest in the Balkans (including Greek and Yugoslav territory) and 

particularly has insisted on maintaining diplomatic relations with the 

U.S.S.R. 

d. Finland is bound to Germany by her fear of the U.S.S.R., her 

dependence on Germany for essential supplies, and the presence of German 

troops. She would willingly withdraw from the war if these problems could 

be solved. She maintains contact with the United Nations through continued relations with the United States. 

5. THE SITUATION IN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES. 

a. Norway. Strong undercover resistance to German occupation continues unabated. 

b. Denmark. Although Denmark has been set up as a model for the 

“New Order,” receiving exceptionally mild treatment, anti-German sentiment continues in relatively passive form. 

c. The Low Countries.Hostility toward Germany exists in both countries, although less bitter in Belgium than in Holland. 

d. France. Although the puppet regime at Vichy is being forced into 

closer collaboration, hostility toward Germany is general and underground 

resistance appears to be well organized. 

e. Poland. Although an effective national underground organization 

exists, the situation is complicated by a boundary dispute with the U.S.S.R. 

and the presence of Russian guerrillas and various Russian-influenced 

underground organizations independent of the Polish government in 

London. 

f.Yugoslavia.German and Italian forces have conducted extensive 

operations to eliminate guerrilla activity, but such resistance continues on 

a reduced scale. Although guerrilla forces which recognize the governmentin-exile and others which are influenced by the U.S.S.R. have clashed, latest 

reports indicate that same degree of coordination between them may have 

been established. 

g. Greece. Some underground and guerrilla activity exists, but the 

country is so exhausted that little effective military assistance c8n be 

expected. There is considerable opposition to a restoration of the government of King George II. 

55 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

h. Occupied Russia. Considerable guerrilla activity continues behind 

the German lines. German efforts to organize anti-Communist Russian 

forces have had only limited success. 

6. THE ATTITUDES OF EUROPEAN NEUTRALS. 

a. Sweden is Arm in her neutrality and is taking a stronger attitude 

than formerlyin her relationswith Germany. Public expression of sympathy 

with the United Nations, especially with Norway, is increasingly permitted. 

b. Switzerland. Despite their isolation, the Swiss have succeeded in 

maintaining a firmly neutral attitude. 

c. Spain. The steadily mounting show of power of the Western United 

Nations in the Mediterranean area has impressed the high command of 

the Spanish Army that Franco’s past alignment was wrong. The Falange

is very unpopular with the people in Spain. Liberals and conservatives 

including those elements in favor of a restoration of the monarchy have 

been estranged by Franco pronouncements and it is now clear that the 

Army holds the key to the Spanish situation. 

Franc0 himself has given no indication of abandoning his proposed 

belief in the Spanish types of totalitarianism which he has rechristened 

“Unitarianism” and which he claims is peculiarly suited to the Spanish

people. He has maintained that all nations, including the United Nations, 

will emerge from the war with some form of totalitarianism. Whether these 

beliefs arise from sincere conviction or whether it is that he has been so 

sheltered and isolated that he has recently been unable to guage the sentiments and strength of the United Nations or the feeling of his own people 

cannot be ascertained. 

The Army high command, convinced of the change in the international and domestic situation, have let it be known that they intend to 

confront Franco with the true picture, and call for an immediate restoration 

of the monarchy with a liberalized constitution before it is too late. 

Franco has said that he would resist any invasion of Spanish soil, 

whether by the Western United Nations or by the Axis,and it is generally 

believed that he would keep his word. A junta of generals representing the 

most popuiar element in the army are reported to have agreed that they 

would resist any such invasion, irrespective of Franco’s decision, and would 

depose him if he declined to take the leadership or showed signs of aligning 

himself more closely with the Axis. 

56 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

It is therefore considered possible that under increasing pressure of 

events, Franc0 may, in order to hold his position, seek United Nations 

support. 

d. Portugal. Although remaining neutral, Portugal now leans toward 

the United Nations. 

e. Turkey. Although well disposed toward Great Britain and the 

United States, Turkey is not apt to make an early departure from her 

position of neutrality. Her fear of Soviet domination of the Balkans, however, will probably lead her to active participation in the war, when it can 

be done at minimum cost, in order to obtain a voice in the peace settlement. 

7. SUMMARY OF THE EXISTING SITUATION. The situation of the 

European Axis has definitely deteriorated during the past year. The war against 

shipping. which was to prevent effective support of United Nations operations 

from overseas, has failed to accomplish that purpose. German air strength 

has proved insufficient to meet all defensive requirements; in particular, the 

G.A.F.has been unable to challenge Allied air superiority in the Mediterranean 

or to prevent devastating aerial bombardment of western Germany. Although 

the German Army has been brought to peak strength by scraping the bottom 

of the manpower barrel, it has not been able, at that strength, to eliminate the 

Russian threat in time to gain for Germany freedom of action in dealing with 

attack from the west and south. As a result of aerial bombardment and manpower shortage, German war production has begun to decline. Italy is reeling 

under direct attack, and the other satellites cannot be relied upon in similar 

circumstances. 

Although Germany cannot now impose her will on the U.S.S.R., Great 

Britain, and the United States in combination, the High Command, the armed 

forces, and the German people still hope to gain an acceptable and even advantageous negotiated peace by stubborn resistance and by diplomacy. 

8. COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO GERMANY, 1943-44. 

a. To Continue the War Against Shipping. Germany will follow this 

course to the end, to the best of her ability,regardless of what other courses 

she may adopt. 

b. To Seek a Decision in Russia. Only by the destruction of the Soviet 

armies can Germany completely free herself of her huge commitment in 

the east in order to concentrate her forces against her enemies in the west. 

57 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The lateness of the season and the course of operations around Kursk would 

seem to indicate that she cannot accomplish this in 1943. In 1944 she will 

have less force available for the purpose. 

c. To Seek During 1943 to Improve Her Defensive Position in th U.S.S.R. 

and to Impair w Destroy Soviet OffensiveCapabilities. This would be the 

best alternative to b as a means of reducing her commitment in the east 

in order to meet attack in the west in 1944. It may be the object of current 

German operationsin Russia. So far the Germans have failed to straighten 

their Russian front by the recapture of Kursk. They may hope that the 

battle of attrition at Ore1willsigniflcantly impair Soviet strength. Attrition, 

however, is double-edged. 

d. To Undertake Offensive Operations in the West w South. Such a 

course would sacrifice her advantage of position and expose the forces 

engaged to destruction. Moreover, she lacks the requisite air and naval 

strength to conduct such an operation. The present deployment of the 

German Army indicates that this course has been discarded for 1943. It 

will be even less feasible in 1944. 

Since an invasion of Spain is the only overland operation which 

Germany can undertake in this direction, we examine that capability in 

greater detail. 

By crossing the Pyrenees, where the rail net changes to a different 

gauge from that standard in central Europe, and where both road and 

railcommunications are subject to interdiction by aerial attack, any forces 

so committed are subject to denial of supply and reinforcement. 

At present Germany is believed to have 186 operational aircraft 

(mostly long-range bombers) now disposed in Southern France. Any

build-up of air support for an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula at this 

time could be made only by a transfer of operational aircraft from other 

theaters where German air strength is inadequate to meet, successfully, its 

commitments. The Germans huve the capability of increasing the strength 

now in Southern France to from 500 to 600 aircraft by withdrawals from 

Italy and the Western front. In the event such an undertaking were accepted 

as a calculated risk,the complications of supply and maintenance will 

reduce effectiveness to below 30% by the end of the first month. Germany 

could presumably divert 250 transport aircraft (JU-52) to this zone of 

operations within a week, from her strength of 1250 transports (of which 

40% are non-operational in Central Germany), and possibly another 250, 

including 25 Me 323’s, within two weeks; but this would leave her practi58 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

cally without transport aircraft on other fronts. The JU-52 has a range of 

about 780 miles, which would enable it to be flown from southern fiance 

(Bayonne) to Madrid and return without refueling. It is not believed that, 

except for limited offensive strikes, the German Air Force could advance 

through a hostile Spain any more rapidly than the ground force, owing to 

logistical problems and inability to protect advanced airdromes. The 

available airdromes, though scattered, are believed to be adequate for such 

aircraft as m-igight be used, apart from logistical considerations. 

It is estimated that 12 German divisions will be required in Italy, 

Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. Seven divisions have actually been identified 

in those areas and there are indications that an additional five are “ear 

marked” for Italy. In France, where we believe the German strategic reserve 

to be stationed, there will then remain 11 divisions available for use in 

Spain above what we believe to be the minimum defensive commitment 

there. To these could be added one division from Germany and another 

from Denmark. We believe that none of these 13 divisions are up to preStalingrad standards in training and combat efficiency. We further believe 

that to successfully accomplish an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, even 

with no Spanish resistance, would require 12 German divisions. We believe 

that the Spanish will not cooperate. We believe that to accomplish this 

mission at least 20 German divisions would be required against Spanish 

resistance augmented by United Nations forces as they become available. 

We believe that such an operation would originate from Southern France 

where, along the Spanish border there are now only two divisions disposed. 

The German comb-out and call-up of the fall of 1942 hzs we believe, 

extracted practically all available German man-power except oncoming 

classes. If casualties continue at approximately the same rate as 1941 and 

1942, Germany will not be able to maintain existing Army strength. As the 

Western United Nations continue to expand their capabilities in England 

and the Mediterranan, German defensive commitments will increase and 

in consequence less force will be available in 1944 for such an invasion. 

Such a course of action might, in desperation, be adopted by 

Germany,in order to create a situation for the negotiation of an acceptable 

peace with the United States and Great Britain. The poorly equipped 

Spznish ground forces, with practically no air support, are not presently 

deployed to resist Axis penetration. Even if the military successes or diplomatic pressure of the United Nations should bring about the redisposition 

of these Spanish forces essentially to block the Pyrenees, German forces 

would probably still be capable of occupying strategic areas tbreatening the 

59 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Straits of GIBRALTAR unless United Nations’ forces intervene. From bases 

in southern Spain, the German Air Force might temporarily interrupt the 

passage of our convoys through the Straits of Gibraltar. Should the United 

Nations increase their commitments in the Central Mediterranean and 

penetrate deeper into the Axis Citadel from this area, the temptation to 

interdict their vital artery of communication correspondingly increases. 

e. To Stand on the Strategic Defensive. This is the present German 

attitude in the west and south and may be forced upon Germany in the 

east as well. It is a negative course which cannot bring victory, but may 

serve to avert complete defeat. Its adoption would not preclude counteroffensive action to destroy or expel any United Nations force which gained 

a lodgment on the continent. 

f. To Abandon Outlying Tenitory (e.g., Norway, France, Italy, Greece, 

portions of Russia, Finland) in order to conserve and concentrate strength. 

The consequent impairment of her military, economic, political, or psychological situation will not permit Germany to adopt this course voluntarily. 

g. To Sue for Peace. Germany is probably already willing to accept a 

negotiated peace, but is unable to obtain acceptable terms from the United 

Nations. In this situation, if she cannot conduct a successful defense on all 

fronts, she will seek to divide her enemies and obtain an acceptable negotiated peace with one party in order to concentrate against the other. 

Although a separate peace with Great Britain and the United States might 

be preferable to her, one with the U.S.S.R. might be more practicable and 

might appear to be advantageous. 

Actual or virtual surrender will remain unacceptable 80 long as there 

is hope of achieving a staiemate or a negotiated peace. Should the High 

Command conclude that surrender is inevitable, it may try to yield to the 

U.S.S.R.or to Great Britain and the United States separately, whichever 

course offers the better prospect at that time, meanwhile trying to hold 

off the other party. 

9. GERMANY’S MOST PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION, 1943-1944. 

a. To continue the war against shipping. 

b. To endeavor, during 1943, to improve her defensive position in Russia 

and to impair Soviet offensive capabilities by attrition. 

60 
U. 5. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

c. To stand on the strategic defensive in the west and south during 

1943 and on all fronts during 1944. 

d. To abandon outlying territory only under compulsion. 

e. If surrender becomes inevitable, to yield to either the U.S.S.R. or to 

Great Britain and the United States, whichever course offers the better 

prospect at that time. 

10. FORECAST FOR 1943-1944. 

a. The German war against shipping will continue, but probably with 

diminishing effect. 

b. The bomber offensive against Germany will have cumulative effect 

destructive of the German industrial potential, the G.A.F. fighter force, 

the air defenses, and morale. It may create conditions within the country 

which will facilitate and hasten complete military defeat. 

c. Germany will continue to resist as long as hope persists that thereby 

she may gain a negotiated peace. When surrender becomes inevitable, she 

may seek to yield to either the U.S.S.R. or Great Britain and the United 

States, whichever course offers the better prospect to her at that time. 

d. The German satellites (Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and 

Finland) will collapse or come to terms whenever forced to bear the brunt 

of direct and sustained attack or whenever relieved of fear of Germany and 

of the U.S.S.R. 

61 
82 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITSSH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 301f 3 27 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST, 1943-44 

References: 

C.C.S. 110th Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.S. 114th Meeting, Item (4) 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosure is a revision of C.C.S. 301 (circulated 9 August 1943) to 

include a new paragraph 8 i, which was proposed in C.C.S. 301f2 and approved 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staffin their 114th Meeting. Except for the added 

paragraph, C.C.S. 301has not received specific approval of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff, although pertinent extracts from it have been approved in C.C.S. 319f 5. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

63 
U. S. SECFtn 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE 

PACIFIC AND FAR EAST, 1943-44 

Report bg the US.Chiefs of Staff 

PROBLEM 

1. Prepare an outline plan for specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR 

EAST in 1943-44to be in consonance with the Strategic Plan for the Defeat of 

JAPAN. 

ASSUMPTIONS 

2. It is assumed that ITALY is eliminated from the war in 1943;GERMANY 

will be defeated in the fall of 1944;JAPAN and RUSSIA remain at peace. 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 

1943-44 PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA 

3. An estimate of the enemy situation is contained in C.C.S. 300.This concludes that: 

a. General. JAPAN will probably remain on the strategic defensive 

except in one or more of the following circumstances: (1) if convinced that 

RUSSIA had decided to attack her or to grant to the other UNITED 

NATIONS the use of Siberian air bases, JAPAN would strike first; (2) if 

convinced that there was real danger of serious UNITED NATIONS 

operations against her from CHINA, JAPAN mould strike first; (3) if 

JAPAN had inflicted a severe defeat upon UNITED NATIONS forces operating against her in the PACIFIC, she might follow up oflensively; (4) if 

RUSSIA met with serious reverses on the Western Front, JAPAN might 

take the opportunity to attack the SOVIET. 

b. North Pacific. We believe that JAPAN will continue to strengthen her 

defenses in the KURZLES as means become available, but is not likely to 

depart from the defensive except in case of war with RUSSIA, in which case 

she would probably try to seize KAMCHATKA. 

c. Manchuria. We believe that JAPAN will continue to seek to avoid war 

with RUSSIA in all circumstances except those indicated in a (1) above. 

64 
0. s. SECRET 

BRITIsa MOST SECRET 

She will continue to match Russian strength in SIBERIA, reducing her 

forces in MANCHURIA only in case of extreme necessity. 

d China (including Yunnan).We believe that JAPAN will continue to 

seek a satisfactory solution in CHZNA by political means, but will probably 

engage in no decisive military operationsthere except in the circumstances 

indicated in a (2) above. In that case,her most likely objective would be 

KUNMZNG and probably the determining factor would be relative air 

strength there. 

e. Bum. We believe that JAPAN will remain on the strategic defensive. 

f. Southwest and Central Pacific. We believe that JAPAN will remain on 

the strategic defensive, continuing to build up her local defensive forces 

and facilities and her naval striking force. 

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 

4. The Strategic Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN (C.C.S. 220) envisages the 

actual invasion of JAPAN following an overwhelming air offensive from bases 

in CHZNA. This requires the opening of lines of communication to CHINA 

which, in turn, involves the early recapture of BURMA and the seizure of a 

port in CHINA. This requires a westward advance by the UNZTED STATES 

through the Central and South-Southwest PACIFIC. Operations during this 

period must have as their objectives those stated in C.C.S. 242/6: “to maintain 

and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced.” An analysis of our capabilities prior to 1945 

indicates that we can conduct operations in the PaciAc and Asiatic Theaters 

which will be in consonance with the above objective. 

5. A phase in the North PACIFIC, now drawing to a close, deals with the 

ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS. Consideration is being given to 

plans for an operation against PARAMUSHZRU in 1944 considering means 

available and feasibility in connection with our other operations in the 

PACIFIC. 

6. In the Central and South-Southwest PACZFIC during 1943-44,we can 

continue our objective of reaching positions for an all-out effort against JAPAN 

by attaining a line that runs roughly through the PALAUS and the VOGELKOP in western NEW GUINEA. At the same time we will constantlybe restricting Japanese communications. It may be found desirzible or necessary to seize 

GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS, possibly the BONINS, in conjunction 

with the seizure of the western CAROLZNES, and in particular with the attack 

65 
u.s. SECBET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

on the PALAUS. The MARIANA-BONIN attack would have profound effects 

on the Japanese because of its serious threat to the homeland. 

7. In the Asiatic Theater, during this period, the British willbegin the ejection of the Japanese from BURMA. This will constitute a further pressure 

against the Japanese and will increase the attrition of their military power. 

The early increase in assistanceto CHINA is of the utmost importance in keeping her in the war. In addition to assisting CHINA materially, our air efforts in 

CHINA will be furthered. The British forces are scheduled to complete the conquest of BURMA with operations beginning in late 1944. 

8. The various operationsrequired in the several theaters, during 1943-44, 

together with a brief statement of the concept of each operation, are listed below. These operations further the objectives stated in C.C.S. 242/6 and, as will 

be shown later, are within our capabilities during the period under consideration. Outline plans for these operations are available. 

a. oilberts. 

Thisis a plan for the seizure and consolidation of the GILBERTS preparatory to a further advance into the MARSHALLS. NAURU, TARAWA, 

and MAKIN are to be captured by simultaneous assault followed by the 

rapid development of air flelds in the forward (TARAWA-MAKIN) area and 

staging flelds along the GILBERT line. 

b. Marshalls 

This is a plan for the seizure of the MARSHALL ISLANDS (including 

WAKE and KUSAIE) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central PACIFIC. Initial operations envisage either the seizure of the center 

nucleus by simultaneous assault or a step-by-step advance up from the 

GILBERTS through JALUIT and MILL 

c. Ponaw 

This is a plan for the capture of PONAPE preparatory to operations 

against the TRUK area. The main effort is to be against the northern 

(PONAPE Town)area. Subsequent operations provide for the elimination 

of enemy forces by successive seizure of their positions. 

d. Carolines (Tmk area) 

This is a plan for the seizure of the eastern CAROLINES asfar west as 

WOLEAI and the establishment of a fleet base at TRUK.Atolls to the Southeastward of TRUK are to be captured flrst, followed by the rapid development of airfieldsin the area. These will provide bases for a sustained flghter66 
u.s. SEGRET 

BRITISH MMT SECRET 

supported bombing offensive against TRUK. Subsequent operations provide for capture of TRUK and the reduction as necessary of the remaining 

enemy positions as far west as WOLEAI. 

e. Palau Islands 

This is a plan for the capture of the PALAUS including YAP. The plan 

calls for the initial capture of YAP and other suitable islands in the neighboring atolls from which to conduct a more intensifled air attack against 

the PALAUS. The initial phases of the Anal assault against the PALAUS 

center largely on the MALAKAL-KOROR Harbor area,with the objective 

of seizing airfields. Subsequent operations provide for the capture or 

neutralization of all the islands. 

f. Operations against GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS 

(in preparation) 

This is a plan for the seizure of GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS. 

g. Operations in the NEW GUINEA-BISMARCKS-ADMIRALTY 

ISLANDS subsequent to CARTWHEEL 

This is a plan for the seizure or neutralization of eastern NEW 

GUINEA asfar west as WEWAK and including the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS 

and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. RABAUL is to be neutralized rather than 

captured. Airfields are to be developed throughout the area and advanced 

naval anchorages are to be established at KAVZENG and MANUS ISLAND. 

The plan envisages: (1) an advance to WEWAK, (2) the seizure of NEW 

IRELAND and the outlying islands of NEW HANOVER and ST. MATTHIAS, and (3) the seizure of the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS in the order 

listed.Concurrentlywith these operations, RABAUL is to be neutralized by 

an air offensive of increasing intensity. 

h. Operations in NEW GUINEA subsequent to the WEWAK-KAVIENG 

Operation 

This is a plan for an advance along the north coast of NEW GUINEA 

asfarwest asVOGELKOP.It provides for step-by-step airborne-waterborne 

advances. Each successive offensive is predicated on the consolidation of 

earlier seizures, including the activation of airRelds from which to provide 

close land-based aircraft support for subsequent operations. 

i Air Route into China 

Present plans provide for first priority of resources available in the 

China-Burma-India Theater, in the building up and increasing of the Sir 

routes and air supplies to China,and the development of air facilities, with 

a view to: 

67 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISa MOST SECRET 

(1) Keeping China in the war. 

(2) Intensifying operations against the Japanese. 

(3) Maintaining increased U.S.and Chinese Air Forces in China. 

(4) Equipping Chinese ground forces. 

j. Operations in BURMA at the end of 1943 moon (to be presented

by British) 

These are plans for advances, with limited objectives, in both north 

and southwest (ARAKAN coast) BURMA in November 1943. The northern 

advance will be made by Chinese troops from YUNNAN and LEDO and by 

British forces from ZMPHAL. The objective of this operation is to clear 

the Japanese from northern BURMA and allow the completion of the LEDO 

Road to a junction with the BURMA Road. The operation in the southwest 

is to be an overland advance and an amphibious assault against AKYAB. 

The capture of AKYAB will be followed by operations for the seizure of 

RAMREE ISLAND. The objective of these operations is to place our forces 

in a position to interdict RANGOON, and Japanese lines of communication 

into BURMA. 

k. Operations in BURMA at the end of 1944 monsoon (to be presented 

bg British) 

These are plans for an overseas operation to drive the Japanese from 

BURMA, with the objective of opening additional routes to CHZNA and 

increasing the flow of suppliesat the earliest practicable date. 

1. Operations in CHZNA 

These operations are of a continuing nature, being increased as our 

resources permit. They envisage the maximum possible flow of supplies to 

CHZNA and the maintaining of increased American Air Forces in CHZNA. 

m. Operations against PARAMUSHZRU 

A plan for operations against PARAMUSHZRU is under consideration. 

9. Increased bombing of the KURZLES from the ALEUTIANS and possibly 

an amphibious movement against PARAMUSHZRU would have a measurable 

effect on other operations against the Japanese. The KURZLES are a part of 

the Japanese Archipelago and a threat against them also threatens the Empire 

and will tend to pin down forces at home. 

10. The two areas where operationscome nearest to being mutually supporting are the Central ?ACZFZC and South-Southwest PACIFIC. An advance in 

either of these two Theaters will either increase the threat to the other or 

68 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

increase the difficulties of its logistic support. Our seizure of the BISMARCKS 

would place TRUK under threat. Our seizure of TRUK would tend to flank 

western NEW GUINEA, thereby increasing the difficulties of its supply. The 

fleet can operate to support operations in both Theaters simultaneously. Diversions can frequently be made from one Theater to the other without adversely 

affecting planned operations. 

TARGET DATES 

11. The target dates shown below are for the most part tentative and are 

listed only for planning purposes. 

Target Dates 

15 Aug. 1943 

1 Sep. 1943 

15 Oct. 1943 

1 Nov. 1943 

15 Nov. 1943 

1 Dec. 1943 

1 Jan. 1944 

1 Feb. 1944 

1 May 1944 

1 June 1944 

1 Aug. 1944 

1 sep. 1944 

15 Sep. 1944 

15 Oct. 1944 

1 Nov. 1944 

30 Nov. 1944 

31 Dec. 1944 

Central PACIFIC 

KISKA 

-

-

-

GILBERTS 

-

MARSHALLS 

-

-

PONAPE 

-

TRUK 

-

-

-

-

PALAU 

CHINASouthwest PACIFIC BURMA-INDIA 

LAE-MADANG - BUIN-FASI ­

- (1) Upper BURMA 

(2) AKYABRAMREE 

- ­

(1) W .NEW BRITAIN ­ (2) KIETA 

(3) BUKA (Neutralize) 

- ­

(1) RABAUL (Neutralize) ­ (2) WEWAK 

KAVZENG - MANUS - HOLLANDIA -

WADKE 

JAPEN 

- Complete BURMA 

MANOK WARI ­

69 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

AVAILABILITY OF MEANS 

12. An analysis indicates that, provided the shipping needs of the PACIFIC 

will continue to be fulfilled, the requirements for the above operations can be 

met by presently planned deployments. 

CONCLUSION 

13. Specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST for 1943-44 should 

include the recapture of BURMA and the opening of a land route to CHINA 

through Northern BURMA, meanwhile furnishing all possible logistic and air 

support to China in order to insure the availability of Chinese areas suitable 

for operationsof United Nations forces against Japan, and a westward advance 

in the PACIFIC to the PALAU-VOGELKOP line. An analysis of the separate 

operations indicated in paragraph 11 above shows that sufficient means can 

be made availablefor their accomplishmentin 1943-44. The completion of these 

operations will place the UNITED NATIONS in a position to use most 

advantageously the great air, ground, and naval resources which will be at 

our disposal after GERMANY is defeated. 

70 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 303, 303/1 and 303/3 

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT 

OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE 

References: 

CCS 108th Meeting, Item (3) 

CCS 109th Meeting, Item (1) 

CCS 110th Meeting, Item (1) 

C.C.S. 303 was circulated, 9 August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Following the discussion of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff in their 109th Meeting, the U.S.Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum 

circulated asC.C.S. 303/1. 

C.C.S. 303/2 set forth extracts from C.C.S. 303 with certain amendments 

proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 110th Meeting, agreed upon 

certain resolutions which were circulated as C.C.S. 303/3 and which were also 

included in C.C.S. 319/5. 

71 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 303 9 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT 

OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE 

Memorandum by the US.Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The enclosed memorandum by the US. Joint Chiefs of Staff is presented 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

ENCLOSURE 

STRATEGICCONCEPTFORTHEDEFEAT 

OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To develop a strategic concept for the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE. 

DISCUSSION 

2. AXIS Strategic Situation and United Nations Strategy. From the AXIS 

point of view, objective evaluation of the events of the past year must present 

a discouraging picture. At sea, the effectiveness of the U-boat campaign has 

decreased sharply. In the air, the AXIS has seen its enemies achieve varying 

degrees of superiority on all fronts. Meanwhile, the Combined Bomber Offensive accelerates. On the ground, the AXIS has Seen initial successes in both 

EGYPT and RUSSIA degenerate into a steady series of military reverses: EL 

ALAMEIN -STALINGRAD - winter defeat in RUSSIA -TUNISIA -BELGOROD -SICILY -and now OREL. 

Due primarily to inadequate air power, the AXIS now lacks the 

capability of destroying the Russian armed forces, particularly while engaged 

in containing or parrying the blows of the increasing Anglo-American sea, air, 

and ground forces in Western EUROPE. As long as the bulk of the German 

forces is contained on the Russian front, the AXIS has very limited offensive 

capabilities, including invasion of the IBERIAN PENINSULA, which is now 

considered unlikely. 

72 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

It is difficult to believe that current AXIS strategy still visualizes total 

victory, as once conceived. There are as yet no definite indications, but it is 

reasonable to suppose that the AXIS leadership may now seek a satisfactory 

negotiated peace. Failing in this, an “honorable” surrender might be the next 

AXIS objective. The AXIS, however, still retains strong defensive power. A 

defensive strategy on the part of the AXIS might develop into a protracted 

struggle and result in a stalemate on the Continent. It is imperative, therefore, 

that the Allied Powers penetrate to the heart of the fortress of Europe, come 

to grips with the enemy and thus bring about the early and decisive defeat of 

the AXIS. 

In the early stages of the present war, the United Nations of necessity 

pursued an opportunistic strategy forced upon them by their comparative 

weakness. However, the present rapidly improving position of the United 

Nations in relation to the Axis in Europe demands an abrogation of opportunistic strategy and requires the adoption of and adherence to sound strategic 

plans which envisage decisive military operations conducted at times and 

places of our choosing -not the enemy’s. 

IF PRESENT CONDITIONS JUSTIFY OUR PRINCIPAL EFFORT IN 

THE MEDITERRANEAN, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve plans: 

a. That would require the concentration of our strength in that area, 

and concurrently. 

b. That would provide only sufficient forces in the British Isles to 

secure this important base and to make available opportunistic forces to 

cross the channel if a German collapse should occur. 

HOWEVER, CONDITIONS HAVE NOT SO CHANGED AS TO JUSTIFY 

ON SOUND MILITARY GROUNDS THE RENUNCIATION OF THE TRIDENT 

CONCEPT. We must not jeopardize our sound over-all strategy simply to 

exploit local successes in a generally accepted secondary theater, the Mediterranean,where logistical and terrain difficulties preclude decisive and final 

operations designed to reach the heart of Germany. 

A careful evaluationof the march of events in the world and particularly 

in the European-Mediterranean area indicates that the strategy enunciated 

in TRIDENT is sound -specifically: 

a. That Operation OVERLORD, carefully synchronized with the ambined Bomber offensive, if given whole-hearted and immediate support, 

would result in anearly and decisive victory in Europe; 

73 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

b. That continued operationsin the Mediterranean should be conducted 

with available Allied resources as stipulated in TRIDENT in order to cause 

the collapse of Italy, to create diversions of enemy forces, and to destroy 

vital AXIS installations on the Continent. 

It is on this basis that the strategic concept for the defeat of the AXIS 

in Europe is developed in the present paper. 

3. OPERATIONS IN RUSSIA 

It is assumed that RUSSIA will continue to exert increasing and eventually crushing pressure against the German armies massed against her. In the 

unlikely event of either a separate Russo-German armistice or peace, the 

strategy of the UNITED NATIONS will require reexamination. In that case, 

the defeat of JAPAN would probably take priority over the defeat of 

GERMANY. 

4. EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1943-44. For the purposes of 

clarity and analysis, the concept of operations here recommended is outlined 

first in its entirety; thereafter, its component elements are discussed. 

a. Operation POINTBLANK 

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 

industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of 

communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength 

by the succesful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian 

victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority. 

b. Operatian OVERLORD 

(1) This operation will be the primary U.S-British ground and air 

effort against the AXIS in EUROPE. (Target date 1May 1944.) After 

securing adequate CHANNEL ports, exploitation will be directed toward 

securingareas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against 

the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in 

FRANCE operations designed to strike at the heart of GERMANY and 

to destroy her military forces will be undertaken. 

(2) Balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and 

continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in 

74 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the UNITED KINGDOM in readiness to take advantage of any situation 

permitting an opportunistic cross-CHANNEL move into FRANCE. 

(3) As between the operation OVERLORD and operations in the 

MEDZTERRANEAN, when there is a shortage of resources OVERLORD 

will have an overriding priority. 

c. Operations in ZTALY 

(1) First Phase. The elimination of ZTALY as a belligerent and 

establishment of air bases at least as far north as the ROME area, and, 

if feasible, to include the ANCONA area. 

(2) Second Phase. Seizure of SARDZNZA and CORSICA. 

(3) Third Phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on 

German forces in northern ZTALY, and the creation, with available 

MEDZTERRANEAN forces, of a situation favorable for the eventual 

entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army 

and Air Force into southern FRANCE. 

d. Operations in Southern FRANCE 

Offensive operations against southern France, utilizing available 

MEDZTERRANEAN forces (to include trained and equipped F'rench forces), 

should be undertaken to establish a lodgment in the TOULON-MARSEZLLES area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in 

connection with OVERLORD. 

e. Air Operations 

(1) Strategic bombing operations from central MEDZTERRANEAN 

bases,complementing POZNTBLANK. 

(2) Support for ground operations with land and carrier-based air 

forces. 

(3) Development of an air ferry mute through the AZORES. 

(4) Air supply of BALKM guerrillas (see g below). 

f. opetations at sea 

(1) Intensified anti-submmine warfare, including operations from 

the AZORES. 

75 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(2) Security of our sea communications. 

(3) Continued disruption of AXZS sea communications. 

(4) Support of amphibious operations. 

g. Operations in the BALKANS 

Operations in the BALKAN area will be limited to supply of Balkan 

guerrillas by air and sea transport, and to the bombing of PLOESTZ and 

other strategic objectives from Italian bases. 

h. Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in 

the MEDITERRANEAN 

Defensive garrison commitments (Appendix “A”) in the MEDZTERRANEAN area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting 

economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the 

Strait of GIBRALTAR will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our 

forces in Northwest AFRICA, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the IBERIAN PENINSULA. 

5. OPERATZON OVERLORD 

This is the main U.S.-British ground and air effort against the AXIS in 

Europe.In consonance with the decisions made at TRIDENT and reaffirmed 

for QUADRANT (par. 5, Section 111,Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all 

Strategic Concept), maximum resources will be concentrated in the U.K. “as 

early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the 

AXZS citadel.” Target date for execution of plans now being prepared by 

COSSAC is 1 May 1944. After a firm lodgment has been established and 

adequate channel and Atlantic ports secured, exploitation will be directed 

toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations 

against the enemy. 

By TRIDENT decisions, OVERLORD will consist of 29 divisions of which 

seven are to be HUSKY veterans withdrawn from the MEDITERRANEAN. If 

only three of these divisions were moved to the U. K., enough personnel shipping would be available to move four additional US.divisions to the U.K., and 

thus our strength in the MEDITERRANEAN would be increased by four divisions without decrease in the planned number for OVERLORD. However, there 

mould then be only three instead of seven battle-tested divisions for OVERLORD, a disadvantage which cannot be accepted. The maximum support 

76 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

should be given the main effort. Hence, the TRIDENT decision to move seven 

divisions to the U.K.should not be changed. 

6. OPERATIONS IN ITALY AND HER POSSESSIONS 

a. General Objectives. Our immediate objective (TRIDENT) in the 

MEDITERRANEAN is to knock ITALY out of the war. This will open the 

door to the accomplishment of many other important objectives. These are: 

(1) The progressive establishment of air bases in ITALY, at least as 

far north as the ANCONA area, and the initiation of a strategic bombing

offensive therefrom against the Reich and the BALKANS, coordinated 

with and complementing POINTBLANK. 

(2) The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in 

Northern ITALY, and the creation, with available MEDITERRANEAN 

forces,of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, 

including the bulk of the reequipped French Army, into Southern 

FRANCE. 

(3) The final elimination of the Italian fleet as a military factor in 

the war. 

(4) The acquisition of the Italian merchant fleet. 

(5) The occupation of SARDINIA and CORSICA. 

b. Specific Operations. The elimination of ITALY as a belligerent does 

not necessarily mean that the Germans will withdraw behind the ALPS. 

The more likely German reaction will be to defend on the RZMINZ-PISA 

line. Regardless of where GERMANY may defend in ITALY, our strategy 

must contemplate maintaining steady pressure against her forces. In our 

view, however, the mere maintenance of pressure on German forces remaining in ITALY does not constitute an adequate mission for the powerful forces we will have in the MEDITERRANEAN after ITALY is knocked 

out of the war. Including the French, there will be approximately 4,500 

combat aircraft and at least 24 offensive divisions above and beyond garrison 

and security requirements. Our strategy must provide an appropriate task 

for these forces in the MEDITERRANEAN. Such a task should, if possible, 

lend support to our main effort across the CHANNEL. Broadly speaking, 

there are but three places where the ground element of these forces could 

be utilized. The BALKANS, the TRIESTE-VIENNA region, or in Southern 

FRANCE. Each of these warrants brief discussion: 
u.s.SECREr 

EuITISH Mom SECRET 

(1) Balkans. The BALKANS are unsuitable for large scale offensive 

operations, due to terrain and communication difEculties. This course, 

therefore, is rejected. (We do recommend special operations in the 

BALKANS. These are discussed in paragraph 9 below). 

(2) Trieste-Vienna. OEensive operations, either limited or unlimited 

in their scope and objective, along the TRZESTE-VIENNA line would 

strike directly at the German heartland. Consequently, such operations 

would insure a swift and positive German reaction. The nature of the 

terrain, however, is such that great German forces would not be required to halt our advance. There is no reasonto believe that a limitedobjective operation in this area would contribute materially to OVERLORD success by drawing signifkant German forces out of FRANCE. 

The establishmentof a new front, moreover, in this area would undoubtedly guarantee the continuous separation of our forces between the 

MEDITERRANEAN and Westem FRANCE for the duration of the war. 

Lastly, and by no meansof l& importance,the French Army wantsto 

fight in FRANCE and will have little stomach for operations in the 

TRIESTE-VIENNA region. Consequently this courseis also rejected. 

(3) Southern France. Southern FRANCE is retained as being the 

only suitable area in which ultimately to utilize the forces that will be 

available in the MEDITERRANEAN after ITALY is knocked out of the 

war. Our concept for the eventual operations in Southern FRANCE is 

developed in paragraph 7,below. 

c. Elimination of the Italian Fleet. The finaleliminatin of the Italian 

fleetasa militaryfactor in the war will releasethe larger units of the British 

fleet for use in other theaters. 

d. Italian Merchant Fleet. The acquisition of the Italianmerchant fleet 

will be of assistance to the UNITED NATIONS in the rehabilitation of 

ITALY. 

e. ormpation of Sardinia and Corsica. Our forward advance on the 

mainland of ITALY, before ITALY is knocked out of the war, need not be 

restricted by continuing AXIS occupation of SNINIA and CORSICA. 

These two islandsare very likely to fall when ITALY goes out of the war. 

If not, their reduction and occupation must be accomplishedbefore operations in Southern FRANCE are undertaken. 

7. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 

8 After ITALY is eliminated and the Germans are forced back into 

Northern ITALY, FRANCE becomes a vulnerable salient to GERMANY. At 
u.s. EEcuIrr 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

first glance, this salient appears most formidable, bounded as it is on the 

three exposed sides by heavily-defended se&co8sts and neutral S~~DW territory. If, however, Russian pressure continues undiminkhed, the intensity 

of POINTELANK is augmentedfrom bases in ITALY, our pressure in ITALY 

remains steady, and appropriate political and economic measures are taken 

with regard to SPAIN, the adequate defense by the AXIS of the French 

salient will have become a confounding problem. Exposed to steady and 

increasingpressure, GERMANY will not have the air power requiredto adequately maintain her perimeter and internaldefense. The German air force 

will be stretched some 3,000to 4,000 miles around three sides of the continent of EUROPE. In view of present estimates that the over-all German 

strategic situation will continue to deteriorate, we believe that operations 

for the conquest of FRANCE can be initiated in the spring of 1944. 

b. On the assumption that conditions are substantially as stated in 

paragraph a above, operations in Southem FRANCE coordinated with 

OVERLORD are believed feasible, with the first objective the establishment 

of a firm lodgment in the MARSEILLES area.The sequence of operations 

is envisaged as follows: 

(1) Holding attack with strong ground forces in Northern ITALY. 

(2) Amphibious invasion of Southern FRANCE, under carrier and 

land-based airsupport, with relatively small forces. Due to the distances 

involved, only limited land-based air support can be expected for this 

operation. 

(3) Security of the lodgment by rapid introduction of strong reinforcements, overland if feasible, from Northern ITALY, and by sea 

within the limitsof available shipping. 

(4) Exploitation to secure the Port of MARSEILLES, and airfields in 

the area. 

(5) mensive operations designed to assist OVERLORD by containing maximum German forces. 

c. For available means see Appendices “A,” and “B.” Exclusive of garrison and security requirements in the MEDITERRANEAN area and the 

seven divisionstransferred to the UNITED KINGDOM for OVERLORD, and 

assuming that 10 divisions will be adequate to maintain pressure against 

the Germans in Northern ITALY, it is estimated that the following forces 

79 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

will be available for offensive operations against Southern FRANCE: 

10 U.S.and British divisions. 

4 French divisions. 

4,500 U.S.and British combat aircraft. 

Approximately enough amphibious lift for at least two reinforced 

divisions (44,000). (If LCM’s can be used, the lift can be increased to 

three divisions.) 

Adequate Naval escort vessels are now allocated for Mediterranean 

operations. 

8. AIR OPERATIONS 

a. The main effort of our Combined Bomber Offensive from the United 

Kingdom progresses and should accomplish the expected results in the 

destruction of German air power, air defenses, war-making resources, and 

general morale. This bomber offensive will be carefully integrated with 

OVERLORD and should be directed so as to reach its greatest effectiveness 

in the spring of 1944and thereby create conditions favorable for the OVERLORD operation. 

b. A strategic bombing offensive from Italian air bases as far north as 

ANCONA and from other MEDITERRANEAN air bases would complement 

the POINTBLANK offensive. With our MEDITERRANEAN air power advanced to bases in the ANCONA area of ITALY, many critical AXIS war industries and resources,including fighter aircraft and oil production, would 

be within operating radiusof our medium as well as heavy bombers. 

c. Provision for air support of surface operations requires careful and 

timely planning. Carrier-borne air cover will probably be required in sup 

port of amphibious operationsin the MEDITERRANEAN beyond the radius 

of action of land-based fighters. 

d. The necessity for air staging points and anti-submarine bases in the 

AZORES was recognimd at TRIDENT. Reduced flying time and better 

weather along thisroute would result in combat units in the EUROPEAN, 

MEDITERRANEAN, and FAR EAST theaters receiving initialand replacement equipment more expeditiously and in better condition. Anti-submarine bases would complete the air and surface coverage of the central 

and north Atlantic. Hence, air and naval bases in the AZORES should be 

secured as early as possible. 

80 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

9. OPERATZONS IN THE BALKANS 

The BALKANS are unsuitable for large-scale offensive operations, due 

to terrain and communication difficulties. Nevertheless, as long as Germans 

occupy the BALKANS there remains a problem as to how to deal with them. 

It is our view that our strategy is best served if GERMANY should continue to 

hold the BALKANS, provided GERMANY can he forced to garrison heavily 

and be made to pay a high price in attrition of personnel and materiel. 

Therefore, our strategy should be to supply the BALKAN guerrillas by 

air and sea, with the object of enabling them to compel the Germans to maintain not only present forces of 12 divisions in that region, but also to provide 

additional divisions to replace the 30 Italian divisions now there. 

10. POLZCY TOWARD SPAIN AND TURKEY 

a. Spain 

SPAIN is assisting the AXZS with her economic resources and even 

with armed forces. The UNITED NATZONS have endured Spanish official 

approval of AXZS war aims and denunciation of our own with an attitude 

of conciliation. At the present moment we find Spanish troops defensively 

disposed against us, with little or no disposition facing our enemy. We are 

forced by this disposition to maintain large forces ready to protect our lifeline throught the Straits of GZBRALTAR &d constantly to plan for immediate provision of additional forces to hold GZBRALTAR should SPAIN 

permit a German offensive through her territory. Indications are that 

Franc0 is realizing the Anal UNZTED NATIONS’ victory and is tending 

toward a position of real neutrality. 

The tie is now ripe to take full advantage of our present position 

and adopt a stern and frankly demanding policy toward SPAIN. The 

UNITEDNATZONS should require SPAZN, for the price of wartime economic 

assistance and postwar friendship, to: 

(1) Shift the bulk of her defensive forces from MOROCCO and 

Southern SPAIN to Northern SPAIN. 

(2) Cease military and economic aid to GERMANY. 

b. Turkey 

To date, the UNITED NATZONS have devoted -and, by TRIDENT, 

are continuing to devote -considerable effort toward bringing TURKEY 

81 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

into the war as an ally. This efforttakes the form of very sizeable economic 

aid and involves a UNITED NATIONS military commitment of considerable 

proportions. This policy toward TURKEY has not been fruitful. The current 

estimate is that the Turkish attitude is unlikely to change. It is believed, 

therefore, that the continuation of aid to TURKEY, at the present scale, is 

not warranted. 

11. RELATZONS WITH PATRZOT FORCES IN EUROPE. Within the limits 

of available means and without prejudice to major operations, patriot forces, 

everywhere within enemy-occupied territory in EUROPE, should be furnished 

supplies to enable them to conduct sabotage, propaganda, intelligence, and 

guerrilla warfare. Since our strategy contemplates the conquest of FRANCE, 

the French underground can be expected to make a very important and direct 

contribution to the U.S.and British effort in Western EUROPE. The supply of 

the French underground, and the development of plans for the use of these 

Patriot Forces, therefore,should have a relatively high priority in our program. 

12. OPERATIONS IN LIBERATED AREAS. Should GERMANY, of her own 

volition, withdraw her forces from NORWAY or the Southern BALKANS, our 

policy will be limited to the economic and military supply of the liberated 

nations to the extent of our capabilitieswithout prejudice to military operations 

in more vital areas. The advisability of conducting military operations in and 

from NORWAY, in the event of German withdrawal therefrom, will be assessed 

in the light of the then-existing over-all strategic situation. 

82 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX "A" 

SUUGESTED DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES IN THE 

MEDITERRANEAN AFTER THE CONQUEST OF ITALY 

British & 

Others -US. French Total

­

Available in divs. and equivalent divs. 28 9 5 42 

Garrisons and Commitments 

Sicily and So. Italy 2 2 

Central Italy ........................... 2 2 

Sardinia ............................... 1 1 

Corsica ................................. 1 1 

Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. .............. 1 1 

Egypt and Palestine ..................... 2 2 

Syria and Cyprus........................ 1 1 

North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and 

French Morocco) 1 * 1* 

Recommended commitment to OVERLORD 3 4 7 

12 5 1* 18* 

Available for operation in North ITALY 

and Southern FRANCE 16 4 4 24 

1* Six additional French divisions, begin equipped and trained in North Africa. 

83 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “B” 

DEPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES IN MEDITERRANEAN 

Unit equipment and total airplanes available as of August 2,1943: 

U.S. R.A.F. FRENCH 

UE Total UE Total UE Total 

Heavy Bombers (D) ....... 262 393 - - - -

TYPES 

Heavy Bombers (N) ....... - - 48 72 -

Medium Bombers (D) ... 389 588 

-

- - - ­

Medium Bombers (N) ..... - - 183 275 ­ -

Light Bombers ............ 57 86 384 576 - -

SEF, TEF, Ftr Bombers ... 1,069 1,604 942 1,413 60 90 

TEF (N) ............. 24 36 120 180 ­ -

Recn and Photo ......... 78 116 72 108 3 3 

TIC .................... 364 546 - - - -

Torpedo Bombers ......... - - 160 240 3 3 

TOTALS ............. 2,246 3,369 1,909 2,864 66 96 

GRAND TOTALS -Unit Equipment ... .4,221 

Total Airplanes .. .6,329 

Less for garrison and security

in Mediterranean (fighters only) :* Unit equipment 1,164 

Total Airplanes 1,747 

Balance remaining for offensive operations: Unit equipment 3,057 

Total Airplanes 4,582 

: Figures based on Trident Estimates. 

NOTES: a. Total R.A.F. strength is figured as follows: Number of squadrons 

x authorized strength plus 50% reserve. There is not a definite 

figure set as a reserve but 50% is known to be very conservative 

as far as fighters are concerned. 

b. It is contemplated that the number of U.S. planes will be reduced 

365by Jan. 1944if proposed planning is carried out. 

c. Reductions or additions in R.A.F. strength not included. 

84 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

CC.S. 303/1 16 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE 

Memorandum frm the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The discussion in the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting yesterday made 

more apparent than ever the necessity for decision now as to whether our main 

effort in the European Theater is to be in the Mediterraneanor from the United 

Kingdom. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that this is the critical 

question before the conference and that the effective conduct of the war in 

Europe makes this decision now a must. 

We propose the following: 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the decisions of the TRIDENT 

Conference as to the execution of OVERLORD including the deflnite 

allotment of forces thereto and assign to it an overriding priority over other 

operations in the European Theater. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that the acceptance of this 

decision must be without conditions and without mental reservation. They 

accept the fact that a grave emergency will always call for appropriate action 

to meet it. However, long range decision for the conduct of the war must not 

he dominated by possible eventualities. 

a5 
86 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 303/3 17 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE 

Note by the Secretaries 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the following strategic 

concept of operations for the defeat of the Axis power in Europe, 1943-44. 

2. OPERATION POINTB BLANK^ 

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 

industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of 

communication,and the material reduction of German air combat strength by 

the succxsful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive is a prerequisite 

to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before 

OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have 

highest strategic priority. 

3. OPERATION “OVERLORD” 

a. This operation will be the primary US.-British ground and air effort 

against the AXIS in EUROPE. (Target date 1 May 1944) After securing 

adequate CHANNEL ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing 

areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. 

Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in FRANCE, operations 

designed to strike at the heart of GERMANY and to destroy her military 

forces will be undertaken. 

b. Balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the 

UNITED KINGDOM in readiness to taken advantage of any situation 

permitting an opportunistic cross-CHANNEL move into FRANCE. 

c. As between operation OVERLORD and operations in the MEDITERRANEAN, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be 

distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of 

OVERLORD. Operations in the MEDITERRANEAN Theater wil! be carried 

out with the forces alloted at TRIDENT except insofar as these may be 

varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

4. OPERATIONS IN ITALY 

a. First Phase. The elimination of ITALY as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the ROME area, and, if feasible, farther north. 

b. Second Phase. Seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA. 

c. Third Phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German 

forces in Northern ITALY, and the creation of the conditions required for 

OVERLORD and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our 

forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force 

into Southern FRANCE. 

5. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 

Offensive operations against Southern France (to include the use of 

trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a 

lodgment in the TOULON-MARSEILLES area and exploit northward in order 

to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD. 

6. AIR OPERATIONS 

a. Strategic bombing operations from Italian and central MEDITERRANEAN bases, complementing POINTBLANK. 

b. Support for ground operations with land and carrier-based air forces. 

c. Development of an air ferry route through the AZORES. 

d. Air supply of BALKAN guerrillas (see paragraph 8 below). 

7. OPERATIONS AT SEA 

a. Intensified anti-submarine warfare, including operations from the 

AZORES. 

b. Security of our sea communications. 

c. Continued disruption of AXIS sea communications. 

d. Support of amphibious operations. 

8. OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 

Operations in the BALKAN area will be limited to supply of BdLKAN 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

guerrillas by air and sea transport, and to the bombing of PLOESTZ and other 

strategic objectives from Italian bases. 

9. GARRISON REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY OF LINES OF 

COMMUNICATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Defensive garrison commitments (Appendix “A” to C.C.S.303) in the 

MEDITERRANEAN area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to 

effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through 

the Strait of GIBRALTAR will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our 

forces in Northwest AFRICA, so long as there remains even a remote possibility 

of the Germans invading the IBERIAN PENINSULA. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

89 
90 
U. S. SECRET 

BRXTISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 304 

WAR CABINET 

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE 

OPERATION “OVERLORD”-OUTLINE PLAN 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 108th Meeting, Items (4) and (5) 

C.C.S. 113thMeeting, Item (2) 

1st Citadel Meeting 

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (3) 

C.C.S. 304 circulated, 10 August 1943, a covering note by the British 

Chiefs of Staff, pointing out certain observations relative to the Outline Plan 

for Operation OVERLORD (Annex “B”),which was presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 108th Meeting, approved the outline plan as presented and endorsed the action taken by the British Chiefs of 

Staff in authorizing General Morgan to proceed with the detailed planning and 

with full preparations. 

91 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 304 10 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

WAR CABINET 

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE 

OPERATION “OVERLORD”-OUTLINE PLAN 

Covering Note by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We have examined carefuly the outline plan for operation OVERLORD 

which General Morgan has submitted. We have the following observations:­

a. It will be observed that General Morgan lays down three main conditions which must be created if the operation is to have a reasonable prospect of success. These are:­

(1) Theremust be an overall reduction in the strength of the German 

Fighter forces between now and the time of the assault. 

(2) German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole, 

excluding Divisions holding the coast, G.A.F. divisions, and training 

divisions, should not exceed on the day of the assault 12 full strength, 

flrst quality, divisions. In addition, the Germans should not be able to 

transfer more than 15 Arst quality divisions from Russia during the Arst 

two months. 

(3) The problem of beach maintenance over a prolonged period in 

the Channel must be overcome. 

We entirely agree with General Morgan that these conditions are essential, and we shall have certain proposals to make during the QUADRANT 

discussions with a view to their fulfillment. 

b. The annexed table (Annex “A”) shows:­

(1) The Allied rate of build-up as planned by General Morgan. 

(2) The maximum rate of German build-up which General Morgan 

considers acceptable. 

92 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

From this table it will be seen that our margin of superiority over the 

maximum acceptable rate of German build-up, particularly during the first 

two critical days, is small. Moreover, the figures in the Table do not sufficiently reflect the handicap under which our newly-landed divisions must 

suffer when engaging the enemy’sdivisionswhich have all along been established on land. We think it important, therefore, that the scale of German 

reserves should be reduced by some means below the maximum specified by 

General Morgan in his second condition. Otherwise, the operation may not 

succeed. 

c. We think the general rate of advance planned by General Morgan is 

optimistic. Recent experience in Sicily shows that if the enemy is resisting 

fiercely, and if the country lends itself to defense, the advance is bound to 

be slow. The country south of the Caen beaches is in many respects admirable for delaying actions. We think that this part of General Morgan’s plan 

should be carefully re-examined. 

2. Subject to the above observations, we recommend that the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff should approve General Morgan’s outline plan and authorize 

him to proceed with detailed planning, and with full preparations. We gave 

instructions to this effect before leaving England, in order that no time should 

be lost. and we ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff to endorse our action. 

S. S. QUEEN MARY, 

IOTH AUGUST, 1943. 

93 
 OHP PAR IS ON OF OUR OWN OUILD UP YlTH THE 6ERHAll RATE OF 

ICIIFORCEYEIT, WMlCH C.O.S.S.A.C. STATES CAY BE ACCEPTED. 

GERMAN RATE OF TOTALS 

COSSAC'S euito-up 

I REINFORCEMENT THAl COMMENTS ostai I CAN BE ACCEPTED 

Iiil I liiil IVII 

6 

6 

11 

10 

215 
U,5. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.O.S.S.A.C. (43) 28. 

ANNEX B 

OPERATION “OVERLORD.” 

The Secretary, 

Chiefs of Staff Committee, 

Offices of the War Cabinet. 15th July, 1943 

1. In my original Directive (C.O.S. (43) 215 (0)) I was charged with the 

duty of preparing a plan for a full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 

as early as possible. 

2. This part of my Directive was subsequently amplified (see C.O.S. (43) 

113thMeeting (0),Item 4), in that I was ordered to submit an outlie plan for 

an assault, with certain specified forces, on a target date the 1st May, 1944, 

to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations 

can be carried out. It was indicated to me, in the course of this amplification, 

that the lodgement area should include ports that, suitably developed, could be 

used by ocean-going ships for the build-up of the initial assault forces from the 

United Kingdom, and for their further build-up with additional divisions and 

supporting units that might be shipped from the United States or elsewhere. 

3. I have the honour now to report that, in my opinion, it is possible to 

undertake the operationdescribed, on or about the target date named, with the 

sea, land and air forces specified, given a certain set of circumstances in 

existence at that time. 

4. These governing circumstances are partly within our direct control and 

partly without. “hose within our control relate flrst to the problem of beach 

maintenance, and secondly to the supply of shipping, naval landing craft and 

transport aircraft. Wherever we may attempt to land, and however many ports 

we capture, we cannot escape the fact that we shall be forced to maintain a high 

proportion of our forces over the beaches for the first two or three months while 

port facilities are being restored; and that, in view of the variability of the 

weather in the Channel,thiswill not be feasible unless we are able rapidly to improvise sheltered anchoragesoff the beaches. New methods of overcoming this 

problem are now being examined. There is no reason to suppose that these 

methods will be ineffective,but I feel it my duty to point out that this operation 

is not to be contemplated unless this problem of prolonged cross-beach maintenance and the provision of artificial anchorages shall have been solved. 

95 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. As regards the supply of shipping, naval landing craft and tra.csport 

aircraft, increased resources in these would permit of the elaboration of alternative plans designed to meet more than one set of extraneous conditions, 

whereas the state of provision herein taken into account dictates the adoption 

of one course only,or none at all. In proportion as additional shipping,landing 

craft and transport aircraft can be made available, so the chances of success 

in the operation will be increased. It seems feasible to contemplate additions 

as a result either of stepped-up production, of strategical re-allotment or, in 

the last resort, of postponement of the date of assault. 

6 I have come to the conclusion that, in view of the limitations in resources 

imposed by my directives, we may be assured of a reasonable chance of success 

on the 1stMay, 1944,only if we concentrate our efforts 011 an assault across the 

Norman beaches about Bayeux. 

7. As regards circumstances that we can control only indirectly, it is, in 

my opinion,necessary to stipulate that the state of affairs existing at the time, 

both on land in France and in the air above it, shall be such as to render the 

assault as little hazardous as may be so far as it is humanly possible to calculate. 

The essential discrepancy in value between the enemy’s troops, highly organised, armed and battle-trained, who await us in their much vaunted impregnable defences, and our troops, who must of necessity launch their assault at 

the end of a cross-Channel voyage with all its attendant risks, must be reduced 

to the narrowest possible margin. Though much can be done to this end by 

the means available and likely to become available to us in the United Kingdom 

to influence these factors, we are largely dependent upon events that will 

take place on other war fronts, principally on the Russian front, between now 

and the date of the assault. 

8. I therefore suggest to the Chiefs of Staff that it is necessary, if my plan 

be approved, to adopt the outlook that Operation “Overlord” is even now in 

progress, and to take all possible steps to see that all agencies that can be 

brought to bear are, from now on, co-ordinated in their action as herein below 

described, so as to bring about the state of affairs that we would have exist on 

the chosen day of assault. 

9. Finally, I venture to draw attention to the danger of making direct 

comparisons between operation “Husky” and operation “Overlord.” No doubt 

the experience now being gained in the Mediterranean will prove invaluable 

when the detailed planning stage for “Overlord” is reached, but viewed as a 

whole the two operations could hardly be more dissimilar. In “Husky,” the 

bases of an extended continental coastline were used for a converging assault 

96 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

against an island, whereas in “Overlord” it is necessary to launch an assault 

from an island against an extended continental mainland coastline. Furthermore, while in the Mediterranean the tidal range is negligible and the weather 

reasonably reliable, in the English Channel the tidal range is considerable and 

the weather capricious. 

10. Attached hereto are papers setting forth the plan that I recommend 

for adoption. 

F. E. MORGAN, Lieutenant-General, 

Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate). 

H.Q., C.O.S.S.A.C., 

Norfolk House, 

St. James’s Square, S.W.1. 

97 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(C.O.S.S.A.C. (43) 32 (Final). 

(Also C.O.S. (43) 415 (0).) 

27th July, 1943. 

DIGEST OF OPERATION “OVERLORD“ 

Object 

1. The object of Operation “Overlord” is to mount and carry out an operation, with forces and equipment established in the United Kingdom, and with 

target date the 1st May, 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from 

which further offensive operations can be developed. The lodgement area must 

contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty-six to 

thirty divisions, and enable that force to be augmented by follow-up shipments 

from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting 

units of the rate of three to five divisions per month. 

Selection of a Lodgement Area 

2. In order to provide sufficient port facilities to maintain these large forces, 

it will be necessary to select a lodgement area which includes a group of major 

ports. We must plan on the assumption that ports, on capture, will be seriously 

damaged and probably blocked. It will take some time to restore normal 

facilities. We shall thus be forced to rely on maintenance over beaches for an 

extended period. 

3. A study of the beaches on the Belgian and Channel coasts shows that 

the beaches with the highest capacity for passing vehicles and stores inland 

are those in the Pas de Calais,* and the Caent-Cotentin$ area. Of these, the 

Caen beaches are the most favourable, as they are, unlike the others, sheltered 

from the prevailing winds. Naval and air considerations point to the area 

between the Pas de Calais and the Cotentin as the most suitable for the initial 

* “Pas de Calais area” has been assumed as the area between Gravelines 

and the River Somme. 

t “Caen area” is taken as that between the River Orne and the base of the 

Cotentin Peninsula. 

$ The “Cotentin”Peninsula is the peninsula in which Cherbourg is situated. 

Annex B 

98 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

landing, air factors of optimum air support and rapid provision of airfields 

indicating the Pas de Calais as the best choice, with Caen as an acceptable 

a1ternative. 

4. Thus, taking beach capacity and air and naval considerations together, 

it appears that either the Pas de Calais area or the Caen-Cotentin area is the 

most suitable for the initial main landing. 

5. As the area for the initial landing, the Pas de Calais has many obvious 

advantages such that good air support and quick turn round for our shipping 

can be achieved. On the other hand, it is a focal point of the enemy fighters 

disposed for defence, and maximum enemy air activity can be brought to bear 

over this area with the minimum movement of his air forces. Moreover, the 

Pas de Calais is the most strongly defended area on the whole French coast. 

The defences would require very heavy and sustained bombardment from sea 

and air: penetration would be slow, and the result of the bombardment of beach 

exits would severely limit the rate of build-up. Further, this area does not offer 

good opportunities for expansion. It would be necessary to develop the bridgehead to include either the Belgian ports as far as Antwerp or the Channel 

ports Westwards to include Havre and Rouen. But both an advance to Antwerp 

across the numerous water obstacles, and a long flank march of some 120 miles 

to the Seine ports must be considered unsound operations of war unless the 

German forces are in a state not far short of final collapse. 

6. In the Caen-Cotentin area it would be possible to make our initial landing either partly on the Cotentin Peninsula and partly on the Caen beaches, 

wholly in the Cotentin or wholly on the Caen beaches. An attack with part of 

our forces in the Cotentin and part on the Caen beaches is,however, considered 

to be unsound. It would entail dividing our limited forces by the low-lying 

marshy ground and intricate river system at the neck of the Cotentin Peninsula; thus exposing them to defeat in detail. 

7. An attack against the Cotentin Peninsula, on the other hand, has a 

reasonable chance of success, and would ensure the early capture of the port 

of Cherbourg. Unfortunately, very few airfields exist in the Cotentin, and that 

area is not suitable for rapid airfield development. Furthermore, the narrow 

neck of the Peninsula would give the Germans an easy task in preventing us 

from breaking out and expanding our initial bridgehead. Moreover, during the 

period of our consolidation in the Cotentin the Germans would have time to 

reinforce their coastal troops in the Caen area, rendering a subsequent amphibious assault in that area much more difficult. 

Annex B 

99 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

8. There remains the attack on the Caen beaches. The Caen sector is weakly 

held; the defences are relatively light and the beaches are of high capacity and 

sheltered from the prevailing winds. Inland the terrain is suitable for airfield 

development and for the consolidation of the initial bridgehead; and much of 

it is unfavourable for counter-attacks by panzer divisions. Maximum enemy 

air opposition can only be brought to bear at the expense of the enemy air 

defence screen covering the approaches to Germany; and the limited number 

of enemy airfields within range of the Caen area facilitates local neutralisation 

of the German fighter force. The sector suffers from the disadvantage that 

considerable effort will be required to provide adequate air suppori to our 

assault forces and some time must elapse before the capture of a major port. 

After a landing in the Caen sector it would be necessary to seize either 

the Seine group of ports or the Brittany group of ports. To seize the Seine ports 

would entail forcing a crossing of the Seine, which is likely to require greater 

forces than we can build up through the Caen beaches and the port of Cherbourg. It should, however, be possible to seize the Brittany ports between 

Cherbourg and Nantes and on them build up sufficient forces for our final 

advance Eastwards. 

Provided that the necessary air situation can first be achieved, the 

chances of a successful attack and of rapid subsequent development are so 

much greater in this sector than in any other that it is considered that the 

advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. 

The Lodgement Area Selected 

9. In the light of these factors, it is considered that our initial landing on 

the Continent should be effected in Caen area, with a view to the eventual 

seizure of a lodgement area comprising the Cherbourg-Brittany group of ports 

(from Cherbourg to Nantes) . 

Opening Phase up to the Capture of Cherbourg 

10. The opening phase in the seizing of this lodgement area would be the 

effecting of a landing in the Caen sector with a view to the early capture and 

development of airfield sites in the Caen area, and of the port of Cherbourg. 

11. The main limiting factors affecting such an operation are the possibility 

of attainingthe necessary air situation; the number of offensive divisions which 

the enemy can make available for counter attack in the Caen area; the availability of landing ships and craft and of transport aircraft; and the capacity 

of the beaches and ports in the sector. 

Annex B 

100 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

12. Although the strength of the G.A.F. available in 1944 on the Western 

front cannot be forecast at this stage, we can confidently expect that we shall 

have a vast numerical superiority in bomber forces. The first-line strength of 

the German fighter force is, however, showing a steady increase and although 

it is unlikely to equal the size of the force at our disposal, there is no doubt that 

our fighters will have a very large commitment entailing dispersal and operations at maximum intensity. Our fighters will also be operating under serious 

tactical disadvantages in the early stages,which will largely offset their numerical superiority.Before the assault takes place, therefore, it will be necessary to 

reduce the effectiveness of the G.A.F., particularly that part which can be 

brought to bear against the Caen area. 

13. The necessary air situation to ensure a reasonable chance of success 

will therefore require that the maximum number of German fighter forces are 

contained in the Low Countries and North-West Germany, that the effectiveness of the fighter defence in the Caen area is reduced and that air reinforcements are prevented from arriving in the early stages from the Mediterranean. 

Above all, it will be necessary to reduce the over-all strength of the German 

fighter force between now and the date of the operatio3 by destruction of the 

sources of supply, by the infliction of casualties by bringing on air battles, and, 

immediately prior to the assault, by the disorganisation of G.A.F. instaLations 

and control system in the Caen area. 

14. As it is impossible to forecast with any accuracy the number and location of Germen formations in reserve in 1944, while, on the other hand, the 

forces available to us have been laid down, an attempt has been made in this 

paper to determine the wisest employment of our own forces and then to 

determine the maximum number of German formationswhich they can reasonably overcome. Apart from the air situation, which is an over-riding factor, the 

practicability of this plan will depend principally on the number, effectiveness 

and availability of German divisions present in France and the Low Countries 

in relation to our own capabilities. This consideration is discussed below 

(paragraph 35). 

15. A maximum of thirty and a minimum of twenty-six equivalent divisions 

are likely to be available in the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations 

on the 1st May, 1944. Further build-up can be at the rate of three to five 

divisions per month. 

16. Landing ships and craft have been provided to lift the equivalent of 

three assadt divisions and two follow-up divisions, without “overheads,” and 

Annex B 

101 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

it has been assumed that the equivalent of an additional two divisions can be 

afloat in ships. 

17. Airborne forces amounting to two airborne divisions and some five or 

six parachute regiments will be available, but, largely owing to shortage of 

transport aircraft, it is only possible to lift the equivalent of two-thirds of one 

airborne division simultaneously, on the basis of present forecasts. 

18. Even if additional landing ships and craft could be made available, the 

beaches in the Caen area would preclude the landing of forces greater than 

the equivalent of the three assault and two follow-up divisions, for which craft 

have already been provided. Nevertheless, an all-round increase of at least 

10 per cent in landing ships and craft is highly desirable in order to provide a 

greater margin for contingencies within the framework of the existing plan. 

Furthermore, sufficient lift for a further assault division could most usefully be 

employed in an additional landing on other beaches. 

19. There is no port of any capacity within the sector although there are 

a number of small ports of limited value. Maintenance will, therefore, of 

necessity be largely over the beaches until it is possible to capture and open 

up the port of Cherbourg. In view of the possibilities of interruption by bad 

weather it will be essential to provide early some form of improvised sheltered 

waters. 

20. Assuming optimum weather conditions, it should be possible to build 

up the force over the beaches to a total by D plus 6 of the equivalent of some 

eleven divisions and five tank brigades and thereafter to land one division 

a day until about D plus 24. 

Proposed Plan 

Preliminary Phase. 

21. During the preliminary phase, which must start forthwith, all possible means including air and sea action, propaganda, political and economic 

pressure, and sabotage, must be integrated into a combined offensive aimed 

at softening the German resistance. In particular, air action should be 

directed towards the reduction of the German air forces on the Western front, 

the progressive destruction of the German economic system and the undermining of German morale. 

Annex B 

102 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISIX MOST SECRET 

22. In order to contain the maximum German forces away from the Caen 

area diversionary operations should be staged against other areas such as the 

Pas de Calais and the Mediterranean Coast of France. 

Preparatory Phase. 

23. During this phase air action will be intensified against the G.A.F., 

particularly in North-West France, with a view to reducing the effectiveness 

of the G.A.F. in that area, and will be extended to include attacks against 

communications mere directly associated with movement of German reserves 

which might Mect the Caen area. Three naval assault forces will be 

assembled with the naval escorts and loaded at ports along the South Coast of 

England. Two naval assault forces carrying the follow-up forces will also be 

assembled and loaded, one in the Thames Estuary and one on the West Coast. 

The Assault, 

24. After a very short air bombardment of the beach defences three 

assault divisions will be landed simultaneously on the Caen beaches, followed 

up on D day by the equivalent of two tank brigades (United States regiments) 

and a brigade group (United States regimental combat team). At the same 

time, airborne forces will be used to seize the town of Caen; and subsidiary 

operations by commandos and possibly by airborne forces will be undertaken 

to neutralise certain coast defences and seize certain important river crossings. The object of the assault forces will be to seize the general line of Grandcamp-Bayeux-Caen. 

Follow-up and Build-up Phase. 

25. Subsequent action will take the form of a strong thrust Southwards 

and South-Westwardswith a view to destroying enemy forces, acquiring sites 

for airfields, and gaining depth for a turning movement into the Cotentin 

Peninsula directed on Cherbourg. When sufficient depth has been gained a 

force will advance into the Cotentin and seize Cherbourg. At the same time 

a thrust will be made to deepen the bridgehead South-Eastwards in order 

to cover the construction and operation of additional airfields in the area 

South-East of Caen. 

26. It is considered that, within fourteen days of the initial assault, 

Cherbourg should be captured and the bridgehead extended to include the 

general line Trouville-Alencon-Mont St. Michel. By this date, moreover it 

should have been possible to land some eighteen divisions and to have in 

Annex B 

103 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

operation about fourteen airfields from which twenty-eight to thirty-three 

flghter-type squadrons should be operating. 

Further Developments after Capture of Cherbourg 

27. After the capture of Cherbourg the Supreme Allied Commander will 

have to decide whether to initiate operationsto seize the Seine ports or whether 

he must content himself with flrst occupying the Brittany ports. In this decision 

he will have to be guided largely by the situation of the enemy forces. If the 

German resistance is sufficiently weak, an immediate advance could be made 

to seize Havre and Rouen. On the other hand, the more probable situation is 

that the Germans will have retired with the bulk of their forces to hold Paris 

and the line of the Seine,where they can best be covered by their air forces from 

North-East France and where they may possibly be reinforced by formations 

from Russia. Elsewhere they may move a few divisions from Southern France 

to hold the crossings of the Loire and will leave the existing defensive divisions 

in Brittany. 

It will therefore most probably be necessary for us to seize the Brittany 

ports flrst, in order to build up sufficient forces with which we can eventually 

force the passage of the Seine. 

28. Under these circumstances,the most suitable plan would appear to be 

to secure first the left flank and to gain sufficient airllelds for subsequent 

operations. This would be done by extending the bridgehead to the line of the 

River Eure from Dreux to Rouen and thence along the line of the Seine to the 

sea, seizing at the same time Chartres, Orleans and Tours. 

29. Under cover of these operationsa force would be employed in capturing 

the Brittany ports; the Arst step being a thrust Southwards to seize Nantes and 

St. Nazaire, followed by subsidiary operations to capture Brest and the various 

small ports of the Brittany Peninsula. 

30. This action would complete the occupation of our initial lodgement 

area and would secure sufficient major ports for the maintenance of at least 

thirty divisions. As soon as the organisation of the L. of C. in this lodgement 

area allowed, and sufficient air forces had been established, operations would 

then be begun to force the line of the Seine, and to capture Paris and the Seine 

ports. As opportunity offered, subsidiary action would also be taken to clear 

the Germans from the Biscay ports to facilitate the entry of additional American troops and the feeding of the French population. 

Annex B 

134 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Command and Control 

31. In carrying out Operation “Overlord” administrative control would be 

greatly simplified if the principle were adopted that the United States forces 

were normally on the right of the line and the British and Canadian forces on 

the left. 

Major Conditions Aflecting Success of the Operation 

32. It will be seen that the plan for the initial landing is based on two main 

principles -concentration of force and tactical surprise. Concentration of the 

assault forces is considered essential if we are to ensure adequate air support 

and if our limited assault forces are to avoid defeat in detail. An attempt has 

been made to obtain tactical surprise by landing in a lightly defended area ­ presumably lightly defended as, due to its distance from a major port, the 

Germans consider a landing there unlikely to be successful. This action, of 

course, presupposes that we can offset tine absence of a port in the initial stages 

by the provision of improvised sheltered waters. It is believed that this can be 

accomplished. 

33. The operation calls for a much higher standard of performance on the 

part of the naval assault forces than any previous operation. This will depend 

upon their being formed in sufficient time to permit of adequate training. 

34. Above all, it is essential that there should be an over-all reduction in 

the German fighter force between now and the time of the surface assault. 

From now onwards every practical method of achieving this end must be 

employed. This condition, above all others, will dictate the date by which the 

the amphibious assault can be launched. 

35. The next condition is that the number of German offensive divisions 

in reserve must not exceed a certain figure on the target date if the operation 

is to have a reasonable chance of success. The German reserves in fiance and 

the Low Countries as a whole, exciuding divisions holding the coast, G.A.F. 

divisions and training divisions, should not exceed on the day of the assault 

twelve full-strength first-quality divisions. In addition, the Germans should 

not be able to transfer more than fifteen first-quality divisions from Riissia 

during the first two months. Moreover, on the target date the divisions in reserve should be so located that the number of first-quality divisions which the 

Germans could deploy in the Caen area to support the divisions holding the 

coast should not exceed three divisions on D day, five divisions by D plus 2, 

or nine divisions by D plus 8. 

Annex B 

105 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

During the preliminary period, therefore, every effort must be made to 

dissipate and divert German formations, lower their fighting efficiency and 

disrupt communications. 

36. Finally, there is the question of maintenance. Maintenance will have 

to be carried out over beaches for a period of some three months for a number 

of formations, varying from a maximum of eighteen divisions in the Arst 

month to twelve divisions in the second month, rapidly diminishing to nil in 

the third month. Unless adequate measures are taken to provide sheltered 

waters by artiflcial means, the operation will be at the mercy of the weather. 

Moreover, special facilities and equipment will be required to prevent undue 

damage to craft during this extended period. Immediate action for the provision of the necessary requirements is essential. 

37. Given these conditions-a reduced G.A.F., a limitation in the number 

or effectiveness of German offensive formations in France, and adequate 

arrangements to provide improvised sheltered waters-it is considered that 

Operation “Overlord” has a reasonable prospect of success. To ensure these 

conditions being attained by the 1st May, 1944, action must start now and 

every possible effort made by all means in our power to soften German resistance and to speed up our own preparations. 

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1, 

30th July, 1943. 

Note: C.O.S. (43) 416 (0),Report and Appreciation, with Appendices, is Filed 

in the Offices of the Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

Annex B 

106 

NOTE: Airfields, L. Gs.and E. L.Gs. in 

GERMANY are NOT shown 
MAP NO.3, 
I 
MAP NO. 3 

CHAUSEY 

.. 

b’ 

Grd. 1.1. 

-I 
30' 1" 3d 0" 

W.S. SECRET 

I I 1 I r1 Eighteen Divs. plus overh 

2 Army H.Qs. S Corps n 0; low++ (shown thus 1-21 * US. FORMATIONS 

@ CANADIAN FQRMAW34.9 I 

llsc SI Marcouf a BRITISH FORMATIOWS C d. I0 Have 

3 Air Situntiqn. Fourteen airfie& amilabfe operdng abed Thirty­

~ 

_. i iding. ,

\ 

, 

n 

?n' 1 - 30' 
MAP NO 7 
Twenty-four Divs. B I of C tw Iondd. 

2 Army B WOr. Corps numbed in order of Ionding. 

(shown thus El) * 0.5 FORMATIONS 

4 3 2 1 0 3 

I 
MAP NO. 9 
I

CRET 

I MOST SECRL, 

LuATION D"' 

Bcibrh-Conodian Army Gp 116 I 
u. s. SECBET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.S.S. 305 and 305/1 

EFFECT OF INDIAN FLOODS ON BURMA CAMPAIGN 

References: 

CCS 107th Meeting. 

CCS 110th Meeting, Item (5) 

CCS 111th Meeting, Item (3) 

C.C.S. 305 was circulated, 14 August 1943, for the information of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff.The interim report of an ad hoc committee, a study 

thereon, was circulated 18August, (C.C.S. 305/1). 

C.C.S. 305/1 was considered and noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

in their 111th Meeting. A statement on the flood situation was included in 

C.C.S. 319/5. 

107 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 305 14 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

EFFECT OF INDIAN FLOODS ON BURMA CAMPAIGN 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosure is a message received from General Auchinlech on the 

above subject. It has been referred to an ad hoc committee for study and the 

submission of a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

H. REDMAN 

J. R. DEANE 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

PARAPHRASED VERSION OF A MOST SECRET 

CYPHER TELEGRAM NOT IN A ONE TIME PAD 

T.O.O. 1401202 Aug '43 

T.O.R. 1319432 

MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM 

MOST IMMEDIATE 

From: ARMINDIA 

To: Air Ministry Special Cypher Section 

Repeated: J.S.M. Washington -for F.M. Dill 

65566/COS 13th Axgust 2003. 

Following from General Auchirilech for Chiefs of Staff: 

Program of planning for operations from India: 

1. On receipt of decisions of Washington Conference a first appreciation 

of the possibility of carrying out the tasks allotted to this Command was 

produced. 

108 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

2. Salient point in this was that while requirements were in the neighborhood of 4,300tonsa day, theoretical maximum we could hope for was a lift into 

Assam of 3,400tons a day. It seemed at the time that requirements for the 

operations could probably be reduced to this figure. 

3 The two months which have followed have revealed in the first place 

increased requirements. This is mainly due to the continuance into October, 

November and December of engineer stores for Airfield Program which has 

first priority and must be met in full. Airfield Program and connected activities have resulted in an increase of personnel in Assam for which no allowance 

had been made. Further, we had reckoned on using some of the oil production 

for our own requirements, but the Americans now ask for the total output 

which means we must import more petrol and lubricants into Assam than we 

had anticipated. 

4. While requirements have increased lift which we can count on getting 

has been reduced. In the first place the figure of 3,400included no margin for 

cqntingencies which must be reckoned at absolute minimum of 15 per cent. 

Secondly, the stepping up of the previous lift which was only about 1700-1800 

does not take effect until mid-September and in the meantime arrears are 

accumulating of essential stores which must be lifted. Shortage of locomotives 

will not be made good until October. Greatest factor, however, in reducing 

figure has been breaches near Burdwan owing to floods on the Damodar River 

subseqcent breach at Ghatsila and floods at Parhatipur. 

5. Result of factors in Paras. 3 and 4 above is that we are faced with a total 

deficiency of lift into Assam of about 128,000 tons by 1st March. If reductions 

are made to the !imit which we consider possible in tonnages allotted for our 

own purposes and to the Americans this deficiency can be reduced but not by 

more than 20,000 tons in total which leaves a daily deficiency of about 600 tons 

for six months. 

6. Problem is thus in first place whether L of C can be stepped up still 

fiirther and seccnd!y if no increase possible in L of C how reduction in requirements can be effected. 

7. Whole question discussed today with Benthall, Member in Charge War 

Transport Department and with American Generals Ferris and Bissell. 

8. Majority of improvements to L of C into Assam are long term projects 

which cannot help our immediate problem such as doubling railway iines, 

building increased River Fleet, and increasing capacity of River Ports.Much of 

this is already in hand but will not be effective before October 1944. Proposals 

for short term improvement are as follows:­

109 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISR MOST SECRET 

(i) Increasing number of train paths by improving the operation of 

the railway system through supervision by Military personnel, and by relaxing certain precautions thus taking riskswhich would not be acceptable in 

normal times. war Transport Department is immediately starting inquiry 

into possibility of this. Representative of Wheeler will be associated with 

inquiry and also Representative of Transportation Directorate. 

(ii) Immediate increase in locomotive and rolling stock on Bengal and 

Assam Railway from other parts of India to be replaced by fresh stock from 

U.S.A.on arrival. War Transportation Department is inquiring into possibility. 

(iii) Quickening of turn round on river by icstallation of navigational 

lights and of night running. We are inquiring into this. 

(iv) Flying Stores for China from Calcutta into Assam Airfields. This 

can only be done with help of additional aircraft from U.S.A. 

9. While we may be able to achieve some improvement by these methods 

or by a combination of them and are doing all we can to do so,I feel it is probable that an over-all deficiency will remain. The L of C into Assam has never 

fdfilled expectations and this must be borne in mind. Possibility must, therefore, be faced of having to call off either the advance from Led0 or the advance 

from Imphal or both. 

10. If we call off the former, and the Road Construction project, troops required for defensive would probably be not more than one infantry brigade 

which was all we had there before the Americans took over thisarea. This would 

effect a saving of between four and five hundred tons a day. If we call off the 

latter we should still need two divisions forward for defensive purposes, with 

one division in reserve. This would mean a saving of only about two hundred 

tons a day. Thus if we remain on the defensive on both fronts saving effected 

would be six or seven hundred tons a day against anticipated deficiency of 

about six hundred tons a day. We should then be able to meet fully demands 

of air ferry route and later in the season when construction of airfields is 

reduced, whik capacity of L of C is increased by fresh stock from U.S.A.and 

completion oi pipelines, we should have a growing capacity to spare for increased lift to China. 

11. Question now arises whether the land operation in Arakan,Cudgel and 

the assault on Akyab should be carried out without operations in North at the 

same time. We should carry out raids and simulate activity by all means in our 

110 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

power in order to induce Japanese to believe that we were contemplating an 

offensive in the North. I consider therefore that it is unlikely that they would 

appreciatethat we had abandoned the Imphal advance in time to enable them 

to alter the dispositions of their land forces substantially before the monsoon. 

As far as land forces are concerned, therefore, containing effect would be 

approximately the same as that of the Imphal advance. Unlikely however that 

a similar containing effect would be exerted in case of Air Forces. On balance 

I do not think abandonment of the land and air operationsin Northern Burma 

should rule Arakan operations and Akyab. 

12. I do however consider that Akyab should not be attempted without the 

land operations in Arakan.Examination of the L of C required for the latter 

reveals that this also is insufficient for full requirements. Bottleneck is Chittagong. Everything possible is being done to increase capacity here by extension 

of wharfage use of country craft at improvised jetties etc. but it appears 

unlikely that it will ever be possible to carry out both the raising to heavy 

bomber standard of the Eastern Bengal Group of airfields before next monsoon and the Arakan operation. 

13. The A.0.C.-in-C. points out that if these airfields are not completed to 

heavy bomber standard in the winter of 1943-44they will not be ready for 

operations either this year or in 1944-45.They are needed at once for deeper 

penetration in Burma. They would be essential for increased air offensive over 

Burma and particularly were it decided to carry out at a later date an airborne 

attack on Mandalay or Rangoon and they may also be required for supplying 

Allied Air Forces in China. I am not in a position to assess the relative probabilities of these operations. 

14. I am in doubt asto whether priority given at TRIDENT to air operations 

means that preparations for air operations mentioned above should take absolute precedence over land operationswhich I have been instructed to carry out 

this winter. But if Akyab is to take place this winter I consider that Arakan 

operations must have precedence over raising the standard of these airfields. 

15. It remains to consider whether, if Akyab is unavoidably delayed, the 

Arakan operations should be given priority over the raising of the standard of 

Eastern Bengal airfields. Ithink that the Arakan operations might be successful by themselves and that we should have a fair chance of capturing Akyab 

overland. Setting aside any non-military reasons for its capture main military 

reasons are: 

(i.) containing effect on Japanese forces in Burma and particularly

Air Forces. 

111 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(ii.) possession of a more advanced airfield. These must be weighed 

against completion of airfields in Eastern Bengal. 

16. We should maintain continuous air offensive against Burma and in 

particular Akyab whether amphibious operations were postponed or not. 

Japanese would remain in uncertainty until weather had deteriorated to such 

an extent as to make it difficult for them to move large forces. Consider therefore containing effect is likely to be the same in either case. 

17. Regarding airfields A.0.C.-in-C. would prefer raising Eastern Bengal 

airfield to heavy bomber standard to acquiring new airfields at Akyab. 

18. In these circumstances therefore there would be little military advantage in taking Akyab beyond raising morale and killing Japanese. Do not consider this would justify failure to raise standard of airfields. If therefore Akyab 

were abandoned I should recommend that the Arakan operations also should 

be abandoned and priority given to airfields. 

19. Fully appreciate anxiety which exists to start large-scale offensive 

operationsagainst Burma this coming winter. The course of planning for even 

the limited operations intended in Northern Burma has brought me to the 

conclusion that best military course would be to avoid such operations and to 

concentrate on supply to China by air, at the same time increasing and conserving strength of India and preparing resources for large scale amphibious 

operations against Malaya next winter. Preparation for these would enable us 

to bring training of troops to high standard. If they were definitely decided on 

for 1944-45it would be desirable to divert resources earmarked for Akyab to 

taking Andamans in the late spring of 1944.We are urgently examining the 

possibility of this and will signal results to you. 

20. Americans are examining effect of changed situation on their plans 

in more detail and I cannot send final recommendations until results of War 

Transport Departments inquiry regarding railways is known but it seems desirable to let you know probabilities at once. 

21. This signal has been discussed with and agreed to by C.-in-C. Eastern 

Fleet who is in Delhi and A.0.C.-in-C. 

T.O.O.1401202 

I12 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 305/1 18 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

EFFECT OF INDIAN FLOODS ON BURMA CAMPAIGN 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Enclosure has been prepared by an ad hoc Committee appointed 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to study the above subject. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

INTERIM REPORT 

By the Committee Appointed to Examine C.C.S. 305 

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff we 

have examined the telegram from the Commander in Chief INDIA contained 

in paper C.C.S. 305,and submit this interim report. 

2. From the information at our disposal,which is confined to the telegrams 

received from the Commander in Chief INDIA, there is a short-fall of 600 tons 

per day foreshadowed cjn the ASSAM line of communications out of the estimated capacity of 3,400tons per day. This short-fall is expected to cont.inue 

up to 1st March 1944. 

3. In respect of priority for allotment of capacity on this line of communication we consider that the air transport service to CHINA should retain its 

present overriding priority. 

113 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

4. We have examined the detailed allocation of tonnage as planned by the 

Commander in Chief INDIA on the basis of 3,400 tons per day, and agree that 

this allows no margin if the operations are to take place as planned. 

5. We assess that a savingof approximately 600 tons per day might be made 

by calling a halt to one of the offensives as planned, either at LEDO or at 

IMPHAL. 

6. It would therefore appear from the figures available that one of these 

projects should be cancelled if the other is to be carried out. 

7. We have, however, addressed a cable to the Commander in Chief INDIA 

offering him certain assistance which should begin to have an effect in improvicg capacity by late November or December 1943. This assistance, coupled 

with the postponement of the date of active operations till 15th February, 1944, 

may permit of both projects being continued though with some loss of preparedness. 

8. Having regard to the above factors, we do not consider that the abandonment of either project should be definitely decided upon. The importance of 

continuing work on the LEDO road is manifest, and with a lower target of road 

construction in the IMPHAL area, due to the later date of operations, the continuance of the LEDO road may well be possible with little delay. 

9. We make this forecast with some reserve, and we cannot definitely state 

what will be practicable until we receive a reply from the Commander in Chief 

INDIA, to the cable which we have dispatched. 

114 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 306 

ROME AN OPEN CITY 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 108th Meeting, Item (2) 

C.C.S. 306 was circulated, 14August 1943,for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. By informal action the message was approved and dispatched the same date. (FAN 191) 

In their 108th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff further considered 

C.C.S. 306 and agreed to inform the President and Prime Minister that from a 

military point of view, the “stand still” order should be revoked. 

Following this decision and with the approval of the President and Prime 

Minister, the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatched FAN 194,15August, authorizing General Eisenhower to carry on operations to the extent he considers 

necessary or advisable, subject to previous limitations regarding safety of t.he 

Vatican. 

115 
U,S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 306 14August 1943 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ROME AN OPEN CITY 

Note by the Secretaries 

Press reports have been received that Rome has been declared an open 

city by the Italian Government. General Eisenhower has indicated that he 

may make an attack against Rome tomorrow, 15 August. 

Pending clarification of the situation, it is suggested that the following

FAN message might be sent to General Eisenhower: 

“hess reports this date indicate Italian Government has declared 

Rome an open city. Pending clariAcation and further instructions it is desired that you make no further attacks on Rome nor make any statements 

from your headquarters regarding the attitude of the United Nations with 

respect to the action taken by the Italian Government.” 

H. REDMAN, 

.I.R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

116 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITIS3 MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 307 

ARTIFICIAL HARBORS FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS 

References: 

C.C.S. 108th Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.S. 113th Meeting, Item (10) 

C.C.S. 307 was circulated, 14August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff tookcognizanceof this paper in their 108th 

meeting relative to the discussion of C.C.S. 304 (Operation OVERLORD). 

In the C.C.S. 113th Meeting, it was noted that certain experts with regard to synthetic harbors were on their way to discuss the matter with appropriate United States OfRcers. 

117 
u.5. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S.307 14August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ARTIFICIAL HARBORS FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS 

Memorandum bg the British Chiefsof Staff 

1. The enemy has realized that we can only maintain a large invasion force 

by using ports and he has, therefore, heavily defended the existing ports and 

their neighboring beaches from sea and land attack. He has also made arrangements to render them unserviceable if they should be captured. 

2. It is, therefore, of vital importance that we should be able to improvise 

port facilities at an early date. Supplies could then be maintained during unfavorableweather conditions and before we have been able to capture and recondition ports. The British Chiefs of StafT have appointed a Committee to 

study the whole problem and to make recommendationsasa matter of urgency. 

3. The basic requirements for an improvised port are: 

a. Breakwaters. 

b. Unloading facilities. 

4. BREAKWATERS 

a. Natural Topographicd Features 

The best use must be made of natural features such as promontories 

and shallow banks. A study of the area, however, shows that there is only 

one position where such natural facilitiesexist. 

b. Ships Sunk to Form a Breakwater 

Shipswere used to make breakwatersin the last war, but only in nontidal waters. The objections to this method off the coast of France are: 

(1) The large range of tide precludes their use except in very shallow 

water. 

(2) The scour effect of the strong tidal stream may cause the ships 

to become unstable. 

118 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(3) The large number which would be required. 

c. New Scientific Devices 

(1) Bubble Breakwater. In principle this consists of a curtain of air 

bubbles rising from a submerged pipe. The constant upward flow of 

bubbles destroys the rotary movement of water particles which is Bssociated with waves, thus damping out the waves. Air compressors are 

necessary to feed the pipe. This method has been used in Russia and 

full scale experiment is shortly to be carried out in England by the Admiralty. 

(2) Lilo Breakwater. It has been found that a quilted canvas bag, 

inflated by air at a low pressure and ballasted to float so that the greater 

portion is below the surface, damps out waves. A model breakwater constructed on these principles has been designed and has given promising 

results. It is hoped to overcome the practical difficulties of mooring, and 

full scale trials are being progressed at high priority by the Admiralty. 

5. UNLOADING FACILITIES 

a. Methods in Previous Use 

The process of beaching L.S.T. and L.C.T. and of drying out coasters 

and barges can be continued with additional safety within the breakwaters. 

To save wear and tear and to speed up discharge of cargoes, these methods 

must be supplemented by other facilities. 

b. Piers 

Piers and pierheads which are capable of being towed across the 

Channel have been designed and are being put into production. These piers 

are capable of being moored so that they will stand up to a strong wind, but 

unloading under all weather conditions will only be possible when they are 

placed inside breakwaters. These piers are being designed to enable L.S.T. 

and L.C.T. to “beach”against semi-submerged pontoons which enable them 

to discharge over their ramps. Simultaneously the upper deck of L.S.T. can 

discharge their vehicles direct on to an “upper deck” built on the pierhead. 

c. Pierships 

In the Annexure to Appendix “X’of the OVERLORD plan (C.O.S. 

(43) 416 (0)) , C.O.S.S.A.C. has suggested the construction of specially 

119 
u.s.SEm 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

modiAed 500 feet pierships,which could be sunk in position and which could 

be connected to the shore by some form of pontoon equipment or two-way 

pier. He has also suggested the construction of some form of quay on rocks. 

These and other suggestions are being examined. 

d. Hat& 

If beaches of slope 1 in 40or steeper can be found within the breakwater, the construction of unloading hards similar to those used for loading 

m U.K.will simplify the unloading of L.S.T. 

120 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

*^ I 

.. 

w 

I4 

m 

m 

5 

m 

U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 30813 

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

References: 

C.C.S 111th Meeting, Item (5) 

C.C.S. 114th Meeting, Item (3) 

C.C.S. 116th Meeting, Item (7) 

1stCitadel Meeting 

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (7) 

C.C.S. 308 circulated, 15 August, a memorandum by the British Chiefs 

of Staff which presented for consideration the proposed set-up for the South 

east Asia Command. 

C.C.S. 308/1, a report by the Combined Staff Planners, proposed certain 

amendments with relation to a clarification of tie status of General Stilwell 

and the command of the U.S.Army and Navy Air Transport Services. 

C.C.S. 308/2, a memorandum from the US.Chiefs of Staff, proposed a 

revision of Paragraph 8 c, C.C.S. 308. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 114th Meeting considered the 

subject of Southeast Asia Command and agreed upon the proposal set forth in 

C.C.S. 308 as amended by C.C.S. 308/1 and C.C.S. 308/2. 

The conclusions of the agreement were circulated as C.C.S. 308/3 and 

also included in C.C.S. 319/5. 

123 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 308/3 21 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

Note by the Secretaries 

The decisionsof the Combined Chiefs of Staff with relation to the Southeast Asia Command are set forth in the Enclosure. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

PART I 

1. The vigorous and effective prosecution of large-scale operations against 

Japan in Southeast Asia, and the rapid development of the air route through 

Burma to China, necessitate the reorganization of the High Command in the 

Indian Theater. It has, therefore, been proposed that the Command in India 

should be divided from the operational Command in Southeast Asia as 

described below. 

COMMAND IN INDIA 

2. The administration of India as a base for the forces in Southeast Asia 

will remain under the control of the Commander in Chief, India. Coordination 

124 
U. S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

of movement and maintenance both of the operational forces based on India 

and of the internal garrison can best be carried out efficiently by one staff 

responsible in the last resort to one authority with power to decide priorities. 

This machinery exists today in the Government of Icdia and in G.H.Q. India. 

It is the only machinery which can carry out the dual tasks of meeting the 

internal requirements of India as well as the requirements of operations in 

the Southeast Asia Theater. 

COMMAND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

3. A Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia should be set up as 

follows: 

a. The command and staff to be a combined British and American one 

on the lines of the North African Command. 

b. The Supreme Allied Commander to be British, with an American 

deputy. He should have under him Naval, Army and Air Commanders in 

Chief, and also a Principal Administrative Officer to coordinate the administrative planning of all three services and of the Allied forces. 

c. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the Commanders of the 

three services mentioned above, acting under the orders of the Supreme 

Allied Commander, to control all operations and have under their command 

such Naval, Military and Air forces as may be assigned to the Southeast 

Asia Theater from time to time. 

4. The proposed boundaries of the Southeast Command will be as follows: 

a. Eastern Boundary 

From the point where the frontiers of Burma, Indo China and Thailand meet, southwards along the eastern boundary of Thailand and Malaya 

to Singapore; from Singapore south to the North Coast of Sumatra; thence 

round the East Coast of Sumatra (leaving the Sunda Strait to the eastward 

of the line) to a point on the coast of Sumatra at longitude 104 degrees East; 

thence South to latitude 08 degrees South; thence Southeasterly towards 

Onslow, Australia, and, on reaching longitude 110 degrees East, due South 

along that meridian. 

b. Northern Frontier 

From the point where the frontiers of Burma, Indo China and Thailand meet generally north and west along the Eastern and Northern Fron125 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

tier of Burma to its junction with the Indo-Burma border; thence along that 

border to the sea; thence round the Coast of India and Persia (all exclusive 

to the South East Asia Command ) to meridian 60 degrees East. 

c. Western Boundary 

Southward along meridian 60 degrees East to Albatross Island, thence 

Southeastward to exclude Rodriguez Island and thence due southward 

5. The Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia 

Command, should be formed in the first instance at Delhi, since it will take over 

elements of the present General Headquarters, India. The Supreme Allied 

Commander will submit his recommendations as to the ultimate location of 

his Headquarters as soon as he has had time to study the problem. 

DIVISION OF RESONSIBILITY BETWEEN INDIA AND 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

6. Conflicts of opinion over priorities in connection with administration 

must be anticipated. It will, therefore, be necessary for someone on the spot to 

resolve these differences day by day as they occur. This authority should be 

the Viceroy, not in his statutory capacity as Governor-General, but acting on 

behalf of the British War Cabinet. 

7. The Supreme Commander will in any event have direct access to the 

British Chiefs of Staff on all matters, and if he is not satisfied with the ruling 

of the Viceroy on administrative matters, he will be able to exercise this right. 

The Commander in Chief, India, will continue to have the right of direct access 

to the British Chiefs of Staff. 

8. a. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander 

General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the 

Southeast Asia Theater and in that capacity will command the Chinese 

troops operating into Burma and all US. air and ground forces committed 

to the Southeast Asia Theater. 

The operational control of the Chinese forces operating into Burma 

will be exercised, in conformity with the over-all plan of the British Army 

Commander, by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander or by his representative, who will be located with the troops. 

The operational control of the 10th Air Force will be vested in the 

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and exercised by his air representative 

located at the headquarters of the Air Commander in Chief. 

126 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

General Stiiwell will continue to have the Same direct responsibility 

to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as heretofore. His dual function under 

the SupremeAllied Commander and under the Generalissimo is recognized. 

The organization and command of the U.S.Army and Navy Air Transport Services in the Southeast Asia area will remain under the direct control of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces and of the Commander in Chief, U.S.Fleet, respectively, subject to such supply and service 

functions as may be by them delegated to the Deputy Supreme Allied 

Commander. Requests by the Supreme Allied Commander for the use of 

US.troop carrier aircraft for operational purposes will be transmitted to 

the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. 

Requests for the use of surfacetransportation capacity in and through 

India, or for development involving construction for the air route to China, 

will be passed through the Supreme Allied Commander in order that they 

may be related, as regards priority, to his requirements before being placed 

on the Commander in Chief, India. 

b. Command Relationship 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction 

over strategyfor the Southeast Asia Theater, and the allocation of American 

and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction 

over all matters pertaining to operations,and would be the channel through 

which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed. 

c. The Coordination of American Agencies such as O.S.S.,O.W.I.,F.C.B., 

etc., with comparable British Organizations 

In order to facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the US.and British quasi-military agencies in India and the 

Southeast Asia Command, a Combined Liaison Committee will be set up 

at New Delhi. 

There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in India or 

the Southeast Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such 

operations in these areas are put into effect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the government of India,the Commander in Chief, India, or the 

Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Theater, must be obtained as 

applicable. 

127 
128 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S 309 

“POINTBLANK” 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 109th Meeting, Item (3) 

1st Citadel Meeting 

C.C.S. 309 was circulated, 15 August 1943, for the information of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. In their 109th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

discussed and took note of this paper. Further, in meeting with the President 

and Prime Minister, 19 August, it was agreed that the plan for the combined 

bomber offensive should include attacks from all convenient bases. 

The final resolution agreed upon for this operation is included in C.C.S. 

31915. 

129 
U. S. SECRET 

BIUTISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 309 15 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

“POINTBLArar’ 

Note by the Secretaries 

In order to save delay,the enclosure, prepared by the Chief of the British 

Air Staff,ispresented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. 

H. REDMAN, 

.I.R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

“POINTBLANK’ 

Note by the Chief of the Air Stag 

1. I annex an appreciationby Air Intelligence of the trend of development 

and disposition of the German Fighter Force in relation to “POINTBLANK”. 

The salient points are: ­

a. The German Fighter Force has increased by 22% since 1 January 

1943. 

b. Its strength on the Western Front has been doubled since the same 

date. 

c. The increase on the Western Front has absorbed the entire expansion under a. 

d. Fighter units and experienced fighter pilots have nevertheless had 

to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts as well, in 

spite of the critical situation on those fronts. 

130 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

e. In spite of the present strain on the German night fighters they are 

being used by day to counter the deep daylight penetration of “POINTBLANK” into Germany. 

2. The build-up of the Eighth Bomber Command as required in the 

“POINTBLANK” plan approved by the C.C.O.S. at TRIDENT should have 

been 1068 aircraft on the 15th August. The comparable figure of the actual 

build-up achieved on that date was 921 (including 105 detached to North 

Africa). 

3. The present strength of the G.A.F. Fighter Force is 2260 aircraft in 

first line units compared with a strength of 2000 which it was hoped would 

not be exceeded if “POINTBLANK” could have been executed as planned. Thus 

the G.A.F. Fighter Force is 13% stronger than had been hoped, and this in 

spite of increased successes in Russia and the Mediterranean which were not 

taken into account in the “POINTBLANK” plan. 

4. I do not set out the above information in order to make a criticism of 

an ixfability to have achieved complete fulfillment of “POINTBLANK”. My 

object is to bring out the fact that, in spite of some shortfall in the build-up, 

Germany is now faced with imminent disaster if only the pressure of “POINTBLANK” can be maintained and increased before the increase in the G.A.F. 

Fighter Force has gone too far. 

There is no need for us to speculate about the effect of “POINTBLANK” 

on Germany. The Germans themselves, when they weaken the Russian and 

Mediterranean fronts in the face of serious reverses there, tell us by their acts 

what importance to attach to it. 

5. The daylight “Battle of Germany” is evidently regarded by the Germans as of critical importance and we have already made them throw into it 

most, if not all, of their available reserves. 

If we do not now strain every nerve to bring enough force to bear 

to win this battle during the next two or three months but are content to see 

the 8th Bomber Command hampered by lack of reinforcements just as success 

is within its grasp, we may well miss the opportunity to win a decisive victory 

against the German Air Force which will have incalculable effects on all future 

operations and on the length of the war. And the opportunity, once lost, may 

not recur. 

6. I, therefore, urge most strongly that we should invite the U.S.C.O.S. to 

take all practicable steps at the earliest possible date to increase the striking 

131 
U.6.SECRET 

BRITISa MOST SECRGT 

power of the 8th Bomber Command as much as possible during the next two 

months. 

ANNEX 

G.A.F. SINGLE-ENGINED FIGHTER REINFORCEMENT OF 

THE WESTERN FRONT, JANUARY-JULY,1943 

1. Strength and Disposition. The Initial Equipment (I.E.) of the G.A.F. 

single-engined fighter force as a whole increased by 245 aircraft from 1,095 

to 1,340between 1 January and 1 August 1943. The disposition of this force 

in the main operational areas on the respective dates waS as follows: 

-

1-1-43 -1-8-43 Difference 

Western Front 305 600 + 295 

Mediterranean 320 295 - 25 

Russian Front 430 395* - 35 

Refitting -

40 -50 + -10

Total 1,095 1,340 245 __ ~ ~

*including 30 I.E. in Rumania newly formed since 1-1-43 

2. It will be seen that the fighter force on the Western Front has been 

doubled during the period under review and that this increase has in effect 

more than absorbed the entire expansion which has occurred; it has in addition entailed a weakening of both the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts 

notwithstanding the important military campaigns in those areas where the 

Axis forces have suffered serious reverses since the beginning of the year. 

3. Sources of Increased Strength. The raising of S.E. fighter strength on 

the Western Front has been accomplished in two ways: 

a. As a result of the defensive strategy forced on the G.A.F. since the 

end of 1942 in face of growing Allied air power on the Western Front, in 

the Mediterranean and in Russia, Germany was forced to adopt the policy 

of achieving the maximum possible expansion of fighter production. 

The outcome of this policy is clearly seen in the formation of new 

fighter units and of the expansion of others; in addition there has been a 

noticeable tendency to maintain the actual strength of many fighter units 

well in excess of I.E., particularly on the Western Front. 

132 
u. s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

b. By the withdrawal of units from the Mediterranean and Russia. 

4. The reinforcement of the Western Front as a result of the above 

measures can be analyzed as follows: 

Newly formed units 1

1 165 

Expansion of existing units] 

Transferred from Russia 90 

Transferred from Mediterranean -

60

Gross Total 315 

Loss: 

Fighter units transferred to fighter-bomber category. 20 - Net Total Increase 295 aircraft 

5. Redispsition on the Western Front. A most striking change in the 

disposition of the G.A.F. fighter force on the Western Front has taken place 

since 1 January in order to secure the greatest possible defensive strength to 

cover the approaches to Germany. Prior to that date, the German fighter

dispositions were mainly to cover the North coast of France, Belgium and the 

Low Countries against R.A.F.fighter sweeps in these areas and against such 

daylight bombing of occupied territory as then took place. 

The comparative dispositions are shown as follows: 

I.E.at I.E.at 

Area 1-8-43 1-1-43 Differences 

France (West of the Seine) 95 95 0 

France (East of the Seine and Belgium) 105 70 + 35 

Holland 150 40 + 110 

N.W.Germany 180 35 + 145 

Denmark and S.Norway 50 35 + 15 

Trondheim and N. Nomy -

20 -30 -

- 10

Total -600 -

SO5 + 295

The salient points which emerge are: 

a. The greatly increased defenses of Northwest Germany have absorbed 

50% of the total increased fighter strength on the Western Front. 

b. The balance of this increase has gone mainly to the Belgium-Holiand 

area. 

133 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

A point not clearly revealed by the above figures has been the movement 

eastwards of French based units and the bringing of others from Norway to 

Northwest Germany; there has therefore been a strong tendency to concentrate the maximum possible forces into the area between the Scheldt and the 

Elbe. Nevertheless it is certain that the present fighter strength defending 

Northwest Germany and its approaches is still inadequate for its purpose; this 

is supported by the increasing use of night-fighters for daylight interception 

especially against deep penetration into Germany where the resources of the 

G.A.F. are inadequate to maintain S.E.day fighter forces. 

7. Reason fur increased defenses.The doubling of the German S.E.fighter 

force on the Western Front and the allocation of virtually the whole of this 

increase to Belgium, Holland and Northwest Germany are attributable solely 

to the development of Allied day bombing of Germany. The defense of Germany against these attacks has in fact become the prime concern of the G.A.F. 

and is being undertaken even at the expense of air support for military operations on other fronts. There is no reason to suppose that this will not continue 

to constitute the main commitment of the defensive fighter forces of the 

G.A.F.: if anything this commitment is likely to increase and the transfer of 

further units to the Western Front from other operational areas cannot be 

excluded. 

8. Strain on Crews. Despite their strength and fiexibilit,y the fighter 

defenses of Germany are liable to be subjezt to extreme strain over periods of 

sustained day and night attacks on Germany: this was particularly noticeable 

during the last week in July when day fighters were extensively employed as 

night fighters in addition to their day operationsand conversely night fighters 

had to be employed for day interception. The effects of such continued activity 

on crews must inevitably have been severe and there is evidence that in the 

later raids during this period opposition was less determined and Allied losses 

noticeably reduced. There is no doubt that during this period the German 

fighter defenses were subjected to the most severe test they have yet 

experienced. 

9. Transfer of experienced pilots to Western Front. The urgent necessity 

of the defense of Germany has not only deprived the Russian and Mediterranean Fronts of units, let alone reinforcements; it has also entailed a 

deterioration in quality of the fighter pilots employed in those fronts, notably 

Russia since there is strong evidence that the most experienced pilots are 

being transferred to the Western Front and replaced by others of inferior skill. 
0.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

10. CONCLUSIONS 

a. There can be no doubt that Germany regards the defense of the 

Reich against daylight air attack as of such supreme importance that 

adequate support for military operations in Russia and the Mediterranean 

has been rendered impossible. In Russia, the fighter force actually engaged 

on the entire front is now little more than half that on the Western Front; 

this fighter weakness has unquestionably been an important contributory 

factor to the German failure in Russia this year. 

Similarly in the Mediterranean despite the wide areas exposed to 

Allied air attack from Sardinia to Crete and the need for support of Italy no 

reinforcement whatever has been forthcoming; consequently Allied air 

operations have been carried out with the maximum of success and minimum loss against negligible opposition thereby largely contributing to 

present conditions in Italy. 

b. The Western Front with a fighter strength almost equal that of the 

Mediterranean and Russian Fronts combined constitutes the only source 

from which reinforcements needed elsewhere can be provided unless 

further new units are formed; this however appears unlikely in the 

immediate future. Consequently in the event of South Germany becoming 

exposed to air attack by day, it seems inevitable that such fighter defenses 

as may be set up must be derived almost exclusively from the West; the 

defense of South Germany against air attack on a scale equivalent to that 

now existing on the Western Front would necessitate the reduction of the 

fighter force in that area by up to 50% dependent on the then existing 

commitments of the G.A.F. in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. 

135 
i36 
U. 6. SECRET 

BRITJsa MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 310 

PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 116th Meeting, Item (8) 

C.C.S. 310 was circulated, 15 August 1943, for consideration by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff at QUADRANT. In their 116th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed as to the necessity of adequate machinery for the 

coordination of propaganda and took note that, following the results of 

negotiations by the British authorities concerned, further action would be 

taken by the British Joint Staff Mission. 

137 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 310 15 August 1943 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE 

Memorandum from the United States Chiefsof Staff 

Recent events have indicated the necessity for establishing some 

machinery whereby propaganda policies to be followed by London, Washington, and Theater Headquarters may be coordinated, particularly in emergency 

cases. 

The enclosure is presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a possible 

solution to this problem. They consider it desirable that something along these 

lines be accomplished during the QUADRANT Conferences. 

ENCLOSURE 

PiZOBLEM 

To establish a central agency with power of decision regarding propaganda lines to be followed. 

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 

The recent removal of Mussolini disclosed the fact that in emergen­

?ies there is no United Nations agency immediately available to coordinate and 

determine the propaganda policy that should be followed in order to derive 

the maximum benefit from the situation. As a result there has been a divergence in the propaganda aims as between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Theater Commander, which will be difficult to correct. 

The time involved in obtaining agreed views from the Chief Executives 

of the two governments, the State Department, the Foreign Office, and the 

military and naval leaders of the two countries is too long to permit taking 

full advantage of a situation which requires immediate action. 

138 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ACTION RECOMMENDED 

That the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend to the President and the 

Prime Minister: 

a. That a Propaganda Committee be set up in Washington to include 

one high-level representative each from the US.State Department, British 

Foreign OfIlce,U.S.Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff. 

b. That this Committee be authorized to make decisions and issue broad 

directives on propaganda policies to be followed by the propaganda agencies of the two countries. These should be such as to insure the maximum 

benefit in furthering the military and political aims of the two governments. It should be understood that this committee ordinarily is free to 

seek guidance on the highest levels, but in emergencies to have the responsibility of taking immediate action without reference to higher authority. 

c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be charged with the implementation of the above. 

139 
140 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 311 

ITALIAN PEACE FEELERS 

Reference: 

CCS 110th Meeting, Item (2) 

CCS 111th Meeting, Item (2) 

C.C.S. 311 circulated, 17 August 1943, the approved paper on this subject 

for presentation to the President and Prime Minister. 

With the approval of the President and Prime Minister, FAN 196 was 

dispatched to General Eisenhower instructing him in this regard. 

141 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 311 17 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ITALIAN PEACE FEELERS 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosure with reference to the above subject has been prepared 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for submission to the President and Prime 

Minister. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

SUGGESTED ACTION ON ITALIAN 

PEACEFEELERS 

1. General Eisenhower should be instructed to send two Staff Officers, 

one US. and one British, to Lisbon at once to meet General “C”. 

2. The communication to General “C” should be on the following lines:­

a. The unconditional surrender of Italy is accepted on the terms stated 

in the document handed to him (Armistice Terms for Italy as already 

agreed. These do not include political, economic or financial terms which 

will be communicated later.) 

b. These terms did not visualize the active assistance of Italy in fighting 

the Germans. The extent to which the terms will be modified in favor of 

Italy will depend on how far the Italian Government and people do, in fact, 

aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war. 

The United Nations, however, state without reservation that wherever 

Italian forces or Italians fight Germans, or destroy German property, or 

hamper German movement, they will be given all possible support by the 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

forces of the United Nations. Meanwhile bombing will be restricted to targets which immediately affect the movements and operations of German 

forces. 

c. The cessation of hostilities between the United Nations and Italy 

will take effect from a date and hour to be notified by General Eisenhower. 

(NOTE: General Eisenhower should make this notification a few 

hours before Allied forces land in Italy in strength.) 

d. Italian Government must undertake to proclaim the Armistice immediately it is announced by General Eisenhower, and to order their forces 

and people from that hour to collaborate with the Allies and to resist the 

Germans. 

(NOTE: As will be seen from 2 c above, the Italian Government will 

be given a few hours’ notice.) 

e. The Italian Government must, at the hour of the Armistice order 

that all United Nations’ prisoners in danger of capture by the Germans 

shall be immediately released. 

f. The Italian Government must, at the hour of the Armistice, order 

the Italian Fleet and as much of their merchant shipping as possible to 

put to sea for Allied ports. As many military aircraft as possible shall fly 

to Allied bases. Any ships or aircraft in danger of capture by the Germans 

must be destroyed. 

3. Meanwhile there is a good deal that Badoglio can do without the 

Germans becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and extent 

of his action must be left to his judgment; but the following are the general 

lines which should be suggested to him:­

(i) General passive resistance throughout the country if this order can 

be conveyed to local authorities without the Germans knowing. 

(ii) Minor sabotage throughout the country, particularly of communications and airfields used by the Germans. 

(iii) Safeguard of Allied prisoners of war. If German pressure to hand 

them over becomes too great, they should be released. 

(iv) No Italian warships to be allowed to fall into German hands. Arrangements to be made to insure that all these ships can sail to ports desig143 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

nated by General Eisenhower immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would let the cat 

out of the bag. 

(v) No merchant shipping to be allowed to fall into German hands. Merchant shippingin Northern ports should, if possible, be sailed to ports south 

of the line Venice-Leghorn. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All 

ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by General Eisenhower. 

(vi) Germans must not be allowed to take over Italian coast defenses. 

(vii) Make arrangements to be put in force at the proper time for Italian 

formationsin the Balkans to march to the coast, with a view to their being 

taken off to Italy by United Nations. 

4. General Eisenhower’s representatives must arrange with General “C” 

a secure channel of communication between Italian Headquarters and General 

Eisenhower. 

(NOTE: In view of the urgency of the matter, a warning order should 

be sent to General Eisenhower that instructions as to how he 

is to deal with peace-feelers are being concerted between the 

President and the Prime Minister, and that in the meanwhile 

he should hold two Staff Officers in readiness to proceed to 

Lisbon immediately on receipt of these instructions to meet 

General “C, who must leave Lisbon on the night of the 20th 

at very latest. He should also make the necessary transportation arrangements with London for entry into Portugal.) 

144 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 312 and 312/1 

PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA 

References: 

C.C.S. 107th Meeting 

C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.S. 312 was circulated, 18 August, and the report of an ad hoc 

committee thereon (C.C.S. 312/1) was circulated, 21 August. 

The Combined Chiefs of SM in their 115th Meeting approved the 

recommendations of the sd hoc codth, and this agreement was included 

in C.C.S. 319/5. 

145 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 312 18 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA 

References: 

a. C.C.S. 107th Meeting 

b. J.C.S. Memo Directive, 14 August 1943 

Note by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

The Enclosure, a report by the U.S.Joint administrative Committee, is 

presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The U.S.Chiefs 

of Staff recommend that it be referred to the Combined Administrative Committee or to a special ad hoc Committee for study and report to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff before being placed on the C.C.S. Agenda at QUADRANT. The 

Committee's report should assess the effect of the troop lift involved on other 

troop lift commitments. 

ENCLOSURE 

PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA 

References: 

a. C.C.S. 10'7th Meeting 

b. J.C.S. Memo Directive, 14 August 1943 

REPORT BY THE U.S.JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE 

THE PROBLEM 

1. Prepare a study on the construction of a pipeline from India to China 

via Calcutta, Led0 and Fort Hertz, to Kunming. 

146 
BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. SECRET 

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 

2. Description of Project: 

The project is divided into two parts which can be executed simultaneously: 

a. The construction of a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Dibrugarh 

(Project C, attached map) to provide gasoline (1) for U.S. air transport 

operations in Assam, (2) for further transportation to Kunming, and (3) 

to supplement the supply of the Imphal Force. The Calcutta-Dibrugarh 

pipeline is 900 miles long and will have a capacity of 36,000 tons per month. 

The line is easily accessible from railroads for the entire length. Time 

required for construction is estimated at five months. 

b. The construction of a four-inch pipeline from Dibrugarh via Fort 

Hertz to Kunming (Project A, attached map), to provide gasoline for air 

operations in China. This line is 1,000 miles long and will have a capacity 

of 18,000 tons per month. Approximately 400 miles of this line traverses 

territory accessible by road, the remainder is accessible only via foot trails 

or air. In order to speed construction by building several sections simultaneously, materials should be flown in to airfields along the route. Time 

required for construction is estimated at eight months. 

3. Military necessity: 

a. US.air transport operationsrequire 15,000tons of gasoline per month 

in Assam. 

b. The amount of aviation fuel available in the Kunming area will be 

a limiting factor which will restrict the size of the air force which can be 

supported from Chinese bases, for attacks against Japanese shipping, shore 

installations, naval forces and ground forces during the year 1944. 

c. There are additional military requirements, other than gasoline, for 

the support of ground establishments and ground forces, which are essential to the securing of the airbase area in China. The delivery of gasoline 

to the Kunming area by pipeline will permit the devotion to these requirements of much of the capacity of the U.S. air transport facilities previously 

used for gasoline. 
u. s.SEcFtET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

4. Requirements for Construction: 

The requirements for construction are as follows: 

900 miles six-inch pipeline and accessories . . . 29,000 short tons 

1,OOO miles four-inch pipeline and accessories.. 18,000 short tons 

Signal supplies . .... .. . . . .. .. .. . .. . .. ....... 400 short tons 

4,000 troops (15 Petr Dist Cos & misc deb) . ... 2,600 short tons 

50,000 short tons 

5. Capacity to Meet Requirements: 

a. Cargo shipping is available for movement of equipment and supplies. 

b. Equipment and supplies are available as required to implement this 

project. 

c. Additional shipping for the transportation of 4,000 troops must be 

made available or an equal number of troops destined for the same theater 

must be deferred. 

d. Troop units are available as required. 

6. Difficultiesto Be Overcome: 

a. In order to execute the project in a minimum of time, it will be necessary to transport, over a period of several months, 15,000 tons of pipeline

material by air to points along the pipeline east of Ledo. 

b. It will be necessary to transport over the line of communicabions from 

Calcutta, over a period of several months, an aggregate of: 

(1) 20,000 tons of four-inch pipeline materia! to Assam. 

(2) 30,000 tonsof six-inch material along the route between Calcutta 

and Assam. 

c. It will be necessary to provide adequate protection to prevent enemy

action from interrupting the construction and operation of the pipdine. 

CONCLUSZONS 

7. a. The project is feasible from an engineering point of view. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

b. The project can be initiated at once and promises considerable and 

early aid to China. 

c. The air delivery of 15,000 tonsof four-inch pipeline material invested 

in the Assam-Kunming pipeline project over a period of several months, 

will be returned in terms of tons of aviation gasoline delivered in Kunming

in the first month of pipeline operation. 

d. The distribution along the Calcutta-Assam line of communications 

of 30,000 tons of six-inch pipeline material over a period of several months 

will increase the capacity of that line of communication by 36,000 tons 

per month. 

e. Without adequate ground protection, it is within the capabilities of 

the Japanese to interrupt the Assam-Kunming section of the pipeline 

project. 

RECOMMENDATION 

8. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the proposed pipeline project. 

149 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

" 

150 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 312/1 21 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA 

Memmandum fromAd Hoc Committee 

The ad hoc Committee appointed by the C.O.S. to examine administrative matters has reviewed C.C.S. 312, and recommended its approval. 

Orders for the construction of these pipelines are included in the draft 

directive to the Supreme Commander Southeast Asia, submitted for approval

of the C.C.S. under C.O.S.(Q) 36.The tentative allocation of shipping has included the movement of these troops. 

GENERAL SIR T. S. 

RIDDELL-WEBSTER 

LT. GENERAL BREHON SOMERVELL 

REAR ADMIRAL 0.C. BADGER 

151 
152 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S 313 and 313/1 

APPRECIATION AND PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 107th Meeting 

C.C.S. 113th Meeting, Item (5) 

1st Citadel Meeting 

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (5) 

C.C.S. 313 circulated, 18August 1943, a covering memorandum and summary of CPS 83 (Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan). 

C.C.S. 313/1 circulated a proposed amendment to paragraph 20 of 

C.C.S. 313. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 113th Meeting, after discussion 

of C.C.S. 313, agreed to defer action on this paper. Final decisions re C.C.S. 313 

are included in the resolutions contained in C.C.S. 319/2 and 319/5. 

153 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 313 18 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPRECIATION AND PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Enclosure is a covering memorandum submitted by the Combined 

Staff Planners in forwarding C.P.S. 83for consideration of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. C.P.S. 83 has been previously circulated and file copies are available 

in the offices of the Secretariat. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

18 August 1943 

ENCLOSURE 

MEMORANDUM 

From: The Combined Staff Planners. 

To : Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

Subject: Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN (C.P.S. 83). 

1. In their 90th Meeting on 20 May 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

“directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an 

outline plan for the defeat of JAPAN, including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation.” 

2. In their 102nd Meeting on 16 July 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

directed the Combined Staff Planners to place an appreciation and plan for the 

war against JAPAN before the Combined Chiefs of Staff during QUADRANT. 

3. Combined planning teams, working in LONDON in June and in WASHINGTON in July, completed C.P.S. 83 on 8 August with the exception of certain 

154 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Tables of Forces which are under preparation and should be completed prior 

to the end of QUADRANT. A summary of C.P.S. 83 is attached. 

4. On the basis of the premises adopted,the Combined Staff Planners consider that the measures set forth as being necessary for the defeat of JAPAN, 

namely, the retention of China as an effective ally, the destruction of Japanese 

sea and air forces, the blockade of JAPAN, and the large scale bombing of the 

Japanese homeland as a preliminary to the possible invasion of JAPAN, are 

sound. 

5. The general lines of advance-through the CENTRAL and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, and possibly in the NORTHWEST PACIFIC by UNITED 

STATES forces; and through the STRAITS OF MALACCA and CHINA SEA by 

British forces, with the development of a line of supplies to CHINA through 

BURMA, are concurred in. 

6. The dates on which operations are to be undertaken, with the consequent prolonged duration, envisages, as set forth by the Planning Team, the 

least favorable conditions to be anticipated. The Planning Teams state that 

conditions less unfavorable will permit the expediting of the contemplated 

operations. 

7. Even on this conditional basis the Combined Staff Planners consider 

that the plan contemplates a war in the PACIFIC so prolonged as to be unacceptable to the UNITED NATIONS. They feel that the situation existing at this 

time is that the Japanese have won the war and that operations which do not 

contemplate the complete nullification of Japanese gains before 1947 will produce the serious hazard that the war against JAPAN will not, in fact, be won 

by the UNITED NATIONS. 

8. THE UNITED NATIONS’ over-all objective, as approved in C.C.S. 242/6 

during the TRIDENT Conference, states:­

“The over-all objective of the UNITED NATIONS is, in conjunction with 

Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the AXIS Powers.” 

9. The Combined Staff Planners feel that the conduct of the war to bring 

about the defeat of JAPAN must be in consonance with the over-all objective, 

as well as with the over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war 

against JAPAN, which reads (C.C.S. 242/6, Paragraphs 1,2 and 3) :­

“1. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about by the 

earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in Europe. 

155 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

“2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with 

the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any 

such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken. 

“3. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other 

PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources 

of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to bring about at the earliest 

possible date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.” 

10. At the present time a great preponderance of the UNITED NATIONS 

Forces is deployed against the AXIS Powers in EUROPE. At the time of the 

defeat of GERMANY large forces will become available for redeployment 

against JAPAN. This redeployment will require a long period of time. During 

this period the will to prosecute the war to the defeat of JAPAN will suffer from 

the stultifying effect caused by long delays in the increase of offensive action 

in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST. 

11. The Combined Staff Planners feel, therefore, that, if we are to comply 

with the approved over-all objective and strategic concept and are to ensure the 

complete defeat of JAPAN, we must contempIate the start of the reorientation 

of forces from four to six months in advance of the prospective date of the 

defeat of GERMANY, adjusting the tempo and scale of the reorientation to the 

progress of the war in Europe, as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

from time to time. 

12. The U.S. Planners feel that our plans and preparations should contemplate the defeat of JAPAN not later than 12 months after the defeat of GERMANY. This timing should itself now be established as a more or less controlling objective with which our efforts,measures, and courses of action should 

conform. If, in the future, the measures set forth in the proposed plan do not 

prospectively provide for this desired rate of progress of the war, other measures should be sought -as, for instance, inducing RUSSIA to enter the war. 

The British Planners, however, while fully conscious of the need to 

shorten the war against Japan and to take all possible measures so to shorten 

it, cannot accept such a target date. In their opinion such acceptance would 

necessitate an entirely new concept of operations involving an assault on the 

Japanese homeland without the preparatory bombing from bases in China 

and/or Formosa which they believe will be required. This course, though 

worthy of consideration nearer the time, is insufficiently certain to provide a 

basis for long term planning. 

156 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

13. The chief value of an over-all plan of this kind is the guidance of action 

now and in the immediate future. Operations now underway in the NORTH, 

CENTRAL, SOUTH, and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, as well as those PACIFIC 

operations set forth in C.C.S. 301, - Specific Operations in the PACIFIC and 

FAR EAST, 1943-1944 -are in conformity with the plan. Operations for the 

seizure of BURMA are in conformity with the plan, but the date that they 

should be undertaken is in dispute. 

14. The U.S.Planners consider that the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC operations, 

through NEW GUINEA, and to the NORTHWEST of NEW GUINEA, provide 

for a line of advance which at this time must be considered concurrent and 

coordinated with the advance in the CENTRAL PACIFIC and in this respect 

do not agree with the plan that these operations should be considered subsidiary in character. 

The British Planners however consider that operations in NEW GUINEA 

will be slow and very expensive in resources. They therefore support the view 

set out in the summary that when we turn to our main PACIFlC effort, through 

the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES, operations in NEW GUINEA should become subsidiary and should only be pursued in so far as they are necessary for 

the success of our main effort. 

15. The U.S. Planners assume that the operations in NORTH BURMA, as 

approved at the TRIDENT Conference -advance from LED0 and IMPHAL, 

and increase of supplies by air to CHINA, and the AKYAB and RAMREE operations -will be firmly carried out in 1943-1944. Beyond these operations the 

plan submitted by the British Members does not contemplate offensive operations from the WEST (other than further operations in NORTH BURMA) 

until March, 1945. In other words, during the period March, 1944, to March, 

1945, the efforts from the WEST to “maintain and extend unremitting pressure 

against JAPAN with the purpose of continually reducing her military power 

and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can 

be forced” would be only those possible to the forces deployed in NORTH 

BURMA. The U.S.Planners feel that a more extensive contribution to the war 

effort is necessary along this line of advance during this period. They feel that 

the support rendered in 1944, even though smaller than could be afforded in 

1945, will give better and more needed support to the PACIFIC THEATER. 

16. The U.S. Planners consider that Course B, the capture of SOUTH 

BURMA, beginning in November, 1944, should be carried out. This operation 

is regarded as necessary not only for the improved line of supplies to CHINA 

through RANGOON, but as a preliminary to the further movement of the ad157 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

vance from the WEST through the STRAIT OF MALACCA. In this they are in 

disagreement with the British Plmners who concur with Course C, the attack 

against SINGAPORE to by-pass SOUTH BURMA, and to be inaugurated in 

March, 1945. 

17. The British Planners feel that the question of whether or not China 

remains in the war will not be decided by the choice between Course B (the 

prior capture of BURMA) and Course C (the prior capture of Singapore) since 

China’s darkest hours will be in the early half of 1944,before Germany is defeated. Thereafter, the obvious weight of tie United Nations offensive against 

Japan in general and the prospect of an early opening of the sea route in particular will do more to sustain morale than the arrival of limited additional 

material through Burma, always provided supply by the air route continues 

at the maximum. 

18. The British Planners feel strongly that the recapture of SOUTHERN 

BURMA and RANGOON would be a small strategic gain for the expenditure of 

great effort. At best it would:­

a. Produce limited pressure on Japanese land and air forces for two dry 

seasons with little attrition during the intervening wet seasons. 

b. Open the Burma Road. As this cannot in any case be in full operation 

before some time in 1946,whether we go for RANGOON or SINGAPORE first, 

the results are long term. In the unlikely event of the Japanese in the meantime occupying KUNMING, all our efforts in BURMA would be nullified. 

19. On the other hand, the British Planners feel that the recapture of 

SINGAPORE before RANGOON is a full and correct application of sea and air 

power. It will electrify the Eastern world and have an immense psychological 

effect on the Japanese. It will threaten the Japanese communications to THAILAND and so to BURMA, enable direct attack to be brought to bear on the 

Dutch oilfields, and in fact flank and undermine the whole Japanese defense 

structure in SOUTHEAST ASIA. It provides a base for the great naval and air 

forces available for deployment against Japan from the West. Above all, it provides for an advence complementary to that being undertaken by the U.S.A. 

from the East, and converging upon the sxme objectives, i.e., the capture of 

HONG KONG or FORMOSA and the control of the SOUTH CHINA SEA. It thus 

accelerates the opening of a sea supply route to CHINA. Operations against 

SINGAPORE will, moreover, provoke intense Japanese reactioxi to preserve 

the material gains of the Japanese Empire in the West as opposed to its strategical position and gains in the East, thereby rplieving Japanese pressure on 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

CHINA and stretching Japanese ability to resist the Eastern advance possibly 

to the limit. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

20. To summarize. it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

should take the following action:-

RECOMMENDATIONS BY 

US. PLANNERS 

(a) Approve the general objectives and the general lines of advance 

set forth in the plan, as a basis for 

planning and preparation. 

(b) Disapprove, as unacceptable 

those aspects of the plan which contemplate a prolonged war lasting

into 1947 or 1948. 

(c) Direct that plans and preparations for the defeat of Japan shall 

have as their objective the accomplishment of this defeat not later than 

12 months after the defeat of Germany. 

(d) Approve, in principle, the inauguration of reorientation of forces 

from the EUROPEAN THEATER to 

the PACIFIC and FAR EAST THEATERS from four to six months in advance of the prospective date of the 

defeat of GERMANY, the scope and 

timing of reorientation to be adjusted 

to the requirements of the EUROPEAN THEATER, as determined by 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff from 

time to time. 

(e) Recognize that the deployment of forces and the operations to 

RECOMMENDATIONS BY 

BRITISH PLANNERS 

(a) Agreed. 

(b) Agreed. 

(c) Direct that intensified study 

of ways and means for shortening the 

war should be undertaken at every 

stage; and that theater commanders 

should be so instructed. 

(d) Agreed. 

(e) Agreed. 

159 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

RECOMMENDATIONS BY 

U.S. PLANNERS 

be undertaken in the war against 

Japan must be in accord with the 

over-all objective and strategic concept defined in C.C.S. 24216, Sections 

I and 11. 

(f) Re-affirm the TRIDENT decision that approved operations in 

North Burma and against Akyab and 

Ramree will be executed during the 

coming dry season. 

(9) &-affirm the TRIDENT decision to undertake such measures as 

may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of China 

as an effective ally and as a base for 

operations against Japan. 

(h) Direct the maximum possible 

expansion of the air supply route into 

China. 

ti) Approve the Pacific operations as accepted in the final version 

of C.C.S. 301. 

(j) Make a decision at this time 

as to operations to be undertaken in 

the west (South Burma or toward 

Singapore) in 1944. 

(k) Agree that the forces to carry 

out the operations from the East, inRECOMMENDATIONS BY 

BRITISH PLANNERS 

(f) The British Planners consider 

that the form of this decision must 

await the outcome of discussion on 

C.C.S. 301. 

(h) Agreed. 

(i) Agreed. 

(j) Approve planning and preparations for the start of operations for 

the capture of Singapore with a target date of 1945,followed by the recapture or re-occupation of Southern 

Burma during the season 1945-46. 

This decision to be reviewed in the 

spring of 1944in the light of the then 

existing German situation. 

(k) Agree that the forces to carry 

out the operations from the East, in160 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

RECOMMENDATIONS BY 

US.PLANNERS 

cluding Southwest Pacific, will be 

provided by the U.S.,Australia and 

New Zealand; operations to be carried out from the west t~ be with 

forces provided by Great Britain, except that special types not available 

to Great Britain will be added by 

the U.S. 

RECOMMENDATIONS BY 

BRITISH PLANNERS 

cluding Southwest Pacific, will be 

provided by U.S.operationsto be carried out from the west to be with 

forces provided by Great Britain, except that special types not available 

to Great Britain will be added by the 

U.S.The employment of Dominion 

forces will be a matter for discussion 

between all the Governments concerned. 

161 
U,S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX 

SUMMARY OF APPRECIATION AND OUTLINE PLAN 

FOR THEDEFEAT OF JAPAN 

1. The following iS a summary of C.P.S. 83 (Appreciation and Plan for the 

Defeat of Japan). We have based the outline plan that follows on our best 

evaluation of what may have to be undertaken. 

2. We have assumed that Japanese resistance will be continuously stubborn, and have taken no credit for a decline in the morale of the Japanese 

people or fighting services. Nevertheless we do not believe that it will be necessary to carry out the whole program of operations in order to defeat them. Even 

if Japanese morale remains high, at some point the continuous process of 

weakening the enemy’s forces and reducing his war potential will cause a rapid 

decline in his ability to fight and a consequent acceleration of our advance. 

Since it is impossible to forecast the stage of the operations at which this critical point will be reached, we have throughout endeavored to make the plan 

sufficiently flexible to permit of considerable acceleration at any stage. 

BASIC CONCLUSIONS 

3. We summarize below the basic conclusions of our appreciation: 

4. To achieve the ultimate defeat of Japan we must destroy her capacity 

to resist and this may well involve the invasion of Japan. 

5. The security of the Japanese position in the Pacific depends primarily 

on the Japanese Fleet and Air Forces. We must therefore destroy them as soon 

as we can. 

6. Heavy and sustained air bombardment of Japan proper should cripple 

the Japanese war industry and destroy her ability to continue her main war 

effort.It might cause the surrender we demand but we cannot rely on this. In 

any case, air bombardment of this nature is probably an essential prelude to 

bring about the defeat of Japan. 

7. To bring about the sustained air offensive against Japan we shall almost 

certainly require the use of China and/or Formosa as the bases for our longrange bombardment. These two areas will also go a long way towards meeting 

our requirementsfor mounting invasion forces. We shall require Chineseassistance in seizing and holding the area in China required for our air bases. 

Appendix 

162 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISFl MOST SECRET 

8. To secure and develop airfields on the mainland of China, it will be 

necessary to acquire ports in China. So far as we can see, Hong Kong will be 

the most suitable port to open initially. 

9. We therefore require a sea route to China and/or Formosa and the 

interruption of the enemy’s lines of communication thereto. This will entail 

control of the South Japan and South China Seas. 

The best route of advance from the East lies through the Mandated 

Islands, and then either through the Celebes and Sulu Seasor north of Luzon. 

The best route of advance from the West lies through the straits of 

Malacca. 

10. In reaching these conclusions we have been guided by certain principles, 

which in turn should be applied throughout the execution of the plan: 

a. We should attack Japan along asmany linesof advance as are profitable, in order to make use of our superior forces and to extend the enemy 

defense. 

b. Every possible means of taking short cuts to our objectives should be 

adopted. The superior forces, particularly Air Forces, available to us and 

the opport-mities for surprise should enable large and bold steps to be 

taken without unacceptable risk. 

c. Shortage of bases will initially restrict our possible lines of advance. 

We should therefore take the fist opportunity of securing additional bases 

from which to deploy our superior strength. 

d. Our strength, particularly in the air,should be concentrated against 

Japan’s weaknesses, which lie in her shortage of aircraft, warships, shipping 

and oil. 

Conversely extensive campaigns against Japanese land forces in 

difficult country, where we cannot use our own forces to the best advantage, 

should be avoided until they have been weakened by lack of supplies and 

support from the Japanese navy and air forces. 

Whenever possible, we should, in fact, aim at leaving Japanese land 

forces in possession of outlying territory, in order that they may continue 

to be a liability to Japanese shipping, air and naval forces. 

Appendix 

163 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

e. Wherever practicable, direct attacks on our objectives should be aided, 

and if possible preceded, by attack against Japanese communications leading to them. The extremely extended nature of their communications, 

together with the notorious inability of the Japanese to deal with the unexpected, are likely to render such methods very profitable. 

f. Since shipping is unlikely to be a limiting factor after the defeat of 

Germany,our lines of advance need not necessarily be selected so as to take 

the shortest route from the U.S. or U.K.to our ultimate objective,but rather 

the one most easily established and protected. 

g. We should devise every possible means of exploiting to the full, the 

vast technical and numerical air superiority which we shall enjoy over the 

Japanese after the defeat of Germany. 

h. Whilst recognizing that every effort must be made to retain China in 

the war and to develop her bases and land forces, our plans should retain 

the necessary flexibility to enable our program against the Japanese to be 

continued if China should drop out of the war or prove less effective than 

we now hope. 

i. Whilst being prepared to achieve our aimswithout Russian assistance, 

our plans should nevertheless retain the necessary flexibility to exploit the 

situation fully if Russia should join in the war at any stage. 

j. We cannot forecast the date at which Germany will be defeated. To 

minimize the delay in turning the full weight of our offensive against Japan 

after the defeat of Germany, the bases from which our initial advances are 

to be launched should be developed as soon as possible and plans for reorganization and redeployment made without delay. 

GENERAL CONCEPT OF THE WAR 

11. Applying these principles to the basic conclusions set out above, the 

general concept of the war which emerges is as follows: 

FIRST PHASE-ACTION PRIOR TO CAPTURE OF A PORT IN CHINA 

AND/OR FORMOSA 

12. In the Srwt, our main effort should be through the Mandated Islands. 

Until we are ready to launch this main effort, we should maintain increasing 

pressure on the Japanese by means of offensive operations in the SolomonsAppendix 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

New Guinea area and in the Aleutians. When we turn to our main effort these 

latter operations should become subsidiary, and should only be undertaken 

insofar as they are necessary for the success of our main effort. 

Having completed our advance through the Mandated Islands, we should 

then proceed either to the South Philippines or to the north of them. Our choice 

should be made in the light of whichever course will most quickly achieve our 

object of reaching the China Coast and/or capturing Formosa. 

13. Zn the West, we should maintain China and build up our air forces there 

by stepping up the air supply route from Assam and by operations to clear 

Northern Burma, thus permitting the opening of a land route to China. 

Meanwhile we should make preparations in India for the launching of 

the major campaigns to recapture the whole of Burma and to break into the 

Japanese perimeter from the west by the recapture of Singapore. 

Once that has been accomplished we should make our way through the 

South China Sea towards the coast of China and Formosa. 

COORDZNATZON 

14. To integrate our advances from the West and the East, the timing of 

the various operations should, if possible, be so arranged that they afford one 

another the maximum amount of mutual assistance at each stage. 

15. For our advance from the East, a very large fleet, but comparatively 

small land and shore-based air forces will be necessary, and therefore comparatively little shipping, until we have completed our advance through the 

Mandates, when our ground and land-based air forces may well be of a very 

large order. 

Our advance from the West, on the other hand, will require large land 

and air forces and much shipping, but probably a considerably smaller fleet 

than in the case of our advance from the East. 

16. Our advance from the east should provide opportunities for bringing 

the Japanese fleet to action in favorable circumstances. It will enable us to 

threaten and strike at Japan herself, and, in conjunction with air forces from 

China, to strike at the focal point of the Japanese sea communications in the 

Yellow Sea-Formosa areas. This will greatly assist our advances from the west 

by forcing the Japanese fleet and air forces on to the defensive in their Home 

Appendix 

165 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

area and by enabling our forces in the east to strike at the Japanese communications leading to the objectives of our advance from the west. 

17. In executing our advance from the west, and after completing the capture of North Burma, (Course A), two courses of action remain open to us in 

the west. 

Course B-(Recapture of South Burma followed by recapture of 

Singapore) probably offers the best chance of maintaining China in the 

war by insuring that the overland supply route is developed as early as 

possible and with the greatest reliability. On the other hand, the delay in 

the recapture of Singapore is likely to mean that our advance to open the 

sea route to China would have to be undertaken from the east alone, and 

would receive little aid from the west. 

Course C -(Recapture of Singapore, followed by recapture of South 

Burma) would enable a much greater degree of coordination and mutual 

assistance to be achieved in the later stages of our two advances since we 

should expect to reach Singapore and advance therefrom a year earlier. It 

would stretch Japanese resources over a wide area and would enable the 

British Fleet to operate off the China coast. Our land and air forces could 

also be moved up the South China Sea along routes far removed from the 

main enemy naval strength in Japan. 

On the other hand, we should run the risk of delaying the development 

of the overland routes to China, although there would be no appreciable delay 

if all operations go according to plan. 

18. Irrespective of whether the advance from the east or the west approaches 

China first, it is unlikely that we shall be able to capture Shanghai direct. In 

conjunctionwith shore-based air support from China, and Chinese land forces, 

we might, however, be able to undertake a direct assault on Hong Kong, subsequently taking Formosa. 

If the capture of Hong Kong is impracticable, we should endeavor to 

seize Formosa first, or, if this too is impracticable, Luzon. 

If neither of these can be seized direct, we should assault Hainan and if 

possible one of the Ryukyus. 

If the above are impracticable we should continue operations against 

the South Philippines and complete our control of the Celebes and Sulu Seas, 

Appendix 

165 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

subsequently carrying out our program to capture a port in China and/or 

Formosa. 

SECOND PHASE -ACTION SUBSEQUENT TO THE CAPTURE OF A 

PORT IN CHINA AND/OR THE CAPTURE OF FORMOSA 

19. This phase will involve overland and amphibious operationsin China and 

direct air and naval action to weaken Japanese capacity to resist. It will 

probably culminate in the invasion of Japan. 

20. If we are established in Hong Kong before Formosa has been captured, 

we shall be in a position to build up the necessary land forces in China, secure 

the air bases most accessible from Hong Kong, and start the bombing of Japan 

at long range. 

If,on the other hand, we capture Formosa before Hong Kong, or find that. 

the Chinese assistance on the mainland is disappointing,the bombing of Japan 

can start from Formosa. 

21. It is possible that, with the assistance of sea-borne air forces, Japan 

may be sufficiently weakened to enable us to invade her when our bomber 

offensive has been developed from either Formosa, or the area most accessible 

from Hong Kong. 

On the other hand, to bomb Japan effectively we may have to move 

further northwards from Hong Kong in order to use the area up to the line 

Wenchow-Nanchang-Changsha, 

From the invasion point of view, we may possibly have to secure the 

Shanghai area, and if this is the case, we should be well placed from our positions in Hong Kong and Formosa to undertake such an advance both overland and coastwise. 

22. If Chinese assistance proves to be effective, our main effort will probably 

be made overland. If, on the other hand, it is disappointing, our main effort 

would be concentrated in amphibious operations along the China coast as far 

northwards as necessary. 

Appendix 

167 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SUBSIDIARY AND ALTERNATIVE LINES OF ADVANCE 

23. Meanwhile, subject to the requirements of our main advance, we should: 

(i) undertake subsidiary operations along the Malay Barrier to bring 

increased pressure to bear on the Japanese; 

(ii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of the Northern Kuriles and 

the reinforcement of Petropavlovsk, in order to secure a sea route to Russia 

in the event of her entering the war; 

(iii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of Hokkaido should the 

opportunity arise for assisting our bombing or undertaking our invasion of 

Japan from this direction,possibly in conjunctionwith Russian action from 

the Maritime Provinces, Sakhalin or Petropavlovsk. 

OUTLINE PLAN 

24. Based on our appreciation, we indicate below an outline plan for operations against Japan: -

ACTION IN THE WEST ACTION IN THE EAST 

Serial 1 -Up to November 1943 

Development of air routes to China. Offensive operations against 

Solomons and New Guinea. 

Holding operationsin North Burma Offensive operationsagainst 

and China. the Aleutians. 

Serial 2 -November 1943 to May 1944 

offensiveoperationsin Northern 

Burma and on Arakan coast. 

Developing Northern routes leading 

to China. 

Offensive operations against 

Gilberts and Marshalls. 

Subsidiary operations in Solomons 

and New Guinea and air operations from the Aleutians. 

Appendix 

168 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Serial 3 -June 1944 to November 1944 

Holding operationsin Burma. Offensive operations against 

Carolines. 

Subsidiary operations in 

New Guinea area. 

Serial 4 -November 1944 to May 1945 

Course B Course C 

(Favored by US.) (Favored by British) 

Offensiveoperations Offensive operations Offensive operations against 

in North Burma in North Burma. the Pelews and possibly 

and capture of Offensive Operations Marianas. 

Rangoon. against Northern Subsidiary operations in 

Sumatra and Malaya. the New Guinea area. 

Commence offensive operations against South 

Philippines.** 

Serial 5 -June 1945 to November 1945 

Holding Holding Con- -OR Offensive 

operations operations tinue ofin Bum. in North 

Burma. 

Continue 

offensive 

operations 

in Malaya 

and against 

Japanese 

communications to 

Burma. 

operaf ensive op- tions 

erations against

against the Luzon, 

South Formosa 

Philippines. or 

RYkyuS. 

* * If conditions are favorable, it may prove possible to by-pass this objective. 

Appendix 

169 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISEI MOST SECRET 

Sericl 6 -November 1945 to May 1946 

Complete 

offensive 

operations 

t~ clear 

Burma. 

Offensive 

operations 

against

N. Sumatra 

and Malaya. 

Offensive 

operations 

against 

North 

Burma and 

Rangoon,

sub=­

quently 

clearing the 

whole of 

Burma. 

Oflensive 

operations 

against 

Camranh 

Bay.** 

Serial 7 -During 

Con- -OR Launch oftinue of - fensive 

sive opera- operations 

tions against

South Hong 

Philippines. Kong or 

Formosa 

(if not 

already 

captured). 

the remainder of 1946 

Complete capture of Launch offensive opera- OR Establish the 

Malaya. tions against Luzon, strategic bombing 

Formosa,Hong Kong, force in China and/ 

Hainan and/or or Formosa. 

Ryukyus from East 

and West. 

Serial 8 -From 1947 onwards 

Establish the strategic bombing force in China and/or Formosa. 

Bomb Japan. 

Invade Japan. 

** If conditionsare favorable, it may prove possible to by-pass these objectives. 

Appendix

170 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 31311 20 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

APPRECIATION AND PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

Memorandum fromthe United States Chiefsof Stag 

The US.Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of paragraph 20 of C.C.S. 

313 as amended below: 

“20. To summarize, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

should take the following action:­

a. Approve the general objectives as a basis for planning and preparation. 

b. Direct examination of lines of advance, including a study of the 

feasibility and desirability of operations through the Moulmein area or Kra 

Peninsula in the direction of Bangkok with the object of isolating Rengoon 

and facilitating the capture of Singapore. 

c. Disapprove, as unacceptable, those aspects of the plan which contemplate a prolonged war lasting into 1947 or 1948. 

d. Direct that plans and preparations for the defeat of Japan shall have 

as their objective the accomplishment of this defeat not later than 12 

months after the defeat of Germany. 

e. Approve,in principle, the inauguration of reorientation of forces from 

the EUROPEAN THEATER to the PACIFIC and FAR EAST THEATERS 

from four to six months in advance of the prospective date of the defeat of 

GERMANY, the scope and timing of reorientation to be djusted to the 

requirements of the EUROPEAN THEATER, as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time. 

f. Recognize that the deployment of forces and the operations to be 

undertaken in the war against Japan must be in accord with the over-all 

objective and strategic concept defined in C.C.S. 24216, Sections I and 11. 

171 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

g. Reaffirm the TRIDENT decision that approved operations in North 

Burma and against Akyab and Ramree will be executed during the coming 

dry season. 

h. Reaffirm the TRIDENT decision to undertake such measures as may 

be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an 

effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan. 

i. Direct the maximum possible expansion of the air supply route into 

China. 

j. Approve the Pacific operations as accepted in the Anal version of 

C.C.S. 301. 

k. Approve planning for the start of operationsagainst Southern Burma 

and/or the Malaya Peninsula with a target date of 1944; these plans to be 

revised at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

1. Agree that the forces to carry out the operationsfrom the East, including Southwest PaciAc,will be provided by U.S.;operationsto be carried out 

from the west to be with forces provided by Great Britain, except that 

special types not available to Great Britain will be added by the U.S.The 

employment of Dominion forces will be a matter for discussion between all 

the Governmentsconcerned.” 

172 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 314 and 31413 

ALLOCATION OF LANDING CRAFT 

(Operation OVERLORD -Vehicle Lift) 

References: 

C.C.S. 111th Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.S. 112th Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.S. 314 was circulated, 18 August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In their 112th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

agreed with the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff that the possibility of 

arranging an increase in the number of LCT(6) available for OVERLORD from 

American sources should be explored. 

Following the above action, a memorandum by the U.S.Chief of Staff 

(C.C.S.’314/3,20 August) referred to C.C.S. 286, which was a memorandum by 

the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff and which presented a proposed program for movement of U.S. landing ships and craft to the United 

Kingdom for operation OVERLORD, and replied to C.C.S. 314. 

173 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 314 18 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ALLOCATION OF LANDING CRAFT 

(Operation OVERLORD -Vehicle Lift) 

Memorandum Q the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We have been examining the landing craft position for operation OVERLORD. It appears .probable that there will be a shortage of vehicle lift of 870 

vehicles, or 13 per cent of the total lift, compared with the calculations made 

at TRIDENT. This shortage is made up as follows: 

LCT (3 or 4) -57 

LcT (5) -15 

2. The reasons for this shortage are as follows: 

a. 164 LCG(M) which it was hoped to build in the United Kingdom, will 

not be ready in time. In order to compensate to some extent for this and 

in order to provide supportingfire for the U.S. assaults, it has been necessary 

to convert 43 LCT (3 and 4) to LCT(R) or LCG(L). 

b. In the TRIDENT calculations it was assumed that the 44 LCT (4 

and 5) employed in close mobile net protection duties with the Fleet at 

Scapa Flow, would all be available for OVERLORD. Recent developments in 

anti-ship weapons make it impossible to dispense wtth this type of protection. Every effort is being made to substitute other types of craft and 15 

LCT's have been released. The Admiralty are going to try and release more, 

but at present they must retain 14 LCT(4) and 15 LCT(5). 

3. Under the TRIDENT decisions, 18 LCTs were to be brought back from 

the Mediterranean for OVERLORD. It will be necessary for these to sail before 

bad weather starts in the Bay of Biscay. Admiral Cunningham has been asked 

whether these craft are taking part in AVALANCHE and when they can be 

released. The importance of ensuring their passage home has been emphasized. 

Owing to the casualties in HUSKY having been less than expected, we may 

114 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

get more back from this source, which would help us reduce the deficit. But 

we cannot count on this yet. 

4. We have studied various methods by which the shortage in lift for 

OVERLORD could be wiped out. It seems that the only practicable method 

would be to arrange by some means an increase in the number of LCT(6) 

available for OVERLORD from American sources. The British Chiefs of StaR 

ask that the possibility of this should be explored. 

175 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 31411 and 31412 

ALLOCATION OF 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT -AMERICAN PRODUCTION 

References: 

C.C.S. 111th Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.S. 112th Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.S. 31411 was circulated, 18 August 1943, and a memorandum by the 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff in reply was circulated 19 August (C.C.S. 31412). 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 112th Meeting, considered C.C.S. 

31411 and 31412 and amended and approved paragraph 3 b of C.C.S. 31411. 

177 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S.314/1 18 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ALLOCATION OF 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT-AMERICAN PRODUCTION 

Note by the Secretaries 

In order to save delay, the enclosure prepared by the Chief of Combined 

Operations, in consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, is presented 

direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

178 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE 

AUOCATION OF 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT -AMERICAN PRODUCTION 

(Memorandum by British Chiefsof Stan) 

1. It will be remembered that in April 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

agreed (C.C.S. 105/4) that future allocations of additional landing craft from 

U.S.production to the United Kingdom, as could be made available and as 

would be needed for specific employment and specifically projected operations, 

be accomplished by arrangement between the United States and British Naval 

Staffs,and formally processed through the Munitions Assignments Committee, 

Navy, subject to the approval of the Munitions Assignments Board in 

Washington. 

2. No specific operations for the War against Germany, after OVERLORD, 

have yet been decided upon. For the War against Japan, it is hoped that decisions will shortly be taken on the scope and extent of British participation. In 

order to prepare the British Assault Fleet and to estimate British manning 

commitments for 1944/45, the British Chiefs of Staff wish to formulate their 

programme without waiting for specific operational decisions. 

3. We,therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should 

agree : 

a. To modify the policy previously accepted. 

b. That the British should now work out and submit requests for a share 

of U.S.production in 1944-45. 

179 
180 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 31412 19 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ALLOCATION OF 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT-AMERICAN PRODUCTION 

Memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Stafl 

The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposals presented by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 314/1. They feel that the 

provision of landing craft still constitutes a bottleneck in the conduct of 

military operations and will continue to do so for some time. At present there 

is no likelihood of a reserve in landing craft being created. 

The whole subject of the allocation of landing craft is being explored 

by the Combined Staff Planners. However, the United States Chiefs of Staff 

feel the landing craft must continue to be allocated as necessary to meet the 

needs of specific operations. 

181 
182 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 31413 20 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ALLOCATION OF LANDING CRAFT 

(Operation OVERLORD -Vehicle Lift) 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff 

1. We have noted the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 

314) concerning the shortage of vehicle lift for OVERLORD and the necessity 

of additional landing craft therefor; Viz., 57 LCT(3 or 4)’s and 15 LCT(5)’s. 

Consideration has also been given to the British proposals contained in 

C.C.S. 286. 

2. We have examined the possibility of providing additional LCT(6)’sfrom 

US.sources and find that our own LCT deliveries to fulfill the TRIDENT U.S. 

commitment for OVERLORD cannot be accomplished as early as desired and 

that it is impossible to increase the number of the LCT’s so committed; viz., 

146, of which 41, at least, must come from the Mediterranean. 

3. Studies are under way which it is hoped will effect an increase in the 

rate of U.S.landing craft production. However, the result of these studies at 

the present time indicates that such an acceleration cannot be felt before 

April 1944. 

4. In view of this, the deficiencies in OVERLORD will have to be made good 

from the Mediterranean and these movements will, of course, in the case of 

LCT’s, have to be adjusted to weather conditions. 

5. It is suggested that every effort be made to put all the LCT(5)’s now 

in the U.K. in an operating condition and employ them in OVERLORD as a 

means to improve the situation. 

183 
184 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITJSH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 315 and 31512 

“HABBAKUKS” 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 112th Meeting, Item (3) 

C.C.S. 315 was circulated, 18 August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. C.C.S. 31511, a memorandum by the United States Chiefs 

of Staff, was circulated 19 August. 

In their 112th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered these 

two papers, took note of paragraphs a,b and c, C.C.S. 31511, and agreed to an 

addendum to be incorporated as paragraph (1. 

Resolutions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject were circulated as C.C.S. 31512. 

185 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 315 18 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

“HABBAK UKS’ 

Note bg the Secretaries 

Inorder to save delay, the enclosure,prepared by the Chief of Combined 

Operations, in consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, is presented 

direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

“HABBAKUKS’ 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We are impressed with the possibilities of constructing “floating airfields" as a type of aircraft carrier, and we are of the opinion that research 

and design have now reached a stage when we should proceed with the production of certain types. A Technical Note is given in Annex I. 

2. Three types of vessel have been designed on paper by naval architects: 

HABBAKUK I 

3. A vessel made of wood was designed in the hope that it could be ready

in 1944 and would not use much strategic material. This, we have learned is 

not the case, as there is a shortage of timber. Consequently in view of the 

limited requirement for this type, it has been decided not to proceed with it. 

HABBAKUK II 

4. This vessel could be made of steel but would require about 150,000 tons 

per vessel as well as a great deal of shipyard space and skilled labor. Alterna186 
U. S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

tively, it could be made of pykrete (frozen pulp and water), but the feasibility 

of this depends on the completion of full-scale tests during the winter 1943-44. 

These experiments have been in progress in England and Canada since 

December 1942. Tie proposed design has a speed of about seven knots; is selfpropelled; and has a length of 1,700-2,200 feet; the beam would be suflkient 

to operate and park medium bombers and transport aircraft and, if assisted 

take off could be employed, heavy bombers. If orders for the above full-scale 

tests are given immediately, and if these are successful, the first pykrete 

HABBAKUK might be operational by the middle of 1945, but there are a large 

number of constructional and operational problems to be overcome. 

HABBAKUK III 

5. Thiswould be a smaller and faster type made of steel; about 70,000 tons 

per vessel; speed 12 knots; self-propelled; length 1,000-1,200 feet; beam suf& 

cient to operate fighters, naval aircraft and light twin engine bombers. If a 

definite order is given in the near future, and if the material can be made 

available, the first could be operational by the spring of 1945. The construction 

of this type would, however, conflict with other ship construction, e.g. escort 

carriers. 

6. Arrester gear will be necessary on all types and the employment of 

assisted take-off methods would be of great value. 

7. In the war against Japan, we see considerable possibilities in Qpes I1 

and 111,particularly the latter. They could not, of course, in any way fulfill the 

functionsof an aircraft carrier operating with the fleet, but there are a number 

of other ways, details of which are described in Annex 11 in which we think 

they would be of great value. Indeed, we feel that after a certain number of 

escort carriers have been constructed, it would probably be better to build a 

few of these HABBAKUKS rather than devote all our efforts to further escort 

carriers. (Seeparagraphs 40 and 41 of Annex 11.) 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

8. We suggest that we should now take steps as follows: 

a. To construct at least two HABBAKUKS III, which is the more promising type for use both in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean; 

b. To continue experiments and construct during the coming winter 

sections of pykrete for HABBAKUK Il's for experimental purposes. Subject 

to success in this, we should construct B number of HABBAKUK XI'S in 

pykrete during the following winter for use in the Pacific. 

187 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECREI’ 

9. We cannot undertake construction in the United Kingdom because 

neither labor nor the material can be made available. If, therefore, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree in principle with our proposals, we suggest that 

they should invite the appropriate United States and Canadian authorities 

to set up a board forthwith to press on with this matter. We shall be glad to 

place British experts at the disposal of both. 

ANNEX I 

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS* 

Operational requirements fix types of design possible for large floating

air bases. 

1. The basic requirement is to maintain a flying platform of length 1,000­

1,500feet for fighters and naval aircraft, 2,000-6,000feet for bombers with a 

width of 200-300feet and at a height of 40-50feet above water. 

2. The most satisfactory methods of doing this are: 

a. Flying deck supported over full width by hull as in existing carriers 

with a limited extension at sides to give a wider flying deck. The large quantities of steel required limit the size of the vessel to that of fighter carriers. 

A design has been prepared for such a vessel, HABBAKUK IZZD: Length 

1,200feet, beam of hull 130feet, width of flight deck 200 feet, freeboard 50 

feet, draft 35 feet, speed 12-15knots. 

b. For larger vessels the use of a cheap light and abundant material is 

indicated.Such material has been evolved by research undertaken in Canada and England during the past year. It consists of a mixture of wood pulp 

(8-14%) and water, frozen and cooled to a temperature of five degrees 

Fahrenheit. It is known asPykrete and its mechanical properties are similar 

to wood. 

A vessel, HABBAKUK ZI, has been designed using this material. Its 

dimensions are 2,000feet, length beam 300 feet, freeboard 50 feet, draft 150 

feet, speed 7 knots. The massive construction, with 40-foot thickness of 

* A fuller treatment of the technical problems with descriptions of the types

of vessels proposed and the properties of Pykrete has been prepared and is 

available on application to the Joint Staff Secretariat. 

188 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

pykrete for strength and protection at top, sides, and bottom, necessitates 

the deep draft. The labor and material required, except for propulsive 

machinery, would be taken from general construction and not from shipbuilding. 

3. New problems of construction and operation arise from the very large 

size of the vessels. 

The designs proposed seem to meet the requirements of hydrostatic 

stability and resistance to the largest Ocean waves. 

Propulsion power requirements range from 12,000-25,000h.p. in HABBAKUK I11 to 50,000h.p. in HABBAKUK II. The propulsion of HABBAKUK 

II is to be by a series of outboard nacelles driven from central power units. 

Navigation is not required for narrow waters and little maneuvering 

is needed, but special steering devices: rudders on bows, outboard floats and 

nacelles, athwart turning nacelles, etc. are being devised and will be tested. 

Anchoring will rarely be needed and will only be to moorings. 

4. The vessels are liable to heavy attack and in addition to active defense 

-A.A. fire. fighters and escorts -are designed to minimize effects of bombs 

and torpedoes. 

HABBAKUK IUD has been designed to resist torpedo attack by a large 

degree of subdivision and possibly by special devices. It contains a hangar 600 

x 100 feet, protected by a bomb-proof deck, and similar protection is afforded 

to the engines. 

HABBAKUK II is fireproof, but a certain fire danger exists for HABBAKUK 111, slightly less than for an ordinary ship. 

5. HABBAKUK ZI can be made only in deep fjords, but suitable sitescorner Brook, Newfoundland, and Valdez, Alaska-on the east and west 

coasts of America have been surveyed. Many other sites would be available if 

artificial refrigeration was used. 

HABBAKUK IIID can be made in a large dock 130 x 1,300 feet. 

6. Repairs for HABBAKUK III can be carried out in a dock adapted for 

the purpose. HABBAKUK II can only be repaired afloat. 

7. HABBAKUK III could operate in anything but shoal, narrow or dangerous waters on account of their moderate draught and poor maneuverability. 

189 
u.s.SECRET 

mISH MOST SECRET 

HABBAKUK II is only suitable for deep sea work, but can approach the shore 

in most of the Pacific and Mediterranean. Its refrigerating system has been 

designed for maintenance in tropical waters. 

SUMMARY 

8. The principal problems of construction of large floating bases are those 

directly connected with the large size of the vessel, determined by the size of 

the flying platform it supports. Large size implies either the use of very large 

quantities of steel or the use of unconventional but cheap and abundant materials, such as wood and ice for construction. It also implies changes from 

conventional design of the vessel and of its propulsive machinery. A whole set of 

other problems arise in regard to the navigation and range of these bases. All 

these problems are serious, but none seem out of range of solution in the near 

future, as means of solving them by calculation or the use of models are to 

hand in most cases, while in the remainder, experimental sections of the 

vessels will give the answer. It may turn out that when these tests are made, 

some of the designs put forward at this present stage will be found to be impracticable or relatively uneconomic, whilst in the course of the investigation 

new and better methods not hitherto discussed may emerge. 

ANNEX II 

REQUIREMENTS OF HABBAKUKS FOR WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Requirement for Aircraft Carriers of all sorts 

1. Our projected plans for the defeat of Japan involve a series of amphibious assaults and it is obviously essential to speed this process up to the 

greatest possible extent. Two ways of doing this are: 

a. To increase the size of the stops of our amphibious advances, the 

main limiting factor of which is the effective range of shore-based air 

support. 

b. To accelerate the bombing of Japan by the use of ship-borne aircraft, 

which must necessarily be undertaken at very long range and will for some 

years be on a light scale only. 

2. The extent to which these two measures can be achieved depends almost 

entirelyon the number and efficiency of the zkcraft carriers of all sorts that we 

can provide. Aircraft and air personnel we shall have in abundance after Ger190 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

many has been defeated, but air bases sufficiently close to enable our vast air 

resources to be impacted against the enemy will be severely limited. 

3. Any increase in numbers or efficiency of our aircraft carriers will therefore have a direct effect on the time taken to defeat Japan. 

FUNCTIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 

4. The functions which are required to be undertaken by aircraft carriers 

of various sorts are as follows: 

a. To destroy the Japanese Fleet, and provide cover for our operations

and communications. 

b. To carry out raids on Japanese back areas and in particular shipping, 

bases, sources of raw materials and industries in Japan. 

c. As escorts for our convoys to protect them against attacks of all sorts, 

particularly by aircraft. 

d. To provide fighter and tactical bomber support in amphibious operations. 

e. To enable long-range amphibious operations to be supported by air 

borne troops flown from reasonably short distances, so that they are not 

unduly fatigued before being dropped. 

f. To augment or extend our shore-based aircraft in support of defensive operations, such as the holding of small island bases after they

have been captured. 

g. The supply of Naval and fighter aircraft to the battle area, the aircraft carriers acting either as staging points or as ferries. 

ATTRITION FOR PERFORMING REQUIRED FUNCTIONS 

5. To perform the above functions each type of aircraft carrier required

in a varying degree: 

a. Ability to fly aircraft on and off. 

b. Strategic mobility. 

c. Protection from enemy attack. 

191 
U.S. SECRET 

BRlTISH MOST SECRET 

These requirements are provided for by the three attributes, speed and 

size and invulnerability in varying combinations according to the function 

to be fulfilled. 

6. It is the combination of speed and size which gives them the ability to 

fiy aircraft on and off. In the case of the Fleet Carrier, its high speed enables 

it to be comparatively small. At the other end of the scale the stationary or 

very slow HABBAKUK I, because of its lack of speed, will require vast size to 

enable aircraft to fly on and off. 

7. It is speed which, of course, determines the degree of strategic mobility 

provided. In the case of the Fleet Carrier, it is very great. In the case of the 

HABBAKUL it will be very small, and if the direction of the wind is unfavorable, strategic mobility may be almost lost altogether unless the operation of 

aircraft on passage is foregone altogether, since the vessel must turn up into 

the wind whenever aircraft are flying on and off.* 

8. It is the combination of speed, size and invulnerability of construction 

which gives the aircraft carrier the required protection from enemy attack. In 

the case of the Fleet Carrier, this immunity is provided by high speed, a reasonably small target, fairly good under water and armor protection and the distribution of the “eggs”amongst a fair number of “baskets.” In the escort carriers, 

the lack of speed and protection is to some extent made up for by distributing 

the “eggs”in very large numbers of “baskets.”The large, slow, unmaneuverable 

HABBAKUK will, on the other hand, be extremely easy to hit with torpedoes 

and bombs and many “eggs”will be contained in each “basket.” It must, therefore, be constructed with material of great strength to enable it to continue in 

operation, in spite of the hits which it is likely to receive. 

POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS OF HABBAKUKS 

9. Of the aircraft carrier functions enumerated in paragraph 4 above, 

clearly HABBAKUKS cannot operate with the Fleet (Function a) owing to 

their lack of mobility. 

10. TO CARRY OUT RAIDS ON JAPANESE INDUSTRIES, ETC. (Function 

b) HABBAKUK could be used in one of three ways: 

a. As a carrier operating aircraft in the normal way; 

* During the advance to, and retirement from an operation the HABBAKUK 

will, therefore, normally require an aircraft carrier escort, in addition to 

A/S and possibly surface escort. 

192 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

b. As a carrier, carrying the aircraft to the flying-off position, launching them, but the aircraft then returning to a convenient shore base; or 

c. As an advanced landing ground for refuelling aircraft operating 

from bases further back, thus extending their radius of action. 

11. For a aircraft must be capable of being stowed below, both for maintenance and for protection against enemy attack. To enable reasonably large 

numbers to be employed, comparatively small types of aircraft should therefore be used. 

12. The use of short-range single-engine Naval types of Arcraft combined 

with the comparatively low speed of any HABBAKUK would, however, make 

the achievement of surprise difficult. A long-range light twin-engine bomber 

(e.g., the Mosquito type) capable of operating without fighter escort would 

therefore be more satisfactory for this type of operation, and the HABBAKUK 

would require a speed of not less than about 12 knots. 

13. At this speed a Mosquito requires a flight deck of not less than 1,200 ft. 

without assisted take off. 

14. For b and c above, aircraft need not be maintained on board, and protection from enemy action could be dispensed with for the limited period that 

they are on board. 

15. Stowage for aircraft between decks becomes, therefore, unnecessary, 

and the use of larger aircraft would not be uneconomical. These methods may, 

therefore, provide the opportunity for taking advantage of the long range and 

heavy loads of medium and heavy bombers. 

10. For this type of operation a speed of about seven knots should be sufficient, and at this speed the length of deck required is as follows: 

Medium Bombers: about 1,500/2,000 ft. without assisted take-off. 

Heavy Bombers: about 2,200 ft. without assisted take-off. 

17. Owing to the undesirability of attacking in small numbers, it will be 

necessary for the bombers to take-off and, in the case of c, land-on with a 

number of aircraft on deck. A vessel of considerable beam will therefore be 

necessary. 

18. Even so, arrester gear will, almost certainly, be necessary to avoid collision with aircraft on deck. The provision of this gear for large aircraft, and 

193 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the strengthening of the latter will require investigation but should not be 

insoluble. 

19. For escorting convoys. (Function c) a speed of at least 15 knots and 

fairly good maneuverability is required to enable the vessel to regain the convoy 

when the direction of the wind has necessitated steering away from it while 

operating aircraft. 

20. Although not definitely ruled out for this function, the HABBAKUK is 

not very suitable for it, and should not, however, attempt it at present. 

21. For Fighter and tactical bomber suppart in amphibious operations 

(Function d) , there is cleerly great scope for HABBAKUKS to reinforce the 

escort carriers on which we must otherwise mainly rely, until the destruction 

of the Japanese Fleet frees our Fleet carriers for this purpose. 

22. For this function a speed approaching that of the slowest convoy to be 

used in the operation is important, otherwise the success of the whole operation may be seriously prejudiced due to loss of surprise. A speed of, or nearly, 

12 knots is required. 

23. Since large numbers of small aircraft, as opposed to a small number of 

large aircraft, are best for this function, a vessel of comparatively small size 

would be acceptable in order to achieve the speed required and fighters and 

naval types of bombers would be suitable. 

24. For a 12-knot vessel these aircraft require a deck of at least 1,000 ft. in 

which to take off without assisted take-off. 

25. Arrester gear must almost certainly be used for landing on, regardless 

of the length of the vessel, in order to avoid collision with aircraft parked on 

deck. 

26. The beam of the vessel need not necessarily be greater than that required to operate single engine types but a broad flying deck will of course 

enable more aircraft to be carried and operated. 

27. Stowage for aircraft below must be provided both for maintamice and 

for protection against enemy attack. 

28. For launching air borne troops in support of amphibious operations 

(Function e),fleet or escort carriers are of little value due to the small number of troops that can be carried in Naval types of aircraft. The HABBAKUK 

appears to offer the only practicable alternative. 

194 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITXSH MOST SECRE? 

29. Since it would be quite satisfactory to launch our air borne forces at a 

distance of 3/400miles from the objective, at a time when our assault convoys 

are approaching it, a speed considerably less than the latter would be acceptable in this case without prejudicing surprise. About seven knots is considered 

acceptable. 

30. To fly off a medium type of transport aircraft (e.g., C-47 carrying 12 

men), from a vessel of seven knots, a flight deck would be required of at least 

1,700 ft. without assisted take-off. 

31. To carry and operate a reasonable number of such aircraft a vessel of 

considerable beam will be necessary. Again, arrester gear will almost certainly 

be necessary unless aircraft are able to return direct to a shore base. 

32. For the defense of Island based (Function f) any of the types already 

described will be suitable. An engine-less HABBAKUK, moored in a sheltered 

and tideless harbor, free to swing to the wind, might also be of value in islands 

where airfields are lacking. 

33. To operate fighter and naval types, a stationary HABBAKUK of this 

type would have to be at least 1,500ft. long without assisted take-off. 

34. For the supply of naval and fighter aircraft,whether acting as staging 

points or ferries, any of the mobile types referred to above would be suitable, 

and the engine-less type could also be used as a staging point, either permanently at anchor in harbor or temporarily at sea with tugs to keep it head to wind. 

CONCLUSION ON TYPES OF “HABBAKUK” REQUIRED 

35. It appears from the above that the following types of HABBAKUK 

would be of value. In all cases it is assumed that arrester gear must in any case 

be provided, but no reduction in length is allowed for assisted take-off. 

a. About 1,000ft. long. Speed about 12knots. Beam sufficient for operating large numberr of fighter and naval aircraft. Protected stowage required for a considerable proportion. 

b. About 1,200 ft. long. Speed about 12knots.Beam sufficient for operating light twin-engine bombers. Protected stowage required for considerable proportion. 

c. About 1,500/2,000ft. long. Speed about 7 knots. Beam sufficient for 

operating fair numbers of medium bombers and transport aircraft. No 

stowage required. 

195 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

d. About 2,200ft. long. Speed about 7 knots. Beam sufficient for operating fair numbers of heavy bombers. No stowage required. 

36. The types required could be reduced to two, one for requirements a and 

b and one for c and d, as follows: 

1st (HABBAKUK 111) a vessel of: 

a. length about 1,000-1,200ft.; 

b. speed as near 12 knots as possible; 

c. sufRcient beam to operate fighters and naval aircraft and light twinengine bombers; 

d. protected stowage for aircraft; 

2nd (HABBAKUK XI) A vessel of: 

a. sevenknots; 

b. length at least 1,700ft. and if possible about 2,200ft.; 

c. sufficient beam to operate and park medium bombers and transport 

aircraft, and heavy bombers if length of 2,200 ft. proves possible; 

d. protected storage for aircraft not required. 

HABBdKUK III should be given first priority since the operation of 

fighter and naval types is already proven, and fighter and tactical support for 

amphibian operations is a matter of first importance. 

ASSISTED TAKE-OFF 

37. For efficient operation of all types of aircraft which can use HABBAKUK XI and III, it is more than likely that assisted take-off methods and arrester gear will have to be used. By these means it should be unnecessary to 

rely entirely on the need for natural wind, and errors caused by pilots without 

fleet air arm training or resulting from battle damage to aircraft or the vessel 

itself should be reduced to a minimum. 

38. The employment of these methods requires detailed investigation but 

may, if successful, allow a reduction in deck lengths. Although the greater the 

deck length the more likely the success of operations, the problem of reduction 

196 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

should be investigated in closest collaboration while final designs are behg 

produced by the HABBAKUK Main Technical Committee. 

39. TYPES OF CONSTRUCTION 

a. HABBAKUK III, the smaller and faster type, could best be made in 

steel and timber, and would take about 15 months to construct. Successful 

construction could be relied on without building any prototypes or experimental sections, and if a definite order is given in the near future they 

should be operational by the spring of 1944. 

b. HABBAKUK XI, the larger and slower type could be built in steel, 

but would require a very large quantity of it; it is more suited to construction in pykrete, but could not be built in this material with any reliability 

without first constructing sections for experiment. Experimental sections 

could be built next winter and if successful the first pykrete HABBAKUK 

might be operationalby mid-1945 at the earliest, but there are a large number of constructional and operational problems to be overcome. 

c. In comparison with a large number of escort carriers, for a given 

number of operational aircraft, a small number of the smaller steel and 

timber HABBAKUK Ill’s referred to above, would require: 

(1) Less steel, and steel of a type more easy to obtain. 

(2) Less horsepower and certain of the engines would be of a type 

more easy to obtain. 

(3) Less labor, and labor of a type which will shortly be freed from 

other war constructional projects and thus would not compete with 

existing shipbuilding commitments. 

(4) Less personnel to man them -particularly officers and highly 

trained ratings. 

d. The present shortage of steel is unlikely to remain a really serious 

bottleneck for long, anyhow after the defeat of Germany. 

e. Good protection from the torpedo and bomb hits which we must expect 

will be inherent in the large pykrete vessel. The effect of hits on the steel 

and timber HABBAKUK III will be greatly minimized, in comparison with 

normal ships, by the following factors: 

(1) By the provision of a number of independent propulsion units. 

197 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(2) The use of plastic armor of great thickness which, unlike normal 

ships’armor, is easy to provide and fit. 

(3) Under water protection by such methods as subdivision, backed 

by plastic armor, used to a much greater extent than is possible in a 

normal ship, where accessibility to all compartments is required. 

40. For operational reasons, we consider that the provision of a smaller 

number of HABBAKUK would be preferable to a very large number of small 

escort carriers, because: 

a. Coordination and forming up of aircraft flying from a smaller number of vessels would be simplified, and a considerable economy would be 

made in skilled navigational personnel. 

b. The sea room required for handling the vessels would be greatly reduced and thus concentration, control and mutual support gained. 

c. The extreme vulnerability of our escort carriers is bound to be bad 

for morale when operating against shore-based aircraft, and this counterbalances to a large extent, the advantage they gain from the “eggs” being 

distributed among a very large number of “baskets.” 

CONCLUSIONS 

41. We conclude, therefore, that: 

a. Even if the building of steel and timber HABBAKUK 111’s should 

eventually prove to compete in steel, labor, etc., with an expansion in the 

present building program of escort carriers it would be desirable to construct at least a certain number of them at the expense of the latter. 

b. To meet the requirement of a large mobile landing platform without 

using large quantities of steel and to exploit the inherent protective properties of pykrete, the development of the large pykrete type (HABBAKUK II) 

is very desirable. 

198 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 315f 2 29 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

“HABBAKUKS” 

Note ba, the Secretaries 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have taken note of paragraphs a, b, and c 

below,which were presented by the United StatesChiefs of Staffin C.C.S. 315f 1. 

They have agreed to the provisions of paragraph d below. 

a. By the expenditure of extraordinary effort and consequent stoppage 

of other essential war projects, the construction of HABBAKUK 11and an 

erecting plant therefor is feasible and might be completed as early as the 

end of 1945. 

b. Construction of HABBAKUK III could possibly be accomplished by 

the end of 1945. Claims for invulnerability of HABBAKUK I11 to hull 

damage may be somewhat justified, but they are outweighed by the operating advantages inherent in conventional carrier types by virtue of speed, 

maneuverability, and operating refinements. 

c. Due to the relatively small value of the HABBAKUKS in increasing 

the effectiveness of aircraft operation, and in view of the existing aircraft 

carrier program, the diversion of manpower and critical materials involved 

in their construction is not warranted. 

d. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree to the construction of a section 

of HABBAKUK 11,the continuation of design, and the study of the construction and of the facilities necessary for a full-size ship. They have 

further agreed that the appropriate United States, British and Canadian 

authorities should be invited to set up a board forthwith to press on with 

the action agreed to above and to report progress monthly to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

199 
200 
BRITISH MOST SEU.S. SECRET 

C. C. S. 316 

THE “PLOUGH”FORCE 

Reference: 

CCS 112th Meeting, Item (5) 

C.C.S. 316 was circulated 18 August 1943. 

In their 112th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff concurred in the 

proposal set forth in paragraph 4 of the Enclosure to C.C.S. 316. 

201 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 316 18 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE “PLOUGH’ FORCE 

Note by the Secretaries 

In order to save delay, the enclosure,prepared by the Chief of Combined 

Operations, in consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, is presented 

direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

THE “PLOUGH” FORCE 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

1. We have been considering the question of the possible employment of 

the PLOUGH Force, which we understand will shortly become available for 

operations elsewhere. 

2. The essentials as we see it are that the Force should be retained intact 

and employed in snow conditions on the type of task for which it has been 

trained. 

Hence, there are now two theaters in which the Force might be 

empIoyed: 

a. Norway, as originally planned. Here, if the maintenance commitment is not too great, it might be used for some specific operation at an 

appropriate moment, in conjunction perhaps with Operation OVERLORD. 

202 
BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. SECRET 

b. Italy. Here it might be used in conjunction with possible operations 

in the Appenines, or better still in the Alps if we get as far north. Failing 

either of these, it might conceivably fulfill a useful role in collaboration 

with patriot forces in the mountains of the Dalmatian Coast. 

3. The Force is at present gaining experience in the Kiska operations and 

we understand that it is unlikely to arrive back in the United States much before the end of November. There is time therefore for the possibilities of its 

further employment to be fully explored. 

4. We suggest that the full details of the Force and its capabilities should 

be communicated to General Eisenhower and General Morgan at once, who 

should be asked to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by 1October 1943: 

a. Whether they consider that the Force could be usefully employed in 

their theater, and if so,what tasks they propose it should undertake. 

b. Whether any additional provision would be necessary in the form 

of transport aircraft or ancillary units to sustain the Force in the role 

Proposed. 

If General Eisenhower considers that the Force would best be employed 

on the Dalmatian Coast, we suggest that he should consult the Commanders 

in Chief in the Middle East and put forward his recommendations agreed with 

them. 

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should then decide on the theater to 

which the Force should be allotted. 

203 
204 
U.S. SECREf 

BRITISH MOST SeCREf 

C.C.S. 317, 31711, 31712, and 31713 

EQUIPPING ALLIES,LZBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS 

References: 

CCS 112th Meeting, Item (6) 

CCS 113thMeeting, Item (3) 

CCS 115th Meeting, Item (8) 

C.C.S. 317 was circulated, 18 August 1943, for consideration b3 the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In a memorandum, C.C.S. 317/1 circulated 21 August, the 

U.S.Chiefs of Staff proposed that the recommendations containedin paragraph 

10 of C.C.S. 317 be approved as amended in C.C.S. 317/1. 

C.C.S. 317/2, a note by the Secretaries, circulated the recommendation 

of the U.S.Chiefs of Staff that an immediate decision be rendered on the 

recommendations contained in subparagraphs 10 a and b of C.C.S. 317. 

By memorandum (C.C.S. 317/3 circulated 23 August) the British Chiefs 

of SM concurred in C.C.S. 317/2 subject to a minor amendment. 

The Combined Chiefs of SM in their 115th Meeting considered C.C.S. 

317/1, 317/2 and 317/3 and agreed that the recommendations contained in 

subparagraphs 10 a and b of C.C.S. 317 be approved as amended. 

205 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 317 18 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS 

Note by the Secretaries 

In order to avoid delay, the enclosure, prepared by the U.S. Staff Planners, is presented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS 

References: a. C.C.S. 288; C.C.S. 28811; C.C.S. 28812. 

b. C.C.S. 104th Meeting, Item 3. 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To consider the requirements for materiel for equipping allies, liberated 

forces, and friendly neutrals,and the determination of basic policies which will 

govern the meeting of such requirements. 

DZSCUSSZON 

2. During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government 

accepted the responsibility for equipping 11 French divisions (three armored 

and eight infantry). By 1September 1943, the equipment for two armored and 

four infantry divisions, with supporting troops, will have been shipped. 

3. General Eisenhower has recommended (radio BOSCO-IN-21, 13 Aug 

1943) (Appendix “A”) that equipment for remaining French troops be accelerated in a manner that would provide for a total of four armored and seven 

infantry divisions.The Commanding General of the North African Theater of 

Operations advises that such a program would satisfy the requirements of the 

206 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Casablanca Conference. The requisite equipment can be made available to meet 

such requirements without prejudice to currently directed operations, i.e., 

BOLERO/SICKLE, and operations in the Pacific. It should be noted, however, 

that approximately 60% of the equipment required must be withheld from 

advance shipments to the United Kingdom, to be made up prior to departure 

of United Kingdom units concerned. This can be done. 

4. During the first four to flve months following an initial assault on the 

continent, all available port and beach capacity will be required for the buildup and maintenance of the United Nations forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to eight months will be required between the start of reorganization and reequipment of French Army units on the continent and their initial 

employment. Thus it would appear that no continental French Army units 

could be employed for from ten to thirteen months after the initial assault. 

5. Balkan forces are capable of mounting approximately six modifled divisions and supportingtroops (175,000) (Appendix “B”).They should be supplied 

with captured German and Italian equipment, if available, inasmuch as they 

are familiar therewith, and their strategic position does not further substantiate commitments from other sources. 

6. It is assumed that Polish forces will continue to fight with the British 

and they need not be considered as sacaced by non-support of the Polish 

“SecretArmy” asan organized unit. Moreover, the formation of Polish divisions 

and brigadescan only be accomplished after the fall of Germany, at which time 

existence of a formal Polish Army for the defeat of Germany would not be 

necessary (Appendix “C”). 

7. In respect to equipping the Turkish forces, it is presumed that this programwill not extend beyond that envisaged at TRIDENT. In view of the apparent inability of the Turkish forces to properly assimilate, maintain, and train 

with such equipment as has been provided to them, it is questionable as to 

whether the political beneflts that would accrue from furnishing any further 

equipment would outweigh the advisability of retaining such equipment for 

other purposes. 

8. The aggregatestrengths of forces which might be available to the United 

Nations and which are now located in Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland 

totals about 150,000 men (Appendix “D’).Since potential forces in none of 

these countries constitutes a force which of itself could carry out extensive offensive operations, it is assumed that such forces would be available only for 

garrison and interior guard duty. 

207 
U.S. SECRET 

BRXTISH MOST SECRET 

9. It isthe opinion of the War Shipping Administrationthat cargo shipping 

captured should be operated for rehabilitation and support of the occupied 

country. This policy will reduce shipping load on United Nations and will save 

the time and expense of repair and rehabilitation of vessels in U.S. ports. Personnel vessels should be operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions 

as to U.S. or British control. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

10. It is recommended that : 

a. The supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program

recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater of 

Operations (cable W7177-CM-IN-BOSCO 21,13Aug. 1943) be authorized 

for shipment during the period 1 September -31 December 1943. 

b. Rearmament of French Army unitsbe limited to the obligationsof the 

Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower’s radio of 13 August 1943. 

c. Equipment for any French local forces to be organized on the Continent subsequent to invasion be limited to that required for garrison or guard 

duties and no attempt be made to organize assault forces. Equipment to be 

furnished through CG, ETO, for Northern France and through CG, NATO, 

for Southern France. All equipment to be furnished as far as practicable

from captured German and Italian items. 

d. In accordance with C.C.S. 30313,Strategic Concept for the Defeat of 

the Axis in Europe (par. 6 d and par. 8) equipment to be supplied to the 

Balkans will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport and for planning purposes the forces to be so equipped will be limited 

to 175,000men (six divisions and supporting troops). 

e. No equipment be supplied the Polish forces in Poland, other than 

that which can be flown in to guerrilla and underground forces extant 

within the limits of Poland. (The limitations imposed by the requirement 

that all material must be flownin will lit the forces that can be equippd 

to an optimum figure of 50 modiiied infantiy battalions). This is to be a 

British commitment. 

f. The program of aid to Turkey be reviewed in the light of experience 

to date and with a view to possibly curtailing the furnishing of additional 

equipment. 

208 
C. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

g. Equipment for potential forces in Norway and the Low Countries 

be limited to basic individual equipment fora total force aggregating 150,000 

men, together with certain categories of light infantry weapons and light 

motor vehicles. That measures be initiated to determine the exact forces 

to be equipped as soon as operations by the United Nations in Western Europe make such action practicable. Theater commandersconcerned to equip 

liberated forces of Norway, Holland, and Belgium through CG, ETO. The 

Balkans to be equipped through CG, NATO. 

h. That in implementing the recommendations appearing in subparagraphs c to g, inclusive, maximum use be made of captured war materiel. 

i. That implementation (after maximum utilization of captured war 

materiel) of equipping the forces carried in subparagraphs a, b and d above, 

be considered to be a responsibility of the United States, and for subparagraphs c, e, f, and g to be considered as a responsibility of the United 

Kingdom. 

j. Captured cargo shipping be used, insofar as practicable, to carry relief 

and rehabilitation supplies to the country from which captured. Captured 

personnel vessels be operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions 

as to US. or British control. 

209 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “A” 

REARMAMENT OF THE FRENCH 

1. During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government accepted the responsibility for the equipping of 11 French divisions (three armored and eight infantry). 

2. By 1 September 1943 the equipment for two armored and four infantry 

divisions,with supporting troops, will have been shipped. 

3. a. By radiogram W7177 (BOSCO-IN-21, 13 August 1943), the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, recommends that 

equipment for the remaining French troops be provided as follows: 

September, 1943 -One infantry and one armored division 

(less certain units) 

October, 1943 -One infantry division 

November, 1943 -One infantry division 

December, 1943 -One armored division 

Equipment for supporting and service units to be provided on a proportionate basis for each month. 

b. The proposal outlined in a above will provide for a total of four armored (on a slightly reduced scale) and seven infantry divisions. The Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, advises that this, 

considering also the Koenig Division, which was equipped by the British, 

will satisfy the requirements of the Casablanca Conference. 

4. Equipment, allowing minor substitutions, can be made available to meet 

the requirements outlined in paragraph 3 above, provided that priority above 

that for pre-shipments to the United Kingdom is granted. About 60% of the 

equipment for French units would necessarily be withheld from pre-shipment 

to the United Kingdom. These shortages can be made up in time to equip U.K. 

units prior to departure. Provision of this equipment will not prejudice currently directed operations in the Pacific, BOLERO, or SICKLE. Any equipment 

left behind by U.S. divisions transferred from the Mediterranean to the United 

Kingdom will be credited against this requirement. Shippingcan be made available as requested by General Eisenhower (180,000 ship tons in September and 

lW,aoO ship tonsper month, October, November, and December). 

210 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. The provision of equipment and supplies referred to in paragraph 5 

above, will satisfy the United States obligation of the Casablanca Conference. 

There is no further known requirement for equipment for French units from 

United Statessources. During the Arst four to five months following the initial 

assault on the Continent, all available port and beach capacity will be required 

for build-up of the combat forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to 

eight months would be required between the start of reorganization and reequipment of French Army units on the Continent, and their initial employment. Thus it would appear that no Continental French Army units could be 

employed for from ten to thirteen months after the assault. 

6. Certain resistance groups in France are being equipped by air delivery 

with small arms. This is a British commitment. Any demands on the United 

States for weapons or equipment for this purpose will be negligible. 

7. It may be necessary to clothe and equip local defense units organized in 

France after the invasion is well under way. Arms for such units would undoubtedly be limitedto small arms and light weapons. It is believed that any 

such equipment should be provided from and limited to that available from 

captured enemy (Italian) supplies, and should not be set up as an obligation 

of the United States Government. 

211 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “B” 

BALKANS 

1. The Balkan guerrilla forces are estimated to number around 175,000; 

however, some estimates have placed this figure as high as 300,000. The former 

figure is based on recent intelligence reports and is considered to be reliable. 

These forces are divided into several political groups, operating independently, 

the strongest of which is General Mihailovitch’sChetniks. However, it is doubtful that even he can command the loyalty of more than 175,000 to 200,000 men. 

2. In addition to these forces, recent radio report from the Mediterranean 

Theater quotes a Yugoslavian representative as being desirous of establishing 

a training corps, on the fall of Italy, in some Italian territory, preferably Sicily, 

to consist of 30,000 to 40,000 Yugoslavian prisoners of war now in Italy. The 

State DepErtment is very emphatic in the opinion that a maximum of 6,500 

Yugoslavian and 1,800 Greek prisoners of war will be liberated on the fall of 

Italy, and that any claims of the Yugoslav Government in Exile in excess of 

this figure would constitute an attempt to create a Free Yugoslav Army to lend 

national prestige in peace conference negotiations. The liberated prisoners of 

war available therefore appear to be relatively insignificant in comparison to 

the tangible guerrilla forces, and, moreover, the time that would be consumed 

in training such a force would render them valueless in the conquest of 

Germany. 

3. In the past, supply of these forces has been effected by the British Middle East Command,in some 100 scattered sorties, dropping only the bare essentials of medical supplies, etc. Their principal needs are machine guns, light 

(horse) artillery and medical supplies. 

4. The supply of equipment to the Balkans therefore devolves to a consideration of furnishing an equivalent of the requirements for a force commensurate with the 175,000 guerrillas. 

5. Equipment to be supplied to the Balkans should be limited to supply 

of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport. The latter method must supplement the former before any substantial amount of equipment can be made 

available to a force aggregating 175,000 men. 

212 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “C” 

POLISH FORCES 

1. Polish forces in the U.K.consist of approximately 40,000 men, including 

one armored division, one parachute brigade, 13 air squadrons and some light 

naval vessels. In the Middle East, Polish forces contain about 73,000 men, 

including two infantry divisions, one tank brigade, and corps troops. In 

both of the above elements, the supply of materiel and equipment has been 

from British sources, including some lend-lease transactions, and the supply 

status of each is approximately ‘75% complete. 

2. There is an additional Polish force of approximately 65,000men, in the 

occupied territory, known as the “Secret Army.” Various estimates of this force 

have run as high as 300,000 men, however the former figure is based on US. 

Army Intelligence information and is considered to be reliable. In addition to 

supplying the Polish forces in the U.K.and Middle East, the British have occasionally dropped small quantities of explosives, and communications equipment, to this “Secret Army,” from the air. 

3. Supplyof the forces in the U.K. and Middle East having been undertaken 

by the British (these elements are now a part of British forces in the respective 

area),the equipping of Polish forces evolves to the requirements of the “Secret 

Army.” This requirement amounts to equipment for an equivalent of Arty 

infantry battalions which must be flown in, and would require an estimated 500 

sorties initially. The Polish General Staff estimates this force could Aght in 

isolation for about 20days and its continued existence would depend on a break 

through contact by other Allied Forces within that time. 

4. The Polish plan further envisages the transporting of the U.K.and Middle East Forces into Poland by air after the break through contact with the 

“Secret Army” has been established. These, with other liberated Polish forces, 

would be organized into 16 infantry divisions and six dismounted cavalry brigades. This latter phase is not considered as advantageous inasmuch as the 

effect of it can not be realized until such time as it is no longer needed. 

5. It is clear that sabotage and intelligence operations are desirable and 

the operation of 50 rifle battalions will aid considerably in this activity, as well 

asoccupy the attention of considerable German forces. However,current intelligence digests indicate Russia will violently oppose any arming of the Poles in 

Poland due to the well-known Polish-Russian enmity. 

6. To support this operation, including supply of initial equipment, would 

require some 2,000sorties by heavy transport planes and this air lift can not 

be spared without seriously aflecting other operations. 

213 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “D 

NORWAY, LOW COUNTRIES 

1. In giving consideration to the possible need for supplying equipment 

and materiel to the forces of free neutrals of nations at present occupied by

Axis forces and which might come within the scope of possibly having to be 

rearmed by the United Nations, estimates have been confined to Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland. The table which follows indicates (on the basis 

of informal estimates furnished by a representative of the Joint Intelligence 

Committee) the strengths of the armed forces of each nation at or about the 

time each became involved in the war, as well as the indicated potential 

strengths of that portion of the manpower of each nation which might be 

available for reequipment, rearming, training and service in the event of a 

United Nations reoccupation: 

Country 

Norway 

Denmark 

Belgium 

Holland 

Estimated Strength at 

Outbreak of War 

17,000 

11,000 

650,000 

400,000 

Possible Strength 

to Be Equipped 

40,000 (a) 

10,000 (b) 

50,000 (a) 

50,000 (a) 

150,000 

(a) Estimated on basis of ability to form and train unitsupon liberation. 

(b) For police purposes only. 

2. From the above table it is apparent that the aggregate strength of the 

forces which might be available for rearming in all of these countries totals 

150,000 troops. Since potential forces in none of these countries constitute a 

force which of itself could carry out extended offensive operations, it is presumed that such forces would be supplied only to the extent of basic individual 

equipment, together with certain categories of small arms and light motor 

vehicles. Considering the reequipment of all of these nations as a complete 

total requirement, and assuming that such reequipment would not take place 

until, at the earliest, some time after 1 January 1944 (the estimated date on 

which the rearming of the French forces as presently contemplated would be 

completed), it is not considered that any great problem of supply would be 

214 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

involved and that quantities of the requisite materiel could be made available 

without unduly affecting the equipment status of American forces. 

3. Assuming (for conservative purposes) that the reequipment of all of 

these countries would be coincidental, which of course would not be the case, 

a total maximum shipping requirement of some six to eight ships might be 

required but this could be made available without any effect on the 

BOLERO/SICKLE operation or operations as presently contemplated and 

planned for the South and Southwest Pacific areas. 

4. It is, of course, obvious that a determination must be made at the earliest 

practicable moment in the event any or all of these countries, or any contiguous countries, are to be reequipped and rearmed. Such plans must indicate the 

approximate date on which rearming and reequipping would be required and, 

in general, the type force that it would be considered advisable to rearm and 

reequip for each country with the forces available to it and the nature of operations in which it is contemplated such forces might become engaged, i.e., garrison and police duty, or actual components of an offensive fighting force. It is 

also essential that a determination be made at the earliest practicable date as 

to how much equipment would be supplied and the source of the equipment. 

215 
216 
BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S. SECRET 

C.C.S. 317/1 21 Amst 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

EQUIPPING AUIES,LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

We recommend approval of paragraph 10of C.C.S. 317,amended to read 

as follows (Note: additions are underlined and deletions are in Italics) :­

“10. It is recommended that: 

a. The supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program 

recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater 

of Operations (cable W7177- CM-IN-BOSCO 21,13 Aug. 1943) be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September-31 December 1943. 

b. Rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of 

the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower’s radio of 13 August 1943. 

c. Equipment for any French local forces to be organized on the Continent subsequent to invasion be limited to that required for garrison or 

guard duties and no attempt be made to organize assault forces. Equipment to be furnished through CG, ETO, for Northern France and through 

CG, NATO, for Southern France. All equipment to be furnished. as far as 

practicable from captured Germun and Italian items. 

d. In accordance with C.C.S. 303/3, Strategic Concept for the Defeat 

of the Axis in Europe (par. 6 d and par. 8) equipment to be supplied to the 

Balkanswill be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport and for supply planning purposes the forces to be so equipped will be 

limited to 175,000men (six divisions and supporting troops). 

e. No equipment be supplied the Polish forces in Poland, other than 

that which can be flown in to guerrilla and underground forces extant 

within the limits of Poland. (The limitations imposed by the requirement

that allmaterial must be flown in willlimit the forcesthat can be equfpped 

to an optimum figure of 50 modified infantry battalions). This is to be a 

British commitment. 

217 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

f. The program of aid to Turkey be reviewed in the light of experience 

to date and with a view to possibly curtailing the furnishing of additional 

equipment. 

g. For supply planning purposes, equipment for potential forces in 

Norway and the Low Countries be limited to basic individual equipment 

for a total force aggregating 150,000men, together with certain categories 

of light infantry weapons and light motor vehicles. That measures be initiated to determine the exact forces to be equipped as soon as operations 

by the United Nations in Western Europe make such action practicable. 

Theater commanders concerned to equip liberated forces of Norway, Hdland, and Belgium through CG, ETO. The Bdkans to be equipped through 

CG, NATO. 

h. That in implementing the recommendations appearing in subparagraphs c to g, inclusive, maximum use be made of captured war materiel. 

i. That implementation (after maximum utilization of captured war 

materiel) of equipping the forces carried in subparagraphs a, b, and d 

above, be considered to be a responsibility of the United States,and for subparagraphs c, e, f, and g to be considered as a responsibility of the United 

Kingdom. 

j. Captured cargo shipping be used,insofar as practicable, to carry relief and rehabilitation supplies to the country from which captured. Captured personnel vessels be operated to assist U.S.troop lift regardless of 

decisions as to U.S.or British control.” 

218 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 31712 22 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

EQUIPPING AL;LIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS 

Note by the Secretaries 

Action onC.C.S. 317has been deferred pending further study of the subject by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

The United StatesChiefs of Staff, however, recommend that immediate 

decision be rendered on the recommendations contained in paragraph 10 a 

and b of that paper. These paragraphs pertain to the equipment of French 

forces in North Africa. A decision at thistime is necessary because of certain 

administmtive arrangements which should be carried out at once in the event 

that the recommendations are to be approved. 

�I.REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

219 
220 
C.C.S.31713 23 August 1943 

COMBINED CHEFS OF STAFF 

EQUIF’PING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS 

Memorandum bg the British Chiefsof Stuff 

We agreewith the recommendationof the United $taka chiefs of Staff 

that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve at once subparagraphs 10 

a and b of C.C.S. 317,providedthat the following isinsertedatthe end of subparagraph a, ‘‘insofar as this does not interfere with pera at ions scheduled 

previousto QUADRANT”. 

If you agree, we suggest that the newsmy action should now be taken 

without this matter again coming before the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 

QUADRANT. 

221 

u.s. SECREr 

RRlTISH MOST SECBET 

C. C. 5.318/1 

SARDINIA, FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES 

References: 

CCS 112th Meeting, Item (7) 

CCS 113th Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.C. 318, 19 August 1943, circulated a memorandum from the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff proposing that present conditions of unrest in Italy might offer 

an opportunity for favorable results from 5th column activities in Sardinia. 

They therefore submitted a suggested message to General Eisenhower. 

C.C.S. 318/1, 20 August 1943, circulated an amended message proposed 

for dispatch to General Eisenhower. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 113th Meeting, agreed that the 

message contained in C.C.S. 318/1, as amended during discussion to include 

a reference to operations in Corsica, be dispatched. (FAN 198) 

The conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were included in C.C.S. 

319/5. 

223 
u.s.SECFLET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 318/1 20 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SARDINIA,FIFTH COLUMN ACTXVITIES 

Memoranalum from the United States Chiefsof Stuff 

The U.S.Chiefs of Staff desire to amend the message to General Eisenhower which they proposed in C.C.S. 318 to read as follows: 

“The promising situation existing throughout the Italian area would 

appear to offer an excellent opportunity by means of fifth column activities to establish conditions in Sardinia for an unopposed occupation of 

that island. The O.S.S.and S.O.E. organizations might collaborate in accomplishing this. Furthermore, this presents an excellent opportunity to 

test the effectiveness of these organizations and to provide them with experience and training for future operations of a similar character. Your 

comments and recommendations are requested. 

224 
u.s. E.FcRET 

BRITISH MOST SEW 

C.C.S. 319 

FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

References: 

C.C.S. 112th Meeting, Item (2) 

C.C.S. 114th Meeting, Item (2) 

C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (2) 

C.C.S. 116th Meeting, Item (2) 

1st Citadel Meeting 

"he first Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister, pertaining principally to the European Theater, was considered, amended by them 

and subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 319, 19 August 1943. 

C.C.S. 319/1 circulated for consideration of the Combined chiefs of 

StM a draft report with reference to the war against Japan. "he Combined 

Chiefs of Staft in their 114th Meeting amended C.C.S. 319/1 (subsequently 

circulated as C.C.S. 319/2). 

C.C.S. 319/3, 22 August 1943, circulated for consideration of the Canbined Chiefs of Staff the Draft Final Report. This report as amended during 

the course of discussion in their 115th Meeting was circulated as C.C.S. 319/4. 

C.C.S. 319/4, the FinalReport to the President and Prime Minister was 

amended during the course of discussion in the C.C.S. 116th Meeting and was 

subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 319/5 on 24 August. "his report was presented to and approved by the President and Prime MinMer. 

225 
U. S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 319 19 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Enclosure is the report to the President and the Prime Minister 

which was made to them at the meeting at the Citadel on 19 August. It includes 

all of the amendments which they directed be made. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff submit the following report on the 

progress made so far in the QUADRANT Conference. 

2. We have agreed to accept tentatively Sections I, I1 and I11 of the final 

report made to you at the TRIDENT Conference as a basis for use in this 

Conference. These sections, covering the Over-all Objective, the Over-all 

Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War, and the Basic Undertakings 

in Support of the Over-all Strategic Concept, to be reaffirmed at the conclusion 

of the present Conference. 

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE 

3. We have approved the following strategic concept of operations for the 

defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, 1943-44. 

226 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

4. OPERATION “POINTBLANK 

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 

industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of 

communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength 

by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all 

convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and 

complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation 

must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority. 

5. OPERATION “OVERLORD’ 

a. This operation will be the primary US.-British ground and air effort 

against the AXIS in EUROPE. (Target date 1 May 1944). After securing 

adequate CHANNEL ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing 

areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. 

Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in FRANCE, operations 

designed to strike at the heart of GERMANY and to destroy her military 

forces will be undertaken. 

b. Balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the 

UNITED KINGDOM in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-CHANNEL move into FRANCE. 

c. As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the MEDITERRANEAN, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be 

distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of 

OVERLORD. Operations in the MEDITERRANEAN Theater will be carried 

out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT except insofar as these may be 

varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation 

OVERLORD and have authorized him to proceed with the detailed planning 

and with full preparations. 

6. OPERATIONS IN ITALY 

a. First Phase. The elimination of ITALY as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the ROME area, and, if feasible, farther north. 

b. Second Phase. Seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA. 

227 
c. s. SEcm 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

c. Third Phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German 

forces in Northern ITALY, and the creation of the conditions required for 

OVERLORD and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our 

forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force 

into Southern FRANCE. 

7. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 

Offensive operations against Southern FRANCE (to include the use of 

trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a 

lodgement in the TOULON-MARSEILLES area and exploit northward in order 

to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD. Air nourished guerilla 

operations in the Southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated. 

8. AIR OPERATIONS 

a. Strategic bombing operations from Italian and Central MEDZTERRANEAN bases, complementing POINTBLANK. 

b. Support for ground operationswith land and carrier-based air forces. 

c. Development of an air ferry route through the AZORES. 

d. Air supply of BALKAN and French guerillas (see paragraph 10 

below). 

9. OPERATIONS AT SEA 

a. Intensified anti-submarine warfare, including operations from the 

AZORES. 

b. Security of our sea communications. 

C. Continued disruption of AXIS sea communications. 

d. Support of amphibious operations. 

10. OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 

Operations in the BALKAN area will be limited to supply of BALKAN 

guerillas by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces, and to the 

bombing of PLOESTI and other strategic objectives from Italian bases. 

228 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

11. GARRISON REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY OF LINES OF 

COMMUNICATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Defensive garrison commitments in the MEDITERRANEAN area will be 

reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The 

securityof our lines of communication through the Strait of GIBRALTAR will 

be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest AFRICA, so 

long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the 

IBERIAN PENINSULA. 

THE U-BOAT WAR 

12. PROGRESS REPORT 

We have had encouraging reports from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs 

regarding the U-boat war. We have approved recommendations made by the 

Allied Submarine Board which should result in further strengthening our 

anti-U-boat operations. The Board has been directed to continue and expand

its studies in search of further improvements. 

PORTUGUESE ISLANDS 

13. FACILITIES IN THE AZORES ISLANDS 

On the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the use of the 

AZORES we have taken note of the assurance given by the British Chiefs of 

Staff that everything willbe done by the British as soon as possible after actual 

entry into the AZORES has been gained to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by US.aircraft. 

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

14. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

We have considered the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff for the 

set-up of the Southeast Asia Command. 

On the question of Command relationship, we have agreed: 

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise a general jurisdiction 

over the strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater and the allocation of 

American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater 

and the Southeast Asia Command. 

229 
0.S.SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

b. That the British Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all 

matters pertaining to operations, and will be the channel through which 

all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed. 

We are giving further consideration to: 

c. The precise duties of General Stilwell as Deputy Supreme Allied 

Commander; and 

d. Arrangements for the coordination of American agencies such as 

O.S.S., 0.W.I.,F.C.B., etc., with comparable British organizations. 

15. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST 

a. We have given preliminary consideration to a memorandum by the 

Joint US.Chiefs of Staff on specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR 

EAST 1943-44. 

b. We have had an account from Brigadier Wingate of the experiences 

of the long-range penetration groups which were employed in Northern 

BURMA in the early part of this year. We think that there is much to be 

said for further developing this method of conducting operations on a larger 

scale against the Japanese, and are working out plans to give effect to this 

policy. 

c. We have not yet considered specific operations in Northern BURMA 

or the Arakan Coast for 1943-44,pending the receipt of further information 

about the logistic situation which has been created by the disastrous floods 

in India. 

d. Meanwhile the Combined Staff Planners have completed in outline 

a long-term plan for the defeat of JAPAN. This has not yet been considered. 

We propose to review specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST 

for 1943-44(See a, b and c above) in the light of the conclusions reached 

on this larger question. 

REMAINDER OF CONFERENCE 

16. Before we separate, we propose to discuss the following matters: 

a. Immediate operations in the MEDITERRANEAN; 

b. Emergency return to the CONTINENT; 

230 
U.S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

c. Military considerations in relation to SPAIN; 

d. Military considerations in relation to TURKEY; 

e. Military considerations in relation to RUSSIA; 

f. Equipment of Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals; 

g. A number of miscellaneous matters. 

231 
232 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISHMOSTSECRET 

C.C.S. 319/2 (Revised) 27 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROGRESS EWF’ORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRME MINISTER 

From the Combined Chiefs of Sta8 

We have had under consideration an appreciation leading up to an 

outline plan for the complete and ultimate defeat of Japan. We have also 

considered the specific operations to be carried out against Japan in 1943-44. 

Our conclusions are set forth in the enclosed report. 

ENCLOSURE 

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

1. At TRIDENT we directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a 

study and prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of Japan, including an 

estimate of the forces required for this implementation. 

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, having made a preliminary examination 

of thisstudy (summary attachedasAnnex 1) are of the opinion that the following factors require particular emphasis: 

a, The dependence of Japan upon air power, naval power, and shipping 

for maintaining her position in the Pacific and Southeast Asia; 

b. The consequent need for applying the maximum attrition to Japan’s

air force, naval forces, and shipping by all possible means in all possible 

areas. 

c. The advantage to be gained and the time to be saved by a more extensive use of the superior air resources at the disposal of the United Nations, 

both in the strategic field and in conjunction with operations on land. 

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that great advantage may be 

obtained by modern and untried methods from the vast resources which, with 

233 
the defeat of Germany, will become available to the United Nations. They 

have in mind: 

a. A project rapidly to expand and extend the striking power of the 

United Nations air forces in China as well as of the ground troops for their 

defense by employing the large numbers of load earrYing aircraft available 

to open an “air road’’ to China. 

b. The employment of lightly equipped jungle forces, dependent largely 

upon air supply lines. 

c. The use of special equipment, such as artificial harbors, HABBAKUKS, etc., to enable the superior power of the United Nations to be 

deployed in unexpected and undeveloped areas. 

From every point of view operationsshould be framed to force the defeat 

of Japan as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany. Planning should be 

on the basis of accomplishing this within twelve months of that event. Decisions 

as to specific operations which will insure a much more rapid course of events 

than that envisaged in the plan laid before us (Annex I) must await further 

examination on the lines indicated above. 

4. The deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the 

war against Japan must be in accord with the over-all objective and strategic 

concept deiined at TRIDENT. (C.C.S. 24216, Sections one and two.) 

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed that the reorientation of forces 

from the European theater to the Pacific and Far Eest should be started 85 

soon as the German situation, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 

80 allows. 

The principle has been accepted that the forces to carry out operations

from the East, including the Southwest Pacific, shall be provided by the United 

States, and for operations from the West by Great Britain, except for special 

types not available to Great Britain which will be provided by the United 

States. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion 

between all Governments concerned. 

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are convinced that the issues raised in 

the plan (Annex I) that has been submitted are so large and complicated that 

it would be impracticableto arrive at all the necessary decisions for operations

in the war against Japan in 1943-44 during the few days of QUADRANT which 

remain. They therefore propose that, BS soon as the necessary further exam234 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

inations have been made, a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference should be held 

wherever may be most convenient unless agreement is reached through the 

ordinary channels. 

7. There are, nevertheless, certain decisions which the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff feel able to make at once. These are: 

a. To approve the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff for 

operations in the Pacific in 1943-44(see Annex 11). 

b. To carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to 

improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. 

Target date mid-February 1944. 

It is recognized that the extent of these operationsis dependent upon

logistic considerations as affected by recent flcais. 

c. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring 

of 1944on the scale already contemplated, namely, for the capture of Akyab 

and Ramree. 

d. To continue the preparation of India as a base for the operations

eventually contemplated in the Southeast Asia Command. 

8. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have also directed that the following 

studies shall be made forthwith: 

a. A study and report on the following operations and their relation one 

to another: 

(1) An operationagainst Northern Sumatra; target date spring, 1944. 

(2) Operations southwards from Northern Burma; target date 

November 1944. 

(3) Operations through the Moulmein area or Kra Isthmus in the 

direction of Bangkok;target date to be as early as practicable. 

(4) Operations through the Malacca Straits and Malaya for the 

direct capture of Singapore; target date to be as early as practicable. 

(5) The capture of Akyab and Ramree to determine whether it is 

necessary to the success of operations in (1) to (4)above or the operations in Northern Burma (Paragraph 7 b) . 

235 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

b. A study of the potentialities and limitations of developing the air 

route to China on a scale sufEcient to employ all the heavy bomber and 

transport aircraft likely to be available for the Southeast Asia Theater and 

China in 1944-45, on the assumption that Germany is defeated in the 

Autumn of 1944. 

This study to specify the action required to implement the best 

possible plan resulting from the above without prejudice to the operations 

in paragraphs 7 b and c. 

ANNEX‘T’ 

SUMMARY OF APPRECIATION AND OUTLINE PLAN 

FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

1. The following is a summary of C.P.S.83 (Appreciation and Plan for the 

Defeat of Japan). We have based the outline plan that follows on our best 

evaluation of what may have to be undertaken. 

2. We have assumed that Japanese resistance will be continuously stubborn, and have taken no credit for a decline in the morale of the Japanese 

people or fighting services. Nevertheless we do not believe that it will be necessary to carry out the whole program of operations in order to defeat them. 

Even if Japanese morale remains high, at some point the continuous process

of weakening the enemy’s forces and reducing his war potential will cause a 

rapid decline in his ability to fight and a consequent acceleration of our 

advance. Since it is impossible to forecast the stage of the operations at which 

this critical point will be reached, we have throughout endeavored to make 

the plan sufficiently flexible to permit of considerable acceleration at any stage. 

BASIC CONCLUSIONS 

3. We summarize below the basic conclusions of our appreciation: 

4. To achieve the ultimate defeat of Japan we must destroy her capacity 

to resist and this may well involve the invasion of Japan. 

5. The security of the Japanese position in the Pacific depends primarily 

on the Japanese Fleet and Air Forces. We must therefore destroy them as soon 

as we can. 

Annex “I” 

230 
u.s.SECRET 

BRlTISH MOST SECRET 

6. Heavy and sustained air bombardment of Japan proper should cripple

the Japanese war industry and destroy her ability to continue her main war 

effort. It might cause the surrender we demand but we cannot rely on this. 

In any case, air bombardment of this nature is probably an essential prelude 

to bring about the defeat of Japan. 

7. To bring about the sustained air offensive against Japan we shall almost 

certainly require the use of China and/or Formosa as the bases for our long 

range bombardment. These two areas will also go a long way towards meeting 

our requirementsfor mounting invasion forces. We shall require Chinese assistance in seizing and holding the area in China required for our air bases. 

8. To secure and develop airfields on the mainland of China,it will be necessary to acquire ports in China. So far as we can see, Hong Kong will be the 

most suitable port to open initially. 

9. We therefore require a sea route to China and/or Formosa and the 

interruption of the enemy’s lines of communication thereto. This will entail 

control of the South Japan and South China Seas. 

The best route of advance from the East lies through the Mandated 

Islands, and theneither through the Celebes and Sulu Seasor north of Luzon. 

The best route of advance from the West lies through the Straits of 

Malacca. 

10. In reaching these conclusions we have been guided by certain principles,

which in turn should be applied throughout the execution of the plan: 

a. We should attack Japan along asmany lines of advance as are profltable, in order to make use of our superior forces and to extend the enemy 

defense. 

b. Every possible means of taking short cuts to our objectives should be 

adopted The superior forces, particularly Air Forces, available to us and 

the opportunities for surprise should enable large and bold steps to be 

taken without unacceptable risk. 

c. Shortage of bases will initially restrict our possible lines of advance. 

We should+.herefore take the first opportunity of securing additional bases 

from which to deploy our superior strength. 

Annex “P 

237 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECBgT 

d. Our strength, particularly in the air,should be concentrated against 

Japan’s weaknesses,which lie in her shortage of aircraft, warships, shipping 

and oil. 

Conversely extensive campaigns against Japanese land forces in dif8­

cult country, where we cannot use our own forces to the best advantage,

should be avoided until they have been weakened by lack of supplies and 

support from the Japanese navy and air forces. 

Wherever possible, we should, in fact, aim at leaving Japanese land 

forces in pansession of outlying territory, in order that they may continue 

to be a liability to Japanese shipping, air and naval forces. 

e. Wherever practicable, direct attacks on our objectives should be aided, 

and if possible preceded, by attack against Japanese communications leading to them. The extremely extended nature of their communications, 

together with the notorious inability of the Japanese to deal with the 

unexpected, are likely to render such methods very profitable. 

f. Since shipping is unlikely to be a limiting factor after the defeat of 

Germany,our linesof advance need not necessarily be selected so as to take 

the shortest routefromthe U.S.or U.K.to our ultimate objective, but rather 

the one most easily established and protected. 

g. We should devise every possible means of exploiting to the full, the 

vast technicaland numerid air superiority which we shall enjoy over the 

Japanese after the defeat of Germany. 

h. Whilst recognizing that every ef�ortmust be made to retain China 

in the war and to develop her bases and land forces, our plans should retain 

the necessary flexibility to enable our program against the Japanese to be 

continued if China should drop out of the war or prove less effective than 

we now hope. 

i. Whilst being prepared to achieve our aims without Russianassistance. 

our plans should nevertheless retain the necessary flexibility to exploit the 

situation fully if Russia should join in the war at any stage. 

j. We cannot forecast the date at which Germany will be defeated. To 

minimize thedelay in turning the full weight of our offensive against Japan 

after the defeat of Germany, the bases from which our initial advances are 

Annex “I” 

238 
u.s. SECBm 

BRlTISFl MOST SECBm 

to be launched should be developed as soon as possible and plans for 

reorganization and redeployment made without delay. 

GENERALCONCEPTOFTHE WAR 

11. Applying these principles to the basic conclusions set out above, the 

general concept of the war which emerges is as follows: 

FIRST PHASE -ACTION PRIOR TO CAPTURE OF A PORT IN CHINA 

AND/OR FORMOSA 

12. In the East, our main effort should be through the Mandated Islands. 

Until we are ready to launch this main effort, we should maintain increasing 

pressure on the Japanese by means of offensive operations in the SolomonsNew Guinea area and in the Aleutians. When we turn to our main effort these 

latter operations should become subsidiary, and should only be undertaken 

insofar as they are necessary for the success of our main effort. 

Having completed our advance through the Mandated Islands, we should 

then proceed either to the South Philippines or to the north of them. Our choice 

should be made in the light of whichever course will most quickly achieve our 

object of reaching the China Coast and/or capturing Formosa. 

13. In the West,we should maintain China and build up our air forces there 

by stepping up the air supply mute from Assam and by operations to clear 

Northern Burma,thus permitting the opening of a land route to China. 

Meanwhile we should make preparations in India for the launching 

of the major campaignsto recapture the whole of Burma and to break into the 

Japanese perimeter from the west by the recapture of Singapore. 

Once that has been accomplished we should make our way through the 

South China Sea towards the coast of China and Formosa. 

COORDINATION 

14. Tointegrate our advancesfrom the West and the East,the timingof the 

various operations should, if possible, be so arranged that they afford one 

another the maximum amount of mutual assistance at each stage. 

15. Far our advancefromthe East,avery largefleet,but comparatively small 

land and shore-based air forces will be necessary, and therefore comparatively 

Annex “I” 

239 
U. S, SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

little shipping, until we have completed our advance through the Mandates, 

when our ground and land-based air forces may well be of a very large order. 

Our advance from the West, on the other hand, will require large land 

and air forces and much shipping, but probably a considerably smaller fleet 

than in the case of our advance from the East. 

16. Our advance from the east should provide opportunitiesfor bringing the 

Japanese fleet to action in favorable circumstances. It will enable us to threaten and strike at Japan herself, and, in conjunction with air forces from China, 

to strike at the focal point of the Japanese sea communications in the Yellow 

Sea-Formosa areas. This will greatly assist our advance from the west by 

forcing the Japanese fleet and air forces on to the defensive in their Home 

area and by enabling our forces in the east to strike at the Japanese communications leading to the objectives of our advance from the west. 

17. In executing our advance from the west, and after completing the capture of North Burma, (Course A), two courses of action remain open to us in 

the west: 

Course B -(Recapture of South Burma followed by recapture of 

Singapore) probably offers the best chance of maintaining China in the 

war by insuring that the overland supply route is developed as early as 

possible and with the greatest reliability. On the other hand, the delay in 

the recapture of Singapore is likely to mean that our advance to open the 

sea route to China would have to be undertaken from the east alone, and 

would receive little aid from the west. 

Course C -(Recapture of Singapore, followed by recapture of South 

Burma) would enable a much greater degree of coordination and mutual 

assistance to be achieved in the later stages of our two advances since we 

should expect to reach Singapore and advance therefrom a year earlier. It 

would stretch Japanese resources over a wide area and would enable the 

British Fleet to operate off the China coast. Our land and air forces could 

also be moved up the South China Sea along routes far removed from the 

main enemy naval strength in Japan. 

On the other hand, we should runthe risk of delaying the development

of the overland routes to China, although there would be no appreciable delay 

if all operations go according to plan. 

18. Irrespective of whether the advance from the east or the west approaches China first, it is unlikely that we shall be able to capture Shanghai 

direct. In conjunction with shore-based air support from China, and Chinese 

Annex “I” 

240 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

land forces, we might, however, be able to undertake a direct assault on Hong 

Kong, subsequently taking Formosa. 

If the capture of Hong Kong is impracticable, we should endeavor to 

seizeFormosa first, or, if this too is impracticable, Luzon. 

If neither of these can be seized direct, we should assault Hainan and 

if possible one of the Ryukyus. 

If the above are impracticable we should continue operations agaht 

the South Philippines and complete our control of the Celebes and Sulu Seas, 

subsequently carrying out our program to capture a port in China and/or 

Formosa. 

SECONDPHASE-ACTIONSUBSEQUENTTOTHECAPTUREOFAPORT 

IK CHINA AND/OR THE CAPTURE OF FORMOSA 

19. This phase will involve overland and amphibious operations in China 

and direct air and naval action to weaken Japanese capacity to resist. It will 

probably culminate in the invasion of Japan. 

20. If we are established in Hong Kong before Formosa has been captured, 

we shall be in a position to build up the necessary land forces in China,secure 

the air bases most accessible from Hong Kong, and start the bombing of Japan 

at long range. 

If, on the other hand, we capture Formosa before Hong Kong, or find 

that the Chinese assistance on the mainland is disappointing, the bombing of 

Japan can start from Formosa. 

21. It is possible that, with the assistance of sea-borne air forces, Japan may 

be sufficiently weakened to enable us to invade her when our bomber offensive 

has been developed from either Formosa, or the area most accessible from 

Hong Kong. 

On the other hand, to bomb Japan effectively we may have to move further northwards from Hong Kong in order to use the area up to the line Wenchow-Nanchang-Changsha. 

From the invasion point of view, we may possibly have to secure the 

Shanghai area, and if this is the case, me should be well placed from our positions in Hong Kong and Formosa to undertake such an advance both overland 

and coastwise. 

Annex “I” 

241 
U,S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

22. If Chinese assistance proves to be effective, our main effort will probably 

be made overland. If, on the other hand, it is disappointing, our main effort 

would be concentrated in amphibious operations along the China coast as far 

northwards as necessary. 

SUBSIDIARY AND ALTERNATIVE LINES OF ADVANCE 

23. Meanwhile,subject to the requirementsof our main advance, we should: 

(i) underwe subsidiary operations along the Malay Barrier to bring 

increased pressure to bear on the Japanese; 

(ii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of the Northern Kuriles 

and the reinforcement of Petropavlovsk, in order to secure a sea route to 

Russia in the event of her entering the war; 

(iii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of Hokkaido should the 

opportunity arise for assisting our bombing or undertaking our invasion 

of Japan from this direction, possibly in conjunction with Russian action 

from the Maritime Provinces, Sakhalin or Petropavlovsk. 

OUTLINE PLAN 

24. Based on our appreciation, we indicate below an outline plan for operations against Japan:-

ACTION IN THE WEST 

Setial 1 

Development of air routes 

to China. 

Holding operations in 

North Burma and China. 

ACTION IN THE EAST 

-Up to N~~~bes 1943 

Setial 2 -November 

Offensive operations in 

Northern Burma and on Arakan 

coast. 

Developing Northern routes 

leading to China. 

Offensive operations against 

Solomons and New Guinea. 

Offensive operations against 

the Aleutians. 

1943 to May 1944 

Offensive operations against 

Gilberts and Marshalls. 

Subsidiary operations in 

Solomons and New Guinea 

and air operations from the 

Aleutians. 

Annex "I" 

242 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Serial 3 -June 1944 to November 1944 

Holding operations in Burma. Offensive operations against 

Carolines. 

Subsidiary operations in the 

New Guinea area. 

Serial 4 -November 1944 to May 1945 

Course B 

(Favored by U.S.) 

Offensive operations in North 

Burma and capture -

Course C 

(Favored by British) 

Offensive operations in North 

Burma. 

Offensive operations against 

Northern Sumatra and Malaya. 

Offensive operations 

against the Pelews and 

possibly Marianas. 

Subsidiary operations in 

the New Guinea area. 

Commence offensive operations against South 

Philippines.* 

of Rangoon 

Holding operations in Burma. 

Serial 5 -June 1945 to November 1945 

Holding opera- Continue of -OR - Offensive 

tions in North fensive opera- operaBurma. tions aeainst tions 

Continue offen- the Soith against 

sive opera- Philippines. Luzon, 

tions in Mala- Formosa 

ya and against or 

Japanese com- Ryukyus. 

munications to 

Burma. 

* If conditions are favorable, it may prove possible to by-pass this objective. 

Annex "I" 

243 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Serial 6 -November 

Complete offen- Offensive 

sive opera- operations 

tions to clear against North 

1945 to Mau 1946 

Continue OR Launch offenoffensive 

operations 

Burma. Burma and Ran- against 

Offensive opera- goon, subsequent- South 

tions against ly clearing the Philippines. 

N. Sumatra and whole of Burma. 

Malaya. Offensive operations against 

Camranh Bay.+ 

sive operations against Hong 

Kong or 

Formosa 

(if not 

already 

captured). 

Serial 7 -During the remainder of 1946 

Complete capture Launch offensive operations 

of Malaya. against Luzon, Formosa, Hong 

Kong, Hainan and/or Ryukyus 

from East and West. 

Serial 8 -From 1947 onwards 

OR Establish 

the strategic bombing 

force in 

China and/ 

or Formosa. 

Establish the strategic bombing force in China and/or Formosa. 

Bomb Japan. 

Invade Japan. 

* If conditions are favorable, it may prove possible to by-pass these objectives. 

Annex “I” 

244 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX “I I ’’ 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS APPROVED IN THE PACIFIC THEATER 1943-44, 

INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR ROUTE INTO CHINA 

The various operations approved in the Pacific Theater during 1943-44 

and for the development of the air route into China are shown below. 

1. GILBERTS 

The seizure and consolidationof the GILBERTS preparatory to a further advance into the MARSHALLS. NAURU, TARAWA, and MAKIN are to 

be captured by simultaneous assault followed by the rapid development of 

airfields in the foreward (TARAWA-MAKIN) area and staging fields along 

the GILBERT line. 

2. MARSHALLS 

The seizure of the MARSHALL ISLANDS (including WAKE and 

KUSAIE) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central PACIFIC. Initial operations envisage either the seizure of the center nucleus by 

simultaneous assault or a step-by-step advance up from the GILBERTS 

through JALUIT and MILL 

3. PONAPE 

The capture of PONAPE preparatory to operationsagainst the TRUK 

area. The main effort is to be against the northern (PONAPE Town) area. 

Subsequent operations provide for the elimination of enemy forces by successive seizure of their positions. 

4. CAROLINES (TRUK area) 

The seizure of the eastern CAROLINES as far west as WOLEAI and 

the establishment of a fleet base at TRUK. Atolls to the southeastward of 

TRUK are to be captured first, followed by the rapid development of airfields in the area. These will provide bases for a sustained fighter-supported 

bombing offensive against TRUK. Subsequent operations provide for capture of TRUK and the reduction as necessary of the remaining enemy positions as far west as WOLEAI. 

Annex ‘TI” 

245 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. PALAU ISLANDS 

The capture of the PALAUS including YAP. The plan calls for the initial capture of YAP and other suitable islands in the neighboring atolls 

from which to conduct a more intensified air attack against the PALAUS. 

The initial phases of the fii assault against the PALAUS center largely 

on the MALAKAL-KOROR Harbor area, with the objective of seizing airfields. Subsequent operations provide for the capture or neutralization of 

all the islands. 

6. OPERATIONS AGAINST GUAM AND THE JAPANESE MARIANAS 

The seizure of GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS. 

7. OPERATIONS IN THE NEW GUINEA-BISMARCKS-ADMIRALTY 

ISLANDS SUBSEQUENT TO CARTWHEEL 

The seizure or neutralization of eastern NEW GUINEA as far west 

as WEWAK and including the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and BISMARCK 

ARCHIPELAGO. RABAUL is to be neutralized rather than captured. Airfields are to be developed throughout the area and advanced naval anchorages are to be established at KAVIENG and MANUS ISLAND. The plan 

envisages: (1) an advance to WEWAK, (2) the seizure of NEW IRELAND 

and the outlying islands of NEW HANOVER and ST. MATTHIAS, and (3) 

the seizure of the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS inthe order listed. Concurrently 

with these operations, RABAUL is to be neutralized by an air offensive of 

increasing intensity. 

8. OPERATIONS IN NEW GUINEA SUBSEQUENT TO THE WEWAKKAVIENG OPERATION 

An advance along the north coast of NEW GUINEA as far west as 

VOGELKOP, by step-by-step airborne-waterborne advances. Each successive offensive is predicated on the consolidation of earlier seizures, including the activation of airftelds from which to provide close land-based aircraft support for subsequent operations. 

9. AIR ROUTE INTO CHINA 

Present plans provide for first priority of resources available in the 

China-Burma-India Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air 

routes and air supplies to China, and the development of air facilities, with 

a view to: 

Annex “11” 

246 
u. s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

a. Keeping China in the war. 

b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese. 

c. Maintaining increased U.S.and Chinese Air Forces in China. 

d. Equipping Chinese ground forces. 

AMex “11” 

247 
248 
C.C.S. 31915 24 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

Note ig the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

The Enclosure is the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the 

QUADRANT Conference. It has been approved by the President and the Prime 

Minister, except for paragraph 61, upon which acticm has been deferred pending further consideration by the U.S.and Britiih Governments. 

ENCLOSURE 

QUADRANT 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

OF THE FINAL AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED 

BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1. In previous memoranda (C.C.S. 319 and C.C.S. 319/2) the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present 

conference regarding operations in the main theaters of war. These amended 

conclusions have been related to resources available, and an agreed mmmq 

is submitted herewith. 

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

2. In conjunctionwith RUSSZA and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXZS powers. 

11. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION 

OF THE WAR 

3. In cooperation with RUSSZA and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE. 

249 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITXSH MOST SECRET 

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned 

to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpase

of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which 

her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the 

over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of SM before action is taken. 

5. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other 

PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources of 

the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN. 

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL 

STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic 

concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against 

our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with 

the changing situation. 

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE and the BRITISH ISLES. 

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas. 

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular 

emphasison the defeat of the U-boat menace. 

d. Continuethe disruption of AXIS sea communications. 

e. Intensify the air offensive against the AXIS Powers in EUROPE. 

f. Concentratemaximum resourcesin a selected area asearly as practicable for the purpose of conductinga decisive invasion of the AXIS citadel. 

g. Undertake such measures asmay be necessary and practicable to aid 

the war effort of RUSSIA. 

h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of CHZNA as an effective Ally and as a base for 

operations against JAPAN. 

i. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of 

TURKEY in the war on the side of the Allies (See also paragraph 62). 

250 
u.a. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

j. To prepare the French Forces in AFRICA to fulAll an active role in 

the war against the AXIS Powers (See also paragraph 63). 

IV. EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

7. The following operations in execution of the over-all strategic concept 

are agreed upon. 

8. THE U-BOAT WAR 

a. Progress RelJort 

We have had encouraging reports from the Chiefs of the two Naval 

Staffs regarding the U-boat war. We have approved recommendations made 

by the Allied Submarine Board which should result in further strengthening our anti-U-boat operations. The Board has been directed to continue 

and expand its studies in search of further improvements. 

b. Facilities in the AZORES Islands 

The facilities of the AZORES Islands will be used for inteded sea 

and air operations against the U-boat. 

NOTE: On the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the 

use of the AZORES we have taken note of the assurance given 

by the British Chiefsof Staff that everything will be done by 

the British as soon as possible after actual entry into the 

AZORES has been gained to make arrangements for their 

operational and transit use by U.S.aircraft. 

9. THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE 

We have approved the following operations in 1943-44 for the defeat of 

the Axis Powers in Europe. 

10. THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

The progessive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the 

~~ccessful prosecution of the Combined Bomber ORensive from all convenient 

bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete 

251 
Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must 

therefore continue to have highest strategic priority. 

11. OPERATION “OVERLORD” 

a. This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort 

against the AXIS in EUROPE. (Target date 1 May 1944). After securing 

adequate CHANNEL ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing 

areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. 

Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in FRANCE, operations 

designed to strike at the heart of GERMANY and to destroy her military 

forces will be undertaken. 

b. There will be a balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the UNITED KINGDOM in readinessto take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic c~ss-CHANNELmove into FRANCE. 

c. As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the MEDITERRANEAN, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be 

distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of 

OVERLORD. Operations in the MEDITERRANEAN Theater will be carried 

out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT except insofar as these may be 

varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

12. We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation 

OVERLORD and have authorized him to proceed with the detailed planning 

and with full preparations. 

13. OPERATION “JUPITER 

In case circumstances render the execution of OVERLORD impossible, 

it may be necessary to consider JUPITER asan alternative. Plans for this operation, with particular reference to anentry into Southern Norway, should therefore be made and kept up to date. 

14. OPERATIONS IN ITALY 

a. First phase. The eliminationof ITALY as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the ROME area, and, if feasible, farther north. 

b. Second phase. Seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA. 

c. Third phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German 

forces in Northern ITALY, and the creation of the conditions required for 

252 
u.8. SECRET 

BBITEBB Mom SECRET 

OVERLORD and of a situation favorable for the eventualentry of our forces, 

including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into 

Southern FRANCE. 

15. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 

Offensive operations against Southern FRANCE (to include the use of 

trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a 

lodgement in the TOULON-MARSEILLES area and to exploit northward in 

order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD. Air nourished 

guerrilla operations in the Southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated. 

16. AIR OPERATIONS 

a. Strategic bombing operations from Italian and Central MEDITERRANEAN bases, complementing POINTBLANK. 

b. Development of an air ferry route through the AZORES. 

c. Air supply of BALKAN and French guerrillas (see paragraph 17 

below). 

17. OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 

Operations in the BALKAN area will be limited to supply of BALKAN 

guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces, and to the 

bombing of strategic objectives. 

18. GARRISON REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY OF LINES OF 

COMMUNICATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Defensive garrison commitments in the MEDITERRANEAN area will 

be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The 

security of our lines of communication through the Strait of GIBRALTAR will 

be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest AFRICA, m 

long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the 

IBERIAN PENINSULA. 

19. EMERGENCYRETURNTOTHECONTINENT 

We have examined the plans that have been prepiued by General Morgan’s staff for an emergency operation to enter the Continent. We have taken 

note of these plans and have directed that they be kept under contiuous review 

253 
u.s. SECRET 

BBITlsH MOST SECRET 

with particular reference to the premises regarding the attainment of air 

superiority and the number of troops necessary for the success of these operati0Il.S. 

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

20. LONG-TERM STRATEGY 

We have made a preliminary study of long-term strategy for the defeat 

of JAPAN and are of the opinion that the following factors require particular 

emphasis: 

a. The dependence of JAPAN upon air power, naval power, and shipping 

for maintaining her position in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. 

b. The consequent need for applying the maximum attrition to JAPAN’S 

air force, naval forces and shipping by all possible means in all possible 

areas. 

c. The advantageto be gained and the tie to be saved by a more extensive use of the superior air resources at the disposal of the United Nations, 

both in the strategic field and in conjunctionwith operationson land. 

21. We consider that great advantage may be obtained,by modern and untried methods, from the vast resources which, with the defeat of Germany, will 

become available to the United Nations. We have in mind: 

a. A project rapidly to expand and extend the striking power of the 

United Nations airforces in CHZNA as well as of the ground troops for their 

defense by employing the large numbers of load carrying aircraft available 

to open an “airmad” to CHZNA. 

b. The employment of lightly equipped jungle forces, dependent largely 

upon air supply lines. 

c. The use of special equipment, such as artscial harbors, HABBAKUKS, etc., to enable the superior power of the United Nations to be deployed in unexpected and undeveloped areas. 

22. From every point of view operationsshould be framed to force the defeat 

of JAPAN as soon as possible after the defeat of GERMANY. Planning should 

be on the basis of accomplishing this within 12 months of that event. Decisions 

as to specific operationswhich will insure a rapid course of events must await 

further examination on the lies indicated above. 

254 
23. The deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the 

war against JAPAN must be in accord with the over-all objective and strategic 

concept reahed in Sections I and I1above (paragraphs 2-5). 

24. We are agreed that the reorientation of forces from the European Theater to the PACIFIC and FAR EAST should be started as soon as the German 

situation, in our opinion, so allows. 

25. The principle has been accepted that the forces to carry out operations

from the East, including the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, shall be provided by the 

UNITED STATES, and for operations from the West by GREAT BRITAIN, 

except for special types not available to GREAT BRITAIN which will be provided by the UNITED STATES. The employment of Dominion forces will be a 

matter of discussion between all Governments concerned. 

26. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS 1943-44 

We have found it impracticable during QUADRANT to arrive at all the 

necessary decisions for operations in the war against JAPAN in 1943-44.We 

therefore propose that, as soon as the necessary further examinations have 

been made, a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference should be held wherever 

may be most convenient, unless agreement is reached through the ordinary

channels. There are, nevertheless, certain decisions which we feel able to make 

at once. 

27. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 1943-44 

We approve the proposals of the United States Chiefs of StaiT for operations in the PACIFIC in 1943-44 as follows: 

28. GILBERTS 

The seizure and consolidation of the GZLBERTSpreparatory to a further 

advance intathe MARSI3ALJ.S. 

29. MARSHALLS 

The seizure of the MARSHALL ISLANDS (including WAKE and KUSAZE) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central PACIFZC. 

30. PONAPE 

The capture of PONAPE preparatory to operations against the TBUK 

area. 

255 
31. CAROLINES (TRUK AREA) 

The seizure of the eastern CAROLINES as far west as WOLEAI and the 

establishment of a fleet base at TRUK. 

32. PALAU ISLANDS 

The capture of the PALAUS including YAP. 

33. OPERATIONS AGAINST GUAM AND THE JAPANESE MARIANAS 

The seizure of GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS. 

34. PARAMUSHIRU 

Consideration of operationsagainst PARAMUSHIRU and the KURILES. 

35. OPERATIONS IN THE NEW GUINEA-BISMARCKS-ADMIRALTY 

ISLANDS SUBSEQUENT TO CURRENT OPERATIONS 

The seizure or neutralization of eastern NEW GUINEA as far west as 

WEWAK and including the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. RABAUL is to be neutralized rather than captured. 

36. OPERATIONS IN NEW GUINEA SUBSEQUENT TO THE WEWAKKAVIENG OPERATION 

An advance along the northcoast of NEW GUINEA as far west as VOGELKOP, by step-by-step airborne-mter-bmm advances. 

37. OPERATIONS IN INDIA-BURMA-CHINA THEATER, 1943-44 

To carry out operations for the capture of UPPER BURMA in order to 

improve the air route and establish overland communications with CHINA. 

Target date mid-February 1944. 

It is recognized that the extent of these operations is dependent upon 

logistic considerations as affected by recent floods. 

83. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring of 

1%. Pending a decision on the particular operation, the scale of these preparations should be of the order of those contemplated at TRIDENT for the capture of AKYAB and RAMREE. 
U.5. SECRET 

CmISH MOST SECRET 

39. To continue the preparation of INDIA as a base for the operations 

eventually contemplated in the Southeast Asia Command. 

40. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of 

CHINA, and the development of air facilities, with a view to: 

a. Keeping CHINA in the war. 

b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese. 

c. Maintaining increased U.S.and Chinese Air Forces in CHI". 

d. Equipping Chinese ground forces. 

41. We have decided that our main effort should be put into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with CHINA and 

improving and securing the air route. Priorities cannot be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander in formulating his proposals 

to regard this decision as a guide and to bear in mind the importance of the 

longer term development of the lines of communication. 

42. EXAMINATION OF FUTURE OPERATIONS 

We have directed that the following studies shall be made forthwith: 

43. A study and report on the following operations and their relation one to 

another : 

a. An operation against NORTHERN SUMATRA; target date spring 

1944. 

b. Operations southwards from NORTHERN BURMA; target date November 1944. 

c. Operations through the MOULMEIN area or KRA ISTHMUS in the 

difection of BANGKOK; target date to be as early aspracticable. 

d. Operations through the MALACCA STRAITS and MALAYA for the 

direct capture of Singapore; target date to be as early as practicable. 

e. The capture of AKYAB and RAMREE to determine whether it is 

necessary to the success of operations in a to d above or the operations in 

WPPER BURMA (Paragraph 37). 

257 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

44. A study of the potentialities and limitations of developing the air route 

to CHINA on a scale sufacient to employ all the heavy bomber and transport

aircraft likely to be available for the Southeast Asia Theater and CHINA in 

1944-45, on the assumption that GERMANY is defeated in the autumn of 1944. 

45. Thisstudy to specify the action required to implement the best possible 

plan resulting from the above without prejudice to the operations in pagraphs 37 and 38. 

46. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

The vigorous and effective prosecution of large-scale operations against 

JAPAN in Southeast Asia, and the rapid development of the air route through 

BURMA to CHINA, necessitate the reorganization of the High Command in 

the Indian Theater. It has, therefore, been decided that the Command in 

ZNDIA should be divided from the operational Command in Southeast Asia as 

described below: 

47. COMMAND IN INDIA 

The admims’ tration of INDIA as a base for the forces in Southeast Asia 

will remain under the control of the Commander in Chief, India. Coordination 

of movement and maintenance both of the operational forces based on INDIA 

and of the internal garrison can best be carried out efficiently by one staff 

responsible in the last resort to one authority With power to decide priorities. 

This machinery exists today in the Government of INDIA and in G.H.Q. India. 

It is the only machinery which can carry out the dual tasks of meeting the 

internal requirements of INDIA as well as the requirements of operations in 

the Southeast Asia Theater. 

48. COMMAND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

A Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia should be set up as 

follows: 

a. The command and st& to be a combined British and American one 

on the lines of the North African Command. 

258 
U.S.WRET 

BRITXSR MOST SECRET 

b. The Supreme Allied Commander to be British, with an American 

deputy. He should haw under him Naval, Army and Air Commanders in 

Chief, and dso a Principal AdministrativeOficer to coordinate the administrative planning of all three Services and of the Allied forces. 

c. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the Commanders of the 

three Services mentioned above, acting under the orders of the Supreme 

Allied Commander, to control all operatibns and have under their command 

such Naval, Military and Air forces as may be assigned to the Southeast 

Asia Theater from time to time. 

49. AREA INCLUDED 

The boundaries axe set out in detail in C.C.S. 30813, but, generally, they 

include BURMA, CEYLON, THAILAND (SIAM), the MALAY PENINSULA 

and SUMATRA. 

50. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Conflicts of opinion over priorities in connection with administration 

must be anticipated. It will, therefore, be necessary for someone on the spot to 

resolve these differences day by day asthey occur. This authority should be the 

Viceroy,not in his ststutorycapacity asGovernor-General,but acting on behalf 

of the British War Cabinet. 

51. The Supreme Commander will in any event have direct access to the 

British Chiefsof Staff on all matters, and if he is not satisfled with the ruling 

of the Viceroy on administrative matters, he will be able to exercise this right. 

The Commander in Chief, India,will continue to have the right of direct access 

to the British Chiefs of Staff. 

52 DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER 

General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the 

Southeast Asia Theater and in that capacity will command the Chinese troops 

operating into Burma and all US.air and ground forces committed to the 

Southeast Asia Theater. 

53. The operationai control of the Chinese forces operating into Burma will 

be exercised, in conformity with the over-all plan of the British Army Commander, by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, or by his representative, 

who will be located with the troops. 

259 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

54. The operationalcontrol of the 10thAir Force will be vested in the Deputy 

Supreme Allied Commander and exercised by his air representative located at 

the headquarters of the Air Commander in Chief. 

55. General Stilwell will continue to have the same direct responsibility to 

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as heretofore. His dual function under the 

Supreme Allied Commander and under the Generalissimo is recognized. 

56. The organization and command of the U.S.Army and Navy Air Transport Services in the Southeast Asia area will remain under the direct control of 

the Commanding General, U.S.Army Air Forces, and of the Commander in 

Chief, U.S.Fleet, respectively, subject to such supply and service functions as 

may be by them delegated to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. Requests 

by the Supreme Allied Commander for the use of U.S.troop carrier aircraft for 

operational purposes will be transmitted to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. 

57. Requests for the use of surface transportation capacity in and through 

INDIA, or for development involving construction for the air route to CHINA, 

will be passed through the Supreme Allied Commander in order that they may 

be related, as regards priority, to his requirements before being placed on the 

Commander in Chief, INDIA. 

58. COMMAND RELATIONSHIP 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over 

strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and the allocation of American and 

British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast 

Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all 

matters pertaining to operations, and would be the c'hannel through which all 

instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed. 

59. THE COORDINATION OF AMERICAN AGENCIES SUCH AS O.S.S., 

O.W.I., F.C.B., ETC., WITH COMPARABLE BRITISH 

ORGANIZATIONS 

In order to facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination 

between the U.S.and British quasi-military agencies in INDIA and the Southeast Asia Command, a Combined Liaison Committee will be set up at New Delhi. 

60. There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in INDIA or 

I!FSoutheast Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such 

2so 
operations in these axeas are put intoeffect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence 

of the government of INDIA, the Commander in Chief, INDIA, or the Supreme 

Commander, Southeast Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable. 

V. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS 

61. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO SPAIN 

We suggest that our general policy should be to deny the enemy his 

present privileged position in SPAIN, and to supplant him there to as great an 

extent as possible, thus transferring to the Germans the anxiety that has 

hitherto been ours. In pursuance of this policy, we suggest that we should now 

intensify pressure by economic and political means in order to obtain the following objectives: 

a. Discontinuance of supplies of raw materials to GERMANY. The most 

important material which GERMANY obtains from SPAIN is wolfram, 

of which commodity SPAIN and PORTUGAL supply the largest proportion 

of German requirements. 

b. Withdrawal of the Blue Division from the ranks of the enemy. 

c. A modification of the present distribution of Spanish forces in 

MOROCCO soasto remove any suggestion of distrust of the United Nations. 

d. Cessation of the useof Spanishshipping for the benefit of our enemies. 

e. Denial to the enemy of secret intelligence facilities. 

f. Facilities for civil aircraft of United Nations. 

8. A more benevolent attitude towardsescaped Allied prisoners of war. 

h. Elimination of objectionable anti-Allied propaganda and increase in 

pro-Allied propaganda. 

62. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO TURKEY 

We are of the opinion that from the military point of view the time is 

not ripe for TURKEY to enter the war on our side. Our policy should be as 

follows: 

261 
u.6. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SEIXET 

a. We should ask TURKEY to interpret the Montreux Convention 

strictly,soasto exclude the passage of all German shippingof military value 

through the Straits. 

b. We should askthat suppliesof chrome to Germany should be stopped. 

c. We should ask TURKEY to continue: 

(1) To improve her internal communications. 

(2) To complete the airAelds required for HARDIHOOD. 

(3) To allow us to install the full R.D.F. and Sector Control facilities 

which we require. 

(4) To complete the construction of storage facilities required for 

the full HARDIHOOD Plan. 

(5) To raise the effectiveness of their fighting forces. 

d. Our policy on equipment to TURKEY should be that we should continue to supply such equipment aswe can spare and asthe Turkscan absorb. 

63. REEQUIPPING THE FRENCH FORCES 

We have approved the rearmament of French units up to and including 

eleven divisions by 31 December 1943 as recommended by the Commander, 

North African Theater. 

64. “PLOUGH” FORCE 

General Morgan and General Eisenhower have been given the details of 

PLOUGH force and have been asked toreport as to possible uses for it in their 

respective theaters. 

65. SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN SARDINIA AND CORSICA 

We have WedGeneral Eisenhower to examine the possibilities of intensifying subversive activitiesin SARDINIA and CORSICA with a view to facilitating entry into those islands. 

66. “HABBAKUK” 

We have examined the possibilities of constructing “floating airfields” 

and have given our approval to the active pursuit of further experiments. 

262 
67. PIPELINE, INDIA-CHINA 

We have approved, subject to prior requirements for Wtary operations 

in BURMA, the construction of a four-inch pipeline from ASSAM to KUNMING 

and of a six-inch pipeline from CALCUTTA to ASSAM. These will facilitate ah 

operationsin CHINA and ease congestion on the existing lines of supply. 

68. SUPPLY ROUTES IN N. E. INDIA 

We have approved, subject to prior requirements of operations in 

BURMA, intensified development of the supply routes into and in ASSAM and 

have issued directivesto theater commanders concerned with a view to a target 

of 220,000 tonsper month being reached by 31 December 1945. 

RELATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO 

THE OPERATIONS DECIDED UPON 

69. We have carried out an examination of the available resources of the 

United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the operations 

decided upon. We And in general that these resources will be sumcient to meet 

our needs. In some cases, however, the availability of resources is dependent 

upon conditions which cannot be foreseen at this time. The subject therefore 

Bhould be kept under constant review, and if shortages develop or conflicts of 

interest arise,they will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision. 

263 
264 
u.s.SECRET 

BIUTISJ3 MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 320 

“RANKIN” 

Reference: 

CCS 115th Meeting, Item (9) 

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (2) 

C.C.S. 320 was circulated 20 August 1943. The Combined Chiefs of StafE, 

in their 115th Meeting, approved the subject plan in principle, and their decisionon this subject paper is ihcluded inC.C.S. 319/5. 

265 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 320 20 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

“RANKIN’ 

Note bg the Secretaries 

The Enclosure is a digest of the plan for Operation RANKIN which has 

been prepared by the COSSAC Staff. 

H. REDMAN, 

.I.R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

DIGEST OF OPERATION “RANKIN” 

Recommendations for the Courses of Action to be followed in North-West 

Europe in the event of substantial weakening of German resistance, or withdrawal from Occupied Countries or unconditional surrender occurring between the 1st November, 1943, and the 1st May 1944. 

INTRODUCTION 

1. The latest review (J.I.C. (43) 324 of 3 August 1943) by the J.I.C. of the 

enemy’s present situation and his possible plans and intentions during the remainder of 1943 shows that the recent reverses on the Russian front, the 

breach developing in Italy and the Balkans, the set-back suffered by the Uboat campaign and the ever-increasing Allied air offensive, all combine to 

create a position which (in the opinion of the J.I.C.) must appear to the German leaders as verging on the desperate. The limiting factor for the enemy 

being availability of forces, the gathering threat in Italy and the Balkans may 

well lead him to find reserves at the expense of the ground and air forces now 

located in Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries and France. Nor is it beyond 

the bounds of possibility that an imminent threat of complete disaster on the 

Russian front might induce him to abandon altogether his occupation of 

Western and probably Southern Europe, in order to concentrate all available 

266 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

forces against the Russian menace, postpone the hour of final defeat and insure the ultimate occupation of Germany by Anglo-American rather than by 

Russian forces. 

CONDITIONS OF A RETURN TO NORTH-WEST EUROPE DURING THE 

WINTER 1943-44 

2. It follows from the above that it has bcome a matter of urgent necessity 

to prepare for a return to the Continent during the winter 1943-44. The possible alternative conditions of return are:-

Case A.-Such substantial weakening of the strength and morale 

of the German armed forces as will permit successful assault with the 

Anglo-American forces prior to the target date of OVERLORD. 

Case B. -German withdrawal from the occupied countries. 

Case C. -German unconditional surrender and cessation of organized rsistance in North-West Europe. 

In Cuses A and B our object is to effect a lodgment on the Continent 

from which we can complete the defeat of Germany; our object in Case C is to 

occupy as rapidly as possible appropriate areas from which we can take steps 

to enforce the terms of unconditional surrender laid down by the Allied Governments. Inherent in all cases will be the rehabilitation of liberated countries. 

The three cases are considered in succession below. 

CASE A. -COURSES OF ACTION FOR A RETURN TO THE CONTINENT IN 

THE EVENT OF SUBSTANTIAL WEAKENING OF GERMAN RESISTANCE 

IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES. 

3. Excluding airborne troops and tank brigades, it is calculated that the 

number of Allied Divisions operationally and administratively ready on the 1st 

November, 1943, will be eight, on the 1st January, 1944, seventeen, and on the 

1st March, 1944, twenty-three. The approximate Naval Assault Forces available on these dates will be respectively one, two-three, and five. The Metropolitan Air Force will be available for cover and support and one composite 

group of the Tactical Air Force should be available by the end of 1943. It is 

considered that with these resources the following operations would be practicable. During November and December 1943 an assault could only be undertaken on a narrow front against a weakly-held sector of the coastline, provided 

that there are clear indications that France and the Low Countries have been 

almost entirely denuded of reserves, and that German resistance is on the 

267 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

point of collapse. During January and February 1944 an assault could be undertaken against weak opposition to secure a strictly limited objective. From 

March 1944 onwards an assault with a more ambitious role might be undertaken, provided the strength and morale of the German troops and, in particular, of German reserves, are markedly below the maximum acceptable 

strength for Operation OVERLORD. Clearly in all three cases the overriding 

condition of adequate reduction in the present fighting value of the G.A.F. on 

the Western front, and an inability of the German Command to bring up important reserves,must pertain. 

4. As for the area of assault, the choice in Operation OVERLORD was narrowed down to the alternatives of the Pais de Calais and the Cotentin-Caen 

sectors. The Pasde Calais is the pivot of the whole German defensive system, 

and it may be expected that the defenses there will remain strong to the end; 

it is therefore concluded that the assault area in the present case should be 

the same as for OVERLORD, i.e., Cotentin-Cam. As maintenance over beaches 

and the construction of artificial ports would prove too hazardous in winter, 

it will be essential to capture the port of Cherbourg and as many minor ports 

as possible within 48 hours.The plan for OVERLORD would therefore have to 

be modified to meet this special requirement. There are obvious advantages in 

having the same area for either operation; for in the early months of 1944 our 

preparations for OVERLORD will be well advanced, and it would be difficult 

at that stage to change the area of assault to some different part of the coast. 

5. The strategic recommendations for Case A may accordingly be summarized as follows:­

a. No assault against organized resistance will be feasible before the 

1st January, 1944, unless there are clear indications that German resistance in the West is on the point of collapse, and measures are taken in time 

to make the Naval Assault Forces available for operations by recourse to 

special manning expedients. 

b. Subsequent to that date, an assault elsewhere than in the area selected for OVERLORD is unlikely to be feasible or advisable. 

c. If a sufficiently drastic reduction in the morale and strength of the 

German armed forces takes place, operations against organized opposition 

could be undertaken in January or February 1944 to capture the Cotentin 

Peninsula, or in March or April 1944to put up a modified OVERLORD plan

intoeffect. In either case the plan must provide for the capture of the port 

of Cherbourg within the first 48 hours. 

268 
u.s. SECRET 

RRITISH MOST SECRET 

d. As in the case of OVERLORD, diversionary operations in the Pas de 

Calais area, and from the Mediterranean against the South of Frame will 

probably be essential. 

CASE B.-COURSES OF ACTION FOR A RETURN TO THE CONTINENT 

IN THE EVENT OF A GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED 

COUNTRIES. 

6. It is probable that if the enemy is obliged to make withdrawals from 

Western Europe he will first withdraw his forces from his extremities, i.e., 

from Norway in the North and from South-Western and Western France in 

the South. If this occurs, we should require, for po!itical as well as strategic 

reasons, to send some forces to occupy the areas so liberated; but it would be 

important that we should not tie up our main forces far from the eventual 

center of action. 

7. In Norway, establishment of certain bases for Coastal Command Aircraft and Naval Forces is likely to be most desirable. It is probable that requirements can be limited to the establishment of bases in Northern Norway

for aircraft of Coastal Command for the anti-submarine protection of shipping 

on passage round the North Cape; the development of Stavanger and Bergen 

as bases for aircraft of Coastal Command and light Naval Forces to blockade 

the entrance to the Baltic, and for the conduct of small offensive operations; 

and the establishment of surface warning sets (Radar) on the South coast 

of Norway. It is considered that forces of the order of one brigade group would 

be required for Northern Norway, and one division for Southern Norway, to 

secure the naval and air bases and support the Norwegian contingent in its 

task of rehabilitation. 

8. In France, it is probable that the first point of withdrawal would be 

Bordeaux, followed in succession by the other ports on the Western coast; the 

Channel coast and in particular the Pasde Calais would remain the last areas 

to be uncovered. Once withdrawal begins it is likely that it will eventually 

rxmtinue as far as the Siegfried Line, owing to the difficulty of holding any 

intermediate position with an economical force. 

9. The governing condition of our return is that we must have ports, since 

maintenance over beaches in winter is not practicable. If the enemy withdraw 

from South-Western and Western France, it is proposed that we should send 

a brigade group each, together with minimum necessary covering air forces, 

to occupy Bordea~ux,Nan& and Brest. The purpose of occupation of Bordeaux 

would be the rehabilitation of South-West France; the purpose of occupation 

269 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

of Brest and Nantes would also be partly the rehabilitation of France, but 

mainly the preparation, as a long-term policy, for the entry and maintenance 

of United States Forces direct from the United States. Demands to commit 

larger forces to these areas should be firmly resisted, and the first point of 

entry for our main forces should not be West of Cherbourg. The Northern extension of the German defensive position on the Siegfried Line would probably 

prevent our use of Antwerp, in which case the major ports available for our 

return would be Cherbourg, Havre and Rouen. It is impossible to forecast the 

turn that operations would take, since our advance would be dependent on the 

enemy’s withdrawal policy. It must be assumed that the enemy’s demolitions 

~111be thorough, and, therefore,it cannot be expected that our rate of advance 

will be swift. Moreover, rapid airfield construction, as proposed in OVERLORD, 

is impracticable in winter, and a more permanent and lengthy type of construction will be required. The capture of existing airfields is, therefore, of 

increased importance. A likely course of events is that an initial landing might 

be made at Cherbourg,followed by later landings at Havre and Rouen, and not 

long afterwards by the introduction of reinforcements and stores through the 

Pas de Calais ports. Our general intention should be to press Eastwards as 

fast as possible, opening up additional ports as we go, with the further object 

of establishing airfields in the Pas de Calais and in Belgium, from which the 

Tactical Air Force can complete the destruction of the German Air Force and 

the strategic bomber force can intensify their attack on Germany at closer 

range when the advance Eastwards has gone sufficiently far to make this 

profitable. Under the condition of German withdrawal, deficiencies in the 

strength of the Tactical Air Force can be made good at the expense of the 

static fighter defense system of the United Kingdom. In this way enough 

squadrons could be made available to take full advantage of airfields prepared 

by the Army on the Continent, while additional air support could still be provided from bases in the United Kingdom. 

10. The strategic recommendations for Case B may accordingly be summarized as follows:­

a. That the port of Cherbourg be the first place of entry for our main 

forces. 

b. That as the German withdrawal proceeds, our main forces be based 

on Cherbourg,Havre and Rouen, supplemented as necessary by the smaller 

ports further East. 

c. That the port of Bordeaux be occupied in the first instance by a small 

forceonly for the sole purpose of rehabilitation of South-West France. 

270 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

d. That the ports of Brest and Nantes be similarly occupied by small 

forces only, partly to assist in the rehabilitation of France, but mainly to 

prepare, as a long-term policy, for the entry and maintenance of United 

Stah Forces direct from the United States. 

e. That as large forces as possible from the Mediterranean be dispatched 

to occupy the ports of Marseilles and Toulon, and subsequently to move 

Northwards on Lyons and Vichy, and thereafter as required. 

CASE C -COURSES OF ACTION FOR A RETURN TO THE CONTINENT IN 

THE EVENT OF GERMAN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER AND THE CESSATION OF ORGANIZED ARMED RESISTANCE IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE 

11. The object is to occupy, as rapidly as possible, appropriate areas from 

which we can take steps to enforce the terms of unconditional surrender imposed by the Allied Governments on Germany; and in addition to carry out 

the rehabilitation of the Occupied Countries. 

12. A consideration of the areas of strategic importance leads to the conclusion that the best use of our limited land forces lies in the speedy occupation 

in adequate force of the Jutland Peninsula, the adjacent great ports of Bremen, Hamburg and Eel, and the large towns in the valleys of the Ruhr and 

the Rhine. It is considered that the forces required for occupation of these 

areas would amount to seven divisions for Denmark and North-West Germany, six Divisions for the Ruhr, eleven Divisions for the valley of the Rhine; 

making a totalin all of twenty-four Divisions. 

18. In addition to the forces required for occupation of Germany, further 

forces will be required for rehabilitation of the Liberated Territories and to 

assist in the disarmament of Germany. It is considered that the following 

forces will be required in support of the contingents of the Nations concerned, 

or in the case of Denmark supplementary to the field force formations given 

in paragraph 12 above; one division and one brigade for Norway, one brigade 

for Denmark, two brigades for Holland, four brigades for Belgium; and in the 

case of France, two field force divisions for Paris and Northern France, two 

field force divisions for the Mediterranean ports and South France, and six 

brigades for the Atlantic and Channel ports. Except where it is explicitly 

stated that field force divisions will be required, full use should be made of 

non-field force formations in the above role. 

14. Both in the case of Germany and in the case of liberated territories, it 

will be necessary for adequate air forces to form part of the occupying force. 

In Germany, their role will be to take immediate action to overcome any re271 
u.s. SECRET 

BRJTISE MOST SECRET 

sistance to our terms, to take punitive action against local disorder and to be 

a reminder to the German people of the main strategic bomber force which 

will remain based in the United Kingdom. Adequate air forces for occupation

of areas near key points in Germany and liberated territories are available in 

the United Kingdom and the whole resources of the Metropolitan Air Force 

will be available for reinforcement. 

15. The use of large forces in the dual task of rehabilitating the liberated 

territories and occupying strategic areas in Germany is a problem of such 

complexity that the greatest simplicity in plan is required if mistakes of farreaching consequenceare to be avoided. It is considered that the best plan will 

be to keep to the alignment proposed for OVERLORD,i.e., to dispose the 

American forces on the right of the front and the British forces on the left. It 

is thus contemplated that the American sphere of responsibility will extend 

from the Rhine at the SwissBorder to Dusseldorf, and will also include France 

and Belgium; while the British sphere of responsibility will include the Ruhr 

and North-West Germany, Holland, Denmark and Norway. In the liberated 

countries there should be representative forces of both nations. 

16. It is clear that for both political and military reasons speed of entry will 

be of the first importance. It may be possible to use air transport to a limited 

extent, but the bulk of our forces will have to be carried by sea. In the case of 

reentry through Copenhagen, Bremen and Hamburg, minesweeping is likely 

to impose short delays. The most suitable port of entry for the formations to 

occupy the Ruhr appears to be Rotterdam, while that for the forces for the 

Rhine Valley will be Antwerp. 

17. The comparison of requirements against availability of forces at different dates is as follows, providing the BOLERO program is maintained and the 

forces earmarked to return from the Mediterranean are received. The requirement is constant at 26 divisions and the availability of divisions shown excludes airborne troops and tank brigades:­

a. March 1944, 

23 divisions administratively ready for mobile operations. 

4 divisions admlnls ’ ’ tratively incomplete. 

Total 27 divisions. 

b. January 1944. 

17 divisions administratively ready for mobile operations. 

7 divisions administratively incomplete. 

Totd 24 divisions. 

273 
c. November 1943. 

8 divisions adrrrrmst ' ' ratively ready for mobile operations.

8 divisions administratively incomplete. 

Total 16 divisions. 

In view of the non-operational and semi-mobile nature of the tasks, the total 

figure shown in each case may be taken as the availability. The deficits therefore are two divisions in January 1944,and ten divisions in November 1943.It 

is proposed that these deficits should be made good when emergency arises by

the dispatch of Allied forces in the Mediterranean and of the United States 

divisions earmarked for Operation OVERLORD,Apart from these forces it is 

proposed that Allied forces in the Mediterranean should supply one United 

States and one British division to accompany the forces of the French Committee of National Liberation, for employment in Southern France. 

18. It is emphasized that the forces given in paragraph 12 above are the 

minimum land forces which will be required initially to obtain control in the 

Rhine Valley, the Ruhr, the entrance to the Baltic and in North-Western Germany. The ultimate size of forces of occupation will depend on the requirements and terms of occupation laid down by the Allied Governments. 

19. The strategic recommendations for Case C may accordingly be summarized as follows:­

a. That the sphere of the Supreme Allied Commander include the whole 

of France, Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and such portion of enemy territory as the Allied Governments may decide. It is assumed 

that this will include at least the Rhine Valley, the Ruhr and North-West 

Germany. 

b. That, as mn as the situation permits at the time of German unconditional surrender, Allied Forces based in the United Kingdom be dispatched: 

(1) Tooccupy and control the Valley of the Rhine from the Swiss to 

the Dutch frontiers, together with the area of the Ruhr, and insure disarmament of German armed forces returning from occupied territory. 

(2) To occupy and control Denmark, Schleswig, Holstein, the Kiel 

Canal, and the cities of Hamburg and Bremen, and insure disarmament 

of German armed forcesin those areas. 

273 
u.8. SECRET 

BpITIsaMasrsECRET 

(3) Toopen selected ports in the West coast of France and the Low 

Countries, to establish controlin the capitals of those countries,to institute measures of rehabilitation, and to assist as may be required in the 

disannsment of German armed forces. 

(4) To establish control in Norway, to rehabilitate the country, and 

insure disarmament of German armed forces. 

c. That, simultaneously, Allied contingents from the forces based in 

the Mediterranean be dispatched to open selected ports on the Mediterranean coast of France, to establish control at Vichy, to institute measures for 

the rehabilitation of Southern France, and to assist as may be required in 

the disannament of German armed forces. TheseAllied forces to come under 

operationalcontrol of the Supreme Allied Commander on arrival in France. 

d. That, under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, 

France, Belgium and the Rhine Valley from the Swiss frontier to inclusive 

Dusseldorf be regarded as a sphere under the control of the United States 

forces, with British representation in the liberated countries. 

e. That, under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Holland, Denmark, Norway and North-West Germany from inclusive the 

Ruhr Valley to Lubeck be regarded as a sphere under the control of British 

forces,with United States representation in the liberated countries. 

CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS 

20. Certain general recommendations emerge from the above study of 

RANKIN:­

a. The forces allotted for OVERLORD should be considered as equally 

available for RANKZN, if the occasion should arise. 

b. The appointment of the Allied Air Commander-In-Chief and Staff, 

and the provision in the United Kingdom of the Commanding General, Staf[ 

and headquarters of the United States Army Group are of urgent importance and should be undertaken forthwith. 

c. If the strategic recommendations in this paper are accepted in 

principle, the British and United StatesGovernments should be invited, as 

a matter of urgency, to lay down a policy to govern the conduct of the Civil 

Affairs Staff in the establishment of military governments in enemy territory to be occupied by our troops, and a policy to govern the establishment 

of indigenous administrations in the liberated Allied territories. 
u.s.SECBET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

d. That no time be lost in setting up nucleus combined American/British 

Civil AfIairs SMs in London for Germany and for each Allied country and 

friendly country, and such other countries as may be decided to lie within 

the sphere of the Supreme Allied Commander, to study in detail the problems involved and to make, without delay, detailed plans for the organization of civil administration therein. 

e. That plans be made forthwith, complete in every detail, for the rapid 

recruitment in reserve units on a para-military basis of British civil 

resources in technical personnel, labor and equipment for employment on 

the Continent, especially for airfield construction. In order to avoid any 

interference with the progress of current vital work, such as the BOLERO 

and airfield construction programs, these plans only to be put into efIect 

when the emergency arises. 

f. It will be desirable to undertake a campaign of propaganda among our 

own people to bring to their notice the necessity for widespread participation in the campaign in prospect. Our Service resources will be stretched to 

the uttermost, and will need every sort of civilian administrative support 

if they are to develop their full force at the decisive point or point& Provision of this support may well entail sacrifices on the part of all classes of 

the community. 

g. Close attention should be devoted to the question of collaboration 

with the U.S.S.R. 

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.l, 

14 August, 1943. 

275 
276 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 321 

POLICY TOWARDS SPAIN 

Reference: 

CCS 113th Meeting, Item (7) 

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (8) 

C.C.S. 321 wascirculated, 20 August 1943, and approved by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in their 113th Meeting.The conclusions of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff on this subject paper are included in C.C.S. 319/5. 

277 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 321 20 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

POLICY TOWARDS SPAIN 

Menuwandurn by the British Chiefs of Stag 

1. We have examined the suggestion put forward by the United States 

Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 303 paragraph 10) that the time is now ripe to take full 

advantage of our present position and adopt a stern and frankly demanding 

policy towards Spain. 

2. We can say at once that we agree entirely with the sense of this suggestion. The only point at issue is exactiy how far we should go. 

3. We feel that it will be agreed that: 

a. The Spaniards,with Germany on their doorstep,will not be persuaded 

to take any military action which appears to threaten Germany and which 

might bring on them German retaliation. Any action or threat on our part 

to coerce them in this direction would merely tend to unite them against us. 

b. From our point of view, it is most undesirable that we should press 

the Spaniards to a point which might impose upon us any military commitment in support of diplomatic or military threats. 

4. We suggest therefore that it would be unwise to go so far as to press 

the Spaniards to transfer the bulk of their defensive forces to the North, which 

they would he most unlikely to do. 

5. We suggest that our general policy should be to deny the enemy his 

present privileged position in Spain, and to supplant him there to as great an 

extent as possible, thus transferring to the Germans the anxiety that has 

hitherto been ours. In pursuance of this policy, we suggest that we should now 

intensify pressure by economic and political means in order to obtain the following objectives: 

a. Discontinuance of supplies of raw materials to Germany. The most 

important material which Germany obtains from Spain is wolfram,of which 

commodity Spain and Portugal supply the largest proportion of German 

278 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

requirements. A note on the wolfram position by the Ministry of Economic 

Warfare is attached. 

b. Withdrawal of the Blue Division from the ranks of the enemy. 

c. A modification of the present distribution of Spanish forces in Morocco so as to remove any suggestion of distrust of the United Nations. 

d. Cessationof the use of Spanishshippingfor the benefit of our enemies. 

e. Denial to the enemy of secret intelligence facilities. 

f. Facilities for civil aircraft of United Nations. 

g. A more benevolent attitude towards escaped Allied prisoners of war. 

h. The strictest interpretation of international law towards enemy personnel and naval and air units. 

i. Elimination of objectionable anti-Allied propaganda and increase in 

pro-Allied propaganda. 

6. Owing to the resentment which we are likely to cause if we interfere 

directly in Spanish internal affairs, it would not be in our military interests 

openly to promote the restoration of the monarchy since such interference 

would be likely to cause serious disorder in Spain,of which the Germans might 

take advantage by infiltration. 

We should, however, welcome and encourage the formation of a less 

anti-Allied Government. 

ENCLOSURE 

WOLFRAM FROM THE IBERIAN PENINSULA 

1. GERMANY'S PRESENT POSITiON 

The virtual absence of stock, Allied preemptive purchasing in the Peninsula and the success achieved against blockade runners has made Germany's 

wolfram position critical. 

279 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

2. STOCKS AND SUPPLIES 

Germany started the war with a stock of 12,000tons of concentrates. 

After the outbreak of war, Germany was dependent upon what was then a 

small output in the Peninsula, of which Portugal provided some 2,000 to 3,000 

tons and Spain only 300 tons. Until 1942Germany used her stocks to maintain 

an annual consumption of about 9,000tons. From 1942onwards, her consumption has been at the rate of about 5,800per year, of which about 4,300are basic 

industrial consumption and the balance for A.P. projectiles. Mines in Germany 

and France produce about 250 tons a year. Should our preemptive purchases 

in Spain and Portugal continue to be successful Germany will receive only 

about 2,000tons from each country in 1943 and may receive substantially less 

from Spain. As Germany started the year with only 500 tonsof stock, a further 

cut in consumption will be necessary unless she succeeds in obtaining further 

supplies by blockade running. 

3. EFFECTS OF SHORTAGE 

Germany’s main uses for tungsten (the metal derived from wolfram) 

are to make tungsten carbide, which is used for providing a hard tip for 

machine tools,and for cores for armor piercing projectiles. Small quantities of 

tungsten are also used for providing filaments for electric lamps, radio valves, 

etc., and asa hydrogenationcatalyst. A substantial reduction of supplies would 

therefore face Germany with the following alternatives: 

a. A cut in the production of weapons of all types, resulting from the 

absence of tungsten carbide tips from cutting tools and consequent less 

efficient production, or 

b. The sacrifice of armor piercing ammunition with tungsten carbide 

cores. 

Should supplies from the Peninsula be entirely cut off, Germany would probably suffer both as it is improbable that she would obtain sufficient suppliesby 

blockade running. Blockade running by surface Ships should prove impracticable in the future and submarinescould only bring the desired quantity at the 

expense of all other much needed commodities. 

4. SPEED OF EFFECT 

Theloss of suppliesfrom the IberianPeninsula would probably not aflect 

militargr operations for six months but after that the effect would be increasingly felt. 

280 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. CONCLUSIONS 

Failure to obtain wolfram from the Iberian Peninsula would seriously 

affect the rate of production throughout German industry and would render 

impossible the manufacture of armor piercing projectiles with tungsten carbide cores on any substantial scale. These effects would become apparent in 

actual operations after about six months, depending on the rate of military 

wastage. 

281 
282 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 32211 

POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY 

References: 

CCS 113th Meeting, Item (8) 

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (9) 

C.C.S. 322 was circulated, 20 August 1943, and approved by the Combined 

Chiefs of StafT in their 113th Meeting. Subsequently, during the course of discussion in their second meeting with the President and Prime Minister, the 

policy was approved subject to a minor amendment, proposed by the Prime 

Minister. The flnal approved paper was circulated as C.C.S. 322/1. 

The conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject paper are 

included in C.C.S. 319/5. 
u. s. SECBgT 

ERITISK MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 32211 30 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosure, Policy Towards Turkey, in the form as finally approved 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the President and Prime Minister, is circulated for information. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY 

The British Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that from the military point 

of view the time is not ripe for Turkey to enter the war on our side. Our policy 

should be as follows: 

a. We should ask Turkey to interpret the Montreux Convention strictly, 

so as to exclude the passage of all German shipping of military value 

through the Straits. 

b. We should ask that suppliesof chrome to Germany should be stopped. 

c. We should ask Turkey to continue: 

(1) To improve her internal communications. 

(2) To complete the airfields required for HARDIHOOD. 

(3) To allow us to install the full R.D.F.and Sector Control facilities 

which we require. 

284 
u.6.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(4) To complete the construction of storage facilities required for 

the full HARDIHOOD Plan. 

(5) To raise the effectiveness of their fighting forces. 

d. Our policy on equipment to Turkey should be that we should continue to supply such equipment as we can spare and asthe Turks can absorb. 

285 
286 
U. S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 323 

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 114th Meeting, Item (6) 

C.C.S. 323 was circulated, 20 August 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff 

in their 114th Meeting, after discussion, referred this paper to the Combined 

Staff Planners for study and submission of an appropriate report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 15 September 1943. 

No further action was taken on this subject paper at QUADRANT. 
u. s. mcm 

BRITISH MOiST SECRET 

C.C.S. 323 20 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS STAFF 

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

Memorandum fromthe U.S. Chiefsof Staff 

The Enclosure, prepared by the U.S. Army Air Force Planners, is referred 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the recommendation that it be referred 

to the Combined Staff Planners for study and the submission of a report by 15 

September 1943. 

ENCLOSURE 

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

Memorandum fromthe United States Army Air Force Planners 

THE PROBLEM 

1. The provision of an appreciation producing an outline plan to direct 

the full aerial resources of the United Nations to bring about, in conjunction 

with other military and naval effort, the overwhelming defeat of Japan not 

later than 12 months after the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe. 

ASSUMPTIONS 

2. It is assumed that: 

a. The defeat of the Axis powers in Europe has been accomplished in 

the fall of 1944. 

b. Russia and Japan maintain a state of neutrality. 

c. China continues as an active and cooperative Ally, furnishing ground 

forces which, in conjunction with U.S.Tactical Air Forces,serve to secure 

the unoccupied portions of China. 

2aa 
u. s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

d. The capacity of the air, road and pipeline facilities for “over the 

hump” transportation is to be first devoted to requirements of the 14th Air 

Force and the Chinese Army. 

e. During the period in question, October 1944 to August 1945, inclusive, 

United Nations naval, air, amphibious and ground operations in the North, 

Central, South and Southwest Pacific, in Burma and the Bay of Bengal 

areas, are maintaining constant and increasing pressure against enemy 

forces. United Nations submarines, in increasing numbers. continue to 

harass and destroy enemy shipping. 

f. North and North Central Burma are cleared of the enemy and occupied in 1944; and all of Burma in 1945. 

THE MISSION 

3. To accomplish, by a combined aerial offensive, the destruction of the 

Japanese military, industrial and economic systems to such a degree that the 

nation’s capacity for armed resistance is effectively eliminated, within 12 

months after the defeat of Germany. 

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

4. a. To accelerate the destruction of selected systems of critical Japanese 

industry, the accomplishment of which will reduce the Japanese war effort 

to impotency. 

b. Among the intermediate, nevertheless the most important objectives, 

is the neutralization of the Japanese Air Force, by combat, and through the 

destruction of aircraft factories, and the reduction of Japanese shipping 

and naval resources, to a degree which permits an occupation of Japan. 

DISCUSSION 

5. To reduce Japanese capabilities of resistance to a point which, within 

12 months after the defeat of Germany, will force the capitulation or permit 

the occupation of Japan, requires the launching of an effective bomber offensive against vital targets on the main islands not later than the fall of 1944. 

Only such an offensive can,at a sufaciently early date, reach and destroy the 

vital elements of Japan’s transportation structure, and the nerve centers of 

her economic, military and political empire. 

289 
U S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

6. In view of the political, economic, military and transportation situation 

in the U.S.S.R., and more particularly the degree of industrial and economic 

development in Far Eastern Russia, the vulnerability of supply lines connecting it with Western Russia, and the consequent logistic difficulties which would 

probably be encountered in supporting air forces in substantial strength in the 

Maritime Provinces, it is unwise at this time to plan United Nations bomber 

offensive operations against Japan from bases in that area. 

7. The islands of the Paciiic within effective bombing range of the vital 

industrial areas of Japan, do not afford adequate bases for our air forces which 

will be available in 1944-45.Upon information now available, it appears that 

the only land area affording such bases with adequate capacity and dispersion, 

within 1,500 miles of the Japanese target area, immediately available for development,is on the Chinese mainland. 

8. The beginning of the air offensive against Japan cannot await the opening of the ports of Hong Kong and Wenchow by the difficult and necessarily 

slow penetration of the enemy’s far flung and well defended defensive positions 

to the south and east thereof. Naval advances from the south and east will, 

however, be greatly facilitated and expedited by preliminary air offensive operations against the industrial and transportation targets on the islapd of IIonshu. 

9. It is evident that if a bomber offensive is to begin in 1944 from bases in 

China, the movement of all troops, organizational equipment and supplies in 

the base areas must initially be accomplished by air from India. 

10. The transportation of such personnel, equipment and supplies may be 

accomplished by the employment of approximately 4,000B-24airplanes converted to cargo airplanes and tankers. The project will require a flow of approximately 596,000tons per month through the port of Calcutta. (See Section 1, 

Enclosure “A”). Calcutta port facilities are at present adequate to handle 

960,000tons per month. Construction of additional facilities in that port will 

however not be required immediately. 

11. A most important factor in planning for the air attack on Japan from 

the west, is the necessity for providing adequate protection of the air bases 

against the violent Japanese reaction which is certain to follow the large-scale 

development of those bases, and initiation of the use thereof. The pressure 

being exerted by our operations against Japanese forces in outlying Pacific 

areas in Burma and perhaps Sumatra, will substantially contain those forces, 

and prevent Japan from greatly reinforcing her air forces now deployed in 

China. Nevertheless, Japan will not rezdily accept the risk of loss of her already 

29C 
C.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

important, and FoCentially rich, new!y acquired empire to the south. It is believed, however, that Chinese forces, reasonably equipped and supplied, aided 

in leadership, supported by the US.10th and 14th Air Forces, will be able to 

defend the air base areas. Chinese forces and US. Tactical Air Forces, essential 

to provide such defense, will be available. Logistic support for them is dealt with 

in a subsequent paragraph. The initiation of the bomber offensive, and even 

measures in preparation therefor, will tremendously stimulate Chinese morale 

and unify the Chinese people under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. 

12. A brief outline of the logistical implications of the proposed plan is contained in Enclosure “A.” 

13. B-29heavy bomber aircraft possess a tactical radius of 1,500miles with 

a bomb load of ten tons, and are the best suited aircraft for the bombing of 

Japan from available bases. B-29tactical units shown in Section 2 of Enclosure 

“A” will be available for deployment in China for operations against Japan on 

the dates indicated. 

14. Studiesconducted within the U.S.Army Air Forces indicate that 28 33-29 

groups,of 28 airplanes each,conducting five missions per month on a 50 percent 

operational basis, for a period of six months, or a total of 168 operating group 

months, can accomplish the degree of destruction required to accomplish the 

Over-all Objective, described in paragraph 4,above. 

15. Seventy-fivepercent of the selected strategic targets in Japan lie between 

Tokio and Nagasaki. Substantially, all of this objective area is within 1,500 

miles of a region in unoccupied China, the center of which is Changsha, vrithin 

an approximate 800 miles radius of Kunming (See Map, Appendix “A’). 

16. The area 400 miles north and south of Changsha, within this zone, is 

suitable for the development of VLR bomber airftelds, and many old unimproved fields exist in the region. Operations of B-29 aircraft from this area 

would bring the majority of the selected strategic objectives within effective 

tactical radius. 

17. From a source of supply in the Calcutta area, 200 heavy bomber aircraft 

of the B-24type, stripped of armor, armament, and other equipment not essential to transport service, can support one B-29group operating against Japan 

from bases in this area, at the rate set forth in paragraph 14. 

18. Such B-24 type airplanes would transport gasoline, bombs and other 

required supplies directly from the port of Calcutta to Kunming, using the 

latter area as a staging center, before proceeding with a capacity load to the 

B-29operating base zone. 

291 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

19. FORCES REQUIRED 

A minimum striking force of 100 B-29 airplanes is desirable to conduct 

effective strategic bombing operations against Japanese mainland objectives. 

The availability of ten B-29groups in the base area willpermit sustained operation by such striking forces. Ten B-29 groups will be available for deployment 

in China by October, 1944. 

20. 2,000B-24type aircraft, converted to transports, would be required to 

support such operations from Calcutta supply bases. This number of aircraft, 

so converted,could be made available in the Calcutta area by October, 1944. 

21. Aircraft availability schedules shown in Section 2,Enclosure “A,” indicate that a total of 20 B-29 groups will be available for deployment in China 

by May, 1945,and could be maintained at normal strength thereafter. 

22. The same schedules indicate that the 4,000B-24 type aircraft required 

for conversion to transport functions to maintain these 20 B-29 groups, can 

also be made available in the Calcutta area by May, 1945. 

23. Operations by the 10-20groups of B-29 aircraft which will be available, 

at the rate set forth in paragraph 14,would total 182 operating group months 

by 31 August 1945 at which time it is estimated that the degree of destruction 

of Japanese resources essential to crush the enemy’s capacity for effective 

armed resistance will have been fully accomplished. 

24. Such operations, while weakening and demoralizing the enemy, will 

vastly encourage our long suffering Chinese allies, and inspire them to 

increasedand united effort to eject the enemy from their homeland, and hasten 

complete victory. 

25. During the summer months of 1945,B-29 groups based in the Aleutian 

Islands could effectively attack parallel strategic Japanese objectives located 

in the northern part of the Empire. 

26. AIR BASES. A report on air base requirements and availability is contained in Section 3, Enclosure “A.” Sites, materials and labor required for construction of Chinese and Indian air bases are locally available. 

27. Preparation of the necessary bases and other facilities for these operations must be initiated at least one year prior to October, 1944. 

28. OTHER SUPPLY ROUTES INTO CHINA. The supplies brought into 

China from the west by the Air Transport Command, by pipeline, or by over292 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

land transportation, would be available for equipment and support of Chinese 

Ground units and supporting Tactical Air Forces (the latter provided by the 

U.S.A.A.F., with limited augmentation by Chinese Air Units). The Tactical Air 

Force required to be furnished by the U.S.A.A.F., will be available. The indicated volume of such supplies during the period in question is set forth in Section 4, Enclosure “A.” Such balance of supply as is available beyond the requirements of the above forces will serve to reduce the demands of the B-29 strategic

Air Force upon the special type of air transport support set forth herein. 

29. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION 

a. Phase I. October 1944-April 1945. Sustained B-29 precision bombing 

attacks throughout the period to accomplish the destruction of selected 

strategic Japanese industrial systems, including aircraft factories and ship 

yards. 

b. Phase II. May 1945-August 1945. An all-out attack against the other 

selected strategic objectives within tactical radius, integrated with attacks 

upon complementary objectives in Northern Japan by two B-29 groups 

based in the Aleutian Islands, to accomplish the destruction of Japanese 

resources which are an essential preliminary to an occupation of the Japanese homeland by United Nations forces. 

CONCLUSIONS 

30. The destruction of Japanese resources to such a point that the enemy’s 

capacity for effective armed resistance is substantially exhausted can be accomplished by sustained bombing operations of 10-20 B-29 groups based in an 

area of Unoccupied China within 1,500 miles of the center of the Japanese 

industrial zone. 

31. Such operations can be supplied by 2,000-4,000 B-24 type aircraft, converted to transports, based at Calcutta, supplying the operational bases after 

staging at Kunming. 

32. The required air striking and supply forces will be available. 

33. Adequate air and ground defense forces and the maintenance of such 

units will likewise be available. 

34. The planning and preparation of air bases and other facilities essential 

for the execution of thisplan should be instituted without delay. 

293 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

35. The execution of this plan promises to vastly strengthen our Chinese 

Allies, and to bring about a decisive defeat of Japan within 12months after the 

defeat of the Axis powers in Europe. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

36. That the line of advance proposed in the “Air Plan for the Defeat of 

Japan” be approved; and that this appreciation and outline plan be submitted 

to the Combined Staff Planners for further study and detailed development. 

37. That in consonance with the United Nations Overall Objective, and 

Overall Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War,action be initiated 

without delay and prosecuted with all practicable expedition, to complete the 

preparatory measures required to be taken, and to provide the facilities and 

air bases in expanded numbers and increased proportions, essential for the 

timely execution of this plan. 

ENCLOSURE “A” 

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

LOGISTICAL SUMMARY 

INDEX 

Section 1. Initial and maintenance tonnages required to support the 20 B-29 

groups in the general vicinity of Changsha and personnel and 

troop lift required. 

Port capacity Calcutta. 

Sectim 2. Estimate of converted B-24’s (C-87) required and availability of 

same. 

Availability of B-29 groups. 

Section 3. Airdromes available and required in the Calcutta, Assam, Kunming areas. 

Section 4. Capacity of the India-China air supply route, the Led0 Road and 

pipeline and estimated dates available. 

294 
zi. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE “A” 

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

SECTION 1 

INITIAL AND MAINTENANCE TONNAGES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT 

THE 20 B-29 GROUPS IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF CHANGSHAPERSONNEL AND TROOP LIFT REQUIREDPORT CAPACITY OF CALCUTTA 

1. Monthly maintenance (short tons) required to support 20 B-29 groups 

based on 140 sortiesper month per group: 

A/C Gasoline and Oil ............ 27,700 tons 

All other supplies ............. 42,300 tons 

Total. .............. 70,000 tons 

Additional A/C Gas and Oil to be delivered at Kunming to relay supplies forward ....... 70,000 tons 

Total to be moved out of Calcutta area to Kunming 

and Changsha area ........... 140,000 toils 

2. Initial tonnages plus 60 days maintenance all supplies per B-29 group exclusive of construction 

materials. .............. 15,000 tons 

Note: Calculations based on normal combat-service 

team 3,800 men per group and four tons per 

man. 

3. Tonnages required for B-24transport organization: 

Monthly maintenance base supply ....... 21,000 tons 

A/C Gasoline and Oil ............ 435,000 tons 

Total .............. 456,000 tons 

Initial tonnage plus 60 days maintenance 146,000 

men @ four tons ............ 584,000 tons 

Enclosure “A”- Section I 

295 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

4. Total monthly maintenance tonnage into Calcutta: 

For B-29 group .............. For B-24 requirements ........... ~~ 

Total. .............. 

Capacity of Port of Calcutta ......... 

5. Personnel and Troop Lift: 

Personnel for B-24 transport operations. The bulk of 

this personnel will be based in the Calcutta 

area ................ 

20 B-29 groups @ 3,800 per group. Some of this personnel will be based at Calcutta and Kunming . 

Total personnel ........... 

ENCLOSURE “A” 

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

SECTION 2 

140,000 tons 

456,000 tons 

596,000 tons 

32,000 tons per 

day

960,000 tons per 

month 

146,000 

76,000 

222,000 

ESTIMATE OF CONVERTED B-24’s (C-87) REQUIRED AND AVAILABLE. 

AVAILABILITY OF B-29 GROUPS 

1. Estimate of Converted Required B-24’s: 

a. For monthly maintenance Calcutta to Kunming, 2,250 

mile round trip, 140,000tons. ........ 3,000 B-24 

Basis: 75% aircraft in operation 20 missions per month 

delivering three tons per airplane. 

Enclosure “A”- Section 2 

296 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

b. For monthly maintenance Kunming forward, 1,600 

mile round trip, 70,000 tons ......... 950 B-24 

757" aircraft in operation 20 missions per month delivering five tons. 

Total B-24 required .......... 3,950 B-24 

Note: If 70 sorties per group are flown instead of '140, 

requirements will be reduced 20% since gas is 

40% of pay load. In this case,3,150 B-24's are required. 

c. Requirements to move initial tonnage plus 60 days 

maintenance for one group: 

Initial plus 60 days maintenance tons per group ... 15,000 tons 

To move one group into position per month requires 850 

B-24 with 75% operational. 

2. a. The following tables assume that B-29 groups will be ready as shown 

in C.P.S. 83, Appendix 111, and that sufRcient knowledge of the collapse 

of Germany will be available to permit the immediate conversion of production and the stripping of part of the B-24 inventory then on hand. 

B-24 Aircraft 

1944 B-29 Groups Required lnventwy 

June 

JdY 

August 

September 

October 

November 

December 

1945 

January 

February 

March 

April 

May 

4 1,600 5,800 

6 1,900 5,800 

7 2,200 5,800 

8 2,500 5,800 

10 2,800 5,800 

11 3,100 5,800 

13 3,400 5,800 

15 3,700 5,800 

16 4,000 5,800 

18 4,000 5,800 

19 4,000 5,800 

20 4,000 5,800 

b. The size of the inventory after June lst, 1944, and its availability for 

Conversion will depend on the course of the war in Europe. The inventory 

should, in no case,be less than the figure shown above. 

Enclosure "A"- Section 2 

297 
ENCLOSURE “A” 

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

SECTION 3 

AIRDROMES AVAILABLE AND REQUIRED 

IN THE 

CALCUTTA, ASSAM, KUNMING AND CHANGSHA AREAS 

Specillcation: Heavy Bombardment. 

Calcutta: 45 required; 1 available 

Assam: 9 required; 9 available 

Kunming: 50 required; 5 available 

Changsha: 20 airdromes for B-29 groups 

Three airdromes for advance depot and air transport activity. Bulk of supplies will be flown directto B-29 airdromes. 

Note: Fighter Defense Bases will be considered separately. 

Enclosure UA- &&ion 3 

298 
u.s.SECBET 

BBITIsa MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE "A" 

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

SECTION 4 

CAPACITY OF THE INDIA-CHINA AIR SUPPLY ROUTE, 

THE LED0 ROAD AND PIPELINE, AND ESTIMATED DATES AVAILABLE 

Assam-India Air Supply Route: 

Capacitg: 10,000 tons monthly 

Date: September, 1943 

Capacity: 20,000 tons monthly

Date: April, 1944 

Asgam-Ledo-Kunming Road: 

Capacitg: 65,000 tons 

Date: June, 1945 (U.S.) 

or 

March, 1946 (British) 

Calcutta-Assam-Kunming PipelLne: 

Capacities: Calcutta-Assam, 36,000 tons 

Aasam-Kunming, 18,000 ~IIS 

Date: June, 1944 
300 

U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 32411 

REHABILITATION OF OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (10) 

C.C.S. 324, 20 August 1943, circulated a study on this subject, prepared 

by the US.Joint Administrative Committee. 

The report of an ad hoc committee thereon wascirculated as C.C.S. 324/1 

22 August and presented for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 115th Meeting approved the 

recommendations contained in paragraph 5, C.C.S. 32411. 

301 
u.5. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 324/1 22 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

REHABILITATION OF OCCUPIED AND LIBERA'lED TERRITORIES 

Refere7lcm: 

a. C.C.S.288; C.C.S.288/1; 

C.C.S.288/2. 

b. C.C.S.104th Meeting,Item 3. 

Note bg the Secretarb 

The enclosure, on the above subject, was submitted by an ad hoc committee for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of SW. 

H.REDMAN, 

1. R. DEANE. 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

RQIABILITATION OF OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TEFUWIORIES 

References: 

a.C.C.S.288; C.C.S.288/1;

C.C.S.288/2. 

b. C.C.S.104th Meeting,Item 3. 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To determine the broad basic policy and division of reaponsibility as 

between the United Kingdom and the United States regardhg the stating of 

requirements, procurement of supplies and shipping thereof, for supplies 
required in connection with the initial phases of relief and rehabilitation of 

reoccupied countries. 

DISCUSSION 

2. It is recognized that minimum economic relief for the population of 

occupied areas must be furnished by the military during the period of militarJr 

operations and for some time thereafter. Procurement for such relief by the 

military should be limited to that essential to military occupation but as this 

period may vary it is desirable for the military procurement to be coordinat8d 

with that of the civil authorities for the purpose of long term production

planning. As such, it should be conftned to making available the minimum 

quantities of food, fuel, medical, sanitary, and agreed essential supplies necessary to maintain the health and working capacity of the civilian population, 

aswell as that required to preserve public order, maintain lines of communiCation and, where appropriate, develop effective fighting partners or local 

resources to lighten the burden on the allied armies. 

3. In accordance with the basic objectives outlined in paragraph 2 above, 

it is essential that a program of requirements be developed which will clearly 

indicate the quantities of supplies estimated to be required for the civilian 

populations of reoccupied countries in Europe according to operational estimates. Such a statement of requirements should indicate the quantities of 

each category which will be supplied by the United Kingdom and what part 

will be supplied by the United States. Likewise, the responsibility for arranging 

for the shpiment of these supplies should be established. 

4. Stockpilesshould be held to the smallest possible amount with food item8 

limited to the basic ration in order that large frozen stocks will not accumulate 

and thereby impinge on other needs of equal or greater urgency. In the case of 

the United States, inasmuch as the War Department utilizes military priorities 

for the procurement of those stores it furnishes during the period of military 

operations for the economic relief of the populations of occupied areas,such 

procurement must necessarily be limited to the basic ration, soap, medical 

and sanitary supplies and fuel (coal and petroleum) essential to military operations as distinguished from a more generous relief standard or from rehabilltation measures. It is essentialthat the basic ration issued by the United States 

or the United Kingdom be as nearly as possible the same. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

5. It is recommended that an over-all combined program of requirements

covering the minimum economic relief for the population of occupied areas 

303 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

that must be furnished by the militaryduring the period of military operations 

and for some time thereafter, be developed in accordance with the following 

principles : 

a. The quantities incorporated in the program to be confined to the 

provision of the basic ration, soap, medical, sanitary supplies, fuel (coal 

and petroleum products), and other agreed articles considered essential to 

military operations. The basic ration should be as nearly as possible the 

same whether supplied by the United States or United Kingdom. 

b. Stockpiling should be limited to the smallest possible amount. 

c. A statement of requirements will be prepared indicating the quantities of Pach category which will be supplied by the United Kingdom and 

the United States. 

d. Responsibility for arranging for shipment will rest with the country 

procuring the supplies. 

e. In the provision of coal and other supplies required for relief of civil 

populations in reoccupied countries,maximum use will be made of supplies, 

stockpiles and resources locally available within such reoccupied countries. 

Where possible and where a surplus of coal or other supplies exists within 

any particular reoccupied country over and above the requirements for 

such commodities by that country, such surpluses will be used to All the 

requirements of other reoccupied countries. 

f. The monthly requirements for the various countries which it is 

anticipated may be reoccupied, will be a matter for recommendation by the 

Combined Civil Aflairs Committee. 

g. It is agreed that for a period of three months subsequent to the 

occupation of Italy, the United Kingdom will deliver up to 100,000 tons 

of coal to Italy each month if the Italian stock position and the need require 

it. Deliveries after the first three months will be the subject of further 

negotiation. Subsequent to the occupation of Italy within the strategic plan, 

the United States will make available the equivalent of two ships each 

month for the purpose of supplying the Italian civilian population with 

the essential dry cargo imports other than coal if the need requires it. 

Should it be agreed that essential civilian requirements exceed the capacity 

set forth above additional shipping will be provided as may be agreed upon. 

This paragraph is subject to the provision that Italian ships are not available for the purposes herein stated. 

304 
U.S. SECRET 

BIUTISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 325 

SUPPLY ROUTES IN NORTHEAST INDIA 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 114th Meeting, Item (5) 

C.C.S.325 was circulated 21 August 1943 for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendations contained 

in this paper and their conclusions are included in C.C.S. 319/5. 

305 
U.S.SECRET 

BR?3XSH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 325 21 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUPPLY ROUTES IN NORTHEAST INDIA 

Note bg the Secretaries 

The Enclosure, prepared by General Riddell-Webster and General 

Somervell, is presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

1. The opening of an overland route to CHINA will greatly facilitate operations and may well assist in bringing hostilities to an earlier conclusion than 

would otherwise be possible. In addition to meeting requirements for 1943-1944 

operations in BURMA, and the short term projects which are necessary to make 

them possible, it is necessary because of the Herculezn task ahead to make 

urgent preparations for completing the overland route and insuring an 

adequate supply of stores for delivery over the route when opened. 

2. Preliminary studies of the possible opening date and capacity of the 

road from LED0 via MYITKYINA-PAOSHAN to KUNMING, together with 

projected pipelines, disclose certain divergence of views as between the U.S. 

and British Staffs. It is not possible or necessary in this paper to assess which 

of the views ismore nearly correct, but it is agreed by all parties that the project 

is urgent and should be carried out at the earliest possible date, subject to such 

operations as may be agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

3. Regardless of the date of opening of the route, which depends on the 

course of operations and on the major constructional problems that may arise, 

it is necessary now to examine the target requirement of tonnage to be 

carried over the route and to initiate urgent action for the expansion of the 

306 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ASSAM L of C in preparation for this tonnage and that required for the maintenance of the route if development is not to be held up for lack of prompt action. 

4. The present planned capacity of the ASSAM L of C to be reached by 

1 November 1943 is 102,000 tons per month, including petroleum products, 

which will suffice only for minimum operational maintenance of essential 

ground and air forces, for an estimated air ferry delivery to CHINA of about 

10,000 tons per month and for road construction to keep pace with operational 

advances. 

5. When the overland route is opened it is estimated that the additional 

requirement will be : 

a. Increase of air route 10,000 tons per month 

b. Increase for operational forces 13,000tons per month 

c. Stores for delivery to CHINA by road 65,000 tonsper month 

d. Maintenance stores for route 30,000 tonsper month 

This represents an increase of 118,000 tons per month to be carried by the 

ASSAM L of C, exclusive of petroleum products for which two six-inch pipelines 

from CALCUTTA to LEDO are essential features and whose construction must 

keep pace with the development of the project. 

6. We, therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve in 

principle the projezt for a supply route to CHINA through BURMA and ASSAM 

and that a directive (draft attached) be issued to the Supreme Commander 

to initiate immediate action to increase the capacity of the ASSAM L of C to the 

following target figures: 

1st November 1943 102,000 tons per month 

1st May 

1st July 

1st January 

1st May 

1st July 

1st January 

1944 140,000 tons per month 

1944 1st six-inch pipeline CALCUTTA to LEDO 

1945 170,000 tons per month 

1945 200,000 tons per month 

1945 a. a second six-inch pipeline CALCUTTA to LEDO 

b. balanced increase of tankage at CALCUTTA 

1946 220,000 tons per m0nt.h 

307 
zi.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

7. The United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the provision of the 

special personnel, equipment and stores necessary to construct and operate 

the route LEDO-KUNMING and, having due regard to agreed operational 

priorities, will make available such personnel, equipment and stores as may

be necessary to achieve the increased tonnage on the ASSAM L of C in conformity with the plan recommended by the Supreme Commander. Pending 

the assumption of command by the Supreme Commander, the Commander in 

Chief INDIA should be charged with the primary action in regard to the above. 

APPENDIX “A” 

DRAFT 

DIRECTIVE TO 

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, INDIA 

FROM CHIEFS OF STAFF 

The attached draft Directive to the Supreme Commander SOUTHEAST 

ASIA has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

Pending the appointment of the Supreme Commander, you should, in 

consultation with the appropriate American authorities, initiate the steps 

necessary for the development of the NORTHEAST INDIA and ASSAM transportation systems. 

Appendix “A” 

308 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “B” 

DRAFT DIRECTIVE 

COMBINED CHIEF’S OF STAFF 

TO SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTHEAST ASIA 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved in principle the develbpment at the earliest possible moment, of a supply route into CHINA from 

BURMA, with the ultimate object of effecting delivery into CHINA of 85,000 

tons per month of general stores and up to 54,000 tons per month of petrol,

of which 18,000tonsof aviation spirit by four-inch pipeline via Fort Hertz and 

36,000 tons by six-inchpipeline follow the road. 

It is envisaged that delivery of stores will be effected as to 20,000 tons 

monthly by air ferry, the balance passing over a rehabilitated “BURMA 

ROAD,” and that all petrol will be delivered by pipelines. The prerequisite to 

the effective opening of the supply route to CHINA is the development of the 

transportation system of NORTHEAST INDIA and ASSAM. This is a matter 

of urgency and you should, in consultation with Commander in Chief INDIA 

and the appropriate United States authorities in INDIA, plan your requirements and initiate the necessary action for the development of the transportation system to the following target flgures: 

1st November 1943: 102,000 tons per month (a) 

1st May 1944: 140,000 tons per month 

1st January 1945: 170,000 tom per month 

1st May 1945: 200,000 tons per month 

1st January 1946: 220,000 tons per month 

Note: (a) Plans for this have already been made by Commander in 

Chief INDIA. 

United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the provision of the special

personnel, equipment and stores necessary to construct and operate the route 

LEDO-KUNMZNG, and, having due regard to agreed priorities, will make availAppendix “B” 

309 
Z..S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

able such personnel, equipment and storesasmay be found necessary to achieve 

the increase in transportation capacity, in conformity with your plan. 

Requirements in equipment, materials and special personnel should be 

notifled through ( ) (b) as soon as possible. 

Attached as Annexure I are certain informatory details necessary for 

purposesof planning. 

NOTE: (b) Procedure for submission of demands to be determined. 

ANNEX TO APPENDIX “B” 

Annexure I to Directive to Supreme Commander S.E. ASIA 

No. dated August 43 

BREAKDOWN OF TARGET TONNAGE 

1. The ultimate target figure of 220,000 tons per month in the Directive 

is made up as follows: 

Estimated operational and administrative needs as at: 

1st November 1943.......................... 

Air lift as at 1st November 1943.............. 

Estimated increase for operational forces. .... 

Maintenance stores for the overland route. ... 

Ultimate road delivery required into CHINA. .. 

Additional air lift........................... 

PETROL 

92,000tons per month 

10,000 tons per month 

13,000tons per month 

30,000 tons per month 

65,000 tons per month 

10,000tons per month 

2. The intention is to deliver by two six-inch pipelines from CALCUTTA 

Annex to Appendix “B” 

310 
U.8. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

carrying72,000 tons per month. The United Statesauthorities have undertaken 

to provide the pipelines and necessary tankage by the following dates: 

1st July 1944 1st pipeline to LEDO 

1st July 1945 2nd pipeline to LEDO 

The capacity of these pipelines is estimated to be 72,000 tonsper month. 

The total ultimate requirement of petrol for all purposes is 96,000 tons per 

month, of which 9,000 tonswill be produced and consumed locally. There will, 

therefore, remain 15,000 tuns per month for transport with other stores. The 

figure of 220,000 tonsper month makes allowance for this lift. 

RIVER CRAFT 

3. The United States authorities have under provision a number of barges 

and towboats, and are prepared to supply the necessary supervisory personnel 

with a view to commencing operations by 1st April 1944 with a fleet estimated 

to be capable of delivering at DIBRUGARH: 

15,000 tons P.O.L.per month 

15,000 tons General stores per month. 

Annex to Appendix "B" 

311 
312 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S.326 

AMPHIBIANS FOR “OVERLORD 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (7) 

C.C.S.326 was circulated 21 August 1943. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 115th Meeting agreed to defer 

action on this paper until after the QUADRANT Conference. 

313 
IT. 8. SECRJZT 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 326 21 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AMPHIBIANS FOR “OVERLORD” 

Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff 

1. In view of the proved value and necessity of the DUKW, two and one-half 

ton amphibioustruck, it is considered essential that adequate provision of these 

vehicles be available for OVERLORD in order to mitigate the great problems 

involved in prolonged maintenance over the beaches under difficult conditions. 

2. Preliminary examination of requirements resulted in demands being 

placed for 1,200 DUKWs, of which 700 were destined for use by US. Forces and 

500 for use by British Forces. It is understood that this requirement was 

accepted on the basis of production of 400 DUKWs per month to meet present 

global requirements. 

3. Subsequent to the above demand, additional requirements for OVERLORD, it is understood, have been stated bringing the total requirement to 

2,400; covering 1,400 for U.S.Forces, and 1,000 for the British, of which the 

latter will probably be increased to 1,500. Preliminary inquiries in Washington 

lead us to suppose that these enhanced demands have not yet been presented 

to the Amphibian Subcommitteeof the Munitions Assignment Committee, and 

there appears to be some doubt in Washington as to what is the full OVERLORD requirement. With a View to clarifying the position, a telegram has 

been sent to London. 

4. It is probable that the present production of DUKWs will prove too small 

to compete with requirements, and it is considered that every effort should be 

made a.s a matter of urgency to increase productive capacity. It is believed 

that a substantial increase can be achieved with existing plant but at the 

expense of production of two and one-half ton trucks and by a reallotment 

of the requisite steel for hulls. 

5. It is further understood that the U.S. Navy has, or will shortly have, a 

considerable requirement for DUKWs additionalto any already demanded. 

314 
C. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

6. In view of the above, agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is 

requested for: 

a. Acceptance of the principle that priority of allocation of production 

be given to OVERLORD. 

b. The issue of instructions for the urgent examination of possible 

increases in production. 

c. Allocations to OVERLORD be concurrent for American and British 

needs in a ratio to be stated by Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate). 

315 
316 
u.s..wxET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 327 

OPERATIONS FROM INDIA 

References: 

C.C.S. 110th Meeting, Item (5) 

C.C.S. 111th Meeting, Item (3) 

C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (5) 

1st Citadel Meeting 

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (6) 

C.C.S. 327 was circulated 23 August 1943 for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 115th Meeting agreed to certain 

conclusions which are included in C.C.S. 319/5. 

317 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 327 23 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS FROM INDIA 

Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Stag 

1. We have now received a number of telegrams from Commander in Chief 

in India giving his views on the possibility of operations in Northern Burma, 

in the light of the generous offer of assistance put forward by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff. 

2. These telegrams discuss the subject in great detail, and it is quite clear 

that they cannot be examined fully during the present Conference. We propose, 

therefore, to take them back to London, have them examined at once, and let 

the United States Chiefs of Staff know as soon as we can the extent to which 

we would like to take advantage of their assistance. 

3. Meanwhile, it has been possible to extract from these telegrams a brief 

summary of the Commander in Chief’s views, and we think they should be 

brought to the notice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the Conference 

breaks up. Briefly, on the assumption that first priority must be accorded to 

raisingthe capacity of the air route to China, the Commander in Chief estimates that:­

a. Even with the assistance now offered, he will be short on 1st March 

1944,by a total of 102,000 tons, of the supplies and material required to 

enable him to fulfill the undertakings agreed at TRIDENT for Northern 

BUrma. 

b. The deficiency must either fall on the Led0 operation or must be 

shared between the Led0 and Imphal operations. It cannot be borne exclusively by the Imphd advance as the capacity then available would not 

enable us to maintain the forces necessary to repel a Japanese incursion. 

c If a certain reduction in the capacity allotted to the Led0 operations 

could be accepted, the Commander in Chief estimates that it should be 

possible to undertake a limited advance to the areas forward of Tamu and 

Tiddh which we occupied prior to the monsoon this year. It is not clear 

whether General Stilwellcanaccept this reduction however without causing 

the Led0 operations to be abandoned. In General Auchinlech’s opinion the 

extensive use of LR.P.Gs in the manner proposed by Brigadier Wingate 

will not alleviate the position since the L.R.P.Gs must be followed up by our 

318 
tr. s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

main forces to hold the ground gained, and the capacity of the L. of C. will 

not be sufficient for the purpose. 

d. Even these limited operations will apparently absorb the whole 

capacity of the L. of C. for the coming winter, and will make impossible the 

long-term improvements of the L. of C. which are essential if we are to 

contemplate the longer term increase of supplies to China by land or by air. 

4. We have not the figures available in Quebec to explain in detail how 

the Commander in Chief arrives at the above conclusions, and further investigation will be necessary in India before definite decisions can be taken as to 

what is to be done. Before this investigation can be carried any further, however, it is clear that a policy decision is required from the Combined Chiefs of 

staff. 

5. Broadly speaking there are three possible courses open to us in Northern 

Burma in the dry sewn 1943-44;and it seems clear that the existing capacity 

of the L. of C. will not allow us to do more than one of these fully:-

First Course. To put our main effort into the land and air operations 

which are necessary to establish land communications with China and to 

improve and secure the air route. It is believed that this can only be done 

at the expense of the air lift to China. 

Second Course. To give first priority of resources to increasing air 

supplies to China. It is believed that if this is to be done there will not be 

sufficient transportation capacity to sustain offensive operations in Northern Burma. The air route will therefore remain liable to interruption. 

Third Course. To adopt a longer term policy and put our main effort 

into the development of the L. of C. so that we shall be able in the 1944-45 

season both to make the air route secure and to deliver a far greater tonnage to China. This could be done if we are prepared to curtail land operations and accept a smaller rate of delivery to China in the meantime. 

6. We should like to discuss these three courses with the United States 

Chiefs of Staff so that we shall be in a position to give guidance to the Supreme 

Commander immediately we return to London. Our own feeling is that we 

should adopt the first course and put our main effort into offensive operations 

with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. We suggest that the successful conquest of 

Northern Burma in the coming dry season which should result in our joining 

319 
U. S. SECRET 

BRmH MOST SECRET 

hands with the Chinese,should go far to compensate the Generalissimo for a 

temporary reduction in the supplies he will receive by air.Priorities between 

the three courses will not be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the 

Supreme Commander, in formulating his proposals, to regard this decision 

aa a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer term development 

of the L.of C. 
u.s.SEmET 

BRITIGH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 32811 

DIRECTIVE To GENERAL EISENHOWER 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 116th Meeting, Item (3) 

C.C.S. 328.24 August 1943, circulated a proposed directive prepared by

the Combined Staff Planners and their. suggestion that General Eisenhower 

be given the full report which has been submitted to and approved by the President and Prime Minister. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 116th Meeting agreed that General 

Eisenhower should be furnished only those sections of C.C.S. 31915 and 329/2

pertaining to operations in the European Theater. The directive to General 

Eisenhower, which transmitted extracts from C.C.S. 31915 and C.C.S. 32912, 

was circulated as C.C.S. 32811. 

321 
u.8. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 32811 27 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER 

Note by the Secretaries 

Attached hereto is the directive sent to General Eisenhower as a result 

of the QUADRANT Conferences. The enclosures referred to contain complete 

extracts of all information, included in C.C.S. 319/5 and C.C.S. 329/2,pertaining to the European Theater. The enclosures were too voluminous for publication but are available in the files of the Secretariat. 

J. R. DEANE, 

R. D. COLERIDGE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

322 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

WASHINGTON 

27 August 1943 

General D. D. Eisenhower, 

Supreme Commander, 

Allied Force Headquarters, 

Algiers. 

Dear General Eisenhower: 

Attached hereto are two documents which are referred to you for your 

guidance. 

Enclosure “A” includes extracts, pertaining to the European Theater, of 

the Final Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which has been approved by 

the President and Prime Minister. 

Enclosure “B” includes extracts, pertaining to the European Theater, 

from C.C.S. 329/2 (Title: Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and 

SpecificOperations for the Conduct of the War, 1943-1944).This document has 

been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

With reference to Section IV,paragraph 15, “Operations in Southern 

mance,” your appreciation and outline plan should be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by 1 November 1943.The plan will be based on resources 

allotted to the Mediterranean Theater, vide, paper number C.C.S. 329/2, extracts from which are given in Enclosure “B.” 

In preparing the plan you will arrange for close consultation with the 

Supreme Commander for cross-Channel Operations or his Chief of Staff so 

that your plan may be coordinated with the requirements of OVERLORD. 

Sincerely yours, 

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff: 

/s/ J. R. DEANE, 

/s/ R. D. COLERIDGE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

323 
324 
U.S. SECRCT 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 329/2 

XMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC 

OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR,1943-44 

Reference: 

CCS 116th Meeting, Item (6) 

C.C.S. 329,24 August 1943, circulated the report of the Combined Staff 

Planners on this subject for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

C.C.S. 329/1 circulated certain comments on the Dry Cargo Shipping 

Position presented by Lord Leathers and Mr. L.W.Douglas. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 116th Meeting considered C.C.S. 

329 and C.C.S. 329/1 and approved the report as amended in the course of discussion. 

The final approved report was circulated as C.C.S. 329/2. 

325 
I?. S.SECW 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 32912 26 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

IMPLEMENTATIONOF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC 

OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, 1943-1944 

as 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosed report of the Combined Staff Planners has been approved, 

mended, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

H.REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC 

OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1943-1944 

AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE 

REQUIREMENTS OF CRITICAL STRATEGY 

Report by the Combined StaffPlanners 

1. We have examined the available means of the United Nations with the 

object of assessing our ability to carry out the policy agreed by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

2. A summary of this policy, which has been taken as a basis of our investigation, is attached as Annex I. 

3. We would emphasize that the purpose of this investigation is to examine 

whether the operations decided on at QUADRANT are within our resources, 

and not to imply binding commitments or decisions on the part of the Cornbined Chiefs of Staff. 

326 
U. S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

4. The principle has been accepted that, for war against Japan, the forces 

to carry out operations from the East, including the Southwest Pacific, shall 

be provided by the United States, and for operations from the West by Great 

Britain, except for special types not available to Great Britain which will be 

provided by the United States, or vice versa. The employment of Dominion 

forces will be a matter of discussion between all governments concerned. 

5. Our conclusions are set out below. 

GROUND FORCES (ANNEX 11) 

6. The necessary ground forces for operations from the United Kingdom 

and in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, can be made available. Searching investigations are proceeding to determine if the forces required for operations in Northern Burma can be found by the target date of mid-February 1944. 

NAVAL FORCES (ANNEX Ill) 

7. Apart from BULLFROG the naval forces necessary for approved operations will be available, subject to a revision of the support forces required in 

the Mediterranean,if a decision is made to execute the Southern France operation. No such revision can be made until a plan is available. For BULLFROG 

the requirements provisionally estimated at TRIDENT were as follows:­

2 Fleet Carriers (CV) 6 Escort Carriers (CVE) 

3 Old Battleships (BB) 40 Destroyers (DD) 

4 Heavy Cruisers (CA) 32 Escorts (DE) 

6 Light Cruisers (CL) 8 Minesweepers 

2 A.A. Cruisers 14 Submarines 

It is estimated that the British will not be able to meet these forces in full and 

that there will be the following deficiencies:­

1 Escort Carrier (CVE) 8 Escorts (DE) 

21 Destroyers (DD) 6 Submarines, at most 

Note: The possibility of conflict of the deployment for BULLFROG 

with OVERLORD and the South of France operation must be 

borne in mind. 

No additional operational commitments for British naval personnel can 

be met in addition to those planned up to 1 May 1944,except at the expense 

of some other operation or undertaking. 

327 
U.S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

AIR FORCES (ANNEX IV) 

8. The air resources required to meet the operations specified in this paper 

are available subject to:­

(a) The possible deficiency of land based aircraft for operations in the 

Pacific (See Appendix D) which may arise unless the war with Germany 

has been concluded in time to release the additional resources required. 

(b) The decision that the operations in the Mediterranean Theater 

(See Appendix B) shall be limited to the capabilities of the air resources 

specifically allocated. 

9. The extent of operations in support of resistance groups will be related 

to the advantages to be gained and will be limited by the supply of heavy 

bomber aircraft. Large-scale diversions of heavy bombers from the Combined 

Bomber Offensive are not forecast. 

10. The major factor now restricting the support of air and ground forces 

in China by air transport is the deficiency of base facilities in Assam Province 

of India and of transportation into Assam Province from Calcutta. 

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAFT (ANNEX V) 

11. There will be sufacient landing ships and craft for approved operations 

in 1943 and until the summer of 1944.Landing ships and craft will, however, 

be the bottleneck limiting the full scope of assault in the approved operatians, 

both in the PACIFIC and the ATLANTIC. Appendices “A and “B” of Annex 

V are made out on the assumption that landing craft will be sent from the 

MEDITERRANEAN to OVERLORD so as to arrive by 15 December 1943,and 

assault ships by 1 March 1944. 

12. To provide sufficient landing craft after the summer of 1944,an acceleration and increase in the present British and U.S.assault shipping and landing craft programs is necessary, probably at the expense of cargo ship and 

escort production and certain army items. 

SUPPLY OF CRITICAL ITEMS (ANNEX VI) 

13. In the absence of detailed plans oi operations for each theater, it is not 

possible to give finalized requirements and estimated detailed shortages of 

critical items. A provisional estimate is, however, set out in Annex VI. Temporary shortages will exist for a few specid items, (as set out in paragraph 

328 
BRITBE MOST SECRET 

u.s. SECRFT 

1b of Annex VI).It is anticipated that these deficiencies will be made up early

in 1944, and they do not appear to be of great consequence. 

SHIPPING [ANNEX VII) 

14. Apart from a small deficit in the Pacific, which will be met by the end of 

the first quarter of 1944, there is sufficient personnel shipping capacity to 

meet our known requirements. 

A careful operationof cargo shipping should enable us to meet all essential commitments. 

"he Shipping Annex (VII) takes no account of accommodation, depot 

and repair ships which will be required by the British Navy in the South-East 

Asia area for the satisfactory prosecution of the war against Japan. 

OIL [ANNEX VIII) 

15. An examination of the oil position has revealed that the critical item is 

100 octane aviation gasoline, of which there will be a pronounced shortage

through 1944. Steps are being taken to find a solution to this problem, not 

only by the substitution of lower grades of aviation gasoline for training and 

other purposes, but also by taking steps to expedite to the maximum extent 

possible the completion of the aviation gasoline manufacturing program. 

16. In all theaters there is a very real need for smaller tankers, particularly 

where it is necessary to supply newly established beach-heads and bases. There 

appear to be sufficient large sea-going tankers, in existence and coming from 

new construction, to meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum 

products. 

329 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX I 

BASIS OF INVESTIGATION 

The following operations and undertakings have been used 8s a basis 

for this investigation. They are not arranged in order of priority. 

I -USE OF THE AZORES ISLANDS. 

1. The British obtain the use of facilities in the Azores from 8th October 

1943 for intensified sea and air operations against the U-Boat. 

2. These facilities are extended to embrace operational and transit use by 

the United States. 

II -OPERATIONS IN EUROPE. 

GENERAL. 

3. The combined bomber offensive from all convenient bases. This operation will continue to have the highest strategic priority. 

4. Support resistance groups in Europe. 

OPERATIONS IN NORTHWEST EUROPE. 

5. OVERLORD takes place on 1st May 1944 in accordance with the approved plan which allows for employment of the following:-

Assault: 5 divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft). 

2 divisions -follow-up. 

2 airborne divisions. 

Subsequent build-up: At least 20 divisions. 

Total: At least 29 divisions of which 7 divisions will return to 

U.K. from the Mediterranean. 

6. As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring the success of OVERLORD. 

Annex “I” 

330 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 

7. Operations in the Mediterranean will be carried out with the forces 

dotted at TRIDENT. In addition such French forces as may be re-equipped 

and fit for war will be used. 

8. First Phase. The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment 

of air bases in the Rome area and, if feasible, further north. 

9. Second Phase. Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica. 

10. Third Phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on the German 

forces in north Italy. 

11. Offensive operations against southern France to establish a lodgment 

in the Toulon-Marseilles area and exploit northwards in order to create a 

diversion in connection with OVERLORD. The target date for planning purposes -1st May 1944. 

12. Minimum essential defensive garrison commitments. 

III -OPEMTIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND 

FAREASTTHEATER. 

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. 

13. As the main effort, carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma 

in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with 

China. These operationsto include the extensive use of long range penetration 

groups.Target date -mid-February 1944. 

The extent of these operations to be dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by the recent floods. 

14. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies to 

China, and the development of facilities, with a view to: ­

a. Keeping China in the war; 

b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese; 

c. Maintaining increased U.S.and Chinese air forces in China; 

d. Equipping Chinese ground forces. 

Annex "I" 

331 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

15. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring of 

1944,of the order of those contemplated at TRIDENT for the capture of Akyab 

and Ramree. 

16. Preparation of the necessary bases for operations in the Southeast Asia ~ 

Command. 

OPERATIONS IN CHINA. 

17. Air operations in and from China. 

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC. 

18. Operations to seize: 

Objective 

GILBERTS 

MARSHALLS 

WESTERN NEW GUINEA 

NEW IRELAND 

PONAPE 

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS 

TRUK 

PALAUS or )

MARIANAS-GUAM) 

Target date for 2: inn 

15th November 1943 

1st January 1944 

1st February 1944 

1st May 1944 

1st June 1944 

1st June 1944 

1st September 1944 

31st December 1944 

N -OTHER UNDERTAKINGS. 

19. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles. 

20. Support and maintain the war making capacity of our forces in all areas. 

21. Maintain vital overseas lines of communications, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the u-Boat menace. 

22. Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide China with 

a volume of supplies to keep China actively in the war against Japan. 

23. To sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that 

can be supplied and transported to RussiS without militating against the attainment of the overdl objectives. 

Annex "I" 

332 
u.s. SECBET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

24. Continue to supply such equipment to Turkey as we can spare and as 

the Turks, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, Middle East, can absorb.’ 

25. To provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war. 

26. To provide for the economic support of countries occupied by the United 

Nations. 

27. To re-arm and re-equip eleven French Divisions and supporting troops 

in North Africa by 31st December, 1943,insofar as this does not interfere with 

operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT. 

* See paragraph d, C.C.S. 322/1. 

Annex “I” 

333 
C. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX II 

LAND FORCES 

SECTION I -MEDITERRANEAN 

1. RESOURCES AVAILABLE. 

After allowing for the return to the United Kingdom of four American 

and three British divisions, there will be the following forces available in the 

Mediterranean on 1November 1943: 

DIVISIONS 

BRITISH us. FRENCH TOTAL 

(Native) 

19§ 5 5!: 29 

(including 

2 Polish) 

2. UNDERTAKINGS (GARRISON REQUIREMENTS). 

BRITISH us. FRENCH TOTAL 

(Native) 

Sicily and Southern Italy 1 - - 1 

Sardinia - - 1 1 

Corsica - - 1 1 

N. Africa, Palestine, Syria, 2 

Cyprus 

- -t 2 

Italy 4 - ­

7 ­ 4 

2 9 

?The garrison commitment in N. Africa will be filled by French 

Divisions in training. 

$ Includes on F.F. division. 

3. The balance which will, therefore, be operationally available on 1November 1943,will be as follows: 

BRITISH us. FRENCH TOTAL 

(Native) 

12§ 5 3 20 

8 Includes one airborne division. 

Annex I1 

334 
U. S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

4. After 1 November 1943, six further French (Native), divisions will 

become operationally available, making a total of 11 divisions in June 1944. Of 

these six further divisions,four will be required for garrison duties in N. Africa, 

leaving two extra divisions available for operations. 

5. By June 1944, there will, therefore, be available in the Mediterranean 

theater 225 Allied Divisions. 

6. The Eritish divisions shown 8s available in paragraph 1above are exclusive of some 14 Independent Brigades which are the equivalent of four and twothirds divisions, but have no supporting troops. These Brigades will assist in 

the garrison commitments shown in paragraph 2 above. 

SECTION II -UNITED KINGDOM 

7. FORCES AVAILABLE. 

The forces available in the United Kingdom on 1 May 1944, will be as 

follows: 

British: 13 divisions 

3 divisions from Mediterranean 

1airborne division 

American: 14 ex U.S. (includes2 now in U.K.) 

4 divisions from Mediterranean 

1airborne division ex US. 

36 

8. Of the above, five American divisions, which will be in the United Kingdom or enroute, will not be operationally available on 1 May 1944. These five 

American divisions will, however, be operationally available two months from 

their date of arrival and can, therefore, be used in the build-up subsequent to 

the initial assaults. During May, June and July 1944, assuming operations start 

in May, reception and dispatch facilities in the United Kingdom will limit the 

build-up to two, one and one division respectively, making the total number of 

American divisions in the United Kingdom and on the Continent approximately 

23 by August 1944. Thereafter it is assumed that direct despatch from the U.S. 

to the lodgment area may be commenced at the rate of three to five divisions 

per month. 

Annex I1 

335 
9. FORCES OPERATIONALLY AVAILABLE ON 1 MAY 1944. 

The total forces which will therefore be operationally available on 1May 

1944, are as follows: 

British: 16 divisions (includes Canadians) 

American: 13 divisions 

Airborne: 2 divisions (oneBritish and one American) 

Total: 31 divisions 

In addition to the above, five American divisions will be available for the 

subsequent build-up which should continue at the rate, if practicable, of three 

to five divisions per month, starting about August 1944, through ports made 

available on the Continent. 

SECTION 111- INDIA AND BURMA 

10. REQUIRED FOR OPERATIONS. 

British: 8 2/3 divisions** (including five assault and two follow-up brigades) 

6 long range penetration groups 

1parachute brigade 

Chinese: 13 divisions 

11. RESOURCES AVAILABLE. 

Existing formations will have to be converted to find the additional 

L.R.P.groups required, unless these are found from west African formations, 

and the necessary suitable divisions for land operations in Northern Burma. 

This matter is now undergoing detailed investigation in India, and in 

the War OBce, and the effect of the implications cannot yet be assessed.These 

forces are not readily available, and therefore every effort must be made without delay to provide them from resources now available in India. The British 

undertake to clarify data on available resources for inclusion in this paper as 

an addendum. Chinese forces available amount to 22 divisions (assuming 

10,OOO to a division). This will allow nine divisions in reserve. 

SECTION IV -THE AZORES 

12. No signillcant land forces are required, the necessary facilities in the 

'Islands having been made available as a result of negotiations. 

** 2 additional divisions as reserve will be held in India. 

336 
U. S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

SECTION V -THE PACIFIC 

13. RESOURCES AVAILABLE. 

The following major United Nations ground forces are present in or 

projected for the area as of 1January 1944: 

Central Pacific 

South Pad@ 

Southwest Pacific 

Total 

4 Infantry Divisions 

5 Infantry Divisions 

2 Marine Divisions 

1New Zealand Division 

4 Infantry Divisions 

1Infantry Division (1stCav. Div.) 

1Marine Division 

-

11Australian Divisions

29 

Note: Of the above eleven Australian divisions, three infantry divisions (6th. 

7th and 9th) are available for offensive operations; the remaining six 

infantry divisions and two armored divisions are presently assigned for 

defense. 

14. REQLIREMENTS FOR CONTEMPLATED OPERATIONS. 

The followhg additional divisions are required for operations in the 

Pacific and will be made available from U.S. resources: 

6 Infantry divisions (amphibious) 

1Marine division 

1Airborne division - Total additional - 8 

Already allotted - 29

- Total available 

and to be made 

available 37 

This estimate is based on reorganizing divisions after combat and recommitting them to subsequent operations. Interchange of divisions between 

theaters is also contemplated. As a result, the above estimate of requirements 

should be considered a minimum for planning purposes. 

Annex 11 

337 
c.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX III 

PROVISION OF NAVAL FORCES 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS 

CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS (OVERLORD). 

1. SufficientBritish light forceswill be made availableto counter a probable 

German threat within the Channel, while the British Home Fleet will be of 

sufficient strength to counter any move by German heavy units.The remaining 

naval forces required have not yet been assessed, but it is the intention that 

these shall be found by the British, with same augmentation from the US. 

US.-U.K. MOVEMENT. 

2. Two U.S.escort groups previously assigned to the UGF convoys (which 

are being discontinued) will be available for other employment commencing in 

September, 1943. 

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 

3. On the assumption that British and US.combatant forces at present 

allocated to the Mediterranean are not reduced, sufficient forces will be available to support approved post-HUSKY operations, but not specifically for the 

southern France operation for which planning is not yet complete. If decision 

is made to execute that operation, a revision of support forces in the Mediterranean will be required, especially in view of the carrier borne air support considered necessary. It is the intention that the British will provide these support 

forces. 

4. There is a requirement of 135 escorts in the Mediterranean for operational and through Mediterranean convoys. This requirement is at present. 

being met by 116 British escort vessels with some assistance from British and 

United States destroyers. Certain of the British escorts have been loaned from 

the Eastern Fleet and from U.K.coastal convoys, leaving deficiencies therein. 

PACIFIC OPERATIONS. 

5. U.S.ships now available and becoming available in 1943 and 1944 are 

adequate for the operation now approved for the Pacific areas. 

Annex 111 

338 
Ti. S. SECRET 

RRITISH MOST SECRET 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS FROM INDIA. 

6. The British can provide forces as follows: 

Assault Forces 

4 cruisers (CL) 

5 escort carriers (CVE) 

2 AA cruisers 

5 destroyers (DD) 

24 escorts (DE) 

8 minesweepers 

8 submarinesat least 

Covering Forces 

2 fleet carriers (CV) 

3 battleships (OBB) 

4 heavy cruisers (CA) 

2 light cruisers (CL) 

14 destroyers (DD) 

Note: The possibility of conflict of the above deployment with OVERLORD and the &uth of France Operation must be borne ix~mind. 

7. At TRIDENT it was estimated there would be needed from the United 

States for the Akyab-Ramree operation, set for December 1,1943, the following 

naval forces: 

Assault Forces Covering Forces 

5 escort carriers (CVE) Two fleet carriers (CV) 

21 destroyers (DD) Should Italy be out of the 

6 submarines (SS) war,the British will be able 

to provide one of these.

Tanker Force VICTORIOIJS is counted 

8 escorts (DE) as a United States unit. 

Since then four additional escort carriers have been transferred to Great 

Britzin. Further, major operations in the Central PaciAc involving extensive 

use of naval forces will probably prevent these forces from becoming available 

for Burma operations in February, 1944. 

ESCORTS. 

8. General requirements for the escorts for the speciflc strategic operations 

projected in this paper can be met from our combined resources without unduly 

weakening the convoy escorts and support groups required for the existing 

convoy system, except as noted in paragraph 4. Additional escorts required for 

the north Russian convoys, should they be resumed, and for any necessary 

adjustmentsin existing convoy cycles can, however, only be met from new construction and a reduction in the number of support groups employed. 

Annex I11 

339 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

NAVAL PERSONNEL -GENERAL. 

9. The accepted general policy is that landing craft will be manned and 

maintained by personnel from the nation supplying the forces engaged in the 

operation unless speciflclaly arranged otherwise. 

NAVAL PERSONNEL -BRITISH. 

10. On the assumption that the manpower proposals now before the War 

Cabinet are approved, the British naval personnel for the approved operations 

will be found, although, in order to meet the OVERLORD requirements, it will 

be necessary temporarily to close certain schools and establishments.Personnel 

due to be returned from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD, or to proceed to 

India,must do soand cannot be held for the offensive operationsagainst Southern France, which requirement must be met from those remaining on the station. 

11. No additional operationalrequirements for British naval personnel, over 

and above that at present planned up to 1 May 1944,can be met, except at the 

expense of some other operation or undertaking. 

NAVAL PERSONNEL -AMERICAN 

12. Personnel for approved operations and maintenance of craft therefor 

can be provided. This involves a commitment over and above those agreed to at 

TRIDENT, to provide for OVERLORD 135 ofacers and 1511 men to man certain 

support craft involved in the U.S.part of the operation. 

Annex nr 

340 
t’. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX “IV” 

PROVISION OF AIR FORCES 

1. The following appendices show the resources available to us for the various operations: 

Appendix “A” -Combined Bomber Offensive from U.K.and 

Cross-Channel Operation OVERLORD. 

Appendix “B” -Operations from the MEDITERRANEAN. 

Appendix “C -Operations in Southeast Asia. 

Appendix “D” -Operations in the Pacific. 

Appendix “E” -Support of Resistance Groups in EUROPE and 

BALKANS. 

Appendix “F” -Air Operations in and from CHINA. 

2. The group or squadron strength as measured in termsof unit equipment 

(U.E.) does not provide an exact measure of air force strength. Ability to 

endure prolonged periods of heavy combat activity is measured by the adequacy 

of reserves of airplanes and crews. The reserve airplanes are not included in 

the strength data as the percentage held in reserve varies with intensity of 

activity and with other factors. 

3. The tactical role formerly assigned to dive bombers has been largely 

taken over by the fighter-bomber in the land-based air forces. Since the fighter 

is readily transposable to the fighter-bomber, it has been necessary to combine 

day flghter and fighter-bomber strengths. 

Annex “IV” 

341 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “A”. 

COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM U.K. 

AND CROSS CHANNEL OPERATION “OVERLORD”. 

1. After allowing for the fighter defense requirements of the U.K. and 

Northern Ireland not covered by the OVERLORD Operation, which will amount 

to 18 SEF Squadrons and 13 TEF Night Fighter Squadrons,it is estimated the 

fobwing air forces will be available in the U.K. by 1May 1944: (TRIDENT 

figures shown in parentheses.) 

U.S.A.A.F. R.A.F. 

Groups Aircraft Squadrons Aircraft 

U.E. U.E. 

Heavy Bombers 54 2,592 (2448) 90 1,620 (1600) 

Mdium Bombers 9 576 (576) 19 342 (240) 

Light Bombers 2 128 (832) 8 144 (274) 

Fighter Bombers ) 35 2,625 (2500) 51 918 (960) 

Day Fighters )

Night Fighters % 36 11 198 (150)

Fighter Recon. 4 280 8 144 (231) 

Photo Recon. 1 48 (168) 11 184 (100) 

Air OP (336) 9 144 (160) 

Air/Sea Rescue 8% 170 (170) 

Transpo~ 9% 494 (442) 9 240 (190) 

Total 115% 6,779 (7302) 224% 4,104 (4075) 

2. The forces authorized during TRIDENT for operation POINTBLANK 

and OVERLORD will be available with the following exception 

Allocated Estimated Indicated 

by TRXDENT Availability alemt 

Light and Dive Bombers 1092 272 820 

Observation and &COnnwCe 1177 800 377 

Battle experience has proved that the types of airplanes previously contemplated for dive bombing, observation and reconnaissance missions are not 

suitable for use in the European theater. The numerical deficiencies noted 

above have been offset by the assignment of types of superior performance. 

Appendix “A’ 

Annex IV 

342 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

3. COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

a. Of the above US. forces, the 54 heavy bomber groups and 10 of the 

fighter groups ere provided for the Combined Bomber Offensive. 

b. Of the above R.A.F. forces, 90 heavy bomber squadrons, 13 medium 

bomber squadrons and the balance of fighter squadrons not specifically 

attached to the Tactical Air Force will be available for use with the Combined Bomber Force. 

c. It has been decided to prosecute the Combined Bomber Offensive 

from all convenient bases. For this purpose the following air forces based 

in the Mediterranean may in due course become available: 

(1) U.S.A.A.F. -6 heavy bomber groups (24 squadrons) 

(2) R.A.F. -4 heavy bomber squadrons 

6 medium bomber squadrons (Wellington). 

4. BUILD-UP FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

Estimated Bomber Strength in Aircraft (U.E.) 

1 Aug. ’43 1 Dec. ’43 1 May ’44 

U.K. Bases US.. .... 560 980 2,592 

British. ... 1,227 1,656 1,854*** 

Med. Bases US. ..... 367* 262 288 

British ... 212** 152 184 - - - Total ........ 2,366 3,050 4,918 

* Includes three B-24groups (103U.E.) on loan from U.K. 

** Three Wellington squadrons (60U.E.) on loan from U.K. 

*** Excludes six medium day bomber squadrons. 

Note: These data include only heavy bombers from the U.S.A.A.F. 

For the R.A.F. heavy and medium (Wellington) bombers are 

included. 

5. CONCLUSION ON AVAILABILITY OF FORCES 

There will be sufficient forces available for the Combined Bomber Offensive, and for OVERLORD, with the exception of 270 transport aircraft. 

Consideration is being given to the transfer of four additional troop carrier groups (208 airplanes U.E.) from the Mediterranean to United Kingdom 

for Operation OVERLORD. If accomplished, this action will leave a deAcit of 

62troop carrier transport aircraft against the requirement for 1,004transports. 

Appendix “A” 

Annex IV 

343 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “B” 

OPERATIONS FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN 

1. The following Air Forces will be available in the Mediterranean area as 

of 1st October 1943: (TRIDENT figures shown in parantheses.) 

HeavyBomber . Medium Bomber . Light Bomber (2) 

Fighter Bomber )

Fighter, Day ) 

Fighter, Night . Fighter, Recon. . Photo. Recon. . . Transport . . . 

Totals . 

U.S.A.A.F. 

Groups Aircraft 

U.E. 

... 6 262 (210) 

... 7 399 (399) 

... 1 57 (171) 

... 14 1,028 (1,084) 

... 1 48 (48) 

... 1 48 (-) 

... 2 96 (-) 

... 7 364 (364) 

... 39 2,302 (2,276) 

R.A.F. 

Squadrons Aircraft 

U.E. 

2 32 (32) 

7 136 (120) 

8 128 (128) 

50 800 (932) 

8 128 (112) - -(-) 

3 36 (-)

5% 137 (48) 

83% 1,397 (1,372) 

2. Operationsplanned for the Mediterranean area after HUSKY are predicated upon the employment of the forces now available in the theater after garrison requirements are met. 

3. The garrison forces required for the defense of the Mediterranean Area 

upon conclusion of operations after the collapse of Italy are estimated at 853 

day and night fighter airplanes, !caving 1,151day and night fighter airplanes 

to support further operations in Italy and the south of France. 

4. After air bases have been secured in Central Italy, the heavy bombers 

and medium (Welington) bombers of this force should in due course become 

available to complement the Combined Bomber Offensive effort from bases in 

U.K. (See Appendix “A,” paragraph 3 c.). 

5. Consideration is being given to the transfer of additional troop carrier 

groups to U.K. for Operation OVERLORD. (See Appendix “A,” paragraph 5). 

Appendix “B” 

Annex IV 

344 
APPENDIX "C" 

S.E. ASIA OPERATIOXS 

SOUADROWS AVAILABLE AS OF FEBRUARY, l9UV 

TRIDENT COWHITWEUT AVAILABLE FEE., 

(In Squadrons) (In Squadrons) 

N. BURMA BRITISH u. s. T

HEAVY BOMBtR 5 3 4 

ME01 UM BOMBER - 2 4 

LIGHT BOMBER 121 4 5 - 

FIGHT-BOMBER I 

FIGHTER, DAY I I I 1 28 I 

FIGHTER. RECCO. 5 31 1 3

FIGHTER, DAY 121 4 4 I 

FIGHTER, NIGHT I 2 I 

PHOTO RECCO. 4 2 3 

AIR O.P. - I - 

COASTAL PATROL 2 4 

TORPEDO BOMBER I 

I 2 - 

TORPEDO FIGHTER I 

TRANSPORTS 6 5.. 2" 

- - - - 

TOTAL 60 61 22 8

2-

* 150 Transport Aircraft. 

P ** The 5 R.A.F. Squadrons and 2 U. 5. Squadrons have a total U. E. of 151 transports.

g-3

3% 

rDDx 

x ­

w 

I& 

cn 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “D’: 

AIR OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

1. SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. 

a. Operations in the New Guinea -Bismarck -Admiralty Islands subsequent to CARTWHEEL. 

(1) Operation. Seizure or neutralization of eastern New Guinea as 

far west as Wewak and including the Admiralty Islands and Bismarck 

Archipelago. Rabaul is to be neutralized rather than captured. 

(2) Assumed period of operation 1 December, 1943 to 1 September,

1944. 

(3) Estimated Air Forces Required. 

Bomber (H) 

Bomber (M) 

Bomber (L & D) 

Fighters 

Reconnaissance 

Patroi Bombers (MS) 

Patrol Bombers (LS) 

Transports (T/C) 

Total 

(4) Availability 

144 

192 

171 

536 

136 

48 

12 

-

234 

1,473 

The 2,579 aircraft allocated to the South and South-west Pacific 

as of 1 January, 1944, including Army, Navy, R.A.A.F. and R.N.Z.A.F. 

will be sufficient to carry out the operation. 

b. Operations in New Guinea subsequent to the Wewak-Kavieng operation. 

(1) Operation. An advance along the north coast of New Guinea 

as far west as Vogelkop, step by step airborne -waterborne advances. 

(2) Assumed period ofoperation 1 August,1944 to 31 December, 1944. 

Appendix “D” 

Annex IV 

346 
U. S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

(3) Estimated Air Forces Required for each Successive Operation. 

Ftr. 

B (H) B (M) B (L&D) Ftr. N TIC Rec. Total 

Hollandia 196 256 256 400 39 208 24 1,379 

Wakde Is. 196 256 128 200 39 208 24 1,051 

Japan-Schouten Is. 384 320 256 500 52 520 24 2,056 

Manokwari 196 256 256 600 52 520 24 1,904 

(4) Availability. 

Prospective deployment of aircraft in this theater, in addition 

to the 2,579 allocated as of 1 Jan., 1944,is dependent upon the situation 

in the European Theater. Unless Germany has been defeated in time 

to permit the deployment of same of the heavier types of aircraft, it is 

anticipated that there will be a deficiency at the period under review. 

2. CENTRAL PACIFIC. 

a. Operations in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. 

(1) Operation. Seizure and consolidation of these islands. Initial 

operations envisage seizing the center nucleus by simultaneous assault 

or a step by step advance from the Gilberts through Jaluit 2nd Mille. 

Aircraft requirements are considered to be approximately the same for 

either method. 

(2) Assumed period of operation, 15 November, 1943 to 15 March, 

1944. 

(3) Estimated Air Forces required, exclusive of ship-based aircraft. 

Bomber (H) 

Bomber (M) 

Bomber (L & D) 

Fighters 

Photo. Recco. 

Patrol Bombers (HL) 

Patrol Bombers (ML) 

Patrol Bombers (MS) 

Patrol Bombers (LS) 

Transports (TIC) 

Total 

347 

104 

64 

288 

288 

12 

36 

24 

72 

24 

12 

924 

Appendix “D” 

Annex IV 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(4) Availability. 

The addition of one heavy bomber group and one medium bomber 

group will be necessary to carry out this operation. 

b. Ponape Operation. 

(1) Operation. Capture of Ponape preparatory to the operation 

against Truk. 

(2) Assumed target date is 1June 1944. 

(3) Estimated Air Force Requirement, exclusive of ship-based 

aircraft. 

Bomber (H) 

Bomber (M) 

Bomber (L & I)) 

Fighters 

Photo Recco. 

Patrol Bombers (HL) 

Patrol Bombers (ML) 

Patrol Bombers (MS) 

Total 

(4) Availability. 

52 

64 

144 

144 

12 

36 

24 

9 

485 

Assuming that the shortage of one heavy bomber group and one 

medium bomber group, required for the Marshall Islands operation, is 

found there will be sufficient aircraft in the theater for this operation. 

c. Caroline Islands (Truk) Operation. 

(1) Operatwn. Seizure of the eastern Carolines as far west as Woleai 

and the establishment of a fleet base at Truk. Atolls to the southeast 

of Truk are to be captured first, followed by the rapid development of 

air fields in the area, for a sustained fighter-supported offensive against 

that port. Subsequent operations provide for capture of Truk and the 

reduction of the remaining enemy positions west to Woleai. 

(2) Assumed ts.rget date is 1September 1944. 

(3) Additional air forces may be required for this operation but cannot be determined within useful limits of accuracy without a detailed 

study of the operation. 

Appendix “D” 

Annex Iv 

3.18 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

d. Palau Islands. 

(1) Operution. Capture of the Palaus including Yap. The plan calls 

for the initial capture of Yap and other suitable islands in the neighboring atolls from which to conduct a more intensified air attack 

against the Palaus. 

(2) Assumed target date 31 December 1944. 

(3) Estimated air forces required for this operation cannot be determined within useful limits of accuracy, without a detailed study of the 

operation. 

Appendix “D” 

Annex IV 

349 
U.S. SECRET 

RRXTISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “E 

SUPPORTOF RESISTANCE GROUPS 

IN 

EUROPE AND BALKANS 

1. The following British aircraft are allocated to the support of resistance 

groups in EUROPE and the BALKANS: 

U.K. Bases 

Med. Bases 

Heavy Bombers Miscl. Aircraft 

22 14 

36 -

2. No further heavy bomber aircraft can be allocated for this purpose without retarding the rate of build-up of heavy bomber squadrons in British 

Bomber Command. 

3. Priority for aircraft has recently been given to the support of resistance 

groups in Greece and the Balkans. 

4. Further assistance can therefore only be given to resistance groups in 

Europe at the expense of the Bomber Offensive, or the support of guerrilla 

forces in Greece and the Balkans. 

5. Due to their special role in the Combined Bomber Offensive the heavily 

armed high altitude day bomber types used by the US. Army Air Force are not 

suitable or available for night operations in support of guerrilla forces. 

Appendix “E” 

Annex IV 

350 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX ‘7“ 

AIR OPERATIONS IN AND FROM CHINA 

1. The 14th Air Force in CHINA has a strength,as of 23 August 1943,of one 

i1) heavy bomber group (35U.E.) ,one (1) medium bomber squadron (13 U.E.) 

and five (5) fighter squadron (125 U.E.) . If logistical considerations permit, 

the US. fighter force in CHINA will be expanded to thirteen squadron (325 

1J.E.) by March, 1944.The medium bomber strength will be augmented to one 

group (57 U.E.) by 1 January 1944. 

2. The Chinese Air Force will have, by 1 January 1944,four medium bombel 

squadrons (40 U.E.) and 10 fighter squadrons (100 U.E.) . The fighter force 

will be expanded in 1944 to 20 squadrons (200U.E.) . 

3. The Air Transport Command has, as of 23 August 1943, available in 

ZNDU sufficient aircraft to lift tonnage to CHINA at the rate of 7,000 tons 

per month. 

4. The provision of base facilities and refueling facilities in Assam Province 

are at present the major factors restricting the flow of material to CHINA. It 

is anticipated that the monthly lift to CHINA will be increased to 10,000tons 

p?r month by November, 1943. Further expansion of the Air Transport facilities into CHINA is under consideration. 

Appendix “F” 

Annex IV 

351 
11. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX V 

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND CRAFT 

GENERAL SITUATION 

1. See Appendix “A” for the allocations and estimated availability of British landing ships and craft to 1 January 1945,and Appendix “B” giving the 

same information for US. landing ships and craft. The quantity and rate of 

new production are shown in the Appendices. Appendix “C” contains the 

casualty rates and serviceability factors used for planning purposes. 

2. The present position in Ianding ships and craft is such that there is 

everywhere a deficit of landing craft. Operations are limited in many cases 

solely by the lack of these vessels. 

3. Studies are under way which it is hoped will increase the rate of U.S. 

landing craft production. However, the result of these studies at the present 

time indicates that such an acceleration cannot be felt before April 1944.Similar efforts should be made in the U.K. to improve the situation for OVERLORD, 

the Mediterranean and later to prosecute the war in the Far East. The British 

have indicated that there may be difficulty in manning amphibious craft in 

additional numbers. 

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN CONNECTION 

WITH OVERLORD 

4. The assault ships and craft now in the Mediterranean are all that can 

be provided tor immediate post-HUSKY operations in that theater. 

5. In accordance with the guiding principle that, “as between operation 

OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage 

of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the 

main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD,” future operations in the 

Mediterranean should not be allowed to encroach upon the assault craft planned at TRIDENT to be withdrawn froin the Mediterranean for OVERLORD. 

Production both in the US. and U.K. together with the necessities in other 

theaters will permit OVERLORD to be satisfactorily mounted by 1 May 1944 

only if these Mediterranean ships and craft are used. The Tables of Appendices 

“A” and “B” indicate the numbers and types of the U.S. 2nd British ships 

and craft so involved as well as the scheduling of their delivery to U.K. The 

Annex V 

352 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

numbers are substantially the same as at TRIDENT. It may be necessary to 

move 15 additional LCT(5), or their equivalent LCT lift, from the Mediterranean toOVERLORD. 

6. Bad weather likely to be encountered off the Bay of Biscay after November, together with the need for the early formation and training of the assault 

forces for OVERLORD makes it requisite that landing craft sent from the 

Mediterranean for OVERLORD be sent as soon as practicable and, in the case 

of British LCT types, not later than early November. 

7. The combat loaders should be released as follows: 

U.S. APA’s and AKA’S and AGC-as soon after immediate postHUSKY operations as possible, and after a refit in U.S., to be utilized for 

training and participation in OVERLORD. 

British LSI(L) ’s -as soon after immediate post-HUSKY as possible 

for normal troop movements, principally to increase the BOLERO lift. 

British LSH -as soon after immediate post-HUSKY operations as 

possible. for OVERLORD. 

8. a. The nature of the assault on southern France in order to create a 

diversion in connection with OVERLORD is not known, as no definite plan 

has been formulated. The losses of landing ships and craft in HUSKY were 

much smaller than estimated at TRIDENT. Excluding planned withdrawals 

from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD arid BULLFROG, it is estimated 

that there should be left available in the Mediterranean by 1May 1944 suf8­

cient assault ships and craft to mount approximately 27,000 troops and 

1,500 vehicles. The ships and craft shown do not provide a balanced assault 

lift (See Appendices “A” and “B”) and the lift is not great. However, any 

operations that may be planned are tobe planned with the resources shown 

as available herein. Augmentation is not considered practicable without 

drawing from OVERLORD. The British LSI(L) ’s available for operations 

against southern France should be on station by 1March 1944. 

b. In order to provide for carrying the small ship-borne landing craft 

which will be used in the Mediterranean the U.S. LST’s to remain there 

should be the ones having davits. 

Annex v 

353 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

OVERLORD 

9. The assault shipping and craft indicated as available for OVERLORD in 

Appendices “A” and.“B” are the same as at TRIDENT with very minor exceptions. Landing craft destined for OVERLORD will arrive in time for the operation, though the complete allotment of some types from the United States 

will not arrive as early as desired by COSSAC. This, however, cannot be 

improved. 

BULLFROG 

10. a. Three LSI(L) with their landing craft and one LSC have already 

been ordered to sail from the Mediterranean for India. One LSH, one LSI(H) 

and the remaining six LSI (L) with their landing craft, should be sailed 

so as to arrive in India by 15 November 1943. The ten U.S. and eight 

British LST for the operation are now on passage from the U.S.to India. 

b. All the landing ships and craft requested by General Auchinlech for 

this operation will be available with the exception of 12 LCG(L) and 

9 LCT(5). 

c. The provision of LSP is dealt with in Annex VII. 

d. The LSI(L) should be released immediately after the operation so 

as to be employed for trooping movements if not required for further 

operations. 

PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

11. Broad estites of over-all requirements of assault shipping and 

landing craft for the campaign against Japan indicate deficiencies in certain 

types, particularly APA’s, LSTs, and LSD’s. 

12. The small US.APA’s and AKA’S now authorized and building by the 

Maritime Commission will be required in the early future and their completion 

is a matter of urgency. The Maritime Commission has been advised in this 

matter. In addition, others will be required to insure the speed of the advance 

across the Pacific toward Japan. 

13. It is anticipated that the major British and U.S. landing ships and 

craft surviving OVERLORD can be made available to leave the European 

Theater in September 1944 for use in the Pacific and southeast Asia. 

Annex V 

354 
U.S.SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

CONCLUSIONS 

14. a. There will be sufficient landing ships and craft for approved operations in 1943 and until the summer of 1944. Landing ships and craft will, 

however, be the bottleneck limiting the full scope of assault in the approved 

operations, both in the Pacific and the Atlantic. 

Appendices “A” and “B” of Annex V are made out on the assumption 

that landing craft will be sent from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD so 

as to arrive by 15 December 1943,and assault ships by 1 March 1944. 

b. In order to provide sufficient landing craft after the summer of 

1944,an acceleration and increase in the present British and U.S. assault 

shipping and landing craft programs is necessary. 

Annex V 

355 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “A” 

ALLOCATIONS AND ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT TO 1 JANUARY 1945 

(Appendix “B” giving the same information for US.landing ships and 

craft follows Appendix “A.”) 

NOTE: The British Table indicates the delivery to the U.K. of 40 more 

LCM(3)’s than shown in the US. Table (Appendix “B,” 

Table VII) . 

Appendix “A” 

Annex V 

356 
236 

U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET ALLOCATIONS AND AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH ASSAULT SHIPS AND LANDING CRAFT TO 1 JANUARY 1945 

~111b. varied b nn( 6, wds of swc1.l oo.m11011#. 

- -- - - L.S.T. .C.G, L.C.3 L.C.1 L.C.A. ..C.P .C.P. L.C.V. 

(1) (M) (11 (L) (U) (P) 

- -- - - (7) .- -

(22) -

(23 -

(25) -

127) 129) (30) (31) (32) 

2 22 65 99 197 I* 95 138 43 

I Y Y (1 7 

Rnent pdu& and r.1. .I indiuhd. AIIDI~IIO~S 

7 36 108 61 18 5 - 183 

Y. Moved to tkater by I Jan. I9VY. Y8 6 25 65 

5. Moved frm theater by I Jan. 19YY. 6 

6. Total of Ilner I. 2, 3 k Y leas Itne 5. 51 12 29 I30 272 262 33 IW 138 233 

7. Production fra I:9:Y3 to 1:I:YY. 2 13 30 60 160 - 26 209 

8. PrOdUCtIon fva I:I:YY to I:5:VY. 50 60 80 

9. Total In U.K. on I:5:YY. -53 25 

- -

109 -250 -

512 -

262 59 309 138 233 ­

10. Casualtler estimated In OVERLORD. 2Y 12 53 98 I98 99 - 130 

(I. Renalnlng In U.K. after OVRLORD. 29 13 56 I52 314 163 59 179 138 233 

12. Production fra I:5:YY to I:l:Y5 incl, U.S. 56 I20 26Y

arrlgnnentr already made. 

13. TOTAL dlrDorable in U.K. on I:I:V5 less reaulrenentt in tr.inin9 1.e. lines I1 DlYI 12 

1err Itne 3. 

-

29 -

105 - -470 ­

I02 YI 17Y 138 50 

IY. Monthly DTcddYCtlOn rate I -

7 15 33 - __ - __ 15. YEDITERRAIEAI (0oerstlana.l 71 23 78 269 30 

.I at I SCDt. ( 

16. 1943 (Training 5 18 68 26 36 

17. Llne~15 DlUs 16. Total In kd. On I SeDt. 71 18 28 96 337 26 30 36 

18. Estimated losses In PRICELGSS. I1 6 5 2Y V8 - 9 

19. Move0 frm theater (BULLFROG. OVERLORDI V8 12 I6 25 17Y 

20. Moved to theater 

21. TOTAL wallable in Wed. on I March, liner 17 PI" 

20 less liner 16 DlUI 18 PlUI 19. 12 12 -

47 - 21 ­ 22. llD1A ODerlltlonal 5 70 ­ 23. Anclllary 6 Tralnlng I 29 Y5 23 

24. Liner 22 01"s 23 Total In lndla on I Sent. 6 2s Y5 93 

25. Indian Productian to 1:I:YY and to arrlvc 

from U.S.A. 8 25(P 

26. Moved to theater from U.K. 6 kd. I2 109 

27. Total wallable In India on I Jan. I9YY. - 8 I7 Is* ?O 

21. Indian Oroductlon 1:I:YY to I:I:Y5 - -- ­ NOTES: 

lai Refitting. cmpletes December. 111 Assumes that 40 are being assigned as replacemnts for those lost on lql Omitted 

!bl These 34 L.C.T. 151 are:- 6 nm employed for boom defense. 15 at Scapn 

and 13 fitting far Scapa. The 6 employed on boom defense duties and 

the 13 fitting for Scapa are being returned for operational forces. 

pa155age. 

!;I Of these L.C.T. it is not expected that more than about 48 will be able 

to join their operational forces in time for OVERLORD. 

lr) 5 already approved. 3 more to be aporoved 

($1 In addition there will be a further 11 Red Ensign L.S.I.(H). 

!cJ These need only be moved in time to arrive in Mediterranean by 1 March. (kl Omitted. (11 These are 2 cargo hulls being converted in the U.K. and 13 C.l B hulls 

assigned fra1I.S.A. 

(dl Of these 40 L.C.T.IS1. 24 are to be returned to operationai forces. (I)An allolyance has here been mde for an extra 10 L.C.T.131 or 141 to be 

used in training as I0 of the L.C.T.111 or 121 now in u5e are old ("1 Released to troopi?q. Not available for BULLFROG or OVERLORD. 

lei It is assumed that these will be returned for OVERLORD. 

if1 Assumes that only 18 out af a possible 42 L.C.l.1Ll are assigned to the 

British. 24 extra. above the 20 shown in C.C.S. 24411 have been shorn 

L.C.T.111 and are practically falling to pieces. 

lml The prduction of L.C.T.. L.C.F.IL1 and L.C.G.IM1. has been shwn a5 30 

per month between them. Any increase of orduction in L.C.GIMI would. 

GENERAL. Ha wastage rate has been allwed during the periods after 

owrat iom. 

as returning for OVERLORD. as at present planned, be at the expense of L.C.T. 

(gl See note (el above. It is improbable that all of these will return. In) These are frm previous U.S. assignwnts. 

Ihl These 96 include 49 engineless and 31 under major re~air(chiefly 10) These are all very old craft and barely fit for training.

stiffening1 14 at Scam and 2 under conversion far Scam, these latter 

2 as well as those nw engineless and those under major repair will ID1 180 L.C.A. are being built in India. but the exact rate of production 

ccme into operatiow1 forces. is. hard to forecast. it is certainly $1~. 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “B 

1. This Appendix consists of eight tables showing allocations and availability of U.S.landing ships and craft. 

2. Allocations will be varied to meet the needs of special operations. 

3. Agreed estimates as to casualty rates and serviceability factors are 

indicated in the tables for planning purposes. 

357 

Appendix “B” 

Annex V 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

28 28 28 

10 110 110 

18 18 18 

~ 37 558 578 

358 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

359 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TABLE Ill 

ALLOCATION OF C.l.(L)'s (As on completion of building and delivery.) 

New DrOdWtlOn Shm 1n Darentherls. NO DTWm erlsts beyOna 1 Jan. 1845. 

N~WDrawtion erei in allocated is estmted to arrive on statla auwmmte1r 2 months after dellwry. 

No losses have been EOnsldered. See Table IV for estlmted BCtUalaVsllabllltles of L.C.1.(Uts. 

Allaatlons after 1 Awl1 1944 are tentative onl~andare not to be cmsldersd 8s deflnl'tte omltments. 

I I I 

1943 1944 ! 1945 

ALLOCATED 

TO AS Of the 1st Of each mnth I I 

CENTRAL 

AND NORTH 

PAC IF IC 

SOUTH 

PAC IF IC 

SOUTHWEST (2) 

54 38 38 38 38 36 38 

TOTAL 

PAC I FIC 88 101 112 128 IS2 188 148 

DELIVERED

U.K. 150 150 1M 150 150 150 150 

360 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

361 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TABLE V 

ALLOCATIOI OF L.C.T.(5]'* (AS On somoletion Of building and dalivory.1 

New production shown in parenthesis. NO program exists beyond 1 January 1045 

New production herein allocated is estimated to arrive on station In European Theaters approximately 2 months after delivery and in Pacific Theaters approximately 3 months after delivery. 

No losses have been considered. See Table VI for estimated actual availabilitles of L.C.T.'s. 

Allocations after 1 April 1944 are tentative.only and re not to be considered as definite 

comitaents. 

ALLOCATED 

TO 

CENTRAL b 

NORTH 

PAC IFI C 

SOUTH 

PAC IFIC 

SOUTHWEST 

PAC IF IC 

TOTAL 

PAC 1 F It 

DELIVERED 

U.K. 

KUSKY 

'LANNED FOR 

POST-HIISXY 

OVERLDRD 

362 
363 
- 

- 

- 

-

-

- ~ -

--

-

-

I cc7. , MOY. , OEC. I ,A*. , FEB. , MAR. , APR. , MA" , A"$. SEPT. , m

--- ~ -_ 

--

- __ 

- ~ 

'471 I4171 1411 155lb 1551 1551 175511 1151 1751 1751 11

415 522 565 624 679 7% 805 884 1102 1184 125

2. SOUTH PACIFIC 1401 I401 1401 I251b 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251~ 1251 12

382 622 452 487 512 537 552 587 562 fi87 71

I501 llool 11501 11501 I1501 11501 11501 ll501 1501 1501 15

288 388 530 688 818 988 1130 128R 1638 1688 173

4. SHIP-BORNE 1151, I151 I151 1151 1151 1151 I151 1151 1151 1151 1151 11

147 162 117 192 207 222 237 252 297 312 2

5. PACIFICPCOL 1301 1201 1101 1441 11441 11441 IlMl I1001 I2001 IZW! l28

1569 

-

63 

-

83 

-

93 ~ 

137 281 425 569 799 ~ 

1285 - 181

~ 

1l02l 12221 12621 12881 I3891 14891 1609: 14451 (4451 I4451 144

1463 1685 197 2236 2625 3014 923 3468 4833 5248 

-----

__ 

- = = -= ~ 

~ 

56s 

7. ATUNTIC 1151 I151 1151 1151 IISI I151 1151 1151 1151 1151 115

182 197 212 227 242 257 212 281 332 31 362 

674 614 674 67, 674 5 74 5 74 614 674 6 74 614 

113 10% 101 107 101 107 107 107 107 107 10

mi 1181 1321 1321 1321 1321 1321 101 

-

-

-

24 42 14 lffi 138 110 207b 202 202 202 202 

11. SHIP-BORNL I101 I101 1101 120ib 1201 1201 1201 I201 1201 I201 1201 I20

50 68a 78 98 118 138 150 178 198 218 258 278 

12. UNT WOL 12% IR31 !551 1411 1441 1441 I441 I211 I201 I201 1201 no

172 227 268 312 356 400 674 444 464 489 504 524 544 

--- ---- -- _

13. mr TOT~L 11131 1981 lgil 11111 Ill11 1911 I551 1551 1551 155

1891 1751 1813 1898 1223 1321 1119 ---- ~ 

2063 2llk Zl13

-

-

-

- ~ 

- ~ 

~ 

4. MISCLLUNEOUS h 

LL6SE.5 TO MTE 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 

--- __ -- ~ 

5. UlAND TCTAL 15001 l500l 6001 15001 14m1 l4Wl l400

4702 5209 5709 6209 6705 1710 7518 80l8 MlO 

----*- ====!= -

6. RioDUCTloH TOTAL (2401 15001 15001 15w1 15001 14001 11001 I400

j129 3009 4109 5209 5709 6209 7616 Bolo 811

,. ..L" & "C "".be 

, rrpl., rd rO I I..c
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APA'S 

ILL PACIFIC 

cum. on ste. 

Elt. Auail. 

\LL ATLANTIC 

cum. On st.. 

Est. Aur.I. 

:Urn. Tot. 

>n sta. 

:urn. Tot. 

\Y.il. 

365 
U.S.SECRET 

RRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “C” 

1. The following casualty rates and serviceability factors have been used 

in compiling Appendices “A”and “B.” 

CASUALTY RATES 

Mediter­

“OVERLORD” ranean 

(As in “Over- (Post Indian Pacific lord” Plan) “HUSKY”) Theater US.Theaters 

LST. . . . 45% 1576 15% 10% 

LCT. . . . 

LCI(L) . . . 

45% 

45% 

30% 30% 

30% 

) and40%of 

20‘/u remainder 

j damaged for 

lo%) one month 

Minor Landing 

Craft . . . 50% 30% 30 %i 30% 

2. In theaters where continuous operations are in progress an attrition 

rate of 5% per month has been allowed. 

SERVICEABILITY FACTOR 

“OVERLORD’ 

LST . . . . LCT . . . . LCI(L) . . . Minor Landing 

craft . . . 

as agreed Mediterranean Indinn Pacific 

at TRIDENT (Post “HUSKY”) Theater US.Theaters 

goy;, 85:;;! 85% 85% 

85:/,> 75y. 70% 75% 

85% 80ljb 70%, 80% 

857. 707L 70% 70% 

Appendix “C” 

Annex V 

366 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX VI 

AVAILABILITY OF CRITICAL SUPPLY AND CONSTRUCTION ITEMS 

GENERAL 

In general, the United Nations will be able to provide the critical supply 

and construction items for the specific operations projected except as indicated 

hereafter. In the absence of detailed plans of operations and specific lists of 

equipment and supply requirements, a more definite statement is not justified. 

a. Overall shortages of radar and radio equipment are rapidly being 

eliminated. Adequate distribution of these items to U.S. Army Air Forces 

will be made by the end of September, 1943.All requirements will be met by 

June, 1944. 

b. Certain items of equipment, notably special Air Forces vehicles, 

heavy trucks, two and one-half ton amphibious trucks (DUKWs),landing 

vehicle tracked (L.V.T. I1 and L.V.T.(A) 11) portable gasoline-driven generators, and cargo-handling equipment, are now short and must be 

expected to continue short for several months. Eemands for these items 

are increasingly heavy and production is not yet sufficient to meet all 

requirements. The United States production of N.L.pontoon equipment 

may fall short of additional requirements and is,in any case, uneconomical 

of shipping. Urgent steps must therefore be taken to start production outside the United States. 

I -USE OF THE AZORES ISLANDS 

1. Requirements can be met. subject to the limitations indicated in general 

paragraphs above. 

XI -OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 

OPERATION “POINTBLANK” AND OTHER AIR OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 

1. Requirements are being met, subject to limitations indicated in the 

general paragraphs above. 

SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE GROUPS IN EUROPE 

2. Requirements can be met. 

Annex VI 

367 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

OPERATION “OVERLORD” 

3. Requirements can be met. However, the low rate of troop movements to 

the U.K. during the spring and summer of 1943 has forced a high rate of movement during the fall and winter of 1943-1944.Limitations of cargo shipping 

and U.K. port capacity have necessitated preshipment of equipment for units 

scheduled to move from August 1943 to May 1944. A balance will be reached 

only about 1 May 1944.Preshipment has been accomplished by reducing certain 

equipment of units in training in the United States and depot stocks of these 

items to dangerously low levels. Should it become necessary to divert to some 

other theater U. S.air and ground units now destined for OVERLORD, part of 

the equipment for such units could only be made available by withdrawal from 

the United Kingdom. 

4. Amphibious training facilities as required by the over-all plan are being 

provided to meet the arrival of landing craft. 

5. The plans for establishment of the artificial harbors required by OVERLORD operations are being made the matter of thorough investigation and it 

is anticipated that means can be provided to meet the requirements. Consideration and all possible action is necessary to move pontoon drydocks and 

equipment in amounts comparable to landing craft transferred from the 

Mediterranean to OVERLORD. 

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

6. Since these operations are to be executed with the means now available 

in the Mediterranean,the only supply requirement (other than the completion 

of the equipment of the French forces) will be maintenance. Naval logistic 

requirements are either in the area or have been provided for. 

111-OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER 

OPERATIONS IN INDIA-BURMA-CHINA 

1. Requirementsinsofar as they are known, can be met. Additional requirements are expected and it is probable that they can be met, subject to the 

Limitations indicated in the general paragraphs, above. 

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

2. Requirements are being met. 

Annex VI 

368 
U.S. SECRET 

RRITISH MOST SECRET 

IV -OTHER UNDERTAKINGS 

GENERAL 

1. Insofar as they are known, requirements can be met, subject to the 

1imitations indicated in the general paragraphs, above. 

REARMING AND REEQUIPPING OF FRENCH FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA 

2. Equipment for 11 French divisions and the supporting troops in North 

Africa can be provided by 31 December 1943. 

V -PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

The range and speed of contemplated amphibious operations indicate 

heavy future requirements for amphibious vehicles and auxiliary servicing 

ships of all types. The provision of these vehicles and ships together with the 

development of new types requires urgent consideration. Such action has 

already been initiated as regards U.S.development and production of two and 

one-half ton amphibious trucks (DUKWs) . 

Annex VI 

369 
U.S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX VII 

SHIPPING 

PART I 

BRITISH DRY CARGO SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS 

1. British Military Cargo Shipping Requirements for the last four months 

of 1943 and the first half of 1944 have been reexamined in the light of the 

revised strategy, agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

These requirements are now as follows: 

2. For the maintenance and build-up of British Forces overseas monthly 

sailings are required as follows: 

(A)-1943 

September October November December 

Theater Loading Area U.K. US. U.K. U.S. U.K. US. U.K. U.S. 

India & Ceylon. .... 11 20 11 20 11 17 11 17 

Mediterranean Theaters . 62 38 60 40 65 35 70 40 

Russian Aid. ..... 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - TurkishAid. ..... 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 

Persian Gulf ..... 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 

(B)-1944 

Theater January February March April May June 

Loading Area U.K.U.S. U.K.US. U.K. U.S. U.K. U.S. U.K. U.S.U.K. US. 

India&Ceylon 12 18 12 18 12 18 13 20 13 20 13 20 

Mediterranean 

Theaters . 70 40 65 45 65 45 60 50 50 50 50 50 

RussianAid . 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - TurkishAid.2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 

Persian Gulf. 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 

3. In addition shipping will be required for allied operational purposes as 

follows: 

(A) PRICELESS. The shippingrequired for AVALANCHE now amounts 

to 126 vessels. It is probable that these will be required to be retained until 

Part 1 

Annex VII 

370 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

December, a smaller number, say 100,until February-March and thereafter 

about 50 for operations in the South of fiance and other Mediterranean 

movement. In addition, the Coaster Fleet in the Mediterranean will need to 

be retained indefinitely for internal maintenance. 

(B) OVERLORD. Requirements in the initial stages will be 100 oceangoing ships and approximately 200 Coasters for the carriage of M.T.vehicles 

and a further 200 coasters for the carriage of stores. 

Subsequently the majority of the Coasters will be progressively 

released but the stores lift will require tonnage of small ocean-going and 

large Coaster type up to a maximum of the order of 500,000 tons deadweight. 

In addition, there may be a requirement for block ships for the construction of “SyntheticPorts’’and it is possible that up to 50 vessels of some 

450 feet length by 45 feet height keel to deck might be involved. 

(C) BULLFROG. According to the present plan 21 M.T.ships will be 

required from January to April inclusive and thereafter approximately five 

ships monthly will require to be loaded within the Indian Ocean area on 

account of maintenance. 

(D) ALACRITY AND OATMEAL. Operation ALACRITY will require three 

ships to sail towards the end of September but thereafter maintenance 

requirements will be extremely small. OATMEAL will require the sailing of 

17 vessels for one voyage in September-October. 

Part 1 

Annex VII 

371 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

PART “IS’ 

AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH CONTROLLED DRY CARGO TONNAGE 

(1600 G.R.T. & OVER) 

4. Total shippingavailable is estimated to be as shown below (million deadweight tons): 

Date 

30 June 1943 

30 Sept. 1943 

31 Dec. 1943 

31 March 1944 

30 June 1944 

Estimated new 

Estimated losses construction & 

(at rates approved transfersto 

by C.C.S.) during British fiug 

preceding during preceding 

quarter-year quarter-year 

.9 1.2 

.9 1.3 

.8 1.3 

.9 1.2 

Average for the second half of 1943 

Average for the Arst half of 1944 

Estimated 

tonnage at date 

18.6 

18.9 

19.3 

19.8 

20.1 

18.9 

19.8 

5. The employment of this shipping is as follows (million deadweight 

tons) : 

Estimated British-controlled tonnage . AoX “free” tonnage importing to U.K. 

Deduct average allowance for tonnage 

awaiting or undergoing repair. . . 

Deduct U.K.coastal tonnage . . . . Tonnage permanently abroad . 

Second half 

of 1943 

18.90 

0.25 

19.15 

2.40 

-

16.75 

0.50 

2.25 2.75 - ­

14.00 

First half 

of 1944 

19.80 

0.25 

20.05 

2.50 

-

17.55 

0.50 

2.25 2.75 - ­

14.80 

Part I1 

Annex VII 

372 
- - 

W. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Deduct non-importing Naval & Military 

tonnage (including troopships) : 

Naval Commissioned vessels .... Naval, Military & R.A.F. auxiliaries . . Miscellaneous Naval & Military Services 

(Northern Waters, Mediterranean & 

IndianOcean areas) ...... Troopships .......... 

Tmnage required (expressed as an 

average over the half-year) : 

I. for U.K. imports ....... II. for Military commitments: 

Build-up & maintenance (after allowing for W.S.A. customary alloCationsandBareBoats) .... Operations ......... 

Deficit ....... 

Second half First half 

of 1943 of 1944 

0.60 0.60 

0.65 0.65 

0.60 0.60 

1.25 3.10 1.25 3.10 - - - ­ 10.90 11.70 

8.75 8.25 

4.35 5.75 

0.90 14.0 0.90 14.90 - ­

-

3.10 ­3.20

6. After allowing for imports in certain bare boat chartered ships and for 

1,500 tons average in each scheduled BOLERO sailing, the deficits in tonnage 

chown above are equivalent to: 

384 sailings in the last 4 months of 1943, 

488 sailings in the first half of 1944. 

These are allowed for in the U.S.statement in Part III. 

7. No provision has been made for: 

a. Shipment of coal to Italy. It is anticipated, however, that Italian shipping will contribute substantially towards thiscommitment. 

b. Additional civil commitmentsto Portugal. 

c. Possible provision of “blockships” for OVERLORD. This commitmen6 

is indefinite but is already the subject of urgent investigation under the arection of C.O.S.S.A.C. 

Part II 

Annex VII 

373 
U.S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

PART 111 

US.CARGO SHIPPING POSITION 

The requirements listed in the following summary include those expressed in paragraph 6 of Part I1 of this Annex, and in addition incorporate 50 

ships for operation PRICELESS and 80 MT ships for operation OVERLORD, 

being the balance required after those to be provided from British controlled 

tonnage. 

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S.CARGO SHIPPING 

IN TERMS OF SAILINGS 

Requirement 

(I) To maintain the war making capacity of WESTERN HEMISPHERE . j . . O . 

(2) To maintain the war making capacity of BRITISH EMPIRE 

a. U.K.Import Program . ~ . b. Regular IRnd Lease Allocations 

c. Ships bareboat chartered . 

(3) Lend Lease Al!ocations other than 

British 

a. Russian. . ~ 

b. French . . . , . c. China Defense .* 

(4) Re-arm and re-equip FRENCH 

forces 

(5) Economic support of occupied 

countries (Italy) 

1943 1944 

Sept. 4th Qtr. 1st Qtr. 2d Qtr. 

44 134 136 136 

75 309* 265 223 

14 43 30 30 

17 52 58 35 

21 56 64 75 

4 12 12 12 

1 3 3 3 

Included in Mediterranean r e ­ quirements. 

The requirements for Italy are not 

included because they can not now 

be based on more than a rodgh 

guess and because Italian tonnage 

may be available to satisfy Italian 

requirements. 

* Includes 10 in compensation for British ships employed in Mediterranean operatiom. 

Part I11 

Annex VII 

374 
U. S. SECRET 

EBITISK MOST SECRET 

Requirement 

(6) Supply of equipment to Turkey 

(7) Maintenance of prisoners of war 

MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Support and maintenance of the 

war making capacity of U.S.forces 

in all areas. 

(8) Army and Navy requirements for 

minor areas ........ 

(9) U.R. (ArmyandNavy) ... 

(10) MEDITERRANEAN (Army a n d 

1943 1944 

Sept. 4th Qtr. 1st Qtr. 2d Qtr. 

Carried in British shipping. 

Included in Mediterranean requirements on basis of requisitions 

from theater 

30 85 74 74 

81 308 375 340 

Navy) .......... 94 261 173 172 

(11) CENTRAL PACIFIC 

Including Gilbert, Marshall and 

Caroline Islands. 

Army ..... 12 46 46 57 

Navy . . 35 79 77 90 

(12) SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC -Including New GuineaBismarck-Aduralty Islands 

Army., ...... 29 127 143 159 

Navy ........ 30 95 83 58 

(13) CHINA-BURMA-INDIA 

(Armyonly). ....... 14 44 57 55 

(14) ALASKA(AnnyandNavy) . . 40 114 88 87 

(15) TOTAL REQUIREMENTS , . . 541 1,768 1,684 1,606 

(16) TOTAL AVAILABLE ..... 549 1,731 1,905 1,982 

(17) BALANCE. ........ +8 -37 +221 +376 

NOTE: a. The foregoing is bed on the assumption that each BOLERO cargo 

ship will lift approximately 1,500tonsof British import cargo and on 

Part I11 

Annex VII 

375 
U.S. SECRET 

ERITISB MOST SECRET 

the other hand the equivalent of 12shiploads of measurement cargo 

on BOLERO account will be lifted monthly in U.K.import vessels. 

b. See comments by Mr. L. W. Douglas and Lord Leathers below. 

COMMENTS BY MR. L. W. DOUGLAS AND LORD LEATHERS 

ON THE DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION 

(Circulated as C.C.S. 329/1) 

In May we pointed out that the deficiencies in shipping resources availaible to meet the estimated requirements during the last half of 1943 were 

susceptible of being satisfactorily managed. This appears to have been the 

cue, though the last four months of this year indicate a tight position. 

Now we believe that the suggested surpluses in the first half of 1944 do 

not reflect the real situation, first, because planned operations may impose 

heavier burdens on our resources than are now contemplated and, secondly,

because the war requirements have not been fully submitted. This is emphasized by the fact that the estimated number of sailings required during each 

of the first and second quarters of 1944 is substantially less than during the 

last quarter of 1943. 

We feel it necessary to add this comment lest the figures give rise to 

misleading interpretations. 

/s/ L. W. DOUGLAS /s/ LEATHERS 

376 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX VII 

PART IV 

PERSONNEL SHIPPING POSITION 

BRITISH 

1. In examining the British personnel shipping resources and determining 

their optimum deployment, the following assumptions have been made :­

a. That known opera.tiona1 requirements will be as in a of Table I 

attached and, for purposes of calculating the British aid to U.S.troop movements have been counted against British resources. 

b. That British personnel will be required to carry out troop movements, other than operational, as scheduled in b of Table I attached. 

c. That losses of escorted class of troopships during the period under 

consideration (September 1943-June 1944) will offset additions to the 

escorted troopship fleet, and that about seven percent of the escorted 

troopship fleet is permanently immobilized for repairs and refits. Losses of 

unescorted troopships cannot be made good by new construction, and the 

calculations have been made on a basis of no losses in this class. 

d. That personnel movement to Mediterranean and Indian Ocean destinations and to South and East Africa is carried out through the Mediterranean on a monthly convoy cycle and that this and other troop convoy 

cycles remain as at present. 

e. That the available British controlled personnel shipping in the Indian Ocean is capable of meeting local requirements (except for certain 

operatioiial requirements) in that theater. 

f. That troopships fitted for assault loading (LSI(L) and LSP) will be 

released to troop movement on conclusion of operations to which they are 

now assigned. 

g. That the C.I.B. cargo ships which are being converted to LSI(L) in 

the U.S.A.will only be available for troop movement during their delivery 

voyage to the U.K.and thereafter will be used entirely on operations. 

h. That the number of troopships in escorted BOLERO-SICKLE convoys may be increased to 30 ships if circumstancespermit. 

Part IV 

Annex VII 

377 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

2. The BOLERO-SICKLE movement program during the period September 1943 to April 1944 makes demands on the fast unescorted class which are 

so exacting t.hat there is no margin for contingencies. 

3. Table I1 attached shows the extent of the assistance which it is estimated that British personnel shipping can provide towards the movement of 

US. troops on the following routes:-

U.S.A. to United Kingdom (BOLERO-SICKLE movement) 

Iceland to United Kingdom (one division) 

North Africa to United Kingdom (equivalent of one division) 

U.S.A. to North Africa 

U.S.A. to India (transhipping in North Africa) 

U.S.A. to South or Southwest Pacific 

Ship operating requirements may cause fluctuations in the movements scheduled for each month. 

UNITED STATES 

4. The deployment of US. personnel shipping, and of British personnel 

shipping which is estimated to be available for the movement of U.S. troops, 

is shown in Table 111.It should be noted that Table 111indicates capabilities 

under the distribution of troop lift assumed in this paper. A comparison of 

capabilities with forecast requirements shows the following general position: 

a. Joint Amy and Navy Requirements in Pacific. 

Troop lift available in September will not eliminate the large backlog 

presently existing, but beginning in October, transport capacity will be 

available to meet monthly requirements and substantially to reduce this 

backlog. The tabulation below summarizes this situation. 

Central, South and Southwest Pacific 

September 4th Quarter 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 

Cumulative 1943 1944 

Deficit 56,500 24,900 14,400 I00 

b. Build-up of US.Forces in U.K. 

(1) The requirement for a balanced force of approximately 1,416,000 

U.S. Troops, including 19 divisions, in the U.K. by May 1944 can be met 

if the expectations over the period are realized. It is estimated that 14 

U.S. divisions will be operationally available on 1May 1944. 

Part IV 

Annex VII 

318 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(2) The build-up of US.forces includes the transfer of 4 divisions 

from the Mediterranean area in November 1943,and of 1 division from Iceland in August 1943. 

(3) The limitations on cargo reception in the U.K.during May, June 

and July 1944 will restrict build-up to two, one, and one divisions in the 

respective months. There is an indicated surplus of troop shipping in the 

Atlantic during the period between mounting date of OVERLORD and the 

date on which movements can be made direct into continental ports. 

c. Mediterranean Requirements. 

(1) Troop capacity to this area after August 1943 is based on replacement requirements. 

(2) US.personnel shipping (2 XAP’s) now in the Mediterranean is 

scheduled to augment the U.K. build-up program beginning in January 

1944. 

d. China-Burma-India. 

The requirements for this area can be met. 

e. Alaska. 

The requirements for this area can be met. 

f. Other Areas -Including Newfoundland, Greenland, Bermuda, Iceland, West and Central Africa, Caribbean and South Atlantic, Middle East 

and Persian Gulf. 

Troop movements to these areas represent a very small proportion 

of the total and consist almost wholly of replacements. Total strengths 

show a gradual reduction. 

GENERAL 

5. Active examination is being made of measures to provide some margin 

for contingenciesin this very tight program of United Nations troopship operation which the basic strategy during the period September 1943 -June 1944 

demands. 

6. It is pointed out that the early arrival of certain Port, Depot and Engineer units is essential if the maximum quantity of BOLERO-SICKLE cargo is 

to be handled, and high priority must be given to the dispatch of these troops 

in the BOLERO-SICKLE convoys. 

Part rv 

Annex VII 

379 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TABLE I 

a. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS COUNTING AGAINST BRITISH 

CONTROLLED TROOP SHIPPING FOR PLANNING PURPOSES 

Period Capacity 

Operation Required Required 

1. Against Italy, Sept. '43-Apr. '44 80,000 (including 10,000 in 

Sardinia,Corsica (U.S. assault ships to 

(be released not later 

(than 31 Dec. '43) 

2. Southern France May '44-June '44 25,000 

3. Burma Aug. '43-Dec. '43) 10,000 

(BULLFROG) increasing to ) 

Jan.-Apr. '44 ) 45,000 

4. Continental NOV.'43-J~ly'44 18,000 18,000 new LSI(L) 

(OVERLORD) 

NOTE : The above figures include troopships which will have to be used as LSI 

(L) and LSP in the operations. In the case of OVERLORD the lift will 

be provided by cargo ships converted to LSI(L). 

b. BRITISH TROOPING COMMITMENTS OTHER THAN 

OPERATIONAL 

Area 

(i) Canada & North 

America to U.K. 

(ii) U.K.to Gibraltar 

U.K.to North Africa 

U.K.to Malta 

U.K.to Middle East 

U.K.to India & Persia 

U.K.to East Africa 

U.K.to South Africa 

(iii) U.K.to West Africa 

(iv) West Africa to India 

(v) North Africa t@ U.K. 

Number Remarks 

10,500 per month 5000 Canadian Troops 

5000 Air Force 

500 Miscellaneous 

1,400 per month ) 

10,000 per month ) 

1,100per month ) Reinforcements and 

6,000 per month ) reliefs all via 

8,200 per month ) Mediterranean route. 

800 per month ) 

1,900per month ) ~ 

29,400 

1,700 per month 

1,400 per month Reliefs 

36,000 Sailing 

May-July 1944 82nd West African 

Division 

about 100,000 Nov. One U.S.and three 

'43-Jan. '44inclusive British divisions 

Table I-Part -IV -Annex VII 

380 
. 28,300 55,000 72,800 52,400 55,400 83,600 56,800 90,000 88,100 7

SHIPPING 

4,500 

-

-

Apr. 

4,500 

-

-

Mar. 

PERSONNEL 

4,200 

4,100 

-

Feb. Jan. Dec. Nov. Oct. Sept. 

FOR MOVEMENT OF US. TROOPS 

AUGUST 1943 to JUNE 1944 

(a) To Casablanca 

(b) Tranship in North 

8,700 

4,100 

Africa 

-

BRITISH 

8,700 

4,100 

-

VII ANNEX 

TABLE I1 

AVAILABILITY OF 

8,700 

-

4,100 

4,500 

4,100 

- 1,000 

4,500 

4,100 

ESTIMATE OF 

. 15,000 

-

U.S.A.4.Pacific. . 

-

Aug. 

. 

. Africa (a) 

MEDITERRANEAN 

. 

. 

. 

BOLERO-SICKLE 

. 

. 

(b) 

U.S.A.-U.K. 

Iceland-U.K. 

N.Africa-U.K. 

U.S.A.-N. 

U.S.A.-India 

PACIFIC 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TABLE 111 

rn 

PAFtT XV OF ANNEX VII 

Table I11 to Part IY of Annex YII 

382 
ESTIMATED U. S. TROOP MOVEMENT CAPABILITY notas: 

STRENGTH 

I AUGUST 1913 18U1

OCTOBER NOVEMBER _ DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY -a

~ _ _ MARCH 

55,500 51,800 55,700 50, I00 56,800 35.100 37,100 

5, 150 5,700 Y.800 5,050 v,voo 3,600 1.050 

107,800 117,300 2117,500 2115,300 1v3,100 2uo.900 zsn.700 

9,500 8.900 10,700 13,200 28,500 19.000 20,000 

35.900 78,800 157,700 V6.800 156,000 177,700 80.800 1w,200 190.000 

15.00O(lOi".) 1,000 

80,000 (1 U.S. Divsl 

621,500 658.300 8111,300 982,000 1,082, 800 1,125,000 I,U16.900 

5 8 10 12 15 17 19 

8.500 12.600 12,500 17.100 12,200 8.500 3,500 

535,SW v95,900 195,800 V95.800 195,800 185,800 U85,SOO 

1U.300 13,900 13,700 21,500 IV,500 23.500 20,600 

I55,800 163,500 150,900 188,300 178,900 203,500 210, 100 

11,000 11.000 55.000 VV,200 70.000 56.300 YV,OOO 

126.000 165,000 513.000 5uv,200 301,200 61U,OOO 577,000 

11,300 11,800 5,600 8,600 IO.100 11,100 5,500 

77,500 81,600 99,600 108,500 118.200 121,600 127,YOO 

2.500 2,500 2,500 2.000 2,000 2,000 2.000 

152,500 1v9,noo 1~5,800 112,800 IV2,800 112,300 IY2.800 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

PART “V” 

CONCLUSIONS 

The presently estimated required troop lift in the Atlantic and India 

areas will be met within the prescribed period of tie, but in the Pacific there 

is a deficiency which will be substantially reduced at the end of this year. 

To achieve this result and to have a reserve against contingencies will 

impose a heavy strain on troop transports. After 1 May 1944 there appears to 

be, according to present calculations, an easing of this strain. 

The combined cargo shipping position indicates a deficit of 29 sailings 

during the last four months of this year, and a surplus during tie first half of 

1944. 

This deficit, if handied with full cooperation among the various demanders, can be covered, but even so,it indicates a tight position throughout 

the period. 

Part v 

Annex VII 

384 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX VIII 

PETROLEUM 

REQUIREMENTS 

1. Estimates have been made of service demands of petroleum products 

to implement the specifically agreed QUADRANT decisions. While there has 

been no opportunity to make a combined final and detailed survey of refinery

capacities and crude oil availability it is our judgment that adequate facilities 

exist, or are in process, or can be made ready in time to meet QUADRANT decisions requirements, with the exception of high grade aviation gasoline (100 

octane or higher). 

These estimates include essential civilian requirements. 

100 OCTANE AVIATION GASOLINE 

2. The critical petroleum item is 100 octane aviation gasoliie. The total 

production of this grade of fuel is now being consumed and requests for allocations are far greater than can be met from production at the present time. 

Anticipated increase in production is offset by correspondingly increased requirements in the various theaters. 

3. Based on current estimates there will be a daily world-wide shortage of 

68,000 barrels during September 1943. This shortage decreases progressively 

until the first quarter 1944 when it is estimated that shortage will average 

6,492barrels per day. Requirements then increase over production until the 

end of 1944 when production fails to meet requirements by a total of 53,586 

barrels per day. 

4. The only apparent solution to this problem is priority of allocation to 

the theaters prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the substitution 

to the fullest degree of lower grades of aviation gasoline for training and other 

purposes until the new manufacturing program is more nearly in balance with 

requirements. 

5. The Army and Navy Petroleum Board, acting through a staff of officers 

assigned to it by the U.S.Army and Navy, have taken steps to expedite to the 

maximum extent possible the completion of the aviation gasoline manufacturing program. The responsibility for this program rests with the Petroleum 

Administration for War and the joint service activities above mentioned are 

carried out in cooperation with that organization. 

Annex VIII 

385 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TANKERS 

6. Existing large seagoing tankers plus conservative estimate of deliveries 

from new construction over the next several months wili meet requirements 

for bulk movements of petroleum to areas of consumption. 

7. In all theaters there is a very real need for smaller ta.nkers, particularly 

where necessary to supply newly established beachheads and bases, as for 

operationsin the Paci�ic.,Southeast Asia, OILERLORD and the Mediterranean. 

They are particularly important for operations in the Pacific, and in addition 

are being requested in increasing numbers in the United Kingdom and the 

Mediterranean. Steps are now being taken to determine requirements. Sich 

as cannot be supplied from present building programs will be requested in new 

construction. 

PIPELINE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

8. The construction of the pipeline through Burma, and later into China, 

will greatly facilitate the de!ivery of petroleum products to allied forces in 

those areas. The ocean terminus of the pipeline HTill be served by an adequate 

battery of tanks to be erected, and these in turn will receive their deliveries 

from tankers, tine supply for which is being planned~ 

Amex WII 

386 
U.S. SECRET 

RRITISH MOST SECRET 

30 August 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 128 

MESSAGES TO MARSHAL STALIN AND GENERALISSIMO CHIANG 

KAI-SHEK, SENT AT THE CONCLUSION OF QUADRANT 

Note by the Secretaries 

Enclosed are messages sent by the President and the Prime Minister on 

25 August to Marshal Stalin (Enclosure “A”) and Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek (Enclosure “B”). 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R DEANE. 

Combined Secretariat. 

387 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE “A” 

August 25,1943 

From: Opnav 

To : Alusna, Moscow 

From Admiral Brown, Naval Aide to the President. 

My immediately following message is most secret. 

It should be seen only by Alusna, a decoder appointed by him and the 

Ambassador who is then requested to deliver it to the British Ambassador. If 

possible it should then be delivered by the British and American Ambassadors 

jointly to Marshal Stalin. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased 

before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery. 

August 25,1943 

From: Opnav 

To : Alusna, Moscow 

Secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. 

In our conference at Quebec, just concluded, we have arrived at the following decision BS to military operationsto be carried out during 1943 and 1944. 

388 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The bomber offensive against Germany will be continued on a rapidly 

increasing scale from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy. The objectives of 

this air attack will be to destroy the German air combat strength, to dislocate 

the German military, industrial, and economic system, and to prepare the way 

for a cross-channel invasion. 

A large-scale build-up of American forces in the United Kingdom is now 

under way. It will provide an initial assault force of British and American divisions for cross-channel operations. A bridgehead in the Continent once secured 

will be reenforced steadily by additional American troops at the rate of from 

three to five divisions per month. This operationwill be the primary British and 

American ground and air effort against the Axis. 

The war in the Mediterranean is to be pressed vigorously. Our objectives 

in that area will be the elimination of Italy from the Axis alliance, and the 

occupation of that country as well as Sardinia and Corsica as bases for operations against Germany. 

Our operations in the Balkans will be limited to the supply of Balkan 

Guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor raids by Commandos, and to the 

bombing of strategic obectives. 

We shall accelerate our operations against Japan in the Pacific and in 

Southeast Asia. Our purposes are to exhaust Japanese air, naval, and shipping 

resources, to cut the Japanese communications and to secure bases from which 

to bomb Japan proper. 

389 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE “B” 

August 25,1943 

From: Opnav 

To : Alusna, Chungking 

From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President. 

My immediately following message is most secret and should be seen only 

by Alusna, a decoder appointed by him, and the Ambassador who is then to 

deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible it should be 

delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully but closely paraphased before delivery. Acknowledge 

receipt and delivery. 

August 25,1943 

From: Opnav 

To : Alusna, Chungking 

Secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek from President 

Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. 

In order to vitalize operations in Burma, a command, separate from 

India, has been set up under Vice Admiral The Lord Louis Mountbatten to 

operate directly under the Combined Chjefs of Staff. This, we think, will be an 

improvement in organization and further the concept of aggressive operations. 

Thus, we hope to obtain unity in our combined effort in the forthcoming Burma 

operations. Unity must be achieved if success is to be attained. 

390 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

At the conclusion of the conference in Quebec, I hasten to bring to you 

certain proposals that have been advanced as to operations in your theaters 

and areas contiguous thereto. 

First, to accelerate the build-up of the air freight route into China to 

provide greatly increased support for your air and ground forces. 

Second, the heavy burden now imposed on the lines of communications 

from Calcutta to Assam requires immediate increase in their capacity. Instructions have been issued to provide additional river craft and rail transportation 

facilities which should result in an eventual lift of two hundred thousand tons 

a month into Assam. 

Third, to carry out offensive operations in the coming dry season for the 

capture of Upper Burma with a view to increasing the capacity of the air route, 

and to making possible the reopening of an overland route to China. The security of these land and air routes is considered of vital importance to the build-up 

of an air offensive based in China. The operations as now proposed take the 

form of an attack from Assam into Burma via Imphal and Ledo, coordinated 

with an advance at the same time from Yunnan. These converging attacks 

are to be facilitated by the employment of long-range penetration groups in 

front of each column similar to those employed by Brigadier Wingate last 

spring. These columns are to be organized by Wingate. They will include 

British, American, and Indian contingents, 211 to be supported and supplied 

by air. 

Fourth, preparations are underway for amphibious operations designed 

to contribute to the success of the North Burma campaign. .4t the same time 

steps are being taken to provide adequate naval forces to assure om naval 

supremacy in the Indian Ocean area and to interdict the enemy’s sea cDmmunications into Rangoon. The precise objective for the amphibian attacks is 

still under investigation. The decision will not be made until Lord Mountbatten 

has had an opportunity to consider the various factors on the ground. 

391 

MINUTES 

OF 

M EETl NGS 

393 
394 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTES 

1ST MEETINGOF THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

WITH THE COMBINED CHIEFSOF STAFFHELDAT 1730, 

19 AUGUST,AT THE CITADEL,ABRAHAM. 

PRESENT 

British 

The Prime Minister 

Mr. Anthony Eden 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Adniiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudlev Pound 

Air Chief Mirshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral 

Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Gt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

u. s. 

The President 

Admiral William D. Leahy 

General George C. Marshall 

Admiral Ernest J. King~ 

General Henry H. Arnold 

Mr. Harry Hopkins 

SECRETARIES 

Brigadier General J. R. Deane 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

395 
u. s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

After welcoming the Combined Chiefs of Staff the President and Prime 

Minister agreed that they should read through the Report of Progress which 

had been submitted to them. (Note: The amendments to the report that were 

directed by the President and Prime Minister have been included in a revised 

copy of the report and have been published as C.C.S. 319.) 

MR. HOPKINS raised the question as to whether POINTBLANK included air operations from Italy. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it did not but it was anticipated that 

it might include such operations in the future. He said that one of the chief 

objectives of the POINTBLANK operation (in its first stage) was to destroy 

German fighter factories. Some of these can be better attacked from Italy. 

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed and said it was contemplated that part of 

the POINTBLANK forces would eventually move so as to operate from Italian 

bases when they became available. 

THE PRESIDENT asked if the operation included attacks on Ploesti. 

GENERAL ARNOLD replied that the oil industry was one of the major 

objectives in the third phase of the plan and attacks on Ploesti, if not specifically mentioned in the plan, could be included in that phase provided suitable 

bases had become available. 

THE PRESIDENT indicated that if we could reach bases as far north 

as Ancona in Italy they would be within striking distance of Ploesti. 

It was then agreed that the plan for the combined bomber offensive 

should include attacks from all convenient bases. 

THE PRIME MINISTER discussed the paragraph pertaining to OVERLORD. He indicatedthat he was in favor of the plan but that it must understood 

that its implementation depends on certain conditions being fulfilled regarding 

relative strengths. One of these was that there should not be more than 12 

mobile German divisions in Northern hswce at the time the operation was 

mounted and that the Germans should not be capable of a build-up of more 

than 15 divisions in the succeeding 2 months. If the German strength proved 

bo be considerably greater than this, the plan should be subject to revision 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

MR. HOPKINS said he did not feel that the Alliss should take a rigid 

view of these limitations. He suggested that there might be 13 German 

divisions, or even 15 German divisions at two-thirds strength. Also it would 

396 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECEET 

be difficult to assess what the German fighter strength would be at that time. 

In this regard, he felt that General Morgan’s report was inelastic. 

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that there should be elasticity in judgment in deciding as to whether or not the operation should be mounted. He 

wished to emphasize that he strongly favored OVERLORD for 1944. He was 

not in favor of SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942or ROUNDUP in 1943.However, the 

objections which he had had to those operations have been removed. He said 

that every effort should be made to add at least twenty-five per cent strength 

to the initial assault. This would mean an increase in the landing craft 

necessary but there are nine months available before the target date and 

much can be done in that time. The beaches selected are good but it would be 

better if at the same time a landing were to be made on the inside beaches 

of the Cotentin Peninsula. The initial lodgment must be strong as it so largely 

affects later operations. 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that an increase in initial assault would 

greatly strengthen the OVERLORD operation. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he would like to have the time of arrival 

of US.troops in England stepped up, and GENERAL MARSHALL indicated 

that a study with respect to this was now being made. He wished to emphasize 

that the shortage of landing craft places the greatest limitation on all of our 

operations. He cited the case of the Mediterranean, at the present time, and 

indicated that we could have made an entry into Italy before this, had landing 

craft been available. 

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that Mr. Lewis Douglas, Mr. 

Averill Harriman, and Lord Leathers had made an intensive study on the 

shipping situation which indicates that a large increase will be available as 

a result of our success in anti-U-boat warfare. 

ADMIRAL KIhG said that the prospects are excellent that there will 

be more landing craft available than we had previously anticipated. 

THE PRESIDENT said that a study is now being carried on looking 

toward the possibility of converting excess dry cargo ships into troop carriers. 

Such conversion takes about six months, but he felt that it should be carried 

out to the extent, necessary to bring the cargo lift and troop lift into balance. 

GENERAL MARSHALL reported that General Somervell is optimistic 

over the prospects of making up our present backlog in troop lift. 

397 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

In discussing the paragraph pertaining to Italy The PRESIDENT asked 

if it was contemplated sending French troops to Sardinia and Corsica. He 

thought it desirable to use them in an operation against Corsica but considered 

it best not to use them in an operation against Sardinia. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE expressed t.he thought that an attack against 

Sardinia depends entirely on what the Germans do with the forces they now 

have on that island. There is a possibility in the case of a collapse of Italy that 

the German force will be withdrawn entirely. In that case Sardinia will fall 

with Italy and a military operation to obtain it will not be necessary. 

THE PRIME MINISTER wanted it to be definitely understood that he 

was not committed to an advance into Northern Italy beyond the Ancona-Pisa 

Line. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE doubted whether we should have enough troops 

to go beyond this line, but it was not yet possible to say. 

THE PRESIDENT asked if it was necessary to go further into Northern 

Italy in order to reach Germany with our aircraft. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL replied that it was not necessary but there 

was a distinct disadvantage in permitting the Germans to occupy the airllelds 

in Northern Italy south of the Alps. This had a particularly bad effect in 

improving the warning service for all raids into Germany. Additionally, the 

airfields in Northern Italy have greater capacity than those in Central Italy. 

These need considerable work done on them before they can accommodate 

our big bombers. 

In discussing the paragraph pertaining to a diversion in Southern 

France The PRIME MINISTER indicated that he would be hesitant in putting 

our good divisions into that area to meet the resistance which might be anticipated, and he doubted therefore if French divisions would be capable of an 

operation of the kind suggested. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that such a diversion would, of course, depend 

on what the German reactions had been and that troops would only be landed 

in Southern France if the Germans had been forced to withdraw a number 

of their divisions from that area. There are two routes by which it might be 

accomplished: from West Italy if our forces in Italy had been able to advance 

that far north; otherwise the landing in Southern France would have to be 

an amphibious operation. 

MR. EDEN asked if there would be adequate air cover for an amphibious 

operation against Southern France. 

398 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL replied that the air cover would not be good. 

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that it would be well to consider, as 

an alternate plan, the possibility of flying supplies in for guerrillas who might 

be operating in the mountains thirty miles from the coast. Thismountain area 

would constitute an excellent rendezvous point for Frenchmen who objected 

to being sent into Germany and who might take refuge there. He described 

such an operation as “air-nourished guerrilla warfare.” 

It was agreed that the possibilities of this proposal should be explored. 

With reference to the Balkans, The PRESIDENT asked if plans were 

being prepared as to the action we should take in the event that the Germans 

withdrew from the Balkans to the line of the Danube. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE replied that of course any such action would 

depend on the forces available. He did not think there would be any surplus 

from our main operation. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he was most anxious to have the Balkans 

divisions which we have trained, particularly the Greeks and Yugoslavs, 

operate in their own countries. He thought it would be advantageous if they 

could follow up, maintain contact, and harass the withdrawal of the Germans 

if they should e!ect to withdraw to the Danube. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that Commando forces could also 

operate in support of the guerrillas on the Dalmatian coast. 

THE PRESIDENT then referred to a suggestion made by the Netherlands Government that 1,500potential officers should be trained in the U.S.A. 

with a view to organizing, if the Germans withdrew, formations in Holland 

to take part in the struggle against Germany. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this would present no difficulty. 

The discussion then turned to the garrison requirements and security 

of lines of communication in the Mediterranean. 

It was generally agreed that there would be about forty-seven divisions 

available for operations in that area. These include the French, Greeks, Yugoslavs, and Poles in addition to the divisions of the US. and U.K. Seven of the 

latter were due to be brought back to the U.K. for OVERLORD. 

399 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there are several British divisions 

that have to be reconstituted and that every effort is being made to do this 

assoon aspossible. One expedient is the sending of nine independent battalions 

to North Africa to take over the guard duty now being performed by active 

formations. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the operations now envisaged made use 

of all the divisions that will be available. This, of course, is subject to fluctuation 

depending upon the enemy’s reactions. He estimated, however, that seventeen 

to twenty divisions would be required in Italy, one in Corsica and Sardinia, and 

these, together with garrison troops in Cyprus and North Africa, would limit 

those available for other offensive operations. There was also a shortage of 

antiaircraft artillery. So long as the Germans occupy Crete and Sardinia 

maintenance of antiaircraft defense will be necessary in North Africa. However, 

every effortwas being made to remedy this deficiency. 

THE PRESIDENT reiterated his desire to use the Yugoslav and Greek 

divisions in the Balkans if the opportunity arose. 

TEE PRIME MINISTER said that he believed that, barring the necessity 

to retain the oil output in the Balkans, it would be to the Germans’ advantage 

to withdraw from t‘nat area. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that there were other raw materials, 

particularly bauxite, which the Germans secured from the Balkans that would 

cause them to hesitate to withdraw. 

The discussion then turned to the occupation of the Azores. 

THE PRESIDENT suggested that within a week or ten days after the 

British occupalion of the Azores, he would send the Prime Minister a notice 

that a British and American convoy and some British and American air units 

were proceeding to the Azores and would expect to use the facilities of those 

islands. The British could then say to the Portugese “that they were frightfully sorry that their cousins from overseas had descended upon them but that, 

having done so, there was little that they could do about it.” 

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed to this plan. He pointed out that the 

British were not at fault in failing to obtain the immediate use of these facilities for the United States. He had kept the President informed of events. He 

said the British have not given President Salazar any assurance as to what 

forces would be sent to help Portugal in case of attack. The British had only 

committed themselves to declare war on Spain in the event that she attacked 

400 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Portugal, and to afford such help to Portugal as was in their power against an 

attack by the Germans. He said that, if on the 8th of October, the British have 

entered the islands and no attack against Portugal had resulted, President 

Salazar would feel much better about permitting United States use of the 

Azores’ facilities. Immediately upon occupancy, the British will make every 

effort by diplomacy to obtain the permit for United States entry. 

MR. EDEN said that it had always been visualized that this would be 

done. He suggested thst the proposed American-British convoy might sail in 

about a fortnight after the British entry. He thought that timing was an 

extremely important factor but he felt confident that the situation could be 

handled to everyone’s satisfaction. 

In discussing the command situation in Southeast Asia, The PRIME 

MINISTER pointed out that the setup agreed upon did not exactly coincide 

with the MacArthur model. He asked General Marshall if it might not be 

possible to have a British liaison officer appointed to General MacArthur’s 

Staff. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that arrangements to accomplish this were 

under way at the present time, and, in addition, he was taking the necessary 

steps to see that the situation in the Southwest Pacific was adequately reported 

to the Prime Minister at frequent intervals. 

When an examination of the final report had been concluded, The 

PRIME MINISTER referred to the long term plan for the defeat of Japan, on 

which he understood work had been proceeding ceaselessly since the last 

Conference. This plan was both strategical and technical. It would deal with 

such things as the best method of gaining access to China, the securing of 

airfields from which to bomb Japan, and the provision of synthetic harbors and 

HABEAKUKS. There was no doubt that the combined resources of the United 

States and the British Empire could produce whatever special equipm-ent 

might be required to permit of the concentration of the enormous air forces 

which would be released to attack Japan after the defeat of Germany. But 

apart from such considerations, there were many political factors to be taken 

into account. Great Britain would be faced with difficulties in moving her 

veterans, many of whom would have been on continuous service for several 

years, forward into a new campaign. It might prove somewhat easier to arrange 

matters in the Navy and the Air Force, and in the war against Japan it would 

be the air which would be of vital importance. These difficulties would, of 

course, be overcome. Nevertheless he hoped that the work of the Planning 

Staffs would only be taken as foundation data. With their comparatively 

401 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

circumscribed viewpoint, the Planners could not be expected to produce final 

solutions to the problems confrontingour two nations. He hoped the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff would not think themselves limited by the results of the 

Planners’ study of the war against Japan. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the Chiefs of Staff never felt themselves so 

limited. 

Continuing, The PRIME MINISTER said that he did not view with 

favor the idea that a great expedition should be launched to retake Singapore 

in 1945. He was most anxious not to set an aim for that year which would 

paralyze action in 1944. The campaign of 1942-43 had been most ineffective, 

and he felt ashamed that results in this theater had not been better. It was 

now proposed in the coming winter to extend the operation of the long-range 

penetration groups in Northern Burma,and he thought this should be supplemented by the seizure of the tip of Sumatra. If a strong air force could be 

lodged there, the Japanese could be brought to action, their shipping could 

be bombed, and they would be forced to gather resources to react against our 

initiative.Options would be kept open for subsequentaction in either direction. 

Whatever happened, we must not let an ultimate objective paralyze intervening action, and he earnestly hoped that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would 

examine the possibilities in the Southeast Asian Theater, with the object of 

doing the utmost possible to engage all forces against the Japanese. Only in 

this way would our overwhelming superiority achieve rapid results against 

the waning strength of the enemy. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he looked at the problem from a rather 

different angle. The position occupied by the Japanese might be compared to 

a slice of pie, with Japan at the apex, and with the island barrier forming the 

outside crust. One side of the piece of pie passed through Burma, the other led 

down to the Solomons. He quitesaw the advantageof an attack on Sumatra, but 

he doubted whether there were sufficient resources to allow of both the opening 

of the Burma Road and the attack on Sumatra. He would rather see all 

resources concentrated on the Burma Road, which represented the shortest 

line through China to Japan. He favored attacks which would aim at hitting 

the edge of the pie as near to the apex as possible, rather than attacks which 

nibbled at the crust. Thus, provided Yunnan could be securely held, an air 

force could be built up through Burma in China, which would carry out 

damaging attacks on Japanese shipping. At the same time the attack through 

the Gilberts and Marshalls to Truk would strike the opposite edge of the slice 

of pie. If one might judge by the operations in the Solomon Islands, it would 

take many years to reach Japan, but the other side of the picture was the 

heavy attrition to wWch the Japanese forces were subjected in these operations. 

402 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his agreement with the President's 

simile, but inquired whether the conquest of Southern Burma was really 

necessary. The problem in Burma was not so much the finding of forces to 

deploy, but rather of overcoming the difficulties of an exiguous line of communication, and of a monsoon which limited operations to six months in the 

year. Burma was the worst possible place in which to fight, and operations 

could only be carried on by a comparatively small number of high class troops. 

There were large forces in the Southeast Asia Command, and it was for this 

reason that he hoped to see an attack on the Sumatran tip. An attack on Akyab 

could hardly be regarded as profitable. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he also had never thought much of the idea 

of taking Akyab or Rangoon. The Generalissimo had favored the attack on 

Rangoon, because he thought that it would interfere with the Japanese 

communications, but these probably now ran across land from Bangkok, and 

the Japanese were in any event not so dependent on their line of communication 

as the Allied troops. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he favored the extension of Wingate's 

operations in Northern Burma, and the supporting advances; but he wished 

to emphasize his conviction that the attack on Sumatra was the great strategic 

blow which should be struck in 1944. CULVERIN would be the TORCH of the 

Indian Ocean. In his opinion, it would not be beyond the compass of our 

resources. We should be striking and seizing a point of our own choice, against 

which the Japanese would have to beat themselves if they wished to end the 

severe drain which would be imposed upon their shipping by the air forces 

from Sumatra. 

THE PRESIDENT suggested that the Sumatra operation would be 

heading away from the main direction of our advance to Japan. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that nevertheless it would greatly facilitate the direct advances. The alternative would be to waste the entire year, 

with nothing to show for it but Akyab and the future right to toil through the 

swamps of Southern Burma. He earnestly hoped that careful and sympathetic 

study would be given to this, the Sumatra project, which he was convinced 

was strategically of the highest importance. He would compare it, in its 

promise of decisive consequences, with the Dardanelles operation of 1915. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then read to the meeting a telegram recently 

received from General Auchinlech, reporting the opinion of Admiral Somerville 

that greater resources than had hitherto been deemed necessary would be 

required for the operations at Akyab. 

403 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that Akyab, the importance of which 

had apparently been overlooked in the retreat from Burma, and which we had 

failed to take last winter, had now been turned into a kind of Plevna. It was 

against this that we proposed to employ the whole of our amphibious resources 

in the Indian Ocean in 1943-44. He could not believe that this was right. 

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the possession of Akyab was essential for an attack on Rangoon. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that it would certainly be useful in improving 

the scale of air attack which could be brought to bear on Rangoon, and possibly 

on Bangkok, but he doubted whether it was essential. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he had always understood that Akyab was 

required in order that attacks might be made against the Japanese line of 

communication northward from Rangoon. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the principal importance of Akyab 

was as a stepping-stone to the conquest of Southern Burma. 

Reference was then made to the air route to China, and GENERAL 

ARNOLD reported that the figure of 7,000 tons was almost certain to be 

reached in August. 

THE PRESIDENT then inquired what would be the relationship between 

the Generalissimo and the new Allied Commander in Chief of the Southeast 

Asia Command. 

He was informed that their relationship would be that of two neighboring Commanders in Chief. Liaison would be insured by the fact that 

General Stilwell would be the Deputy Commander in Chief, Southeast Asia 

Command, and also Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. The arrangements 

made for the new command guarded against the diversion of resources destined 

for China, unless agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

THE PRESIDENT then suggested that it would be necessary to include 

in the final report a carefully considered paragraph relating to our action in 

support of Russia. 

He was informed that this was under consideration, and an appropriate 

paragraph would be included. 

THE MEETING then adjourned. 

404 
U. S. SECRW 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTES 

2ND MEETINGOF THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

WITH THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF HELDAT 1730, 

23 AUGUST,AT THE CITADEL, ABRAHAM. 

PRESENT 

British 

The Prime Minister 

General Sir Alan F.Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudlev Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral 

Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

u. s. 

The President 

Admiral William D. Leahy 

General George C. Marshall 

Admiral Ernest J. King 

General Henry H. Arnold 

Mr. Harry Houkins - Rear Admiral Wilson Brown 

SECRETARIES 

Brigadier General J. R. Deane 

Brigadier E.I. C. Jacob 

405 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

At the request of the Prime Minister, BRIGADIER JACOB read C.C.S. 

319/3,a draft of the Final Report from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the 

Resident and hime Minister containing the conclusions of the Quadrant 

Conferences. 

There was no comment on Sections I, 11, and 111. 

1. FACILITIES IN THE AZORES ISLANDS 

With reference to Section IV,paragraph 1 b, The PRIME MINISTER 

asked if any measures had been taken as yet to prepare a combined BritishU 5.convoy including escorts and air support to move to the Azores about two 

weeks after the original British occupation on 8 October. 

ADMIRAL KING said that arrangements would be made for such a 

convoy to leave the United States on or about 20 October. 

2. EMERGENCY OPERATION TO ENTER THE CONTINENT 

THE PRESIDENT asked if a study was being made regarding an 

emergency entrance of the Continent and indicated that he desired United 

Nations troops to be ready to get to Berlin as soon as did the Russians. 

GENERAL BROOKE replied that General Morgan’s staff had prepared 

plans for such an entry and that they were based on several contingencies. 

These include a weakening of German resistance, a withdrawal of the German 

forces from France, or a complete German collapse. 

3. OPERATION “OVERLORD” 

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he wished it definitely understood 

that British acceptance of the planning for Operation OVERLORD included 

the proviso that the operation could only be carried out in the event that 

certain conditions regarding German strength were met. These included the 

number of German divisions to be in France and a definite superiority over the 

German fighter force at the time of the initial assault. Further, that if it 

developed that the German ground or air fighter strength proved to be greater

than that upon which success of the plan was premised, the question as to 

whether or not the operations should be launched would be subject to review 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.In this connection he suggested that the 

United Nations have a “second string to their bow” in the form of a prepared 

plan to undertake Operation JUPITER. He did not in any way wish to imply 

that he wasnot wholeheartedly in favor of OVERLORD, but, at the same time, 

406 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

be wished to emphasize that its launching was dependent upon certain 

conditions which would give it a reasonable chance for success. 

It was decided that the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister 

should include a paragraph which would provide for continued planning for 

the launching of Operation JUPITER in the event that OVERLORD should 

have to be abandoned. 

THE PRIME MINISTER also discussed the question of moving seven 

trained divisions from the Mediterranean to England. He agreed that at this 

time the decision to return the seven divisions to England was firm but that it 

was subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff if the strategic situation 

seemed to make such review advisable. He asked General Brooke if that was 

definitely understood. 

GENERAL BROOKE said that at the present time it was planned that 

the seven trained divisions would return from the Mediterranean to England 

to participate in OVERLORD unless the situation forced the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff to reconsider this decision. This decision of course would be dependent 

upon the enemy situation at the time. It might be necessary to keep one or 

two of these trained divisions in the Mediterranean in order to create a more 

favorable situation for the success of OVERLORD or to avoid a setback in Italy. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if it becomes necessary to make an 

interchange of divisions between England and the Mediterranean, it might 

be done without prejudice to the move of the seven divisions by exchanging 

others. For example, it might be necessary to send out a second Canadian 

division to complete a Canadian Corps and bring home a British division in 

itsplace. Meanwhile, he stated he had heard Brigadier MacLean give a presentation of the OVERLORD plan and that it seemed sound, but should be 

strengthened. 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed to this and pointed out that actually 

there would be four and one-half divisions in the initial assault rather than 

a force of three divisions which had been suggested at the last conference 

with the President and the Prime Minister. 

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if this would include an attack on the 

inside of the Cotentin Peninsula. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said the present plans would not provide for 

such an operation but that if more landing craft could be made available there 

was a possibility that this landing would be included in the initial assault. 

407 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed some surprise that the Commander 

in Chief, Portsmouth, had been designated as Naval Commander and he 

indicated that he had always thought of this officer as having administrative 

rather than outstanding tactical ability. He agreed with the choice of Air 

Commander in Chief. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that he felt that the Commander in Chief, 

Portsmouth was the logical person to be given this command, particularly 

at this time. During the preliminary phases much of the naval planning and 

operations had to be accomplished between adjoining naval commands in 

Great Britain and he was the logical person to coordinate it. He said that if 

later events indicated the desirability, there would be no difficulty in designating a new commander. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had thought of giving this position 

to Admiral Ramsey who had been in command of the British naval operations 

in the attack on Sicily under the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean. 

He would accept the present arrangement only if it were subject to review on 

the appointment of the Supreme Commander. 

In discussing the transport of troops across the channel, the President 

recalled that in 1917 two light American passenger vessels, the HARVARD 

and the YALE, had been sent to England and had been utilized very successfully in transporting troops across the channel. He suggested that the world 

should be combed to see if vessels of this type could not be made available and 

thus increase the troop lift from England to France. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States had been pretty well 

explored in this connection but he would see what else could be done. 

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated the possibility of asking Canada to 

help out in this respect. 

4. OPERATIONS IN ITALY AND SOUTHERN FRANCE 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there had recently been rumors that 

the Germans were planning to defend the Ravenna-Genoa Line in Italy, which 

is about 50 or 50 miles north of the Ancona-Pisa Line. He thought that our 

forces should proceed as far beyond their objective as possible with the troops 

allocated for the purpose. 

SLR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt the Germans must defend on the 

forward or southern slope cf the Apennines, in which case they would be somewhat south of the Ravenna-Genoa Line. 

408 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING agreed with this and thought that the terrain dictated 

a German defense on the Leghorn-Ancona position. 

THE PRIME MINISTER felt that the further north in Italy the United 

Nations were able to progress, the easier would become the supply of guerrillas 

who might be assembled in the Maritime Alps. In this connection he said he 

was glad to see that steps had already been taken to investigate the possibility 

of intensifying fifth column activities in Sardinia. He thought that organizations such asthe 0.S. S. and the British S. 0.E. should certainly enter Sardinia 

at this time. However, he suggested that if Italy capitulates, Sardinia would 

probably come into our hands without a struggle. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there were conflicting reports in this 

regard. One was that the Germans would attempt to hold Sardinia and another 

was that they were assembling landing craft between Sardinia and Corsica for 

the purpose of effecting an evacuation. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if an advance into Southern France 

appeared to be likely he thought that General Giraud and General DeGaulle 

should be brought into consultation by General Eisenhower and that French 

forces should be fully utilized. 

THE PRESIDENT indicated that he felt guerrilla operations could be 

initiated in south central France as well as in the Maritime Alps. 

5. THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was glad to see that the Chiefs 

of Staff included provision that plans should be made for the defeat of Japan 

within 12 months after the collapse of Germany; this at least would be a target 

towards which we should work and it discouraged planning on the basis of a 

prolonged war of attrition. 

The paragraphs concerning operations in the Central Pacific were read 

and The PRIME MINISTER suggested that these should result in bringing 

on a naval battle with the Japanese Fleet. 

ADMIRAL KING said that was one of their main purposes but he did 

not feel that a large battle would develop until our forces had reached the 

Marianas. 

6. OPERATIONS IN THE INDIA-BURMA-CHINA THEATER 

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked for an explanation of what \vm 

meant by the directive to the Commanding General of the Southeast Asia 

409 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Command that he should give priority to operations in Northern Burma but 

at the same time keep in mind the long-term necessities for improving the 

lines of communication. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that priority must be set between operations 

and the maintenance of the lines of communications. This directive to the 

Commanding General, Southeast Asia Command, had been put forward to 

emphasize the importance of the Burma operations and, at the same time, to 

caution him to take a long-range view of the necessity for building up his lines 

of communication, without which no communications would be possible. 

to 

be 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out to the President that in giving priority 

the operations in Northern Burma, the delivery of supplies into China might 

reduced. He said he did not disagree with the decision but he had been 

charged with the responsibility for the delivery of supplies to China and he 

wished to point out that giving first priority to the reconquest of Northern 

Burma might make it impossible for him completely to fulfill his responsibility. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this would be largely a matter of 

judgment for the commander on the ground. He cited the necessity of sending 

some 2,000 men to Yunnan as part of General Wingate’s force to cover the 

Chinese advance from Yunnan. This would be an instance in which the 

delivery of supplies to China would be temporarily but justifiably interfered 

with. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he wished to establish some proviso which 

would prevent commanders on the supply lines in China confiscating supplies 

intended for China for use in their own theaters. 

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he thought that situation had 

been pretty well taken care of. However,he said that it was necessary for someone on the ground to have authority to make decisions regarding priorities. 

He said that if, for example, it wasarbitrarily decided to use the entire capacity 

of the air transport route to supply General Chennault with gasoline, this very 

decision might jeopardize the success of the Burma operations which in themselves were essential to keeping China in the war. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then referred to studies that were directed in 

the report submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He said that as far as 

he was concerned he had no objection to a study being made regarding the 

capture of Singapore but he was very much opposed to such an operation being 

adopted for 1945 if action in 1944 was thereby curtailed. 

410 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

He would personally be quite unable to agree to an operation for the 

capture of Akyab and Ramree as the main amphibious operation for the Indian 

Ocean in 1944.At the Trident Conference, the capture of Akyab had been 

spoken of as a preliminary to operations in Southern Burma for the capture of 

Rangoon. Rangoon had then been dropped out for 1943-44,but Akyab had been 

retained, mainly to please Chiang Kai-shek. Later developments showed that 

the capture of Akyab would be a dangerous, sterile and costly operation 

directed against a point where the Japanese would be expecting attack. If we 

undertook it, we would hamstring operations in the Indian Ocean area to little 

purpose. He was quite prepared for a study of the operation to be made, and it 

might well prove right to carry it out asa sequel to some more profitable operation elsewhere; but he would not himself be able to subscribe to it as our main 

amphibious operation in the coming year. 

THE PRESIDENT said General Wingate had informed him that the 

capture of Rangoon would not cut the Japanese line of communications since 

they were now largely supplied overland from French Indo China and 

Thailand. 

7. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

THE PRESIDENT asked if Thailand was included in the Chinese 

Theater. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY replied that both French Indo China end Thailand 

had been included in the Chinese Theater. At the beginning of the discussion 

on the Southeast Asia Command,it had been intended that French Indo China 

should be included in it. However, any operations in this area were so far in 

the future that it was not necessary to include French Indo China in the new 

command at this time. The situation with regard to Thailand, however, was 

quite different. Operations to be undertaken by the Southeast Asia Command 

might well envisage a conquest of Thailand. Forces of the Southeast Asia Command were in a position to carry out such an operation if it appeared to be 

desirable, whereas, Chinese forces could do nothing as far as this area is concerned. He therefore felt that regardless of what the commitments to the 

Generalissimo might have been, Thailand should definitely be included in the 

area of the Southeast Asia Command. 

ADMIZAL KING indicated that a check was tobe made to see if French 

Indo China and Thailand had not been removed from the Chinese Theater in 

a more recent definition of bounds. 

411 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was anxious to make a public 

announcement regarding the formation of the Southeast Asia Command and 

also to indicate who the commander was to be. He thought that such a public 

announcementwould indicate that much of the discussions at the QUADRANT 

Conferences had been concerned with the war against Japan which would set 

forth a sufficient reason asto why Russia had not been included in the deliberations. He asked General Ismay to make up a short statement for release to the 

press. 

THE PRESIDENT said that the statement should make it clear that the 

Generalissimo still retains command of the Chinese Theater. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the anouncement should be written 

in such a way as not to mention the use of Chinese troops in the Southeast 

Asia Command or give any indication of General Stilwell’splace in the command 

setup. He said that General Stilwell is still the Generalissimo’s Chief of Staff 

and that it would be offensive to the Generalissimo if he were not to be consulted before Stilwell was assigned his additional position. Moreover, he might 

expect that a Chinese deputy would be appointed. Actually, General Stilwell 

is being made Deputy Suprem-e Commander for the purpose of protecting 

Chinese interests and also to try and insure that Chinese forces would carry 

out their share of the plans devised by the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the mere announcement of the 

formation of the Southeast Asia Command would indicate General Stilwell’s 

status at once. He thought that any announcement should be delayed until 

after the Generalissimo had been informed of the decisions. 

MR. HOPKINS said that Dr. Soong had said that he had just had a 

telegram from the Generalissimo saying that the Supreme Allied Commander 

should be appointed forthwith. 

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that any difficulty could be overcome 

by making the announcement to the press extremely brief. He suggested, for 

example, that it might be as follows: 

“It has been decided to establish a combined separate Southeast 

Asia Command. The Supreme Commander will be (here give the officer 

designated by name) .” 

He felt that the shorter the announcement the better it would be. General 

agreement was expressed with this proposal. 

412 
BRITISH MOST SECRET 

V. S. SECRET 

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked General Marshall if it would not be 

wise to place a paragraph in the Final Report to the President and Prime 

Minister providing for the designation of a British liaison officer as a member 

of General MacArthur’s staff. 

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he did not feel it would be necessary 

to include such a statement in the paper, but that he would see that the 

suggestion was carried out immediately. 

a. SPAIN 

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if the Chiefs of Staff‘s recommendations 

regarding Spain had been submitted to the Foreign Office. 

GENERAL ISMAY informed him that the suggestions had been sent 

to the Foreign Office but no comments had as yet been received. 

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated then that before committing himself 

on these recommendations he would like to have the advice of his government. 

He said that personally he did not favor putting “economic screws” on Spain 

at this time. The situation was still tco critical. For instance, there were the 

negotiations with Portugal which should be settled before a new attitude 

regarding Spain is adopted. He said, however, that in any event even though 

the recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were approved, the 

timing as to their execution would have to be determined by the governments. 

9. TURKEY 

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed disagreement with the proposal to 

have the Commander in Chief of the Middle East empowered to determine 

what amount of supplies Turkey could absorb. He felt that this decision should 

be retained by the British Government. He said that the time has now come 

to ask Turkey for something in return for the aid which the United Nations 

have been giving her. He thought the Turks would be considerably relieved if 

they were only asked to carry out the recommendations submitted by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff rather than being asked to give up their neutrality 

and enter the war. 

It was decided to delete any reference to the Commander in Chief, 

Middle East’s being allowed to determine the amount of supplies to be given 

Turkey. 

10. MEETING OF DR. SOONG WITH THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF 

STAFF 

After a brief discussion, it was decided that the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff would ask Dr. Eoong to meet with them on Tuesday, 24 August. 

413 
414 
u.s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 106th Meeting 

QUADRANTCONFERENCE 

M~mnwOF MEETING HEm IN ROOM2208 CHATEAUFRONTENAC 

ON SATURDAY, 14 AUGUST 1943, AT 1030. 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

PRESENT 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0.C. Badger, USN 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Brig. Gen. L.5.Kuter,USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Comander W.L. Freseman, USN 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral 

Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Capt. C. E.Lambe, RN 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

415 
U.8. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. CONDUCT OF THE CONFERENCE 

With reference to the Conduct of the Conference, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed: 

a. That the meetings should be daily at 1430. 

B. That there should be morning meetings when necessary. 

c. That the numbers attending should be limited to about 12 on each 

side. Closed sessions will be held as may be found desirable. 

d. That it should be understood that attendance of the Planners is not 

mandatory as they would often have other work demanding their attention,in which case they might be represented by one of their members. 

e. That in general the procedure should followthe lies of the TRIDENT 

Conference, with specific referenceto recording of decisions, approval

of minutes, reports to the President and Prime Minister and the form 

of the Final Report. 

f. That they would meet tomorrow. 

2. SECTIONS I,II AND III, C.C.S. 24216 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note: 

That SectionsI,11and I11 of C.C.S. 24216 (TRIDENT Conference Report 

to the President and Prime Minister) had been accepted for the QUADRANT Conference, it being understood that courses of action were not 

thereby excluded from consideration which might appear likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives. The Sections to be reaffirmed at the conclusion of the QUADRANT Conference. 

3. AGENDA 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the sequence put forth in the suggested agenda presented by 

416 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the British Chiefs of Staff and directed the Secretaries to incorporate 

those items proposed by the U.5. Chiefs of Staff and to issue a revised 

agenda (subsequently published as C.C.S. 28813). 

4. THE EUROPEAN THEATER 

SIR ALAN BROOKE gave a resume of the present situation in the European Theater. He proposed to start with the situation in Russia since it was on 

that front that the main land forces in Europe were concentrated. Earlier in 

the year German forces had massed for an attack on this front but had delayed 

the attack largely, he believed, due to the situation in the Mediterranean.They 

launched their offensive against Kursk with the object of straightening their 

line and possibly exploiting their success, as well as producing the required 

political results in Germany. The Russians had succeeded in holding them by 

defense in depth. Some 16 panzer divisions had been used, in addition to infantry. The Russians had waited until they were sure they were holding this 

offensive and had then themselves attacked, not only pushing back the Germans on the Kursk salient and capturing Orel, but also threatening Briansk. 

The attack in the neighborhood of Kharkov seemed to be succeeding and it was 

to be hoped that the fate of that town was now sealed. Further offensives had 

now started in the Smolensk area. 

Though the number of German divisions remained almost constant, it 

was believed that their strength, both in personnel and equipment, was only 

some 60 percent of their authorized strength. The manpower of Germany was 

now stretched to its limit. The Germans had been further weakened by the 

withdrawalof Italians and certain other satellite forces from the Eastern Front, 

and this tendency for the satellites to withdraw would increase with the present 

situation in Italy. Further, the Italians had some 30 divisions in the Balkans 

and five in Southern France. Some of the former had already made overtures 

with a view to surrender, and Germany would be faced with the necessity for 

replacing all these troops. 

It seemed probable that while the Italians had wished the Germans to 

defend Southern Italy, the latter had refused and would concentrate on the 

defense of the northern plains where the vital airdromes threatening Southern 

Germany were situated and which provided doorways to the east and west. At 

present Germany had approximately five divisions in Italy though there were 

signs that she was reinforcing in the North. 

In France there were signs of Germsn divisions being moved to the 

South of France to replace Italians and to the Russian Front, though it was 

not known if these would be replaced by training divisions from Gemany. 

417 
U.S. SECRJ2T 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

In the British view there was at present no German threat to Spain.The 

necessary forces were not available, nor could they be made available unless 

Germany shortenedher line in the East. In this connection,there were two possible lines to which the German forces might withdraw, one to the East and 

one to the West of the Pripet marshes. It was estimated that withdrawal to 

these lines might save the Germans some 30 and 70 divisions, respectively. 

There was a further possibility that Germany might decide to withdraw from 

France to the Rhine-Siegfried line. Whether Germany would decide to withdraw in the East or the West was a matter for conjecture. A withdrawal from 

the East would bring Eastern Germany and the Rumanian oilAelds within easy 

bombing range and a withdrawal from the West would help us to intensify our 

air attacks on Germany. Since if the U-boat campaign failed completely Germany would have no further use for French bases, and since the Germans were 

likely to fear a Russian land advance into the country more than one carried 

out by Anglo-American forces, it seemed probable that, on balance, Germany 

would be more likely to choose a withdrawal from the West. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he had read the U.5. Chiefs of Staff 

appreciation of the war in Europe which, from the air point of view, accorded 

very largely with his own views. 

The German air force was now completely on the defensive. Their 

bomber force had deteriorated greatly in the last year, largely from lack of 

training and a proper training organization. ney had relied on a series of victorious land campaigns to be supported by the air and between which the air 

forces could rest and reorganize. The situation was now very different. 

Their fighter forces, on the other hand, were growing fast and had 

achieved the remarkable increase of 22 percent during the year 1943. All this 

increase had been absorbed on the Western Front. In spite of this they sti 

did not consider themselves strong enough to combat the daylight operations 

of the 8th Air Force and had withdrawn units both from the Russian and the 

MediterraneanFronts,in spite of the defeats they were suffering in these areas. 

The United Nations Air Forces, on the other hand, were everywhere on 

the strategic offensive. The shorter range aircraft were being used for attacks 

on communications, transport centers, locomotives and air�leIds. The night 

offensive was steadily increasing. Wo aids to navigation had proved immensely effective. Cefiain step were now being taken to baffle lbe defenses 

which had resulted in a decrease in casualties from flve to six percent to only 

three percent. 

Finally, the daylight bombhg -the most important phase of all -waa 

Wig extraordinarily effective. The flrst object of POINTBLANK was to knock 

415 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

out the fighter factories and to destroy fighter planes in the air in order to 

achieve complete mastery in the air over Germany. The forces available to the 

8th Air Force had done remarkable work but the program was behind schedule 

for reasons, however, which were quite understandable. The targets were being 

hit, the enemy aircraft were being shot down and a high percentage of the aircraft were returning safely,but it was a great battle which hung in the balance 

and it was vitally important to sustain and give every support to our forces in 

order that they could achieve superiority over the enemy. 

In the Mediterranean the mixed U.S. Army Air Force and R.A.F.units 

were working as one team and were giving a wonderfully good account of themselves. 

The key to the situation from the air point of view, would be the placing 

of strong offensive air forces in Northern Italy. From there all South Germany 

would be within comfortable range and above all two of the largest German aircrdt factories which between them produced nearly 60 percent of the German 

fighters. The bombing of Ploesti, in his opinion perhaps the most brilliant and 

outstanding single air operation of the war, had shown what could be achieved 

even at a range of 1,000 miles. This target could be attacked at much shorter 

range from the heel of Italy, but to get a decisive effect against the German Air 

Force it would be necessary to go to the North. If we could base a strong force 

of Heavy and Medium Bombers there in the near future, Germany would be 

faced with a problem that seemed insoluble. It was estimated that to protect 

their Southern Front against a similar scale of attack to that being made from 

the U.K.they would requirehalf the fighter forces now on the Western Front. 

The Alps would render the German radio warning system relatively ineffective. 

He regarded the piition of North Italy as the key to the situation. 

On the Russian front some 2,000 German aircraft were opposed to 4,000 

Russians.The Russian t.gining was, however, bad,and until recently the Germans had held their own. Now, however, the tide was turning and the withdrawal of German forces to the west and particularly the withdrawal of experienced leaders was making itself felt. 

STR DUDLEY POUND briefly discussed certain aspects of the war at 

sea. At Casablanca it had been agreed that Russian convoys should not be run 

if the loss was likely to be prohibitive. Since German forces were concentrated 

in the north of Norway, this route was still closed. There was no sign at present 

that the German surface forces intended to break out into the Atlantic, and 

he believed that this was now less likely, since it would probably only be considered worthwhile if by so doing the Germans could achieve the final coup & 

grace terminating a sucessful U-boat Campaign in the North Atlantic. 

419 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The battle of the convoys had been fought in May, and since then 

the U-boats had sufferedheavy losses, whilst on the other hand there had been 

no sinkings in the North Atlantic. It was essential, however, to be ready for a 

return of the U-boat concentrationsto that area, and our dispositions of escorting forcesmust be designed to meet this menace. Thus it was impossible to send 

additionalescortsto the Azores or the Cape, though hunting groups were being 

used to reinforce the aerial bay offensive. The bay offensive, with additional 

United States help in the air, was proving very effective. Groups of submarines 

were now endeavoring to fight their way in and out of the bay on the surface, 

and it had become a battle of the U-boat versus the aircraft. Recently, fewer 

German submarines had come out of the Baltic, and this was believed to be 

because many of them were refitting with additional radar aids and antiaircraft guns. 

The bombing of the Biscay submarine bases had proved disappointing 

since the Germans had taken very adequate steps to protect their submarines 

in these ports. It was now felt that continuous bombing of these ports did not 

justify a great diversion from the essential bombing offensive against German 

fighter factories. German submarines were at present disposed largely in the 

outer seas,where they were achieving some successes, but only in the North 

Atlantic could they find sufficient targets to render their campaign a real success. 

In the Mediterranean the Commander in Chief was anxious to retain 

his six battleships until after the Italian fleet had been eliminated. Our ability 

to reinforce the Indian Ocean was dependent therefore on the collapse of Italy. 

The loan of the aircraft carrier “Ranger” to the Home Fleet was much appreciated,and enabled sufficient aircraft carriers to be provided for Mediterranean 

operations. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked for the views of the British Chiefs of Staff 

with regard to the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he was in agreement with the United 

States paper on this point. It would not pay us to attack these islands at this 

stage.There were indications, as yet inconclusive, of German wtihdrawals from 

Sardinia,and he did not believe that if Italy collapsed Germany would continue 

to defend these islandswhich were largely garrisoned by Italian troops. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that prior to the occupation of 

Sicily, it had been considered inadvisable to fflter agents into the island. If, 

however, immediate attacks on Sardinia and Corsica were unlikely, it might be 

advisable to send agents to those islands. 

420 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

In reply to a question from General Marshall as to the value of France 

as an air base in the event of the Germans withdrawing, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the basing of heavy bombers in France would prove a lengthy 

and dimcult logistic problem. He therefore considered that while the heavy 

bombers should continue to operate from the United Kingdom, medium and 

light bombers as well as fighters would use advance bases in France. They 

would then be within easy range of the Ruhr and the Upper Rhine towns.In 

addition, the fighter cover which could be provided from advance bases in 

France would be of immense value to the daylight bombing operations. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that it was difficult to confine a discussion on 

the war in the air to Europe since available resources must be spread between 

all theaters. Early estimates, based on British experience, of the replacements 

of men and machines had proved too low in the case of the operations of the 

8th Air Force. In addition, there was the problem of the “war-weary” crews. 

General Eaker at present had some 800 aircraft, but only 400 crews. No new 

units would be sent until September,but 200 aircraft would be sent in July and 

239 in August. By January 1944 it was hoped to have 1,900 aircraft, with two 

crews for each aircraft. Finally, he questioned the possibility of obtaining the 

maximum use of heavy bombers in England during the winter months. In this 

connection North Italian bases would prove valuable. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he appreciated the difficulty which 

General Arnold had mentioned in foreseeing exactly replacement requirements. He agreed with General Arnold‘s view as to the importance of Northern 

Italy. Heavy bombers based in England could use Northern Italy, if the necessary ground crews and facilities were provided, as an alternative taking-off 

point during bad weather in the United Kingdom. 

The battle against the German fighter forces was a vital battle. It must 

be watched, not only with hope and enthusiasm, but with the determination 

of providing reinforcements from wherever possible. If German fighter 

strength was not checked in the next three months, the battle might be lost, 

since it was impossible to judge the strength which the German fighter forces 

might attain by next spring if our attack was not pressed home. 

ADMIRAL KZNG said that a possible German move to Spain would be 

aimed at cutting our vital lines of communication through the Straits of 

Gibraltar. The Germans might be held back until the United Nations were 

further committed in the Mediterranean and then they would flood the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar with U-boats. The value of this line of 

communicationwas second only to the North Atlantic route and its value would 

increase BS our commitments in the Mediterranean grew. 

421 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The naval situation must be considered globally, and any forces which 

could be spared from the European theater were urgently required in the war 

against Japan. 

He was surpised to learn that the bombing of U-boat bases in France had 

been stopped or slowed down. He was convinced that a large number of U-boats 

were being refitted with a view to renewing the offensive and that the U-boat 

campaign had not yet been won, though it was now under control, as he had 

predicted. 

422 
U.8. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 107th Meeting 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN ROOM2008, CHATEAUFRONTENAC, 

ON SATURDAY, 14 AUGUST 1943 AT 1630. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W.D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E.J. King, USN Sir Dudley Pound 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0.C. Badger, USN 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Maj.Gen. M. S.Fairchild, USA 

Brig. Gen. L. 5.Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wederneyer, USA 

Commander W. L. Freeman, USN 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral 

Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R.Welsh 

Capt. C. E.Lambe, RN 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Commodore W.Elliot 

Brigadier M. W.M. Macleod 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier �I.Redman 

Brig. Oen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Comdr. R.D. Coleridge, RN 

Col. A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

423 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

ADMIRAL KING said the principal operations against Japan at present 

taking place were those directed on Rabaul. These were being delayed by lack 

of means. He had said at Casablanca, and he must now repeat, that lack of 

means was in his opinion caused by failure to consider the war against all three 

Axis Powers as a whole. If some 15 per cent of resources of the United Nations 

were now deployed against Japan, then an increase of only five per cent 

would increase by one-third the resources available whereas a decrease of five 

per cent of the forces deployed against the Axis in Europe would only mean a 

reduction of six per cent. Air power was lacking, and at present all naval air 

forces not required for the U-boat campaign were being sent to the Pacific. 

Consequent on the TRIDENT decisions, operations against the Mandates had 

been planned and would begin on 15 November against the Gilberts. This 

particular line of advance had certain disadvantages, but had been necessary, 

firstly, since it would protect Samoa, the weak spot on the line of communications to Australia; secondly, there were air facilities available in the Ellis 

Islands; and, thirdly, the relative proximity of this line of advance toward the 

operations in Rabaul would enable forces to be shifted from one to the other. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff memorandum set out their proposals for the 

war against Japan in the relatively near future. In general, these envisaged an 

advance headed on Luzon by two routes, one from New Guinea, and the other 

through the Mandates. This plan would have the advantage of obviating the 

necessity for fighting for the Dutch East Indies which, if the Philippines were 

captured, would automatically fall to us. 

In the North Pacific the attack on Kiska was planned for tomorrow. 

There were indications that at least a partial evacuation might already have 

taken place there, but the operation had been planned on the supposition that 

the original scale of defense still existed. There was a third possible line of 

approach which was through the Kuriles via Paramushiru. 

It was, in his opinion, most important to plan how best the preponderance of forces now employed against the Axis in Europe could be transferred 

and brought to bear against Japan. It would appear that the air power which 

would be available could not be fully used in an advance through the Islands 

and therefore the use of China as a base for air action against Japan became 

very important. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed that the campaigns in Alaska, against 

Rabaul, in the Central Pacific, and in Burma all formed part of the complete 

campaign against Japan. The defeat of Japan must be accomplished at the 

424 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

earliest possible date by the use of the maximum possible effort. The requirements for the plan, the forces which could be made available, both immediately 

and on the defeat of Germany, and the method by which those forces now 

employed against Germany could be diverted to Japan must all be studied. 

Every effort was now being made with the insufficient forces available to wear 

down Japanese resources, and her resistance was becoming less effective, but 

an immediate assessment of the availability of resources as soon as Germany 

had collapsed must be made. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was important to decide on the bases 

required to exploit our available means. In the Pacific, adequate shipping had 

proved a bottleneck since heavy demands were made on account of the 

necessity for transferring troops to recuperate after long service in difficult 

and unhealthy country. Every effort was being made to render bases, particularly air bases, more healthy. The same problem of transferring troops, owing 

to bad climate, existed in the Aleutians. 

An interesting factor in the present campaign against Japan was the 

heavy air losses which she was sustaining, not only in the air but in cargo and 

troop-carrying vessels. All operations in the Pacific were related to those in 

Burma. There were two matters on which differences of opinion existedfirstly, the importance of China as a base, and, secondly, the possibilities with 

regard to the use of Chinese manpower. General Stilwell’s view, which he 

shared, was that properly led, the Chinese troops were an important military 

factor. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then read out a telegram he had received from 

General Stilwell, giving the details of the equipment and efficiency of the 

Chinese troops now in Ramgarh and Yunnan and outlining possible employment for these forces. General Stilwell stressed the importance of an early 

campaign to reopen the Burma Road. 

There was an alternative route to China via Sumatra, Singapore and 

Camranh Bay, though this would entail a heavy shipping commitment. There 

was a project, which will be further explained by General Somervell, to lay a 

pipeline for gasoline from Calcutta into China. There seemed to be four issues 

which must be decided. Firstly, what was the value of Chinese troops; secondly, 

could we affordto take so little action with regard to China that the present 

government would fall; thirdly, if we employed only air forces from China, 

would not the Japanese reactions be so strong as to cut the line of communication to them, and, fourthly, in an operation through China was it essential to 

capture a port for heavy build-up of supplies and thus link up with the naval 

operationsaross the Pacific. 

425 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

He regretted immensely that there was no air communication between 

Australia and Ceylon. The interests of the two commands were mutual, and the 

psychological factor of a gap of 10,000miles, which was not bridged, was serious. 

In his view it was important to find the speediest method of bringing pressure 

to bear on Japan itself and it might well be that operations through China 

would produce the result faster than fighting our way through the Islands. 

It was essential to link Pacific and European strategy. Movements of 

ships from the Mediterranean must take place in the next few days if operations from India were not to be delayed, and a decision must be taken. It was 

important that no time should be lost in agreeing on a general plan for the 

defeat of Japan since the collapse of Germany would impose the problem of 

partial demobilization and a growing impatience would ensue throughout the 

United States for the rapid defeat of Japan. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that in the early days of the war with Japan 

a holding policy had been adopted. Now superiority was being achieved. In the 

air, over the last six months, the Japanese known losses had been four times 

the combat and operational losses of the U.S.Air Forces opposed to them. 

In the Pacific, airfields would not be available in which to base the air 

forces which would be released after the defeat of Germany. Only China provided the necessary facilities. At present the number of units which could be 

deployed depended directly on the capacity of the air route. This route had 

achieved 4,000 tons in July and this would, he felt sure, increase, but a 4,000 

ton capacity was sufficient only to enable General Chennault’s 223 aircraft to 

undertake 10 operationseach per month. The heavy bomber group now operating in China against Hanoi, Hong Kong and Shanghai was forced to do three 

trips into Assam for every one operational sortie. In order to release tonnage 

on the air route a plan had been worked out to run a pipe line capable of taking 

six million gallons per month (approximately 20,000 tons) into China. Even 

this amount would only enable five hundred heavy bombers to undertake 10 

missions per month, and an additional one thousand tons of gasoline would be 

required to provide for the necessary fighter protection. 

The openingof the Burma Road was, from the air point of view, essential, 

together, if possible, with a port on the east coast of China through which the 

air forces could be adequately supplied. 

The northern air line of approach to Japan via the Kuriles was hampered 

by the worst weather in the world and lack of bases. At a maximum, only one 

or two groups could be employed from this area. Island facilitiesnow available 

426 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

could only accommodate some 20 groups, whereas if Germany were defeated 

some 50 groups of heavy bombers would be released from the U.K.,alone, in 

addition to those from the Mediterranean area. The situation, however, was 

hopeful. Japanese aircraft production was estimated at only 600 aircraft per 

month. He was convinced that heavy bombing of their homeland would defeat 

the Japanese, “who could not take it.” 

At the request of General Arnold, GENERAL SOMERVELL outlined the 

the plan for the pipeline into China. It would lead from Calcutta to Led0 and 

between these places would be a six inch line in order to take the load off the 

bad communications from Assam. From there on it would be a three inch line 

running through Fort Hertz to Kunming. The building of the line was not 

dependent on further operations in Burma though this would probably be 

necessary to insure its security. The line could be completed in seven months 

and would require only 15,000 tonsof supplies. The necessary piping and installations were already available in the United States and all the necessary plans

had been prepared. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked that a paper giving a brief outline of the plan 

might be sumitted for study by the British Chiefs of Staff. He was in entire 

agreement as to the necessity for the earliest possible completion of a general

plan for the war with Japan. 

It was essential to decide on a policy for the employment of our forces 

and to allocate tasks to be undertaken either separately or jointly. The British 

were faced with the problem of partial demobilization after the defeat of Germany. Many of the British troops had been abroad for over seven years and a 

scheme was being worked out to insure that those troops who were best trained 

were retained, without inflicting unnecessary individual hardships. If major 

operations were to be undertaken from India, that country must be developed 

as a base. Its capabilities were at present small and its communications bad. 

Airfields, ports and communications must all be developed, and the extent of 

thisdevelopmentwas dependent on the plan decided on. 

The relative advantagesof the opening of the original Burma Road or the 

seizure of a port in China must be examined, together with the time factor, in 

relation to the working of the Burma Road at its maximum capacity. Plans had 

been worked out for advances from Imphal, Led0 and Yunnan into Burma, together with landings on the Arakan Coast.The British Chiefs of Staff had considered proposals put forward by Brigadier Wingate for the increased employment of long range penetration groups in conjunction with the main advances. 

These groups relied on the Japanese out-fianking tactics but whereas the Japanese outflanking movements consisted of four or five mile sweeps, Wingate’s 

427 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

method used 40 or 50 miles sweeps and used units of the size of a brigade group. 

These groups took pack transport and wireless and could, when necessary, be 

maintained from the air. They would reach far into the area of the Japanese 

lines of communication in conjunction with the main advances. A second 

brigade group was already being formed and it was hoped to form a third, one 

of which could operate with the Chinese forces from Yunnan by cutting Japanese communicationswith Mandalay. Another would operate between the Led0 

and Imphal advances, and a third to the west of the Imphal Road. He felt that 

the United States Chiefs of Staff might wish to hear from Brigadier Wingate 

his views on the use of long-range penetration groups. 

The British Chiefs of Staff had only recently learned, however, of the 

very seriousresults of the floodsin Assam, which would have very serious effects 

on futureoperationsin Burma. These results had not yet been assessed and he 

suggested that a small committee consisting of General Somervell, General 

Riddell-Webster and an officer from the Commander in Chief's Staff in India 

should examine and report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the effects of the 

floodsin Assam on future operationsin Burma. 

In addition to the plans for Burma a study had been made of an alternative operation on the northern tip of Sumatra. This might either be an operation in itself, aimed at forming a base from which Japanese forces and lines of 

communication could be attacked, or it might be the first step to an attack on 

the Malaya Peninsulain the neighborhood of Penang with an advance on Singapore. In the former case some two to four divisions would be required, but in the 

latter case the forces required would render the operation impossible of achievement until after the defeat of Germany. If, however, only the tip of Sumatra 

was attacked, though it would result in the diversion of important Japanese 

forces in reaction to it, it would have the disadvantage of giving prior warning 

to the Japanese that an attack on Malaya was possible and they would therefore increase their defense in that area. Before, however, further examining 

the Sumatra plan he suggested that operations in Burma should be examined, 

possibly based on a later date than originally envisaged. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he strongly endorsed the view that an 

early decision on the plan for the defeat of Japan must be taken. Air forces 

would be piling up as soon as Germany was defeated. British production of 

heavy bombers alone would amount to some five to six hundred a month, with 

four hundred crews. He was interested in the statement that adequate island 

bases could not be found in the Pacific to deploy large air forces since in Malta, 

which was a very small island, some 500 aircraft had been operating. After the 

defeat of Germany sufficient shipping should be available to maintain these 

island air bases. 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

GENERAL ARNOLD explained that most of the islands in the Mandated area were atolls, with very limited land area available and complicated topographical features. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that a small committee should be formed which would include 

General Riddell-Webster, Major General Mallaby, General Somervell, 

and Admiral Badger, to examine and report on the effect of the recent 

floods in India on the projected Burma campaign. 
430 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOSTSECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 108th Meeting 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MEETINGHELDIN ROOM 2208, CHATEAUFnoramAa, 

ON SUNDAY,15 AUGUST1943,AT 1430. 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

PRESENT 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

SirCharles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0.C. Badger, USN 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Maj. Gen. M.S. Fairchild, USA 

Maj. Gen. R. W. Barker, USA 

(For Items 4 and 5 only) 

Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Commander W. L. Freseman, USN 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral 

Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. SirThomas Riddell-Webster 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air CommodoreW. Elliot 

Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod 

Brigadier K. G.MacLean 

(ForItems 4 and 5 only) 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H.Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Capt. F. B. Royal, USN 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge 

431 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRJ3T 

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETINGS 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 106th and 107th meetings. The detailed 

record of the meetings was also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

2. ROME -AN OPEN CITY 

(C.C.S. 306) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred to the FAN message which had been sent 

to General Eisenhower yesterday telling him to make no further attacks on 

Rome nor any statements from Allied Force Headquarters pending clarification 

and further instructions regarding the Press reports indicating that the Italian 

Government had declared Rome an open city. He felt it was now necessary for 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take a new decision in the matter. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt that it would be impossible to reach 

a decision until the matter had been discussed with the President and suggested that no action should be taken until his views had been obtained. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt it the duty of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff to express the military point of view to the Chiefs of Government 

for them to make whatever decisions might be necessary politically. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it appeared that Rome had unilaterally been declared an open city by the Italians. He felt that General Eisenhower 

should be allowed to retain his freedom of decision until the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff were restrained from this by political action. He said that the British 

Chiefs of Staff had advised their Government that acceptance of open city 

status for Rome was fraught with much difficulty for the Allies in the future. 

It might be preferable that we had Rome in our possession to use its communicationsand to risk Germanbombing. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that no disadvantagewould be suffered by 

refraining from bombing. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that it might be desirable from the 

military point of view to bomb and that a signal should be sent to General Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff revoking yesterday's decision and 

giving him a free hand. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the only reports that he had received 

regarding the latest bombing effort on Rome were that it had achieved success 

against its targets and that there had been little or no damage caused to nonmilitary targets. 

432 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING referred to the French declaration of Paris as an open 

city at the time of their collapse. Then the Germans moved into Paris and used 

it as a base Did this establish a precedent for the Allies in relation to Rome? 

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to the danger of political pressure 

later if the Allies were to agree indeed to Rome being considered an open city. 

ADMIRAL KING agreed that if we were in any way a party now to its 

being declared an open city our hands would be tied. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he understood that the U.S.and 

British Governments had agreed to take no action regarding any request for 

Rome to be made an open city. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should 

encourage the two Governments to make no reply and that this would leave 

usfree to bomb. He also referred to the possibility of the danger of political capital being made regarding this whole question in the future. 

GENERAL MARSHALL af�irmed that the political complications in the 

U.S.would tend to be so serious that clearance from the President must be 

obtained before yesterday’s message was cancelled. He agreed that it should be 

reahed that the Allies should in no way commit themselves to agreeing regarding the reported declaration of Rome as an open city and that an early 

recommendation to this effect should be made to the two Governments. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that the President and Prime Minister should be informed at 

once: 

a. Of yesterday’s “stand still”order regarding the bombing of Rome and 

that they should be advised that from the military point of view the 

recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was that the order 

should be revoked; 

b. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered that the two Goyernments should in no way commit themselves on the subject of Rome 

being declared an open city. 

3. STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN 

EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 303) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would Arst like to say, on behalf of the 

British Chiefs of Staff, that after reading C.C.S. 303 they believed that there 

was a great similarity of outlook between themselves and the U.S.Chiefs of 

433 
U,S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Staff on the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe. Such divergencies as there were did not appear to be fundamental. The British Chiefs of 

Staff were in entire agreement that OVERLORD should constitute the major 

offensive for 1944 and that Italian operations should be planned with this 

conception as a background. 

The plan for OVERLORD was based on three main conditions being 

created in order to give it reasonable prospect of success. Firstly, reduction in 

German fighter strength; secondly, German strength in France and the Low 

Countries and her ability to reinforce during the first two months must be 

kept at specified limits; and thirdly, the problem of beach maintenance must 

be solved. He believed that the OVERLORD plan envisaged too rapid a rate of 

advance and too small a margin of superiority,bearing in mind our experience 

in fighting German forces. It was essential, therefore, to insure that the Germans had available to them the minimum possible number of divisions in 

France and that their rate of reinforcement should be as slow as possible. 

Operations in Italy, therefore, must have as their main object the 

creation of a situation favorable to a successful OVERLORD. This could be 

achieved by holding German reserves and by reducing German fighter strength 

by bombing fighter factories in Southern Germany from Italian airdromes. 

He considered, therefore, that the statement (C.C.S. 303, para. 4b (3) ) 

in the U.S.Chiefs of Staff memorandum that as between OVERLORD and 

operations in the Mediterranean,when there is a shortage of resources, OVERLORD will have an overriding priority, was too binding. Sufficient forces must 

be used in Italy in order to make OVERLORD a possibility. 

There were two further points in the US.Chiefs of Staff paper which 

he would like elucidated. How far north was it proposed our forces in Italy 

should go, and what strength was it estimated would be required to hold that 

line? He understood that the line proposed was the “Apennine”lie across the 

neck of Italy. He believed that this should be regarded as the first stage only, 

and that if possible the northwestern plains should also be seized. Fighter factories in SouthernGermany could be bombed from Central Italy but far greater 

results could be achieved by the useof those airdromes in the Milan-Turin area. 

Whether or not this area could be seized would depend on the amount of resistance met and could not be decided now, since the number of German divisions which wculd be deployed against us could not, at this stage, be assessed. 

Some 20 divisions might be required to hold the neck of Italy which might entail retaining three of the seven divisions earmarked for OVERLORD. If the 

Milan-Turin area were taken, then all seven might be required, but a decision 

434 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

should be deferred until it could be Seen what forces were required to attain 

the desired result, i.e., the production of the situation requisite for a successful 

OVERLORD. 

He agreed, however, that trained “battle experienced” troops were required for OVERLORD and therefore it would be necessary to exchange those 

of the extra divisions required with others from the US.or the U.K. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE then explained,with the aid of a map, the possible 

lines which might be held in Italy. He pointed out that the occupation of the 

northwestern part of Italy would afford a gateway into Southern France 

through which troops, possibly French, might attack in conjunction with the 

amphibious operations suggested by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. He asked finally 

that certain details of the Appendices might be revised by the Combined Staff 

Planners. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the desired targets in Germany 

could be reached by heavy bombers based in the Florence area, which would lie 

within the line across the neck of Italy. He felt that the advantage of having 

these northern fields was outweighed by the disadvantage of the additional 

forces required to gain and hold them. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the advantages of the Turin-Milan 

area were considerable.There were many excellent melds in the Turin-Milan 

area, capable of operating within a reasonably short period a thousand heavy 

and a thousand medium bombers, whereas fields in the south would have to 

be extended and improved and the rate of build-up would therefore be slower. 

Further, the Germans would make good use of the northern airfields and 

would not have the barrier of the Alps between them and ow bases. 

ADMIRAL KING said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of 

Staff had serious doubts as to the possibility of accomplishing OVERLORD. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British View was that OVERLORD 

would be a success if the three conditions laid down in General Morgan’s 

paper were brought about, and it was essential to take the necessary steps to 

insure the achievement of these conditions. 

ADMIRAL KING said he did not believe that the achievement of the 

necessary conditions was dependent solely on operations in Italy. The necessary conditions might be produced by many other factors, such as,operations 

in Russia, the result of those already taking place in Sicily, and the air offensive 

from the United Kingdom. 

435 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it seemed to him that the essence of 

the problem was whether or not the required conditions for a successful OVERLORD could only be made possible by an increase in the strength in the 

Mediterranean. Only by giving an operation overriding priority could success 

be insured. TORCH was a perfect example of this concept. He agreed that if 

resistance was weak we should seize as much of Italy as possible. It would be 

better if we, and not the Germans, held the northern airfields, though almost 

asmuch could be achieved from the Florence area. On the other hand, unless a 

decision were taken to remove the seven divisions from the Mediterranean, and 

unless overriding priority was given to OVERLORD, he believed that OVERLORDwould become only a subsidiary operation. A delay in the decision would 

have serious repercussions on our ability to build up for OVERLORD and any 

exchange of troops, as had been suggested would absorb shipping and complicate logistic considerations of supply as far back as the Mississippi River. Recently in North Africa an additional unexpected requirement for 60,000 service 

troops had arisen. This requirement had been met but with very serious results 

for planned expansion and movement to other theatres. Not only would the 

OVERLORD build-up be hampered, but operations in the Pacific would also 

suffer. 

If OVERLORD was not given overriding priority, then in his opinion the 

operation was dmmed and our whole strategic concept would have to be recast 

and the United States forces in Britain might well be reduced to the reinforced 

army corps necessary for an opportunist cross-Channel operation. 

General Barker had submitted a paper with regard to the required conditions. This note (the main points of which General Marshall read to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff) pointed out that in the view of the Combined COSSAC Staff, t.he required condition concerning the German build-up did not 

imply that the operation became impracticable if the conditions were not 

achieved but rather that more extensive use would have to be made of available 

means to reduce the enemy’s ability to concentrate his forces. 

To sum up, he felt that unless OVERLORD were given overriding priority it would become a minor operation, in which case we should be depending 

for the defeat of Germany on air bombing alone. This had achieved great results, but its Anal result was still speculative. We must make a plan and bring 

our strength against Germany in such a way as to force Germany to feel it. 

An “opportunist” operation would be cheaper in lives but was speculative. If 

we relied on this we were opening a new concept which in his view weakened our 

chances of an early victory and rendered necessary a reexamination of our 

basic strategy,with a possible readjustment towards the PaciAc. 

436 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

In the course of discussion the following points were made: 

a. In the British view, successful operations in France necessitated a 

preponderance of force. It was essential to achieve this preponderance in 

order to avoid a castrophe,which might seriously delay our ultimate victory. 

Success depended not on the absolute strength of the United forces available for OVERLORD, but on the relative strength of those forces vis-a-vis 

the Germansopposed to them. Thisrelative strength could best be achieved 

by operations in Italy, aimed at containing the maximum German forces, 

and by air action from the best possible Italian bases to reduce the German 

fighter forces. By agreeing now to the withdrawal of seven divisions from 

the Mediterranean,risks might be run in that theatre which would not only 

prejudice the success of OVERLORD, but might make it impossible of successful achievement. 

In the British view OVERLORD was the main operation and all 

operations in Italy must be aimed at assisting OVERLORD. 

b. The U.S. Chiefs of Stafffelt that unless overriding priority were given 

to OVERLORD the operation would never materialize. In every previous 

operation,requirements had arisen additional to those originally envisaged. 

These requirements might also arise in Italy and must not be met by unilateral action. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should now take a decision 

that Operation OVERLORD should have overriding priority and maintain this decision in order that the success of the operation could be insured. 

Any departure from this concept must entail a reconsideration of our basic 

strategy. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed to give further consideration to C.C.S. 303 at their next 

meeting; 

b. Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to examine the Appendices 

and amend as necessary. 

4. OPERATION “OVERLORD-OUTLINE PLAN 

(C.C.S. 304) 

“SYNTHETIC” HARBORS 

(C.C.S. 307) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed a note (C.C.S. 304) by 

the British Chiefs of Staff on the outline plan for Operation OVERLORD. 

437 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN 

outlined the various methods by whch the problem of beach maintenance could 

be overcome. 

GENERAL BARKER and BRIGADIER MACLEAN of the COSSAC Staff 

explained the main features of the outline plan for Operation OVERLORD. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD, as set out in British Chiefs of Staff paper, C.O.S. (43)416 (0), 

and endorsed the action taken by the British Chiefs of Staff in authorizing him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations. 

5. AIR AND NAVAL COMMANDaPERATION “OVERLORD’ 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would like to have an opportunity 

to discuss with General Arnold the question of an Air Commander for OVERLORD. At present Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory was giving the necessary decisions but the Air Commander should be selected as soon as possible. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that consideration had been given to the problem of naval command for OVERLORD. The majority of the forces to be employed would be trained, organized and operate under the Commander in Chief, 

Portsmouth. He had been given a special Chief of Staff to assist him in this 

matter. The Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, could be given control over 

adjacent commandsasmight be necessary. He asked that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff should endorse the appointment of the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, as Naval Commander in Chief. 

ADMIRAL KING said he would like to consider this suggestion. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note: 

a. That the British Chief of the Air Staff and General Arnold would 

examine the question of the appointment of an Air Commander for 

OVERLORD and would put up their recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the end of QUADRANT. 

b. Of the proposals by the British Admiralty that the Commander in 

Chief, Portsmouth, should carry out the duties of Naval Commander 

for OVERLORD, wth authority over the Naval Commanders, Plymouth and Dover, for this purpose; and deferred a decision on this 

matter. 

438 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 109th Meeting 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN ROOM2208, CHATEAUFRONTENAC, 

ON MONDAY,16 AUGUST1943, AT 1430. 

Admiral W.D.Leahy,USN 

General G.C. Marshall. USA 

Admiral E.J. King,USN 

General H.H. Arnold, USA 

PRESENT 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

PRESENT FOR ITEMS 2 AND 3 ONLY 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr. USN 

Rear Adm. 0.C. Badger, USN 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Brig. Gen. L. S.Kuter,USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Commander W. L. Freseman, USN 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Vice Admiral 

Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Capt. F. B. Royal, USN 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge 

439 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN 

EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 303-303/1) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed in closed session the 

strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to give further consideration to this subject at their next meeting. 

2. CONCLUSIONS OF 108TH MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 108th Meeting. The detailed record of 

the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

3. “POINTBLANK” 

(C.C.S. 309 and C.C.S. 252/2) 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL gave certain figures with regard to the progress of the combined bomber offensive. Since the beginning of the war the 

Royal Air Force had dropped 136,000 tons of bombs on Germany, 73,000 tons 

of which had been dropped within the last seven months. In the first quarter of 

194317,000 tonshad been dropped by night and in the second quarter as much 

as 35,000tons. 

The damage caused by the air offensive was difficult to assess in precise 

terms, but he would like to draw attention to certain points in the report by the 

Joint Intelligence Committee which had been circulated to the U.S.Chiefs of 

Staff. 

Only one-third of the German industry had been under heavy attack for 

three nonths. The effect of these attacks had fallen mainly on the basic industries in t.he Ruhr. Hence, the effect of the attack on the forces in the fleld was 

not immediate and results on these forces would increase as time went on. A 

further result of the attacks was the forcing on Germany of a defensive air 

strategy. In addition, they produced a serious drain on Germany’s manpower. 

With regard to the submarine war,it was estimated that no less than 30 

U-boats less than the planned program had been produced between June 1942 

440 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

and June 1943. As a result of damage already inflicted an additional loss in 

U-boat construction would result, amounting to some 12 or 13 boats over the 

next six months. 

Morale had also been seriously affected. Casualties were heavy and great 

destruction of industrial homes had occurred. It was estimated that some 

422,000 workers had been rendered homeless and an additional 1,800,000 had 

suffered damage to their homes which was irreparable, since the necessary consumer goods to replace those destroyed were not available. The report stated 

that the bombing had affected the outlook of the population with regard to the 

regime, the war effort asa whole and willingness to hold out. 

Damage to Krupps Works had decreased output from 50 to 75 percent 

and this was in addition to damage to other similar industries. The U.S.Air 

Force attack on the syntheticrubber plant had reduced the total rubber supply 

by 15per cent. Transportation was also dislocated and Germany's plan for an 

expansion of locomotive production had been nullified by the destruction of 

locomotives and their manufacturing and repair facilities. 

He had felt it right that he should put forward a memorandum on the air 

offensive in view of the task of coordination given him by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff at Casablanca. Further, the day and night offensives were complementary and a heavy scale of daylight bombing rendered the task of the night 

bombers easier, since the Germans were being forced to use night fighters 

against daylight attacks. 

The present situation had both good and bad features. On the one hand, 

German fighter strength was stretched almost to breaking point, and in spite 

of their precarious situation on the Russian and Mediterranean fronts, they 

had found it necessary to reinforce their fighter forces on the Western Front 

from these sources. On the other hand, the expansion of German fighter 

strength was continuing and had increased 13percent during this year. It had 

been hoped that this expansion would by now have been stopped. The 8th Air 

Force, who were achieving a great task with their existing resources, believed 

that they could achieve even greater successes if their strength was increased. 

He asked the Combined Chiefs of Staffto take action to make a victory in 

the battle of the air as certain as possible before the autumn. If this was not 

done, the Germans,by a conservation of their strength and by the development 

of new methods of defenss, might be in an unassailable position by the spring. 

441 
u.8. SECRET 

BBITIsHMOSTsEcIlET 

Toachieve our object diversions from the 8th Air Force should be stopped, loans 

of aircraft from the 8th Air Force to other theaters must be returned, and the 

bomber command of the 8th Air Force must be built up and reinforced to the 

maximumpossible. Such stepswould, he was convinced, be amply justified. 

With regard to the employment of the aircraft used for TZDALWAVE, he 

considered that whether employed from the Mediterranean or from England, 

they should be under the command of the 8th Air Force and devoted to attacks 

onfighter factories. They should, in fact, revert to a part of the POINTBLANK 

forces and not be left under the control of General Eisenhower,whose air forces 

were already considerable. 

ADMZRAL LEAW said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had examined SirCharles Portal‘s paper, and that they were in full accord with the 

views expressed and wished to reafErm that every resource within United 

States capabilities was being strained to provide the maximum reinforcement 

of POZNTBLANK. 

ADMZRAL KZNG referred to a directive to General Eisenhower (FAN 

172), in which he was instructed that follow-up attacks on Ploesti were to follow attackson fighter factories. He was not clear asto how far the missions referred to in this telegram had been accomplished. It might now be neceaeary 

to modify the instructionswith regard to follow-up attacks on Ploesti. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he believed that at TRIDENT only one 

a$tack on Ploesti had been decided on. A second attack would have serious 

results on POINTBLANK. 

ADMIRAL KZNG pointed out that General Eisenhower’s latest signal 

(C.C.S. 252/2) requested the use of the B-24’sagainst Italian targets after the 

completion of their attacks on the fighter factories. General Eisenhower visualized further attacks on Ploesti being carried out after the aircraft were established in Italy. 

GENERAL ARNOLD outlined the lanses suffered in the Ploesti raid; of 

the 178 aircraft dispatched,54, including 51 crews, had been lost. The results 

had been excellent, with eight out of the nine targets hit and five of them almost 

totally destroyed. The casualties had, at leastin part,been caused by the loss 

of the leader of the formation at the outset. This had necessitated reorganization and an attack which was not completely coordinated. It might be impossible to ask crews to sustain a loss of 33 percent in more thanone operation. 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

With regard to POINTBLANK, GENERAL ARNOLD said that in the 

month of July 25 attacks had been made, with a loss rate of 7.4 percent per mission, ascompared with an average loss rate throughout the period of their operations of 6.7 percent. 3,400 tonsof bombs had been dropped in July. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note of C.C.S. 309 and of the following comment submitted by 

the U.S.Chiefs of Staff: 

“The U.S.Joint Chiefs of Staff are in full accord with the views of 

the British Chiefs of Staff that the maximum reinforcement of 

POINTBLANK, particularly over the period of intense combat with 

the German Fighter Air Force immediately ahead, is a subject of 

the most critical importance, and wish to re- that every resource within U.S.capabilities is being strained to bring this 

about.’’ 

b. Agreed to defer action on C.C.S. 25212. 

443 
444 
U. S. SECRET 

BXITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 110th Meeting 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MEETINGHELDIN ROOM2208, CHATEAU~ONTENAC, 

ON TUESDAY, 17 AUGUST1943, AT 1430. 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

PRESENT 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

PRESENT FOR ITEMS 3,4 AND 5 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0. C. Badger, USN 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Brig. Gen. L. 5.Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Commander W. L. Freseman, USN 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Vice Admiral 

Lord LouisMountbatten 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N.Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier M.W. M. Macleod 

Brigadier 0.C. Wingate 

(For item 5 only) 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H.Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Capt. F. B. Royal, USN 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge 

445 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 303and 303/2) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed in closed session the 

strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Accepted the extract from C.C.S. 303which is set forth in C.C.S. 303/2 

as a brief and concise statement of their agreed strategic concept for 

operations in the European Theater in 1943-44. 

b. Directed the Secretariat to put C.C.S. 303/2 in proper form with a 

view to its being submitted to the President and Prime Minister. 

(Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 303/3.) 

2. ITALIAN PEACE FEELERS 

THE COMBINED CHZEFS OF STAFF considered a draft memorandum 

for the President and Prime Minister prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved with certain amendments, for submission to the President 

and Prime Minister, a paper setting out the action suggested on the 

Italian peace feelers. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 311.) 

b. Directed that a signal should be sent at once to General Eisenhower 

warning him to hold two staff officers in readiness to proceed to 

Lisbon. (Message sent as FAN 195.) 

3. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 109th Meeting. The detailed record of 

the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

4. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST 1943-1944 

(C.C.S. 301) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum 

by the U.S.Chiefs of Staff outlining their views on operationsto be undertaken 

in 1943-1944in the Pacific and Far East. 

446 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had read this 

memorandum with great interest. There were certain points he would like to 

raise. Was not the assumption that Russia would remain at peace unnecessarily pessimistic? Was an actual invasion of Japan necessarily essential; 

might we not obtain the collapse of Japan without invasion? 

In a discussion on these two subjects it was pointed out that while 

Russia had everything to gain by attacking Japan, it might well be that she 

would wait to do so until the defeat of Japan had been almost completely 

accomplished. 

It was also generally agreed that while blockade and air bombardment might produce the collapse of Japan without invasion, it was necessary 

to plan on the assumption that the country itself would have to be attacked 

by land forces. 

In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke as to the forces required to 

obtain the objectives outlined in C.C.S. 301,ADMIRAL COOKE explained that 

an estimate of the forces required for the various operationshad been prepared 

and was being handed over to the British Planning Staff. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should 

return to a further consideration of C.C.S. 301 and to the plan for operations 

from India after a review of the report by the Combined Planning Staff on the 

strategic concept for the defeat of Japan. Each set of operations could then 

be considered in relation to the whole war against Japan and to the forces 

required. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF were informed that it was hoped 

that the report by the Combined Staff Planners would be ready on the following day. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that it was essential for the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff to take decisions with regard to the specific operations in 

1943-1944 during the Conference. 

In a further discussion of C.C.S. 301,SIR ALAN BROOKE asked whether 

it was considered essential, in order to retain the initiative, that both the 

advance into the Mandated Islands and New Guinea should be pressed forward 

with vigor. Might this not prove too costly, and a better course be to restrict 

operations in New Guinea. thus possibly releasing resources for Operation 

OVERLORD? 

447 
u.5. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered that if forces were so released, 

they should be concentrated on the Island thrust in the Pacific. However, he 

believed that both advances were complementary and equally essential. The 

western advance through Truk, could, after the capture of that base, be swung 

either north or continue to the westward. Thus the two thrusts would either 

converge on the Philippines, or one would be directed to the Marianas. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the troops to be employed in 

New Guinea were either already there or in transit. Thus, no saving could 

be made, and the only decision with regard to the troops was whether or not 

we could afford to take the heavy casualties which might be incurred. Supplies 

in the New Guinea area, owing to Japanese air action, were maintained almost 

entirely by 150-foot vessels, and thus no saving in cargo ships or combat 

loaders would be effected by limiting these operations. Landing craft might 

be saved, but not tank landing craft. With regard to air, though a small saving 

might be achieved, all the heavy bombers required for the operations had 

already been deployed in the area. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was not considered that operations 

in New Guinea should be discontinued, but rather that they should be limited 

to a holding role. The Island advance would cut across the Japanese lines of 

approach to the south. 

ADMIRAL KING explained that the landing craft used in the Kiska 

operation were required for operations in the Central Pacific. For this reason 

it had been essential not to delay the operations in the Aleutians. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that certain landing craft were still 

being sent to the Southwest Pacific to meet attrition. He believed that the New 

Guinea operations were causing very important losses to the Japanese, particularly in aircraft. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that C.C.S. 301 should include a reference to the air route through Burma into China. 

It was generally agreed that a reference to the air route should be 

inserted, since it was the only existing line of supply into China and must also 

be considered in relation to the limited capacity of the lines of communication 

through Assam. 

With regard to the value of Chinese troops, GENERAL MARSHALL said 

that there were some 60 or 70 thousand at Ramgarh and about 200,000 in 

Yunnan.He believed that they might have great value in the land operations 

in China provided that they were properly trained and led. He did not visualize 

a vast Chinese Army being built up. 

448 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

These troops would have to be led by U. S. officers even though the 

nominal control of the army, for “face saving” purposes, would be in Chinese 

hands. They must also be provided with adequate air and artillery support. 

He believed that if these conditions were met, and if their first operations were 

crowned with success, they would be of considerable value. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Directed the Secretariat to draft a subparagraph for inclusion in 

paragraph 8 of C.C.S. 301 on the subject of the development of the 

air route into China. 

b. Agreed to defer action on this paper until after consideration of the 

long-term plan for the defeat of Japan. 

5. OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN FROM INDIA, 1943-1944 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that though the recent floods might force us 

to change our strategy in this area, he would suggest that the discussion 

should start on the basis of our present plans. The British Chiefs of Staff had 

been examining the possibilities of the use of long-range penetration groups 

which, operating well ahead of the main advances, would by long outflanking 

movements cut the enemy’s supply lines. They themselves would be largely 

maintained by air. It was proposed to expand the number of these units now 

available to some six brigade groups. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff might ask Brigadier Wingate to explain his recent operation with a 

long-range penetration group and to set out his views on their fcture employment. After this the Combined Chiefs of Staff would wish to hear the report 

of General Somervell and General Ftiddell-Webster on the repercussions on 

planned operations of the recent floods. 

BRIGADIER WINGATE explained the tactical employment of longrange penetration groups and the reason for their introduction. He then outlined the course of the operations of the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade and put 

forward his views with regard to the future employment of long-range penetration groups in conjunction with main advances aimed at the recapture 

of Northern Burma. 

In summing up, BRIGADIER WINGATE pointed out that there were 

two main features in the employment of these groups; firstly, their whole 

object must be to prepare the way for the follow-up of the main advance and 

their employment, based on the object of dislocating enemy communications, 

must fit into the main plan; secondly, plans for the use of these groups must 

be elastic and open to alteration in the light of enemy reactions. 

449 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had decided 

to form six long-range brigade groups and to this end a comb-out of suitable 

personnel from the Indian Army would be undertaken. One of the difficulties 

was the lack of trained officers who had served with native troops and could 

speak their language. The operations outlined by Brigadier Wingate would 

enable us to seize sufficient of North Burma to open a road to China. These 

operations must continue until the break of the monsoon in order to avoid a 

Japanese reaction before the rains started. It was possible that in the second 

phase, long-range penetration groups might be used, operating from the 

coast through to the Mandalay-Rangoon line of communication. He suggested 

that on the following day General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster’s 

report on the effect of the flood should be studied, together with operations 

against Akyab or Sumatra, which latter might prove necessary were it found 

that the floodswould seriously hamper operations in Burma. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer action until after consideration of the long-term plan 

for the defeat of Japan. 

450 
u. s.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 111th Meeting 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

M~UTF,SOF MEETING HE~D M RQOM2208, CHATEAU FRONTENAC,

ONWEDNESDAY, 18AUGUST1943, AT 1500. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W.D. Leahy, USN General SirAlan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King,USN SirDudley Pound 

General H. H.Arnold, USA Air Chief Marshal 

SirCharles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somenell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M.Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0. C. Badger, USN 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Ma$ Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Brig. Gen. L.S. Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Commander W. L. Freseman, USN 

Commander V D. Long,USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral 

Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. 0.N. Macready

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Air Commodore w. Elliot 

Brig. J. K.McNair 

Capt. R. B. Tollemache 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen J. R.Deane, USA 

Capt. F. B.Royal, USN 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

451 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. CONCLUSIONS OF PREVIOUS MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 110th Meeting. "he detailed record of 

the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

2. ITALIAN PEACE FEELERS 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Representative at the Vatican 

had received a signed document from Marshal Badoglio informing him that 

General Castellano was mthorizcd to spezk on his behalf. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of the above statement. 

3. OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN FROM INDIA, 1943-1944 

(C.C.S. 305/1) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that it appeared from the memorandum (C.C.S. 305/1) prepared by the special committee that from the figures 

available,the Ledo or Imphal advances might have to be abandoned as a result 

of the floods. A telegram had, however, been dispatched to the Commander in 

Chief, India, offering him certain assistance to improve the capacity of the line 

of communication. He proposed that further consideration of operations from 

India should be deferred pending a reply from the Commander in Chief, India. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of the interim report of the ad hoc committee, set out in 

C.C.S. 305/1. 

4. PRODUCTION OF LANDING CRAFT 

ADMIRAL KING informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he was 

examiningthe possibility of increasing the production of landing craft by stopping production of 110 foot submarine-chasers and slowing up production of 

destroyer escorts. The steps he was examining might produce an increase of 

25 percent in the landing craft program, but this must not, however, be taken 

as a firm figure. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note with interest of Admiral King's statement. 

452 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(C.C.S. 308) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF were in general agreement with 

the conceptslaid down in Part I of C.C.S. 308. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there were certain specificpints which 

he would like to discuss with regard to Part 11.It had been found difficult to cut 

the Southeast Asia Command from India, since the former was dependent on 

India asits main base. However,there were constitutional difficulties in linking 

the two. The logistic and administrative side of the command set up was most 

important and a new post of Chief Administrative Officer to the Commander in 

Chief, India had been set up in order that the Chief Administrative Officer of 

the Southeast Asia Command should have only one individual to deal with in 

logistic and administrative matters. 

With regard to the Deputy Supreme Commander, the British Chiefs of 

Staff were distressed by the multitude of functions which this officer would 

have to carry out, necessitating his presence in many widely separated places. 

In the course of discussion the following pints were made: 

(1) It would be difficult for one officer to combine the functions 

of Deputy Supreme Commander, Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo and 

Commander of the U.S.and Chinese forces in the area. 

(2) The Deputy Commander’s main task must be to insure that 

the Chinese forces play their part in operations into Burma. This would 

be no easy task and to insure it, it was essential that General Stilwell, 

who must control the Chinese forces,should have the standing of Deputy 

Commander. 

(3) The command arrangements might be expected to follow 

the same pattern as in the North African theater, i.e., there would be 

ground, air and naval commanders. If General Stilwell commanded the 

ground forces, difficulties would arise since it was essential that control 

of all ground forces should be centralized in one commander. Only thus 

could the various operations be effectively controlled and coordinated. 

On the other hand, it was highly unlikely that the Chinese forces could 

be under the direct control of a British officer, and it was, therefore, 

necessary that General Stilwell should, at least, nominally control these 

forces and that all orders to these forces should pass through him. 

453 
0.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(4) GENERAL MARSHALL said that he visualized this necessarily abnormal organization working on the following lines: General 

Stilwell’s function as Deputy Supreme Commander would be limited, 

since his other functions would occupy the majority of his time. It must 

be his major task, and that not an easy one, to insure not only that the 

Chinese forces played their part in the operations, but also that, to the 

maximum extent possible, the 14th Air Force should cooperate in operations in Burma. It must be remembered that politically, all U. s.forces 

in China, or in the Southeast Asia Command, were regarded as being 

there for the sole purpose of supporting China, and therefore a system 

must be evolved whereby, while retaining this political principle, the 

maximum support could be obtained for operations into Burma. 

(5) SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he appreciated that while 

the 10thAir Force was regarded as a source of reinforcement to the 14th 

Air Force, it also had possibilities for offensive action in the Burma theater.Its operationsin Burma must, however, be coordinated with those of 

the Royal Air Force by the Air Commander, Southeast Asia Command. It 

was therefore essential that these two commanders should occupy the 

same headquarters. 

(6) GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out a further complication in 

that the operation of the air ferry route into China was under a separate 

command. It was not controlled either by General Chennault, by the 

commander of the 10thAir Force, or by General Stilwell, though the latter decided what supplies were flown into China. 

(7) It would seem to be necessary, once operations were in progress, for General Stilwell or his representative to be situated at the Army 

Commander’sheadquarters with United Statesofficers attached to each 

Chinese force through whom he could issue instructions to the Chinese 

forces concerned,in accordancewith the policy of the army commander. 

(8) Finally it was pointed out that the proposals for the employment of Chinese forces and the command arrangements would still have 

to be negotiated with the Generalissimo. 

GENERAL ARNOLD and SIR CHARLES PORTAL then presented draft 

proposals covering the command arrangements on the lines discussed. Certain 

amendments put forward by Admiral Leahy to paragraph 8 (b) were discussed 

and agreed to. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Directed the Combined Staff Planners to revise paragraph 8 (a) and 

454 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

paragraph 8 (b) of Part I1 of the paper, on the basis of the suggestions 

put forward during the course of the meeting. 

6. DECEPTION PLAN FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 284/3/D) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that C.C.S. 284/3/D set up the machinery for 

deception planning for the war against Japan. It remained to prepare plans. 

The responsibility for the formulation,for the approval of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff,of overall deception plans for the war against Japan had been accepted 

by the United StatesChiefs of Staff. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Staff was now engaged 

on this matter. They felt, however, that plans could not be finalized until the 

decisions taken at the present Conference were known. It was hoped that the 

plan would be ready for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff by 15 

September. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note that the U. S. Planners were engaged in preparation of an 

overall deception plan for the defeat of Japan but that it would have 

to be premised to some extent in the QUADRANT decisions and therefore 

would not be ready for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior 

to 15September. 

7. THE U-BOAT WAR 

(C.C.S. 27211) 

SIR DUDLEY POUND referred to a report by the Anti-Submarine 

Survey Board, putting forward certain recommendations with regard to the 

mobility of air units. He was in general agreement with the proposals of the 

United States Chiefs of Staff, though he would like to examine further the 

detailed proposals put forward in the report itself. 

ADMIRAL KING gave a brief resume of the present position with regard 

to the anti-submarine war. His latest information went to show that 429 Uboats were operating, of which 166,including 23 in far northern waters, were 

in the Atlantic. Of the original 12refueling U-boats, 10 had been sunk and one 

or two were working up in the Baltic, but there were undoubtedly others under 

construction. The United States was now operating five auxiliary carriers. 

To meet new U-boat tactics of fighting it out on the surface,aircraft were being 

equipped with heavier forward mountings. The United States Army Air Corps 

455 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

had recently made a much appreciated loan of B-25’s fitted with 75-millimeter 

cannon. It might be found that the best weapon was the 37-millimeter cannon, 

which could carry more rounds. There were a very large number of anti-submarine weapons and projects in the course of experiment and development. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL mentioned the rocket weapon which could fire 

eight projectiles in one salvo, and which was particularly effective. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that at present U-boats were operating 

largely in the Central Atlantic, off the Cape, and in the Indian Ocean. It was 

possible to divert escort vessels from the North Atlantic only as far as the Bay 

of Biscay since it was essential that any craft diverted should be capable of 

rapidly reinforcing the North Atlantic route should the Germans decide to 

concentrate in that area. He believed that the U-boats now in the Baltic were 

refltting with new antiaircraft weapons and radar equipment and that the 

Germans might, when these were ready revert to pack attacks in the North 

Atlantic, having fought their way out of the Bay on the surface in groups, 

using their new and heavier antiaircraft weapons. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND then outlined the steps which were being taken 

to reinforce the escorts in the Cape of Good Hope area. 

In reply to a question by Sir Dudley Pound, ADMIRAL KING said that 

the proposals, to which he had earlier referred, with regard to increasing the 

output of landing craft would not have any material effect on the production of 

anti-submarine craft. It was not proposed to stop the building of any antisubmarine craft except for the 110 foot submarine-chasers. Destroyer escorts 

already laid down would be completed and only a proportion of new construction foregone to allow for stepping up the production of landing craft. Thus 

no effect on important anti-submarine craft output would be felt for at least 

six months. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

.4pproved the recommendations of the U. S.Chiefs of Staff contained 

in C.C.S. 27211. 

8. OPERATION “ALACRITY” 

C.C.S. 27015-27016) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had only received the United States Chiefs of Staff‘sviews as set out in C.C.S. 270/6 after 

their arrival at QUADRANT. Negotiations undertaken by the Foreign Office in 

456 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

consultation as necessary with the British Chiefs of Staff were then almost 

reaching a conclusion. The British Cabinet had given a ruling that the facilities required must, if possible, be obtained on the basis of our treaty with Portugal (our oldest Ally) and not by force. Negotiations had been very protracted. 

Portugal’s main fear was an attack by Spain. They asked for assistance and 

guarantees for their defense against such an attack and had suggested that a 

Portuguese Staff should proceed to London to discuss these terms. This would 

obviously have taken too long. The Portuguese had felt strongly that our initial 

entry into the Islands in too great strength would produce reactions from the 

Spaniards and that it must therefore be on a small scale. It had been felt possible to give the guarantee required by the Portuguese since the risk of invasion 

of that country appeared to be remote. The Portuguese had now agreed to the 

entry of a small British force intothe Azores on the 8th of October.The Prime 

Minister had informed him that the President had agreed to this arrangement. 

As soon as the British were in the Islands the policy would be to build up and 

arrange for the necessary facilities for United States forces. 

GENERAL ARNOLD stressed the importance of the ferry route through 

the Azores, particularly during the coming winter months when weather conditionswill greatly restrict ferrying operationsover the northern route, forcing 

a transfer of these operations to the South Atlantic crossing -5,400 miles 

longer to the U.K.than the Azores route would be. It was expected that by 

early 1944 some 1,800 aircraft per month would be ferried across the Atlantic. 

During 1944it is estimated that airtransport Atlantic crossings will reach 3,500 

per month. The use of the Azores for these operations would effect a monthly 

saving of approximately 15,000,000 gallons of gasoline, and substantially expedite the movement of aircraft and air cargo to the European-Mediterranean, 

Middle East and Far Eastern areas. Grave inconvenience will be caused if this 

ferry route is not available by the winter. Negotiations by Pan-American Airways had almost achieved the desired result but had been discontinued when 

British negotiations got under way. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the original decision of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff to obtain the use of the Azores had been based on their value in 

the anti-submarine war. The air facilities available were limited and he believed that anti-submarine requirements must take priority. He fully appreciated, however, the value of these Islands as a staging point in the air ferry 

route. A clause in the agreement allowed for further development and General 

Arnold could be assured that every effort would be made, and pressure put upon 

the Portuguese, to afford the use of all facilitiesto the United States as soon as 

possible. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt that once an entry had been effected, 

the required facilitiesfor United States aircraft might be made available with457 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

out reference to the Portuguese, but it was generally felt by the British Chiefs 

of Staff that some reference would be necessary. 

After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note : 

a. That the negotiations with the Portuguese regarding the use of the 

Azores had been brought to a successful conclusion as regards their 

use by the British, with effect from October 8th. 

b. That the President had agreed that the negotiationsbetween the British and Portuguese Governments with regard to the use of facilities 

in the Azores should not be prejudiced by insisting that the facilities 

be made immediately available to the United States. 

c. That the British Chiefs of Staff gave an assurance that everything 

would be done by the British as soon as possible after entry had been 

gained into the Azores, to make arrangements for their operational 

and transit use by U.S.aircraft. 

458 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 112th Meeting 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MEETING HELDIN ROOM2208, CHATEAUFRONTENAC 

ON THURSDAY, 19 AUGUST1943, AT 1430. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA General Sir Alan Brooke 

Admiral E.J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet 

General H. H.Arnold, USA Sir Dudley Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0. C. Badger, USN 

Brig. Gen. L.5.Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Commander V.D. Long, USN 

Vice Admiral 

Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hmtings L. Ismay 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod 

Captain L. E. Porter, R.N. 

Air Commodore B. Warburton 

Professor Bernal 

(For part of Item 3) 

PRESENT FOR ITEMS 5,6 AND 7 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Adm. R.Willson, USN Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Maj. Gen. T.T. Handy, USA Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Maj. Gen. M.S. Fairchild, USA Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Capt. F. B. Royal, USN 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge 

459 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 111th Meeting. The detailed record of 

the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

2. PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft progress 

report to the President and Prime Minister. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister. 

3. “HABBAKUKS” 

(C.C.S. 315-315/1) 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that HABBAKUKS might be 

regarded as floating seadromes or giant aircraft carriers. They could be used 

as floating advance landing grounds and could form a staging base for air 

attacks. They might ultimately be used for four-engined heavy bombers. He 

outlined the principal characteristics of the three types. He then referred to 

pykrete, the material from which it was proposed to construct HABBAKUK XI. 

This might prove a strategic material of which there was an abundant supply.

It was formed of a frozen mixture of diluted pulp and water, the latest type 

of which contained 94 per cent water. He gave details of the characteristics 

and strength of this material. A thousand ton model had been built and had 

spent the summer in Lake Jasper, refrigeration being maintained by means 

of an engineof only 15horsepower. He wished to emphasize that a HABBAKUK 

XI, constructed of pykrete, had no limit to its size. Four-engined bombers could 

use them if they were built of sufficient dimensions or if adequate arrester 

gear and assisted take-off could be arranged. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British Chiefs of Staff regarded 

HABBAKUK XI as essentially a Paciftc project. General Arnold had mentioned 

the diWculty of providing adequate bases in the Islands for the deployment of 

air forces for the bombardment of Japan. It would be a long time before the 

supply route to China allowed the maintenance of large air forces in that 

country and therefore the HABBAKUKS might be regarded as strategic bases 

or staging points for air attacks against Japan and would thus All a gap in 

our facilities. They could be provided without impinging on other programs. 

460 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING said that he would agree to accept the recommendations contained in paragraph 8 b of C.C.S. 315. 

In reply to a question by General Arnold, LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that it was proposed that experiments and construction of 

pykrete sections for HABBAKUK II should proceed during the coming winter. 

If these experiments proved successful, construction could start in the spring 

of 1944and the completed HABBAKUK be ready by the spring of 1945.In the 

meanwhile no delay must occur in the preparation of plans and construction 

of sites for the building of the HABBAKUKS. He asked that the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff should also approve the setting up of a US.-British-Canadian 

Board to press on with the whole matter, not only with regard to the winter experiments and the preparation of sites, but also with the preparation of drawings for the completed HABBAKUK. This Board should, in order to insure results, be asked to report monthly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

PROFESSOR BERNAL demonstrated with the aid of samples of pykrete 

the various qualities of this material. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Tmk note of paragraphs a, b, and c, of C.C.S. 315/1. 

b. Agreed to the construction of a section of HABBAKUK II, the 

continuation of design, and the study of the construction and of the 

facilities necessary for a full-size ship. This agreement to be incorporated as paragraph d in C.C.S. 315/1. 

c. Agreed that the appropriate United States, British and Canadian 

authorities should be invited to set up a Board forthwith to press on 

with the action agreed in b above, and to report progress monthly to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

4. LANDING CRAFT 

a. Manning of Landing Craft 

(C.C.S. 286/3) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to the modified proposal put forward by the British Chiefs of 

Staff in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 286/3. 

b. Allocation of Landing Craft -Operation OVERLORD -Vehicle Lift 

(C.C.S. 314) 

461 
u.s.SECBET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed with the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 

of C.C.S. 314that the possibility of arranging an increase in the number 

of LCT(6) available for OVERLORD from American sources should be 

explored. 

c. Allocation of Landing Ships and Craft-American Production 

(C.C.S. 314/1-31412) 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN explained that under the present ruling

the Combined Munitions Assignments Board would feel themselves bound to 

allocate landing craft only to specifically projected operations. In order that 

the British should be able to play their part in operations in the Pacific, it 

was necesrary for them to enter and train adequate personnel to man landing

craft. If the present rulingwere followed landing craft could be only allocated 

for specifically agreed operations which at present did not exist in the Pacific 

Theater. The British assault force which was in fact available and used for 

Operations TORCH and HUSKY had of necessity been built up before these 

actual operationswere decided on. He felt that the allocation of landing craft 

should be based on agreed strategy rather than on agreed operations. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the present position was such that 

there was everywhere a deficit of landing craft. Our operations were liited 

in many cases solely by the lack of these vessels. In view of this over-all 

deficiency, he felt it essential to retain the ruling that landing craft should 

be allocated only to specifically agreed operations. 

ADMIRAL KING said he would like to know the future construction 

program for landing craft in the United Kingdom. He appreciated the necessity 

for the provision of landing craft for training purposes. 

ADMIRAL KING then suggested a modillcation to proposal 3b,m C.C.S. 

314/1,designed to meet Lord LouisMountbatten’s point. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved paragraph 3b of the enclosure to C.C.S. 314/1 modified to 

read as follows: 

“That the British should now work out their training requirements 

and submit requests for a corresponding share of U.S.production 

in 1944-45.’’ 

462 
u.s. s m 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. USE OF “PLOUGH” FORCE 

(C.C.S. 316) 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the U.S.Chiefs of Staff agreed with 

the proposal that the capabilities of the PLOUGH force should be communicated to General Eisenhower and General Morgan who should be asked to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff whether these forces could be usefully 

employed in their theaters. This force had already been ordered to withdraw 

from Kiska. 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN suggested that it would assist the two 

commanders if a United States oBcer from PLOUGH force could proceed to 

the two theaters to give details of the capabilities of the force. He himself could 

also send an officer. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note that Admiral Nimitz and General DeWitt had been directed 

to return the PLOUGH force to the United States on the first available 

transportation. 

b. Concurred in the proposal presented in paragraph 4 of the enclosure 

to C.C.S. 316. 

6. EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY 

NEUTRALS 

(C.C.S. 317) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the BritishChiefsof Stafl had not yet had 

time to consider this paper. 

GENERAL MARSHALL put forward certain amendments to the paper, 

which were suggested by the U.S.Chiefs of Staff. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note of certain amendments presented by the U.S.Chiefs of 

Staff. 

b. Agreed to defer action on the paper until the next meeting. 

7. SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN SARDINIA 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that though he had no reports from the 

theater commander on the matter, General Donovan had informed him of the 

463 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECREI' 

excellent work accomplished by O.S.S. personnel in Sicily. He had felt that even 

better results could have been obtained if they had been allowed to land prior to 

the operation, or at least in the first wave. He (General Marshall) believed that 

since no immediatemilitary operationswere planned against Sardinia, it would 

be well worthwhile to allow O.S.S.and S.O.E. to operate freely in this island. 

They might succeed in enablingan unopposed landing to be achieved or to seize 

Welds or other strategicpoints and hold them as centers of resistance. He had 

not, of course, as yet discussed this matter with General Donovan. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then presented a draft telegram to General 

Eisenhower suggesting that O.S.S.and S.O.E.should be given a free hand to 

operate in the island of Sardinia. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked for time to consider this proposal. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of a proposal submitted by the US. Chiefs of Staff that 

General Eisenhower be requested to comment on a suggestion to gain an 

unopposed occupation of Sardinia by fifth column activities. 

464 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 113th Meeting 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELD IN ROOM2208, CHATEAUFRONTENAC, 

ON FRIDAY, 20AUGUST1943,AT 1430. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Dudley Pound 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0. C. Badger, USN 

Maj. Gen. T.T. Handy, USA 

Maj. Gen. M. S.Fairchild, USA 

Brig. Gen. L. 5.Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Commander W.%. Freseman, USN 

Commander V.D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral 

Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Lt. Gen.Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod 

Captain A. W. Buzzard, RN 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Capt. F. B. Royal, USN 

Comdr. R. D.Coleridge, RN 

Col. A. T.Cornwall-Jones 

465 
BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.S.SECRET 

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 112th Meeting. The detailed record of 

the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

2. NAVAL AND AIR COMMANDERS FOR OPERATION “OVERLORD’ 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to the following British suggestion for Air and Naval Commanders for OVERLORD: 

Naval Commander -Commander in Chief Portsmouth (Admiral Sir 

Charles Little) 

Air Commander -Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Fighter Command 

(Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory) 

3. EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY 

NEUTRALS 

(C.C.S. 317) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would like to have time to refer this 

matter to London where the officers most qualified to advise were situated. It 

It might be necessary to handle it at a later date through the Joint Staff 

Mission. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer action on this paper. 

4. SARDINIA -FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES 

(C.C.S. 318/1) 

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 112th Mtg. Min., Item 7. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft telegram to General Eisenhower on the subject of the use of O.S.S.and S.O.E.organizationsin 

Sardinia. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested certain amendments to this telegram, 

including a reference to operations in Corsica. 

466 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed, with certain amendments, to the dispatch to General Eisenhower of the signal contained in C.C.S. 31811 (Subsequently dispatched 

as FAN 198.). 

5. APPRECIATION AND PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 313) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not had 

sufficient time to arrive at a definite conclusion with regard to the plan and 

would like to hear the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.The early action required 

by US.forces in the Pacific appeared to be generally agreed by the Combined 

Staff Planners,except for differing views as to the emphasis to be laid on operations in New Guinea. It was with regard to operations of British forces that 

the various alternatives existed. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the US.Chiefs of Staff were in agreement 

with the recommendations put forward by the U.S. Planners with certain 

amendmentswhich he outlined. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that, in his opinion, it would be necessary 

to undertake the recapture of the whole of Burma; only thus could the main 

road to China be reopened. Akyab and Ramree must be taken before the next 

monsoon. Operations further south, i.e., against Sumatra,would, he considered, 

be a diversion from the main effort which must be concentrated with a view 

to clearing Burma. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE then outlined the various operatims which could 

be undertaken from India. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there seemed to be two alternatives. In 

both cases the first step would be the recapture of North Burma. After that, it 

would be possible either to press on with the reconquest of the whole of Burma 

and later attack Singapore or, alternatively,to recapture Singapore and afterwards clear Southern Burma. The extent of the operations this sewn was dependent on the reply from the Commander in Chief, India, with regard to the 

lines of communications through Assam. The capture of Akyab was a necessary preliminary to an attack on Rangoon, since it provided the necessary air 

base. The Prime Minister had suggested an alternative operation, the capture 

of the northern tip of Sumatra. It was not possible to undertake in 1944 both 

the capture of Akyab and that of Northern Sumatra. The Akyab operation 

could take place in March and the Sumatra operation, which was not depen467 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

dent on the monsoon, could take place in May. The North Sumatra operation 

was being examined and necessitated a force of some four divisions. This was 

only a slightly larger force than that required for Akyab. 

From an exaxhination of the courses of aotion put forward by the Planners, it appeared that the opening of a port in China could be accomplished at 

approximately the same time, whether this was done by an overland advance 

through China after opening the main Burma road, or, whether it was done 

by sea-borne attacks from Singapore after opening the Malacca Straits. 

It was, in any event, essential to develop to the maximum the air route 

into China. It was the only method of supplying that country. On the defeat 

of Germany a great number of aircraft should be available. In addition to this 

it was necessary to decide on the main line of advance, either overland or by 

sea from Singapore. In each case the Led0road would first be opened and then 

either Akyab captured as a preliminary to an attack on Rangoon, or Northern 

Sumatra captured as a preliminary for an attack on Singapore. Whatever 

course of action was adopted, great developments would have to be undertaken 

with regard to base facilities in India. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked if an attack on the Kra Isthmus, as an alternative to the attack on Northern Sumatra, had been examined. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that though this line of advance had certain advantages,the difficulty was the lack of any ports on that coast. 

ADMIRAL KZNG said that he had always considered Bangkok as the 

most valuable prize. If this towncould be captured, it would be unnecessary to 

assault Rangoon, since all Japanese lines of communication to it could be effectively cut, and it would fall intoour lap. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that on the assumption that the war 

against Germany was completed by the autumn of 1944,he believed that the 

air route to China could be vastly increased. According to the plan, no substantial amount of supplies could get into China by any road before 1946. The 

United Nations would have a tremendous production of heavy bombers, transports and air crews which, when the drain of active operations against Germany ceased,would rapidly build up into vast numbers. Similarly, the other 

requirements for the air route, such as radio aids, would be plentiful. 

Toachieve results, however, from these vast forces it would be necessary 

at once to start building up the necessary facilities and to make preparations 

for deploying and employing the aircraft. Numbers would be 80 large that, if 

468 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

necessary, unserviceable aircraft could be scrapped rather than large repair 

depots should be set up. Maximum efforts must be made, if necessary at the expense of operations to open the southern road. By 1945 it could be possible for 

the air supply route to reach such magnitude that delivery by the Ledo and 

even the main Burma roads would be insignificant in proportion. He realized 

that there were great diWculties in the construction of airfields particularly 

in China. Myitkyina, Bhamo and Lashio could be used which would increase 

the load. Air forces could develop a direct air offensive on Japan and ground 

forces could be thrown in to stiffen the Chinese troops required to safeguard 

the base area. Japanese opposition everywhere would be weakened and their 

morale lowered. Operations on these lines would be, he felt, more profitable 

than tedious land operations to open the main land route. As he visualized it, 

it would, by the methods he had outlined,be possible to continue attacks on the 

periphery of the wheel to achieve attrition, to attack the heart of Japan (the 

center of the wheel) by air, with devastating results on her industry and morale, while at the same time the westerly drive in the Pacific would cut the 

spokes of the wheel. Thus he believed the earliest collapse of Japan could be 

achieved, but a greater effort must be made to build up the air route. A study 

of the logistic possibilities should be made at once, after which the route must 

be built up, if necessary at the expense of ground operations. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt it important that in view of 

the immense difficulties of ground operations in the area concerned, that the 

most effective application of our air superiority should be considered and that 

we should capitalize on the effects of this superiority. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was very strongly in agreement 

with General Marshall and had himself been thinking on the same lines. He 

had been impressed by the small number of aircraft (22) required to maintain 

three of Brigadier Wingate’s groups. The air could be directed by these groups 

onto vital enemy points. Penetration by these methods with lightly armed forces 

assisted and supplied by the air, could, he felt, produce quicker results than the 

laborious advances of land forces, accompanied by the necessary building of 

road communications. With regard to the seizure by air action of potential 

air bases, he believed that while this, in certain cases, could be achieved, it must 

be remembered that troops and anti-aircraft weapons were essential in the 

initial stages and that the bases could not be held by air action alone until the 

enemy had been driven back to a certain distance from them. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he considered that further use could be 

made of the vast number of fighters and light bombers which would later be 

available for direct action against the Japanese all over Burma. They could attack railroads,bridges and troops and vehicles on the march. 

469 
U.S. SECRET 

ERITISH MOST SECRET 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed that this had great possibilities but 

pointed out the risk of delaying the air operations out of China by building up 

too heavy a force of lighter aircraft for operations in Burma. 

Both GENERAL MARSHALL and SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that the 

tactical conception of operations in Burma employing air reinforcement and 

air support and supply to long-range penetration groups should be studied as a 

matter of urgency. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that to attack Japan it would be necessary to base force; far into China. The Chinese forces required to hold the 

essentialbases would require considerable supplies which would effect a reduction in the air effort itself. In addition to the development to the maximum of 

the air route, the Led0 road, with pipelines for gasoline, and then a sea route 

into China, must be developed. Operations to clear Lower Burma by means of 

long-range penetration groups in conjunction with air support or operations 

against either the Kra Isthmus or Singapore could be undertaken. He would 

be interested to know which it was believed would most assist the United States 

thrust in the Pacific, particularly with regard to the synchronization of these 

operations with corresponding operations in the Islands. 

ADMIRAL KING said that in view of the nature of the country he did 

not believe that an attack on Rangoon would divert many Japanese forces. 

Operations, however, against the vital center of Bangkok or into China to 

develop the air offensive would, he thought,both produce strong Japanese reactions. The Japanese, however, had no shortage of troops. Their major deficiencies were in aircraft and shipping. Shipping was their main bottleneck 

since this was required to support all their operations throughout a wide area, 

including their air operatifins. This being the case, he believed that the initial 

main effort of the air forces based in China should be against shipping and 

port facilities. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he agreed with Admiral King’s conception of the vital importance of striking at Japanese shipping from the air. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

had had a most valuable discussion. He would like to have the subject further 

considered on the following day. It was important to get the background as to 

possibilities by the various methods which had been discussed and to decide on 

a long-range plan and to relate immediate operations to this general policy. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:--

Agreed to defer action on this paper. 

470 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

6. IMMEDIATE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Reference: C.C.S. Memo for Information No. 132. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum 

setting out the main points in the various signals which had recently been exchanged between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the latest information seemed to show 

that the Germans had some 16 divisions in Italy. The majority of these ap 

peared to be in the north and there was a tendency to move the headquarters 

of units in the south into the Naples area. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of C.C.S. Memo for Information No. 132. 

7. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO SPAIN 

(C.C.S. 321) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there had been no time to refer the British paper with regard to policy in relation to Spain to the Foreign Office but it 

set out the military considerations involved. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved this paper. 

8. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO TURKEY 

(C.C.S.322) 

GENERAL MARSHALL said it seemed that the present scale of equipment to Turkey was too high and might be reduced. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed with this view. The Turks were not absorbing all the equipment now being provided. Their training and repair facilities 

were inadequate.He believed that supplies should be slowed down to a “trickle” 

and they should not be given more than they could usefully absorb and employ. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved this paper. 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

9. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO RUSSIA 

SIR ALAN BROOKE outlined the present position in Russia. In general, 

the Russians were in a stronger position than ever before. He believed that 

they had reserves available for further offensives in the autumn. Hungary was 

understood to be seeking to negotiate a separate peace and neither Rumania 

nor Finland were desirous of remaining in the war. The Germans would, he 

thought, be forced to hold all their existing divisions on the Russian front or 

even to reinforce them. This would facilitate our operations in Italy and 

OVERLORD. He did not believe that there was any chance of the Germans 

achieving a negotiated peace with the Russians who had too much to wipe off 

the slate. 

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the forming of a “Free Germany” 

movement within Russia. From reports he had received, it appeared that Russia was turning an increasingly hostile eye on the capitalistic world, of whom 

they were becoming increasingly contemptuous. Their recent “Second Front” 

anouncement, no longer borne of despair, was indicative of this attitude. He 

would be interested to know the British Chiefs of Staff’s views on the possible 

results of the situation in Russia with regard to the deployment of Allied 

forces-for example, in the event of an overwhelming Russian success, would 

the Germans be likely to facilitate our entry into the country to repel the 

Russians? 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he had in the past often considered the 

danger of the Russiansseizing the opportunity of the war to further their ideals 

of international communism. They might try to profit by the chaos and misery 

existing at the end of hostilities. He had, however, recently raised this point 

with Dr. Benes, who had forecast the Russian order to international communist 

organizations to damp down their activities. Dr. Benes’ view had been that 

since Russia would be terribly weakened after the war, she would require a 

period of recovery, and to speed up this recovery would require a peaceful 

Europe in which she could take advantage of the markets for her exports. 

There would, however, SIR ALAN BROOKE considered, be Russian demands for a part of Poland, at least part of the Baltic States, and possibly concessions in the Balkans. If she obtained these territories, she would be anxious 

to assist us in maintaining the peace of Europe. 

With regard to Russia’s air power, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that in 

view of her superiority on the Eastern Front, the results achieved were disappointing. This, he believed, was largely due to lack of adequate training and 

handling. 

472 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

In discussing the possibility of the Germans releasing forces from the 

Eastern Front for operations elsewhere by the shortening of their line, ADMZRAL KING said that he was doubtful whether the shortening of a line would in 

fact allow Germany to divert divisions elsewhere. The shortening of the line 

would enable the Russians to intensify their dispositions on this shorter front. 

10. SYNTHETIC HARBORS 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN reported that certain experts with regard to synthetic harbors were now on their way to Quebec to discuss the 

matter with the appropriate United States officers. 

473 

U,SoSECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 114th Meeting 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM2208, CHATEAU RONTENAC, 

ON SATURDAY, 21 AUGUST 1943,AT 1430. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound Admiral E. J. King, USN Air Chief Marshal 

GeneralH. H.Arnold, USA Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R.Deane, USA 

475 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 113th Meeting. The detailed record of 

the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

a. PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 319/1) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 319/1, as amended in the course of the discussion. 

(Amended version subsequently published as C.C.S. 31912.) 

3. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(C.C.S. 308,308/1,308/2) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved C. C. S. 308,excluding paragraph 8. 

b. Approved the amendments to paragraphs 8a and b set forth in 

C.C.S. 308/1. 

c. Approved the amendment to paragraph 8 c set forth in C.C.S. 308/2. 

(The amended paper subsequently published as C.C.S. 308/3.) 

4. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST 1943-1944 

(C.C.S. 301,301/1,301/2) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the new subparagraph eight (i) “Air Route into China”, set 

forth by the U.S.Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 301/2. 

5. SUPPLY ROUTES IN NORTHEAST INDIA 

(C.C.S. 325) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the recommendations contained in the paper. 

476 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

6. AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 323) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that this paper should be referred to the Combined Staff Planners 

for study and the submission of an appropriate report to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff not later than 15 September 1943. 

477 
478 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 115th Meeting 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN ROOM 2208, CHATEAUFRONTENAC, 

ON MONDAY, 23 AUGUST1943,AT 1430. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. I).Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Dudley Pound 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0.C. Badger, USN 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Commander W. L. Freseman, USN 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral 

Lord LouisMountbatten 

(Items 1to 7, incl.) 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Capt. R. B. Tollemache 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Capt. F. B. Royal, USN 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge 

479 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff,subjectto the understanding that, with regard to Item 2 of these 

conclusions,certain amendmentsmade to C.C.S. 319/3 would necessitate 

consequential amendments in C.C.S. 319/2. 

2. DRAFT FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 319/3) 

Certain amendments were agreed to the draft report to the President 

and Prime Minister contained in C.C.S. 319/3. 

Later in the meeting, certain additional amendments were put forward 

consequent to decisions taken on Items 4 and 5 below. 

In the course of discussion, GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that there 

might be some method whereby the Supreme Commander of the Southeast 

Asia Command should have at least some control over the lines of communication through Assam. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that it had originally been thought that 

it might be possible to put the Commander in Chief India, under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area, since India formed the base for the latter’s 

operations. There were, however, constitutional difficulties which had prevented this plan being implemented. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he fully appreciated these constitutional difficulties,but had hoped that some system similar to the French “zones 

des armees”might be instituted. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that this point had also been considered 

and an Eastern Command, India, had been formed comprising the whole area 

covering the lines of communication through Assam. This command had been 

placed under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area. 

GENERAL ARNOLD suggested that with regard to the examination of 

future operationsin the India-Burma-China Theater, it might be well to insert 

a reference to a study and report on operations against the Andaman Islands, 

sincethe possession of these islandswould be of great value to operationsin this 

Theater. 

480 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the Planning Staff would 

certainly consider the Andaman Islands in connection with certain of the 

operationswhich they had been instructed to examine. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the draft final report to the President and Prime Minister aa 

amended in the course of discussion (subsequentlycirculated as C.C.S. 

319/4),and agreed to present it at the meeting to be held that evening at 

the Citadel. 

3. JAPANESE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 

GENERAL MARSHALL read to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief 

memorandum on the treatment of U. S. and Filipino prisoners by the Japanese. "his memorandum was a report from a Major in the Air Corps of the U.S. 

Army who had recently escaped after one year in captivity. The Japanese treatment of the prisoners had been inhuman and barbaric in the extreme. 

4. PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA 

(C.C.S. 312;312/1) 

It was pointed out that an unqualified approval of the proposals contained in C.C.S. 312might result in a further decrease in the scale of our military operations in Northern Burma. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the U.S.craft sent to India for the 

pipeline could be used for other more urgent purposes if the Supreme Commander so desired. 

After a full discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved, subjectto prior requirementsof militaryoperationsin Burma, 

the construction of a four-inch pipeline from Assam to Kunming and a 

six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam to facilitate air operations in 

China and to ease congestion on the existing lines of supply. 

5. OPERATIONS FROM INDIA 

(C.C.S. 327) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that there were three possible courses 

open to us in North Burma in the dry season of 1943-44,and that it seemed 

481 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

clear that the existing capacity of the lines of communication would not allow 

of the full accomplishment of more than one of these. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL pointed out that operations in North Burma 

would not start until mid-February. He said that he believed the movement 

of supplies into the area should be based on the most optimistic forecast of the 

capacity of the lines of communication. 

After a f~lldiscussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed: 

a. That the main effort should be put into offensive operations, with 

the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. 

b. That priorities cannot be rigid and that therefore the Supreme Commander should be instructed that in formulating his proposals he 

should regard the decision in a above as a guide and bear in mind the 

importance of the longer term development of the lines of communication. 

6. MOVEMENT OF THE “QUEENS” 

(C.C.S. 24611) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that the “QUEENS” should revert to running on a 21 day cycle. 

7. AMPHIBIANS FOR “OVERLORD” 

(C.C.S. 326) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer consideration of C.C.S. 326 until after the QUADRANT 

conference. 

8. EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY 

NEUTRALS 

C.C.S. 31711-31712-31713) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed: 

a. That the supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program

recommended by the Commanding General of the North African 

482 
U. S. SECRET 

BRlTISH MOST SECRET 

Theater of Operations (Cable W7177-CM-IN-BOSCO 21, 13 August 

1943) be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September ­ 31 December 1943, insofar as this does not interfere with operations 

scheduled previous to QUADRANT. 

b. That the rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by 

General Eisenhower’s radio (W7177)of 13 August 1943. 

9. OPERATION “RANKIN” 

(C.C.S. 320) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that the 

Allied forces employed were too large and that it was hoped that fewer forces 

could be used for occupation purposes.An insufficient emphasis had been laid 

on the value of air power to quell the population. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the US.Chiefs of Staff agreed with this 

view. They suggested that the plan should be approved in principle and kept 

under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air 

superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this 

operation. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to the recommendation, contained 

in Paragraph 20 b, that the provision in the United Kingdom of a Commanding 

General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S.Army Group was of urgent 

importance and should be undertaken forthwith. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved in principle the digest of the plan for Operation RANKZN 

contained in C.C.S. 320, but directed that this plan be kept under 

continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air 

superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success 

of this operation. 

b. Took note that the U.S.Chiefsof Staffwould give early consideration 

to the appointment of a Commanding General, Staff and HeadqQartersfor the U.S.Army Groupin the United Kingdom. 

483 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

10. REHABILITATION OF OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES 

(C.C.S. 324/1) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.'--

Approved the recommendations contained in Paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 

324/1. 

11. FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC 

(C.C.S. 222/2) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer consideration of this paper. 

12. MEETING WITH MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS AND MAJOR GENERAL 

WHITELEY 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to discuss operations in the Mediterranean with Major General 

Rooks and Major General Whiteley at their meeting the following day. 

13. FUTURE MEETINGS 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to meet at 1030 on Tuesday, 24 August. 

484 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 116th Meeting 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESof MEETINGHELDIN ROOM2208, CHATEAUFRONTENAC, 

ON TUESDAY, 24 AUGUST1943, AT 1030. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy,USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound Admiral E. J. King, USN Air Chief Marshal 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0.C. Badger, USN 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Maj. Gen. L. W. Rooks, USA 

(for Item 3 only) 

Brig. Gen. L.S. Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Commander W. L. Freseman,USN 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral 

Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier J. K. McNair 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod 

General J. F. M. Whiteley 

(for Item 3 only) 

Air Commodore R. Foster 

Captain T. M. Brownrigg, RN 

PRESENT FOR ITEM 5 

Dr. T.V. Soong 

Major General Shih-Ming Chu 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge 

485 
u.a. SECRET 

BIUTISE MOST SECRI!X 

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusionsof the 115thMeeting. The detailed record of the 

meeting was also accepted,subject to minor amendments. 

2. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 319/4) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft cover 

note for the final report and certain amendments arising out of the Second 

QUADRANT Meeting between the President and Prime Minister. 

Later in the meeting SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the Combined 

Chiefs of Staffthat the Prime Minister considered that the names of the navai 

and air commanders for OVERLORD should not be mentioned in the final 

report. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the cover note and certain amendments to the final report 

(subsequently circulated as 31915). 

3. MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 

a. Directive to GeneralEisenhozoer 

(C.C.S. 328) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners covering a draft directive to Gerierai 

Eisenhower based on the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at QUADRANT. In the course of discussion, it was agreed that General Eisenhower 

should be sent only those parta of the final report to the Prime Minister and 

president (C.C.S. 319/5), and of the paper relating available resources to plane 

(C.C.S. 38), that dealt with the European Theater. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that those extracts from the Final Report of the QUADRANT 

Conference (C.C.S. 319/5) and from the Implementation of Assumed 

Basic Undertakings (C.C.S. 329) dealing with the European Theater 

should be sent to General Eisenhower with the cover note contained as 

an enclosure to C.C.S. 328. 

486 
u.6. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

b. DiscwSion with Generals Whiteley and Rooks 

GENERAL WHITELEY outlined the position with regard to forthcoming operationsin the Mediterranean. His statement follows: 

1. Forthcomingoperationsin Italy comprise two amphibious assaultsa. Across the Straits of Messina (BAYTOWN); 

b. IntoMemo Bay (AVALANCHE).These assaultswill be under the 

command of General Alexander, and have as their object the securing of 

the Rome airfields and the clearing of the enemy from Southern Italy. 

2. The BAYTOWN assault is Wig carried out by the 13th Corps, with 

two divisionsin the assault and one in reserve. The assaulting divisionsare 

the 5th and the Canadian. The object of the BAYTOWN assault is to containGerman divisionsand to open the Straits of Messina for shipscarrying 

cargoes to Naples. 

3. The AVALANCHE assault isunder the command of the 5th U.S.Artxy. 

The assault will be carried out by the loth British Corps, comprising 46th, 

56th and 7th Armored Divisions.The 6th U.S. Corps is the immediate followup, and later follow-ups may include a French Corps and the 5th British 

Corps.The immediate object of AVALANCHE is to secure the port of Naples. 

4. We expect to f3nd 16Germandivisionsin Italy. The German intention 

seems to be to deny us the Po Valley by holding a position pisa-Rumini. It 

looks as if they intend to withdraw their divisions from Southern Italy to 

the North. The four divisionsin the extreme south are, we think, withdrawing, covered by two German divisions in the Naples-Memo area. Two 

more German divisions are in the Rome area disciplining the Italian Government. 

5. The BAYTOWN assault will take place between September 2 - 4. General Eisenhower wasanxious to have a ten day gap between BAYTOWN and 

AVALANCHE so that some of the BAYTOWN landing craft could be used 

for AVALANCHE. The limiting factors for the AVALANCHE assault are 

that it cannot be launched before September 7; that, for reasons of moon, 

it cannot be launched between September 11 and 21.The AVALANCHE assault will probably, therefore, We place September 9- 11. 

6. It looks, therefore, as if the BAYTOWN assault may not meet very 

strong opposition. On the other hand, the Germans had large numbers of 

487 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

antiaircraft dual-purpose gunson the Straits,and some of these may still be 

in position. Even if we do not meet with much opposition, our progress is 

likely to be slowed down by the physical difficulties of the country and 

enemy demolitions.We hope, however, to pass six divisionsthrough Calabria 

by 1st December. 

7. There is, of necessity, some anxiety about the AVALANCHE operation. The assault may be opposed within a few hours by comparable German 

forces. If and when the Germans realize that our assault is not in very great 

strength they may move divisions to the sound of the guns and attack us 

with up to six divisions some time during September. On the other hand, 

communications in Italy are poor and it may not be easy for the Germans 

to alter their withdrawal plans and concentrate divisions against our AVALANCHE assault. However, General Eisenhower must naturally be anxious 

to protect the AVALANCHE assault with the maximum aircraft, and to 

build it up just as quickly as is humanly possible. Algiers estimates that, 

apart from air-borne divisions, six divisions and tactical air force will be 

ashore in the Naples area by 1st December. 

8. The strategical air force cannot be moved in until we have secured 

the Rome airfields. It is not possible to estimate at this stage how many divisions will be required to do this -probably of the order of 16. The maintenance commitment of the strategical air force is the equivalent of approximately four divisions so considerable development will be necessary before 

it can be operating at full strength. This will probably include the provision 

of pipelines. 

9. For any advance north of the Pisa line, we will require ports north of 

Naples. Civitivechia is a good port and can be used even if the German is In 

occupation of Corsica and Sardinia. We must, however, deal with those two 

islands before we can use Leghorn and Genoa. General Eisenhower’s intention prior to the receipt of any instructions resulting from this conference, 

was to continue to hit the Germans whenever and wherever possible. 

10. As regards operations against Southern France,the main limiting 

factor is likely to be landing craft. If we can only assault with approximately two divisions,we want to create diversions asmuch as possible from 

other directions. Naturally, therefore, we would like to be in possession of 

the Italian coast right up to the French frontier. Whether or not it will be 

possible to do an amphibiousoperation in Southern France if we are not appreciably further north than the Pisa line has not yet been examined, 

488 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

11. We are faced with a very difficult movement and maintenance problem in the Mediterranean. For several months we will have to be manning 

ports in North Africa and in Italy. Moreover, the North African ports will 

be working at extreme pressure. They will not only have to accept US.and 

U.K.convoys, discharge these cargoes and reload them for Italian destinations,but also they will be loading divisions for Italy at top pressure. Moreover, owing to poor communications in North Africa, we cannot always 

move divisions to the most desirable ports of embarkation; we have to load 

them where they are situated. 

12. On paper, General Eisenhower has a large number of divisions available. On the other hand, it is questionablewhether we will be able to provide 

the personnel and equipment necessary to maintain these divisions on an 

operational scale. There is not only the problem of shipping equipment, but 

of dealing with it through our bases during this period of high pressure. 

Moreover,many of these divisions are of foreign nationalities and this leads 

to less elasticity and increased maintenance commitments. 

13. Plans for Operation BACKBONE have been prepared. Until the end 

of the year there are likely to be some British divisions in North Africa 

which could be made available. After the New Year we will probably have to 

rely on the French to provide the insurance for BACKBONE. Our first step 

would have to be to move air forces from Italy to the Spanish Moroccan area 

to operate from fields already prepared or earmarked. We would also have 

to forestall the Germans ix: the Balearics with a view to interfering with 

their coastal traffic from Marseilles. If we could deny them this coastal 

traffic, we could interfere appreciably with their rate of build-up. 

14. To sum up, I think that General Eisenhower’s main concerns are: 

a.The anxious period during and immediately after the AVALANCHE assault; 

b. Port congestion and the difficulties of movement in the Mediterranean; 

c. Whether we will be able to maintain sacient divisions on an 

operationalscale. 

GENERAL ROOKS explained that the AVALANCHE attack would be 

under command of the 5th U.S. Army and would consist of two corps, one British and one American. The possibility of a German effort to sever the lines of 

communication through the Straits of Gibraltar was continually kept under 

489 
v. s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

review. Plans had been prepared by the Fifth Army,which had now been turned 

over to MQ,who would use such forces as were available to them. At present 

some two to four United Statesand British divisions were available for this purpose,though later it might be necessary to depend to some extent on French 

troops. 

AIR COMMODORE FOSTER said that already all the tactical fighter 

and most of the tactical bomber force was situated in Sicily.Air cover for the 

assault in the Salerno area would be provided by fighters based initially in 

Sicily. The single-engined fighters would operate from six to eight strips laid 

to the eastwardof Messina and with their extra tanks could operate for between 

15and 20 minutes over the assault. The twin-engined fighters based on Catania 

and in Western Sicily, having a greater range, could remain longer over the 

area. In addition,A-26 units were also based on Catania, and the Fleet air arm 

would provide air cover with Seafires from four escort and one Fleet carrier. It 

was estimated that it would be possible to maintain 30 fighters continuously 

over the assault during the hours of daylight. The tactical bomber force would 

be used on an arc designed to stop enemy reinforcementswhile the strategical 

bomber force would concentrate on communications and airdromes. Since the 

enemy had good airdromes on the eastern coast of Italy opposite the assault 

area,it would not be possible to harry the enemy aircraft to the same extent 

ashad been achieved in HUSKY.It was for this reason that the Commander in 

Chief had asked to retain the B-24's which had been used for the Ploesti raid. 

CAPTAIN BROWNRIGG explained the naval command arrangements. 

The AVALANCHE assault would all be under the command of Admiral Hewitt. 

Under him would be Admiral Hall, commanding the combat loaders carrying 

the 6th Corps; Admiral Connelly commanding the United States landing 

craft; and Commodore Oliver, the British landing craft. Admiral Hewitt would 

have a force of cruisers and destroyers operating under his orders and Admiral 

Vian would command the carrier force. Cover to the northward would be provided by a battleship force. There would be a further covering force operating 

to the south of the Toe in the unlikely event of the Italian ships in Taranto 

endeavoring to break out. The Naval Commander in Chief was not worried on 

the assault phase of the operation but realized the difeculties of safeguarding 

the long lines of sea communication and the various routes on which convoys 

would have to run.Jt would be impossible to divert convoys to avoid submarines 

and air attack and they would therefore have to fight their way through. For 

this reason there was, of course, a large demand for escort vessels. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note with interest of the abovestatements. 

490 
u.s. SECRFT 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

4. FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC 

(C.C.S.22213) 

SIR DUDLEY POUND explained that a Combined ad hoe committee 

had put forward the proposals contained in the enclosure to C.C.S.22213 since 

the present arrangement of three UGS convoys per month, with a limit of 80 

ships per convoy, did not provide for all the ships presenting themselves. The 

suggestion that four convoys per month should be established would require 

further investigation since the running of additional UGS convoys would 

necessitate consequential adjustments to other Atlantic convoys. With regard 

to paragraph 5 of the memorandum, he suggested the words “unless otherwise 

agreed” should be added after the words “following priority” in order to give 

a greater degree of flexibility. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he fully appreciated that the cycle could not 

be changed to four convoys a month except after consultation and in relation 

to other convoys. He suggested that it should be agreed that the United States 

Navy should fix the earliest practicable date for a program of four UGSconvoys 

a month, “with due regard to the general setupof convoys in the Atlantic.” 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed, 

a. That the U.S.Navy should fix the earliest practicable date when a 

program of four UGS convoys per month could be established, with 

due regard to the general setup of convoys in the Atlantic. 

b. To delegate executive authority to the Combined Military Transportation Committee to act on similar problems in the future with 

regard to UGS convoys in accordance with the following priority 

unless otherwise agreed: 

(1) U.S.and British ships destined for forces commanded by the 

Allied Commander in Chief in Mediterranean. 

(2) U.S.and British shipsdestined for India. 

(3) U.S.and British ships destined for Allied forces in Middle East. 

(4) U.S.and British shipscarrying civil supplies for occupied territories in Mediterranean. 

(5) Ships destined for Persian Gulf. 

491 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(6) Lend-Lease to Turkey. 

(7) Miscellaneous. 

5. MEETING WITH DR. T. V. SOONG 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he understood that Dr. T. V.Soong had been 

informed of the progress of discussions at Quebec by the President and Prime 

Minister. He felt it would be very useful to have Dr. Soong’s reactions to the 

points made by the President and Prime Minister. 

DR. SOONG said that the President and Prime Minister had given him 

only a general outline and had suggested that he should obtain full information 

about actual plans from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was most happy to 

know that so much consideration had been given at QUADRANT to the war 

with Japan. To achieve greater security he proposed to send General Chu to the 

Generalissimo to inform him of the decisions taken by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

In reply to a question by Dr. Soong, GENERAL SOMERVELL explained 

the layout of the proposed pipeline to China which would carry 18,000 tons of 

gasoline per month. It was hoped by 1945-46 to achieve a lift of 65,000 tons of 

supplies by road. Some small amounts could, he hoped, be got over the road 

about three months after the opening. 

DR. SOONG then asked for details with regard to the Chinese share 

of proposed operations. Was he right in assuming that the original plan was 

being adhered to and that Chinese forces at Ramgarh would operate from Led0 

in conjunctionwith an advance by the forces from Yunnan? 

GENERAL MARSHALL confirmed that in general this was the case. 

In reply to a question by Dr. Soong, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the 

size of the British forces to be employed had not yet been settled, since the full 

effect of the floods on the lines of communication through Assam was not yet 

known. These lines of communication had to carry not only supplies to be 

flown by air into China and those required for the forces to operate from Led0 

and Imphal, but also the supplies required for the expansion of the air route 

and the building up of the lines of communicationsthemselves. 

DRSOONG asked to be informed of the date on which it was proposed 

these operations should commence. 

492 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that it was now proposed that they 

should start later than originally envisaged, since it was believed better that 

they should carry on into the early part of the monsoon, thus assisting us to 

consolidate our position. The actual date was, however, not settled, nor was it 

possible to disclose it. 

Referring to amphibian operations, DR. SOONG said that the Generalissimo had always understood that they would be carried out in Burma. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he was not in a position to disclose the 

selected area for the amphibious assault, but it was to take place from India 

and would have a direct bearing on operations in Burma and Western China. 

DR. SOONG pointed out that the Generalissimo feared the Japanese 

capacity to attack since they had the advantage of superior lines of communication which would be hard to combat. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the position was improving since 

the Japanese no longer had the same power as hitherto, and attrition against 

air and shipping was being forced upon them by the ever increasing efforts of 

the United Nations. In Burma it was hoped that the employment of long-range 

penetration groups on the principle of Brigadier Wingate’s columns, would 

seriously interfere with Japanese lines of communications. 

DR. SOONG said that he felt that it would be of no value for him,as a 

civilian, to express his own views on the situation. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the success of operations in Burma 

was largely dependent on the confldent cooperation of the Chinese forces. With 

this, success could be expected, but unless this collaboration was forthcoming 

they could not be undertaken. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out the colossal effort required to build 

up and maintain communications with China. The pipeline was only a small 

part, though that in itself necessitated the shipping of much equipment and 

many techniciansover a vast distance. The air line was also an immense undertaking. Last week it had achieved a rate of 7,000 tonsper month. It would soon 

achieve 10,000tonsa month and would increase from even that flgure.To make 

thisprodigious effort worthwhile, security of the lines of communication was 

essential. 

In the Mediterranean, by a magnificent unity of effort, a great victory 

had been achieved. In the Far East the position was Wlnhly more difRcult. 

493 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Unity of effort and unity of action in Burma, in India and in China must be 

achieved. A Supreme Commander had been proposed by the British and 

accepted delightedly by the U.S.Chiefs of Staff. This Commander in Chief 

was faced with an extremely diWcult problem and his operations could never 

succeed unless he was assured of complete unity of action and of cooperation 

by China. 

(At this point General Marshall left the meeting with Dr. Soong in order 

to inform him of a certain decision taken by the Combined Chiefs of SW.) 

On hiff return GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff of the lines of his discussion with Dr. Soong. He had once more emphasized to him that he, Dr. Soong, must ensure unity of action from China on 

behalf of the united effort and that this unity of action must be accompanied 

by no holding back or reluctance. Only thus could success be achieved and 

without it all our efforts would be futile. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note with warm approval of the statement made by General 

Marshall. 

6. RELATION QF RESOURCES TO PLANS 

(C.C.S. 329; 329/1). 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum 

by the Combined Staff Planners on the implementation of assumed basic 

undertakings and specific operations for the conduct of the war, 1943-44, 

together with certain amendments,subsequently put forward by the Combined 

Staff Planners. These amendments, together with certain others put forward 

at the meeting, were discussed in detail. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed to certain amendments to the paper including that in 329/1 

(amended paper subsequently published as C.C.S. 329/2). 

b. Approved the report by the Combined Staff Planners in the enclosure 

to the paper. 

c. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare a suitable paragraph on the 

subject for insertion in the Final Report. 

494 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

7. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them the terms of an 

announcement to be made with regard to the appointment of Vice Admiral 

the Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia 

Command. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF;-

Took note with approval of the proposed announcement. 

8. PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE 

(C.C.S. 310) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were 

not in a position to take action at present on this paper. He understood that 

it was being discussedby the British Minister of Information on a political level. 

He fully appreciated the importance of resolving the problem presented and 

would make every effort to insure that a solution was found as rapidly as 

possible. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he realized that the suggestion that 

the Combined Chiefs of StafT should be charged with the implementation of 

the policy was questionable. He felt, however, that an early solution was 

important, particularly from the United States Chiefs of StafT point of view, 

since they had a particular responsibility in the matter. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed asto the necessity from the military point of view of adequate 

machinery for the coordination of propaganda. 

b. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would ascertain the result of 

the recent negotiations by the British authorities concerned. 

c. Agreed that further action in this matter should be taken up by the 

Joint Staff Mission as early as possible. 

9. MESSAGE TO STALIN 

GENERAL MARSHALL read out a draft message to Mr. Stalin, which 

he suggested might be put forward to the President and Prime Minister as the 

basis of the communication to the Soviet Government. Certain minor amendments to this draft were suggested. 

495 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the draft message to be put forward to the President and 

prime Minister. 

10. CONCLUDING REMARKS 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff would like to place on record their appreciation of the work done by the 

Planning Staffs, by General Riddell-Webster, General Somervell and Admiral 

Badger, who, by their industry and long hours of toil, had contributed much 

to the success of the conference. 

ADMIRAL KING felt that special mention of the labors of the 

Secretariat should also be expressed. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed, on behalf of the United States Chiefs of 

Staff, his appreciation for the consideration which had been shown by the 

British Chiefs of Staff for the United Statespoint of view. This had contributed 

largely to the success of the conference and the easy reconciliation of ideas. 

He believed that the conference had been of great value and that further 

conferences should be held at short intervals. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed 

his gratitude for the patience and consideration shown by the United States 

Chiefs of Staff to the British points of view. He believed that each meeting was 

a step forward to a full appreciation by each of the other’s point of view, and 

agreements were therefore more quickly reached. Now that we held the 

initiative, the tempo of the war was faster and meetings should, he believed, be 

held more frequently than hitherto. 

496 
U.S.SECRET 

BRiTISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

A 

AD HOC COMMI'ITEE REPORTS 

Future convoy arrangements in the AtlantlC, 1 

Interim report re effect of Indian floods 

on Burma campaign, 113 

Pipeline from India to China, 151 

Rehabilitation of occupied and liberated 

territories, 301 

AGENDA 

For QUADRANT conference, 31,416 

AIR FIELDS (See ako Air Routes) 

Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board report on, 19 

Development of HABBAKUKS, 185, 199, 

460 

Facilities in the Azores, 11, 229, 251, 400, 

406,456 

Use of air fields in North Italy, 398,419,421 

434 

AIR FORCES, AXIS 

Estimated streneth I in Eurow. _ _ 48 

Strength of German Fighter Air Force, 130, 

132,441 

AIR FORCES, UNITED NATIONS 

Combined bomber offensive and OVERLORD, 342 

Deployment of air forces in the Mediterranean, 2 August 1943, 84 

8th Bomber Command, 131 

Operations from the Mediterranean, 344 

Provision of air forces for agreed operations, 341 

Resistance groups, in support of, 350 

Southeast Asia operations, 345 

TIDALWAVE air force, employment of, 7 

AIR OPERATIONS (See &o Combined 

Bomber Offensive; POINTBLANK) 

Air plan for the defeat of Japan, 287 

Resolutions of the C.C.S. re, 88,253 

AIR ROUTES (See ah supply ~outes) 

Azores, through the, 75, 457 

China, plans for air route into,67,235.257, 

404,449,468,476 

Command of U.S.Army and Navy air transport services in Southeast Asia, 127,404 

Fuel requirements for air transport operations, India-Burma-China, 148 

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (See also 

HABBAKUKS) 

For Mediterranean operations, 420 

AIRCRAFT, UNITED NATIONS 

Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board report on Spares, 20 

Estimated requirements, air plan for defeat 

of Japan, 296 

Standardization of anti-submarine, 21 

AIC/AB (See also Burma,BULLFROG) 

C.C.S. discussion on plan for defeat of 

Japan, 467 

Citadel discussion re operations against 

Akyab, 402, 411 

General Auchinlech's message re operations in Burma, 111 

Re study of operation against, 257 

ALACRITY 

See Azores 

ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 

Specific operations for defeat of Japan, 65, 

68,446 

497 
U.S. SECFtET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

ALLIED ANTLSUBMARlNE BOARD 

Report on logistic organization to improve 

mobility of anti-submarine squadmw 

17, 455 

ALLIES 

Equipping allies, liberated forms and 

friendly neutrals, 205,463,466 

AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT (See &o Landing 

craft) 

Amphibians for OVERLORLJ, (DUKW’s), 

313 

Projected reguirements for, 369 

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE 

Admiral King‘s statement re German intentions in U-Boatwarfare, 421 

C.C.S. discussion re present position with 

regard to the anti-submarine war, 455 

Logigtie organizstion to improve mobility 

of anti-submarine squadrons,11,455 

POZNTBLANK, effect of option on, 

420,440 

Sir Dudley Pound’sstatement re situation 

in European Theater,419 

With relation to strategic wncept for the 

defeat of the Ads in Eumpe, 75, 88 

ARMISTICE 

see Peace and AlmiStice 

ARNOLD, GENERAL H.H. 

Statementa in reference to: 

Akyab in relation to an attack on Rangoon, 404 

~zores,importance of the ferry mute 

through, 457 

china, air operations based on logistie

capacities in. 426 

Japan, Appdtion and plan for the defeat of, 469 

North Itallan air bases, use Oi, 421,475 

Ploesti: 

FUhu‘e OpZl’8tiOM U@lI&, 596 

Results of raid on,442 

Priority bebeen operations and line5of 

wmmunication in Burma.420 

southeastAsis command,454,480 

ASIA, SOUTHEAST (see &o ~ndiaB--China) 

Air form available for agreed operation8 

in,36 

Citadel disnuudon re Southeast Asla Command, 411 

Combined Liaison Committee, 127,260 

Directive re supply route into chinafmm 

Burma,309 

Southeast Asia Command, 123. 229, 258. 

401,453,476, 495 

ASIATIC THEATER 

Specificoperations for the defeat of Japan, 

63 

ASSAM 

Planned capacity of the Assam L of C. 906 

ASSAULT SHIPS AND CRAfT (~ee&o 

Landing craft) 

Amphibians for OVERLORD, 313 

General situation, 352 

ASSAULT FORCES (see FO~, u.N.) 

Formation of U.5. assault form for operation OVERLORD, 25 

ATLANTIC OCEAN 

Admiral King‘s statement re anti-u-boat 

warfare in, 421 

Future convoy BITangementsin, 1,484,491 

Sir Dudley Pound’s statement re U-boat 

warfare in North Atlantic, 419 

498 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

AUCHINLECH, GENERAL C. J. E. 

Message re effect of Indian flocds on 

Burma campaign, 107 

AVALANCHE (See &o Mediterranean) 

Discussion of coming operations in the 

Mediterranean, 487 

Shipping requirements for operation, 310 

AXIS (See also Germany, Japan, Italp) 

Air plan for the defeat of Japan, 287,477 

Armed force strength in Europe, 47 

Estimate of the enemy situation, 1943­

1944, European-Mediterranean area, 45 

Estimate of the enemy situation, 1943­

1944, Pacific-FarEast area, 35,64 

Situation in the Satellite countries, 54 

Strategic concept for the defeat of the 

Axis in Europe, 87,226,251,433,440,446 

Strategic situation, 72 

AZORES 

C.C.S. discussion re operation ALACRITY, 

456 

Citadel discussion re occupation of the 

Azores, 400,406 

Land airport facilities in, 15 

Report to the President and Prime Minister re facilities in, 229,251 

Shipping requirements for operation in, 

371 

B 

BACKBONE 

General Whiteley's discussion of plans for 

operation, 489 

BALKANS 

Aircraftavailable for support of resistance 

groups in Europe, 350 

Enemy situation in the Balkans, 417 

Equipping Balkan forces. 207, 212 

Trained Balkan troops for operations in 

own countries.399 

With relation to strategic concept for defeat of the Axis in Europe, 72,18,81,253 

BANGKOK 

C.C.S. discussion on plan for defeat of 

Japan, 468 

Re planning for futureoperations against, 

257 

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT 

OF OVER - ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

Implementation of assumed basic undertakings and specific operations for the 

conduct of the war,1943-1944,326,494 

Report to the President and Prime Minister, 250 

BAY OF BISCAY 

Effect of combined bomber offensive on 

submarine bases, 420,440 

BAYTOWN 

Discussion of coming operations in the 

Mediterranean.487 

BELGIUM 

Situation in, 55 

BERNAL, PROFESSOR 

HABBAKUKS, 461 

BISMARCK ISLANDS 

Specificoperations for defeat of Japan, 67s 

446 

NOTE: mil. nunmh nln lo P.la in mino., d 

hi"hp. ".u.l. nh lo Po¶.. I. c. c. 5. P.F. 

499 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

BOLERO (See a&o SICKLE) 

Allocationof U. S.manned asssult craft for 

operation OVERLORD, 25 

Availability of British controlled dry Cargo 

tonnage, 372 

Effectof equipping French forces on, 206 

Estimated British troop lift for BOLEROSICKLE movement, 378 

Estimated U. S. troop movement capadty, 

383 

President's statement re stepping up time 

of arrival, U. 5. troops in England, 397 

Resolutionre balanced build-up for OVERLORD, a7 

U. 9. cargo shipping position, 374 

BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

See Combined Bomber Offensive 

BOUNDARIES 

Southeast Asia Command, 125, 259, 422 

BREAKWATER 

See Harbors 

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Memoranda re: 

Allocation of landing ships and craft - American production, 177 

Allocation of landing craft (operation 

OVERLORD -vehicle lift), 173 

Amphibians for OVERLORD, 313 

Employment of the PLOUGH force,201 

Equipping allies, liberated forces and 

friendly neutrals, 221 

Formation of U. S. assault forces for 

operation OVERLORD, 29 

Land airport facilitiesin the Azores, 11 

Movement of the QUEENS, 5 

Operations from India, 318 

Opera$ion OVERMRkutline plan, 91 

Policy towards Spain,277 

BRITISH JOINT STAFF PLANNERS 

Views on plan for defeat of Japan, 158 

BROOKE, SIR ALAN 

Statements in reference to: 

Azores, negotiations for the use of, 456 

Balkans, operationsin, 399 

Burma, to Dr. Soong re proposed operations in, 492 

Emergency operation to enter the continent (RANKIN),406,483 

Employment of British forces after defeat of Germany, 427 

European Theater, resume of present 

situation in,427 

India, operations from,427,482 

Italy, German strength in, 472 

Japan: 

Appreciation and plan for the defeat 

of, 467 

Deception plan for the war against, 

455 

Operations against, from India, 1943­

44,449,452 

Mediterranean, gamson troops for, 400 

Moving trained divisionsfrom the Mediterranean to England, 407 

Naval command - operation OVERLORD, 486 

Pacific and Far East, speciflcoperations 

in 1943-1944,447 

Priority between operations and lines of 

communication in Burma, 410 

Propaganda committee,495 

Russia, military considerations in relation to,472 

Sardinia and Corsica, re occupation,398, 

420 

Southeast Asia Command, 453,480 

Southern France,operations in, 398 

Strategic concept for the defeat of the 

Axis in Europe, 433 

Turkey, suppliesto,472 

500 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

BROWNRIGG, CAPTAIN T. M. 

Naval operation for AVALANCHE, 490 

BUBBLE BREAKWATER 

See Harbors 

BUILD-UP (See Q~SOBOLERO) 

8th Bomber Command, 131,343 

For operation OVERLORD, 101,397 

BULGARIA 

Situation in, 55,61 

BULLFROG (See also Akyab) 

Landing craft for, 354 

Naval force requirements for, 321 

Shipping requirements for, 311 

BURMA 

C.C.S. discussion on plan for defeat of 

Japan, 467 

C.P.S. appreciation of courses planned for 

defeat of Japan via Burma, 151, 166, 111 

China, plans for air route into, 61,251 

Citadel discussion re operations in, 409 

Effectof Indian floods on campaign in, 101, 

449,452 

Forces available and required for operations in, 336 

Japan : 

Situation and intentions of Japan, 39,65 

Specific operations for defeat of Japan, 

65,68,477 

Long range penetration group, 318, 402, 

427,449 

Operations from India, 256,318,402, 427, 

449 

Pipeline from India to China, 145, 481 

Requirements for, (general), 368 

Report to the President and Prime Minister on operations in, 230,256 

S~p~ly route from Northeast India, 305, 

476 

C 

C.C.S. DECISIONS 

See Decisions 

CALCUTTA 

Port capacity, 290 

CANADIAN FORCES 

See Dominion Forces 

CARGO SHIPPING 

See Shipping 

CAROLINE ISLANDS 

Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 

66,256,348,447 

CARTWHEEL 

Specific operations for the defeat of Japan. 

subsequent to operation, 61,447 

CENTRAL PACIFIC OCEAN 

See Pacific Ocean, central 

CHARTS AND TABLES 

Air squadrons available in Southeast Asia, 

February 1944,345 

Breakwaters: 

Bubble, 121 

Lilo, 122 

Comparison of U.S.,Axis build-up acceptable for operation OVERLORD, 94 

50 1 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

CHARTS AND TABLES (Continued) 

LANDING CRAFT 4ND ASSAULTSHIPPING: 

Allocations and availability of British 

assault shipping to January 1945 (facing page 356) 

Allocation of LCI (L)'s (as on completion of building and delivery), 360 

Allocation of LCM (3)'sas delivered, 364 

Allocation of LSTs (as on completion of 

building and delivery, 358 

Allocation of LCT (5) & (6)'s (as on 

completion of building and delivery), 

362 

Casualty rates for landing craft, 366 

Estimated availability of LCI (L)'s in 

Theaters, 361 

Estimated availability of LST's in Theaters, 359 

Estimated availability of LCT (5) & (6)'s 

in Theaters, 363 

SHIPPING: 

APA and AKA deliveries & estimated 

availability, 365 

Availability of British controlled dry 

cargo tonnage, 372 

British dry cargo shipping requirements, 

370 

Estimate of availability of British personnel shipping for movement of U.S. 

troops, 381 

Estimated U. S. troop movement capacity, 383 

U.S. cargo shipping position, 314 

CHIANG KAI-SHEK, GENERALISSIMO 

Message re QUADRANT decisions, 390 

CHIEF OF COMBINED OPERATIONS 

Reports on: 

Employment of the PLOUGH force, 201 

HABBAKUKS, 185 

Reques' for modification of policy on allocation of landing ships and craft -

American production, 177 

CHINA 

Air forces available in, 351 

Armed strength and capabilities of Chinese army, 41, 65, 448 

C.C.S. discussion with Dr. T. V. Soong re 

operations planned for the IndiaBurma-China theater, 492 

Citadel discussion re operations in IndiaBurma-China theater, 409 

General Stilwell's responsibility to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 127,260,453 

Japanese situation in, 39, 41, 43 

Message to Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek, 390 

Pipeline from India to China, 145,427,481 

Plans for air route into China, 67, 258, 319; 

448 

Requirements for, (general), 368 

Report to the President and Prime Minister re operations in, 256 

Specific operations for defeat of Japan, 65 

Supply routes from N. E. India, 305 

Thailand and French Indo China, re 

Southeast Asia Command, 411 

CIVIL AFFAIRS 

In Europe, 274 

COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

iSeealso POINTBLANK) 

Air forces available for, 343 

Citadel discussion re operation from North 

Italy, 396 

Effecton Axis oroduction. 52 

Sir Charles Portal's statement re operation, 418 

With relation to concept for defeat of the 

Axis in Europe, 73,68, 251 

COMBINED LIAISON COMMITTEE 

Coordination of American and British 

quasi - military agerxies in Southcast 

Asia Command, 127, 260 

502 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

COMBINED MILITARY 

TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE 

Future convoy arrangements in the Atlantic, 2 

COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS 

Memorandum re Appreciation and Plan 

for the defeat of Japan, 154,467 

Report on implementation of assumed basic undertakings and specific operations 

for the conduct of the war,1943-1944, 

326, 494 

COMMAND 

Air and Naval command - operation 

OVERLORD, 408, 438, 466, 486 

Air transport service in China, 260 

Eastern Command India to comprise area 

of L of C through Assam, 480 

Southeast Asia Command, 123, 229, 258, 

401,411,453,476,495 

CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

Specific operations for the, 330 

CONVOY 

Escort requirements in the Mediterranean, 

338 

Future arrangements in the Atlantic, 1, 

484, 491 

General requirements, 339 

HABBAKUKS for escort, 194 

CONVOY CYCLES 

Future convoy arrangements in the Atlantic, 1,484, 491 

Movement of the QUEENS, 5, 482 

CORSICA 

Fifth column xtivities ia, 223, 262, 409, 

420,463,466 

French troops in operation against, 398, 

409 

Specific operation re defeat of the Axis 

in Europc, 78 

COSSAC STAFF 

Operation OVERLORD, 91 

Operation RANKIN, 265 

CRITICAL ITEMS 

Availability of, 367 

Supply of, 328 

CROSS CHANNEL OPERATIONS 

See OVERLORD 

CULVERIN 

See Sumatra 

D 

DATES 

See Target Dates 

DECEPTION 

Deception Plan for the war against Japan, 

455 

DECISIONS (see also Resolutions) 

Agenda for QUADRANT conference, 416 

Anti-U-boat warfare, 455 

Artificial harbors, 437 

Azores, occupation of, 400 

Combined bomber offensive,bases for, 396 

Combined Liaison Committee, 260 

Conference, conduct of, 416 

Convoy arrangements in the Atlantic, 484, 

491 

Deception plan for war against Japan, 455 

Equipping Allies, liberated forces and 

friendly neutrals, 463, 466, 4882 

Floods in India, 429,452 

French forces, rearmament of, 483 

Garrison in the Mediterranean, 399 

503 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

DECISIONS (Continued) 

General Eisenhower, directive to, 486 

Guerrilla warfare in the Balkans, 399 

HABBAKUKS, 461 

India: 

Floods in, 429, 452 

Operationsfrom,482 

Supply route in N.E.India, 476 

Italian peace feelers,446 

Japan: 

Air plan for the defeat of, 477 

Appreciation and plan for the defeat of, 

409, 470 

Landing Ships and Craft: 

Allocation of, for operation OVERLORD, 

461 

Allocation of landing ships and craft - American production, 183,462 

Manning of, 183, 462 

Mediterranean operations, 486 

Operations: 

Against Japan from India, 1943-44, 450, 

452, 482 

ALACRITY, 400, 458 

From India, 482 

POINTBLANK, 396, 443 

RANKIN, 483 

Specific operations in the Pacific and 

Far East, 1943-44, 449, 476 

OVERLORD: 

Air and naval command, 408,438,466 

Allocation of landing craft, 461 

Amphibians for, 482 

Outline plan, 438 

Pipeline from India to China, 481 

PLOUGH force,463 

Propaganda committee, 495 

POINTBLANK, 396, 443 

QUEENS, movement of, 482 

Rehabilitation of occupied and liberated 

territories, 484 

Report to the President and Prime Minister, 406, 416, 460, 476, 481, 486 

Resources, relation of plana to,494 

Rome, an open city, 433 

Russia, message to Marshal Stalin. 495 

Southeast Asia Command, 412, 454, 476 

Spain, military considerations in relation 

to, 413,471 

Strategic concept: 

For the defeat of the Axis in Europe, 437, 

440,446 

For the pmsecution of the war, 416 

Subversive activities in Sardinia and Corsica,464,466 

Turkey: 

Military considerations in relation to, 

471 

supplies to,413 

TIDALWAVE air force, 443,7 

DENMARK 

Situation in, 55 

DIRECTIVES 

To General Eisenhower, 321 

To Supreme Commander, Southeast Asis 

re supply route into China frum Burma, 

309,409 

DOMINION FORCES 

Employment of, 234 

Replacement of British divisions in the 

Medite~ane~tnwith a Canadian Corps, 

407 

DOUGLAS, LEWIS W. 

Statement on dry cargo shipping position, 

316 

DUKWr 

See Amphibious Craft 

504 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

E 

EASTERN COMMAND INDIA 

To comprise area of L of C through Assam, 

480 

EDEN, ANTHONY 

Occupation of the Azores, 401 

EIGHTH BOMBER COMMAND 

Build-up in U.K.,131,421 

EISENHOWER, GENERAL D. D. 

Directive to, 321,486 

Message re further use of TIDALWAVE 

air force, I 

Recommendation for equipment of remaining hnch troops, 206 

ENEMY SITUATION 

See Axis 

EQUIPMENT 

Equipping allies, liberated forces and 

friendly neutrals, 205,466, 482 

For French forces, 206,262,333,369 

For Turkey, 207,283,413 

ESCORT 

See Convoy 

EUROPEAN AREA (GENERAL) 

Attitude of neutrals, 56 

Axis defenses on the Western Front, 52 

Emergency return to the continent 

(RANKIN) 253,265,406,483 

Estimate of the enemy situation 1943-44, 

45,417 

Operations in, 330 

Patriot forces, 82 

Specific operations for defeat of the Axis 

in Europe, 77 

Strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis 

in Europe, 87, 226,251,218,433,440,446 

F 

FAR EAST AREA (GENERAL) 

Citadel, discussion re operations in the 

India-Burma-China theater, 409 

Estimate of the enemy situation, 1943­

1944,35 

Forces required and available for operations in, 338 

Report to the President and Prime Minister on operations in, 230,235,255 

Specific operations in the Pacific and Far 

East, 1943-44,63,331,446, 476 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMlSlON 

Coordination of American and British 

agencies in Southeast Asia Command, 

127,260 

FINLAND 

Situation in, 55,61 

FIRST SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE 

See PLOUGH Force 

FLOODS 

Effect of Indian floods on Burma campaign, 107,449,452 

FORCES, AXIS 

Available for defense of Mediterranean 

area, 51 

Enemy resistance acceptable for successful OVERLORD, 92,101,105,396 

Estimate of armed force strength in 

Europe, 41 

Estimate of Japanese armed force strength, 

31 

German forces in Italy, 471 

German forces in Norway, 52 

Strength of German Fighter Force, 130, 

132 

505 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

FORCES UNITED NATIONS 

(See also Air Forces, U.N.) 

(See also Naval Forces, U.N.) 

Available and required: 

For operations in India and Burma, 336 

For operations in the Pacific, 337 

Available for: 

Garrison requirements and security of 

lines of communication in the Mediterranean, 399 

Operations in Northern Italy, 83 

Operation OVERLORD, 101,325 

Operations in Southern France, 79,83 

Available in the U.K., 1 May 1944,335 

Availibility of,to meet the requirements of 

critical strategy, 327 

Chinese armed strength and capabilities, 

41,448 

Deployment of ground forces in the Mediterranean after the conquest of Italy, 83 

Employment of Dominion Forces, 234 

Equipping allies, liberated forces and 

friendly neutrals, 205,453,466 

Estimated available, Nov. 1943,for emergency return to the continent, 267 

For occupation of Europe (operation RANKIN),271 

Formation of US. assault forces for operation OVERLORD, 25 

Land forces available in the Mediterranean 1 November 1943,334 

Orientation of forces from the European 

theater to the Pacific and Far East, 156, 

234 

PLOUGH force, 201,463 

Provision of naval forces for specific operations, 338 

FOSTER, AIR COMMODORE R. 

Air operation for AVALANCHE, 490 

FRANCE (See also OVERLORD) 

Operation RANKIN, 265 

Sir Charles Portal's statement re air bases 

in France, 421 

Situation in, 55 

FRANCE, SOUTHERN 

Citadel discussion of operations in, 398,408 

Report to the President and Prime Minister on operations in, 228,253 

Specific operations re defeat of Axis in 

Europe, 74,88 

U.N. forces available for operations in, 79, 

83 

FRENCH FORCES 

Equipping of, 206,210,262,333,369 

For operations in: 

Corsica and Sardinia, 398 

Southern France, 75 

FRENCH INDO CHINA 

Citadel discussion re area included in 

Southeast Asia Command, 411 

G 

GARRISON REQUIREMENTS 

Citadel discussion, 399 

In the Mediterranean, 76, 83,89,229,253, 

334 

GERMANY 

Capabilities and probable intentions, 57, 

417 

Enemy resistance acceptable for successful OVERLORD, 92,101,105,396 

Estimated air force strength, 48 

Estimated naval strength, 48 

Forces in Italy, 471 

Situation in the European Theater, 417 

Strength of fighter air force, 130,132 

Wolfram from the Iberian Peninsula, 279 

506 
u. s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

GlL0ERT ISLANDS 

~ir ~~ form for ooerations wainst. ­ 347

Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 

66, 255,447 

GLOBAL STRATEGY 

(SeeStrategic Concept) 

GREAT BRITAIN 

(See United Kingdom) 

GREECE 

Situation in, 55 

Use of trained Balkan tmops for operations in own countries, 399 

GROUND FORCES 

(See FORCES, United Nations) 

GUAM 

Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 

67, 256, 447 

GUERRILLA FORCES 

(See Subversive activities) 

H 

HABBAKUKS 

C.C.S. resolutions re development of, 199, 

234,460 

Report of the Chief of Combined Operations, 185 

HARBORS 

Artificial harborsfor combined operations, 

117, 437, 473 

HOLLAND 

(See Netherlands) 

HONG KONG 

Seaportfor development of airfieldson the 

mainland of China,163,290 

HOPKINS, HARRY L 

Operation: 

OVERLORD, 396 

POINTBLANK, 396 

Southeast Asia wmmsnd, 412 

HUNGARY 

Situation in, 54,61 

I 

IBERIAN PENINSULA 

(See also Spain,Portugal) 

Axis capabilities in, 72 

Supply of wolfm to Germany, 280 

IMPHAL 

Operation, 318 

IMPLEMENTATION 

Of BIjgumed W C un- ' andspecific operations for the conduct of the 

war,1943-1944, 325, 494 

INDIA 

C.C.S. discussion on plan for defeat of 

Japan, 467 

Citadel discussion re operations in IndiaBurma-Cbina Theater, 409 

Combined Liaison Committee, 121, 260 

507 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISK MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

INDIA (Continued) 

Coordination of British and American 

agencies in India, 127, 260 

Eastern Command India to comprise area 

of L of C through Assam, 480 

Effect of floods on Burma Campaign, 107 

Forces required and available for operations in, 3s 

Operations from India, 317, 448,452, 481 

Pipeline from India to China 145, 426, 481 

Requirements for, (general), 368 

Report to the President and Prime Minister re operations in, 256 

Southeast Asia Command, 123, 258, 401, 

453, 476, 495 

Supply routes in Northeast India, 263, 305, 

476 

INDIAN OCEAN 

Naval reinforcements for, 420 

ITALY 

C.C.S. discussion of forthcoming operations in Italy, 487 

Citadel discussion re operations in North 

Italy, 398, 408 

Estimated air force strength, 48 

Estimated naval strength, 48 

General Arnold's statement re value of air 

bases in North Italy, 421, 435 

German defenses in Italy, 417,471 

Italian peace feelers, 141, 446, 452 

PLOUGH force, employment of, 201 

Relief and rehabilitation in, 304 

Report to the President and Prime Minister on operations in, 227, 252 

Rome, an open city, 116, 432 

Situation in, 54, 61 

TIDALWAVE air force, future employment of, 9 

With relation to strategic concept for defeat of the Axis in Europe, 74, 75, 433 

J 

JAPAN 

Air plan for the defeat of, 287, 477 

Appreciation and plan for the defeat of, 153, 

467 

Report to the President and Prime Minister 

on, appreciation and plan, 236 

Basic factors in the Japanese situation, 36, 

63 

C.C.S. discussion of the war agair,st Japan, 

424,467 

Employment of HABBAKUKS in defeat of, 

190, 234 

Estimate of armed force strength, 37, 42 

Estimate of shipping position, 38, 43 

Operations against Japan from India, 1943­

1944,317,449,452 

Prisoners, Japanese treatment of, 481 

Report to the President and Prime Minister 

re long-term strategy in the war against 

Japan, 254,401 

Situation and intentions in the Pacific 

Area, 39, 43, 64 

Specific operations in the Pacific and Far 

East, 1943-44, for defeat of, 63, 255, 446 

Strategic reserves, 40 

JUGGLER 

Employment of TIDALWAVE air force, 7 

JUPITER 

Report to the President and Prime Minister 

re operation, 252, 406 

K 

KAUFFMAN-MANSFIELD COMMITTEE 

See Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board 

508 
U. S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

KING, ADMIRAL E. J. 

Statements in reference to: 

Akyab in relation to attach against the 

Japanese lines of communications,401 

Anti-11-Boat warfare, 422, 456 

Appreciation and plan for the defeat of 

Japan, 468 

Azores, arrangements for the ocupation 

of, 406 

Convoy arrangements in the Atlantic, 

491 

German forces on the Eastern front, 

release of, 473 

German intentions in Spain, 421 

HABBAKUKS, 460 

Japanese shipping and port facilities as 

initial main effort of the United Nations, 470 

Landing Craft: 

Availability of, 397 

For training purposes, 462 

Increased production of, 452, 456 

Line of communications to the Mediterranean, 421 

Pacific forces for operation OVERLORD 

vs. an island thrust in the Pacific, 448 

Ploesti, follow-upattacks, 442 

Present operations in the war against 

Japan, 424 

Southeast Asia Command, re press release, 412 

Strattgic concept for the defeat of the 

Axis in Europe, 435 

KRA ISTHMUS 

C.C.S. discussion on plan for defeat of 

Japan, 468 

Planning for future operations against, 257 

KURILES 

Specificoperations for the defeat of Japan, 

68,256,424,426,446 

L 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT 

(See also Charts and Tables) 

Admiral King's statement re increase in 

production of, 452,456 

Allocation of landing craft (vehicle lift) 

for operation OVERLORD, 173,183,461 

Allocation of landing ships and craftAmerican production, 178, 181,462 

Allocation of U.S. manned assualt craft for 

operation OVERLORD, 25 462 

Availability of, for approved operations, 

328, 352,397 

Estimated casualty rate of, 366 

Movement to U. K. for operation OVERLORD, 173,183 

LEAHY, ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. 

Statements in reference to: 

Appreciation and plan for the defeat of 

Japan, 467 

Area included in Southeast Asia Command, 411 

Availability of resources for defeat of 

Japan after collapse of Germany, 425 

Azores, facilitiesin, 457 

Chinese forces, cooperation of, 493 

Deception plan for the war akainst 

Japan, 455 

Owration RANKIN. 483 I ~~ 

U. S. resources for operation POINTBLANK, 442 

LEATHERS, LORD 

Statement on dry cargo shipping position, 376 

LED0 

Operation, 318 

LEIGH-MALLORY, SIR TRAFFORD 

Air Commander, operation OVERLORD, 

466 

505 
u.s. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

LIBERATED AREAS 

Equipping allies, liberated forces and 

friendly neutrals, 205 

Forces required for occupation of, 271 

Rehabilitation of occupied and liberated 

territories, 301,484 

United Nations policy for operations in, 82 

LlLO BREAKWATER 

See Harbors 

LINES OF COMMUNICATION 

Agsam L of C, planned capacity of, 306 

Australia to Cevlon. ~. 426

Burma, C.C.S. resolution re operations in 

256. 311 

China, priority for air transport service to, 

113 

Directive to Supreme Commander Southeast Agia re supply routeinto China from 

Burma, 309,409 

India, operations from, 317,481 

Mediterranean, in the, 16,89,229,253,399, 

421 

Northeast India, proposed supply routes 

from,305 

Sir Dudley Pound's statement re North Atlantic convoy route,420 

LllTLE, SIR CHARLES 

Naval Commander,operation OVERLORD, 

466 

LOGISTICS 

Implementation of basic undertakings and 

specilkoperations for the conduct of the 

war,1943-1944, 325 

Logistic organization to improve mobility 

of anti-submarine squadrons, 11 

Logisticalsummary for air plan for the defeat of Japan, 294 

LONG RANGE PENETRATION GROUP 

See Burma 

LOSS RATE 

See Shipping 

LOW COUNTRIES 

(See &o Netherlands, Belgium, 

Denmark) 

Equipping of forces in the, 209, 214 

Situation in. 55 

M 

MALACCA STRAITS 

Planning for future operations through, 

251 

MALAYA 

Planning for future operations through 

257 

MANCHURIA 

Japanese situation in, 39,40,43,64 

MANSFIELD, REAR ADMIRAL J. M. 

See Allied Anti-Submarine Board 

MAPS 

Air plan for the defeat of Japan, facing 

page 300 

OVERLORD 

Ten situation maps, facing page 108 

Pipeline from India to China. 150 

MARIANAS ISLANDS 

Speciflcoperations for the defeat of Japan, 

65, 256 

510 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

MARSHALL, GENERAL G. C. 

Statements in reference to: 

Appreciation and plan for the defeat of 

Japan, 467 

China, importance of bases in, for operations against Japan, 425 

Chinese troop, value of,448 

Dr.Swng, re maintaining communications with China, 493 

Fifth column agents in Sardinia and 

Corsica, 420, 463 

Japanese treatment of prisoners, 481 

Landing craft, allocation. for specifically agreed operations, 462 

New Guinea, operations in, 448 

OVERLORD, 397, 407 

In relation to the defeat of the Axis 

in Europe, 436 

PLOUGH force, employment of, 463 

Propaganda committee, 495 

Russia,military considerationsin relation to,472 

Southeast Asia Command,454 

Turkey, supplies to, 471 

MARSHALL ISLANDS 

Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 

66, 255, 447 

MEDITERRANEAN AREA 

Air forcesavailablefor operationsfrom,344 

Axis forcesavailable for defense of, 51 

C.C.S.discussion with Generals Whiteley 

and Rooks, re operations in, 487 

Deploymentof ground forcesafter the conquest of Italy, 83 

Directive to General Eisenhower, 321, 486 

Escort requirements in, 338 

Estimate of the enemy situation, 1943-1944, 

45 

Garrison requirements in, 76, 83, 89, 229, 

253, 334, 399 

Movement of seven divisions for operation 

OVERLORD, 16,407,437 

Operations: 

AVALANCHE, 487 

BAYTOWN, 487 

Corsica, 223, 252 

Italy, 252,398,408 

Sardinia, 223, 252 

So. France, 253 

Report to the President and Prime Minister 

on garrison requirements for, 229, 253, 

399 

Requirements for, (general) 368 

Resolution re resomes for operations in, 

87, 331 

MORGAN, Ll. GEN. F. E. 

Covering note, transmitting outline plan 

for operation OVERLORD, 9s 

MOULMEIN AREA 

Planning for futureoperationsagainst, 251 

MOUNTBATTEN, LORD LOUIS 

Appointment as Supreme Commander, 

Southeast Asia Command, 495 

Statements in reference to: 

Employment of the PLOUGH force, 463 

HABBAKUKS, 460 

Landing ship and craft -American 

production, 462 

Synthetic harbor experts, 473 

MUNITIONS PRODUCTION 

See Production 

N 

NAVAL FORCES, AXIS 

Estimate of Japanese naval strength, 37 

Estimate of submarine and surface vessels 

in European Theater, 48 

511 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

NAVAL FORCES, UNITED NATIONS 

Naval reinforcements for Indian Ocean,

420 

Provisionof, for speeiflcoperations,338 

NETHERLANDS 

Situation in, 55 

Training potential omcers in the U.S.,399 

NEW GUINEA 

C.C.S. discussion on plan for defeat of 

Japan, 467 

Speciflc operations for the defeat of Japan, 

61,246,256, 346,447 

NEW GUINEA-BISMARCKSADMIRALTY ISLANDS 

Omrations in. subseauent to current operations, 256 

NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN 

See Pacific Ocean, North 

NORWAY 

Axis forces in, 52 

Base for coastal command aircraft and 

naval forces in operation RANKIN, 269 

Equipping of Norwegian forces, 209,214 

JUPITER, C.C.S. resolution re operation, 

252 

PLOUGH force, employment of, 202 

Situation in, 55 

United Nations policy in event of an Axh 

withdrawal,82 

0 

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 

Forces required for, 211 

Rehabilitation of occupied and liberated 

territories, 301,484 

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION 

Coordination of American and British 

agencies in Southeast Asia Command, 

121,260 

OFFICE STRATEGIC SERVICES 

Coordination of American and British 

agencies in Southeast Asia Command, 

121, 260 

Fifth column activities in Sardinia and 

Corsica, 223,463,466 

OIL 

See Petroleum 

OPERATIONS (See also Target Dates) 

Air operations, 88, 228, 253 

ALACRITY (See Azores) 

AVALANCHE, 487 

BACKBONE, 489 

BAYTOWN,487 

BULLFROG, 327 

CARTWHEEL,61 

From ; 

India, 311,481 

In ; 

Balkans, 253 

China, 332 

Italy, 88,221, 252, 331, 398, 408, 434 

Liberated areas,82 

Mediterranean, 331, 344 

Pacific, 66,332 

Southeast Asia, 331 

Southern France,18,88,228,253,398,408 

JUPITER, 252, 406, 

OVERLORD 

See OVERLORD 

POINTBLANK, 74, 87, 129, 221, 251, 330, 

440 

RANKIN, 253, 265,483 

NOTE: hlir num.nb Rhr D PI" In minw d n..lini. 

Phi" hue nun."b*Dp,ain C.C. 5. P.m. 

512 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

OPERATIONS (Continued) 

Report to the President and Prime Minister on operations in the Pacific and 

Far East, 230, 235 

Sea operations, 88, 228. 249 

Specific operations in the Pacific and Far 

East. 1943-44, 63, 235, 255, 446, 477 

Specific operations for the conduct of the 

war, 1943-1944, 330 

OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

See Strategic Concept 

OVERLORD 

Air forces available for, 342 

Amphibians for, 313 

Enemy resistance acceptable for successful 

operation, 92,101,105,396,406 

Forces available for, 101 

Formation of U. S. assault forces, 25 

Landing craft for, 354 

Landing craft, allocation of (vehicle lift) 

for operation, 113, 183,461 

Movement of 7 divisions from the Mediterranean, 16,407,437 

Naval and air commanders for, 438,466,408 

Operation OVERLORD -outline plan, 91. 

437 

Report to the President and Prime Minister, 225, 252. 436 

Requirements for, (general), 368 

Shipping requirements for, 311 

Use of light passenger ships to increase 

troop lift, 408 

With relation to strategic concept for defeat of the Axis in Europe, 13,81,433 

P 

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (GENERAL) 

Air forces required and available for operations in, 346 

Citadel discussion re operations in, 401 

Citadel discussion re operations in the India-Burma-China Theater, 409 

Estimate of the enemy situation, 1943-44, 

35 

Landing craft for operations in, 354 

Naval forces required and available for 

operations in, 338 

Report to the President and Prime Minister 

on operations in, 230,235,255 

Specific operations in the Pacific and Far 

East 1943-44,63,331,446,476 

PACIFIC OCEAN, CENTRAL 

Japanese situation and intentions in, 40, 

44, 65 

PACIFIC OCEAN, NORTH 

Japanese situation and intentions in, 39, 

43, 64 

PACIFIC OCEAN SOUTHWEST 

Japanese situation and intentions in, 39, 

44,65 

PALAU ISLANDS 

Specific operations for the defeat of Jar m, 

61, 256, 349,447 

PARAMUSHIRU 

Specific operations for the defeat of Japan 

68, 256,424,447 

PATRIOT FORCES IN EUROPE 

United Nations policy toward, 82 

PEACE AND ARMISTICE 

Italian peace feelers, 141, 446,452 

Military considerations in relation to Russia, 472 

513 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

PERSONNEL (See also TTOOPLift) 

Available for agreed operations. 340 

For garrison requirements in the Mediterranean, 76, 83, 89, 229, 253, 334, 399 

Re movement of seven divisions from the 

Mediterranean for operation OVERLORD, 76, 407, 437 

Re request for US.crews to man British 

Assault craft for operation OVERLORD, 

25. 183. 461 

PETROLEUM 

For China, 145, 310, 386, 427, 481 

Petroleum situation, 385 

United Nations oil position thru 1944, 329 

PIERS 

See Harbors 

PIPELINE 

From India to China, 145, 386. 427, 481 

PLANS 

See Operations 

PLOESTI 

General Arnold's statement re results of 

raid on, 442 

Sir Charles Portal's remarks re bombing 

of, 418 

TIUALWAVE air force. employment of,7, 

442 

PLOUGH FORCES 

Employment of, 201, 262, 463 

POINTBLANK (See also Combined Bomber 

Offensive) 

Air forces available for, 342 

C C.S. dizcussion of progress report on 

operation. 440 

Chief of British Air Staff report on operation, 129 

Citadel discussion re operation from North 

Italy, 396 

Report to the President and Prime Minister, 227, 251 

Sir Charles Portal's remarks re effectiveness of operation, 418 

TIDALWAVE air force, future employment of 7.442 

With relation to the strategic concept for 

defeat of the Axis in Europe, 74, 75, 87 

POLAND 

Equipping Polish forces, 207, 213 

Situation in, 55 

PONAPE ISLANDS 

Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 

66.255, 348,447 

PORT CAPACITY 

Artificial harbors for combined operations, 

117 

For operation OVERLORD, 102 

Port of Calcutta, 290 

PORTAL, SIR CHARLES 

Statements in reference to: 

Air command -operation OVERLOfiD, 

438 

"Air war'' in the European Theater, 418 

Apprcciation and plan for the defeat of 

Japan, 468 

Azores, facilities in, 457 

Combined bomber offensive progress report, 396, 440 

France, use of air bases in, 421, 

HABBAKUKS, 460 

New Guinea. operations in, 448 

North Italy, use ol air bases in, 421, 435 

Pacific, air bases in, 428 

Russia's air power, 472 

Sxtheast Asia Command, 454 

Southern France, air cover for operations in, 399 

514 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

PORTUGAL (See dso Iberian Peninsula) 

Attitude toward United Nations, 51 

Land airport facilities in the Azores, It, 

229,251, 400,406,456 

PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS 

See Azores 

POUND, SIR DUDLEY 

Statements in reference to: 

Anti-Submarine Survey Board report, 

455 

Convoy arrangements in the Atlantic, 

491 

Enemy U-boat operations, 456 

Naval command - operation OVERLORD, 408,438 

"War at sea" in the European Theater, 

419 

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

QUADRANT conferencereport to, 226,249, 

460,476,481,486 

Statements in reference to: 

Azores, facilities in, 400 

Confiscation along the China supply 

lines, 410 

Conversion of dry cargo ships into troop 

carriers, 397 

French troops for use against Corsica, 

398 

Guerrilla operations: 

In the Balkans, 399 

In South Central France, 409 

Long term plan for the defeat of Japan, 

402 

Netherlands Officers, training of, 399 

Northern Italy, bases in, 396 

OVERLORD, build-up for operation, 397 

Rangoon in relation to the Japanese line 

of communication,411 

Southeast Asia Command relationship, 

404 

Use of light American passenger type 

vessels for cross-Channel operation, 

40.3 

PRESS RELEASE 

Re QUADRANT eonference, 412 

PRICELESS 

Shipping requirements for, 370 

PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN 

QUADRANT conferencereport to, 226,249, 

460,476,481,486 

Statements in reference to: 

"Air nourished guerrilla warfare," 399 

Azores, facilities in, 400 

Capture of: 

Akyab, 411 

Ramre, 411 

Singapore, 402 

Garrison for the Mediterranean, 400 

India-Burma-China Theater, operations 

in, 409 

Japan: 

Long term plan for the defeat of 

Japan, 401 

War against, 409 

Moving trained divisions from the Mediterranean to England, 407 

Naval command - operation OVERLORD, 408 

North Italy, operations in, 398, 408 

OVERLORD, operation, 396,406 

Southeast Asia Command, press release, 

412 

Southern France, operations in, 398,408 

Spain, Military considerations in relation to,413 

Turkey, Supplies to, 413 

PRISONERS 

Japanese treatment of, 481 

515 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

PRODUCTION 

Estimate of German munitions p~uauction, 49 

Estimated Japanese munitionsproduction, 

during 1944,42 

Of AmphibiousDUKW’s, 314 

U.9. production of landing craft, 183,452, 

456,462 

PROPAGANDA 

U..%-Britishcoordinating committee, 137, 

495 

PROSECUTION OF ME WAR 

See Strategicconcept 

Q 

QUADRANT CONFERENCE 

Agenda, 31,416 

Conduct of, 416 

Directive to General Eisenhower, 321 

QUEENS 

Movement of, 5,482 

R 

RABAUL 

C.C.S.resolution re operations against, 256 

RADAR 

See Critical Items 

RAMREE ISLAND (see ako Burma) 

C.C.S. discussion on plan for defeat of 

Japan, 467 

Prime Minister’s remark re operation for 

the capture of, 421 

Study of operation against, 256 

RANGOON 

C.C.S. discussion on defeat of Japan, 467 

Citadel discussion re operations againat, 

403,41 2 

RANKIN 

Operation RANKIN, 253, 265,406,483 

RATE OF BUILD-UP 

See BOLERO 

REHABILITATION 

Of occupied and liberated territories, 301, 

484 

RESISTANCE GROUPS 

Policy toward patriot forces in Europe, 82 

U.N.Air forcesin support of, 350 

RESOLUTIONS (see al~ohisions) 

Basic undertakings in support of over-all 

strategic concept, 250 

Paciflc and Far East, operations in, 235 

Southeast Asia Command, 123 

Strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis 

in Europe, 87 

RESOURCES 

Availability of resources to meet the requirements of critical strategy, 326, 493 

Relation of available resources to the 

agreed operations, 263 

RIDDELL-WEBSER, SIR THOMAS 

Study on supply mutes in Northeast India, 

305 

ROME 

An open city, 115, 432 

516 
u.s. SECBET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

ROOKS, MAJ. GEN. L. W. 

Statement in reference to operationsin the 

Mediterranean, 489 

RUMANIA 

Situationin, 54,61 

RUSSIA 

Axis capabilities in, 47 

Effectof operation POINTBLANK on German operations in Russia, 131 

Enemy situation in, 417 

Japan, relations with, 36 

Message to Marshal Stalin, 388,495 

Military considerationsin relation to,472 

North Atlantic convoy mute, 419 

Situation in occupied Russia, 56 

Supplies for, 332 

With relation to United Nations Strategic 

concept for defeat of the Axis in Europe. 

74 

S 

SARDINIA 

Fifth column activities in, 223, 262, 409, 

463,466 

finch troops in operation against, 398 

Specific operation re defeat of the Axis in 

Europe, 78 

SATELLITE COUNTRIES 

See Axis 

SEA OPERATIONS 

Convoy arrangements in the Atlantic, 1, 

484, 491 

Enemy U-boat operations,455 

Report to the President and Prime Minister on, 228 

Resolutionsof the C.C.S. re, 88 

Resume of the “war at sea” in the Eumpean Theater, 419 

SHIPBUILDING 

Anti-Submarine Craft, 456 

Conversion of excess dry cargo ships into 

troop carriers, 397 

Development of HABBAKUXS, 185, 199 

SHIPPING (See also Charts and Tables) 

Availability of, for agreed operations, 328 

British dry cargo shipping requirementr, 

370 

Convoy arrangements in the Atlantic, 1 

Estimate of Japanese shipping position. 38, 

43 

Lord Leathersand Mr.L. W. Douglas’ comments on, 376 

Personnel shipping position, 371 

Results of Axis war against United Nations 

shipping, 53, 397 

U. S.cargo shipping position, 374 

SICKLE 

Effect of equipping French Forces on, 206 

Eighth Bomber Command,build-upof,131, 

421 

Estimated British troop lift for BOLEROSICKLE movement, 381 

SINGAPORE 

C.C.S. dixussion on plan for defeat of 

Japan, 467 

C.P.S. appreciation of courses planned for 

the defeat of Japan -Burma vs. Singapore, 157,166 

Planning for future operations against,257 

Prime Minister’s statement re operation 

against Singapore,402,410 

SOMERVELL, LT. GEN. B. B. 

Statements in reference to: 

India,operations from, 482 

Pipeline into China, 427,481,492 

Study on supply routes in Northeast India, 

305 

511 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

SOONG, DR. T. V. 

Discussion with the C.C.S. re operations 

planned for the India - Burma ~ China 

Theater, 413, 492 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

(See also Asia, Southeast) 

Southeast Asia Command, 123,229,258,404, 

411,453,476,495 

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC OCEAN 

See Pacific Ocean, Southwest 

SPAIN (See also Iberian Peninsula) 

British new of enemy capabilities in, 418 

Military considerations in relation to, 261 

Situation in, 56 

United Nations policy toward, 81, 277,413, 

471 

SPARES, AIRCRAFT 

(See also Aircraft, U.N.) 

Production of, 20 

Transport of, 21 

STALIN, MARSHAL JOSEPH 

Message re QUADRANT decisions, 388,495 

STILWELL, LT. GEN. J. W. 

Command in Southeast Asia, 125,258,453 

STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

Basic undertakings in support of, 250, 330 

Confirmation of sections I,I1and 111, TRIDENT report to the President and Prime 

Minister, 226, 406, 416 

Execution of, 251 

For the defeat of the Axis in Europe, 87, 

226,278,433,440,446 

For the defeat of Japan, 64, 233 

For the prosecution of the war, 249 

SUBMARINE WARFARE 

(See also Anti-U-Boat Warfare) 

Admiral King's remark re line of communications thru the Mediterranean, 421 

Logistic organization to improve mobility 

of anti-submarine squardons, 17 

Sir Dudley Pound's remarks re situation in 

European Theater, 419 

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES 

Coordination of American and British 

agencies in Southeast Asia Command, 

127, 230, 260 

Corsica, 5th column activities in, 466 

Policy toward patriot forces in Europe, 82 

Propaganda committee, 137, 495 

Resistance groups in Europe, aircraft 

available for support of, 350 

Sardinia, fifth column activities in, 223, 

262, 420, 463, 466 

SUMATRA 

C.C.S. discussion on plan for defeat of 

Japan, 467 

Citadel discussion re operations against, 

402 

Planning for future operations in, 257,428 

SUPPLY ROUTES (See also Air Routes) 

Directive to Supreme Commander Southeast Asia re supply route into China from 

Burma, 309, 409 

Effect of Indian floods on operations in 

Burma, 113 

In Northeast India, 263, 305, 476 

Pipeline from India to China, 145 

To Russia via North Atlantic, 419 

SWEDEN 

Situation in, 56 

SWITZERLAND 

Situation in, 56 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

SYNTHETIC HARBORS 

See Harbors 

T 

TABLES 

See Charts and Tables 

TARGET DATES 

For operation OVERLORD 74 

For specific operations for defeat of Japan, 

69 

TENTH AIR FORCE 

Operation control, 126, 260, 454 

THAILAND 

Citadel discussion re area included in 

Southeast Asia command, 411 

TIDALWAVE 

See Ploesti 

TRIDENT CONFERENCE 

QUADRANT conference confirmation of 

sections I, I1and 111,TRIDENT report to 

President and Prime Minister, 226, 416 

TROOP LIFT 

Availability of personnel shipping for 

agreed operations, 328 

Conversion of excess dry cargo ships into 

troop carriers, 397 

Convoy arrangements in the Atlantic, 1 

For pipeline project from India to China, 

148 

Movement of the QUEENS, 5, 482 

Personnel shipping position, 317 

U. S. manned assault troop lift allocated 

to OVERLORD, 21 

Use of light passenger vessels for operation 

OVERLORD, 408 

TROOPS 

See Forces, U.N. 

TRUK AREA 

Specfic operations for the defeat of Japan, 

65, 255 

TURKEY 

Equipping Turkish forces,207,262,283,413 

Military considerations in relation to, 261, 

471 

Situation in, 51 

U?ited Nations policy toward, 81 

U 

U-BOAT WARFARE 

See Anti-U-Boat Warfare 

U.S. S. R. 

See Russia 

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Memorande re: 

Air plan for the defeat of Japan, 281 

Allocation of landing ships and craft - American production, 181 

Appreciation and plan for the defeat of 

Japan, 171 

Equipping allies, liberated forces and 

friendly neutrals, 211 

Formation by U. S. assault forces for 

operation OVERLORD, 25 

Land airport facilities in the Azores, 15 

Logistic organization to improve mobility of anti-submarine squadrons, 11 

Pipeline from India to China, 145 

Sardinia, fifth column activities, 223 

Specific operations in the Pacific and Far 

East, 1943-44, 63 

51.9 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF (Continued) 

Study on estimate of the enemy situation. 1943-194.4 European-Mediterranean Area, 45 

Study on estimate of the enemy situation, 1943-1944, PacMc-Far East Area. 

35 

Strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis 

in Eumpe, 71,85 

U. S. JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE 

COMMITTEE 

Report on Pipeline from India to China,145 

U. S. JOINT STAFF PLANNERS 

Report on equippingallies,liberated forces 

and friendly neutrals, 205 

Views on plan for defeat of Japan, 159 

U-BOAT WARFARE 

See Anti-U-Boat Warfare 

UNITED KINGDOM 

Forces available in, on 1 May 1944,334 

Movement of seven divisionsfrom Meditermean to the U.K., 76,407,437 

Shipping requirements, 370 

UNITED NATIONS STRATEGY 

(See also Strategic Concept) 

In the European Theater. 72 

W 

WAR, PROSECUTION OF 

See Strategic Concept 

WAR PRODUCTION 

See Production 

WHITELEY, MAJ. GEN. J. F. M. 

Discusion re Mediterranean operations, 

487 

WINGATE, BRIGADIER 0.C. 

Plan for long-range penetration grodps in 

Burma, 402,42Y, 449 

Y 

YUGOSLAVIA 

Situation In, 55 

Useof trained Balkan troops for operations 

in own countries, 399 

YUNNAN 

Japanese situation and intentions in, 39, 

43,65 

520