THE JOINT STAFF 

 

The Sextant, Eureka, and Second Cairo Conferences: November–December 1943 

The Sextant Conference (also known as the Cairo Conference) was held in Cairo, Egypt, from 

November 22 to 26, 1943. The three main participants were President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 

British prime minister Winston S. Churchill, and Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. The inclusion 

of the Chinese president confirmed China’s status as one of the Big Four nations (along with 

Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union). In addition to attending meetings with the three 

Allied leaders, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) also convened separately to deliberate the 

details of the military operations. The primary topic under consideration for the Allies was 

planning for the defeat of Japan. Based on discussions at Sextant, Roosevelt, Churchill, and 

Chiang jointly issued the Cairo Declaration on December 1, which set the stage for postwar Asia. 

According to this proclamation, after its unconditional surrender, Japan would be stripped “of all 

the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World 

War”; all Chinese territory would be returned to China; and Korea would become “free and 

independent.” 

 Sandwiched between the two conferences in Cairo was perhaps the most important Allied 

meeting to date. The Eureka Conference (also called the Tehran Conference) met from 

November 28 to December 1, 1943, in Tehran, Iran. This conference marked the first time that 

the Big Three—Roosevelt, Churchill, and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin—had assembled. The 

main focus of their discussions was the Allied invasion of northern France (Operation Overlord) 

to open a second front in Europe in the late spring or early summer of 1944. Stalin, who had 

been pressing Churchill and Roosevelt for a second front since 1941, agreed to launch a 

simultaneous offensive against Germany on the Eastern Front to divert Axis troops from the 
Allied campaign. Other topics at Eureka included the possibility of Turkish entry into the war, 

intensifying support for partisans in Yugoslavia, and Soviet intervention in the war against Japan 

once Germany had surrendered. 

The Second Cairo Conference, also held in Egypt, lasted from December 2 to 7. In 

addition the CCS, Churchill and Roosevelt were joined by Turkish president Ismet Inönü for 

several of the sessions. Operation Overlord again dominated the discussions, as did Operation 

Anvil, the original code name for the Allied invasion of southern France that was to be 

concurrent with Overlord. For the Pacific campaign, operations in Southeast Asia were a key 

topic at this conference. 

The Sextant, Eureka, and Second Cairo Conferences were three in a series of high-level 

conferences held by the US and British leaders in Washington, DC; Casablanca; Quebec; Cairo; 

Tehran; Malta; Yalta; and Potsdam to formulate the Allied grand strategy. At the Tehran, Yalta, 

and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was also in attendance and played an 

important role. Reports, memorandums, position papers, and maps were prepared by the CCS for 

the conferences, and minutes were taken at the accompanying CCS meetings. Taken together, 

these documents address virtually every policy and strategy issue of the war, from troop 

deployments, to debates about the location and timing of key Allied offensives, to discussions 

about postwar occupation boundaries. Thus, they record the early years of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and serve as an indispensable primary source on the planning and conduct of World War II. 

Originally highly classified, the conference materials were declassified on October 3, 

1973. The Joint History Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is publishing these documents as 

eBooks and web-ready PDFs to make them widely available to historians, faculty and students at 

the joint and service schools and other institutions of higher learning, and the general public. 
In addition to Sextant, Eureka, and Second Cairo, the other conferences are available as 

eBooks in Mobi, ePub, and PDF formats: 

Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), December 24, 1941–January 14, 1942: ISBN 

978-0-16-093887-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093886-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093888-7 (PDF) 

Post-Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), January 23–May 19, 1942: ISBN 978-0-

16-093890-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093889-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093891-7 (PDF) 

Casablanca Conference (Morocco), January14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093893-1 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093892-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093894-8 (PDF) 

Trident Conference (Washington, DC), May 12–25, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093879-5 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093878-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093880-1 (PDF) 

Quadrant Conference (Quebec City, Canada), August 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-

093882-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093881-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093883-2 (PDF) 

Octagon Conference (Quebec City, Canada), September 12–16, 1944: ISBN 978-0-16-

093925-9 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093927-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093928-0 (PDF) 

Argonaut Conference (Malta and Yalta, Soviet Union), January 30–February 11, 1945: 

ISBN 978-0-16-093930-3 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093929-7 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093924-2 

(PDF) 

Terminal Conference (Potsdam, Germany), July 17–August 2, 1945: ISBN 978-0-16-

093923-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093931-0 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093932-7 (PDF) 

David B. Crist, PhD 

Director for Joint History 
SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

November-Decern ber 1943 

PAPERS 

AND 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

SEXTANT AND EUREKA CONFERENCES 

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE 

OFFICE, U. S. SECRETARY 

OFFICE OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS Of STAFF 

1943 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 

270113 

270/14 

30012 

30013 

30817 

32014 

37917 

387 

38713 

39011 

397 

398 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

Use of Facilities in the Azores by U.S.Aircraft ..... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

Development of Facilities in the Azores. ....... (Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff) 

Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1944-

Pacific-Far East ................ (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1944-Europe ...... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

Boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command ..... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

Operation RANKIN .............. (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

Retentionof LST’sin theMediterranean ....... (Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, Allied Force 

Headquarters) 

Basic Policies for the Next United States-British Staff 

Conference ................ (Note by the Secretaries) 

Mediterranean Command Arrangements ....... (Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

Chiefsof Staff) 

Directive for Unification of Command in the Mediterranean 

(Directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff) 

Future Operations in the Southeast Asia Command ... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944 .... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

Specific Operations for the Defeat of Germany and Her 

Satellites, 1943-44 ............... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

PAGE 

1 

3 

5 

21 

41 

45 

47 

49 

53 

57 

63 

65 

73 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. 

399 Report on Recent and Prospective Developments in AntiSubmarine Operations Since QUADRANT ...... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

399/1 Progress Report on the U-Boat War-September-October 

1943 .................... (Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff) 

400 Integrated Command of US. Strategic Air Forces in the 

European-Mediterranean Area .......... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

400/1 Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and 

the Mediterranean .............. (Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

40012 Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and in 

the Mediterranean ............... (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

401 V.L.R. Airfields (B-29)in the China-Burma-India Area . . (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

401/1 V.L.R. Airfields (B-29) in the China-Burma-India Area . . (Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

401/2 V.L.R. Airfields (B-29) in the China-Burma-India Area , 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

403 Progress Report, Combined Bomber Offensive .... (Report by the Chief of the Air Stag and the 

Commanding General, US.Eighth Air Force) 

403/1 Progress Report on Combined Bomber Offensive ... (Note by the Chief of the Air Stag) 

404 Agenda for SEXTANT. ............. (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

404/1 SEXTANT Agenda ............... (Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

405 Role of China in Defeat of Japan .......... (Memorandum from Lt. General Stilwell, USA) 

PAGE 

79 

85 

93 

100 

105 

109 

112 

113 

115 

157 

205 

208 

211 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

406 Combined Chiefs of Staff-United Chiefs of Staff .... 215 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs 01 Staff) 

40611 Combined Chiefs of Staff-United Chiefs of Staff. .... 217 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

407 Collaboration with the U.S.S.R. ........... 219 

(Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff) 

40711 Collaboration with the U.S.S.R. .......... 223 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

408 Command of British and U.S. Forces Operating Against 

Germany .................. 225 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

40811 Command of British and US. Forces Operating Against 

Germany .................. 230 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

409 OVERLORD and the Mediterranean ......... 233 

(Note by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

410 The Effect of Weather on Operation OVERLORD ..... 237 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

41112 Operationsinthesoutheast AsiaCommand. ...... 241 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

41115 Operations in the Southeast Asia Command ....... 244 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

413 French Participation in Cairo Conference ........ 247 

(Memorandum by the Commander in Chief,Allied Force 

Headquarters) 

41312 French Participation in Cairo Conference ........ 249 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

41513 The Provision of Merchant Shipping for the British Fleet for 

the War Against Japan .............. 251 

(Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, United States 

Fleet and First Sea Lord) 

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PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

417 Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan ......... 253 

(Report by the Combined Staff Planners) 

41811 Entry of Turkey into the War ............ 269 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

420 General Progress Report on Recent Operations and Future 

Plans in the Pacific ................ 273 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

42312 Draft Agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff ..... 281 

(Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff) 

424 Amphibious Operation Against the South of France .... 285 

(Report by the Combined Staff Planners in Collaboration 

with the Combined Administrative Committee) 

425 Directive for Intensification of Support of Partisan Forces in 

Yugoslavia .................. 293 

(Report by the Combined StaffPlanners) 

42611 Report to the President and Prime Minister ....... 297 

(Note by the Combined Chiefs of Staff) 

427 Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Alternative to 

BUCCANEER ............ .... 307 

(Report by the Combined Stag Planners) 

42711 Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Alternative to 

BUCCANEER ................ 311 

(Message from Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast 

Asia Command) 

Relation of Available Resources to Agreed Operations ... 315 

(Report by the Combined Administrative Committee and 

Shipping and Logistics Experts) 

M-165 Military Conclusions of the EUREKA Conference ..... 375 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

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TABLEOFCONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

1st Plenary Meeting .................. 377 

Future Operations in Southeast Asia 

2d Plenary Meeting .................. 383 

Operations in Europe and the Mediterranean 

Aid to the Balkan Patriots 

Southeast Asia Theater 

OVERLORD 

3d Plenary Meeting .................. 389 

OVERLORD and ANVIL 

Operation BUCCANEER 

Entry of Turkey into the War 

4th Plenary Meeting .................. 397 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command 

Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL 

5th Plenary Meeting .................. 405 

Report to the President and Prime Minister 

Messagesto Marshal Stalin and GeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 127th Meeting ................. 409 

Conduct of Conference 

Proposed SEXTANT Agenda 

EUREKA 

Relations Between Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Representatives of the U.S.S.R. and China 

Reaffirmation of Over-All Strategic Concept and Basic 

Undertakings 

C.C.S. 128th Meeting ................. 413 

The Role of China in the Defeat of Japan 

Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1944-Pacific-Far East 

Future Operations in the Southeast Asia Command 

Combined Chiefs of Staff-United Chiefs of Staff 

The Present Situation in the Southeast Asia Command 

C.C.S. 129th Meeting ................. 423 

Thanksgiving Day 

Combined Chiefs of Staff-United Chiefs of Staff 

Agenda for EUREKA 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command 

Boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command 

Discussions with Representatives of Chinese Government on 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command 

C.C.S. 130th Meeting ................. 437 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command 

Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan 

OVERLORD and the Mediterranean 

C.C.S. 131st Meeting ................. 441 

Operations in the Southeast Asia Command 

Reports from Commanders in Chief 

(1) Report by Commander in Chief, AFHQ 

(2) Report by Commanders in Chief, Middle East 

OVERLORD and the Mediterranean 

Collaboration with the U.S.S.R. 
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MINUTES 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 132d Meeting (Tehran) .............. 451 

OVERLORD and the Mediterranean 

C.C.S. 133d Meeting ................. 463 

Implications of Military Conclusions of the EUREKA 

Conference 

(1) Partisans 

(2) Turkey 

(3) Russian Declaration of War on Bulgaria 

(4) OVERLORD and Operations Against the South of 

France 

(5) Coordination with the Russian Staff 

Draft Agenda for the Remainder of SEXTANT Conference 

Entry of Turkey into the War 

Progress Reports 

The Combined Bomber Offensive 

C.C.S. 134th Meeting ................ 471 

Integrated Command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the 

European-Mediterranean Area 

Mediterranean Command Arrangements 

Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan 

Operation RANKIN 

Review of Conditions in Europe 

Occupation of Europe 

Results of the Plenary Session Held at 1100,3December 1943 

C.C.S. 135th Meeting ................. 481 

Draft Agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Integrated Command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the 

European-Mediterranean Area 

Directive for Unification of the Command in the Mediterranean 

Amphibious Operation Against the South of France 

Directive for Intensification of Support of Partisan Forces in 

Yugoslavia 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 136th Meeting ................. 489 

Operations in Southeast Asia 

Operation ANVIL 

Directions to Combined Staff Planners and the U..S. and British 

Shipping Authorities 

Future Work 

Message for Admiral Mountbatten from the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff 

C.C.S. 137th Meeting ................. 497 

Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Command Alternative to BUCCANEER 

Control of Strategic Air Forces in N.W. Europe and in the 

Mediterranean 

Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan 

Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944 

Operations in the Southeast Asia Command 

Draft Report to the President and Prime Minister 

Relation of Resources to Plans 

Messages to Marshal Stab and the Generalissimo 

Future Business 

C.C.S. 138th Meeting ................. 503 

Integrated Command of US. Strategic Air Forces in the 

European-Mediterranean Area 

Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Alternative to 

BUCCANEER 

Provision of Merchant Shipping Types for the War Against 

Japan 

Relation of Available Resources to the Operations Decided upon 

Development of Facilities in the Azores 

New Command Arrangements 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command 

Employment of French Forces 

Final Remarks 

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TABLEOFCONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

1st EUREKA Plenary Session ............... 513 

General Survey of the War 

Soviet Strategic Concept of the War in Europe 

Entry of Turkey intothe War 

EUREKA Military Conference ............... 527 

Conduct of the War in Europe and the Mediterranean 

Air War in Europe 

Operation OVERLORD 

2d EUREKA Plenary Session ............... 543 

Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force 

Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL 

Aid to the Balkan Partisans 

Entry of Turkey into the War 

Use of French Troops in Invasion of France 

3d EUREKA Plenary Session ............... 557 

Coordination of Allied Operations 

Deception Plans for Operation OVERLORD 

INDEX ....................... 563 

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C.C.S. 270/13 and 270/14 

USE OF FACILITIES IN THE AZORES BY U.S. AIRCRAFT 

Reference: 

CCS 138th Meeting, Item 6 

In reply to a memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 

270/12) which outlined a formula for operational control in the Azores, the 

United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 270/13, 6 December 1943) noted that 

consideration is being deferred. They suggested steps to expedite an early 

completion of Lagens Field. The British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 270/14, 

6 December 1943) outlined formulae for the development of facilities in the 

Azores. 

C.C.S. 270/13 and C.C.S. 270/14 were considered by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff in their 138th Meeting. They approved C.C.S. 270/14 with the elimination of the last sentence of paragraph 4 and agreed that details regarding the 

use of the Azores facilities by United States Amy Air Forces should be settled 

directly between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal. 

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C.C.S. 270/13 6 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

USE OF FACILITIES IN THE AZORES BY US. AIRCRAFT 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. Although the United States Chiefs of Staff have noted the memorandum 

from the British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 270/12), dated 3 December 1943, it is 

considered necessary to defer its consideration until more detailed reports and 

recommendations are available from such sources as the U.S. Army-Navy 

Reconnaissance Party in the Azores, the Air Ministry Officers now at Lagens 

Field, Terceira, the Air Transport Command, A.A.F., and the Transport Command, R.A.F. 

2. Whatever decisions may be reached concerning the future extent, nature, 

and control of U.S. and British anti-submarine and in transit aircraft operations in the Azores, it is apparent that the expansion, completion, and maximum 

possible use of Lagens Field are matters of urgency. In order to render all 

possible assistance in the early completion of Lagens Field and to maintain 

U.S. anti-submarine, ferried, and transport aircraft operations, it is proposed 

to send appropriate US. construction, communications, meteorological and 

maintenance material and equipment, supplies, and personnel to Terceira on 

the first possible convoy. The United States Chiefs of Staff have been advised 

by representatives of the United States in Lisbon that Dr. Antonio Salazar, 

Premier of the Portuguese Government, has replied favorably to questions 

regarding this procedure. 

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C.C.S.270/14 6 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DEVELOPMENT OF FACILITIES IN THE AZORES 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. Reports from Lisbon indicate that, provided the U.S.are prepared to 

work under British cover, they will be able to obtain all the essential facilities 

in the Azores they require for the prosecution of the war. 

2. As regards U.S. operational facilities at Lagens, we would suggest that 

a formula on the following lines might be acceptable to the Portuguese 

Government. They might be informed that American operational units in the 

Azores would be on loan to H.M.G. operating under the command of a British 

officer from a base under British control. 

3. As regards transit facilities, we recommend that we should await the 

outcome of Dr. Salazar’s consideration of the American proposal that the U.S. 

should construct an aerodrome on Santa Maria on behalf of the Portuguese 

Government. If this is unfavorable, as it may be in view of Dr. Salazar’s insistence on retaining the framework and principles of the British agreement, the 

British should then ask for authority to construct an aerodrome and should 

use American material and assistance under British cover. 

4. The formula we would suggest for American transit aircraft would be 

that aircraft in transit through the Azores are controlled by British Air Transport Command. The second airfield, when constructed, would be under British 

Command, and aircraft using it would fulfill the same conditions as those 

using Lagens. 

5. In any case the first step would be a survey of Santa Maria which could 

be done ostensibly by the British, but with the assistance of the four American 

officers who remained behind in Terceira, pending further instructions, after 

completion of work by American survey party recently in that island. 

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6. We do not foresee any requirements for two B-24 squadrons in the 

Azores, or, in fact, for two American squadrons of any type. Our requirement 

is a total of three squadrons of which two should be British squadrons, and 

we prefer to retain the two Fortress squadrons now at Terceira. We recommend 

that the third squadron should be an American B-24 squadron, which would 

replace the Hudsons now in the Azores. If this is agreed, we could also make 

the point to Dr. Salazar that the majority of operational units would be British 

and all under British command. 

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C.C.S. 300/2 

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944-PACIFIC-FAR EAST 

Reference: 

CCS 128th Meeting, Item 3 

C.C.S. 300/2was circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff and as a basis of discussion at SEXTANT. 

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C.C.S. 300/2 18 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944-PACIFIC-FAR EAST 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The United States Chiefs of Staff submit herewith an estimate of the 

enemy situation, 1943-44, Pacific-Far East area for information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the SEXTANT Conference. 

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ENCLOSURE 

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 194P-PACIFIC-FAR EAST 

(As of 1November 1943) 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To estimate the enemy situation in the Pacific-Far East, 1944, with due 

regard to Soviet and Chinese capabilities and intentions. 

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 

2. We do not feel it practicable to attempt a summarization of the enemy 

situation in the Pacific-Far East as projected through 1944. Such a condensation, in our opinion, would inevitably result in incomplete treatment of factors 

essential to the over-all picture. Our view of the situation, 1944, is therefore 

attached as Appendix “A,” to which reference is hereby made. 

3. As of 1November 1943,we estimate Japanese intentions in the Far East, 

1944, as follows: 

a. General. Japan will probably remain on the strategic defensive unless 

convinced that the U.S.S.R. has decided to attack her or to grant to the other 

United Nations the use of Siberian air bases. In such an event Japan would 

attack the Soviet Union. It is probable, however, that Japan will assume the 

tactical offensive whenever she considers it necessary, and it may be expected that Japan will initiate local offensive actions to forestall operations 

by the United Nations in Burma and to prevent the establishment of air 

bases by the United Nations in China. Japan will take full advantage of 

any breathing spell permitted her by Allied inactivity to strengthen her 

defensive cordon with installations of all types in order to make Allied 

advance most costly in time and casualties. 

b. North Pacific. We believe that Japan will continue to strengthen her 

defenses in the Kuriles and Hokkaido, but is not likely to depart from the 

defensive except in case of war with the Soviet Union. 

c. Manchuria. We believe that Japan will continue to seek to avoid war 

with the U.S.S.R. in all circumstances except as already mentioned above. 

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She will continue to balance Soviet strength in Siberia, reducing her forces 

in Manchuria only in case of necessity. 

d. China (including Yunnan). Although Japan will continue to seek a 

satisfactory solution in China by political means, chances of success have 

deteriorated since the Moscow conference. We believe that she will undertake decisive military operations only to prevent the United Nations from 

establishing offensive air bases for action against her vital installations. 

e. Burma and Southeast Asia. We believe that Japan will seek to maintain her present position in Burma and Southeast Asia, devoting especial 

attention to Burma, while extending her efforts when necessary to prevent 

large scale reinforcements and supplies reaching China. 

f. Southwest and Central Pacific. We believe that Japan will remain on 

the strategic defensive, continuing her efforts to build up her local defensive forces and facilities and her naval striking force. 

4. Our estimate of Japanese intentions, as set out in paragraph 3 above, 

is in part based upon our beliefs as to Soviet and Chinese capabilities and 

intentions, which are attached as Appendix “B”and Appendix “C.” 

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APPENDIX “A” 

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944--PACIFIC-FAR EAST 

(As of 1 November 1943) 

1. BASIC FACTORS IN THE JAPANESE SITUATION 

a. Objectives. Japan’s basic objective is to establish undisputed control 

of an area in East Asia and the Western Pacific which shall be militarily 

secure and assearly self-sufficient economically as possible. The area now 

occupied by her approximates the territorial requirements of this objective 

but is deficient in three respects, as follows: (1) the possession of eastern 

Siberia by a latently hostile power; (2) the existence in China of unoccupied areas within bombing range of Japan and of important Japanese lines 

of communication; and (3) the presence of United Nations forces in the 

Japanese defensive perimeter in the Melanesia area. Other territories 

beyond the limits of present occupation may be objects of ultimate Japanese aspiration, but only those specified are essential to the immediate basic 

objective. 

b. Relationship to the Axis. Japan’s connection with the Axis is a matter 

of expediency only. Her action will be coordinated with that of Germany 

only in so far as she estimates that such coordination will contribute to 

the realization of her basic objective. 

c. Relations with the U.S.S.R. There exists between the U.S.S.R. and 

Japan a basic conflict of interest. Japan cannot enjoy complete strategic 

security without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. The 

U.S.S.R. is determined to hold that region, the strategic security of which 

requires the ultimate expulsion of Japan from the mainland of Asia and 

from southern Sakhalin. For the present, however, both the U.S.S.R. and 

Japan desire to avoid war with each other in order to be free to direct their 

efforts against their respective enemies. 

d. Relations with subject peoples. Wherever circumstances allow, 

Japan’s policy is to establish nominally independent, but actually controlled, national governments. This policy fits in with two powerful propaganda themes: (1) “Asia for the Asiatics”; (2) the “Co-Prosperity 

Sphere,” ostensibly a cooperative project. 

Appendix “A” 

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Japan has recognized the “independence” of China, as represented by the Nanking puppet government, and has sought to enlist 

Chinese nationalism in support of that regime by surrendering to it 

various foreign concessions, notably those at Shanghai. She has granted 

“independence” to Burma and the Philippines, thereby seeking to enlist 

the relatively developed nationalism of those countries in her favor. She has 

hinted that other occupied areas, e.g., Java, may receive similar grants of 

independence. Thailand has been rewarded for cooperation by the cession 

of bits of neighboring territory to which she had some pretensions. By such 

policies, Japan hopes to strengthen somewhat her position among the 

subject peoples. 

e. Strategic and economic position. Although the strategic initiative 

has passed from Japan to the United Nations, a far-flung perimeter of 

defense positions must be penetrated before areas of great strategic or 

economic importance to Japan are subject to attack. Within this empire, 

Japan is practically self-sufficient except for textiles. Furthermore, Japan, 

by stockpiling materials from the Outer Zone and by pursuing a policy of 

developing resources within the Inner Zone wherever possible, has obtained 

within the Inner Zone a high degree of short range self-sufficiency in most 

of the essential materials of war. However, the loss of Sumatra and Borneo 

would seriously impair Japan’s oil position, and loss of the Philippines 

would seriously impair her ferro-alloys position. Her manufacturing facilities, located mainly in Japan proper and in Manchuria, are accessible only 

to air attack. Meanwhile, the expansion of war production capacity undertaken in recent years will bear fruit in growing rates of output. For certain 

critical items, however, growing output is unlikely to offset attrition (ships) 

or to do more than keep pace with losses (planes). Japan should expect 

that ultimately greatly superior forces can be directed against her, but 

she will continue to hope that the United Nations will hesitate to face the 

tremendous logistical problems, or pay the price in lives, involved in an 

invasion of Japan proper. 

f. Psychology and morale. The Japanese, traditionally, are a close-knit 

family whose broad characteristics are a toughness of fibre and a fatalistic 

singleness of purpose. They have been taught that they are of divine origin 

and that the Emperor is directly descended from the god-founder of the 

nation. They are taught that the Japanese are divinely and infallibly 

guided towards the establishment of a new world order dominated by Japan. 

To attain this goal the Japanese soldier is taught to give blind 

obedience and to regard death in the service of the Emperor as an honor. 

Appendix “A’ 

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He is told that he is invincible and that to show weakness or to surrender 

is to accept disgrace. 

As a result of these teachings, the morale of the Japanese populace, 

and especially of the armed forces, remains high in spite of recent reverses. 

As much of popular morale is, however, based upon the theory of invincibility, a series of sharp defeats when and if brought home to them will tend 

to confuse and bewilder the people as a whole. 

In contrast with the broad mass of the people, real power in Japan 

rests in the hands of small groups of leaders capable of manipulating the 

symbols of emperor-worship for their own self-interest. An early collapse 

of Germany would have a tremendously depressing effect upon such 

leaders. This, combined with ever increasing United Nations pressure and 

approach to the homeland, might conceivably bring about a re-shuffle of 

the ruling cliques followed by an attempt to secure a negotiated peace. 

g. Propaganda. Official propaganda on the home front has shifted from 

that of the self-assured offensive to propaganda of the defensive, and determination to fight for existence is replacing exaltation in victory. The potential of the United Nations is admitted to be high, and the government has 

announced its intention to prepare for the defense of the capital and the 

production centers of the homeland. The government is also preparing the 

Japanese people for more serious German reverses in Europe. Japanese 

withdrawals are admitted, and it is implied that the Japanese have finished 

winning independence for other Asiatic countries and now must prepare 

to defend their own islands from frontal attack. 

2. THE EXISTING OVER-ALL SITUATION 

a. Military strength. We estimate the present strength of her armed 

forces to be as follows: (1) Naval, 11 battleships, 7 aircraft carriers, 5 

auxiliary aircraft carriers, 14 heavy cruisers, 18 light cruisers, 78 destroyers, 

89 submarines. (2) Air, 1,660 fighters, 1,770 bombers, 490 float planes and 

300 other types. Of the total, 110 fighters and 130 bombers, and 185 float 

planes are ship-based. In addition to the above total of 4,220 U.E. combat 

aircraft there are some 1,375 combat type aircraft engaged in advanced 

operational training. (3) Ground, a total ground strength of 2,500,000 

representing approximately 110 equivalent divisions, which include 65 

infantry divisions, 18 independent mixed brigades, 1 infantry brigade, 3 

cavalry brigades, 20 tank regiments, 13 border garrisons, 17 independent 

Appendix “A” 

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garrisons and other independent units. (4) Totaling in round numbers 

3,500,000 men (exclusive of Puppet Troops). 

Puppet Troops. There are some 330,000 Manchurian troops and more 

than 420,000 Nanking puppet troops. For the most part, both forces are 

organized into small garrison units lacking in automatic weapons and 

artillery. Some Manchurian combat divisions exist, and similar Nanking 

divisions are said to be forming (strength about 6,000 per division), but it 

is doubtful whether Japan can provide for them normal equipment in 

heavier weapons in view of her own shortages in those categories. Japan 

has found Nanking troops particularly unreliable in the past. 

Burmese and other puppet forces are so small as to be inconsequential. 

b. Positional strength. Japan is now on the strategic defensive. Her 

control of Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, Pacific islands and parts 

of China keeps United Nations forces at a distance too great for delivery 

of effective blows against Japan itself and prevents effective development 

and use of the Chinese war potential. Thus Japan’s position, facing United 

Nations forces from the North Pacific around to India, is one of great 

natural strength. At this time, her position in China is secure because of 

the present inability of either China or the other United Nations to mount 

large-scale operations there. Soviet commitments in Europe and Japanese 

strength in Manchuria insure for the time being the security of Japan’s 

northern flank, Japan is able at present to direct her maximum effort toward 

building up her economic and military strength. 

c. Limitations on Japanese Power 

(1) Shipping. Japan’s defensive position requires secure and adequate ocean transport over long lines of communication. The Japanese 

shipping situation has become acute, with her total tonnage being further reduced by sinkings in excess of total new construction. We estimate that 50-60% of her total tonnage is committed to maintaining her 

military forces outside the homeland and that the remainder is used 

primarily to maintain the essential part of her war economy. From this 

latter bracket some tonnage might still be found for new operations 

by diverting it from trade, and, provided such diversions were temporary, this would not necessarily have serious effects on Japan’s capacity 

to wage war. Since, however, Japan’s rate of building, though on the 

increase, cannot keep pace even with the present rate of sinkings, she 

Appendix “A” 

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would be reluctant to risk adding further to her shipping commitments. 

Although attempts are being made to improve the position by building a 

large number of small and medium-size wooden ships, the general 

shipping position is becoming increasingly difficult and may well 

become precarious in 1944.The situation in regard to tankers is also 

acute. Japan is attempting to meet a deficiency in this respect by continuing to fit out dry-cargo ships for use as oil carriers. 

(2) Air requirements. Until recently Japan has not only been able to 

maintain her over-all air strength at approximately the same total 

figure but has kept her allocated air strength along the perimeter in 

reasonable balance with her requirements. At present, however, indications point to such a rapid attrition in the Melanesian area that she 

is having difficulty in replacing losses. We believe that as United Nations 

pressure increases along the outer defense frontier, she will be unable 

to maintain sufficient strength to offer effective resistance at all points 

under attack. Assuming that the United Nations carry out the agreed 

program for 1944,we are of the opinion that Japan’s defensive air 

requirements will preclude the possibility of her engaging in any offensive operation requiring heavy air support. 

(3) Naval requirements. Japan cannot afford to risk large commitments of naval strength except for the defense of vital areas. Her 

extended lines of communication already entail a large commitment 

of naval strength for the protection of essential shipping. Their further 

extension, or indecisive action entailing heavy attrition, might well be 

unacceptable. 

(4) Military requirements. A large proportion of Japanese ground 

forces is required for occupational duties and for concentration in Manchuria to balance Soviet forces in Siberia. Japan, however, has ample 

ground forces for any probable combat requirements, inasmuch as the 

insular character of much of the occupied area and the topography of 

New Guinea, the Indo-Burmese frontier and China limit the scale of 

ground operations in those areas. Developments of the last few months 

indicate the necessity of using her superiority in ground forces to compensate for her relative inferiority in naval and air forces. Her ability 

to move her strategic reserve is restricted by availability of shipping. 

Appendix ‘‘A> 

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3. THE EXISTING LOCAL SITUATION 

a. North Pacific. Japan is strengthening the fortifications and garrisons 

on her “Northern Fortress” (Shimushu and Paramushiru), and we believe 

that preparations are being made for a determined defense in the Kuriles. 

b. Manchuria. Japanese ground forces in Manchuria probably balance 

the Soviet ground forces in Eastern Siberia-Outer Mongolia, but Japanese 

air strength is believed to be relatively inferior. Japan has the advantage in 

strategic position, equipment, and supply but is deterred from aggression 

by respect for Soviet armed forces and reluctance to commit herself further 

while her army is actively engaged in other areas. Japan is also apprehensive of vulnerability to bombing and submarine attack and fears the 

probability that in the event of war between Japan and the U.S.S.R., the 

United States would utilize air bases in Siberia for direct attacks on Japan. 

c. China (except Yunnan). The front has been largely stabilized for 

years, with the Japanese in possession of the country’s principal productive 

areas and communications lines. The Japanese are deterred from further 

expansion primarily by logistical difficulties and secondarily by Chinese 

resistance. On occasion the Japanese engage in minor offensive operations 

to season inexperienced troops and accomplish limited objectives such as 

the temporary denial of facilities to the Chinese. Although nominally in 

overwhelming numerical strength, the Chinese forces are at present so 

poorly equipped, supplied, fed, and trained that they are unable to prevent 

these forays or to undertake other than local action. This Chinese military 

weakness springs in large part from China’s generally anemic condition, 

which has resulted from loss of productive areas, disruption of internal 

communications, isolation from outside support, and war-weariness. 

d. Yunnan. Active operations have recently been launched by the Japanese along the Salween River. We believe these operations are to strengthen 

the Japanese position along the Burma frontier in anticipation of a United 

Nations increase in activity in that area. 

e. Burma. The wet monsoon very greatly hinders major operations from 

May to October. Recently the Japanese have been increasing their ground 

and air forces in Burma. It may be that the supply to these forces overland 

via Indochina and Thailand may be increased considerably in the near 

future. 

Appendix “A” 

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f. Southwest Pacific. The ground and air strength in the Timor-Inner 

Seas area and New Guinea-Bismarcksarea appearsto be defensive in character. Because of recent United Nations successes in this area, Japan, in order 

to maintain her defensive position has been forced to increase her strength 

by one division over and above replacements for her combat losses. Due to 

extreme losses in this area, it now appears that she is having difficulty in 

maintaining the air strength disposed heretofore. 

g. Central Pacific. At present Japan bases 50-60q6 of her naval strength 

at Truk. The total air strength of this area has been increasing,particularly 

in the Marshalls and Gilberts. 

4. STRATEGIC RESERVES 

a. Air. We believe no strategic reserve exists as such. Although Japan’s 

staging facilities are sufficiently developed to enable her to fly even fighter 

planes to practically any part of her position, theoretically allowing the 

quick reinforcement of any threatened front, there are indications that 

simultaneous pressure on several fronts would prevent substantial reinforcements being sent to more than one area. 

b. Naval. Normally Japan maintains her battleship and carrier strength 

in home waters and at Truk, shifting the center of gravity according to 

circumstances. A formidable striking force, which can reach any threatened 

point of the defensive perimeter in from 6-9days, can be quickly assembled 

in either of these central areas. However, destroyer shortage is becoming 

critical. 

c. Ground. Surplus ground strength in Central China constitutes 

Japan’s initial reserve. If hard pressed, she can also draw surplus strength 

from Japan and North China and in extremity from Manchuria. 

5. PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH 1944 

a. Air strength. Although Japanese aircraft production is expected to 

continue to increase gradually during the remainder of 1943 and during 

1944,attrition will probably keep pace with and may even exceed this 

increased production. 

b. Naval strength. Disregarding attrition, we estimate that Japanese 

naval strength should increase as a result of new construction to the following totals: 

Appendix “A” 

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Aux. 

1 Nov. 43 

1 Jan. 44 

1 June 44 

1 Jan. 45 

.Lr- Air- Heavy ight DesBattle- craft craft Cruis- Cruis- troy- Submaships Car. Car. US mS ers rines 

11 7 5 14 18 78 89 

12 8 5 14 18 85 97 

12 10 6 15 19 95 113 

13 14 7 16 20 105 130 

c. Ground strength. We expect that by the end of 1944 the strength of 

the Japanese army will have increased to 2,750,000,comprising appoximately 120equivalent divisions (including73infantry divisions and 14independent mixed brigades, 3 cavalry brigades, and 24 tank regiments, 20 

independent garrisons, and 13 border garrisons). 

d. Shipping. Despite Japan’s strenuous shipbuilding efforts, estimates 

of the rate of loss and rate of construction of steel ships indicate that the 

Japanese may suffer a net loss of 1,500,000gross registered tons of steel 

operating tonnage from 1 November 1943 to the end of 1944. However, 

construction of wooden vessels and further substitution of land transport 

may offset a part of the estimated net loss of steel ships. 

e. War production. Assuming that Japan retains control of the productive areas now under occupation,that shipments by sea can be maintained, 

and that there be no effective bombing of Japanese industry or land transportation, Japan’s production of critical finished war goods may increase 

materially in 1944 as compared with 1943.Heavy industrial production as 

a whole, however, is not expected to show great gains in 1944, chiefly 

because steel output seems unlikely to rise by more than a few percent. The 

steady development of economically unprofitable but strategically important resources of Japan proper and immediately adjacent areas and the 

use of stock piles will make it possible for Japan’s war industry to continue 

for about two years at approximately its present rate of consumption of 

raw materials (except for oil, chromite, and possibly lead and zinc), even 

if cut off from access to resources south of the Yangtze River. 

Appendix “A” 

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APPENDIX “B” 

U.S.S.R.CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST 

1. STRENGTH 

We estimate that total Soviet air strength east of Lake Baikal consists of 

some 2,000 tactical aircraft. Of these, some 1,200 are believed to be organized 

into operational squadrons. This force is apparently disposed on the southern 

border of Soviet-controlled territory from Ulan Bator to Vladivostok. Existing 

airfields are believed adequate for flexible operation. 

Naval strength is estimated to consist of one light cruiser, 9 destroyers, 

6 torpedo boats, 60 submarines, 60 motor torpedo boats, and a number of 

assorted small craft of no combatant value. There are believed to be sufficient 

bases available for thisforce. 

The ground strength east of Lake Baikal is estimated to total some 

660,000 men divided into units as follows: 

20 infantry divisions (15,000 men each) 

11 cavalry divisions (6,600 men each) 

1mountain division (9,000men) 

2 motorized divisions (7,000 men each) 

13 tank brigades (2,000men each) 

5 motorized brigades (4,000men each) 

9 infantry brigades (4,000 men each) 

1 composite brigade (5,000men) 

Corps, army, line of communication, 

and other troops (180,000 men) 

Pending the defeat of Germany, reinforcement is unlikely. Although 

these forces in the Far East are supposed to be self-sufficient, their local sources 

of supply are actually both limited and vulnerable. Support, in any cm, 

would have to be delivered via a long, and in part exposed, line of communication. 

Appendix “B” 

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2. CAPABILITIES 

Offensively, the U.S.S.R. could scarcely hope for any success until her 

forces in the west have been released by the defeat of Germany or until after 

the other United Nations have gained access from the Pacific to the Sea of 

Okhotsk. Defensively the U.S.S.R. would probably be unable to prevent the 

isolation of the Maritime Provinces by the cutting of, or at least demolitions on, 

the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Holding operations, however, should be possible 

on present stored reserves for at least six months. Subsequent developments 

in the whole area would depend largely on the effectiveness of the assistance 

of the other United Nations. 

3. INTENTIONS 

Pending further informationas to the results of the Moscow Conference, 

we estimate Soviet intentions as follows: 

The U.S.S.R. is likely to intervene in the war against Japan at some 

stage, but not before the German menace to her has been removed. After 

that, she would be likely to intervene only when she reckoned that Japan 

could be defeated at small cost to her. It is unlikely that any arguments 

that we might bring forward, except substantial progress in our war against 

Japan, would greatly affect the timing of Soviet intervention. On the other 

hand, we believe that large-scale hostilities between the United States and 

Japan in the Northwest Pacific would make the Soviet Union’s present 

neutrality in the Far East increasingly difficult to maintain. 

Appendix “B” 

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APPENDIX “C” 

CHINESE CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS 

1. STRENGTH 

The Chinese active army has a nominal strength of 320 infantry and 

16 cavalry divisions, plus 30 independent infantry brigades. Infantry divisions 

average 7,000 each; cavalry divisions and infantry brigades average 3,000each. 

The combat efficiency of the bulk of the force never was very high and it has 

deteriorated considerably since 1938. At the present tilhe malnutrition and 

lack of medical attention are prevalent and have reduced the combat potential 

of many units to a very low point. Armament consists almost wholly of infantry weapons. Such heavy material as is available is inadequate and is largely 

obsolete.The augmentation of this armament to any appreciable degree by the 

United Nations will not be possible until capacity of transport into China is 

greatly increased. We feel that, at most, not more than one-fifth of the Chinese 

Army is currently capable of sustained defensive operations and then only 

with effective air support; we believe that with the possible exception of the 

American-trained Chinese divisions, no large number of troops can be expected 

to undertake more than very limited objective offensive operations, at the 

present time. 

Chinese guerrillas, whose strength is estimated to be 600,000 part-time 

troops, have proved of value. In recent months, they have done the bulk of 

the fighting against the Japanese. They share with the regular divisions credit 

for retaining substantial Japanese occupational forces in China. 

2. CAPABILITIES 

If given adequate United Nations air support, China might be able to 

defend her major strategic areas against a Japanese offensive and might be 

able to execute a very limited objective offensive. 

3. INTENTIONS 

The Chinese probably intend to remain generally on the defensive, 

pending the re-equipping and training of their army for offensive action at 

a later date. 

Appendix ‘‘c” 

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C.C.S. 300/3 

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944-EUROPE 

Reference: 

CCS 131st Meeting, Item 4A 

C.C.S. 300/3 was circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff and as a basis for discussion at SEXTANT. 

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C.C.S. 300/3 18 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944-EUROPE 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The United States Chiefs of Staff submit herewith an estimate of the 

enemy situation, 1944-Europe, for information of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff at the SEXTANT Conference. 

ENCLOSURE 

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944-EUROPE 

(As of 1 November 1943) 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To prepare an estimate of the enemy situation, 1944-Europe. 

SUMMARY OF THE EXISTING SITUATION (1 November 1943) 

2. Germany is now under severe strain, and her general situation is deteriorating. Her strength remains formidable, however, and, granted relief from 

pressure, she still has the power of recuperation. 

Germany is now on the defensive on all fronts. She has no decisive 

offensive capabilities. Her military resources are inadequate to meet all of her 

defensive requirements. The German Air Force is unable to ward off destructive Allied strategic bombing. Its concentration to resist such bombing leaves 

Germany’s land fronts in the east and south inadequately supported. On both 

of these fronts the German Army has been compelled to yield considerable 

ground, at the sacrifice of military, economic, political, and psychological interests, in order to conserve its strength for a final decisive conflict. The German 

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Navy has been unable to prevent the build-up of Allied offensive forces within 

striking distance of the Continent. 

The bomber offensive is increasingly destructive of German air strength, 

industrial capacity, and morale. Reserves of fit German manpower being now 

exhausted, continued heavy casualtiesmust cause either a decrease in strength 

or a decline in quality in the German Army. The prospect is such as to cause 

her allies to seek means of escape, to encourage renewed resistance in occupied 

areas, and to impair her own morale. Signs of deterioration in her political 

structure are beginning to be discernible. 

Nevertheless, Germany’s armed forces are still strong, experienced, and 

willing to fight hard. By reason of past conquests, she is still able to fight well 

in advance of her vital areas (except in the air). Her political structure is 

designed to withstand internal strain. Given any relief from pressure, she has 

the power of recovery. 

GERMANY’S MOST PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION 

3. We conclude that Germany’s most probable courses of action (a and b 

to be followed concurrently) are: 

a. To stand on the strategic defensive. This includes: 

(1) Continuation of the war against shipping. 

(2) Continued direction of her primary air effort to defense against

the bomber offensive. 

(3) An intention to counterattack to destroy or expel any hostile 

force entering her defensive perimeter. 

(4) A probable intention to yield outlying occupied territory only

under pressure and with maximum practicable delaying action. 

b. To seek a negotiated peace by psychological and political means. This 

includes continuation of her efforts to divide her principal enemies. 

c. To sue for peace only after it has been proved impossible to achieve 

either a negotiated peace or a stalemate. 

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FORECAST FOR 1944 

4. Our forecast for 1944, so far as we are now able to make one, is that: 

a. The German war against shipping will continue, but probably with 

diminishing effect. 

b. The bomber offensive against Germany will have cumulative effect 

destructive ofthe German fighter force, industrial capacity, and morale. It 

will create conditionswithin Germany conduciveto complete military defeat. 

c. The final German defensive line in the east appears to be marked by 

the rivers Dniester-(Polish) Bug-Niemen. There they must stand and give 

decisive battle since further withdrawal would uncover vital areas. 

d. Germany will continue to resist as long as hope persists that thereby 

she may gain a stalemate or negotiated peace. When that hope fails, the 

High Command may assume control in order to halt destruction prejudicial 

to Germany’s eventual recovery. Unmistakable signs of German collapse 

will not become apparent until the end of resistance is close at hand; when 

that point has been reached, disintegration will proceed with startling 

rapidity. 

e. Germany’s allies (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland) will come 

come to terms whenever forced to bear the brunt of direct and sustained 

attack or whenever relieved of fear of Germany or of the U.S.S.R. 

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APPENDIX 

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944-EUROPE 

(As of 1November 1943) 

1. BASIC FACTORS IN THE EUROPEAN SITUATION 

a. Predominance of Germany. The enemy situation in Europe must be 

estimated in terms of the German situation. Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, 

and Finland are merely satellites of Germany and, to a considerable degree, 

prisoners of circumstance. None of them could offer prolonged resistance 

without effective German support; any of them would now disassociate 

itself from Germany if it could do so without fear of Germany or of the 

U.S.S.R. 

b. Germany’s Basic Task is now to defend “Festung Europa,”* with such 

assistance as she can extort from satellite and occupied countries. We believe 

that her leaders now realize that they cannot win the military victory, but 

that they still hope that they may be able to avert complete defeat by making 

the operations of the United Nations to that end so costly as to induce one 

or more of them to conclude some type of negotiated peace. These hopes 

provide a basis for continued resistance. 

c. “Festung Europa.”* Germany now controls, directly or indirectly, all 

of continental Europe west of the Soviet front, except part of Italy and the 

territories of five neutral states (Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and 

Turkey). This control extends to include the Baltic and Aegean Seas and 

the Mediterranean islands of Crete and Rhodes. This whole area is 

encircled by blockade but contains within itself the essentials of a military 

self-sufficiency. 

The western and southern faces of this position are now subject to 

invasion only by difficult amphibious attack or through mountainous terrain. The eastern face is, however, without clear natural definition. For that 

reason, and because of the immense forces deployed by the U.S.S.R., the 

Eastern Front must continue to be Germany’s chief preoccupation in land 

operations. 

* As herein conceived, “Festung Europa” consists of an essential core 

(roughly Germany itself, most of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania), surrounded by outer defensive and auxiliary areas. 

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Despite the best efforts of German propaganda and the employment 

of large occupational forces, resistance (active or passive) by the subject 

peoples within “Festung Europa” continues to increase. 

2. THE EXISTING OVER-ALL SITUATION 

a. Ground Forces. European Axis armies now (1November 1943) comprise 433 combat divisions-315 German, 29 Rumanian, 37 Hungarian, 21 

Bulgarian, 15 Finnish, 8 Croat, 6 Slovak, and the equivalent of 2 Italian 

divisions.Only 258 German divisions and the 7 depleted Rumanian divisions 

in the Crimea could, however, be counted on for front line service. 

The German Army has been brought to such strength only by lowering 

the physical standards, combing out industrial personnel hitherto deferred, 

and enlisting considerable numbers of non-Germans. In consequence, the 

average quality of German divisions has declined. Assuming a continuation 

of losses at current rates, Germany must either permit the size of her armed 

forces to decrease or see their quality deteriorate further. 

Morale among the German ground forces until lately has been generally excellent, but among the satellite forces it has been only good to fair. 

Further reverses may produce a lowering of morale during 1944. 

b. Air Forces. The total first-line strength of the German Air Force (29 

October 1943) is approximately 5,325 U.E. aircraft. The high proportion of 

fighters (2,550) to bombers (2,300) and other types (475) is indicative of 

the continued emphasis upon defensive capabilities at the expense of offensive. The rate of production has recently declined as a result principally of 

bombing attacks, bringing it into approximate balance with the rate of 

attrition. If the attrition rate can be maintained and further reduction in 

the rate of production can be effected by increased bombing attacks, a downward trend in over-all strength would promptly result, for no substantial 

stored reserves of aircraft exist to serve as a cushion. 

Owing largely to the shortage of trained crews, the efficiency of the 

long-range bomber force continues to be low. In equipment,some improvement in present types continues, but no important production of radically 

new types is expected. In defense against daylight bombing attacks and 

in offensive operations against shipping, some tactical and technical 

improvements have been made, particularly in the use of rocket projectiles 

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and radio-controlled bombs, and further improvement may probably be 

expected. Little, if any, deterioration of air force morale is apparent. 

We believe that the remnants of the Italian Air Force in German 

hands have little, if any, present or potential value. Satellite air strength 

is negligible except for that of Rumania, which has about 200 aircraft of 

modern type, half of which are on the southern section of the Eastern Front. 

Dependent as the satellite air forces are upon German production, they are 

unlikely to receive any substantial increase in first-line equipment. 

c. Naval Forces 

(1) Submarines. Germany now (1 November 1943) possesses around 

400 German-built submarines, of which about 200 are attached to the 

operating forces. Of the ex-Italian submarines a few in use as supply 

vessels or blockade runners may be operational but probably no others. 

None of the ex-French submarines are believed to be operational. 

The rate of completion of new submarines (all German-built) 

may be expected to continue at approximately 20 a month. 

Germany is encountering great difficulty in manning submarines. 

The quality and morale of the personnel have on the average declined 

and in some instances are very low, but there are no reliable indications 

that any general breakdown of morale is imminent. 

(2) Surface Vessels (eflective combatant types -1 November 1943). 

The major units are 2 battleships, 2 pocket battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 

and 4 light cruisers. Of these, the battleships TIRPITZ (damaged to an 

unknown extent) and SCHARNHORST are in northern Norwegian 

waters; the rest are in the Baltic with their effectiveness probably much 

reduced by the transfer of experienced personnel to submarines. (The 

aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN is not operational,) Some 30 destroyers 

and 40 torpedo boats are in waters from the Bay of Biscay northward 

(including the Baltic). In service in Mediterranean waters are perhaps 

2 destroyers and 3 torpedo boats in the Western Basin and perhaps 5 

destroyers and torpedo boats in the Aegean (all ex-French or ex-Italian) ; 

as many as 40more of such light units might be placed in service but no 

major units. 

New construction in progress consists of about 18 destroyers and 

possibly two ex-Netherlands light cruisers. 

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We believe that morale is low in the major units but is reasonably 

high in the light forces. 

d. Manpower. German reserves of combat manpower (physically fit 

German men aged 17-37) are by now exhausted. Future losses in that 

category can be replaced only from boys attaining age 17 and from recruitment of foreigners and over-age German men. 

In contrast to the position in German combat manpower, large 

reserves of German men in the limited service categories and of foreign 

manpower still are available. 

During the past year the civilian labor force in Germany has actually 

increased slightly in numbers, mainly as a result of compulsory recruitment of foreigners. It is, however, still 3,000,000 (8%) below the figure for 

May, 1939. It has been kept up, despite drafts of men for the armed services, 

by recruitment of foreigners, women, and substandard men. This change in 

composition has caused a decline of about 5 percent in per capita productivity, additional to the numerical decline previously noted. 

e. WarEconomy 

(1) General. The general level of German industrial production has 

declined probably 10 percent in recent months, principally because of 

Allied bombing. Other factors are the blockade, sabotage, and the 

general strain of war. The deterioration would have been greater had 

the Germans not achieved improvements in industrial efficiency and 

obtained additions to the labor force. 

(2) War Production. Aircraft production and submarine construction facilities have been particular objects of air attack. Single-engine 

fighter production has been so reduced that it no longer exceeds attrition; submarine construction has fallen below attrition. Motor vehicle 

production also has failed to equal recent wastage rates. The production 

of anti-friction bearings has been so seriously interrupted that it is now 

believed to be inadequate to sustain the required flow of military equipment. With the exception of fighter aircraft, however, these losses may 

not be felt immediately on fighting fronts. 

With respect to synthetic rubber, aircraft tires, and petroleum 

products, the protective cushion afforded by excess capacity has already 

been dangerously thinned or eliminated. 

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The production of anti-aircraft equipment has probably increased. 

The German retreat in the east has brought a saving in rail 

transport of the order of 3 percent of total ton-miles. This eases the 

entire German rail situation and permits reallocations of materials and 

labor as between rail equipment and other products. There is also a 

saving of the several hundred thousand tons of steel required for repairs 

of Soviet railroads in 1942. 

(3) Civilian Economy. Civilian economy in Germany is seriously 

strained. On top of the pre-war shortage, 15 percent of all dwellings in 

43cities subjected to Allied air attacks have been rendered uninhabitable, 

and three times that number have suffered damage requiring some 

emergency repair. Four and one-half million persons have been transferred from danger areas. This, in addition to the social dislocations 

involved, has placed a heavy burden on transportation. There is a severe 

shortage of most civilian goods, and services such as electric power and 

transportation have been greatly curtailed. The food situation is, however, reasonably satisfactory; and, except in heavily bombed areas, 

civilian living standards have been maintained at a tolerable level. 

f. German Civilian Morale and Internal Political Situation. A popular 

feeling of intense war-weariness and discouragement exists in Germany as 

a result of the vanishing prospects of victory, the heavy damage and casualties inflicted by the Anglo-American bomber offensive, the heavy casualties 

on the Eastern Front, the reverses on that front and in North Africa and 

Italy, the defection of Italy, the comparative failure of the submarine campaign, the feeling that all the victories to date have accomplished nothing 

decisive while their achievement has drained Germany’s strength, the long 

hours of work, and the uncomfortable, though not generally intolerable, 

living conditions. But the popular acceptance of the war’s continuation is 

supported by deep fear of the consequences of surrender, which has been 

zealously fostered by propaganda. 

Because of the ruthless and thorough methods employed to prevent 

the existence in Germany of any free political parties or other voluntary 

organizations except the churches, almost no opportunities exist for low 

popular morale to find effective expression in concerted action. The only 

change of leadership which therefore appears possible at an early date is 

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one which might be engineered by army officers, supported by big industrialists and landowners. Such a change might, however, lead to a weakening or relaxation of the system of control and thereby make it less difficult 

for low popular morale to express itself in effective action. 

Lacking channels of effective expression, low popular morale appears 

generally to be taking the form of numbness and apathy. For this reason the 

internal political situation appears today less precarious than it was, say, in 

August 1918. 

Unmistakable signs of German collapse will probably not become 

apparent until the end of resistance is close at hand. We believe that the 

cumulative effect of the factors listed above will then cause disintegration 

to proceed with startling rapidity. 

3. THE SITUATION BY FRONTS-1 NOVEMBER 1943 

a. The War Against Shipping. Germany’s war against ocean shipping 

has fallen far short of achieving its objective of preventing effective support 

from overseas of United Nations operations. It has, however, succeeded in 

delaying such support and limiting its scale, and its effects are still felt in 

such ways. Moreover, the Germans realize that as long as they continue 

their submarine attacks, or threaten them, on a serious scale, they will force 

the United Nations to devote to anti-submarine activities large amounts of 

manpower, energy, and materials which could advantageously be used for 

other war purposes and will prevent them from making the most efficient 

use of available shipping. We believe that the effectiveness of the war 

against shipping will not increase. 

b. Strategic Air Operations. The current primary commitment of the 

German Air Force is defense against Allied strategic bombing. To this end, 

out of an over-all fighter strength of 2,422 in operational units, 1,686 are 

concentrated in Germany, the Low Countries, and France. In addition to 

established dispositions and installations for defense against bombing 

attacks from Great Britain, it has now become necessary to set up in southern Germany and Austria similar defenses against such attacks from 

Mediterranean bases. In order to meet these requirements, German air 

support of the Eastern and Mediterranean land fronts has been seriously 

curtailed. 

Despite these efforts and sacrifices, the Germans have not succeeded 

in warding off the Allied air offensive, which continues to develop in weight 

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of attack, range of penetration, and technical effectiveness. In addition to 

general destructionof German industrial capacity and dislocation of civilian 

life,* the German Air Force itself has suffered direct and indirect damage 

which tends to impair its ability to maintain the present scale of defense. 

Heavy combat losses have been inflicted on it, single-engine fighter production has been substantially reduced, the percentage of serviceability has 

been lowered, and the flow of replacements has been seriously interrupted. 

The growth of the German fighter force has been checked; attrition and 

production are now approximately in balance; and, if the attack is pressed, 

and resisted at current intensity, a decline in strength may be expected, 

opening the way to further progress in the effectiveness of the attack. 

Assuming continued growth in the strength of the Allied air offensive, 

the results achieved may be expected to increase progressively. The cumulative effects may so weaken Germany’s capacity for armed resistance as 

to accelerate greatly the collapse of her will to continue the conflict. 

c. Eastern Front (from Leningrad southward). During 1943 approximately two-thirds of Germany’s ground strength has been committed to 

this front. The proportion of Germany’sair strength so committed has been 

significantly less and has been steadily reduced to meet the increasing 

requirements of the Western and Mediterranean Fronts, thus facilitating 

the Soviet advance. German ground strength on the Eastern Front consists 

of 205 German and 14 satellite divisions of varying strength. Numerically, 

Soviet ground strength is to the German approximately as 3 to 2. Present 

air strengths may be compared as follows: 

Germany 

U.S.S.R. 

Fighters Bombers Others 

393 1,062t 237 

1,700 2,450 250 

t Includes 90 Rumanian. 

During 1943 Germany has surrendered the initiative to the U.S.S.R. 

and has accepted the necessity of yielding space under pressure in order 

to minimize losses. The Germans may have hoped that eventually the extension of Red communications and the shortening of their own would 

bring them to a position which could be held with reduced forces against 

weakened Red pressure. Thus they might gain greater freedom of action 

in meeting the requirements of 1944. However, the pressure developed and 

* See paragraphs 2 e and 2 f, Appendix to C.C.S. 300/3. 

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maintained by the Red Army has exceeded German expectations; and 

German losses of men, material, and ground have been greater than were 

anticipated. 

At present (1November 1943) Red penetrations of the Dnieper Bend 

and the Nogai Steppe have rendered those areas untenable and German 

withdrawal from them is apparently in progress. The Crimea has been 

isolated, and may not be tenable for long.* In the Ukraine the Germans 

may well attempt delay in successive positions (e.g., Kremenchug-Krivoi 

Rog-lower Dnieper, and Cherkassy-Nikolaev) , but no position suitable for 

a determined stand is apparent east of the general line Dniester RiverZhitomir-Pripet Marshes. 

Between the Pripet Marshes and the Dvina River, the Germans will 

apparently seek to hold on the general line Dnieper River-Orsha-Vitebsk. 

Further north they may withdraw from the Leningrad-Novgorod area to 

the general line Vitebsk-Pskov-Narva. 

The final German defensive line in the east appears to be marked 

by the rivers Dniester-(Polish) Bug-Niemen. There they must stand and 

give decisive battle, since further withdrawal would uncover vital areas. 

d. Finland and Adjacent Norway. This front has long been quiet. Finnish strength is equivalent to 15divisions, with 7 German divisions in northern Finland and adjacent Norway. The Soviet numerical superiority is as 

3 to 2. Air strengths in the area may be compared as follows: 

Germany 

U.S.S.R. 

Fighters Bombers Others 

66 63 27 

100 50 50 

A German withdrawal from before Leningrad would have psychological repercussions in Finland, but would not affect basically the military 

situation so long as the Germans remained in Estonia. 

e. Norway and Denmark. In Norway (less the area adjacent to Finland) 

there are 11German divisions; in Denmark,5. Of these 16, only 6, in Norway, 

* Axis naval forces in the Black Sea consist principally of 4 Rumanian destroyers, a few submarines, and same motor torpedo boats. 

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are offensive in type. German air strength in the area consists of 126 fighters, 42 bombers, and 45 other types. Two German battleships, one of which 

is damaged, and their accompanying light forces remain in north Norwegian 

waters. 

f. Western Front. The coast from Brest to Den Helder has been well 

fortified in depth. Although various interior installations have been locally 

fortified, it is now believed that no prepared defensive line exists between 

the coast and the West Wall. 

In France and the Low Countries there are 42 German divisions 

(including 10 training divisions). Seventeen of them are offensive in type, 

but only 11 of these are now fully effective. German air strength in the 

same area, less southern France, consists of 796 fighters, 267 bombers, and 

30 other types. 

g. Italy. We believe that from 22 to 25 German divisions are in Italy, 

all of them offensive in type. Twenty have been identified, of which 10 are 

panzer or panzer grenadier. Ten are at Rome or southward (3 panzer, 3 

panzer grenadier, 2 infantry, 2 parachute). Five (2 panzer, 3 infantry) are 

engaged against Partisans in Venezia Julia, and a sixth (panzer grenadier) 

may be en route thither. The remaining identified divisions (4 infantry) 

are in the Po Valley and Tuscany and are considered as equivalent to the 

minimum occupational requirement for that area. In Italy elements of 4 

Italian divisions are cooperating with the Germans, of which only one is 

actively engaged (against the Partisans in Venezia Julia). 

German air strength in Italy and southern France consists of 132 

fighters, 362 bombers, and 27 other types. It is, for the most part, held back 

in the north, German air support in central Italy having been relatively 

slight. 

Since the topography in central Italy is well suited to defense against 

frontal attack, the Germans are now principally concerned lest their flanks 

be turned by amphibious operations. Their intention appears to be to engage 

in strong delaying actions in successive positions as long as possible and 

eventually to hold when equilibrium is established, probably north of Rome 

but south of the Po watershed. A counter offensive capability exists, however, and may be promptly exploited if a good opportunity is offered. For 

such a purpose ground strength could be drawn, not only from northern 

Italy, but also from France. The principal deterrent factor would be Allied 

air superiority. 

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h. Adriatic-Aegean Area. Axis ground strength in Yugoslavia, Albania, 

Greece, and the Aegean islands consists of 20 German, 8 Croat, 1 Serb, and 

9Bulgar divisions. Of these, only 14German divisions are offensive in type. 

German air strength consistsof 65 fighters, 199 bombers, and 63other types. 

Naval strength in the Aegean consists only of few ex-Italian destroyers and 

torpedo boats and some motor torpedo boats. 

Germany’svigorous reaction to Italian defection in this area indicates 

a determination to maintain her position there. The prompt seizure of the 

Adriatic ports and the islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, Rhodes, and Cos, has 

practically restored the front. The British still hold Leros and Samos. The 

Germans are sensitive to this penetration and attacks to recapture these 

islands are anticipated. 

Axis occupational forces are stretched thin to make up for the disappearance of 30 Italian divisions. They are still able to hold important 

localities and routes of communication,but they are inadequate to suppress 

guerrilla activity and probably inadequate to hold the interior and resist 

invasion simultaneously. 

i. Strategic Reserves. No strategic reserves exist as such. Relief and reinforcement are accomplished by transfer of units from one front to another 

according to circumstances. Since air strength is inadequate on all fronts, 

reinforcement of one is possible only at the sacrifice of less important interests on another. With respect to ground forces, it still remains possible to 

withdraw one or two divisions from any one front (except the Balkans) 

without undue risk, and several such withdrawals in combination may 

constitute an appreciable reinforcement at the point where they are needed, 

but it is no longer possible to withdraw any considerable number of divisions 

from any one front. 

In France an apparent surplus of divisions over minimum defensive 

requirements exists. France is a notable training and reforming area, however,and consequently a number of the divisions there are not fully effective. 

They could nevertheless be of some use in extreme emergency. France is 

thus the principal source of possible reinforcements for other fronts. 

4. THE SITUATIONS IN THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES 

a. Hungary and Rumania. Because of the vital importance to her of 

Rumanian oil and of Hungarian lines of communication and oil, Germany 

will maintain a firm grip on both countries as long as possible. Each wishes 

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to escape that grip but is prevented from surrendering or terminating its 

resistance principally by fear of German occupation. Each also fears the 

U.S.S.R. and the other, and Hungary also has reason to fear Yugoslavia 

and Czechoslovakia. 

b. Bulgaria. The death of King Boris has as yet brought no significant 

political change, though future governments will find it harder to sustain a 

pro-German policy. The people of Bulgaria look to the U.S.S.R.for support, 

and the widespread pro-Soviet sentiment forces the government to maintain diplomatic relations with that country. Bulgaria has achieved her 

territorial aspirations at the expense of Yugoslavia and Greece and might 

not relinquish them easily. 

c. Finland. Overwhelming fear of the U.S.S.R. is by far the greatest 

factor binding Finland to Germany. Less important factors are Finland's 

dependence on Germany for essential supplies and the presence of German 

troops in northern Finland. If a satisfactory territorial adjustment with 

the U.S.S.R.could be made, the less important factors probably could be 

overcome and Finland would willingly withdraw from the war. 

5. THE SITUATIONS IN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 

a. Norway. Strong underground resistance continues to increase. Some 

rifts between the underground and the Government in exile are appearing. 

There is also some evidence, not yet fully evaluated, of Communist influence 

in the underground. 

b. Denmark. As a result of German demands arising out of increased 

Danish resistance and sabotage the Danish Government tendered its 

resignation to the King. Although their resignations were not formally 

accepted, Denmark has since been without a Government and is ruled 

directly by the Germans. 

c. The Low Countries. A general increase in sabotage and civilian resistance, somewhat more advanced in the Netherlands than in Belgium, has 

been accompanied by a disintegration of native pro-Nazi parties in both 

countries. Both countries are compelled to contribute substantial industrial manpower to Germany. Belgian industry, though below capacity, is 

important. 

d. France. Resistance to German control has greatly increased and is 

seriously affecting production for the Axis. Recruitment of labor for Germany has nearly stopped. The underground movement, increasingly unified 

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and confident, has now reached a stage of considerable political effectiveness. 

French underground leaders show great irritation over attempts to exclude 

France from major political decisions. The present Vichy Government is 

likely to give way soon to a more pro-German regime, and even Lava1 and 

Petain are making overtures to the United Nations. 

e. Italy. The Germans appear to have the situation behind their lines 

in Italy reasonably well in hand, although some Italian units continue to 

resist in the Alpine area, particularly on the French and Yugoslav frontiers, 

and some sabotage continues. The Mussolini Government appears to have 

acquired relatively few supporters. 

f. Yugoslavia. The surrender of Italy and the disintegration of the 

Italian forcesof occupation touched off more active campaigns by guerrilla 

forces. In spite of extensive operations by German forces, these activities, 

strengthened by the adherence of certain Italian units, the acquisition of 

Italian arms, the increased scale of Allied material support, and the psychological effect of the surrender of Italy, have now reached considerable 

proportions, especially in the western half of the country. The internal 

conflict between the Partisans and the Chetniks has, however, reduced 

guerrilla effectiveness. 

g. Albania. There is some guerrilla activity but on a much smaller scale 

than in Yugoslavia. 

h. Greece (Including Crete). Despite the exhaustion of the country 

there is considerable and increasing underground and guerrilla activity, 

but on a much smaller scale than in Yugoslavia. Greek guerrilla forces are 

divided politically and have clashed. There is general opposition to a restoration of King George 11. 

i. Poland. Considerable underground activity is carried on, but the 

situation is complicated by a boundary dispute with the U.S.S.R. and the 

presence of Soviet guerrillas and various Soviet fostered organizations independent of the Polish Government in London. Poland contributes manpower, and coal, food,and some oil to Germany. 

j. Occupied U.S.S.R. Considerable guerrilla activity continues behind 

the German lines. German efforts to organize anti-Communistsforces have 

had virtually no success. The Germans have obtained manpower and some 

food and raw materials from Occupied U.S.S.R. The food dividend for this 

crop year is at least partly safe against Soviet recapture. 

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6. THE ATTITUDES OF EUROPEAN NEUTRALS 

a. Sweden. Sweden is determined to maintain her neutrality and is now 

taking a firm attitude in her relations with Germany. Public expression of 

sympathy with the United Nations and with German occupied countries, 

especially Norway and Denmark, is greatly increasing. Swedish fear of 

ultimate Soviet intentions in the Baltic area continues, however, to be a 

factor in the Swedish attitude toward the developing war situation. 

b. Switzerland. Despite their isolation, the Swiss have succeeded in 

maintaining a firmly neutral attitude. However, Switzerland depends 

heavily upon trade with Germany and continues to make economic contributions of value to that country. 

c. Spain. The Franco regime is apparently torn between the dictates of 

sympathy and of discretion, with Spain’s internal situation unstable but 

held in delicate balance. Since November 1942 Spanish policy has been 

progressively readjusted away from non-belligerent adherence to the Axis 

to one of “vigilant neutrality” in accordance with the increase of United 

Nations power in the Mediterranean. The fall of Mussolini, the capitulation 

of Italy, and its declaration of war against Germany have made a profound 

impression on Franco. It is possible that, in order to hold his position, he 

may seek British and American support and even acquiesce in a return of 

the monarchy, in which he might retain a favorable post. 

d. Portugal. The Government of Portugal desires above all to remain 

neutral on the Continent. Owing to the need for outside economic aid and 

to popular sympathy toward the United Nations, Portugal has shown 

increased leanings towards them by granting to Britain the use of the 

Azores as bases. Further concessions cannot, however, be expected in the 

near future. 

e. Turkey. Turkey’s fear of Soviet domination of the Balkans or Dardanelles will probably lead her to active participation in the war in order 

to obtain a voice in the peace settlement. But such participation will not 

take place until it can be done at minimum cost. 

7. SUMMARY OF THE EXISTING SITUATION-SEE PARAGRAPH 2. 

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8. COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO GERMANY IN 1944 

a. To Stand on the Strategic Defensive. In view of Germany’s lack of 

decisive offensive capabilities and the prospect of having to meet attack 

on three fronts, this is the only general course of military action open to 

her. It is a negative course, which cannot bring victory but which might 

serve to avert defeat. Although her military resources are inadequate to 

meet all of her defensive requirements, Germany may yet hope that a prolongation of resistance may lead to a favorable stroke of fortune or at least 

to a stalemate. 

Within this general course are several subordinate courses of action, 

as follows: 

(1) To Continue the War Against Shipping. Germany will follow 

this course to the end in order to impede support of Allied operations in 

Europe. 

(2) To Continue to Direct Her Air EffortPrimarily to Defense Against

Strategic Bombing. Germany is compelled to adopt this course, regardless of its effect upon air support of her land fronts and upon her offensive 

air capabilities. 

(3) To Counterattack to Destroy or Expel any Hostile Force Entering

Her Defensive Perimeter. Germany’s last military hope is by exploiting 

interior lines to concentrate against her enemies in detail and to inflict 

on at least one of them a repulse severe enough to induce a willingness 

to negotiate. 

(4) To Abandon Outlying Territory (e.g., Norway, France, Italy,

Greece, Occupied Russia, Finland). This course is responsive to Germany’s need to conserve and concentrate strength. However, the consequent impairment of her military, economic, political, or psychological 

situations will not permit her to adopt it voluntarily. 

b. Contingent Courses of Action. Within the concept of the strategic 

defensive are certain contingent courses of offensive action. Since all involve 

dispersion of force, she will adopt none of them except under imperative 

necessity to forestall or counteract certain unfavorable developments. 

(1) To Invade Sweden. Certain intelligence that United Nations 

bombers were to be permitted to operate against her from Swedish bases 

would compel Germany to adopt this course. German forces now surrounding Sweden cannot undertake the operation and at the same time 

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maintain their outward fronts against the United Nations. Their reinforcement would be required. 

(2) To Invade Spain. In present circumstances this course could be 

adopted only as a diversion. A counter-offensive in Italy would probably 

be regarded as more effective for that purpose, at less cost in increased 

commitments. 

(3) To Invade Turkey. Germany’s present strength in the BalkansAegean area is barely adequate to occupy and defend it. She is apparently 

determined, however, to maintain her position there, and, if compelled 

by a threat to it from Turkey, could divert sufficient strength from other 

fronts to advance at least to the Straits for defensive purposes. 

(4) To Occupy Hungary, Rumania, OT Bulgaria. Germzny would 

occupy any one of them if it were absolutely necessary to prevent or 

counteract its defection. 

c. To Seek a Negotiated Peace. Germany will continue, by means of 

propaganda warfare, to seek to persuade her principal enemies that her 

defeat is impossible or is possible only at prohibitive cost, in hope of inducing 

them to accept a negotiated peace advantageous to her. Included in this 

will be continued efforts to divide her principal enemies so as at least to 

impede their operations and at best to secure a negotiated peace with one 

which would enable her to concentrate against the others. 

d. To Surrender. Actual or virtual surrender will remain unacceptable 

so long as there is hope of achieving a stalemate or a negotiated peace. It 

will, presumably, never be acceptable to the Nazi leaders. The only possibility of political change presently apparent in Germany is an assumption 

of control by the High Command. If Germany cannot conduct a successful 

defense on all fronts and cannot divide her enemies, making peace with one 

in order to concentrate against the others, the High Command may elect to 

sue for peace in order to avert further destruction prejudicial to Germany’s 

eventual recovery. 

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C.C.S. 30817 

BOUNDARIES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

Reference: 

CCS 129th Meeting, Item 6 

C.C.S. 30817 was circulated by the United States Chiefs of Staff 24 November 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this paper in their 129th 

Meeting and agreed to defer action. 

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C.C.S. 30817 24 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BOUNDARIES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

1. The Generalissimo has indicated his objection to the boundaries of the 

Southeast Asia Command proposed at QUADRANT and in lieu thereof, after 

conferences with Admiral Mountbatten and Lieutenant General Somervell, has 

indicated his views as follows: 

The Generalissimo approves wholeheartedly unity of command under 

Mountbatten for the Burma campaign. Under existing circumstances he feels 

that the inclusion of Thailand and Indochina in the Southeast Asia Theater 

would not be practicable and would deter rather than further the success of any 

project designed to defeat Japan. He cites as his reasons for this belief the 

effect which a change of boundary would have on the Chinese people,onChinese 

troops, on the people of Thailand and Indochina and on the Japanese. The 

Chinese people and army are aware that those countries were included in the 

China Theater of War and that now to make the change would strike a blow 

at their morale which would affect the conduct of the coming operations and 

attitude of the people and troops towards the war. This is borne out by the 

effect of the announcement in the British press that such a change was contemplated. This caused repercussions involving necessity for the Chinese news 

agency to deny the statements. Japanese propaganda has been directed to 

convincing people of Indochina and Thailand that the British intended to 

hold those countries after the war. A change in boundaries at this time would 

tend to convince people that Japanese were correct and thus incur hostility to 

our cause and lastly the change would permit Japanese propaganda in China 

to be more successful in creating a breach in present happy British, American, 

and Chinese relations. 

The China Theater comprises Thailand, Indochina, and the whole of 

China. As the war develops, the scope of operations of the United Nations’ 

Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater newly created, besides 

Burma and Malaya, may involve Thailand and Indochina. In order to enable 

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the two theaters to cooperate closely and satisfactorily, the Generalissimo 

deems advisable to reach the following arrangements in advance: 

a. When the time comes for two theaters to launch assaults upon the 

enemy in Thailand and Indochina, the Chinese troops will attack from the 

north, and the troops under the command of the Southeast Asia Theater, 

Mountbatten, are expected to make full use of facilities afforded by the ports 

and air bases under its control and attack from the south. If the troops are 

landed in those countries, the boundaries between the two theaters are to 

be decided at the time in accordance with the progress of advances the 

respective forces made. 

b. All matters of political nature that arise during operations will be 

dealt with at a Chinese-British-American committee which is to be located 

in the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the China Theater. 

2. Admiral Mountbatten has accepted the suggestions of the Generalissimo 

insofar as the boundaries are concerned but objects to the political commission. 

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff and the President have approved the 

proposal of the Generalissimo as it stands and recommend British acceptance 

of his proposals. 

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C.C.S. 320/4 (Revised) 

OPERATION “RANKIN” 

References: 

CCS 134th Meeting, Items 5,6, and 7 

5th Plenary Meeting 

C.C.S. 320/4 was circulated by the United States Chiefs of Staff 4 December 1943.The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 134th Meeting agreed to accept 

C.C.S. 320/4 as modified (subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 320/4 (Revised) ) . 

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C.C.S. 320/4 (Revised) 4 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATION “RANKIN” 

Reference: CCS 320 Series 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. In developing his plans for RANKIN, COSSAC has submitted a recommendation (paragraph 11, C.C.S. 320/2) that under the general direction of 

the Supreme Allied Commander the territories to be occupied should be divided 

into two spheres, the British sphere, including northwest Germany, Belgium, 

Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark, and the U.S. sphere, generally southern 

Germany and France, with Austria a U.S.sphere, initially under the Mediterranean command. It is understood that planning by COSSAC is now proceeding 

on this basis. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff now propose that these spheres be 

changed as follows: 

a. U.S. sphere. The general area Netherlands, Northern Germany as 

far east as the line Berlin-Stettin, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The 

boundary of this area is to be as follows: Southern boundary of the Netherlands; thence to Duesseldorf on the Rhine; down the east bank of the Rhine 

to Mains; thence due east to Beyreuth; thence north to Leipzig; thence 

northeast to Cottbus; thence north to Berlin (exclusive); thence to Stettin 

(inclusive). 

b. British sphere. Generally the territory to the west and south of the 

American western boundary. 

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff further propose that COSSAC be 

directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning 

on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation. 

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C.C.S. 37917 

RETENTION OF LST'S IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

References: 

CCS 132d Meeting 

2d Plenary Meeting 

C.C.S. 379/7 circulated a memorandum by the Commander in Chief, 

Allied Force Headquarters, 27 November 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff 

resolved this matter in their 132d Meeting and informed General Eisenhower 

(FAN 281) that the 68 LST's which are due to be sent from the Mediterranean 

to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD be retained in the Mediterranean 

until 15January. 

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C.C.S. 37917 27 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

RETENTION OF LST'S IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters 

22 November 1943 

1. In my NAF 486 and 505 I outlined my plans for the capture of Rome and 

explained the great part which an amphibious operation might play should 

the opportunity arise. 

2. This operation is now being planned to take place south of Rome, but it 

cannot be launched until we are ready to advance from the Frosinone area. 

The reason is that the assault force, unable to depend on maintenance over 

beaches owing to the unreliability of weather on the Italian coast in winter, 

must be joined by the overland force within 48 hours in order to insure maintenance and withstand the estimated scale of enemy counter action. 

3. We estimate that we will not be able to advance from the Frosinone 

area and launch the amphibious assault before mid-December. 

4. If circumstances prevent our launching the amphibious assault, we 

will be faced with coitinued frontal assaults and there will be compelling 

demands for more infantry divisions and, therefore, for all available landing 

craft. I would remind you that our divisions will have been engaged in bitter 

fighting under very exacting conditions for many weeks with little or no relief, 

and I am concerned about the possibility of a low state of battle efficiency 

in January. 

5. These requirements have not taken into account the possibility that 

the Combined Chiefsof Staff may order accelerated operations north of Rome. 

In any event, it is essentialthat these LST's remain in this area. 

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C.C.S. 38012 

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATESBRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE 

Reference: 

CCS 127th Meeting, Item 5 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 127th Meeting, accepted the 

over-all strategic concept and basic undertakings as set out in C.C.S. 380/2. 

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BFXTISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 380/2 6 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT 

UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosure, approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 126th 

Meeting, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT 

UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that the following statement of 

basic stategy and policies will be used as a basis for the next United StatesBritish Staff Conference, it being understood that such agreement does not 

exclude from consideration courses of action which might appear likely to 

facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives. 

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

2. In conjuction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest 

possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers. 

II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE 

WAR 

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest 

possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe. 

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to 

maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose 

of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which 

her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the 

over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

before action is taken. 

5. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific 

Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United 

States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan. 

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III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC 

CONCEPT 

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic 

concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our 

resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with 

the changing situation. 

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western 

Hemisphere and the British Isles. 

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas. 

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace. 

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications. 

e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe. 

f. Concentratemaximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel. 

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to 

aid the war effort of Russia. 

h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for 

operations against Japan. 

i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war as 

is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the 

over-all objectives. 

j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them 

to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers. 

k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific 

and Far East as soon as the German situation allows. 

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C.C.S. 387 and 38713 

MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS 

References: 

CCS 131st Meeting, Item 4B 

CCS 134th Meeting, Item 3 

CCS 135th Meeting, Item 4 

C.C.S. 387 circulated a memorandum by the Representatives of the 

British Chiefs of Staff 3 November 1943. This paper was considered by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 131st Meeting, wherein they agreed to the 

unification of command in the Mediterranean as outlined in C.C.S. 387. C.C.S. 

38711 circulated a directive to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces proposed 

by the United States Chiefs of Staff, and C.C.S. 38712 circulated a directive 

proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 135th Meeting amended and 

accepted C.C.S. 38712. The approved directive was subsequently circulated as 

C.C.S. 38713. 

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C.C.S. 387 3 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Stag 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have been considering the present system of 

command in the Mediterranean under which General Eisenhower is responsible for operations in the Central Mediterranean and the Commander in Chief, 

Middle East, for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. 

2. They point out that the success or failure in one Mediterranean theater 

has an immediate effect upon the other theater. The present system whereby 

all transfers of even small forces have to be referred to the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff, involves delays which are likely to lead to failure to take advantage of 

fleeting opportunities as has been illustrated by recent events in the Aegean. 

The restoration of our control of the Mediterranean has removed the necessity 

for two naval commands. 

3. The British Chiefs of Staff therefore consider that the time has come 

for one Commander to be made responsible for all operations in the Mediterranean and suggest that the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, should now 

assume responsibility for operations in the following areas in addition to those 

already in his command, Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Crete, Aegean Islands and Turkey. The three Commanders in Cairo would 

be under his orders for these operations, but would remain responsible to the 

British Chiefs of Staff for operation of the Middle East base and for all matters 

pertaining to those parts of the present Middle East Commands situated in 

Africa, Asia and Levant (except Turkey) and should continue to receive 

political guidance from the Minister of State resident in the Middle East in 

respect of these responsibilities. 

4. Such reorganization would insure that operations in the Mediterranean 

are regarded as a whole and would empower the Commander in Chief to 

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transfer forces from one part of the area to another in order to take advantage 

of fleeting opportunities. The British Chiefs of Staff consider this particularly 

desirable in view of possible opportunities in the Balkans and the effect that 

operations in that theater might have on the main operations in Italy. 

5. On Air Marshal Tedder’s recommendation the British Chiefs of Staff 

would like to suggest that the Mediterranean Air Command should be renamed 

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. 

6. The views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on these proposals are 

requested. A diagram of the proposals is attached as an enclosure. 

55 
ENCLOSURE 

PROPOSED SYSTEM OF COMMAND IN THE -MEDITERRANEAN 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFf 

I 

C. -I N-C. 

ALLIED FORCES 

DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHI

ALLIEF FORCES AND C.-IN-C., MEDITERRANEAN 

15 ARMY GROUP IGEN. ALEXANDER)

I I 

UI 15 ARMY C.-IN-C., A.O.C., A.0.C.-IN-C., FLAG OFFICER, FLAG OFFICER, 

cn GROUP MIDDLE EAST NORTH-WEST AFRICAN MIDDLE EAST WESTERN CENTRAL 

AIR FORCE MEDITERRANEAN MEDITERRANEAN 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 38713 5 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DIRECTIVE FOR UNIFICATION OF COMMAND IN 

THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean 

was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 135th Meeting. 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ALLIED FORCES 

NORTH AFRICA 

1. We have decided to set up a unified command in the Mediterranean 

Theater on account of its geographical unity and its dependence on all bases 

in the area. 

2. We have no intention of changing existing organization and arrangements any more than is necessary to give effect to our main intention. You 

should assume, therefore, that all present arrangements continue with the 

exceptions outlined below but you should report as necessary whether you consider any further changes are required in the light of experience. 

3. To your present responsibilities you will add responsibility for operations 

in Greece,Albania, Yugoslavia,Bulgaria,Rumania, Hungary, Crete and Aegean 

Islands and Turkey. The British and American forces allocated to you from 

Middle East will be determined by the British and United States Chiefs of Staff, 

respectively. You will have full liberty to transfer forces from one part of your 

Command to another for the purposes of conducting operations which we have 

agreed. The Commanders in Chief, Middle East, will be under your orders for 

operations in these areas. 

4. You will provide US. Strategic Air Forces under separate command, but 

operating in your area, with the necessary logistical and adminstrative support in performance of Operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first 

priority. Should a strategic or tactical emergency arise, you may, at your discretion, utilize the 15th U.S. Strategic Air Force for purposes other than its 

primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding 

General, US. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, if and when that command is 

organized. 

5. You will in addition, assume responsibility for the conduct of guerrilla 

and subversive action in all the territories in your command and for setting 

up the necessary organization for the dispatch of supplies to resistance groups 

in occupied territories. 

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6. The Commanders in Chief, Middle East, will remain directly responsible 

to the British Chiefs of Staff for all the territories at present in Middle East 

Command situated in Africa, Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon, and for the 

operation and security of the Middle East base with such forces as the British 

Chiefs of Staff may allot for this purpose from time to time. 

7. You will be notified later of any adjustments which are thought necessary to the machinery by which you receive political guidance. In the meantime, 

in respect of the new territories in your command you should obtain any 

necessary political advice from C-in-C Middle East through the channels he at 

present uses. 

8. The system of Command is shown on the attached diagram (Appendix 

“A”). You will note that the Mediterranean Air Command will now be known 

as Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. 

59 
A P P E N D I X "A" 

PROPOSCU SYSTEM OF COlvKrlANU IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C-IN-C ALLIED FORCES (a1 

DEPUTY C-IN-C ALLIED FORCES 

I I I I I 

15t h GROUP C-IN-C CUR: BALKAN AIR C-IN-C MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL COMMAN

OF ARMIES MIDDLE EAST -T ALLIED AIR FORCES MEDITER

I. 1- I 

A.O.C. IN C F!O. 

DEPUTY AIR C-IN-C C C D DEPUTY AIR C-IN< - i.0- - 

IU.S.1 I BR IT1SH 1 MIDDLE EAST GIS. ID! Yi. MED. CE

Q,

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APPENDIX “B” 

BALKAN SUPPORT 

It was agreed at the EUREKA Conference that our support of the Patriots in the Balkans, which now falls within the area in which you are responsible for Allied operations, should be intensified in order to increase their 

effectiveness. 

You will be responsible for supporting them to the greatest practicable 

extent by increasing the supply of arms and equipment, clothing, medical 

stores, food and such other supplies as they may require. You should also support them by commando operations and by furnishing such air support as 

you may consider advisable in the light of the general situation. 

You should examine the possibility of continuing to supply the Patriots 

with Italian equipment, in the use of which they are already experienced, 

making good deficiencies in Italian formations to such extent as may be 

necessary with available British or American equipment. 

We consider that this mission is of such importance that it would best 

be controlled on a regular basis by a special commander and joint staff. 

Appendix “B” 

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C.C.S. 390/1 

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

References: 

CCS 128th Meeting, Item 4 

1st Plenary Meeting 

2d Plenary Meeting 

3d Plenary Meeting 

4th Plenary Meeting 

CCS 397 (Revised) 

CCS 427 and 427/1 

C.C.S. 390/1 circulated a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of 

Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 128th Meeting, approved C.C.S. 

390/1 but agreed to suspend final decision regarding Operation BUCCANEER 

until later in the SEXTANT Conference. The decision relative to Operation 

BUCCANEER was resolved in the consideration of C.C.S. 427 (Operations in 

the Southeast Asia Command). 

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C.C.S. 390/1 18 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

Reference: 

CCS 390 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff realize that it is undesirable for the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff to enter into the details of various operations, but 

do not agree, however, that only matters of grand strategy should be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

2. The QUADRANT decisions (C.C.S. 319/5, paragraph 58) state that 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy 

for the Southeast Asia Theater. This is construed as requiring decision by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff as to which of several courses of action are to be 

undertaken, and their sequence and timing. 

3. Since the United States cannot furnish the required assistance for FIRST 

CULVERIN, it is agreed that Operation BUCCANEER should be mounted as 

early as practicable. However, we believe it may prove possible to conduct 

additional land, sea, and air operations in order to pin down Japanese forces 

in South Burma. We therefore recommend that the CinC, Southeast Asia, be 

directed to explore this subject, and to submit recommendations thereon to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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C.C.S. 397 (Revised) 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944 

References: 

CCS 137th Meeting, Item 5 

1st Plenary Meeting 

2d Plenary Meeting 

C.C.S. 397 (Revised) circulated a memorandum by the United States 

Chiefs of Staff, 3 December 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 137th 

Meeting, approved the specific operations against Japan, 1944, set out in C.C.S. 

397 (Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to 

Operation BUCCANEER. 

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C.C.S.397 (Revised) 3 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944 

References: a. CCS 242/6 

b. CCS 319/5 

c. CCS 417 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. We are agreed that every effort should be exerted to bring the U.S.S.R. 

into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date, and that plans 

should be prepared in that event. 

2. We are agreed that plans should be prepared for operations in the event 

that Germany is defeated earlier than the fall of 1944. 

3. A schedule of proposed operations and projected target dates for 

planning purposes is given in the appendix to the enclosure (pages 70 and 71). 

The operations envisaged are based on a concept of obtaining strategic objectives and bases from which to conduct further operations to force the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest practicable date. The operations are in 

consonance with the over-all objective and over-all strategic concept agreed 

upon at QUADRANT and reaffirmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 

380/2,and with the provisions of C.C.S. 417 (Over-all Plan for the Defeat of 

Japan). 

4. General. In addition to the specific objectives hereinafter indicated, 

supporting operations should be conducted. Both the specific and supporting 

operations will be designed to destroy the Japanese Fleet at an early date; to 

secure maximum attrition of enemy air forces; to intensify air,submarine, and 

mining operations against enemy shipping and lines of communication; to 

establish air and sea blockade of the main Japanese islands; to continue efforts 

to keep China in the war; and to enable us to launch land and carrier-based air 

operations against Japan. 

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5. North Pacific. Plans for the North Pacific involve the augmentation of 

base facilities and defensive installations in the Aleutians in preparation for 

entry into the Kuriles and Soviet territory in the event of Russian collaboration. 

Naval surface and submarine action, including raids on the Japanese fishing 

fleet will be carried out. Preparations will be made for executing very long range 

strategic bombing against the Kuriles and northern Japan. 

6. Central, South and Southwest Pacific. The advance along the New 

Guinea-N.E.1.-Philippine axis will proceed concurrently with operationsfor the 

capture of the Mandated Islands. A strategic bombing force will be established 

in Guam, Tinian, and Saipan for strategic bombing of Japan proper. Air bombardment of targets in the N.E.1.-Philippine Area and the aerial neutralization 

of Rabaul will be intensified. 

7. China. Our efforts in the China area should have as their objective the 

intensification of land and air operations in and from China and the build-up 

of the U.S.A.A.F. and the Chinese army and air forces. It shall include also the 

establishing,without materially affecting other approved operations, of a very 

long range strategic bombing force at Calcutta, with advanced bases at Chengtu 

to attack vital targets in the Japanese “inner zone.”* 

8. SoutheastAsia. Operations for the capture of Upper Burma in the spring 

of 1944in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications 

with China, and an amphibious operation at approximately the same time. 

Continuance of operations during the autumn of 1944 within the limits of the 

forces available (see paragraph 14,C.C.S. 417) to extend the position held in 

upper Burma. 

Should the means be available, additional ground, sea and air offensive 

operations, including carrier-borne raids, with the object of maintaining 

pressure on the enemy, forcing dispersion of his forces, and attaining the 

maximum attrition practicable on his air and naval forces and shipping. 

9. As more carriers become available, the operations set forth should be 

supplemented, between scheduled operational dates as practicable, with 

massed carrier task force strikes against selected vital targets. 

* Includes: Japan proper, Manchuria,Korea, North China, Karafuto (Japanese 

Sakhalii) and Formosa. 

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10. The completion of these operations will place the United Nations in 

positions from which to use most advantageously the great air, ground, and 

naval resources which will be at our disposal after Germany is defeated. 

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ENCLOSURE 

A schedule of operations for 1944 is set forth in the appendix. Target 

dates which have been determined after careful consideration of prospective 

means and of time and space factors, are presented for planning purposes 

only. We are convinced that the sequence of operations must be flexible; we 

must be prepared to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments in the situation. The four primary developments which may permit 

short cuts are: 

a. Early defeat of the Japanese Fleet. 

b. Sudden withdrawal of Japanese forces from areas (as from Kiska). 

c. Increase in our means such as by acceleration of the assault shipbuilding program and by an earlier defeat of Germany than 1October 1944. 

d. The early collaboration of the U.S.S.R.in the war against Japan. 

We have directed that further study be conducted and plans made and 

kept up to date for the conditions assumed in c and d. 

We have directed that special attention be given to the optimum employment of the enormous air forces which will be released upon the defeat of 

Germany. 

We have directed that a study be made for the optimum use, timing, 

and deployment in the war against Japan of very long range bombers. 

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APPENDIX 

SCHEDULE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES OF OPERATIONS FOR 

OBTAINING THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES IN 1944 

Target Dates 

1-31 Jan. 1944 

15 Jan.­

15March 1944 

1 Feb. 1944 

20 March 1944 

20 April 1944 

1 May 1944 

1 June 1944 

Central Pacific 

Seizure of the 

Marshalls, 

including 

Eniwetok and 

Kusaie. 

Seizure of 

Ponape. 

Southwest Pacific 

Complete the 

seizure of Western 

New Britain; contmue neutralization of Rabaul. 

Seizure of Hansa 

Bav area. “ 

Capture of 

Kavieng. 

Seizure of Manus. 

Seizure of 

Hollandia. 

(Humboldt Bay) 

Southeast 

Asia Command 

and China 

Operations in 

Upper Burma, 

Arakan Region 

and China. 

Amphibious 

operations in 

Southeast Asia. 

(BUCCANEER) 

Initiate V.L.R. 

bombing of vital 

targets in Japanese “Inner 

Zone” from bases 

in China. 

(Table Continued on Following Page) 

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Southeast 

Asia Command 

Target Dates Central Pacific Southwest Pacific and China 

20 July 1944 Seizure of 

Eastern 

Carolines 

(Truk Area). 

15 Aug. 1944 

1 Oct. 1944 Seizure of Guam 

and Japanese 

Marianas. 

1 Nov. 1944 

(end of 

monsoon) 

31 Dec. 1944 Initiate V.L.R. 

bombing of vital 

targets in 

Japanese “Inner 

Zone” from bases 

in the Marianas. 

Initiate V.L.R. 

bombing of vital 

targets in the 

Netherlands 

East Indies. 

Advance to westward along north 

coast of New 

Guinea to include 

Vogelkop. 

Intensification of 

offensive operations in the 

Southeast Asia 

Command. 

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C.C.S. 398 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND HER 

SATELLITES, 1943-44 

C.C.S. 398 circulated a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of 

Staff. This memorandum was noted informally by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

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C.C.S. 398 18 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND HER 

SATELLITES, 1943-44 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The United States Chiefs of Staff propose the following specific operations for the defeat of Germany and her satellites in 1943-44. 

1. Facilities in the Azores Islands. The facilities of the Azores Islands will 

be used for (1) intensified sea and air operations against the U-boat, and 

(2) air ferry operations. The British Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the assurance 

given by them in QUADRANT that everything will be done by the British as 

soon as possible to assist in making arrangements for facilities in the Azores 

for U.S. naval participation in the anti-U-boat campaign and for the operational and transit use by US. aircraft. 

2. The Combined Bomber Offensive.The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication and the material reduction 

of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined 

Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD. 

The Combined Bomber Offensive continues to have highest strategic priority. 

We have directed that studies be made of the use of bases in the U.S.S.R. for 

shuttle bombing operations. 

3. Operation OVERLORD 

a. This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort 

against Germany. (Target date 1 May 1944.) In the preparatory phase 

immediately preceding the invasion, the whole of the available air power 

inthe U.K., tactical and strategic, will be employed in a concentrated effort 

to create the conditions essential to the success of the assault. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed toward 

securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against 

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the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied Air Forces in 

France, an intensive air attack on Germany and her military forces, communications and installations will be launched, designed to precipitate the 

collapse of enemy resistance prior to a general assault on the hostile ground 

forces in the advance into the heart of Germany. 

b. There will be a balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces 

available in the United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any 

situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France. 

c. As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be 

distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of 

OVERLORD. Operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be carried out 

with the forces allotted except in so far as these may be varied by decision 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

d. The Supreme Allied Commander for Operation OVERLORD, when 

appointed, will establish contact with the Commander in Chief, North African Theater of Operations, and the Commanders in Chief, Middle East, or 

with the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, if and when appointed, 

and recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff their -

general missions and 

objectives, and the timing of their operations, so as best to support OVERLORD. 

4. Planning for OVERLORD. Pending the appointment of the Supreme 

Allied Commander, COSSAC will continue with the detailed planning and with 

full preparations for operations OVERLORD and RANKIN. 

5. Operations in Scandinavia 

a. Strong carrier-based raids on German combatant ships in northern 

Norway should be undertaken in order to relieve naval units from the 

eastern Atlantic for operations in other theaters. 

b. Plans should be developed for operations in the Scandinavian area in 

the event that circumstances should render the execution of OVERLORD 

impossible. Such plans should envisage collaboration with the U.S.S.R.,with 

particular reference to opening communications to Sweden and developing 

a situation favorable for Sweden to enter the war. In the event Sweden 

enters the war, we should make use of her air bases to establish an air task 

force of suitable composition to aid in the strategic bombing of Germany. 

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6. Operations in Italy. The maximum possible pressure will be maintained, 

with the forces allocated, on German forces in Italy, in order to assist in the 

creation of the conditions required for OVERLORD, and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the re-equipped 

French Army and Air Force into Southern France. The Allied Commander, 

North Africa, (or the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean,if and when 

appointed) will, in the light of the changing strategic situation, make recommendations from time to time to the Supreme Allied Commander for Operation 

OVERLORD concerning the operations in the Mediterranean that will, in his 

judgment, make the greatest contribution towards insuring the success of 

Operation OVERLORD. Pending the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander, these recommendations will be made, after coordination with COSSAC, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

7. Operations in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean Region 

a. Recognizing that (1) the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean approach 

to the European Fortress is unsuitable, due to terrain and communication 

difficulties, for large-scale military operations, (2) the implementation of 

our agreed strategy for the defeat of Germany will require all available 

military means, and (3) our experience shows that the acceptance of limited 

objective operations, however attractive in themselves, invariably requires 

resources beyond those initially anticipated, we are agreed that our strategy will be best served by causing Germany to dissipate her defensive 

strength in maintaining her position in the Balkan-Aegean area. So long, 

therefore, as the present strategic situation in this area remains substantially unchanged, operations in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean region 

will be limited to: 

(1) The supply of Balkan guerrillas by sea and air transport. 

(2) Minor action by Commando forces. 

(3) The bombing of vital strategic targets. 

b. We agree that it is desirable to bring Turkey into the war at this 

time but this must be brought about without diversion of resources that 

would prejudice the success of our commitments elsewhere. To this end, in 

full collaboration with the U.S.S.R., we should bring pressure to bear on 

Turkey to enter the war and conduct offensive operations in the Balkans 

to the extent possible with the resources presently available to her. It must 

be made clear that military assistance to be furnished Turkey by the 

United States and Great Britain is limited to such supplies and equipment 

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as can be furnished without prejudice to the successful accomplishment of 

our commitments elsewhere. 

8. Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in the 

Mediterranean. Defensive garrison commitments in the Mediterranean area 

will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. 

The security of our lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar 

will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest Africa, so 

long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans’ invading the 

Iberian Peninsula. 

9. Coordinated i7.S.-British-U.S.S.R. Operations. We are now examining, 

and shall continue to seek out, methods and means whereby the defeat of 

Germany and her satellites can be expedited through maximum coordination 

of United States, British, and U.S.S.R. operations. 

10. Emergency Entry into Europe. We have directed that an extended RANKIN plan be prepared in collaboration with the U.S.S.R., in order that available Allied forces may take prompt action in the event an opportunistic entry 

into Europe becomes possible. The extended plan will provide for emergency 

entry into Europe in collaboration with the U.S.S.R. of United Nations forces 

from the United Kingdom, the North African Theater of Operations, Middle 

East, and, if required, directly from the United States. 

11. German Satellites. We are agreed that, in so far as means can be made 

available without prejudice to the over-all strategy agreed hereto, effort should 

be made to separate the satellite powers from Germany. 

12. Relations With Patriot Forces in Europe. Within the limits of available 

means and without prejudice to major operations, patriot forces everywhere 

within enemy occupied territory in Europe, should be furnished supplies to 

enable them to conduct sabotage, propaganda, intelligence and guerrilla 

warfare. 

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C.C.S. 399 

REPORT ON RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS 

IN ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS SINCE “QUADRANT” 

Reference: 

CCS 133d Meeting, Item 5 

C.C.S. 399 circulated a report from the Commander in Chief, United 

States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. The Combined Chiefs of Staff 

took note of this report. 

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C.C.S. 399 18 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

REPORT ON RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS 

IN ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS SINCE “QUADRANT” 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

The enclosed memorandum from the Commander in Chief, United 

States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations is presented herewith for the 

consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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ENCLOSURE 

REPORT ON RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS 

IN ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS SINCE “QUADRANT’ 

Memorandum from Commander in Chief, United States Fleet 

and Chief of Naval Operations 

8 November 1943 

Subject: Report on Recent and Prospective Developments in Anti-Submarine 

Operations Since QUADRANT. 

Enclosure: (A) Surface craft chart. 

(B) Aircraft chart. 

(C) Prospective Deployments of Anti-Submarine Aircraft. 

1. OPERATIONS -AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYMENT OF SURFACE 

CRAFT AND AIRCRAFT 

a. In September, 17 merchant M/Vs were sunk; in October, 15. In September, 11U-boats were sunk; in October, 32. For 1942, 1 submarine was 

sunk or probably sunk for every 9.3 M/Vs lost. For 1943 to date this figure is 

2.1 M/Vs; for the past 5 months -.5. 

b. Enclosure (A) indicates the status of Atlantic Fleet and Sea Frontier 

escorts as of 1August and 1November. Significant are: 

(1) The increase of 51 DEs in the Atlantic Fleet; 

(2) From 1 August to 1 November the reduction in DDs temporarily

assigned ComNavNaw from 28 to 13; 

(3) There were still 16 Pacific Fleet DDs on temporary duty with 

CinCLant on 1 November. 

c. Matters of prospective interest in the escort situation are: 

(1) Commencing with UGS 22 (about 25 October) a minimum escort 

strength of 1 DE Division plus 1 DD Division (10ships) was established 

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for these convoys. This will be raised to 12 as a standard and CinCLant 

plans to gradually increase this to 16 when more slow DEs become 

available. 

(2) The number of escort groups for CU convoys is being increased 

from 1 to 4 because of reduced sailing interval. 

(3) DesDiv 57 (ODDs) now with Fourth Fleet will be replaced by 

CortDivl8. The 4 ODDs in CaribSeaFron and 1ODD in PaSeaFron will 

also be replaced by 327 ft. Coast Guard Cutters. 

(4) 18 acquired craft 100 ft.-150 ft. category in Sea Frontiers and 

LantFlt will be replaced by standard service designed craft, and 4 have 

been decommissioned without relief. 

d. Enclosure (B) indicates the status of anti-submarine aircraft as of 

1August and 1November. 

(1) The anti-submarine aircraft available are adequate to cope with 

the anti-submarine situation present and prospective. It should be 

noted, however, that the availability of PVs and B-24s until 1944 will 

not permit those squadrons to be built up to 15 planes as planned and 

that there is some question as to whether the 8 B-24 Squadrons can be 

maintained at the strength of 12 planes, unless B-24s not now in the 

program for the Atlantic are obtained. This plane shortagemay adversely 

affect our ability to meet emergencies. 

(2) The present CVE situation will remain unchanged until the 

end of the year when MISSION BAY is scheduled to arrive in the 

Atlantic. Six additional CVEs are scheduled to arrive on the east coast 

during the first quarter of the calendar year 1944. The CVEs have continued their effective offensive operations against U-boats and only 1 

ship has been sunk in convoys in the Atlantic that have been covered 

by a U.S. CVE Support Group. 

(3) All Army aircraft in our Frontiers were relieved from antisubmarine duties with the Navy by 1 October except 1 squadron of 

B-25s in the Caribbean Sea Frontier equipped with 75 mm. cannon 

which were loaned to the Navy for anti-submarine evaluation of that 

weapon. The 4 Army B-24 Squadrons on anti-submarine operations in 

U.K. were relieved by Navy squadrons in October. The 2 remaining 

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Army B-24 squadrons in anti-submarine operations in Morocco are in 

process of being relieved by Navy B-24 squadrons. 

2. MATERIEL 

a. Surface Craft 

(1) A single towed parallel rod noisemaker is now issued to all U.S. 

escorts to counter enemy acoustic torpedo. Expendable devices actuated 

by explosives or air are-under test and give promise of being superior 

to FXR. 

(2) A surface craft division of the Anti-Submarine Development 

Detachment has been established, and in addition to conducting experiments will further develop coordinated air and surface anti-submarine 

tactics. 

(3) Mark 9 Depth Charges with faster sinking rate now replacing 

Mark 6 Ash Can type depth charge. 

(4) Mark 8 Depth Charge with proximity pistol now being produced 

with quantity production commencing 1December. 

(5) Bearing Deviation Indicators to improve echo-ranging sound 

equipment is in quantity production. 

(6) Bathyothermograph giving a water temperature depth curve is 

now being issued to escorts to obtain more accurate information on the 

sound conditions. 

(7) 100 in. Dome being installed in new construction DDs will give

improved echo-ranging performance at higher speeds -over 20 kts. 

(8) Shipboard Anti-Submarine Attack Teacher is being issued to 

assist in shipboard training. 

(9) Prospective developments to be accomplished within the next six 

months are: 

(a) Mark 9 Mod 2 Depth Charge with Doppler Acoustic Proximity 

Fuse and improved sinking rate. 

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(b) Scatter Depth Charge to be projected from the usual 

projector. 

(c) Mark 12 Depth Charge -small fast sinking stern dropped 

depth charges. 

(d) The net result to be expected from improvements in depth 

charges is that effectiveness of patterns will be improved about 6 

times. 

b. Aircraft 

(1) Rocket Projectile equipment is being introduced into service in 

both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets; in the Atlantic as an anti-submarine 

weapon. 

(2) Intercept receivers for enemy radar without direction finder and 

homing features are being installed in many Atlantic Fleet aircraft. 

A special test plane (B-24)is now in Moroccan Sea Frontier for purposes 

of obtaining data on German Radar wave lengths, etc. and when this is 

determined installed detectors will be made directional. 

(3) Sono-radio Buoys and associated receivers are being installed 

in the Atlantic Fleet aircraft in limited numbers. 

(4) Aircraft tactics to counter radar and use of intercept receivers 

by the enemy are being revised as new information is received. 

(5) Increased forward firing power, additional armor and leak-proof 

tanks are being provided for all A/S aircraft to offset the fighting back 

tactics of U-boats. 

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C.C.S. 399/1 

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE U-BOAT WARSEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1943 

Reference: 

CCS 133d Meeting, Item 5 

C.C.S.399/1 circulated a report from the British Chiefs of Staff. The 

Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of this report. 

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C.C.S. 399/1 23 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE U-BOAT WARSEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1943 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

7 November 1943 

U-BOAT TREND 

1. After an absence since May, 1943,U-boats again formed a pack of more 

than 15in the North Atlantic and broke the lull on the 19th of September. Since 

that date this pack has been maintained, refuelling as necessary from supply 

boats and the pack being moved to intercept convoys. 

2. U-boats have only operated on other stations in a sporadic fashion. A 

group of U-boats has carried out a campaign in the Indian Ocean in the 

approaches to convoy assembly ports, but this appears to be on the wane; one 

or two U-boats have operated off the Brazilian Coast, the West African Coast, 

in the Caribbean, off the U.S. Coast, and off the Canadian Coast. 

3. Recent successes against fuel supply U-boats must be causing the enemy 

much inconvenience and seriously restricting the length of patrols in the 

N. Atlantic and the number of 500-ton U-boats that can operate in distant 

areas. 

4. One attempt was made during September to reinforce the 14 U-boats 

at present in the Mediterranean. To the best of our belief, only one or two 

passed Gibraltar and the remainder turned back. Recent attacks in the Cape 

St. Vincent area indicate that this attempt at reinforcement continues, and 

two U-boats have been sunk in the Straits of Gibraltar. 

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OPERATIONS BY AREAS 

North Atlantic 

5. When the enemy reopened his attack on North Atlantic convoys his 

U-boats were armed with a new weapon-the acoustic homing torpedo-and 

there is some evidence that experts in listening to our H/F D/F R/Twave were 

also carried in a few U-boats. The first two convoys intercepted (O.N.S. 18 and 

O.N. 202) were joined together in order to get the full benefit of the 17 A/S 

vessels escorting them. The enemy succeeded in torpedoing six merchant vessels, their new weapon sank three escorts and damaged one for a probable loss 

of three U-boats sunk. 

6. This pack failed to intercept a convoy again until 7 October owing to 

the success of our evasive routing. On this date they commenced an operation 

against S.C. 143 but only succeeded in torpedoing one merchant vessel and 

one escort for the loss of three U-boats. 

7. Two further convoys were shadowed and attacked ineffectively during 

October (O.N. 206 and O.N.S. 20). One merchant vessel sunk for the loss of 

six U-boats. 

Air cooperation with the above convoys was very satisfactory and the 

U-boats suffered severely on each attempt to attack. 

8. Three British Escort Carriers are now operating with the support groups. 

U.S.Carriers operating in the North Atlantic have been most successful. 

Gibraltar Convoys 

9. Most of the convoys between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom and 

vice versa have been shadowed by enemy long-range aircraft, probably with 

the object of homing U-boats onto them. It appears that a small pack of U-boats 

was concentrated on S.L. 138/M.K.S. 28 on the last day of October, one ship 

being torpedoed. Weather prevented air cooperation but effective counterattack by surface escorts appears to have prevented the assembly of the pack 

and probably resulted in sinking at least one U-boat. 

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Azores Area 

10. There has been no U-boat activity in connection with our occupation 

of the Azores, although it is probable that a few U-boats did reconnoiter the 

area, and then left again owing to lack of profitable targets. Two Fortress 

squadrons are now based in the Azores and will afford A/S protection to U.K.-

U.S.A. convoys on the southern route and to the U.K.-Gibraltar-Freetown 

convoys. 

Caribbean Area 

11. There has been only slight evidence of U-boat activity in the Caribbean, but it is suspected that mines may have been laid in the approaches to 

ports. 

West African and Brazilian Areas 

12. During September a German U-boat sank two ships off Brazil and was 

attacked by aircraft. Towards the end of October two or three U-boats operating between Freetown and Pointe Noire have sunk a single merchant vessel 

and her trawler escort. The small degree of success achieved off Brazil suggests 

that at least one of the U-boats operating there may have been sunk or driven 

Off. 

Indian Ocean 

13. In the Indian Ocean, one U-boat was sunk by aircraft near Muscat and 

it appears that the campaign is now coming to a close. Japanese U-boats have 

also been taking part in this campaign. Twelve ships have been torpedoed and 

sunk in this area during the two months. 

OPERATIONS AGAINST U-BOATS IN TRANSIT AREAS 

14. U-boats in the transit areas are no longer remaining on the surface 

and fighting aircraft by day. They surface only to charge batteries for a minimum period by night, accepting the long time to pass through the danger area. 

The formation of a pack in the Atlantic forced us to withdraw escort vessels 

cooperating with Coastal Command aircraft in the Bay of Biscay. 

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15. The number of aircraft sightings in the Bay has dropped severely as we 

have insufficient aircraft fitted with Leigh searchlights; the Wellingtons so 

fitted are of insufficient range and bad weather has interfered with flying. 

Flying was cancelled on 13 nights in September. A comparison between the 

figures for sightings and attacks by aircraft taking part in the Bay offensive 

including sorties from Gibraltar and North Afrfica, and those by aircraft in 

the remainder of the North Atlantic, is as follows: 

BAY OFFENSIVE NORTH ATLANTIC 

Sightings Attacks Sightings Attacks 

September 24 12 9 5 

October 13 10 31 26 

16. Similarly, the sightings in the Northern transit area have been very 

disappointing. We have inadequate air and surface forces for this task. 

TACTICS 

17. The use of an acoustic homing torpedo by a U-boat has increased the 

risk to an escort vessel chasing and attacking a contact. Measures have been 

introduced to enable an escort to avoid the probable danger area when these 

torpedos are suspected of having been fired (known as the “step aside” approach). They are apparently proving effective and, while delaying attack on 

the U-boat, enable an escort to continue the hunt as soon as clear of danger. 

18. Otherwise there appears to have been little change in either the U-boat’s 

method of attack or the escort’s hunting tactics, although possibly the former 

are showing a greater timidity in closing to effective range when firing torpedoes. 

NOISE-MAKING DEVICES TO COUNTER THE ACOUSTIC TORPEDO 

19. The noise-maker known as the “Foxer,” two of which are towed astern 

of each escort vessel, is now in sufficient production for all slower escorts to be 

fitted before sailing for convoy duty. Its operation is proving unsatisfactory 

owing to structural weakness of design which prevents it standing up to heavy 

weather, and to the interference that it causes with Asdic detection results. 

It is hoped that some of these difficulties may be overcome. 

20. The development of other noise-malung devices is proceeding under 

flrst priority. Generally speaking, the acoustic torpedo has not yet given the 

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enemy the advantage they must have hoped for, and it is worth noting that 

the Germans claimed they had sunk fifteen destroyers when, in fact, they had 

only sunk three and damaged one. 

RADAR DECOYS 

21. U-boats have been employing a Radar decoy balloon, a device which 

carriesa length of line secured to a small wooden float with metal foil reflectors 

suspended on the line. U-boats are believed to carry about 50 of these decoys 

with apparatus for inflating the balloons on deck. The best counter-measure 

to this device is for the ship to start a plot of the suspicious echo immediately 

it is detected. The fact that echoes travelling in a direction other than downwind cannot be due to decoys will be a means of differentiating between decoys 

and U-boats. 

FUTURE POLICY 

22. There is no doubt that the U-boats have returned to the North Atlantic 

convoy routes in considerable force and will endeavor to remain there until 

their losses become unacceptably high. They have been roughly handled by 

both aircraft and escorts and, from the number of attacks they have made 

on the latter, it can be assumed that they are endeavoring to torpedo escorts, 

using their acoustic homing torpedo, before concentrating on the convoy. In 

other respects the normal pack tactics are apparently still being employed. It is 

appreciated that enemy losses are already approaching the breaking limit 

and we must be prepared for yet another change on the part of the enemy. 

23. When the aircraft in the Azores come into operation we may have great 

scope for evasive routing between the Azores zone and that of Iceland, and 

it may well be found that we can successfully secure the Atlantic trade routes 

by means of evasion. 

24. This added scope will enable us to concentrate our striking forces in 

threatened areas and so develop the offensive against the U-boat. Coordination 

of the offensive with U.S.A. striking forces is satisfactory. 

25. The above policy may not produce decisive results and we must take 

further measures to ensure making contact with U-boat concentrations and 

completing their destruction. 

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26. We have had opportunity to review the morale of the U-boat personnel

inthis new campaign and to assess their degree of determination or timidity. 

It is apparent from this examination that the U-boats are not pressing home 

their attacks and that they are more concerned with their own safety than 

heretofore. 

27. It is considered, therefore, that we are now in a position to sail selected 

convoys on the most favorable route for air cover and efficient surface and air 

escort, prepared to accept battle with the U-boats in the confidence that we 

shall be masters of the situation whatever circumstances arise. This course 

of action has frequently been considered in the past, but the time has only 

just arrived when it is considered reasonable to accept the increased risk of 

encountering U-boats. 

28. It is hoped that the above measures will inflict such heavy casualties on 

the enemy that he will be forced once again to withdraw from the North 

Atlantic and concentrate on attacks in dispersed areas. 

29. This will be the moment to reinforce the Bay offensive to the maximum 

extent. Surface and air escorts to the convoys will have to be cut to a minimum 

in order to produce the necessary forces. 

30. Preparations are now well in hand to provide increased numbers of 

Leigh Light-fitted aircraft, particularly to those of the V.L.R. and L.R. category.The enemy may be expected to strive for early warning of approaching 

aircraft by the use of listening devices against our A.S.V. and also by means 

of his own Radar. Measures have been taken to provide an alternative A.S.V. 

for our aircraft, also a device by which we can listen to enemy Radar and so 

home onto the U-boat. As expected from the outset of the Bay offensive in 

its present form, the only full answer to successful “early warning” of U-boats 

is the provision of sufficient aircraft for “flooding,” i.e., such vigorous and 

continuous flying that will force the U-boat commander to exhaust his batteries if he dives on every occasion an aircraft threatens him. This technique 

would necessitate reinforcing the air forces operating in the Bay. 

31. It is by these means we hope finally to break the morale of the U-boat 

service, and encompass its destruction. If successful, it may well prove a decisive factor in the defeat of the German High Command and the armed forces 

of the Reich. 

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APPENDIX 

U-BOAT SINKINGS 

U-boats sunk and probably sunk are:-

September 8 

October 26 

-

34 

-

SHIPPING LOSSES (By U-boat) (September and October) 

A. According to Areas 

Atlantic North of Equator 

Atlantic South of Equator 

Mediterranean 

Indian Ocean 

B. According to Duty 

Convoy and Escorted Groups 

Independents 

Number 

11 

4 

4 

12 

-

31 

-

15 

16 

-

31 

-

Tonnage 

63,600 

20,500 

27,000 

-

65,300 

176,400 

-

87,600 

-

88,800 

176,400 

-

Appendix

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C.C.S. 400, 400/1 and 400/2 

INTEGRATED COMMAND OF U.S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES 

IN THE EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA 

References: 

CCS 134th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 135th Meeting, Item 3 

CCS 137th Meeting, Item 3 

CCS 138th Meeting, Item 2 

C.C.S. 400 circulated a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

dated 18 November 1943. The British Chiefs of Staff circulated their reply 

(C.C.S. 400/1) on 26 November. The conclusions of the United States Chiefs 

of Staff relative to the alternate proposal suggested by the British Chiefs of 

Staff in C.C.S. 400/1 were circulated as C.C.S. 400/2, 4 December 1943. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 138th Meeting, agreed to accept 

C.C.S. 400/2. 

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C.C.S. 400 18 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

INTEGRATED COMMAND OF U.S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES 

IN THE EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

THE PROBLEM 

1. The provision of a directive to insure the most effective utilization of 

the U.S. Army Air Forces strategic bombing capabilities from all available 

European-Mediterranean bases in the accomplishment of the objectives of 

POINTBLANK. 

DISCUSSION 

(See Enclosure) 

CONCLUSIONS 

2. a. That control of all US. Strategic Air Forces in the EuropeanMediterranean area, including the control of movement of forces from one 

area to another, should be vested in a single command in order to exploit 

U.S. heavy bomber aircraft capabilities most effectively; and that these 

forces should be employed primarily against POINTBLANK objectives, or 

such other objectives as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may from time to 

time direct. 

b. That such a command should likewise be charged with the coordination of these operations with those of the R.A.F. Bomber Command. 

c. That the responsibility for over-all base service and administrative 

control of these Strategic Air Forces should remain in the appropriate 

Commanders of U.S. Army forces in the United Kingdom and in the 

Mediterranean area. 

d. That provision should be made to assure the assignment of resources, 

supplies and other services between tactical and strategic operations so as 

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to bring the required support to POINTBLANK as the air operation of first 

priority. 

e. That the headquarters of such US. Strategic Air Forces should be 

established in the United Kingdom because of the facilities available, the 

existing weight of the respective bomber forces, and the necessity for continuous integration of operations with the R.A.F. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

3. It is recommended that: 

a. There be established a U.S. Strategic Air Force Command with 

Headquarters in the United Kingdom, charged with the direction and 

coordination of all U. S. Strategic Air Force operations in the EuropeanMediterranean area. 

b. A directive to implement the above, attached as Appendix, be issued 

to the following: 

Supreme Allied Commander, 

Commanding General, ETOUSA 

Allied Commander in Chief, NATO 

Commanding General, U. S. Strategic 

Air Forces in Europe. 

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ENCLOSURE 

DISCUSSION 

1. There are at present in the Mediterranean Theater the 12th US. Army 

Air Force (Tactical) and the 15th U.S. Army Air Force (Strategic), as approved 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in a directive issued to General Eisenhower 

(C.C.S. 217/1, Appendix “C”) ,under which directive the Allied Commander in 

Chief, NATO, is charged with employing the 15th U.S. Air Force primarily 

against the selected targets of POINTBLANK. It is additionally directed that 

the operations of the 15th US. Air Force will be closely coordinated by direct 

liaison with the 8th US. Air Force. 

2. The division of heavy bomber units between the 8th and the 15th US. 

Air Forces is likewise set forth in the above directive, upon a quarterly basis, 

resulting in the deployment of 41 heavy bomber groups in the U.K., and 21 

heavy bomber groups in the Mediterranean, by 30 June 1944. This directive 

provides that those units of the current 12th US.Air Force, assigned to the 

newly organized 15th US.Air Force, may continue to be employed primarily 

against objectives other than POINTBLANK until such time as the air base 

objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, and further that, should a 

tactical or strategical emergency arise, requiring such action, the US. Theater 

Commander is authorized, at his decision, to employ the 15th US. Air Force for 

purposes other than its primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff of the action taken. 

3. Strategic bombing operations from bases other than the United Kingdom which compel German forces to spread in breadth and depth for the 

defense of other areas, or cause parallel destruction of selected POINTBLANK 

objectives,and particularly to the German fighter aircraft and aircraft industry, 

will contribute heavily to the success of POINTBLANK, hasten the deterioration of the enemy over-all position and decrease losses. 

4. Timing and coordination of the mutually supporting operations of the 

two Strategic Air Forces from the various bases is essential to achieve the most 

effective exploitation of US. heavy bomber aircraft capabilities. Forces should 

be moved promptly from one area to another to take immediate advantage of 

varying weather conditions,dispositions of enemy forms, current tactical operations or other circumstances of opportunity. The present command arrangement with the 8th Air Force under CG, ETOUSA and the 15th Air Force under 

CG, NATO requires decisions to be reached on a mutually cooperative basis in 

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which both commanders must agree. The integration of timing and services, 

to capitalize fully upon the mobility of aircraft and the need for prompt command decision not possible under the existing situation require a cohesive 

over-all control, not existent under present command directives. 

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the air war in Europe has reached 

a stage where the necessity for command direction over the components of the 

Strategic Air Forces is imperative. Unified command is necessary in order to 

achieve effective results from the concerted efforts of the bomber forces, and 

to reach the vital targets with minimum losses from the formidable defenses 

established by the enemy. Base facilities in the United Kingdom and the 

Mediterranean provide a potential flexibility which must be exploited to confuse, saturate and disperse the enemy defenses and reduce our losses. We feel 

that it is most urgent that we adopt every means known to us to save the 

lives of our men and sustain the impetus of their offensive. The one effective 

method is to insure the rapid, coordinated employment of the two components 

of our daylight striking force on a day-to-day basis, in order to obtain the 

maximum dispersion of enemy defenses and to take advantage of weather 

conditions in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean. Unified command over the Eighth and Fifteenth US.Air Forces must, therefore, be established without delay. 

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APPENDIX 

DRAFT OF A PROPOSED DIRECTIVE 

To: The Supreme Allied Commander 

The Commanding General ETOUSA 

Allied Commander in Chief NATO 

Commanding General U.S.Strategic Air Forces in Europe 

1. Effective 1 January 1944 there will be established an air command designated “The US.Strategic Air Forces in Europe,” for the purpose of directing 

and coordinating the operations of the US.Strategic Air Forces in the European 

and Mediterranean areas. Headquarters for this air command will be established in the United Kingdom. 

2. Lieut. General Carl Spaatz is designated “Commanding General, US. 

Strategic Air Forces in Europe.” 

3. The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly under the 

command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later by 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the interim the commander of the U.S.Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

4. The U.S. StrategicAir Forces in Europe will consist initially of the Eighth 

and Fifteenth U.S. Army Air Forces. 

5. The U.S.Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be employed initially to 

achieve the objectives of the Combined Bomber Offensive, as directed by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Commanding General, USSAFE, will be charged 

with the strategic direction of the U.S.Strategic Air Forces, and he will assign 

missions to them, keeping the appropriate theater commanders informed. 

In carrying out his strategic objectives, the Commanding General, US.Strategic Air Forces in Europe is authorized to allocate, reallocate, or move any or 

all of the air force units placed under his command. 

6. The Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, will be 

charged with the coordination of the operations of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces 

with those of the R.A.F. Bomber Command, through the Chief of the Air Staff 

R.A.F. 

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7. The commanders of the U.S. Army Forces in the United Kingdom and 

in the Mediterranean area will continue to be responsible for administrative 

control of the US. Army air units in their respective areas, including the provision of base services. They will exercise a judicious allocation of resources 

and supplies and other services between tactical and strategic air forces in such 

manner as to provide the necessary support to POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority. 

8. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, 

theater commanders may, at their discretion, utilize the strategic air forces, 

which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their 

primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding 

General, USSAFE, of the action taken. 

9. The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ six heavy bombardment 

groups and two long-range fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force to meet 

the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations against 

objectives other than those prescribed for POINTBLANK, until such time as the 

air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in accordance with 

the provision of the direcbive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 

October (FAN 254). 

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CC.S. 400/1 26 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CONTROL OF STRATEGICAIR FORCES IN NORTHWEST 

EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. In C.C.S.400 the United States Chiefs of Staff have proposed that the US. 

Strategic Air Forces operating from the United Kingdom and from Mediterranean bases, the 8th and 15th Air Forces respectively, should be placed under a 

single Command-the US. Strategic Air Forces in Europe-with a Headquarters in the United Kingdom. The object of this proposal is to achieve the 

more effective exploitation of US.heavy bomber capabilities which, it is hoped, 

the new Headquarters will secure in two ways: 

a. By organizing mutually supporting operations of the two Strategic 

Air Forces in order to obtain the maximum dispersal of enemy defenses; 

b. By enabling advantage to be taken of changing weather and tactical 

conditions by switching heavy bomber forces quickly from one theater to 

another. 

2. This proposal affects directly only US. heavy bomber forces, and we 

recognize the ultimate right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to decide the 

organization of U.S. forces in any theater of operations. We feel bound, however, 

to record our view that the adoption of this proposal would entail serious disadvantages far outweighing any advantages to be derived from it. 

3. To deal first with the advantages which are expected from the present 

proposal : 

a. Great operational benefit would undoubtedly result if an effective 

combination of operations in the two theaters could be achieved. The 

operation of a large force of heavy day bombers is however a considerable 

undertaking and a period of up to 24 hours is required for the preparation 

and loading of aircraft and the briefing of crews. Unfortunately, the 

weather in the European theater is so uncertain that the decision to dispatch heavy bomber forces can only be taken a few hours before the time 

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of take-off and it is then too late to make changes in targets and the timing 

of attacks. The conduct of operations in accordance with a settled policy 

in either theater is therefore a matter of great difficulty and frequently 

much effort is wasted, both in abortive operations and in standing by for 

operations which have to be canceled. A fortiori, the detailed coordination 

of attacks from two bases so far apart as the U.K. and Italy would be still 

more difficult and would in fact prove impossible. A commander set up to 

control the two forces would find in practice that he could do no more than 

insure that the subordinatecommanders in each theater worked to a general 

plan and kept him and each other closely informed of the situation on their 

own front so that the general plan could be altered as necessary. Coordination of this type can be secured with the present organization without the 

introduction of a new headquarters. 

b. The possibility of switching heavy bomber forces from one theater 

to another is at first sight an attractive one.In order to obtain full benefit 

from the plan, it would however be necessary to build up a margin of facilities in the two theaters involving the preparation of heavy bomber airfields, 

runways, and maintenance depots over and above what is required for the 

forces already based in the theater, and the locking up of additional maintenance personnel. If these additional facilities were not provided, the 

serviceability and effectiveness of the heavy bombers would fall considerably 

as soon as they were transferred and the operations carried out would be 

on a smaller scale and less effective than if the forces had to remain at 

their normal bases. The Air Ministry have, in the past, given very careful 

consideration to this plan but they have been forced to the conclusion that, 

except on rare occasions, the results would not justify the effort involved. 

Such occasional transfers of forces as are likely to be profitable can be 

secured by the present machinery. 

c. The provision of the necessary margin of facilities which, if a large 

transfer of force is envisaged, may be considerable, must of necessity conflict in the U.K. with other service and governmental requirements. In 

Italy or other active theaters of war they can only be provided at the expense 

of other service requirements. 

There is therefore a potential conflict of interest between the commander of the Strategic Air Force on the one hand and the U.K. Government 

and theater commanderson the other. 

4. Our conclusion is that the setting up of a new higher headquarters would 

not achieve the advantages which are claimed from it and would not in fact 

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be any improvement over the existing machinery. It would, moreover, entail 

certain disadvantages which we consider to be serious, namely the following: 

a. The most serious disadvantage is that it would destroy the present 

arrangements for the close coordination of the 8th Air Force and the R.A.F. 

including the 2nd Tactical Air Force. This depends for its effectiveness on 

the fact that general direction over their operations is exercised by the 

Chief of the Air Staff, R.A.F. The latter, with his headquarters in London, 

possesses not only a complete operational staff but is also served by the 

central Intelligence Staff of the three Services, the Ministry of Economic 

Warfare,and the Secret Intelligence Service,and is in the closest touch with 

the Admiralty,Foreign Office,Ministry of Home Security,and other Government departments. The Air Staff is also in constant touch with the Mediterranean Air Command on matters concerned with operations and Intelligence, and very close liaison arrangements have been made between the 

different commanders in the Mediterranean theater and in the United 

Kingdom. 

The interposition of a new link in the chain of control would, we are 

convinced, cause a reduction in the efficiency of these arrangements, 

and the reduction would be even more serious if, as indicated in 

paragraph 3 of the directive proposed to C.C.S. 400, the Commanding 

General of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe is placed as an interim 

measure directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This latter proposal 

would mean the termination of the arrangement agreed to at Casablanca 

whereby the C.A.S. exercises general direction over the operations of the 

8th Air Force in furtherance of the combined bomber offensive and would, 

in our opinion,be a retrograde step. It would in fact mean that the ultimate 

control required for the direction of the bomber offensive would have to be 

effected in Washington rather than as at present in London. Since all the 

Intelligence and administrative services which are essential for the efficiency 

of the bomber offensive are centralized in London, there could not fail to 

be a grave reduction in efficiency from this change. 

The final arrangement proposed is that the new Commander should 

come directly under the Command of the Supreme Allied Commander for 

Operations in N.W. Europe. In our opinion, it would be fundamentally wrong 

in principle that the direction of a large part of the strategic bomber offensive 

which affects operations on all fronts in the European theater should be 

exercised by the Theater Commander of any single theater. 

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b. The new Commander would presumably require a large staff of all 

kinds in order to exercise operational and the necessary administrative 

control. We cannot help thinking that the provision of the large numbers 

of specialized and skilled staff officers needed must be a matter of considerable difficulty at the present time and, since the benefits expected from 

this proposal are in fact attainable under the present organization, that it 

would be highly wasteful in skilled manpower. 

c. The proposal would also cause serious difficulties in the Mediterranean 

Air Command not only by a division of operational from administrative 

responsibility but also because it would mean that the night bomber component of the Mediterranean Strategical Air Force would be served by a 

different chain of information and would be under a different authority 

from the day bombing component though operated by the same headquarters staff in the Mediterranean theater. This could only make for 

confusion. 

5. To summarize, we consider that the present proposal: 

a. Would not secure any advantage over the present system of control; 

b. Would mean breaking up the present highly integrated system of 

control, which has achieved considerable success, and the replacement of it 

by a less closely integrated and less effective system; 

c. Would be wasteful in skilled staff. 

We recognize however that there is much to be gained by having a single 

authority charged with the general direction of the heavy bomber offensive 

against Germany-someone who can interpret the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

directives by issuing detailed instructions from time to time according to the 

changing situation and who can exercise a general supervision over all bomber 

operations against Germany and the administrative support that they require, 

and over the provision of Intelligence and Tactical information so as to secure 

the most effective use of the heavy bomber forces engaged in the Combined 

Bomber Offensive. We do not see how such an authority can be on a lower level 

than a Chief of Staff since only on this level can the supervising authority keep 

in touch with all the strategical political and administrative factors which affect 

the bombing programme. Our conclusion is that the authority best able to 

exercise this general control is the Chief of the Air Staff. The latter, acting as 

the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is already charged with the coordination of the operations of the 8th Air Force and the R.A.F. This coordination 

has been of the closest and, in our opinion, has enabled the best possible use to 

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be made of the available forces. It would not be difficult to extend this system 

to the 15th Air Force by giving the C.A.S. authority to regulate, in conformity 

with the plans of the Commanders of R.A.F. Bomber Command and the 8th 

Air Force in this country, the priority of objectives to be attacked by the 15th 

Air Force. The C.A.S. would also be in a position, subject to the Theater Commander’s assessment of his administrative capacity, to transfer strategical 

forces from the United Kingdom to the Mediterranean and back if this seemed 

profitable. 

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff may wish to consider this alternative 

arrangement to secure the advantages which they have in mind in putting 

forward their present proposal. 

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C.C.S. 400/2 4 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN NORTHWEST 

EUROPE AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the subject matter 

presented in the memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 400/1, 

and concluded that the advantages to be gained by a more effective exploitation of U.S.daylight precision bombing capabilities, through unification of the 

command of US. Strategic Air Forces, outweigh the disadvantages anticipated 

by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

2. We do not consider that the occasional transfer of aircraft from one 

theater to another will occasion any significant wastage of manpower or facilities, as each A.A.F. group station is organized to take care of the needs of two 

groups for brief periods. 

3. Neither do we consider that there should be any slackening in the 

existing close coordination of operations between the US.Strategic Air Forces 

and the R.A.F., as the headquarters of the former will remain in the U.K. in 

unaltered contact with the intelligence and other services provided by the 

latter. In fact, this coordination should be broadened by drawing the 15th 

Strategic Air Force into a unified command. 

4. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, after giving careful consideration to the 

alternative arrangement suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, have concluded: 

a. That control of all U.S.Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean area, including the control of movement of forces from one 

area to another, should be vested in a single command in order to exploit 

the flexibility of U.S. heavy bomber capabilities most effectively and that 

these forces should be employed primarily against POINTBLANK objectives 

or such other objectives as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may from time to 

time direct. 

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b. That such a command should likewise be charged with the coordination of these operations with those of the R.A.F. Bomber Command. 

c. That the responsibility for over-all base services and administrative 

control of these Strategic Air Forces should remain with the appropriate 

commanders of US. Army Forces in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area. 

d. That provision should be made to assure the assignment of resources, 

supplies, and other services between tactical and strategic operations so 

as to bring the required support to POINTBLANK as the air operation 

of first priority. 

e. That the headquarters of such US. Strategic Air Forces should be 

established in the United Kingdom because of the facilities available, the 

existing weight of the respective bomber forces, and the necessity for continuous integration of operations with the R.A.F. 

f. That the Commanding General, US. Army Air Forces, should continue to have direct channels of approach to the U.S. Strategic Air Force 

Commander in order to provide direct technical control and insure that 

operational and training technique and uniformity of U.S. tactical doctrine 

are maintained. 

5. A directive to implement the above, attached as Enclosure, is therefore 

being issued to the following: 

Commanding General, USSAFE 

Commanding General, ETOUSA 

Commanding General, NATO 

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ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT OF A DIRECTIVE 

To be Issued by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

TO: Commanding General, US.Strategic Air Forces in Europe. 

The Commanding General, ETOUSA. 

The Commanding General, NATO. 

1. Effective 1 January 1944 there will be established an air command 

designated “The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe,” consisting initially of the 

Eighth and Fifteenth U.S. Army Air Forces. Headquarters for this air command 

will be established in the United Kingdom. An officer of the U.S. Army Air 

Forces will be designated Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in 

Europe. 

2. The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly under the 

command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the interim the Chief of the Air Staff, 

R.A.F. will continue to act as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 

pending transfer of the USSAFE to the command of the S.A.C., and will be 

responsible under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for coordination of all POINTBLANK operations. Under his direction, the Commanding General, US.Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be responsible for the determination of priorities 

of POINTBLANX targets to be attacked by the Eighth and Fifteenth Air 

Forces and for the technique and tactics employed and is authorized to move 

the units of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces between theaters within 

the limits of base area facilities and available for his forces. 

3. The Commanding General USSAFE will keep the Allied Commander 

in Chief in the Mediterranean Theater informed of his general intentions and 

requirements. As far as possible, consistent with the performance of his primary mission, the Commanding General USSAFE will coordinate his operations with those of the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean. 

4. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the European and North 

African Theaters of operations will continue to be responsible for the administrative control of the U.S, Army air units in their respective area, including 

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the provision of base services. The Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in the 

Mediterranean will provide the necessary logistical support to the Fifteenth 

Air Force in performance of operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of 

first priority. 

5. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, 

theater commanders may, at their discretion utilize the strategic air forces, 

which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their 

primary mission,informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding 

General, USSAFE of the action taken. 

6. The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ six heavy bombardment groups and two long-range fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force to 

meet the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations 

against objectives other than those prescribed for POINTBLANK, until such 

time as the air base ,objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in 

accordance with the provisions of the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff on 22 October (FAN 254). 

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C.C.S. 401, 401/1, and 401/2 

V.L.R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA 

C.C.S. 401 circulated a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of 

Staff. The reply from the British Chiefs of Staff was circulated as C.C.S. 401/1. 

Informal agreement on interpretation of paragraph 3, C.C.S. 401/1 is 

noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 401/2,circulated 6 December 

1943. 

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C.C.S. 401 18 November. 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

V.L.R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA 

References: a. CCS 323 

b. CCS 31915 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. In the final QUADRANT Report, C.C.S. 319/5, the following decisions 

were made: 

“6. h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable 

in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base 

for operations against Japan.” 

“40. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air 

supplies of China, and the development of air facilities, with a view to: 

a. Keeping China in the war. 

b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese. 

c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in China. 

d. Equipping Chinese ground forces.” 

2. It now appears possible that B-29 aircraft will be available early in 1944 

and that offensive operations from India and China against Japan might be 

intensified earlier than contemplated at QUADRANT if suitable airfields could 

be constructed in India and the Chengtu area of China. 

3. Current studies indicate that a minimum of four such airfields in the 

Calcutta area and five in the Chengtu area would probably be required for 

the employment of these aircraft. 

4. The airfields in the Calcutta area would be constructed in coordination 

with British authorities in India. 

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5. The airfields at Chengtu would be constructed in coordination with the 

Chinese Government. 

6. It is believed that operations against the Japanese from China can be 

intensified in the spring of 1944by the use of B-29bombers if airfields are made 

available in the Calcutta and Chengtu areas. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

7. It is recommended: 

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff impress the proper authoritites to 

make available in the Calcutta area the facilities which are necessary for 

the construction of four V.L.R. airfields. 

b. That the proper U.S. authorties initiate necessary measures to construct five V.L.R. airfields in the Chengtu area of China. 

c. That these airfields be completed not later than May 1944 insofar as 

consistent with the commitments already placed on the Allied Commanders 

in those areas. 

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C.C.S 401/1 23 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

V.L.R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. As the United States Chiefs of Staff will be aware, the President has 

already telegraphed to the Prime Minister with regard to the provision of 

suitable airdromes in India and China for the operation of B-29 aircraft 

against Japan in the spring of 1944. The Prime Minister has instructed the 

Commander in Chief, India, to render every possible assistance in the construction of the four air bases in India and has so informed the President. 

An examination of the project has been undertaken and we are satisfied that 

the difficultiesinvolved, including the movement of the extra tonnage required 

through the port of Calcutta, can be overcome. 

2. We therefore accept the recommendations of the United States Chiefs 

of Staff contained in paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 401 and are issuing the necessary 

instructions to the British authorities concerned. 

3. If the necessary work in India is to be completed in time, it is essential 

that the United States units and equipment required should arrive in Calcutta 

by 15 Janaury; otherwise the work will not be completed by 1 April and in 

fact would have to be stopped to allow resources temporarily diverted owing 

to airfield construction to be sent through to Ledo. 

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C.C.S. 401/2 6 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

V.L.R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the following interpretation 

of.paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 401/1: 

“If the necessary work in India is to be completed by the desired 

date of April first,it is essential that the United States units and equipment 

required should arrive in Calcutta by the 15th of January and, in addition, 

that certain resources be diverted from Ledo, which would result in delaying 

progress of road construction for a period of six weeks to two months. 

“Certain preparatory work in advance of arrival of American units 

and equipment can be done without interfering with S.E.A.C. projects 

which, with arrival of necessary resources from the U.S. by January 15th, 

will permit completion of the airfields by May 15th.” 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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C.C.S. 403 and 403/1 

PROGRESS REPORT. COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

References: 

CCS 133d Meeting, Items 5 and 6 

C.C.S. 403 circulated a progress report on the Cnmbined Bomber Offensive prepared by the Chief of the Air Staff and the Commanding General, US. 

Eighth Air Force. C.C.S. 403/1 presented comments by the British Chief of Air 

Staff which were circulated for informatlon. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 133d Meeting considered the 

Combined Bomber Offensive plan and agreed: 

a. That the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should 

remain unchanged. 

b. That General Eaker should not be urged to catch up the three months 

of arrears. 

c. That General Eaker should be told to expand his operations to the 

extent possible with the aircraft and crews available. 

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C.C.S. 403 21 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROGRESS REPORT, COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached message, on the program of the Combined Bomber Offensive, has been received from the Chief of the Air Staff and the Commanding 

General, U.S.Eighth Air Force, and is submitted for the consideration of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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INDEX 

Period Covered ............................................. 

Method of Employment of the Forces ....................... 

Forces Employed ............................ 

Assessment of Results Achieved ................. 

General Results on Towns and Cities ........................ 

General Results of Precise Day Attacks ...................... 

Effects of Enemy’s War Economy Generally ...................... 

Effects on the General Military Situation ...................... 

Effects on U-Boat War ........................................ 

Detailed Estimates of the Total Effects of the Bomber Offensive .... 

Scale of Effort ............................................... 

Casualties Involved ........................................... 

Enemy Efforts to Counter the Bomber Offensive .............. 

Recommendation ............................................ 

117 

Paragraph 

1 

2-6 

7 

8 

9-10 

11-12 

13 

14-15 

16 

17 

18-19 

20-22 

23-31 

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ENCLOSURE 

PROGRESS MADE BY THE R.A.F. AND UNITED STATES EIGHTH 

AIR FORCE IN THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

PERIOD COVERED 

1. This report covers the period from 4 February to 31 October 1943. 

The former is the date of issue to Bomber Command arid the Eighth Air Force 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive C.C.S. 166/1/D,approved by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff on 21 January 1943.This directive is attached as 

Appendix “A,” C.C.S. 403/1. 

METHOD OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE FORCES 

2. The forces concerned have operated in accordance with that directive 

and a supplementary directive issued on 10 June 1943 by the Chief of the 

Air Staff, in order to implement the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan as 

approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This directive is attached as Appendix “B,” C.C.S. 403/1. 

3. The primary object of the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom 

as stated in the earlier directive was: 

“The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 

industrial, and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the 

German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is 

fatally weakened.” 

The primary object of the subsequent directive remained as set out 

above. In view, however, of the increasing strength of the German fighter forces, 

and in order to check their growth and reduce their strength, it was decided 

that first priority should be accorded to the attack of these forces and the industry on which they depended. 

4. At the beginning of the period covered by this report the Eighth Bomber 

Command, while in process of developing their offensive power, were employed 

mainly in the attack of submarine construction yards and operating bases. 

From the beginning of April, with the formulation of the Combined Bomber 

Offensive Plan, their effort was directed increasingly to the destruction of the 

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G.A.F. fighter forces. In the summer months the R.A.F. Bomber Command, 

being limited in radius of action by the available hours of darkness, concentrated upon the destruction of the Ruhr-Rhineland industries and the undermining of the morale of the workers of that area. With the incidence of longer 

nights they have been able to make a more direct contribution to the reduction 

of the German Air Force, and vastly to extend their effects on the enemy’s 

military industrial and economic systems as well as on enemy morale generally, 

by the destruction of a number of towns and cities of critical importance in 

the enemy’swar economy. 

5. The British and United States medium bombers and British fighterbombershave been used mainly against enemy airfields in diversionary attacks, 

so timed and directed as to reduce the concentration of fighters which could 

oppose the passage of the heavy formations. 

6. British and United States fighters have been used increasingly to cover 

the bomber formations, both on the outward and return passage, to the limits 

of their range. By the use of long-range tanks, American fighters have been 

able to give effective fighter cover to targets as far afield as Bremen and 

the Ruhr. 

FORCES EMPLOYED 

7. The strategic bomber forces available during the period under review 

are shown in Plates I and II.The effort of the medium and light bomber and 

fighter aircraft in support of the Combined Bomber Offensive is shown in 

Plates 111,IV,V, and VI. 

ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS ACHIEVED 

8. In assessing the results of the Combined Bomber Offensive it will be 

appreciated that our sources of information are necessarily limited; a complete 

and accurate picture of results achieved is not possible. We are dependent to 

a large extent on air photography,but much damage sustained in air bombardment is not revealed by air photography. Assessments of results based on photographs, even when interpreted in the light of known effects produced by the 

enemy attacks on objectives in the United Kingdom, are liable to large discrepancies. Comparison is the more difficult since the scale of enemy attack 

on this country, even when the enemy was making his heaviest raids in 1940 

and 1941,was far smaller than we are now delivering on objectives in Germany. 

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Moreover, his general economic structure is far weaker and less resilient than 

was that of the United Kingdom at that time. Viewed as a whole, however, all 

evidence points to the fact that conditionsin Germany are resolving themselves 

into an ever more acute conflict of priorities, and a marked deterioration in 

morale. 

GENERAL RESULTS ON TOWNS AND CITIES 

9. With photographic cover as the basis of calculation, it is estimated that 

of the towns of outstanding importance in the enemy’s war economy 19 have 

been virtually destroyed, 19 seriously damaged, and 9 damaged. The term 

“destroyed” can be taken as expressing devastation to a degree which makes 

the objective a liability to the total German war effort in excess of any 

remaining assets; “serious damage” implies urban destruction greater than 

the most serious damage experienced in the United Kingdom. 

10. This degree of devastation of industry and urban areas is illustrated 

by the following figures of acreage devastated by our own attacks on Germany 

and by enemy attacks on the United Kingdom: 

Coventry: 120 out of 1,922acres devastated. 

Hamburg: 6,200out of 8,382acres devastated. 

Cologne: 1,785out of 3,320acres devastated. 

Essen: 1,030out of 2,630acres devastated. 

Elberfeld: 825 out of 1,068acres devastated. 

GENERAL RESULTS OF PRECISE DAY ATTACKS 

11. VIII Bomber Command have concentrated their attacks upon individual targets, as well as individual industries, selected in the light of their 

critical importance to the German war effort. Damage to such targets must, 

therefore, have proportionately greater effect upon the German military 

machine as a whole than damage achieved in the course of area attack, which 

normally embraces a wide range of unrelated industries. Thus the attacks on 

the ball-bearing industry at Schweinfurt and the synthetic rubber plant at 

Huls have undoubtedly produced far-reaching effects throughout the range 

of German war industry. 

12. Similarly the ability to concentrate a series of daylight attacks on a 

single vital system, as in the case of the attacks made upon the fighter 

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factories at Regensburg, Kassel, Oschersleben, Marienburg, Anklam, Warnemunde and Wiener Neustadt are likely to have produced effects within that 

industry far in excess of the sum of the visible damage. Thus by means of 

precise and selective attack it may well be possible to reduce below a critical 

level an individual industry without which Germany cannot continue her 

military resistance. 

EFFECTS ON ENEMY’S WAR ECONOMY GENERALLY 

13. The general effects of our bomber offensive against Germany are indicated briefly in the following extracts from a Joint Report by the Ministry 

of Economic Warfare and the Air Ministry Intelligence Branch: 

Over-all Eflects 

(i) (a) “It is difficult to estimate the over-all effect in quantitative terms, 

but it is considered to be now in the region of 10 percent of the total war 

potential. A total decline of 20 percent in over-all effort may well be fatal.” 

(b) “The effects of bombing do not fall evenly on the various parts of 

the enemy’s war potential, and, to some extent, they are redistributed 

according to the immediate requirements of the consumers of war 

material having the highest priority in Germany.” 

(c) “There is the very much greater decline in some individual industries (e.g.,ball-bearings and rubber), which may be near the point where 

they could cause the collapse of the whole war machine.” 

Eflects on manpower 

(3) “The employment of a considerable and increasing number of fulltime adult personnel in anti-aircraft and civil defense, factory repair and 

reconstruction, and first-aid to housing, represents a serious drain on 

Germany’s industrial manpower that might otherwise have been 

employed on production.” 

Effects on Fighter Aircraft Production 

(iii) “Damage to assembly factories alone . . . . has resulted in the production loss of 880 single-engined fighter aircraft, and production in 

October was between 600 and 700 against an estimated planned production of 1,000.’’ 

121 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

“Single-engined fighter production in the months of September 

and October was on a lower level than in the month of July, notwithstanding the high degree of priority accorded to single-engined fighter 

production and the considerable planned expansion in output.” 

Eflects on Morale 

(iv) “The maintenance of morale is the greatest single problem confronting the home authorities. The full effects of air attack since the 

devastation of Hamburg have become known in all parts of the country. 

The increasing death roll is the important factor and, coupled with military failures, the general attitude is approaching one of ‘peace at any 

price’ and the avoidance of the wholesale destruction of further cities 

in Germany.” 

“Damageto housing, combined with evacuation, has resulted in the 

final saturation of all suitable accommodation in Germany. In the 

coming winter the problem of housing evacuees, many of whom have 

hitherto been in temporary dwellings unsuitable to winter conditions, 

will put upon the home administration a burden that it may not be able 

to support.” 

‘I . . . . The housing situation and the general morale are both so 

bad that either might cause a collapse before industry became unable to 

sustain the war effort. 

EFFECTS ON THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION 

14. The bomber offensive has made a significant contribution to the success 

of the Allied military operations on the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts. 

The enemy has been compelled to withdraw fighters from the support of his 

armiesto counter the threat from the West. A year ago 38 percent of his fighter 

strength was deployed on the Western Front. With the growth of the bomber 

offensive the proportion had risen to 45 percent in April and is now 63 percent. 

The changes in this situation are outlined in Plate VII. The repercussions 

upon the armies in the field of this denial of the essential minimum of air support have been far reaching in their general effect on the conduct of enemy 

military operations, particularly on the Russian Front, where our Allies have 

now achieved outstanding air superiority as a direct result of our efforts on 

the Western Front. The very fact of these changes which have been imposed 

on the enemy is an indication that he is forced to defend his home front even 

at the cost of serious military reverses. 

122 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

15. The reduction of supplies of weapons, technical equipment and transport vehicles consequent upon our sustained and damaging air offensive has 

doubtless played a great part in further restricting the enemy’s military capabilities. 

EFFECTS ON U-BOAT WAR 

16. The attacks by the VIII Bomber Command on submarine construction 

yards and operating bases, coupled with the area attacks upon industrial 

centres by the R.A.F. Bomber Command, have reduced the scale of U-boat 

activity. It is estimated that attacks on U-boat construction and components 

manufacture have in 1943 caused a direct loss of at least 22 U-boats out of 

a total of about 200 that would have been launched by the end of October. 

The delayed action of attacks on areas producing materials and components 

appears now to be having an effect on the average rate of completion. See 

Appendix “C”, C.C.S. 403/1. 

DETAILED ESTIMATES OF THE TOTAL EFFECTS 

OF THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

17. Estimates of the total effects of the Bomber Offensive are given in the 

following reports: 

(i) Joint report by the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Air Ministry Intelligence Branch dated 4November 1943.Appendix “C”, C.C.S. 403/1. 

(ii) Summary of conclusions on effects of bombing offensive on German 

war effort in 1943 up to July by the British War Cabinet Joint Intelligence 

Subcommittee. Appendix “D”, C.C.S. 403/1. 

(iii) Summary of conclusions on effects of bombing offensive on German 

war effort for the period July to October 1943 by the British War Cabinet 

Joint Intelligence Subcommittee. Appendix “E”, C.C.S. 403/1. 

(iv) Joint Report by the Air Ministry Intelligence Branch and the Political Warfare Executive on Allied Air Attacks and German Morale. Appendix “F”, C.C.S. 403/1. 

123 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SCALE OF EFIilORT 

18. The effort of the combined strategic bomber forces during the period 

under review totalled 61,690sorties. They consisted of: 

Night sorties 45,844 

Day sorties 15,846 

Total 61,690 

19. The detailed statistics of scale of effort are given in Plstes VIII, IX, X, 

and XI. 

CASUALTIES INVOLVED 

20. The number of strategic bombers missing during the period under 

review was: 

R.A.F. (averaging 198 a month with 

a cumulative rate of 3.9 percent) 1,784 

VIIIth Bomber Command (averaging 

78 a month with a cumulative 

rate of 4.4percent) 698 

Total (cumulative rate, 4 percent) 2,482

21. Notwithstanding these casualties, and the higher rate incurred in deep 

daylight penetrations into Germany, the morale of crews remains high. It 

appears to be governed only by the degree of success achieved. 

22. The casualties for heavy, medium and light bombers and fighters are 

given in Plates VIII, X, XII, and XIII. 

ENEMY EFFORTS TO COUNTER THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

23. The enemy has been unsuccessful in his attempt to counter effectively 

the bomber offensive, and there is as yet no indication that he can develop 

new methods which will defeat our offensive. His efforts have taken the form of: 

(i) Increased production of fighters at the expense of bombers. 

124 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(ii) Redistribution of fighter and other defense resources to meet the 

threat. 

(iii) New tactics and weapons. 

24. The increasing effort devoted to fighter production continues. This is 

shown graphically in Plate XIV. Single-engined fighter production, on which 

our attacks have so far been concentrated, has been reduced materially, but 

production of twin-engined fighters has increased. Bomber production continues on a reduced scale. The first-line strengths of the German fighter and 

bomber forces are shown in Plate XV. 

25. The German fighter force has been increasingly concentrated on the 

Western Front until it has now reached a figure of 1,800. The redistribution of 

fighter forces following on our bomber offensive is shown in Plate VII. 

26. The deep daylight penetrations into Germany of the United States 

bombers have forced the enemy to deploy his defenses in depth. Although he 

has disposed on the Western Front the maximum possible number of fighters, 

this in itself does not meet his needs, and he has been forced to increase their 

mobility and to employ increasing numbers of twin-engined fighters. He can 

now concentrate against bomber formations penetrating deep into Germany, 

fighters from an area extending from the West of Paris to the Baltic. The 

main counter to this mobility continues to be feints and diversionary attacks. 

27. At night the use of “Window” and other radio counter-measures has 

largely neutralized his controlled night fighter system. He has been forced to 

adopt a new system of concentrating large forces of single-engined and twinengined fighters which “free-lance” over what he assumes will be the target. 

This opens up exceptional opportunities for feint attacks, and these have 

already been exploited with success; the enemy night defense system has frequently been thrown into great confusion. 

28. Flak and searchlights have equally been disorganized by “Window,” 

the use of which, coupled with the expected presence of night fighters over the 

target, has restricted flak activity to barrage fire below the level of the bomber 

stream. This has increased the reliance and hence the strain on the fighter 

defenses. Our new tactics have substantially reduced the percentage success 

of the enemy’s night fighter sorties, and up to date he has found no method of 

meeting the situation, except to increase continuously the number of fighters 

available for the purpose. 

125 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

29. The day and night fighters responsible for the defense of Germany have 

now been placed under a single command, and are required to deal with both 

the United States attacks by day and the R.A.F. attacks by night. This system 

of employment in a dual role may produce weaknesses during the periods of 

sustained day and night attack. 

30. The principal new weapon developed for day use by the enemy is the 

rocket, mounted mainly on twin-engined fighters. This weapon has been used 

effectively in massed attacks delivered from the rear of the bomber formations 

and from beyond the range of the .50 calibre tail guns. Such attacks have been 

coordinated with single-engined fighter attacks from other quarters. Rocketequipped aircraft are extremely vulnerable to our fighters, and although their 

employment is increasing, the most dangerous enemy of the day bomber 

remains the single-engined cannon fighter. 

31. In the face of these new tactics and new weapons the bombers have 

continued to operate successfully and have every expectation of being able so 

to continue. 

RECOMMENDATION 

32. All evidence indicates that the Combined Bomber Offensive is achieving 

a profound effect upon Germany's war economy and upon the morale of her 

people. In the continuation of the offensive toward a decision, time is a vital 

factor. The offensive should be pressed on, in accordance with the existing 

directives, with all vigor, and its intensity increased. 

7 November 1943 

126 
127 

I943 

AIRPLANES ASSIGNED TO 

Vlll BOMBER COMMAND 

NES AVAILABLE 

AIRPLANES REQUIRED 

DEC. NOV. 

c 

OCT. 

1943 TO DATE APRIL - AVERAGE 

FORCE EIGHTH AIR 

HEAVY BOMBERS 

SEPT. AUG. JULY 

MONTHLY 

JUNE MAY APR. 

n 

NUMBER 

wo 

1.500 

1.200 

300 

0 

U. 5. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET PLATE 111 

ROYAL AIR FORCE 

FIGHTER BOMBER AND LIGHT BOMBER* 

AIRPLANES DISPATCHED FROM 

AIRDROMES 

*MITCHELL 

VENTURA 

t 053 1 BOSTON 

8.9 

FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG 5EPl IOCT NOV DEC 

AIRPLANES MISSING IN ACTION AND 

GERMAN AIRPLANES DESTROYED 

R. A. F. LOSSES GERMAN LOSSES 

40 30 20 10 0 

8 

JUNE 

JULV 

AUG. 

SEPT. 

OCT. 0 

131 

U. 5. S�CREl 

11RllISH MOST SfCR�l PLATE I\' 

~ 

35w3wo2500­

2wo. 

1 5w. 

1wO5wNO OPERATIONS 

' 13 

o, tFEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG iEPT OCT NOV DEC ' 

133 

ROYAL AIR FORCE 

FIGHTER AIRPLANES 

(INCLUDING ARMY CO-OP & TAF) 

DISPATCHED FROM AIRDROMES 

NUMBER 

14oOO n . .,... 

14,m 1 IN SUPPORT OF BOMBERS 

6.W 

4.m 

2wO 

0 

FEE. hUR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEW OCT. I

NOV. 

I 

DEC. 

AIRPLANES MISSING IN ACTION AND ENEMY 

AIRPLANES DESTROYED 

R A F LOSSES GERMAN LOSSES 

Irn 50 0 0 50 1w 150 

- FEQ ­

57 - APR - .I 

- MAY - I63 

- JUNE - I.. - JULY ­

- 73 

I - AUG 83 

- SEPT im 

- OCT ­

- NOV ­

- DEC -

IN SUPPORT OF BOMBERS 

135 

U. 5.SECRET 

BRlTlSH MOST SECRET PLATE VI 

EIGHTH AIR FORCE 

FIGHTER AIRPLANES 

DISPATCHED FROM AIRDROMES 

NUMBER 

3.500

“Oo0 R 

3.m . 

2.m . 

2.m . 

1.500 . 

l.m . 

m 

01 

FEU. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. KPT OCT. NOV. DEC. 

AIRPLANES MISSING IN ACTION AND 

ENEMY AIRPLANES DESTROYED 

u “ 1 FEB. 0 

I MAR. 0 

137 

DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN 

AIR FORCE FIGHTERS 

- 1.m 

I 

- 1.a I 

I 

- I 

WESTERN FRONT I I

,

I 4 

I I 

I I 

1 I 

I , 1 

I 

I 

9 1 

1 AUG. 1943 

L BALKANS I 1 w 01 

, I 01 

, I I

! mI 

4 I : 0 

- , AUG. SEFT. OCl. NOV. DEC. IAN. FED. MAR. APR. N JUNE J AUG. SEFT. OCT. NOV. 

1942 I943 

1.100 

- 

2. lLClL, 

TlSH MOST SECRET PLATE VIII 

NUMBE 

8.W 

7.W 

6.W 

5.000 

4.00 

3.W 

2.W 

l.W 

0 

40 

3M) 

m 

ROYAL AIR FORCE 

HEAVY BOMBER AIRPLANES 

(INCLUDING WELUNGTONS 8. MOSQUITOS) 

DISPATCHED FROM AIRDROMES 

5.011 

I 11M 

FEU MAR. APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT. OCT. NOV. 

I 

DEC. 

I JRPLANES MISSING Ir ACTIC I 

FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPl OCT. NOV OK 

GERMAN AIRPLANES DESTROYED 

2 7 11 21 22 21 46 45 23 

141 

ROYAL AIR FORCE 

TOTAL LONG TONS OF BOMBS 

DROPPED MONTHLY 

WELLINGTONSa MOSOUITOS 

FEBRUARY, 1943 TO DATE 

OTHER TARGETS

iiiii GERMAN TARGETS 

HEAVIES, 

NUMBER 

LONG TONS 

2o.ooo ­

16,MM . 

5. SECREI 

'irisn MOST SECRET PLATE x 

EIGHTH AIR FORCE 

HEAVY BOMBER AIRPLANES 

NUM0ER DISPATCHED FROM AIRDROMES 

1.748 

AIRPLANES MISSING IN ACTION AND 

GERUAN AIRPLANES DESTROYED 

U. S. LOSSES GERMAN LOSSES 

m

+i .m m3w~m6001008m5wFD " 

1.7 

APR. I48 

MAY 

JUNE 

JULY 

AUG. 

SEPT. 

176 OCT. 

NOV. 

DK. 

1 fEB. GH .?OW. 

-

3,086 ENEMY AIRPLANES DESTROYED

145 

NOV

EIGHTH AIR FORCE 

TOTAL SHORT TONS OF BOMBS 

DROPPED MONTHLY 

NUMBER 

SHORT TONS APRIL 1943. TO DATE 

0.w . 

7.000 ' 

6.m . 

5.m ' 

1.47P.S 

1.BPI.7 4,000 

3.w. 7.610. 

1.000 ' 

962 6

1.w 

Or IIJULY 

SEPT. AUO. 
148 
ROYAL AIR FORCE 

HEAVY BOMBERS, WELLINGTONS AND MOSQUITOS 

PERCENT MISSING PER AIRPLANE DISPATCHED 

FROM AIRDROMES 

MONTHlY & CUMUlATlVE 

.­ b 
150 
EIGHTH AIR FORCE 

HEAVY BOMBER AIRPLANES 

PERCENT LOSS PER AIRPLANE DISPATCHED 

FROM AIRDROMES* 

MONTHLY 6 CUMULATIVE 

PERCENT 

MONTHLY 

4.9 4.8 

1.0 CUMULATIVE 3.6 ­ 4 . 1.1 

I 3.P 

~ I I 

I 

I ~ 

I 2.6 I 2 - I 

I I 

I 

~ 

I 

I I 

, I 

I I t I I 

0. 

I I I I 

AUG 1P42 MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPl OCT. NOV. DfC

TO APRIL 30. IP43 

* MISSING IN 
152 
u i SECRET 

lTlSH MOST SfCRFl PLATE XI\' 

GERMAN AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION 

PW r 

j SINGLE ENGINE FIGHTERS ME 109 

I' F.W 170 

I '80 

1 8 

i' TWIN ENGINE FIGHTERS 

7W 1 Fighter DO. 217 

II5 Finhlpr JU. 88 1; 

0 

AUG~ SEbr. Oh. NOV. DEC- JiN. FEB. MiR Aka. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEW. 

rn Ip13 

I.1Wi 

I IOM 

- 1m 

TOTAL FIGHTER PRODUCTION 

JU. 88 400- JU. I88 

HE. I1 I 

DO. 217 

I HE. I77 

1w' F, W. 2W 

JU. 87 

HS. 129 

JU. 86P I 

01' 

AUG. SEPl. OCT. NOV. DEC. JAN, FEB, MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPl. 

-

1942 -I943

NOTE; Fwurm for the lost two months should b. tr&d 0. TENIATIVE. 

153 
154 
GERMAN AIR FORCE 

FIRST LINE STRENGTH 

NUMBER 

2.m 7 

1.933 

l.m . 

TWIN ENGINE FIGHTERS 

MS 

5&5 ­

3,m 

2.933 

2,m 

1,713 

1.933 BOMBERS (L.R.B., B.R., 6 D.B.) 

1.m 

933 

0 - . - ­ 1A SEM. 00. NOV. DEC. JAN. FEB. MR. APR. MAY J IE JULY AUG. SEPT. 1 

1942 I v43 

155 
156 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 40311 3 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROGRESS REPORT ON COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached note on the Combined Bomber Offensive has been prepared 

by the British Chief of Air Staff and is circulated for information. On 3 December 1943, at their 133rd Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed 

Passages A, B and C. It was generally agreed that General Eaker should be 

ordered to proceed with the present plan up to the limit which can be achieved 

without seriously outrunning the supply of replacement aircraft and crews 

in prospect for the units which he has at any time. 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

157 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE 

THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

Note by the British Chief of Air Staff 

General Eaker and I have prepared in accordance with the request of 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff the report (C.C.S. 403) which is before you. It 

contains, largely in the form of diagrammatic charts, statistical information 

of many kinds. It also contains appreciations by the British Ministry of 

Economic Warfare, Air Intelligence and the Political Warfare Executive stating 

what they believe to be the effects of the bombing on Germany to date. 

I do not of course intend to take you through the report in detail, but 

I will try to give you a brief summary of what has been achieved, and then I will 

deal shortly with certain features of the report which deserve particular 

attention. 

This is a short summary of what has been done. First, mainly as a 

result of the successful attacks on 7 factories, German single-engined fighter 

production has been reduced by some 40 percent below what the Germans had 

planned that it should be at the present time. This is equivalent to a strength 

of about 750 less than the planned strength. 

Secondly, attacks on other factories and industrial areas have seriously 

affected the German capacity for armament manufacture, chiefly in respect 

of ball-bearings, rubber, electrical equipment, vehicles, machine tools, steel, 

shipbuilding and heavy industry. It is not possible to assess the loss accurately, 

but Appendix “C” contains some approximate estimates. Of course damage 

to capacity is not immediately reflected in shortages with the fighting forces, 

especially with the heavy industries, but there is very good evidence that 

actual shortages exist in certain important finished products and the field of 

these shortages will doubtless steadily widen. 

Thirdly, the effects of the Combined Bomber Offensive on German 

morale, though incidental, are nevertheless of tremendous importance, are 

summed up as follows in Appendix “F”: 

158 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

“We conclude that during the period under review: 

(1) Fear of air attack has been the dominant pre-occupation of a 

large part of the German civilian population, and has contributed to produce a situation in which fear of the consequences 

of continuing the war is becoming greater than fear of the consequencesof defeat. 

(ii) Air attacks on Germany have resulted in social disruption on a 

scale which has greatly impaired the German ability to prosecute 

the war and threatens the structure of the entire home front. 

(iii) Though the forces of repression, the hopes of a compromise with 

one or other of the belligerents, and the favorable climatic 

conditions of the past three months have so far prevented any 

general break in morale, it is not reasonable to infer that no 

such break in morale can occur, and we do not exclude the 

possibility that, in conjunction with further large-scale military 

reverses and with the advent of winter air operations may 

exercise a decisive influence on conditions inside Germany.” 

I will give you a few statistics not recorded in the report which form a 

solid basis for the above opinion. Some 38 German cities have now been more 

or less seriously attacked. They aggregate a population of 18 millions. These 

cities contain 84,000 acres or 133 square miles of built-up area. Of this total 

20,700 acres or 32% square miles have been devastated. This does not include 

the heavy damage in industrial areas or suburbs,which is additional. 

Ninety percent of the above has been done in 1943. 

It is approximately equivalent to the devastation of three-fourths of the 

total built-up area comprised in the 10 largest cities in England and Scotland, 

excluding only London. I have brought to this Conference two books containing 

photographs of these German cities and transparencies showing the devastation achieved at each of them and a comparison, on the same scale, of what 

the Germans did at Coventry. Perhaps 6,000,000 people or more have been made 

homeless and have spread alarm and despondency in the areas into which they 

have gone. They are crowding into areas as yet unbombed, and huts are being 

built for some of them, but the replacement of their clothing and moveable goods 

destroyed in these devastating attacks is either impossible or can only be done 

at the direct expense of the war effort. There is no shadow of doubt that morale 

is at an extremely low ebb. 

159 
U. 6. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

I do not think it is optimistic to suggest that we are now at least half-way 

along the road of industrial devastation towards the point where Germany will 

become unable to continue the war. With the winter coming on we may be even 

further along the road towards morale breakdown, though measurement of 

the destruction of morale is impossible. 

I now come to one or two points in the report to which I would like to 

direct your attention. 

You will remember that the essence of the first stage of the POINTBLANK Plan was the progressive destruction of the German fighter force. 

This was to be achieved in three ways: 

(a) By destruction of assembly plants by day bombing; 

(b) By general destruction of the industrial facilities on which aircraft 

production depends; 

(c) By the attrition resulting from air fighting. 

Now if the POINTBLANK operations had proceeded exactly in accordance with the plan and had achieved exactly the planned effect the strength of 

the German fighter force, as then estimated, would have been reduced at the 

1st July 1943 from a possible 2,480 to 2,450 and at the 1st November from a 

possible 2,900to 2,250. You will note that very little effect was expected by the 

1st July. 

In fact,the rate of increase of the German single-engined fighter strength 

had not been accurately appreciated at the time the plan was formulated. 

The actual strength SEF and TEF on the 1st July was 2,720 and on the 1st 

November 2,850. I should nevertheless point out that had it not been for the 

POINTBLANK Plan, and had the observed rate of production in April, May 

and June been maintained, the total strength might well have been 2,760 in 

July and would certainly by now have mounted off the graph altogether, probably to over 3,500.If you will look at Plate XIV, annexed to C.C.S.403 (blue line), 

you will see very clearly how single-engined fighter production has declined as 

a result of POINTBLANK. 

Of course there are several things to account for the incomplete fulfillment of our hopes. 

One of the most important is shown in Plate 11,annexed to C.C.S. 403, 

where the black line shows the U.S.heavy bombers required by the Plan and 

160 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the broken line the aircraft assigned to the U.K. The red line in relation to 

the green reflects the serviceability rate and the availability of crews. 

I must say that I regard the achievementsof the Eighth Air Force in relation to the resources available to them as highly creditable. Moreover, there is a 

concealed achievement which is, of course, to a considerable extent shared 

by the R.A.F. in that an ever-increasing proportion of the German fighter 

strength has been drawn away from other fronts to the immense advantage 

of the fighting in Russia and the Mediterranean. 

In emphasizing the extent to which the POINTBLANK Plan has fallen 

shortin one direction of what was intended of it I am not in any way minimizing 

what has been done towards achieving the primary object of the Combined 

Bomber Offensive which is stated in paragraph 5 of Appendix “B.” 

You will see from Plates IX and XI, annexed to C.C.S. 403,the total of 

bombs dropped and from Appendix “C” some of the results. 

The R.A.F. Bomber Command has of course had its own dimculties to 

contend with in supporting the POINTBLANK Plan. The short summer nights 

virtually limited its effort for two months to the Ruhr. The mounting scale of 

defence caused a sharp rise in the casualty rate as shown in Plate XII, 

annexed to C.C.S. 403. The towns where twin-engined fighters are mainly 

constructed are distant and hard to find at night, yet the scale of assault on 

Germany mounted steadily until autumn weather of an unusually unfavorable kind set in during Septeml 

I would refer you for a moment to Plate I, annexed to C.C.S. 403,which 

shows how the provision of crews is related to the scale of effort to be expected. 

The weather in April was actually better than that in August and the 

aircraft on strength were almost exactly the same in the two months. The 

increase in crews (blue) is reflected not only in the increase available (red) 

but much more strikingly in the sorties and bomb delivery, which rose from 

4,805to 7,175(PlateVIII) and from 11,193tons to 20,149 (PlateIX) respectively. 

There are two factors which affect the effort which can be sustained: 

(a) The availability of aircraft and crew replacements. 

(b) The casualty rate. 

British heavy bomber production is now about 400 a month with corresponding crew output and it can only increase very slowly. Our casualty rate 

161 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

as you see from Plate XI1 is at the moment stabilized at just under 4% of 

sorties. Whether we can keep it there or not will depend largely on the success 

of POINTBLANK. 

The Eighth Bomber Command casualty rate, which was fluctuating 

between 3M% and 5% until August, dropped sharply in September to 2.6% 

and then rose sharply to 6.7% in October as a result of the deep penetration 

undertaken during that month against ever-increasingstrength of the defence. 

(See Plate XIII). 

The only other charts deserving mention are Plates V and VI, which 

illustrate how far we have employed the fighter forces in U.K. in support of 

the day bombers. 

In August, September and October the R.A.F. flew over 26,000 and the 

U.S.fighters nearly 9,000 sortieson this work and destroyed 241 and 170 enemy 

aircraft respectively. 

I now come to the point where I must ask for a decision on policy. 

At the inception of the POINTBLANK Plan it was pointed out 

most clearly that the planned result could not be achieved unless the 

forces required were provided. This is how it was put: 

"The task requires the force called for. The provision of a lesser 

force will not accomplish a proportionate result. For example, if 

only 75% of the force called for is made available, 75% of the 

result cannot be expected. If only 75% of the force called for is 

made available, less than 50% of the result outlined can be 

accomplished." 

According to my calculations about 89% of the planned strength 

was provided for the first phase, 76% for the second phase and 67% for 

the first haIf of the third phase, where we now are. With this force 90% 

of the sorties required by the Plan have been despatched, but it has 

not been possible for them all to be against targets in the Plan. Nevertheless, 58% of the planned successful sorties have been flown against 

targets in the Plan and 54% against the G.A.F. targets in the Plan. The 

.hard fact is that we are almost exactly three months behind schedule 

and German fighter production and strength are both higher than the 

Plan contemplated. This is in spite of the most gallant and successful 

efforts on the part of the squadrons to use surprise instead of numbers 

for achieving penetrations which were only intended to be attempted 

in the later stages of the Plan and with far greater strength. 

162 

1 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The question is what is to be done in view of the arrears and the dependence of OVERLORD on POINTBLANK. 

I think it is necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take 

responsibility for laying down a policy for the use of the Eighth Bomber 

Command in the remainder of Phase IXI and during Phase IV of the 

POINTBLANK Plan. 

Is the Commander to go out for the completion of the present 

phase regardless of the fact that, being 26% short of planned strength, 

he must expect to suffer disproportionate losses? 

B 

Or on the other hand is he to be given a modified objective which 

is believed to be within the compass of the force he will have? 

Or is some middle course possible? 

After discussing this question at some length with General Eaker, 

I would advise against the modification of the Plan and also against his 

being ordered to completeit regardless of loss. 

I would advise the following: 

(a) The greatest possibIe increase in the force at General Eaker’s disposal in respect of both formed units and replacement aircraft and 

crews. I suggest it may be necessary to give the Eighth Air Force 

priority over the Fifteenth Air Force in new groups until the spring. 

(b) Subject to (a) above, General Eaker should be ordered to proceed 

with the present Plan up to the limit which can be achieved without C seriously out-running the supply of replacement aircraft and crews 

in prospect for the units which he has at any time. 

A decision to the above effect would enable General Eaker to feel his 

way and perhaps to achieve more than we at present dare to expect. It will also 

serve to sustain morale and to prevent the undue dissipation of the forces now 

in action which by its accumulated experience must form the basis of future 

expansion. 

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APPENDIX “A” 

C.C.S. 166/1/D 

January 21, 1943 

“CASABLANCA DIRECTIVE” 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 

Directive to the appropriate British and United States 

Air Force Commanders, to Govern the operation of 

the British and United States Bomber Commands in 

the United Kingdom. 

(Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 

65th Meeting on January 21, 1943). 

YOUR primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, 

and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their 

capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. 

2. Within that general concept, your primary objectives, subject to the exigencies of weather and of tactical feasibility, will for the 

present be in the following order of priority:­

(a) German submarine construction yards. 

(b) The German aircraft industry. 

(c) Transportation. 

(d) Oil plants. 

(e) Other targets in enemy war industry. 

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The above order of priority may be vaned from time to time according to developments in the strategical situation. Moreover, other objectives of great importance either from the political or military point of view must be attacked. 

Examples of these are ­

(i) Submarine operating bases on the Biscay coast. If these can be put 

out of action, a great step forward will have been taken in 

the U-boat war which the C.C.S. have agreed to be a first 

charge on our resources. Day and night attacks on these 

bases have been inaugurated and should be continued so that 

an assessment of their effects can be made as soon as possible. 

If it is found that successful results can be achieved, these 

attacks should continue whenever conditions are favourable 

for as long and as often as is necessary. These objectives have 

not been included in the order of priority, which covers longterm operations,particularly as the bases are not situated in 

Germany. 

(ii) Berlin, which should be attacked when conditions are suitable for 

the attainment of specially valuable results unfavourable to 

the morale of the enemy or favourable to that of Russia. 

3. You may also be required, at the appropriate time, 

to attack objectives in Northern Italy in connection with amphibious operations 

in the Mediterranean theatre. 

4. There may be certain other objectives of great but 

fleeting importance for the attack of which all necessary plans and preparations should be made. Of these, an example would be the important units of 

the German Fleet in harbour or at sea. 

5. You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the 

German day fighter force and to contain German fighter strength away from 

the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war. 

6. When the Allied Armies re-enter the Continent, you 

will afford them all possible support in the manner most effective. 

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7. In attacking objectives in occupied territories, you 

will conform to such instructions as may be issued from time to time for 

p~liticalreasons by His Majesty’s Government through the British Chiefs of 

Staff. 

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APPENDIX “B” 

AIR MINISTRY, 

LONDON, S.W. 1. 

MOST SECRET 

S.46368/A.C.A.S. (Ops.) 10th June, 1943.

Sir, 

I am directed to refer to Directive C.C.S. 166/1/D dated 21st January, 

1943,issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and forwarded to the Commanding 

General, Eighth Air Force and the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber 

Command under cover of Air Ministry letter S.46368/A.C.A.S. (Ops.) dated 

4th February, 1943. This directive contained instructions for the conduct of the 

British and American bomber offensive from this country. 

2. In paragraph 2 of the directive, the primary objectives were set out 

in order of priority, subject to the exigencies of weather and tactical feasibility. 

Since the issue of this directive there have been rapid developments in the 

strategical situation which have demanded a revision of the priorities originally laid down. 

3. The increasing scale of destruction which is being inAicted by our 

night bomber forces and the development of the day bombing offensive by the 

Eighth Air Farce have forced the enemy to ciepby day and, night fighters in 

increasing numbers on the Western Front. Unless this increase in fighter 

strength is checked we may find our bomber forces unable to fulfil the tasks 

allotted to them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

4. In these circumstances it has become essential to check the growth 

and to reduce the strength of the day and night fighter forces which the 

enemy can concentrate against us in this theatre. To this end the Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that first priority in the operation of British 

and American bombers based in the United Kingdom shall be accorded to the 

attack of German fighter forces and the industry upon which they depend. 

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5. The primary object of the bomber forces remains as set out in the 

original directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 166/1/D dated 

21st January, 1943) i.e. :­

“the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 

industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale 

of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.” 

6. In view however, of the factors referred to in para. 4 the following 

priority objectives have been assigned to the Eighth Air Force:-

Intermediate objective: 

German Fighter strength 

The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command 

The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command 

The Commanding General, Eighth Air Force. 

Primary objectives: 

German submarine yards and bases 

The remainder of the German aircraft industry 

Ball bearings 

Oil (contingent upon attacks against Ploesti 

from the Mediterranean) 

Secondary objectives: 

Synthetic rubber and tyres 

Military motor transport vehicles. 

While the forces of the British Bomber Command will be employed in accordance 

with their main aim in the general disorganisation of German industry their 

action will be designed as far as practicable to be complementary to the operations of the Eighth Air Force. 

7. In pursuance of the particular requirements of para. 6 above, I am 

to request you to direct your forces to the following tasks:­

(i) the destruction of German air-frame, engine 

and component factories and the ball-bearing 

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industry on which the strength of the German 

fighter force depend 

(ii) the general disorganisation of those industrial 

areas associated with the above industries 

(iii) the destruction of those aircraft repair depots

and storage parks within range, and on which 

the enemy fighter force is largely dependent. 

(iv) the destruction of enemy fighters in the air and 

on the ground. 

The list of targets appropriate to these special tasks is in Appendix ‘A’ forwarded 

under cover of Air Ministry letter S.46368/III/D.B. Ops. dated 4th June, 1943. 

Further copies of this list,which will be amended from time to time as necessary, 

will be forwarded in due course. 

8. Consistent with the needs of the air defence of the United Kingdom 

the forces of the British Fighter Command will be employed to further this 

general offensive by :­

(i) the attack of enemy aircraft in the air and on 

the ground 

(ii) the provision of support necessary to pass bomber 

forces through the enemy defensive system with 

with the minimum cost. 

9. American fighter forces will be employed in accordance with the 

instructions of the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force in furtherance of 

the bomber offensive and in co-operation with the forces of Fighter Command. 

10. The allocation of targets and the effective co-ordination of the 

forces involved is to be ensured by frequent consultation between the Commanders concerned. To assist this co-ordination a combined operational planning committee has been set up. The suggested terms of reference under which 

this Committee is to operate is outlined in Air Ministry letter CS.19364/A.C.A.S. 

(Ops.) dated 10th June, 1943. 

11. It is emphasised that the reduction of the German fighter farce is 

of primary importance; any delay in its prosecution will make the task progressivelymore difficult. At the same time it is necessary to direct the maximum 

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effort against the submarine construction yards and operating bases when 

tactical and westher conditions preclude attacks upon objectives associated 

with the German Fighter Force. The list of these targets is in Appendix ‘B’ 

forwarded with the Appendix ‘A’ referred to in paragraph 7 above. 

I am, Sir, 

Your obedient Servant, 

(Sgd) N. H. BOTTOMLEY. 

Air Vice Marshal, 

Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations) 

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APPENDIX “C” 

JOINT REPORT BY MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE 

AND AIR INTELLIGENCE ON EFFECTS OF 

BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

The effects of bombing do not fall evenly on the various parts of the 

Enemy’s war potential, and, to some extent, they are redistributed according 

to the immediate requirements of the consumers of material having the highest 

priority in Germany. There is a cushion represented by the margin over the 

bare minimum demands required by the workers and the armed forces, which 

is now being deeply depressed by aerial attack. 

2. It is difficult to estimate the overall effect in quantitative terms but 

it is considered to be now in the region of 10% of the total war potential. A total 

decline of 20% in overall effort may well be fatal. Contributing to this average 

decline is a very much greater decline in some individual industries (e.g. Ballbearings and rubber) which may be near the point where they could cause the 

collapse of the whole war machine. Moreover, the housing situation and the 

general morale are both so bad that either might cause a collapse before 

industry became unable to sustain the war effort. 

Aircraft. 

3. Direct attack on fighter-aircraft assembly and component plants 

did not begin until the end of July. Between that date and the end of October 

the eight attacks that were made by the U.S.A.A.F. on the Me. 109 works at 

Wiener Neustadt“ and Regenburg and on the F.S. 190 works at Oschersleben, 

Warnemunde, Anklam, Marienburg and Kassel have been highly successful. 

They were aided by a night attack by Bomber Command on Kassel in October, 

which damaged the Bettenhausen components plant. 

4. Single-engined fighter production in the months of September and 

October was on a lower level than for the month of July, notwithstanding the 

high degree of priority accorded to single-engined fighter production and the 

* Two attacks by N.A.A.F. 

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considerable planned expansion in output. Damage to assembly factories alone 

in the above attacks has resulted in a production loss of 880 aircraft and production in October was between 600 and 700 against an estimated planned production of 1,000. 

U-Boats. 

5. The regular attacks on U-Boat construction and components manufacture have caused a direct loss of at least 22 vessels in 1943 out of the total 

of about 200 that would have been launched by the end of October. The delayed 

action of attacks on areas producing materials and components for U-Boats 

appears now to be having an effect on the average rate of completion. 

Industrial Damage. 

6. Up to the Spring of this year bombing appears to have had only a 

small effect on Coal output. Between April and July inclusive, however, Ruhr 

coal production probably declined by 10%. In spite of this, and presumably 

because consumers were harder hit than producers, supply still more than 

covers essential demand. Coke continues to be a limiting factor in steel production. There is increasing stringency in the supply of liquid fuels caused at 

least in part by the raid on Ploesti. At the peak of the Summer attack Ruhr steel 

output probably declined by 30-40%. This was partly offset by increased output 

in France, Belgium and Luxembourg, so that the maximum net drop was not 

less than 10% in German Europe. Bombing has also helped the shortage of 

ferro-alloys to reduce the quality and quantity of special-steel output. The 

decrease in the supplies of crude and special steels has made itself felt in 

armaments output, including aircraft, which has also been directly reduced 

by damage to the heavy-engineering industries of the Ruhr and other areas. 

7. Virtually no rubber has been received through the blockade during 

the past nine months and consequently the raw material for tyres has been 

reduced in quantity and wearing quality. The destruction of the Huls plant 

has deprived Germany of 15% of her total rubber requirements and pressure 

has been increased by heavy losses of stocks at tyre factories. 

8. Manufacturing centres for textiles have suffered heavily and the 

greater part of the remaining textile output is now reserved for essential 

military and industrial requirements. The civilian clothes ration has been 

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cancelled and parachute cloths, cords and harness have been affected. Losses of 

stocks have probably been an important factor in producing immediate effects. 

9. Electrical engineering has suffered more heavily than any other 

branch of the engineering industry owing to the direct effects of factory damage 

and a high degree of concentration of the industry in a few concerns. There is 

evidence of continuing shortage of signals equipment in the Wehrmacht. 

10. A few raids have resulted in damage to ball-bearing factories on a 

scale which may cause a 50%)loss of production over the next six months, and 

in addition, by producing bottlenecks in an even shorter period, is likely severely 

to affect particular types of bearings required in the armaments and aircraft 

industry. 

Housing. 

11. Damage to housing, combined with evacuation, has resulted in the 

final saturation of all suitable accommodation in Germany. In the coming 

Winter the problem of housing evacuees, many of whom have hitherto been 

in temporary dwellings unsuitable to Winter conditions, will put upon the home 

administration a burden that it may not be able to support. 

Land Transportation and Shipping. 

12. Damage to the Western European communications system and its 

equipment, although heavy throughout the year, has declined of late; and 

this, coupled with the withdrawal on the Russian front and t.he reduction in 

traffic to Italy, has caused some easing in the general transport position. New 

construction of locomotive and wagons now probably more than offsets losses 

by bomb damage. 

13. Damage to ports on Germany’s Western seaboard has necessitated a 

most inconvenient reorientation of sea-borne and internal transport. 

Mining. 

14. In Northern waters the continued mining offensive has further 

decreased the enemy’s shipping potential by sinking many of his ships and by 

causing him to divert tonnage from his now slender reserves to mine-sweeping. 

It has also contributed to the enforced reorientation of transport. 

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Immobilization of Enemy Resources, etc. 

15. The employment of a considerable and increasing number of fulltime adult personnel in anti-aircraft and civil defence, factory repair and 

reconstruction, and first-aid to housing, represents a serious drain on Germany’s industrial man-power that might otherwise have been employed on 

production. 

Morale. 

16. The maintenance of morale is the gravest singleproblem confronting 

the home authorities. The full effects of air attack since the devastation of 

Hamburg have become known in all parts of the country. The increasing death 

roll is an important factor and coupled with military failures the general attitude is approaching one of “peace at any price” and the avoidance of the wholesale destruction of further cities in Germany. 

4th November, 1943. 

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APPENDIX “D” 

WAR CABINET 

JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE 

EFFECTS OF BOMBING OFFENSIVE ON GERMAN WAR EFFORT 

Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-committee 

CONCLUSIONS 

1. All the great industrial centres of the Ruhr and Rhineland have been so 

devastated by bombing that they are openly regarded as front line zones whose 

essential activities must somehow be kept going. The task of evacuating less 

essential personnel is being pressed forward on the highest priority, but is 

clearly meeting with very grave difficulties. A.R.P. services, even though reinforced, are increasingly inadequate to meet the strain of prolonged bombardment, and relief measures have lost much of their earlier efficiency. The willingness to hold out has been seriously lowered in the heavily bombed areas; in 

the less heavily bombed areas morale has most certainly been affected. The 

morale of the fighting forces has suffered in consequence of the plight of their 

relatives but there is as yet no evidence that their fighting spirit has been 

impaired. 

2. The problem of housing workers in the heavily bombed industrial areas, 

and of housing refugees elsewhere is very acute. The effect of the offensive on 

transportation and administration and on the supply of consumer goods, 

though not calculable, is known to be severe and cumulative. 

3. Though the physical destruction of productive capacity in Germany 

has been considerable, it comprises as yet only a small proportion of the total 

industrial capacity available to Germany. Indeed only about one-third of German industry has been under really heavy attack and that for only about 

three months. 

4. No individual industry, with a few exceptions, has yet suffered the complete loss of a critical number of the factorieson which it depends. There are also 

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still some small reserves of manufacturing capacity and some possible spheres 

of retrenchment with which to “cushion” munitions production from the 

effects of bomb damage. Such “cushioning”, however, involves serious repercussions on capital construction, housing, repairs and consumer goods production. These in turn react on future production plans and on morale. 

5. The reduction in steel production must already be having its effect on 

armament output; some other industries producing finished materials for 

the armed forces have already suffered immediate consequences as a result of 

the offensive. The chief of these are industries producing submarines,WIT, and 

other signals equipment, motor transport and perhaps heavy guns and ammunition. In other departments, it has so far been possible to maintain the 

supply of finished armaments to the forces by the expedients mentioned, and 

by depleting stocks. 

6. The greater part of the damage has fallen on industries producing or 

processing for other industries. This means a time lag of weeks or even months 

before the impact is fully felt by industries producing finished equipment. Thus 

the final effect of the damage done to Krupps in March and April will not be 

seen until the Autumn or even the Winter of 1943. 

7. On the other hand our offensive must have taken immediate effect on 

German plans by making production prospects both more adverse and largely 

incalculable at the very time when an unexpectedly high rate of military wastage had to be made good,and thus increasingly limiting German strategy. 

8. Our bombing offensive has been a major factor in forcing Germany to 

adopt a defensive air strategy. It has forced the Germans to make a special 

effort to increase the production of fighter types and it has tied down fighter 

units on the Western Front in spite of a vital need for them elsewhere. 

9. Our bomber offensive has made very heavy demands on skilled manpower for Radar and fighter defences. Large A.R.P. and fire services have had 

to be maintained at a high level of efficiency. The effect on Germany’s military 

manpower in causing men to be diverted from the armed forces or retained 

in civil life instead of being called up appears so far to have been very small. 

The Germans, however, appear to be now realising that their policy in this 

respect has been mistaken and members of the Todt organization have already 

been recalled from Norway and Russia to the Ruhr. 

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10. Although the rate of “softening” does not admit of numerical calculation without far greater knowledge of German policy and of the indirect results 

of bombing than we possess at present, enough is known to show that considerable progress has already been made, the effect of which is still developing. 

(Signed) E.G.N. RUSHBROOKE 

F.H.N. DAVIDSON 

A.F. INGLIS 

C.G. VICKERS 

A. NOBLE (for Mr. CavendishBentinck) . 

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.l. 

22ND JULY,1943. 

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APPENDIX “E” 

WAR CABINET 

JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE 

EFFECTS OF BOMBING OFFENSIVE ON GERMAN WAR EFFORT 

Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee 

(November, 1943) 

CONCLUSIONS 

1. The extreme gravity with which the German High Command view 

the extension of the air offensive during the past three months is evidenced 

by changes effected between 1st July and 1st October in the distribution of 

the German fighter force. Whereas at the beginning of this period approximately 50% of the total German fighter strength was employed on the Western 

front, today the fighter defenses of the Reich comprise not less than 70$’, of 

the total fighter resources of the G.A.F. This policy of concentrating fighter 

forces for home defence has been pursued at the direct expense of the Russian 

and Mediterranean fronts and has contributed to the severe military reverses 

which Germany has suffered on these fronts. 

2. The Allied air offensive has inflicted heavy casualties on the civilian 

population. In addition by compelling the German authorities to evacute 

not only raided areas but also major cities throughout Greater Germany, it 

has spred alarm throughout the Reich, and has dislocated the social and 

economic life of the country. It has also greatly reinforced the effect of military 

reverses in convincing an increasing majority of the German people that defeat 

is now probable. Despite the strength of the Gestapo control and the increasing 

use of and publicity about the death sentence, often for minor offences, the 

discipline of the German people now shows signs of considerable weakening; 

in particular their co-operation in civil defence, in helping with the difficulties 

of evacuation and in complying with the direction of labour has been found 

wanting. The masses are still carrying on owing to fear of the Gestapo and to 

fear of the consequences of defeat. The sense of hopelessness, however, and still 

more the voluntary and involuntary withdrawal of support for the war effort 

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already seriously impedes the German leaders in their conduct of the war. The 

extent to which this is attributable to Allied bombing has conspicuously 

increased in the last quarter. 

3. Probably five to six million people have by now been rendered temporarily or permanently homeless by bombing. This, coupled with evacuation 

of many large cities under the threat of further bombing has resulted in final 

saturation of all existing accommodation in Germany. The authorities are 

now being forced to divert labour and materials to the erection of large numbers 

of emergency hutments. Simultaneously, destruction of stocks of clothing 

in factory, shop and home have compelled the suspension of the clothing 

ration for adults. Lastly, the shortage of consumer goods has been so accentuated that even the needs of air-raid victims cannot be met. By the end of 

September, it is estimated that the number of workers displaced by bombing 

from their normal productive activities in industry, or engaged in rehabilitation work necessitated by bombing had reached the million mark (6%% of 

the industrial labour force). In addition a substantial carry-over of lost production and repair work has been created so that if the continuity of the 

attack can be maintained, there is every prospect that this figure will increase. 

4. Since June the offensive has been directed primarily against the 

single-engined fighter industry and by the middle of October had deprived 

the G.A.F. of over 900 S.E.F. 

5. Since the beginning of the year, five U-Boats have been destroyed 

by bombing of the yards. In addition damage to the yards and to the cities in 

which they are situated will result in the further loss of production of 17 

U-Boats before September, 1944. Of the total of 22 U-Boats denied, 10 are attributable to attacks in the third quarter. 

6. Although the shortage of A.F.V’s., and Signals equipment is primarily due to the high rate of wastage, the inadequacy of production has 

been aggravated by bombing, particularly in the case of signals equipment for 

the G.A.F. It is probable that as a result the arming and equipping of new 

divisions is now a greater problem than manning them. 

7. The attack on the Schweinfurt ball-bearing factories early in October is likely to produce a decline in Axis supplies by 15% - 2041 over the next 

six months and may well begin to affect the production of aircraft, A.F.V’s.,and 

other military equipment after two months. 

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8. Over the past twelve months, Axis steel production as a whole has 

shown a net decline of 5% - 75%and high-grade steel production for armament 

purposes an even larger decrease due to the concentration of damage in the 

Ruhr where the decline in steel output at the height of the offensive amounted 

to 30:’o-40%. 

9. The bombing of synthetic oil plants and the temporary dislocation 

in distribution of oil from Ploesti have contributed to maintaining the stringency of the German oil supply position. 

10. As a direct result of bombing during the third quarter, combined with 

the enemy’s lack of success in blockade running operations since the beginning 

of the year, the rubber position has deteriorated severely and has produced an 

acute shortage of tyres, the effects of which have not yet been fully felt. 

11. In other industries damage has been distributed too widely to make 

a deep impression on any one of them. In its overall effort (Le., allowing for 

bombing offensive resulted by the end of September, 1943, in a reduction of 

output of 10% - 15% as compared with the level of early 1943. Armament production as a whole has been reduced over this period perhaps to the same extent. 

In view of the wastage of equipment which the German armed forces, particularly the Army, have been and are incurring, and of the other factors operating 

after four years of blockade and intense military effort to impair Germany’s 

economic potential, such a decline at this critical stage of the war is undoubtedly causing the greatest concern to the higher direction of the German war 

effort. 

(Signed) V. CAVENDISH - BENTINCK 

E. G. N. RUSHBROOKE 

F. H. N. DAVIDSON 

F. F. INGLIS 

C. G. VICKERS 

Offices of the War Cabinet, 

s.w.l. 

12th November, 1943. 

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APPENDIX “F’ 

REPORT BY AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE 

IN CONSULTATION WITH 

POLITICAL WARFARE EXECUTIVE 

ALLIED AIR ATTACKS AND GERMAN MORALE - IV 

1. This paper appreciates the effect of Allied air attacks on German 

morale during the period July 15th - October 15th. 

2. In these three months the Allied air offensive has increased in 

weight and has included night attacks on targets in Central, Southern and 

South-Western Germany and day attacks on targets in East Prussia, Austria 

and Bavaria. In North-Western Germany Hamburg was devastated between 

July 24th and August 3rd by four attacks of an unparalleled intensity; Hanover 

became the target of four successful attacks on September 22ndf23rd and 

27th/28th, and October 8thf9th and 18th/19th; and notably effective single 

night attacks were made on Essen on July 25th/26th, Remscheid on July 30thf 

31st, Munchen-Gladbach on August 30th/31st, Bochum on September 29th/ 

30th, Hagen on October lst/2nd, and Kassel on October 3rd/4th. In SouthWestern Germany three very successful attacks were made on Mannheim on 

9thflOth August and 5thf6th and 23rdf24th September, and Stuttgart and 

Frankfurt were raided on the nights of October 4th/5th and 7thf8th. In 

Southern Germany an ineffective attack on Munich on September 6thf7th 

was followed by a heavy and concentrated attack on October 2nd/3rd, and 

Nuremburg was raided on August lOth/llth and 27th/28th. In Central Germany two moderately effective attacks on Berlin at the end of August culminated in a very successful attack on September 3rd/4th; and on ZOth/2lst 

October a scattered attack was for the first time made on Leipzig. By day 

aircraft of the U.S.A.A.F. have attacked targets as widely dispersed as Hamburg 

(July 25th and 26th), Kiel (July 29th), Kassel (July 29th and 30th), Bonn 

(12th August), Regensburg (17th August), Wiener-Neustadt (13th August 

and 1st October), Schweinfurt (17th August and 14th October), Stuttgart 

(6th September), Emden (September 27th and October 2nd), Frankfurt 

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(October 4th), Bremen (October 8th) , Gdynia, Anklam and Marienburg 

(October 9th), and Munster (October 10th). 

3. It was concluded in mid-July that attacks during the preceding two 

months had transformed what had previously been serious local difficulties 

into a threat affecting the entire structure of the German home front, and had 

caused a decline in morale which if it continued might prejudice the conduct 

of the war. It is appreciated that since that time the decline in morale as a 

direct and indirect result of air attack has been accelerated and that the tendencies noted in the earlier period are now present in a much exacerbated 

form. We single out for special notice the following reports:­

(i) A reliable and somewhat conservative Berlin source indicated in 

the third week of August that bombing was having a progressive 

and extremely detrimental effect on morale, and that among the 

whole population it had given rise to an increasing desire for peace. 

(ii) It was learned in mid-September that in the view of a responsible 

official the moral effect of Allied air attacks on Germany had been 

greatly increased by their systematic nature, since the Germans now 

had the impression that the Allies could wipe out any town district 

by district as they chose. 

(iii) A collated Swissreport prepared during the second half of September 

concluded that air attacks were having a more lowering effect on 

morale than the withdrawal in Russia. It was being said that even 

victory (which was generally regarded as unattainable) would not 

be worth achieving at the cost of the destruction of so many German towns. 

(iv) It was reliably indicated on 14th October that Allied air attacks 

were the main topic of conversation in Berlin. It was said that if no 

means could be found of putting an end to these attacks, the deterioration of economic conditions and morale would render a general 

collapse inevitable. The feeling in the bombed areas was that the war 

must be terminated regardless of what the terms might be, since 

even were Germany able to hold out in the hope of attaining a 

compromise peace, destruction would be on a scale which would 

preclude a return to normal conditions for an indefinite period. 

We consider that these reports accurately describe the evolution of opinion 

in Germany since the attacks on Hamburg at the end of July. 

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4. Concurrently with the last of the Hamburg attacks the German 

authorities inaugurated a system of large-scale precautionary evacuation from 

Berlin and other threatened areas. Initiated at short notice and conducted in 

confusion,these evacuation measures gave rise to alarm verging on panic in the 

towns concerned. Described by Das Reich as “a movement of millions of individuals”, they involved the wholesale removal of non-essential personnel inter 

alia from Berlin, Hamburg, Stettin,Nuremburg, Munich, Mannheim, Hannover, 

Kassel, Stuttgart,Augsburg, Leipzig,Vienna, Graz and Linz, and were accepted 

as a tacit admission on the part of the German Government that the security 

of centres of civilian population could no longer be ensured. An account of the 

evacuation of Berlin from an objective resident mentions the confusion 

resulting from the sudden recension of restrictions on individual movement, 

the appearance on the roads of large numbers of cars and lorries which had 

been laid up as a result of fuel rationing, the despatch of administrative departments to one point and of their archives to another, the unco-ordinated 

evacuation of industrial concerns without regard to technical considerations, 

and the temporary inability to trace evacuated offices. 

3. On the disastrous long-term effects of this precautionary evacuation 

all sources are agreed. Earlier reports of the results of the evacuation of raided 

areas in the Ruhr described the tension which had arisen between evacuees 

and the inhabitants of evacuation areas. This has now become apparent on a 

national scale. Thus a responsible source reporting in late August describes 

the difficulties that had arisen from the tendency of evacuees to regard themselves as state pensioners, and to drift back to evacuated districts as a result 

of the discomfort to which they were subjected in evacuation areas and the 

quarrels to which their presence there had given rise. Another source refers 

to the hostility with which evacuees were greeted in Eastern Germany, to 

the lack of preparation which had necessitated their sleeping in sheds, and 

to the dislocation of the supply system of the smaller towns as a result of 

the influx of the evacuated population. A third source refers to the fear 

of evacuees that they might be despatched to Poland, which was generally 

regarded as a danger zone. Statements made by a German business man 

towards the beginning of September also pay tribute to the influence on morale 

of the movement of large numbers of civilians from place to place, and to the 

effect upon them of a period of residence in strange surroundings when they 

are regarded as intruders. That demoralisation extends to the residents of 

evacuation areas as well as to evacuees is suggested in a report of early September. which describes the latter as “about as welcome as the plague” in the 

areas to which they are despatched. A detrimental effect has undoubtedly been 

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exercised on local morale by the contagious despondency of refugees from raided 

areas. In this connection there is good evidence that the advent of evacuees 

from North-Western Germany resulted in an epidemic of defeatism in the 

Sudetenland. It was in these circumstances that Himmler in August assumed 

control of the Ministry of the Interior. 

6. So far-reaching have been the consequences of evacuation and so 

complex the problem of housing, feeding and controlling the evacuated population, that a number of reports compare the low standard of living necessitated 

by evacuee conditions with Russian Communism. A responsible German business man, for example commented in the first week of September on the fact 

that evacuees who lost all their possessions constituted in effect a new proletariat, and on the inclination of residents in evacuation areas to regard the 

newcomers as Communists. The same theme recurs in a responsible report 

received in late October, which describes the automatic drift of this homeless, 

migratory population towards a Communist mentality. The danger that Europe 

might be “proletarianised by dispropriation through bombing” has also been 

mentioned in the German press. While it cannot be precluded that some of 

these references and reports are in the nature of propaganda addressed to 

Great Britain and the U.S.A. we believe that the tendency described has some 

basis in fact. 

7. While it is difficult to provide firm figures for the number of individuals in Germany affected by evacuation, some conception of the magnitude 

of the problem which confronts the German authorities can be gained from reports estimating the evacuated population at between four and six millions and 

eight millions respectively. An index to the scale of evacuation following specific 

attacks is provided by Hannover, from which 250,000 homeless were transferred 

after the attack of October 8th/9th. 

8. In conjunction with heavy residential damage, large-scale evacuation has contributed to the complete absorption of the housing resources of 

the Reich. The results of this are apparent both in raided districts and in 

evacuation areas. Thus during August evacuation from Hamburg caused a 

crisis in accommodation in Danzig, while by the third week of September (when 

evacuation to the Ostland was suspended) serious congestion had arisen in 

East Prussia, whither evacuees from the triangle Bremen - Hamburg - Berlin 

were moved, and where life was described as completely disorganised. From 

raided areas there is evidence that as late as 4th October essential personnel 

in Mannheim were living in air raid shelters for want of alternative accommodation, that in October further dwelling space was being requisitioned in 

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Bochum, and that in Bremen supplementary registration was in progress in 

anticipation of heavy air attacks. In late September the problem of housing 

the evacuated population during the winter months was reported to be causing 

the authorities the gravest concern, since in many areas refugees were accommodated in temporary wooden barracks. An official solution in the form of a 

German Housing Relief Scheme was announced by Ley on October 30th. This 

somewhat nebulous plan which provided for the large-scale construction of 

pre-fabricated emergency dwellings “in the form of summer houses” for evacuated families, had the merit of reassuring the evacuated population as to their 

chances of securing occupation of independent premises and even of returning 

to the vicinity of their native towns, and the disadvantage of an admission that 

since construction had only recently begun on an appreciable scale, it would 

be some time before the scheme was fully operative. 

9. The regionalism noted in the Ruhr in a previous report as one of the 

administrative consequences of a heavy series of attacks have assumed more 

significant proportions. Separatist tendencies are reliably reported to be attracting official attention in Bavaria,Wurtemberg and Baden where deeprooted hostility towards the Prussians is becoming evident. In Southern Germany during the first week of October demoralisation was stated to have 

expressed itself in growing anti-Prussian feeling. While it would be a mistake 

to attach undue importance to this point, sources agree that this development 

is largely due to the effect of air attacks on Nuremberg and Munich and to the 

transfer to Bavaria of large numbers of evacuees from raided areas in NorthWestern Germany. 

10. Not unnaturally the authorised evacuation a�non-essential civilian 

personnel led to the unauthorised evacuation of large numbers of civilians 

in essential occupations. In Vienna and other centres, which have not yet been 

attacked, a large section of the population is reported to sleep outside the town. 

In Berlin non-evacuated workmen are described as crowded into camps within 

a fifty mile radius of the city returning to the city daily for their work, while 

in Mannheim it proved necessary to institute a special check on motor-cars 

and trucks “loaded With goods as camouflage”, which were transporting the 

inhabitants into the country at night. A serious view is taken by the German 

authorities of this practice on the ground that it places an unnecessary strain 

on local communications and results in a depletion of the A.R.P. services. 

Absconding A.R.P. workers have been threatened that their ration cards will 

be withdrawn if the practice does not stop. 

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11. A by-product of the Hamburg raids was the diffusion of rumours 

on a scale and of a kind unparalleled in earlier periods. Lurid accounts of men 

and women with their clothes on fire running like living torches through the 

town seem to have gained immediate currency, and every effort has been made 

by the German authorities to dispel an illusion that liquid phosphorous was 

sprayed over the town by the attacking aircraft. An unprecedented number 

of injunctions against rumour mongering have been delivered, warnings have 

been issued against retailing sensational stories in shelters during air attacks, 

and heavy sentences have been imposed on individuals stabbing the home 

front in the back. There is no doubt that in the minds of the authorities the 

new credulity with which the German public discusses the effects of air attack 

is an important factor in undermining civilian resistance. 

12. There is good evidence that the number of fatal casualties incurred 

in raids has greatly increased during this period. In the case of four attacks 

on Cologne in June and July the German press admitted a total of over 4,000 

deaths; and in the case of the Hamburg attacks of 28,000 dead. There is some 

reason to think that in the latter instance the admitted casualties were about 

50% of the true figures, and many reports from Hamburg have mentioned 

totals of between 100,000 and 120,000. At Hannover 3,000 were killed in a single 

raid. While there is no means of forming an accurate estimate of aggregate 

casualties for any specificseries of attacks,it is clear that in Germany casualties 

are believed greatly to exceed the totals admitted by the authorities. The fact 

that it is found necessary to deny the “gruesome figures” in current circulation 

indicates that in the eyes of the public the expectation of life of the airerage 

German civilian has sharply declined. 

13. This has no doubt contributed to reduce the effort of the A.R.P. and 

fire-fighting services. That impaired efficiency is not confined to any one locality is indicated by reports from Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin, by the threats of 

punishment meted out to defaulting A.R.P. personnel in Dusseldorf, Breslau, 

Chemnitz, Munich and Stettin, by press admissions of the failure of the firefighting services in Stuttgart during the attack of October 4th/5th and by a 

local announcement that the material losses incurred at Franuurt on October 

7thJSth could have been reduced by 25y0 had the fires been fought in a more 

energetic and determined way. 

14. The organisation of relief in raided areas varies greatly in efficiency 

from town to town. Whereas in Hannover the relief organisation evidently 

functioned reasonably well, in Mannheim and Ludwigshafen hitches seem to 

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have occurred. At Hamburg the distribution of food and commodities broke 

down after the first two attacks,while the non-availability of drinking water and 

the dislocation of the drainage system presented major medical problems, with 

which Conti, the Reich Health Leader, was called upon to deal. As late as the 

first week of October the Hamburg press contained references to the “open 

ditch latrines”, which had had to be instituted, and to living conditions, which 

suggest that the rate of recovery, even in the quite exceptional circumstances 

obtaining, was very slow. Contributory evidence of a decline in the rate of repairs comes from Stuttgart,where the population were asked in mid-October to 

show understanding of the situation. The need to use the existing retail supply 

system after air attacks accounts for the cancellation during August of the 

order providing for the closure of surplus retail establishments. 

15. The shortage of consumer goods mentioned in earlier reports as a 

factor in intensifying and prolonging the effect of raids has become progressively more serious with the advent of evacuation and the extension of attacks. 

It was alleged, for example, in a collated Swiss intelligence report, that twofifths of the entire July production of consumption goods were commandeered 

in factories for the bombed areas. Following the Hamburg attacks, the sale of 

textiles was suspended throughout the whole of Germany, but as late as the 

third week of September this does not seem greatly to have alleviated the 

textile supply position in Hamburg itself. Elsewhere at the end of September 

the impossibility of obtaining goods not sold on the card system was popularly 

attributed to the results of air attack. 

16. One outcome of the shortage of consumer goods has been an increase 

in the incidence of looting after raids. Cases have been reported inter alia from 

Berlin, Cologne, Hannover, Frankfurt, Mannheim, Karlsruhe, and Oldenburg. 

First-hand observers have alluded to the prevalence of looting in Hamburg, in 

which the police were alleged to have participated. Looting on the part of the 

police has also been reported on by Russian prisoners-of-war in Bremen. 

17. Of the effect of raids on industrial morale there is cumulative 

evidence. Reporting in early August, a Hamburg business man mentions a 

marked deterioration in the industrial situation as a result of the effect of air 

attacks upon the workers; in this lack of sleep, a sense of insecurity, and 

changes in living and factory conditions played their part. An authoritative 

report of mid-September also testifies to the decline in working capacity of 

raided or evacuated personnel, and in general it appears that nervousness and 

overstrain have served appreciably to reduce industrial effort. French workers 

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in Germany (whose statements must, however, be treated with reserve), have 

consistently reported on the low state of industrial morale. To this the presence 

of foreign workers has contributed. Thus a source who left Hamburg before the 

July attacks mentioned that at that time the foreign workers, many of whom 

were Communists, were already fomenting unrest amongst the German workmen,while a member of the staff of I. G. Farben indicated that an armed organisation had been formed from German staff to handle foreign workmen in the 

event of any crisis. That these apprehensions are not altogether unfounded is 

confirmed by the difficulty known to have been experienced in rounding up 

conscripted workmen and prisoners-of-war after attacks. 

18. The anti-Party bias noted in the preceding period as an effect of air 

attack has assumed more formidable proportions. A Berlin source indicated in 

late September that Hitler was more or less openly criticised as a result of his 

responsibility for the deteriorating military position on the Eastern Front and 

for the continuance of air attacks. Another source reported in mid-August 

that Hitler’s personal prestige had greatly declined. Accounts of anti-Nazi 

slogans chalked up after raids come from a number of sources. A Spaniard 

reported in mid-September that in the Berlin factory in which he was employed 

he observed a diminution in Hitler’s influence with the workers and the growth 

of a new antipathy towards the regime. A similar report emanates from a 

French workman in a North-West German factory. According to some sources, 

resentment in Hamburg was also directed in the first instance against Hitler 

and the Party. In press and public statements the Fuehrer’s personal interest 

in the home front has been increasingly insisted on, and a somewhat defensive 

tone has been adopted in respect of local Party leaders. Only in the post-war 

period, it is insisted, will the achievements of National Socialism receive the 

appreciation and esteem which is their due. Instances of a new effort to counter 

the prevailing impression that the Fuehrer is not interested in events in Germany are Ley’s statement that Hitler was responsible for devising the Housing 

Relief Scheme and Hitler’s own participation in the much publicised conference 

on the home front held at his headquarters in the third week of October. 

19. Whereas during the preceding period there was little evidence as 

to disturbances after attacks, in the present period the number of first-hand 

reports of demonstrations after raids has tended to increase. A circumstantial 

report from Nuremburg describes an anti-Nazi demonstration after the attack 

of August lOth/llth, which resulted in a hundred or more arrests; this report 

is the more credible in view of a tendency to panic during the attack reported 

on by many sources notwithstanding the small scale of damage caused. Smallscale anti-Nazi demonstrations were also reported from Aachen. At Hamburg 

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incidents broke out in connection with the distribution of relief, and sources 

described the defacement of pictures of Hitler “to the accompaniment of 

extremely coarse language.” Difficulties are reliably reported to have arisen 

at Cologne, where a body of workmen downed tools after a heavy attack, a 

number being shot and the remainder transported to other areas, and disturbances have also occurred at Mannheim (as the result of a delay in carrying 

out evacuation), Munich and Frankfurt. Tension in Munich is mentioned by 

several sources. 

20. First-hand observers continue to express the view that the German 

security forces remain strong enough to deal with such disturbances as may 

occur. It was appreciated by an officer of the German Intelligence Service in 

early October that the repressive measures adopted would not lose their efficacy 

until the end of 1944, and by a German business man a month earlier that 

the sporadic disturbances which had occurred were relatively insignificant in 

face of the repressive measures which were used to check the growing desperation following attacks. In Mid-August (when panic was at its worst) reports 

were circulating in Berlin of the arrival in the capital of some 60,000 S.S.troops, 

and of an incident a month earlier at Essen in which a clash with the S.S. had 

led to many deaths. While it is a fact that repressive measures have so far lost 

little or nothing of their efficacy and that there is as yet no indication of 

organised revolt, it would none the less be a mistake to accept these indications 

in too literal a way. On the one hand, the slight weakening of control recorded 

earlier in the Ruhr has become apparent in other areas, notably in Hannover, 

and on the other it is credibly reported that S.S. units brought in to raided 

areas from Eastern Germany are relieved as rapidly as possible in order to 

minimise the danger of any form of disaffection. It is also stated that in early 

August a secret investigation was instituted intothe reliability of S.S. officers. 

In addition, evacuation and the extension of attacks should have resulted in 

some thinning out of the forces of control. 

21. The attempt to stimulate flagging morale by creating a demand 

for retaliation has continued, and references to coming reprisals have been a 

feature of Ley’sspeeches to factory workers and other quasi-official pronouncements. The consensus of evidence suggests that despite the hysterical vilification of the attacking air forces, which has been noticeable in the local press in 

frankfurt and elsewhere, reprisals are viewed rather as a vague means of 

averting further attacks than in a strictly retaliatory spirit. It was indicated 

by a Swisssource in late July that the middle classes in particular were placing 

what hopes they had upon reprisal action. Elsewhere press threats seem to 

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meet with scepticism. A significant sentence in a Munich paper reads: “Remembering the binding statements of the Reich leaders, the German people awaits 

the hour of retaliation with set teeth lest this frantic terror should become an 

unassailable law against us.” 

22. The general tendency of propaganda, however, has been to divert 

attention to Allied losses in aircraft and personnel as a limiting factor on the 

development of operations. Propaganda of this type reached its climax with 

the U.S.A.A.F. attack on Schweinfurt on October 15th, when the loss of 121 

four-engined bombers was claimed in the official communique and the loss of 

199 in unofficial statements put out on the German-controlled wireless. Concurrently with these announcements, a tone of cautious optimism became 

apparent in German press statements, which had for some time previously 

alluded to the strengthening of the German defensive system. At the same 

time no specific promise of immunity or even of an appreciable decline in the 

incidence of air attack within any specific period was made. Locally this line 

of propaganda has been followed out in public tributes to the leaders who had 

“built up new German air defences.” 

23. The myth of the invulnerability of German industry, to which 

propaganda statements had adhered in the preceding period, has been abandoned, and a number of press articles have gone so far as to refer to the 

possibility that German industry will be unable to recover in the post-war 

period, and that the U.S.A.A.F. may “destroy all our factories in order to prevent 

German-European competition.” This is one among a number of instances of 

the great moral effect exercised by day attacks. 

24. Mosquito attacks on Berlin and other towns have lost none of the 

effectiveness with which they were credited in the preceding two months, and 

we are satisfied that these are playing an important part in wearing down 

morale. 

25. Evidence as to the impact of air attacks on the morale of German 

troops on the war fronts or abroad is fragmentary. The most significant item 

is a categorical but uncorroborated statement in a Swiss intelligence report 

that an O.K.W. circular had been issued to troops in the East, assuring them 

that every possible measure was being taken to relieve the lot of the bomb 

victims, and exhorting them to stand firm in the belief in final victory. Unconfirmed reports refer to the deleterious influences exercised by air attacks on 

the morale of German troops in Oslo and on personnel of the Todt Organisation 

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at Bodo, while a report despatched in August from Crete stated that R.A.F. 

attacks had done more to lower the morale of the German occupying forces 

than military defeat. It may well be that this attitude is representative of 

that of garrison forces in other occupied areas. 

26. We conclude that during the period under review:­

(i) Fear of air attack has been the dominant preoccupation of a large 

part of the German civilian population, and has contributed to 

produce a situation in which fear of the consequences of continuing 

the war is becoming greater than fear of the consequences of defeat. 

(ii) Air attacks on Germany have resulted in social disruption on a 

scale which has greatly impaired the German ability to prosecute 

the war and threatens the structure of the entire home front. 

(iii) Though the forces of repression, the hopes of a compromise with 

one or the other of the belligerents, and the favourable climatic 

conditions of the past three months have so far prevented any 

general break in morale, it is not reasonable to infer that no such 

break in morale can occur, and we do not exclude the possibility 

that, in conjunction with further large-scale military reverses and 

with the advent of winter, air operations may exercise a decisive 

influence on conditions inside Germany. 

7thNovember, 1943 

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APPENDIX “G 

MAJOR TARGETS ATTACKED BY R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND 

FEBRUARY 4 -OCTOBER 31, 1943 

TARGETS IN THE RUHR AND RHINELAND 

Target -Date

Sorties 

Desp’d 

Bomb 

Tonnage 

A/C

Missing 

Aachen 13114 July 374 875 20 

Barmen 29/30 May 719 1,895 33 

Bochum 29/30 March 157 149 13 

13/14 May 442 1,056 24 

12/13 June 503 1,596 24 

29/30 Sept. 352 1,344 7 

Cologne 14/15 Feb. 243 528 9 

26/27 Feb. 427 1,062 10 

16/17 June 212 718 14 

28/29 June 608 1,727 25 

314 July 653 1,878 30 

819 July 288 1,097 7 

Dortmund 415 May 596 1,570 31 

23/24 May 826 2,248 38 

Duisburg 26/27 March 455 944 6 

819 April 392 846 19 

9/10 April 109 321 8 

26/27 April 561 1,492 17 

12/13 May 572 1,554 34 

Dusseldorf 25/26 May 759 2,038 27 

11/12 June 783 2,101 38 

Elberfeld 24/25 June 630 1,746 34 

(Table continued on following page) 

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-

Target

Essen 

Gelsenkirchen 

Hagen 

Krefeld 

Leverkusen 

Mulheim 

Munchen-Gladbach 

Oberhausen 

Remscheid 

Ruhr Dams 

(Moehne & Eder) 

Date

-

112 March 

27/28 March 

29/30 March 

23/24 Aug. 

3111 Sept. 

314 Sept. 

Date 

516 March 

12/13 March 

314 April 

3011 May 

27/28 May 

25/26 July 

25/26 June 

9/10 July 

112 Oct. 

21/22 June 

22/23 Aug. 

22/23 June 

30131 Aug. 

14/15 June 

30131 July 

16/17 May 

BERLIN 

Sorties 

Desp’d 

442 

457 

348 

305 

518 

705 

470 

418 

251 

705 

462 

557 

660 

203 

273 

19 

Bomb A/C

Tonnage Missing 

1,014 14 

1,027 23 

983 21 

839 12 

1,443 23 

2,032 26 

1,391 30 

1,341 12 

1,115 1 

2,068 44 

1,729 5 

1,643 35 

2,353 25 

645 17 

778 15 

61 8 

Sorties Desp’d Bomb Tonnage A/C Missing 

302 665 17 

396 883 9 

329 606 21 

719 1,772 57 

612 1,448 47 

316 999 22 

(Table continued on following page) 

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THE CENTRAL COMPLEX, THE “BERLIN ROAD,” 

THE NORTH SEA AND BALTIC PORTS 

Target 

Bremen 

Hamburg 

Hannover 

Kassel 

Kiel 

Leipzig 

Stettin 

Wilhelmshafen 

Date - Sorties 

Desp’d 

Bomb 

Tonnage 

A/C

Missing 

21/22 Feb. 143 424 -

819 Oct. 119 252 3 

314 Feb. 263 393 16 

3/4 March 417 922 10 

24/25 July 791 2,397 12 

27/28 July 787 2,417 17 

29/30 July 777 2,383 28 

213 Aug. 740 1.426 30 

22/23 Sept. 711* 2,503 26 

27/28 Sept. 678* 2,358 38 

819 Oct. 504 1,762 27 

18/19 Oct. 360 1.697 17 

314 Oct. 547 1,601 24 

22/23 Oct. 569 1,806 43 

415 April 577 1,381 13 

20121 Oct. 358 1.045 16 

20121 April 339 847 22 

11/12 Feb. 177 432 3 

18/19 Feb. 195 596 4 

19/20 Feb. 338 781 11 

24/25 Feb. 115 193 -

(* Including 5 US. Fortresses. 1reported missing on night 27/28 Sept.) 

(Table continued on following page) 

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THE UPPER RHINE AND THE SOUTHERN COMPLEX 

Target 

Frankfurt 

Mannheim 

Munich 

Nuremburg 

Stuttgart 

Sorties 

-

Date Desp’d

10/11 April 502 

4/5 Oct. 409* 

(* Including 3 U.S. Fortresses) 

16/17 April 271 

9/10 Aug. 457 

5/6 Sept. 605 

23/24 Sept. 630* 

(* Including 5 US. Fortresses) 

9/10 March 264 

6/7 Sept. 404 

2/3 Oct. 298* 

(* Including 4 US. Fortresses) 

25/26 Feb. 337 

8/9 March 335 

10/11 Aug. 653 

27/28 Aug. 674 

11/12 March 314 

14/15 April 462 

718 Oct. 342 

(Table continued on following page) 

Bomb AIC 

Tonnage Missing 

1,060 20 

1,088 10 

362 18 

1,723 9 

1,586 34 

1,974 32 

579 8 

1,045 17 

‘979 8 

758 9 

798 7 

1,671 16 

1,773 33 

821 11 

801 23 

1.235 4 

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IMPORTANT WAR FACTORIES ATTACKED IN GERMANY 

AND OCCUPIED TERRITORY 

-

Target -Date

Sorties 

-

Desp’d

Bomb 

Tonnage 

A/C

Missing 

Jena (Zeiss Works) 27 May 14 7 3 

Peenemunde 

(Experimental 

Station) 17/18 Aug. 597 1,937 40 

Pilsen (Skoda Works) 16/17 April 327 617 37 

13/14 May 168 527 9 

FRANCE 

Arnage 

(Renault Works) 9 March 15 13 1 

Le Creusot 

(Schneider Works) 19/20 June 287 751 2 

Montbeliard 

(Peugeot Works) 15/16 July 165 391 5 

Montlucon 

(Dunlop Works) 15/16 Sept. 376* 1,016 3 

(* Including 5 U.S. Fortresses) 

NORWAY 

Knaben 

(Molybdenum Mines) 3 March 10 9 I 

SEA-MINING OPERATIONS 

No. of Aircraft No. of Aircraft 

Despatched Mines Laid Missing 

4,094 10,752 98 

(Table continued on following page) 

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LEAFLET OPERATIONS 

No. of AircraftDespatched No. of Aircraft Missing 

1,056 13 

Of the Total Effort, 89.8% was expended on Bomb Raids, 8.1% on Sea-Mining 

and 2.1% on Leaflets. 

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APPENDIX “H’ 

MAJOR TARGETS ATTACKED BY VIII BOMBER COMMAND 

FEBRUARY 4 -NOVEMBER 1, 1943 

Date AIC Tonnage 

of Attack TARGET ATTACKED Attacking on Target 

16 Feb. ST. NAZAIRESubmarine Base 65 160.0 

26 Feb. WILHELMSHAVEN-Submarine Building 

Yards 64 161.5 

27 Feb. BREST-Submarine Base 60 155.0 

4 Mar. HAMM-Railway Marshalling Yard 14 35.0 

6 Mar. LORIENT-Submarine Base 63 157.5 

6 Mar. BREST-Submarine Base 15 44.5 

18 Mar. VEGESACK-Submarine Building Yard of 

Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau u MaschinenFabrik A.G. (Subsidiary of Vereinigte 

Stahlwerke A.G.) 97 268.0 

22 Mar. WILHELMSHAVEN-Submarine Building 

Yard 84 224.n 

4 April PARIS (BILLANCOURT)-Motor Vehicle 

and Armament Works of SOC.des Usines 

Renault 85 251.0 

5 April ANTWERP (MORTSEL) -Aircraft and 

Aero Engine Works of Erla Maschinewerk 

G.m.b.H. (formerly Soc. Nouvelle des 

Automobiles Imperia) (formerly S.A. 

Minerva Motors) 82 245.5 

16 April LORIENT-Submarine Base 59 147.0 

16 April BREST-Submarine Base 18 49.0 

(Table continued on following page) 

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Date A/C Tonnage 

of Attack TARGET ATTACKED Attacking on Target 

17 April BREMEN (NEUENLAND)-Bomber Aircraft Assembly Factory of Focke Wulf 

Flugzeugbau A.G. 106 263.0 

1 May ST. NAZAIRE-Submarine Base 25 49.0 

4 May ANTWERP-Motor Assembly Plant of Ford 

Motor Co. Motor Assembly Plant of General Motors 65 161.5 

13 May MEAULTE Nr. ALBERT-Aircraft Factory 

of SOC.Nationale de Constructions Aeronautiques du Nord (S.N.C.A.N.) (formerlyAvions et Hydravions Potez-C.A.M.S.) 88 218.0 

14 May KIEGSubmarine and Warship Building 

Yard of Fried Drupp Germania-Werft 126 293.6 

14 May ANTWERP-Motor Assembly Plant of Ford 

Motor Co. Motor Assembly Plant of General Motors 38 89.0 

15 May HELIGOLAND-Submarine Base 76 186.0 

17 May LORIENTSubmarine Installations 80 197.5 

17 May KEROMAN-Submarine Base 38 92.0 

19 May KIEGSubmarine and Warship Building 

Yard of Deutsche Werke Kiel A. G. 103 236.9 

19 May FLENSBURG-Submarine Building Yard of 

Flensburger Schiffsbaugesellschaft A. G. 55 134.0 

21 May WILHELMSHAVEN-Submarine Building 

Yards 77 190.5 

21 May EMDEN -Submarine Building Yard of 

Nordseewerke G. m. b. H. (Subsidiary of 

Vereinigte Stahlwerke A. G.) 45 111.0 

29 May ST. NAZAIRE-Submarine Base 147 277.0 

29 May LA PALLICE-Submarine Base 34 99.0 

(Table continued on following page) 

Appendix “H” 

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Date A/C

of Attack TARGET ATTACKED Attacking 

29 May RENNES-Submarine Installations 57 

11 June WILHELMSHAVEN -Submarine Building 

Yards 168 

13 June BREMEN-Submarine and Warship Building Yard of Deutsche Schiff u Maschinenbau A. G. (Deschimag) 102 

13 June KIEL-Submarine and Warship Building 

Yard of Deutsche Werke Kiel A. G. 44 

22 June HULS Nr. RECKLINGHAUSEN-Synthetic 

Rubber (Buna) Works of Chemische 

Werke Huls G.m.b.H. 181 

22 June ANTWERP-Motor Assembly Plant of Genera1 Motors 39 

28 June ST. NAZAIRE-Submarine Base 158 

29 June LE MANS-Aero Engine Factory of Societe 

des Moteurs Gnome et Rhone 74 

4 July LE MANS-Aero Engine Factory of Societe 

des Moteurs Gnome et Rhone 103 

4 July NANTES-Aircraft Assembly Plant of Societe Nationale de Constructions Aeronautiques du Sud-Ouest (S.N.C.A.S.O.) 

(formerly S.A. des Ateliers d’Aviation 

Louis Breguet 61 

4 July LA PALLICESubmarine Base 69 

14 July VILLACOUBLAY -Aircraft Factories of 

Breguet 101 

14 July LE BOURGET Nr. PARIS-Aircraft Repair 

Installations 52 

17 July AMSTERDAM-Aircraft Factory of Fokker 

Aircraft Co. 21 

(Table continued on following page) 

Tonnage 

on Target 

132.5 

417.0 

253.7 

99.7 

422.0 

95.5 

301.0 

181.5 

254.5 

145.0 

137.5 

202.5 

122.8 

51.5 

Appendix “H” 

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Date A/C

of Attack TARGET ATTACKED Attacking 

24 July HEROYA (68 miles S.S.W. of Oslo) - Aluminum Works of Nordisk Lettmetal 

AIS 167 

24 July TRONDHEIM4ubmarine Base 41 

25 July HAMBURG-Submarine Building Yard of 

Blohm & Voss K.G. 51 

25 July HAMBURG (MONFLETH)-Aero Engine 

Works of Klockner Flugmotorenbau A.G. 17 

25 July KIEGSubmarine and Warship Building 

Yard of Deutsche Werke Kiel A.G. and 

Submarine and Warship Building Yard 

of Howaldtswerke A.G. 67 

26 July HANNOVER-ere and Tube Factory of 

Continental Gummiwerke A.G. 42 

26 July HANNOVER-( NORDHAFEN)-Synthetic 

Rubber (Buna) Processing Works of 

Continental Gummiwerke A.G. 50 

26 July HAMBURG-Submarine Building Yard of 

Blohm & Voss A.G. 39 

26 July HAMBURG (MONFLETH)-Aero Engine 

Works of Klockner Flugmotorenbau A.G. 15 

28 July KASSEL (BETTENHAUSEN)-Fighter Aircraft Components Factory of Fieseler 

Flugzeugbau G.rn.b.H. 49 

28 duly OSCHERSLEBEN-Fighter Aircraft Assembly Factory of AGO Flugzeugwerke A.G. 37 

29 July KlEGSubmarine and Warship Building 

Yard of Deutsche Werke Kiel A.G. 42 

29 July KIEMubmarine and Warship Building 

Yard of Howaldtswerke A.G. 50 

(Table continued on following page) 

Tonnage 

on Target 

414.2 

81.0 

100.0 

34.0 

155.3 

98.3 

115.5 

89.2 

37.0 

137.0 

90.4 

94.9 

115.5 

Appendix “H” 

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Date A/C Tonnage 

of Attack TARGET ATTACKED Attacking on Target 

29 July WARNEMUNDE-Fighter Aircraft Assembly Factory and Airfield of Ernst Heinkel 

Flugzeugwerke G.m.b.H. (formerly Arado 

Flugzeugwerke G.m.b.H.) 54 129.0 

30 July KASSEL (BETTENHAUSEN)-Fighter Aircraft Components Factory of Fieseler 

Flugzeugbau G.m.b.H. 95 222.0 

30 July KASSEL (WALDAU)-Fighter Aircraft Assembly Factories of Fieseler Flugzeubau 

G.m.b.H. 37 87.0 

16 August LE BOURGET (Nr. PARIS)-Aircraft Repair Installations 168 397.4 

17 August SCHWEINFURT-Ball-bearing Works of 

Kugelfischer Schweinfurt;Undercarriage, 

Clutch and Cycle Accessories Works of 

Fichtel & Sachs A.G.; Ball-bearing Works 

of Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken A.G. 

(Werk I and 11) 183 424.4 

17 August REGENSBURG -Fighter Aircraft Assembly Factory of Messerschmitt A.G. 127 299.3 

24 August VILLACOUBLAY (Nr. PARIS) -Aircraft 

Factories of Breguet 86 257.3 

3 Sept. ROMILLY-SUR-SEINE-Air Park and Airfield 100 294.0 

3 Sept. MEULAN-LES-MUREAUX -Aircraft Factory of SOC.Nationale de Constructions 

Aeronautiques du Nord (S.N.C.A.N.) 

(formerly Avions et Hydravions Potez 

C.A.M.S.) 38 114.0 

3 Sept. PARISAircraft Components Factory of 

S.A. des Avions Caudron-Renault 20 60.0 

(Table continued on following Page) 

Appendix “H” 

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Date A/C Tonnage 

of Attack TARGET ATTACKED Attacking on Target 

7 Sept. BRUSSELS (EVERE) -Aircraft Repair 

Works of Erla Maschinenwerk G.m.b.H. 

(formerly S.A.B.C.A.) 104 282.0 

15 Sept. ROMILLY-SUR-SEINE-Air Park and Airfield 76 246.0 

15 Sept. PARIS-Aircraft Components Factory of 

S.A. des Avions Caudron-Renault and 

Automobile Engine and Lorry Assembly 

Works of S.A. Andre Citroen 40 118.8 

15 Sept. PARIS (BILLANCOURT)-Motor Vehicle 

and Armament of SOC. Des Usines 

Renault 21 63.0 

15 Sept. PARIS-Aero Engine Factory of Societe Hispano-Zuiza and Ball Bearing Works of 

Compagnie d‘applications Mecaniques 

(C.A.M.) 78 229.0 

16 Sept. NANTES-Naval Installations 79 233.0 

16 Sept. LA PALLICESubmarine Base 53 131.8 

23 Sept. NANTES-Naval Installations 61 134.0 

23 Sept. NANTES-Naval Installations 46 130.0 

26 Sept. REIMS/CHAMPAGNE-Aircraft Assembly 

and Repair Plant of Junkers Flugzeug 

und Motorenwerke A.G. 40 118.0 

2 Oct. EMDEN -Submarine Building Yard of 

Nordseewerke Emden G.m.b.H. 341 953.0 

4 Oct. FRANKFURT (HEDDERNHEIM-Aircraf t 

Components Works of Vereinigte 

Deutsche Metallwerke A. G. (V. D. M.) 

Heddernheim Kupferwerke 77 216.3 

4 Oct. FRANKFURT-Built up area of City 37 88.3 

(Table continued on following Page) 

Appendix “H” 

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Date A/C

of attack TARGET ATTACKED Attacking 

8 Oct. BREMENSubmarine and Warship Building Yard of Deutsche Schiff u Maschinenbau A.G. (Deschimag) 44 

8 Oct. BREMEN (OSLEBHAUSEN)-Bomber Aircraft Assembly Factory of Weser Flugzeubau G.m.b.H. 33 

8 Oct. BREMEN-Center of City 197 

8 Oct. VEGESACK-Submarine Building Yard of 

Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau u Maschinenfrabrik A.G. 48 

9 Oct. ANKLAM-Trainer, Reconnaissance and 

Bomber Aircraft Components Factory of 

Arado Flugzeugwerke G.m.b.H. 102 

9 Oct. MAR1ENBURG-G.A.F. Station 96 

9 Oct. DANZIG-Naval Installations 23 

9 Oct. GDYNIA-Naval Installations 127 

10 Oct. MUNSTER-Railway Junctions 138 

14 O&. SCHWEINFURT-Ball Bearing Works of 

Kugelfischer Undercarriage Clutch and 

Cycle Accessories. 

Works of Fichtel and Sachs A.G. Ball Bearing Works of Vereinigte 

Kugellagerfabriken A. G. (Werk I) Ball 

Bearing Works of Vereinigte 

Kugellagerfabriken A. G. (Werk 11) Ball 

Bearing Cage Works of Deutsche Star 

Tonnage 

on Target 

130.0 

81.0 

471.9 

142.5 

185.5 

218.0 

50.0 

308.0 

354.0 

Appendix “H” 

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C.C.S. 404 and 404/1 

AGENDAFORSEXTANT 

References: 

CCS 127th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 133d Meeting, Item 3 

On 22 Novem ?r 1943. the United States Chie of Staff proposed an 

agenda for SEXTANT (C.C.S.’404). The British Chiefs of Staff circulated C.C.S. 

404/1. In their 127th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposals for the main subjects for discussion on the SEXTANT agenda as set 

out in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 404/1. 

On 2 December 1943, the Secretaries circulated a draft agenda for the 

remainder of the SEXTANT Conference. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 

133d Meeting agreed that all but the most essential items should be excluded 

from the SEXTANT agenda and listed in their decision the priority in which 

the remaining conference items should be dealt with. 

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C.C.S. 404 22 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AGENDA FOR “SEXTANT” 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The attached proposed agenda is presented for the consideration of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

ENCLOSURE 

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR “SEXTANT” 

1. Agreement as to conference procedure. 

2. Over-All Objective; Over-All Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of 

the War; Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-All Strategic Concept. 

3. European-Mediterranean 

a. Estimate of the enemy situation. 

71. Report on the Combined Bomber Offensive. 

c. Report on anti-U-boat operations. 

d. Report on status of development of facilities in the Azores, air and 

naval. 

e. Readiness report on OVERLORD, RANKIN, and JUPITER. 

f. Report on Mediterranean operations, including the Middle East. 

g. Plans for U.S.-British-U.S.S.R. military collaboration. 

h. Specific operations for the defeat of Germany and her Satellites, 

1943-44. 

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i. Policies with respect to military considerations in dealing with neutral, liberated and occupied countries, including agreement as to division 

of responsibility between the United Nations. 

4. Japan 

a. Estimate of the enemy situation, 1944,Japan (giving consideration 

to Russian and Chinese intentions). 

b. Short Term Plan for the defeat of Japan. 

c. Report on the general situation in the Southeast Asia Command. 

d. Report on operations in China. 

e. Report on Pacific operations. 

f. Transfer of United Nations efforts to the defeat of Japan upon the 

defeat of Germany. 

g. Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944,including amphibious operations in Southeast Asia. 

5. Relation of resources to plans. 

6. Final report to President and Prime Minister. 

7. Preparation and approval of any directives arising from conference 

decisions and of any reports to other Allies. 

8. Discussion as to the next conference. 

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C.C.S. 404/1 22 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SEXTANT AGENDA 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We have considered the Agenda for SEXTANT proposed by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 404) and while we have no specific objections to 

the subjects set out in their memorandum, we suggest that a more simple 

agenda would meet the case. 

2. We, therefore, propose that the main subjects for discussion should be 

as follows: 

I. REAFFIRM OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE, OVER-ALL STRATEGIC 

CONCEPT AND BASIC UNDERTAKINGS 

(C.C.S. 31915, paragraphs 2-5 and paragraphs 6, as subsequently 

amended by agreement between Combined Chiefs of Staff (see C.C.S. 

38012) ) 

11. SOUTHEAST ASIA OPERATIONS 

111. “OVERLORD” AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 

IV. THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

V. PROGRESS REPORTS 

3. Discussion of the above main subiects would inclu ~ the introi ction of 

most, if not all, of the points put forward in the American agenda. The arrangements for dealing with the detailed subjects would, however, be made from 

day to day. 

4. It will be noted that Southeast Asia operations have been placed second 

on the list, in view of the intention to bring the Generalissimo and Admiral 

Mountbatten into the discussions at the earliest stage. 

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5. It is thought that the Progress Reports should be left to the end of the 

Conference when the main items have been disposed of. This procedure will 

not, of course, preclude points being raised for discussion when the Progress 

Reports are taken. 

(Signed) A. F. BROOKE, 

C. A. PORTAL, 

A. B. CUNNINGHAM. 

CAIRO. 

22 November 1943 

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C.C.S. 405 

ROLE OF CHINA IN DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

Reference: 

CCS 128th Meeting, Item 2 

C.C.S. 405 circulated a memorandum from Lt. General Stilwell, 

22 November 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this memorandum 

in their 128th Meeting and agreed that operations proposed in paragraphs 

2 a to d inclusive are in general, in consonance with the present concept of 

operations against Japan as expressed in C.C.S. 397, Specific Operations for 

the Defeat of Japan, 1944. They further agreed that operations proposed in 

paragraphs 2 e to h inclusive go beyond the present concept of operations in 

China and require detailed examination and study with particular reference 

to logistic difficulties. This study, when completed, to be incorporated in the 

over-all plan for the defeat of Japan. 

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C.C.S. 405 22 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ROLE OF CHINA IN DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

Memorandum fromLt. General Stilwell, USA 

1. At QUADRANT an outline plan for operations against Japan was presented in Annex “I”to C.C.S. 319/2. These operations culminated in an invasion 

of Japan some time after 1947. 

2. The question at hand which concerns the China Theater is “what operations can be mounted from China which will have the greatest effect on the 

course of the war in the Pacific?” This question can be answered as follows: 

a. Assist S.E.A.C. in operations against North Burma-Current. 

b. Develop land route to China and improve internal communicationsCurrent. 

c. Continue to train and improve combat effectivenessof Chinese ArmyCurrent. 

d. Initiate intensive bombing of Japan by V.L.R.bombers -Early 1944. 

e. Recapture Canton and Hongkong -November 1944-May 1945. 

f. Carry out intensive bombing of Formosa and P.I., deny use of Straits 

of Formosa and South China Sea to Japan and furnish land-based air 

support to any US. Navy activities in these areas-October 1944­

g. Attack Formosa if required -May 1945-November 1945. 

h. Offensive operations towards Shanghai-November 1945. 

The above operations are tactically and logistically feasible. The cost 

is low. There is no competition with other theaters for specialized equipment 

and there is no conflict with operations projected by other theaters. These 

operations will : 

(1) PROVIDE GREATEST AID POSSIBLE TO OTHER THEATERS, 

and 

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(2) CUT DOWN “QUADRANT” TIME TABLE FOR FINAL DEFEAT 

OF JAPAN BY ONE TO TWO YEARS. 

3. REQUIREMENTS 

a. One U.S. Infantry Division in India by March 1944.Two additional 

divisions about a month apart thereafter. (These to be definitely earmarked 

for China Theater.) 

b. Continuation of supply program from U.S.for equipping Chinese 

troops. 

c. Setting up India as a base for both China and Southeast Asia 

Theaters. All U.S. Troops now in India except those necessary for operation 

of the Communication Zone to be moved to China after recapture of North 

Burma. 

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C.C.S. 406 and 406/1 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF-UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

References: 

CCS 127th Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 128th Meeting, Item 5 

CCS 129th Meeting, Item 3 

C.C.S. 406 circulated a memorandum from the United States Chiefs of 

Staff 23 November. The British Chiefs of Staff circulated their reply 24 November. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 129th Meeting took note of C.C.S. 

406 and 406/1 and agreed to a reply to the Chinese and/or U.S.S.R. if the 

question of machinery for closer military cooperation should be raised. 

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C.C.S. 406 23 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF-UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Reference: CCS 127th Meeting, Item 4 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. The discussion in the C.C.S. 127th Meeting concerning the Chinese 

military representatives meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff was the 

first of a series of such problems which will arise, particularly as our cooperation with the Soviets and Chinese develops. It would seem highly desirable to 

find a solution which will permanently (a) maintain the exclusive AmericanBritish character of the Combined Chiefs of Staff while avoiding these embarrassing complications and (b) furnish adequate and satisfactory machinery for 

discussions by the principal Allies at the Chiefs of Staff level, as military problems arise or political considerations make such meetings desirable. 

2. As a solution it is suggested: 

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be reco@zed as an exclusive 

American and British Body, and 

b. That a “United Chiefs of Staff’ be set up at the Chiefs of Staff level 

to include the principal Allies -that is, for the present, the four “Moscow” 

powers. 

3. The United Chiefs of Staff would function only when necessity arose, 

and would provide for attendance either by all members or by only those concerned in the problems to be discussed. This arrangement would give an “out” 

to China or Russia as the case might be. The proposed United Chiefs of Staff 

should consist of a single representative of the Chiefs of Staff of each nation. 

This representative would not necessarily have to be the same official at all 

meetings. Our Allies could not complain of being left out of Combined Chiefs 

of Staff discussion, since in theory, at least, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would 

be the lesser of the two bodies. 

4. Such a “United Chiefs of Staff” should be considered as a flexible organization designed to meet situations as they develop, including possible inclusion 

of other Allies at a later date, on the same basis of participation when 

concerned. 

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C.C.S 406/1 24 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF-UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff 

We have studied the question of the possible formation of a United Chiefs 

of Staff organization and, alternatively, of the possible representation on the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the US.and the British. We 

appreciate, moreover, the need for us all to have our minds made up on this 

subject, in view of the increasing pressure that is likely in the future. Our 

views are as follows: 

a. The chief need is that the best possible coordination of our military 

effort with that of the Russians and of the Chinese should be ensured. We 

feel strongly that, whereas the integration of US.and British forces is 

complete and worldwide, this is in no way the case with regard to the 

Russians or the Chinese, whose outlook, indeed, is largely confined to their 

own particular main front. We feel, therefore, that no change whatever 

should be made in the present Combined Chiefs of Staff standing organization, and that it should remain essentially US.-British. 

b. We have considered whether there should be any other organization, 

such as a United Chiefs of Staff, and have come to the conclusion that it 

would not be desirable to establish any form of standing machinery. Relations of such a body to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be very difficult. 

It might even claim to be the more representative body, and therefore to 

exercise jurisdiction over the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The representatives 

of such a body would not have the authority to make big decisions, and in 

consequence, such an organization could serve no useful purpose, excepting 

as a means of improving liaison. This could be done better by improving the 

arrangements already existing in Washington, London, MOSCOWand 

Chungking. 

c. Our final conclusion, therefore, is that the best way of ensuring interAllied coordination and at the same time meeting the Russian and Chinese 

susceptibilities, is to ensure that whenever the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

meet for a big conference such as SEXTANT, they should be invited to 

attend to discuss the military problems with which they are concerned, 

as has been done on the present occasion. 

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C.C.S. 407 (Revised) and 407/1 

COLLABORATION WITH THE U.S.S.R. 

References: 

CCS 127th Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 129th Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 131st Meeting, Item 5 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 131st Meeting amended and 

accepted C.C.S. 407. The amended paper, in which are incorporated the conclusions on this subject reached at the C.C.S. 129th Meeting, was circulated 

as C.C.S. 407 (Revised). 

C.C.S. 407/1 circulated an agenda of items which are currently under 

discussion as a result of the Moscow Conference and which should be discussed 

between the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow and the 

Soviet authorities concerned. 

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C.C.S. 407 (Revised) 26 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COLLABORATION WITH THE USSR 

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

1. During the forthcoming conference with the Soviets it is recommended 

that the following broad lines of action be adopted: 

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree upon the US.-British 

strategy in Europe and seek the approval of the President and Prime 

Minister before meeting the Soviets. 

b. That the Soviets be urged to enhance the effectiveness of the United 

Nations offensive by effective coordination with OVERLORD. 

c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree to consult together 

before making reply to proposals upon which there has been no previous 

agreement. 

d. That, specifically, an agreed answer be obtained to any Soviet proposals which involve the undertaking of major operations through the 

Balkans or the Aegean. 

e. That a common policy be adopted concerning Turkey, to include 

briefly the support of the Soviet proposal to force Turkey into the war but to 

stand firm on the principle that no diversion of forces or supplies for Turkey 

can be accepted to the prejudice of approved operations elsewhere. 

2. Throughout the deliberation with the Soviets it should be made clear 

that the United States and Great Britain are involved in military operations 

not only in the European Theater but also in the Pacific-Asiatic Theater, and 

that their heavy commitments of resources throughout the world compel 

them to decide on operations only after careful analysis of the over-all 

situation. 

3. At the Moscow Conference, the United States and British representatives 

were primarily engaged in explaining and defending their own position. In the 

future, the United States and Great Britain should make specific requests on 

the Soviets. 

4.A proposed agenda is attached as an enclosure. 

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ENCLOSURE 

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR U.S.-BRITISH-U.S.S.R. CONFERENCE 

1. COORDINATION OF MILITARY EFFORT 

The coordination of Soviet operations with Anglo-American operations 

in Europe. 

2. ITALY 

Discuss current and planned military operations in and from Italy. 

3. TURKEY 

Turkish action on entry into the war. 

4. SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA 

5. STRATEGIC BOMBING 

Discussion of Soviet capabilities to initiate strategic bombing of targets 

in Germany or her satellites in extension of POINTBLANK. (Current intelligence indicates German fighter strength is extremely weak on the Russian 

front -130 serviceable fighters.) 

6. JAPAN 

On the assumption that the U.S.S.R. will bring up for discussion its 

entry into the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany, the following 

should be considered : 

a. Request Soviets to furnish combat intelligence information concerning Japan; if agreed to we will present specific questions through the military mission at Moscow. 

b. Request Soviets to indicate whether they consider it desirable at this 

time to set in hand arrangements to base Soviet submarine force in US. 

territory. 

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c. Request Soviets to indicate what direct or indirect assistance they 

will be able to give, if it is found possible to launch an attack on the Northern Kuriles. 

d. Soviets to indicate what ports, if any, they could allow the Allies to 

use.Request Soviets to furnish data on ports through Military Mission in 

order that we may determine the size and type of Naval Task Forces we 

can employ. 

e. Soviets to indicate what air bases, if any, they could allow our air 

forces to use for operations against Japan, and what facilities, including 

gasoline and bombs, could be supplied. What air routes to these bases could 

be provided? 

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C.C.S. 407/1 26 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COLLABORATION WITH THE U.S.S.R. 

Note by the Secretaries 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 131st Meeting, Item 5, agreed that 

the following items, which are currently under discussion as a result of the 

Moscow Conference, should be discussed between the United States and British 

Military Missions in Moscow and the Soviet authorities concerned: 

A. SHUTTLE BOMBER BASES 

(1) When will the U.S.S.R. be prepared to designate air bases for 

our use? What are presently available locations, facilities, and capabilities? The United States tentatively desires 10 bases so distributed as to 

permit shuttle bombing from Italy and United Kingdom. 

(2) When may we begin sending the required service personnel into 

the U.S.S.R. to the designated bases? 

(3) What is Soviet proposal for handling the close operational 

liaison required? 

(4) What signal communications with the United Kingdom and 

Italy can be provided? 

B. AIR TRANSPORT ROUTES 

Request establishment of US. Air Transport Service on a minimum 

frequency basis of one round trip weekly on three routes in the following 

order of priority: 

(1) ALSIB 

In order that the U.S. may have a direct and independent air 

line of communications with the U.S.S.R. 

In order that the basic machinery may be set up and be in 

operation to provide a direct US-U.S.S.R. aerial route of supply to 

support any future U.S.S.R. military air operations. 

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(2) US.-U.K.-MOSCOW 

Primarily to support shuttle bombing operations, 

(3) TEHRAN-MOSCOW 

In order to transport munitions and spare parts required in 

connection with shuttle bombing operations and to connect Moscow 

with our Mediterranean and S.E. Asia fronts. This will provide an alternative during the winter months when the nothern route (US.-U.K.) 

is not operating regularly. 

C. WEATHER INFORMATION 

(1) Request Soviet basic weather ciphers in order to interpret 

weather broadcasts. The US. will furnish weather ciphers desired by the 

U.S.S.R. 

(2) Alternatively if foregoing is not acceptable to the Soviets, US. 

desires weather data on specific areas, using special ciphers as follows: 

(a) Shuttle bombing areas. 

(b) Tehran transport route; data west of Long. 75" E. 

(c) From 60" E. to 160" E., (for operations in China). 

(d) From 90" E. to 180",(for the Alsib route). 

(3) Request U.S.S.R. to indicate the procedure they suggest in the 

mutual exchange of weather information. We propose exchange of 

meteorological liaison officers for coordination of technical details and 

arrangements for distribution of weather codes and ciphers. 

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire their respective missions to make 

periodic reports to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding progress made in 

the negotiations on the above subjects. 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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C.C.S. 408 and 408/1 

COMMAND OF BRITISH AND U.S. FORCES 

OPERATING AGAINST GERMANY 

C.C.S. 408 circulated a proposal by the United States Chiefs of Staff, 

25 November 1943. The reply from the British Chiefs of Staff was circulated 

26 November as C.C.S. 408/1. 

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C.C.S. 408 25 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMMAND OF BRITISH AND U.S. FORCES 

OPERATING AGAINST GERMANY 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. Current operations in the war against Germany and those approved for 

the immediate future are grouped geographically and functionally into three 

categories : 

a. Operations in the Mediterranean area involving combined forces with 

land, sea, and air components. 

b. Operations in the northwestern part of Europe, also involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components. 

c. Operations against interior Germany involving combined strategic 

air forces based both in theMediterranean area and in northwestern Europe. 

2. Each of these operations is an entity requiring unity of command over 

the forces which are engaged. 

3. These operations are all intimately related to each other, with a common, over-all objective-DEFEAT OF GERMANY. Events in the Mediterranean area attract enemy forces and affect enemy capabilities, which in turn 

have an important bearing upon our capabilities in northwestern Europe, and 

vice versa. Strategic air operations against interior Germany strongly affect 

our capabilities in both areas. Furthermore, the flexibility of the strategic air 

forces permits their employment in varying degree to assist the Allied forces 

in either area. 

4. The United States Chiefs of Staff now consider that the war in Europe 

has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over all these 

forces, in conformity with general directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 

is clearly indicated. This command should be vested in a single commander, 

and he should exercise command over the Allied force commanders in the 

Mediterranean, in northwest Europe, and of the strategic air forces. The 

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immediate appointment of this commander is, in our opinion, most urgently 

necessary. Even if he is appointed now, it is improbable that he will be able to 

organize his staff and begin to function before the end of January 1944.The 

situation which may develop in Europe by that time requires a more positive 

over-all command arrangement than that now functioning under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Any delay in setting up such a command may lead to 

confusion and indecision at a critical time, thus delaying the attainment of 

early victory in Europe. 

5. In matters pertaining to strategic bombing, it is imperative that unified 

Allied command be established. The rapidity with which decisions regarding 

air operations must be made demands command control, as opposed to general directives or occasional direct action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We 

cannot escape the responsibility for adopting every means known to us to 

save the lives of our men and the planes they fly. The one effective method is 

to insure the rapid coordinated employment, on a day-to-day operational 

basis, of the United States Air Forces in both the U.K. and Mediterranean by 

day and R.A.F. bomber units by night in order to obtain the maximum dispersion of enemy air and anti-aircraft defense, and to take the greatest 

possible advantage of weather conditions in both theaters. This unified command must, therefore, be established without delay and must embrace all 

the strategic air forces engaged against Germany, including the United States 

Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command. 

6. The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed the establishment of unified 

command in the Mediterranean area. We are in accord with this proposal, 

with the proviso that the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force should be specifically 

excepted and commanded as in paragraph 5 above. 

7. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose to the British Chiefs of Staff: 

a. That a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all 

United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and 

the Atlantic under direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

b. That an over-all commander for northwestern European operations 

be appointed, under the Supreme Commander. 

c. That a strategic air force commander be appointed, under the 

Supreme Commander, to exercise command over the U.S.Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command. 

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d. That the Commander of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean shall 

come under the Supreme Commander. 

8. The United States Chiefs of Staff further propose that the Supreme 

Commander be directed to carry out the agreed European strategy, and 

a. Be charged with the location and timing of operations; 

b. Be charged with the allocation of the forces and materiel made 

available to him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and 

c. That his decisions on the above questions be subject to reversal by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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COMBINED 

CHIEFS OF STbFF 

S.A.C.

c 

N ALLIED N 

W CDMVANDEH COhMANDER COMMANDER 

N.W. EUROPE I STRATEGIC A.F. I ME0 lTEPRlNEAN 

-& 

ARMIES 

BRITISH 

BOMBER 

NAVAL ARMY TACTICAL COMWAlO 

FORCES GROUPS AIR 

FORCES 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 408/1 26 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMMAND OF BRITISH AND U.S. FORCES 

OPERATING AGAINST GERMANY 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to the 

proposal put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 408 that 

“a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all United Nations 

operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.” This 

proposal has immense political implications and is clearly a matter for the 

most earnest consideration of the US. and British Governments. Nevertheless, the British Chiefs of Staff must say at once that, from the military point 

of view, they profoundly disagree with the proposal. Their reasons are set 

out in the paragraphs that follow. 

2. Total war is not an affair of military forces alone, using the word 

“military” in the widest sense of the term. There are political, economic, 

industrial, and domestic implications in almost every big war problem. Thus 

it seems clear that the Supreme Commander for the war against Germany will 

have to consult both the U.S. and the British Governments on almost every 

important question. In fact, it boils down to this, that he will only be able to 

make a decision without reference to high authority on comparatively minor 

and strictly military questions, such as the transfer of one or two divisions, 

or a few squadrons of aircraft, or a few scores of landing craft, from one of 

his many fronts to another. He will thus be an extra and unnecessary link in 

the chain of command. 

3. There is no real analogy between the position of Marshal Foch in the 

last war and the position now contemplated for the Supreme Commander 

against Germany. Marshal Foch was responsible only for the Western Front 

and the Italian Front. His authority did not extend to the Salonika Front, 

the Palestine Front, or the Mesopotamian Front. Under the arrangements now 

contemplated, the Supreme Commander will have not only OVERLORD and 

the Italian Front under his authority, but also the Balkan Front and the 

Turkish Front (if this is opened). There must be some limit to the responsibili230 
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ties which Allied Governments can delegate to a single soldier and the sphere 

now proposed seems to exceed these limits considerably. 

4.The United States Chiefs of Staff propose (see paragraph 8 c) that the 

decisions of the Supreme Commander should “be subject to reversal by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff.” If the main object of this new arrangement is to 

insure rapid decisions, it looks as though the above proviso will lead to deplorable consequences. Instances will occur in which the Supreme Commander 

has issued orders and the troops have marched in accordance with these 

orders, only to be followed by a reversal of the order by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff and consequent confusion. Again it may happen that the British 

Chiefs of Staff agree with a decision taken by the Supreme Commander, while 

the United States Chiefs of Staff totally disagree with it. What happens then? 

Or again, the Combined Chiefs of Staff may wholeheartedly support on military grounds a decision taken by the Supreme Commander, only to find that 

one or other of the Governments concerned is not prepared to ratify it. Then 

what happens? 

5. If the Supreme Commander is going to exercise real control, he will 

need to assemble the whole paraphernalia of Intelligence, Planning and 

Administration on an unprecedented scale. This staff will merely be a great 

pad between the theater commanders and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

6. Finally, it is not admitted either that the existing machinery for the 

higher direction of the war has failed, or that the situation which now confronts us is so inherently different as to demand a revolutionary change. 

7. The conclusion to be drawn from the above arguments is that the 

Supreme Commander of the war against Germany will never have, under the 

system of government which now obtains in the U.S.A. and U.K., authority 

to deal with anything but strictly military, and comparatively minor, problems. 

He will be boosted by the Press and public opinion as a superman who is going 

to lead the two nations to victory. This is a mere delusion. His position will be 

a sham. In important matters, he will not be able to do anything more than 

is now done by the theater commanders. 

8. If the well tried machinery that has led us safely through the last two 

years has failed in the smaller problems, it would be better to examine that 

machinery and see how it could be speeded up and adjusted, rather than to 

embark upon an entirely novel experiment, which merely makes a cumbrous 

and unnecessary link in the chain of command, and which will surely lead to 

disillusionment and disappointment. 

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C.C.S. 409 

“OVERLORD” AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 

References: 

CCS 130th Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 131st Meeting, Item 4B 

CCS 132d Meeting 

C.C.S.409 circulated a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 25 

November 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff resolved this subject in their 

132d Meeting at EUREKA. 

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C.C.S. 409 25 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

“OVERLORD” AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Note by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. For some time past it has been clear to us, and doubtless also to the 

United States Chiefs of Staff, that disagreement exists between us as to what we 

should do now in the Mediterranean, with particular reference to the effect of 

future action on OVERLORD. The point at issue is how far what might be 

termed the “sanctity of OVERLORD” is to be preserved in its entirety, irrespective of developments in the Mediterranean Theater. This issue is clouding 

the whole of our future strategic outlook, and must be resolved at SEXTANT. 

2. At the outset we must point out that, since the decisions taken at 

QUADRANT, there have been major developments in the situation. The Russian campaign has succeeded beyond all hope or expectations and their victorious advance continues. Italy has been knocked out of the war; and it is 

certainly not beyond the bounds of possibility that Turkey will come in on our 

side before the New Year. In these changed conditions, we feel that consideration of adjustments of, if not actual departures from, the decisions taken at 

TRIDENT and QUADRANT are not only fully justified but positively essential. 

3. Nevertheless,we emphasize that we do not in any way recoil from, or wish 

to sidetrack, our agreed intention to attack the Germans across the Channel 

in the late spring or early summer of 1944, or even earlier if RANKZN conditions 

were to obtain. We must not, however, regard OVERLORD on a fixed date as 

the pivot of our whole strategy on which all else turns. In actual fact, the 

German strength in France next spring may, at one end of the scale, be something which makes OVERLORD completely impossible and, at the other end, 

something which makes RANKIN not only practicable, but essential. Consequently, to assume that the achievement of a certain strength by a certain date 

will remove all our dimculties and result in shortening the duration of the war is 

entirely illusory. This policy, if literally interpreted, will inevitably paralyze 

action in other theaters without any guarantee of action across the Channel. 

4. With the Germans in their present plight, the surest way to win the 

war in the shortest time is to attack them remorselessly and continuously in 

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any and every area where we can do so with superiority. The number of places 

at which we can thus attack them depends mainly on the extent to which they 

are stretched. Our policy is therefore clear; we should stretch the German 

forces to the utmost by threatening as many of their vital interests and areas 

as possible and, holding them thus, we should attack wherever we can do so in 

superior force. 

5. If we pursue the above policy we firmly believe that OVERLORD (perhaps 

in the form of RANKIN) will take place next summer. We do not, however,attach 

vital importance to any particular date or to any particular number of divisions 

in the assault and follow-up, though naturally the latter should be made as 

large as possible consistent with the policy stated above. It is,of course, valuable 

to have a target date to which all may work, but we are firmly opposed to allowing this date to become our master, and to prevent us from taking full advantage 

of all opportunities that occur to us to follow what we believe to be the correct 

strategy. 

6. In the light of the above argument, we submit the following proposals 

for action in the Mediterranean: 

a. Unification of Command 

Unification of Command in the Mediterranean, as outlined in C.O.S. 

(W) 919 is an essential and urgent measure which should be put into effect 

irrespective of any other decisions taken about this theater. 

b. The Italian Campaign 

The Offensive in Italy should be nourished and maintained until we 

have secured the Pisa-Rimini line. 

c. Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania 

Our policy should be to place on a regular military basis and to 

intensify our measures to nourish the Partisan and irregular forces in these 

countries. 

d. Turkey 

We should bring Turkey into the war this year. 

e. The Dardanelles 

We should aim to open the Dardanelles as soon as possible. 

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f. The Balkans 

We should undermine resistance in the Balkan States and do everything possible to promote a state of chaos and disruption in the satellite 

Balkan countries. 

7. If the above measures necessitate putting back the date upon which 

the forces agreed to be necessary for OVERLORD will be available in the United 

Kingdom, this should be accepted since it does not by any means follow that 

the date of the invasion of France will be put back to the same extent. 

8. To sum up, our policy is to fight and bomb the Germans as hard as 

possible all through the winter and spring; to build up our forces in the United 

Kingdom as rapidly as possible consistent with this; and finally to invade the 

Continent as soon as the German strength in France and the general war 

situation gives us a good prprospect of success. 

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C.C.S. 410 

THE EFFECT OF WEATHER ON OPERATION “OVERLORD” 

Reference: 

CCS 131st Meeting, Item 4B 

C.C.S. 410 circulated a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 25 

November 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of this subject in their 

131st Meeting. 

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C.C.S. 410 25 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE EFFECT OF WEATHER ON OPERATION “OVERLORD” 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Stag 

1. The following examination has been made regarding the limitations 

imposed by weather conditions on the postponement of Operation OVERLORD. 

2. Suitable weather conditions are required for two phases of the operation, 

firstly, the assault for which a four-day fine weather period is required; 

secondly, the maintenance and build-up period for which suitable weather for 

a decreasing degree of beach maintenance is required for about three months. 

THE ASSAULT 

3. In order to launch the assault a quiet spell of four days with winds of 

force 3 or less is desirable. Over ten consecutive years there were quiet spells 

for four or more consecutive days on the following number of occasions: 

April 18 times 

May 21 times 

June 19 times 

July 16 times 

August 23 times 

September 17 times 

October 14 times 

It will be seen that there is no serious deterioration in the chances of launching 

the assault between the months of May and September with the exception of 

July, where the incidence of a fine spell is only slightly less than in the month 

of June. It is therefore considered that, purely from the assault aspect, the 

operation could be postponed up to the month of September. 

4. For tidal reasons the assault is limited in each lunar month to two 

periods of five or six days, which occur at times of full and new moon. The air 

lift can only be carried out in the full moon period. It therefore follows that 

if the full moon period is missed on account of the weather conditions being 

unsuitable, the assault must be postponed for 24 days. By sacrificing the air 

lift this postponement could be reduced to 10 days. 

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AIR FACTORS AFFECTING THE ASSAULT 

5. a. For fully effective operation of air forces the following conditions 

must be satisfied: 

Night Day

Minimum horizontal visibility 5 miles 5 miles 

Minimum cloud base above ground level 3,000 feet 11,500 feet 

Maximum cloud 6/10 lop0 

Maximum wind at ground level 20 m.p.h. 20 m.p.h. (if airborne forces are used 

by day) Minimum moon 5 days each side of full. 

Moon 20" above horizon. 

b. If high level bombing is abandoned, the cloud conditions by day are 

then limited by the requirements of the fighter cover over shipping and 

beaches. These are 10/10 at not less than 5,000 feet. 

c. The chances of obtaining these conditions are not yet available, but 

it is evident that they will lengthen the odds against launching the assault 

to some extent, although settled summer weather suitable for the landing 

will most probably be suitable for the air operations. 

MAINTENANCE AND BUILD-UP PERIOD 

6. COSSAC has stated that, making full use of every captured port, large 

and small, 18 divisions must be maintained over the beaches during the first 

month of the operations, 12 divisions during the second month, and a number 

rapidly diminishing to nil during the third month. It is believed that the use 

of MULBERRIES will approximately halve this commitment for beach maintenance. Therefore, during this period there will be at first a considerable, and 

later a gradually dwindling dependence on fine weather conditions. In 

assessing suitable weather for carrying out beach maintenance any day with 

wind of not more than Force 3 on shore and not more than Force 4 off shore 

has been accepted. In the OVERLORD area the average number of suitable 

days per month is as follows: 

April 21 

May 23 

June 25 

July 25 

August 24% 

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September 23?h 

October 18?h 

November 20 

December 20 

It is apparent from the above figures that a marked deterioration does not 

occur until October. Although the months of October, November, and December appear to provide a reasonable number of quiet days, it is considered that 

this proportion cannot be fully relied on owing to the severe weather which 

may occur during unsuitable days, thereby producing conditions of sea or 

swell which will render beach maintenance impracticable on the subsequent 

quiet day or days. 

7. It is impossible to calculate what loss in expectation of suitable maintenance days can be accepted by COSSAC during the second and third months 

of the beach maintenance period without a very intimate knowledge of his 

maintenance and build-up plan; but it would appear that weather should be 

suitable for sufficient beach maintenance at least up to the end of September 

and possibly, in view of the dwindling commitment in this respect, up to the 

middle or end of October. 

CONCLUSION 

8. It is not possible to submit a firm recommendation on this subject, but 

from the limited facts available for this brief examination, there does not 

appear to be any overriding reason why the assault could not be carried out 

up to about the middle of July. 

9. This means that the target date should be in the middle of June to 

allow for a postponement of 24 days in case weather conditions are unsuitable. 

10. Thus if the target date is mid-June and the air lift is not sacrificed, only 

two periods of four or five days when Moon and Tide conditions are suitable 

will occur in 1944;and these must coincide with a four day spell of fine weather. 

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C.C.S. 411/2 and 411/5 

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEASTASIA COMMAND 

References: 

CCS 128th Meeting, Item 6 

CCS 129th Meeting, Items 5 and 7 

CCS 130th Meeting, Item 1 

CCS 131st Meeting, Item 1 

CCS 132d Meeting 

CCS 138th Meeting, Item 8 

1st Plenary Meeting 

At their 130th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff invited Admiral 

Mountbatten to prepare a list of the points with regard to operations in the 

Southeast Asia Command on which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s concurrence should be obtained before his departure from SEXTANT. C.C.S. 411 

circulated the draft prepared by Admiral Mountbatten 25 November 1943. 

Amendments proposed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were circulated as 

C.C.S. 411/1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff,in their 131st Meeting approved the 

memorandum as amended (subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 411/2). 

C.C.S. 411/3 and 411/4 circulated memoranda by the Deputy Chief of 

Staff,Southeast Asia Command proposing an amendment to paragraph 4, C.C.S. 

411/2, also stating that it is understood that C.C.S. 411/2 was explained to the 

Generalissimo but not handed to him. 

C.C.S. 411/5, 7 December, circulated a memorandum by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff suggesting a solution to the proposal contained in C.C.S. 

411/3 and 411/4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 138th Meeting, accepted 

C.C.S. 411/5. 

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C.C.S. 411/2 2 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosure, a list of points with regard to operations in the Southeast 

Asia Command on which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-sheks concurrence is to 

be sought, was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 131st Meeting 

and is circulated herewith for information. 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

POINTS ON WHICH GENERALISSIMO’S AGREEMENT 

SHOULD BE OBTAINED 

1. Since the Combined Chiefs of Staff are unable to find the 535 additional 

transport aircraft which are required for the Mandalay plan, it is agreed that 

the plan presented by Admiral Mountbatten at the First Plenary Session shall 

be accepted. 

2. The stipulation which the Generalissimo has made that an amphibious 

operation is to be carried out in March is noted,and will be taken into consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when amphibious operations in all parts 

of the world are reviewed in about a weeks time. Meanwhile preparations are 

being pushed forward in the Southeast Asia Theater for an amphibious operation to meet this date, should approval be subsequently given. 

3. A fleet of adequate strength to cover such an operation and to obtain 

command of the Bay of Bengal will be assembled by the beginning of March. 

4. The Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command, will be authorized 

to divert not more than an average of 1,100tons per month from tonnage over 

the “hump” to the requirements of the Burma campaign. Diversions in excess 

of this figure may be made by him only to meet sudden and critical emergencies of the battle or by permission of the highest authority. The Air Transport Command will use its utmost energy to raise the efficiency of its operation 

and increase the “hump” tonnage to a full 10,000tons per month into China 

by the late winter and a further increase in the spring. 

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is delegating his command over the 

Chinese-American Task Force starting from Led0 to Lieutenant General Slim, 

commanding the 14th British Army, until the main body reaches Kamaing, 

when he will place the force under the command of Lieutenant General Stilwell. 

6. It is the intention to resume the offensive in October 1944,when the 

monsoon stops; it is, however, too far ahead to decide the precise resources 

which will be available. 

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CCS 411/5 7 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. In order to settle the question of tonnage lift to China versus availability 

of aircraft from A.T.C. India-China Wing, it is recommended that the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff accept the following in lieu of the solution recommended in 

C.C.S. 411/4, SEXTANT, 5 December 1943: 

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognize the principle that the Supreme 

Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command must have control over 

resources allocated to him for the accomplishment of the assigned objectives. 

b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff also recognize the necessity of firm 

commitments of tonnage over the “hump” into China during the next six 

months. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct: 

(1) That the tonnage over the “hump” be maintained on the following basis of transport plane allotments: 

C-87s C-46’s Tons Delivered 

December 40 97 8,858 

January 40 107 9,535 

February 48 120 11,066 

March 55 25 5,614 

April 52 46 6,716 

May 50 96 9,686 

(2) They further direct that transport plane allotments to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, for TARZAN, be 

on the following basis: 

15 Dec to 31 Jan- 18 C-47’s or 12 C-46s 

1 Feb to 28 Feb- 11 C-47’s or 8 C-46’s 

1Mar to 31 Mar- 188 C-47’s or 126 C-46’s 

1Apr to 15Apr- 183 C-47’s or 122 C-46’s 

16 Apr to 15 May-114 C-47’s or 76 C-46’s 

16 May to 30 Jun- 43 C-47’s or 29 (2-46’s 

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Note: The above subparagraph is based on the assumption that 35 

additional C-47’s will be available in the theater by 1February. 

(Now allotted to the 10th Air Force) 

c. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that any shortages in delivery 

of transport aircraft into the theater on present allottment bases be prorated in proportion to the allotments outlined in b (1) and (2) above. Excess 

in numbers of A. T. C. aircraft over the expectations outlined in (1) and (2) 

above will be allocated by direction of the Commanding General, U.S.A.A.F., 

India, during the above period. 

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C.C.S. 413 and 41312 

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN CAIRO CONFERENCE 

C.C.S.413 circulated a memorandum from the Commander in Chief, 

Allied Force Headquarters 26 November. The Secretaries’ proposed reply was 

circulated as C.C.S. 41311.The Combined Chiefs of Staff amended and approved, 

informally, the proposed reply which was subsequently circulated for information, as C.C.S. 413/2. 

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C.C.S. 26 November 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN CAIRO CONFERENCE 

Memorandum from Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters 

An extract of a letter received today by the Commander in Chief Allied 

Forces, from General Giraud, is quoted for the information of the Allied Chiefs 

of Staff and such action as they desire to take: 

“The conversation which I had with you this morning has confirmed 

my conviction that the point of view of the French High Command should 

be explained at the Cairo Conference, before any decision determines definitely the conduct of operations in Western Europe. 

“Indeed, if France is to be the theater of new operations, you will 

understand, I am sure, how anxious I am to contribute to the studying of 

these operations with all the competence which a thorough knowledge of 

our territory has given me, and also to take my share of responsibility in 

the operation where the use of underground forces and resistance groups 

share the preponderant role. 

“If it is not considered necessary that I go personally to this Conference, though I do hold myself at the disposal of President Roosevelt and of 

the British Prime Minister, I would consider it most useful to have one omcer of my staff present to explain my views before the Allied Chiefs of Staff. 

“In the event where such a solution would not be possible, I do rely 

upon you to defend the interests of France and the French Army with the 

friendship and understanding which you-havealways shown us.” 

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C.C.S. 41312 22 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN CAIRO CONFERENCE 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached message (FAN 282), as sent to General Eisenhower from 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 4December 1943,is circulated for information. 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

SECURITY CONTROL 

PRIORITY 

From: SEXTANT 

To : AGWAR 10116 

Algiers FP30 

USFOR MP 60 

4 December 1943 FAN 282. 

With reference to letter from Giraud suggesting he attend SEXTANT, 

you should reply on following lines: 

General Giraud’s offer to come to Cairo very much appreciated by Combined Chiefs of Staff,who feel, however, that it is unnecessary to ask the General to undertake the journey, since discussions on global strategy are of the 

broadest possible nature and the details of operations in France are not under 

consideration. Please inform him that the Combined Chiefs of Staff believe 

that your presentation here included an accurate and sympathetic explanation of his views. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have the interest of France and of the 

French Armed Forces much at heart. 

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C.C.S. 415/3 

THE PROVISION OF MERCHANT SHIPPING FOR THE 

BRITISH FLEET FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Reference: 

CCS 138th Meeting, Item 4 

C.C.S. 415, 26 November 1943, circulated a memorandum by the British 

Chiefs of Staff who recommended that the Combined Staff Planners formulate 

and coordinate the service demands for merchant ship types required for the 

war against Japan. Reply from the United States Chiefs of Staff was circulated 

as C.C.S. 415/1,4 December. Further memorandum from the British Chiefs of 

Staff (C.C.S. 415/2) was circulated 5 December. 

The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and the First Sea Lord 

presented a suggested formula for this problem (C.C.S. 415/3) which was 

approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 138th Meeting. 

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C.C.S. 415/3 6 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE PROVISION OF MERCHANT SHIPPING FOR THE 

BRITISH FLEET FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, 

United States Fleet and First Sea Lord 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are requested to approve that the Ministry 

of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Auxiliaries for the British Fleet for operations in 

the war against Japan, and that they should take steps to provide the requisite 

ships after agreement in detail between the Commander in Chief, United States 

Fleet and the First Sea Lord. 

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C.C.S. 417 

OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

References: 

CCS 130th Meeting, Item 3 

CCS 134th Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 137th Meeting, Item 4 

1st Plenary Meeting 

2d Plenary Meeting 

C.C.S. 417 circulated the report by the Combined Staff Planners 

2 December 1943.The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 134th Meeting amended 

C.C.S. 417. In their 137th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved C.C.S. 

417 in principle as amended by C.C.S. 417/1less paragraph 4 (certain changes 

submitted by the Combined Staff Planners). They directed that the Combined 

Staff Planners prepare a plan of campaign for the Chinese theater proper 

together with an estimate of the forces involved. 

C.C.S. 417 as published herein is corrected as amended. 

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C.C.S. 417 2 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

References: 

a. CCS 31915,paras. 43,44 

b. CCS 130th Meeting, Item 3 

Report by the Combined StaffPlanners 

Pursuant to reference b, the report of the Combined Staff Planners is 

forwarded for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

ENCLOSURE 

DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

Report by the Combined StaffPlanners 

PROBLEM 

1. To prepare an over-all plan fop the defeat of Japan. 

ASSUMP XIONS 

2. Our studies of this subject have taken account of: 

a. The possibility that invasion of the principal Japanese islands may 

not be necessav and the defeat of Japan nay be accomplished by sea and 

air blockade and intensive air bombardment from progressively advanced 

bases. The plan must, however, be capable of expansion to meet the contingency of invasion. 

b. The possibility that Germany may be defeated as early as the spring 

of 1944. 

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c. The possibility that the U.S.S.R.may enter the war against Japan 

early after the defeat of Germany, and our plan proposes that all possible 

preparations should be made to take advantage of such a development. 

Further progress is dependent upon staff conversations with the Soviets. 

d. The possibility that a full campaign in Burma may have to be carried 

out following on the TARZAN operation. 

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

3. To obtain objectives from which we can conduct intensive air bombardment and establish a sea and air blockade against Japan, and from which to 

invade Japan proper if this should prove to be necessary. 

GENERAL CONCEPT 

4. The main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific. 

CONCEPT WITHIN THE PACIFIC 

5. The advance along the New Guinea-N.E.1.-Philippine axis will proceed 

concurrently with operations for the capture of the Mandated Islands. These 

two series of operations will be mutually supporting. United Nations naval 

forces can be deployed to support successive operations along each axis, and 

to prevent interference by hostile surface units with simultaneous operations 

in the two areas. Transfer of forces and resources from one area to the other 

is contemplated. When conflicts in timing and allocation of means exist, due 

weight should be accorded to the fact that operations in the Central Pacific 

promise at this time a more rapid advance toward Japan and her vital lines 

of communication; the earlier acquisition of strategic air bases closer to the 

Japanese homeland; and, of greatest importance, are more likely to precipitate 

a decisive engagement with the Japanese Fleet. 

The aim should be to advance along the New Guinea-N.E.1.-Philippine 

axis and to complete the capture of the Mandated Islands in time to launch 

a major assault in the Formosa-Luzon-China area in the spring of 1945 (i.e.. 

before the onset of the typhoon season), from a distant base. 

CONCEPT WITHIN OTHER AREAS 

6. Operations in the North Pacific, the South Pacific, China and the Southeast Asia Theater should be conducted in support of the main operations in the 

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Central and Southwest Pacific. In the event of the U.S.S.R.entering the war, 

operations in the North Pacific may assume far greater importance and may 

involve a major redeployment of forces. 

GENERALCONDUCTOFOPERATIONS 

7. The conduct of operations should be designed to: 

a. Destroy the Japanese Fleet at an early date. 

b. Secure the maximum attrition of enemy air forces. 

c. Intensify air, submarine and mining operations against enemy shipping and lines of communication. 

d. Enable us to launch shore-based and carrier-borne air attack on 

Japan. 

e. Keep China in the war. 

f. Insure that the sequence of operations remains flexible and that preparations are made to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments in the situation. 

g. Take advantage of the earliest practicable reorientation of forces 

from the European Theater. 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN 1944 

8. For operations planned for 1944, see schedule in C.C.S. 397, Specific 

Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944 (To be revised). These operations 

are in accordance with the over-all concept. In brief they contemplate: 

Central Pacific 

a. Capture of the Mandated Islands and conduct of V.L.R.strategic 

bombing of Japan proper from the Marianas (Guam, Tinian and Saipan). 

Southwest Pacific 

b. Continuing the advance along the New Guinea-N.E.1.-Philippine 

axis. Intensification of air bombardment of targets in the N.E.1.-Philippine 

area. 

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North Pacific 

c. Preparations to conduct very long range strategic bombing against 

the Kuriles and Northern Japan. (Preparations for the possible entry of 

the U.S.S.R. into the war are discussed in Annex I, page 261). 

Southeast Asia Theater 

d. Operations for the capture of Upper Burma in the spring of 1944 in 

order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with 

China, and an amphibious operation at approximately the same time. Continuance of operations during the autumn of 1944within the limits of the 

forces available (see paragraph 14) to extend the position held in Upper 

Burma. 

e. Should the means be available, additional ground, sea and air offensive operations, including carrier-borne raids, with the object of maintaining pressure on the enemy, forcing dispersion of his forces, and 

attaining the maximum attrition practicable on his air and naval forces 

and shipping. 

CHINA AREA 

f. Conducting V.L.R. air operations from the Chengtu area in China 

against vital targets in the Japanese inner zone. 

g. Building up the U.S. Air Forces in China and the Chinese Army and 

air force with the object of intensifyingland and air operations in and from 

China. 

DISPOSITION OF FORCES 

Naval Forces 

9. Considering the British Naval forces shown below, we believe the combined naval forces will be adequate to conduct the operations envisaged for 

the defeat of Japan. We show in Annex 11,page 262, the estimated dispositions 

of British Naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific after the completion of operation BUCCANEER, and the subsequent build-up of British Naval 

forces in the Pacific during 1944 and early 1945. 

10. This allocation provides for sufficient forces in the Indian Ocean to 

maintain our communications with the Andamans, to act as a deterrent 

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against any attempt to recapture them by the Japanese and to carry out operations, raids and threats against Japanese possessions in S.E. Asia. All other 

available units, to the extent that they can be supported and profitably 

employed, will be concentrated for the main effort in the Pacific. 

11. Though full details have not yet been worked out, we consider that the 

British naval forces shown can be supported logistically and should in general 

operate from advanced bases in the Bismarck and Solomons area so that they 

may either cover the operations along the New Guinea-N.E.1.-Philippines axis, 

or cooperate with the U.S. Fleet in the Central Pacific. 

12. Logistic preparations should be made by the British for the increased 

British naval forces expected to become available for the long distance assault 

contemplated in the spring of 1945. Manpower limitations will probably prevent any new bases being manned by the British until after the defeat of 

Germany. 

13. Our studies have reemphasized the importance of the provision of aircraft carriers of all sorts for our future operations against Japan. 

Land Forces 

14. Present plans contemplate the timely deployment in the Pacific of about 

40 U.S. divisions and supporting troops. British/Indian land forces, which can 

be made available to Southeast Asia command up to the end of 1944 are likely 

to be fully committed in carrying out the operations recommended for the 

season 1943/44, and subsequently extending the area of occupation in Burma 

and in carrying out additional operations against the enemy. This concept 

is subject to alteration in the light of the progress of the 1943/44 operations 

and of detailed examination of the forces which will be required for 1944/45, 

but included in the forces retained in the theater there should be at least one 

amphibious division. 

15. After the defeat of Germany the number of additional British divisions 

from the European Theater and the dates by which they can be made available for the war against Japan cannot yet be assessed, but it is estimated that 

some nine months will be required for the necessary reorganization, passage 

and training. Additional British forces may prove essential for Burma. In the 

Pacific, the target should be to provide four British divisions based on Australia 

for service in that theater as early as possible after the defeat of Germany. At 

least two of these divisions should be amphibiously trained. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

16. After providing for paragraph 15 above, additional British forces 

becoming available will probably be best placed in reserve at the disposal of 

Southeast Asia, ready for additional offensive operations in that area. 

17. Australian and New Zealand forces should continue to be employed in 

Pacific operations. The employment of Canadian forces should be discussed 

with the Canadian Government. 

18. We believe that the combined land forces to be made available as outlined in paragraphs 14,15, 16 and 17 above will be adequate to conduct the 

operations envisaged for the defeat of Japan. 

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft 

19. Present plans contemplate an eventual US. assault lift of 12 divisions 

in the Pacific. The British should maintain in the Southeast Asia Theater an 

assault lift for at least one division. As soon as the war with Germany is over 

the British should aim to provide in the Southwest Pacific as large an assault 

lift as possible (probably between two and three divisions simultaneously). 

Air Forces 

20. British and U.S. air forces are sufficient for plans at present contemplated although if the U.S.S.R.enters the war the demand on our resources for 

the establishment of a bomber force in the Maritime Provinces may conflict 

with the development of our air effort against Japan through China. 

The large air forces which will be available when Germany is defeated 

must be redeployed against Japan as quickly as possible. The general principles which we consider should govern this redeployment are in Annex 111,page 

263. Immediate examinations of the problems involved in this redeployment 

of British and US. air forces should be made. Studies are now under way to 

determine the best employment of the B-29 aircraft against Japan. 

Appendix “A” to Annex I11 shows the US.and British air forces which 

may be available for deployment against Japan after the defeat of Germany. 

PREPARATION OF BASES IN INDIA 

21. The preparation of the bases in India required for approved operations 

in the Southeast Asia and China Theater should continue in consonance with 

provisions of paragraphs 4,5 and 6. 

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RECOMMENDATIONS 

22. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff: 

a. Approve the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan and direct that the 

necessary preparations be initiated. 

b. Approve the specific operations set out in C.C.S. 397,Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944. (To be revised). 

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ANNEX I 

NOTE ON PREPARATIONS THAT SHOULD BE MADE FOR 

POSSIBLE RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR 

1. We should urge the U.S.S.R. to come in as early as possible; ask them 

to tell us when they propose to come in; what they propose to do when they 

come in; and what they want us to do to help. 

2. Meanwhile, in so far as they do not conflict with the operations in the 

Central and Southwest Pacific, preparations should be made by the spring or 

early summer of 1944so that we can assist her: ­

a. By building up supplies by trans-Pacific shipment, sea and air. 

b. By insuring that her defenses and means in Kamchatka are adequate. If she wants our forces there we should be prepared to move them in, 

especially air. 

c. By furnishing aircraft and air units released from the European 

front, both from the East and the West. 

3. If and when conversations with the Soviets can be arranged, plans 

should also be made for operations:­

a. To enter and develop bases in Kamchatka and the Maritime Provinces. 

b. To seize and hold the Northern Kuriles and to open a sea route to 

the Maritime Provinces. 

c. To supply and operate air forces from Siberian bases. 

4. We must constantly review the situation so as to be ready to adjust our 

operations elsewhere when the U.S.S.R. come into the war. 

Annex I 

261 
PROYISIOKAL ANNEX 11 

ISubject to further Confirmtionl 

BRITISH FORCES IN THE INDIAN WAN AND PACIFIC AFTER COMPLETION OF "BUCCANEER" 

Indian Ocean 1944 Pacific 

June 2 OBB IGueen ElirabeTh e Valiant1 ! AA Ship lhtch Jon, I OIIB IRenownl 

Doubrful I 

I cv 12 Fl~etD1) 2 rv RESCI:RCE IFleer R

3 CYE IAssaulr I 6 Frigates 6 CL IlNICORh IAircraft 

I CVE IAiSI 14 SS 110 be based 4 CVE IAssaultI 1 Armnmenr Supply 

3 CA Australia when I CVE IA/SI 3 Armament Carrie

4 CL 11 Durchl possible1 2 or 3 VCE IFerripsi 3 victualling Sup

9 SS IBased 1.0.1 B tn 10 Fleet Tan

I6 Flret 09 I Nrval Store Iss

12 Frigates 2 Naval Store Sar

! Air Store Issu

- &d Add 

JUlY July 2 CV ? ~ieetnD I Air Stare Issuin

~ ~~ ~ 

In51 Except for CVE's, no ships below this line I&t I BB IXGVI 7 CL 

Quarrer can be manned for certain until after the defeat Qunrrer2 CVL 7 Frigates

of Germany nor can the needs of The Atlantic 3 CYF, IAssaulrI I Naval Store Iss

Iif Germany is still fighringl be esriwted at 6 CVE IAiSI I Victualling Sup

This rime. 3 Arrrament Supply 

? I Haspiral Ship 

- ,94j 19n5 

First First I BB IAnsan fullv modn.11 

Quarter Quarter1 CVL I 

I Appropriate CVE's, CL'

Second Second I RB lhke Of York fully1 

Quarter nuarrrr modernized1 1 

2 CYL 

IRevised z December 19'131 

Provisional Annex I1 

1944 
ANNEX I11 

AIR FORCES 

AVAILABILITY OF AIR FORCES 

1. Appendix “A” shows the British and U.S.air forces that may become 

available for the war against Japan on the alternative assumptions that 

Germany is defeated in March or October 1944. 

These large air forces must be deployed against Japan as quickly as 

pssible. 

REDEPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES 

Pacific 

2. We should speedily increase our air forces in the Central, Southwest 

and North Pacific. The air forces in the Central Pacific will be U.S.;those in the 

Southwest and possibly in the North Pacific will be both British and U.S. 

Southeast Asia 

3. In Southeast Asia we must deploy sufficient air forces to insure the 

security of the area, protect our sea communications and to meet the requirements of operations. These will be predominantly British. 

U.S.S.R.and China 

4. A study is now being made to determine the best employment of B-29 

aircraft in the war against Japan. 

In 70 far as operations from China are concerned, we have under consideration the DRAKE Plan for V.L.R. bombing from the Kweilin area and a 

plan for V.L.R. bombing from the Chengtu area (plan MATTERHORN). We 

recommend approval of the MATTERHORN plan on the understanding that it 

is not permitted to interfere materially with other approved operations. 

The preparations now underway for the Chengtu operations are also 

preliminary for the DRAKE plan. 

Annex I11 

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Further study of the DRAKE plan is required, especially with regard to 

the logistic features. 

5. With respect to whether we carry out DRAKE operation from China or 

V.L.R. bombing from the U.S.S.R., we consider that: 

a. If the U.S.S.R.enters the war, grants us facilities and we are able to 

establish and maintain a bomber force in the Maritime Provinces,the 

establishment and operation of such force should have priority over the 

DRAKE plan. 

b. Ifthe U.S.S.R. enters the war but it does not prove feasible to establish 

and maintain a bomber force in the Maritime Provinces, we should proceed 

with the DRAKE plan. In this case the requirement in Chinese divisioy 

for the defense of the forward area should be considerably reduced below the 

figure of 50 stipulated by General Stilwell. If 20 divisions only were required we might start bombing Japan by autumn 1945. 

c. If the U.S.S.R.does not enter the war, we should proceed with the 

DRAKE plan. If the full figure of 50 divisions is necessary, bombing could 

not start before the end of 1946. 

EXAMINATIONS REQUIRED 

6. We do not consider that at this stage we can go further than the abvs 

We recommend, however, that the following examinations should be carried 

out as a matter of urgency: 

a. A proposed redeployment of the British and U.S. air forces in the 

light of the above principles, after the defeat of Germany, setting out the 

types and strengths required in the various areas. 

b. DRAKE Plan 

(1) To be examined by S.A.C.S.E.A. and Commander in Chief, India. 

(2) A study as to the extent to which Lancaster/Halifax aircraft 

could take the place of the B-24 aircraft on which our staff study has 

been based. 

c. It is most desirable to examine as early as practicable with the Soviet8 

the problems involved in establishing and maintaining a U.S.-Bfitish 8ir 

force in the Maritime Provinces of the U.S.S.R., leading to conclusions as to 

the size of force that may be achieved and the effort required to maintain it 

by sea, land and air routes. This will depend upon staff conversations with 

the Soviets. 

Annex IlI 

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ippendix "A" to Annex I11 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “B” TO ANNEX III 

“DRAKE” PLAN 

1. The plan is to bomb Japan with B-29 aircraft supplied through India 

and operating through forward airfields in the Kweilin area of China. This 

forward area would be protected by US. equipped Chinese divisions and the 

augmented 14th Air Force. 

2. Twenty-seven airfields would be constructed (or converted) in Bengal. 

These would be supplied with gasoline by pipelines direct from the port. This 

would necessitate considerable expansion of the port facilities of Calcutta (both 

for dry stores and for gasoline) and communications in India, including the 

BengalIAssam L. of C. In addition, the plan would require the construction of 

the Ledo-Paoshan-Kunming road and the projected pipelines from India to 

China. 

3. Simultaneously with the above, fifteen airfields would be constructed 

in the Kunming area, using Chinese labor and local resources. 

4. On the completion of these projects supplies would be moved from India 

into China by approximately 2,000 transport aircraft (our plan is based on 

B-24’s), the Ledo-Kunming road and the oil pipelines. These supplies would 

equip and maintain Chinese forces and the augmented 14th Air Force. As soon 

as sufficient forces have been built up to protect the Kweilin area, airffelds 

would be constructed there for use by the B-29 aircraft. 

5. General Stilwell has stipulated that he would require 50 U.S. equipped 

and trained Chinese divisions before he could secure the Kweilin area SufEciently to allow airfield construction to be started. On this basis bombing could 

not start before the autumn of 1946. If a lesser force were acceptable, bombing 

could start correspondingly earlier (e.g., if 20 divisions would suffice, bombing 

might start in autumn 1945). The above dates assume the defeat of Germany 

by 1October 1944. 

6. The maximum B-29 force which we could operate would be eight groups 

(224 aircraft). 

7. The plan allows for the Chengtu project, preparations for which have 

already been ordered. 

Appendix “B” to Annex m 

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8. The plan would be dependent upon the following assumptions: 

a. That operations in North Burma in 1943144 enable construc ion of 

the Ledo-Paoshan-Kunming Road and pipelines to be completed by 

1January 1945. 

b. That sufficient airfield sites (27) in Bengal and port and communication facilities can be made available. 

c. That the BengalIAssam L. of C. is expanded as directed at QUADRANT. 

d. That we can construct suitable airfields (15) in China with local labor 

and materials. 

e. That during 1944,7,000tons a month (including 5,000already allotted 

to the 14th Air Force) are made available from the capacity of the existing 

A.T.C. route to China. 

f. That the necessary US.personnel and equipment are made available 

by the dates required. 

Appendix “B” to Annex I11 

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C.C.S. 418/1 

ENTRY OF TURKEY INTO THE WAR 

References: 

CCS 133d Meeting, Item 2 (2) 

CCS 133d Meeting, Item 4 

1st EUREKA Plenary Meeting 

2d EUREKA Plenary Meeting 

C.C.S. 418 circulated a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

2 December 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 133d Meeting, amended 

and approved C.C.S. 418 (subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 418/1). 

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C.C.S. 41811 3 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ENTRY OF TURKEY INTO THE WAR 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The object of this paper is to discuss the role that Turkey might be called 

upon to adopt if she agrees to come into the war, and the extent of our commitments likely to be involved. 

TURKEY'S ROLE IN THE WAR 

2. We consider that our object in the Balkans should be to bring about the 

surrender of Bulgaria and open a short sea route to Russia. 

3. The surrender of Bulgaria is most likely to be achieved by: 

a. Air action. 

b. Russian diplomatic and subversive action. 

c. The psychological effect of Turkey becoming an active ally of the 

United Nations. 

4. We do not propose that Allied forces should be concentrated in Thrace 

to cooperate with the Turks. In Thrace, therefore, the Turks must be persuaded 

to stand on the defensive and to concentrate their forces for t.he protection of 

the Straits. To assist them we would continue to bomb the Bnlgarians. 

5. The opening of a short supply route to Russia through the Dardanelles 

would achieve a considerable economy in shipping, but might also enable us 

to take the strain off the Persian supply route. The Turks should be called upon 

to provide us with the bases from which to protect the convoys. 

COMMITMENTS INVOLVED 

6. The commitments which would be involved in the above policy can be 

considered under two headings: 

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a. Minimum air and anti-air assistance to the Turks, who make a great 

point of the necessity for protecting their main cities, communications and 

industries from German air attack. 

b. Action, within the capacity of the forces that can be made available, 

for openingthe Aegean Sea, the capture of Rhodes and the other Dodecanese 

Islands. 

Assistance to the Turks 

7. We can provide a reasonable scale of air defense for Turkish key points. 

Opening the Aegean 

8. In addition to 6 a above, we can find the necessary air forces to provide 

air cover for convoys in the Aegean and the Marmora, without any serious 

effect on operations elsewhere. 

9. The naval forces required for escorting and minesweeping for a fortnightly convoy cycle would have to be provided from outside the Mediterranean. 

10. With the above naval and air forces it should be possible to pass occasional 

convoys through the Aegean without first capturing Rhodes. In these circumstances, however, the losses in ships might be considerable, and for the 

passage of regular convoys it would be necessary to capture Rhodes and highly 

desirable to clean up Kos, Leros, Samos,Khios, Mytilene and Lemnos. From the 

military point of view it would be an immense advantage if the Turks could 

cooperate in the assaults on the islands other than Rhodes. 

11. The forces required for the capture of Rhodes over and above those now 

in M.E. Command would be: 

a. Naval forces for the assault. 

b. One British division. 

c. The assault shipping and craft for one division, two brigades 

assaulting. 

d. Two parachute battalions and the necessary air lift for them amounting to 90 transport aircraft. 

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12. As far as can be foreseen at present the land and air forces for this 

operation could be found from resources in the Mediterranean Theater. 

13. There are two possible sources for the necessary assault shipping and 

craft: the Mediterranean Theater, and the Southeast Asia Theater. 

14. The two parachute battalions and the 90 transport aircraft could only 

come from the Central Mediterranean and their release would depend on the 

requirements of the situation in Italy, and the preparations for operations 

against Southern France. 

15. From the point of view of the weather it might be possible to stage an 

assault on Rhodes towards the end of February, but other factors are likely to 

affect this date. 

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C.C.S. 420 

GENERAL PROGRESS REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS 

AND FUTURE PLANS IN THE PACIF'IC 

Reference: 

CCS 133d Meeting, Item 5 

C.C.S. 420, 4 December 1943, circulated a report by the United States 

Chiefs of Staff for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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C.C.S. 420 4 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

GENERAL PROGRESS REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS 

AND FUTURE PLANS IN THE PACIFIC 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The enclosure, compiled from reports of the area commanders in the 

Pacific, is presented to the Combined Chiefsof Staff for their information. 

ENCLOSURE 

GENERAL PROGRESS REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS 

AND FUTURE PLANS IN THE PACIFIC 

PROGRESS OF PACIFIC AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

15 AUGUST-15 NOVEMBER 1943 

North Pacific 

1. The Kiska operation was begun on 15 August. A combined United 

States-Canadian Task Force, involving naval, ground, and air units, effected 

an unopposed occupation as the Japanese had previously evacuated without 

the knowledge of our forces. This evacuation eliminated the Japanese from 

the Aleutians where they had begun seizure of bases in June 1942. 

2. Subsequently an aircraft strike was made against Paramushiru in August 

and another in September. These strikes inflicted some damage on Japanese 

shore installations, aircraft, and ships, and provided some information on the 

extensive development and fortification underway in this area. The aircraft 

losses in these strikes were disproportionate to results obtained. Accordingly 

the small air forces now allotted to this area have assumed a generally defensive 

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BRITISH -MOST SECRET 

role for the time being. The North Pacific Force, in addition to carrying out 

the usual patrols, is proceeding with the development of bases and plans for 

the capture of Paramushiru and for follow-up in the Kuriles or, in case of 

Soviet participation, in Kamchatka or Sakhalin, or both. 

Central Pacific 

3. Activities in this area have mainly been limited, generally to support of 

the submarine campaign and the operations in the North and South Pacific 

Areas, and to preparation of forces for island operations. 

4. A carrier task force raided Marcus Island on 31 August effecting complete surprise and meeting opposition only from anti-aircraft fire. Enemy 

installations were heavily damaged and some enemy aircraft, which were 

caught grounded, were destroyed. 

5. Similarly, on 18 September, Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama in the Gilberts were attacked by a carrier task force. This attack was coordinated with 

one by US.Army planes from Canton and Guadalcanal on Tarawa and Nauru, 

respectively. Enemy shore facilities and considerable aircraft were destroyed 

in these raids. 

6. On 5 and 6 October, Wake Atoll was attacked by aircraft and bombarded 

by ships of a task force of six carriers, seven cruisers, and supporting destroyers.

US. Navy planes temporarily based at Midway also attacked Wake during 

these two days. Damage was estimated as 55 percent of enemy shore installations and 67 enemy planes destroyed. 

7. In preparation for operations against the Gilberts and the Marshalls, 

Baker, Nukufetau. and Kanomea were occupied between 1 and 15 September. 

Airfields for healy bombers on Baker and Nukufetau, and for fighters on 

Naaomea have been prepared. 

Sozth and Southwest Pacific 

8. On 15 August the forces of the South and Southwest Pacific, under the 

strategic direction of the CinC, SWPA, were engaged in the CARTWHEEL 

Operations. (Map,facingpage 280). In these operations theEasternhis (Phases 

A, B and C) was assigned to the South Pacific Forces, while the Western Axis 

(Phases I,2 and 3) was assigned to the Southwest Pacific Forces. 

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9. By 5 August, Munda airfield on New Georgia had been captured, but 

mopping up of scattered enemy resistance continued for several weeks. Continuing with Phase A, Vella Lavella was occupied on 12 August, thus by-passing 

the enemy strength on Kolombangara. Initial landings on Vella Lavella on 

12 August met little resistance and our ground strength was quickly built up. 

This outflanking move, involving air attacks against enemy airfields, personnel, and landing barges, and numerous naval engagements,prevented reinforcements and supplies reaching Japanese garrisons, and forced enemy evacuation 

of Kolombangara and nearby islands. The battle of New Georgia was officially 

terminated on 16 October, completing Phase A of CARTWHEEL. In the course 

of these operations, 5 airfields were captured or constructed in this area, thus 

permitting more effective employment of aircraft in support of further 

operations. 

10. On 26 October, Phase B was begun by enveloping operations against the 

strong enemy position in the south Bougainville area. Allied forces from the 

South Pacific, including New Zealand troops, occupied two islands in the 

Treasury Group. One day later U.S. troops landed in northwest Choiseul as 

a diversion. On 1November a large-scale landing was made on the northern 

shores of Empress Augusta Bay. Coincident with this landing, carrier and 

shore-based aircraft struck Buka and Bonis airfields and surface craft bombarded in the Buka and Shortland areas. Air forces from the Southwest Pacific 

gave support by operations against the airfields in New Britain. Early on the 

morning of 2 November a United States force of cruisers and destroyers made 

contact with several groups of Japanese cruisers and destroyers west of 

Empress Augusta Bay. Preliminary reports on this engagement indicate 

possibly five Japanese ships, including a cruiser of the SENDAI class, were 

sunk and four damaged. We lost no ships although some damage was received. 

On 5 November a carrier task force conducted an air strike against shipping 

in Rabaul harbor, inflicting damage on six Japanese heavy cruisers, two light 

cruisers, and two destroyers with only mirior US. plane losses. One of the 

Japanese heavy cruisers is reported to have blown up. These strikes were 

coordinated with the operations of the air forces from the Southwest Pacific 

which hit Rabaul immediately after the carriers. Subsequently air groups 

from two carrier task forces again struck at naval vessels and shipping in and 

near Rabaul inflicting damage on the enemy while receiving little themselves. 

Despite Japanese surface ship, aircraft, and ground reaction, the Bougain~lle 

operations are progressing satisfactorily and approximately 27,000 troops have 

been landed. 

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11. On the Western Axis, Phase 1was initiated on 30 June, by simultaneous 

unopposed landings on Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands by forces from the 

Southwest and South Pacific respectively. An airfield on Woodlark was completed for fighter operation by 5 July. Two large airdromes were ready for full 

operational use on Kiriwina by 11October. On 12 October the first full-scale 

fighter-escorted daylight raid on Rabaul was launched, using Kiriwina to stage 

the fighters and medium bombers. This attack was initiated by escorted lowlevel bombing and strafing of the airdromes by the medium bombardment 

and followed up with a high level bombardment of shipping by 84 heavy 

bombers. The attack was eminently successful and similar attacks are being 

continued as weather permits and in conjunction with the operations on the 

Eastern Axis. 

12. On 30 June one US. regiment was landed at Nassau Bay to assist the 

Australians in the capture of Salamaua which was finally occupied on 11 

September. 

13. Phase 2 of the Western Axis was initiated on 4 September by shore to 

shore assault of the 9th Australian Division 14 miles east of Lae. This assault 

was closely followed by seizure of the Nadzab airdrome on 5 September by a 

U.S.Parachute Regiment. Seizure of Nadzab permitted the airborne movement 

of the 7th Australian Division into the Markham Valley, completing the double 

envelopment of Lae. Heavy bombardment of Lae and its perimeter defenses 

with 1,000-lb. bombs so softened these defenses and demoralized the Japanese 

that Lae fell to the advancing 7th Australian on 16 September. 

14. As Lae was occupied, the 9th Australian changed direction and effected 

alanding 6 miles north of Finschhafen on 22 September and, by a pincer movement, cleared the coastal area to include the tip of the Huon Peninsula. Construction was begun on a fighter strip on the south shore of Langemak Bay 

about 20 October. Remnants of scattered Jap farces, reassembled and reinforced at Satelberg, are still being cleaned out by the Australians. 

15. The 7th Australian by a combination of airborne and overland operations 

moved rapidly up the Ramu Valley seizing Kaipit by 19 September and advancing their outpost line west to Kasawai and north to the Finisterres. Construction of airfields at Kaipit and Dumpu are now in progress. 

16. During all of Phase 2 extensive air operations were maintained against 

Japanese supply lines, particularly barges and all airfields within striking 

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distance of the operation. These air operations were effect.ivein pushing back 

the Jap air concentrations and destroying Jap air forces, as indicated by the 

fact that during t,he month of October an estimated 660 Japanese aircraft were 

destroyed and 245 probably destroyed and damaged, against a loss of 34 Allied 

planes destroyed and 6 damaged. In addition, these air attacks sank 4 destroyers. 1 subchaser, 1 gunboat, 44 miscellaneous merchant vessels, 86 small craft 

and iuggers and 50 barges; ?robably sank 2 destroyers, 1gunboat, 4 merchant 

vessels and 12 barges; damaged 1cruiser, 1destroyer, 1submarine, 1 destroyer 

tender, 1 submarine tender, 12 merchant cargo vessels and 14 schooners and 

barges. 

17. In the Northwestern Sector of the Southwest Pacific, continual harasing 

bombardment and fighter sweeps were conducted by the Allied air unitsstationed around Darwin. These attacks were concentrated on Jap installations, 

shipping and aircraft on Timor ar.d the islands cf the Arafura Sea. Severallong 

range attacks on targets such as Balikapapan, Soerabaya, Ambon, and Gram 

were carried out. One heavy bombardment group at approximately two-thirds 

strength is now maintained in this area in addition to R.A.A.F. flghter squadrons and Dutch and R.A.A.F. medium bombardment squadrons. 

18. Naval forces in the Southwest Pacific area escorted supply and troop 

ships from Australia to New Guinea and along the northeast New Guinea coast. 

They also participated in amphibious operations at Kiriwina, Woodlark. Salamaua, Lae and Finschhafen. No opposition was met at any beaches but several 

assaults withstood air attacks. One destroyer was lost by torpedoing. There 

was small loss in landing craft. 

19. All preparations have been completed and units are in position for initiation of Phase 3, which will consist of ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore assaults 

on the Cape Gloucester and Gasmata areas. Present target date is 4 December. 

At Gloucester. assaults will be made by the 1st U.S.Marine Division and at 

Gasmata by the 32d US.Infantry Division. At Gloucester the assault wiU 

receive its close fighter cover from the strip now being completed at Langemak 

Bay near Finschhafen and the Gasmata assault from Kiriwina. The 503rd 

ParachGte Regiment will again be ased if necessary in the Cape Gloucester 

operation. The initiaI assaults of Phase 3 wilI be followed by successive inflltrstion movements to secure the line Talasea-Gasmata. 

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SubmaTineOperations 

20. During the period 15 August-1 November, US. submarines have continued to operate against Japanese shipping in the Pacific from bases in 

Hawaii and Australia. These offensive patrols extended to Japanese Empire 

waters, to Japanese Mandates, the South China Sea-Philippine wat.ers, and 

the New Guinea-Bismarck Archipelago waters. All reports for October have 

not been received but results continue to be satisfactory. Indications are that 

September, with approximately 262,000 tons of shipping sunk and 203,000 

tons damaged, was the outstanding month of those for which complete reports 

have been received. Japanese anti-submarine measures and tactics have been 

intensified, but escort vessels are still limited and our losses have not increased. 

New submarines are reporting at the rate of about six per month, and proportionate future effectiveness in patrol areas is expected. 

PROGRESS OF FUTURE PLANS IN THE PACIFIC 

21. In general future planning for the over-all Pacific campaign has been 

directed towards the exploration of ways and means to accelerate the defeat 

of Japan after the collapse of Germany. Studies to date have indicated the 

necessity for immediate action to provide a large increase in assault shipping 

to insure the success of that campaign beyond 1944. This wilI tax the shipbuilding facilities of the United States. Future planning for 1944 has covered 

the develop-ment of StafT studies for operations which had keen approved at 

the QUADRANT Conference. The actual operational planning is being done 

by the area commanders. 

North Pacific Area 

22. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided that the target date for planning 

purposes for the capture of the Paramushiru area should be the spring of 1945, 

as studies have shown that the advance into the Northern Kuriles is an operation of such magnitude t.hat it cannot be integrated with other approved operations for the PaciSc during 1944. Plans for such an advance are actively continuing in order that it may be possible to take advantage of unforeseen events. 

Plans for 1944 contemplate the continuance of bombing and photographic 

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missions in the Paramushiru area, and the development of base facilities in the 

Aleutians to provide B-29 airfields and staging areas, to facilitate any operations that may be projected against the Kuriles in 1945. 

Central Pacific Area 

23. The Area Commander’s plans for seizure of the Gilbert Islands have 

reached the final phase. These plans include preliminary air strikes by carrier 

and shore-based aircraft on objectives in the Marshalls and Gilberts, followed 

by the simultaneous seizure on 20 November of Makin, Tarawa, and Apamama 

after sustained air and gunfire bombardment. While complete reports are not 

yet available, these operations are proceeding satisfactorily. 

24. His plans for seizing control of the Marshall Islands are nearing completion. At present, these plans envisage the simultaneous capture of Wotje, 

Maloelap, and Kwajalein and control of Mille and Jaluit, followed shortly 

by the seizure of Eniwetok and the control of Kusaie. Wake will be by-passed 

initially. The target date for the initial Marshall assault has been deferred from 

1January to 17 January, mainly in order to allow more time for the movement 

of material to mounting areas, essential training, and rehabilitation of ship 

involved in the Gilbert Islands operation. Both the Gilbert and the Marshall 

Islands operations will require the full employment of all available assault 

shipping in the Pacific over and above that assigned to the South and Southwest Pacific, plus the support of the Fifth Fleet. 

25. Plans for operations in the Mandates west of the Marshalls are now 

in the exploratory and preliminary phases. At the present time no change 

in the objectives as outlined at QUADRANT for 1944 is foreseen. However, it 

is expected that the QUADRANT target dates may be anticipated. 

South and Southwest Pacific Area 

26. The schedule of 1944 post-CARTWHEEL operations as approved in 

QUADRANT Conferences include the seizure of Kavieng, the Admiralty Islands, 

the neutralization of Rabaul and an advance along the north New Guinea 

coast to the Vogelkop area. Detailed plans and requirements for these operations have been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Commander in 

Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, entitled Reno 111. 

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145' 150" 155" 1W" 

PARA?BOOP ATTACK 

1 rsr) 

0 

SHORE MDIWG 
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C.C.S. 42312 

DRAFT AGREEMENT BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

References: 

CCS 134th Meeting, Item 8 

CCS 135th Meeting, Item 2 

4th Plenary Meeting 

CCS 426/1 

CCS 427 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff. in their 134th Meeting agreed that the 

U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively, should draw up a paper setting 

out a draft of matters of high policy regarding the European Theater and the 

8outheast Asia Command. Subsequently, the memorandum submitted by the 

British Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 423 and the memorandum submitted by the 

United States Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 42311 were considered by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in their 135th Meeting. An agreed memorandum for the 

President and Prime Minister, setting out the various points of agreement and 

dtsagreement was circulated as C.C.S. 423/2, 5 December 1943. The resolutions 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff following their meeting with the President 

and Prime Minister (4th Plenary Meeting) are contained in C.C.S. 426/1. 

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C.C.S. 42312 5 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 

1. OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must 

be carried out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other 

part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations. 

2. OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything 

practicable should be done to increase its strength. 

3. The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division 

assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals 

that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the 

provision of additional resources. 

4. Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, 

are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL. 

5. Every effort must be made by accelerated building and conversion, to 

provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater. 

6. The decisions made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the QUADRANT 

Conference covering the bombing of German industrial targets and the destruction of the German air force, as set forth in paragraph 10 of C.C.S. 319/5, 

are reaffirmed. 

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OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THEATER 

Views of U.S. Chiefs of Stag 

7. Political and military considerations and commitments make it essential that Operation TARZAN and 

an amphibious operation in conjunction therewith should take place. 

Apart from political considerations, 

there will be serious military repercussions if this is not done, not only 

in Burma and China, but also in the 

Southwest Pacific. 

8. The Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be told 

that he must do the best that he 

can with the resources already allocated to him. 

Views of British Chiefs of Stag 

7. We fully realize that there are 

political and military implications in 

the postponement of BUCCANEER. 

As regards the political implications, 

we must leave these to be taken into 

consideration by the President and 

Prime Minister. As regards the military disadvantages, these are overridden by the far greater advantages 

to be derived from a successful invasion of the Continent, and the 

collapse of Germany. 

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C.C.S. 424 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST THE SOUTH OF FRANCE 

References: 

CCS 132d Meeting 

CCS 133d Meeting, Item 2 (4) 

CCS 135th Meeting, Item 5 

CCS 136th Meeting, Item 2 

3d Plenary Meeting 

4th Plenary Meeting 

1st EUREKA Plenary Meeting 

1st EUREKA Military Meeting 

2nd EUREKA Plenary Meeting 

C.C.S. 424 circulated the report of the Combined Staff Planners prepared with the collaboration of the Combined Administrative Committee. The 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 136th Meeting, amended and approved 

C.C.S. 424 and directed that the draft directive contained in Appendix “B” be 

forwarded to General Eisenhower. 

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C.C.S. 424 5 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST THE SOUTH OF FRANCE 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosure is a report by the Combined Staff Planners prepared 

with the collaboration of the Combined Administrative Committee. 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST THE SOUTH OF FRANCE 

Reference: CCS Memo Directive 

1 December 1943 

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we 

have examined the agreed operations against the South of France on the following premises: 

a.That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two 

assault divisions. 

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of 

OVERLORD. 

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2. We have in addition assumed: 

a. That operation ANVIL will approximately coincide with OVERLORD. 

b. In Italy we have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and thereafter as 

strong pressure as possible is maintained consistent with the provision of 

forces for ANVIL. 

c. The Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations 

elsewhere. 

3. We have made tentative estimates, in the absence of any detailed operational plan, of the resources which will be required for the operation under 

two hypotheses where these apply: 

a. That the assault is carried out within range of shore-based fighter 

aircraft. 

b. That the assault is carried out beyond the range of shore-based 

fighter aircraft. 

4. It appears that the following cannot be found from the resources which 

under present agreements will be available to General Eisenhower in the 

Mediterranean at the time of the operation: 

A. Naval Forces 

On the assumption that adequate shore-based, short-range fighter cover 

is provided : 

(1) Additional escorts, probably 10 to 20. 

(2) 2 AA fighter direction ships. 

(3) In the event that the build-up exceeds one division before D plus 8, 

nine A/S A/A escorts will be required for each extra division. 

This indicates that if a rapid build-up is necessary, more escorts will 

be required. 

In the event that adequate shore-based short-range air cover can not 

be provided the following will be needed in addition to those above. 

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(1) 9 to 12 escort carriers with fighters. 

(2) 6 AA cruisers. 

(3) 18 screening vessels. 

To meet these deficiencies,we must draw on other theaters, most probably from the Atlantic. It might prove possible for four CVE and six escorts 

which are taking part in BUCCANEER to return to the Mediterranean in time. 

This, however,will be conditioned by the availability of fighters for reequipping 

these escort carriers. We have assumed that port parties will be provided from 

within the Mediterranean. 

B. Land Forces 

Certain service forces, the number and type of which cannot be determined without careful study by AFHQ. 

On the assumption that French divisions will participate, the requirement will be lessened if, as recommended by General Eisenhower, some of the 

French divisions scheduled for activation are not formed but are converted to 

service forces. 

C. Air Forces 

The troop carrier resources in the Mediterranean will only be sufficient 

to lift one brigade and if the detailed plan requires a second brigade lift, this 

will have to be provided. 

D. Shipping 

(1) Personnel Shipping. 

The QUADRANT allotment of personnel shipping for 80,000 troop lift 

in the Mediterranean expires on 31 March. Initially, personnel shipping for 

32,000 will be required until after the assault, and during the period of buildup, a total personnel lift for 15,000 will be necessary. It is proposed to use cargo 

ships for personnel lift to the maximum extent possible. 

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(2) MT/Stores Shipping. 

The following sailings within the Mediterranean will be required in 

addition to those required for the maintenance of the remainder of the theater: 

First month - 128 

Second month - 90 

Third month - 75 

Fourth and 

subsequent months - 40 

This can obviously be provided but until the present shipping examination 

is completed, we cannot assess the cost. 

E. Assault Shipping and Craft 

Assault lift for two divisions can be provided. Methods of providing this 

are shown in Appendix “A.” 

5. We consider that General Eisenhower should be directed to prepare an 

outlineplan for the agreed operationagainst the South of France as a matter of 

urgency. We have accordingly prepared a directive to General Eisenhower, 

and this is attached at Appendix “B.” 

RECOMMENDATION 

6. That the directive in Appendix “B” be sent to General Eisenhower. 

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APPENDIX “A” 

1. We have examine the resources availat for :agree operation 

against the South of France on the following premises: 

a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two 

assault divisions. and; 

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of 

OVERLORD. 

2. The assault shipping and craft which we estimate will be available and 

serviceable in the Mediterranean for an assault on Southern France at about 

the time of OVERLORD is as follows: 

Assault Shipping Craft 

British U.S. Total 

L.S.I.(L) 3 

L.S.T. 10 

L.C.T. 30 

L.C.I.(L) 45 

L.S.I. (M) 1 

L.S.I.(H) 1 (a) 

M.T. Ships 16 

L.S.C. 1 

L.S.G. 1 

L.C.M. 85* 

* US.and British 

Lift 

Personnel Vehicles 

3,600 ­ 10,000 1,920 

1,800 600 

20,000 ­ 400 ­ 2,000 (by using the 

LCT for tinloading 

other ships after the 

3’200 LCT have discharged

their original lift as 

shown above.) 

39,000 4,520 

(a) Fitted as a brigade headquarters ship. The British state that its allocation is not firm. 

3. The above lift in terms of divisions is estimated to be as follows: 

a. U.S.- A task force to include one division in the assault and 2/3 of a 

division embarked as a follow-up or the equivalent thereof; 

OR 

b. British - 3 assault and 2 follow-up Brigades. 

Appendix “A” 

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4. It is estimated that, to meet the full requirements of a minimum of two 

assault divisions, a total force of 45,500 personnel and 7,740 vehicles should 

be provided. The lift available is short by 6,500 personnel and 3,220 vehicles. 

5. The above deficit can be overcome by the provision of 3 combat loaders, 

12 MT ships, 26 LST and 31 LCT so that all required vehicles are available on 

D-day. If required, these 26 LSTs can bring with them 12 to 15 sets of pontoon 

strips. 

6. We find that from US. resources 26 LST and 26 LCT can be supplied from 

early spring production previously allocated Pacific and arrive in the Mediterranean by 15 April. The remaining 5 LCT can be supplied from US. LCT’s 

now in the Mediterranean and scheduled for OVERLORD. The United States 

is sending 24 additional LCT’s to OVERLORD beyond the QUADRANT commitment, hence these 5 LCT’s are not materially at the expense of that operation. 

The United States can supply 3 XAP’s. We consider that the additional MT 

ships can be supplied from the shipping of that category now pooled in the 

Mediterranean under AFHQ. 

7. The above LST’s and LCT’s sent from the United States represent a one 

month’s allocation to the Pacific the majority of which were due to be available for the TRUK operation in July. It may be possible by withdrawing some 

of these craft from the South Pacific to make up the TRUK deficiency thus 

created, otherwise the operation may be delayed. 

8. The requirement for LSH (AGC) are 2 ; OVERLORD requires 3. There 

are 2 British* and 3 US.**available which can be allocated to meet these 

requirements. 

* H.M.S. LARGS 

H.M.S. HILARY 

** U.S.S. ANCON 

U.S.S. BISCAYNE 

U.S.S.COTOCTIN 

9. Special landing craft types for the assault support must come from 

those now available in the Mediterranean. Since these are few, the naval forces 

must be arranged to properly provide close support for the assault. 

Appendix “A” 

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APPENDIX “B” 

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an operation is to take 

place in conjunction with OVERLORD, with the object of estabiishing a bridgehead on the South Coast of France and subsequently to exploit in support of 

OVERLORD. 

2. You will prepare in consultation with COSSAC and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation. 

3. The exact date for OVERLORD has not yet been decided upon, but it 

is to take place at the most suitable date during May 1944.You will be informed 

of the date once this has been decided, and operation ANVIL will be timed 

approximately to coincide with operation OVERLORD -the exact date to 

be determined in consultation with COSSAC. 

4. You will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift for at least 

two divisions (each with two brigades in the assault). 

5. You will inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of your requirements 

which cannot be met from the resources which will be at your disposal in the 

Mediterranean on that date. In assessing your resources you should assume 

that your forces have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and that as strong pressure as possible is maintained, consistent with the forces required for ANVIL; 

also that Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations 

elsewhere. 

Appendix “B” 

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C.C.S. 425 

DIRECTIVE FOR INTENSIFICATION OF SUPPORT OF PARTISAN FORCES 

IN YUGOSLAVIA 

References: 

CCS 133d Meeting, Item 2 (1) 

CCS 135th Meeting, Item 6 

2d EUREKA Plenary Meeting 

C.C.S. 425 circulated the report by the Combined Staff Planners 4 December 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 135th Meeting approved 

the draft directive, enclosure to C.C.S. 425, and directed that it be included in 

the directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean (subsequently 

circulated as C.C.S. 387/3). 

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C.C.S. 425 4 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DIRECTIVE FOR INTEXSIFICATION OF SUPPORT 

OF PARTISAN FORCES IN YUGOSLAVIA 

References: a. CCS 38711 

b. CCS Memo Inf. No. 165, 

2 December 1943. 

c. CCS 133d Mtg., Item 2. 

Report by the Combined Stag Planners 

1. As directed by reference c and after consideration of reference a, Unification of Command in the Mediterranean, the Combined Staff Planners have 

prepared a proposed directive to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in 

North Africa, with regard to the support of the Partisans in Yugoslavia. 

2. It is submitted herewith to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the recommendation that it be approved and forwarded to the Commander in Chief, 

Allied Forces in North Africa. 

ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ALLIED FORCES 

IN NORTH AFRICA 

It was agreed at the EUREKA Conference that our support of the Partisans in Yugoslavia, which now falls within the area in which you axe responsible for Allied operations, should be intensified in order to increase their effectiveness. 

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You will be responsible for supporting them to the greatest practicable 

extent by increasing the supply of arms and equipment, clothing, medical 

stores, food and such other supplies as they may require. You should also 

support them by commando operations and by furnishing such air support 

as you may consider advisable in the light of the general situation. 

You should examine the possibility of continuing to supply the Partisans with Italian equipment, in the use of which they are already experienced, 

making good deficiencies in Italian formations to such extent as may be necessary with available British or American equipment. 

We consider that this mission is of such importance that it would best 

be controlled on a regular basis by a special commander and joint staff. 

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C.C.S. 426/1 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

Reference: 

CCS 136th Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 137th Meeting, Item 7 

5th Plenary Meeting 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a draft report to the President 

and Prime Minister (C.C.S. 426) in their 137th Meeting. The report as amended 

and approved by them was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 426/1. 

The President and Prime Minister approved C.C.S. 426/1 in their 5th 

Plenary Meeting. 

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C.C.S. 426/1 6 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

Note by the Combined Chiefs of Stag 

The enclosure is the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the 

SEXTANT Conference. 

ENCLOSURE 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE 

AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AT 

THE “SEXTANT’ CONFERENCE 

1. The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at SEXTANT Conference is submitted herewith:-

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the 

earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers. 

11. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE 

WAR 

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest 

possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe. 

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4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned 

to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose 

of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which 

her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the 

over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

before action is taken. 

5. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific 

Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United 

States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan. 

111. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC 

CONCEPT 

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic 

concept, the following established undertakings will be a flrst charge against 

our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping 

with the changing situation. 

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western 

Hemisphere and the British Isles. 

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in a11 areas. 

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular 

emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace. 

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications. 

e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe. 

f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel. 

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to 

aid the war effort of Russia, including the coordinated action of our forces. 

h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for 

operations against Japan. 

i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war 

as is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the 

over-all objectives. 

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j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them 

to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers. 

k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific 

and Far East as soon as the German situation allows. 

IV.EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

THE U-BOAT WAR 

7. We have received from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs encouraging 

reports regarding the U-boat war. (C.C.S. 399 and 399/1) 

THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE 

THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

8. a. We have received a most encouraging report covering the combined 

bombing operations against Germany. (C.C.S. 403) 

b. The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 

industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines 

of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat 

strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive 

from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). 

This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority. 

c. We are agreed that the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should remain unchanged except for revision of the bombing objectives 

which should be made periodically. The intensity of the operations of the 

8th Air Force should be limited only by the aircraft and crews available. 

“EUREKA” DECISIONS 

9. At the EUREKA Conference, the following military conclusions were 

approved by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. The Conference: 

a. Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by 

supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations. 

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b. Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable 

that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the 

end of the year. 

c. Took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey 

or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. 

The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in 

the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war. 

d. Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during 

May 1944,in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The 

latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability 

of landing craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal 

Stalin’s statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at 

about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from 

transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front. 

e. Agreed that the military staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending 

operations in Europe. In particular, it was agreed that a cover plan to 

mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned. 

10. In the light of the above EUREKA decisions, we have reached agreement as follows regarding operations in the European Theater: 

a. OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They 

must be carried out during May, 1944.Nothing must be undertaken in any 

other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations. 

b. OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength. 

c. The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division 

assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination 

reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given 

to the provision of additional resources. 

d. Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of 

Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment 

to OVERLORD and ANVIL. 

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e. Every effort must be made, by accelerated building and conversion, 

to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater. 

OPERATIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN FRANCE 

11. We have examined the operations to be undertaken against Southern 

France. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean 

Theater, in consultation with COSSAC, to submit, as a matter of urgency, an 

outline plan for the operation. He has been informed that it will take place at 

about the same time as Operation OVERLORD and that he will be given the 

assault shipping and craft for a lift of at least two divisions. He has been instructed to inform us of his requirements which cannot be met from the resources he will have at his disposal in the Mediterranean on that date. 

OPERATIONS IN ITALY 

12. We have agreed that in Italy the advance should be continued to the 

Pisa-Rimini line. We have informed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, that he may retain in the Mediterranean until the 15th 

January 1944 the 68 LSTs due for return to the United Kingdom. This will 

still allow these landing craft to reach the United Kingdom in time for 

OVERLORD. 

COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

13. We have agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean 

Theater and have issued the necessary directive to General Eisenhower (C.C.S. 

38713). 

SUPPORT TO THE BALKANS 

14. We have issued special instructions to the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Mediterranean Theater, with regard to the assistance he should render to the 

Partisans (C.C.S. 38713, Appendix “B”). 

TURKEY 

15. We have examined the role that Turkey might be called upon to adopt 

if she agrees to come into the war* and the extent of our commitments that is 

likely to be involved. (C.C.S. 418/1). 

:& Seeparagraph9 babove 

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COORDINATION WITH THE U.S.S.R. 

16. We have agreed that the necessary coordination of effort with the 

U.S.S.R. should be arranged through the United States and British Military 

Missions in Moscow. We have agreed that deception experts should proceed to 

Moscow to coordinate plans with the Soviet Staff. 

EMERGENCY RETURN TO THE CONTINENT 

17. In developing his plans for RANKIN, COSSAC has submitted a recommendation that under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander 

the territories to be occupied should be divided into two spheres, the British 

sphere, including Northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and 

Denmark; and the U.S. sphere, generally Southern Germany and France, with 

Austria a U.S. sphere, initially under the Mediterranean command. Planning 

by COSSAC is now proceeding on this basis. 

18. The United States Chiefs of Staff now propose that these spheres be 

changed as follows: 

a. U.S.sphere. The general area Netherlands, Northern Germany as far 

east as the line Berlin-Stettin, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The boundary 

of this area is to be as follows: southern boundary of the Netherlands; 

thence to Dusseldorf on the Rhine; down the east bank of the Rhine to 

Mains; thence due east to Beyreuth; thence north to Leipzig; thence northeast to Cottbus; thence north to Berlin (exclusive) ;thence to Stettin (inclusive). 

b. British sphere. Generally the territory to the west and south of the 

American western boundary. 

19. We have agreed that COSSAC be directed to examine and report on the 

implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of 

spheres of occupation. 

20. We have further agreed that the Combined Intelligence Committee be 

instructed to keep the situation in Europe under constant review in relation 

to RANKIN and to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

LONG TERM STRATEGY 

21. Active study continues regarding the Over-all Plan for the Defeat of 

Japan, and we have approved in principle C.C.S. 417 and 41711 (less paragraph 4 

of the enclosure to C.C.S. 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to plan a campaign for 

the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved. 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN 1943-1944 

22. We have approved the Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan in 

1944 (C.C.S. 397 Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein 

to BUCCANEER. 

HIGHER DIRECTION OF OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

23. We agree that it is undesirable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to enter 

into details of various operations in this theater, but consider that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their general jurisdiction over strategy 

in this theater must reach decisions as to which of several courses of action are 

to be undertaken and their sequence and timing. 

OPERATIONS IN THE S.E. ASIA COMMAND 

24. We have agreed to delay major amphibious operations in the Bay of 

Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned 

to BUCCANEER to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD. 

25. We have decided:­

a. To make all preparations to conduct TARZAN as planned less 

BUCCANEER, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious 

raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of TARZAN; and to 

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carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor 

of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of 

BengalOR ALTERNATIVELY 

b. To postpone TARZAN, increase to a maximum with planes available 

the air lift to China across the “hump,” and intensify the measures that will 

enable the B-29’s to be brought to bear on the enemy. 

26. The choice between alternatives a and b above will be made at a later 

date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion 

by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia 

Command. 

RELATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO THE OPERATIONS DECIDED 

UPON 

27. We have now in process of examination a study of the available resources 

of the United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the 

operations decided upon. 

V. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS 

UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

28. We have studied proposals for the possible formation of a United Chiefs 

of Staff organization and, alternatively, the possible representation on the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the U.S. and the British. We 

have agreed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not take the initiative 

in putting forward either of the above proposals. We feel that if the U.S.S.R. 

or China should raise the question,the difficulties of and objections to any form 

of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to 

them. It should then be pointed out that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 

Washington are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Anglo-American 

forces which are closely integrated in accordance with the broad policy laid 

down at the formal conferences such as CASABLANCA, TRIDENT, QUADRANT 

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and SEXTANT, which are convened from time to time; and that the U.S.S.R. 

and/or the Chinese Governments will be invited to join in any formal conferences which may be convened in the future, to take part in the discussion of 

any military problems with which they are specifically concerned. 

NOTE 

The matters still under study and decisions which have yet to be taken, 

notably in paragraphs 11, 15, 19, 21, 25, and 27, will be duly brought to 

your attention for approval. 

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C.C.S. 427 and 42711 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

ALTERNATIVE TO “BUCCANEER” 

References: 

CCS 129th Meeting, Items 5 and 7 

CCS 130th Meeting, Item1 

CCS 136th Meeting, Item 1 

CCS 137th Meeting, Items 2 and 6 

CCS 138th Meeting, Item3 

1st Plenary Meeting 

3d Plenary Meeting 

4th Plenary Meeting 

5th Plenary Meeting 

C.C.S. 427 circulated a report by the Combined Staff Planners, 5 December 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of C.C.S. 427 in their 137th 

Meeting. 

C.C.S. 427/1 circulated a message received from the Supreme Allied 

Commander, Southeast Asia Command. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 

138th Meeting, resolved this subject and their conclusions are contained in 

C.C.S. 426/1. 

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C.C.S. 427 5 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

ALTERNATIVE TO “BUCCANEER” 

Report by the Combined Staff Planners 

Pursuant to C.C.S. 136th Meeting, Item 1,the Combined Staff Planners 

enclose their report on the subject for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. 

ENCLOSURE 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

ALTERNATIVE TO “BUCCANEER” 

Draft Report by Combined Staff Planners 

PROBLEM 

1. On the assumption that the amphibious lift available for BUCCANEER 

is reduced in certain respects, to consider what minor amphibious operations 

or raids might be carried out in the Southeast Asia Theater, in order to harass 

Japanese communication, destroy Japanese installations and equipment, or 

alternatively to support the land advance on the Arakan coast and obtain airfields with which to support further operations in Burma. 

RESOURCES AVAILABLE 

2. An appendix is attached showing a list of the resources which we assume 

will be left in Southeast Asia. This list is based on the assumption that the bulk 

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of LST and LSI (L) will be withdrawn together with a proportion of the 

naval forces and escort carriers now allotted to BUCCANNER, as these are the 

resources which are chiefly required in the European Theater. 

3. With resources remaining in the Southeast Asia Theater it would be 

possible to land a force of one infantry battalion group up to one brigade group, 

depending on the scale of transport to be landed. 

POSSIBLE OPERATIONS 

4. Detailed study by the Force Commanders of intelligence maps and photographs is necessary before any definite opinion can be formed as to the practicability of any operations. 

5. From a general survey of the possibilities however we consider that the 

following merit examination and might assist Operation TARZAN: 

a. Amphibious operations along the Arakan coast in conjunction with 

the land advance of the 15th Army Group on Indin-Rathedaung-Kyauktau, 

which is timed to start in mid-January and be completed in February. 

b. An amphibious operation to capture and secure the northern tip of 

Ramree Island, prior to the beginning of the 1944monsoon. This operation 

might be covered by shore-based aircraft at Maungdaw. Maintenance of a 

garrison in this area by sea might prove costly as convoys will be subject 

to air attack. It might be possible to extend air operations against Japanese 

communications in Burma, and to infiltrate on the Taungup-Sandaway 

coast, The provision of fighter support to any such operations would have 

to be carefully balanced against the requirements of TARZAN. 

6. Unless a target can be found to justify the landing of a raiding force, 

we do not believe that any raids should be attempted other than carrier-borne 

air raids. 

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APPENDIX 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

ON A REDUCED SCALE 

Forces to remain in 

Southeast Asia 

a. Land and Shore Based Air Forces 

As available for BUCCANEER 

b. Naval Forces 

2 Old Battleships 

1 Battle Cruiser 

2 cv 

5 CVE (3assault) 

Destroyers) 

Cruisers ) As required 

Escorts ) 

c. Assault Shipping and Landing Craft 

3 to 6 LSI (L) with Landing Craft 

1 Brigade HQ Ship or HQ Ship 

3 LST(1) 

2 LSD 

1 LSC 

15 LCT (5) 

12 LCI(L) 

3 LSP if required 

120 LCM 

101 LCP 

Forces released for 

European Theater 

Nil 

4 CVE 

A number of Destroyers 

Cruisers 

Escorts 

3 to 6 LSI (L) with Landing 

Craft 

15 LST (2) 

1 HQ Ship or Brigade HQ Ship 

Appendix

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C.C.S. 42’711 6 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

ALTERNATIVE TO “BUCCANEER’ 

Reference: 

CCS 136th Meeting, Item 1 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached message has been received from the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command in reply to the message sent to him on 

5 December 1943 (Annex to C.C.S. 136th Meeting Minutes) . 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

SEACOS 38 90211 SEACOS. 6th December, 1943 

Following for COS from Mountbatten 

1. Your 051430 Dec. para 2 we have examined proposal very carefully and 

consider that no small amphibious operation can be carried out for the following reasons: 

a. In view of enemy’s powers of concentration our seaborne air requirements will be the same whether the operation is large or small. 

b. BUCCANEER was selected as objective for amphibious operation because it was the only worth while operation which could be carried out with 

the forces allotted. 

c. There is no other objective which could be seized and held with the 

landing craft and assault shipping likely to be available under your para 1. 

2. I am totally opposed to landing troops and withdrawing them since the 

psychological effect of such withdrawal is considerable and in this theater I 

regard this aspect as of the greatest importance. 

3. Possibility remains of hit and run operations by carriers with a view to 

containing enemy air and possibly surface forces. This may reduce pressure on 

the SW Pacific and is being examined. Least force which would be necessary 

for operation of this type is Fleet carriers 2, Unicorn 1,Escorts 3. 

4. The utility of extending inshore operations on the Arakan coast is being 

examined but they cannot be represented as amphibious operations or be considered to be of great significance. Such operations in order to be in any degree 

effective would require 12 LCI(L), 15 LCT(5), 6 LCS(M), 3 LCA Flotillas, 2 

LCM Flotillas, 1LCP Flotilla. Some of these forces might however be more 

profitably employed in some other theater other than SEAC. 

5. Cancellation of BUCCANEER must inevitably lead to collapse of TARZAN since Generalissimo has only agreed to reduction in “hump” tonnage and 

cooperation on Yunnan force if amphibious operation is staged at the same 

time. I have carried out a rapid examination of what could be done in the light 

of these circumstances and assuming that we could get the additional 25 first 

line transport aircraft promised by General Arnold in China a rough forecast 

is as follows: 

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a. That TARZAN in its original form will not be possible. In particular 

there will not be enough transport aircraft to fly in the 60th Parachute 

Brigade and the 26th Infantry Division to Indaw or to maintain them by air. 

b. It will still be possible to employ all the LRPGs but in conjunction with 

c. An advance by 4th Corps down the Kabaw Valley and through the 

Chin Hills on to the Kalemyo Kalawa area. 

d. The Arakan operations would remain as in TARZAN. 

e. The Led0 force would still be available to advance if the Generalissimo gave permission and they prove capable of doing so. 

7. It is realized that this new operation the code word for which is given 

inmy immediately following telegram will not enable me to achieve the QUADRANT Directive of opening up the land route to China but it has certain merits. 

a. It enables the LRPGs to operate thus confusing the Japanese and 

helping to inflict casualties. 

b. It will still produce a considerable amount of air fighting. 

c. The capture of the Kalemyo Kalewa area will give us a starting point 

from which to begin land operations against Mandalay. 

d. It does not repeat not necessarily commit us to further operations in 

the center of Burma. 

8. The original plan was based on the high fighting qualities believed to be 

possessed by the Led0 Force. If, however, they fail to advance in accordance 

with the general program the fly in to Indaw would have to be cancelled even 

after the starting of TARZAN so as to avoid leaving the 26th Division entirely 

isolated in Central Burma. 

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C.C.S. 428 (Revised) 

RELATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO AGREED OPERATIONS 

References: 

CCS 136th Meeting, Item 3 

CCS 137th Meeting, Item 8 

CCS 138th Meeting, Item 5 

C.C.S. 428 circulated an interim report prepared by the Combined Administrative Committee and shipping and logistics experts 7 December 1943. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 138th Meeting amended and accepted 

C.C.S. 428 in principle (amended report subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 428 

(Revised) ) . 

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C.C.S. 428 (Revised) 15 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

RELATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO AGREED OPERATIONS 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosed report relating available resources to agreed operations 

has been prepared by the Combined Administrative Committee and shipping 

and logistics experts, and is circulated for cdnsideration by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

IMPLEMENTATIONS OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

1943-1944 

AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS 

OF CRITICAL STRATEGY 

Report by the Combined Administrative Committee 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To examine the available means of the United Nations with the object 

of assessing our ability to carry out the operations and undertakings indicated 

in C.C.S. 42611. 

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 

2. The basis of investigation is given in Annex I. 

3. We would emphasize that the purpose of this investigation is to examine 

whether the operations decided on at SEXTANT are within our resources, and 

not to imply binding commitments or decisions on the part of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

4. Military operations shall take precedence over civil relief and rehabilitation of occupied territories. 

5. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between governments concerned. 

CONCLUSIONS 

6. GROUND FORCES (Annex 11) 

-

The necessary ground forces for approved operations can be made available. Certain types of service units may be a critical factor but in no case should 

preclude the operations. 

7. NAVAL FORCES (Annex 111) 

So far as can be foreseen, British and United States naval forces adequate 

to accomplish all approved operations for 1944 will be available. The situation 

will be tight particularly as to destroyers, escorts and escort carriers in the 

early part of the year but should be considerably eased by new construction 

as the year progresses. The defeat of Germany will make available an increase 

in naval forces for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. 

8. AIR FORCES (Annex IV) 

The air resources to meet the operations specified in Annex I will be 

available with the following exceptions: 

a. A deficiency in troop carrier squadrons in the Mediterranean if the 

detailed plan to be made for ANVIL requires more than a one brigade lift. 

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b. A possible deficiency of land-based aircraft for certain operations in 

the Pacific if the war with Germany is not concluded in time to release the 

additional resources required. 

c. A possible deficiency of aircraft for the approved lift into China if 

diversions are made to supply forces operating in North Burma. 

Such support can be given to the resistance groups in Europe as will not 

interfere with the intensification of the bomber offensive. 

9. ASSAULT SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAFT (Annex V) 

Production of combat loaders, LST's and LCT's still continues to be the 

bottleneck limiting the scope of operations against the enemy and our ability 

to carry out operations will continue to be limited by this fact. In 1944 there 

should be sufficient landing craft available to carry out approved operations. 

The shortage of landing craft impels the earliest practicable release of 

assault shipping and craft after assaults to permit proper maintenance of 

material, rest for personnel and reorientation to other assignments. 

10. SUPPLY OF CRITICAL ITEMS (Annex VI) 

In the absence of detailed plans for certain of the approved operations 

it is impossible to determine exact requirements for supplies and equipment. 

Certain shortages will exist as indicated in Annex VI.In no case, however, is it 

considered that shortages will be so serious as to preclude the mounting of 

approved operations. 

11. SHIPPING (Annex VII) 

Examination of personnel and cargo shipping position indicates our 

ability to support approved naval and military operations. In addition it will 

be noted that provision has been made to execute Operation HERCULES in 

spring 1944.In the event that this operation is not undertaken, this shipping 

can be made available for approved operations. While the statement of the 

shipping position covering the first nine months of 1944 does not include 

presently indefinable demands or relief requirements except for Italy, there 

is now no reason to expect any interference with approved military and naval 

operations. This applies both to personnel shipping as well as to dry cargo 

resources. 

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12. OIL (Annex VIII) 

An examination of the oil position has revealed that t.he most critical 

petroleum products are 100 octane aviation gasoline and 80 octane motor 

gasoline. The situation with respect to 100 octane gasoline continues to improve and the gap between production and consumption will be closed during 

February 1944.It is believed that the indicated shortage of 80 octane motor 

gasoline will be avoided by using gasolines with lower octane numbers and will 

be further reduced by continued acceleration of the aviation gasoline plant 

building program. 

In all theaters there continues to exist a shortage of small tankers or 

small ships suitable for use as such. There appear to be sufficient large oceangoing tankers in existence and coming from new construction to meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum products. 

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ANNEX I 

BASIS OF INVESTIGATION 

Reference: CCS 426. 

The following operations and undertakings have been used as a basis for 

this investigation. They are not arranged in order of priority. 

I-BASIC UNDERTAKINGS 

1. The following list of our basic undertakings, selected from Section I11 

of the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (C.C.S. 426/1) involves continuing commitments which must be regarded asa first charge upon 

our resources:­

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles. 

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas. 

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace. 

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications. 

e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe. 

f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel. 

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid 

the war effort of Russia. 

h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for 

operations against Japan. 

i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war as 

is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the 

over-all objectives. 

j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them 

to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers. 

Annex I 

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k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific 

and Far East as soon as the German situation allows. 

II-OTHER UNDERTAKINGS 

1. Provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war. 

m. Provide for the economic support of countries occupied by the 

United Nations. 

III-THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE 

2. The Combined Bomber Offensivefrom all convenient bases. This operation continues to have the highest strategic priority. 

3. OVERLORD and ANVIL. OVERLORD and ANVlL are the supreme 

operations for 1944.They must be carried out during May, 1944 and for planning purposes D-day will be assumed to be the same for both operations.Nothing 

must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success 

of these two operations. 

a. OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength. The approved 

plan allows for the employment of the following:-

Assault 5 divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft) 

2 divisions-follow-up 

2 airborne divisions 

Subsequent Build-up -At least 20 divisions. 

Total -At least 29 divisions. 

Thereafter, an additionalbuild-up of 4 divisions a month. 

b. ANVIL. The object of this operation is to establish a bridgehead on 

the south coast of France and to exploit in support of OVERLORD. There 

is no approved plan, but resources should allow for an assault of at least 

two divisions plus such additional lift as can be released from resources 

now allotted to Southeast Asia, building up to ten divisions. 

Annex I 

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4. Operations in Italy. In Italy the advance will be continued to the PisaRimini line. Thereafter such pressure as is consistent with the provision of the 

necessary resources for ANVIL. 68 LST's due by QUADRANT agreement for 

return to the U.K. may be retained in the Mediterranean until 15 January 1944. 

5. Use of the Azores Islands. Facilities in the Azores available to the British 

are extended to the United States. 

6. Resistance Groups in Europe. Continue the support of resistance groups 

in Europe, in particular the Partisans in Yugoslavia who will be supported by 

supplies and equipment to the greatest practicable extent and also by commando and air operations. 

7. Turkey and the Aegean. Efforts will continue to bring Turkey into the 

war with a view to bringing about the collapse of Bulgaria and opening a short 

sea route to Russia. Commitments will be limited. 

a. The minimum air and anti-air assistance for protection of Turkish 

main cities, communications and industries (paragraph 6, C.C.S. 418/1). 

b. Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of 

Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment 

to OVERLORD and ANVIL. 

IV-THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

8. Operations in the Pacific 

a. Northern Pacific. Plans for the North Pacific involve the augmentation of base facilities and defensive installations in the Aleutians in preparation for entry into the Kuriles and Soviet territory in the event of 

Russian collaboration. Naval surface and submarine action, including raids 

on the Japanese fishing fleet will be carried out. Preparations will be made 

for executing very long range strategic bombing against the Kuriles and 

Northern Japan. 

b. Central, South and Southwest Pacific. Operations will be conducted 

as follows: 

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Target Dates 

1-31 January 1944 

1 February 1944 

20 March 1944 

20 April 1944 

1 May 1944 

1 June 1944 

20 July 1944 

15 August 1944 

1 October 1944 

31 December 1944 

Central Pacific 

Seizure of the Marshalls, including 

Eniwetok and Kusaie 

Seizure of Ponape 

Seizure of Eastern 

Carolines (Truk area) 

Seizure of Guam 

and Japanese Marianas 

Initiate V.L.R. 

bombing of vital 

targets in Japanese 

“Inner Zone” from 

bases in the Marianas 

Southwest Pacific 

Complete the seizure of 

Western New Britain; continue neutralization of 

Rabaul 

Seizure of Hansa Bay area. 

Capture of Kavieng 

Seizure of Manus 

Seizure of Hollandia 

(Humboldt Bay) 

Initiate V.L.R. bombing of 

vital targets in the Netherlands East Indies 

Advance to westward along 

north coast of New Guinea 

to include Vogelkop 

c. British Naval Forces. Such preparations as are necessary at this 

time will be made for British Naval Forces to move to the Southwest Pacific 

as envisaged in C.C.S. 417. 

9. Operations in China. Efforts in the China area should have as their 

objective the intensification of land and air operations in and from China and 

the build-up of the U.S.A.A.F. and the Chinese Army and Air Forces in accordance with the approved program. Operation MATTERHORN has been 

approved (C.C.S. 397,Appendix, and C.C.S. 401/2).Target date 15 May 1944. 

10. Operations in Southeast Asia. Preparations for Operation TARZAN 

should be continued until a decision on this operation has been reached by the 

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Combined Chiefs of Staff. Target date, March 1944. Similarly, preparations 

should continue for minor amphibious operations or raids to harass Japanese 

communications, destroy Japanese installations and equipment, or alternatively to support the land advance on the Arakan coast. 

11. Preparation of India as a base. Preparation of the bases in India required 

for approved operations in the Southeast Asia and China Theaters should continue in consonance with the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of C.C.S. 417. 

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ANNEX I1 

LAND FORCES 

SECTION I -UNITED KINGDOM 

FORCES AVAILABLE 

1. The forces available in the United Kingdom on 1 May 1944,will be as 

follows 

British U.S. Total 

15-213 divisions 14 ex U.S. 36-213divisions 

airborne 3 divisions ex Mediterranean 

divisions 2 airborne divisions (one from US. 

and one from Mediterranean) 

2. Of the above, five American divisions which will be in the U.K. or en 

route will not be operationally available on 1 May 1944. These five American divisions will, however, be operationally available two months from their 

date of arrival and can, therefore, be used in the build-up subsequent to the 

initial assault. During May, June and July, 1944,reception and dispatch of 

facilities in the United Kingdom will limit the build-up to two, one and one 

divisions respectively making a total number of American divisions in the 

United Kingdom and on the Continent approximately 23 by August 1944. 

Thereafter, it is assumed that direct dispatch from the United States to the 

lodgment area may be begun at the rate of four divisions per month. 

FORCES OPERATIONALLY AVAILABLE ON 1 MAY 1944 

3. The total forces which will Vherefore be operationally available on 

1 May 1944,are as follows: 

British American Airborne Total 

(incl. Canadians) 

15-213 divisions 12 divisions 4 divisions 31-213 divisions 

(2 British and 

2 American) 

In addition to the above, 28 American divisions will be available for the 

subsequent build-up which should continue at the rate, if practicable, of four 

divisions per month starting about August 1944,through ports made available 

on the Continent. 

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SECTION 11-MEDITERRANEAN 

FORCES AVAILABLE 

4. There will be the following forces available in the Mediterranean on 

1 January 1944: 

British us. French (native) Total 

19 divisions 7 divisions 7 divisions 33 divisions 

(including 2 Polish) 

Of the above, three British divisions will be required for internal security commitments in Cyrenaica, Palestine, Syria and Cyprus. The garrison 

commitments in North Africa can be filled until May by U.S.and French divisions in training for ANVIL. 

5. The balance on 1 January 1944, will be as follows: 

British U.S. French (native) Total 

16 divisions 7 divisions 7* divisions 30 divisions 

(including 2 Polish) 

6. After 1 January 1944, 4 further French (native) divisions may 

become available making a total of 11 divisions by June 1944. Of this total of 

11 divisions, 3 may be broken up to find service troops for the French 

(native) forces in which event the total divisions in the Mediterranean available for operations would amount to 31. 

7. The British divisions shown as available in paragraph 4 above, are 

exclusive of some 12 independent brigades** which are the equivalent of 

4 divisions but have no supporting troops. These brigades will be available 

to assist both in the internal security commitments shown in paragraph 4 

above and, to a limited extent, in operations. 

* 3 of these are not yet adequately trained for offensive operations but should 

be ready for ANVIL. 

** Includes one airborne brigade. 

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OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOUTH OF FRANCE 

8. In the absence of a plan for ANVIL we have assumed that 10 divisions 

will be required for this operation. Of the total of 31 divisions (which includes 

8 French) in the Mediterranean we estimate that 15 may be required to hold 

the Pisa-Rimini line. Providing that this line is reached in time to allow the 

necessary regrouping and reorganization of forces for ANVIL, we consider that 

sufficient divisions should be available within the Mediterranean. It appears, 

however, that adequate service troops are not now available in the theater. 

No British service troops will be available from outside the Mediterranean. The 

full requirements in service troops will therefore have to be found from within 

the resources now at the disposal of the Allied Commander in Chief, supplemented in so far as possible by service units from the United States. 

TURKEY AND THE AEGEAN 

9. If Turkey enters the war on the side of the Allies and our commitments 

are limited to : 

a. The minimum air and anti-air assistance for protection of Turkish 

main cities, communications and industries; and 

b. Operations in the Aegean including in particular the capture of 

Rhodes; 

then the forces required can be found from the total resources in the Mediterranean Theater. The requirement in service troops is numerically small but 

would inevitably have to be furnished at the expense of other Mediterranean 

operations. 

SECTION III -THE AZORES 

10. No significant land forces are required. 

SECTION IV 

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

11. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

a. NORTHERN PACIFIC 

American Forces now present in Alaska are adequate to effect the 

augmentation of base facilities and defensive installations. 

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b. CENTRAL, SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

(1) Resources Available 

The following major Allied ground forces are present in, or projected for, the area as of 1January 1944: 

Central Pacific 

South Pacific 

Southwest Pacific 

1 Marine Infantry Division 

5 Infantry Divisions 

2 Marine Infantry Divisions 

4 Infantry Divisions 

1 New Zealand Division 

1 Marine Infantry Division 

3 Infantry Divisions 

1 Cavalry Division (dismounted) 

11 Australian Divisions. 

NOTE: Three Australian Infantry Divisions (6th, 7th and 9th) 

are available for offensive operations. There are also six 

Australian Infantry Divisions and two Australian Armored Divisions (militia) presently assigned for defense. 

(2) Requirements for Contemplated Operations 

and Available From U.S. Resources" 

Required in addition to 

allocations above 

Central Pacific 3 Infantry Divisions 

Southwest Pacific 1 Infantry Division 

South Pacific 4 Infantry Divisions 

1 Airborne Division 

12. OPERATIONS IN CHINA 

American Forces now present in and projected for the China area are 

adequate to implement the approved operations. 

* Operation in contiguous areas, and movements through the Central Pacific 

as a staging area, may alter the subtotals but will not change the over-all 

requirements and availability indicated. 

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13. OPERATIONS IN S.E. ASIA 

a. REQUIRED FOR OPERATION “TARZAN” 

British Chinese 

6-213 BritishIIndian divisions 13 divisions 

7 Long range penetration brigades 

(of which one is American) 

1 Parachute brigade 

The forces required can be made available from British resources 

now in India. The Chinese forces available amount to 22 divisions 

(assuming 10,000 to a division) which will allow of a reserve of nine 

divisions. 

b. MINOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS OR RAIDS 

(1) The necessary forces can be found from those available in India. 

(2) At present the forces which India will receive in addition to those 

at present available in India, are 82nd West African Division and two East 

African Brigades, total 1-213 equivalent divisions. These additional 

resources will be inadequate for post-monsoon operations in Northern Burma when assessed against the Supreme Allied Commander’s additional 

requirements. 

14. PREPARATION OF INDIA AS A BASE 

Forces present in and projected for India are adequate to prepare those 

bases required for approved operations in Southeast Asia and China. 

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ANNEX III 

NAVAL FORCES 

1. The British intend to provide the forces for OVERLORD by: 

a. Using Fleet destroyers from the Home Fleet not required for the 

Atlantic covering force, as escorts. 

b. Using eight Fleet destroyers at present allocated to the Eastern Fleet 

as escorts. 

c. Withdrawing one Monitor and two Fighter Direction ships from the 

Eastern Fleet. 

d. Withdrawing nearly all escorts from the Atlantic and Home Commands. The U-boat threat is steadily diminishing but a possible increase 

in shipping losses may have to be accepted. 

e. Possibly requesting some assistance from U.S. forces. 

2. The British can provide the forces estimated as required for ANVIL at 

the expense of the Eastern Fleet to the scale of: 

1-6” cruiser 

3 -5.25” cruisers 

37 -escorts 

2 -A/A ships 

3 -CVE Assault 

1-CVE spare hull without aircraft. 

NOTE: If carrier-borne fighter support is required on the scale estimated, 

about seven British escort carriers will have to be withdrawn from 

the Atlantic and equipped with R.A.F. fighters from the OVERLORD Tactical Air Force reserve. 

3. Present and prospective availability of combatant US. Naval Forces, 

including Naval Air, will meet the requirements of scheduled operations in 

the Pacific. The tempo of these operations can be stepped up by the addition 

of British Forces, shown below, to those U.S. Forces available in the South and 

Southwest Pacific. The situation concerning destroyer and carrier types will 

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be close, however, and forces less than those stated as required by area commanders must be accepted for certain operations in early 1944.Any diversion 

of these types for operations in other areas will further aggravate a situation 

where stated requirements are not now being met. 

4. After meeting the commitments for OVERLORD and ANVIL the Eastern Fleet will be reduced to about: 

3 -OBB 

2-cv 

3 -8” cruisers 

2 -6” cruisers 

20 -Fleet destroyers 

70 -Escorts 

3 -CVE Assault 

2 -CVE A/S 

8 -old cruisers for station duties until paid off. 

5. After operations in the Indian Ocean area in 1943-44,the Eastern Fleet 

.will probably be divided as follows: 

Indian Ocean 

2 -OBB 

3 -8” cruisers 

8 -Fleet destroyers 

60 -escorts 

(Reinforced very shortly by 1CV 

Pacific 

1 -OBB (RENOWN) 

2-cv 

2 -6” cruisers 

12 -Fleet destroyers 

10-escorts (frigates) 

and 3 CVE (see paragraph 6 below) ) 3 -CVE (assault) 

2-CVE A/S 

6. The Eastern Fleet will be further reinforced during the second half of 

1944 as follows: 

2-BB 

3-cv ) 

5 -CVE ) It will probably be impossible to man a 

2 -CVL ) number of these until Germany is defeated 

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As soon as the OVERLORD and ANVIL assaults are completed the following ships will also reinforce the Eastern Fleet: 

3 -6” cruisers 

3 -5.25” cruisers 

12 -Fleet destroyers 

At least 40 to 50 -Escorts 

2 -A/A ships 

2 -FD ships 

8 -CVE 

7. Thus by the end of 1944 the Eastern Fleet might be divided between the 

Indian Ocean and the Pacific as follows: 

Indian Ocean 

2 -OBB 

1-cv 

4-CVE 

3 -8” cruisers 

8 -Fleet destroyers 

60 -escorts 

2 -A/A ships 

Pacific 

2 -BB (RENOWN in U.K. for 

modernization)

4-cv 

2-CVL 

14-CVE 

5 -6” cruisers 

3 -5.25” cruisers 

24 -Fleet destroyers 

At least 50 to 60-Escorts 

2 -FD ships 

8. All the build-up of the Eastern Fleet referred to in paragraphs 5-7 above 

is dependent on the provision of the necessary fleet auxiliaries and base facilities. 

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ANNEX IV 

AIR FORCES 

1. The following ppendic 5 show the resources vailable for the various 

operations: 

Appendix “A” -Combined Bomber Offensive from United Kingdom and crossChannel Operation OVERLORD. 

Appendix “B” -Operations from the Mediterranean. 

Appendix “C” -Operations in the Pacific. 

Appendix “D’-Air operations in and from China. 

Appendix “E” -Operations in Southeast Asia. 

Appendix “F’-Support of Resistance Groups in Europe and the Balkans. 

2. Aircraft strength in this Annex is stated in terms of unit equipment 

(U.E.) .Reserve aircraft are not included in the strength data. 

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APPENDIX “A” 

COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM UNITED KINGDOM 

AND CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATION “OVERLORD” 

1. It is estimated that the following aircraft will be available in the United 

Kingdom by 1 May 1944. 

U.S.A.A.F. R.A.F 

Groups Aircraft Squadrons Aircraft 

U.E. U.E. 

Heavy Bombers 40 1400-1920* 80 1600 

Medium and Light Bombers 11 627 17 306 

S.E.1T.E. Fighters 35 2625 90 1630 

Night Fighters 314 36 22 396 

Torpedo Fighters - 5 100 

Reconnaissance 168 15 264 

G.R. (Patrol Bomber) - 29 415 

Transport and Troop Carrier 702 15 330 

Air/Sea Rescue 8 210 

TOTAL 

NOTE : U.S.A.A.F.. fighter groups include 3 fighter groups transferred 

from North Africa. 

* These groups will be increased from a U.E. of 35 aircraft to a U.E. 

of 48 aircraft per group as rapidly as the present policy of providing two crews per aircraft will permit. 

2. Combined Bomber Offensive 

a. Of the above U.S.forces, 40 heavy bomber groups and 15 fighter 

groups, one reconnaissance group and half a transport group are provided 

for the combined bomber offensive. 

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b. Of the above R.A.F. forces 80 heavy bomber squadrons and such 

fighter squadrons as can be spared from the tactical air forces and the 

defense of the U.K. and Northern Ireland will be available for the 

support of the combined bomber offensive. 

c. The 15th US.Strategic Air Force and R.A.F. heavy bomber squadrons 

in the Mediterranean will be employed primarily on the combined bomber 

offensive. These forces will also be available for the support of land operations on the mainland of Italy and for ANVZL. 

3. Build-up for the Combined Bomber Offensive-Estimated Heavy Bomber 

Strength in Aircraft U.E. 

United Kingdom Bases 

United States 

British 

Mediterranean Bases 

United States 

British 

TOTAL 

December February April 

980 1120 1400 

1240 1420 1600 

446 656 735 

-

32 -

32 -

48

2698 3228 3783 

NOTE: The above totals exclude medium and fighter bombers 

since these are not employed in the bomber offensive 

deep into Germany. 

4. Conclusion on Availability of Air Forces 

There will be sufficient forces available for OVERLORD and the intensification of the Combined Bomber Offensive as planned. 

The deficiencies of transport aircraft for OVERLORD previously estimated at QUADRANT have been overcome and the requirement for 1,004 

transport aircraft for this operation will be met. 

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APPENDIX “B” 

OPERATIONS FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN 

1. It is estimated the followinn- air forces will be available in the Mediterranean area by 1 May 1944: 

U.S.A.A.F. R.A.F. 

Aircraft Aircraft 

Groups U.E. Squadrons UB. 

Heavy Bombers 21 735 3 48 

Medium and Light Bombers 7 399 14 248 

S.E. and T.E. Fighters 10 

Night Fighters 1 

Torpedo Fighters -

750 

48 

-

51 

7 

2 

816 

112 

32 

Reconnaissance 3 171 8 104 

G.R. (Patrol Bomber) - - 16 256 

Transport and Troop Carrier 3 

Air/Sea Rescue - 156 

- 4 

4 

100 

52 - - - TOTAL 45 2259 109 1768 ~ -

NOTE: The &_mefigures make allowance for Le transfer from the Mediterranean of three fighter groups to the U.K., two fighter groups 

to China, and one medium bomber group to Southeast Asia. 

CONCLUSION ON AVAILABILITY OF AIR FORCES 

2. The forces in the Mediterranean will be sufficient: 

a. To support the Combined Bomber Offensive. 

b. To support the land advance to the Pisa-Rimini line. 

c. To provide the minimum defenses for Turkey if necessary and if 80 

decided to support an amphibious operation for the capture of Rhodes 

except for the diversion of heavy bombers which this would demand. 

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3. When the Pisa-Rimini line has been secured, air forces in the Mediterranean will be sufficient for Operation ANVZL subject to the following qualifications: 

a. The troop carrier resources in the Mediterranean will only be 

sufficient to lift one brigade, and if the detailed plan for the assault on 

Southern France requires a second brigade lift, this will have to be 

provided from the United States. Sufficient individual aircraft and crews 

can be provided from this source but they would have to be superimposed on existing units and could not arrive in time to be fully trained. 

b. That if the assault for ANVIL takes place beyond the range of 

land-based, short range fighters, escort carriers with fighters will have 

to be provided. 

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APPENDIX “C 

AIR OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

1. South and Southwest Pacific 

a. Operations: 

(1) Complete the seizure of Western New Britain; continue neutralization of Rabaul 1-31 January 1944. 

(2) Seizure of Hansa Bay area, capture of Kavieng and seizure of 

Manus 1February 1944 to 20 April 1944. 

(3) Seizure of Hollandia (Humboldt Bay) 1June 1944. 

(4) Advance to westward along north coast of New Guinea to include 

Vogelkop starting 15 August 1944. 

b. There is no approved plan for these operations stating aircraft 

requirements .The theater commander has submitted a plan entitled RENO 

111which has not yet been approved. Aircraft requirements stated in RENO 

111are : 

H/B M/B L/D/B F F(N) TIC Photo TOTAL 

- -- 240 640 736 1650 60 272 256 3854 

384 576 564 1850 72 396 352 4194 

480 800 800 1850 72 492 352 4846 

-

Recon ~~.~ 

c. It is estimated that aircraft will be available in the theater as follows: 

1January 1944 & 

1February 1944 -

H/B M&L/B F&F/B F(N) Recon TIC TOTAL

AAF 248 342 675 36 171 273 1745 

NAVY 288 216 12 306 48 870 

RAAF 0 159 361 0 215 57 792 

*NZAF - - - - -

TOTAL 248 789 1252 48 692 378 3407 

*Note: Some of these aircraft are obsolescent types. Figures 

shown are those as of 31 December 1943. Build-up during 

1944 not known at this time. 

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1June 1944 H/B -M&L/B F&F/B F(N) Recon TIC TOTAL

AAF 248 342 675 36 171 273 1745 

NAVY 288 216 12 306 36 858 

RAAF 

*NZAF 0 159 361 0 215 57 792 

_. - _. - ­ TOTAL 248 789 1252 48 692 366 3395 

15 August 1944 

AAF 248 384 900 36 192 273 2033 

NAVY 288 216 12 306 30 852 

RAAF 

*NZAF 0 159 361 0 215 57 792 

- - __ - ­ _. 

TOTAL 248 831 1477 48 713 360 3677 

*NOTE: Some of these aircraft are obsolescent types. Figures 

shown are those as of 31 December 1943. Build-up during 

1944 not known at this time. 

d. Air resources available for these operations exceed the requirements 

estimated at QUADRANT (C.C.S. 32912) except for a shortage in heavy 

bombardment and a slight shortage in night fighters for operation 1a (4) 

unless the war in Europe is over in sufficient time to permit redeployment 

of European forces. Air resources available will be less than requested by 

the theater commander in RENO III. 

2. Central Pacific 

a. Operations: 

(1) Seizure of the Marshalls, including Eniwetok and Kusaie 

1-31 January 1944. 

(2) Seizure of Ponape 1May 1944 

(3) Seizure of Eastern Carolines (Truk area) 20 July 1944. 

(4) Seizure of Guam and Japanese Marianas 1October 1944. 

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-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

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b. There is no approved plan for these operations stating aircraft 

requirements. The Joint War Plans Committee has prepared a tentative 

plan which indicates the following requirements: 

Photo 

H/B M/B -

L/D/B F T/C Recon TOTAL ­ 2a (1) 118 93 198 444 49 34 931 

2 a (2) 142 177 252 570 74 52 1267 

2a (3) 252 232 404 896 74 100 1958 

2 a (4) 276 268 666 1268 86 118 2682 

c. With Dresent allocations it is estimated that aircraft will be available 

in the theaier as follows: 

1 January 1944 -

H/B M&L/B F&F/B F(N) Recon -

T/C TOTAL

AAF 70 57 

*NAVY 234 

TOTAL 70 291 

1 May 1944 

AAF 70 57 

*NAVY 372 

MTAL 70 429 

1 July 1944 

AAF 105 64 

*NAVY 582 

TOTAL 105 646 

1 October 1944 

AAF 105 64 

*NAVY 870 

TOTAL 105 934 

175 12 28 28 370 

270 12 192 36 744 - ­ 445 24 220 64 1114 

175 12 28 28 370 

360 4a 312 48 1140 - ­ 535 60 340 76 1510 

200 12 28 28 437 

612 72 396 48 1710 - ­ 812 84 424 76 2147 

200 12 28 28 437 

936 120 438 60 2424 - ­ 1136 132 466 88 2861 

“NOTE: These figures include garrison forces of islands in the 

Central and South Pacific areas. 

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d. Land based aircraft will be available for these operations assuming 

that excess patrol bombers make up the deficiency in heavy bombers. (See 

naval Annex for carrier borne aircraft.) 

3. V.L.R.Bombing 

a. B-29 groups in addition to those provided for MATTERHORN will 

become available for movement to theaters as follows: 

October 1944 3 Groups 

November 1944 2 Groups 

December 1944 3 Groups. 

b. Therefore, three groups in November and two groups in December can 

be deployed and ready to commence bombing in either the Southwest or 

Central Pacific areas, depending upon availability of suitable facilities. 

c. To provide the necessary troops for V.L.R. bombing an increase is 

required in the troop allotment to the A.A.F. for the supporting service 

units, including construction troops, for the first four groups and for all 

personnel for subsequent groups. 

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APPENDIX “D” 

AIR OPERATIONS IN AND FROM CHINA 

1. It is estimated that the strength of the 14th U.S.A.A.F. in China as of 

February 1944 will be as follows: 

Heavy Bombers 1 Group (35) 

Medium Bombers 1 Group (57) 

Fighter and Fighter Bombers 4 Groups (300) 

Reconnaissance 1/2 Group (28) 

Included in the above table are two high altitude fighter groups to 

be transferred from North Africa. 

2. It will be possible to initiate V.L.R. bombing from China in accordance 

with the time schedule, provided the required shipping is made available and 

assuming that the necessary air bases and facilities are provided in accordance 

with existing directives, C.C.S. 401 and 401/1. For this purpose B-29 groups 

will become available as follows: 

April 1944 4 Groups (112) 

August 1944 2 Groups (56) 

September 1944 2 Groups (56) 

3. In addition to the above American Forces, it is expected that Chinese 

Air Forces will attain during the first quarter of 1944 the following strength’: 

Chinese Air Forces 

1 H.B. Group 

1 M.B. Group 

2 Fighter Groups 

1 Recon Squadron 

1 Transport ” 

4. On the assumption: 

(30) 

(48) 

(96) 

(15) 

(9) 

a. That TARZAN takes place; 

Composite Wing 

8 Fighter Squadrons (96) 

4 M.B. Squadrons (48) 

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b. That an additional 35 C-47’s are available in the theater by 1February 

1944; 

sufficient aircraft will be available to deliver the following tonnage over the 

“hump”: 

December 1943 8,858 tons 

January 1944 9,535 tons 

February 1944 11,066 tons 

March 1944 5,614 tons 

April 1944 6,716 tons 

May 1944 9,686 tons 

and in addition to provide the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 

with the following US.transport aircraft: 

15 Dec. to 31 Jan. 18 C-47’s or 12 C-46’s 

1Feb. to 28 Feb. 11 C-47’s or 8 C-46’s 

1Mar. to 31 Mar. 188 C-47’s or 126 C-46’s 

1Apr. to 15 Apr. 183 C-47’s or 122 C-46‘s 

16 Apr. to 15 May 114 C-47’s or 76 C-46’s 

16 May to 30 June 43 C-47’s or 29 C-46’s 

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APPENDIX “E” 

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

1. The following air forces will be available in S.E.Asia in February 1944: 

Heavy Bombers 

Medium and Light Bombers” 

S.E. & T.E. Fighters** 

Night Fighters 

Torpedo Aircraft 

Reconnaissance Photo 

G.R. (Patrol Bomber) 

Troop Carriers 

Air/Sea Rescue 

U.S.A.A.F. 

Groups Aircraft 

U.E. 

1 35 

1 57 

2 150 

-

5% 322 

R.A.F. 

Squadrons Aircraft 

U.E. 

3 48 

8 128 

35 560 

2 32 

2 32 

2 40 

18 156 

5 125 

-

1 25 

­

76 1146 

NOTES: * One U.S.A.A.F. medium group will be transferred from 

North Africa in February and is included in above table. 

** Assumes one R.A.F. T.E. fighter squadron is transferred 

from North Africa by February. 

CONCLUSION ON AVAILABILITY OF AIR FORCES 

2. Aircraft requirements for operations in the Southeast Asia Command 

should be sufficient for TARZAN and approved operations. Action has already 

been taken to provide two additional troop carrier squadrons to meet the 

requirements of TARZAN. These squadrons are included in the above table. 

Appendix “E” to Annex lV 

344 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “F 

SUPPORTOF RESISTANCE GROUPS IN EUROPE AND BALKANS 

1. The following aircraft are allocated to the support of resistance groups 

in Europe and the Balkans and at present are based as follows: 

Heavy Bombers 

United Kingdom Bases 16 

Mediterranean Bases 42 

-

58 

2. In addition it has been agreed to form within e 8th ir Force in the 

U.K.,two squadrons of Liberators not suitable for combat duties by day. 

3. Only such support can be given to the resistance groups in Europe as 

will not interfere with the intensification of the bomber offensive. 

Appendix “F’to Annex IV 

345 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX V 

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND CRAFT 

GENERAL SITUATION 

1. Appendices “A’ and “B” contain tables showing production and estimated availability of US. and British landing ships and craft, respectively. 

2. The planned allocations shown in the tables are not commitments and 

may be varied at any time to meet strategic requirements. 

3. Thereisstill a general shortageof assault shipping and craft,particularly 

in combat loaders and LSTs. 

4. There will be need for a general reassessment and reallocation of landing 

ships and craft remaining in the European-Mediterranean Theaters after the 

defeat of Germany in the light of the numbers and types available for reorientation to the Pacific and the situation in Europe at the time. 

“OVERLORD” AND “ANVIL” 

5. Planned allocations for these operations at QUADRANT are being augmented as follows: 

OVERLORD ANVIL 

TYPe us. British us. British 

LST 23 3 extra from 36 (a) 5 (From SE 

Med. Asia) 

LCI (L) 24 -

LCT 19 (c) 45 (d) 

XAP 

LSI(L) - ­ - -

NOTES: (a) 26 LST from the U.S., 10 from S.E. Asia. Some of those coming

from the U.S. are from spring production previously planned 

Annex V 

346 
U. S. SECRET 

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for the Pacific for use in the TRUK operation in July. It is 

believed that by pooling within Pacific areas, the TRUK deficiency can be offset and that the operation need not be delayed. 

(b) Five of these LCT are from those previously scheduled to be 

sent from Mediterranean to OVERLORD, the remaining are to 

come from U.S. 

(c) 24LCT as now directed will be sent from U.S. The 5 LCT previously scheduled from the Mediterranean will not be sent; 

increase to OVERLORD--19. 

(d) British production of LCT 3 and 4 in April, May and June 

amounts to 139. Although this will not all be available for the 

assault in May, it will all come into service progressively during 

the build-up period in June, July and August. 

6. The above increases should provide a satisfactory lift both for OVERLORD and ANVIL. The 68 LST now in the Mediterranean will be released to 

OVERLORD, 15 January. 

OTHER OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

7. Specific allocation of landing ships and craft will not be made for operations in the Aegean. Resources if necessary must be provided without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL from those available in the Mediterranean at 

the time of the operation. 

PACIFIC (CENTRAL, NORTH AND SOUTH PACIFIC AREAS) 

8. Approved U.S. programs should provide minimum requirements of 

assault shipping and craft to carry out approved operations in the war against 

Japan from the Pacific in 1944. Any augmentation from survivors of European 

operations will improve the situation. It will be necessary to pool the combat 

loaders in all the Pacific Theaters and to pool the LST in the South and Southwest Pacific. It is considered that the timing of the operations will permit the 

shift of combat loaders from one operation to another and, to a certain extent, 

the LST and other special types such as LSD. Because of the close timing of 

some of the operations, assault shipping and craft must be released promptly 

after assaults to permit time for proper maintenance of material, and rest for 

personnel, and reorientation. 

Annex V 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

9. Assault shipping and craft originally made available for BUCCANEER 

are now available for ANVIL and OVERLORD. It is planned to divert to ANVIL 

at least 15 LST, 3 Pontoon Causeways, 1 ARL and 6 LSI(L)s. The U.S.LSD 

previously assigned BUCCANEER is planned for retention in Central Pacific. 

10. No additional commitments for this theater as tentatively allocated at 

QUADRANT and as shown in Table I11 in Appendix “A’ herein, are necessary 

for approved operations. The 68 additional LST’s tentatively allocated to this 

theater can be made available to the Central Pacific. 

11. It appears likely that the assault lift necessary to maintain one division 

for amphibious operations in S.E. Asia can be supplied from British resources 

after Germany is defeated. The remaining portion of the British assets will be 

available for deployment in S.W. Pacific. British estimates in this respect are: 

Ship to shore assault - no balanced lift. 

Shore to shore assault - 1Brigade in the assault. 

NO follow-up. 

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

12. By pooling South and Southwest Pacific assault ships and craft, 

together with augmentation by combat loaders from the Pacific pool for speciAc 

operations, it is considered that there will be sufficient resources to carry out 

1944 operations mounted from this area. 

13. It is considered that U.S.assault ships and craft presently planned for 

operations, augmented by US. and British resources remaining available after 

the defeat of Germany, will be available and are adequate to provide the 

necessary assault lift for the amphibious divisions which it is expected will be 

employed in this area. 

FUTURE PRODUCTION 

14. Production programs in the US.and U. K. are proceeding to their 

maximum extent without unacceptable interference to other programs to 

Annex V 

348 
U. S. SECRET 

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overcome limitations in landing ships and craft for approved operations. The 

British plan to build LSTs to come into service in 1945. 

CONCLUSIONS 

15. Production of combat loaders, LST's and LCTs still continues to be the 

bottleneck limiting the extent and scope of operations against the enemy and 

our ability to carry out operations will continue to be limited by this fact. In 

1944, there should be sufficient landing craft available to carry the approved 

operations. 

Annex V 

349 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “A” 

This Appendix contains 5 tables showing tentative allocations and availability of U.S.Assault ships and craft as follows: 

Tables I and I1 - APA and AKA 

I11 - LST 

IV - LCI(L) 

V - LCT(5) & (6) 

Appendix “A” 

Annex V 

350 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ESTIMATED PRODUCTION, ALLOCATION AND AVAILABILITY OF A.P-A.'s AND A.K.A,'s 

[REVISED 19 NOVEMBER, 1943) 

TABLE I 

This table 15 based on present approved conyersion and building programs. See notes. 

A.P.4'3 

C. Maritime Conmission's approved building program Of 

32 small APA's and 32 small AKA'S. 

Resent estimated dates of cornoletionareas follows 

for 1944 and 1945 

TOTALS COMPLETED. ICUMULATIVEI 19 19 20 20 21 25 26 26 27 2812 2816 %/I0 114 31/1831.22 

AKA A PA PRtlClT A"0 sROSPECTIYE ISSIGWMEWTS a - - July 2 0 

PACIFIC AREA I3 I3 13 13 I5 19 10 20 21 2?/2 2216 24s I 2511 2511 25/22 Aug. 4 2 

Sept . 4 3 

ATUNTIC AREb 616 17 17 1616 16 16 16 161 61 6 6 161 6 Oct. 4 3 

No". 4 a 

Dee . -

4 -

3 

Sub-Totals a2 13 

ATLANTIC AREA 1 0 ~ 1 0 ~ I I ~ l 117171 7 71717 1717) 717 

-

AKA -

APA 2 5 6 7 9 3 4 3 5 5 612 615 6/8 4/8 318 Jan. 4 5 

Feb . 4 4 

TABLE II Rr . Apr. 

a 

0 

5 

4 

This rable is based on present approved conversion and building arograms plus new proposed May -

0 -

1 

Maritime Commission additional building program (See notes1 Sub-Totals 10 19 

~ 7 ~ 

D. Proposed new Maritire Conmission's building program 

to meet as nearly as possible the estimted deficits 

given in a Joint Sraff Planners study. 

This programhas not yet been approved. The estimated 

PSESCWT *ID PROSPECTIVE *ssicy*i*rs and shouldbe used onlyforloog-rangedplanningsrudies 

PACIFIC AREA 13 13 13 14 15 19 20 20 21 2212 27,633110411 4811 55122 3112 3512 '&2 3112 4312 4342 512 GI2 4912 MI2 15/4 91117 19/1 IW/l 1E6115 -

1944 -

APA -AKA

ID10 11 I1 7 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 J""C 1 0 

July 0 

Aug . 13 5 

PACIFIC AREA I1 12 13 13 14 14 14 15 19 20 20 21 921 2716 33/10 sept . 21 4 

Oct. 19 7 

dares of completion given helm are approximate only 

No". 30 7 

Dee . -

36 7

Sub-Totals 119 3-

E S DATA ON PRESENT COWERSIOE AND BUILDING PRCGRAM AND ON A(OWED And with cagacity TO Continue a1 a rate of about 48 

111 A11 ships are pooled in The Atlantic and Pacific areas assuming they will be moved to areas 8s renuired for Operation. 

Inirial disrriburion assignmenr in Pacific is 1 in SWPAC, 8 in SOPAC and 2012, in WNTKAL PACIFIC. SWPAC has 3 old 

slow Australian ships converred to APA's 107 training purpose-. not shown in this table. 

NEW MArlITIMF COMMISSIONS ADDITIONAL BUILDING FUCGRAN FOR 104"-1045 

A. The so-called 24-6 conversion program IqA.P.A.'s and 6 A.K.A.'s,I 

ships per month thereafter. 

NOTE Programs A,B dr C were wed in making TABU I of 

is nearly finished-thelasr vessel completing in May, 1944. There- the tabulation. Program A,B,C d D were used 

ial Where two figures are shown in 1 block, the lefr hand !figure* represenrs large &PA'S and R.K.A.'s while rhe right fore derailed data is not given here. 

in nuking TABLE 11. hand figure represenrs thr small types, as DOYEN and FELAND and the Yaritime Commission program of 32ij~ B. The approved cooversion program for8APA'sand6AKA'e,, 

131 All estimates are based on present eSTimFiteS of deliveries which are subjecr to change monthly. 6xdP's available in to be completed as soon as possible in 1944 and a 

the Arlantic for emergency use as APA's are not included in the tables. continuing program of 1 APA per month and 1 AKA every 

two months thereafter. 

141 No aTrrition has been BpDlied Resent eStimate3 of completion dates for this program 

through 1944 are as follows: 

151 In estimaring availabililyinthe area, 3 monrhshas been allwed for fiLTing-oUt, shakedarn, transit to area, additional 

training in The area, and ~nforseen contiogencies, In many cases his 3 month allowance may be excessive and the 

probabilities ire that more shipswill be available inany one month for full employment in aprations. The availability 

figures are rherefore conservative provided rhe estimated completion dates are met. 

I944 ApA

Jan. 0 

Feb. 0 

Mar. 0 

-

AKA 

0 

4 

161 1 APA's and 6AKA's assignedtoAtlanticaaybecome availablefor iransfer to the Pacific during the summer or fall of 1944 

upon completion of the operations for which they are scheduled. 

Apr . 1 

May 1 

June 2 

0 

I71 4 APA's and >AKA in Atlantic are scheduled to be assigned to the Pacific in January or February 1944 after completion Of July 2 

AUK. 2 

1 

0 

Army training on the East Coast. sept . 2 

Oct. 2 

No". 0 0 

Dec . - -

0

Torals 13 11 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

I I I I I I I I II .TABLE I I I

.+ - 1941 - NOTE Rased "pon Bureau of Ships predicted deliveries at the building 

31 31 30 31 30 31 31 30 31 31 yards under latest accelerated program as directed by Cominch 

,AH. FEB. HLR. 4PR. HI" >"Hi JUL" 6°C. SEP,. oci. NO". OEC. 

serial 03770 of I Nov. 1943. 

Allocations tentative. They maybe altered to meet the requirements of changes in the strategic situation. 

Losses not considered. 12 U.S. LST sent to OVERLORD from Med. 

in November lNAFqq61. 

36 U.S. LST scheduled tosail from Med. to OVERLORD in Dec. There 

is a possibility that 12 of these may sail in Jan. 

As per QUADRANT allocations. At SEXTANT 26 LST were planned to 

be sent from U.S. to ANVIL. Some of the 26 will come from Feb. 

& March production, some may come from training. 

1 LST from Amphibious Training to OVERLORD. 

Time from building yard to station estimated as 3 nos. for Pacific 

Areas, 6 weeks to 2 mos. for OVERLORD. 

iq previously arrived, 36 from Med. 10 for U.S 

Plan to sail 10 from U.S. to OVERLORD in Dec., 18 in Jan.,zZ in 

Jan., 22 in Feb., 28 in Mar., and 5 in April. 

-CENTRAL L NORTH PACIFIC 32 41 59 NOTE 1x1 

SOllTtl PACIFIC 24 2'1 30 

SOUTWEST PACIFIC 33 34 3= The 10 U.S. LST in Southeast Asia are to return 

SOUTHEAST ASIA I0 I(i 10 to the Mediterranean for ANVIL. It is planned 

to shift the allocations shown from April on 

to Central Pacific. 

N I N T A 

Attrition estimated at rate of 5% per month 

for Pacific Areas. 

Attrition 53 out of 148, 28% 

Attrition 18 Out of 71, 25%: not carried beyond Sept. 

Attrition 35 out Of 114, 30% 

Attrition 23 out of 78, 50% 

I I I lj 1 Attrition winter and spring @ 15% 

17 601 11 2416 Ikl Attrition in So. France @ 15% 

21 141cll 601h OVERLORD attrition 60. 45% lOVERLORD combined est.1 

AMPIII BIOUS TRAl NIN6 il. S. IU I 19 111 Considered available for Pacific at this time 
, I 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

L c I (L) 

~ - I943 ----t 4 I944 * TABLE IV DATE OF TABLE 

6 HOV. 19113 

31 30 91 31 29 31 30 71 30 31 31 30 31 30 31 

--.--.---------

OCT. NO". OLC. JIIN. rig. HSR. IPR. ~ n i JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NO". DEC. 

NOTES: Ill Rased upon Bureau of Ships predicted deliveries at the building 

ESTIMATFG TOTAL BUILT AS I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I yards under latest accelerated program as directed by Cominch 

OF GATES INDICATED la1 iQ8 422 475 504 534 564 594 t24 654 684 714 144 774 804 serial 03770 of 1 Nov. 1943, I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 

Ibl Allocations tentative. They may be altered to meet the requirements af changes in the strategic situation. 

IcI 21( sailed from Med. to OVERLORD in Oct. No losses considered 

Id Time from building yard to station estimated as 3 mos. for 

Pacific Areas, 2 m05. for OVERLORD. 

le Plan to sail 12 from U.S. to OVERLORD in Jan., 19 in Feb., and 

9 in March. 

121 I 131 I j 4 ' 

I II

I 66lcr 66 I 66 I 66 I i6 66 I 56 I 66 66 I 6h 56 I 66 I 66 I 66 I 66 MEGITERRANFAN 

OVERLOKU 24lcI 24 74 iiiei ":el 64lel 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 54 64 

I I 

42 

Attrition estimated at rate Of 5% per month 

for Pacific Areas. 

Attrition 62 out of 231, 27% 

Attrition 26 out of 86, 30% 

Attrition 40 out of 141, 28% 

If1 Attrition in Med. estimated at 15% until May. 

lgl Attrition in So. France 15%. 

Ihl OVERLORD attrition 29, 45% IOVERLORD combined est.1 

lil Considered available for Pacific at this time. 

AMPHlBl US TRAININ . . I I I II I I I I I I I I I 42 42 42 

1 I 
CFNTRAL k WORTH PACIFIC 

SOUTH PAC'FIC 

SOUII!WEST PAC IF 1C 

SOUTHEA5T ASIA 

24 43 14 51 48 41. 42 4, 5 0 58 

49 52 51 61 58 FC I7 78 an 97 

52 51 50 49 52 57 'ii 74 n3 91 

10 I0 l(I 10 7 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

I I I II I I I I I I 

tSTlIIATE:: TOTPL illlLT AS CF 

0ATii :NOIC4lrD iai 5! I 56; 621 157 $93 729 715 8VI 837 873 

I I I I I I I I 

:tNTTAL h NORTH PACIFIC 

SOL;TH PA? I F I i 49 54 55 6? 67 'i ni 93 i0F I17 

SOUTHKECT PACIFIC 77 53 i4 55 66 77 82 90 ID2 114 

SOUTHEAST ASIA IOld. 10 I I) I0 I0 !U I 0 IU I0 I0 

~ 

MEDI TERRANLAN 9lidi 7Yie' 50ifI 50 5u 5" iI) 50 5" 50 

3VFRLORD 20 I ~4~kil 9Ji !!I/ 115lmi~ 137imll IhYml 17:) I I73 I I70 I 170 

I I I II I I I I I I 

ULlPHIRIOUS TRAINING U.!,. 6I1 f'i h L 61) 60 6:' hti hO FG OU 

ESTIMATED AVAIILABIL ITY !N 

T+5Alt2SIKNU&N LOSSES ANP EST. 

ATTRITION CONSIDERED 

CFNTRAL k WORTH PACIFIC 24 43 14 51 48 41. 42 4, 50 58 

SOUTH PAC'FIC 49 52 51 61 58 FC I7 78 an 97 

SOUII!WEST PAC IF 1C 52 51 50 49 52 57 'ii 74 n3 91 

SOUTHEA5T ASIA 10 I0 l(I 10 7 

MEDITIQRANEAN 84 72iei 4llfI 41 39 37 151nI 2b10 26 28 

OVERLORD 2:i 441kl 95111 115B 137lmi 163m 17Um 94ipI 94 94 

AMPHIRIOUS TRAlN,NG U.S. 60 60 60 6U 60 6c' cti 60 h0 60 

T m 

Based upon Bureau of Ships predicted deliveries at the 

building yards under latest accelerated program as directed by Cominch serial 03770 of 1 Nov. 1943. 

Allocations tentative. They may be altered to meet the 

re2uirements of changes in the strategic situation. 

Pacific allocations, Oct. through Jan. are entirely from 

expected West Coast production. 

10 sent from Med. to Southeast Asia. 

Losses not considered, 12 going lo OVERLORD from Med. 

in Nov. 

29 scheduled to be sent from Med. to OVERLORD in Dec. 

Entire allncation may not be realized due to ice bound 

conditions in river and Lake region production. 

7 from West Coast expected production, 11 from Midwest 

which. due to freezing of rivers, are not considered 

'0 50 50 51) 50 available for OVERLORD. 

170 li0 170 170 170 lil Allocated Pacific because any March production would 

have to be sent to OVERLORD sectianalized late March 

or early April which makes arrival sectionalized too 

lare. 

I I I I 

t-- 1945- _t 

94 106 I30 154 IIP, 202 726 250 

129 .41 141 141 141 I41 141 141 

116 i3n 150 ifi2 114 I in6 I 198 210 

In I(l 10 10 10 10 10 10 

, I I I I1 I I 

50 50 5u 5ti 50 50 50 50 

I70 110 170 110 I10 I70 I70 I70 

hO 511 60 10 '0 60 60 60 

162 I62 162 162 167 16? 162 I62 

TOTAL I053 

I I I I 

I I I I I I 

I I I I 

60 60 

ljl Time from bldg. yard to Pacific Stations 3 mos 

Ikl 12 from Yed., 12 from 1l.S 

Ill 29 from Med., 20 from U.S. 

Iml In addition to those scheduled above for OVERLORi7,plan 

to sesi: 22 in Jan., 22 in Feb., 28 in March, 5 in Apr. 

Note (x) 

It is planned to send 26 LCT's from early spring 

production and from amphibious training to Anvil, 

Med. column affected accordingly. Also Med. and 

OVERLORD columns affected as per notes Iblblcl 

para 5 Aoner V. 

Attrition estimated at rate 01 5% per month 

far Pacific Areas. 

Attrition 73 out of 250, 31%. 

Attrition 47 out of 141, 33%. 

Attrition 66 out of 210, 31%. 

Attrition 3, 30% Feb. operarions. 

In1 Attrition in Med. estimated at 20% until May. 

lot Attrition in So. France 20%. 

Ipl OVERLORD attrition 76, 45% IOVERLORD combined eSt.1 

Iql Considered available for Pacific at this time. 

I 
-- -- -- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- -- 

-- -- 

-- 

-- -- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- -- 

-- 

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APPENDIX a m c E' 

ALLOCATIONS AND AVAlLAaILlTY OF BRITISH ASSAULT SHIPS AND LANDING CRAFT FROM Z? 

1 DECEMBER 1941 TO 1 JANUARY 1945 !2{ 

(SUBJECT TO ALTERATION TO MEET THE NEEDS OF SPECIFIC OPERATIONS.) K g

$ e

e LAND I NG SH I PS MAJOR LANDING CRAFT 

v)

m

2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18. ,I9 0 

W 

UNITED KINGDOL LSI ILI LSI LS1 LSI LSH LST LST LSD LCT LCT LCI LCH LCI LCG LdG LCT LCF LCS i7 

Wh. 2d. [M! 151 (ti1 I 2 3,4 5br 11) 1SI ILI (MI 1Ri ILI ILI 

En. tn. iNh. h8 6 

tn. 

I. Training and X.D.! on - - - - I - - I - ~53 21 - - 3 - - I - ­

2. Non-operational 1I.IZ. i - 1 3 2 2 1 I - 157 71 59 - 5 12 - 4 13 2 

3. Operatiocal i 43. I - - 3 2 - 2 5 -15948- 426 - - 2 15 12 

4. Moved to theatre by 

1.4.44. - - - - - 56 - - - - - - ­

5. Production 1.12.43. to 

I .4.44. - 15 2 - - - - - - 167 2 I3 4 6 13 6 30 I ­

6. Losses and moved from 

Theatre 1. 12.4?. to 

1.4.44. 1 2 - - - - 4 - - - 4 - - - - ­

7. Total 1,2,3,4,L5 

less 6 I I? 3 6 5 2 3 59 - 536 142 73 a 40 25 6 31 29 14 

8. Training 6. X.G. i on - - - - - - - - - a i a 2 - 2 - - I 

9. Non-cperational i 1.5.44.- - - - - - - - - 92 - 251d - 0 - - ­ 10. Allocated to I 

CTJERLORD i i I? 3 6 5 2 3 59 - 436 124 46 a 38 25 6 36 29 14 

I I. Casualties estimated 

in OVERLORD - 3 1 2 1 I I 23 - 187 51 21 2 9 6 1 9 7 3 

12. Losses 1.4.44. toi.9.44. - - - - - - - 2 - 108 6 16 - 4 3 2 I 2 1 

13. Productionlg! I .4.44.to 

1.9.44 for craft and 

to 1.11.44 for ships - - 6 - - 2 - - 5 191 - - - 44 - - ­

14. Total 7, 13 less I1 

and 12 I 10 8 4 4 3 2 34 - 432 79 36 6 27 16 47 27 20 4 

15. Training I I Brigade 

Gp. 61 Basic R.N. l 5 

exper imenta I - - - 4 - - - 2 - 5314 4 2 2 2 2 I 2 2 

16. Available for S.E. 

Asia or Pacific 

1.9.44. for craft 

1.11.44. for ships I hi 

Line 14 185s 15. I 10 8 - 4 3 2 32 5 379 65 32 4 25 14 45 26 18 2 

MEDITERRANEAN 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ­ 17. Training i on 

18. Non-operational i1.12.43 - - - - - - - 22 - 17 - 19 I - 2 - 3 2 ­

19. Operat iona I i - - 1 - 1 - - 45 - 30 - 50 2 - 4 - 3 4 ­

20. Moved to theatre by 

1.4.44. 2 7 - - - 1 - 9 - - - - - - ­

2 I. Moved from theat re by 

1.4.44. and losses - - - I. 12.43. to 1.3.44. - - - - - - 59 - 7 - ? - ­

22. Total 17. 18.19.70 less ­ 21 On 1.4.44. 2 7 I - I 1-11 - 40 -673 - 6 - 6 6 ­

23. Training 11 Brig.Gp.1 

or non-operat Iona I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ­

24. Allocated to ANVIL on 

1.5.44. 2 7 I - I I-11 - 40 -6l? - 6 - 6 6 ­

25. Casualties estimated 

in A,YVIL - 2 - - - - - 3 - 14 -. 20 I - 2 - 2 2 ­

26. Losses 1.3.44 to 1.9.44 - 4lbl - - - - - I - 7 - 5 2 - 4 - 4 4 ­

- - - ­ 27. Total 22 less 25,26. 2 1 I - i I - I3 - 19 - 42 ­

28. Training - - - - ~ 

- - 2 - 19 - 4 - - - - ­

29. Available for S.E. Asia 

or Pacific 1.9.44. - - Line 21 less 28. 2 1 1 - 1 I - 1 1 - - - 38 - - -

S.E. ASIA. - ­ 30. TOTAl in India on I. 12.43. 2 8 - - I 1 3 5 - - 5 12 - ­

35. Available for I 

operat ions I 1 2 - - 1 - 3 - 2 - 5 12 - - - - ­ 36. Estimated casualties 

in operations - 1 - - - - - - - - 2 2 - - - - ­ 37. Losses 1.2.44to 1.1.45 - 21b! - - - - - . - : 1 2 - - - - ~ 

38. Indian Production - - - ­ 1.2.44. to I. 1.45. . - - - - - - - .~ ­

39. Total 33 less 36, 37 

"I,,+ ..iH 

.- I - - - 1 - 3 - 2 - 2 8 - - - - ~ 

40. IREQUIREG [From 

lby l.l.451Rritish 2 3 - - 2 I 2 43 I 88 - 46 4 - 14 45 26 

i 1 sources 

41. 'Total 39.40 114 - - 3 I 543 3 88 2 3 8 4 - 1445 - ­

42. Training i IBde Gp. 

L Basic R. I.N. I - I - - - - 2 2 - ia 2 4 I - - 3 - ­

43. Non-operational - - - - - - -1 I - 21 - 10 - - 4 12 - - ­ 44. Operational ( [Amph. 

3 3 - - 3 I 31 

J 41ff!l 

l 3 49 - 24 3 - 10 30 - - - Divlsioni 

PAC IF IC 

45. Available from British 

sources by l.I.45.Iql 

Line 16.29 185s I ine 

40. ! 8 9 - 3 3 - - 4 - 65 74 - - - 18 2 

NOTES: lal Awaiting spares from U.S.A. 

lbl Revert tO Trooping. 

Ici Available for Pacific 

Id1 50 avai lirble for Pacific 

lei Wi I I NOT be ava) lable by given date. 

If! The FULL Requirement is 53, i.e. there is a shortage of 12. 

igi Production in U.K. after 1.4.44 will be adjusted to meet active requirements in 

Paci f lc Theat re !C. P. 5. 86/81. 

lhl L.C.T. 3 & 4 may be able to get to S.E. Asia but NOT the Pacific. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX “B” 

This Appendix shows the allocations and availability of British assault 

ships and landing craft from 1 December 1943 to 1 January 1945 (subject to 

alterations to meet the needs of specific operations). 

Appendix “B” 

Annex V 

351 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX VI 

SUPPLY OF CRITICAL ITEMS 

1. Shortages of certain organizational (Class 11) and project (Class IV) 

items of equipment may hamper directed operations throughout 1944. Generally speaking, adequate substitutes can be provided until standard item8 

become available from production. It is considered that with the possible 

exception of provision of parachutes for TARZAN, shortages will in no case be 

so serious asto preclude the mounting of operations scheduled in C.C.S. 426/1. 

2. Organizational (Class II) Equipment 

The acceleration of Pacific operations, new requirements for V.L.R. 

bombing operationsin the SoutheastAsia Command and PacificAreas,together 

with the increased scale of operations against Southern France will aggravate 

current shortages of organizational equipment. Increased demandsfor service 

troop units are expected, particularly port, depot, and certain construction 

units. Shortages are heaviest in the equipment for these types of units and in 

portable radar equipment. Generally speaking, except for certain signal item, 

production will meet requirements by mid-1944. It will be necessary to move 

some units with combat-serviceable (as opposed to new) cargo vehicles. 

3. Project (Class IV) Equipment 

Shortagesof ClassIV equipment are expected in the followingcategories: 

Heavy trucks, tipping lorries, and tires 

Cargo handling equipment 

Small tankers, fire-boats, tugs and other floating equipment 

Air compressors 

Gasoline driven generators 

Heavy engineer shop equipment 

Construction equipment 

Heavy crawler cranes 

Earth moving equipment 

Pumps 

Tractors 

Pierced plank landing mat 

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Signal Equipment 

Plant items 

Long line equipment 

Submarine cable 

Water distillation units 

Production of N.L. pontoon equipment has started in U.K. and India though 

the latter’s production will be negligible for some time to come. 

4. Pacificoperations will require considerably increased numbers of landing 

Yehicles tracked, (LVT) both armored and unarmored. Production of these 

vehiclesisbeing accelerated in order to meet the demands; however,no increases 

can be realized until the latter half of 1944. 

5. Operations in the Southeast Asia Command will require tugs, lighters, 

mobile cranes,railway flat cars,and N.L. pontoon equipment. Local production 

of these and similar items should be emphasized to reduce shipping requirements. Shortages of some of these items, as indicated in paragraph 3, above, 

will hamper L of C operations in this area. Due to the necessity for export of 

300,000 tons of coal per month through the port of Calcutta, port construction 

supplies and equipment may be required for L of C operations in India. Since 

requirements are not yet firm, the exact degree of shortages cannot be assessed, 

but no insuperable difficulties are anticipated. 

6. Requirements for operationsin Europe are being met. The high priority

of operationsOVERLORD and ANVIL insure the provision of essential supplies 

and equipment. There is a possible requirement for small refrigerated ships 

for OVERLORD. Availability of such vessels is under investigation. 

7. Requirements for support of resistance groups in Europe including a 

stockpile of light weapons for 150,000 personnel can probably be met. However, 

production should not be increased to meet these requirements except in 

specific instances approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

AIR FORCE TECHNICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT 

OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT 

8. Shortages of certain critical items of Air Force Technical Supplies and 

Equipment will continue to exist for some time. These shortages will in some 

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cases hamper operations but in no case will they be serious enough to preclude 

the mounting of operationsin C.C.S. 426/1. 

9. There will probably be a shortage of parachutes. Production of parachutes is being stepped up in the U.K.and in India. British requirements for 

TARZAN and other S.E.A.C. operations cannot be met without the help of U.S. 

production until the end of July 1944. A statement as to whether US.production will be able to meet the deficit cannot be made at this time. 

10. Floating Air Depots (Aircraft repair ships) will be needed to support 

A.A.F. units in Pacific operations for which no provision has been made. Provision has been made to meet R.A.F. requirements. 

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ANNEX Vl I 

Sh I PPI NG 

PART I - SRlTlSH CRY CARGO SHIPPING RE3UIREMENTS 

Brltlsh Mllltary Cargo Shlpplng requirements for the flrst 

three-quarters of 1944 have been reexamlned in the llght of the 

SEXTANT declslons and are now as follows:-

A. FOR MAINTENANCE AND BUILD-UP OF BRITISH FORCES OVERSEAS: -

JAN. 

THEATER UK U: 

MEDITER- 60 4c 

RANEAN 

INDIA 13 22 

PEfiqIAN 

GULL 

AID TO 

, TURKEY 

AID TO 

RUSSIA 

REQUIREMENTS IN RESPECT OF ALLIED OPERATIONS: 

(11 Requlrernencs wlthln the Medlterranean for the maintenance of the 

Forces now wlthln the Theater Bnd for Operations H6:KClILES and A,VVIL wlll 

involve the Iollowlne monthly sall1ngs:-

JAN. FEE. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. 

140 140 I40 fi0 175 130 105 75 75 

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It has been agreed that the number of vessels to be provided as a 

British commitment will be asfollows: 

Jan. - 70 

Feb. - 70 

Mar. - 70 

Apr. - 30 

May - 49 

Jun. - 38 

Jul. - 31 

Aug. - 38 

Sept. - 38 

The U.S. contribution is stated in Part I11 of this Annex-U. S. Cargo 

Shipping Position. 

(ii) For Operation OVERLORD 625,000tons of Coastal Shippingwill be 

required over a period of three months and at least 100,000tonsthereafter. 

M.T. ships will be required for the carriage of M/T for both British 

and U.S.Forces as follows: As at QUADRANT it is agreed that M.W.T.and 

W.S.A. will each provide half of the total tonnage including coasters. 

First month - 160 

Second month- 100 

Third month - 70 

The U. S. controlled ships detained for this purpose are shown in 

Part I11 of this Annex-U.S. Cargo Shipping Position. 

At the end of the third month these ships will be released relying on 

vehicle ferry in craft sufficient for the agreed “build-up.’’ 

Ocean-going vessels for the carriage of Stores with a D.W. of about 

9,000 tons will require to be taken up about the middle of the secondmonth 

to a total of 90 vessels on British account only, and these will be retained 

until the completion of the operation. 

(iii) The build-upof the Pacific task force will call for large shipmentsof 

naval aircraft and landing craft to the Pacific in the second half of 1944. 

The transference of LST’s from home waters will provide considerable 

assistance, but even so it is likely to be in excess of the lift possible 

in programmed sailingsto Australia. The full extent of the commitment is, 

however,so uncertain that no useful program can be made at this stage. 

6 December 1943. Annex VII 

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PART 11-AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH CONTROLLEDDRY-CARGO 

TONNAGE: (OF 1600 G.R.T. AND OVER) 

1. Total shipping available is estimated to be as shown below:­

(Million deadweight tons) 

Estimated losses 

(atrates approved 

Date by C.C.S.) during 

preceding quarter 

Ye= 

31December 1943 

31 March 1944 0.55 

30 June 1944 0.55 

30September 1944 0.55 

Estimated new Estimated 

construction and tonnage at 

transfers to date 

British flag 

during preceding 

quarter year ~ 

1.10 

1.00 

0.55 

20.30 

20.85 

21.30 

21.30 

20.85 

21.30 

Average for first half of 1944 

Average for third quarter of 1944 

2. The estimated employment of this shipping is as follows: 

(Million deadweight tons) 

First half Third quarter 

of 1944 of 1944 

Estimated tonnage available: 20.85 21.30 

Deduct average allowance for tonnage awaiting or 

undergoing repair : 2.60 2.65 

18.25 18.65 

Deduct: 

(1) United Kingdom coastal tonnage: 0.45 

(2) Tonnage permanently abroad 

engaged in maintenance of warmaking capacity of areas of 

British responsibility : 2.20 

(Table continued on following page) 

Annex VII 

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(Continued) 

(3) Non-importingNaval and 

Military tonnage (including 

troopships) 

First half Third quarter 

of 1944 of 1944 

Naval Commissioned vessels: 0.60 

Naval, Military and R.A.F. 

auxiliaries: 0.60 

Vessels carrying military 

cargoes and permanently in 

Mediterranean and Indian 

Ocean and vessels detained 

in N. Russia 0.50 

Troopships and LSI(L)'s 1.35 3.05 5.70 5.70 __ ­

12.55 12.95 

(Million deadweight tons) 

First half Tihrd Quarter 

of 1944 of 1944 

Tonnage required (expressed as an 

average over the period) 

(1) for the maintenance of the warmaking capacity: 

(a) of the United Kingdom after 

allowing for importsforBritish a/c 

at the average rate of 1,500tons per 

ship in scheduled BOLERO sailings: 7.40 7.60 

(b) of areas (other than U.K.) of 

British responsibility,additional 

to item (2) above: 

(2) for Military commitments: 

(a) build-up and maintenance as 

in (A) of Part I 

(b) in respect of Allied operations, 

as in (B) of Part I 

NETDEFICIT 

0.90 0.90 

5.90 5.90 

1.05 15.25 1.40 15.80 

2.70 2.85 

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3. After allowing for (1) imports for British account in scheduled 

BOLERO sailings; 

(2) the effect of the W.S.A./M.W.T. bareboat 

chartering scheme and 

(3) for 10 customary sailings of W.S.A. ships 

monthly from North America to South and 

East Africa and Anzac area, 

it is estimated that the following W.S.A. sailings will be required to meet the 

tonnage deficiencyin the first half of 1944shown above:­

(a) 10 Eastern customary sailings monthly from N. America to India 

and the Red Sea. 

(b) 60 sailings monthly from N. America (including some from the 

Gulf) to the U.K. 

(c) 16 flexible customary sailingsmonthly (the equivalent of 22 sailings 

monthly from N. America to the U.K.) from N. America, probably to Italy 

and N. Africa. 

4. Of the sailings mentioned in paragraph 3 above, (a) and (b) are 

fully provided for in the United Statesstatement of Part 111. The sailings provided towards item (c) leave a small tonnage deficit which, after discussion 

with W.S.A., it is agreed should prove manageable. 

5. In the above estimates no provision has been made for auxiliaries of 

the merchant ship type in connection with the deployment of the Royal Navy 

for the war against Japan beyond the immediate needs of the Eastern Fleet in 

the Indian Ocean and of the British Task Force in the Pacific. 

6. The movement of coal to Italy will be met by arrangements effected 

through the M.W.T. and W.S.A. Subject to further review it is expected to be 

covered at the current level by allocations of W.S.A. ballasters during the 1st 

quarter of 1944 to lift available coal from the Indian Ocean principally from 

India. 

7. The estimated deficiency in the 3rd quarter of 1944, which is given 

with considerable reserve, could be met by the same number of monthly sailings 

as mentioned in paragraph 3 with the exception of item (c), which becomes:­

19 flexible customary sailings monthly (the equivalent of 26 sailings 

monthly from North Africa to the U.K.) 

8. This apparent deficiency will be discussed between the U.K. and U.S. 

and should not be difficult to resolve. 

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PART I11 

US. CARGO SHIPPING POSITION 

1. The U.S.Military dry cargo requirements are based on known Army 

and Navy deployment programs within troop ship capabilities for the first half 

of 1944 and on the estimated deployment of US. Forces for the third quarter. 

Other requirements listed in the following summary include British dry cargo 

shipping requirements met by U.S. shipping and in addition incorporate retentions in overseas areasfor operational use to the extent required after allowing 

for those provided from British controlled tonnage. 

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. CARGO SHIPPING 

IN TERMS OF SAILINGS 

(As determined at SEXTANT Conference) 

Requirement 

1944 

1st Qtr. 2d Qtr. 3d Qtr. 

1. To maintain the war making capacity of 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

2. To maintain the war making capacity of 

BRITISH EMPIRE 

a. U.K. Import Program 

b. Regular Lend Lease allocations 

c. Ships bareboat chartered 

3. Lend Lease Allocations other than British 

a. Russian 

b. French 

c. China Defense 

4. Rearm and re-equip FRENCH Forces 

5. Economic support of occupied countries 

(Italy) 

6. Supply of equipment to TURKEY 

7. Maintenance of prisoners of war 

137 137 137 

261 223 222 

30 30 30 

58 35 

120 75 75 

12 12 12 

3 3 3 

Included in Mediterranean 

requirements. 

64 110 110 

Carried in British shipping. 

Included in theater requirements on basis of requisitions from theater. 

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1st Qtr 

MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Lsupport and maintenance of the war making 

capacityof U.S.Forces in all areas. 

8. Army and Navy requirementsfor minor areas. 57 

9. U.K.-EUROPEAN (Army & Navy) 323 

10. MEDITERRANEAN (Army and Navy) 174 

11. CENTRAL PACIFIC 

Including Marshalls, Ponape, Carolines,and 

Guam-Marianas. 

Army 60 

Navy 90 

12. SOUTH and S.W.PACIFIC 

Including New Guinea, Bismarck, Manus. 

Army 165 

Navy 126 

13. CHINA-BURMA-INDIA 56 

14.ALASKA 

Army 59 

Navy 10 

15. OPERATIONAL USE 

Average No. of Shipsretained 

a. Mediterranean (73) 

b. U.K. (33) 

c. Pacific (96) 

2d Qtr. 3d Qtf. 

54 54 

354 536 

155 154 

71 67 

95 125 

181 194 

117 109 

77 100 

46 43 

6 6 

Retentions not included in totals. 

Available sailings have been 

adjusted. 

16. TOTAL REQUIREMENT 1805 1781 1977 

17. TOTAL AVAILABLE 1811 1806 2035 

18. BALANCE +6 +25 +58 

Annex VII 

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7 December 1943 

COMMENTS BY LORD LEATHERS AND MR.L. W. DOUGLAS 

ON THE DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION 

The combined cargo shipping position for the first three quarters of 

1944,while reflecting a necessarily heavy increase in the demand for ship8 

on military account, including a very large tonnage indeed retained for operations in the active theaters, does not include a claim for shipping to provide 

relief for occupied and liberated areas other than for Italy. For this reason, 

the essential requirements for shipping may not be adequately stated. Particularly may this be the case for the last quarter of the period in question. 

But the situation after the first half of 1944 is susceptible of such wide and 

unpredictable changes that only by frequent review can any variations that 

promise materially to affect the position be satisfactorily disposed of. At the 

moment it seemsreasonable, however,to anticipate no interference on shipping 

grounds with the approved military and naval operations. 

/s/ LEATHERS /s/ L. W. DOUGLAS 

AnnexM 

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PART IV 

PERSONNEL SHIPPING POSITION 

BRITISH 

1. In our consideration of the British personnel shipping position the 

following assumptions have been made :­

a. That the British contribution to operational requirements will be as 

shown in the attached Table I: Operations HERCULES in March and 

OVERLORD and ANVIL in May, 1944,are covered; the allowance made for 

assault shipping remaining in Southeast Asia Command is adequate. 

b. That British personnel shipping will be required to carry out troop 

movements other than operational as detailed in Table 11. 

c. That the available British personnel shipping in the Indian Ocean 

is capable of meeting local trooping requirements in that area except for 

the movement of East African troops to India for which special provision 

has been made. 

d. That the projected improved convoy cycle permitting troopships to 

proceed from the U.K. direct to Naples will become effective as from 1January 1944, and will be maintained throughout the period; that all other 

convoy cyclesremain as at present, and the numbers of ships permitted in 

these convoys remain unchanged. 

e. That the movement of personnel from North Africa and the Middle 

East to Italy can be covered by means of two groups of fast troopships 

making three round voyages each per 35-day period. 

f, That additions to the escorted class of troopship during the period 

under review will offset losses. Losses of unescorted troopships cannot be 

made good by new construction and no allowance has been made for losses 

in this class. Any retardation of completion dates of ships under conversion 

to troopships will affect the estimates. 

2. It must again be stated that the BOLERO program is to a large extent 

dependent upon the intensive running of the large liner class of ship; there 

is no margin in that program for damage or unexpected delays of any sort 

and the whole program must be regarded as subject to this overriding contingency. 

Annex VII 

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U. S. SECRET 

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3. During the period since QUADRANT all British trooping movements 

have been subordinated to the achievement of the maximum possible 

BOLERO/SICKLE flow. This has necessitated the postponement of certain 

British troop movements for some of which allowance has now to be made in 

the period under review. 

4. Table I11 details present estimates of British assistance to US. troop 

movements (i.e., over and above that rendered in the Mediterranean for the 

movement of U.S. and French personnel to Italy from North Africa). 

The BOLERO/SICKLE figure is based upon a new target of a total of 

1,366,100U.S. personnel in the U.K. and en route by 1 May 1944. 

Diversion of 16,000capacity in U.S. ships for use in ANVIL to immediate follow-up and build-up may result in a reduction in United States contribution to the BOLERO program in April 1944.This reduction has, however, 

been covered by the British contribution of 386,000during the period January 

to April 1944. 

Accordingly, to any extent that this diversion is not necessary the 

British contribution to BOLERO may be reduced. 

United States 

5. The deployment of U.S. personnel shipping, and of British personnel 

shipping which is estimated to be available for the movement of U.S. troops, is 

shown in Table 111. A comparison of capabilities with forecast requirements 

shows the following general position: 

a. Joint Army and Navy Requirements in the Pacific 

(1) Available trooplift will overcome present deficits during the 2d 

quarter of 1944.Trooplift capability in the 3d quarter will meet all 

estimated requirements. Troop units essential to planned operations 

can be moved into Pacific areas in time to be ready for scheduled target 

dates. 

b. Build-up of US.Forces in U.K. 

(1) The requirement for a balanced force of approximately 1,366,000 

U.S. troops, including 19 divisions, in the U.K. by May 1944 can be met. 

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U. S. SECRET 

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(2) The build-up of divisions in the U.K. during May, June and 

July 1944 is scheduled at two, one, and one in the respective months. 

Thereafter it is estimated that US. Forces will be moved into the European Theater at a rate of four divisions per month. 

c. Mediterranean Requirements 

(1) Requirements to this area can be met. 

(2) Preliminary estimates indicate a requirement for 16,000 U.S. 

troop ship lift in the Mediterranean for ANVIL immediate follow-up 

and build-up. This requirement will be met by the use of the troop 

capacity in cargo ships to the maximum extent consistent with operational plans. 

d. China-Burma-India 

Troop capacity is available for the movement of units essential to 

operations and projects planned for this area. 

e. Alaska and Northwest Service Command 

The requirements for this area can be met. 

f. Other Areas - Including Newfoundland, Greenland, Bermuda, Iceland, West and Central Africa, Caribbean and South Atlantic, Middle 

East and Persian Gulf. 

Troop movements to these areas represent a very small proportion 

of the total and consist almost wholly of replacements. Total strengths 

show a gradual reduction. 

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TABLE I 

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS COUNTING AGAINST 

BRITISH CONTROLLED SHIPPING (INCLUDING 

L.S.I. (L) ) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES 

OPERATION 

1. In Indian Ocean 

Area. 

2. OVERLORD. 

3. ANVIL. 

4. HERCULES. 

PERIOD REQUIRED 

January-September 

(a) Up to July 1944. 

(b) May/June 1944. 

(a) April/May 1944. 

(b) April/May 1944. 

March/April 1944. 

*Includes L.S.I. (L) allocated 

for training only. 

CAPACITY REQUIRED 

6,000* 

(a) 16,000 in 13 L.S.I. 

(L) (C.1.B’s) 

(b) 10,000.To be used 

in immediate follow-up, probably 

for one voyage only. 

(a) 14,000 in 7 L.S.I. 

(L) including 5 reallocated from 

BUCCANEER. The 

other two are 

specially converted cargo ships. 

(b) 16,000 - for use 

in immediate 

follow-up. 

24,000 

Annex VII 

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TABLE II 

BRITISH TROOPING COMMITMENTS other than: 

(1)Operational. 

(2) In Indian Ocean, shipping. 

(3) BOLERO and other direct U.S.assistance. 

AREA NUMBER 

1. Canada & North 10,800 per month 

America to U.K. 

2. U.K. to Gibraltar, ) 

West Africa, North) 

Africa, Italy,

Middle East, P.A. 

I.C., India, East 

and South Africa 

3. InternaI Mediterranean movemcntNorth Africa and 

Middle East to 

Italy 

4. Miscellaneous 

Movements: 

(a) W. Africa to 

India 

W. Africa to 

ME. 

(b) Return of 

Falkland Islands garrison 

to U.K. 

) 38,000per month ) 

) 

) 

75,000 per month up 

to end of March, 1944. 

Reducing thereafter by 

May to 30,000per 

month by end of May. 

1,700per month to 

end of August, 1944: 

3,400per month 

thereafter. 

36,000 to arrive in 

India in June, July 

and August, 1944. 

2,000 

2,000 

REMARKS 

Covers R.A.F., Canadian and miscellaneous requirements. 

Reinforcements for 

81st W.A. Division 

and subsequently for 

82nd W.A. Division. 

82nd W. A. Division. 

Pioneer Corps 

Personnel 

(Table continued on following page) 

Annex vIr 

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AREA 

(c) Newzealand 

to Middle 

East 

(d) East Africa 

to India 

NUMBER REMARKS 

4,300 to arrive by

February 1944. Reinforcements for 

4,000 to arrive New Zealand Division. 

by July 1944. 

9,000 in January/ 

February, 1944 and East African troops 

5,000 in June 1944. 

Annex M 

368 
TABLE III 

ESTIMATE OF AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH PERSONNEL SHIPPI

FOR THE MOVEMENT OF US. TROOPS JANUARY 1944 

TO SEPTEMBER 1944 

(CAPACITY IN THOUSANDS) 

6.

-

July 

70.0 

June 

-

70.0 

6.0 

70.0 

6.0 

-

May April 

-

95.5 

6.0 

March 

110.6 

6.0 

-

103.2 

6.0 

-

Feb. Jan. 

76.7 

12.7 

6.0 

2. MEDITERRANEAN 

North Africa/ 

1. BOLEROISICKLE 

India (ex USA) 

Africa 

U.S.A./U.K. 

U.S.A./North 

6.12.43. 
TABLE IV 

ESTIMATED US. TROOP MOVEMENT CAPABILITY 

Strength 1944 

1 Jan. 44 Jan. Feb. Mar. APT. May June J

1. Troop movement of Naval Forces 

provided for in Pacific including 

Alaska - 40,475 29,875 44,975 79,375 61,975 31,175 

2. Troop movements to minor Areas 1,650 1,550 1,650 1,550 1,450 1,550 

(Army and Navy)

Cumula~iveStrength (Army Only) (212,000) 209,100 206,100 203,100 200,100 191,900 195,700 1

W 3. U.K.-European Build-up (Army) 4 Replacements-Attrition 10,100 10,400 13,200 14,200 12,400 25,000 

0 PO01 8,100 19,100 5,800 5,800 47,600 35,000 

Troop Units 77,800 147,900 127,300 157,100 62,600 61,100 1

Cumulative Strength-End Month (811,200) 903,100 1,070,100 1,203,200 1,366,100 1,476,300 1,512,400 1,6

Divisions 12 13 17 19 21 22 

Navy movements in addition to 

above figures 7,600 7,600 7,M)O 1,400 1,400 1,400 

4. Mediterranean (Army & Navy) 34,600 34,100 31,200 18,600 14,600 14,600 

Army Cumulative-End Month (590,500) 613,000 633,100 649,700 653,700 653,700 653,700 6

5. Central Paciffc (Army Only) 30,500 ZG,700 19,100 41,200 35,200 29,100 

Cumulative Strength-End Month (185,100) 193,100 197,900 215,500 249,200 261,900 294,100 3

6. South and S.W. Pacific (Army Only) 51,400 63,000 69,400 59,300 40,900 19,000 

Cumulative Strength-End Month (523,300) 582.700 653,700 710,100 761,400 809,300 820,900 8

I. China-Burma-India (Army & Navy) 8,800 11,900 13,800 30,800 11,900 12,900 

Army Cumulative-End Month (108,600) 116,000 124,900 137,300 161,900 168,500 176,200 2

8. Alaska & N.W.Ser. Comd. (Army Only) 500 500 500 500 500 500 

Cumulative Strength-End Month (139,000) 132,400 123,500 115,500 101,500 100,600 97,500 

NOTES: This table includes movement Provided in British troopships. 

Movements include replacements. Cumulative strength reflects net build-up present or en route. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX VIII 

PETROLEUM 

REQUIREMENTS 

1. Studies of crude oil availability and refinery capacity recently made by 

a combined committee indicate that adequate facilities exist or can be made 

available by the use of idle refinery capacity and by absorbing the surplusfrom 

Persian Gulf Refineries, together with facilities now in process of construction 

or which can be made available in the course of the next eighteen months. This 

statement does not apply to high grade aviation gasoline (100 octane) and to 

a limit,ed degree it does not apply to 80 octane motor gasoline. 

HIGH GRADE AVIATION GASOLINE 

2. The most critical petroleum product continues to be high grade (100 

octane) aviation gasoline. The present total production of this grade of fuel is 

still inadequate to meet current requirements. Consequently, training planes 

and many others carrying heavy freight loads are required to operate on inferior grades of gasoline from 87 octane to 91 octane. Obviously, this deficit 

seriously curtails training programs and other associated activities. Steps have 

been taken by both the US. Army and Navy to assist Petroleum Administration for War in its aviation gasoline plant building program, but even so the 

schedule continues to lag critically. U.S. War and Navy Departments jointly 

have supported the uprating to AA-1 by W.P.B. of all materials required in 

the aviation gasoline plant building program for plants scheduled for completion by 31 December 1944. 

3. The degree to which the present deficits in production for current 

requirements may be reduced will depend entirely upon the success which may 

be attained in accelerating the plant building program. The report of new 

worldwide estimates together with scheduled increases in production, indicates 

a shortage in production of 86,000 barrels per day during December 1943. The 

gap between requirements and production will be gradually closed during 

January and February 1944, until in March the study shows an excess of 

production over requirements of 30,000 barrels per day worldwide. The surAnnex VIII 

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U. S. SECRET 

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plus increases gradually until July 1944 when it reaches 52,000 barrels per 

day and in December 1944,93,000barrels per day, based upon projected plant 

expansions being completed on schedule. 

4.The requirement figures take into account the scheduled delivery of all 

Allied aircraft planned for operations during the period covered. 

5. As additional quantities of high grade aviation gasoline become available the lower grades now used for certain phases of training and in transport 

planes will be replaced by the better gasoline. The upgrading of motor base 

stock to 87 octane gasoline will then be discontinued thus easing to some extent 

the indicated shortage of 80 octane motor gasoline. (See below) 

6. It should be noted that stocks are inadequate in all theaters and that 

as surplusesmaterialize they should be allocated for stock building in keeping 

with C.C.S. approved priority of operations. 

7. When stock building requirements are taken into consideration and 

the proper amount of high grade aviation gasoline is allocated for transport 

and training planes, no excess will exist, even after plant building program 

has been completed. 

80 OCTANE MOTOR GASOLINE 

8. A preliminary report just completed by the Army-Navy PetroleumBoard 

Committee considering this subject indicates a possible shortage of 112,000 

barrels per day by the end of 1944.However, from a practical point of view. 

it is believed that this shortage can be avoided by using gasolines with octane 

numbers as low as 72 where this is practicable, and by so accelerating the 

aviation gasoline plant building program as to make it unnecessary to use 

any of the higher components going into 80 octane gasoline for aviation gasoline purposes. Further, it is anticipated that with the higher percentages of 

lead and by the use of other additives, combined with the measures above 

mentioned, this situation will be satisfactorily met. 

9. It is believed that by the measures outlined above sufficient 80 octane 

gasoline may be conserved for combatant areas. 

Annex VIII 

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SEAGOING TANKERS 

10. It is believed that seagoing tankers as necessary for agreed operations 

will be available provided they are judiciously employed. It is certain, however, 

that based upon agreed SEXTANT operations, the working surplus will be 

practically non-existent. 

SMALL TANKERS 

11. The need in all theaters for small tankers ismore acute at this time than 

ever before. A preliminary report based upon the findings of a committee, 

representative of US. Army and Navy, W.S.A., and British interests, shows 

the deficit in vessels under 5,000 D.W.T. to be about 90,000 tons. The matter 

of prompt clearance for the providing of these additional units is important 

in connection with presently planned offensive operations. 

Annex VIII 

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2 December 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 165 

MILITARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE “EUREKA” CONFERENCE 

Reference: CCS 133d Mtg., Item 2 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosure sets out the military conclusions of the EUREKA Conference, as signed by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin on 

1December 1943. 

H. REDMAN, 

F. B. ROYAL, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

MILITARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE “EUREKA’ CONFERENCE 

THE CONFERENCE : 

(1) Agreed that the Partisans inYugoslavia should be supported by supplies 

and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando 

operations. 

(2) Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that 

Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of 

the year. 

(3) Took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that if Turkey found herself 

at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or 

attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war. 

(4) Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 

1944,in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter 

operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing 

craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin’sstatement 

that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with 

the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern 

to the Western Front. 

(5) Agreed that the military staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations 

in Europe. In particular, it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the 

staffs concerned. 

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MINUTES 

OF 

MEETINGS 
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SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF FIRSTPLENARYMEETING,HELDAT THE VILLAKIRK, 

ON TUESDAY, 23 NOVEMBER1943 AT 1100 

PRESENT 

United States 

The President (In the Chair) 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

Lt. General J. W. Stilwell, USA 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Maj. General R. A. Wheeler, USA 

Maj. General G. E. Stratemeyer, USA 

Maj. General C. L. Chennault, USA 

Maj. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

China 

British 

The Prime Minister 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Lt. General A. Carton de Wiart 

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 

Madame Chiang Kai-shek 

General Shang Chen 

Lt. General Lin Wei 

Lt. General Chu Shih Ming 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

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SOUTHEAST ASIA OPERATIONS 

THE PRESIDENT, extending a warm welcome to the Generalissimo and 

Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and to the Chinese Delegation, said that this was 

an historic meeting and a logical consequence to the Four Power Conference 

recently concluded in Moscow. The effect of this meeting would, he hoped, not 

only bear fruit today and in the immediate future, but for decades to come. He 

suggested that Admiral Mountbatten might be asked to give a general survey 

of intended operations in Southeast Asia. The ground to be covered mainly 

concerned the land, since seagoing operations were in progress all the time. 

There was, he felt sure, unanimous agreement that every effort should be 

made to send more equipment to China, with a view to accelerating the process 

by which we could launch an air offensive against the heart of Japan itself. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN then outlined the operations he proposed 

for the coming campaign in Burma. Apart from current air operations by 

British-U.S. air forces and two Chinese divisions operating from Ledo, the first 

land movement would take place in mid-January. The 15th British Indian 

Corps would advance on the Arakan front with a view to taking up an improved 

line. This Corps would not, however, be restricted to a defensive role, but 

would exploit success wherever possible. For this purpose a West African 

brigade would be deployed on an outflanking movement. At the same time 

the 4th British Indian Corps (Imphal Force) would start operations with the 

object of capturing Minthami, Mawlaik, and Sittaung and advancing as far as 

possible to the southeast. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN then explained the natural difficulties 

mdth which the Allied Forces had to contend. Our lines of communication ran 

through one of the most dificult countries in the world, served by a one meter 

gauge railway which, nevertheless, had been worked up to carry 3,100 tons a 

day, with the hope that this might be increased by a further 500 tons a day. 

After leaving the railway and the Brahmaputra River, the communication 

was by roads now being built. All this was being done in thick jungle and across 

mountains running north and south across the line of communications. The 

Japanese in Burma were at the end of an excellent line of communication up 

the Irrawaddy from Rangoon, with a railway running through Indaw to 

Myitkyina. They had vast resources and adequate equipment and a force of 

some five divisions, which was likely to be augmented by a sixth division. In 

order to make good the disparity between our extremely difficult and the 

Japanese relatively good communications, we had adopted the expedient of 

air supply on a large scale. 
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In February General Wingate intended to make three thrusts with his 

Long Range Penetration Groups. One would be from Chittagong; the second 

would support the 4th Group in the Tamu area; and the third would help the 

Chinese forces operating from Ledo. It was hoped that the 3rd Group would, 

by the use of gliders operating ahead of the Yunnan forces, disrupt and muddle 

the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Led0 forces would move down in the Myitkyina 

direction to link up at Bhamo with the main operations of the Yunnan forces 

advancing on Lashio. In mid-March the 5th Indian Parachute Brigade would 

seize the airfield at Indaw, after which the 26th Indian Division would be flown 

in to Indaw by transport aircraft and thereafter be maintained by air. 

It was hoped in these operations to surprise the Japanese by using novel 

methods of supply and by the boldness of our advance through what they 

might consider to be impassable country. Subject to the Generalissimo’s 

permission, General Stilwell had agreed that the Led0 force should come 

under the 14th Army Commander until it reached Kamaing, after which it 

would revert to the command of General Stilwell. Admiral Mountbatten 

enquired whether this arrangement was agreeable to the Generalissimo. 

THE GENERALISSIMO said that he would like to see the proposals 

illustrated on a map before giving his decision. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN then gave certain logistic information for 

the air route over the “hump.” He had promised the Generalissimo to work 

the supply over this route up to 10,000 tons a month. For November and 

December the figure would be 9,700 tons. For January and February, however, 

it would drop to 7,900 tons. In March the figure should rise again to 9,200 tons. 

Twenty-five additional first-line transport aircraft were required and this 

demand had been put to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with, he understood, 

every prospect of the demand being met. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that these were important military operations of a much greater magnitude than ever previously contemplated for this 

theater. The plans had not yet been examined by the Chiefs of Staff, but this 

would be done at the earliest opportunity, possibly the same day. In all there 

was an Allied force of approximately 320,000 men who would apply pressure 

on the enemy in this theater. They would have a qualitative as well as a 

quantitative supremacy over the enemy. He had high hopes of these operations, 

the success of which largely depended on surprise and secrecy and ignorance 

on the part of the enemy as to the lines of approach and the points of attack. 

Owing to the surrender of the Italian Fleet and other naval events of a 

favorable character, a formidable British Fleet would be established in due 

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course in the Indian Ocean. This would ultimately consist of no less than 5 

modernized capital ships, 4 heavy armored carriers, and up to 12 auxiliary 

carriers, together with cruisers and flotillas. This force would be more powerful 

than any detachment which it was thought that the Japanese could afford 

to make from their main fleet in the Pacific, having regard to the US.naval 

strength in the Pacific theater. In addition to all this, Admiral Mountbatten 

would have formed by the spring an amphibious “circus” for use in such 

amphibious operations as might ultimately be decided upon, but for which 

preparations were now going ahead with all speed. 

THE GENERALISSIMO said that in accordance with the view he had 

expressed at Chungking, the success of the operations in Burma depended, in 

his opinion, not only on the strength of the naval forces established in the 

Indian Ocean, but on the simultaneous coordination of naval action with the 

land operations. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that naval operations in the Bay of Bengal 

would not necessarily be coordinated with and linked to the land campaign. 

Our naval superiority in this area should ensure the security of our communications and a threat to those of the enemy. It should be remembered that the 

main fleet base would be anywhere from 2,000 to 3,000 miles away from the 

area in which the armies were operating. Thus, no comparison could be made 

with these operations and with those carried out in Sicily, where it had been 

possible for the fleet to work in close support of the Army. 

THE GENERALISSIMO considered that the enemy would reinforce 

Burma and that this could only be stopped by vigorous naval operations. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said it would be disastrous if we could do 

nothing to prevent the Japanese bringing large reinforcements by sea through 

the Malacca and Sunda Straits. We could not guarantee to cut off reinforcements by sea entirely, but we should do everything to prevent their arrival. 

THE GENERALISSIMO said he was not clear as to the timing of the 

concentration of the naval forces in the Indian Ocean. He was convinced that 

simultaneous naval and land operations gave the best chance of success for 

the operations. Burma was the key to the whole campaign in Asia. After he 

had been cleared out of Burma, the enemy’s next stand would be in North 

China and, finally, in Manchuria. The loss of Burma would be a very serious 

matter to the Japanese and they would fight stubbornly and tenaciously to 

retain their hold on the country. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER said he was unable to agree that the success of 

the land operations entirely hinged on a simultaneous naval concentration. 

The fleet could not, in any event, be assembled by January, nor, indeed, until 

some time later. The ships had to be tropicalized and fitted with special 

equipment. Some would be starting soon, but the build-up to full strength 

would not be achieved until the late spring or early summer of 1944. It seemed, 

however, on the whole improbable that in the meanwhile the enemy would 

send naval forces in any strength to the Bay of Bengal. 

THE PRESIDENT enquired about the railway communications between 

Siam and Burma. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the Japanese had recently completed the railway from Bangkok to Thanbyuzayat, 15 degrees 55 minutes N., 

97degrees 40 minutes E. and this would improve their facilities for maintaining 

forces in Burma to an appreciable degree 

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the Japanese were mainly relying 

upon road and rail communications from the Malay Peninsula to maintain 

their forces in Burma. As we did not possess shore air bases, it was not possible 

for us to threaten the Japanese communications in the Gulf of Siam. He 

wished to emphasize the great importance he attached to the operations in 

Southeast Asia, which would be driven forward with all vigor and dispatch. 

He hoped to have a further talk with the Generalissimo when some other 

details of the British naval situation would be communicated. 

In conclusion, THE PRESIDENT said that the matter could not be carried 

any further that morning. He hoped that the Generalissimo would take this 

opportunity of meeting the Chiefs of the American and British Staffs and to 

discuss these important problems frankly with them. 

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SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF SECOND PLENARY MEETING,HELDAT THE VILLAKIRK, 

ON WEDNESDAY, 24 NOVEMBER 1943 AT 1100

PRESENT 

United States 

The President (In the Chair) 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

British 

The Prime Minister 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Maj. General R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

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1. OPERATIONS IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 

THE PRESIDENT said that at this meeting he hoped there would be a 

preliminary survey of operations in the European Theater, including the 

Mediterranean. Final decisions would depend on the way things went at the 

conference shortly to be held with Premier Stalin. There were some reports that 

Premier Stalin had no thoughts beyond OVERLORD, to which he attached the 

highest importance as being the only operation worth considering. In other 

quarters it was held that Premier Stalin was anxious that in addition to 

OVERLORD in 1944,the Germans should be given no respite throughout the 

winter, and that there should be no idle hands between now and OVERLORD. 

The logistic problem was whether we could retain OVERLORD in all its integrity 

and, at the same time, keep the Mediterranean ablaze. In his view, Premier 

Stalin would be almost certain to demand both the continuation of action in 

the Mediterranean, and OVERLORD. As regards the Eastern Mediterranean, 

the question arose “where will the Germans go from the Dodecanese.” The 

answer seemed to be “nowhere.” If the same question was applied to ourselves, 

the answer seemed to depend on the action of Turkey. The entry of Turkey 

into the war would put quite a different complexion on the matter. This would 

be another question for discussion at the meeting with Premier Stalin. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was in accord with the President’sviews. 

We had had a year of unbroken success in North Africa and the Mediterranean, 

in Russia, and in the Pacific. Alamein and TORCH had paved the way for the 

extermination of large German forces in Tunisia. This was followed by the 

highly successful Sicily operation, and subsequently by the daring amphibious 

landing at Salerno and the capture of Naples. Then came Mussolini’s fall, the 

collapse of Italy and the capitulation of the Italian Fleet. In the whole history 

of warfare there had never been such a long period of joint Allied success, nor 

such a high degree of cooperation and comradeship extending from the High 

Command down to the troops in the field between two Allies. We should, however, be unworthy of these accomplishments and of the tasks lying ahead if 

we did not test our organization to see whether improvements could be made. 

That was the purpose of these periodical meetings. 

As a contrast to the almost unbroken successes of the past year, the last 

two months had produced a series of disappointments. In Italy the campaign 

had flagged. We did not have a sufficient margin of superiority to give us the 

power to force the enemy back. The weather had been bad. The departure 

from the Mediterranean of certain units and landing craft had had, it seemed, 

a rather depressing effect on the soldiers remaining to fight the battle. The 

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build-up of strategic air forces may also have contributed to the slow progress. 

The main objective was Rome, for “whoever holds Rome holds the title deeds of 

Italy.” With Rome in our possession, the Italian Government would hold up 

its head. Moreover, we should then be in a position to seize the landing grounds 

to the northward. 

He, THE PRIME MINISTER, had agreed, but with a heavy heart, to the 

return of seven divisions from the Mediterranean Theater. The 50th and 51st 

British Divisions, which were first-class troops, had had their equipment 

removed in preparation for embarkation. In the meanwhile, the 3rd U.S.Division had been no less than 49 days in constant contact with the enemy, and 

other US.and British units had been fighting without rest for long periods. 

Passing across the Adriatic to Yugoslavia, more trouble had brewed up. 

It was a lamentable fact that virtually no supplies had been conveyed by sea 

to the 222,000 followers of Tito. These stalwarts were holding as many Germans 

in Yugoslavia as the combined Anglo-American forces were holding in Italy 

south of Rome. The Germans had been thrown into some confusion after the 

collapse of Italy and the Patriots had gained control of large stretches of the 

coast. We had not, however, seized our opportunity. The Germans had recovered and were driving the Partisans out bit by bit. The main reason for this 

was the artificial line of responsibility which ran through the Balkans. On 

the one hand, the responsibility for operations here lay with the Middle East 

Command but they had not the forces. On the other hand, General Eisenhower 

had the forces but not the responsibility. Considering that the Partisans and 

Patriots had given us such a generous measure of assistance at almost no cost 

to ourselves, it was of high importance to insure that their resistance was 

maintained and not allowed to flag. 

Moving further east to the Aegean, the picture was equally black. When 

Italy fell, cheap prizes were open to us, and General Wilson had been ordered 

to “improvise and dare.” Although we had not been able to seize Rhodes we 

had occupied Kos, Leros, Samos and others of the smaller islands. It had been 

hoped to capture Rhodes in October, but when the time came only one Indian 

division was available for the task, and this was considered an insufficient 

force to eject the 8,000 Germans in the island. The enemy had reacted strongly 

to our initial moves. He had ejected us one by one from the islands, ending up 

with the recapture of Leros where we had lost 5,000 first-class troops, with four 

cruisers and seven destroyers either sunk or damaged. Nevertheless, taking

intoaccount the German soldiers drowned and those killed by air attack and 

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in the battle, neither side could claim any large superiority in battle casualties. 

The Germans, however, were now re-established in the Aegean. 

As stated by the President, the attitude of Turkey would have a profound effect on future events in this area. With Rhodes once more in our 

possession and the Turkish airfields at our disposal, the other islands would 

become untenable for the enemy. 

It was to be hoped that the Russians would share our view of the importance of bringing Turkey into the war. They should see that great possibilities 

would accrue and a chance to join hands with them by means of sending supplies through the Dardanelles. The effect on Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria 

would be profound. All this might be done at quite a small cost, say, two divisions and a few landing craft. It might well be that a meeting with the Turkish 

Prime Minister could be arranged on the way back from meeting Premier 

Stalin. 

Passing now to the Southeast Asia Theater, it was now clear that FIRST 

CULVERIN would require many more ships and craft than the British alone 

could supply. If it was thought by the United States Chiefs of Staff that CULVERIN was the best contribution to the Pacific war, then our resources would 

have to be made up by help from America. If, on the other hand, CULVERIN was 

thought to be too costly, it might be better to bring back from the Southeast Asia 

Theater to the Mediterranean sufficient landing craft for an attack on Rhodes. 

Thus the sequence would be, first Rome then Rhodes. He, the Prime Minister, 

wished to make it clear that the British had no idea of advancing into the 

Valley of the Po. Their idea was that the campaign in Italy should have the 

strictly limited objective of the Pisa-Rimini line. No regular formations were 

to be sent to Yugoslavia. All that was needed there was a generous packet of 

supplies, air support and, possibly, a few Commandos. This stepping-up of our 

help to the Patriots would not involve us in a large additional commitment. 

Finally, when we had reached our objectives in Italy, the time would come to 

take the decision whether we should move to the left or to the right. 

Turning now to the knock-out blow, OVERLORD, THE PRIME MINISTER emphasized that he had in no way relaxed his zeal for this operation. We 

had profited very considerably in our experiences of amphibious operations 

md our landing appliances had improved out of all knowledge. There would 

be an anxious period during the build-up, when the Germans might be able 

to concentrate more quickly than we could. Nevertheless, the 16 British divisions would be ready when called upon. It seemed to him that the timing of 

the operation depended more on the state of the enemy than on the set perfec386 
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tion of our preparations. He agreed with the view that if the Germans did not 

throw in the sponge by February we should have to expect heavy fighting 

throughout the summer. In this event, it would have to be realized that the 

16 British divisions were the limit of our contribution. The British could not 

meet any further calls on our manpower, which was now fully deployed on 

war service. 

After reviewing all the various theaters of operations the relationships 

seemed to work out as follows. 

OVERLORD remained top of the bill, but this operation should not be 

such a tyrant as to rule out every other activity in the Mediterranean; for 

example, a little flexibility in the employment of landing craft ought to be 

conceded. Seventy additional LCT’s had been ordered to be built in British 

shipyards. We must see if we can do even better than this. 

General Alexander had asked that the date of the return of the landing 

craft for OVERLORD should be deferred from mid-December to mid-January. 

The resources which were at issue between the American and British Staffs 

would probably be found to amount to no more than 10 percent of the whole, 

excluding those in the Pacific. Surely some degree of elasticity could be 

arranged. Nevertheless, he wished to remove any idea that we had weakened, 

cooled, or were trying to get out of OVERLORD. We were in it up to the hilt. 

To sum up, the program he advocated was Rome in January, Rhodes in 

February, supplies to the Yugoslavs, a settlement of the Command arrangements and the opening of the Aegean, subject to the outcome of an approach 

to Turkey; all preparations for OVERLORD to go ahead full steam within the 

framework of the foregoing policy for the Mediterranean. 

THE PRESIDENT said that we could not tell what the state of German 

military capabilities would be from month to month. The Russian advance, 

if it continued at its present rate, would bring our ally in a few weeks to the 

boundaries of Rumania. At the forthcoming conference, the Russians might 

ask what we intended to do in this event. They might suggest a junction of 

our right with their left. We should be ready to answer this question. 

The Russians might suggest that we stage an operation at the top of 

the Adriatic with a view to assisting Tito. 

Turning to manpower, THE PRESIDENT read out the figures for the 

US.and British air and land forces at present disposed overseas and in the 

respective home countries. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER said that the staffs had been giving much 

thought to how we should beat Japan when Hitler was finished. He was determined to solve this problem and the British Fleet would be disposed wherever 

it could make the best contribution towards this end. The air force build-up 

would also be studied. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he shared the views expressed by Mr. Molotov that the defeat of Japan would follow that of Germany and more rapidly 

than at present was generally thought possible. It seemed that the Generalissimo had been well satisfied with the discussion held the previous day. There 

was no doubt that China had wide aspirations which included the re-occupation of Manchuria and Korea. 

THE PRESIDENT then referred to the question of Command, remarking 

that he still received requests for the transfer of shipping and of air forces 

from one theater to another for a limited period of operations. In his view our 

strategic air forces from London to Ankara should be under one command. He 

cited the example of the command which Marshal Foch exercised in 1918. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that once we were across the Channel a 

united command would be established in the area of operations. He considered 

that the Combined Chiefs of Staff system had worked reasonably satisfactorily 

in taking the decision referred to by the President. 

THE PRIME MINISTER paid a tribute to the accuracy and effectiveness 

of the US. daylight bombers operating from the United Kingdom. 

THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER invited the staffs to study 

the problems as to the scope and dates of the operations to be carried out in 

the European and Mediterranean Theaters in 1944, with a view to arriving at 

an agreed view, if possible, before the coming meeting with the Russians. 

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SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF THIRD PLENARY MEETING,HELD AT THE VILLAKIRK,

ON SATURDAY, 4DECEMBER 1943 AT 1100

PRESENT 

United States 

The President (In the Chair) 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

The Prime Minister 

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Captain Forrest B. Royal, USN 

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THE PRESlDENT said that he must leave Cairo on Monday morning. 

It was therefore necessary that all reports of the Conference should be signed 

by Sunday night. Apart from the question of Turkish participation in the war, 

which he felt should be brought about at some date between 15 February and 

1 April, the only outstanding problem seemed to be the comparatively small 

one of the provision of about 20 landing craft or their equipment. It was 

unthinkable to be beaten by a small item like that, and he felt bound to say 

that it must be done. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not wish to leave the Conference 

in any doubt that the British Delegation viewed the early separation of the 

SEXTANT Conference with great apprehension.There were still many questions 

of first-class importance to be settled. Two decisive events had taken place in the 

last few days. In the first place, Marshal Stalin had voluntarily proclaimed that 

the Soviet would make war on Japan the moment Germany was defeated. This 

would give us better bases than we could ever find in China, and made it all the 

more important that we should concentrate on making OVERLORD a success. 

It would be necessary for the Staffs to examine how this new fact would affect 

operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The second event of first-class 

importance was the decision to do OVERLORD during May. He himself would 

have preferred the July date, but he was determined nevertheless to do all in 

his power to make the May date a complete success. OVERLORD was a task 

transcending all others. A million Americans were to be thrown in, and 500,000­

600,000 British. Terrific battles were to be expected on a scale far greater than 

anything that we had experienced before. In order to give OVERLORD the 

greatest chance of success, it was necessary that Operation ANVIL should be 

as strong as possible. The critical time would come at about the thirtieth day, 

and it was essential that every possible step should be taken by action elsewhere 

to prevent the Germans from concentrating a superior force against our 

bridgeheads. As soon as the OVERLORD and ANVIL forces got into the same 

zone, they would come under the same Commander. 

Reverting to ANVIL, THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the view that it 

should be planned on the basis of an assault force of at least two divisions. This 

would provide enough landing craft to do the outflanking operations in Italy 

and also, if Turkey came into the war soon, to capture Rhodes. But he wished 

to say at once that, in the face of the new situation, Rhodes had no longer the 

great importance which he had previously attached to it. 

ADMIRAL KING intervened to remark that a two-division lift for ANVIL 

was in sight. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER, continuing, said that operations in Southeast 

Asia must be judged in their relation to the predominating importance of 

OVERLORD. He was astounded at the demands for BUCCANEER which had 

reached him from the Supreme Commander. Although there were only 5,000 

Japanese in the island, 58,000 men were apparently required to capture it. As 

he understood it, the Americans had been fighting the Japanese successfully at 

odds of two and a half to one. In the face of Marshal Stalin’s promise that 

Russia would come into the war, operations in the Southeast Asia Command 

had lost a good deal of their value; while on the other hand their cost had been 

put up to a prohibitive extent. 

THE PRIME MINISTER concluded by observing that there were still 

very large differences of opinion between the British and American Delegations, 

and that it was of the first importance that these differences should be cleared 

away. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that at all the previous Conferences there had 

been a number of military meetings, as a result of which reports had been 

submitted from time to time to the President and Prime Minister. The last 

stage of the Conference had always been the submission of a final report, followed by an examination of ways and means. SEXTANT had been a very 

different affair. In the first place there had been meetings with the Generalissimo. Then after a short interval, the principal members of both delegations 

had gone to Tehran where there had been a number of Plenary Conferences on 

political as well as military matters. Thus the Combined Chiefs of Staff had so 

far had very few opportunities of discussion at SEXTANT. The following matters were still outstanding: First, an examination of the landing craft position, 

without which it was impossible to say what operations could or could not be 

undertaken; second, the long term plan for the defeat of Japan, which in its 

turn was affected by the decisions to undertake operations in Upper Burma 

next March. The plan was also seriously affected by Marshal Stalin’s promise 

to make war on Japan as soon as Germany was finished. It seemed essential 

that these problems should be resolved before the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

separated. The Mediterranean was of the greatest importance. It would be 

fatal to let up in that area. We should go on hitting the Germans as hard as we 

possibly could, and in every place that we could. Finally, the question of ANVIL 

was still under examination and it was essential to decide how the necessary 

resources could be provided. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM observed that, on a preliminary examination, our naval resources in cruisers, escort carriers, destroyers, and escorts 

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were not adequate to undertake more than two amphibious operations at the 

same time, namely OVERLORD and ANVIL. It might be possible to arrange 

for some of the naval forces employed in BUCCANEER to get back in time for 

ANVIL, but a large proportion of them would have to remain in the Indian 

Ocean. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that, according to his information, there 

was only one good airfield in the Andamans. This was capable of operating 

squadrons of heavy bombers. There was another site which had been cleared 

by blasting the top off a hill, and a few strips might be made on the beach. Thus 

the value of the Andamans as a base for long distance bombing was strictly 

limited. 

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed agreement with General Brooke’s 

observations. There was no question that there were a number of important 

points to be settled. It was impossible to say how long this settlement would 

take; and thereafter there would be the business of surveying ways and means. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he himself would at any rate be 

leaving on Tuesday. Would it not be possible for the Staffs to stay for two or 

three days and work out their problems together? 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that two or three days would not suffice for what 

they had to do, since the detailed problems to be worked out would take at 

least one or two weeks. 

ADMIRAL KING remarked that the staffs were unlikely to reach agreement on certain problems which could only be resolved by the President-Prime 

Minister level. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo 

under the impression that we were going to do BUCCANEER. The new facts 

were, firstly, that the Soviet had declared themselves ready to go to war with 

Japan immediately Germany collapsed; secondly, that it had been decided to 

do OVERLORD in May; and, thirdly, that ANVIL was also to be undertaken. 

He added that he was very anxious lest the Russian promise should leak out. 

THE PRESIDENT agreed, and added that it was impossible to tell the 

Chinese. Continuing, he said that 18-20 additional landing craft must be 

provided by hook or by crook. As for the BUCCANEER assault, he thought that 

14,000instead of 58,000 men would be ample. The Supreme Commander in the 

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Far East should be told that he must do his best with the resources which 

had already been allocated to him. It should be possible for the staffs to settle 

their problems in principle, leaving the details to be worked out afterwards. 

They appeared already to have reached agreement on the objectives. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE demurred. Many questions, such as shipping, 

landing craft, and naval resources would have to be examined in detail, as 

would the relation between ANVIL and BUCCANEER. The former was being 

examined on the basis of a two-division assault, whereas it might be found that 

the proper strategy was to divert landing craft from BUCCANEER to the 

Mediterranean and to increase this to say a three-division assault. 

ADMIRAL KING said that landing craft and assault shipping for a twodivision assault was already in sight, subject to certain complications. He 

added that. so long as the target date for OVERLORD was 1 May, it had been 

necessary to arrange for landing craft to be in the U.K. by 1 March. Consequently, the intention had been to send all new construction of landing craft 

after that date to the Pacific. Now that it had been decided to postpone OVERLORD by 2-4 weeks, this new construction would come to the U.K.Kothing 

would be sent to the Pacific. 

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that this was a fruitful contribution. 

Some discussion followed on the subject of LSI(L)'s.Would it not be 

possible, asked THE PRIME MINISTER. to adapt merchant ships for this 

purpose instead of building special vessels? 

ADMIRAL KING said that conversions of this character were in progress. The U.S. Navy used ships of 6,000-10,000 tons for this purpose, the 

monster liners being reserved for transportation of large bodies of troops 

across the Atlantic. 

Some discussion followed about the increase of Japanese fighter strength 

in Southeast Asia, and, in connection with this matter, ADMIRAL KING 

pointed to the interrelation between the attack on Rabaul and BUCCANEER. 

The Japanese air force was going to be in difficulties at two widely separated 

points. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that if it could be decided: 

a. that AhVIL should go ahead on the basis of a two-division assault: and, 

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b. that Admiral Mountbatten should be instructed to do the best he 

could with the resources already allocated to him; 

the picture would begin to be filled in. Of course, if Admiral Mountbatten said 

that he could do nothing, some of his resources could be taken away from him 

for other purposes. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that BUCCANEER might be left 

until after the monsoon; in fact this solution of the problem might be forced 

upon us by facts and figures. 

ADMIRAL KING said that there was a definite commitment to the 

Generalissimo that there should be an amphibious operation in the spring. 

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled that at the Plenary Meeting with the 

Generalissimo, the latter had said that it was essential that an amphibious 

operation should be undertaken simultaneously with TARZAN. He (THE 

PRIME MINISTER) had said quite firmly that he could not agree. The Generalissimo could be under no illusion about this. 

THE PRESIDENT suggested the following plan of action: 

a. Accept OVERLORD and ANVIL as the paramount operations of 1944. 

b. Make every effort to get the additional 18-20 landing craft for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

c. Let Admiral Mountbatten be told that he could keep what he has got, 

but is going to get nothing else; and that he must do the best that he can. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL remarked that ANVIL had only come seriously 

into the picture last week. At the present, nobody knew whether a two-division 

assault would, or would not, be enough. It was merely a yardstick for the 

planning staffs to work on. It might well be that the proper strategy would be 

to get a lift for at least another division out of the Southeast Asia Command. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that for OVERLORD the assault was only 3% 

divisions; and for ANVIL only a two-division assault was at present contemplated. Surely it would be better to employ all the BUCCANEER resources to 

strengthen up the European front. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY entirely agreed with the idea of strengthening up 

the European front, but observed that BUCCANEER had been decided on a 

higher level than the Chiefs of Staff. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER pointed to the great military advantages that 

were to be gained by operations in the Aegean. If Turkey entered the war, there 

would be great political reactions. Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary might all 

fall into our hands. We ought to make these German satellites work for us. 

MR. EDEN thought that Russia would probably agree to postponing the 

date for the Turkish entry into the war from 31 December 1943 to about 15 February 1944. As for Rumania, the Russians had, in the first place, refused to have 

anything to do with the feelers put out by Maniu, except on the basis of unconditional surrender. Maniu had now said that he was prepared to send a 

representative to negotiate on that basis. It was true that he did not represent 

the Government of Rumania, but there was always the possibility of a coup 

d'etat. 

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed to the great advantages that were to 

be gained by Rumania's entry into the war. If we could get a grip on the Balkans, there would be a tremendous abridgement of our difficulties. The next 

Conference might perhaps be held at Budapest! All this would help OVERLORD. He himself was not apprehensive about the landing; but the critical 

period would be at about the 30th day. It was therefore essential that the 

Germans should be held at every point, and that the whole ring should close 

in together. 

There followed some discussion of the conduct of the political conversations with President Inonu. 

THE PRESIDENT, summing up the discussion, asked whether he was 

correct in thinking that there was general agreement on the following points: 

a. Nothing should be done to hinder OVERLORD. 

b. Nothing should be done to hinder ANVIL. 

c. By hook or by crook we should scrape up sufficient landing craft to 

operate in the Eastern Mediterranean if Turkey came into the war. 

d. Admiral Mountbatten should be told to go ahead and do his best with 

what had already been allocated to him. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it might be necessary to withdraw resources from BUCCANEER in order to strengthen up OVERLORD and 

ANVIL. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he could not agree with this. We had a 

moral obligation to do something for China and he would not be prepared to 

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forego the amphibious operation, except for some very great and readily apparent reason. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this “very good reason” might be 

provided by OVERLORD. At present the assault was only on a 3% division 

basis, whereas we had put 9 divisions ashore in Sicily on the first day. The 

operation was at present on a very narrow margin. 

FIELD MARSHAL DILL thought it was impossible for us to be strong 

at both OVERLORD and ANVIL. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that, from the military point of view, there 

was everything to be said for strengthening up OVERLORD and ANVIL at the 

expense of other theaters; but there were serious political issues at stake. 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed with Field Marshal Dill and Admiral 

Leahy. He pointed out, however, that the difficulties in abandoning or postponing BUCCANEER were not merely political. If BUCCANEER was cancelled, 

the Generalissimo would not allow Chinese forces to take part in TARZAN. 

There would be no campaign in Upper Burma, and this would have its repercussion on the operations in the Pacific. There would be a revulsion of feeling 

in China; the effect on Japan would be bad, and the line of communication 

between Indochina would be at hazard. 

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that he had never committed himself 

to the scale or timing of the amphibious operation in the Southeast Asia 

Theater. Perhaps it might be advisable to revert to Akyab or Ramree. 

THE PRESIDENT said that the Generalissimo was anxious that we 

should secure a base from which the supply line from Bangkok could be bombed. 

ADMIRAL KING, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, said 

that he had no fear of the Japanese being able to retake the Andamans once 

we had occupied them. He added that any increase in the scale of BUCCANEER 

was out of the question. 

The meeting concluded with an injunction from the President and Prime 

Minister to their respective staffs to meet together and try to reach agreement 

on the points at issue in the light of the discussion which had taken place. 

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SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF THE FOURTH PLENARY MEETING,HELD AT THE VILLAKIRK, 

ON SUNDAY, 5 DECEMBER 1943 AT 1100

PRESENT 

United States 

The President (In the Chair) 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

The Prime Minister 

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

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THE PRESIDENT read out to the Conference a report by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff on operations in the European Theater. The point at issue 

between the two staffs was Operation BUCCANEER, and on this agreement 

still remained to be reached. He would like to have had a document to which 

signatures could be affixed. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the difficulty might be overcome 

if the date of BUCCANEER could be advanced. Would it be possible to do it, for 

example, in January? 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this would not be possible. 

THE PRESIDENT inquired what date Admiral Mountbatten had given 

for the operation. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that Southeast Asia Command were working 

to a date in the middle of March. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY remarked that if a mid-March date was adopted, the 

landing craft could not be returned to the European Theater till the beginning 

of May. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was disturbed at the growth in the 

forces required for BUCCANEER. If a superiority of 10 to 1was required, this, 

in fact, made the conduct of war impossible. Could not BUCCANEER be postponed till after the monsoon and the Generalissimo be informed that, as a 

result of developments arising from the discussions with the Russians, we could 

not carry out BUCCANEER as originally contemplated? TARZAN would, of 

course, be carried out as arranged. 

THE PRESIDENT said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo quite 

clearly under the impression that an amphibious operation would be carried 

out simultaneously with TARZAN. He, the President, was a little dubious about 

putting all our eggs in one basket. Suppose Marshal Stalin was unable to be as 

good as his word; we might find that we had forfeited Chinese support without 

obtaining commensurate help from the Russians. 

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that BUCCANEER would not really 

influence Chinese continuation in the war. This would depend much more upon 

the supplies she received over the “hump.” 

MR. HOPKINS inquired whether, if BUCCANEER took place on 1March, 

landing craft and naval forces could leave the Indian Ocean for ANVIL? 

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SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM did not think this would be possible. A 

considerable portion of the naval forces would have to remain in the vicinity of 

BUCCANEER, perhaps up to a month, after the assault. 

ADMIRAL KING agreed that the follow-up for BUCCANEER might take 

up to four weeks before the ships in any numbers could be released. This would 

leave no margin at all for fitting them in to OVERLORD or ANVIL, even 

assuming that these operations took place in late May. 

MR. HOPKINS inquired whether the Combined Staffs had examined 

the adequacy of a two-divisional assault for ANVIL. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this question had not yet been examined 

in detail. 

THE PRIME MINISTER, reverting to BUCCANEER, said that there was 

no question of providing any additional forces. When Admiral Mountbatten was 

told this, he would be quite likely to say that he could not do BUCCANEER and 

revert to BULLFROG. This was an operation which found favor with no one. 

The next step would be to discuss the possibilities of an amphibious operation 

in the Southeast Asia Theater with the Force Commanders. 

SIR JOHN DILL inquired as to the earliest date for OVERLORD. It was 

generally agreed that no specific date had been set. 

A discussion followed regarding the phases of the moon in May 1944. It 

was finally ascertained that the full moon would be on 8 May and the new 

moon on 22 May. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that ANVIL might take place at the same 

time as OVERLORD or possibly a week later. 

MR. HOPKINS said as far as he could see, the situation was about as 

follows: 

There were probably sufficient landing craft for a two-division lift for 

ANVIL; there were also landing craft available for BUCCANEER and landing 

craft provided for OVERLORD on the scale now planned, although possibly 

inadequate in the latter case for an additional lift which might be hoped for. 

Unless the Chiefs of Staff have ascertained that there are sufficient landing 

craft for the required assault on Southern France, then there would definitely 

not be enough landing craft for these operations. 

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ADMIRAL LEAHY said that while it was apparent that there was 

sufficient lift for two divisions for ANVIL it was unquestionably true that a 

greater lift would be more likely to insure the success of the operation. He felt 

that if the Generalissimo could be induced to put his forces into TARZAN 

without accomplishing BUCCANEER, it might be a good thing. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he felt that there were a good many new, 

revolutionary ideas recently injected as regards the relationship between 

BUCCANEER and TARZAN. 

MR. HOPKINS inquired as to whether it was not a question that OVERLORD and ANVIL are of such great importance that they should be augmented 

if possible. 

MR. ANTHONY EDEN said that it was unfortunate that we cannot 

separate BUCCANEER and TARZAN and continually have to consider them 

connected. 

ADMIRAL KING said that if the BUCCANEER operation was postponed, 

he believed there would be no operations in Burma after the monsoon except 

possibly as a part of other incidental operations. 

GENERAL BROOKE said if we do TARZAN and then run on into the 

monsoon we cannot sit still; we must go on. There are two further steps. The 

next operation is to go down to Mandalay and the Irrawaddy. The subsequent 

operation is to continue on to Rangoon. 

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that operations on land such as 

TARZAN would not cut into OVERLORD or ANVIL. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL inquired whether it would not be possible to 

substitute some form of amphibious operations in lieu of BUCCANEER. The 

Generalissimo had made a special point of naval operations. It might be possible 

to organize commando groups and make a descent on some part of the coast. 

He considered that commando raids supported by naval forces would fulfill the 

Generalissimo’s requirements. He believed that operations of this sort would 

be suitable without making a definite commitment which we will have to 

continue further. He also believed that the Generalissimo might be told that 

amphibious operations on a large scale could be carried out after the monsoon. 

ADMIRAL KING said that Sir Charles Portal probably meant some sort 

of “hit-and-run” operations. 

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MR. HOPKINS inquired whether or not the Chiefs of Staff would get 

any further if they sent Admiral Mountbatten a wire. He inquired whether the 

Chiefs of Staff would recommend against the whole business if Admiral Mountbatten said he could not accomplish BUCCANEER with the means available. 

Would the Chiefs of Staff still tell Admiral Mountbatten to go ahead and do 

what he could with what he had? 

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that both OVERLORD and ANVZL 

were known to be of great importance and will be seriously affected by a 

diversion such as BUCCANEER. 

MR. HOPKINS said he understood there was nothing in any C.C.S. paper 

to the effect that landing craft were not available for either OVERLORD or 

ANVIL. On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff had never stipulated that there 

should be a six-division assault for OVERLORD or a three-division assault for 

ANVIL. 

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the Southeast Asia Command 

had 50,000 men against 5,000 Japs and were now asking for more. 

MR. HOPKINS said it made no difference in the number of landing craft 

whether 30,000 men or 50,000 men were being used for BUCCANEER because 

the size of the initial assault was gauged by the number of landing craft. He 

asked if Lord Mountbatten’s landing craft were made available in the Mediterranean, how many more men could be lifted? 

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM replied that Admiral Mountbatten’s lift is 

about 25,000 men. In other words, these landing craft meant an additional lift 

of about one division for ANVIL. He also believed that the landing craft from 

the Indian Ocean could get to OVERLORD in time if necessary. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the difficulty in lifting additional 

troops in the initial assault for OVERLORD was a function of the ports available. There was already considerable port congestion anticipated in England 

with a lift of the 4% divisions contemplated. He further observed that 

his understanding was that the number of troops in the initial OVERLORD 

assault was predicated on what could properly be used on the available landing 

front in France. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, in his view, the landing could be extended 

and use made of other beaches. 

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SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the LSI(L)’scould be more 

economically employed in the longer Mediterranean hauls than in the short 

cross-Channel haul. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that while he did not feel committed to 

an amphibious operation on any specific date in Southeast Asia, he realized 

the difficulty which faced the President with regard to the Generalissimo. Either 

Admiral Mountbatten should plan for BUCCANEER with the existing resources 

or start sending back the forces at once. He favored TARZAN going ahead. He 

had not realized that the amphibious operation was directly related to and 

bound up with TARZAN. 

Continuing, THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the Generalissimo 

should be informed that Admiral Mountbatten had now said that he wanted 

more forces than had been contemplated when he, the Generalissimo, had been 

in Cairo. It was therefore proposed to postpone BUCCANEER until after the 

monsoon. Meanwhile, TARZAN would go forward. The postponement of BUCCANEER would not effect TARZAN. If the Generalissimo expressed surprise 

and threatened to withhold the Yunnan forces, we should say that we would go 

on without them. Alternatively, we could say that the inaction of the Yunnan 

forces would allow more supplies to go over the “hump.” 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that if the Yunnan forces were to be withdrawn 

from TARZAN, the whole plan would need recasting. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the two-divisional lift for ANVIL was already 

in sight and it might even be possible to improve on this. He explained, however, 

that the two-divisional lift entailed keeping back one month’s production 

of landing craft output from the Pacific. Nothing at all was going to the 

Pacific now. 

THE PRESIDENT said he would like the possibility of a series of “hitand-run’’ raids to be examined. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, in reply to a question by the Prime 

Minister, said that the naval force for BUCCANEER would include battleships, 

cruisers, destroyers and one or two big carriers. No great difficulty should be 

encountered in doing a raid or raids. He remarked that Admiral King had 

promised to help by providing American naval forces for ANVIL. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that assuming that the President and 

United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to extend their time at Cairo for a 

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day or so, it would be necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to get to work 

on the problems which had emerged from the discussion. First came ANVIL. 

A more detailed study was required of the strength to be employed in the 

assault and in the follow-up. Next, we ought to deal with the Turks. He had 

in mind a program on the following lines: At the end of January the Turkish 

airdromes should be fitted out with Radar and anti-aircraft defenses. At the 

beginning of February the US.and British squadrons should be ready to move 

in to Turkey, and medium bombers should start a softening process from airfields in Cyrenaica. By 15 February the bombing attacks on the islands should 

be intensified. By this time we should expect some reactions from Germany, but 

as they grew progressively stronger, the Turks would have to face up to greater 

risks. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that, as far as the United States Chiefs of Staff 

were concerned, they were quite right to leave the Turkish program to the 

British Chiefs of Staff to decide upon. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the adjustment of resources to plans, 

including particularly shipping, could not yet be worked out. The adjustment 

of resources depended on the decision about BUCCANEER and ANVIL. As 

regards the former operation, the right thing seemed to be to take what was 

required for the European Theater, and then see what could be done with 

what was left in Southeast Asia. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that Admiral Mountbatten should be 

asked what he could do as an alternative to BUCCANEER assuming that the 

bulk of his landing craft and assault shipping was to be withdrawn at once. 

We could not get away from the fact that we should be doing wrong strategically if we used vital resources such as landing craft on operations of comparatively insignificant importance, instead of using these resources to strengthen 

up OVERLORD and ANVIL, where it looks like we are working to a dangerously 

narrow margin. 

GENERAL ARNOLD explained the possibilities and capabilities of the 

very long range aircraft which would operate from the four airfields at Calcutta. 

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired how the construction of these airfields 

was progressing. He called for a special report, to be followed by weekly progress 

reports. 

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THE CONFERENCE:­

a. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to initiate further studies concerning the scope of OVERLORD and ANVIL with a view to increasing 

the assaults in each case. 

b. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to consult with the Force Commanders of BUCCANEER and thereafter to ask Admiral Mountbatten 

what amphibious operations he could do on a smaller scale than 

BUCCANEER if the bulk of landing craft and assault shipping were 

withdrawn from Southeast Asia during the next few weeks. 

c. Agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should prepare a statement 

for presentation to the Turks showing what assistance they would 

receive if they entered the war. 

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SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF FIFTHPLENARYMEETING,HELDAT THE VILLAKIRK, 

ON MONDAY,6 DECEMBER1943 AT 1930 

United States 

The President (In the Chair) 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G.C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

PRESENT 

British 

The Prime Minister 

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir CharlesF. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Field Marshal Jan C. Smuts 

Lt. Gen. Sir HastingsL. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

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THE PRESIDENT read out paragraph by paragraph the report of the 

agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 

the SEXTANT Conference [C.C.S. 426J1). 

There was some discussion over the Emergency Return to the Continent 

(paragraphs 17 to 20). THE PRESIDENT understood that objections had been 

raised to the United States proposals in paragraph 18on the grounds that they 

would involve a move of the United States forces from the right to the left 

across the British lines of communication. He understood that in practice this 

objection should not be a serious one, as the change-over would not take place 

until operations had been concluded. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could not commit the British 

Government to these proposals. They would have to be put to the War Cabinet. 

With regard to the Higher Direction of Operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command (paragraph 23), THE PRIME MINISTER said that this did not 

affect the decision taken at the QUADRANT Conference that the British Chiefs 

of Staff were to be the channel of communication with the Southeast Asia 

Command. 

With reference to paragraph 26, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he 

thought the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should 

be sent a copy of the President’s recent signal to the Generalissimo on the 

subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command. THE PRESIDENT 

agreed and THE PRIME MINISTER gave instructions for the signal to be 

dispatched. 

After reading out paragraph 28, THE PRESIDENT said that he had 

been approached by the Chinese, here at the SEXTANT Conference, with a 

request for Chinese representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. He had made it clear at once that such representation could not be agreed 

to. The Chinese had also asked if a US.-Chinese Committee could be appointed 

for the consideration of the military operations with which China was 

concerned. 

When THE PRESIDENT came to the end of the report, he commended 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the report that they had produced. 

THE PRIME MINISTER classified the report as a masterly survey of the 

whole military scene. He gave it as his opinion that when military historians 

came to adjudge the decisions of the SEXTANT Conference, they would find 

them fully in accordance with the classic articles of war. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER then expressed his deep sense of gratitude to 

his United States colleagues. The ANVIL operation had been a great contribution made by them to this Conference. He was convinced that this operation 

would contribute largely to the success of OVERLORD. 

THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER then initialled the report 

(C.C.S. 426/1). 

In answer to a question from the Prime Minister as to whether the 

draft communique on the U-boat war had been approved, ADMIRAL KING 

stated that the communique had been cleared with the President, that it had 

been dispatched already to Washington, and that it would be released on the 

10th of the month. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested to the President that the communique 

should be made out in alternate months by the United States and the British 

respectively, and that as the British had prepared the present communique, 

that for next month should be prepared by the United States. THE PRESIDENT 

agreed with this proposal. 

A draft message to Marshal Stalin was then considered. It was approved 

with a minor modification and instructions given for it to be sent at once. 

A draft telegram to the Generalissimo was then read out. It was agreed 

that on grounds of security it would be undesirable to put so much secret 

information into a dispatch of this nature. It was decided not to dispatch a 

telegram to the Generalissimo until his reply had been received to the recent 

telegram sent to him by the President on the subject of operations in the 

Southeast Asia Command. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 127th Meeting 

SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN CONFERENCE ROOM1,THEMENAHOUSE, 

ON MONDAY,22 NOVEMBER1943 AT 1500 

PRESENT 

United States British 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Admiral E.J.King, USN Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

General H.H.Arnold, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. Russell Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cmke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0.C. Badger, USN 

Rear Adm. B. H. Bieri, USN 

Maj. Gen. T.T. Handy, USA 

Maj. Gen. M. S.Fairchild. USA 

Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. P. H. Tansey, USA 

Brig. Gen. H. S. Hansell, USA 

Captain A. K. Doyle, USN 

Colonel F. N. Roberts. USA 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Captain C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier C. S. Sugden 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier J. K. McNair 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Colonel A.J. McFarland, USA 

Commander R. D.Coleridge, RN 

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ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested, and the COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

agreed, that General Sir Alan Brooke should take the Chair at the meetings 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at SEXTANT. 

1. CONDUCT OF CONFERENCE 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the future work of the 

Conference, with particular reference to the necessity for considering operations in the Far East as early as possible. 

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that he understood it was likely that the 

President and Prime Minister would hold a plenary session with Generalissimo 

Chiang Kai-shek at 1700 on Tuesday, 23 November, and that it had been 

suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet with Generalissimo 

Chiang Kai-shek on Wednesday, 24 November. 

GENERAL MARSHALL read out to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief 

memorandum prepared by General Stilwell giving the Generalissimo’s views 

of future operations in the Chinese Theater. He suggested that the United 

State:; and British Chiefs of Staff should separately study this memorandum 

on th,? following morning and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff collectively 

should consider it at 1430 on Tuesday, 23 November. These proposals were 

accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was also agreed that the Generalissimo and his principal advisers should be invited to be present at the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting at 1530on Tuesday, 23 November. 

At the suggestion of Admiral Leahy, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:--

Agreed that the procedure to be used at SEXTANT should follow the 

lines of that used at the QUADRANT Conference, with specific reference 

to the recording of decisions, the approval of minutes, and the reports 

to the President and Prime Minister. 

2. PROPOSED “SEXTANT’ AGENDA 

(C.C.S. 404and 404/1) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British proposals set out in 

C.C.S. 404/1 were designed to enable the Combined Chiefs of Staff to study 

at the earliest possible opportunity operations affecting the Chinese Theater. 

They could then turn to operations in Europe in order that if possible they 

should have fully considered these before meeting the U.S.S.R. representatives. 

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ADMIRAL KING said he felt that the British agenda was acceptable 

as an outline into which the details suggested by the United States Chiefs of 

Staff could be fitted. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the proposals for the main subjects for discussion on the 

SEXTANT agenda as set out in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 404/1. 

3. “EUREKA 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the arrangements for 

EUREKA. 

4, RELATIONS BETWEEN COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE 

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

should consider the question of their relationship both during the Conference 

and in the future, with the military representatives of the U.S.S.R. and China. 

This seemed particularly important in view of the recent Four-Power agreements concluded in Moscow. There had already been an intimation from 

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that he would welcome an invitation for a 

Chinese military representative to sit with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It 

might facilitate the development of good faith and mutual understanding 

with the U.S.S.R. and China if each were invited to have a representative 

present with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However, he thought that this 

should be based on a well thought out scheme, rather than on day-to-day decisions. There might be certain advantages in having the Soviet representatives 

attend at least some conferences in order that they could appreciate the 

difficulties of a world-wide war on every front in comparison with their own 

and China’s highly localized operations. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the question raised a basic problem in that 

it might lead to the permanent expansion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff into 

a Four-Power body. It was pointed out that it would be impossible for the 

Chinese and the Soviet representatives to sit at the same table since they were 

not engaging the same enemies, nor could the Soviet representatives attend 

deliberations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff dealing with the war against 

Japan. 

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ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Chinese and Soviets should, during 

the present Conference, be invited to be present only when the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff were discussing the problems of the particular fronts in which 

each was interested. With regard to the Soviets, it would of course most 

certainly be necessary, when a Western Front was opened, that our action 

should be coordinated with theirs and that the delegates attending meetings 

for this purpose should be able to speak with full authority. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that this would be equally true if 

Turkey was brought into the war and operations in that area were undertaken. 

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that at Moscow it had been clear that the 

Soviet representatives did not realize that the machinery of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff was in continuous operation. They would, he thought, expect 

to be invited only to Conferences such as QUADRANT or SEXTANT, but not 

to attend all the meetings at these Conferences. There had been no signs of 

their suggesting permanent representation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

There was general agreement that. subject to further consideration. the 

best procedure would be for the Chinese and Soviet Representatives to be 

invited to attend only those meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at which 

matters concerning the fronts in which they were interested were under discussion. At EUREKA, however, it would obviously be necessary for the Soviet 

representatives to attend all meetings held. 

5. REAFFIRMATION OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND BASIC 

UNDERTAKINGS 

Without discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the over-all strategic concept and basic undertakings as set 

out in C.C.S. 380/2. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 128th Meeting 

SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MKXUTES OF MEETING HELDIN CONFERENCE ROOM1,THEMENAHOUSE,

ON TUESDAY, 23 NOVEMBER1943 AT 1430 

PRESENT 

United States 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King,USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. J. W. Stilwell, USA 

Lt. Gen. B. B.Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0 .C. Badger, USK 

Rear Adm. B. H. Bieri, USN 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Maj. Gen.G. E. Stratemeyer, USA 

Maj. Gen. R. A. Wheeler, USA 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Maj. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Brig. Gen. L. S.Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. P. H. Tansey, USA 

Brig. Gen. H. S. Hansell, USA 

Captain A. K. Doyle, USN 

Colonel F. N. Roberts, USA 

Colonel E. O’Donnell, USA 

Captain W. L. Freseman, USN 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Field MarshaI Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen.Sir Hastings L. Isrnay 

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Lt. Gen. A. Carton de Wiart 

Captain C. E. Larnbe, RN 

Brigadier C. S. Sugden 

Air Commodore W. Elliot, RAF 

Brigadier E. M. W. Cobb 

Brigadier A. Head 

Brigadier J. K. McNair 

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PRESENT FOR LAST ITEM ONLY 

General Shang Chen 

Lt. General Lin Wei 

Vice Adm. Yang Hsuan Ch’eng 

Lt. General Chou Chih Jou 

Lt. General Chu Shih Ming 

Maj. Gen. Tsai Wen Chih 

Maj. Gen. C. L. Chennault, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

Commander R. D. Coleridge,RN 

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1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE 127TH MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 127th Meeting. The detailed record of 

the Meeting was also accepted subject to minor amendments. 

2. THE ROLE OF CHINA IN THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 405) 

GENERAL STILWELL informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he 

had received a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he 

did not wish any proposals for Chinese action laid before the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff until he had had a further consultation with the President and 

General Marshall. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it appeared that the operations set out 

in subparagraphs 2 a, b, c, and d of C.C.S. 405 were acceptable. The remaining 

proposals appeared unrealistic, particularly in view of the logistic difficulties 

which General Marshall had mentioned at a previous meeting. He could not 

.,ee how Formosa could be attacked from the mainland of China without any 

landing craft. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he agreed with Sir Alan Brooke’s views. 

Subparagraphs 2 a, b, c, and d were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of 

Staff; the remaining proposals were matters for the future, requiring detailed 

examination, particularly in view of the serious logistic implications. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should so inform the Chinese 

representatives. 

GENERAL MARSHALL reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that 

up till now the Generalissimo’s sole interest had been in the provision of a 

large United States Air Force in China and a large number of transport aircraft. He had taken each step in the direction of the formation of ground forces 

with reluctance. Months had passed before he would agree to the training of 

the Chinese troops at Ramgarrh. More months had passed before he had agreed 

to an increase in their numbers. Negotiations with the Indian government had 

necessitated further delay. Yet another period had passed before the Generalissimo would agree to the habilitation of the Yunnan force. Now, for the first 

time, the Generalissimohad shown an active interest in and an admission of the 

importance of the formation and employment of Chinese ground forces. He 

(General Marshall) personally had confidence in the value of Chinese troops 

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provided they were properly led. Their powers of endurance should prove 

immensely valuable in the type of warfare in which they were to be employed. 

He considered that the Generalissimo’s new proposals should be given the 

most careful and sympathetic consideration. These factors and the value of 

China once Germany had collapsed and the flow of supplies to the East had 

increased, should be borne most carefully in mind when considering the Generalissimo’s plan. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Generalissimo’s proposals must 

be considered in relation to the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan. He agreed 

with General Marshall as to the importance of the change of heart shown by 

the Generalissimo in his latest proposals, and felt that he should not be discouraged if it could possibly be avoided. 

GENERAL ARNOLD mentioned the problem of the employment of some 

two thousand heavy bombers which would be available on the defeat of Germany. Available bases in the Aleutians, Maritime Provinces, and the Islands 

were all of limited capacity. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that this great force might be used 

against shipping. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the bases he had mentioned would 

in fact be used by heavy bombers employed against shipping. His point was 

that only by using them out of China could the heart of Japan itself be 

attacked. Attacks on Japanese oil resources and shipping, while valuable, 

would not produce the final result. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed Generalissimo 

Chiang Kai-shek’s views with regard to the employment of naval forces in the 

Bay of Bengal. 

GENERAL STILWELL said he believed that the Generalissimo would be 

satisfied if we could guarantee naval security in the Bay of Bengal. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that it would be right to say that we 

should have general control of the Bay of Bengal but he could not absolutely 

guarantee its complete security. He believed that the Prime Minister intended 

in due course to inform the Generalissimo of the British naval forces to be 

employed in the Bay of Bengal but felt that this information should be imparted 

by the Prime Minister himself and not by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that in discussing amphibious 

operations with the Generalissimo in Chungking, he had pointed out that it 

was intended to launch an amphibious operation in the spring, probabIy to 

synchronize with the Burma land operations. From the air bases made available by the amphibious operation it was hoped to be able to interfere with seaborne supplies, both through Rangoon and Bangkok. He believed that the 

Generalissimo was in fact interested in this action rather than in the actual 

provision of naval forces in the Bay of Bengal. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed: 

a. That the operations proposed in paragraphs 2 a to d inclusive, of 

C.C.S. 405 are, in general, in consonance with the present concept of 

operations against Japan as expressed in C.C.S. 397, Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944. 

b. That the operations proposed in paragraphs 2 e to h inclusive, of 

C.C.S. 405 go beyond the present concept of operations in China and 

require detailed examination and study with particular reference to 

logistic difficulties. 

C. That the study indicated in b above, together with an examination 

of the employment for the defeat of Japan of the heavy bombers that 

would become available when Germany has been eliminated from the 

war, should be included in the general study of the over-all plan for 

the defeat of Japan now being conducted by the Combined Staff 

Planners. 

3. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944-PACIFIC-FAR EAST 

(C.C.S 300/2) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there appeared to be minor discrepancies 

with regard to the estimate of enemy forces available, which could be discussed 

by the Combined Intelligence Committee. In other respects the paper could be 

accepted as an estimate of the situation. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed with this view. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted and noted for future information the estimate of the enemy 

situation, 1944-Pacific-Far East, set out in C.C.S. 300/2. 

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4. FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(C.C.S. 390/1) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he noted that the United States Chiefs 

of Staff were not able to provide the forces necessary for CULVERIN. With 

regard to BUCCANEER, he would like to defer consideration of this operation 

until the Conference was further advanced. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the Japanese forces in CULVERIN 

had increased from one to three divisions. He was, however, prepared to accept 

a risk and to undertake Operation CULVERIN with smaller forces if this should 

be considered necessary. His chief concern was to be in a position to cut the 

Japanese lines of communication into Burma and to obtain an air base from 

which he could attack the Malacca Straits, Rangoon, and Bangkok. BUCCANEER, though not providing so many airfields, was approximately the same 

distance from Bangkok as was CULVERIN, and so offered almost equal strategical advantages; it could be undertaken with the forces now available to 

him. He would propose to launch BUCCANEER probably some two to three 

days after the launching of the land campaign in North Burma. This would 

disperse the Japanese air effort. The Burma operations and BUCCANEER 

each had a considerable effect on the other and had been planned and considered together. 

After further discussion, 

THE COMBlNED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 390/1 but agreed to suspend final decision regarding 

Operation BUCCANEER until later in the SEXTANT Conference in 

order to allow the operation to be considered in relation to the other 

operations to be undertaken. 

5. COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF-UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

(C.C.S. 406) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would like further time to consider 

the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the United States Chiefs of Stafl 

had given only very brief consideration to this matter but had felt that it 

would be valuable to outline a possible course of action before pressure was 

exerted from any quarter to widen the membership of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. 

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ADMIRAL KING said that, as he saw it,the United Chiefs of Staff would 

consist of one representative of the Chiefs of Staff of each nation who would 

act as spokesman. This proposal would reduce the difficulties to their simplest 

possible terms if the issue were to be forced upon the United States and British 

Chiefs of Staff. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer action on this paper. 

6. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then entered into a general discussion of the situation in the Southeast Asia Command. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN, in reply to a question, explained that the 

grounding of a vessel carrying spare aircraft engines would result in a deficit 

in air lift over the “hump” for December of some 2,100 tons. .The backlog thus 

caused had not been included in his calculations and he suggested that the 

Combined Planners should look into this question. His plans were not made on 

wide margins of safety and did not make allowance for acts of God since he 

realized fully that too heavy demands from his theater would have direct repercussions on the operations in other theaters. In reply to a further question, 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that his Royal Air Force transports were 

being used to the full. They were not being employed in China since there 

were insufficient numbers to train his parachute troops and long range penetration groups. It had been necessary for United States aircraft to fly in supplies 

tothe British units in Fort Hertz. 

GENERAL STRATEMEYER asked if it was possible for the Royal Air 

Force to provide old bombers which were not operationally fit, for use as 

transport aircraft. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he did not feel that worn-out aircraft, 

even if available, could be used for this task. Manpower also was short and 

the production of British bombers was a direct measure of the weight of attack 

on Germany. 

In further discussion of the possibility of interrupting Japanese communications, SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that air bombing alone 

could not completely stop the use of enemy ports. 

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ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN agreed with this view but explained that he 

had great hopes that heavy bombing of Japanese occupied ports would result 

in strikes of dock labor and a resulting slowing up in the flow of supplies. 

GENERAL ARA‘OLD felt that our present calculations with regard to 

air transport possibilities had been wrongly based on a 100 percent figure of 

accomplishment. This figure was never achieved, and it would be safer to 

“lower our sights” with regard to target figures and accept as a bonus any 

increase on this lower figure. 

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN 

said that the airport at Blair in BUCCANEER had a 1,650 yard runway and was 

capable of operating three squadrons. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of the above statements. 

(At this point General Shang Chen, Lieutenant General Lin Wei, Vice 

Admiral Yang Hsuan Ch’eng, Lieutenant General Chou Chih Jou, Lieutenant 

General Chu Shih Ming, Major General Tsai Wen Chih and Major General 

Chennault entered the meeting.) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE, in welcoming the Chinese Representatives, said 

that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were very pleased to have this opportunity to 

meet with them and discuss around the table plans for future operations in 

China. These discussions should lead to definite conclusions. Admiral Mountbatten had that morning put forward his plans and he suggested that the 

Chinese Representatives should ask any further questions that they might 

wish and put forward their own suggestions mlth regard to these plans. 

GENERAL CHU, on behalf of General Shang Chen, explained that the 

Chinese Representatives had not had sufficient time to study these plans and 

would prefer to discuss them on the following day. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN suggested that the Chinese Representatives 

should give an outline of the state of readiness of the Yunnan Force and of the 

detailed plans for its employment. He pointed out that the success of our 

efforts to open the land route to China was dependent on the successful operation of the Yunnan Force in coordination uith the British attacks. 

GENERAL STILWELL then outlined in detail the Chinese Forces available and their state of readiness. There were, at present, certain shortages of 

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personnel which were being rapidly made good. The ten assault divisions would 

first be brought up to strength and any deficiencies in pack transport would be 

compensated for by the use of manpower. 

With the aid of a map GENERAL STILWELL outlined the three coordinated attacks which would be made by the Yunnan Force. He believed that 

sufficient tactical air forces were available to support these operations. 

GENERAL CHENNAULT and GENERAL STRATEMEYER explained 

the arrangements which had been made for the coordination of the air effort 

with that of the ground forces. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note with interest of the above statements. 

b. Agreed to meet again with the Chinese Representatives at 1530 hours 

on 24 November. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 129th Meeting 

SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN CONFERENCEROOM1, THEMENAHOUSE, 

ON WEDNESDAY, 24 NOVEMBER1943 AT 1430 

United States 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

PRESENT 

British 

General SirAlan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt.Gen. B. B. Somervell,USA 

Vice Ah. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Ah. 0. C. Badger, USN 

Rear Adm.B. H.Bieri,USN 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Brig. Gen.L. S.Kuter,USA 

Captain A. K.Doyle, USN 

Colonel F. N. Roberts, USA 

Captain W. L. Freseman, USN 

Commander V.D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir HastingsL. Ismay 

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Lt. Gen. A. Carton de Wiart 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Captain C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier C. S.Sugden 

Air Commodore W. Elliot, RAF 

Brigadier E. M. W. Cobb 

Brigadier A. Head 

Brigadier J. K. McNair 

Lt. Col. W. A. C. H. Dobson 

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Present for the Last Item Only 

General Shang Chen 

Lt. Gen. Lin Wei 

Vice Adm. Yang Hsuan Ch’eng 

Lt. Gen. Chou Chi Jou 

Lt. Gen Chu Shih Ming 

Maj. Gen. Tsai Wen Chih 

Lt. Gen. J. W. Stilwell 

Maj. Gen. C. L. Chennault 

Maj. Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer 

Brig. Gen. Frank Merrill 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F.B. Royal, USN 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. THANKSGIVING DAY 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that since the following day would be Thanksgiving he had made inquiries into the possibility of holding a service in the 

cathedral inCairo and had found that this would be possible at 1800hours. The 

British members of the Conference would, if agreeable to their American 

colleagues,like to join them in attending this service. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked SirAlan Brooke for this gesture. It was very 

much appreciated by the United States Chiefs of Staff,who would gladly attend. 

2. CONCLUSIONS OF THE 128TH MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 128th Meeting. The detailed report of 

the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

3. COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF -UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

(C.C.S. 406 and 406/1) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said the British Chiefs of Staff had considered the 

US. proposals and saw certain difficulties. The United Chiefs of Staff, if 

organized to exercise executive functions and take decisions, would in effect 

be superimposed on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Only three members of the 

United Chiefs of Staff would be able to sit together at any one time since 

Russia and China were not fighting the same enemies, and the organization 

would be unable to take the wide global outlook which was the function of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff now functioned day 

in and day out and dealt with day-to-day problems of global strategy. He felt 

it better that Russian and Chinese representatives should be asked to attend 

allfuture conferences,such asSEXTANT, to discuss mattersin which they were 

directly concerned. 

ADMIRAL KING felt it important to have ready some possible plan to 

meet future demands for stronger representation. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he felt sure the Combined Chiefs of Staff would 

be put under pressure to alter their present machinery. He agreed that no 

other body could be superimposed above the Combined Chiefs of Staff, since 

such a body could never take major decisions. 

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SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt that a distinction should be 

drawn between the day-to-day work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and the major decisions which were taken at the special conferences. 

He felt that if pressure were applied for permanent representation, the demand 

would be withdrawn if it were suggested that the Chinese or Russian Representatives concerned would have to be able to speak with the full authority of 

their governments. 

SIR JOHN DILL pointed out the special position of the United States 

and Great Britain in that they only were fighting a global war and were completely integrated and united on all fronts. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the CombinedChiefs of Staff should 

not go further than to agree that, for the present, the Russians and Chinese 

should be asked to attend those meetings at future special conferences at 

which their own problems were being discussed. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note of C.C.S. 406 and C.C.S. 406/1. 

b. Agreed: 

(1) That the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not take the initiative 

in putting forward any proposals for machinery to secure closer 

military cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and China. 

(2) That if the U.S.S.R.and/or the Chinese should raise the question, 

the difficulties of and objections to any form of standing United 

Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them. 

It should be pointed out: 

(a) That the CombinedChiefs of Staff in Washington are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Anglo-American 

forces which are closely integrated in accordance with the 

broad policy laid down at the formal conferences such BS 

Casablanca, TRIDENT, QUADRANT, and SEXTANT which 

are convened from time to time; and 

(b) That the U.S.S.R. and/or Chinese Governments will be invited 

to join in any formal conferences which may be convened 

in the future to take part in the discussion of any military 

problems with which they are specifically concerned. 

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4. AGENDA FOR “EUREKA” 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he regarded the EUREKA Conference as 

primarily a politicalmeeting at which certain points would probably be referred 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their advice. He felt that it would be wise 

to consider at this conference the best method of coordinatingRussian military 

effortwith our own, particularly with regard to Russian action during and 

prior to the OVERLORD assault. It was essential that this attack should not 

take place during a lull in the fighting on the Eastern front. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed with this view and pointed out that there 

were several other items which might be raised, including the question of the 

provision of Russian bases for shuttle bombing. He agreed that it was wise to 

have in mind certain special points for discussion but that the work of the 

conference would be inevitably affected by the political discussions. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed : 

a. That no formal agenda need be produced at this stage because the 

military problems to be considered would arise from the political 

discussionswhich would be held at the start of the conference. 

b. That the three main military topics for consideration would appear 

to be: 

(1) The coordination of Russian operations with Anglo-American 

operationsin Europe. 

(2) Turkish action on entry into the war. 

(3) Supplies to Russia. 

(At this point Admiral Mountbatten, General Wheeler, General Wedemeyer, Brigadier Cobb, and Lt. Colonel Dobson entered the meeting, and 

Admiral Leahy withdrew.) 

5. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

GENERAL MARSHALL reported that he had discussed the proposed 

operationsin the Southeast Asia Command with Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek. The Generalissimo disapproved of the present plan, which he felt would 

lead to heavy losses and possibly defeat. The Generalissimo had made the 

following stipulations: Firstly, that there must be an amphibious operation 

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carried out simultaneously with the land attack in Burma. In this connection 

the Generalissimo had suggested action against the Andaman Islands. 

Secondly,that the advances by the columnsas now envisaged in the plan should 

all be aimed at a line running east and west through Mandalay, including the 

occupation of Mandalay by one of the columns. The Generalissimo was satisfied that the Yunnan force should not advance beyond Lashio, its present 

objective. 

He (GENERAL MARSHALL) had pointed out that the plan as explained 

to the Generalissimo was only the first stage of the operations to recapture 

Burma and was a conservative one and much less dangerous than that 

suggested by the Generalissimo. In view of the Generalissimo’s extreme interest 

in the naval situation in the Bay of Bengal, he suggested he be given, as soon 

as possible, the build-up of the British naval forces. Admiral Mountbatten 

should see him and explain his plan, pointing out that it was the first step only 

of a long campaign and that it was in the nature of a safe and conservative 

first step. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that the plan was based on the 

principle that the advance should end at the time that the monsoon would 

break. This would prevent Japanese repercussions. He stressed the point that 

it would be impossible to remain stationary in the positions captured at the 

end of the first stage. It would be essential therefore to have collected sufficient 

resources by October for the next step forward. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in taking the first step we were committing ourselves to the recapture of all Burma. There could be no question of 

holding a halfway line and we should probably have finally to undertake an 

airborne attack on Rangoon and amphibious operations. The alternatives were 

to continue the Burma land campaign to a finish or to give up the campaign 

altogether and endeavor to open the Malacca Straits. It was probably now too 

late to reverse our decision. This decision would, of course, affect the final plan 

for the defeat of Japan, and this must be realized. 

ADMIRAL KING said he felt there was one alternative -to attack 

Bangkok instead. This would sever the Japanese lines of communication into 

Burma. 

In reply to a question, GENERAL MARSHALL confirmed that the 

Generalissimo did not feel that the Chinese force from Yunnan should advance 

further than Lashio. The Generalissimo’sfear with regard to the present plan 

wasthat it would enable the Japanese to attack and defeat in detail the various 

columns, particularly the Chinese. 

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ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN asked for direction from the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff as to what he should say to the Generalissimo with regard to 

future operations after the monsoon. These operations were largely dependent 

on the amount of air transport he could obtain in order to make his columns 

fully mobile. It might be possible to launch an amphibious operation in the 

Prome area and to put inmore long range penetration groups. He again emphasized that at the end of the monsoon it would be essential either to advance, in 

which case sufficient resources would have to be provided, or to retire. To 

remain stationary was impossible. He would have liked to advance as far as 

Mandalay in the present dry season if the resources had been available but the 

lines of communication to Mandalay did not permit this. Further, he had no 

reserve divisions. He hoped to gain his present objectives by early April when 

it might be expected that the monsoon would break. During the monsoon, long 

range penetration groupswould operate. He asked that the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff should consider as early as possible the provision of resources to enable 

him to renew his advances at the end of the next monsoon. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Chinese fear appeared to be 

mainly that they might be left to carry out their Yunnan advance unsupported. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of the above statements. 

6. BOUNDARIES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(C.C.S. 308/7) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered a memorandum 

presented by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the revision of the boundaries 

of the Southeast Asia Command. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the proposalsin the paper dealing 

with the boundaries themselves were acceptable to him but he did not believe 

that a committee sitting in Chungking should deal with political matters in 

Thailand and Siam. He pointed out that the Kra Isthmus was far removed 

from Chungking with which there was no communication. The Siamese and 

the French were not suspicious of the United States or Great Britain acting 

in concekt, but rather of the Chinese themselves. His two main considerations 

were that preoccupational activity by such agencies as the S.O.E.and O.S.S. 

into Thailand and Siam must be permitted from his theater and that political 

questionsshould not be dealt with in Chungking, but either through the ordinarymachinery of Government or perhaps even by theCombinedChiefsof Staff. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer action on C.C.S. 30817. 

(At this point General Shang Chen, Lieutenant General Lin Wei, Vice 

Admiral Yang Hsuan Ch'eng, Lieutenant General Chou Chih Jou, Lieutenant 

General Chu Shih Ming, Major General Tsai Wen Chih, Lieutenant General 

Stilwell,Major General Chennault, Major General Stratemeyer and Brigadier 

General Merrill entered the meeting.) 

7. DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINESE 

GOVERNMENT ON OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST 

ASIA COMMAND 

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked if the Chinese representatives had now had 

time to consider the plan for operations in the Southeast Asia Command put 

forward by Admiral Mountbatten. 

GENERAL SHANG confirmed that he had had time to study the plan. 

He had certain questions and comments. Though there might be differences 

of opinion,these comments were offered in a spirit of helpfulness and he hoped 

they would be accepted in the same spirit. 

With regard to enemy intelligence,there were certain points of difference 

but he did not propose to raise these at the meeting but rather to exchange 

views with the appropriate staff officers. General Shang then put the following 

questions: 

a. How many purely British units would be used in the area? 

b. Would there be any further British units other than those now in 

the area? 

c. Were there any armored or special troops? 

d. What was the fighting experience of the formations which would be 

engaged? 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN and BRIGADIER COBB outlined in considerable detail the nature of the British and Indian formations which would be 

engaged in the coming operations. Further details which might be required 

would be available from the staff of the Southeast Asia Command. 

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GENERAL SHANG then asked for the plan for the employment of the 

Imphal column. ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that this column 

would fight its way through as far as possible. Strong resistance was, however, 

expected in the Kalewa area. He had insufficient air transport to supply this 

column from the air and, therefore, its rate of advance would be limited by the 

line of communications which could be built up behind them. All of the columns 

would advance as far as possible and exploit to the full the success they 

achieved. 

GENERAL SHANG then asked for details with regard to the Indaw 

column. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that Indaw would be captured by the 

50th Indian Parachute Brigade and the 26th Indian Infantry Division would 

then be flown in to hold it. It was essential to hold Indaw since it would serve 

as an essential base for the operations of long range penetration groups 

against the Japanese lines of comunication. An airfield was essential for this 

purpose since insufficient parachutes were available to supply the column by 

this means. The L.R.P. groups were invaluable, not only for harrying lines of 

communication but also for killing Japanese. 

In reply to a further question, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained 

the operations which would take place from Fort Hertz. He pointed out that 

the details of the coordination of these operations with those of General Stilwell’s Yunnan force had not yet worked out. Plans with regard to amphibious 

operations could not yet be disclosed. There would, of course, be a land advance 

in the direction of Akyab which would be exploited to the full. He hoped to 

put an L.R.P. group in by gliders west of the Salween River, commanded by 

an officer well known to the Chins who inhabited this area. 

GENERAL SHANG then made certain comments. The Generalissimo 

had instructed him to emphasize his conviction that the land operations in 

Burma must be synchronized with ngval action and a naval concentration in 

the Bay of Bengal. The Generalissimo would be most disappointed if he was 

not fully apprised, before leaving the Conference, of the intention with regard 

to the strength and time of the arrival of the naval forces in the Bay of Bengal. 

The Generalissimo also considered that in the present plan the columns did 

not advance far enough. He considered that the plan also should cover the 

recapture of all Burma with Rangoon as an objective and the Mandalay-Lashio 

line as the first stage. Lastly the Generalissimo was insistent that, whatever 

the needs of the land campaign,the air lift to China must not drop below 10,000 

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tons a month. Though this might be thought to hinder the land operations, it 

must be remembered that operations in China and in Burma were closely 

related and the pressure exerted from China on Japanese forces must be maintained. The Generalissimo was most insistent with regard to the maintenance 

of the airlift to China. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that he could state definitely that 

by the time that the land operation in Burma started, there would be adequate 

naval forcesin the Bay of Bengal. The details of strength and date of this concentration would, he was sure, be communicated by the Prime Minister to the 

Generalissimo. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the plan for the first stage as 

outlined by General Shang was very similar to the one he had originally considered but logistic difficultiesmade it impossible. His staff could explain these 

difficulties in detail to the Chinese representatives. It was illogical to demand 

in the same breath that this extensive plan should be carried out and a 10,000 

ton air lift to China maintained. He then outlined the relatively small reductions below 10,000 tons which would be necessary over a period to enable his 

present operations to take place. He pointed out that the 10,000 ton lift had 

never, in fact, been reached and was no more than a target. In his opinion, the 

US.Air Force had achieved miracles in reaching their present capacity over 

the “hump.” It was essential that the Chinese should make up their minds 

whether to insist on a 10,000 ton lift to China or whether they wished his present 

operations carried out. The Generalissimo had told him that he would regard 

with sympathy any small reductions below 10,000 tons necessary to enable the 

operations to be undertaken which, in fact, were designed to open the Burma 

Road to China. He must know where he stood. China could not have both the 

10,000tons and the land operations to open the road. 

He would like an explanation with regard to the questions asked as to 

the numbers of British and Indian troops engaged. Did the Chinese Representatives wish to infer that the fighting qualities of the Indian troops were bad? 

This suggestion he most strongly refuted. The Indian divisions had fought 

magnificently in the North African campaigns. If, on the other hand, the 

ChineseRepresentatives wished to imply that British troops were remaining in 

Indiawithout playing an active part in the operations, he wished it to be clearly 

understood once and for all that this was not the case. There were only two 

British divisions not engaged; one of those was training for an amphibiousrole 

and the other was being broken up to form the long range penetration groups. 

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GENERAL SHANG explained that he had asked the questions referred 

to merely in order to have full details of the position and that, of course, he 

wished in no way to criticize the fighting qualities of either the Indian or British 

troops. With regard to tonnage over the “hump,” 10,000 tons per month was 

an absolute minimum, essential to maintain and equip the Chinese Army. Had 

it been possible to obtain it, they would have asked for ten times this amount. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN pointed out that, in order to make the airline safe or to open the Burma Road, it was essential to put everything into the 

present battle. He considered that the Chinese, at this stage,should only equip 

troops which would actually take part in the present battle and that tonnage 

designed to equip or maintain the remainder must be foregone until the battle 

had been won. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the present campaign was 

designed to open the Burma Road, for which the Chinese had asked, and that 

the opening of the Road was for the purpose of equipping the Chinese Army. 

The Chinese must either fight the battle for opening the Road or else call for 

more American planes to increase the air lift over the “hump.” Any further 

increase in those American planes, at this time, he was opposed to. There must 

be no misunderstanding about this. The battle was to be fought to open the 

Burma Road. Unless this road were opened there could be no increase in 

supplies to China at this time since no further aircraft or equipment could be 

provided from the United States due to commitments elsewhere to meet serious 

shortages. 

GENERAL SHANG said that allwere agreed that the Burma Road should 

be opened but in spite of that he felt that 10,000 tons per month was necessary 

for the China area. These supplies would not be hoarded or sold but would be 

used against the enemy. All the 10,000 tons was required for the Yunnan force 

and for the Chinese Air Force. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the requirements for the campaign had been calculated in consultation with General Stilwell and General 

Chennault. These requirements were met by the reduced tonnages he had 

suggested. The figure of 10,000 tons was a purely arbitrary one whereas his own 

were based on exact calculations. The Generalissimo had promised him that he 

would regard minor reductions sympathetically, and he, Mountbatten, hoped 

that he would now do so. 

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GENERAL SHANG said that he was not in a position to give any decision 

with regard to a reduction in the tonnage over the “hump” but would report 

the points which had been made. 

GENERAL STILWELL said that he had been instructed by the Generalissimo to put forward four points which the Generalissimo considered essential: 

Firstly, naval and amphibious operations to be synchronized with the land 

campaign; secondly, that the Indaw and Imphal advances should continue as 

far as Mandalay; thirdly, that the Yunnan force should advance to Lashio; and 

lastly, that the needs of the Chinese Air Force should be met. 

GENERAL CHENNAULT outlined the present and projected strengths 

of the 14th Air Force and the Chinese Air Force, together with the additional 

monthly tonnages required to maintain these forces. The present role of the 

Chinese Air Force was to defend the Szechwan basin, but the Generalissimo 

considered it must be equipped and trained to undertake an offensive role. 

The tonnages required by this plan for the two air forces in China amounted 

to some 10,000 tons per month. 

GENERAL ARNOLD asked how it was proposed to use this 10,000 tons 

which, if all diverted to the air, would leave no lift for the ground forces. 

GENERAL CHENNAULT said that it was proposed to build up the 

Chinese and United States Air Forces equally. The figures he had given were 

the requirements to meet the plan. He was not putting forward any 

recommendations. 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the Chinese Representatives 

should arrange for Admiral Mountbatten to wait on the Generalissimo to 

explain his operations and the considerationswith regard to the airlift to China. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he had believed that the Generalissimo 

earnestly desired that the Burma Road should be opened. This could only be 

done if the air lift to China was reduced. 

GENERAL SHANG undertook to arrange a meeting between Admiral 

Mountbatten and the Generalissimo. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note with interest of the discussion between the Chinese military 

representatives and Admiral Mountbatten on the subject of the 

operationsplanned inBurma in the Southeast Asia Command. 

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b. Noted that the Chinese military representatives undertook to arrange 

a meeting between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo at 

which details of the plan, the reasons underlying it, and the considerable effort involved,could be explained to the Generalissimo as well as 

the implications on the air lift to China. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 130th Meeting 

SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN CONFERENCE ROOM1, THE MENAHOUSE, 

ON THURSDAY,25 NOVEMBER1943 AT 1430 

PRESENT 

United States 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten 

(For Item 1only) 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

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1. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

At the request of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN gave an account of his meeting with the Generalissimo the day before 

on the subject of the plan of operations in the Burma campaign. At this 

meeting the Generalissimo insisted that the alternative plan of campaign 

should be carried out, the plan for which, in fact, the resources were not available and which demanded an additional 535 transport aircraft. 

When Admiral Mountbatten expressed his opinion that these aircraft 

could not be found and insisted that in this event it would be necessary for 

the Generalissimo to give his enthusiastic and personal support to the less 

extensive plan being put into effect, the Generalissimo acceded but said that 

first the Combined Chiefs of Staff must be asked formally to provide the aircraft necessary for the more extensive plan. 

The Generalissimo also insisted that an amphibious operation should 

be carried out at the same time as the land operation in North Burma. 

The Prime Minister gave the Generalissimo the details of the British 

Fleet to be available at which the Generalissimo expressed great pleasure. 

Also,The Prime Minister informed him that the amphibious operation 

would not affect the land battle. 

The Generalissimo made the point that it would, in that it would draw 

off part of the enemy air forces available. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then made it clear that this would act both 

ways and that for an amphibious operation to be carried out at the same tie 

as a land operation would mean that the whole air force would not be made 

available for the land operation. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that possibly 25 aircraft could be made available but that the figure of 535 might be impossible to find without taking 

aircraft away from other operations to which they had already been allotted. 

In regard to the amphibious operation, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that 

the Generalissimo must be told that he must wait for the answer as it depends 

upon progress atSEXTANT.The question of air lift toChina was then discussed. 

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ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the Generalissimo had been told 

that the average air lift over the “hump” for a period of six months during the 

course of the operation would be 8,900 tons per month. 

The Generalissimo had demanded that the full 10,000 tons per month 

should be made available. 

Admiral Mountbatten had made it clear that this was only a target figure 

which, indeed, had not been reached hitherto. 

The Generalissimo had then said that he would deal direct with General 

Somervell in the matter. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he would like the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff to decide that support should not be given to the Chinese Air Force over 

and above that which had already been agreed upon. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN asked that it should be accepted as a principle that if there should be an increase in the transport available over the 

“hump,” the right to use that additional transport should be reserved to the 

Southeast Asia Command. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said this acceptance could not be given without 

reference to the President. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that in view of the important issues 

involved, it was necessary to get a written agreement from the Generalissimo 

regarding the Burma campaign to be carried out before the monsoon in 1944. 

He understood that the Generalissimo would give the campaign his enthusiastic 

support and had accepted the implication of reduced air lift. 

After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed that it would not be possible to find the additional 535 aircraft 

that would be required for the more ambitious plan of campaign in 

North Burma to be adopted, and for the increased tonnage over the 

“hump.” 

b. Took note that Admiral Mountbatten would draw up a paper for 

submission to the Generalissimo with a view to getting the latter’s 

written agreement to the Burma operations now contemplated; this 

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paper tobe submitted for approval to the Combined Chiefs of Staff &s 

soon as possible in view of the impending departure of the Generalissimo from SEXTANT. 

c. Agreed that it would be very desirable if Admiral Mountbatten would 

get a clearance to this paper in view of the dealings he had already had 

with the Generalissimo in the matter. 

2. APPROVAL OF DECISIONS OF C.C.S.129TH MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 129th Meeting. The detailed report of 

the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

3. OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that instructions should be issued to the Combined Staff Planners 

to have the Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan, now under study by 

them, completed prior to the return of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

from Jerusalem. This date should be assumed to be about 1 December. 

4. “OVERLORD’ AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Discussed the subject of “OVERLORD and the Mediterranean” in closed 

session. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 131st Meeting 

SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN CONFERENCE ROOM1,THEMENAHOUSE, 

ON FRIDAY, 26 NOVEMBER 1943 AT 1430

PRESENT 

United States British 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General D. D. Eisenhower, USA 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. B. H. Bieri, USN 

Rear Adm. 0.C. Badger, USN 

Maj. Gen. R. K. Sutherland, USA 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Maj. Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer, USA 

Maj. Gen. R. A. Wheeler, USA 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Maj. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. P. H. Tansey, USA 

Brig. Gen. H. S. Hansell, USA 

Captain A. K. Doyle, USN 

Colonel F. N. Roberts, USA 

Colonel E. O’Donnell, USA 

Colonel R. E. Jenkins, USA 

Captain W. L. Freseman, USN 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Admiral Sir John Cunningham 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder 

General Sir H. Maitland Wilson 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas 

Vice Admiral Sir A. U. Willis 

Major General J. F. M. Whiteley 

Major General R. H. Lewis 

Brigadier R. de Rhe Phillipe 

Captain M. L. Power, RN 

Colonel J. H. Lascelles 

Captain C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier C. S. Sugden 

Air Commodore W. Elliot, RAF 

Brigadier A. Head 

Brigadier J. K. McNair 

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SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(C.C.S. 411 and 411/1) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the amendments to C.C.S. 411 set out in C.C.S. 411/1 and 

directed that the amended paper, subsequently published as C.C.S. 411/2, 

should be forwarded to the Generalissimo via the Supreme Commander 

S.E.A.C. without delay. 

2. REPORTS FROM COMMANDERS IN CHIEF 

a. Report by Commander in Chief, AFHQ 

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked General Eisenhower to give his views with 

particular reference, firstly, to the question of centralization of command in 

the Mediterranean, and secondly, to the best ways and means of prosecuting 

the war in the Mediterranean area. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that with regard to the first question, 

he regarded centralization of command as being absolutely essential. In 

practice, the air and naval commands were already centralized and he considered the whole command must similarly be coordinated and controlled from 

one headquarters. With regard to future operations in the Mediterranean, 

he considered that these had to be looked at under two different assumptions. 

Firstly, that there would be a full-out effort in the Mediterranean throughout 

the winter. On this assumption, taking into consideration the Russian advances 

and the effect of POINTBLANK, Italy was, in his view, the correct place in 

which to deploy our main forces and the objective should be the Valley of the 

PO. In no other area could we so well threaten the whole German structure 

including France, the Balkans and the Reich itself. Here also OUT air would 

be closer to vital objectives in Germany. The seven divisions for OVERLORD 

had all left his theater so that, to implement his suggested course of action, only 

additional landing craft were needed. It was necessary to keep all that he now 

had and certain others would be required for certain phases of his operations. 

His build-up must go on continuously. In addition, it was essential to have 

enough landing craft to insure that one amphibious division can be always 

ready to attack. With regard to the timing of operations, it would be quite 

impossible to reach the Po by 15 January, a date which he believed had 

been suggested. The fighting was particularly bitter and it was necessary to 

keep fresh infantry divisions in the front line. Amphibious operations, it must 

be remembered, depended on weather conditions and therefore the timing of 

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the advances could not be exactly predicted. The next best method of harrying 

the enemy was to undertake operations in the Aegean.There are sufficient forces 

in the Mediterranean to take action in this area provided it is not done unti 

after the Po line has been reached. It could then be undertaken while the 

forces in Italy were reorganizing for thrusts either to the east or west. When 

the Aegean operations were undertaken it would be necessary to bring Turkey 

into the war. The French High Command were most anxious to undertake 

operations into the south of France but these were ruled out since all available 

landing craft were required for the Italian campaign. 

Turning to operations in the Mediterranean, based on the assumption 

that only limited means were available, GENERAL EISENHO WER considered 

that only the line north of Rome could be achieved and that after that he would 

have to maintain a strategic defensive with strong local offensive action. Lack 

of landing craft would prevent him from amphibious turning movements 

designed to cut off enemy forces. The time to turn to the Aegean would be when 

the line north of Rome had been achieved. German reactions to our occupation 

of the islands had clearly proved how strongly they resented action on our part 

in this area. From here the Balkans could be kept aflame; Ploesti would be 

threatened and the Dardanelles might be opened. Sufficient forces should 

be used for operations in the Aegean and no unnecessary risks run. He considered that the earlier British occupation of the islands had been right and 

justified, but the position was now different and strong German reactions 

could be expected. In either of the two assumptions it was essential to bring 

Turkey into the war at the moment that the operations in the Aegean were 

undertaken. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the date of 15 January had been 

suggested, not for the capture of the Po line but for that of the Pisa-Rd 

line. He asked for General Eisenhower’s views with regard to action in 

Yugoslavia. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that on the assumption that he would 

advance to the Po line, he would propose action to establish small garrisons in 

the islands on the eastern coast of the Adriatic from which thrusts as far north 

as possible could be made into Yugoslavia and the Patriots furnished with 

arms and equipment. If only the Rome line was reached, it would not be poSsible to thrust as far up the Adriatic as he would have liked. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER then outlined the program for the build-up of 

his forces in Italy. He confirmed that the ground forces available to him should 

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be sufficient to reach the Po line. His present strength was the maximum which 

the poor lines of communication could maintain. It must be remembered that 

there was no good port north of Naples until Leghorn was reached. With regard 

to his air force build-up, GENERAL EISENHOWER said he would like it clearly 

understood that all of this was not for use in POINTBLANK but much of it 

took an active part in assisting the land battle. This air force, based in Italy, 

was twice as effective as if it had remained in Tunisia. Only the initial build-up 

of the air force was a costly business since, once established, six groups could 

be maintained for the same tonnage as two divisions. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER stressed the vital importance of continuing 

the maximum possible operations in an established theater since much time 

was invariably lost when the scene of action was changed, necessitating, as it 

did, the arduous task of building up a fresh base. 

With regard to supply of equipment to the Yugoslavian guerrillas, one 

officer had now been placed in charge of these operations and arms captured 

in North Africa and Sicily were being sent in. Italian equipment captured in 

Italy was at present being used to equip one Italian parachute division, which 

was believed to be of good fighting quality, and a further division would possibly also be equipped. He believed that all possible equipment should be sent 

to Tito since Mikhailovitch’sforces were of relatively little value. 

SIR JOHN CUNNINGHAM agreed that everything in our power should 

be done to support Tito, who had some hundred thousand men under his control. 

The Germans would have great difficulties operating against the guerrillas 

since their lateral communicationswere immensely difficult and there was only 

one poor railway. They would have largely to supply their forces by sea. It 

would be impossible, therefore, for them to rapidly concentrate against Tito’s 

forces. He believed that by air and naval action, their seaborne lines of communication could be cut and, in fact,he hoped shortly to be operating destroyers 

in the Venice-Trieste-Pola area. He questioned whether it would be possible or 

right to continue to supply Italian equipment since this was rapidly running 

short. 

AIR MARSHAL TEDDER said that the present system of air operations 

into the Balkans worked reasonably well. The tactical commander in Italy 

was given his targets from the Middle East. He agreed with Sir Charles Portal 

that when the joint staff under the officer responsible for operations in the 

Balkans had been set up, coordination of effort would be more satisfactory. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he believed that given 50 percent 

good weather, he would, once his air forces were firmly established in Italy, 

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be able to almost completely cut the seven German lines of communication 

into Italy and keep them cut. 

b. Report by Commanders in Chief, Middle East 

GENERAL WILSON, referring to operations in the Aegean, said that it 

was essential to cut the German iron ring which included Rhodes, Scarpanto, 

Crete, and Greece. Rhodes was the key to the situation and to capture this, 

additional equipment would be required from the western Mediterranean. Once 

Rhodes had fallen, these resources could be returned and the remainder of the 

operations in the Aegean carried out with the resources available in the Middle 

East. All of this was based on the assumption that Turkey had entered the 

war on our side. For Rhodes, one British division including two assault loaded 

brigades with previous amphibious experience would be required. These couId 

be withdrawn after the capture of Rhodes. The additional forces required included one armored brigade and one parachute brigade, which were available 

from the Middle East. He considered that Turkey should be asked to take 

other islands of the Dodecanese. This he felt should be within their power with 

the possible exception of Lemnos, which the Germans were using as a base and 

had reinforced. The commitment to Turkey to protect them against air attack, 

i.e., Operation HARDIHOOD, could be met, with the exception of certain 

administrative units, without affecting Aegean operations. 

AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS said that he would require 

some 17 to 20 squadrons and these could be provided with certain assistance 

which Air Marshal Tedder could provide. With this, Smyrna and Constantinople could be protected, Rhodes captured, and convoys to the Dardanelles 

given adequate cover. He considered that the capture of Rhodes was a prerequisite to running convoys since without it unacceptably heavy losses must 

be expected. 

Most of the airports required in Turkey were already completed with 

the exception of two in the neighborhood of Rhodes, on which steel mats were 

now being laid. Negotiations were being undertaken with the Turks to enable 

us to put into Turkey the necessary equipment to provide R.D.F. cover and 

operation rooms. Only one of the airfields was situated to the west of the 

Bosphorus, and he believed the Turkish forces, including the two divisions in 

the neighborhood of airdromes opposite Rhodes were adequate to protect them 

even against airborne attack. 

GENERAL WILSON stressed the importance of action in support of the 

guerrillas as far north as possible in Yugoslavia. The islands on the eastern 

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Adriatic would be a valuable stepping stone to the mainland and would assist 

in the maintenance of guerrillas. Operations in northern Yugoslavia would 

constitute a serious threat to the Germans’ rear. 

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, GENERAL WILSON said that 

the Turks had not got the necessary resources for a full-scale amphibious attack but that he believed that with the assistance of air attack and seaborne 

bombardment and by using local craft and small landing craft, some of which 

might have to be provided from the western Mediterranean, the Turks could 

stage the short shore-to-shore assault required for the capture of certain 

of the islands. 

With regard to Rumania, GENERAL WILSON said that he was in touch 

with resistance groups and that a wireless station had been established in 

Bucharest. The resistance groups, however, were fearful of the Germans and 

were taking little action. His knowledge of resistance in Bulgaria was small but 

he believed this resistance to be growing. He had discussed with General 

Donovan the possibility of further efforts being made to establish contact with 

this country. 

In reply to a question by General Arnold, AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO 

DOUGLAS said that the airfields in Turkey would be ample for the forces he 

was able to deploy, and consisted of about eight fighter airdromes and six 

bomber airdromes. Sites had been selected at a reasonable distance back from 

the coast and all were equipped with hard surfaces except those in the neighborhood of Rhodes, on which work was now in hand. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note with interest of the statements of the Commanders in Chief, 

North African and Middle East Theaters, and of the resulting discussion. 

(At this point General D. D. Eisenhower, Admiral Sir John Cunningham, 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, General Sir H. Maitland Wilson, Air Chief 

Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, Vice Admiral Sir A. U. Willis, Major General 

J. F. M. Whiteley, Major General R. H. Lewis, Brigadier R. de Rhe Phillipe, 

Captain M. L. Power, R.N., Colonel J. H. Lascelles and Colonel R. E. Jenkins, 

U.S.A. withdrew from the meeting.) 

3. APPROVAL OF DECISIONS OF C.C.S. 130TH MEETING 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 130th Meeting. The detailed record of the 

meeting was also accepted subject to minor amendments. 

4. “OVERLORD AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 

A. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1944-EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 30013) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the “Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1944-Europe,” presented by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 30013 (SEXTANT). 

B. “OVERLORD” AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 

(C.C.S. 409, 410, and 387) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff tentatively 

accepted the proposals for action in the Mediterranean contained in paragraph 

6 of C.C.S. 409 as a basis for discussion with the Soviet Staff. 

It was the understanding of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the 

British proposals would include the opening of the Dardanelles and the capture 

of Rhodes for which the retention of landing craft in the Mediterranean waa 

essential but that the retention of these landing craft would in no way interfere with the carrying out of Operation BUCCANEER. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that BUCCANEER would not be interfered with provided the date for OVERLORD was put back. The British Chiefs 

of Staff had prepared a detailed examination of the relationship of OVERLORD, 

Mediterranean and Aegean operations, and BUCCANEER. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

tentatively accepted the British proposals for negotiations with the Soviets. He 

understood that these proposals implied the capture of the Rimini-Pisa line, 

the capture of Rhodes and the retention of the 68 landing craft until its capture. 

He understood that Operation BUCCANEER would not be interfered with and 

that further discussion would take place on these proposals when the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff returned to SEXTANT. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that if the capture of Rhodes and Rome and 

Operation BUCCANEER were carried out, the date of OVERLORD must go 

back. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he quite understood this point. He 

was of the opinion that it was essential to do Operation BUCCANEER, for the 

reasons that firstly, not only were the forces ready but the operation was 

acceptable to the Chinese; secondly, it was of vital importance to operations 

in the Pacific; and, thirdly, for political reasons it could not be interfered with. 

In the course of a full discussion the following points were made: 

a. SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it might be necessary to consider 

earnestly the possibility of putting off Operation BUCCANEER since by so 

doing the full weight of our resources could be brought to bear on Germany, 

thus bringing the war as a whole to an end at the earliest possible date. The 

matter should be looked at from a purely strategical aspect. 

b. SIR CHARLES PORTAL felt that the Russians might well say that not 

only did they agree with the proposed course of action outlined by the British 

Chiefs of Staff and tentatively accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

but also that they required Operation OVERLORD at the earliest possible 

date. In this case we must surely consider the possibility of putting off 

Operation BUCCANEER. He did not believe this operation essential to the 

land campaign in Burma. 

c. ADMIRAL KING considered it unsound to bring back landing craft 

from BUCCANEER. In his view the land campaign in Burma was not complete without Operation BUCCANEER. Our object was to make use of China 

and her manpower and the delay of a year in achieving this object must 

most certainly delay the end of the war as a whole. 

d. GENERAL MARSHALL stressed the US. contribution to the war in 

Europe. He believed that the suggestion that putting off the Operation 

BUCCANEER would shorten the war was an overstatement. The United 

States Chiefs of Staff were most anxious that BUCCANEER should be 

undertaken. They had gone far to meet the British Chiefs of Staff views but 

the postponement of BUCCANEER they could not accept. 

e. ADMIRAL LEAHYsaid he wished it clearly understood that the United 

States Chiefs of Staff were not in a position to agree to the abandonment 

of Operation BUCCANEER. This could only be decided by the President and 

the Prime Minister. 

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(At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff continued the meeting in 

closed session.) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean as outlined in C.C.S. 387, and that this unification of command should be 

made effective forthwith. 

b. Tentatively accepted paragraph 6 b, c, d, e, and f (modified) of C.C.S. 

409 as a basis for discussion with the Soviets, subject to the following 

understandings and modifications : 

(1) That these proposals necessitate a delay in the target date for 

OVERLORD. 

(2) That paragraph 6 e includes the capture of Rhodes and the 

retention of certain landing craft in the Mediterranean. 

(3) That in paragraph 6 f the words “do everything possible to” in 

the second line be deleted. 

(4) That the United States Chiefs of Staff could not accept the 

abandonment of the BUCCANEER operation; also that if further 

discussion should show the postponement of BUCCANEER to be 

desirable, this would need to be taken up with the President and 

the Prime Minister. 

c. Took note of the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff on the 

effect of weather on Operation OVERLORD. (C.C.S. 410). 

5. COLLABORATION WITH THE U.S.S.R. 

(C.C.S. 407) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted C.C.S. 407, with certain amendments as a basis for the agenda 

at the forthcoming conference with the U.S.S.R. [The amended paper, 

in which are incorporated the conclusions on this subject reached at 

C.C.S. 129th Meeting, has been published as C.C.S. 407 (Revised).] 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S 132d Meeting 

EUREKA CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETING HELD IN THE BRITISHLEGATION, TEHRAN, IRAN, 

ON TUESDAY, 30 NOVEMBER1943 AT 0930 

PRESENT 

United States British 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Captain W. L. Freseman, USN Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE began by saying that the problem was to arrive at 

an agreed basis for discussion with the Soviets at this afternoon’s Plenary 

Meeting. He then went on to consider operations in the Mediterranean from 

west to east. It had always been agreed that some operation should take place 

against the South of France. In Italy he felt that it was agreed we should not 

stay in the position now reached and must advance farther. For political and 

other reasons, it was important to get Rome, and he thought it was probably 

generally accepted that we should advance as far as the Pisa-Rimini line. For 

operations in Italy it was clear that landing craft would be wanted. General 

Eisenhower had asked for the retention of the landing craft due to return to 

OVERLORD until 15 January. This would have a repercussion on the OVERLORD date. 

In Yugoslavia it was important to give all possible help to the Partisans 

and there was general agreement regarding this. As regards Turkey and 

operations in the Aegean, agreement was much more in question. If Turkey 

were to be brought into the war, it would be desirable to open the Dardanelles 

and operations in the Aegean would be necessary. If Turkey were not to come 

into the war, the operations in the Aegean would not be called for. 

If examination showed the operation against the South of France to be 

feasible, sufficient landing craft might be provided for the purpose. The 

sequence would then be Italian campaign, Rhodes (only if Turkey comes into 

the war), South of France, landing craft from Rhodes returning in time for 

the South of France. The date for the South of France operation would therefore be affected by the undertaking of the Rhodes operation. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the problem seemed to be a straightforward 

one of the date of OVERLORD. The Russians wanted OVERLORD on a fixed 

date in May. They also wanted an expedition against the South of France at the 

same time, or perhaps a little earlier or a little later. As far as he could see, 

the date of OVERLORD was the only point confusing the issue. If this matter 

was settled, everything would be settled. If OVERLORD was to be done by the 

date originally fixed, other operations could not be carried out. It was entirely 

agreed, he felt, that the operations in Italy must be carried on. On the U.S.side 

it was felt that this could be done without interfering with OVERLORD and, 

indeed, the U.S.Planners were of the opinion that the operation against the. 

South of France could be undertaken as well, without interfering with OVERLORD. If the landing craft were to be kept in Italy until 15 January, the U.S. 

calculation was that they could still be back in time for OVERLORD. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this was not thought by the British to be 

the case. Landing craft would need repair and there were also training 

demands. According to British calculations, even the date of 15 December for 

returning landing craft to OVERLORD was rather tight and it would be a 

great help if US. repair facilities could be made available for the British landing craft returning. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then said that the paper submitted the day 

before by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the operation against the South 

of France had been produced at Cairo but was based on logistic and other data 

prepared in detail before SEXTANT. He said that four questions had been put 

tc~the US. Planners. Firstly, assuming that the operations against the South of 

France, set out in the paper in question, were undertaken, could OVERLORD 

take place on 15 May? In this connection the answer had been that, with the 

possible exception of transport aircraft, this date would still be possible for 

OVERLORD. There was reasonable expectation that the transport aircraft 

would be available from elsewhere. It was possible, moreover, that an airborne 

division might be brought from the U.S. by cargo ship infiltration, thus making 

it unnecessary to bring an airborne division from the United Kingdom. 

As regards the timing of the operation against the South of France, he 

eonsidered that it should not be carried out more than two to three weeks 

before OVERLORD. 

The second question asked the US. Planners was how long the 68 LSTs 

could remain in the Mediterranean and still arrive in time for an OVERLORD 

date of 15May. The U.S. calculation was that the landing craft must be released 

2% months before OVERLORD in order both that the necessary repair of craft 

could be effected and that the craft might be available for training purposes. 

"his gave a date of 1March. The time for training might be reduced by using 

more fully the craft already in the United Kingdom. It was clear that all US. 

resources must be used to assist in the repair of the landing craft returning 

late from the Mediterranean. 

The US. calculation was that, after allowing for losses, the landing craft 

remaining in the Mediterranean after the departure of the 68 LSTs for OVERLORD would be sufficient to lift 27,000 troops and 1,500 vehicles. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the British felt that 100 days 

were necessary instead of the 2% months calculated by the US. This put 15 

February as the latest date to which the landing craft could be retained. 

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ADMIRAL KING agreed and said that therefore it should be safe to leave 

the landing craft in the Mediterranean until 1 February. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that this also might allow for some 

small refits to be carried out in the Mediterranean before returning to the 

United Kingdom. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then went on to the third question which had 

been asked the US. Planners, which was that if the Rhodes operation had to 

be undertaken as well as the operation against the South of France, how would 

OVERLORD be affected? It was difficult to get an answer to this question. In 

the first place, the dates were quite uncertain. Rome had not yet been taken 

and the date of the amphibious operation in Italy must be dependent on land 

operations. Moreover, in an amphibious operation such as might be carried 

out in the Italian campaign maintenance across the beaches might be 

necessary, which would delay accordingly the availability of landing craft. It 

was understood, however, that the amphibious operation contemplated was 

such that the main forces would join up quickly with it. Assuming that the 

Rome operation would have been completed by the end of January, the landing 

craft required for Rhodes could be in the Middle East by 15 February; the 

Rhodes operation could take place then on 21 March. Allowing a month �or the 

operation, the landing craft could return to Corsica on 21 April, arriving 30 

April. A month would probably be necessary for the repair of landing craft 

before the operation against the South of France which could, therefore, be 

undertaken at an earlier stage -15 July. Moreover, the total landing craft 

available would be barely sufficient for operations against the South of France, 

and this was not allowing for any losses that might occur. 

The Planners were also asked how long OVERLORD would be delayed if 

the 68 LST’s were never returned to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD. The 

answer to this was that these craft represented a three months’ production and, 

in consequence, three months’ delay to OVERLORD. As the landing craft could 

be made available alternatively only by withdrawing them from allocations to 

the Pacific, operations there would also be put back by three months. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the only landing craft that had not been 

mentioned were those allocated to Operation BUCCANEER, in which 20 LST‘s 

and 12 LSI(L)’swere involved. He then read certain extracts from NAF 492, 

giving General Eisenhower’s views on operations against the South of France. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL expressed himself as being opposed to an early 

date for the attack against the South of France in advance of the OVERLORD 

date. He was more inclined to a simultaneous operation. 

ADMIRAL XING considered that D-day should be the same for both 

operations and that this would provide a much better basis for planning. This 

met with general agreement. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE then referred to the U.S.paper on the operation 

against the South of France and said that the paper would need careful 

examination as to the number of divisions that were available from Italy for 

such an operation, and the number that would need to be retained for the 

operations in Italy. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the figure of four British divisions 

represented garrison requirements in Italy outside the immediate zone of 

operations. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE thought the figure of 10 divisions and an amphibious lift of 2 divisions, available from Italy for the South of France operation, 

to be too high. 

ADMIRAL KING stressed the importance of insuring that landing craft 

were employed for the purposes for which they were designed and not diverted 

to other uses for convenience. This had happened in the Pacific and no doubt 

also in the Mediterranean and it was necessary to be firm in view of the importance of the landing craft factor. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM agreed and said that once the assault 

was over and ports were open, all landing craft should be withdrawn for refit for 

the next operation. It was true that although in the Mediterranean the 

Commanders were alive to the situation and had tightened up matters considerably, there was still some misuse of landing craft. 

In this connection, SIR CHARLES PORTAL referred to the tendency to 

be too conservative in the build-up. He referred particularly to the large stocks 

that had been accumulated in Sicily as an insurance. Probably there was a 

tendency to over-insure. 

There was general agreement on the above considerations and some 

discussion ensued in which two extremes were quoted, one, in which the 8th 

Army landing in Sicily had taken a bare minimum of transport and in 

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consequence had been delayed in their subsequent advance; and the other, in 

&heplanning for OVERLORD in which so many vehicles had been put down to 

accompany the leading formations, that the whole operation would tend to 

be hampered thereby. 

As regards relief work, ADMIRAL KING considered that it was necessary 

to be hard-hearted and to cut out anything that was being taken across beaches 

which was not absolutely necessary. There was general agreement regarding 

this. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then referred to the aspect of fighter cover for 

the operation against the South of France. He said he was not satisfied that the 

range from the available air bases would allow of adequate air support and 

thought the matter would need to be examined carefully. In AVALANCHE two 

alternative plans had been considered and one of these had had to be turned 

down because fighter cover could not be insured. Salerno had been 180 miles 

from available fighter strips in North Sicily. Marseilles was 190 miles from the 

nearest part of Corsica and 225 miles from the eastern side on which the best air 

bases were sited. We might want to go farther than Marseilles. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY questioned as to why we should need to go as far west 

as Marseilles. There were good beaches at various places along the coast. 

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed that the whole question would have to be 

studied very carefully. He stated that the estimates in the U.S. draft paper on 

operations against Southern France had been based on the use of long-range 

fighter aircraft. 

ADMIRAL KING then asked whether he was correct in understanding 

that, should all other operations be dropped, the landing craft would not be 

available for OVERLORD to take place on 1 May. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE replied that this was the case and that if the landing 

craft due to return to OVERLORD did not leave the Mediterranean until 15 

January, 1 June would be the earliest date possible for OVERLORD because 

of the need for repairing the landing craft and using them for training purposes. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the U.S. figures did not agree with 

this and that if the landing craft were retained until 15 February, OVERLORD 

would still be possible by 15 May. 

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ADMIRAL KING said that any US.facilities available for the repair of 

landing craft would be placed at the disposal of the Commander of OVERLORD 

for this urgent task. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then made the suggestion that if an amphibious 

lift of one division were left in Italy until the capture of Rome and one division 

with its amphibious lift were kept mounted in the Middle East until the middle 

of February, by then it would be known whether Turkey would come in. If 

Turkey did not come in, the division could be dismounted and the landing craft 

made available for OVERLORD. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said, in reply to this, that he felt that the landing 

craft that would be required for this division for the Aegean were already being 

used for the Italian campaign. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that if the proposed operation were to take place 

after 15 February, this would surely delay OVERLORD. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed but suggested that we might have two 

alternative dates for OVERLORD -the one if Turkey were to come into the 

war, and the other if Turkey were not to come in. 

ADMIRAL KING made it clear that whereas the operations against 

Rhodes and the Dodecanese were contingent upon Turkey entering the war and 

were not concerned with OVERLORD, the operations against the South of 

France and in Italy were completely interlocked with OVERLORD. It should 

be possible for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to work out roughly on these bases 

two alternative dates for OVERLORD, as suggested by Sir Charles Portal. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL remarked that while he agreed with Admiral 

King, he could not accept that the entry of Turkey into the war would have 

no effect on OVERLORD. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then said that disregarding the question of postponing the date for OVERLORD and considering the matter of landing craft 

only, it seemed to him that the suggestion of Sir Charles Portal would involve 

the dividing of the resources of landing craft available in the Mediterranean 

so that no real strength would be left anywhere. This, he thought, was serious 

as it would be splitting the most potent means of influencing the war. It would 

reduce correspondingly the effort in Italy and might have serious consequences. 

General Eisenhower’s views were different from those expressed formerly, and 

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he now talked of a two division amphibious lift whereas formerly he had only 

asked for one. 

GENERAL MARSHALL felt, moreover, that there was the chance that 

the landing craft so withdrawn to the Aegean, to which Sir Charles Portal 

referred, might never be used. He said that he agreed completely with the 

Prime Minister as to the importance of keeping a tighter hold on supply. There 

was general agreement in this connection. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the OVERLORD plan should be coordinated with the plans for a Russian offensive. No Russian offensive had ever 

started before the end of May. Marshal Stalin clearly, and quite reasonably, 

would like us to draw the German strength away from the Russian front before 

the Russian offensive started. 

A general discussion then ensued as to the answer that could be given 

to the Russians regarding the date on which it would be possible to undertake 

OVERLORD. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that unless we could give the Russians a firm 

date for OVERLORD, there would be no point in proceeding with the Conference. As far as he could see, we could do OVERLORD in May if we did not 

undertake other operations. Sir Alan Brooke said that he did not think that 

1 May would be possible although 1 June might be. This brought us back to 

the BUCCANEER operation to which, of course, there was a political background. He stiI1thought that it would be better to use the landing craft allocated 

to BUCCANEER for this main effort against the Germans. In response to a 

question of Admiral Leahy as to whether the BUCCANEER landing craft would 

help OVERLORD at all, SIR ALAN BROOKE replied that it would, as it could 

be used both in the Aegean and against the South of France. Moreover, the 

amphibious lift for OVERLORD was itself all too small. It was even smaller than 

it had been at Salerno. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that this affected the validity of the whole of 

the OVERLORD plan. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that if OVERLORD were delayed it 

would make more landing craft available. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL remarked that whatever operations were undertaken in the European theater, the OVERLORD operation would undoubtedly 

be helped indirectly. 

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SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that unless BUCCANEER landing 

craft were to be used, it would not be possible, except at the expense of OVERLORD, to have more than a one-division lift for the South of France operation, 

a lift which, in his opinion, was not sdcient. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the Prime Minister had laid great stress on 

the importance of keeping actively employed all forces now in the Mediterranean. He agreed with this in principle but drew attention to the 2Yz months' 

inactivity that would ensue for 35 divisions in the United Kingdom if the 

OVERLORD date was postponed from 1May to 15 July. He had always felt that 

the OVERLORD operation was the way to break the back of Germany. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM questioned the 2% months referred to 

by Admiral King, saying that the earliest date possible for OVERLORD would 

be 1June. Both ADMIRAL KING and ADMIRAL LEAHY then said that this 

came to them as a complete surprise as 1May was the date agreed upon. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked Sir Alan Brooke whether he believed that the 

conditions laid down for OVERLORD would ever arise unless the Germans had 

collapsed beforehand. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he firmly believed that they would and 

that he foresaw the conditions arising in 1944,provided the enemy were engaged 

on other fronts as well. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was still in the balance as to whether 

we would overcome the German increase in fighter production. The success 

of the combined bomber offensive had not been as complete as had been hoped 

for. The Germans were making tremendous efforts and were aiming at a 

Droduction of 1,600 to 1,700 fighters per month. If they succeeded, the OVERLORD operation might be faced by a very strong fighter force acting against it. 

GENERAL ARNOLD then said how important it was to examine carefully the whole question of air strengths throughout the world in order to 

ensure that our great air superiority could be applied to best advantage. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL expressed his opinion that from the air point of 

view a June or July date for OVERLORD would seem to be better, as regards 

weather, than one in May. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Russians would not refuse a 1June 

date for OVERLORD but that we would have to be firm about it. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the date would have to be fixed earlier 

than 1 June because of the need to retain landing craft for Italy until 15 

January. It would be possible to fix a RANKIN date for 1May when probably 

an attack could be made across the Channel with about two-thirds the strength 

now envisaged for OVERLORD. It was generally felt that the Russians would 

not understand the RANKIN operation if it were put to them. He reminded the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff that 1 May had been settled at TRIDENT as the 

date for OVERLORD by splitting the difference between the U.S. suggestion 

of 1April and the British suggestion of 1June. It had not been based on any 

particular strategic consideration. 

GENERAL ISMAY said that at Moscow the Russians had been told that 

the operation was scheduled for some time in May. They had not been told 

1May. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that we might tell the Russians that OVERLORD could be undertaken not later than 1June but that we would expect, in 

that case, the Russian offensive to take place also not later than 1June. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM agreed that 1June could be adhered to. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that Marshal Stalin’s statement that the 

Russians would enter the war against Japan when Germany had been defeated, 

seemed to alter the whole relative importance of the war in Europe and the 

Pacific, and to shift the emphasis rather towards Europe for the time being. 

There was some further discussion in which the dependence of the 

attack upon moon and tide and weather conditions was considered, and also the 

desirability of giving a bracket of dates instead of a fixed target date for the 

operation. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed: 

a. That we should continue to advance in Italy to the Pisa-Rimini line. 

(This means that the 68 LST’s which are due to be sent from the 

Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD must be kept 

in the Mediterranean until 15 January.) 

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b. That an operation shall be mounted against the South of France on 

as big a scale as landing craft permit. For planning purposes D-day 

to be the same as OVERLORD D-day. 

c. To recommend to the President and Prime Minister respectively that 

we should inform Marshal Stalin that we will launch OVERLORD 

during May, in conjunction with a supporting operation against the 

South of France on the largest scale that is permitted by the landing 

craft available at that time. 

NOTE: The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed to inform 

each other before the Plenary Meeting this afternoon of the 

decisions of the President and Prime Minister respectively on 

the above point. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were unable to reach agreement 

on the question of operations in the Aegean until they had 

received further instructions from the President and Prime 

Minister respectively. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 133d Meeting 

SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETING HELD IN CONFERENCE ROOM1,THEMENAHOUSE,

ON FRIDAY, 3 DECEMBER 1943 AT 1430

PRESENT 

United States British 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Admiral E. J.King, USN Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr.,USN 

Rear Adm. 0.C. Badger, USN 

Rear Adm. B. H. Bieri, USN 

Maj. Gen. R. K. Sutherland,USA 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. F. N. Roberts, USA 

Captain A. K. Doyle, USN 

Captain W. L. Freseman, USN 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Captain C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier C. S. Sugden 

Air Commodore W. Elliot, RAF 

Brigadier J. K. McNair 

Colonel A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. APPROVAL OF DECISIONS OF C.C.S.131ST AND 1320 MEETINGS 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 131st meeting and the conclusions of 

the 132d meeting, subject to the insertion of the words “via the Supreme 

Commander, S.E.A.C.” after the word “Generalissimo” in the conclusion 

of Item 1of C.C.S. 131st meeting. The detailed reports of the meetings 

were also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

2. IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE “EUREKA” 

CONFERENCE 

(C.C.S.Memorandum for Information No. 165) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should 

consider the military conclusions reached at the EUREKA Conference as set out 

in the enclosure to C.C.S. Memorandum for Information Number 165, and 

consider the implications of these decisions and the action necessary. The 

military conclusions were then examined in turn. 

(1) Partisans 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that a directive should be issued to 

General Eisenhower on the lines of this conclusion. There were certain pinb 

which should be covered. He understood that General Eisenhower had set up, 

or was setting up, a commander with a joint staff to deal with the whole question 

of supplies to Yugoslavia on a regular basis. There was also the question of the 

supply of equipment. He understood from General Eisenhower that captured 

Italian equipment was running short. It might be better to give this equipment 

to the Partisans who already had weapons and ammunition of Italian make 

ahd would use the equipment to good advantage, and to arm Italian troop8 

where necessary with Allied weapons. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that these points might form a part of the 

general directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean area. 

After further discussion, it was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners 

should, as soon as possible, produce a short directive to the Supreme Commander dealing with the question of supplies to the Partisans. 

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(2) Turkey 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that all the necessary preparations were going 

forward in anticipation of Turkey entering the war. 

ADMIRAL KING said he felt that there were implications in this 

decision which should be considered. For instance, how many squadrons of 

aircraft and how many anti-aircraft regiments would be required to support 

Turkey? 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the details of the commitments were 

set out in C.C.S. 418. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered that paper, at least in part, 

out of date. For instance, a target date of 15 July was regarded as a possibility 

for OVERLORD. 

(C.C.S. 418, “Entry of Turkey into the War” was later considered in 

closed session.) 

(3) Russian Declaration of War on Bulgaria 

It was generally agreed that there were no particular implications to 

this conclusion. 

(4) OVERLORD and Operatims Against the South of France 

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt the first step in considering the implications 

of this conclusion should be that the whole landing craft situation must be 

examined in order to discover from where the necessary landing craft for the 

South of France assault could be obtained. He suggested that the Combined 

Staff Planners should examine this at once on the basis that the OVERLORD 

operation took place during May and that a two-divisional assault took place 

against the South of fiance. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the decision at EUREKA was only 

that the operation against the South of France should be undertaken in as 

great a strength as the availability of landing craft permitted and that there 

was no decision as to the strength of the assaulting force. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he regarded a two-divisional assault as 

the minimum which could be accepted. The attack must be planned with 

sufficient strength to make it successful. 

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SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that the Combined Staff Planners 

must be given an agreed basis on which to consider the landing craft situation. 

The British Chiefs of Staff felt and hoped that the United States Chiefs of 

Staff agreed with them, that an assault with less than two divisions would 

be asking for failure. He reminded the Committee that the plan which had 

been considered at EUREKA envisaged something in the neighborhood of a 

two-divisional assault with an advance up the Rhone by some ten divisions. 

If undertaken with less strength, the operation could only be in the nature 

of a diversion. It appeared that in order to carry out a successful operation 

in the South of France, other operations would have to suffer. Unless the 

Planners were given an indication from the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the 

strength of the assault, they would probably do no more than report that this 

operation was impossible of successful accomplishment. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that the Planners should be told that this 

operation should be carried out without interference with Operation 

OVERLORD. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the problem might be approached in two 

ways: The Planners could be directed to study and report on the lift possible 

with the landing craft available; the other method was to begin with an 

arbitrary number of divisions and determine whether resources could be 

made available for a lift of this size. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that in considering the availability 

of resources, all other operations must be taken into consideration except 

OVERLORD. He considered that if no strength was set, the Planners could 

not examine the availability of resources properly. He suggested that they be 

told, firstly, to report on the required strength for the assault and, secondly, 

to put forward proposals from where the landing craft resources to lift this 

assault force could be made available. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he believed there was no record in the 

EUREKA discussions with regard to a two-division assault. As far as his 

recollection went, the paper, which had been hastily prepared, showed that 

without interfering with other operations, there was an amphibious lift for 

some 37,000 personnel . 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the conclusion at EUREKA 

implied a definite limitation of resources. What was required was a report on 

the landing craft necessary for a successful operation against the South of 

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France without affecting Operation OVERLORD. This operation could not 

be planned on a lavish scale. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that one hypothesis might be that 

the necessary resources could be found by giving up the Andaman operations. 

It was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should be directed in 

collaboration, as necessary, with the Combined Administrative Committee, to 

examine the agreed operation against the South of France on the following 

premises: 

4. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two 

assault divisions, and; 

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of 

OVERLORD. 

This report to include a statement showing where the necessary resources 

particularly in assault shipping and landing craft might be found. 

(5) Coordination with the Russian Stag 

It was generally agreed that coordination of effort with the Russian 

Staff should be achieved through the U.S. and British Missions in Moscow. 

It was suggested that it might be desirable that experts should be sent 

to Moscow from Washington and London in order to deal with the problem 

of deception. 

3. DRAFT AGENDA FOR THE REMAINDER OF “SEXTANT 

CONFERENCE 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the future subjects for discussion 

might be grouped in blocks under main headings. He presented for consideration, a draft agenda set out on this principle. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY then explained that he believed the United States 

Chiefs of Staff would have to leave Cairo on the morning of Monday, 6 December, or possibly on the morning of Sunday, 5 December. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that it would be a calamity if 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff broke up without fully agreeing on all the many 

points still to be resolved. 

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ADMIRAL LEAHY said he saw no hope of postponing their departure 

after these dates. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then suggested an agenda designed to deal 

only with the essential points before the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed: 

a. That all but the most essential items should be excluded from the 

SEXTANT Agenda. 

b. That the following should be the order of priority in which they 

should be dealt with: 

(1) Entry of Turkey into the war. 

(2) Integration of the US. Air Command-directive to Supreme 

Commander, Mediterranean Theater. 

(3) Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan. 

(4) RANKIN -discussion only. 

(5) Operations against the South of France. 

(6) Relation of resources to requirements. 

(7) Final Report. 

(At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into closed session.) 

4. ENTRY OF TURKEY INTO THE WAR 

(C.C.S. 418) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 418 as amended during the course of the discussion. 

(Subsequently published as C.C.S. 41811.) 

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5. PROGRESS REPORTS 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that all progress reports submitted for the SEXTANT Conference 

should be taken as having been noted by them. This is not to be taken 

as meaning that any recommendations that there may be in different 

progress reports have been accepted. Should such acceptance be needed, 

the recommendations in question must be put forward separately. 

6. COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed : 

a. That the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should 

remain unchanged. 

b. That General Eaker should not be urged to catch up the three months 

of arrears. 

c. That General Eaker should be told to expand his operations to the 

extent possible with the aircraft and crews available. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 134th Meeting 

SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MEETINGHELD IN CONFERENCEROOM1,THEMENAHOUSE, 

ON SATURDAY, 4 DECEMBER1943 AT 1430 

PRESENT 

United States British 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. CONCLUSIONS OF C.C.S. 1330 MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 133d Meeting. The detailed record of the 

meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

2. INTEGRATED COMMAND OF U.S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN THE 

EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA 

(C.C.S.400/1 and 400/2) 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he had not had time to study the 

United States Chiefs of Staff paper thoroughly but felt from a brief consideration of it that the points put forth by the British Chiefs of Staff in their 

memorandum on this subject had not been fully appreciated. He would like to 

discuss the matter quite frankly. He would like to make three points. Firstly, 

he fully conceded the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to organize their 

own air forces as they saw fit. Secondly, in spite of this he would like to go on 

record as advising most strongly against the arrangements proposed by the 

United StatesChiefs of Staff since, in his view, they would not attain the objects 

desired, were unnecessary, and would prove inefficient. Finally, he would like 

to make it quite clear that, if in spite of his advice, the United States Chiefs of 

Staff made the reorganization they proposed, he, for his part, would do his 

utmost to ensure that it worked as smoothly as possible. 

From paragraph 2 of the United States Chiefs of Staff paper, it was clear 

that the US.had sufficient personnel and equipment for each AAF group 

station to be organized to take care of the needs of two groups for brief periods. 

He had not appreciated this point. 

The points which the U.S. reorganization was aimed to achieve were 

better coordination of the air operations based on Italy and the United Kingdom, the ability to take advantage of varying weather in the two theaters, and 

the ability of one man to decide on the movements of groups of aircraft from 

one theater to another. 

He would like to point out that after two or three years of experience 

in the operation of bombers, he considered that it was impossible to coordinate 

bomber operations from two theaters or work rigidly to a given program. The 

technical difficulties of getting some 2,000 aircraft in the air at a time required 

days of planning done by a committee which brought together all the best 

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available knowledge. The final decision to launch the operation had to be 

taken within four or five hours of its taking place. No amount of unity of 

command or drive could overcome the inherent difficulties in the operation 

of large bomber forces. 

In his view the insertion of an over-all air commander for Europe would 

merely insert another link in the chain of command. 

With regard to the moving of groups, a quick decision was not always 

the right decision, and the views not only of the bomber commander but also 

of the theater commanders concerned must be considered. To give the power 

to move groups to one man who could take his decisions without consultation 

with others concerned might result in faulty decisions being taken and even 

in the movements of groups having to be countermanded by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

The new proposals would, he believed, tend to break up the close integration which had been achieved between the Royal Air Force and the Eighth 

Bomber Command. The Air Ministry had a large staff fully integrated with all 

the R.A.F. commands in England, and here the operations of the various U.S. 

and British commands were coordinated. This wasdone under his own direction 

and he exercised his functions under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. To insert 

another commander over the US. Air Forces would rupture the present 

relations between the 8th Air Force and the Air Ministry. 

The US.proposals would also result in the elimination of the present 

system of dual responsibility of the Chief of the Air Staff to the British 

Government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It must be remembered that 

the United Kingdom was in the front line and the operations of the bomber 

forces from the U.K. were of vital moment to the life and industry of England. 

When the use of “Window” had been advocated, it had had to be debated 

in consultation with the British Government over a long period. If a supreme 

commander were appointed, he might take action of this nature on his own 

initiative since he would have no responsibility to the British Government. 

From the Naval point of view the Commander of the Strategic Air Force 

would be divorced from that close contact now existing between the Air Ministry 

and the Admiralty. If, for example, the German Fleet put to sea, the quickest 

possible action was required and aircraft of many different forces had to be 

brought to bear. For quick action in a case like this, coordination by the Chief 

of the Air Staff was, in his view, essential. 

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The question of additional staffs must also be considered. If the supreme 

commander for OVERLORD had only one air commander under him to deal 

with, then he, the supreme commander, did not require an air staff. If, however, 

there were two air commanders under him, the supreme commander must be 

provided with such a staff in order to integrate the two air commands. The 

Commander of the Strategic Air Force would also require a large staff which 

would be duplicating the staff already in existence in the Air Ministry. He 

(SIR CHARLES PORTAL) could not undertake any commitment to provide 

additional staffs. 

With regard to the power of the Strategic Air Commander tomove forces 

from one theater to another, he considered that no theater commander would 

advocate a system where he might, without consultation, be bereft of a large 

part of his air forces. His own proposal to deal with this matter was, briefly, 

that his (the Chief of the Air Staff’s) own operation headquarters should 

be used by the 15th Air Force as it was used at present by the 8th Air Force, 

under himself, acting for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He would then indicate 

or recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the targets for the 8th and 15th 

Air Forces and would move these forces as might be necessary after consultation with the theater commanders concerned. 

He did not claim that he could vote against the U.S.proposal, but he 

aid feel that he must most strongly advise against it. He would, however, if 

the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on adhering to their proposal against 

his advice, move heaven and earth to make the new organization work. 

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said 

that he would certainly allow General Eisenhower to use the 15th Air Force 

in his theater as might be necessary since he conceded the principle that a 

theater commander had a right in an emergency to use such forces as were 

in his theater provided that he informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of his 

action. 

With regard to coordination between the Royal Air Force and the US. 

Strategic Air Forces, he felt that only one man must have authority over both 

or the interest of one must be subordinated to those of the other. For his part, 

he could not undertake to subordinate the operations of the R.A.F. to those 

of the 8th Air Force. 

In reply to a question by General Marshall, he said the present position 

with regard to operations of the 8th Air Force was as satisfactory as w&8 

possible without the full resources envisaged in the bomber plan. General Eaker 

had only some 75 percent of his full resources and was, as he had pointed out 

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in his paper, therefore achieving only some 54 percent of the results expected. 

The program was, in fact, some three months behind. He realized the reasons 

which had caused this and would like to say that he felt that the 8th Air Force 

had done everything that was possible in the circumstances. General Eaker had 

done his utmost to keep the plan to schedule. In spite of his smaller resources, he 

had penetrated deep into Germany and had accepted the consequent losses. 

Air operations in Europe and in the Pacific could not be compared. In no other 

part of the world were our bomber forces up against some 1,600 German 

fighters over their own country. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the proposals he had put forward were 

designed in part to overcome the lack of flexibility in the operations of the U.S. 

bomber forces in Europe. They had not changed their technique. He had sent 

a series of inspectors to the United Kingdom to try to probe into the reasons for 

this. In other theaters 60 or 70 percent of available aircraft were used in operations. In the U.K. only some 50 percent were used. Even on this basis some 1,900 

sorties had been launched during the month of September. There were approximately 1,300 bombers supplied to the U.K. This gave 800 with the units and 

a 50 percent reserve. In addition, two crews were provided. In spite of this, only 

once in the last month had 600 aircraft taken part in operations on one day. 

He could see no reason why at least 70 percent of the planes available 

should not be regularly employed. The failure to destroy targets was due 

directly to the failure to employ planes in sufficient numbers. A sufficient 

weight of bombs was not being dropped on the targets to destroy them, nor 

was the proper priority of targets being followed. 

With regard to the transfer of groups in the U.K., aircraft were flying 

on an average some five sorties per month whereas in North Africa six sorties 

per month were being achieved. The question of flexibility between the two 

theaters was,therefore, of the utmost importance. Transfers of groups must 

be made as proved necessary and a decision to make the transfer must be 

taken in 24 to 48 hours. The appointment of a Strategic Air Commander would 

not break up the close integration between the 8th Air Force and the Royal 

Air Force. Interchange of ideas must and would continue. The commander to 

be appointed would be responsible mainly for operations. Administration and 

supply would be handled by the theater commanders. Training, technique, and 

operational efficiency must all be improved. Only a new commander divorced 

from day-to-day routine could achieve this. 

At present, the necessary drive and ideas were coming from Washington. 

He believed that more aircraft were being sent to the U.K. than were being 

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effectively used and that unless better resuits could be achieved no more planes 

should be sent. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out the difficulties inherent in the 

operatjon of huge numbers of aircraft. The joint U.S. and British staffs had 

yet to learn fully their lessons on this point. If a commander were appointed 

who insisted on keeping the bomber force rigidly to the program, it would 

undoubtedly be found that, in fact, less sorties would be flown, and he, for one, 

could never permit his own fighters to escort bombers on a mission which he 

did not believe to be sound. It was not always right nor was it possible to keep 

rigidly to a plan laid down in advance. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it had always proved the case that 

a combat commander was loath to release any forces in his possession lest 

they should not return to him. As far as the air forces were concerned, there 

was required a commander for the strategic air both in Italy and in Europe 

who, by reason of his position, was not affected by this very human weakness. 

He realized that the U.K.was in the front line and that this entailed certain 

complications. He believed that the technique of precision daylight bombing 

was not being completely carried out in Europe. The US.daylight bombers 

were being operated from bases all over the world and in some of these places 

were achieving twice the results obtained in the U.K.Flexibility of thought 

and imagination were required. A huge force could not be allowed to collect 

in the U. K. unless it was employed to the maximum possible extent. Whether 

the 8th and 15th Air Forces were integrated or not, he still believed that a 

commander in England was required who could give full consideration to 

the many problems involved and impart the necessary drive. He suggested 

that action be deferred in order to afford additional time to consider the views 

put forward by Sir Charles Portal and General Arnold. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer consideration of C.C.S. 400/1 and 400/2. 

3. MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS 

(C.C.S. 387/1) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer consideration on C.C.S. 387/1 pending receipt of a 

memorandum on the same subject by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

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4. OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 417) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that C.C.S. 417 would serve as 

a basis for further work but that it required recasting in certain respects. 

Paragraph 2 c would, for instance, require revision in the light of the statements made by Marshal Stalin at EUREKA. He (General Brooke) was in 

agreement with the general concept set out in paragraph 4 that the main 

effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific. He was frankly disturbed 

with regard to present ideas on operations in Southeast Asia. The Supreme 

Allied Commander had recently put forward his views which he had stressed 

while present at SEXTANT, that once the operations in North Burma were 

undertaken, either they would have to be continued to complete the capture 

of the whole of Burma or, alternatively, our forces would have to withdraw 

when the monsoon stopped. The Supreme Allied Commander had also put 

forward his requirements in order to continue the campaign at the end of 

the monsoon. He feared that Burma might become a huge vacuum and if this 

were the case, it would not fit in with the strategic concept set out in the plan 

under consideration, i.e., that the main effort should be made in the Pacific. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he had always regarded operations in 

Burma as a diversionary effort. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff could not agree to an initial campaign in Burma without considering 

the implications of a large further effort or a retirement. It was now considered 

that the major effort must be made in the Pacific and large operations to 

recapture North Burma would not be in accordance with this concept. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that as he understood the position, the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff had not yet considered the provision of the additional requirements necessary to continue the campaign. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the paper should be returned to 

the Combined Staff Planners for further study in the light of a further 

assumption with regard to the necessity of continuing the reconquest of 

Burma if once the campaign were launched. 

ADMIRAL KING agreed with this suggestion. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that it would obviously help the 

Combined Staff Planners in their further study if it could be agreed to accept 

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paragraph 4 of the report. There were many logistic implications which would 

have to be taken into consideration. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt that paragraph 6 b, of 

Annex 111,was politically unacceptable since British heavy bombers must, to 

a large extent, be employed to fight the enemy rather than being used as 

transport aircraft. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he quite appreciated this point. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed: 

a. That the following additional subparagraph 2 d should be inserted 

in the enclosure to C.C.S. 417: 

“The possibility that a full campaign in Burma may have to 

be carried out following on the TARZAN operation.” 

b. That the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to reexamine 

and amend C.C.S. 417 in the light of the above, before resubmission 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

5. OPERATZON “RANKIN” 

(C.C.S. 320/4) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he understood that the proposal in 

C.C.S. 320/4had been mentioned by the President to the Prime Minister. He 

considered that it would have to be examined by the political agencies 

concerned in both countries. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the proposals would entail a 

crossing of the lines of communication. This did not appear acceptable from 

the military point of view. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said the logistic implications had been briefly 

examined and found to be difficult but possible. They were most serious when 

the forces were most deeply committed, i.e., in RANKIN Case “A’ and least 

serious in RANKIN Case “C.” It had been felt necessary to put forward this 

paper since at present COSSAC was planning on a different basis and an early 

decision was required in order to be prepared when the need arose. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that paragraph 3 should be amended 

to read, “That COSSAC be at once directed to examine and report on the 

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implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of 

spheres of occupation.” This amendment was accepted. 

After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to accept C.C.S. 320/4 as modified (subsequently circulated as 

C.C.S. 320/4 (Revised) ) . 

6. REVIEW OF CONDITIONS IN EUROPE 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that Sir John Dill had suggested, and he 

himself fully agreed, that since some six weeks were required to prepare for 

Operation RANKIN, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should either fix a date for 

planning for this operation or review at monthly intervals the state of Europe 

in order that they could decide the date on which the operation might have 

to be mounted. Plans were kept up to date by COSSAC but six weeks were 

required to take up the necessary shipping. 

After a brief discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to instruct the Combined Intelligence Committee to keep the 

situation in Europe under constant review in relation to RANKIN and 

to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

7. OCCUPATION OF EUROPE 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff briefly discussed the occupation and 

administration of Europe after the defeat of Germany. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that each occupying power would 

be responsible for an area and that broad directives would be given by a 

centralized body. Occupation forces should be kept to a minimum and the 

maximum use made of the threat of air power and action by armored and 

mobile forces. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the administration must, wherever 

possible, be undertaken by the Germans with the necessary degree of military 

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control by ourselves. A European Advisory Commission had already been set 

up in London. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that there might be difficulties due to the 

different methods adopted, for example, by ourselves and the Russians in 

administering adjacent territories. 

8. RESULTS OF THE PLENARY SESSION HELD AT 1100, 3 DECEMBER 1943 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the conclusions of the plenary 

session held that morning. 

GENERAL ISMAY presented a brief note setting out the general sense 

of the meeting on the main points considered. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the relationship of 

BUCCANEER to Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL and the naval, shipping, 

and landing craft requirements for these operations. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that since Operations OVERLORD and 

BUCCANEER had been planned for some time, the requirements for these were 

presumably available. The deficiency would lie in the resources necessary for 

Operation ANVIL. If necessary, he would do his utmost to provide the resources 

required for this operation, particularly in aircraft carriers. 

After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively, 

should draw up a paper setting out a draft of matters of high policy 

regarding the European Theater and the Southeast Asia Command; 

these papers to be exchanged this evening and considered at the meeting 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff tomorrow at 1100. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 135th Meeting 

SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELD IN CONFERENCE ROOM1,THE MENAHOUSE, 

ON SUNDAY, 5 DECEMBER 1943AT 1030

PRESENT 

United States 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

General Sir Nan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. APPROVAL OF CONCLUSIONS OF C.C.S. 134TH MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 134th Meeting. The detailed report of 

the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments. 

2. DRAFT AGREEMENT BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

(C.C.S. 423 and 423/1) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them draft agreements 

prepared by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he felt that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

paper expressed better the views put forward at the Plenary Session of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff with the President and the Prime Minister. The 

United States Chiefs of Staff believed that Operation TARZAN and a simultaneous amphibious operation were essential. The Supreme Commander must 

be told to do his best with the amphibious forces available to him. The British 

Chiefs of Staff paper, on the other hand, visualized the abandonment of the 

amphibious operation. If no agreement could be reached by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff it would be necessary for the United States and British Chiefs 

of Staff to submit their different views to the President and Prime Minister. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were 

in agreement militarily and only in disagreement on the political aspects of the 

operations in Southeast Asia. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he did not think this was the case. The United 

States Chiefs of Staff believed that the abandonment of the amphibious operation would mean either the failure or the abandonment of TARZAN. In the 

latter case, there would be serious military repercussions throughout the 

Pacific. In his opinion, the military implications of the abandonment of the 

amphibious operation were therefore equally as important as the political 

implications. He considered that the enemy must be engaged in Burma, since 

unless this were done, they would be able to stop the supply route to China. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he did not believe this would be the case, 

since if there was no land battle, the whole Allied air force could be directed 

against the Japanese air instead of supporting the troops. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that if there were no land operations the 

Japanese could put more air forces into their many fields out of range of our 

fighters. 

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SIR CHARLES PORTAL reminded General Arnold that the ferry route 

was now being flown at night. Though our fighters might not be able to reach 

the Japanese airfields, our bombers could, and this form of attack would prove 

increasingly effective with the good weather now prevailing. In Sicily it had 

been possible completely to defeat the German air effort by intensified bombing. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said he agreed that more could be done with better 

weather, but it must be remembered that the Japanese were on interior lines 

and had a very large number of airfields available. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he considered that it was not only a 

question of cutting the air line; there was also the Japanese ground effort to 

be considered. The appointment of Admiral Mountbatten with its consequent 

publicity had resulted in large Japanese reinforcements to the area. If Operation TARZAN were not carried out, this large Japanese force would take the 

initiative and could not be stopped by the use of long range penetration groups 

only. The Japanese could carry out a ground campaign against our lines of 

communication to China. The Chinese might well be better in defensive operations than in the offensive, but their task would be a difficult one. We had 

provoked an increased Japanese garrison, and to take no action against it 

would have serious results in relation to our supply line to China. Further, 

extraordinary efforts had been made to increase our forces in the area, and 

these increased forces would now remain immobile. All this was based on the 

assumption that if no amphibious operation took place, Operation TARZAN 

would also not take place. This in turn was based on the assumption that the 

Chinese would not advance unless the amphibious operation took place. There 

were therefore strong military reasons why the amphibious operation should 

take place, and there would be serious military implications if it did not take 

place, particularly in the Southwest Pacific. If it were possible to abandon 

the amphibious operation and still to do the North Burma campaign, he 

personally would not be seriously disturbed. He did not believe, however, that 

without the amphibious operation, there would be any Burma campaign. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked if it was considered that the amphibious 

operation was essential on purely military grounds. 

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the personal view that it would be 

of assistance but was not vital. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then drew attention to paragraph 7 of the 

United States Chiefs of Staff paper. Had the implications of the proposal that 

the Supreme Commander should be told that he must do his best with the 

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resources already allocated to him been fully considered? He had now put 

forward his requirements, which were in excess of the resources he now had. 

There seemed two courses open to him; either to carry out the operation with 

these smaller resources and risk a reverse, or to ask to be relieved of the task. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that there was no insistence on 

Operation BUCCANEER. He could, for example, undertake the amphibious 

operation against Ramree instead. He recalled that prior to Guadalcanal, the 

commanders had felt that the operation was impossible of achievement without additional resources, yet it had been undertaken and had been successful. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that there were admittedly advantages in the taking of the Andaman Islands. They would form a base not only 

for reconnaissance, but to some extent for bombing Bangkok and the Japanese 

lines of communication. They would also form a good stepping-off place for a 

further advance on Sumatra. Their seizure would, however, produce for ourselves a very heavy commitment in maintenance. They were a thousand miles 

away from our nearest base. They were surrounded by Japanese air and it 

would be difficult to supply them to an extent which would make their use 

possible. In his opinion, the capture of the Andamans was not worth the 

candle, except as a stepping-stone to a southward advance. In this connection, 

however, it had been agreed that the main effort should be made in the Pacific, 

and therefore neither amphibious operations against the Andamans nor 

against Ramree were worthwhile. 

ADMIRAL KING said that all were agreed that the capture of Ramree 

would not give us much. He realized that the abandonment of BUCCANEER 

might fit in with the British view that it would be best to withdraw the Eastern 

Fleet to the Mediterranean. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM denied this suggestion. 

ADMIRAL KING, continuing, said that he felt that the commander of 

the Eastern Fleet would feel more secure if he had an air base in the Andamans. 

He (Admiral King) was much concerned over the success of TARZAN. He had 

always felt that the Andaman operation was the most useful one with the 

means available, far better, for instance, than CULVERIN. On purely military 

grounds he considered that Operation BUCCANEER was as much a part of 

TARZAN as ANVIL was of OVERLORD. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he felt that the military implications had been 

overstated. If Operation BUCCANEER were not undertaken, the Chinese 

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forces might withdraw from TARZAN, but they were, even at present, an 

unknown factor, and reports suggested that their troops now in action were 

not too promising. With regard to the security of the air route to China, he 

did not believe that this would be seriously threatened. The Assam airfields 

could be protected and Japanese air bases bombed. An offensive-defensive 

should hold the Japanese forces, coupled as it would be by a serious threat. We 

had, in fact, by our preparations in the Southeast Asia Command, built up an 

ideal cover plan which would hold the Japanese forces away from the Pacific 

front. He did not regard Operation BUCCANEER as a justifiable diversion from 

our main object. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the 14th Air Force was operating “on a 

8hoestring.” They were operating at only 50% of their strength, through lack 

of supplies. Transport aircraft were being shot down, and for each one of these 

lost, 3 aircraft must stay on the ground. If our aircraft were grounded, the 

Japanese could then attack Kunming, and knock out our aircraft on the 

ground. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that if the Chinese troops refused 

to advance from Yunnan, then we should be relieved from the Reed to supply 

them with 3,000 tons per month by air, and this tonnage could be diverted to 

the use of the 14th Air Force. 

ADMIRAL KING felt that it would, on the other hand, be necessary to 

give more to the Chinese in order to assist them to defend the Kunming base. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that as he saw it, there were three threats: 

firstly, the air threat against our bases in Assam; secondly, the air threat to 

the transport line itself, which was difficult to contend with, since the Japanese 

airfields were numerous and well scattered, and full use was made of dispersal; 

thirdly, the threat to Kunming both by ground and more particularly air 

action. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked if it was agreed that if BUCCANEER was 

abandoned and the amphibious lift of 35,000 men was transferred to Europe, 

it would be of the greatest assistance to OVERLORD and ANVIL. 

ADMIRAL KING said that on this basis it might be suggested that 

resources should be given up from the Pacific to OVERLORD and ANVIL. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this consideration too, ought not to 

be ruled out. The British Chiefs of Staff felt no doubt that the abandonment 

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of BUCCANEER must increase the chances of success of OVERLORD and 

ANVIL and must therefore be accepted. We could not afford to take chances 

with either of these two operations. The abandonment of BUCCANEER would 

give far greater military advantages to the war as a whole than the disadvantages entailed in its postponement. 

After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to put forward a memorandum to the President and Prime Minister setting out the various points of agreement and disagreement 

(subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 42312). 

3. INTEGRATED COMMAND OF US.STRATEGIC AIR FORCES 

IN THE EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA 

(C.C.S. 400,40011 and 40012) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note of the alterations proposed by the US.Chiefs of Staff to 

the draft directive proposed by them in C.C.S. 40012. 

b. Agreed to defer action on these papers. 

4. DIRECTIVE FOR UNIFICATION OF COMMAND IN 

THE MEDITERRANEAN 

(C.C.S. 38711 and 38712) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean on the basis of C.C.S. 38712. Certain 

amendments were suggested and agreed to in this paper. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted C.C.S. 38712 as amended in the course of the discussion (subsequently circulated as 38713). 

5. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST THE SOUTH OF FRANCE 

(C.C.S. 424) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to consider C.C.S. 424 at their meeting to be held at 1500 that 

afternoon. 

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6. DIRECTIVE FOR INTENSIFICATION OF SUPPORT OF 

PARTISAN FORCES IN YUGOSLAVIA 

(C.C.S. 425) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved the draft directive to Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in 

North Africa with regard to Balkan support, and 

b. Instructed the Secretaries to include this directive in the main 

directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, now being 

issued. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 136th Meeting 

SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN CONFERENCEROOM1,THEMENAHOUSE, 

ON SUNDAY, 5 DECEMBER 1943 AT 1500

United States 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

Qeneral G. C. Marshall, USA 

Mmiral E. J. King, USN 

Qeneral H. H. Arnold, USA 

Lt.Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

PRESENT 

British 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0. C. Badger, USN 

Rear Adm. B. H. Bieri, USN 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Maj. Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer, USA 

Maj. Gen. R. K. Sutherland, USA 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Maj. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

Brig. Gen. H. S. Hansell, USA 

Brig. Gen. F. N. Roberts, USA 

Captain W. L. Freseman, USN 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Lt. Gen. J. Stopford 

Rear Adm. T. Troubridge, RN 

Air Vice Marshal 

J. W. Baker, RAF 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Captain C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier C. S. Sugden 

Air Commodore W. Elliot, RAF 

Brigadier J. K. McNair 

Colonel A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed future operations in 

Southeast Asia with Lt. Gen. Stopford, Rear Admiral Troubridge and Air Vice 

Marshal Baker. 

GENERAL STOPFORD said that a plan had been made for the capture 

of the Andamans, based on a troop lift of 58,000. It was now felt that the operation to capture Port Blair could be undertaken with a troop lift of 50,000 men. 

However, the latest intelligence on Japanese dispositions, particularly their 

air dispositions, had led to the conclusion that it would be necessary to capture 

Kar Nicobar and retain it for use by ourselves. 

In reply to a question by Sir Andrew Cunningham, ADMIRAL TROUBRIDGE said that shipping was available for the required assault lift of 24,700 

for Port Blair. The remainder of the shipping required could be procured. The 

estimate of the potential strength of Japanese air forces in the area had recently 

risen from some 300 aircraft to 600. It had originally been intended to knock 

out the air strip on Kar Nicobar with a commando raid, but now it was felt 

that a brigade was required and the Air Commander in Chief considered that 

the 120 carrier-borne aircraft provided in the plan were insufficient and should 

be raised to 240 carrier-borne aircraft. Virtually all the assault shipping 

required was now available. 

AIR VICE MARSHAL BAKER explained that the estimate of 600 enemy 

aircraft was the total force the enemy could assemble within striking distance 

of the Andamans. This would include those based on an arc from South Burma 

to the north tip of Sumatra. Some 80 to 100 enemy aircraft could be based in 

the Andamans and Kar Nicobar. 

GENERAL STOPFORD said that no plan had yet been completed for 

the capture of Kar Nicobar. It was estimated that there were 5,000 Japanese 

troops in the Port Blair area and that they could build up to a total of 3,000 in 

Kar Nicobar. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that an estimate of 50,000 Allied troops against 

some 5,000 Japanese appeared excessive. 

GENERAL STOPFORD explained that the figure of 50,000 included 

troops required for the development of facilities in the island, the building of 

airfields and strips, and for work in the docks. It was estimated that of the 

total of 50,000 some 34,000 would be fighting troops, inculding headquarters, 

engineers, and anti-aircraft units; some 16,000would be non-fighting troops. 

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In reply to a question by General Arnold, ADMIRAL TROUBRIDGE 

explained that the present date fixed for Operation BUCCANEER was 23 

March. This date was dependent on tide and moon conditions and could not 

be advanced since the necessary naval covering force would not be available 

in the area before 15 March. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE then asked what operations of a hit-and-run 

nature might be undertaken, assuming that the bulk of the BUCCANEER 

landing craft and shipping was returned to the European Theater. This operation might take place either against the islands or on the mainland. 

GENERAL STOPFORD said that he would like to consider this possibility further before giving a definite reply. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he would like to repeat a statement he had 

made at the Plenary Meeting earlier that day to the effect that if additional 

carriers were found necessary for BUCCANEER, he believed, though he could 

not guarantee, that he could find some four to six additional CvE’s. 

(The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered the remainder of the agenda 

in closed session.) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the relationship 

of Operation BUCCANEER to Operation ANVIL. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that as regards ANVIL, the critical part of 

the operation would be the seizure of a bridgehead, including a port through 

which the build-up could take place. The assault must be in sufficient 

strength to tide us over this dangerous period, otherwise we were in danger 

of being thrown into the sea. 

GENERAL MARSHALL, in discussing the timing of Operation ANVIL, 

said that he felt that it should take place after rather than before OVERLORD 

and suggested that a period of approximately one week should lapse between 

the launching of the two operations. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he agreed with this view. COSSAC had 

been of the same opinion. He did not wish France to rise before the launching 

of Operation OVERLORD, nor could the timing of Operation OVERLORD itself 

be exact in view of weather conditions in the Channel. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the wording of a 

telegram to Admiral Mountbatten with regard to possible operations in his 

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theater on the assumption that certain of his resources were removed to the 

European Theater. 

(At this point General Wedemeyer entered the meeting.) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, had he realized General Wedemeyer was 

still here, he would of course have asked him to be present during the discussion 

with the Force Commanders. He asked General Wedemeyer if he would give 

his views on possible alternative amphibious operations of a hit-and-run nature 

capable of accomplishment with less forces than BUCCANEER. 

GENERAL WEDEMEYER said that he considered that some operation 

commensurate with these lesser resources could be undertaken. The Supreme 

Commander had been given the objective of opening the land route to China 

through Upper Burma. It was considered that an amphibious operation would 

contribute in the military sense to the success of this task, and Operation BUCCANEER had been decided on as the operation most likely, with the means 

available, to assist this task. It would deceive the enemy and split his air forces. 

Amphibious operations along the coast had also been considered but were 

rendered difficult by weather, tides, and the lack of ports through which they 

could be maintained. 

GENERAL WEDEMEYER considered that a hit-and-run operation could 

be undertaken but wouldnot be so effectiveasBUCCANEER. For BUCCANEER 

it was now considered that some 120 more carrier-borne aircraft were required. 

This would mean 4or 5 additional CVE’s or 2 fleet carriers. He considered that 

both the Andamans and Kar Nicobar could be captured with an amphibious 

lift of 50,000. It was strongly felt that the first large operation undertaken in 

the Southeast Asia Command must be a success. The morale of certain of the 

Indian troops was low, and a smashing victory would restore it. Operation 

ANAKIM might be undertaken with only slightly less resources than those 

required for the Andamans, but it would be against a strong defensive position 

and would not, he considered, contain as many Japanese forces as would 

BUCCANEER. Hit-and-run operations would not, in his opinion, divert strong 

enemy forces, and their cost might well prove incommensurate with the results 

achieved. 

After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-­

a. Tooknote: 

(1) That the assault forces for BUCCANEER have not been increased. 

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(2) That the resources necessary for the operation were either already 

available in the theater, or in sight, excepting for an increased 

demand of some 120carrier-borne fighter aircraft. 

(3) Of a statement by Admiral King that there was a possibility of 

making from 4 to 6 CVE’s available from U.S.sources for this 

operation. 

b. Agreed: 

(1) That the representatives of the Supreme Allied Commanders, 

S.E.A.C. and the BUCCANEER force Commanders now at SEXTANT, in consultation with the Combined Staff Planners should 

examine and report on the morning of 6 December 1943 what 

operations of a hit-and-run nature might be carried out in the 

S.E. Asia Theater in 1944,assuming that the bulk of landing 

craft is returned to the European Theater, the report to indicate 

the scale, nature, and objectives of the operations proposed. 

(2) To dispatch a signal to Admiral Mountbatten asking for a flash 

estimate on the above. (Annex) 

(At this point General Wedemeyer left the meeting.) 

2. OPERATION “ANVIL” 

(C.C.S.424) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered a report by the Combined Staff Planners (C.C.S. 424) on Operation ANVIL. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he considered that forces should be taken 

from BUCCANEER only if they were essential to the success of ANVIL. They 

should not be taken for diversionary operations, such as Rhodes. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM pointed out that an early decision would 

have to be taken with regard to Operation BUCCANEER, since otherwise we 

were in danger of “falling between two stools” and the necessary time for the 

training of any craft which might be withdrawn would not be available. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then agreed to amend paragraph 

4 C on page 3 of C.C.S. 424by striking from the first sentence the words “from 

the United States” and by deleting the second sentence. 

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GENERAL ARNOLD discussed the air transport requirements for both 

ANVIL and operations in the Burma-China area. The additional transport 

aircraft required for ANVIL could only be found by cutting out the provision 

of these aircraft to all countries other than the United States, and to the 

domestic air lines in America. This he was quite prepared to do. 

It was also agreed to amend paragraph 4 of Appendix “B”on page 8 by 

inserting the words “at least” between the words “for” and “two.” 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved C.C.S. 424 as amended, and directed that the directive 

contained in Appendix “B” be forwarded to General Eisenhower. 

b. Agreed that the detailed planning for this operation should be left 

entirely to General Eisenhower’s planning staff. 

3. DIRECTIONS TO COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS AND THE US.AND 

BRITISH SHIPPING AUTHORITIES 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed what instructions or 

directions could usefully be given to the Combined Staff Planners or to the 

United States and British shipping authorities. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to 

keep the shipping authorities closely in touch with the progress of 

the discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and that both the 

Combined Staff Planners and the shipping authorities should do all 

possible preliminary work on their estimates of the resources 

required. This to be undertaken both on the basis of the decisions 

already taken, and on the basis of the various possible assumptions 

with regard to operations on which final decisions had not yet been 

reached. 

b. Instructed the Secretaries to inform the Combined Staff Planners 

and the U.S. and British shipping authorities of the above decision. 

4. FUTURE WORK 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed to meet at 1100on 6 December to consider the draft report to the President and Prime Minister (C.C.S. 

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426), the report by the Combined Staff Planners on the over-all plan for the 

defeat of Japan (C.C.S. 417),and the study of alternative amphibious operations being undertaken by the Force Commanders in consultation with General Wedemeyer and the Combined StaffPlanners. THE COMBINED CHIEFS 

OF STAFF further agreed to meet on the following afternoon, if necessary, 

and on the following evening on receipt of the report called for from the 

Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command. 

ANNEX 

To : SACSEA 

From : Mideast 

MOST 

IMMEDIATE 

CLEAR THE LINE 

Following for Admiral Mountbatten from Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

1. If,as a result of EUREKA Conference overriding priority were to be given 

to European operations, this would make it necessary to withdraw bulk of your 

landing craft and assault shipping during the next few weeks. 

2. This would rule out BUCCANEER as at present planned before the monsoon, but the necessity would remain to stage, in conjunction with TARZAN, 

amphibious operations on a smaller scale, possibly of a hit-and-run nature 

involving carrier raids and landings of commandos. 

3. Do you consider operations of this kind feasible? If so,telegraph urgently 

flash estimate of resources you would require. 

4. Your reply must be received by 1600 G.M.T. 6th December. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 137th Meeting 

SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN CONFERENCEROOM1,THEMENAHOUSE, 

ON MONDAY.6 DECEMBER1943 AT 1100 

PRESENT 

United States British 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

RearAdm. 0.C. Badger, USN 

Rear Adm. B. H. Bieri, USN 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Maj. Gen. R. K. Sutherland, USA 

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Brig. Gen. H. S. Hansell, USA 

Brig. Gen. F. N. Roberts, USA 

Captain W. L. Freseman, USA 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Captain C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier C. S. Sugden 

Air Commodore W. Elliot, RAF 

Brigadier J. K. McNair 

Colonel A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. APPROVAL OF CONCLUSIONS OF C.C.S. 135TH AND 136TH 

MEETINGS 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 135th and 136th C.C.S. meetings and 

also the minutes of the 4th Plenary Session held at the Kirk Villa. The 

detailed records of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor 

amendments. 

2. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

ALTERNATIVE TO “BUCCANEER” 

(C.C.S. 427) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the report by the Combined Staff 

Planners (C.C.S. 427) should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the Appendix would require revision in the light of the decisions taken. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed with this view. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note of C.C.S. 427. 

b. Agreed that the forces to be left in the Indian Ocean or to be withdrawn for the European Theater should be decided later. 

3. CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN N.W. EUROPE 

AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

(C.C.S. 400, 400/1 and 400/2) 

At the request of General Arnold, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer consideration of C.C.S. 400, 400/1 and 400/2 until their 

meeting on Tuesday, 7 December. 

4. OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 417 and 417/1) 

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ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt no final decision could be taken on 

these papers pending decisions on operations to be undertaken in Burma and 

the Bay of Bengal. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that it would assist3e Combined Staff 

Planners in their further studies if the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan 

could be accepted in principle as a basis for further work. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he considered that in their further 

study, the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to prepare a plan 

of campaign for the China Theater proper, together with an estimate of forces 

required. He did not agree with the amendment suggested in paragraph 4 of 

the Enclosure to C.C.S. 417/1and preferred the original wording of paragraph 

14of C.C.S. 417. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM asked if the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

were prepared to approve the general concept that the main effort against 

Japan should be made in the Pacific. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he agreed with this concept in principle. 

After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved in principle C.C.S. 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the 

enclosure to 417/1)as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a plan of campaign 

for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the 

forces involved. 

5. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944 

(C.C.S. 397 (Revised) ) 

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered that this paper should be 

approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff less any references contained therein 

to Operation BUCCANEER. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the specific operations against Japan, 1944 set out in C.C.S. 

397 (Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to 

Operation BUCCANEER. 

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6. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(C.C.S.427) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff with regard 

to decisions covering operations in the Southeast Asia Command, as 

follows: 

a. Delay major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after 

the next monwn and divert the landing craft now assigned to 

BUCCANEER to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD. 

b. Make all preparations to conduct TARZAN as planned, less BUCCANEER, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious 

raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of TARZAN; and 

carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the 

harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of 

the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively, 

c. Postpone TARZAN, increase to a maximum with planes available the 

air lift to China across the “hump,” and intensify the measures which 

will enable the B-29’s to be brought to bear on the enemy. 

d. The choice between alternatives b and c above will be made at a later 

date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of 

opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Southeast Asia Command. 

7. DRAFT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 426) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft report 

to the President and Prime Minister (C.C.S. 426). Certain additions and amen& 

ments were considered and agreed. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the draft report to the President and the Prime Minister as 

amended in the course of discussion (amended paper subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 426/1). 

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8. RELATION OF RESOURCES TO PLANS 

It was pointed out that though no Anal decision could be taken on operations in Burma pending replies to the messages sent to the Generalissimo and 

the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, the Combined Staff 

Planners, in consultation with the shipping authorities, might well proceed 

with their examination of the extent to which the resources of the United 

Nations would meet the requirements in the light of decisions already taken. 

In this examination they should take into account the fact that the amphibious 

rewurces previously allocated to BUCCANEER would now be available for 

operations in Europe. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to instruct the Combined StafT Planners to proceed as proposed 

above. 

9. MESSAGES TO MARSHAL STALIN AND THE GENERALISSIMO 

GENERAL MARSHALL read out draft messages which he had prepared 

which might be sent by the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin 

and the Generalissimo, General Marsha11 undertook to circulate copies of these 

messages to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

10. FUTURE BUSINESS 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to meet on Tuesday, 7 December 1943, and to include on their 

agenda the discussion of the Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean, and Facilities for US.Forces in 

the Azores. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 138th Meeting 

SEXTANT CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN CONFERENCEROOM1,THE MENAHOUSE, 

ON TUESDAY. 7 DECEMBER1943 AT 1100 

PRESENT 

United States 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew �3. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. 0. C. Badger, USN 

Maj. Gen. R. K. Sutherland, USA 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Brig. Gen. H. S.Hansell, Jr.,USA 

Brig. Gen. F. N. Roberts, USA 

Commander V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Captain C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier C. S. Sugden 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier J. K. McNair 

Brigadier A. Head 

Colonel A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Lt. Colonel G. Mallaby 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. APPROVAL OF CONCLUSIONS OF C.C.S. 137TH MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the conclusions of the 137th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted, subject 

to minor amendments. 

2. INTEGRATED COMMAND OF US.STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN THE 

EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA 

(C.C.S. 400,400/1 and 400/2) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them C.C.S. 400/2 as 

amended by the corrigendum issued on 7 December. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the attitude of the British Chiefs Of 

Staff to the proposals had already been stated and to these views he had nothing 

to add. He recognized, however, that the new directive proposed by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff was designed to meet some of the objections which had 

been put forward. The British Chiefs of Staff could not signify their approval 

of the proposals, but recognized the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff 

to issue such directives to their own air forces as they might see At. If the 

new directive were issued, he, for his part, was prepared to assume the responsibility laid on him by this directive, and to carry it out to the best of his ability. 

He would suggest, however, that before implementing the new policy, General 

Arnold should, if possible, hear the views of General Eisenhower, General Wilson, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said he was anxious to implement the proposals 

as soon as possible. He would, however, discuss the matter as suggested by Sir 

Charles Portal before taking final action. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Accepted C.C.S. 400/2. 

6. Took note. 

(1) that although the British Chiefs of Staff do not agree in principle 

with C.C.S. 400/2, the United States Chiefs of Staff have decided 

to issue the directive giving effect to their proposals; 

(2) that before issue of the directive, the Commanding General, U.S. 

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Army Air Forces would consult General Eisenhower, Air Marshal 

Tedder and General Wilson; 

(3) that the Chief of the Air Staff undertook to carry out the duties 

laid upon him by the directive contained in C.C.S. 400/2 (ascorrected by corrigendum of 7 December). 

3. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ALTERNATIVE 

TO “BUCCANEER” 

(C.C.S. 427 and 42711) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF ST.4FF had before them a telegram from 

Admiral Mountbatten (C.C.S. 427/1). 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that no decisions should be taken 

until the \dews of the Generalissimo were known. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had 

given brief consideration to the subject that morning. In general, their views 

were that since BUCCANEER had been postponed, the trained forces earmarked 

for this operation would be available for use elsewhere. Some might be required 

for commando operations,if these were decided upon. The service troops might 

be used to assist in overcoming the logistic difficulties in Calcutta and Assam. 

The combat troops might be used as a reliable reserve in the rear of the Chinese 

forces operating on the Ledo Road. He was most anxious to ensure that our 

Assam bases and the pipeline should not be lost. The report received with 

regard to the bad morale of t.he Chinese forces had, he felt, been given too 

much weight. It was a report from one officer only, who was not, in contact with 

the troops. The reactions of the Generalissimo could not be foretold, but if 

Operation TARZAN was called off he felt that the operations outlined by 

Admiral Mountbatten might well be undertaken with an additional advance by 

the Chinese forces on the Led0 Road with the United States long range penetration group of 2,500 to 3,000 men operating ahead of them, and with some 

of the British forces released from BUCCANEER forming a reserve. 

SIR BLAh’ BROOKE said he was in general agreement with the Tlews 

which had been expressed. If the Generalissimo did not agree to the undertaking of Operation TARZAZ, but preferred an additional air lift over the 

“hump,” then a new directive might be given to Admiral Mountbatten, giving 

him as his objective the assurance of the Assam lines of communication and 

instructing him that the combat forces released from BUCCANEER should be 

used in active offensive operations to achieve the object while t.he non-fighting 

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troops released should be used to assist in overcoming logistics difficulties and 

in the construction of the facilities required for the operations of the B-29’s. 

He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should inform General Wedemeyer of these views, telling him that they should form a basis for future 

planning, but could not be taken as a firm instruction until a reply from the 

Generalissimo had been received. In the meantime, a draft directive could be 

prepared for Admiral Mountbatten on the assumption that the Generalissimo 

would prefer the postponement of TARZAN. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed: 

a. That a new directive along the lines indicated in the above discussion 

should be issued to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command regarding the campaign to be carried out in North Burma in 

1944; and 

b. That this directive should not be dispatched until the receipt of the 

Generalissimo’s reply to the President‘s dispatch of 5 December on 

the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command. 

4. PROVISION OF MERCHANT SHIPPING TYPES FOR THE WAR 

AGAINST JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 415/3) 

Without discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved that the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping 

Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Adiaries for the British Fleet for operations in the war against Japan, and 

that they should take steps to provide the requisite ships after agreement in detail between the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet 

and the First Sea Lord, as set out in C.C.S. 41513. 

5. RELATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO THE OPERATIONS 

DECIDED UPON 

(C.C.S. 428) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the paper under consideration had been 

prepared in great haste as an interim report, and as such it could be accepted. 

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Further work would have to be done in the light of the final decisions yet to 

be taken. 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed with this view. He suggested certain 

amendments to the report, which were agreed. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted in principle the relation of available resources to agreed operations outlined in C.C.S. 428with the modifications approved in the course 

of discussion. (Amended paper subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 428 

(Rev.) 

6. DEVELOPMENT OF FACILITIES IN THE AZORES 

(C.C.S. 270/13 and 270/14) 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that there were two sides to this problem. 

Firstly, with regard to the political position, the latest information from Lisbon 

showed that Dr. Salasar was ready to allow the operation of United States 

anti-submarine forces and the ferrying of United States aircraft through the 

Azores on condition that acceptable formulae to cover these operations could 

be found. The British Chiefs of Staff memorandum (C.C.S.270/14)suggested 

certain formulae .These were contained in paragraphs 2,3, and 4 of the paper. 

He would like to know if these were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of 

Staff. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had 

already put forward a draft memorandum for the President to send to the State 

Department with regard to the changing of the insignia on the United States 

aircraft to be used in the Azores. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he did not believe that this would now 

be necessary. It seemed to him that provided Dr. Salazar could be satisfied 

that the United States anti-submarine forces were operating on loan to His 

Majesty's Government under command of a British officer from a British base, 

and that the American transit aircraft were controlled by the British Ar Transport Command, he, Dr. Salazar, would be satisfied. 

With regard to the military aspects, it had been found necessary to 

obtain additional facilities; for instance, more land was required, and it was 

desired to run a pipeline to take the place of the long haul for gasoline by road. 

In this connection, it was proposed that the British Government should make 

a further approach to the Portuguese Government, asking for these additional 

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facilities, on the ground that these were a natural development on the agreement already in force. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the formulae suggested by Sir Charles 

Portal were entirely acceptable to him, except for the proposal in the second 

half of paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 270/14 with regard to the second airfield. He 

suggested, therefore, that the British proposals with this exception should 

be accepted and that he and Sir Charles Portal should work out the necessary 

details. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved C.C.S. 270/14 with the elimination of the last sentence of 

paragraph 4. 

b. Agreed that details regarding the use of the Azores facilities by United 

States Army air forces should be settled directly between General 

Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal. 

7. NEW COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the date on which the 

new Mediterranean Command should be set up, and the most suitable time for 

General Eisenhower to leave this theater and assume command of the Allied 

Expeditionary Force. 

It WBS generally agreed that it was undesirable to publish the fact that 

unification of command in the Mediterranean had been set up, or to announce 

General Eisenhower’s new appointment. In this latter case, however, it was 

accepted that for political reasons the announcement of this appointment 

would be necessary. 

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY put forward a draft memorandum covering these 

points. The Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted this memorandum for submission to the President and Prime Minister. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed that the unification of Command in the Mediterranean shall 

take effect from 10 December. There should be no public announcement of this change of organization. 

b. Agreed to recommend that General Eisenhower should hand over 

Command of the Mediterranean Theater on 1January, or as soon after 

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that date as General Eisenhower himself thinks desirable, having 

regard to the progress of the operations to capture Rome. 

c. Agreed to recommend, that, if there is to be a public announcement 

of General Eisenhower’s move from the Mediterranean to the U.K., 

his new appointment should be described as Supreme Commander, 

Allied Expeditionary Force. 

d. Recommend that concurrently with the above. the announcement 

should be made of the new -4llied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean 

Theater. 

e. Took note that the approval of the President and Prime Minister 

would be sought to the above before transmission of the necessary 

instructions. 

a. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(C.C.S. 411/5) 

The United States Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum (C.C.S. 

411/5) setting out certain proposals with regard to the air lift to China. 

After a brief discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 411/5. 

9. EMPLOYMENT OF FRENCH FORCES 

SIR ALAN BROOKE reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that General 

Giraud had put forward a propmal for employing at least one French armored 

division from the United Kingdom. He felt that in view of shipping limitations 

and the fact that Operation ANVIL had now been decided on, it would be better 

to maintain the principle that the main French effort should be made in the 

South of France. 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed with this view. The training of a French 

armored dillision in the United Kingdom would prove difficult. It would be 

better that the French armored division and other French forces should if 

possible be given a period of active service in Italy, and then used for Operation 

ANVIL. It must be remembered of course that General Guaud did not bow 

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that this operation had been decided on. As he saw, it would probably be best 

for the ANVIL forces to be principally United States and the remainder French. 

The majority of the forces in Italy would then be British. It was most important 

that the French forces for ANVIL should have had experience in battle before 

this operation. There would, of course, have to be a token French force for 

Operation OVERLORD. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed : 

a. That for shipping and other reasons it was undesirable that a French 

armored division should be sent to take part in Operation OVERLORD. 

b. That as a general policy: 

(1) A French force should participate in ANVIL and only a token 

force in OVERLORD. 

(2) It will probably be best to undertake the ANVIL operation with 

U.S. forces with French participation, and to continue the campaign in Italy with British forces. 

c. That all French formations should be given battle experience in Italy. 

10. FINAL REMARKS 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he would like to express on behalf of the British 

Chiefs of Staff their deep gratitude for the way in which the United States 

Chiefs had met their views. 

There was one other point he would like to mention. The British Chiefs 

of Staff would like to express their appreciation of the unstinting help given 

to the British and other Allies from American production. This aspect of United 

States assistance was not mentioned in the consideration of strategy, but 

nevertheless had the widest repercussions on all our plans, and was playing a 

great part in the successful development of the war. The British Chiefs of Staff 

would like to express their deep admiration of the stupendous efforts which 

the United States had made in the field of production. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he very much appreciated Sir Alan 

Brooke’s gracious tributes. He felt that it was most important that during the 

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next month or so the British and United States Chiefs of Staff should both 

study how best the magnitude of future conferences could be reduced. They

would undoubtedly in future have to take place at shorter intervals. 

ADMIRALKING,in agreeing with this view, said that every effort should 

also be made to cut down the number of subjects discussed at these important 

conferences. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed: 

a. That it was desirable to cut down as much as possible the attendance 

at future U.S.-British Conferences. 

b. That a study with this in view should be carried out within the next 

month. 

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EUREKA CONFERENCE 

The minutes of the EUREKA Conference,as transcribed herein, are from notes taken by the 

United States Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

EUREKA CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF PLENARY SESSION 

BETWEENTHE U.S.A.. GREATBRITAINLVD THE U.S.S.R., 

HELDIN THE RUSSIANLEGATION. TEHRAN, IRAN,

ON SUNDAY, 28 NOVEMBER 1943 AT 1600

PRESENT 

United States 

President Roosevelt (In the Chair) 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

Admiral W. D. Leahy,USN 

Admiral E. J. King, - USN

Maj. General J.R. Deane, USA 

F’B’ USN’Secretary 

Mr. C. E. Bohlen (Interpreter) 

British 

Prime Minister Churchill 

Mr. Anthony Eden 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Secretary 

Major Birse (Interpreter) 

U.S.S.R 

Marshal Stalin 

Mr. Molotov 

Marshal Voroshiloff 

One Secretary 

Mr. Pavlov (Interpreter) 

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THE PRESIDENT said, as the youngest of the three Chiefs of State 

present, he had the privilege of welcoming Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister 

Churchill to this auspicious conference. We are sitting around this table for the 

first time as a family, with the one object of winning the war. Regarding the 

conduct of naval and military meetings, it has been our habit, between the 

British and the United States, to publish nothing but to speak our minds very 

freely. In such a large family circle we hope that we will be very successful 

and achieve constructive accord in order that we may maintain close touch 

throughout the war and after the war. The General Staffs of the three countries should look after military matters. Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister 

and I have many things to discuss regarding matters pertaining to conditiom 

after the war. If anyone of us does not want to talk about any particular subject brought up we do not have to. THE PRESIDENT added that before he came 

to the discussion of military problems he felt that perhaps the Prime Minister 

would like to say something about matters pertaining to the years to come. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we represent here a concentration of 

great worldly power. In our hands we have perhaps the responsibility for the 

shortening of this war. In our hands we have, too, the future of mankind. I 

pray that we may be worthy of this God-given opportunity. 

THE PRESIDENT then turned to Marshal Stalin and said, “Perhaps 

our host would like to say a few words.” 

MARSHAL STALIN said, “I take pleasure in welcoming those present. 

I think that history will show that this opportunity has been of tremendous 

import. I think the great opportunity which we have and the power which our 

people have invested in us can be used to take full advantage within the frame 

of our potential collaboration. Now let us get down to business.” 

THE PRESIDENT said he would like to start wth a general survey of 

the war and of the meaning of the war. This survey will be from the American 

point of view. We earnestly hope that the completion of the war will come just 

as soon as possible. Let us begin with a subject that affects the United States 

more than either Great Britain or the U.S.S.R., the subject of the Pacific. It is 

most important to us to bring back to the United States those forces which are 

now in the Pacific. We are bearing a major part of the Pacific war. The United 

States has the greatest part of its naval power in the Pacific, plus about one 

million men. We are proceeding on the principle of attrition as regards Japan. 

At the present that policy is being accepted in our country. We believe we are 

sinking many Jap ships, both naval and merchant-more than tgey can 

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possibly replace. We have been moving forward toward Japan from the south 

and now we are moving toward Japan through the islands from the east. There 

is very little more that we can do as regards operations from the north. On the 

west of Japan it is necessary for us to keep China in the war. Hence, we have 

arranged plans for operations through North Burma and into the Yunnan 

Province. That operation will advance us far enough so that China herself can 

strike into the Yunnan Province. In addition, we are still discussing an amphibious operation in order to strike at the supply lines from the Jap base at 

Bangkok. This base is a veritable storehouse for Japan. The whole operation 

covers a huge territory, and large numbers of ships and men and planes are 

necessary to carry it out. We must definitely keep China actively in the war. 

THE PRESIDENT said, in the second place, we hope, by opening the 

Burma Road and increasing the transportation of supplies by plane into China, 

we will be in a position to attack Tokyo from China by air this summer. All this 

is regarding the Southeast Asia operations. But we want to express to you the 

very great importance not only of keeping China in the war but of being able 

to get at Japan with the greatest possible speed. 

Now to come down to the more important operations which are of immediate concern to the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain. In the last two or three conferences at Casablanca, Washington and Quebec, we have made many plans. As 

a matter of fact, about a year and a half ago the major part of our plans were 

involved in consideration of an expedition against the Axis across the English 

Channel. Largely because of transportation difficulties we were not able to set 

a definite date. Not only do we want to get across the English Channel but once 

we are across, we intend to proceed inland into Germany. It would be impossible 

to launch such an operation before about 1 May 1944-it was decided at 

Quebec. The Channel is such a disagreeable body of water. No matter how 

unpleasant that body of water might be, however, we still want to get across it. 

(MR.CHURCHILL interpolated that we were very glad it was an unpleasant 

body of water at one time.) We can not do everything we would like to do in 

the Mediterranean and also from the United Kingdom, as there is a definite 

“bottleneck” in the matter of war called landing craft. If we were to conduct 

any large expedition in the Mediterranean, it would be necessary to give up 

this important cross-Channel operation, and certain contemplated operations 

in the Mediterranean might result in a delay in OVERLORD for one month or 

two or three. Therefore, I pray in this military Conference to have the benefit 

of the opinion of the two Soviet Marshals and that they will inform us how in 

their opinion we can be of most help to the U.S.S.R. 

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THE PRESIDENT said that he felt that even though OVERLORD should 

be delayed, we can draw more German divisions from the Soviet front by means 

of that operation than any other. We have the troops in the Mediterranean but 

there is a shortage of landing craft. We might help the U.S.S.R.by doing certain 

immediate operations in the Mediterranean, but we must avoid, if possible, 

delaying OVERLORD beyond May or June. There were several things we could 

do: (a) increase the drive into Italy; (b) undertake an operation from the 

Northeast Adriatic; (c) operations in the Aegean; (d) operations from Turkey. 

That is what this military conference is concerned with and we want to create 

a withdrawal of German divisions from the Western Front. (THE PRIME 

MINISTER interpolated “as soon as possible.”) 

THE PRIME MINISTER said we would like to know what we can do 

that would most gratefully help that which the Soviets are doing on their 

Western Front. He added that we have tried to outline matters in the simplest 

terms. There are no differences between Great Britain and the United States 

in point of view except as regards “ways and means.” We would like to reserve 

any further comments until after we have heard from Marshal Stalin. 

MARSHAL STALIN said, as regards the first part of the President’s 

remarks, we Soviets welcome your successes in the Pacific. Unfortunately we 

have not so far been able to help because we require too much of our forces on 

the Western Front and are unable to launch any operations against Japan at 

this time. Our forces now in the East are more or less satisfactory for defense. 

However, they must be increased about three-fold for purposes of offensive 

operations. This condition will not take place until Germany has been forced 

to capitulate. Then by our common front we shall win. 

Regarding the second part of the President’s remarks concerning Europe, 

MARSHAL STALIN said he had certain comments to make. Firstly. in a few 

words, he would like to tell how the Soviets are conducting their own operations, 

especially since they started their advance last July. (Here THE MARSHAL 

inquired whether he would be taking too much time to discuss the operations 

on the Soviet front, and THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER both replied emphatically in the negative and requested him to proceed.) 

MARSHAL STALIN said that after the German defense had collapsed, 

they were prepared to start their offensive, i.e., they had accumulated sufficient 

munitions, supplies and reserves, etc. They passed easily from the defensive 

into the offensive. As a matter of fact, they did not expect the successes they 

achieved in July, August, and September. Contrary to the Soviet expectations, 

the Germans are considerably weakened. At the present time the Germans 

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have on the Soviet front 210 divisions, plus 6 German divisions that are in the 

process of being furnished for this front. In addition, there are 50 non-German 

divisions, which include 10 Bulgarian, 20 Finnish, and 16 to 18 Rumanian. 

THE PRESIDENT asked what the present strength of these divisions was. 

MARSHAL STALZN replied that the Germans considered a normal 

division to be eight to nine thousand men, not counting the corps troops, antiaircraft artillery, and so forth. Including these special troops, the divisions 

totaled about twelve thousand. He said that last year the Germans had 240 

divisions on the Soviet front, 179 of which were German. However, this year 

they have 260 divisions on the Soviet front, 210 of which are German, plus 

the six that are now moving from the West. The Red Army has 330 divisions 

opposing the Germans. This Soviet excess of 70 divisions is used for offensive 

operations. If the excess did not exist, no offensive operations would be possible. 

However, as time goes on the difference between the German and Soviet 

strength decreases, particularly as to the result of demolitions which the 

Germans construct during their withdrawals, which makes supply difficult. 

As a result, the operations have slowed down, but the Red Army still maintains 

the initiative. In some sectors the operations have come to a standstill. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that as to the Ukraine. west and south of Kiev, 

the Germans have taken the initiative. In this sector they have three old and 

flve new tank divisions, plus 22 or 23 infantry or motorized divisions. These are 

for the purpose of capturing Kiev. Some difficulties may, therefore, be foreseen. 

All of these factorsmake it necessary that the Sovietscontinue operations in the 

West and remain silent as far as the Far Eastern front is concerned. The above 

is a description of the Soviet operations during this past summer. 

Now a few words as to how the U.S.S.R. believes the forces of the United 

States and Great Britain could be best used to help the Soviet front. Possibly 

this is a mistake, but the U.S.S.R.has considered the operations in Italy as of 

great value in order to permit ships to pass through the Mediterranean. As to 

other large operations against Germany from the Italian front, it is not considered that operations in Italy are of great value to further the war against the 

Axis. Thus, it is believed that the Italian operations were of great importance in 

order to produce freedom of navigation, but that now they are of no further 

great importance as regards the defeat of Germany. There was once a time 

when the Soviets tried to invade the Alps, but they found it a very difficult 

operation. 

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In the U.S.S.R. it is believed that the most suitable sector for a blow at 

Germany would be from some place in France-Northwestern France or 

Southern France. It is thought that Hitler is trying hard now to contain as 

many Allied divisions in Italy as possible because he knows things cannot be 

settled here, and Germany is defended by the Alps. It would be a good thing 

if Turkey could open the way to Germany, and it would then be unnecessary 

to launch a cross-Channel operation. However, despite the fact that the heart 

of Germany is far from the Balkans, it would be a better area from which to 

launch an attack than from Italy. Soviet military authorities believe it would 

be better to use Northern France for invasion purposes, but it must be expected 

that the Germans ~111fight like devils to prevent such an attack. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that the British had long agreed with 

the United States that an invasion of North and Northwestern France across 

the Channel should be undertaken. At the present time preparations for such 

an operation are absorbing the major part of our energies and resources. He 

said it would take a long statement to explain why the U.S. and U.K. have not 

been able to strike against France in 1943, but that they are resolved to do so 

in 1944. In 1943 operations in Africa and across the Mediterranean were the 

best that could be accomplished in view of the limitations imposed by the lack 

of shipping and landing craft. He said that the United States and Great Britain 

had set before themselves the object of carrying an army into France in the 

late spring or early summer of 1944. The forces set up for this operation amount 

to 16British divisions and 19 U.S. divisions, a total of 35. It must be remembered, 

however, that these divisions are almost twice asstrong as the German divisions. 

The enterprise will involve a force of a million men being placed into France 

in 1944. 

At this point MARSHAL STALIN stated that he had not wished to imply 

that the Mediterranean operations had been unimportant. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was very grateful for the Marshal’s 

courtesy, but both he and the President had never regarded the Mediterranean 

operations as more than a stepping stone to the main offensive against Ger-* 

many. He said that after the British 16 divisions had been committed, there 

would be no more British divisions available for the operations. The entire British manpower would be necessary to maintain the divisions thus committed in 

France and elsewhere throughout the world. The remaining build-up for the 

offensive against Germany would rest with the United States. THE PRIME 

MINISTER said, however, that the summer of 1944 is far away. This particular 

operation is six months away. It is asked now what can be done in the mean518 
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while that will be of more use and take more weight off the U.S.S.R.,possibly 

without delaying OVERLORD more than a month or two. Already seven of the 

best divisions have been wthdrawn from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD 

and many landing craft have already gone or are being collected together. These 

withdrawals, plus bad weather, have resulted in our great disappointment at not 

now being in Rome. However, it is hoped to be there in January. Gegral 

Alexander, who is commanding these operations under the direction of General 

Eisenhower, feels that that offensive might result in completely cutting off the 

10 or 12 divisions now opposing the Anglo-American forces. This would result 

from amphibious operations, flanking movements, which would cut off their 

lines of withdrawal. 

The United Statesand the British have not come to any decision regarding plans for going into the Valley of the Po or for trying to invade Germany 

from Northern Italy. It was felt that when the Pisa-Rimini line should be 

reached we could then look toward Southern France or the Adriatic. It would 

be possible to use sea power in order to open the way. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said, however, that the operations referred to 

above were not enough. Ways of doing much more were now being talked of. 

Splendid things had been accomplished in Yugoslavia by Tito, who is doing 

much more than Mihailovich had accomplished. There were no plans to put 

a large army into Yugoslavia, but a blow could be struck at the Germans by 

means of assisting the Tit0 forces through increased supplies. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that one of the greatest things under consideration was the matter of bringing Turkey into the war, persuading her in, 

and opening the communications into the Dardanelles, Bosphorus and the 

Black Sea. Such operation would make possible an attack on Rhodes and other 

islands in the Aegean. The above would have a very important effect in that 

it would be possible for convoys to supply the U.S.S.R.through that route and 

these convoys could be maintained continuously. At the present time four convoys are scheduled via the northern routes, but it will not be possible to send 

more because of the necessity of utilizing the escorts for the OVERLORD 

build-up. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said one of the most important questions is how 

Turkey can be persuaded to come into the war. What should be done aboutthis 

matter? If Turkey should enter the war, should she be asked to attack Bulgaria 

or should her forces stop on the Thrace front? What would be the effect of 

Turkey’s action on Bulgaria? What do the Soviets think Bulgaria would do in 

the event of Turkey’s coming into the war? How would Turkey’s entry into the 

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war affect Rumania and Hungary? Would not Turkey’s entry into the war 

and consequent operations in the Aegean bring about a political “turnover” 

and force a German evacuation of Greece? It would be appreciated if the Soviets 

would let us know their opinion, political as well as military, on the above 

questions. 

MARSHAL STALIN said with regard to the remark of the Prime Minister 

as to whether it was thought Bulgaria would remember the Soviet action in 

freeing her from the Turks-the liberation of Bulgaria has not been forgotten. 

THE PRIME MINISTER continued that the objective of operations which 

were contemplated in the Eastern Mediterranean was to support the Soviets 

provided the U.S.S.R. considered the matter of sufficient interest for these 

operations to be undertaken -even if it meant as much as about two months’ 

delay in OVERLORD. Until it is known how the Soviets feel about Turkish 

and Aegean operations, the matter can not be definitely decided. The U.S.and 

U.K. can only decide this point after consulting with the U.S.S.R. 

THE PRESIDENT said that possibly an entry through the Northeastern 

Adriatic for offensive operations against Germany in the direction of the 

Danube would be of value. Such operations were being considered together 

with a movement into Southern France. Plans for these operations had not 

been worked out in detail. Such plans would be based, of course, on the assump 

tion that the Red Army would at the same time be approaching Odessa. It was 

thought, however, that it would be desirable to have a subcommittee go into 

the details of this matter. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if the Anglo-American forces take 

Rome and break up the German formation south of the Apennines they would 

then have the choice of proceeding to Southern France or eastward across the 

Adriatic. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that he understood it would require 35 divisions 

to invade France. Did these include the forces to be used in the Mediterranean? 

THE PRIME MlNlSTER indicated that the Mediterranean forces were 

entirely separate from those included in the OVERLORD build-up. He added 

that after the Italians had been defeated in Italy there remained the possibility 

of an attack against Southern France or across the Adriatic in the direction 

of Hungary and the Danube. Entirely separate from the OVERLORD bqld-up 

there would be 22 divisions available in the Mediterranean; these should all 

be used. However, it was not possible to move more than seven of them to the 

OVERLORD build-up because of a lack of shipping. He explained again that 

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the OVERLORD build-up was t,oinclude 16 British and 19 American divisions; 

that once the 16 British divisions had been committed there would be no more 

British divisions available. However, the United States would continue to pour 

divisions into France as fast as they could be shipped across the Atlantic until 

a total force of 50to 60 divisions had been reached. He pointed out, incidentally, 

the British and American divisions with their necessary supporting troops 

could be roughly estimated at 40,000 men each. 

T�IEPRIME MINISTER also spokeof the large air forcesbeing assembled 

in England. The present R.A.F. has about reached its maximum strength and 

be maintained at this strength in the future. However, it is contemplated that 

the American Air Forces in England will be doubled or tripled in the next six 

months. The U.S.has already shipped a million tons of stores to the United 

Kingdom in preparation for the OVERLORD operation. MR. CHURCHILL 

said that the President and he would be delighted to have the whole schedule 

of the OVERLORD build-up, both as to personnel and supply, presented to the 

Soviet authorities and answer any questions which they might have on this 

subject. He added that the schedule so prepared is being carried out. 

MARSHAL STALIN said it seemed to him that in addition to the operations to capture Rome and in addition to those envisaged for the Adriatic, an 

operation in Southern France was contemplated. 

THE PRIME MINISTER replied it was hoped that an operation against 

Southern France might be carried out as a diversion for OVERLORD but that 

detailed plans for such an operaton had not been worked out. 

MARSHAL STALIN asked if Turkey enters the war will Anglo-American 

forces be allocated 'to assist them? 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that speaking for himself, two or three 

divisions would be required to take the islands in the Aegean that control communications to Turkey, that 20 squadrons of fighter aircraft and several regiments of anti-aircraft artillery could also be supplied by the British without 

seriously affecting other operations in the Mediterranean. 

MARSHAL STALIN then said that the Anglo-American presentation was 

clear to him and indicated that he would like to make some comments. He said 

that it was not worthwhile to scatter the British and American forces. The 

plans presented seemed to indicate that part would be sent to Turkey, part to 

be utilized in Southern France, part in Northern France and part for operations 

across the Adriatic. He suggested that OVERLORD be accepted as a basis for 

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operations in 1944 and other operations should be considered as diversionary. 

He thought that after Rome had been captured there might be a chance for 

an operation against Southern France from Corsica, in which event the OVERLORD forces plus the Southern France invasion force could establish contact 

in France. This, he thought, would be a much better operation than to scatter 

forces in several areas distant from each other. He considered that France was 

the weakest of all German-occupied areas. He added that he had no hopes of 

Turkey entering the war and in fact was convinced that she would not, in 

spite of all pressure that might be exerted. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he and the President had understood 

that the Soviet authorities wanted Turkey to come into the war. They were 

prepared to make every effort to persuade or force her to do so. 

MARSHAL STALIN said the Soviets do want Turkey to enter the 

war but he felt that she could not be taken in by “the scruff of the neck.” 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he agreed that the Anglo-American 

forces should not be scattered but that the operations he had outlined in the 

Eastern Mediterranean would require only three or four of a total of 25 divisions 

that might be available. He thought that this could be accomplished without 

seriously affecting the main operations of OVERLORD. Most of the operations 

would be done by divisions from the Middle East. The air power necessary to 

assist Turkey would be taken from that now protecting Egypt and thus they 

would be brought into a better position to strike at the enemy. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he dreaded the six months’ idleness 

between the capture of Rome and the mounting of OVERLORD. Hence, he 

believed that secondary operations should be considered in order to deploy 

forces available. 

MARSHAL STALIN said he would like to express another opinion, i.e., 

that he believed OVERLORD has the greatest possibilities. This would particularly be the case if‘OVERLORD operations were supported by another offensive 

movement from Southern France. He believed that the Allies should be prepared 

to remain on the defensive in Italy and thus release 10 divisions for operations 

in Southern France. Within two or three months after operations commenced 

in Southern France and the German forces had thus been diverted, the time 

would be propitious to start an operation in the North of France such as OVERLORD. Under these conditions the success of OVERLORD would be assured. 

Rome might then be captured at a later date. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER observed that we should be no stronger if we 

did not capture Rome. If the airfields north of Rome are not secured it would 

be impracticable to place adequate aircraft for an attack on Southern France. 

He said it would be difficult for him to agree not to take Rome this January. 

He added that failure to do so would be considered as a crushing defeat, and 

that the House of Commons would feel that he was failing to use his British 

forces in full support of the Soviet ally. He said that in this event he felt it 

would be no longer possible for him to represent his government. 

MARSHAL STALIN suggested that an operation against Southern 

France might be undertaken and given air cover from bases on Corsica. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it would take considerable time to 

construct the necessary airfields on the Island of Corsica. 

THE PRESIDENT said that Marshal Stalin’s proposals concerning 

Southern France were of considerable interest to him. He would like to have 

the Planners make make a study of the possibilities of this operation. The 

question of relative timing in the Eastern Mediterranean with reference to 

these operations posed a very serious question. The point was whether it would 

be better to go into the Eastern Mediterranean and delay OVERLORD for one 

or two months or to attack France one or two months before the first of May 

and then conduct OVERLORD on the original date. He was particularly 

desirous that this operation not be delayed if it were possible to avoid it. 

MARSHAL STALIN said as the result of the Soviet experience in the 

past two years they have come to the conclusion that a large offensive from one 

direction is unwise. The Red Army usually attacks from two directions, forcing 

the enemy to move his reserves from one front to the other. As the two offensives 

converge the power of the whole offensive increases. Such would be the case 

in simultaneous operations from Southern and Northern France. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he agreed with the views expressed by 

Marshal Stalin but did not feel that his proposals concerning Turkey and 

Yugoslavia were inconsistent with them. He wished to go on record as saying 

that it would be difficult and impossible to sacrifice all activity in the Mediterranean in order to keep an exact date for OVERLORD. There would be 20 

divisions which could not be moved out of the Mediterranean because of a 

lack of shipping. These should be used to stretch Germany to the utmost. He 

expressed the hope that careful and earnest consideration should be given to 

making certain that operations in the Mediterranean were not injured solely 

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for the purpose of keeping the May date for OVERLORD. He added that agreement between the three powers was necessary and would be reached but he 

hoped that all factors would be given careful and patient consideration before 

decisions were reached. He suggested meditating on the discussions of the first 

meeting and reviewing them at the meeting of the next day. 

THE PRESIDENT said he thought it would be a good idea for the staff to 

immediately conduct a study on the operations against Southern France. 

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the staff should investigate plans 

for operations against Southern France but added that they should also work 

on Turkey. 

MARSHAL STALIN agreed that it would be well to continue consideration of these matters the next day. He had not expected that the conference 

would deal with purely military questions and therefore they had not brought a 

large military staff. He added, however, that Marshal Voroshiloff was present 

and would be available for military discussions. 

THE PRIME MINISTER asked how the question of Turkish entry into 

the war should be considered. He asked if she could be brought in, what she 

should be expected to do in the event that she did come in and what the cost 

of her entry would be to the three powers concerned. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that the entry of Turkey into the war was both 

a political and a military question. Turkey must take pride in the policy of 

entry from the point of view of friendship. The British and the United States 

should use their influence to persuade Turkey to help. In this way it would be 

impossible for Turkey to maintain her position as a neutral and continue to 

play fast and loose between our side and the Axis. It was his opinion that if 

it were not possible to induce Turkey to enter the war as a matter of friendship, 

she should not enter. MARSHAL STALIN added that all neutral states, including Turkey, look upon belligerents as fools. We must prove to them that if they 

do not enter this war they will not reap the benefits of the victory. 

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that Christmas time would be a 

dangerous season for Turkey. He added that he proposed submitting a paper 

which he would present before the conference, containing six or seven questions 

which should be answered in order to clarify the Turkish situation. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he would do all he could to persuade the 

President of Turkey to enter the war. However, he felt personally that Turkey 

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would ask such a high price for her entry as a belligerent that OVERLORD 

would be jeopardized. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Turks have not yet answered the proposals already made to them but that he expected their reply would be in the 

negative. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Turkey would be mad not to accept the 

Soviet invitation to join the winning side. If she failed to align herself with us 

she would certainly loose the sympathy of the British people and almost certainly of the American people. 

MARSHAL STALIN observed that “a bird in the hand is worth two in 

the bush.” The Turks are now inactive and they should help us. 

THE CONFEREES then agreed that the plenary session should be held 

at 1600 the following day. 

THE PRESIDENT observed that it would be desirable to have a military 

conference first. 

It was agreed that a military conference should be held at 1030 the following day, that Marshal Voroshiloff should represent the U.S.S.R.,Admiral Leahy 

and General Marshal should represent the U.S.A and General Brooke and Air 

Marshal Portal should represent Great Britain. 

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EUREKACONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MILITARY CONFERENCE 

BETWEENTHE U.S.A., GREATBRITAINAND THE U.S.S.R., 

HELDIN THE RUSSIANLEGATION,TEHRAN,IRAN, 

ON MONDAY, 29 NOVEMBER 1943AT 1030

PRESENT 

United States 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

Secretary 

Captain H. Ware, USA (Interpreter) 

British 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Brigadier H. Redman, Secretar] 

Captain Lunghi (Interpreter) 

U.S. S. R. 

Marshal Voroshiloff 

Mr. Pavlov (Interpreter) 

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GENERAL SIR ALAN BROOKE expressed his pleasure at being able to 

sit down at a table around which were gathered the military representatives 

of the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. He said that he would run through a 

brief account of the war as seen by the British representatives at the present 

moment and then examine the relation of the OVERLORD operation to the 

other parts of the war effort. 

He thought that one of the most important things at t.he present time 

was to keep the German divisions actively engaged. For this reason, the British 

were interested in stopping the movement to the Russian front of all the 

German divisions which it was possible to hold. OVERLORD would engage a 

large number of German divisions, but it could not possibly be mounted until 

1May at the very earliest date. Therefore, there would ensue, between the present time and the launching of OVERLORD, a period of some five or six months 

during which something must be done to keep the German divisions engaged. 

It was therefore desired to take full advantage of the forces now established 

in the Mediterranean area. 

At this point GENERAL BROOKE expressed the hope that General 

Marshall would interrupt his statement if anything was said with which 

General Marshall did not agree or on which he wished to offer any comment. 

Continuing his account of the war, GENERAL BROOKE said that for 

the reasons already stated, all the plans on which we have been working have 

been designed to deploy the maximum forces on all fronts. Pointing out on a 

map the present location of the Italian Front, he said that on that line we are 

assembling the forces in Italy necessary to drive the Germans to the north. 

There are some 23 German divisions now in Italy, part of them in the south and 

a part of them in the north. The present conception is to assemble sufficient 

forces to drive the Germans from their present line to a line north of Rome. 

To do this it would be necessary to employ arnphibious forces around the German flanks (pointing to the west flank), and by these operations it was hoped 

to engage the 11or 12 German divisions in the south, render them inoperative, 

and force the Germans to relieve them. By these means we should be able to 

contain the German divisionsnow present in Italy and to reduce their efficiency. 

Turning to Yugoslavia, GENERAL BROOKE said that since the withdrawal of Italian forces there, the Germans have found it difficult to maintain 

their communications in that country. Therefore, full advantage must be taken 

of all opportunities to increase the German difficulties in Yugoslavia by 

assisting the Partisans. It is desired to organize a system by which arms can 

be supplied to them and air assistance rendered as well. 

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GENERALBROOKE said that there were now some 21 German divisions 

deployed in Yugoslavia as far down as the Grecian border. Replying to an 

indication from Marshal Voroshiloff that he did not quite agree with these 

figures, he stated that this was his information and that he would ask the 

British Intelligence to check the accuracy of his figures. He said that there 

were also 8 Bulgarian divisions in addition to the German divisions in the 

Yugoslav area. 

With reference to Turkey, GENERAL BROOKE said that, looking at 

Turkey from a military point of view and omitting all political considerations, 

we see a great military advantage in getting Turkey into the war. By this we 

shall have an opportunity of opening the sea communications through the 

Dardanelles. By doing this, the position of Bulgaria and Rumania will become 

more difficult and the chances of getting them out of the war will be greatly 

increased. There will also be opened up the possibility of establishing a supply 

line to Russia through the Dardanelles. 

By establishing airdromes in Turkey, it will be possible to launch bombing 

attacks on German oil establishments in eastern Europe. The shortening of 

the sea route to Russia will save shipping and thereby assist greatly in the 

general shipping shortage. In order to open sea communications through the 

Dardanelles, it is considered that it will be necessary to capture some of the 

Dodecanese Islands, beginning with Rhodes. With airdromes established in 

Turkey and with Turkish help, it was not believed that this would be a difficult 

task nor that it would detract from other operations. 

GENERAL BROOKE said that we have in the Mediterranean now a 

certain number of landing craft for special operations. These landing craft 

would be required for the operations he had outlined, and their retention for 

these operations would require the retarding of the date set for OVERLORD. 

The landing craft are being used to maintain and build up the forces now in 

Italy. By the operations he had outlined we should be able to hold and destroy 

the German forces now in the Mediterranean area while awaiting the date 

for OVERLORD. 

He considered it also of great importance to establish airdromes to the 

north of Rome in order to bring bombing to bear on German installations. He 

said that this air operation in conjunction with the operations now being carried 

on from England would play a great part in the conduct of the whole war. 

He pointed out that air attacks were now containing about a million men 

now held in Germany solely by reason of the bomber offensive. He said that if we 

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adopt defensive operations in Italy now, as had been suggested at yesterday’s 

conference, we should still have to maintain strong forces in Italy in order to 

contain the German forces there. Therefore, there would be left over only very 

limited forces for the operation against the coast of Southern France. In 

addition, the landing craft available for that operation would be limited to a 

very small assault force. 

GENERAL BROOKE said that he agreed with Marshal Stalin’s pincer 

strategy of two cooperating forces whenever such a strategy was possible but 

he thought that this strategy was better when based on land instead of on long 

sea communications. In the latter case, the two forces are not sufficiently selfsupporting. It is not easy to reinforce one from the other or to keep a reserve 

from which to reinforce either from a central point. The building up of land 

forces by sea is a lengthy business. 

GENERAL BROOKE said that if the attack against Southern France 

were launched two months prior to OVERLORD, that it was certain to be 

defeated before OVERLORD starts. He said that a more nearly simultaneous 

execution of these operations would be required and also that large numbers 

of landing craft would be necessary. However, it had been considered that 

during OVERLORD a small landing Ir-ight be made in Southern France to 

draw German forces away from the larger operation. 

He said that the difficulties and dangers for OVERLORD would develop 

during the building up of the forces. It was possible to assault the French 

coast only with some three or four divisions and the process of building up to 

35 divisions would be long and difficult. During this period it was imperative 

that the Germans should not be able to concentrate large forces against the 

operation. 

GENERAL BROOKE said that this concluded a rough outline of the 

projected land operations and that Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal would 

explain the air aspects of the operations. 

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL inquired as to whether he should, in his 

comments, cover the U.S.air operations or whether General Marshall would 

do this. 

In reply, GENERAL MARSHALL requested Air Marshal Portal to cover 

the entire operations and said that he would elaborate as necessary. 

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In response to Marshal Voroshiloff’s request that the US. representatives give their comments on the land operations before the taking up of the 

air aspects, ADMIRAL LEAHY requested General Marshall to state the US. 

views. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he should first explain the purely 

American point of view of this stage of the war. He pointed out that the US. 

now has a going war on two fronts, the Pacific and the Atlantic, and this 

fact of two major operations at one time presents a dilemma. In contrast 

to the usual diWcultiesof war, there is no lack of troops and no lack of supplies. 

There are now more than fifty divisions in the United States which we wish to 

deploy as soon as possible in addition to those already overseas. The military 

problem, therefore, resolvesitself almost entirely into a question of shipping and 

landing craft. While this is, of course, an exaggeration, jt might almost be said 

that we have reached the point of having to ignore strategy in order to advance 

communications. Our great desire is to bring these troops into action as soon 

as possible. 

When we speak of landing craft we mean, most of all, special craft for 

the transport of motor vehicles and tanks. As the Chief of the Imperial General 

Staff has already stated, our problem in the Mediterranean is largely one of 

landing craft, and of those landing craft, we are particularly concerned with 

the special craft for transporting motor vehicles. 

GENERALMARSHALL said that he wished to repeat and emphasize that 

there was no lack of troops or of supplies. He said we are deeply interested in 

the length of voyages, the length of time required in ports, and the over-all 

time for the turn-around. Our air forces had been sent overseas just as soon as 

they had been trained and hence, the air battle was far more advanced than the 

situation on land. One of the delays in the build-up of land forces in Italy had 

been the getting in of air support and the necessary ground troops to 

maintain it. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that one reason for favoring OVERLORD 

from the start is that it is the shortest oversea transport route. After the initial 

success, transports will be sent directly from the United States to the French 

ports because there are about sixty divisions in the United States to be put 

into OVERLORD. 

As to the Mediterranean factors in the situation, GENERAL MARSHALL 

said that no definite conclusions have been reached up to the present as to 

further operations, pending the results of this conference. The question now 

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before us is: What do we do in the next three months, and then in the next 

six months? He pointed out that what was done in the second period would 

necessarily depend on the decisions made in the first period. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would like to repeat the statement made 

by General Brooke that it is considered dangerous to launch an operation 

against the coast of Southern France a long time (that is, what we consider a 

long time) prior to OVERLORD.On theother hand, action in Southern France 

has been considered and planned on as very important for the support of the 

operation in Northwestern France. He said that at the present moment he 

and his US. colleagues feel that from two to three weeks should be the maximum 

limit for launching this operation in advance of OVERLORD. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he wished to point out, in addition to what 

General Brooke had said, that the destruction of ports imposes an initial and 

serious delay in getting heavy equipment and ammunition ashore, and it is 

necessary that we assume in our planning that the ports will be destroyed. Our 

engineers have accomplished marvels in restoring the damaged ports but 

despite this, a considerable period of dangerous delay inevitably follows the 

initial assault. He illustrated this by reference to the U.S. experience in Salerno, 

a comparatively small landing. In the first 18days there had been landed over 

the beaches a total of 108,000tons of supplies, 30.000 motor vehicles and 189,000 

troops. He wished to emphasize that all of this had to be done over the beaches 

and that none of it came through a port. The US. was fortunate, of course, to 

have had during this period a very slight enemy air reaction. 

GENERALMARSHALL said that the difficulty in such an operation is to 

get sufficient flghter air cover. In almost every case it had been found, therefore, 

that an additional operation was necessary in order to get the aimelds for this 

fighter cover. 

In answer to a question from Marshal Voroshiloff as to how long it had 

taken to land the men and material just enumerated, GENERAL MARSHALL 

said it had required 18 days; thereafter a port had been secured. Then, 

beginning with an initial entry of 2,000 tons of supplies, the intake through 

the port was increased more and more as the demolished equipment was 

rehabilitated until it was possible to take care of all requirements in this 

manner. 

In summarizing, GENERALMARSHALL said that he wished to emphasize that shipping and landing craft, with the provision of fighter air cover, are 

the problems for which we have to find solutions in order to decide the question 

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of Mediterranean operations. He added that over Salerno fighter aircraft had 

had only 15or 20 minutes of actual combat flying time. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF remarked that for OVERLORD this would 

be a very short time. 

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that a total combat time of 30 minutes 

had been planned for OVERLORD. 

In reply to Marshal Voroshiloffs statement that he did not think this 

was sufficient time, AIR MARSHAL PORTAL explained that the 30 minutes 

was not measured from take-off to landing but was the actual time in which 

the fighter planes were actually engaged over the battle area. 

In reply to Marshal Voroshiloff’s question as to what fighters were 

envisaged as being in this area, AIR MARSHAL PORTAL said that these would 

be the high-performance fighters, like the British Spitfires and American P-51’s 

and P-38’s. He explained that the long-range fighters were not so suitable 

against the German defenses as the short-range. 

GENERAL MARSIIALL said that in the Mediterranean we face the problem of where to employ our available landing craft. If we undertake certain 

operations, OVERLORD will inevitably be delayed. If we conthe ourselves to 

reduced operations in the Mediterranean for the next three or four months, this 

course entails the least interference with OVERLORD. He repeated that the 

problem is not a lack of troops or of equipment. He would like Marshal 

Voroshiloff to understand that at the present time the U.S. has landing operations going on at five different places in the Pacific, all of which involve landing 

craft,and that four more similar operations were due to be launched in January. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he thought the best procedure now would 

be to have AIR MARSHAL PORTAL discuss the air aspects of operations and 

then to ask Marshal Voroshiloff to present any comments or advice he may have. 

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL said that he would speak only of the air war 

inEurope other than on the battle fronts. He said that the air offensive against, 

Germany was being waged on an ever-increasing scale from the U.K.; from 

the Mediterranean it was just beginning. As to the scale of attack, the British 

and Americans together were launching from 15.000 to 20,000 tons of bombs 

per month on German communications, installations, and battle industry. Our 

immediate objective is the destruction of the plants and factories on which 

German battle industry depends. If we can do this and inflict heavy casualties 

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on German fighters, we hope to be able to range over a11 Germany and destroy 

one by one every important installation on which the German war effort 

depends. 

The battle is heavy, with heavy losses on both sides. The Germans 

clearly realize their danger if our plans succeed. This is assured by the disposition of their forces in order to counter our attacks. For instance, for the 

defense of central and southern Germany the Germans now have deployed 

between 1,650 and 1,700 fighters. On all other fronts together they have only 

750 fighters. These figures cover fighters only; bombers are not included. 

German sensitiveness to the bombing of their industrial area was recently 

illustrated when, in response to the comparatively light attacks made from 

the Mediterranean on this area, the Germans immediately transferred 200 

fighters to the area. 

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL said that it was recognized that the bulk of the 

Soviet planes were now employed in support of the land battle, but when it 

became possible to spare air forces from the land battle, t.his would help 

enormously on all other fronts by causing the Germans to withdraw forces to 

protect the area threatened by the Soviets. 

111response to a suggestion from Admiral Leahy,it was now agreed that it 

would be helpful if Marshal Voroshiloff would express his opinion on the 

matters under discussion. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that before making a statement, he 

would like to ask same questions. He said that he knew from .the statements 

made by the British and American military representatives in Moscow that 

OVERLORD is being prepared for next spring, with a target date about 1May. 

He had just heard that morning that fifty or sixty divisions would be available 

from the U.S.for this operation and that the only problem was one of shipping 

and landing craft. He hoped that it might be possible to have a report on what 

is being done now to solve the problem of shipping and landing craft and to 

launch Operation OVERLORD on time. This constituted his first question. 

As to his second question, he said that he had attached great importance 

to the remarks made by General Marshall from which he understood that 

the U.S. considers Operation OVERLORD of the first importance. He wished to 

know if General Brooke also considered the operation of the first importance. 

He wished to ask both Allies whether they think that OVERLORD must be 

carried out or whether they consider that it may be possible to replace it by 

some other suitable operation when Turkey has entered the war. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that in answer to Marshal Voroshiloffs 

question as to progress from the U.S.side on the build-up for OVERLORD, 

all preparations are now under way and have been for some time, for a target 

date of 1May 1944,and that the troops are now in motion. As an example he 

pointed out that we now have in England, well ahead of the troops, a million 

tons of supplies and equipment, including munitions and heavy supplies of 

all kinds. It remains now only to bring the troops up to the supplies. 

He pointed out that the US. had only one division in England in August. 

There are nine divisions there now with a constant flow of additional troops. 

There had been a tremendous flow of air personnel for the bomber offensive. 

He said that in speaking of divisions, he was including the necessary 

corps and army troops as well as service troops. He reiterated that the problem 

is landing craft for OVERLORD. The question now is: Shall we take any 

landing craft from OVERLORD for other operations and thereby delay 

OVERLORD? The troops are in motion for OVERLORD. The air forces are 

already there and proceeding with their expansion. The problem is landing 

craft. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that he had an additional question. 

He said that General Deane and General Ismay, in explaining the OVERLORD 

build-up at the Moscow Conference, had said that both in the U.S. and U.K. 

there were now being built special landing craft and special vessels for the 

construction of temporary harbors. He would like to know the present status 

of these construction programs. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he would leave the answer as to the 

special port construction and as to part of the landing craft construction to 

General Brooke. He said that in the struggle with the landing craft problem, 

the object of the US.is to get more craft in order to be able to undertake some 

operations in the Mediterranean that could easily be done if more landing craft 

were available. He wished to make clear that the landing craft program for 

OVERLORD is well in hand. General Marshall repeated and emphasized this 

statement. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that he understood that some shipbuilding yards both in England and America had been taken over for the 

building of landing craft. He wished to know whether the construction was 

actually under way or whether it was still only a program. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that General Brooke could answer for 

the U.K.There was no secret about the matter. He feared that he himself 

had misled Marshal Voroshiloff in view of the fact that he was answering the 

Marshal's question wholly with respect to landing craft for OVERLORD. For 

example, it had recently been decided to delay the movement from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD of sixty landing craft, capable of carrying 40 tanks 

each, in order to permit General Eisenhower not only to advance more rapidly 

in Italy but to force the Germans to reinforce their line from the Po Valley. 

In other words, the object was to absorb more German divisions in view of 

the fact that General Eisenhower was unable to conduct a turning movement 

through the mountains during the winter. For this reason it had been decided 

to delay the movement of these landing craft from the Mediterranean to the 

U.K. but it was hoped that it would be possible to complete the operations for 

which they were being retained in the Mediterranean and still get them through 

on time for OVERLORD. In the meantime, a tremendous effort was being 

made both in the US.and U.K.to increase the output of landing craft so 

that OVERLORD might be made more powerfuI and more certain of success, 

and so that it might be possible to undertake the operations in the Mediterranean that additional landing craft would permit. He pointed out that the 

problem in the Mediterranean involves at present more troops than can be 

put into action. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that this answered his question. 

GENERAL BROOKE said, in answer to Marshal Voroshiloffs flrst 

question as to the importance in British eyes of operation OVERLORD, that 

the British had always considered the operation as an essential part of this 

war. However, they had stipulated that the operation must be mounted at a 

time when it would have the best chances of success. He pointed out that the 

fortifications in Northern France are of a very serious character, that the 

communications are excellent, and therefore the Germans would have an 

excellent opportunity of holding up the landings until they could bring their 

reserves into play. This is the reason for the British stipulations as to the 

conditions prerequisite for launching the operation. They consider that in 

1944 these conditions wiIl exist. They have reorganized all their forces for 

this purpose. These forces were originally organized for the defense of the U.K. 

but they are now organized as an expeditionary force for employment on 

the Continent.Amphibious divisions are now undergoing training for Operation 

OVERLORD. Four battle-tried divisions have been brought back from ItaIy 

to the U.K. for the operation and, in addition, there have been brought back 

some of the landing craft which will be required. All details and plans for the 

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operation have been made as far as it has been possible to do so up to the 

present moment. 

It followed, therefore, that the British attach the greatest importance 

to the execution of this operation in 1944 but, as Genera1 Marshall had said 

and as he (General Brooke) wished to say again, landing craft constituted 

our tactical necessity. In order to maintain the 1May 1944 date for OVERLORD 

it will be necessary to withdraw landing craft from the Mediterranean now. 

If this were done, it would bring the Italian operations almost to a standstill. 

The British wished, during the preparations for OVERLORD, to keep fighting 

the Germans in the Mediterranean to the maximum degree possible. In their 

dew, such operations are necessary not only to hoId the Germans in Italy 

but to create the situation in Northern France which will make OVERLORD 

possible. 

GENERAL BROOKE said that Marshal Voroshiloff had heard correctly 

as to the construction of landing craft in England at the present time. The 

Prime Minister has stopped certain ordinary construction in order to make 

additional landing craft possible. By these means it was hoped to make sixty 

or seventy more craft available in time for OVERLORD. These are being built 

now and are in addition to the original program. 

With reference to the provision for temporary harbors, he said that 

the necessary gear was being built for this purpose now. In this connection 

many experiments have been made, and while some of them had not been 

as successful as it had been hoped, others had offered considerable promise 

and it was hoped would give fruitful results. This was a matter of the greatest 

importance as the success or failure of the operation may depend on these 

ports. He hoped that these statements would provide a satisfactory answer 

to Marshal Voroshiloff’s question. 

MARSHAL VOROSHZLOFF said he wished to apologize for his failure 

to understand clearly but he was interested to know whether General Brooke, 

as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, considered OVERLORD as important 

an operation as General Marshall had indicated that he did. He would like 

Oeneral Brooke’s personal opinion. 

GENERAL BROOKE replied that as Chief of the Imperial General 

Staff he considered Operation OVERLORD as of vital importance, but there 

was one stipulation that he should like to make. He knew the defenses of 

Northern France and did not wish to see the operation fail. In his opinion, 

under certain circumstances it was bound to fail. 

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MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet 

General Staff attach great importance to OVERLORD and felt that the other 

operationsin the Mediterranean can be regarded only as auxiliary operations. 

GENERAL BROOKE said that that was exactly the way he looked at the 

matter but, unless the auxiliary operations are carried out, in his opinion 

OVERLORD can not be successful. 

MARSHAL VOROSHZLOFF said that he would now express his own 

point of view. He recalled that Marshall Stalin had said yesterday that he 

and the Soviet General Staff considered that OVERLORD was a very serious 

operation and would prove a dimcult one. He said that the accomplishments 

of the U.S. and U.K.in the war to date, especially the brilliant operations of 

their air forces over Germany, served to indicate the might of these two nations 

and the superiorityof the Allies in the Mediterranean area. If there is added to 

this the firm will and desire of the U.S. and British staffs, he (Marshal Voroshiloff) felt sure that OVERLORD would be successful and that it would go 

down in history as one of our greatest victories. He repeated that this view 

was supported by what all have seen in the fighting in North Africa and the 

operations of the Allied air forces over Germany. 

MARSHAL VOROSHZLOFF said that he had absolutely no doubt that 

the necessary shipping and landing craft for OVERLORD can be found either 

by construction of new craft or conversion from merchant craft. He was sure 

these problems can be solved successfully. He understood from the statements 

made by General Marshall that the US. now has nine divisions in the U.K. 

He pointed out that there are yet six months to 1 May 1944,the target date 

for OVERLORD. This will permit the U.S. forces in the U.K. to be doubled 

or tripled and, in addition, make possible the bringing over of tanks and other 

supplies. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the nine divisions now in the U.K. 

consisted of seven infantry divisions and two armored divisions. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that in his opinion this force can be 

doubled in the next six months, to which GENERAL MARSHALL replied that 

this is already scheduled. 

MARSHAL VOROSHZLOFF said that he would now discuss the 

operation itself. He entirely agreed with General Brooke that some small 

operations in the Mediterranean are necessary as diversions in order to draw 

German troops away from the Eastern Front and from Northwestern France, 

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but he thought as a military man, and as probably all other military men 

would think also, that OVERLORD is the most important operation and that 

all the other auxiliary operations, such as Rome, Rhodes and what not, must 

be planned to assist OVERLORD and certainly not to hinder it. He pointed 

out that it was possible now to plan additional operations that may hurt 

OVERLORD and emphasized that this must not be so. These operations must 

be planned so as to secure OVERLORD, which is the most important operation, 

and not to hurt it. The suggestion made yesterday by Marshal Stalin that 

simultaneous operations should be undertaken from Northern France and 

Southern France is based on the idea that the Mediterranean operations are 

secondary to OVERLORD. Ge.rmany can not be attacked directly from Italy 

because of the Alps. However, Italy does offer the possibility of successful 

defensewith a small number of troops. The troops saved by defensive operations 

in Italy would be available for launching an amphibious operation against 

Southern France. Marshal Staliii does not insist on this but does insist on 

the execution of OVERLORD on the date already planned. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said, with respect to the action of the air 

forces and Air Marshal Portal’s suggestion of the bombing of eastern Germany 

by the Russian Air Force, that it must be known to the U.S. and the U.K. 

staffs that the Germans are still strong an the Russian front. He wished to 

repeat that, as Marshal Stalin had said yesterday, there are now 210 German 

divisions on this front and 50 satellite divisions, making a total of 260 in all. 

The Soviets will, of course, utilize every opportunity of attacking eastern 

Germany by air, but these opportunities are not very frequent. No such possibility exists at present because all air forces are employed in support of the 

land battle. 

With respect to the difficulties of the cross-Channel operation, he said 

that it was understood, of course, that crossing the Channel was more difficult 

than crossing a large river. He pointed out, however, that during the recent 

Soviet advances to the west they had crossed several large rivers, the most 

recent of which was the Dnieper. In the latter case the ordinary difficulties of 

a river crossing were greatly increased by the high, steep western bank and 

the low eastern bank, but with the help of machine gun, mortar and artillery 

fire and the employment of mine throwers it had been found possible to lay 

down a fire so intense that the Germans could not endure it. It was so in the 

vicinity of Kiev, Gomel, and other points. He believed, therefore, that with 

similar aids it will be possible for the Allies to land in Northern France. 

GENERAL BROOKE said that he would like to point out that the 

question as to whether or not Operation OVERLORD is to be executed in 

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1944 has not been under discussion. It has been definitely decided to carry out 

the operation, and it is recognized that the Mediterranean operations are 

definitely of a secondary nature. There are certain forces, however, now 

deployed in the Mediterranean from whose employment a direct benefit can 

and should be derived. In addition, all operations planned in the Mediterranean area are coordinated in the over-all plan for the war and are projected 

with a view to their eventual influence on the Eastern Front and on OVERLORD. He said that he had been studying the Soviet river crossings with the 

greatest of interest. In his opinion the Soviets had been accomplishing 

technical marvels. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that the crossings were the result of 

the efforts of all of their people. They had the will to do it. 

GENERAL BROOKE said that the Channel crossing was a technical 

matter, the minutest details of which had been under study for several years. 

It must not be forgotten that the fire support for the operation must come 

from the sea. With reference to Marshal Voroshiloff’s remarks as to artillery 

and mortar support, he said that the British have equipped landing craft with 

mortars and have studied every detail of the fire support of the cross-Channel 

operation from air and sea. He wished to point out the special difficulties 

existing in connection with this coast because of the long shelving beaches, 

where the tide goes out a long way. On many parts of the coast this characteristic makes landing operations very difficult and in some places, as at Calais, 

where the situation most favors air support, the beaches are the worst. He said 

the British are still engaged in experiments as to the best means of forcing a 

landing and are adding to the results of these experiments the best experience 

of the U.S.and British forces in the war to date. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF referred to newspaper accounts which he 

had read with reference to large maneuvers held in England and wished to 

know if these had resulted in any new developments. 

GENERAL BROOKE replied that these maneuvers have been carried 

out mainly for the purpose of bringing about battles in the sir. He said that 

they had carried out all preparations for the cross-Channel operation as a 

matter of training, and this had proved of great value to the staffs. The landing 

craft had been launched toward the French coast in the hope that the German 

air forces would be induced thereby to come out and fight. The German 

response had not been in keeping with the British hopes. The maneuvers 

referred to did not include an exercise in the actual landings. These exercises, 

however, are continually being carried out in certain areas on the English 

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Coasts from which the population has been cleared in order to permit the 

neeeasary supporting fire. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said he wished to inquire of Air Marshal 

Portal what his opinion was as to the sufficiency of the air forces available for 

OVERLORD. 

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL replied that there were enough air forces 

available to insure the success of the landing itself. The Allies would probably

be superior to the Germans in the air by five or six to one. It was not, however, 

in the assault period that the air need would be the greatest, but during the 

build-up of the invading forces across the beaches. This would constitute the 

critical period, and it was during this period that the Germans would try to 

bring to bear their maximum available air power. At the same time a considerable portion of the Allied air forces would have to be used in order to interrupt 

communications leading from the interior of France to the front. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said he considered an air superiority of 

five or six to one as satisfactory. 

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL pointed out that all these figures must be 

judged in the light of distance. He said that the Germans have many airfields 

located close ta the front on their side. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that these German airfields must be 

destroyed before the operation is launched. In his opinion it was impossible 

to begin it without air superiority. 

AIR MARSHAL PORTAL replied that this initial destruction of German 

Melds was a part of the OVERLORD plan. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he wished to offer one comment. The 

differencebetween a river crossing, however wide, and a landing from the ocean 

is that the failure of a river crossing is a reverse while the failure of a landing 

operation from the sea is a catastrophe, because failure in the latter case 

means the almost utter destruction of the landing craft and personnel 

involved. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that he appreciated the frankness of 

these statements. 

GENERAL MARSHALL went on to say that his military education had 

been based on roads, rivers, and railroads and that his war experience in 

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France had been concerned with the same. During the last two years, however, 

he had been acquiring an education based on oceans and he had had to learn 

all over again. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that prior to the present war he had never 

heard of any landing craft except a rubber boat. Now he thinks about little else. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF replied, “If you think about it, you will 

do it.” 

To this GENERAL MARSHALL replied, “That is a very good reply. I 

understand thoroughly.” 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF said that he wished to emphasize that if 

in Operation OVERLORD our forces were launched against the hostile coast 

without previously destroying the enemy positions, there could, of course, 

be no success. He thought that the procedure must be similar to that followed 

on land. First the enemy positions must be destroyed with artillery fire and 

bombing from the air; then light forces, including reconnaissance groups, 

would land and take the first ground; when this had been done, the large 

forces would come in later. Therefore, if the advance forces were unable to 

land and were destroyed in the attempt, the larger forces would not be destroyed 

also. He felt that if the operation were conducted in this way, it would prove 

to be a brilliant success and not result in catastrophe. 

GENERAL MARSHALL emphasized that no catastrophe was expected, 

but that everyone was planning for success. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested, in view of the lateness of the hour, that 

the meeting adjourn and reconvene later. 

GENERAL BROOKE suggested the possibility of convening again 

Tuesday morning at 1030. He said that he had some questions he would like 

to ask Marsha1Voroshiloff. 

MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF thought it desirable to reach some conclusions as a result of the discussion. 

GENERAL BROOKE suggested that the conclusions would properly 

follow the second meeting, to which MARSHAL VOROSHILOFF agreed. 

The meeting accordingly adjourned, to reconvene at the Russian 

Legation. Tehran, Iran, on Tuesday, 30 November at 1030. 

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EUREKA CONFERENCE 

MIKUTES OF PLENARY SESSION 

BETWEEN THE U.S.A.. GREAT BRITAINAND THE U.S.S.R., 

HELD IN THE RUSSIAN LEGATION, TEHRAN, IRAN, 

ON MOKDAY, 29 NOVEMBER 1943 AT 1600

PRESENT 

United States 

President Roosevelt 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

Mr. Averill Harriman 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J.King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Maj. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Captain F. B. Royal, USN, Secretary 

Mr. C. E. Bohlen (Interpreter) 

Capt. H. H. Ware, USA (Interpreter) 

British 

Prime Minister Churchill 

Mr. Anthony Eden 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Lt. Gen. Hastings L. Ismay 

Lt. General Martel 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, Secretary 

Sir Archibald Kerr 

Major Birse (Interpreter) 

U.S.S. R. 

Marshal Stalin 

Mr. Molotov 

Marshal Voroshiloff 

One Secretary 

Mr. Pavlov (Interpreter) 

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THE PRESZDENT said he had no formal agenda for today’s meeting. He 

thought it would be a good idea if Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister, and 

possibly Marshal Voroshiloff, would give the meeting their ideas. 

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether the military committee had completed its work. 

GENERAL BROOKE gave an outline of the proceedings of the conference this morning. (See Minutes of Military Conference, 29 Kovember 1943 at 

1030.) 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he had little to add to the statement 

of General Brooke but that the problems concerning the United States are not 

those of troops nor equipment but rather problems of ships, landing craft and 

airfields in sufficient proximity to the scene of immediate operations under 

consideration. Furthermore he said, in speaking of landing craft, he was 

speaking particularly of a special type which carries about 40 tanks or motor 

vehicles. He said he desired to make clear, as far as the United States forces for 

OVERLORD are concerned, that the build-up has proceeded according to 

schedule. Especially should it be noted that the supplies and equipment have 

now been assembled to the extent of one million tons in the United Kingdom, 

in advance of the arrival of the troops anticipated. All supplies and equipment 

have been set up according to schedule. The variable or questionable factor is 

the subject of landing craft. He said there was a schedule of landing craft 

construction which had been accelerated both in the United Kingdom and the 

United States. The purpose of this acceleration is involved with two considerations, (a) the matter of the initial assault for OVERLORD, and (b) operations 

in the Mediterranean, which could be done if additional landing craft could be 

made available. In brief, the OVERLORD build-up is going ahead according to 

schedule asregards ground troops, air forces and equipment. Discussions and 

problems regarding OVERLORD were related almost entirely to the employment and movement of available landing craft. Transfer of certain United 

States and British divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom 

for the OVERLORD build-up had virtually been completed at the present time. 

MARSHAL VOROSHZLOFF said that the information given by General 

Brooke and General Marshall corresponded to the talks which had been held 

this morning on the questions concerning OVERLORD-specifically, technical 

questions. Continuing, MARSHAL VOROSHZLOFF said as far as the matters 

discussed by General Brooke concerning Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Southern France, it was hoped that these matters would be the subject of the next 

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meeting of the ad hoc committee. The committee also had under discussion 

the date of OVERLORD and the details of that operation, with the thought 

that they would be able to discuss these matters further at the next meeting. 

MARSHAL STALIN asked who will be the commander in this Operation

OVERLORD.(THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER interpolated this was 

not yet decided.) MARSHAL STALIN continued, “Then nothing will come out 

of these operations.” He further inquired as to who carries the moral and 

technical respnsibility for this operation. He was informed by the President 

and Prime Minister that the British General Morgan, who is Chief of Staff to 

the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate), is charged with the plans and 

preparations which have been and are continually being made and carried out 

by a Combined U.S.-British Staff. 

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to who has the executive 

responsibility for OVERLORD preparations, THE PRESlDENT replied that we 

have already decided the names of all the commanders except that of the 

Supreme Commander. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that it could happen that General Morgan 

might say that all matters were ready; however, when the Supreme Commander 

reports, he, the Supreme Commander, might not think that everything necessary had been accomplished by the Chief of Staff. He felt that there must be 

one person in charge. 

THE PRIME MINISTER informed Marshal Stalin that General Morgan

had been charged with the preparation and carrying out of plans in the preliminary stages for OVERLORD. His Majesty’s Government had expressed willingnw to have Operation OVERLORD undertaken under the command of a 

United States commander. The United States will be concerned with the greatest part of the build-up,and this United States commander will have command 

in the field. 

MR. CHURCHILL added that in the Mediterranean the British have 

large naval and air forces which are under direct British command under the 

Allied Commander in Chief. A decision had not yet been reached between the 

President and Prime Minister regarding the specific matter of high command. 

Decisions here at this conference will have a bearing on the choice. Therefore 

the President can name the Supreme Allied Commander for OVERLORD if 

he desiresto accept the British offers to serve under a United States commander. 

THE PRIME MINISTER further suggested that Marshal Stalin be given an 

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answer in confidence between the three Chiefs of State regarding who the 

Supreme Allied Commander would be. 

MARSHAL STALIN said he desired it to be understood that he did not 

presume to take part in the selection of a commander for OVERLORD but 

merely wanted to know who this officer would be and felt strongly that he 

should be appointed as soon as possible and be given the responsibility for 

preparations for OVERLORD aswell asthe executive command of the operation. 

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed it was essential that a commander be 

appointed for the OVERLORD operation without delay and indicated that such 

an appointment would be made within a fortnight. He hoped that it might be 

accomplished during his current meeting with the President. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then went on to say that he was concerned with 

the number and complexity of problems which presented themselves before 

the conference. He said that the meeting was unique in that the thoughts of 

more than 140,000,000people were centered upon it. He felt that the principals 

should not separate until agreements on political, moral, and military problems 

had been reached. He said that he wished to present a few points which would 

require study by a subcommittee. Both he and the British Staff had given 

long study to the Mediterranean position, in which area Great Britain has 

a large army. He was anxious that the British Mediterranean army should fight 

throughout 1944 and not be quiescent. From that point of view he asked the 

Soviets to survey the field and examine the different alternatives put before 

them and submit their recommendations. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the first point which required study 

was what assistance could be given to the OVERLORD operation by the large 

force which will be in the Mediterranean. He asked in particular what the 

possibilities of this force might be and what should be the scale of an operation 

that might be launched from Northern Italy into Southern France. He did not 

feel that such an operation had been studied in sufficient detail but he welcomed 

the opportunity to give it close examination. He thought it might be well for the 

U.S.and U.K. staffsto consider this matter together in the light of their special 

knowledge concerning resources available. He pointed out that Marshal Stalin 

had stressed the value of pincer operations. He said that for such operations 

timing is of great importance. A weak attack several months in advance might 

result in it being defeated and permit the enemy to turn his whole strength to 

meet the main attack. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he wanted landing craft to carry at 

least two divisions. With such an amphibious force it would be possible to do 

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operations seriatim, that is, first, up the leg of Italy by amphibious turning 

movements, thus offeringthe possibility of cutting off the enemy’s withdrawal 

and capturing the entire German force now in Central Italy; second, to take 

Rhodes in conjunction with Turkey’s entry into the war; and, third, to use the 

entire force for operations six months hence against the southern coast of 

France in order to assist OVERLORD. He said that none of these operations 

would be excluded but that the timing would require careful study. This force 

of two divisions cannot be supplied in the Mediterranean without either setting 

back the date of OVERLORD for six or eight weeks or without drawing back 

from the Indian Ocean landing craft which were now intended to be used 

against the Japanese. He said that this is one of the dilemmas which the AngloAmerican staffs are balancing in their minds. In reaching their conclusions 

they would be greatly assisted by the views of Marshal Stalin and his officers. 

He welcomed these views because of his admiration for the military record of 

the Red Army. He therefore suggested that the military staffs continue to study 

these subjects. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that the second matter which must 

be settled was political rather than military because of the small military forces 

involved. He referred to the question of Yugoslavia and the Dalmatian Coast. 

Hesaid that in the Balkans there were 21German divisions plus garrison troops, 

of which 54,000 troops are spread about among the Aegean Islands. There were 

also about 21 Bulgarian divisions or a total of 42 divisions in all. (THE PRIME 

MINISTER later corrected these figures to indicate that there were 42 divisions 

in all, 12 of which were Bulgarian divisions in Bulgaria.) He said that if Turkey 

came into the war the Bulgarian divisions would be used to face the Turks on 

the Thrace front. This withdrawal of Bulgarian divisions as garrison troops in 

the Balkans would endanger the remaining German divisions left on that duty 

by operations of the guerrillas. He said that he did not suggest that the AngloAmerican forces put divisions into the Balkans, but he did propose that there 

be a continuous flow of supplies, frequent commando raids and air support 

furnished as and when needed. He felt it was short-sighted to let the Germans 

crush Yugoslavia without giving those brave people now fighting under Tito 

weapons for which they might ask. He emphasized that the Balkan operations 

would be a great factor in stretching the Germans and thus giving relief to 

the Russian front. He added that the British had no interests in the Balkans 

that were exceptional or ambitious in nature and all they wanted to do was 

to nail the 21 German divisions in that area and destroy them. He suggested 

that the Foreign Secretaries of the U.K. and the U.S.S.R.and a representative 

of the United States whom the President might designate should hold discussions to see if the proposed activities in the Balkans presented any political 

difficulties. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER then came to his last point, which was in reference to Turkey. He said that the British are allies of Turkey and that the British 

have accepted the responsibility of endeavoring to persuade or force Turkey 

into the war before Christmas. He said that if the President would come in with 

the British or take the lead, it would be agreeable to him, but he should certainly 

want all possible help from the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in accordance with the agreements made at the Moscow Conference. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the British would go far in warning 

Turkey that her failure to enter the war would jeopardize her political and 

territorial aspirations, particularly with reference to the Dardanelles, when 

these matters were being discussed at the peace table. 

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that the military staffs had already 

discussed the military aspects of Turkey’s entry into the war.He said, however, 

that the question was largely political since only two or three divisions of 

soldiers were involved. He again posed the question as to how the U.S.S.R. would 

fee1 about Bulgaria. Would they be inclined to tell Bulgaria that if Turkey did 

enter the war against Germany and Bulgaria helped Germany, the U.S.S.R. 

would regard Bulgaria as a foe? He felt that such a statement might have a 

great influence on Bulgaria’s attitude because of her relationship with the 

Soviets. He suggested that the Foreign Secretaries study this matter, also 

particularly as to the methods to be used and the results which might be expected. He said that he personally felt that the results might well be decisive, 

particularly in their moral effect. He said that Turkey, being an ally of Germany 

in the last war and now turning against her, would have a profound effect on 

the remainder of the Balkans. He pointed to Rumania’s desire to present an 

unconditional surrender at this time and to other indications of unrest in the 

Balkans, as evidence of the fact that Turkey’sentry into the war would have a 

great effect. 

THE PRIME MINISTER concluded by saying he felt that the whole 

Mediterranean sltuation should be carefully examined to see what could be 

done to take weight off the Soviet front. 

MARSHAL STALIN said, as far as the question of the U.S.S.R. versus 

Bulgaria is concerned, as soon as Turkey comes into the war we can consider 

that the matter is closed. The U.S.S.R. will take care of Bulgaria. If Turkey 

declares war on Bulgaria, the U.S.S.R. will declare war on Bulgaria. Even under 

these circumstances Turkey will not enter the war. 

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As far as military matters are concerned, MARSHAL STALIN said he 

understood that two or three divisions would be made available to help Turkey 

should she come into the war or to help in the Partisan movement in Yugoslavia. 

There is no difference of opinion on this point. We feel it desirable to help in 

Yugoslavia and to give two or three divisions if it would be necessary to do so. 

The Soviets do not think, however, that this is an important matter. Even the 

event of the entry of Turkey into the war or the occupation of Rhodes is not 

the most important thing. If we are here in order to discuss military questions, 

among all the military questions for discussion we, the U.S.S.R., find OVERLORD the most important and decisive. MARSHAL STALIN said he would like 

to call the attention of those present to the importance of not creating diversions from the most important operation in order to carry out secondary 

operations. He suggested that the ad hoc committee, which was created yesterday, should be given a definite task as to what they were to discuss. He said if 

a committee is created in the U.S.S.R., we always give that committee a specific 

directive or instructions. MARSHAL STALIN suggested that the military ad 

hoc committee be given a specific directive. He said it was, of course, true t.hat 

the U.S.S.R. needed help and that is why the representatives of the Soviet are 

here at this conference. He said the Soviets expect help from those who are 

willing to fulfill Operation OVERLORD. The question now was what shall be 

the directive to the ad hoc committee? What shall be the instructions that 

should be given to the committee under the guidance of General Brooke? First 

of all, this directive must be specific with regard to the fact that OVERLORD 

should not be postponed and must be carried out by the limiting date. Secondly, 

the directive to the committee should state that Operation OVERLORD must 

be reinforced by a landing in the South of France a month or two before undertaking the OVERLORD assault. If not possible two or three months earlier, then 

the landing in the South of France should be at the same time. If a landing can 

not be effected in the South of France at the same time as OVERLORD, possibly 

this operation could be mounted a little later than OVERLORD. 

MARSHAL STALIN thought this operation in the South of France would 

be an auxiliary or supporting operation and would help and be considerably 

effective in contributing toward OVERLORD. On the other hand, operations 

against Rhodes and other operations in the Mediterranean would be diversions. 

Operations in the South of France would influence and contribute directly to 

OVERLORD. He said that the directive to the ad hoc committee must also 

state that the appointment of the Supreme Commander for OVERLORD should 

be made forthwith. The decision regarding the OVERLORD commander should 

be made here in Tehran. If it can not be done here, it should be done within a 

week at the latest. The Soviets believe that until such a commander has been 

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appointed, no success from OVERLORD can be expected in the matter of organization for this operation. He added that it is the task of the British and the 

United States representatives to agree on the commander for OVERLORD. The 

U.S.S.R. does not enter into the matter of this selection but the Soviets definitely want to know who he will be. The above are the points of the directive which 

should be given to the ad hoc committee, and the work of this committee should 

be completed immediately. 

MARSHAL STALlN asked the conference to seriously consider the points 

which he had just outlined. He added that he felt if the three points he had 

made were carried out, they would result in the successful and rapid accomplishment of OVERLORD. 

THE PRESIDENT said he was tremendously interested in hearing all 

angles of the subject from OVERLORD to Turkey. He said that if we are all 

agreed on OVERLORD, the next question would be regarding the timing of 

OVERLORD. Therefore, if we come down to a matter of questions, the point is 

either to carry out OVERLORD at the appointed time or to agree to the postponement of that operation to some time in June or July. There are only one or 

two other operations in the Mediterranean which might use landing craft and 

air forces from some other theater. THE PRESIDENT said there are two dangers in creating a delay in OVERLORD. One of them is that the use of two or 

three divisions in the Eastern Mediterranean would cause a delay to OVERLORD and would necesitate the sending of certain landing craft for those 

operations which in turn could not be withdrawn from the Eastern Mediterranean in time to return for the OVERLORD date. He said it was believed that 

once we are committed to specific operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, 

we would have to make it a supreme operation and we probably could not then 

pull out of it. 

MARSHAL STALIN observed that maybe it would be necessary to utilize 

some of the means for OVERLORD in order to carry out operations in the 

Eastern Mediterranean. 

THE PRESIDENT continued that in the Balkans and Yugoslavia he 

believed all aid should be given which could be possibly sent to Tito mlthout 

making any particular commitment which would interfere with OVERLORD. 

He said he thought that we should consider the value of the 40 divisions the 

Germans have in the Balkans and if we can do certain operations with a minimum effort,these divisions might be placed in a position where they could no 

longer be of any value. 

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THE PRESIDENT said he felt that commando raids should be undertaken in the Balkans and that we should send all possible supplies to Tit0 in 

order to require Germany to keep their divisions there. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that in Yugoslavia the Germans have eight 

divisions; they have five divisions in Greece, and three or four divisions in 

Bulgaria. He stated that the figures given by the Prime Minister regarding 

German divisions in the Balkans were wrong. 

In reply to a question, MARSHAL STALIN said there were 25 German 

divisions now in France. 

THE PRESIDENT said we should therefore work out plans to contain 

these German divisions. This should be done on such a scale as not to divert 

means from doing OVERLORD at the agreed time. 

MARSHAL STALIN observed,regarding the President’s statement, “You 

are right”-“You are right.” 

THE PRESIDENT said we again come back to the problem of the timing 

for OVERLORD. It was believed that it would be good for OVERLORD to take 

place about 1May, or certainly not later than 15 May or 20 May, if possible. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could not agree to that. 

MARSHAL STALIN said he observed at yesterdays conference that nothing will come out of these proposed diversions. In his opinion OVERLORD 

should be done in May. He added that there would be suitable weather in May. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not believe that the attitudes of 

those present on this matter were very far apart. He said he (the Prime 

Minister) was going to do everything in the power of His Majesty’s Government 

to begin OVERLORD at the earliest possible moment. However, he did not 

think that the many great possibilities in the Mediterranean should be ruthlessly cast aside as valueless merely on the question of a month’s delay in 

OVERLORD. 

MARSHAL STALIN said all the Mediterranean operations are diversions, 

aside from that into Southern France, and that he had no interest in any other 

operations other than those into Southern France. He accepted the importance 

of these other operations but definitely considered that they are diversions. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER continued that in the British view their large 

armies in the Mediterranean should not be idle for some six months but should 

be, together with the United States Allies, working toward the defeat of Germany in Italy, and at the same time be active elsewhere. He said for the British 

to be inert for nearly six months would be a wrong use of forces, and in his 

opinion would lay the British open to reproach from the Soviets for having the 

Soviets bear nearly all the burden of land fighting. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that he did not wish the British to think that 

the Soviets wished them to do nothing. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said if all the landing craft were taken away 

from the Mediterranean they will not affect the battIe. Marshai Stalin must 

remember that at Moscow it was stated under what conditions OVERLORD 

could be mounted and that under those conditions alone could it be launched. 

Operation OVERLORD was predicated on the assumption that not more than 

12 German mobile dvisions would be located behind the coastal troops, and 

furthermore, that not more than 15reinforcement divisions could enter the fray 

within 60 days. He said that that was the basis on which he (Mr. Churchill) 

had stated the British would do OVERLORD. On those conditions, the Allies 

will have to utilize as many divisions in the Balkans and so forth as are necessary to contain German troops. If Turkey comes into the war, this will be 

particularly necessary. The German divisions now in Italy have largely cone 

from France. Consequently, if there should be a slackening off in Italy, it would 

mean that the German divisions would withdraw and appear in the South of 

France to meet us there. On the other hand, if we do the Eastern Mediterranean, 

we will contain more German divisions and will create conditions indispensable 

to the success of OVERLORD. 

MARSHAL STALIN inquired, “What if there are 13 divisions, not 12?” 

THE PRIME MINISTER replied, “Naturally.” He continued by saying 

there was one more word about Turkey. All are agreed here that she should 

enter the war. If Turkey does not enter the war, then that ends that. If she 

does enter, the only necessary thing to do would be to use an air attack from the 

Turkish bases in Anatolia and an operation to take the Island of Rhodes. For 

the purpose of the Rhodes operation, one assault division would be ready in 

the near future and that would be sufficient. Having gotten Rhodes and Turkish 

air bases, a course could be steered north and operations undertaken to drive 

and starve all German divisions out of the Aegean and then open the Dardanelles. Essentially, these specific operations were limited operations, and therefore they could not be considered as military commitments of an indefinite 

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character. If Turkey comes into the war and we get the air bases, it would be 

a simple matter to open the Straits. 'If Turkey does not come in, we do not pay 

any further attention to the matter. If Turkey comes into the war and we hold 

Rhodes and the Aegean, we will be able to use the air squadrons now in Egypt. 

All could move forward and help the Soviets. They now play no part except in 

the defense of Egypt. We can use the same troops which are now guarding 

Egypt to drive the Germans back. This is a big matter and should not be 

lightly considered. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he felt that our future will suffer great 

misfortune if we do not get Turkey into the war, for in such case troops 

and planes will stand idle. 

THE PRIME MINISTER added that he agreed with General Marshall in 

his statement that the chief problem is one of transportation across the water 

and that that matter is largely a question of landing craft. He said that the 

British were prepared to go into the matter in great detail, and a very srr.all 

number of landing craft could make the subsidiary operations feasible. If these 

landing craft cannot be kept in the Mediterranean because of OVERLORD or 

cannot possibly be found from some other arrangement such as the Indian 

Ocean, then this matter should be resolved by the technical committee. A 

landing in Southern France will require a great number of landing craft. He 

begged that this important point should be carefully weighed. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said in conclusion that he accepted the proposal 

that a directive should be drawn up for this technical committee. He further 

suggested that the Soviet Government draw up terms of reference, that the 

United States draw up terms of reference, that Great Britain draw up terms 

of reference and then he felt sure that all three nations would not be far apart. 

THE PRESIDENT inquired how long will the conference be in session 

until the staff comes to a conclusion on these matters. 

THE PRIME MINISTER in this connection said he can give his own 

opinion on behalf of the British Government tonight. 

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to how many French divisions were in the Allied Armies and how many troops t.here were in French 

divisions, THE PRESIDENT replied he understood there were now five combat 

divisionsand four more will soonbe ready, making a total of nine. Some of these 

divisions are now engaged in Sardinia and Corsica. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that the French Corps is to become a part 

of the US.5th Army in Italy and will occupy the left flank. He said that one 

division was now en route to the Front and will get a trial of battle. As a result 

of this it would be possible to judge better regarding the employment of other 

French divisions.All equipment for the French divisions is now in North Africa. 

There was some delay in four or five divisions being brought up to strength and 

completing their training. He said the French divisions were training with 

United States equipment and under the instruction of United States officers 

and non-commissioned officers. 

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to how many men there 

were in these French divisions, GENERAL MARSHALL replied, French divisions have the same number of men as the United States-15,000 men per 

division. The men are mostly native troops with French officers and some noncoms. In the armored command only one quarter are native troops. 

MARSHAL STALIN said, with regard to the remarks of the Prime 

Minister, if Turkey does not enter the war it cannot be helped. 

THE PRIME MINISTER replied if Turkey does not come into the war, 

he had no intention of asking for any troops for operations in Rhodes or Asia 

Minor. 

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to how many more days 

this conference would continue, THE PRESIDENT said that he was willing to 

stay here until the conference is finished. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would stay here forever, if necessary. 

THE PRESIDENT suggested that if the three Chiefs of State were in 

agreement, the committee need not have any written directive because they 

have been confronted with every suggestion made at this afternoon’s meeting. 

He said if the Chiefs of State could agree on the proceedings of the afternoon 

conference as a directive, then the staff would definitely have only one directive. 

MARSHAL STALIN said he considered that the ad hoc committee was 

unnecessary. It could not raise any new questions for the military conference. 

He believed that all that was necessary to be solved was the selection of the 

commander for OVERLORD, the date for OVERLORD and the matter of supporting operations to be undertaken in Southern France in connection mth 

OVERLORD. He furthermore believed that the committee of Foreign Secretaries proposed by the Prime Minister was unnecessary. He considered that all 

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matters could be solved here and that committees were unnecessary. He said he 

must leave on the first, anyway, but that he might stay over until the second 

of December if it had to be-then he must go away. He said that he must know 

when he can get away. There are two days remaining, the 30th of November 

and the first of December. He said the President would remember that he had 

said he could come to the conference for three or four days. 

THE PRESIDENT then read a proposed directive for the Ad Hoc Committee of the Chiefs of Staff: 

“1. The Committee of the Chiefs of Staff will assume that OVERLORD 

is the dominating operation. 

“2. The Committee recommends that subsidiary operation(s) be included in the Mediterranean, taking into consideration that any delay 

should not affect OVERLORD.” 

MARSHAL STALIN observed that there was no mention regarding the 

date of OVERLORD in the proposed directive. He said for the U.S.S.R.it is 

important to know the date OVERLORD will be mounted in order that the 

Soviets could prepare the blow on their side. He said he insisted on knowing 

the date. 

THE PRESIDENT remarked that the date for OVERLORD had been fixed 

at Quebec and that only some much more important matter could possibly 

affect that date, that is to say, this was the President’s view. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would like to have an opportunity to 

reply to the President’s remarks. He said there was no decisive difference in 

principle. He would be very glad to stay until the first of December and make a 

decision. It was not clear to him what the President’s plans were. however. He 

said he was in favor of the continuance of the ad hoe committee if that could 

be done. With regard to the political subcommittee, Marshal Stalin has clarified 

matters with regard to Bulgaria and help to Yugoslavia. Therefore, the meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries and Mr. Hopkins would be of great 

advantage. It would throw light on the problems and would be particularly 

important on the political questions. He would be grateful for Marshal Stalin’s 

prompt answers to his questions. If it were decided to do so, THE PRIME 

MINISTER thought that on the whole this procedure would be of advantage. 

He considered that the timing of the supreme Operation OVERLORD as regards 

any subsidiary operations would be most necessary as a condition for the success of OVERLORD. Furthermore, he believed that the ad hoc staff committee 

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should recommend what subsidiary operations should be carried out. THE 

PRIME MINISTER believed that we should take more time in drawing up a 

proper directive to the ad hoc committee. 

THE PRESIDENT said he found that his staff places emphasis on OVERLORD. While on the other hand the Prime Minister and his staff also emphasize 

OVERLORD, nevertheless the United States does not feel that OVERLORD 

should be put off. 

THE PRESIDENT questioned whether it would not be possible for the 

ad hoc committee to go ahead with their deliberations without any further 

directive and to produce an answer by tomorrow morning. 

MARSHAL STALIN questioned, “What can such a committee do?” He 

said, “We Chiefs of State have more power and more authority than a committee. General Brooke cannot force our opimons and there are many questions 

which can be decided only by us.” He said he would like to ask if the British 

are thinlring seriously of OVERLORD only in order to satisfy the U.S.S.R. 

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that if the conditions specified at Moscow regarding OVERLORD should exist, he firmly believed it would be England’s duty to hurl every ounce of strength she had across the Channel at the 

Germans. 

THE PRESIDENT observed that in an hour a very good dinner would be 

awaiting all and people would be very hungry. He suggested that the staffs 

should meet tomorrow morning and discuss the matter. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that he believed that that was unnecessary. 

The staffswill not in any way speed our work; they will only delay matters. It 

is proper to decide matters more quickly. 

THE PRlME MINISTER said he thought the talks of the foreign officers 

would be most profitable. 

THE PRESIDENT observed that a few political problems might be discussed during luncheon together by the Foreign Secretaries and Mr. Hopkins 

in a different place from that where the Chiefs of State had their luncheon. 

MARSHAL STALIN commented, “Thenat four o’clock tomorrow afternoon we will have our conference again.” 

THE PRESZDENT suggested that the Chiefs of State have luncheon 

together tomorrow about one thirty. 

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EUREKACONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF PLENARY SESSION 

BETWEEN THE U.S.A., GREATBRITAINAND THE U.S.S.R., 

HELDIN THE RUSSIANLEGATION, TEHRAN, IRAN, 

ON TUESDAY, 30 NOVEMBER1943 AT 1600 

PRESENT 

United States 

President Roosevelt 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

Mr. Averill Harrirnan 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. MarshaI1, USA 

Admiral E. J.King,USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Sornervell,USA 

Maj. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Capt. F. B. Royal, USN, Secretary 

Mr. C. E. Bohlen (Interpreter) 

Capt. H. H. Ware, USA (Interpreter) 

British 

Prime Minister Churchill 

Mr. Anthony Eden 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Lt. General Hastings L. Ismay 

Lt. General Martel 

Brigadier L. C. Hollis, Secretary 

Sir Archibald Kerr 

Major Birse (Interpreter) 

U.S.S.R. 

Marshal Stalin 

Mr. Molotov 

Marshal Voroshiloff 

One Secretary 

Mr. Pavlov (Interpreter) 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

In opening the meeting, THE PRESIDENT said he assumed that most 

of those present were familiar with what had transpired at the meeting of 

the British and American staffs earlier in the day, but he suggested that 

General Brooke be asked to read the conclusions which were reached at that 

meeting. 

MARSHAL STALIN and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed. 

GENERAL BROOKE said that at the meeting of the British and 

American staffs they had agreed to recommend to the President and Prime 

Minister that they should inform Marshal Stalin that the Anglo-American 

forces would launch OVERLORD during the month of May, in conjunction 

with a supporting operation against the South of France, on the largest scale 

that would be permitted by the landing craft available at that time. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said it is of course understood that we shall 

keep in close touch with Marshal Stalin and the Soviet military authorities 

in order that a11 operations may be coordinated with each other. He said that 

the Anglo-American-Soviet forces would be closing in on Germany from all 

parts of a circle and it was essential that the pressure be exerted by all forces 

at the same moment. For this purpose he proposed to keep the Soviet authorities 

informed of the Anglo-American plans.He added that it would be possible to 

hold 8 to 10 German divisions on the Italian front, and he expressed the hope 

that the Yugoslavs could continue their good work in holding German divisions 

in that country. He said that if Turkey could be brought into the war, so 

much the better, and emphasized again the necessity for the three great Powers 

to work together as one team. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that he understood the importance of the 

decision that had been reached by the Anglo-American staffs. He emphasized 

that there would be difficulties in the beginning and possibly dangers. The 

greatest danger would be that at the time of the attack the Germans might 

endeavor to transfer divisions from the Eastern Front to meet it and attempt 

to prevent its success. In order to deny the Germans freedom of action and 

permit them to move their forces to the West he stated that the Soviets would 

undertake to organize a large-scale offensive against the Germans in May in 

order to contain the maximum number of German divisions on the Eastern 

Front and thus remove the difficulties for OVERLORD. He added that he had 

already made such a statement to the President and Prime Minister but felt 

it necessary to repeat it at the Plenary Session of the conference. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE PRESIDENT said that the Marshal’s statement concerning the 

timing and coordination of operations was extremely satisfactory and it forestalled a question on that subject he was about to ask. He suggested that now 

that the staffs of the three nations had gotten together it was essential they 

should maintain close contact with each other, with particular emphasis on 

making certain that all future operations were timed with relation to each 

other. 

THE PRESIDENT then said he had told Marshal Stalin that the next 

step was the appointment of the Supreme Commander for the OVERLORD 

operation. He said that he and the Prime Minister would take up this matter 

with their staffs and make the decision within three or four days, certainly 

soon after their arrival in Cairo. 

THE PRESIDENT said that the only military matters remaining for 

consideration were details of the OVERLORD operation which would have to 

be worked out between the combined British and American staffs, and suggested 

it might be more convenient for them to return to Cairo at once for this 

purpose. 

After ascertaining from Marshal Stalin that he had no more matters 

which he wished presented to the Corr,bined British and American Staffs, THE 

PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER agreed that the staffs should return to 

Cairo on the following day. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said there are many details about the OVERLORD operation which remain to be settled. He said that the necessary landing 

craft would have to be found, but he could not believe that the two nations, 

with their great volume of production, could not make the necessary landing 

craft available. He said also that he would like to add weight to the operation 

as it is now planned, especially in the initial assault. In all events, he wished 

to make sure that the armed forces of the three nations would be in heavy 

action on the Continent of Europe during the month of June. If this were so, 

he added, it would make it very difficult for “that man.” If Hitler attempts 

to meet the Soviet attack from the east, the Anglo-American forces will move 

in on him. On the other hand, if he attempts to stop the Anglo-American forces, 

the Soviet forces will be able to advance into Germany. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that he understood the necessity for the 

detailed staff planning and concurred that it would be a good idea for the staffs 

to return to Cairo at once. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE PRIME MINISTER then indicated that since the military business 

of the conference was concluded, there were mme political matters of extreme 

importance which remained to be decided. He hoped it would be possible for 

the three Heads of State to meet on the first and second of December and not 

to leave Tehran until December 3. He said it would be well if they remained 

until all questions of importance had been decided. He indicated that he was 

prepared to delay his departure, and THE PRESIDENT and MARSHAL STALIN 

agreed to stay the extra day. 

THE PRESIDENT brought up the subject of the communique, particularly as it referred to the military decisions. He suggested that the military 

staffs draft something for the President and Prime Minister’s approval. 

MARSHAL STALIN agreed that this should be done insofar as military 

matters taken up at the conference were concerned. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought the communique should strike 

the note that all future military operations were to be concerted between the 

three great Powers. 

MARSHAL STALIN added, certainly those in Europe from both the 

east and west. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the preparations for OVERLORD are 

bound to be known to the enemy. Numerous depots are being constructed in 

Southern England, the entire appearance of the coast is changing and photographs indicate these changes in detail. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that it was difficult, if not impossible, to hide 

such a large operation from the enemy. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked if any arrangements had been 

made to provide a combined cover plan for the operations in May as between 

the three great Powers. 

MARSHAL STALIN said that on such occasions the Soviets had 

achieved success by the construction of false tanks, airplanes and airfields. 

They move these items to sectors in which no operations are planned, and such 

movements are immediately picked up by the German intelligence. In sectors 

from which blows are to be launched, all movements are made quietly and 

mostly under cover of darkness. In this manner they had often succeeded in 

deceiving the Germans. He noted that at times up to 5,000 false tanks and 

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U. S. SECRET. 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

2,000 false airplanes had been used, as well as the construction of a number 

of airfields which were not actually intended to be used. Another method of 

deception practiced by the Red Army wa.sby the use of radio. Unit commanders 

communicate freely by radio giving the Germans false information and evoke 

immediate attacks from the German air forces in areas where such attacks can 

do no harm. 

THE PRIME MIlVISTER observed that truth deserves a bodyguard 

of lies. 

MARSHAL STALIN said, “This is what we call military wnning.” 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he considered it rather military 

diplomacy. He suggested that arrangements be made for liaison to be established between the three great Powers as regards the deception and propaganda 

methods to be adopted. 

It was agreed that the Chiefs of State and their Foreign Ministers should 

meet on the following day at 1600. 

561 
562 
%inn 5711 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

A 

AEGEAN (See ulso hlediterraneanl 

Assault shipping for, 347 

Opening the Aegean, 271 

Operations in, 385, 395 

AGENDA FOR "SEXTANT" 

See SEXTANT Conference 

AIRFIELDS 

Calcutta. ~~~~~~~. 403 ~~~ 

Japanese. in Southeast Asia, 483, 485 

Statement ot the Prime Minister 011 

Corsican, 523 

Turkish, 446 

VLR. airfields in the China-BurmaIndia, 109, 112, 113 

AIR FORCES (AXIS) (See also Germany) 

German flghter production, 121, 459 

AIR FORCES (U.N.) 

At Calcutk 403 

Command df US. Strategic, 504 

In Italy, 445 

Long range flghters, 455 

VVERLVRD, 540. 541 

IZesources to implement agreed operations, 317 

Technical supplies and equipment for, 2c1 U"" 

US.daylight bombers. 388 

AIR INTELLIGENCE 

Air Ministry Intelligence report on A:­

lied air attack and German morale. 

181 

Report on bomber offensive, I71 

AIR ROUTES 

Over the "hump," 244, 379 

Russian: 

ALSIB, 223 

Tehran-Moscow. 224 

US.-U.K.-Moscow, 224 

Southeast Asia, 483 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

(see ulso Operations) 

Naval Forces, 287 

Souheas: Asia. 64, 67, 245, 257, 391, 483 

Commitment to the Geaeralissirno, 

394, 398 

Southeast Asia alternative tu BUCCANEER, 301, 311, 399, 498, 505 

South of France, 287 

Air forces supporting, 288 

Assault shipping and craft. 289, 466 

MT Stores and shipping ,289 

Personnel shipping, 288 

Land forces, 288 

ANDAMAN ISLANDS, 3%. 484 

Value of, 392 

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE 

Aircraft. 81. 84 

Intercept keceivers, 84 

Rocket projectiles. 84 

Sono-rodlo buoys, 84 

Surface craft, 81, 83 

"ANVIL" 

Assumed conditions for. 286 

Assault shipping for, 346, 366, 393, 399, 

402 

EUREKA Military Conferrnce discusI._... "-" 

Naval forces for, 330 

Planning for OperaLion, 333,466,493,522 

Statement by Marshal Stalin re, 521 

S:atemcnt bv Prime Minister re. 520 

Target date ior, 321, 390 

ARNOLD, GENERAL H. H. 

Statrnients in reference to: 

Aircraft supp1:eb in SoutheastAsia,485 

Air operations in Southeast Asia, 482 

Air superiority, 459 

Air transport requirementsfor ANVIL, 

494 

Command of US. Strategic Air Forces 

in theEuropean-Mediterranean area, 

so4 ... 

Daze for BUCCANEER, 398 

Facilities in the Azores, 508 

Japanese Airfields in Southeast Asia, 

483 

563 
491 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

ARNOLD, GENERAL H. H. (Cont'dl 

Long range aircraft at Calcutta, 403 

Operations in Southeast As-a Command, 434, 438, 439 

Present situation in Southeast Asia 

Command, 420 

Reorganization of Air Forces, 475 

Rcle of China in defeat of Japan, 416 

Threat to Assam, 485 

ASSAULT SHIPPING 

See Cargo Shipping 

See Landing Ships and Craft 

AXIS 

See Germany, Japan 

AZORES 

CCS decision re development of facilit.ies ....in 

~~~ , 3. ~, SOX ... 

CCS decision ID use of facilities by US. 

Army Air Forces, 508 

Development of facilities in, 3, 507 

Fncilitics in, 322. 5V8 

Proposed aerodrome on Santa Maria. 3 

ReDIacement of a British squadron by an Anxrican B-24 squadron, 4 

Transit facilities for the US..3 

Use of facilities by US. aircraft, 2 

Use of Lagens Fieid, 2, 3 

6-29 AIRCRAFT 

BAKER, AIR VICE MARSHAL, J. W. 

On operations in Southeast Asia, 490 

BALKANS 

Advantage to Operation OVERLORD, 

395 

CCS Decision re Balkan Partisans, 61, 

Commando raids, 551 

Operations in, 547, 549 

Partisans. 385 

Support for Tito. 445, 551 

Support of, 61, 464 

Support of resistance groups in Europe

and the Balkans, 345 

Support to guerrillas, 446 

BAY OF BENGAL 

Fleet for, 243 

BOLERO, 363 

BOUNDARIES OF SOUTHEAST 

ASIA COMMAND, 41, 429 

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Command of British and US. Forces 

operating against Germany, 230 

Control of Strategic Air Forces in 

Northwest Europe and the Mediter­ ranean. 100 

Development of facilities in the Azores, 

? 

EBect of weather on Operation OVERLORD, 237 

Entry of Turkey into the war. 269 

Mcditerracean -Command arrangements, 54 

OVERLORD and the Mediterranean. 233 

Progress Report on the U-boat wzrSeptember-October, 1943, 86 

SEXTANT Agenda. 208 

United Chiefs of Staff. 217 

V.L.R. airfields (B-29) in the ChinaBurma-India area. 112 

BROOKE, GENERAL SIR ALAN 

Statement.s in reference to: 

Agenda for EUREKA, 427 

Aeenda for SEXTANT. 467 

Amphibious operations alternative to 

BUCCANEER, 498, 505 ..~. AN'ilL . ..~,,197 .__,.­., 

Appreciation of 3,s. assistance, 510 

Availableresourcesfaroperatior.s, 506 

Basis for discussion with the Soviets, 

452 

BUCCANEER. 449. 484 

Constrwtion of landing craft in England. 537 

Note: Italle numerals refer to paws in mhntes of meeting 

Plaln type oumciak refer to paws In c. c. s. Papers. 

564