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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 

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Foreword

From the Chief of Staff of the Army

America’s adversaries have studied US operations closely during Operations DESERT 

STORM, IRAQI FREEDOM, and ENDURING FREEDOM. They know the American way of 

war well and that we excel in a way of war that emphasizes joint and combined operations; 

technological dominance; global power projection; strategic, operational, and tactical maneuver; 

effective joint fires; sustainment at scale; and mission command initiative.

Simultaneously, emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, hypersonics, machine 

learning, nanotechnology, and robotics are driving a fundamental change in the character of war. 

As these technologies mature and their military applications become more clear, the impacts have 

the potential to revolutionize battlefields unlike anything since the integration of machine guns, 

tanks, and aviation which began the era of combined arms warfare. 

Strategic competitors like Russia and China are synthesizing emerging technologies with 

their analysis of military doctrine and operations. They are deploying capabilities to fight the US 

through multiple layers of stand-off in all domains – space, cyber, air, sea, and land. The military 

problem we face is defeating multiple layers of stand-off in all domains in order to maintain the 

coherence of our operations. 

Therefore, the American way of war must evolve and adapt. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain 

Operations, 2028 is the first step in our doctrinal evolution. It describes how US Army forces, as 

part of the Joint Force, will militarily compete, penetrate, dis-integrate, and exploit our adversaries 

in the future. 

This product is not a final destination, but is intended to provide a foundation for continued 

discussion, analysis, and development. We must examine all aspects of our warfighting methods 

and understand how we enable the joint force on the future battlefield. We must challenge our 

underlying assumptions, and we must understand the capabilities and goals of our potential 

enemies. That is how we change our warfighting techniques and build the fighting forces we need 

in the future. It is also how we maximize deterrence and, if necessary, win future wars.

Read, study, and dissect the multi-domain operations concept in this document. Every one 

of you is part of our evolution and the construction of the future force, and we want your critical 

feedback. Our intent is to publish another iteration in about 12 months following feedback from 

various wargames and exercises. We are laying the cornerstone for the success of our future Army 

in a profession where there is no room for second place. With your help, we will ensure America’s 

Army is ready, lethal, and prepared to destroy its enemies now and in the future, in any domain, 

anytime, anywhere. 

Army Strong! 

Mark A. Milley

General, United States Army

39th Chief of Staff
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 

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Preface

From the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

One of our duties as Army professionals is to think deeply and clearly about the problem of armed 

conflict in the future so that we can build and prepare our Army to deter that conflict and, if 

necessary, fight and win it. As we consider the future, our Army's challenge is clear. In a new era 

of great power competition, our nation's adversaries seek to achieve their strategic aims, short of 

conflict, by the use of layered stand-off in the political, military and economic realms to separate 

the U.S. from our partners. Should conflict come, they will employ multiple layers of stand-off in 

all domains--land, sea, air, space and cyberspace--to separate U.S. forces and our allies in time, 

space, and function in order to defeat us. 

If they are successful, we risk losing the strategic depth that gives our Joint Force its operational 

advantage and enables our offensive military capability. As a nation, we rely on our ability to 

project power from the Continental United States and to integrate the actions of the Joint Force 

globally. Our adversaries seek to fracture this capability and erode the United States' strategic 

advantage--the greatest challenge to U.S. security, power and influence to emerge in the 21st 

century. The American way of war must evolve if we are to successfully thwart the aims of our 

adversaries in competition or to defeat them in conflict. 

The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 concept proposes a series of solutions to solve 

the problem of layered standoff. The central idea in solving this problem is the rapid and 

continuous integration of all domains of warfare to deter and prevail as we compete short of 

armed conflict. If deterrence fails, Army formations, operating as part of the Joint Force, 

penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems; exploit the resulting 

freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy systems, formations and objectives and to achieve our 

own strategic objectives; and consolidate gains to force a return to competition on terms more 

favorable to the U.S., our allies and partners.

To achieve this, the Army must evolve our force, and our operations, around three core tenets. 

Calibrated force posture combines position and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances. 

Multi-domain formations possess the capacity, endurance and capability to access and employ 

capabilities across all domains to pose multiple and compounding dilemmas on the adversary. 

Convergence achieves the rapid and continuous integration of all domains across time, space and 

capabilities to overmatch the enemy. Underpinning these tenets are mission command and 

disciplined initiative at all warfighting echelons. 

To win tomorrow, we must evolve how we organize and integrate the Army as part of the Joint 

Force. To do this we will (1) continue to refine a warfighting concept that provides our azimuth to 

the future--The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 is that concept; (2) develop a 

comprehensive Army modernization strategy linked to this concept and synchronized with a 

joint approach to force development; (3) drive rapid, non-linear solutions in Army 

doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and 

policy; (4) deepen the operational integration of general purpose and special operations forces 

and with our allies and partners. 
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This concept is about warfighting and its centerpiece is the American Soldier. Throughout the 

United States Army's 243-year history, the grit, ingenuity and initiative of the American Soldier 

stands at the forefront of our Nation's success in peace, competition, and armed conflict.

As a concept, this is not the final answer. We will refine and update this concept as we learn from 

our operations, exercises and experiments as well as from other services, allies and partners and 

even our adversaries. The evolution of this concept into doctrine and practice will inform the way 

the Army recruits, trains, educates, operates and drives constant improvement and change to ensure 

the U.S. Army can deter, fight and win on any battlefield, against any foe, now and into the future.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

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Figure 1. Logic map
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

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Executive Summary

1. Purpose: From Multi-Domain Battle to Multi-Domain Operations. TRADOC Pamphlet

525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 expands upon the ideas previously 

explained in Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century. It 

describes how the Army contributes to the Joint Force’s principal task as defined in the 

unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy: deter and defeat Chinese and Russian 

aggression in both competition and conflict. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations

concept proposes detailed solutions to the specific problems posed by the militaries of postindustrial, information-based states like China and Russia. Although this concept focuses on 

China and Russia, the ideas also apply to other threats. 

2. The problem.

 a. Emerging operational environment. Four interrelated trends are shaping competition and 

conflict: adversaries are contesting all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and the 

information environment and U.S. dominance is not assured; smaller armies fight on an 

expanded battlefield that is increasingly lethal and hyperactive; nation-states have more 

difficulty in imposing their will within a politically, culturally, technologically, and strategically 

complex environment; and near-peer states more readily compete below armed conflict making 

deterrence more challenging.0F

1

 Dramatically increasing rates of urbanization and the strategic 

importance of cities also ensure that operations will take place within dense urban terrain. 

Adversaries, such as China and Russia, have leveraged these trends to expand the battlefield in 

time (a blurred distinction between peace and war), in domains (space and cyberspace), and in 

geography (now extended into the Strategic Support Area, including the homeland) to create 

tactical, operational, and strategic stand-off.1F

2

 For the purpose of this document, Russia serves as 

the pacing threat. In fact, Russia and China are different armies with distinct capabilities, but 

assessed to operate in a sufficiently similar manner to orient on their capabilities collectively.

 b. China and Russia in competition. In a state of continuous competition, China and Russia 

exploit the conditions of the operational environment to achieve their objectives without 

resorting to armed conflict by fracturing the U.S.’s alliances, partnerships, and resolve. They 

attempt to create stand-off through the integration of diplomatic and economic actions, 

unconventional and information warfare (social media, false narratives, cyber attacks), and the 

actual or threatened employment of conventional forces.2F

3

 By creating instability within 

countries and alliances, China and Russia create political separation that results in strategic 

ambiguity reducing the speed of friendly recognition, decision, and reaction. Through these 

competitive actions, China and Russia believe they can achieve objectives below the threshold of

armed conflict. 

 1 Hyperactive means more active than usual or desirable; hyper-competitive during competition and hyper-violent in armed conflict. 2 Stand-off is the strategic and operational effect Russia, China, and their surrogates are attempting to achieve. It is achieved with both political 

and military capabilities. Stand-off is the political, temporal, spatial, and functional separation that enables freedom of action in any, some, or all 

domains, the EMS, and the information environment to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives before an adversary can adequately 

respond.

3 Within this document, the term information warfare denotes actions taken by an adversary or enemy. The scope and meaning of the term are 

derived from Russian doctrine. The document refers to friendly actions as information environment operations.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

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 c. China and Russia in armed conflict. In armed conflict, China and Russia seek to achieve 

physical stand-off by employing layers of anti-access and area denial systems designed to rapidly 

inflict unacceptable losses on U.S. and partner military forces and achieve campaign objectives 

within days, faster than the U.S. can effectively respond. Over the last twenty-five years, China

and Russia invested in and developed a systematic approach to “fracture” AirLand Battle by 

countering the Joint Force’s increasingly predictable use of time-phased and domain-federated 

operational approaches in armed conflict. The resulting anti-access and area denial systems 

create strategic and operational stand-off that separates the elements of the Joint Force in time, 

space, and function. Moreover, both China and Russia are continuing to improve these antiaccess and area denial systems and are proliferating the associated technologies and techniques 

to other states. The Joint Force has not kept pace with these developments. It is still designed 

for operations in relatively uncontested environments that allow for sequential campaigns based 

on predictable approaches that assume air and naval supremacy: extensive shaping with air and 

naval strikes before the final destruction of severely degraded enemy forces through joint 

combined arms operations. 

3. Conducting Multi-Domain Operations.

 a. Central idea. Army forces, as an element of the Joint Force, conduct Multi-Domain 

Operations to prevail in competition; when necessary, Army forces penetrate and dis-integrate 

enemy anti-access and area denial systems and exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver to 

achieve strategic objectives (win) and force a return to competition on favorable terms.3F

4

 b. Tenets of the Multi-Domain Operations. The Army solves the problems presented by 

Chinese and Russian operations in competition and conflict by applying three interrelated tenets: 

calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence. Calibrated force posture is 

the combination of position and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances. Multi-domain 

formations possess the capacity, capability, and endurance necessary to operate across multiple 

domains in contested spaces against a near-peer adversary. Convergence is rapid and continuous 

integration of capabilities in all domains, the EMS, and information environment that optimizes 

effects to overmatch the enemy through cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all 

enabled by mission command and disciplined initiative. The three tenets of the solution are 

mutually reinforcing and common to all Multi-Domain Operations, though how they are realized 

will vary by echelon and depend upon the specific operational situation.

 c. Multi-Domain Operations and strategic objectives. The Joint Force must defeat 

adversaries and achieve strategic objectives in competition, armed conflict, and in a return to 

competition. In competition, the Joint Force expands the competitive space through active 

engagement to counter coercion, unconventional warfare, and information warfare directed 

against partners.4F

5

 These actions simultaneously deter escalation, defeat attempts by adversaries 

to “win without fighting,” and set conditions for a rapid transition to armed conflict. In armed 

 4 Dis-integrate refers to breaking the coherence of the enemy's system by destroying or disrupting its subcomponents (such as command and 

control means, intelligence collection, critical nodes, etc.) degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the 

enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. This definition revises the current doctrinal defeat mechanism disintegrate. 5 Expanding the competitive space is a key idea from the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and is a logical extension of the 2017 Joint Concept for 

Integrated Campaigning. Expanding the competitive space refers to taking actions to expand options (diplomatic, information, military, 

economic, etc.) for the political leadership and extending competition in time while also deterring escalation to armed conflict.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

viii

conflict, the Joint Force defeats aggression by optimizing effects from across multiple domains at 

decisive spaces to penetrate the enemy’s strategic and operational anti-access and area denial 

systems, dis-integrate the components of the enemy’s military system, and exploit freedom of 

maneuver necessary to achieve strategic and operational objectives that create conditions 

favorable to a political outcome. In the return to competition, the Joint Force consolidates gains 

and deters further conflict to allow the regeneration of forces and the re-establishment of a 

regional security order aligned with U.S. strategic objectives.

 d. Multi-domain problems and solutions. To achieve these strategic objectives, the Army, 

as part of and with the Joint Force and partners, must solve five operational problems:

 (1) How does the Joint Force compete to enable the defeat of an adversary’s 

operations to destabilize the region, deter the escalation of violence, and, should violence 

escalate, enable a rapid transition to armed conflict? In the past, the U.S. military, due to 

cultural, statutory, and policy reasons, has often remained reactive in competition below armed 

conflict. Successful competition requires Army forces actively engaging across domains 

(including space and cyberspace), in the EMS, and in the information environment. Army forces 

enable the Joint Force and interagency to seize and sustain the initiative in competition by 

deterring conflict on terms favorable to the U.S., defeating an adversary’s efforts to expand the 

competitive space below the threshold of conflict, and setting the conditions to enable the Joint 

Force’s rapid transition to armed conflict. The Army’s posture, capabilities (to include necessary 

authorities), and readiness to execute Multi-Domain Operations deter adversaries from 

escalation, counter their information and unconventional warfare, undermine their efforts to 

coerce U.S. partners with the threat of armed conflict, and set conditions in the event of conflict. 

Denying or restricting the support provided by the adversary’s conventional forces to proxies

allows U.S. partners to more easily counter attempts to destabilize their countries. The 

demonstrated capability to prevail in armed conflict counters narratives by adversaries who 

portray the U.S. as a weak or irresolute partner. These actions combine to create a favorable 

environment for the Joint Force’s rapid transition to armed conflict.

 (2) How does the Joint Force penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems 

throughout the depth of the Support Areas to enable strategic and operational maneuver? 

In the event of armed conflict, Army forces immediately penetrate enemy anti-access and area 

denial systems by neutralizing enemy long-range systems, contesting enemy maneuver forces, 

and maneuvering from strategic and operational distances. Multi-domain formations converge 

capabilities with the Joint Force and partners to rapidly strike the enemy’s long-range systems.

Forward presence forces immediately contest an enemy attack in multiple domains. Forward 

presence forces also preserve lines of communications by degrading enemy long-range 

surveillance and reconnaissance and by employing a mixture of deception, dispersion, and 

protection. The appropriate balance of capabilities across the Total Force provides cohesive, 

fully capable forward presence forces and expeditionary capabilities able to deploy within 

strategically relevant time periods. 

 (3) How does the Joint Force dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems 

in the Deep Areas to enable operational and tactical maneuver? The Joint Force must disintegrate the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems to further the defeat of the enemy’s
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

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stand-off capabilities, prevent the re-integration of remaining capabilities, and enable freedom of 

maneuver. Army forces at echelon employ cross-domain fires to defeat the enemy’s long-range 

systems and begin the neutralization of the enemy mid-range systems. Convergence optimizes 

the employment of capabilities across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment to 

stimulate, see, and strike the enemy. Convergence also complicates the enemy’s attempts to 

conceal and defend its long- and mid-range systems by providing the Joint Force with multiple 

options for attacking the enemy’s vulnerabilities. Joint, Army, and partner maneuver forces 

execute operational maneuver and deception to further stimulate enemy mid-range systems and 

fix or isolate enemy maneuver forces.

 (4) How does the Joint Force exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to achieve 

operational and strategic objectives through the defeat of the enemy in the Close and Deep 

Maneuver Areas? In the Close and Deep Maneuver Areas, Army forces exploit weaknesses in 

the enemy’s command system and their dependence on air defense and ground fires to complete 

the defeat of the enemy. Army forces employ deception and convergence with other domains to 

dislocate the enemy defense by physically, virtually, and cognitively isolating its subordinate 

elements, allowing friendly forces to achieve overmatch and favorable force ratios. The Joint 

Force continues dis-integrating tactical anti-access and area denial systems to enable further

exploitation until it achieves U.S. campaign objectives. 

 (5) How does the Joint Force re-compete to consolidate gains and produce sustainable 

outcomes, set conditions for long-term deterrence, and adapt to the new security 

environment? Army forces consolidate gains and set conditions for a favorable new security 

environment by maintaining control of key terrain and populations that provide U.S. 

policymakers with a political advantage. They consolidate gains through three concurrent 

activities: physically securing terrain and populations for sustainable outcomes; setting 

conditions for long-term deterrence by regenerating partner and Joint Force capacity and by 

actively engaging across domains and the information space; and adapting force posture to the 

new security environment. This provides time for U.S. forces to regenerate regional military 

structures and continue to provide a credible deterrent. 

4. Implications for the Army. 

 a. Enhanced and broader need for combined arms maneuver. The emerging operational 

environment and the challenges posed by China and Russia, particularly their capability to create 

political and military stand-off, demand that the Joint Force apply the proven principles of 

combined arms maneuver and massing of effects at decisive spaces. What is different is the idea 

that Army forces must apply these joint capabilities more comprehensively (earlier, in greater 

capacity, and at lower echelons) and in new ways (faster and with greater agility). Multi-domain 

formations provide the Joint Force with additional means to stimulate, see, and strike key 

components and vulnerabilities within enemy systems. Army forces also continue to conduct the 

traditional tasks of seizing terrain, destroying enemy forces, and securing friendly populations. 

Army forces retain the ability to overmatch the enemy, despite reduced friendly capacity, by 

converging capabilities from across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment. 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

x

 b. Operating at echelon. Army forces execute Multi-Domain Operations with echeloned 

formations that conduct intelligence, maneuver, and strike activities across all five domains (air, 

land, maritime, space, and cyberspace) as well as the information environment and the EMS.5F

6

 

The ability of Army formations at echelon to converge capabilities in multiple ways and 

sequences provide the Joint Force Commander with options to impose additional complexity on 

the enemy. The echeloning of forces prevents the isolation of forward positioned forces within 

the stand-off range of enemy anti-access and area denial systems at the beginning of a conflict 

and enables strategic and operational maneuver by forces from outside the range of anti-access 

and area denial systems. Maneuver at echelon by Army forces then enables the Joint Force to 

overwhelm Chinese and Russian military systems with multiple dilemmas and massed effects, 

creating windows of superiority to enable freedom of maneuver.6F

7

 

 c. Converging cross-domain capabilities. Convergence has two advantages over singledomain alternatives: cross-domain synergy creates overmatch and multiple forms of attack 

create layered options across domains to enhance friendly operations and impose complexity on 

the enemy. The ability to converge cross-domain capabilities enables the Joint Force to 

stimulate, see, and strike vulnerabilities in the Chinese and Russian systems and defeat their 

efforts to create stand-off.7F

8

 Currently, the Joint Force converges capabilities through the 

episodic synchronization of domain-federated solutions, but will have to conduct continuous and 

rapid integration of multi-domain capabilities enabled by mission command and disciplined 

initiative against near-pear threats in the future. 

 d. Maximize human potential. The Army builds and sustains multi-domain formations 

through the selection, training, and education of the leaders, Soldiers, and teams in them. 

Employing multi-domain capabilities requires the Army to attract, retain, and employ leaders and 

Soldiers who collectively possess a significant breadth and depth of technical and professional 

expertise. The Army must exercise careful talent management to make the most of these highquality personnel and integrate them into trusted teams of professionals who are able to thrive in 

ambiguity and chaos. Improving the resilience of leaders and Soldiers—the Army’s most 

valuable capability—requires training, educating, equipping, and supporting them to execute 

Multi-Domain Operations in all of its intensity, rigor, and complexity.

 e. Required Army capability sets. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations concept 

requires the Army to develop or improve capabilities to contribute cross-domain options within 

the Joint Force by:

 6 The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver, 2020-2040 defines cross-domain maneuver as “the employment of mutually 

supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities in multiple domains to generate overmatch, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and enable Joint 

Force freedom of movement and action.” 7 As an example, Army formations can maneuver—or assist Joint Force maneuver—as a reconnaissance action, fighting to gain intelligence, key 

terrain, and set conditions that enable strikes, rather than maneuvering only after passive intelligence collection, deliberate analysis, and precision

strikes have prepared the battlefield for maneuver.

8 The U.S. Army Concept for Multi-Domain Combined Arms at Echelons Above Brigade, 2025-2045 calls for formations able to integrate, 

synchronize, and converge all elements of combat power across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment to execute cross-domain 

maneuver; provide essential linkage to the expanded instruments of national power; and operate ubiquitously with joint, interagency, and 

multinational partners to overmatch any threat in any future environment.
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 (1) Calibrating force posture geographically and across all the Army components to defeat 

Chinese and Russian offensive operations in competition and to deter escalation to armed 

conflict.8F

9

 (2) Preparing the operational environment by building partner capacity and interoperability 

and setting the theater through such activities as establishing basing and access rights, 

prepositioning equipment and supplies, conducting preparatory intelligence activities, and 

mapping EMS and computer networks.9F

10 (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization 

Priorities: Army Network)

 (3) Building partners’ and allies’ capacities and capabilities to defeat increasingly 

sophisticated Chinese and Russian-sponsored unconventional and information warfare. 

 (4) Preparing the operational environment for competition and conflict by building 

understanding of and capabilities in select urban areas of particular operational or strategic 

importance.

 (5) Establishing precision logistics that provides a reliable, agile, and responsive 

sustainment capability necessary to support rapid power projection, Multi-Domain Operations, 

and independent maneuver from the Strategic Support Area to the Deep Maneuver Area. 

(Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Future Vertical Lift, Army Network)

 (6) Establishing necessary authorities and permissions normally reserved for conflict or to 

higher echelons to operate in competition and rapidly transition to conflict effectively. 

 (7) Improving the capability to conduct Multi-Domain Operations in dense urban terrain at 

all echelons through the development of tactics and capabilities to increase the accuracy, speed, 

and synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects. (Supported by Army Materiel 

Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicle, Army 

Network, Soldier Lethality)

 (8) Supporting a credible U.S. information narrative through cross-domain actions that 

communicate and counter threats by Chinese and Russian reconnaissance, strike, combined arms, 

and unconventional warfare capabilities.

 (9) Enabling commanders and staffs at each echelon to visualize and command a battle in 

all domains, the EMS, and the information environment, converging organic and external 

capabilities at decisive spaces. This requires new tools to more rapidly converge capabilities 

across the Joint Force, shifting training paradigms, and changing personnel and talent 

management practices. This also requires that Army formations be trained, manned, and 

equipped to leverage all available information, from national, joint, commercial, and Service 

repositories and libraries, or directly from collection assets seamlessly and in a time dominant 

 9 The idea of calibrating and re-calibrating force posture globally aligns with the idea of “forming operationally coherent forces” as described in 

the Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation.

10 “Setting the theater” encompasses the actions to establish and maintain conditions to seize the initiative and retain freedom of action for a 

specific theater. These actions may occur outside of the theater as well.
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manner. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Army Network, Soldier 

Lethality, Synthetic Training Environment)

 (10) Providing to the Joint Force Commander multi-domain formations and systems that 

can converge capabilities to attack specific vulnerabilities in Chinese and Russian multi-layered, 

mutually reinforcing military forces and systems. This means creating commanders and staffs

who have the means and ability to access and employ capabilities that reside across the Joint 

Force. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, 

Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Soldier Lethality)

 (11) Providing to the Joint Force Commander with multi-domain formations that have

systems, leaders, and Soldiers that are durable, can operate in a highly contested operational 

environment, cannot easily be isolated from the rest of the Joint Force or from partners, and are 

able to conduct independent maneuver and employ cross-domain fires. This requires extended 

sustainability of systems and formations, and leaders and Soldiers who continue to operate 

effectively in austere environments and conditions. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization 

Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, 

Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, Soldier Lethality)

 (12) Consolidating gains through clear demonstrations of U.S. security commitments to 

partners through combined exercises, training, information exchanges, and other presence 

activities. 

 (13) Enabling and complementing land, air, and maritime capabilities with operations in 

space, cyberspace, and the EMS to support the opening of and exploitation of windows of 

superiority that create dilemmas for the enemy while protecting the ability to conduct friendly 

operations in degraded, disrupted, and/or denied operational environments.

 (14) Attracting, retaining, and making maximum use of high-quality, physically fit, 

mentally tough Soldiers who have the skills and expertise to conduct Multi-Domain Operations.

 f. Success in Multi-Domain Operations requires these capabilities be sufficiently developed, 

trained, and practiced within the Army, with the remainder of the Joint Force, and with allies and 

partners. 

 
Department of the Army *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

Headquarters, United States Army 

Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Eustis, VA 23604

27 November 2018

Military Operations

THE U.S. ARMY IN MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS 2028

STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND

General, U.S. Army

Commanding 

WILLIAM T. LASHER

Senior Executive

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6

History. This is a major revision of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1. It replaces The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a 

Complex World, and the Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century

concept.

Summary. This pamphlet describes how Army forces contribute to the Joint Force’s principal 

task as defined in the unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy: deter and defeat 

Chinese and Russian aggression in both competition and conflict.

Applicability. This document applies to all Department of the Army (DA) activities that 

develop doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities. It guides future force development and informs the Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System process. It also supports Army capabilities 

development processes and functions as a conceptual basis for developing supporting concepts 

related to the future force within DOTMLPF.

Proponent: The proponent of this document is the Director, Concept Development and 

Learning Directorate, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ATFC-ED), 950 Jefferson Avenue, 

Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5763.

*This pamphlet supersedes TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, dated 31 October 2014.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

2

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to submit comments and suggested improvements.

Comments may be provided via DA Form 2028 to Director, ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 950 Jefferson 

Avenue, Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604-5763. 

Availability. The official published version of this pamphlet is available on the TRADOC 

Administrative Publications website (http://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/). It is also available at 

the Joint and Army Concept Division DODTechSpace at 

https://www.dtic.mil/dodtechspace/groups/army-capabilities-integration-center/projects/jointand-army-concepts-division. 

Summary of Change

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028

This major revision, dated 27 November 2018-

o Describes how Army forces contribute the Joint Force’s principal task to deter and defeat 

Chinese and Russian aggression in both competition and armed conflict as outlined in the 

unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy.

o Provides a threat-based approach to operations against near-peer adversaries.

o Addresses operations in competition, armed conflict, and the transition back to competition 

(return to competition).

o Describes how Army forces fight across all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the 

information environment and at echelon.

o Introduces or revises the terms: Multi-Domain Operations, calibrated force posture, 

convergence, multi-domain formations, decisive space, independent maneuver, dense urban 

terrain, dis-integrate, information space, stand-off, and precision logistics.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

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Contents

Page

Foreword.......................................................................................................................................... i

Preface............................................................................................................................................iii

Executive Summary....................................................................................................................... vi

Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 5

1-1. Purpose ................................................................................................................................... 5

1-2. Methodology and organization............................................................................................... 5

1-3. Major changes from Multi-Domain Battle ............................................................................. 5

Chapter 2 The Operational Context ............................................................................................... 6

2-1. The emerging operational environment.................................................................................. 6

2-2. Russia: Achieve objectives in competition below armed conflict......................................... 9

2-3. Russia in armed conflict: Separate the Joint Force and create strategic and operational

 stand-off...................................................................................................................................... 11

2-4. Russia’s consolidation operations in competition, armed conflict, and return to

 competition ................................................................................................................................. 14

2-5. Systemic vulnerabilities and dependencies .......................................................................... 14

2-6. Other threats in the operational environment ....................................................................... 15

2-7. Implications for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)............................................................. 15

Chapter 3 Conducting MDO........................................................................................................ 15

3-1. Military problem................................................................................................................... 15

3-2. Central idea........................................................................................................................... 17

3-3. Tenets of MDO..................................................................................................................... 17

3-4. MDO and strategic objectives .............................................................................................. 24

3-5. MDO in competition: Compete to expand the competitive space....................................... 27

3-6. MDO in armed conflict: Penetrate strategic and operational stand-off............................... 32

3-7. MDO in armed conflict: Dis-integrate the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems... 37

3-8. MDO in armed conflict: Exploit freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy objectives .......... 42

3-9. MDO in return to competition: Re-compete to consolidate and expand gains ................... 45

Chapter 4 Conclusion................................................................................................................... 46

Appendix A Assumptions.......................................................................................................... A-1

Appendix B Key Required Capabilities..................................................................................... B-1

Appendix C MDO Supporting Ideas.......................................................................................... C-1

Appendix D MDO in Dense Urban Terrain (DUT)................................................................... D-1

Appendix E Linkage to other concepts.......................................................................................E-1

Appendix F Lessons learned from the fielded force...................................................................F-1

Appendix G References............................................................................................................. G-1

Glossary ....................................................................................................................................GL-1
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Figure List

Figure 1. Logic map....................................................................................................................... v

Figure 2-1. MDO framework......................................................................................................... 8

Figure 2-2. China and Russia in competition and armed conflict.................................................. 9

Figure 2-3. Adversary’s layered stand-off................................................................................... 12

Figure 3-1. Problems superimposed on the MDO framework..................................................... 16

Figure 3-2. Converging capabilities to generate cross-domain synergy and layered options ..... 21

Figure 3-3. MDO solutions.......................................................................................................... 26

Figure 3-4. Competition............................................................................................................... 27

Figure 3-5. Penetrate and dis-integrate anti-access and area denial systems; exploit freedom of

 maneuver..................................................................................................................................... 32

Figure C-1. Characteristics of the ground, air, maritime, and enduring virtual weapons

 cycles......................................................................................................................................... C-8
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

5

Chapter 1 

Introduction

1-1. Purpose

United States (U.S.) Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The 

U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations describes how Army forces contribute to the Joint 

Force’s principal task as defined in the unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy: 

deter and defeat Chinese and Russian aggression in both competition and conflict.10F

11 The U.S. 

Army in Multi-Domain Operations proposes detailed solutions to the specific problems posed by 

the militaries of post-industrial, information-based states like China and Russia. Although this 

concept focuses on China and Russia, the ideas also apply to other threats. The concept 

describes the Army in 2028, though some of the capabilities described might not be fully fielded 

across the entire force by that time.

1-2. Methodology and organization

The U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept describes how Army forces fight across all 

domains, the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and the information environment and at echelon. 

The concept is based on extensive analyses, wargaming, experimentation, and collaboration with 

other Services and the Joint Staff. Chapter 2 describes the characteristics, capabilities, and 

vulnerabilities of Chinese and Russian anti-access and area denial systems in competition and in 

conflict. Chapter 3 describes the military problem, gives a detailed description of the tenets of 

Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), and then provides detailed descriptions of their application to 

solve the five multi-domain problems. Chapter 4 summarizes the immediate implications of 

MDO and describes the path of future concept development.

1-3. Major changes from Multi-Domain Battle

 a. Title changed to The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations to better reflect the broader

scope of competition and conflict and the inherently joint nature of modern warfare.

 b. Insights from the U.S. Army Mosul Study and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Urbanization Project informed revisions to the description of the emerging operational 

environment, refinements to the solution, and a new dense urban terrain appendix.

 c. Insights gained from wargames, simulations, Joint Warfighting Assessments, and joint and 

multi-Service collaboration are incorporated into refined descriptions of Chinese and Russian

systems, tenets of MDO, and required capabilities.

 d. Provides much greater detail regarding the application of MDO as a basis for functional 

concept development, further experimentation, and force development.

 11 The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028 concept is a single Service concept and therefore refers to “Army forces,” even in instances 

when “ground forces” could also be used because U.S. Marine Corps units would operate differently within their Service structures. Similarly, 

“Army forces” is also used in instances describing the use of space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

capabilities that are possessed by one or more of the other Services, but because the Services organize and operate differently, limits the 

description to Army forces. This concept reinforces the requirement for multi-Service and joint operations in new ways without prescribing roles, 

functions, and organization for the other Services or partners. The concept strengthens the idea that the Army will operate as an element of the 

Joint Force in the execution of Multi-Domain Operations.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

6

Chapter 2

The Operational Context

2-1. The emerging operational environment

 a. The Joint Operating Environment 2035 predicts that for the foreseeable future, U.S. 

national interests will face challenges from both persistent disorder and states contesting 

international norms.11F

12 This concept addresses the second of those challenges. As the Joint 

Force responds to adversaries contesting international norms in either competition or armed 

conflict, it will conduct operations in an emerging operational environment shaped by four 

interrelated characteristics: adversaries are contesting all domains, the EMS, and the information 

environment and U.S. dominance is not assured; smaller armies fight on an expanded battlefield 

that is increasingly lethal and hyperactive; nation-states have more difficulty in imposing their 

will within a politically, culturally, technologically, and strategically complex environment; and 

near-peer states more readily compete below armed conflict, making deterrence more 

challenging. These characteristics allow adversaries, particularly near-peer threats like China

and Russia, to expand the battlefield in time (a blurred distinction between peace and war), in 

domains (space and cyberspace), and in geography (now extended into the homeland) to create 

tactical, operational, and strategic stand-off.

 b. An additional important characteristic of the emerging operational environment is its urban 

nature. The strategic importance of cities suggests that Army forces will have to conduct 

operations within dense urban terrain.12F

13 The physical and demographic density of this 

environment creates distinct physical, cognitive, and operational characteristics. The cumulative 

effect of these factors compounds the friction of war by increasing the number of tasks required 

within a given physical or temporal space while multiplying the tactical, operational, and 

strategic variables that commanders and staffs must take into account. Operations in dense urban 

terrain might be in response to either persistent disorder or to contested norms. In the latter case, 

adversaries will exploit dense urban terrain to gain advantage or to mitigate the Joint Force’s 

strengths.13F

14

 c. Among the states most likely to contest international norms, China and Russia prove the 

most capable. They are, therefore, the focus of this concept. As described below, both China 

and Russia are pursuing capabilities and approaches to create the same effect of operational and 

strategic stand-off, though by somewhat different means. This concept assumes—for the 

purposes of organizing a strategic and operational construct—that Chinese and Russia concept 

and force development are sufficiently similar for the Army to solve the problems presented by 

Russia in the near- to mid-term and adapt to the changes China develops in the mid- to far-term. 

 12 Contested norms involve increasingly powerful revisionist states and select non-state actors using all elements of power to establish their own 

set of rules unfavorable to the U.S. and its interests. Persistent disorder is characterized by an array of weak states that become increasingly 

incapable of maintaining domestic order or good governance. Publications supporting this assessment include the Joint Operating Environment 

2035; Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb 2016; Military and 

Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, Annual Report to Congress; and David E. Johnson, The Challenges of the 

“Now” and Their Implications for the U.S. Army (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2016). 13 Dense urban terrain is “areas characterized by extraordinarily closely-packed manmade infrastructure and high population density, potentially 

including concentrations of high-rise buildings, subterranean features, and densely packed slums.” There is no formal doctrinal term; both dense 

urban terrain and dense urban environments are used synonymously. For purposes of this concept, dense urban terrain is used. 14 Appendix D provides a more comprehensive description of Multi-Domain Operations in dense urban terrain.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

7

This document, therefore, accounts for both China and Russia’s approaches to create stand-off, 

but uses Russia as the present pacing threat for technical and tactical purposes.14F

15

 (1) Russia has demonstrated the intent and the most effective combinations of systems and 

concepts to challenge the U.S. and its allies militarily in the near term. Russia’s actions in 

Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria have demonstrated their intent to fracture the relationship between 

the U.S. and its partners and their ability to pursue strategic objectives below the threshold of 

armed conflict. Russia uses unconventional and information warfare to propagate a narrative 

that breeds ambiguity and delays the reactions of their adversaries. Over the last decade, Russia 

has increased its investments in anti-access and area denial capabilities and systems intended to 

deny the Joint Force entry into a contested area and set the conditions for a fait accompli attack. 

 (2) China possesses the vision and strategic depth to become the U.S.’s most powerful 

competitor in time. Unlike Russia, China has the economy and technological base, such as an 

independent microelectronics industry and world-leading artificial intelligence development 

process, sufficient to overtake current Russian system overmatch in the next 10-15 years. China 

is rapidly building a world class military intended to project power globally. In the future, China 

will become the conceptual pacing threat for the Joint Force. The risk associated with this 

assumption will be continuously assessed to ensure the ability to adapt conceptually should 

China accelerate its capability development. 

 d. Chinese and Russian attempts to create political and military stand-off challenge the Joint 

Force’s ability to dominate all domains, the EMS, and the information environment. If 

successful, stand-off grants these near-peer competitors the strategic freedom of action to pursue 

objectives at the expense of the U.S. and its allies.15F

16 They, in conjunction with aligned state and 

non-state actors, will increasingly challenge the global order by undermining U.S. security 

guarantees to allies and partners. Vulnerable fault-line states are the principal targets of Chinese 

and Russian offensive operations short of armed conflict, which are calculated to avoid 

triggering a decisive U.S. response. China and Russia’s ability to escalate through a rapid 

transition to overt military action provides them the means to seize and maintain the initiative 

before U.S. and partner forces can prepare a response. 

 e. Within this emerging operational environment, China and Russia employ a variety of 

political and military anti-access and area denial strategies and systems to create stand-off in 

competition and conflict. In competition, both states seek to fracture U.S. alliances and 

partnerships through a combination of diplomatic and economic actions; unconventional warfare;

information warfare; exploitation of social, ethnic, or nationalistic tensions in a region; and the 

actual or threatened employment of conventional forces. By generating instability within 

countries and alliances, they create political separation that results in strategic ambiguity, 

reducing the speed of friendly recognition, decision, and reaction. In armed conflict, China and 

Russia employ anti-access and area denial systems to create strategic and operational stand-off to 

separate elements of the Joint Force in time, space, and function.

 15 Both China and Russia require individual, classified tactical and operational battlefield development plans for solution development, analysis, 

and requirements determination. These plans are under development; they have and will continue to inform Multi-Domain Operations. 16 The National Defense Strategy describes Russian and China as competitors and states that “Long-term strategic competitions with China and 

Russia are the principal priorities for the Department [of Defense],” Unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy, pg. 1, 4 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

8

 f. The emerging operational environment and the threat necessitate adapting the Joint Force’s 

current understanding of the battlefield. Adversaries have expanded the battlefield in four ways:

in time (phases), domains, geography (space and depth), and actors. They have blurred the 

distinctions between actions “below armed conflict” and “conflict,” enabling the achievement of 

strategic objectives short of what the U.S. traditionally considers “war.” They have expanded 

the battlefield by making space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and information key components 

of their operations. Potential adversaries have also expanded the battlefield geographically 

because the effects of their multi-domain capabilities are less bound by geographic and time 

constraints and extend the range in which formations are under “contact.” Finally, they rely on 

an increasing number of “non-traditional” actors, including proxies and surrogates, to pursue 

their objectives. 

 g. The framework depicted in figure 2-1 illustrates the breadth of activities, spaces, distances, 

and interrelationships for which MDO must account. This concept uses this framework 

throughout to illustrate friendly as well as an adversary’s actions in and across spaces. Despite 

the linear depiction in figure 2-1, the areas are not defined by fixed geographic relationships or 

dimensions but by the operational context, the interplay of friendly and enemy capabilities, and 

terrain. The areas are not self-contained. Instead, the principal utility of the framework is that it 

allows commanders and staffs to visualize the relationships between actions that take place 

across the depth of the expanded battlefield. A more detailed description of the framework is 

found in appendix C.

Figure 2-1. MDO framework
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

9

2-2. Russia: Achieve objectives in competition below armed conflict16F

17

 a. In competition, Russia attempts to separate the U.S. and friendly states politically, limiting 

a coordinated allied response and destabilizing target states. To accomplish this task, Russia 

executes coordinated campaigns employing national- and district-level capabilities, information 

warfare (social media, false narratives, cyber attacks), and unconventional warfare to achieve 

strategic objectives. Russia leverages the presence and posture of conventional forces to both 

actively support these efforts and demonstrate the capability to rapidly transition to armed 

conflict (e.g., “snap drills”). This posture also provides Russia with an escalation advantage, 

because their conventional forces threaten the Joint Force’s freedom of action in the air and 

space and its ability to conduct expeditionary maneuver (see figure 2-2).17F

18 Through these 

competitive actions, Russia seeks to achieve objectives without risking armed conflict with the 

U.S.

Figure 2-2. China and Russia in competition and armed conflict

 b. National- and district-level capabilities. Russian national- and district-level capabilities 

hold the U.S. homeland at risk and threaten expeditionary maneuver. 

 17 Sections 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 describe how Russian forces (the pacing threat) operate. It is assumed that China and other Chinese and Russian

proxies operate with characteristics sufficiently similar to use Russian operations as a basis for analysis.

18 An escalation advantage is essentially a dynamic position of relative advantage, generally achieved by conventional forces.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

10

 (1) Russian national-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets 

collect targeting information on fixed sites (headquarters, communications, critical infrastructure, 

and power projection facilities), detect predictable friendly patterns of operations, and monitor 

changes to friendly force posture. Space-based reconnaissance, special operations forces (SOF) 

and sympathizers, open-source collection, ground-based signal intercept platforms, and the 

communications network linking these sensors to headquarters are the most important ISR 

capabilities retained at the national and military district levels. Nuclear and other weapons of 

mass effect (to include widespread cyberspace attacks) threaten the U.S. homeland, allies and 

partners, and friendly military forces. 

 (2) Russia conducts active, persistent surveillance of adjoining states, regional allies, and 

the U.S. homeland. They focus on U.S. capabilities that enable a rapid response, such as Joint 

Force intelligence collection and transmission, air superiority control and sustainment, and 

power projection facilities. Russian surveillance enables long-range strikes with ballistic 

missiles, cruise missiles, offensive cyber, and SOF direct action teams. These strike capabilities 

support their information narrative in competition by assisting them in controlling escalation on 

their terms. National- and district-level ISR capabilities enable Russia to determine whether they

have achieved the necessary correlation of forces to continue offensive operations in 

competition. Comprehensive ISR by national- and district-level assets in competition also 

enables their conventional forces to transition rapidly to armed conflict.

 c. Unconventional warfare. Russian SOF, local paramilitaries, and activists conduct 

unconventional warfare to destabilize targeted governments by separating their control of certain 

regions or populations. Russian unconventional warfare activities empower proxies and activist 

networks to conduct a range of operations, including terrorism, subversion, destabilizing criminal 

activities, reconnaissance, information warfare, and direct action strikes. These actions add 

physical support to their information narrative. Unconventional warfare capabilities support 

conventional forces with reconnaissance and the ability to exert influence or control over some

elements of terrain and populations within U.S. partner territory.

 d. Information warfare.18F

19 Russian information warfare is composed of the information 

narrative and information warfare capabilities. Information warfare works with, and is supported 

by, their national-level capabilities and unconventional and conventional warfare activities.19F

20 

Adversaries seek to influence both domestic and foreign audiences.20F

21 Information warfare often 

involves cyber reconnaissance and strike actions that support other reconnaissance, 

unconventional, and conventional warfare activities. Information warfare can be destructive, 

using offensive cyber capabilities to disable, monitor, or spoof friendly and civilian command 

networks. An increasingly prevalent form of information warfare is the “firehose of 

falsehood”—fabricated stories distributed by paid “trolls” or automated “bots” that unsuspecting 

citizens amplify through social media or other means—to confuse audiences or divert attention 

 19 This concept refers to an adversary’s actions by the Russian doctrinal term information warfare and friendly actions by the term information 

environment operations. For Russia, information warfare embodies their plans for information confrontation that includes targeting all aspects of 

a society—diplomatic, economic, military, political, cultural, social, and religious information arenas. (http://freebeacon.com/nationalsecurity/dia-reveals-new-details-russian-information-warfare/) 20 Russian information warfare capabilities are largely cyber. 21 An information warfare (or information environment operation for friendly usage) campaign employs various information related capabilities 

working together toward a common strategic or operational objective. 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

11

from adversaries’ intentions.21F

22 This form of information warfare creates ambiguity to prevent or 

delay political recognition, decision, and reaction. 

 e. Conventional forces. Russia postures conventional forces in competition to create a

favorable correlation of forces in regard to the Joint Force and its partners. Exercises, 

demonstrations, and “snap drills” generate force readiness and stimulate friendly response 

patterns for their national- and district-level ISR capabilities to collect and analyze. Russian 

conventional forces possess the demonstrated ability to conduct a fait accompli attack with 

limited warning.22F

23 Russian surface-to-surface missiles, long-range surface-to-air missiles 

(SAM), counterspace, and combined arms ground forces are in position to physically isolate U.S. 

partners and destroy forward-positioned defenders before the Joint Force can respond effectively. 

This local military superiority supports information narratives of Russian strength and postures 

their conventional forces to support unconventional warfare directly through covert assistance or 

indirectly by providing them with an escalation advantage that constrains friendly responses. 

 f. Summary of Russian systems in competition. The operational center of gravity for 

Russian actions in competition is the close integration of information warfare, unconventional 

warfare, and conventional forces. The ability to employ all elements in a coordinated manner 

provides Russia with an escalation advantage, in which any friendly reaction risks a more 

powerful response. Within competition, the most extreme escalation is the transition to armed 

conflict, which favors an adversary with the ability to conduct a fait accompli attack with their

conventional forces. The demonstrated ability to accomplish a fait accompli provides credibility 

to Russian information narratives. The combination of information warfare, unconventional 

warfare, and conventional and nuclear forces provides Russia with political and military standoff within which they can secure strategic objectives short of armed conflict with the U.S. 

Information warfare and unconventional warfare contribute to the destabilization of regional 

security, but are insufficient in themselves to achieve all Russian strategic objectives. The 

escalation advantage provided by conventional forces supplements information warfare and 

unconventional warfare, enabling Russia to maintain the initiative in competition. 

2-3. Russia in armed conflict: Separate the Joint Force and create strategic and 

operational stand-off

 a. Russian conventional forces seek to further enhance physical stand-off by creating layers of 

anti-access and area denial systems designed to inflict unacceptable losses on U.S. and partner 

military forces and to achieve campaign objectives within days, before the U.S. can effectively 

respond. These forces are enabled by all-domain reconnaissance that operates in depth, from as 

deep as the U.S. homeland to the area of operations. Empowered by extensive reconnaissance 

complexes, these threats can conduct simultaneous attacks throughout the depth of the 

battlefield. Russian systems are designed to separate the Joint Force in time, space, and function 

by employing long-range systems to prevent friendly expeditionary maneuver from strategic and 

operational distances, and by employing direct and indirect fires from mid- and short-range

systems to isolate and destroy forward deployed friendly forces.

 22 Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 

2016).

23 A fait accompli attack is intended to achieve military and political objectives rapidly and then to quickly consolidate those gains so that any 

attempt to reverse the action by the U.S. would entail unacceptable cost and risk. 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

12

Figure 2-3. Adversary’s layered stand-off

 b. Long-range fires systems. 

 (1) Within Russian combined arms ground formations, long-range fires systems are 

carefully concealed from friendly ISR and well-protected by layered air defenses. In a 

continental theater, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and long-range SAM are the critical 

elements creating military stand-off, and are supplemented by long-range multiple rocket 

launchers (MRL), offensive cyber, counterspace, and unconventional warfare. Enemy longrange systems use intelligence gathered by SOF and espionage networks, space-based systems, 

unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and ground-based sensors.

 (2) The range of Russian long-range systems expands the battlefield into Support Areas. In 

conflict, the enemy will target U.S. command and sustainment capabilities to degrade friendly air

and maritime superiority and reconnaissance, strike, and strategic lift.23F

24 Long-range kinetic 

strike capabilities will also target Army forward postured forces, prepositioned equipment, and 

munitions stocks. Russian offensive electronic warfare (EW), counterspace, and offensive cyber 

capabilities will jam, spoof, exploit, or destroy friendly space-based reconnaissance and 

communications platforms to prevent effective friendly mission command and ISR. Enemy 

long-range strike capabilities will also be used against civilian infrastructure and resources that 

support military operations, such as transportation networks, energy generation and distribution 

systems, and the defense industrial base. 

 c. Mid-range and short-range systems.

 (1) Within Russian combined arms ground formations, mid-range systems provide the 

majority of fires. Advanced mid-range radars and SAM, capable of integration with long-range

systems, pose a significant threat to friendly air forces. The weight of fire produced by standard

MRL and cannon artillery employed in mass present the greatest danger to friendly ground 

forces, which can be destroyed before closing with enemy maneuver forces. Networked multi-

 24 Destroying integrated air defense systems (IADS) to facilitate deep strikes, isolating enemy maneuver forces, and opening the theater for 

friendly strategic movement are the critical initial premises of current Joint Force operations.
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13

domain reconnaissance forces deployed in depth enable enemy mid-range fires. These forces 

consist of numerous ground observation teams, unmanned aerial systems, radars, and signal 

intercept units. Additionally, the enemy can commit offensive cyber, SOF, space-based, air 

strike, and maritime capabilities to reinforce combined arms ground maneuver formations when 

they are the main effort. Mid- and short-range air defenses severely limit friendly air 

surveillance capabilities, air assault, attack aviation, and close air support by forcing them to 

either operate at increased risk locally or with reduced effectiveness from stand-off ranges. 

 (2) Within the stand-off created by mid-range systems, enemy short-range systems (ground 

maneuver forces) maneuver to occupy key terrain, and create defensive positions that protect 

both the enemy long- and mid-range fires systems. In the offense, enemy short-range systems 

are designed to find and fix friendly forces to be destroyed by their long- and mid-range fires. 

Once in defensive positions, Russian combined arms ground formations employ camouflage, 

concealment, and decoys to defeat Joint Force surveillance and reconnaissance. 

 d. Unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare activities support Russian conventional 

forces in armed conflict with reconnaissance, direct action strikes, and support in consolidating 

gains. Unconventional warfare capabilities play an important role in attacking friendly Support 

Areas by performing reconnaissance and direct action. 

 e. Information warfare. The actions of Russian conventional, national- and district-level 

capabilities, and unconventional warfare enable and empower its information narrative. The 

information narrative targets friendly leaders, populations, and forces. The effectiveness of the 

Russian information narrative in undermining friendly will is enhanced greatly by the success of 

its conventional forces. 

 f. National- and district-level capabilities. National- and district-level capabilities support 

Russian conventional forces in armed conflict by performing reconnaissance, disrupting the Joint 

Force’s strategic and operational maneuver, and preventing a deliberate counteroffensive. 

Nuclear forces, information warfare, cyber capabilities, cruise missiles, space-based platforms, 

and special operations teams provide Russia a variety of options to threaten U.S. and partner 

homelands outside of the range of most conventional forces. Russia uses (or threatens to use) 

these capabilities to isolate the theater and to transition to consolidation operations after its 

conventional forces have accomplished objectives.

 g. Summary of Russian systems in conflict. Russian long- and mid-range fires systems are 

its operational center of gravity in armed conflict. These systems create stand-off that enables a 

successful fait accompli attack. Russia employs these systems to destroy friendly forces’ highvalue capabilities, including headquarters, aircraft, and trained combat formations that are 

difficult to regenerate and essential to achieving U.S. operational and strategic objectives. 

Destroying these friendly high-value capabilities strengthens Russian information narratives and 

creates time and space to consolidate operational gains on political terms favorable to Russia. 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

14

2-4. Russia’s consolidation operations in competition, armed conflict, and return to 

competition

 a. Russian forces begin consolidation operations during armed conflict and continue these into 

the return to competition. During consolidation operations, Russia regenerates and re-postures

military capacity while preserving any political gains achieved in conflict. If consolidation

operations occur in a situation in which the Joint Force and partners have achieved a military 

advantage, the use or threat of Russian nuclear systems becomes an important element in 

maintaining its gains.

 b. The information narrative is the main effort in Russian consolidation operations during the 

return to competition. The information narrative legitimizes gains while projecting the image of 

sustained military strength. In a supporting effort, unconventional warfare, conventional forces, 

and security forces extend control in enemy territory, eliminating dissent and blocking friendly 

information narratives from reaching the population or its own forces. Remaining Russian

reconnaissance capabilities continue to operate in U.S. and partner territories. Russian ground 

forces enable its control over territory by destroying any friendly SOF and irregular capabilities. 

 c. Weapons of mass effect provide military stand-off during the return to competition, which 

allow Russia to regenerate and reposition military capabilities and consolidate gains. The 

combination of weapons of mass effect, information warfare, unconventional warfare, and 

proxies allows Russia to continue contesting the Joint Force in the return to competition, even if 

its conventional forces are severely degraded. This stand-off creates time and space for defeated 

enemy forces to reorganize and limits the extent to which the Joint Force can exploit operational 

military advantage.

2-5. Systemic vulnerabilities and dependencies

 a. Russia’s military exhibits patterns and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by changes to 

Joint Force operations, force posture, and capabilities. Russia: 

 (1) Uses information warfare (enabled by cyber) and conventional military forces in ways 

that, when exposed, galvanize rather than separate the U.S. and its allies.

 (2) Organizes and operates forces through highly centralized command and control 

structures that have difficulty adapting to rapid tactical changes or complexity. 

 (3) Cannot accept high attrition to elite formations or key integrated air defense systems 

(IADS) and fires systems. 

 (4) Depends on achieving air superiority from the ground to protect its fires systems.

 (5) Relies on a limited number of long-range strike systems and enabling munitions.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

15

 (6) Operates in territory and among populations in part or wholly friendly to the U.S.; 

therefore, the revisionist power faces constrained freedom of access in competition and will be 

contested in conflict.

 (7) Possesses limited ability to reconstitute space-based assets.

 b. The Chinese and Russian militaries are powerful, but they also have vulnerabilities that 

MDO seek to exploit. Both China and Russia are fielding mutually supporting systems designed 

to be effective against the well-understood patterns, posture, and capabilities of the current Joint 

Force. Altering Joint Force operational patterns and force posture will mitigate existing capacity 

and capability gaps and create opportunities to exploit Chinese and Russian operational 

shortfalls. The militaries of China and Russia have and will continue to have finite capacity of 

critical capabilities. The Joint Force’s demonstrated capability to destroy or defeat these critical 

capabilities would prevent China and Russia from accomplishing objectives in competition, 

succeeding in armed conflict, or effectively transitioning to consolidation operations.

2-6. Other threats in the operational environment

The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations concept applies to threats other than China and 

Russia. North Korea and Iran also seek to create political and military stand-off in order to 

achieve their strategic goals by destabilizing regional security. In some instances, North Korea 

and Iran directly employ or further proliferate Chinese and Russian anti-access and area denial 

capabilities to create military stand-off. Additionally, these countries employ indigenously 

developed capabilities or strategies to create stand-off. The Joint Force, therefore will also 

employ MDO adapted for the unique cultural, geographic, and military context against these and 

other future threats.

2-7. Implications for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)

The common aspect among the current and emerging threats described in this chapter is the 

intent and capability to challenge the U.S. by employing a variety of means to generate stand-off 

that exploits political ambiguity and the strategic posture and operational predictability of the 

Joint Force. The current conceptual framework of the Joint Force and the Army does not 

account for the problem of stand-off, nor does it acknowledge the need to compete below the 

threshold of armed conflict against a near-peer adversary to expand the competitive space for 

policymakers. Countering these threats will require an operational concept that integrates 

capabilities from all domains, the EMS, and the information environment to offer solutions to a 

wide array of problems in both competition and armed conflict. 

Chapter 3

Conducting MDO

3-1. Military problem

 a. How does the Army enable the Joint Force to compete with China and Russia below armed 

conflict, penetrate and dis-integrate their anti-access and area denial systems and ultimately 

defeat them in armed conflict and consolidate gains, and then return to competition? 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

16

 b. Solving the overarching military problem requires Army forces to address five problems 

posed by China and Russia in competition and conflict (see figure 3-1).

 #1 How does the Joint Force compete to enable the defeat of an adversary’s operations to 

destabilize the region, deter the escalation of violence, and, should violence escalate, enable a 

rapid transition to armed conflict?

 #2 How does the Joint Force penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems 

throughout the depth of the Support Areas to enable strategic and operational maneuver?

 #3 How does the Joint Force dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems in the 

Deep Areas to enable operational and tactical maneuver?

 #4 How does the Joint Force exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to achieve 

operational and strategic objectives through the defeat of the enemy in the Close and Deep 

Maneuver Areas? 

 #5 How does the Joint Force re-compete to consolidate gains and produce sustainable 

outcomes, set conditions for long-term deterrence, and adapt to the new security environment?

Figure 3-1. Problems superimposed on the MDO framework
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3-2. Central idea

Army forces, as an element of the Joint Force, conduct MDO to prevail in competition; when 

necessary, Army forces penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems 

and exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver to achieve strategic objectives (win) and force a 

return to competition on favorable terms.

3-3. Tenets of MDO

 a. MDO solves the five problems through the combined application of three tenets: calibrated 

force posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence.24F

25 The tenets are mutually reinforcing 

and common to all MDO, though how they are realized will vary by echelon and depend upon 

the specific operational situation. The employment of the tenets – particularly calibrated force 

posture and convergence – also enable the global integration of the Joint Force to counter China 

and Russia during competition and armed conflict.

 b. Calibrated force posture. Calibrated force posture is the combination of capacity, 

capability, position, and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances. Calibrated force 

posture allows Army forces to support Joint Force objectives in competition; deters armed 

conflict by preventing adversaries from attempting a fait accompli attack on favorable terms; and 

enables friendly forces to quickly seize the initiative in large-scale combat operations by setting 

the theater for expeditionary forces. Accomplishing these tasks requires a dynamic mix of 

different types of forces that adapt and change as dictated by the strategic environment: forward 

presence forces (U.S. and partner, conventional and SOF), expeditionary forces (Army and joint 

units and capabilities), and national-level cyberspace capabilities, space-based platforms, and 

strike capabilities. The appropriate balance of capabilities across the Total Force provides 

cohesive, fully capable forward presence forces and expeditionary forces able to deploy within 

strategically relevant time periods. Those postured forces also require the appropriate authorities 

to operate in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment, particularly in 

competition. The ability of the Joint Force to rapidly and unpredictably present an adversary 

with different combinations of forces and capabilities expands the competitive space for the U.S. 

and helps deter aggression by complicating an adversary’s ability to achieve local superiority. In 

the event of a conflict, the application of calibrated force posture positions the right mix of ready 

forces and capabilities so they can rapidly transition to combat operations, penetrate and disintegrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems within days, and exploit the resultant 

freedom of maneuver to defeat the enemy within weeks rather than months.25F

26

 (1) Forward presence forces. Forward presence forces consist of Army forward deployed 

and rotational units and capability sets. Forward presence forces include a wide array of Army 

capabilities, but of particular value due to their role in competition and the transition to armed 

conflict are mission command, intelligence, fires, sustainment, security force assistance, civil 

affairs, psychological operations, and SOF. Forward presence forces also provide enhanced 

 25 The components of the solution link to the National Defense Strategy goals for developing a more lethal force: “Forward force maneuver and 

posture resilience” and “Develop a lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment,” Unclassified Summary of the National Defense 

Strategy, pg. 6, 7. 26 Calibrated force posture aligns with the Global Operating Model described in the National Defense Strategy. The National Defense Strategy

“contact force” is composed of forward presence forces. The “blunt force” is a combination of forward presence forces and early-entry 

expeditionary forces. The “surge force” is follow-on expeditionary forces that arrive after the outbreak of armed conflict.
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interoperability with partners through their integration into existing structures for command and 

control, intelligence, targeting, and cyberspace that are difficult for expeditionary forces to 

establish in a crisis or conflict. The persistence of Army forward presence forces is a 

foundational element of dynamic employment of the Joint Force as it enables joint strategic 

maneuver with critical combat, sustainment, protection, and mission command capabilities.

 (2) Expeditionary forces. Expeditionary Army forces are those formations ready to 

maneuver from the U.S. or other regions across strategic distances while in contact with the 

adversary’s reconnaissance, long-range fires, space, and cyberspace capabilities. Forces that 

deploy by air either bring their equipment or draw prepositioned equipment and are ready to 

fight within days or a few weeks of alert. Expeditionary forces deploying by sea are ready to 

fight within weeks. Expeditionary forces may also have to conduct joint forcible entry 

operations in the absence of forward presence forces or to open an additional line of operation. 

In conflict, the speed and effectiveness with which expeditionary forces can deploy along 

contested lines of communications are heavily dependent on the preparation and support of 

forward presence forces, the Reserve Components, other Services, and partners. 

 (3) National-level capabilities. National-level capabilities include intelligence, 

cyberspace, space-based, and some kinetic strike capabilities normally controlled above the 

theater level. These capabilities complement forward presence and expeditionary forces with 

their unique effects, global reach, and rapid execution that require little or no physical 

movement. The scarcity of these resources and the potential for unintended consequences with 

their use might cause policymakers to retain authorities or permissions for their use. The 

extensive preparation required to use these resources must begin in competition, when U.S. 

forces develop detailed intelligence identifying specific vulnerabilities, gain or prepare to request 

required authorities, and train to use national-level capabilities. 

 (4) Authorities. To operate in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment, the 

lowest appropriate echelon of Army forces requires tailored authorities in three broad areas: 

access, surveillance, and employment.26F

27 In competition, they need access to and presence in 

geographic areas and military and civilian networks that enable them to operate in both 

competition and conflict. In armed conflict, Army forces must have authorities to employ 

capabilities such as electronic attack, offensive cyberspace and space measures, and lethal 

strikes, especially to support a rapid transition from competition to conflict. In both competition 

and conflict, authorities to operate in the cyberspace domain and information environment must 

be granted earlier, faster, and to lower echelons to enable MDO. Forward presence headquarters 

enable success in both competition and the transition to armed conflict by making necessary 

coordination and lowering barriers to obtaining authorities before they are needed. Tailored

authorities must also enable the Army’s role as a force provider, with particular focus on 

authorities to notify and mobilize planned and contingency Reserve Component forces, 

formations, and headquarters.

 27 Examples of authorities include country team permissions for physical and virtual access (e.g., overflight permissions, access agreements, 

convoy clearances, materiel and non-materiel host nation support, ability to use or block segments of the EMS, and ability to employ offensive 

cyberspace operations), the ability to task transportation assets and forces for deployment, authority to obligate funds, and authority to conduct 

cross-boundary coordination. 
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 c. Multi-domain formations. Multi-domain formations possess the combination of capacity, 

capability, and endurance which generates the resilience necessary to operate across multiple 

domains. All Army formations must be multi-domain capable to some degree. Multi-domain 

formations can conduct independent maneuver, employ cross-domain fires, and maximize human 

potential. The most important materiel contributors to resilience are advanced protection 

systems, reduced signatures, redundant channels for communications hardened against enemy 

interference, multiple sustainment networks, robust maneuver support capability and capacity, 

layered air defense, layered reconnaissance, and multi-domain obscuration capabilities. The 

most important non-materiel contributors to resilience are flexible planning that account for 

enemy actions, the ability to reorganize formations in conflict, leaders and staffs capable of 

operating in accord with intent, and small, dispersed, cross-trained headquarters. These

combined contributors provide the resilience necessary for Army formations and systems at all 

echelons to conduct both offensive and defensive operations in contested spaces against a nearpeer adversary.

 (1) Conduct independent maneuver. Multi-domain formations conduct independent 

maneuver by continuing operations in a contested environment within the intent of the theater 

campaign.27F

28 Independent maneuver alludes to formation possessing the capacity, capability, and

empowered initiative to operate under the constraints of the operational environment. Multidomain formations possess organic capabilities to sustain and protect themselves until they 

regain contact with adjacent and supporting units. They are enabled by capabilities such as 

reduced visual and electromagnetic signatures, redundant channels for communications hardened 

against enemy interference, reduced logistics demand, enhanced medical support, multiple 

sustainment networks, robust maneuver support capability and capacity, and multi-domain 

obscuration capabilities. Brigades, divisions, and corps, specifically, require organic mission 

command, ISR, and sustainment capabilities to maintain offensive operations for several days 

despite highly contested lines of communications. 

 (2) Employ cross-domain fires. The ability to employ cross-domain fires provides 

options to commanders and builds resilience within the Joint Force to overcome temporary 

functional separation imposed by enemy anti-access and area denial systems. Beyond 

modernized air and missile defense and long-range ground fire capabilities, multi-domain 

formations deliver cross-domain fire capabilities through aviation systems; advanced protection 

systems, layered air defense and reconnaissance, EW devices; multi-spectral sensor-fused 

munitions; and cyberspace, space, and information related capabilities. Cross-domain fires 

include the ISR capabilities required to employ them, which can comprise a mixture of organic 

capabilities and access to external assets. Cross-domain fires combine with necessary 

advancements in mobility and lethality in future air and ground platforms, communications 

networks, and data processing (speed and volume) to provide the capabilities for cross-domain 

maneuver. 

 (3) Maximize human potential. The Army builds and sustains multi-domain formations 

through the selection, training, and education of the leaders and Soldiers in them. Advances in 

 28 Independent maneuver is operating dispersed for an extended period without continuous [or contiguous] support from higher echelons while 

retaining the ability to concentrate combat power rapidly at decisive spaces by employing cross-domain fires and maneuver to achieve mission 

objectives within the intent of the theater campaign.
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performance science enable Soldiers and junior leaders to enter operations at peak cognitive, 

physical, and emotional potential. Biotechnical sensors monitoring the status and changes in 

human performance augment commanders’ understanding of their units, inform decisions about 

the tempo and intensity of operations, and assist units in sustaining and regenerating physical and 

psychological strength. Man-machine interfaces, enabled by artificial intelligence and highspeed data processing, improve human decision making in both speed and accuracy. Employing 

multi-domain capabilities requires the Army to attract, train, retain, and employ leaders and 

Soldiers who collectively possess a significant breadth and depth of technical and professional 

expertise. The Army must exercise careful talent management to make the most of these highquality personnel and integrate them into trusted teams of professionals who are able to thrive in 

ambiguity and chaos. Improving the resilience of leaders and Soldiers—the Army’s most 

valuable capability—requires training, educating, equipping, and supporting them to execute 

MDO in all of its intensity, rigor, and complexity.

 d. Convergence. Convergence is the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all 

domains, the EMS, and the information environment that optimizes effects to overmatch the 

enemy through cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission 

command and disciplined initiative. The Joint Force currently converges capabilities through 

episodic synchronization of domain-federated solutions. Future operations against a near-peer 

threat, however, will require the Joint Force to conduct continuous and rapid integration of multidomain capabilities to gain cross-domain overmatch at decisive spaces. Decisive spaces are 

locations in time and space (physical, virtual, and cognitive) where the full optimization of the 

employment of cross-domain capabilities generates a marked advantage over an enemy and 

greatly influences the outcome of an operation. Convergence complicates the enemy’s attempts 

to conceal and defend its center of gravity by providing the Joint Force with multiple options for 

attacking the enemy’s vulnerabilities at decisive spaces. Multi-domain formations, at echelon, 

utilize convergence during competition and conflict to apply capabilities against vulnerabilities 

in an adversary’s or enemy’s systems. 

 (1) Convergence has two advantages over single-domain alternatives: the creation of 

cross-domain synergy and the layering of options across domains to enhance friendly operations 

and impose complexity on the enemy. Through convergence, multi-domain capabilities are 

brought together in stimulate-see-strike or see-strike combinations that disrupt, degrade, destroy,

or dis-integrate enemy systems or create windows of superiority to enable friendly exploitation 

of the initiative. 

 (a) Cross-domain synergy.28F

29 The principle of cross-domain synergy is an evolution of 

combined arms maneuver. The combination of complementary effects complicates an enemy’s 

ability to act, producing an overall effect greater than the sum of the individual parts (see figure 

3-2). Synergy optimizes capabilities from across all domains, the EMS, and the information 

environment to achieve the maximum effect from the available resources. Against a near-peer 

enemy, the Joint Force will not have sufficient capacity to achieve overmatch without crossdomain synergy. 

 29 Cross-domain synergy is an idea introduced in the Joint Operational Access Concept and continued as a key idea in the Capstone Concept for 

Joint Operations. It is defined as the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each 

enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will 

provide the freedom of action required by the mission.
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Figure 3-2. Converging capabilities to generate cross-domain synergy and layered options 

 (b) Layered options. The layering of multiple forms of convergence provides friendly 

commanders with options and imposes complexity on the enemy (see figure 3-2). The creation 

of additional options makes it easier for friendly forces to target enemy vulnerabilities in 

unexpected ways and avoids dependence on a single method of seeing or striking. Layered 

options also confront the enemy with an array of different threats to which it must respond. So 

long as those convergence combinations are relatively simple for friendly forces to execute, the 

result is a net imposition of complexity upon enemy command and control systems. 

 (2) Mission command. Mission command remains an essential element of Army 

operations on a contested battlefield against a near-peer enemy. Since the enemy will disrupt 

friendly communications and plans, mission command must expand to enable initiative and 

dynamic cooperation across Service and other partner lines—at some risk—to allow the Joint 

Force to preserve the ability to continuously and rapidly integrate multi-domain capabilities 

despite disrupted communications. One manifestation of mission command is intent-based 

synergy, the dynamic cooperation that enables the sufficient integration of available crossdomain capabilities to achieve dominant or essential effects at a decisive space, acknowledging

some degree of risk or collateral cost. Commanders must deliberately create and foster

conditions favorable to mission command so that ever disparate formations and capabilities are

ready to act upon mutual recognition of an opportunity or in response to a battlefield 

development.
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 (3) Convergence at echelon. Multi-domain formations and calibrated force posture enable 

convergence. The principles of convergence apply across echelons, but vary based on specific 

requirements.

 (a) Theater army. Theater armies are forward presence forces. They enable 

interagency access, set the theater, enable expeditionary maneuver, and protect joint bases, 

nodes, and networks. Theater armies set the conditions for operational and tactical convergence 

by calibrating force posture with Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and Headquarters, 

Department of the Army to ensure that necessary joint and Army capabilities are in theater or can 

be accessed when and where needed to deter or defeat aggression. Theater armies converge 

offensive space control capabilities on behalf of all Army forces in theater. Theater armies are 

also the main Army echelon converging capabilities to support joint and combined information 

environment operations.

 (b) Field army. Field armies are forward presence forces in regions that have near-peer 

threats. They relieve the operational burden on theater armies to facilitate focused opposition 

toward that specific threat within a distinct area of operations. They prosecute the campaign in 

competition by conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), enabling partners and 

SOF, deterring the adversary’s aggression, and managing the transition to conflict. They have 

the ability to command two or more corps. The field army provides long-range fires to other 

component commanders against enemy long-range systems. In competition, the field army 

oversees deception, the selective demonstration of capabilities, and the masking of others to 

create uncertainty and deter an adversary’s aggression. The field army also creates options for 

convergence through focused planning and preparation for multi-domain interoperability with 

partners. The field army converges capabilities to destroy enemy long-range ground fires and, if 

no corps headquarters is present during the transition to armed conflict, will assist with the 

targeting and neutralization of mid-range systems. In competition and conflict, the field army is 

the Army echelon responsible for converging national-level capabilities into its or subordinate 

echelons’ maneuver. In competition and conflict, the field army is responsible for analyzing

high-volume data from national and theater intelligence collection assets, and linking sensors to 

specific shooters in support of operational ground objectives. Intelligence enabling formations at 

the field army level will be task organized and tailored to the operational environment.

 (c) Corps. Corps are expeditionary forces. The corps shapes multiple enemy combined 

arms armies simultaneously by assisting with the defeat of long-range systems and the 

neutralization of mid-range systems. The corps also commands two or more divisions and 

enablers. It is responsible for converging capabilities against all enemy long-range systems (air 

defense, anti-ship, and long-range ground fires) within areas designated by the Joint Force 

Commander and providing Army capabilities to assist other components when the corps is

responsible for multi-domain command and control. A corps converges capabilities against 

enemy mid-range fires formations within its areas of operations. The corps is the Army echelon 

responsible for converging large amounts of joint fires, whether against enemy mid-range 

systems or in support of division or brigade maneuver. The corps also converges national- and 

theater-level offensive cyberspace with other capabilities to achieve operational and tactical 

objectives. The corps creates conditions for convergence at lower echelons by allocating 

resources, sequencing division maneuver, and incorporating it with deception. In competition 
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and conflict, a corps conducts intelligence analysis to converge national, theater, and organic ISR 

collection to support tactical ground objectives.

 (d) Division. Divisions can be either forward presence or expeditionary forces. A 

division enables independent maneuver, conducts expeditionary maneuver, commands multiple 

brigade combat teams and enabling brigades, and defeats a shaped enemy army in the Close 

Area. It converges aviation, fires, EW, maneuver support, and multi-brigade maneuver to 

achieve positions of advantage against a combined arms army (or similar formation) that has had 

its mid-range fires systems destroyed or neutralized. The division has the multi-domain 

command and control capacity to incorporate some reinforcing joint or Army fires when it is a 

secondary effort. A division that is the main effort and has been allocated a large number of air 

sorties, a significant amount of naval strikes, or several brigades of reinforcing ground fires 

requires assistance from the corps to converge capabilities on that scale. With assistance from 

higher echelons, the division can converge national-level and offensive space capabilities into its 

scheme of maneuver. A division has the analytical capacity to converge limited amounts of 

national- or theater-level intelligence sources with its organic ISR.

 (e) Brigade.29F

30 Brigades converge organic ISR, maneuver, and fires capabilities with 

limited amounts of available aviation, maneuver support, EW, joint fires, and offensive space

capabilities. All brigades are multi-domain capable, yet those responsible for controlling terrain

require high levels of cross-domain organic capabilities to create the convergence that enables

their broader task sets. Brigades habitually access intelligence, EW, cyberspace, and space 

capabilities through the division, corps, and field army as described above. Brigades execute 

convergence and cross-domain maneuver to see, isolate, maneuver, and/or protect to exploit the 

initiative and achieve positions of advantage to accomplish their missions. A brigade has the 

analytical capacity to converge limited amounts of national- or theater-level intelligence sources 

with its organic ISR.

 e. Multi-domain command and control. Interoperability across Service, interagency, and 

multinational partners is a key element to executing MDO. Multi-domain command and control

is the combination of joint and combined materiel, processes, and authorities that underpin

convergence, multi-domain formations, and mission command designed to enable and exploit 

interoperability.30F

31 Effective multi-domain command and control requires a resilient technical 

architecture, flexible command relationships, and multi-domain control measures. A resilient 

technical architecture provides connectivity to pass critical information between headquarters, 

units, aircraft, or ships at critical moments in operations. Flexible command relationships allow 

the rapid reallocation of multi-domain capabilities and formations across functional components 

and echelons to achieve convergence. Flexible command relationships also allow the creation of 

favorable force ratios through rapid task organization and re-organization of reinforcing fires and 

capabilities among echelons. Multi-domain control measures create the framework for mission 

command by allowing units the greatest possible latitude to execute cross-domain maneuver 

within intent. Multi-domain control measures also facilitate coordination between echelons, 

 30 This includes all types of brigade-level formations, not only Brigade Combat Teams. 31 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Joint Publication 01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, describes the three dimensions of joint and allied 

interoperability – technical (e.g., hardware, systems) procedural (e.g., doctrines, procedures), and human (e.g., language, terminology, and 

training). These directly align to the technical architecture, control measures, and command relationships in multi-domain command and control.
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adjacent units, and joint partners. When technical architecture is disrupted, flexible command 

relationships and multi-domain control measures are the enabling elements of mission command. 

3-4. MDO and strategic objectives

 a. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations is an operational-level military concept 

designed to achieve U.S. strategic objectives articulated in the National Defense Strategy, 

specifically deterring and defeating China and Russia in competition and conflict.31F

32 The concept 

also supports execution of the Army’s four enduring strategic roles: prevent conflict, shape the 

security environment, prevail in large-scale ground combat operations, and consolidate gains. 

These strategic objectives require Army forces to solve the five multi-domain problems 

described in section 3-1. The following sections describe how MDO solves each of these 

problems. Section 3-5 addresses the first problem of competing to defeat aggression short of 

armed conflict and to deter conflict. Section 3-6 addresses the second problem of penetrating 

enemy anti-access and area denial systems to enable strategic and operational maneuver in 

conflict. Section 3-7 addresses the third problems of dis-integrating enemy’s anti-access and 

area denial systems in theater to enable operational and tactical maneuver. Section 3-8 addresses 

the fourth problem of exploiting freedom of maneuver to defeat the enemy and achieve U.S. 

strategic objectives. Section 3-9 addresses the final problem of re-competing to consolidate 

gains and expand the competitive space and enable policymakers to resolve the conflict. The 

remainder of this section describes how solving these operational problems leads to the 

attainment of strategic objectives.

 b. A multi-domain capable Joint Force can achieve friendly strategic objectives (win) and 

defeat the adversary in three different ways. The preferred method of attaining strategic 

objectives is effective competition that deters escalation and defeats adversaries’ destabilization 

efforts. If deterrence fails, the second method is to employ a combination of forward presence 

and expeditionary forces to deny enemy objectives within days and achieve an operational 

position of relative advantage within weeks that leads to an acceptable, sustainable political 

outcome. If neither side is able to achieve its objectives in a short conflict, the third method is to 

defeat the enemy in a protracted war. The three methods are interrelated as the will and 

capability to win a long war, if necessary, is an essential element to convincing an adversary that 

it cannot achieve a fait accompli and will not achieve aims in competition below armed conflict. 

The demonstrated ability and readiness to deny a fait accompli attack, in turn, creates a position 

of strength for the Joint Force in competition. The Army is essential in each of the three ways to 

defeat an aggressive adversary and provide political leaders with as many options as possible to 

deter through determined competition or, when necessary, prosecute and end an armed conflict

on favorable conditions before returning rapidly to a renewed competition. 

 c. Compete. The Joint Force succeeds in competition by defeating the adversary’s efforts to 

achieve their strategic goals and deterring military escalation; it does this by expanding the 

competitive space for policymakers through multiple options for employing the elements of 

 32 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American 

Military’s Competitive Edge, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
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national power.32F

33 Army forces play an integral role in this effort, actively engaging across 

domains (including space and cyberspace), in the EMS, and in the information space. The 

demonstrated capability to prevail in competition and in conflict counters adversaries’ narratives 

that portray the U.S. as a weak or irresolute partner. The combination of the ability to both 

effectively compete below armed conflict and to respond to an escalation toward armed conflict 

creates a position of strength and sets favorable conditions if conflict ensues. This position of 

strength provides a favorable environment for Joint Force, interagency, and partner efforts to 

counter adversaries’ coercion through unconventional and information warfare. The adversary’s 

proxies receive little or no support from its conventional forces, which allows U.S. partners to 

counter attempts to destabilize their countries more easily. The combined and persistent effects 

of deterring armed conflict and defeating unconventional and information warfare in a campaign 

of competition create unpredictability for the adversary and generate additional friendly options, 

thereby expanding the competitive space for policymakers. 

 d. Penetrate, dis-integrate, and exploit. In the event of armed conflict, Army forward 

presence and expeditionary forces enable the rapid defeat of aggression through a combination of 

calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence to immediately contest an 

enemy attack in depth. Army long-range fires converge with joint multi-domain capabilities to 

penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems to enable Joint Force 

freedom of strategic and operational maneuver. Within the theater, Army forces converge 

capabilities to optimize the employment of capabilities from across multiple domains against 

critical components of the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems, specifically long-range 

air defense and fires systems. Convergence against the enemy’s long-range systems enables the 

initial penetration. This sets the conditions for a quick transition to joint air-ground operations in 

which maneuver enables strike and strike enables maneuver. MDO in the Close and Deep Areas 

combine fires, maneuver, and deception to dislocate the enemy defense by physically, virtually, 

and cognitively isolating its subordinate elements, thereby allowing friendly forces to achieve 

local superiority and favorable force ratios. Army forces, having penetrated and begun the disintegration of the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems, exploit vulnerable enemy units 

and systems to defeat enemy forces and achieve friendly campaign objectives. As part of the 

Joint Force, Army forces rapidly achieve given strategic objectives (win) and consolidate gains. 

 33 Expanding the competitive space entails those activities, short of war, that integrate multiple elements of national power to counter the longterm strategic objectives of adversaries. A more lethal force, strong alliances and partnerships, American technological innovation, and a culture 

of performance generate decisive and sustained U.S. advantages. See, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 

America, 4.
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Figure 3-3. MDO solutions

 e. Re-compete. Army forces contribute to the consolidation of strategic gains after a conflict 

by securing the initiative and maintaining operational contact in all domains, the EMS, and the

information environment. This approach ensures that military and political conditions remain 

favorable to the U.S. and its partners. Particularly following an armed conflict with a nuclear 

power, the enemy will retain significant conventional military capability in the field. Army 

forces, therefore, have to simultaneously deter a return to conventional warfare and assist partner 

forces in restoring order to prevent the enemy from exploiting the internal disruption for strategic 

advantage.33F

34 These functions spanning the competition continuum expand the competitive space 

for policymakers, enable strategic objectives, and secure the initiative.34F

35

 34 In most cases, the Army will be required to execute tasks to restore order and support partner’s political, economic, and social structure 

recovery (per FM 3-07 Stability) because civilian agencies lack the capacity or capability to do this in a combat zone. 35 The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning proposes the notion of a competition continuum that offers an alternative to the obsolete 

peace/war binary with a new model of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. These are not mutually exclusive 

conditions and various states of relationships with other actors can exist concurrently. This concept focuses on conditions of competition and 

armed conflict.
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3-5. MDO in competition: Compete to expand the competitive space

 a. Multi-domain problem #1: How does the Joint Force compete to defeat an adversary’s 

operations to destabilize the region, deter the escalation of violence, and, should violence 

escalate, enable a rapid transition to armed conflict?

Figure 3-4. Competition

 b. Success in competition achieves three critical objectives: deterring conflict on terms 

favorable to the U.S., countering adversaries’ efforts to expand the competitive space below the 

threshold of armed conflict, and enabling the rapid transition to armed conflict. In the past, the 

U.S. military—due to cultural, statutory, and policy reasons—has often remained reactive in 

competition below armed conflict. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations concept 

emphasizes the importance of active engagement by the Joint Force, and particularly the Army, 

in competition to defend U.S. interests, deter conflict, and, when needed, create the most 

favorable conditions for the Joint Force’s rapid transition to armed conflict. 

 c. The Army competes successfully, as part of a joint, interagency, and multinational team, by 

defeating the adversary’s attempts to destabilize regional security and by deterring armed 

conflict through a series of mutually reinforcing actions. The field army conducts detailed 

tactical and operational intelligence preparation of the battlefield to enable forward presence and 
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expeditionary forces to immediately defeat a surprise attack by the adversary. In conjunction 

with partners and the Joint Force, Army forces counter the adversary’s reconnaissance and 

conduct deception to create uncertainty within an adversary’s decision making process. Forward 

presence forces also contribute to the defeat of the adversary’s unconventional warfare

campaign, both directly and indirectly, both by enabling partners with advisors and capabilities 

and by building enduring partner capability and capacity. These formations, enabled by the 

necessary authorities, actively engage in the information space through a variety of means, 

including cyberspace and EMS capabilities. Finally, both the theater and field army conduct 

intensive preparations for conventional warfare to demonstrate a credible deterrent. The theater

army sets the theater to enable the dynamic employment of the Joint Force. The field army “sets 

the campaign” to ensure the Joint Force and partners can rapidly transition from competition to 

conflict. 

 d. Conduct intelligence and counter adversary reconnaissance. In competition, the field 

army coordinates collection against and analysis of the adversary’s operational and tactical 

systems, as well as other facets of the operational environment and civil networks. 

Subsequently, the field army disseminates information to allocated joint and Army expeditionary 

forces to familiarize them with the adversary’s systems and likely areas of joint and Army 

operations. The field army also has the primary responsibility for countering the adversary’s 

reconnaissance through counter-reconnaissance and deception. Collectively, these actions 

enable the Joint Force to rapidly transition to armed conflict and create uncertainty for the 

adversary as to whether it can achieve its objectives through a surprise attack.

 (1) Develop understanding of military capabilities. The complexity of modern military 

equipment requires months or years of focused intelligence collection and analysis to identify 

and exploit tactical or technical weaknesses. The field army works primarily with theater- and 

national-level capabilities to develop a detailed understanding of the adversary’s command and 

control and long-range (IADS, SRBM, and long-range MRL) and mid-range systems (mid-range 

SAM, MRL, and cannon artillery). When the adversary’s forces conduct maneuvers or “snap 

exercises” near territory of U.S. partners, the field army deploys organic and allocated ISR (e.g., 

airborne ISR, high-altitude ISR balloons, and electronic intelligence capabilities) to refine 

technical intelligence and to understand the adversary’s operational patterns and methods of 

employment by specific unit and capability. The field army also seeks to create intelligence 

collection opportunities by leveraging training and reassurance operations in partner territory 

adjacent to an adversary to stimulate and analyze enemy ISR capabilities. 

 (2) Analyze operational environment and civil networks. All echelons of forward 

presence forces conduct terrain analysis and familiarization of friendly territory threatened by an 

adversary. This effort builds the necessary information that allows the Joint Force Commander 

to visualize the three-dimensional, multi-domain environment at a level of detail for tactical 

execution and operational planning. Dense urban terrain requires additional preparatory 

intelligence activities to understand the human, social, and infrastructure details. The field army 

focuses IPB on select urban areas that are likely to be of critical of strategic and operational 

importance in conflict. 
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 (3) Conduct deception. In competition, the theater and field armies conduct deception 

primarily through dynamic changes to calibrated force posture. These actions seek to complicate 

the adversary’s efforts to determine the capability and capacity of friendly forces in theater. 

While exercises, training, and alerts are designed to demonstrate specific capabilities, they also 

provide opportunities to mislead the adversary regarding the disposition and staging of forces, 

use of the EMS and cyberspace signatures, and patterns and methods of employment. These 

actions create unpredictability and complicate the adversary’s reconnaissance efforts, which 

increases the likelihood of compromising its assets. The theater army also employs data 

encryption, network access limitations, and decoy data to defeat the adversary’s cyber 

reconnaissance. 

 (4) Execute counter-reconnaissance. The field army conducts and coordinates counterreconnaissance operations principally through partner security forces and interagency partners. 

Partner security forces generally possess the authorities, capacity, and local expertise to counter 

the enemy’s covert intelligence efforts. The primary role of the field army, therefore, is to assist 

partner security forces with counter-reconnaissance operations. These actions reduce the tactical 

effectiveness of an adversary’s efforts in competition and their ability to transition rapidly from 

competition to armed conflict. 

 e. Enable defeat of the adversary’s information and unconventional warfare. Army 

forces support joint and partner campaigns to defeat the adversary’s information and 

unconventional warfare operations through the provision of capabilities, expanded authorities,

and the conduct of supporting operations.

 (1) Conduct information environment operations (IEO). The Joint Force seizes the 

initiative in competition by actively engaging in the information space across domains (to 

include cyberspace) and the EMS. The theater army converges Army actions and messaging in 

support of the Joint Force Commander’s IEO, though all echelons engage in the information 

space in support of policy and commander’s intent. To accomplish this mission, subordinate 

echelons must be enabled with access to intelligence, cyberspace, and EMS capabilities; 

appropriate authorities and permissions normally reserved for conflict or at higher echelons; and 

policy guidance expressed as intent rather than narrow, restrictive directives. This allows 

forward presence forces to aggressively take tailored actions and employ messages to counter 

and expose inconsistencies in the adversary’s information warfare operations. The Army 

primarily contributes to the strategic narrative, however, by reinforcing the resolve and 

commitment of the U.S. to its partner and demonstrating its capabilities as a credible deterrent to 

conflict. 

 (2) Conduct irregular warfare.35F

36 The theater and field armies enable joint, interagency, 

and partner irregular warfare campaigns by providing multi-domain formations with regional 

understanding to the Joint Force Commander. When an adversary employs proxies, Army forces 

defeat them principally through the indirect enabling of partners, but can support directly through 

unilateral action. Special operations forces and security force assistance brigades support partner 

 36 Irregular warfare is comprised of five core activities: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, 

and stability operations. 
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30

irregular warfare efforts both by building enduring partner capacity and by enabling them with 

advisors and capabilities.

 f. Demonstrate credible deterrent. By shaping the entire theater and addressing aggression 

outside the field army’s area of operations, the theater army allows the field army to set the 

campaign against a near-peer adversary’s military formations and stand-off capabilities. To 

provide a credible deterrent, the field army calibrates force posture to reduce an adversary’s local 

military superiority, employs multi-domain formations to withstand a surprise attack, and 

demonstrates the ability to converge forward presence, joint, and national-level capabilities to 

disrupt any surprise attack. Specifically, Army forces must demonstrate four capabilities in 

competition to deter the adversary.

 (1) Ability to immediately deny a fait accompli attack. The field army must be able to 

deny an enemy fait accompli attack within weeks by employing a mixture of forward presence, 

expeditionary (air deployed assets/formations and prepositioned equipment), and national-level 

forces. 

 (2) Ability to penetrate anti-access and area denial systems. Forward presence Army

long-range fires must enable the Joint Force to immediately begin neutralizing enemy long-range 

systems (IADS, SRBM, long-range MRL, and command and control) and have munitions 

stockpiles in theater sufficient to support operations for several weeks. 

 (3) Ability to conduct strategic and operational maneuver. Army expeditionary forces 

must build and demonstrate the ability to conduct strategic and operational maneuver into an area 

of operations despite contested lines of communications.

 (4) Ability to support MDO. Army forces have to calibrate force posture and field multidomain formations to facilitate the Joint Force to dictate and sustain operational tempo in 

conflict. To credibly accomplish these tasks, the theater and field army establish command and 

control mechanisms, ensure interoperability, and sustain and protect forward presence forces. 

 (a) Establish command and control mechanisms. In competition, the field army 

prepares to converge lethal and nonlethal effects from the beginning of a conflict by planning 

with forward presence forces, other elements of the Joint Force, and partners. This preparation 

includes developing the necessary multi-domain command and control architectures, flexible 

command relationships, and physical and virtual control measures for converging capabilities. 

Precise and integrated effects are critical to operations in dense urban terrain, but also facilitate

operations in other environments, particularly chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

(CBRN) impacted zones.

 (b) Ensure interoperability. Forward presence forces must be fully interoperable with 

the remainder of the Joint Force and, to the greatest extent possible, with multinational partners 

and relevant interagency partners. If a low degree of interoperability exists with a partner, Army 

forces integrate MDO through an array of doctrinal or ad hoc organizational methods, such as 

liaison cells. Increasing interoperability builds capacity and expands the range of options for the 

Joint Force Commander. 
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 (c) Sustain and protect forward presence forces. The theater army ensures the 

Operational Support Area has the capacity, capability, and endurance to sustain and generate 

force despite the adversary’s long-range fires (ballistic and cruise missiles, special operations, 

offensive space, and cyber attacks). The field army ensures the Tactical Support Area and Close 

Area possess the multi-domain formations needed to sustain and generate force despite the 

adversary’s ballistic missiles, long-range MRLs, air defenses, and cyber attacks. The theater 

army creates resilience through the protection, hardening, and dispersal of key command, 

control, and logistics nodes. It also plans and coordinates for multiple sea and air ports of entry 

and lines of communication throughout the Operational and Tactical Support Areas. 

 g. Conclusion: MDO in competition. Army forces, as part of the Joint Force, compete with 

a near-peer adversary by defeating their operations below the threshold of armed conflict and 

deterring an escalation of violence. Army forces at all echelons support U.S. policy and

objectives through proactive engagement in the information space, and are in turn enabled by 

delegated authorities and permissions, intent-based guidance, and access to joint and nationallevel capabilities in intelligence, cyberspace, and the EMS. The friendly information narrative is 

supported by the demonstrated capability to deny a fait accompli attack and an adversary’s 

operational objectives. Demonstrated capabilities in competition undermine the adversary’s 

information warfare operations and generate complexity and uncertainty in their decision making 

process. Most importantly, active engagement in competition establishes a robust operational 

assessment of the adversary’s forces and capabilities and sets the campaign to ensure the Joint 

Force can rapidly transition to armed conflict and immediately provide an offensive response to 

aggression. 

The three subsequent sections detail actions to penetrate stand-off, dis-integrate anti-access 

and area denial systems, and exploit the resulting freedom of action and maneuver. Although 

presented sequentially, each section’s actions overlap in time and space to varying degrees. 

Because near-peer enemies have the ability to adapt, reorganize, and reconstitute their systems 

and formations, friendly forces continue penetration and dis-integration concurrent to 

maneuver to fully exploit windows of superiority.
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3-6. MDO in armed conflict: Penetrate strategic and operational stand-off

 a. Multi-domain problem #2: How does the Joint Force penetrate enemy anti-access and area 

denial systems throughout the depth of the operational framework to enable strategic and 

operational maneuver? 

Figure 3-5. Penetrate and dis-integrate anti-access and area denial systems; exploit 

freedom of maneuver

 b. The Joint Force utilizes the active engagement in competition to enable the penetration of 

strategic and operational stand-off by immediately neutralizing the enemy’s long-range systems, 

contesting enemy maneuver forces in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment, 

and conducting strategic and operational maneuver. The neutralization of enemy long-range 

systems enables strategic and operational maneuver by reducing the threat to friendly lines of 

communications. Simultaneously, forward presence forces begin the defeat of enemy stand-off 

“from the inside” by operating within the range of enemy long- and mid-range systems. 

Together, these efforts effectively contest the enemy’s attack; enable greater freedom to 

maneuver elements of the Joint Force from strategic and operational distances into the area of 

operations; and enable the dis-integration of the enemy’s long- and mid-range systems in 

decisive spaces. 
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33

 c. Neutralize enemy-long-range systems. Benefiting from extensive preparations during the 

competition period, forward positioned Army fires and air defense forces immediately begin 

neutralizing the enemy’s long-range anti-access and area denial systems (ballistic and cruise 

missiles, long-range IADS) during the transition to armed conflict. 

 (1) The field army and corps employ long-range fires elements and integrate joint and 

combined capabilities to neutralize the enemy’s long-range systems. Fires formations at those 

echelons provide responsive cross-domain fires to the Joint Force Commander into the Close, 

Deep Maneuver, and Operational Deep Fires Areas. In combination with other multi-domain 

capabilities, these fires begin to neutralize the enemy’s integrated air defense and long-range 

fires systems. They accomplish this by receiving targeting information for high-priority enemy 

long-range systems from space- and high-altitude-based surveillance or low-observable air 

platforms, and striking those high-payoff targets within minutes (paragraphs 3-7.d and 3-7.e 

provide a more detailed description of how the enemy’s long-range systems are identified and 

attacked).

 (2) Ground-based long-range fires provide redundant strike options to the Joint Force, 

posing dilemmas for the enemy in multiple ways. Long-range ground fires offer a responsive 

strike capability (cued by intelligence within minutes), with the capacity to overwhelm point 

defenses and strike targets over larger areas. Long-range ground fires complicate enemy 

defenses by forcing the enemy to react to multiple forms of attack simultaneously against a 

number of different systems for which it does not have an effective counter. The Army’s 

contribution of highly mobile and dispersed long-range fires systems also complicates the 

enemy’s counterfire, reconnaissance, and targeting. By combining Army long-range fires with 

other multi-domain capabilities, the Joint Force increases the speed and scale of its efforts to 

neutralize the enemy’s long-range systems. 

 d. Contest enemy maneuver forces. Forward positioned forces immediately contest the 

enemy attack by enemy maneuver forces. Depending on force posture and the amount of 

intelligence and warning, forward presence forces in the Close Area could vary in strength from 

a single brigade to an entire division of forward deployed, rotational, and expeditionary forces 

deployed by air prior to the conflict. When attacked, forward presence forces in the Close Area 

(partner territory that the enemy is attempting to seize), in concert with partner forces, impose 

losses on the enemy to delay its achievement of campaign objectives and consolidation of gains.

Forward presence Army forces and partners employ layered ISR, both organic and joint, to 

develop an understanding of the enemy’s attack and their capabilities. They also build on the 

counter-reconnaissance activities executed in competition to rapidly degrade enemy intelligence 

in the Close Area. The Joint Force Commander employs joint fires and national-level 

capabilities to assist forward presence forces denying enemy objectives in the Close Area and the

field army executes IEO contingency plans to rapidly seize the initiative in the information 

environment. 

 (1) See with layered ISR. U.S. and partner forces in the Close Area employ a layered ISR 

network to determine the disposition of enemy forces. The layered ISR network provides 

redundancy against the enemy’s ability to contest friendly ISR assets and facilitates layered 

collection and dissemination. 
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34

 (a) Layered collection plan. Forward presence divisions and brigades employ their 

organic ground reconnaissance and UAS to develop the immediate tactical situation. The field 

army primarily relies on organic high-altitude surveillance and joint ISR capabilities deployed 

from the forward edge of the Tactical Support Area, supplemented by low-observable manned 

and unmanned aircraft, space surveillance, and cyberspace intelligence. The field army also 

utilizes an existing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance network developed with 

partners during competition that consists of overlapping systems of remote and autonomous 

sensors, human intelligence, and friendly special operations forces. 

 (b) Processing and dissemination. The field army uses standard and non-standard 

communications methods to rapidly process and disseminate intelligence to maneuver forces in 

the Close Area and to sustainment and protection forces in the Tactical Support Area. The field 

army analyzes the intelligence and disseminates time sensitive combat information to the 

division and the brigades using resilient, low-density data formats to mitigate significant enemy 

jamming and counter-communications attacks. The field army also establishes sensor-to-shooter 

links to enable cross-domain fires in support of subordinate operations.

 (2) Degrade enemy intelligence effectiveness in Close Area. Forward presence forces 

and partners target enemy intelligence capabilities to complicate the enemy’s collection plan and 

force the reallocation of assets at multiple levels. The division and the brigades degrade enemy 

tactical ISR through a combination of air defense against manned and unmanned aerial ISR, 

camouflage, and decoys. Tactical deception plans complicate the enemy’s intelligence collection 

and may force the enemy to adjust their ground attack. The theater army coordinates with the 

division and the brigades for active anti-space ISR measures to support maneuver forces at 

critical times and spaces. The degradation and reallocation of the enemy’s ISR capabilities in the 

Close Area cause the enemy to divert ISR resources from targeting friendly forces in the Support 

Areas, thereby enabling strategic and operational maneuver.

 (3) Deny enemy objectives. Forward presence maneuver forces and partner nation 

conventional forces use the advantages of the defense, particularly in dense urban terrain, to attrit

and slow enemy forces and enable the arrival of friendly expeditionary forces. Army forces 

leverage their preparation during competition to harden friendly urban areas to slow enemy 

advances and complicate its maneuver. The division and brigades employ organic cross-domain 

maneuver (primarily fires and air defense, as well as EW and aviation if a division is present) in 

conjunction with joint and Army multi-domain capabilities from the Support Areas (see next 

section) despite degraded communications. The field army assists the division and the brigades 

by shaping the fight in the Close Area through the accomplishment of three enabling tasks.

 (a) Converge joint fires from Support Areas and national-level capabilities. The 

field army (or corps) supports the division and brigades in the Close Area by contesting enemy 

maneuver forces with long-range fires and coordinating for joint multi-domain capabilities. The 

field army (or corps) identifies high-priority targets (IADS, SRBM, long-range MRL, and 

command and control) in the Close Area and either strikes the target or disseminates the 

information to the division or brigades for their own targeting. Theater and operational fires 

commands, employing long-range fires, are initially the primary means of striking high-priority 

targets within the Close Area from the Support Area. Attacking these high-priority targets 
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35

requires resilience in multi-domain command and control at each echelon, provided through 

redundant means of communications, flexible command relationships, and multi-domain control 

measures designed to withstand degraded communications. The field army (or corps) balances 

the enduring requirement to neutralize the enemy’s long-range fires with providing direct support 

to the division and brigades defending and executing maneuver in the Close Area.

 (b) Employ deception in the Close Area. The field army uses deception plans 

developed in competition to create tactical unpredictability for the enemy and prevent the full 

massing of enemy lethal and nonlethal effects in the Close Area. The deception plans also 

present the enemy with mixtures of real, exaggerated, and false capabilities, especially in 

cyberspace and the EMS. Divisions and brigades execute deception in the Close Area by having

multiple options to defend so even if the enemy gains access to U.S or partner planning, it must 

disperse reconnaissance assets among multiple possible locations of units, logistics, and multidomain command and control nodes. 

 (c) Contest the information environment. The Joint Force, through the field army,

immediately contests the information environment through the execution of IEO contingency 

plans with a credible, compelling message to bolster friendly political will and deny enemy 

information warfare objectives. These plans include prepared messages and methods of delivery 

based on anticipated wartime conditions, such as disruptions to civilian media and energy 

networks. Commanders in the Close Area exploit opportunities to take the initiative with images 

and messaging regarding friendly successes, particularly contesting the enemy advance and the 

rapid arrival of expeditionary forces, and disseminates it to the field army to shape public 

perception and reinforce the Joint Force Commander’s campaign in the information 

environment.

 e. Maneuver across strategic and operational distances. Executing maneuver across 

strategic and operational distances builds friendly combat power and sets the conditions for the 

dis-integration of the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems and the exploitation of the 

resulting freedom of maneuver. Army expeditionary forces use joint strategic transportation and 

prepositioned equipment to enter the theater at multiple points within days or weeks of the 

enemy’s attack. Joint forcible entry operations can be employed to open additional lines of 

operations or initial entry points to enable these actions. Forward presence forces and national 

assets degrade enemy long-range surveillance and reconnaissance to reduce the enemy’s 

effectiveness in attacking the lines of communications. In the area of operations, the theater and 

field army mitigate the effects of the enemy’s attack throughout the Support Areas by executing 

deception plans to further complicate the enemy’s ISR collection, protecting and hardening 

Army prepositioned stocks (APS), and conducting deployment and sustainment in dispersed 

formations along multiple routes. 

 (1) Degrade enemy long-range ISR. The theater and field armies have the responsibility 

to degrade the enemy’s long-range ISR systems targeting the Operational and Tactical Support 

Areas. In both areas, friendly forces defeat or degrade enemy long-range reconnaissance across 

all domains, the EMS, and the information environment. 
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36

 (a) Counter enemy SOF and human intelligence (HUMINT). Host nation 

counterintelligence, military, and internal security forces provide the primary means for 

countering enemy SOF and HUMINT networks in the Support Areas. The theater and field 

armies’ counterintelligence and HUMINT assets collaborate with the host nation to generate a 

threat intelligence assessment and provide intelligence and enablers such as aviation, signals 

intelligence, EW, and cyberspace assets, to enable host nation’s efforts. Security force assistance 

brigades, SOF, and civil affairs units also contribute to the strong relationships required to 

counter enemy SOF and HUMINT. 

 (b) Counter enemy space ISR. Prompt action by the theater army deprives the enemy 

of its primary means of long-range surveillance and significantly increases friendly survivability 

in the Operational Support Area. During the transition to armed conflict, the theater army 

provides offensive space and counter-space control for all ground forces in theater through either 

its organic capabilities or through coordination for joint capabilities. Although the theater army 

is the coordinating echelon, subordinate units down to brigade-level have responsibility to 

identify points in time and space that require the employment of necessary space capabilities to 

protect critical assets or movements. Proactively countering enemy space surveillance is 

particularly important in the Operational Support Area because the large number of potential 

targets spread across a wide geographic area that exceeds the capacity of enemy strategic 

reconnaissance and HUMINT. Effectively countering the enemy’s space ISR capabilities causes 

the enemy to either accept more risk with strategic reconnaissance forces or shift to commercial 

space surveillance. Both of these actions create exploitable vulnerabilities. 

 (c) Counter enemy cyber ISR. The theater and field armies direct cyberspace 

defensive teams to protect critical systems for sustaining and deploying forces in the Support 

Areas. This requires detailed knowledge of the theater’s networks, particularly its transportation 

and sustainment functions that have links to partner commercial, civilian, governmental, 

military, and coalition systems. Army forces counter the enemy’s cyber reconnaissance and 

attacks with deception and traps, creating confusion and multiple presentations of false friendly 

systems to probing enemy cyber teams. 

 (2) Mitigate effects of enemy attacks in the Support Areas. The theater and field armies 

mitigate the effects of enemy attacks in the Support Areas to enable the reception of 

expeditionary forces executing strategic and operational maneuver. Multi-domain forces in the 

Support Areas employ deception to cause the enemy to expend resources on decoys or targets 

that have moved; miss fleeting opportunities; or expend high-value capabilities on less important 

targets. APS are protected and hardened to allow the rapid integration of expeditionary forces 

and the generation of combat power. Army forces in the Support Areas build resilience and 

redundancy by dispersing critical deployment and sustainment capabilities in mixed clusters and 

gain residual protection from air and missile defense radars and launchers, aerial surveillance, 

and other specialized protection capabilities that they would otherwise not be allocated. 

 (a) Employ deception in Operational and Tactical Support Areas. The theater and 

field armies conduct deception to complicate enemy ISR in their respective areas. Similar to

deception in the Close Area, deception plans for the Support Areas employ multiples means to 

disperse enemy surveillance and reconnaissance and present a mixture of real, false, and 
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37

exaggerated capabilities to increase operational unpredictability. The friendly forces’ deception 

plan must be coherent across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment to 

effectively counter the enemy’s multi-domain reconnaissance.

 (b) Protect and harden Army prepositioned stocks (APS). APS sites are a critical 

component of calibrated force posture. Hardened APS sites provide protection, especially

against cruise missile attacks. The main defense for APS sites, however, is the ability to issue 

the equipment or supplies to expeditionary forces quickly, which requires maintaining stored 

equipment at high readiness levels, rehearsing rapid fielding procedures with designated 

expeditionary forces, and stockpiling of critical supplies and munitions to enable immediate 

employment in large-scale ground combat operations.

 (c) Disperse deployment and sustainment. The theater army executes deployment and 

sustainment along multiple, dispersed routes. Army expeditionary forces deploy from the 

homeland and other regions using joint strategic transportation and arrive at multiple points in 

theater, proceed forward along multiple routes, and then occupy dispersed tactical assembly 

areas within range of enemy anti-access and area denial systems. Aviation units employ split 

basing between the Tactical and Operational Support Areas, or in the case of division formations, 

between the Tactical Support and Close Areas. Aircraft and units rotate through a network of 

dispersed, austere locations in the Tactical Support and Close Areas. Sustainment draws on 

multiple sources for local procurement and prepositioned supplies, distributed through dispersed 

supply nodes operated by forward presence units. Intensive sustainment-level maintenance of 

aviation, ground and electronic combat systems, including battle damage assessment and repair 

is conducted within the Operational Support Area’s lower threat environment. The Army 

postures redundant sustainment infrastructure forward, plans and prepares precision logistics 

support, and ensures the availability of additional expeditionary capacity through proper balance 

across the Active and Reserve Components. 

 f. Conclusion: Penetrate. The Joint Force penetrates strategic and operational stand-off by 

immediately neutralizing the enemy’s long-range systems, contesting enemy maneuver forces in 

all domains, the EMS, and the information environment, and conducting strategic and 

operational maneuver. The key to penetration is the neutralization of the enemy’s long-range

systems in decisive spaces enabled by Army long-range fires. The neutralization of these 

systems creates conditions for friendly forces to contest the enemy attack in the Close Area and 

for expeditionary forces to conduct strategic maneuver into theater. This initial penetration 

denies enemy objectives, builds friendly combat power, and enables the corps to begin the disintegration of the enemy’s long-range systems (high-tier IADS, SRBMs, long-range MRLs) and 

mid-range systems (mid-tier IADS, standard MRLs, self-propelled artillery) in decisive spaces.

3-7. MDO in armed conflict: Dis-integrate the enemy’s anti-access and area denial 

systems

 a. Multi-domain problem #3: How does the Joint Force dis-integrate enemy anti-access and 

area denial systems in the Deep Areas to enable operational and tactical maneuver? 
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 b. Dis-integration of enemy anti-access and area denial systems requires the defeat of the 

enemy’s long-range systems, the neutralization of the enemy’s mid-range systems, and 

conducting operational maneuver to begin the dis-integration of the enemy’s mid-range systems. 

These actions do not constitute a discrete phase, but overlap with the execution of penetration 

(described in the previous section, 3-6) and exploitation (described in section 3-8). Essential to 

the dis-integration effort is continuous refinement of intelligence through multiple domains to 

enable the Joint Force to see or stimulate and strike the enemy’s remaining anti-access and area 

denial systems. This intelligence enables the field army’s defeat of enemy long-range systems, 

building on the neutralization that began in penetration. It also allows the corps to begin the 

initial neutralization of the mid-range systems (MRL and cannon artillery) to enable operational 

maneuver of friendly ground forces. Operational maneuver completes the dis-integration by 

stimulating the remaining enemy mid-range fires and fixing and isolating enemy maneuver 

formations, generating favorable force ratios for friendly maneuver forces. The resulting disintegration places maneuver forces in position to conduct rapid exploitation at decisive spaces 

and defeat the enemy. 

 c. Refine intelligence of enemy anti-access and area denial systems. Army forces provide 

the foundation of intelligence collection and analysis in the Close and Deep Maneuver Areas. 

The field army and corps continue to use the layered ISR network consisting of unmanned 

sensors, special operations forces, human intelligence, and high-altitude surveillance. Friendly 

intelligence collection focuses initially on locating the several dozen long-range systems of each

combined arms army that prevent friendly air and ground maneuver forces from closing with the 

enemy (mid-tier IADS, SRBM, and long-range MRL). As dis-integration operations continue, 

the focus shifts to identifying the most critical and vulnerable elements of the enemy’s mid-range 

systems. The enemy protects its critical systems with camouflage, concealment, and deception, 

so the field army and corps must converge multiple types of sensors to acquire targetable

intelligence. The key to converging capabilities across all domains, the EMS, and the 

information environment is high-volume analytical capability and sensor-to-shooter links 

enabled by artificial intelligence, which complicates enemy deception and obscuration through 

automatic cross-cueing and target recognition. The intelligence refinement required for disintegration depends on five interrelated systems.

 (1) Wide area surveillance. The field army and corps require persistent, wide-area 

surveillance throughout the depth of the battlefield that is responsive to operational and tactical 

intelligence demands. The enemy will attempt to degrade this capability through both active 

(jammers, dazzlers) and passive (decoys, camouflage) means. Persistent, wide-area surveillance, 

therefore, requires redundancy with a mixture of space-based and high-altitude systems to 

complicate enemy countermeasures. The field army and corps are the primary echelons for 

employing persistent, wide-area surveillance because they have the analytical capability and 

capacity, communications and data infrastructure, and authorities to process, exploit, and 

disseminate high-volume data. 

 (2) Penetrating reconnaissance. Fifth-generation fighters and other penetrating joint air 

reconnaissance provide responsive collection of targets cued by persistent, wide-area 

surveillance, which requires resilient communications with these aircraft and ground terminals to 

access the information for the field army and the corps. 
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 (3) Stand-off surveillance and reconnaissance. Joint and Army stand-off air surveillance 

and reconnaissance supplements the collection effort by focusing on signatures that identify 

high-priority enemy systems, particularly electronic intelligence for IADS, and rapidly 

processing and disseminating (within minutes) this intelligence to attack fleeting targets.

 (4) Expendable surveillance and reconnaissance. Joint and Army expendable 

surveillance and reconnaissance (low-cost UAS, artillery- and air-delivered unmanned sensors) 

refine target locations cued by other forms of intelligence and also provide a means to stimulate

enemy air defenses to allow collection by another sensor. 

 (5) Human networks. Special operations forces and their human intelligence networks 

provide intelligence about high-priority targets and disseminate this intelligence through nonstandard communications systems to SOF coordination teams at the field army and corps.

 d. Defeat enemy long-range fires systems. Army long-range fires formations in the field 

army’s theater fires command, reinforced by the corps’ operational fires command as required,

converge with other joint capabilities to destroy or suppress enemy long-range systems (SRBM, 

mid-tier IADS, anti-ship missiles, and long-range MRL). The field army, when given 

responsibility for multi-domain command and control against enemy long-range systems, 

converges both joint and Army capabilities into multiple see-strike or stimulate-see-strike 

combinations against enemy systems that target friendly air and ground forces. The more 

combinations of see-strike options the Joint Force presents, the more likely the enemy will 

conclude that it is impossible to counter or mitigate them all and slows its rate of fire to preserve 

its critical systems. This makes stimulating and seeing enemy systems more difficult, but 

achieves the larger effect of creating freedom of maneuver for the Joint Force. By causing the 

enemy to shift to a passive, cautious posture, friendly forces gain the operational initiative and 

begin the dis-integration of the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems.

 (1) Stimulate long-range fires systems. Stimulating enemy long-range systems (e.g., 

IADS radars) makes them visible for detection and destruction under tactical conditions 

favorable to the U.S. and partner forces. Army forces stimulate through deception or offensive 

action. Stimulation through deception employs decoys mimicking the signature of friendly 

aircraft, vehicles, or command nodes. Stimulation through offensive action uses cyberspace 

attacks in conjunction with maneuver and air, naval, or ground fires. Although many of the 

capabilities that stimulate enemy long-range systems are joint, the corps must possess the ability 

and authority to employ them when it commands and controls operations against enemy longrange systems.

 (2) See long-range fires systems. The primary method for identification of enemy longrange systems is wide-area, persistent space-based or high-altitude surveillance rapidly 

disseminating data to a field army or corps analysis cell employing artificial intelligence or other 

computer assistive technologies to analyze the high volume of data. This combination allows 

identification of high-priority targets on a “cluttered battlefield” filled with thousands of 

signatures from military and civilian sources and complicated by enemy attempts at camouflage, 

concealment, and deception. The alternate method of “seeing” is with fifth-generation fighters, 

cyber capabilities, SOF and HUMINT teams, or artillery- or air-delivered UAS sensors tipped to
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a location identified by another intelligence source that provided a reliable but low-fidelity 

location. Seeing enemy long-range systems in conjunction with stimulation requires a sensor 

tailored to the target and its expected reaction. For example, a counterbattery radar or a highaltitude ISR balloon with infrared sensors senses enemy long-range MRLs firing at a decoy 

friendly command post. Regardless of the sensor type, converging stimulation and sensing 

requires rapid analysis and dissemination (within minutes) because the enemy reaction offers 

only a brief window of superiority to exploit. 

 (3) Strike long-range fires systems. The Joint Force generates cross-domain synergy to 

overcome point defenses protecting enemy long-range systems. The main Army strike capability 

against enemy long-range systems is long-range precision fires (LRPF). It is the lowest cost, 

lowest risk, and most responsive method to attack enemy targets as they are identified in the 

Deep Maneuver and Deep Fires Areas. LRPF does not require suppression of enemy defenses 

for access, can be ready to fire in case the precise time of engagement is unknown, and can 

engage opportunity targets over large areas. LRPF, however, is best suited for attacking 

stationary targets due to its long time of flight. Naval strikes and stand-off air strikes (airlaunched cruise missiles and similar systems) have characteristics similar to LRPF. Fifthgeneration aircraft are the primary means of engaging moving targets or those with reliable but 

low-fidelity location data that the aircraft and pilot can improve. The Army’s persistent enabling 

of the Joint Force to stimulate, see, and strike the enemy’s long-range systems results in the 

initial key task in dis-integrating the anti-access and area denial systems. 

 e. Neutralize enemy mid-range fires systems. While the field army suppresses or defeats 

enemy long-range systems, the corps focuses on destroying enemy mid-range fires systems (selfpropelled artillery and standard MRLs).36F

37 This effort occurs simultaneously with the operational 

maneuver (next section), with the corps shifting resources between the two as necessary. The

corps’ operational fires command destroys enemy mid-range fires by converging multiple seestrike combinations of Army and joint capabilities. While the enemy has dozens of long-range 

systems in each combined arms army, they possess hundreds of mid-range systems. In 

comparison to the long-range systems, attacking the large quantity of mid-range systems requires 

simpler methods of convergence that can be executed more quickly and on a larger scale. Rather 

than stimulate individual enemy radars, batteries, or battalions through meticulously planned 

stimulate-see-strike combinations (as required for the long-range systems), the corps creates 

simpler, quickly repeatable see-strike combinations to neutralize the enemy’s mid-range systems. 

Presented with this approach, the enemy mid-range fires formations face a three-fold dilemma:

support their at-risk maneuver forces and risk destruction by U.S. fires; displace and risk 

detection and destruction; or remain inactive, thereby leaving their maneuver forces without 

support and risk eventually being outmaneuvered or isolated.

 (1) See mid-range fires systems. The corps employs multiple sensors to see enemy midrange systems, which cover a large area over the duration of the counterfire fight (several days). 

During such an extended period, the enemy will counter any single surveillance or 

reconnaissance method, so the corps must present a shifting array of multiple, layered sensors to 

complicate enemy counteractions. The corps’ primary system for identifying enemy mid-range 

fires systems before they engage is persistent, wide-area high-altitude or space-based 

 37 With the division fires command, the division also has the capability to conduct a counterfire fight against enemy mid-range systems.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

41

surveillance. The primary systems for identifying enemy fires as they engage friendly forces are 

counterbattery radars. Ground reconnaissance, unmanned and manned aerial systems, EW and 

signals intelligence units, SOF, space, and cyberspace reconnaissance forces augment these 

primary systems. In contrast with enemy long-range systems, which require the capacity to 

process a high-volume of data to find well-hidden but largely stationary targets, detecting midrange fires systems is easier—a battalion volley of MRL creates a large signature—but requires 

fast processing and decision to strike the target before it displaces.

 (2) Strike mid-range fires systems. The corps converges joint and Army capabilities 

against enemy mid-range fires systems. Destroying a large number of mobile systems requires 

simple, rapid forms of convergence, achieved by linking sensors directly to specific forms of 

strike. Air ISR cues air strike or ground fires; counterbattery radars and persistent, wide-area 

high-altitude surveillance cue ground fires; unmanned UAS cues attack aviation and ground 

fires. The ability of the corps to employ relatively simple air, space, and ground capabilities in 

layered combinations imposes greater complexity on enemy command and control systems 

without adding significant complexity to friendly actions. As friendly maneuver forces close 

within range of the mid-range systems, the division’s fires will contribute to these strike efforts, 

especially against enemy mid-range systems able to effect march objectives and decisive spaces.

 f. Conduct operational maneuver. Operational maneuver completes the dis-integration of 

the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems. The field army continues its defeat of the longrange systems, but transitions some capabilities to identifying high-value targets in the Close 

Area and either strikes them or rapidly disseminates the data to the corps to support their 

maneuver. The corps continues with its neutralization of mid-range systems and directs the 

division and brigades as they transit the Support Areas to the Close Area. The enemy will 

attempt to isolate and deny friendly maneuver forces support from adjacent units, multi-domain 

enablers, or higher echelons. Friendly maneuver forces, anticipating the implications of 

operating in such a contested environment, prepare to execute independent maneuver and 

practice intent-based synergy.

 (1) Operational maneuver ideally occurs following the defeat of the enemy’s long-range 

systems and the neutralization of the enemy’s mid-range systems. To protect these critical 

systems, however, the enemy may employ them in a passive, but opportunistic posture capable 

of engaging friendly maneuver forces at critical places in either time or space. The corps and 

division, therefore, may have to maneuver forces in the Close Area and threaten to seize key 

terrain or isolate enemy maneuver forces to stimulate the enemy’s mid-range systems. 

 (2) The corps and the division in the Close Area employ operational deception to fix enemy 

maneuver forces (a combined arms army or equivalent) and critical capabilities of their midrange systems. The corps and division employ physical and virtual deception to generate 

uncertainty in the enemy’s decision making, leaving forces or capabilities out of position or at a 

force ratio disadvantage relative to attacking friendly forces. Deception also prevents the enemy 

from gaining the full disposition of the friendly force and delays their recognition of decisive 

spaces. The corps also employs deception to stimulate the enemy mid-range system and enable 

its strike by multi-domain capabilities. 
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42

 g. Conclusion: Dis-integrate. Operational maneuver, successfully executed, capitalizes on 

the neutralization of the enemy’s mid-range systems to complete the dis-integration of the 

enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems in decisive spaces. It also sets conditions for 

tactical success in the Close and Deep Maneuver Area by bringing sufficient combat power with 

momentum to bear in decisive spaces, ready to exploit opportunities. The dis-integration of the 

enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems, however, is not a permanent condition. If given 

time, the enemy will regenerate the system through tactical adaptation, reorganization, and 

limited reconstitution. Because it is impossible to completely dis-integrate the entire anti-access 

and area denial capability of a near-peer enemy, commanders must exploit and enlarge windows 

of superiority to simultaneously complete the dis-integration of the enemy and further the 

exploitation of the resulting freedom of maneuver. 

3-8. MDO in armed conflict: Exploit freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy objectives

 a. Multi-domain problem #4: How does the Joint Force exploit freedom of maneuver to 

achieve strategic and operational objectives through the defeat of the enemy in the Close and 

Deep Maneuver Areas?

 b. The Joint Force exploits the freedom of maneuver generated by dis-integrating the enemy’s 

anti-access and area denial systems to defeat the enemy’s mid-range systems, neutralize its shortrange systems, and isolate and defeat enemy land forces through maneuver. Exploitation and 

maneuver sustains the penetration and dis-integration of the enemy’s systems and enables the 

achievement of strategic objectives. The conditions for exploitation are achieved through MDO

focused at decisive spaces. Army forces optimize the employment of multi-domain capabilities 

at decisive spaces and maneuver to dislocate the enemy’s defense by physically, cognitively, and 

virtually isolating its subordinate elements, allowing friendly forces to achieve favorable force 

ratios and decisive tactical results. The physical, political, economic, social, and cultural 

importance of cities will often make them decisive spaces, critical to either denying enemy 

objectives or achieving friendly ones. The Joint Force, in dense urban terrain as well as all other 

terrain, links successful actions at decisive spaces to disrupt the enemy’s operational plans, deny

the enemy’s strategic objectives, and, ultimately, achieve sufficient military superiority to attain 

friendly strategic objectives.

c. Defeat the enemy’s mid-range systems. The corps continues to attack the enemy’s midrange fires during exploitation. The capabilities employed to see and strike are the same as those 

used to achieve the initial neutralization (see paragraph 3-7.e). The initial friendly success, 

however, will cause the enemy to attempt to preserve these systems by limiting their use and 

devoting greater effort to protection and survivability (e.g., more frequent survivability 

movements, greater dispersion). The combination of corps fires and division maneuver 

overcomes this enemy attempt to prevent the defeat of its mid-range systems, which are the most 

dangerous element of its tactical systems. Divisional maneuver compels the enemy to employ its 

remaining mid-range systems, which the corps’ fires is ready to defeat. As the exploitation 

continues, the dislocation of the enemy defense caused by friendly maneuver offers increased 

opportunities to attack and overrun the enemy’s fire and sustainment formations, completing the 

defeat of the enemy’s mid-range systems at the decisive spaces. 
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43

d. Neutralize the enemy’s short-range systems. The division converges a combination of 

capabilities across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment (e.g., attack aviation; 

UAS; short-range air defenses; EW; counter-position, navigation, and timing; cyberspace

measures; fires; and maneuver forces) to neutralize the enemy’s short-range systems. The 

division coordinates with the theater army for space control and space-based capabilities. The 

division coordinates with the field army (or corps if acting as Land Component Command) to 

integrate the division’s organic air defense and aviation capabilities (to include UAS) with the 

joint air campaign. Although every echelon defends its own cyberspace, the senior tactical 

headquarters (field army or corps) allocates additional cyber defense teams to the division to 

neutralize the attacks that occur uniquely at short range. As the primary echelon responsible for

managing the EMS, the division reinforces subordinate brigades with ground- and air-based EW

capabilities, prioritizing support to air maneuver. The division supports the aviation brigade with 

both EW and fire support to suppress enemy air defenses and enable exploitation of tactical 

opportunities. The enemy has a significant number of short-range systems, which makes their 

neutralization essential to enabling maneuver.

 e. Maneuver to isolate and defeat land forces. Divisions exploit freedom of maneuver by 

accessing joint multi-domain capabilities and employing their brigades at decisive spaces. The 

corps will play a significant role in supporting maneuver in dense urban terrain due to the 

increased need for converging joint and interagency capabilities. Ground forces that tactically 

overmatch the enemy are the foundation of the Joint Force’s ability to exploit freedom of 

maneuver. Tactical overmatch is the product of adaptable, aggressive leaders and Soldiers 

organized in cohesive, well-trained formations; and aircraft, fighting vehicles, small units, and 

individuals with superior mobility, protection, and lethality. Divisions exploit the advantage of 

formation-level tactical overmatch by employing deception and maneuver to create favorable 

force ratios at decisive spaces. Divisions converge the abilities to see, deceive, and maneuver 

with multi-domain attacks against enemy communications, fires, and reserves. This convergence 

leads to breaking the physical, virtual, and cognitive cohesion of enemy formations, causing their

defeat. 

 (1) See. Divisions and brigades employ their manned and unmanned air ISR, ground 

reconnaissance, and EW capabilities to see. These organic capabilities are supplemented by the 

corps, which analyzes data from high-volume sensors (e.g., space-based and high-altitude ISR) 

for subordinate echelons and translates that information to resilient low-volume data formats. 

This enables lower echelon units to access these intelligence sources even though they lack the 

analytical capability or communications links to exploit the sensors directly. The combination of 

organic reconnaissance and access to joint and national surveillance and intelligence provides 

commanders with additional options for sensing the enemy, which aids protection, deception, 

isolation, and maneuver. 

 (2) Maneuver to isolate. Divisions have primary responsibility for isolating enemy 

elements physically, virtually, and cognitively by converging air and ground maneuver, fires, 

EW, and deception. Additionally, divisions incorporate offensive space and cyberspace into this 

isolation of enemy elements by accessing these capabilities through the theater and field armies. 

The division fires command, combat aviation brigade, and coordinated air interdiction directed 

against enemy lines of communications, reserves, and adjacent units physically isolate maneuver 
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44

elements through fire. Division terrestrial and aerial EW capabilities coordinated with offensive 

space and cyberspace capabilities virtually isolate the enemy by disrupting enemy command and 

control systems with a particular emphasis on reconnaissance and fires. Friendly forces achieve 

both physical and virtual isolation through a combination of maneuver, the skillful use of terrain, 

exploiting the initiative, and deception to fix enemy reserves and adjacent units. The 

combination of physical, virtual, and cognitive isolation creates favorable force ratios for 

maneuver to exploit.

 (3) Maneuver to defeat. The division is the foundational maneuver echelon. Divisions 

direct their brigades and Brigade Combat Teams to execute basic multi-domain convergence of 

maneuver, fires, EMS operations, and air support. Divisions employ brigades simultaneously to 

overwhelm the enemy through cross-domain fires and independent maneuver or in sequence to 

extend the duration of offensive operations. They can accomplish this even when isolated from 

higher headquarters for periods of time because of their organic fires, ISR, and ability to 

communicate locally with aircraft. Brigades integrate EW, medium-scale air operations, cyber 

attacks, and offensive space control into their maneuver. Independent brigades have the 

capability to conduct offensive operations for 72 to96 hours. Divisions and their brigades exploit 

tactical opportunities operating within the commander’s intent to achieve decisive tactical 

results.

 (4) Maneuver in dense urban terrain. Dense urban terrain poses a particular challenge to 

friendly exploitation of freedom of maneuver because it tends to slow the tempo of operations 

and consume significant quantities of supplies, enablers, and forces. In dense urban terrain, the 

division remains the foundational element of maneuver, but it will require additional support 

from the field army and corps to converge specialized capabilities and coordinate with 

multinational and interagency partners. If the commander decides to bypass dense urban terrain, 

then multi-domain capabilities can reduce the risk and cost of securing lines of communications

through virtual isolation, use of unmanned sensors, and deception. In other instances, the Joint 

Force might enable coalition forces by augmenting them with multi-domain assets or 

capabilities. Army forces will fight in dense urban terrain when it is a decisive space due to its 

military, economic, or political value. Dense urban terrain offers increased possibilities for using 

cyberspace- and EMS-based weapons, but it also increases the requirements for using those 

capabilities precisely. Due to the potential for collateral damage to friendly forces or to civilian 

populations, the use of physical and virtual weapons will require detailed intelligence 

preparation, planning, and command oversight. 

 f. Conclusion: Exploit. The successful exploitation creates military conditions favorable to 

achieving strategic objectives. Rapid exploitation minimizes the strategic and operational cost to 

friendly forces and prevents the enemy from re-integrating its systems and consolidating gains in 

captured territory. In a conflict with a near-peer enemy armed with nuclear weapons, the 

operational exploitation, however, will conclude with some combination of policy, logistics, and 

resource constraints. Although the enemy’s conventional forces will be severely degraded, it 

will retain cohesion and capabilities to remain a threat. If there is a period of extended political 

negotiation, the enemy will use the threat or limited resumption of conventional operations in 

conjunction with unconventional and information warfare to win diplomatic advantage and 

undermine the consolidation of gains by friendly forces. The Joint Force, therefore, might have 
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45

denied the enemy from achieving its objectives by penetration, dis-integration, and exploitation, 

but the full attainment of friendly strategic objectives requires a successful transition from 

conflict to return to competition.

3-9. MDO in return to competition: Re-compete to consolidate and expand gains

 a. Multi-domain problem #5: How does the Joint Force re-compete to consolidate gains and 

produce sustainable outcomes, set conditions for long-term deterrence, and adapt to the new 

security environment? 

 b. The Joint Force and partners re-compete to retain and build upon the military advantages

gained in conflict. In an operational environment where peer enemies have nuclear capacity, it is 

an unlikely expectation to hope for a vanquished opponent; some form of a return to competition 

and status quo is more realistic. The persistence and presence of ground forces allow the U.S. to 

consolidate gains and provide continuing deterrence until the adversary no longer seeks to 

overturn the outcome through a return to armed conflict. In the return to competition, Army 

forces conduct three concurrent tasks: physically secure terrain and populations to produce

sustainable outcomes; set conditions for long-term deterrence by regenerating partner and Army 

capacity; and adapt force posture to the new security environment.

 c. Produce sustainable outcomes. In the return to competition, the field army retains overall 

command of Army conventional combat forces in their area of operations. The primary mission 

of these forces is to retain the physical and psychological advantages over the enemy achieved 

during armed conflict and secure key terrain and friendly populations. If the expeditionary corps

redeploys, the field army resumes the role of converging large quantities of capabilities against 

the adversary’s remaining mid-range fires. The potential for conventional lethal operations to 

take place, either in sporadic clashes during the return to competition or through the return to 

armed conflict, requires the field army to continue intelligence preparation of the battlefield. 

Actions in cyberspace, however, will likely continue at a high intensity level similar to that of the 

armed conflict, because physical separation of the armies will not ensure that either will 

surrender access to cyberspace. Operations in the information environment will also continue as 

both sides seek to consolidate gains by influencing friendly and enemy civilians, militaries, and 

governments. Civil affairs activities support partner governments to re-establish essential 

services and governance. At the same time, the theater army supports joint and multinational 

irregular warfare against other proxies outside of the field army’s area of operations and supports 

any allied corps or division deterring enemy conventional attacks outside the field army’s area of 

operations. Taken together, these Army efforts at echelon consolidate gains rapidly and create a 

foundation for deterrence.

 d. Set conditions for long-term deterrence. Army forces set conditions for long-term 

deterrence by regenerating and expanding both Army and partner capacity. Forward presence 

Army forces use defensive planning and preparation that deter a return to conflict as a means of 

building greater interoperability with partner forces. The field army also uses the relative 

freedom of maneuver in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment afforded by the

post-conflict environment to set the conditions for a sustainable, advantageous calibrated force 

posture. The Army enables deterrence by rapid regeneration of munitions stockpiles, which will 

be severely depleted after even a relatively short campaign. Army forces assist the building or 
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46

regenerating of partner capabilities and capacity for self-defense against conventional and 

unconventional threats. SOF and security force assistance forces are essential to rebuilding 

partner capacity and strengthening deterrence. From the adversary’s perspective, the Joint 

Force’s and Army’s actions show an increasing and enduring ability to counter aggression, 

demonstrated through robust exercises, cyber reconnaissance, and information operations. In 

combination, they renew and set conditions for long-term deterrence.

 e. Adapt to the new security environment. Conflict causes significant changes to regional 

security environments. Army forces provide persistent presence to ensure the new security 

environment is advantageous for the U.S. and its partners. The theater and field armies 

coordinate with partners, joint headquarters, and Headquarters, Department of the Army to best 

adapt calibrated force posture to the new operational environment. Army forces retain the 

capability to immediately counter and rapidly renew offensive operations. Reserve component 

formations extend Army presence while allowing the regeneration of expeditionary readiness. 

 f. Return to competition. Through a successful transition from armed conflict to the return 

to competition, the Joint Force translates operational success in armed conflict to the attainment 

of strategic objectives. The consolidation of gains, reconstitution of friendly forces, and building 

capacity of partners enables long-term deterrence of renewed armed conflict. More importantly, 

the successful adaptation to the new security environment results in an overall improvement of 

the United States’ strategic position.

Chapter 4

Conclusion

 a. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations concept challenges Army leaders to visualize 

and conduct maneuver in fundamentally new ways that enable the defeat of Chinese and Russian

systems. Convergence enables Army forces to compete with capable adversaries, and to 

penetrate and dis-integrate their anti-access and area denial systems—even when outnumbered—by attacking vulnerabilities in the enemy’s military system. Convergence, however, 

will not be easy to achieve. Army headquarters must not only have the technical, intellectual, 

and doctrinal tools to execute multi-domain command and control, but rigorous joint and 

combined training to realize it. In this way, Army forces achieve intent-based synergy across all 

domains, the EMS, and the information environment to compete, penetrate, dis-integrate, exploit, 

and re-compete.

 b. The Army organizes for MDO with echeloned formations that conduct intelligence, 

maneuver, and strike activities across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment.37F

38 

Army formations maneuver by moving and linking capabilities in multiple or unexpected ways 

and sequences to defeat or destroy adversaries’ military systems. This method of maneuver at 

echelon by Army forces overwhelms Chinese and Russian military systems at critical spaces 

 38 The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver, 2020-2040 defines cross-domain maneuver as “the employment of mutually 

supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities in multiple domains to generate overmatch, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and enable Joint 

Force freedom of movement and action.”
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47

with multiple dilemmas and massed effects, creating windows of superiority for the Joint Force 

to accomplish objectives.38F

39 

 c. MDO requires the Army to develop or improve capabilities to contribute cross-domain 

options to the Joint Force, by:

 (1) Calibrating force posture geographically and across all the Army components to defeat 

Chinese and Russian offensive operations in competition and to deter escalation to armed 

conflict.39F

40

 (2) Preparing the operational environment by building partner capacity and interoperability 

and setting the theater through such activities as establishing basing and access rights, 

prepositioning equipment and supplies, conducting preparatory intelligence activities, and 

mapping EMS and computer networks.40F

41 (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization 

Priorities: Army Network)

 (3) Building partners’ and allies’ capacities and capabilities to defeat increasingly 

sophisticated Chinese and Russian -sponsored unconventional and information warfare. 

 (4) Preparing the operational environment for competition and conflict by building 

understanding of and capabilities in select urban areas of particular operational or strategic 

importance.

 (5) Establishing precision logistics that provides a reliable, agile, and responsive 

sustainment capability necessary to support rapid power projection, MDO, and independent 

maneuver from the Strategic Support Area to the Deep Maneuver Area. (Supported by Army 

Materiel Modernization Priorities: Future Vertical Lift, Army Network)

 (6) Establishing necessary authorities and permissions normally reserved for conflict or to 

higher echelons to operate in competition and rapidly transition to conflict effectively.

 (7) Improving the capability to conduct MDO in dense urban terrain at all echelons through 

the development of tactics and capabilities to increase the accuracy, speed, and synchronization 

of lethal and nonlethal effects. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long 

Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicle, Army Network, Soldier Lethality)

 (8) Supporting a credible U.S. information narrative through cross-domain actions that 

communicate and counter threats by Chinese and Russian reconnaissance, strike, combined arms, 

and unconventional warfare capabilities.

 39 As an example, Army formations can maneuver—or assist Joint Force maneuver—as a reconnaissance action, fighting to gain intelligence, key 

terrain, and set conditions that enable strikes, rather than maneuvering only after passive intelligence collection, deliberate analysis, and precision 

strikes have prepared the battlefield for maneuver.

40 The idea of calibrating and re-calibrating force posture globally aligns with the idea of “forming operationally coherent forces” as described in 

the Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation. 41 “Setting the theater” encompasses the actions to establish and maintain conditions to seize the initiative and retain freedom of action for a 

specific theater. These actions may occur outside of the theater, as well.
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48

 (9) Enabling commanders and staffs at each echelon to visualize and command a battle in 

all domains, the EMS, and the information environment and shift capabilities rapidly between 

domains and organizations to mass combat power against Chinese and Russian vulnerabilities. 

This requires new tools to more rapidly converge capabilities across the Joint Force, shifting

training paradigms, and changing personnel and talent management practices. This also requires 

that Army formations be trained, manned, and equipped to leverage all available information, 

from national, joint, commercial, and Service repositories and libraries, or directly from 

collection assets seamlessly and in a time dominant manner. (Supported by Army Materiel 

Modernization Priorities: Army Network, Soldier Lethality)

 (10) Providing to the Joint Force Commander multi-domain formations and systems that 

can converge capabilities to attack specific vulnerabilities in Chinese and Russian multi-layered, 

mutually reinforcing military forces and systems. This means creating commanders and staffs 

who have the means and ability to access and employ capabilities that reside across the Joint 

Force. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, 

Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Soldier Lethality)

 (11) Providing to the Joint Force Commander with multi-domain formations that have

systems, leaders, and Soldiers that are durable, can operate in a highly contested operational

environment, cannot easily be isolated from the rest of the Joint Force or from partners, and able 

to conduct independent maneuver and employ cross-domain fires. This requires extended 

sustainability of systems and formations, and leaders and Soldiers who continue to operate 

effectively in austere environments and conditions. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization 

Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, 

Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, Soldier Lethality)

 (12) Consolidating gains through clear demonstrations of U.S. security commitments to 

partners through combined exercises, training, and other presence activities. 

 (13) Enabling and complementing land, air, and maritime capabilities with operations in 

space, cyberspace, and the EMS to support the opening of and exploitation of windows of 

superiority creating dilemmas for the enemy while protecting the ability to conduct friendly 

operations in degraded, disrupted, and/or denied operational environments.

 (14) Attracting, retaining, and making maximum use of high-quality, physically fit, 

mentally tough Soldiers who have the skills and expertise to conduct MDO.

 d. The U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept drives experimentation; informs 

capability and doctrine development; and frames organizational trade-offs and force posture 

decisions that restore the Army’s ability as part of the Joint Force to deter adversaries that utilize 

Chinese and Russian systems. MDO is at present an Army concept—informed by contributions 

from other Services and partners—describing Army contributions to and requirements for a joint 

campaign conducted alongside partners against near-peer adversaries. Future development of 

MDO will test the method of operations described in this edition of the concept in other 

scenarios and with even greater involvement from the Joint Force and partners.
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A-1

Appendix A

Assumptions

A-1. Baseline Assumptions

 a. The U.S. Army will remain a professional, all-volunteer force, relying on all components of 

the Army to meet future commitments.

 b. The Army will adjust to fiscal constraints and have resources sufficient to preserve the 

balance of readiness, force structure, and modernization necessary to meet the demands of the 

national defense strategy in the mid- to far-term (2020 to 2040).

 c. Except for an immediate response to a national emergency, the Army will conduct 

operations as part of joint, interagency, and multinational teams.

A-2. Fundamental assumptions

 a. Adversaries will challenge U.S. interests by means and with ways below the threshold of 

armed conflict and short of what the U.S. considers war. 

 b. Adversaries can conduct armed conflict via regional campaigns with limited warning to 

seize limited strategic objectives and consolidate gains within days or weeks.

 c. The proliferation of precision-guided weapons, integrated air defenses, cyberspace 

weapons, counterspace weapons, and other technologies allows an increasing number of 

potential adversaries to contest and hold at risk U.S. forces in all domains, the EMS, and the 

information environment at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

 d. U.S. and partner political authorities will authorize and enable sufficient force posture and 

readiness levels to respond to and defeat near-peer adversaries if deterrence fails.

 e. U.S. and partner governments will provide authorities for friendly forces to conduct 

operational preparation of the environment, as well as offensive EMS, cyberspace, space, 

unconventional warfare, and information environment operations to deter and defeat adversaries.

 f. U.S. and partner government agencies, headquarters, and fielded forces will develop and 

sustain sufficient interoperability between Services, government agencies, and allies to conduct 

combined operations that deter and defeat adversaries.

 g. Neither the U.S. nor adversaries will employ nuclear weapons. The use of such weapons 

would so significantly alter the strategic context that different operational approaches would be 

required. (This assumption does not mean that this concept ignores the threat of nuclear 

weapons. Army forces must be resilient against all possible forms of attack. Furthermore, 

commanders will have to account for the possibility of nuclear attack in formulating schemes of 

maneuver and accounting for the risk of escalation that might lead to operational restrictions on 

where and how the Joint Force operates.)
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B-1

Appendix B

Key Required Capabilities

B-1. Introduction. This appendix lists capabilities needed to conduct MDO as described in this 

concept. 

B-2. Required capabilities

 a. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to 

calibrate force posture geographically and across all the Army components to defeat Chinese and 

Russian offensive operations in competition and to deter escalation to armed conflict.

(Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires)

 b. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to 

prepare the operational environment by building partner capacity and interoperability and setting 

the theater through such activities as establishing basing and access rights, prepositioning 

equipment and supplies, conducting preparatory intelligence activities, and mapping EMS and 

computer networks. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Army Network)

 c. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to 

build partners’ capacities and capabilities to defeat increasingly sophisticated Chinese and 

Russian -sponsored unconventional and information warfare.

 d. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to 

prepare the operational environment for competition and conflict by building understanding of 

and capabilities in select urban areas of particular operational or strategic importance.

 e. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require precision 

logistics that provides a layered, agile, and responsive sustainment capability necessary to 

support operations from the Strategic Support Area to the Deep Maneuver Area. Precision 

logistics is enabled by: a sustainment enterprise resource planning decision support system with 

predictive analysis tools and the ability to resupply without request and/or redirect supplies based 

on priority; a real-time common operating picture viewable by commanders and logisticians at 

echelon; and significant demand reduction across the Total Force to lessen delivery requirements 

by as much as 50% and extend operational time and reach of formations.

 f. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require necessary 

authorities and permissions to operate in competition and rapidly transition to conflict

effectively.

 g. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to 

conduct MDO in dense urban terrains at all echelons with tactics and capabilities that increase 

the accuracy, speed, and synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects. (Supported by Army 

Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat 

Vehicle, Army Network, Soldier Lethality)
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B-2

 h. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to 

support a credible U.S. information narrative through cross-domain actions that communicate 

and counter threats by Chinese and Russian reconnaissance, strike, combined arms, and 

unconventional warfare capabilities.

 i. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to 

enable commanders and staffs at each echelon to visualize and command a battle in all domains, 

the EMS, and the information environment and shift capabilities rapidly between domains and 

organizations to mass combat power against Chinese and Russian vulnerabilities. This requires 

new tools to more rapidly converge capabilities across the Joint Force, shifting training 

paradigms, and changes in personnel and talent management practices. This also requires that

Army formations be trained, manned, and equipped to leverage all available information, from 

national, joint, commercial, and Service repositories and libraries, or directly from collection 

assets seamlessly and in a time dominant manner. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization 

Priorities: Army Network, Soldier Lethality)

 j. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to 

provide to the Joint Force Commander multi-domain formations and systems that can converge 

capabilities to attack specific vulnerabilities in Chinese and Russian multi-layered, mutually

reinforcing military forces and systems. This means building tactical formations and leaders that 

can think through, access, and/or employ capabilities that reside across the Joint Force.

(Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next 

Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Soldier Lethality)

 k. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require resilient multidomain formations with systems, leaders, and Soldiers that are durable, can persist in a difficult 

operational environment, cannot easily be isolated from the rest of the Joint Force or from 

partners, and able to conduct independent maneuver and employ cross-domain fires. This 

requires extended sustainability of systems and formations, and leaders and Soldiers who 

continue to operate effectively in austere environments and conditions. (Supported by Army 

Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat 

Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, Soldier Lethality)

 l. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to 

consolidate gains through clear demonstrations of U.S. security commitments to partners through 

combined exercises, training, and other presence activities. 

 m. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to 

enable and complement land, air, and maritime capabilities with operations in space, cyberspace, 

and the EMS to support the opening of and exploitation of windows of superiority, creating 

dilemmas for the enemy while protecting the ability to conduct friendly operations in degraded, 

disrupted, and/or denied operational environments.

 n. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, the Army must attract, retain, and 

make maximum use of high-quality, physically fit, mentally tough Soldiers who have the skills 

and expertise to conduct MDO.
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Appendix C

MDO Supporting Ideas

C-1. Maneuver in MDO

 a. Maneuver is the combination of movement and fires to achieve positions of advantage that 

defeats the enemy.41F

42 Movement is the adjustment of the physical location of a capability to 

another more favorable location. In addition to the physical effect of repositioning, movement 

usually produces cognitive effects on the enemy, as well. All military capabilities originate from 

a physical location and undergo movement (of some form) when employed, even those 

capabilities intended to produce cognitive or virtual effects. Fires are the destructive or 

disruptive effects a formation or asset produces on an enemy. Fires can produce a combination 

of physical, virtual, and cognitive effects on the enemy. Fires, even if they are particles or 

waves, must also travel through a domain to reach their intended target, which is also a physical 

location, even if the target is a computer or a human mind.

 b. MDO requires fires and maneuver to operate within and across domains. Cross-domain 

fires and cross-domain maneuver exploit an opportunity from one or more domains intended to 

achieve an advantage in another domain.

 (1) Cross-domain maneuver is the employment of mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal 

capabilities of multiple domains to create conditions designed to generate overmatch, present 

multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and enable Joint Force freedom of movement and action.

 (2) Cross-domain fires is the integration and delivery of lethal and nonlethal fires across 

all five domains (land, maritime, air, space and cyberspace), the EMS, and the information 

environment.

 c. Cross-domain maneuver and cross-domain fires are a realization that a commander must 

visualize and exploit the physical, virtual, and cognitive effects of maneuver and fires in multiple 

domains and environments over time. For example, a ground tactical formation must operate in 

(and potentially affect, if it contains appropriate cross-domain capabilities) the relevant air and 

maritime domains above or adjacent to its land-based area of operations, as well as understand 

cyberspace, EMS, information environment, and space activities that can impact friendly 

operations. Based on this visualization, the commander must converge organic and available 

Joint Force capabilities in time and at the proper place to identify, create, and exploit windows of 

superiority.

C-2. MDO framework

 a. The operational environment, threats, and problems envisioned in MDO demand a 

framework that brings order to the complexities of a multi-domain environment. Because nearpeer adversaries contest and can deny all domains, the EMS, and the information environment at 

extended distances, current and anticipated future problems exceed what could be assigned 

 42 An enemy force is defeated when it has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. To defeat the enemy, joint 

forces destroy, dislocate, dis-integrate, and isolate enemy forces.
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within a single area of operations under the current joint operational framework. The MDO

framework must also account for all domains, extending to space and cyberspace, as well as the 

EMS and information environment, because activities in these domains across time produce 

tactical, operational, and strategic effects not captured by the existing joint framework.42F

43 An 

expanded multi-domain framework allows commanders to arrange operations in the emerging 

operational environment. The MDO framework (see figure 2-1) provides an expanded physical 

framework from which to reference actions across all domains, the EMS, and the information 

environment conducted by the Joint Force, partners, adversaries, and enemies.

 b. Since the MDO framework is operational, it is also grounded in physical spaces. Abstract 

aspects more evident in some domains are also grounded physically, despite their predominantly 

immaterial presentations. At some point, all the abstract elements (cognitive, virtual, 

informational, and human) demonstrate their effects physically at a place or in an area through a 

system or people. Representing these elements in a physically based framework clarifies an 

already very complex multi-domain operational environment for commanders and staffs. The 

following description of the framework places all friendly and enemy activities and physical 

locations in categories of physical space as the fundamental visualization layer.

 c. The areas in the MDO framework are defined by the mixture of capabilities (both friendly 

and enemy) available for use within each area. MDO take a different form in each area because 

the two contending sides have a different mixture of capabilities available for competing and 

fighting. Because of the expanded battlefield in which actions in one area can influence another, 

the breadth of the battlefield needs to be placed within a single, simple framework to illustrate 

these sometimes complex relationships. Though depicted geometrically for simplicity, the areas 

within the framework are not defined by geographic space or relationships. In some theaters, for 

example, a Deep Maneuver Area could be physically adjacent to an Operational Support Area 

due to the types of capabilities available to each side. The complementary nature of unique and 

interoperable Service capabilities provides the Joint Force multiple options to maneuver in areas 

inaccessible to single-Service and single-domain solutions. Previous depictions of the battlefield 

did not capture the full range of places and times that friendly and enemy capabilities interact in 

the current and future operational environment. This increased number of battlefield areas, 

expansion in geographic area, and extended time horizons are new features of MDO. 

 d. MDO framework spaces

 (1) Deep Fires Areas: The Operational and Strategic Deep Fires Areas comprise the Deep 

Fires Areas. These areas are defined as the areas beyond the feasible range of movement for 

conventional forces but where joint fires, SOF, information, and virtual capabilities can be 

employed. Operational and Strategic Deep Fires Areas are differentiated by the types of 

capabilities that can, or are authorized, to operate in each area. These areas are either too far 

(beyond operational reach) for conventional maneuver forces to enter or they are prohibited by 

policy (such as an international border).43F

44 Therefore, operations in the Deep Fires Areas are

 43 FM 3-0, C1 dated 6 Dec 2017 incorporates some of the ideas related to the framework proposed by this concept (pp. 1-29 to 1-35). 44 In cases where policy restrictions create Deep Fires Areas, the areas might be geographically non-contiguous. For instance, in a 

counterinsurgency campaign the Joint Force might have full freedom of action within the host country but is allowed to use only virtual 

capabilities against the enemy sanctuary in a neighboring country. In that instance, the international border would represent the boundary 

between Close and Deep Fires Areas.
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limited to whatever physical and virtual capabilities are permitted by law or policy and that can 

operate in the heart of enemy defenses. This limited accessibility and the inherent difficulty of 

operating deep within enemy territory place a premium on the ability to combine and employ 

whatever capabilities are available from across all domains, the EMS, and the information 

environment.

 (2) Deep Maneuver Area: This area is the highly contested area where conventional 

maneuver (ground or maritime) is possible, but requires significant support from multi-domain 

capabilities; commanders must make a concerted effort to “break into” the Deep Maneuver Area. 

Because more friendly capabilities possess the range and survivability to influence or operate 

within this space than in the Deep Fires Areas, and because commanders can take advantage of 

the combination of fire and movement, there are many more options for Joint Force employment 

here than in the Deep Fires Areas. Moreover, the persistence of ground and maritime maneuver 

forces allows operations to persist for far longer than in the Deep Fires Areas, where effects will 

often be more transitory. In most anticipated campaign designs, many operational objectives are 

in the Deep Maneuver Area.

 (3) Close Area: The Close Area is where friendly and enemy formations, forces, and 

systems are in imminent physical contact and will contest for control of physical space in support 

of campaign objectives. The Close Area includes land, maritime littorals, and the airspace over 

these areas. The new operational environment and improved enemy and friendly capabilities 

have expanded the Close Area. Operations in the Close Area require tempo and mobility in 

order to overcome these enemy capabilities through sufficiently integrated and concentrated 

combat power at the critical time and space. Characteristics of the Close Area present challenges 

to integrating cross-domain capabilities because of the reduced time available to access and 

employ enablers, such as centrally controlled, low-density capabilities. Commanders employ 

capabilities from all domains, the EMS, and the information environment, organic and external, 

in the Close Area to generate complementary effects of combined arms, but speed of action, 

coordination, and synchronization of effects place a premium on organic capabilities. Operations 

in the Close Area are designed to create windows of superiority for maneuver to defeat enemy 

forces, disrupt enemy capabilities, physically control spaces, and protect and influence 

populations.

 (4) Support Areas: Collectively, the Support Areas represent that space in which the 

Joint Force seeks to retain maximum freedom of action, speed, and agility and to counter the 

enemy’s multi-domain efforts to attack friendly forces, infrastructure, and populations. The 

nature of these threats varies with the adversary, though with current technology virtually all 

adversaries will have reach into the homeland (for example, through cyberspace, information 

warfare, agents, sympathizers, and space), even if only by using social media to undermine 

public support and encourage “lone-wolf attacks.” The reach of regional powers is also growing 

and the most potent adversaries already possess multiple advanced cyberspace, space, and 

physical capabilities (air, naval, special operations, and/or missile forces) that can contest the 

friendly rear areas at all times. Though enemy capabilities will vary with the situation, a 

common requirement will be the need to ensure that responsibilities, resources, and authorities 

are properly aligned among echelons, functions, and political organizations. Consequently, the 
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Support Areas are divided according to friendly and enemy capabilities typically operating in 

each area.

 (a) The Strategic Support Area: This area is the area of cross-Combatant Command 

coordination, strategic sea and air lines of communications, and the homeland. Most friendly 

nuclear, space and cyberspace capabilities, and important network infrastructure are controlled 

and located in the Strategic Support Area. Joint logistics and sustainment functions required to 

support MDO campaigning throughout competition and armed conflict emanate from the 

Strategic Support Area. The enemy will attack the Strategic Support Area to disrupt and degrade 

deployments and reinforcements attempting to gain access to the Operational Support Area and 

move to the Close Area, taking advantage of the reach of strategic lethal and nonlethal weapons, 

as well as special operations reconnaissance and strikes. Enemy engagements in the Strategic 

Support Area will drive a rapid tempo of friendly operations in other areas to seek decision and 

limit enemy options for escalation.

 (b) The Operational Support Area: This is the area where many key Joint Force mission 

command, sustainment, and fires/strike capabilities are located; these can be land or sea-based. 

This area normally encompasses many entire nations, thus making the Operational Support Area 

an important space for friendly political-military integration. Due to the political and military 

importance of the Operational Support Area, the enemy targets this area with substantial 

reconnaissance, information warfare, and operational fires capabilities. Friendly units 

maneuvering in the Operational Support Area, therefore, are never out of contact. The Joint 

Force will enable friendly operations in this area by dedicating significant capacity during armed 

conflict to open windows of superiority in the Operational Support Area that enable friendly 

operations.

 (c) The Tactical Support Area: This is the area that directly enables operations in the 

Close, Deep Maneuver, and Deep Fires Areas. Many friendly sustainment, fires, maneuver 

support, and mission command capabilities are in the Tactical Support Area. The enemy directs 

information warfare, unconventional warfare, tactical fires, maneuver forces, and even 

operational fires at friendly forces, populations, and civil authorities in the Tactical Support 

Area. Friendly units in the Tactical Support Area must be prepared to endure threat fires and 

defeat enemy ground force infiltration through and penetrations of the Close Area. Mobility and 

survivability are key requirements for friendly forces operating in or rapidly transiting this area. 

C-3. MDO at echelon

 a. Theater army.

 (1) In competition and return to competition:

• Set conditions for competitive campaigning by working with joint and multinational 

partners to defeat information and unconventional warfare in countries away from the 

adversary’s near abroad
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• Translate tactical successes in defeating information and unconventional warfare by 

using aggressive competition as a means to deepen cooperation and improve the U.S.’s strategic 

posture in the region

• Deter armed conflict by building resilience in friendly command and control, 

sustainment, and other force generation capabilities located in the Operational Support Area,

with a particular focus on enabling quick draw of APS

• Coordinate with partners on cyberspace defense of key logistics and transportation 

systems; develop resilience by creating back-up methods to ensure sustainment

• Set the theater intelligence architecture, provide access to theater collection and 

databases, conduct open source intelligence in support of IEO, establish intelligence 

partnerships, facilitate intelligence engagement, and provide counterintelligence in support of 

force protection in the Operational Support Area

 (2) In conflict:

• Counter enemy SOF actions against the Operational Support Area through the provision 

of intelligence and enablers to partner security forces

• In conjunction with other components, provide ballistic and cruise missile defense for 

critical targets 

• Enable joint maneuver in the Close and Deep Areas through long-range fires provided by 

the Theater Fires Command

• Coordinate offensive space control for Army forces

 b. Field army.

 (1) In competition and return to competition:

• Set the campaign through focused tactical and technical intelligence on critical adversary

military systems that then drives war and deployment plans, training, and resource decisions 

• Set the campaign through creation of multi-layered ISR belts in likely areas of enemy 

aggression

• Coordinate with the Air Component to ensure continuity of support in the Close Area

• Set conditions for competitive campaigning by working with joint and multi-national 

partners to counter information and unconventional warfare in countries most threatened by the 

adversary
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• Translate tactical successes in countering information and unconventional warfare by 

using aggressive competition as a means to deepen cooperation and improve the U.S.’s strategic 

posture in the region with most threatened partners

• Deter armed conflict by building resilience in the Tactical Support Area so that U.S. and 

partner forces can stage a credible force within range of adversary anti-access and area denial

systems

• Orchestrate actions with information environment operations to counter adversary

narratives in the most threatened partner countries

 (2) In conflict:

• Counter enemy SOF actions against the Operational Support Area through the provision 

of intelligence and enablers to partner security forces

• Employ Army high-altitude ISR platforms to develop stand-off intelligence of enemy 

mid-range IADS and fires

• Coordinate complex joint convergence (air and naval strikes, cyberspace) in support of 

corps scheme of maneuver or on behalf of subordinate echelons

• Be prepared to assist theater army with enabling joint maneuver 

 c. Corps.

• Coordinate complex joint convergence if no field army present

• Employ divisions simultaneously to overwhelm enemy or in sequence to extend the 

duration of operations

• Provide access to subordinate echelons by tailoring high-volume intelligence requiring 

significant analysis capacity and communications bandwidth to manageable data

 d. Division.

• Coordinate complex electromagnetic and information operations convergence 

• Employ brigades simultaneously to overwhelm enemy or in sequence to extend the 

duration of operations

 e. Brigade.

• Coordinate simple convergence of maneuver, ground, and air internally and be able to 

integrate complex convergence into scheme of maneuver with the assistance of higher echelons
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• Conduct independent maneuver based on intent and employing internal convergence and 

resilience if physically and virtually isolated

C-4. Convergence considerations

 a. Physical, virtual, and cognitive capabilities across the domains, environments, and 

functions often possess substantially different time characteristics that govern how they can be 

employed. When creating and exploiting windows of superiority, commanders must visualize 

and execute combined arms maneuver in new ways because the varied characteristics of different 

capabilities that must be converged at a place or places to achieve a purpose impose unique time 

considerations to operations. The Joint Force and its partners must also reconsider time in terms 

of converging actions during competition to achieve objectives without resort to, but also 

through transition to, armed conflict and a return to competition. To support converging 

capabilities in time and purpose at decisive spaces, MDO proposes five elements—preparation 

time, planning and execution time, duration time, reset time, and cycle time—to visualize the 

convergence of capabilities. Preparation time is the time required to produce conditions required 

for a capability’s employment. Planning and execution time is the time required to initiate 

movement combined with the time required to move or transmit to the objective. Duration time 

is the time that a capability produces the intended effect. Reset time is the time required to 

regenerate a capability between employments. Cycle time is one iteration of planning through 

reset time. Understanding time is both art and science as elements of time for some capabilities, 

such as planning and execution time for a ballistic missile attack, can (or must) be known with 

great certainty while other aspects, such as duration of a cyberspace effect, can only be 

estimated.

 b. At the operational level, MDO requires the modulation cycles and usage rates. There is an 

art and a science to the application of convergence. Perfect synchronization is generally 

unobtainable due to operational constraints. Additionally, utilizing all available assets at once 

may not support desired operational outcomes. Some assets have limited-use timeframes and 

must be held back for when the application has the highest payoff. Commanders will invariably 

accept less-than-perfect multi-domain synchronization in order to maintain a higher tempo. The 

mission dictates campaign tempo, not domain synchronization. 

 c. Figure C-1 provides general characteristics for the four cycles (ground, air, maritime, and 

enduring virtual weapons). 
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Cycle Type Build-up Time (if not 

already present in theater)

Persistence When 

Employed

Reset Interval

Ground44F

45 Very long (months) Long (days) Long (days to 

weeks)

Air Short (days) Short (hours) Short (hours to 

days)

Maritime Medium (weeks) Very long (months) Very long 

(weeks)45F

46

Enduring virtual weapons 

(cyberspace/space/EW)

Short (days)46F

47 Very short (seconds to 

minutes)

Very short 

(minutes to 

hours)47F

48

Figure C-1. Characteristics of the ground, air, maritime, and

enduring virtual weapons cycles

 d. The two usage rates are preferred munitions and expendable virtual weapons. As opposed 

to the cycles representing capabilities that can be continually used so long as they do not suffer 

attrition, the two usage rate categories decrease with use. Due to the significant time required to 

replenish these stockpiles when compared to the anticipated usage, it is only a slight 

oversimplification to regard them as essentially a fixed arsenal that must be carefully managed. 

Losing the “battle of the burn rates” and thereby being forced to severely curtail the use of 

preferred munitions or expendable virtual weapons while the adversary still has significant 

quantities would put the Joint Force at a severe disadvantage. Put differently, failing to manage 

usage rates in conjunction with the four cycles nullifies MDO and effectively returns one side to 

the 20th century while their better-supplied (or more judicious) enemy retains 21st century 

capabilities. 

 e. In conjunction, the limits of the four cycles and two usage rates define the art of the 

possible at the operational level. The Joint Force Commander’s allocation of resources and risks 

within each establishes the tempo of the campaign. There is no fixed relation among these 

cycles and usage rates; the proper balance will vary according to the situation. The essential 

takeaway is that the degree of multi-domain capability will vary over the course of a campaign. 

Tactical commanders should not assume that all domain capabilities will be available at any 

given time.

 45 For instance, the deployment of a division with some combination of Stryker and Armored Brigade Combat Teams would require several 

months, particularly against an adversary capable of contesting strategic lines of communications. In a deliberate offensive operation, the 

division might be able to sustain operations for several days before culmination. Depending on the attrition and expenditure of stocks, it could 

then require days or weeks to reset before a similar effort.

46 Reset refers to out-of-theater replenishment, such as is required for reloading vertical launch tubes. If the reset requires repairing significant 

battle damage, then it could extend to months or years.

47 This category covers a large array of capabilities for which it is difficult to make generalizations. This rating envisions a capability with a 

small set of personnel and equipment that could be rapidly deployed by air. Some capabilities in this category are global and so have no build-up 

time. Others might require technical infrastructure that could require weeks or months to put in place.

48 Again, it is difficult to generalize about this broad array of categories. Decades of experience with EW suggests that unlike the other cycles, 

the reset interval will often not be the limiting factor of use. Cold War doctrine did not envision continuous jamming but intermittent use tied to 

the scheme of maneuver in order to maintain survivability, security, and effectiveness of EW assets.
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C-5. Information environment operations (IEO)48F

49

 a. Information operations is the current terminology used by the Department of Defense 

(DoD) for operations in the information environment. To support MDO, information operations

must evolve to IEO. IEO synchronizes information related capabilities (IRC), in concert with 

operations, to create effects in and through the information space.49F

50 IRC advance the 

commander's intent and concept of operations; seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in the 

information space; and consolidate gains in the information environment, to achieve a decisive 

information advantage over enemies and adversaries. IEO can provide commanders additional 

ways and means to:

• Degrade, disrupt, or destroy threat capabilities that inform or influence decision making.

• Degrade, disrupt, or destroy threat capabilities that command and control maneuver, 

fires, intelligence, communications, and information warfare capabilities employed against 

friendly forces.

• Protect friendly information, technical networks, and decision-making capabilities from 

an exploitation by adversary/enemy information warfare assets.

• Influence enemy formations and populations to reduce their will to fight.

• Influence friendly and neutral populations to enable friendly operations.

 b. In support of MDO, IEO must be fully integrated into the planning and execution of the 

joint targeting process. When converged with other capabilities, IEO directly supports opening 

and exploiting windows of superiority during competition and armed conflict. The military 

capabilities that contribute to IEO which should be taken into consideration include: strategic 

communications, joint and interagency coordination, public affairs, civil-military operations, 

cyberspace operations, information assurance, space operations, military information support to 

operations, intelligence, military deception, operations security, EMS operations, and military 

and civilian engagement.

 c. Commanders must understand the information space and determine how enemies and 

adversaries operate in that environment. Understanding begins with analyzing the 

adversary/enemy’s use of the information space and how it employs IRC to gain an advantage. 

It continues with determining threat vulnerabilities that friendly forces can exploit and 

identifying areas which must be defended against adversary/enemy IRC. 

 d. IEO provides commanders an implementation strategy and integrative framework for 

employing IRC. An integrated IEO campaign may include the use of the cyberspace domain, the 

space domain, and the EMS to deliver IEO products, observe enemy or adversary actions and 

 49 IEO is the integrated employment, during military operations, of information related capabilities (IRC) in concert with other lines of operations 

to influence, deceive, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of enemies and adversaries while protecting our own; to influence enemy 

formations and populations to reduce their will to fight; and influence friendly and neutral populations to enable friendly operations. 50 For purposes of this concept, the information space refers to the complex system of interrelated and networked information flows amongst and 

between populations that a commander must understand and consider to gain and maintain freedom of action.
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reactions, or to deliver cyberspace, space, or EW effects. Integrating cyberspace, space, and EW 

capabilities generates synergistic information space effects. When employed as part of IEO that 

includes multiple IRC; intelligence, cyberspace, space, and EW operations can provide 

commanders an alternative solution to challenging operational problem sets. 

C-6. Engagement50F

51

 a. Since war is fundamentally and primarily a human endeavor, the Joint Force working with 

its partners, must address the cognitive aspects of political, human, social, and cultural 

interactions to achieve operational and national objectives. Employing engagement, the Joint 

Force and its partners synchronize activities to understand, influence, and achieve human 

interactions which cross all domains, the EMS, and the information environment to achieve a 

position of relative advantage during competition or armed conflict. Engagement enables U.S. 

forces to outmaneuver an adversary cognitively as well as physically and virtually to deter, 

counter, and deny the escalation of violence in competition, and defeat the enemy if armed 

conflict cannot be avoided. Additionally, through engagement, routine contact and interaction 

between the Joint Force and its partners build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate 

mutual activities, and maintain influence.

 b. Employing the operational tenets of engagement presents multiple dilemmas to an enemy, 

converging multi-domain capabilities that will create windows of superiority for friendly 

forces.51F

52 In the best case, engagement activities can strengthen U.S. options and measures in 

competition, and avert or deter armed conflict. However, if armed conflict cannot be avoided, 

engagement provides a deeper and common understanding of the operational environment, and 

enables opening windows of superiority and turning denied spaces into contested spaces.

 c. A cognitive window of superiority is created by degrading, disrupting, or otherwise 

manipulating a decision maker’s understanding and decision cycle or influencing a formation’s 

or population’s will to establish favorable conditions. Achieving cognitive windows of 

superiority requires careful consideration of the following tenets:

• Understand human factors of the operational environment52F

53

• Incorporate human factors into campaign and operations planning, training, and 

exercises

• Build partner operational, institutional, governance, and expeditionary capabilities, and 

joint, interagency, and multinational partner networks

• Operate with and through joint, interagency, and multinational partners and indigenous 

populations to shape the operational environment and conduct security activities

 51 Engagement is the combination of physical, informational, and psychological actions taken to influence actors' decision making (moral and 

mental).

52 Some examples of these dilemmas include: security cooperation activities can strengthen an ally’s defensive capabilities and resolve; civil 

affairs operations can help influence a population positively toward U.S. presence and operations; military information support to operations can 

shape an enemy’s will to fight; interactions with the host nation can develop valuable situational understanding.

53 Human factors are the physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, 

understanding, and interaction.
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Appendix D

MDO in Dense Urban Terrain (DUT)

D-1. Introduction

 a. Purpose. This appendix applies MDO ideas and solutions to a dense urban terrain. It 

provides a description of the problems encountered in DUT and implications for MDO. The 

ideas and solutions found in this appendix use historical and current urban conflict analyses 

across a collection of sources, but are informed primarily from the Mosul Study Group Phase II 

literature review, research, and campaign analysis. 

 b. Background. National defense documents focus on the evolving threat and the changing 

character of warfare identify urbanization trends that portend future competition or conflict with 

the evolving threat will take place in urban environments. Particularly problematic is the 

potential for competition and armed conflict in megacities.53F

54 These areas involve diverse, 

interconnected human and physical networks, three-dimensional engagement areas, and terrain 

and infrastructure that provide varying levels of ready-made cover and concealment. Urban 

operations are inherently multifaceted. The scale and complexity posed by megacities challenge 

Army forces’ capabilities and capacities to compete with, operate and fight versus prepared 

adversaries. 

D-2. Dense urban terrain

 a. Characteristics of dense urban terrain. Dense urban terrain possess unique 

characteristics that complicate all aspects of friendly and enemy operations, to include 

competition below the threshold of armed conflict, penetration and dis-integration of an 

adversary’s anti-access and area denial systems, exploitation of freedom of maneuver to defeat

enemy forces, and consolidation of gains. The physical characteristics (e.g., scale of urban area, 

urban density, and infrastructure) constrain maneuver, limit situational understanding, and create 

unique problems for targeting and delivering effects against enemy positions. Cognitive 

characteristics (e.g., degree of internal and external connectedness, demographics of the human 

terrain, institutions, and governance) influence political decisions, which in turn shape 

operations, rules of engagement, and narratives. Finally, operational characteristics in DUT

(e.g., the type of enemy, degree of joint access, mission, and type of combined force) drive force

and capability requirements. 

 (1) Physical. Physical characteristics of DUT effect all aspects of competition and armed 

conflict. Man-made terrain and natural barriers combine to fragment and frustrate maneuver 

operations. The density and diversity of structures obscure enemy positions and strength, 

challenge friendly communications, and, when destroyed, create rubble causing mobility and 

countermobility problems. Large groups of non-combatants complicate maneuver and fires 

operations, overwhelm rear-area capabilities, and create challenges to intelligence collection and 

 54 The number of megacities (defined as metropolitan areas encompassing more than 10 million inhabitants) has doubled in the past 20 years and 

is projected to double again by 2050. Megacities contain populations, and exercise political, economic, and social influence comparable to many 

nation-states.
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analysis. Each city presents its own challenges but all urban operations require extensive force 

commitments both for combat and stability operations. 

 (2) Cognitive. Cognitive considerations consist of the flow of people, goods, and data in 

and between dense urban areas. The interrelated flow of people, goods, and data creates 

environmental complexity, which congests and complicates the use of all domains, the EMS, and 

the information environment. The unique physical and cultural design of each urban area 

influences its internal flow. Function – centered on formal or informal institutions of governance 

– connects and informs flow relative to the rest of the country, region, or globe. The networking 

of urban environments on a regional or global scale has expanded the influence of population 

centers and the impact of urban operations on political, economic, and social systems. These 

characteristics present commanders and staffs with a constantly changing operational picture to 

assess making intelligence gathering and effects planning (lethal or nonlethal) difficult.

 (3) Operational. Regardless of location or type of operation, in dense urban terrain the 

Army usually operates in unfamiliar and complex terrain in support of a partner force or local 

government objectives. This requires that the Army understand mission requirements, coalition 

and host nation security force capabilities, and return to competition objectives. These three 

considerations inform force size, logistics, and set the theater requirements. The force 

requirement for any mission (offense, defense, stability) is greater in DUT than in any other 

environment. Partner force and coalition members influence rules of engagement and determine 

the support or enabling capabilities required to facilitate movement and maneuver in urban areas. 

Finally, return to competition objectives impact consolidation of gains operations, which in DUT

can require the generation of extensive stability forces. 

 b. Compounding and compressing the problems. During armed conflict, urban areas both 

compound the friction of war and compress physical and temporal spaces. Dense urban terrain

compounds friction by combining more obstacles to maneuver (people, terrain, congested EMS 

and airspace) and by requiring the simultaneous execution of more tasks (airspace and fires deconfliction, protection, lethal and nonlethal fires synchronization) to enable constrained 

maneuver. To execute more tasks simultaneously, the Army must deploy more forces and 

capabilities into urban areas, which compresses the physical and temporal space available for 

operations. The phenomenon of increased friction and compressed space complicate the 

execution of core competencies, which demands greater focus and discipline from tactical and

operational units. This reduces individual Soldier, unit, and staff bandwidth for the incorporation 

of new technologies introduced during conflict. 

D-3. Operating in dense urban terrain

 a. Challenges in dense urban terrain. There are several challenges to operating in DUT, 

including:

 (1) Constraining offensive maneuver operations by requiring the attacker to expend force 

and energy either to secure lines of communications in the vicinity of a bypassed city or to enter 

and clear the city.
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D-3

 (2) Obscuring operations and forces (physical and cognitive).

 (3) Increasing requirements for combat power to maintain operational reach, sustain 

relative advantages, prevent early culmination, and enable stability operations.

 (4) Requiring the synchronization and integration of lethal and nonlethal effects in 

congested and contested spaces. 

 (5) Challenging the ability to seize the initiative, and dictate operational tempo as a result

of greater friction and attrition.

 (6) Sustaining friendly forces in widely dispersed locations to include providing medical 

and mortuary affairs support/evacuation.

 b. To set politically favorable conditions for conflict, in competition an adversary will focus 

information warfare and unconventional warfare operations on targeted populations and 

influential DUT. During the transition to armed conflict, adversary forces will rapidly seize 

vulnerable urban areas to enable swift consolidation of gains and protection of lines of 

communications. Dense urban terrain’s advantages thus lay in the potential for providing early 

warning and slowing enemy operational tempo. To capitalize on these advantages, the Army

must understand, organize, and train to operate in strategically and operationally significant 

urban areas. 

 (1) Understanding dense urban terrain in competition. To best understand DUT in 

competition, the Army should position forces in operationally and strategically significant cities. 

The placement of Army forces in cities, however, is likely to cause political complications. 

Regardless, understanding urban areas during competition requires a grasp of the characteristics 

of DUT described above, and the best ways to employ urban terrain defensively during conflict. 

Dense urban terrain provides early warnings of enemy intent, or partner nation activities likely 

elicit a military response from the enemy (such as anti-Russian rallies in Kiev in 2014). 

Understanding the flow of people and ideas enables the Army to identify major environmental 

changes, which is essential to understanding DUT in competition. This level of understanding 

requires technical collection means, but is largely achievable through physical presence (e.g.,

HUMINT and SOF) and the collection of open source data, particularly from social media. By 

developing an understanding of the cognitive and operational characteristics of DUT during 

competition, the Army gains an initial advantage in armed conflict. 

 (2) Understanding dense urban terrain in conflict. Once conflict starts, the urban 

environment becomes increasingly dynamic, which quickly erodes initial advantages in 

understanding. Gaining or maintaining an understanding of an urban area during conflict 

requires considerable technical means to enable collection, analysis, and display of multi-domain 

data. Joint and partner nation collection means, primarily mechanical sensors, must saturate the 

terrain and airspace above a city. This enables collection of immense amounts of data regarding 

the physical, cognitive, and operational characteristics of DUT. From the large volume and 

various forms of collected data, intelligence analysts must synthesize and isolate information 

critical to operations and decision making. Then, to enable the rapid action against smaller and 
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D-4

easily concealed forces, mission command systems must display analyzed data in near real-time. 

Technical understanding of DUT in conflict serves two primary purposes. First, it provides units 

with situational awareness of the immediate area. Second, mechanical sensors enable 

intelligence collection that supports targeting and shaping operations. Establishing and 

maintaining situational awareness in DUT, however, consumes considerable resources, which 

challenges Army capability and capacity to collect and processing, exploitation, and 

dissemination of intelligence, which necessitate artificial intelligence-enabled processes.

 (3) Organizing for operations in dense urban terrain. No single military Service or Army 

unit is capable of unilaterally operating in DUT during competition or conflict. During 

competition, the Army relies on host nation and whole-of-government approval and support for 

its presence and operations. During conflict, the Army supports host nation operations in urban 

environments to mitigate political risk and reduce operational costs for U.S. forces. Dense urban 

terrain operations also require considerable synchronization of joint capabilities and integration 

of conventional and special operations forces. Further, maneuver units must create combined 

arms teams with a mixture of engineer, armor, infantry, and artillery forces. This enables 

movement to and through urban areas, and penetration and clearance of physical structures. 

Disaggregated maneuver units move along splintered axes of advance and conduct distributed 

operations, which require more sustainment and maneuver support resources. To understand and 

support DUT operations, echelons above brigade must streamline processes to enable faster more 

precise communications, decision making, and enabler support. Finally, urban operations 

require extensive Joint Force generation and logistics, which depend on a robust theater army 

and enabling commands to set the theater during competition. 

 (4) Training for operations in dense urban terrain. The Army must train at echelon for 

urban operations. Successful urban operations are predicated on the ability to conduct three 

essential tasks. First, multi-domain isolation of an urban area to control logistics and 

communications. Second, penetration of the hardened exterior boundary and internal structures 

of an urban area. Third, the ability to gain and maintain contact with the enemy once inside 

DUT. Although effective tactical engagement is an important aspect of these tasks, operational 

and strategic actions ensure victory in urban battles. Field armies and corps train to manage the 

political conditions and operational tasks associated with isolating urban areas. Field armies and 

corps, in conjunction with divisions, train to plan and execute rapid maneuver operations. These 

units must also train to set the sustainment infrastructure required to project and maintain combat 

forces, should urban combat require deliberate house-to-house clearance operations. At and 

below the division level, maneuver units train to penetrate and operate in urban terrain. 

Divisions train to support maneuver units by coordinating force generation and projection, 

sustainment, and joint effects integration. Brigades and below train to penetrate urban terrain, 

and gain and maintain contact with the enemy in this complex environment.

 (5) Operating in dense urban terrain. As an expeditionary force, the Army primarily 

operates in urban areas during natural or man-made disasters. This has conditioned the Army to 

visualize urban operations in conflict terms defined by minimal understanding and offensive or 

stability actions. Dense urban terrain, however, is increasingly a competition space, which 

provides the Army an opportunity to deter conflict. By operating in DUT, the Army can better 

understand enemy intentions and coordinate training exercises to confront aggression and 
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D-5

conduct IEO and special operations to deter escalation. In conflict, urban areas support 

defensive operations against larger, more sophisticated forces, but remain vulnerable to isolation. 

During offensive operations, DUT constrains maneuver and slows operational tempo requiring 

additional forces. Finally, stabilizing or consolidating gains in urban areas, particularly partner

nation capitals and DUT surrounding critical air and sea ports, is essential to securing lines of 

communications and political support for all operations.

 c. The tenets of MDO applied in dense urban terrain.

 (1) Calibrate force posture. Calibrated force posture for DUT operations requires 

preparation during competition. Actions in competition focus on visualizing urban environments 

in enough detail to anticipate their unique force generation, sustainment, and intelligence 

requirements during conflict. This enables theater and field armies to effectively set the theater. 

 (a) Forces. U.S. forces must focus on prepositioning theater enabling commands (TEC) 

that support intelligence, fires (lethal and nonlethal), sustainment, and mission command 

functions. Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is the Army's operational intelligence 

arm. Through the Military Intelligence Brigade-Theater (MIB-T), INSCOM enables the 

geographic combatant command (GCC) to focus collection efforts on operationally and 

strategically significant urban areas. Lethal and nonlethal fires TEC allow GCC to synchronize 

joint effects during initial phases of conflict operations. Operational control measures that will 

be required to converge lethal and nonlethal fires in DUT areas can be established and rehearsed 

in competition. Sustainment TEC develop pre-conflict estimates and pre-coordinate contracting 

requirements needed to maintain forces executing deliberate urban operations. Finally, mission 

command requires headquarters elements to command and control, exercise authority, and 

provide direction. Signal TEC provide the network capability and capacity to support coalition 

operations in congested and contested communications space. Signal TEC also enable the 

distribution of massive amounts of intelligence and information flowing from the DUT. Setting 

the theater with enough intelligence, fires, sustainment, and mission command capability 

provides GCC with the capacity to visualize critical urban areas during competition, and 

transition to conflict when required. 

 (b) Footprint. An increase in forward presence forces requires a commensurate increase in 

the forward footprint (facilities). Basing and infrastructure to accommodate in-theater forces 

must enable joint and combined operations in urban operations. APS also need to be evaluated 

and adjusted to support U.S., partner, or allied maneuver, fires, sustainment, and force protection 

operations in urban areas. 

 (c) Agreements. Agreements with partner nations and allies must account for force and 

footprint requirements, and for increased intelligence and information gathering activities in 

specific urban areas. If U.S. forces intend to understand DUT during competition, activities such 

as IPB or operational preparation of the environment will increase and likely require Department 

of the State awareness, if not concurrence. IPB or operational preparation of the environment is 

best conducted in collaboration with the host nation. Additionally, joint and coalition forces 

must establish urban specific rules of engagement during competition to inform set the theater 

requirements and enable a rapid transition to armed conflict. 
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D-6

 (2) Multi-domain formations. Since dense urban terrain operations attrit forces at a higher 

rate than operations in other environments, formations, systems, and Soldiers that provide the 

combination of capacity, capability, and endurance necessary to operate across multiple domains 

in contested spaces against a near-peer adversary are required. Independent maneuver enables 

quicker adaptation by units operating in a constantly evolving DUT. Cross-domain fires 

integrates and delivers lethal and nonlethal fires across all domains, the EMS, and the 

information environment effecting the physical, cognitive, and operational characteristics present 

within DUT. Finally, each combatant in urban operations exerts constant physical and 

psychological pressure on its adversary. The Army requires human dimension research that 

enables mitigation of these impacts on friendly forces while increasing, particularly, the 

psychological impact of urban operations on the enemy.

 (3) Convergence. The advantages of convergence, creation of cross-domain synergy and 

the layering of options, apply equally in DUT. Implementation of convergence, however, may 

be challenged by complex and congested physical and virtual environments and potential 

restrictions of rules of engagement. There may be increased use of nonlethal effects, and not all 

lethal effects may be useable. 

D-4. Conclusion

Urban environments are inherently multi-domain. The interconnectedness of urban areas enables 

the flow of information, people, and commodities that make this environment disproportionately 

influential to all human affairs, including armed conflict. Dense urban terrain compresses 

physical and temporal spaces, compounds obstacles, and demands the simultaneous execution of 

multiple tasks. This means that while operations are slowed, the pace and complexity of tactical 

engagements increases. Employing the components of MDO in conjunction with improvements 

in Army capacity and capability to understand, organize, and train to operate in DUT enables 

successful operations.
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Appendix E

Linkage to other concepts

E-1. This concept has linkages to the following concepts: Capstone Concept for Joint 

Operations, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Marine Corps Operating 

Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century, Air Superiority 2030 Flight 

Plan, Air Force Future Operating Concept, Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC), 

Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global 

Commons (JAM-GC), Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO), Joint Concept for Human 

Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO), and Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation. 

E-2. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations establishes globally integrated operations as the 

future joint operational concept designed to address the challenge of meeting unremitting 

strategic requirements with constrained military resources. This concept describes how the Joint 

Force, and particularly ground forces, will overcome current challenges for rapid aggregation of 

globally distributed forces to conduct globally integrated operations.

E-3. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower states that naval forces perform these 

essential functions: all-domain access, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime 

security. The U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept proposes joint approaches that help 

address these essential functions.

E-4. The Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st 

Century focuses on five key drivers of change: complex terrain, technology proliferation,

information as a weapon, battle of signatures, and increasingly contested maritime domain. The 

U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept proposes joint approaches that help address these 

changes.

E-5. Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan states that developing and delivering air superiority for the 

highly contested environment in 2030 requires a multi-domain focus on capabilities and 

capacity. 

E-6. The Air Force Future Operating Concept states that flexibility in operational agility 

manifests as integrated MDO. It further asserts that operationally agile forces will defeat future 

enemy threats by fighting in a highly coordinated manner under the principle of mission 

command, and that this approach must be developed within the framework of the joint and 

combined team.

E-7. The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) describes a complex operational

environment in which the Joint Force continually campaigns within the competition continuum, 

which features some mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed 

conflict. Within this construct, the purpose of the Joint Force is to continually seek the 

maintenance and sustainment of strategic aims, while countering efforts of revisionist states to 

undermine U.S. interests. MDO offers the means for the Joint Force to more effectively 

campaign across the competition continuum. 
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E-2

E-8. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) identifies the problem of projecting military 

force into an operational area and sustaining it in the face of armed opposition by increasingly 

capable enemies and within contested domains. The JOAC proposes employing cross-domain 

synergy – the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different 

domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the 

others – to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will provide the freedom of 

action required by the mission. This concept shows how ground forces will help to obtain crossdomain synergy in support of the joint campaign.

E-9. The Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) states that 

the future force must be distributable, resilient, and tailorable, with sufficient scale and capable 

of operations of ample duration. The JAM-GC’s solution includes advanced integration of 

operations across multiple domains, both inside and outside the contested environment. This is 

consistent with many of the ideas in this paper. This concept expands JAM-GC’s premises from 

the global commons to operational maneuver by combined arms formations on land, integrated 

with those in the air, maritime, cyberspace, and space domains.

E-10. The Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO) focuses on the integration of force 

capabilities across domains in order to secure freedom of maneuver on foreign territory within an 

operational area. This concept complements and helps set conditions for the operational ideas in 

the JCEO.

E-11. The Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO) supports the 

U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept’s need to understand relevant actors’ motivations 

and the underpinnings of their will. JC-HAMO acknowledges the centrality of human will in 

war and provides a framework that integrates with the commander’s decision cycle, enabling the 

Joint Force to influence a range of relevant actors. The goal of this concept is to improve 

understanding and effectiveness for cognitive activities during the conduct of operations. 

E-12. The Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation seeks to improve the speed, effectiveness, and 

efficiency of Joint Force aggregation in support of globally integrated operations. It describes 

the idea of forming operationally coherent joint and combined forces by quickly combining 

forces and capabilities, internally and with mission partners, across domains, echelons, 

geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations. MDO complements this with the idea of 

dynamically calibrating force posture.
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Appendix F

Lessons learned from the fielded force

F-1. Lessons to inform the U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept

The Army has begun a rigorous process of experimentation and analysis to further inform and 

refine the U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations concept. In 2017, the Chief of Staff of the 

Army (CSA) directed the design and testing of Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) as forwardstationed formations able to execute aspects of MDO. Designed to deliver long-range precision 

joint strike as well as integrate air and missile defense, electronic warfare, space, cyber, and 

information operations, the MDTF operates across all domains, the EMS, and the information 

environment in both competition and conflict to provide the Joint Force and coalition with new 

capabilities to enable the defeat adversaries’ anti-access and area denial strategies. Given its 

capability to compete and provide and initial penetration, the MDTF, as a forerunner to other 

multi-domain formations now in development, is the essential first step to realizing an MDOcapable Army by 2028.

 a. U.S. Army Pacific is building the first experimental MDTF and executing a multi-year joint 

and combined experimentation program to inform future MDTF design. This experiment

combines 17th Field Artillery Brigade with an augmented headquarters element, a joint 

intelligence, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and space (ICEWS) component, and other tasked 

organized formations to provide realistic assessments of concepts and capabilities and gather

warfighter feedback to inform both Army plans and concept development. Forward stationed 

MDTFs with capabilities in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment create new 

dilemmas for adversaries that strengthen deterrence by complicating potential enemy war plans. 

During conflict, MDTFs also enable successful combat operations through early attrition of the 

adversary’s anti-access and area denial systems and supporting combat forces from the inside, 

thereby re-enabling joint and combined maneuver held at risk today. Over numerous 

experiments and exercises in 2018, the MDTF successfully linked systems and Services across

all domains, the EMS, and the information environment in ways never previously accomplished. 

Joint and combined components demonstrated new ways to share surveillance and targeting 

capabilities in support of combined schemes of maneuver. Most significantly, the MDTF 

demonstrated methods of employing layered non-kinetic effects (EW, space, cyberspace, and 

information operations) that helped set the conditions for successful combined kinetic 

engagements against both maritime and airborne targets. U.S. Army Pacific’s efforts have 

provided critical lessons for both the Army and the Joint Force and are enabling faster, and 

effective transitions of MDO from concept to fielded capabilities.

 b. Joint Warfighter Assessment (JWA) is the Army's capstone multi-echelon live and 

constructive exercise intended to demonstrate and assess future force concepts and capabilities 

required for a more lethal, expeditionary, and agile force. JWA exercises establish the 

conditions to assess unit execution of the MDO concept, ensure integration and interoperability 

of joint and multinational partners, and integrate and assess future force concepts and 

capabilities. To achieve an MDO-capable Army by 2028, JWA exercises provide the Army with 

valuable opportunities to focus the approach to "operationalizing MDO." These exercises allow 

for multi-echelon participants to experiment with the conceptual component solutions and to 

mature enabling capabilities to solve the five key problems of the MDO fight against a peer 
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F-2

adversaries: how does the Joint Force compete, penetrate, disintegrate, exploit, and re-compete 

throughout the depth of the operational environment to fight, win, and survive. JWA 18-1 was 

the first, examining MDO ideas at Grafenwoehr, Germany, between 27 April and 10 May 2018. 

F-2. Lessons learned – tenets of MDO

 a. Calibrated force posture. To effectively compete against a near-peer adversary, the Joint 

Force requires forward deployed multi-domain formations that operate within the range of an 

adversary’s long-range anti-access and area denial systems. As a component of the Joint Force, 

the Army presents a reasonable option to provide an enduring and resilient posture in areas 

contested by an adversary’s actions in competition and armed conflict. 

 (1) Ideally, these formations would represent the Army component of a permanent or 

virtual CJTF that develops habitual training relationships. These Army formations, however, 

must also have the capability to execute independent maneuver and employ cross-domain fires 

based on the Joint Force Commander’s intent in cases where command and control capabilities 

are severely degraded. Multi-domain formations would also employ movement and maneuver 

throughout the theater in the competition phase and conduct capabilities demonstrations in 

support of deterrence, influence operations, and military deception plans.

 (2) Non-kinetic effects are increasingly important in setting the conditions for successful 

kinetic operations by creating a relative advantage, particularly when force ratios favor an 

adversary. Effects such as denial and disruption of enemy communications, surveillance, 

tracking, navigation capabilities, the introduction of false information into enemy networks, and 

influence operations will be increasingly important factors of successful kinetic engagements. 

These can only be provided by forward deployed forces operating within areas or regions 

contested by an adversary.

 b. Multi-domain formations. 

 (1) Wargames and simulations indicate that ground forces are relatively survivable 

(compared to air and naval forces) operating deep within an adversary’s anti-access and area 

denial threat zone, provided they employ a layered set of protective measures. These measures 

include dispersal; a robust mobility plan; strict emissions control until certain trigger criteria are 

met; camouflage, concealment, and deception (including electromagnetic deception); and mobile 

mission command. Multi-domain formations provide a decisive contribution to the Joint Force 

by immediately contesting enemy aggression and conducting the initial penetration of enemy 

long-range systems from inside the range of their anti-access and aerial denial systems.

 (2) Training and evaluating Soldiers and leaders in executing MDO will require state of the 

art real-time wargame simulation capabilities that include other Service, interagency, and 

multinational partner capabilities.

 c. Convergence. Convergence is achieved both through Service-centric and joint integration 

of capabilities in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment. Schemes for Service-
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F-3

centric integration are well-advanced. The Joint Force, however, has important shortfalls in its 

capability to achieve Joint convergence. Some shortfalls are technical, others are conceptual.

 (1) Technical shortfalls. Two of the most important technical shortfalls are the lack of a 

joint common operational picture (COP) and limitations in joint sensor-to-shooter loop 

functionality. The Joint Force requires a COP, or visualization and decision support tool, which 

allows commanders in any Service, at any echelon, in any mission area, and at any classification 

level to "down-select" the categories of information they need to make informed decisions. It 

should also include the technical means to get that information pushed to them from all 

supporting components. The joint and combined team also require the capability for any joint 

sensor to publish surveillance and targeting data so it is available to any joint shooter, kinetic or 

non-kinetic. Army multi-domain formations must have the capability, for example, to receive 

targeting data and clearance of fires from joint platforms such as the F-35, Aegis, or from other 

Theater or National Technical Means. The Army and the other Services have many programs 

and initiatives underway that can help close these shortfalls.

 (2) Conceptual shortfalls. 

 (a) Mission command. The Army must continue to build trusted teams of professionals 

that thrive in ambiguity and chaos and who are empowered through a doctrine of mission 

command to rapidly react to threats and opportunities based on a commander's intent. The MDO 

concept leverages a critical U.S. military advantage—our people. But the Army does not always 

design our training programs and exercises in ways that facilitate or require this type of 

decentralized decision making. More intellectual effort is required to improve training designs 

that facilitate mission command of MDO given the increased complexity.

 (b) Authorities. Many of the most important non-kinetic capabilities across the Joint 

Force are compartmented, and only a small number of staff at the theater headquarters level are 

authorized access. Many of these same programs require authorization to employ a capability at 

the Secretarial level or higher and/or authorization from a functional combatant command. The 

Joint Force needs to put in place and exercise processes to rapidly obtain approval to employ 

these capabilities in support of tactical operations (i.e., below Corps, Fighter Wing, Carrier Strike 

Group, and Marine Expeditionary Force). This is particularly critical when force ratios favor an 

adversary.

 (c) Munitions optimization planning. Limited inventories of munitions across the Joint 

Force could create critical shortfalls that lead to defeat in combat. Therefore, when multiple 

joint fires systems are in kinetic range of the same adversary threats, munitions plans that 

optimize and sequence fires can help husband limited resources while achieving desired effects. 

An integrated munitions optimization plan is required in addition to de-confliction mechanisms.

F-3. Lessons learned – materiel modernization

While DoD once dominated virtually all technological development related to combat 

operations, today the commercial sector is producing many combat enabling technologies faster 

than DoD. In some areas, DoD acquisition processes almost guarantee the obsolescence of 

equipment by the time it is fielded. Ongoing acquisition reforms efforts recommend the Army 
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F-4

consider selective fielding of new capabilities that are Acquisition Category II or III and adopt 

the "Buy, Try, Decide" model pioneered by U.S. Special Operations Command. This will help 

ensure Army formations remain equipped with state of the art capabilities to meet their mission 

requirements and will allow the Army to better assess what emerging capabilities should become 

new Army programs of record or which might inform change proposals to current programs of 

record.
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G-1

Appendix G

References

Section I

Required References. Army regulations, Department of the Army pamphlets, field manuals

(FMs), Army doctrine publications, Army doctrine reference publications (ADRP), and 

Department of the Army forms are available at Army Publishing Directorate home page 

http://www.usapa.army.mil TRADOC publications and forms are available at TRADOC 

Administrative Publications home page at http://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil. Joint publications 

(JPs) are available on the Joint Electronic Library at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm or https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/ 

index.jsp?pindex=0

Army-Marine Corps Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century White Paper 

(2017, January 18)

Joint Operating Environment 2035, The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World

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The U.S. Army Capstone Concept

Section II

Related References

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

Army Doctrine Publication 1-01

Air Force Future Operating Concept

Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan

Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic 

of China 2015. (2015, April 7). Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents 

/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations Planners Guide – January 2016

Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations 

FM 3-60

The Targeting Process
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G-2

FM 3-90-1

Offense and Defense Volume 1

Fruhling, S., & Lasconjarias, G. (2016, March 21). NATO, A2/AD, and the Kaliningrad 

challenge. Survival Magazine, 58(2), 95-116. Retrieved from 

https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2016-5e13/survival--global-politics-andstrategy-april-may-2016-eb2d/58-2-07-fruhling-and-lasconjarias-de87

Grau, L.W. & Bartles C. K. (2017 July). The Russian Way of War, Force Structure, Tactics and 

Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces. Foreign Military Studies Office. Retrieved from 

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/fmso-bookshelf

Johnson, D. (2016). The Challenges of the “Now” and Their Implications for the U.S. Army, 

RAND. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE184.html

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons

Joint Concept for Entry Operations

Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations

Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning

Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation

Joint Operational Access Concept

Karber, P. & Thibeault, P. (2016, May 13). Russia’s new-generation warfare. Army Magazine. 

Retrieved from http://www.armymagazine.org/2016/05/13/russias-new-generation-warfare/

Karber, P. (2015, July 8). “Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War: Personal 

Observations,” Report for the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory and U.S. Army 

Capabilities Center, The Potomac Foundation. Retrieved from 

https://prodev2go.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/rus-ukr-lessons-draft.pdf

Littoral Operations in Contested Environments

Retrieved from https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/concepts/littoral-operationscontested-environment

Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century

Paul, C. and Matthews, M. (2016). The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model, 

RAND Corporation. Retrieved from 

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE198/RAND_PE198.pdf
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Rinehart, I. E. (2016, March). The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress. 

Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from 

https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc847539/m2/1/high_res_d/R44196_2016Mar24.p

df

Romjue, J. (1984, June). From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army 

Doctrine, 1973-1982. Historical Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Retrieved 

from https://books.google.com/books/about/From_active_defense_to_AirLand_Battle.html?id 

=RqcZAAAAIAAJ

Shlapak, D. and Johnson, M. (2016). “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, 

Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics,” RAND. Retrieved from 

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html

Skinner, D. (1988, September). AirLand Battle Doctrine, Professional Paper 463, Center for 

Naval Analysis. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA202888& 

Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Snegovaya, M. (2015, September). Russia Report I, “Putin’s Information Warfare in the 

Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare.” Retrieved from 

http://www.understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-originsrussias-hybrid-warfare

Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening 

the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved from 

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-StrategySummary.pdf

Thomas, T. L. (2007). Decoding the Virtual Dragon: Critical Evolutions in the Science and 

Philosophy of China’s Information Operations and Military Strategy, Foreign Military Studies 

Office. Retrieved from https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/fmso-bookshelf

Thomas, T. L. (2016, May 2). Russia Military Strategy, Impacting 21st Century Reform and 

Geopolitics, Foreign Military Studies Office. Retrieved from 

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/EPubs/Epubs/Thomas_Russian%20Military%20Strategy_Final_(2%20May%202016).pdf

Unified Challenge 18.1 Seminar Final Event Report. Mission Command Battle Lab. Available 

upon request from the proponent.

Weitz, R. (2014, August). “NATO Must Adapt to Counter Russia’s Next-Generation Warfare;” 

World Politics Review. Retrieved from http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13976/ 

nato-must-adapt-to-counter-russia-s-next-generation-warfare
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

G-4

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence. (2016, February 9). Retrieved from 

http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default /files/wwt2016.pdf
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

GL-1

Glossary

Section I

Abbreviations

ADRP Army doctrine reference publication

APS Army prepositioned stocks

DoD Department of Defense

DUT dense urban terrain

EMS electromagnetic spectrum

EW electronic warfare

FM field manual

HUMINT human intelligence

IADS integrated air defense system

IEO information environment operations

IRC information-related capability

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JAM-GC Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons 

JCEO Joint Concept for Entry Operations

JCIC Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning

JOAC Joint Operational Access Concept

JP joint publication

LRPF long-range precision fires

MDO Multi-Domain Operations

MDTF Multi-Domain Task Force

MRL multiple rocket launcher

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SOF special operations forces

SAM surface-to-air missile

SRBM short-range ballistic missile

TEC theater enabling command

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

UAS unmanned aircraft system

U.S. United States

Section II

Terms

adversary

A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force 

may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

air domain

The atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon 

operations become negligible. (JP 3-30)
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GL-2

armed conflict

When the use of violence is the primary means by which an actor seeks to satisfy its interests. 

(JCIC)

battlefield*

The area where military operations are conducted to achieve military goals consisting of all 

domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace), the electromagnetic spectrum, and the 

information environment (including human cognitive aspects). It includes factors and conditions 

that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the 

mission including enemy and friendly armed forces, infrastructure, weather, and terrain within 

the operational areas and areas of interest.

calibrated force posture*

The combination of position and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances. It includes, 

but is not limited, to basing and facilities, formations and equipment readiness, the distribution of 

capabilities across components, strategic transport availability, interoperability, access, and 

authorities.

campaign

A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives 

within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

Close Area*

Where friendly and enemy formations, forces, and systems are in imminent physical contact and

contest for control of physical space in support of campaign objectives.

competition

The condition when two or more actors in the international system have incompatible interests 

but neither seeks to escalate to open conflict in pursuit of those interests. While violence is not 

the adversary’s primary instrument in competition, challenges may include a range of violent 

instruments including conventional forces with uncertain attribution to the state sponsor. (JCIC)

contested spaces*

Those areas where U.S., allied, or coalition forces can challenge the adversary’s denial measures, 

maintain some degree of friendly freedom of action, and potentially deny adversary freedom of 

action.

convergence*

Rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, 

and information environment that optimizes effects to overmatch the enemy through crossdomain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission command and disciplined 

initiative.

counterinsurgency

Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain 

insurgency and address its root causes. (JP 3-34)
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GL-3

cross-domain*

Having an effect from one domain into another.

cross-domain fires*

The integration and delivery of lethal and nonlethal fires across all five domains (land, maritime, 

air, space and cyberspace), the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment.

cross-domain maneuver

The employment of mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities of multiple domains to 

create conditions designed to generate overmatch, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and 

enable Joint Force freedom of movement and action. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6)

cross-domain synergy

The complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such 

that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others – to 

establish superiority in some combination of domains that will provide the freedom of action 

required by the mission. (Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, JOAC)

cyberspace

A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks 

of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, 

telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. 

(JP 3-12)

cycle time*

The shortest overall time required to complete one full linkage of preparation, planning and 

execution, duration, and reset of a capability.

decisive operation

The operation that directly accomplishes the mission. (ADRP 3-0)

decisive space*

Conceptual geographic and temporal location where the full optimization of the employment of 

cross-domain capabilities generates a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influences 

the outcome of an operation.

Deep Fires Areas*

The areas beyond the feasible range of movement for conventional forces but where joint fires, 

SOF, information, and virtual capabilities can be employed.

Deep Maneuver Area*

The area where maneuver forces can go (beyond the Close Area) but is so contested that 

maneuver still requires significant allocation and convergence of multi-domain capabilities.

destroy

Tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat ineffective until it is 

reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot 
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GL-4

perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-

90-1)

denied spaces*

Those areas where the adversary can severely constrain U.S. and allied forces’ freedom of action 

through anti-access and area denial and other measures.

dense urban terrain* 

Areas characterized by extraordinarily closely-packed manmade infrastructure and high 

population density, potentially including concentrations of high-rise buildings, subterranean 

features, and densely packed slums.

dis-integrate*

Break the coherence of the enemy's system by destroying or disrupting its subcomponents (such 

as command and control means, intelligence collection, critical nodes, etc.) degrading its ability 

to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to 

fight.

dislocate*

Render the enemy’s strength irrelevant (and ill positioned) by achieving positional advantage 

through movement, removing the enemy from the decisive point, or achieving functional 

advantage through technology or tactics. (proposed change to existing doctrinal term)

domain*

An area of activity within the operational environment (land, air, maritime, space, and 

cyberspace) in which operations are organized and conducted. (modified joint definition)

echeloning or echelonment*

Maneuver of forces from the Strategic and Operational Support Areas into the Tactical Support 

Area and Close Area.

electromagnetic spectrum

The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 

alphabetically designated bands. (JP 3-13.1)

enemy

A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADRP 3-0)

engagement* 

The combination of physical, informational, and psychological actions taken to build 

relationships or influence actors' decision-making (moral and mental).

escalation advantage*

The ability to change the correlation of forces in your favor faster than an adversary.
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GL-5

expeditionary maneuver*

The rapid deployment of task-organized combined arms forces able to transition quickly to 

conduct operations of sufficient scale and ample duration to achieve strategic objectives. 

fix

A tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy from moving any part of his 

force from a specific location for a specific period. Fix is also an obstacle effect that focuses fire 

planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s movement within a specified area, normally an 

engagement area. (FM 3-90-1)

globally integrated operations

Operations arranged as cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a 

whole to address transregional, all domain, and multi-functional challenges. (Capstone Concept 

for Joint Operations (draft-2018))

hyperactive*

More active than usual or desirable; hyper-competitive during competition and hyper-violent in 

armed conflict.

independent maneuver*

Operating dispersed for an extended period without continuous [or contiguous] support from 

higher echelons while retaining the ability to concentrate combat power rapidly at decisive 

spaces by employing cross-domain fires and maneuver to achieve mission objectives within the 

intent of the theater campaign.

information space*

The complex system of interrelated and networked information flows amongst and between 

populations that a commander must understand and consider to gain and maintain freedom of 

action.

information environment

The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act 

on information. (JP 3-13)

information environment operations*

Integrated employment of information related capabilities (IRC) in concert with other lines of 

operation to influence, deceive, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of enemies and 

adversaries while protecting our own; to influence enemy formations and populations to reduce 

their will to fight; and influence friendly and neutral populations to enable friendly operations.

information operations

Integrated employment, during military operations, of information related capabilities (IRC) in 

concert with other lines of operation to influence, deceive, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision 

making of enemies and adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 3-13)
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GL-6

information warfare

Employing information capabilities in a deliberate disinformation campaign supported by actions 

of the intelligence organizations designed to confuse the enemy and achieve strategic objectives 

at minimal cost.54F

55

interoperability

The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. (JP 3-0) 2. The condition 

achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics 

equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between 

them and/or their users. (JP 6-0)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

An integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning 

and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in 

direct support of current and future operations. Also called ISR. (JP 2-01)

irregular warfare

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the 

relevant population(s). Also called IW. (JP 1) [Note: Irregular warfare favors indirect and 

asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, to 

erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.]

isolate

A tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically— an 

enemy from sources of support, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and prevent the isolated 

enemy force from having contact with other enemy forces. (FM 3-90-1)

land domain

The area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime 

domain in the landward segment of the littorals. (JP 3-31)

littoral

The littoral comprises two segments of the operational environment: 1. Seaward: the area from 

the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. 

Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the 

sea. (JP 2-01.3)

maritime domain

The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including 

the littorals. (JP 3-32)

multi-domain*

Dealing with more than one domain at the same time.

 55 Derived from Russia Report I, pg 9. Adapts Soviet reflexive control to the contemporary geopolitical context. “Reflexive control” is defined as 

a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision 

desired by the initiator of the action.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

GL-7

multi-domain formations*

Army organizations possessing the combination of capacity, capability, and endurance necessary 

to operate across multiple domains in contested spaces against a near-peer adversary.

Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)*

Operations conducted across multiple domains and contested spaces to overcome an adversary’s 

(or enemy’s) strengths by presenting them with several operational and/or tactical dilemmas 

through the combined application of calibrated force posture; employment of multi-domain 

formations; and convergence of capabilities across domains, environments, and functions in time 

and spaces to achieve operational and tactical objectives.

near-peer adversaries*

Those nation states with the intent, capabilities, and capacity to contest U.S. interests globally in 

most or all domains, the EMS, and the information environment.

neutralize

A tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of 

interfering with a particular operation. (FM 3-90-1)

operational maneuver*

Maneuver that supports operational level objectives; usually occurs within a theater of operations 

(intratheater) 

operational preparation of the environment

The conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape the 

operational environment. (JP 3-05)

Operational Support Area*

The area of responsibility from which most of the air and maritime capabilities derive their 

source of power, control, and sustainment as well as where ground forces enter theater, organize, 

and prepare for rapid onward movement and integration.

overmatch*

The application of capabilities or unique tactics either directly or indirectly, with the intent to 

prevent or mitigate opposing forces from using their current or projected equipment or tactics.

planning and execution time*

The time required to plan employment and then execute it to create an effect, to include creating

a window of advantage. Typically, planning and preparation occur simultaneously though 

depending on the situation and capability one or the other might be the limiting factor. 

position of relative advantage

A location or the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations that 

provides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

GL-8

enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage. (ADRP 3-

0)

precision logistics*

The art of delivering support forward utilizing a combination of sensor-driven predictive 

analysis, condition-based maintenance at the point of need, and robotic autonomous delivery 

combined with the beneficial results of demand reduction to enable multi-domain formations to 

present a credible deterrence during competition, to transition to armed conflict with speed and 

agility, and to execute Multi-Domain Operations in depth, including resupply of formations 

conducting independent maneuver to extend time and reach of protracted operations.

preparation time*

The time required to organize and maneuver forces or capabilities (e.g. a cyber weapon) from its 

current location to the intended employment space or window of advantage.

reset

A set of actions to restore equipment to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with 

a unit’s future mission. (JP 4-0)

resilience*

The ability for Army formations and systems at all echelons to operate in contested spaces 

against a capable adversary

shaping operation

An operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, 

other actors, and the terrain. (ADRP 3-0)

snap drill*

Rapid reaction military exercise to test combat readiness. 

space domain

The area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible.

(JP 3-14)

stand-off*

The physical, cognitive, and informational separation that enables freedom of action in any, 

some, or all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment to achieve 

strategic and/or operational objectives before an adversary can adequately respond. It is 

achieved with both political and military capabilities.

strategic maneuver*

Maneuver that supports strategic level objectives; usually occurs across more than one theater of 

operations (intertheater)
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GL-9

Strategic Support Area*

The area of cross-combatant command coordination, strategic sea and air lines of 

communications, and the homeland.

system

A group of interacting, interrelated, and interdependent components or subsytems that form a 

complex and unified whole. Systems have a purpose with their parts arranged in a way 

(structure) to carry out their purpose. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-3)

Tactical Support Area*

The area that directly enables decisive tactical operations in the Close Area and extension of 

capabilities into the Deep Maneuver and Deep Fires Areas. 

unconventional warfare

Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or 

overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, 

auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW. (JP 3-05.1)

window of superiority* 

Converging capabilities in time and space in selected domains and environments to enable 

commanders to gain localized control or physical, virtual, and/or cognitive influence over a 

specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful 

friendly operations. 

* Proposed definition.
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--i:;1--------- TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 

·1 

The U.S. Army 

in Multi-Domain Operations 

2028