1

Filed 1/8/24 P. v. Lashon CA1/3

Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MENIQUE LASHON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A163074

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 51814102)

On September 1, 2023, we issued our original opinion affirming the 

judgment against defendant Menique Lashon based on her conviction for one 

count of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree murder, together 

with true findings of special circumstance allegations. In that opinion, we 

found Lashon had forfeited her ability to bring a California Racial Justice Act 

(CRJA; Pen. Code, § 7451) claim on direct appeal by failing to file a motion in 

the trial court before judgment was entered and we affirmed the judgment.

On November 15, 2023, having granted Lashon’s petition for review, 

our Supreme Court remanded the case to us with directions to vacate our 

opinion2 and reconsider the cause in light of Assembly Bill No. 1118 (2023–

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 

2 Our Supreme Court ordered the depublication of our original opinion. 

Depublication does not bear on the merits of the case before us. (People v. 

Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425, fn. 4; see California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1125(d) [“[a] Supreme Court order to depublish is not an expression of 
2

2024 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1118), which modified the CRJA to allow for additional 

avenues of relief for claims made on direct appeal. Having now considered 

AB 1118’s amendments to the CRJA, we find the long-standing procedural 

appellate rules governing forfeiture of issues continue to apply and again 

affirm. 

Lashon has also filed a separate motion requesting we stay the appeal 

and remand the matter to the superior court to allow her to file a CRJA

motion. Under the circumstances presented here, we do not find good cause 

to grant this request.

DISCUSSION

I. GOVERNING LAW – SECTION 745 AS AMENDED BY AB 1118

In enacting section 745, the Legislature laudably declared its intention 

“to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system because 

racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable,

inimical to a fair criminal justice system, is a miscarriage of justice under

Article VI of the California Constitution, and violates the laws and 

Constitution of the State of California. Implicit bias, although often 

unintentional and unconscious, may inject racism and unfairness into 

proceedings similar to intentional bias. The intent of the Legislature is not to 

punish this type of bias, but rather to remedy the harm to the defendant’s 

case and to the integrity of the judicial system. It is the intent of the 

Legislature to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining 

convictions or in sentencing. It is the intent of the Legislature to reject the 

conclusion that racial disparities within our criminal justice are inevitable, 

and to actively work to eradicate them.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).) 

the court’s opinion of the correctness of the result of the decision or of any law 

stated in the opinion”].) 
3

To further the goal of eliminating racial bias in criminal proceedings, 

subdivision (a) of section 745, provides that “[t]he state shall not seek or 

obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis 

of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” Pertinent to our discussion, a violation 

of section 745 “is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of 

the evidence,” that “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court and during the 

proceedings,” a trial judge “exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant 

because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not 

purposeful.” (Id., subd. (a)(2)).

Subdivision (b) of section 745 informs defendants how to seek relief 

during various stages of a criminal proceeding. As originally enacted, 

effective January 1, 2021, defendants could seek relief by filing a motion in 

the trial court or, if judgment had been imposed, by filing a “petition for writ 

of habeas corpus or a motion under section 1473.7, in a court of competent 

jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (b).) When 

enacted, section 745 applied only prospectively to cases in which judgment 

had not been entered prior to January 1, 2021. (Stats. 2020, ch. 317.) 

Therefore, in all eligible cases – including Lashon’s case – the defendant had 

the opportunity to raise a CRJA claim in the trial court.

Section 745 was later amended effective January 1, 2023 to provide for 

retroactive application to judgments that were not final and created a 

timeline for judgments entered before January 1, 2021. (Stats. 2022, ch. 739, 

§ 2.) After retroactive application became possible, section 745 was modified 

by AB 1118 (Stats. 2023, ch. 464), effective January 1, 2024. The statute now 

provides that post-judgment CRJA claims based on the trial record may be 

raised on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence (including to cases 

with judgments entered before January 1, 2021). (Ibid.) The statute does not 
4

state that a defendant may raise a section 745 claim on direct appeal for the 

first time and does not refer to the general appellate rules governing the 

preservation or forfeiture of claims presented on direct appeal. In addition, a 

defendant may move to stay the appeal and request remand to file a 

section 745 motion in the trial court. (Ibid.) 

II. SECTION 745 CLAIMS REMAIN SUBJECT TO GENERAL APPELLATE 

RULES OF FORFEITURE

In our original decision, we held Lashon’s section 745 claim was not 

properly before us as she forfeited appellate review by failing to make a 

motion before entry of judgment. Our decision was based on well-settled 

general appellate rules of forfeiture. (See, e.g., People v. Elliot (2012) 53 

Cal.4th 535, 572 [defendant forfeited claim that trial court exhibited racial 

bias during jury selection process by failing to raise the issue at trial].) As we 

now explain, we hold AB 1118’s amendments to section 745 do not change our 

analysis or conclusion. 

The interpretation of section 745 as amended by AB 1118 is subject to 

de novo review. (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 382.) We first 

look at the statutory language based upon the customary meaning of that 

language; “ ‘ “[t]he words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping 

in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to 

the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to 

the extent possible.” [Citation.] If the statutory language is susceptible of 

more than one reasonable interpretation, we must look to additional canons 

of statutory construction to determine the Legislature’s purpose. [Citation.] 

“Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical 

circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the 

legislative intent.” ’ ” (Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 849–850.)
5

A. The Language of Section 745 Does Not Obviate the 

General Forfeiture Rules

As noted, section 745 was enacted effective January 1, 2021 and 

originally provided that the only methods for seeking relief for racial bias 

after entry of judgment were by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus3 or 

a motion under section 1473.74, in a court of competent jurisdiction. (§ 745, 

subd. (b); Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.5.) While the Legislature provided a 

defendant could raise a violation of section 745 for the first time in a habeas 

petition (see fn. 4, ante), there was no provision in section 745 “for raising a 

violation of the statute for the first time on direct appeal.” (People v. 

Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 323, 336 (Simmons).) Of course, this was 

3 Section 1473 was amended and currently provides, in pertinent part, 

that “[n]otwithstanding any other law, a writ of habeas corpus may also be 

prosecuted after judgment has been entered based on evidence that a 

criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation 

of subdivision (a) of Section 745;” that “[a] petition raising a claim of this 

nature for the first time, or on the basis of new discovery provided by the 

state or other new evidence that could not have been previously known by the 

petitioner with due diligence, shall not be deemed a successive or abusive 

petition;” and “[i]f the petitioner has a habeas corpus petition pending in 

state court, but it has not yet been decided, the petitioner may amend the 

existing petition with a claim that the petitioner’s conviction or sentence was 

sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a) of section 745.” 

(§ 1473, subd. (e); see Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 4; Stats. 2022, ch. 982, § 1.5; 

Stats. 2023, ch. 381, § 1.) 

4 Section 1473.7 was amended and currently provides, in pertinent part, 

that a person who is no longer in criminal custody may file a motion to vacate 

a conviction or sentence on the basis that a conviction or sentence was 

sought, obtained, or imposed on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin 

in violation of subdivision (a) of section 745; and the motion “shall be filed 

without undue delay from the date the moving party discovered, or could 

have discovered with the exercise of due diligence, the evidence that provides 

a basis for relief under this section or Section 745.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(3),(c); 

Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 5; Stats. 2021, ch. 420, § 1.) 
6

during the time that the CRJA was only applicable to cases in which 

judgment had not been entered prior to January 1, 2021 (§ 745, former 

subd. (j); Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2); in other words, those defendants –

including Lashon – whose trial court proceedings had not been completed by 

January 1, 2021 had the opportunity to raise a CRJA violation in the trial 

court prior to entry of judgment. 

In the amendments to the statute effective January 1, 2023

(Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2), the Legislature made section 745 relief available in 

all cases in which judgment was not final, and created a timeline for 

retroactive relief that was sought in a petition for habeas corpus or a section 

1473.3 motion in (1) capital cases and cases with certain immigration 

consequences (commencing January 1, 2023), (2) cases in which the 

defendant remained incarcerated (commencing January 1, 2024), (3) felony 

juvenile cases adjudicated on or after January 1, 2015 (commencing January 

1, 2025), and (4) all other felony juvenile cases (commencing

January 1, 2026). (§ 745, subd. (j); Stats 2022, ch. 739, § 2) 

Subsequent to the 2023 amendments, the Legislature was asked to 

consider whether a defendant could pursue a post-judgment section 745 claim 

by avenues other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a section 1473.7 

motion. (See Assem. Com. on Pub. Saf., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118 

(2023–2024 Reg. Sess., as amended Mar. 15, 2023, at p. 6.) The Legislature 

responded with AB 1118 (Stats. 2023, ch. 464), effective January 1, 2024, 

which now allows a defendant to seek review of a section 745 claim on direct 

appeal if the violation was based on the trial record. (§ 745, subd. (b).) As an

alternate method, a defendant may request a stay of the direct appeal and 

remand to allow the filing of a motion in the trial court. (Ibid.)
7

By the AB 1118 amendment, the Legislature did not include any 

language indicating a section 745 claim could be presented on direct appeal

for the first time. In the absence of such language, we conclude our review of 

a section 745 claim, like any other appellate claim, is subject to the general 

appellate rules of preservation and forfeiture of claims that could have been 

but were not made in the trial court. (See also Finley v. Superior Court

(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 21 [in habeas corpus proceedings, court is to 

determine whether petitioner is entitled to relief “and also whether the stated 

claims are for any reason procedurally barred;” italics added].) As an 

appellate court, we may not add language to a statute or rewrite it to conform 

to an asserted intent that does not appear in the plain language. (People v. 

Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 692.) “[O]ur task is ‘ “simply to ascertain 

and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert 

what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted. . . .” [Citation.] 

We cannot add . . . language . . . when the Legislature did not.’ ” (Hayes v. 

Temecula Valley Unified School Dist. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 735, 748.) 

Our interpretation is supported by an examination of other provisions 

in the statute addressing how to raise CJRA claims in the trial court. 

In 2022, the Legislature amended the statute to provide that a section 745

motion shall be made in the trial court “as soon as practicable upon the 

defendant learning of an alleged violation,” and “[a] motion that is not timely 

may be deemed waived, in the discretion of the court.” (§ 745, subd. (c); 

added by Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2.) When the Legislature again amended 

section 745 by AB 1118, it retained the waiver provision in subdivision (c) of 

section 745, which is consistent with the basic rationale of the forfeiture 

doctrine — i.e., “ ‘ “ ‘to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention 

of the trial court, so they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had.’ ” ’ ” 
8

(People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103.) The Legislature recognized 

that, for tactical reasons, some defendants might choose not to pursue a claim 

of racial bias in the trial court “ ‘in the hopes of an acquittal, with the thought 

that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an 

otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecution might well be 

difficult.’ ” (Id. at p. 1104 & fn. 15 [defendant’s challenge to venue may be 

forfeited if not raised by timely motion in trial court as failure to make 

motion “often will reflect a strategic decision on part of the defense, and . . . 

improper venue is a defect that easily can be remedied if timely raised”].) 

It makes little sense for the Legislature to prescribe a comprehensive 

procedure for making and adjudicating a section 745 motion at the trial level

(including a specific waiver provision for untimely motions), only to allow 

defendants who could have but did not use that procedure (thereby 

preserving their claim for review) to bypass that procedure and pursue a 

section 745 claim for the first time on direct appeal. 

B. Legislative History

To the extent it may be argued section 745 is ambiguous as to whether 

a defendant may raise a section 745 claim on direct appeal for the first time, 

we conclude the legislative history indicates the Legislature did not intend to

allow a defendant to pursue such a claim for the first time on direct appeal 

where it could have been but was not raised in the trial court. 

At the time the Legislature enacted AB 1118, it was made aware of 

general appellate rules of preservation and forfeiture of issues on direct 

appeal, and exceptions to those rules as judicially applied in analogous 

contexts. In explaining AB 1118’s technical changes being recommended to 

ensure racial bias claims were “processed more efficiently” and that “the 

intent of the law” was followed, the bill’s author explained as follows:
9

[A] CRJA claim based on the trial record may be raised on direct 

appeal from the conviction or sentence, not just in a habeas 

petition. (In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 636 [‘Appellate 

jurisdiction is limited to the four corners of the record on appeal 

. . . .’].) . . . [and] would also clarify that the defendant/appellant 

may move to stay the appeal and request remand to the superior 

court to file a CRJA motion. This may be necessary to permit the 

trial court to rule on the claim in the first instance, and to allow 

the parties to fully litigate the issue. (See Gray1 CPB, LLC v. 

SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 882, 897 [‘[I]t is 

fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider 

claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been 

but were not presented in the trial court. Thus, we ignore 

arguments, authority and facts not presented and litigated in the 

trial court’] (citation and quotations omitted); see also People v. 

Welch (1993) 5 Cal.5th 228, 237 [‘Reviewing courts have 

traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial 

where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported 

by substantive law then in existence’].) [¶] Generally, a trial court 

loses jurisdiction once an appeal is filed. But in other postconviction relief contexts, stays and remands have been 

permitted by the courts – for example to file a petition to vacate a 

felony murder conviction and be resentenced under SB 1437 

(Skinner), Chapter 1015, Statutes 2018. (See People v. Martinez

(2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 729 [‘A Court of Appeal presented 

with such a stay request and convinced it is supported by good 

cause can order the pending appeal stayed with a limited remand 

to the trial court for the sole purpose of permitting the trial court 

to rule on a petition under section 1170.95.’].)

(Assem. Com. Public Saf., com. on Assem. Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. 

Sess.) as amended Mar. 15, 2023, pp. 5–6.) 

Given the above discussion, we find it significant that the Legislature

did not include any language to the effect that a section 745 claim may be 

raised on direct appeal “for the first time,” which it could have easily done 

just as it did when amending the habeas proceedings. (See fn. 3, ante.) The 

omission of such language strongly suggests the Legislature intended to leave 
10

the issues of preservation and forfeiture of claims on direct appeal to be 

resolved by the courts based on long-standing procedural canons. “ ‘We are 

compelled to add language only in extreme cases where, as a matter of law, 

we are convinced that the Legislature, through inadvertence, failed to utilize 

the word or words which give purpose to its pronouncements.’ ” (Settle v. 

State of California (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 215, 220 (Settle).) Here, we see no 

compelling reason to add words to the statute as the legislative history does 

not evince an intent by the Legislature to strip the courts of their 

discretionary authority to determine whether a section 745 claim is 

reviewable on direct appeal where the claim could have been but was not 

presented in the trial court.5 

Lashon argues forfeiture should not apply because the legislative intent 

as expressed in the statute and subsequent amendments is that “all who can 

make a prima facie case for a RJA violation in their cases should have their 

claims heard,” and “[a]pplication of the forfeiture doctrine here cannot be 

viewed as a remedy to eliminate discriminatory practices, but only continue 

to cover up implicit biases which may not always be readily identifiable.” 

While we agree the Legislature meant to provide remedies for racial bias, 

“statutory statement of purpose does not override the express limits the 

Legislature has placed in the statutory text . . . and in the manner the 

5 Our original opinion was published approximately one month prior to 

the Governor’s signing of AB 1118. In that opinion, we explained why 

general appellate rules of forfeiture barred review of Lashon’s section 745 

claim on direct appeal and that no exceptions to forfeiture applied in this 

case. While the Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing judicial 

interpretations of a statute when it chooses to amend a statute (In re Joseph 

T., Jr. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 795–796), given the timing of our opinion 

and the status of AB 1118 in the legislative process, we do not rely on this 

presumption in reaching our decision.
11

statutory text has specified” for a defendant to pursue a remedy for racial 

bias. (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 

897.) 

Accordingly, taking into account the purpose of section 745 – to swiftly 

and effectively address racial bias as soon as practical upon a defendant 

learning of an alleged violation — and “the substantial state interest in 

protecting the integrity of the process from improper ‘sandbagging’ by a 

defendant” (Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1104) along with the language of 

the statute and its legislative history, we conclude a defendant may be found 

to have forfeited a section 745 claim of racial bias made for the first time on 

direct appeal in the absence of a showing that an exception to the forfeiture 

doctrine applies. If we are incorrect and the Legislature meant to allow a 

defendant to raise a section 745 claim for the first time on direct appeal, and 

to dispense with the rules of preservation and forfeiture for a claim that could 

have been but was not raised in the trial court, the Legislature is at liberty to 

amend the statute. (See Settle, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 220.) 

III. LASHON’S SECTION 745 CLAIM ON DIRECT APPEAL IS FORFEITED 

Lashon asserts the general forfeiture rule should not apply in this case

because her section 745 claim involves a “substantial right” or “an important 

issue of constitutional law.” Her reliance on In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 

Cal.4th 875 for this assertion is misplaced. In that case, our Supreme Court 

held a juvenile could present for the first time a constitutional challenge to a 

probation condition on direct appeal as it presented “a pure question of law, 

easily remediable on appeal by modification of the condition.” (Id. at p. 888.) 

However, the court did not conclude “that ‘all constitutional defects in 

conditions of probation may be raised for the first time on appeal, since there 

may be circumstances that do not present “pure questions of law that can be 
12

resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in 

the trial court.” [Citation.] In those circumstances, “[t]raditional objection 

and waiver principles encourage development of the record and a proper 

exercise of discretion in the trial court.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 889.) Simply put, 

Lashon’s claim of relief does not fall under the In re Sheena K. exception 

because it does not present a pure question of law that can be resolved 

without consideration as to what occurred during the trial and sentencing 

proceedings. 

Lashon also argues the general forfeiture rule should not apply because 

she did not have a meaningful opportunity to raise a section 745 claim in the 

trial court and an objection would have been futile. According to Lashon, 

there were no obvious signs of racial bias by the trial judge “[u]ntil the 

African American defense attorney corrected the judge on her misassumption 

that the attorney had not followed the correct procedure on a subpoena duces 

tecum for medical records of a victim.” “However, once this judge felt 

challenged by this attorney of color, both she and her client became targets of 

increasing hostility. This behavior seems most likely explained by the 

implicit bias held by the judge which was unleashed only after she felt her 

authority questioned. When the trial attorney did object to the trial court’s 

behaviors, she was met with denials and greater hostility.”

We find this argument unavailing as Lashon has not demonstrated she 

could not object or an objection would have been futile. Even if her counsel 

did not want to antagonize the trial judge during the trial, a section 745 

motion could have been filed immediately after the trial judge gave her 

reasons for choosing the sentence she was about to impose. (See, e.g., People 

v. Garcia (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 290, 295–298 (Garcia) [trial court abused its 
13

discretion in denying request for continuance of sentencing to allow 

defendant time to prepare a motion for substantive relief under § 745].)6

IV. LASHON’S MOTION TO STAY APPEAL AND REMAND TO FILE SECTION 

745 MOTION IS DENIED

Lashon requests we stay the appeal and remand to allow her to file a 

section 745 motion in the superior court. While there may be circumstances 

in which a court of appeal chooses to exercise its discretion to stay a CRJA 

appeal and remand, we find no basis for doing so in this case. 

We have reviewed the evolution of the CRJA ante. In brief, CRJA relief 

was originally limited to cases in which judgment had not been entered prior 

to January 1, 2021 (such as Lashon’s case). The Legislature enacted 

amendments making section 745 relief available in all cases in which 

judgment was not final and created a timeline for retroactive relief spanning 

2023 to 2026. The following year, the Legislature enacted AB 1118, which 

now allows a defendant to seek review of a section 745 claim on direct appeal 

if the violation was based on the trial record or, in the alternative, request a 

stay of the direct appeal and remand to allow the filing of a motion in the 

trial court. This stay and remand procedure was designed “to permit the trial 

6 To the extent Lashon asserts “[t]he behavior of the trial judge cannot be 

sanctioned even without reference to the Racial Justice Act,” citing to People 

v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404 (Nieves), that issue has been forfeited because 

it was not presented in compliance with the rules governing briefs filed in 

this court. It was not presented under a separate point heading and was not 

supported by a cogent argument as to why we should follow Nieves in this 

case. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [each brief must “[s]tate 

each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, 

and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation to 

authority”]; Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [“citing 

cases without any discussion” as to why the cases should be followed “results 

in forfeiture” of the appellate claim].) 
14

court to rule on the claim in the first instance, and to allow the parties to 

fully litigate the issue.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Saf., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 

1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 18, 2023, at p. 7; Assem. Com. 

on Pub. Saf., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended Mar. 15, 2023, at p. 6.) Therefore, it appears the Legislature 

intended the stay and remand procedure to be available in cases that need 

further factual development.

Lashon’s direct appeal is based solely on her claim of a violation of 

section 745. She does not identify what factual development is needed 

regarding that claim and simply maintains that the record is sufficient to 

require a hearing to determine if the trial judge exhibited implicit bias. As 

Lashon both had the opportunity to raise a CRJA violation and develop the 

record in the trial court and fails to identify what factual development (if any) 

is now needed in the trial court, we decline to stay and remand the matter. 

This does not leave Lashon without an adequate remedy. Indeed, as 

she has informed us, her claim of a violation of section 745 has been made in 

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed and currently pending in the 

Supreme Court, a court of competent jurisdiction in which to file the petition 

as required under section 745, subdivision (b). (In re Menique Lashon, petn.

pending, ptn. filed Oct. 16, 2023, S282242.)

7

DISPOSITION

Our September 1, 2023 opinion is vacated. The judgment is affirmed.

7 While Lashon has not filed the requisite separate request for judicial 

notice and instead has made the request in her motion to stay, we grant her 

request to take judicial notice of certain declarations that she has attached to 

her motion to stay and has included in her petition for writ of habeas corpus 

filed in the Supreme Court. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. 

(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) 
15

_________________________

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Tucher, P.J.

_________________________

Rodríguez, J.

A163074/People v. Lashon