IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 20–1429

Submitted September 15, 2021—Filed October 22, 2021

DOMENICO CALCATERRA,

Appellee,

vs.

IOWA BOARD OF MEDICINE,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert Hanson, 

Judge.

The Iowa Board of Medicine appeals a district court order that reversed 

the Board’s declaratory order interpreting Iowa Code section 272C.6(4)(a).

AFFIRMED.

Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices 

joined.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit (argued), Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellant.

Trent Nelson (argued) and Michael M. Sellers of Sellers Galenbeck & 

Nelson, Des Moines, for appellee.
2

MANSFIELD, Justice.

I. Introduction.

We are asked to review an Iowa Board of Medicine (Board) declaratory 

order interpreting Iowa Code section 272C.6(4)(a) (2018). Section 272C.6(4)(a)

provides that “investigative information” gathered in relation to a licensed 

professional’s disciplinary proceeding shall be “privileged and confidential, . . . 

not subject to discovery, subpoena, or other means of legal compulsion for their 

release to a person other than the licensee and the boards, their employees and 

agents involved in licensee discipline, and . . . not admissible in evidence in a 

judicial or administrative proceeding other than the proceeding involving 

licensee discipline.” Id. It further provides that “investigative information in the 

possession of a licensing board or its employees or agents which relates to 

licensee discipline may be disclosed to appropriate licensing authorities within 

this state [or] the appropriate licensing authority in another state.” Id.

Additionally, it provides that “[i]f the investigative information in the possession 

of a licensing board or its employees or agents indicates a crime has been 

committed, the information shall be reported to the proper law enforcement 

agency.” Id. Lastly, it states, “However, a final written decision and finding of fact 

of a licensing board in a disciplinary proceeding . . . is a public record.”

In its declaratory order, the Board concluded that Iowa Code section 

272C.6(4)(a) allows it to publish statements of charges and press releases 

containing investigative information. On judicial review, the district court 

disagreed. In the following opinion, we come to the same conclusion as the 
3

district court. We find that the above-quoted provisions mean what they say, and 

that they tightly circumscribe the Board’s ability to disclose investigative 

information. Public disclosure is not allowed, other than in a “final written 

decision and finding of fact.” Id. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order

reversing the Board’s declaratory order.

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The Iowa Board of Medicine is the state’s administrative body responsible 

for licensing physicians and regulating medical professionals. See Iowa Code 

§ 147.13(1); id. § 148.3. As part of this responsibility, the Board investigates 

alleged rule violations by licensed physicians and, if necessary, conducts 

disciplinary proceedings. See id. § 148.7. Domenico Calcaterra is a 

cardiothoracic surgeon who formerly practiced in Iowa City and, at that time, 

was licensed by the Board. Currently, Dr. Calcaterra practices out of state.

In March 2013, the Board filed a statement of charges against 

Dr. Calcaterra accusing him of “a pattern of disruptive behavior and/or 

unethical or unprofessional conduct.” The Board’s statement of charges included 

factual allegations relating to a specific incident in November 2010 as well as 

allegations of prior unprofessional conduct. Around the same time, the Board

sent out a press release to its email subscribers that contained much of the same 

information as its statement of charges. 

The Board published both the statement of charges against Dr. Calcaterra 

and the press release on its website. The Board has publicized its disciplinary 
4

actions in this way for several decades. Other licensing boards in Iowa follow a 

similar practice.

Approximately a year later, in April 2014, the Board’s disciplinary action 

against Dr. Calcaterra terminated when the parties reached a settlement. Under 

the settlement, Dr. Calcaterra accepted a citation and warning and agreed to pay 

a $5,000 civil penalty. The Board posted the settlement to its website. It also 

issued another press release that not only disclosed the settlement but also 

reiterated the factual allegations against Dr. Calcaterra, although those 

allegations had not been admitted to or even recited in the settlement. 

Several years later, information about the allegations against 

Dr. Calcaterra remained available on the Board’s public website, and 

Dr. Calcaterra maintained that their presence was adversely impacting his 

medical career. On September 26, 2018, Dr. Calcaterra filed a petition for 

declaratory order with the Board. See id. § 17A.9. Therein, he asked the Board 

to answer the following question: “Does Iowa Code 272C.6(4)(a) prohibit the 

Board from publicly issuing/publishing statements of charges and 

issuing/publishing press releases which contain investigative information?” 

More particularly, he urged the Board to “issue a ruling declaring that all 

statements of charges and press releases issued and published by the Board are 

violative of state law and subsequently remove them from the public record and 

the Iowa Board of Medicine website.”

The Board declined to enter any type of declaratory order. Therefore, on 

December 21, Dr. Calcaterra filed a petition for judicial review in the Polk County
5

District Court. The Board moved to dismiss the petition. It argued that any 

challenge by Dr. Calcaterra to the Board’s prior actions against him was 

untimely and that Dr. Calcaterra lacked standing to raise arguments on behalf 

of other licensees. 

On July 7, 2019, the district court denied the Board’s motion to dismiss. 

The court noted that Dr. Calcaterra was not challenging the 2014 settlement,

but instead, was challenging the Board’s ongoing dissemination of investigative 

information. The court directed the Board to issue a declaratory order answering 

Dr. Calcaterra’s question.

On August 22, the Board issued a declaratory order answering “no” to 

Dr. Calcaterra’s question. Regarding Iowa Code section 272C.6(4)(a), the Board 

indicated that the confidentiality protection therein “extends to the patient, not 

the physician.” In addition, the Board pointed out that its own administrative 

rules have long provided that statements of charges are public records. See Iowa 

Admin. Code r. 653—24.2(8) (2018). Next, the Board referenced an unpublished 

opinion of our court of appeals holding that a statement of charges is a public 

record under chapter 22. Lastly, the Board observed that “[e]very other Iowa 

professional licensing board mandates by rule that their statements of charges 

are public.”

At this point, Dr. Calcaterra amended his petition for judicial review to 

challenge the substance of the Board’s declaratory order. The parties submitted 

briefing. Following oral argument, on April 26, 2020, the district court entered a 

ruling that set aside the Board’s order. The district court reasoned that Iowa 
6

Code section 272C.6(4)(a) was “clear and unambiguous” and prohibited the 

disclosure of investigative information “unless and until such information is 

disclosed in the findings of fact section of a final written decision made at the 

conclusion of a disciplinary proceeding.” In the district court’s view, a statement 

of charges could be published on the Board’s website that did not disclose the 

factual basis; however, “[t]he facts that brought about the charges are precisely 

the type of investigative information that the legislature intended to be privileged 

and confidential in Iowa Code Section 272C.6(4)(a).” The district court added that 

statutory language takes precedence over conflicting agency regulations. 

The Board appealed this ruling, and we retained the appeal.

III. Standard of Review.

The sole question before us is whether the Board correctly interpreted Iowa 

Code section 272C.6(4)(a). We review an agency’s interpretation of a statute for 

errors at law unless the legislature has clearly vested interpretive authority in

the agency. Id. § 17A.19(10)(c), (l); Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of the Iowa Ass’n 

for Just., 867 N.W.2d 58, 64–65 (Iowa 2015); Renda v. Iowa C.R. Comm’n, 784 

N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa 2010). If agency discretion has been granted by the 

legislature, we will reverse an agency’s interpretation only if it is “irrational, 

illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 10 (quoting Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10)(l)).

As we explained in Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, “When a term 

has an independent legal definition that is not uniquely within the subject matter 

expertise of the agency, we generally conclude the agency has not been vested 
7

with interpretative authority.” Id. at 14. In Renda, the fighting issue was the 

meaning of the words “dwelling” and “employee” as used in the Iowa Civil Rights 

Act. Id. at 10. We declined to defer to the Iowa Civil Rights Commission’s 

interpretation of those words, in part because both terms were “widely used in 

areas of law other than the civil rights arena.” Id. at 14.

Here, we are dealing with the phrase “privileged and confidential.” In Doe 

v. Iowa Board of Medical Examiners, we decided the Board did not have 

interpretive discretion to determine what “information is, and is not, 

confidential” under Iowa Code section 272C.6(4). 733 N.W.2d 705, 708 (Iowa 

2007). We see no reason to come to a different conclusion today. No statutory 

language indicates the legislature intended to vest interpretive authority in the 

Board. It is true that section 272C.5 grants the Board general rulemaking 

authority. See Iowa Code § 272C.5. But rulemaking authority on its own does 

not equate to interpretive discretion. Iowa Dental Ass’n v. Iowa Ins. Div., 831 

N.W.2d 138, 143 (Iowa 2013); Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 13.

The question of interpretation in this case—whether “privileged and 

confidential” as used in section 272C.6(4)(a) means that the Board cannot 

publicize investigative information—is not informed by the Board’s special 

expertise. Indeed, we already said as much in Doe. See 733 N.W.2d at 708 

(“Whether information is confidential is not informed by the expertise of the 

board, but rather focuses on the interests of the parties.”). Significantly, section 

272C.6(4)(a) is not unique to the Board; it applies to many different licensing

boards. If we deferred to a single board’s interpretation we would be blind to the 
8

fact that the statute applies to many boards. Furthermore, courts frequently 

interpret the terms “privileged” and “confidential” in a variety of contexts. See, 

e.g., Mitchell v. City of Cedar Rapids, 926 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Iowa 2019) (deciding 

whether certain police reports were confidential). For these reasons, we decide 

that section 17A.19(10)(c) applies here, and we review for correction of errors at 

law.

IV. Analysis.

Dr. Calcaterra’s petition for a declaratory order raises this question: does 

Iowa Code section 272C.6(4)(a) prohibit the Board from publicly issuing 

statements of charges and press releases that contain investigative information?1

The Board answered “no.” We disagree with the Board and hold that section 

272C.6(4)(a) prohibits investigative information from being released to the public 

prior to a final decision in the licensee’s disciplinary proceeding. As we discuss 

herein, our holding is consistent with the statute’s unambiguous text and is 

supported by precedent.

When interpreting the meaning of a statute, we start with the statute’s 

text. Doe v. State, 943 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 2020). If statutory language in its 

proper context is unambiguous, we do not look past the plain meaning of the 

words. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. Iowa Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd., 

928 N.W.2d 101, 109 (Iowa 2019). 

 

1We have not been asked to determine the scope and meaning of the term “investigative 

information.” The Board concedes that its statements of charges regularly contain “limited 

investigative information.” The district court found that “investigative information includes at 

least the specific factual allegations against a licensee that have not been substantiated and 

decided in a disciplinary proceeding.”
9

“Statutes need to be read as a whole, both in initially determining whether 

ambiguity exists and, later, in construing the statute.” Porter v. Harden, 891 

N.W.2d 420, 425 (Iowa 2017); see also Iowa Code § 4.1(38) (“Words and phrases 

shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the 

language . . . .”). 

In 1977, the Iowa legislature enacted the general licensing law now found 

in Iowa Code chapter 272C. See 1977 Iowa Acts ch. 95 (originally codified at Iowa 

Code ch. 258A (1979), now codified as amended at Iowa Code ch. 272C (2013)).

This law established a framework for licensing boards to regulate many 

professions and occupations, including physicians. See Iowa Code § 272C.1(6) 

(listing the licensing boards covered by the chapter). The provision at issue in 

this case, Iowa Code section 272C.6(4)(a), states,

In order to assure a free flow of information for accomplishing 

the purposes of this section . . . all complaint files, investigation files, 

other investigation reports, and other investigative information in 

the possession of a licensing board . . . which relates to licensee 

discipline are privileged and confidential, and are not subject to 

discovery, subpoena, or other means of legal compulsion for their 

release to a person other than the licensee and the boards, their 

employees and agents involved in licensee discipline . . . . However, 

investigative information . . . may be disclosed to appropriate 

licensing authorities . . . . If the investigative information in the 

possession of a licensing board . . . indicates a crime has been 

committed, the information shall be reported to the proper law 

enforcement agency. However, a final written decision and finding of 

fact of a licensing board in a disciplinary proceeding . . . is a public 

record. 

Section 272C.6(4)(a) thus contains a general rule that is sandwiched 

between a prefatory clause (“In order to . . . .”) and several carefully delineated 

exceptions (“However . . . .”). The general rule states that “investigative 
10

information . . . which relates to licensee discipline [is] privileged and 

confidential.” Id. Release of investigative information cannot be compelled “to a 

person other than the licensee and the boards, their employees and agents 

involved in licensee discipline.” Id. Further qualifications are that (1) the Board 

may disclose investigative information to appropriate licensing authorities in 

Iowa or elsewhere; and (2) the Board must disclose investigative information to 

law enforcement if the information indicates a crime has been committed. Id.

Lastly, the statute provides that final written decisions are public records. Id.

In the present case, the Board invites us to find an additional exception 

beyond the stated exceptions despite the categorical language of the general rule. 

In our view, the plain language of the statute does not permit us to take this 

step.

Notably, the statute not only limits the public’s ability to compel disclosure 

by the Board, it also limits the Board’s ability to voluntarily disclose investigative 

information. Therefore, it makes no difference that the Board voluntarily posted 

information about its investigation of Dr. Calcaterra on its website.

The exception for release to other licensing authorities deals with a form 

of voluntary release. If the general rule didn’t apply to voluntary release, this 

exception would not be necessary. Also, the previous sentence specifically 

authorizes release of the information to the Board itself and its own employees 

and agents. If the general rule didn’t cover voluntary release, this specific 

authorization would not be needed.
11

The statute’s prefatory clause—“In order to assure a free flow of 

information”—does not help the Board, either. Id. In context, the phrase “free 

flow of information” refers to the Board’s ability to receive information, not its 

ability to disseminate it. The point being made is that confidentiality would 

encourage those who have relevant information about a licensee to turn it over 

to the Board more freely and willingly.

Read in its entirety, we do not believe the statute is ambiguous. 

Investigative information cannot be released to the public prior to a final decision 

in a disciplinary proceeding. 

The Board urges us to look beyond Iowa Code section 272C.6(4)(a) to other 

areas of the Code. The Board argues that the district court’s reading of section 

272C.6(4)(a) cannot be reconciled with the Administrative Procedure Act and the 

Open Records Act. 

The Administrative Procedure Act requires the Board to give licensees 

notice of disciplinary proceedings against them. See Iowa Code § 17A.12(1)–(2). 

The Board does so with a statement of charges. The notice must include: 

a. A statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing.

b. A statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under 

which the hearing is to be held.

c. A reference to the particular sections of the statutes and 

rules involved.

d. A short and plain statement of the matters asserted.

Id. § 17A.12(2). 
12

The Board insists that “a short and plain statement of the matters

asserted” must often include investigative information. Yet even assuming that 

were so, nothing in Iowa Code section 17A.12 requires the full statement of 

charges to be made public. To the extent necessary, the Board can redact 

information from the public version of a statement of charges.

The Board would also have us consider the Open Records Act. In the 

Board’s view, statements of charges are public records that must be made 

available to the public in their entirety. See id. § 22.2(1). We see things

differently. It is true that statements of charges do not neatly fall under any Iowa 

Code section 22.7 exception.2 See id. § 22.7 (listing categories of public records 

that “shall be kept confidential”). Yet, section 22.7 does not purport to span the 

universe of confidential government records. Elsewhere, the Iowa Code contains 

a number of standalone provisions that make certain information or records 

confidential. See, e.g., id. § 422.72 (deeming tax return information confidential); 

id. § 622.10(1) (addressing communications made in professional confidence).

In Burton v. University of Iowa Hospitals & Clinics, we made clear that 

“chapter 22 does not trump or supersede specific statutes . . . on confidentiality 

of records.” 566 N.W.2d 182, 189 (Iowa 1997). Burton involved the medical peer-

 

2Dr. Calcaterra hypothesizes that investigative information could be shielded from the 

public disclosure by Iowa Code section 22.7(60) of the Open Records Act. That section categorizes 

as confidential “[i]nformation in a record that would permit a governmental body . . . to hold a 

closed session pursuant to section 21.5 in order to avoid public disclosure of that information.” 

Id. Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(d) in turn allows an agency to hold a closed session to “discuss . . 

. whether to initiate licensee disciplinary investigations or proceedings if the governmental body 

is a licensing or examining board.” Thus, a case can be made that investigative information is 

covered by section 22.7(60). Regardless, as we discuss in the main text, chapter 22 does not 

supersede a separate provision in the Iowa Code mandating confidentiality, such as section 

272C.6(4)(a).
13

review privilege set forth in Iowa Code section 135.41. Id. at 186. We held that 

section 135.41 authorized hospitals not to release certain peer-review records 

even though nothing in section 22.7 shielded those records from disclosure. Id.

at 188. We have reiterated this point about section 22.7’s nonexclusivity more 

recently. Last year, we said in Milligan v. Ottumwa Police Department that

“specific state law prohibitions on disclosure located outside of chapter 22 . . . 

can overcome the disclosure provisions in the Open Records Act.” 937 N.W.2d 

97, 102 (Iowa 2020).

In this case, section 272C.6(4)(a) specifically mandates nondisclosure. 

That language controls notwithstanding the lack of corresponding language in 

section 22.7.

The Board also points out that it and other professional licensing boards 

have promulgated rules to the effect that statements of charges should be made 

public. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 653—8.6(1) (“The following records are available 

at no cost to the public: . . . statements of charges . . . .”) (Iowa Board of Medicine);

see also id r. 645—11.6 (Iowa Professional Licensure Division); id. r. 655—20.7 

(Iowa Board of Nursing); id. r. 657—35.7 (Iowa Board of Pharmacy). The parties 

acknowledge these rules have been in effect for some time. The Board would have 

us give considerable weight to these longstanding rules in our interpretation of 

the confidentiality provision. The Board cites Hope Evangelical Lutheran Church 

v. Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance where we said, “Administrative rules 

have the force of law and are presumed valid. Weight should be given to the 

department’s interpretation of the statutes, particularly when they are of long
14

standing, but this court is not bound by that interpretation.” 463 N.W.2d 76, 84 

(Iowa 1990) (citation omitted).

In the post-Renda world, we have refined somewhat what we previously 

said in Hope Evangelical Lutheran Church. Regarding the situation where the 

legislature has not vested interpretive authority in the agency, we have observed,

“Longstanding administrative interpretations are entitled to 

some weight in statutory construction.” Griffin Pipe Prods. Co. v. Bd.

of Review, 789 N.W.2d 769, 775 (Iowa 2010). It is true, as we have 

already said, that we must interpret [the statute at issue] ourselves, 

but at a minimum the durability of the previous interpretation is 

worth noting.

Iowa Ins. Inst., 867 N.W.2d at 77; see also Mathis v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 934 N.W.2d 

423, 430 (Iowa 2019) (reiterating this language); Irving v. Emp. Appeal Bd., 883 

N.W.2d 179, 204 n.2 (Iowa 2016) (“While it may be true that ‘[l]ongstanding 

administrative interpretations are entitled to some weight in statutory 

construction,’ we remain responsible to determine if the administrative body is 

correct on the matter of law.” (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Ins. Inst., 867 

N.W.2d at 77)).

“Some weight” is not enough to override clear statutory language. 

“Adoption of administrative rules which are at variance with statutory provisions 

or which amend or nullify legislative intent exceed[s] the department’s 

authority.” Wakonda Club v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Rev., 444 N.W.2d 490, 491 

(Iowa 1989). “When a statute directly conflicts with a rule, the statute controls.” 

Exceptional Persons, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 878 N.W.2d 247, 252 (Iowa 

2016).
15

Moreover, some prior caselaw supports our interpretation of Iowa Code 

section 272C.6(4)(a). In Doe v. Iowa Board of Medical Examiners, we addressed 

what was then Iowa Code section 272C.6(4), now section 272C.6(4)(a), in a 

somewhat different context. 733 N.W.2d at 709. An Iowa physician had applied 

for a license to practice medicine in another state. Id. at 706–07. The Board 

revealed to the other state’s licensing board certain prior complaints against the 

physician, even though no formal disciplinary proceeding had been initiated by 

the Board in Iowa. Id. We decided that because the Board’s disclosure fell under 

a listed exception to the general rule of confidentiality, it was therefore 

permissible. Id. at 709, 712. 

Several aspects of our Doe decision are noteworthy for present purposes. 

First, in Doe we took a broad view of what investigative information relates to 

licensee discipline. We said, “Section 272C.6(4) was intended to ensure broad 

confidentiality of all complaint and investigative information pertaining to 

licensee discipline.” Id. at 710.

Second, in Doe we traced the legislative history of the statute, with 

relevance for the present case. We explained that “[t]aken literally, section 

[272C.6(4)] did not allow disclosure of complaint or investigative information, 

even during a disciplinary proceeding arising from that information.” Id. at 709. 

Therefore, the legislature soon “adopted a technical amendment . . . providing 

that complaint and investigative information could not be disclosed to any 

person ‘other than the licensee and the boards . . . involved in licensee discipline’

and was not admissible in any proceeding ‘other than the proceeding involving 
16

licensee discipline.’ ” Id. (second omission in original) (quoting Doe v. Iowa State 

Bd. of Physical Therapy & Occupational Therapy Exam’rs, 320 N.W.2d 557, 560–

61 (Iowa 1982)). The significance of this legislative history is plain. The fact that 

the legislature found it necessary to explicitly authorize disclosure of 

investigative information to the Board itself and within the disciplinary 

proceeding itself—two seemingly self-evident propositions—strongly suggests we 

should not be creating additional, unauthorized exceptions.

Third, in Doe we said, although admittedly in dicta, “Section 272C.6(4) 

ensures that the general public does not have access to complaint or 

investigative information unless, and until, a final written decision is published 

and is, therefore, a public record.” Id. at 711. The Board makes no effort in the 

present case to distinguish this language.3

We do not discount the Board’s policy arguments. As a general proposition, 

transparency in government is a good thing. In addition, members of the public 

may find value in getting access to whatever information a licensing agency has 

about a professional, including the contents of unverified complaints against him 

or her. But there are countervailing considerations. Individuals involved in an 

investigation need to be able to speak freely, and this is encouraged by 

confidentiality. Cf. Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Iowa 1996) (“Without 

 

3The Board cites to earlier language in Portz v. Iowa Board of Medical Examiners, 563 

N.W.2d 592, 595 (Iowa 1997), where we said that patient records subpoenaed by the Board “are 

to be seen only by the board during its investigation. See Iowa Code § 272C.6(4).” The Board 

suggests that once the investigation is completed and the disciplinary case is brought, such 

information can be released so long as patient identity is protected. Portz didn’t say that and, in 

any event, the language in Doe is more recent, more definitive, and directly on point.
17

the broad protections, [peer-review participants] would be very reluctant to 

participate . . . .”). In addition, a professional’s livelihood can be damaged by 

putting unproved allegations in public view on an official government website. 

Dr. Calcaterra claims this happened to him. 

It is the legislature’s role to balance these considerations, not ours. 

Presumably, the legislature did so when it enacted Iowa Code section 

272C.6(4)(a).

4 The statute contains other examples of legislative balancing. For 

example, the Board has a duty to report criminal conduct by the physician to 

law enforcement. Id. Also, investigative information eventually becomes available 

to the public at the close of disciplinary proceedings. Id. (“However, a final written 

decision and finding of fact of a licensing board in a disciplinary proceeding . . . 

is a public record.”). 

Our duty is to adhere to the plain meaning of the text. We do so here, and 

hold that investigative information cannot be released to the public in a 

statement of charges or a press release when there has been no underlying final 

decision in the disciplinary proceeding.

 

4Iowa’s statute does not appear to be unique in what it requires. Legislatures in nearby 

states have made similar balancing choices. Their statutes require information obtained by 

licensing boards during disciplinary investigations to be kept confidential. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. 

Ann. § 65–2839a (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 147.01(4) (West, 

Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess.); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 334.001(1)–(2) (West, 

Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg. and 1st Extraordinary Sess.). These states’ administrative rules 

do not provide for public release of a statement of charges or similar document at the outset of 

a disciplinary proceeding. See generally Kan. Admin. Regs. § 100 (2021); Minn. R. 5615 (2008); 

Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 20 § 2150 (2019). See also Uckun v. Minn. State Bd. of Med. Prac., 733 

N.W.2d 778, 788–89 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the Minnesota board could publish a 

temporary suspension order that contained otherwise confidential investigative data only 

because such an order constituted a “disciplinary measure[] of any kind” within the meaning of 

a designated exception to the general rule of nondisclosure).
18

V. Conclusion.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the order of the district court.

AFFIRMED.