UNITED STATES NAVY–MARINE CORPS

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

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No. 201600161

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee

v.

SHARONDA R. MURRAY

Private First Class (E-2), U.S. Marine Corps

Appellant

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Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judge: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Greer, USMC.

For Appellant: Commander Richard E.N. Federico, JAGC, USN.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Commander Clay Trivett, JAGC, USN;

Lieutenant Jetti L. Gibson, JAGC, USN.

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Decided 13 October 2016

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Before CAMPBELL, RUGH, and HUTCHISON, Appellate Military 

Judges

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This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but may be cited 

as persuasive authority under NMCCA Rule of Practice and 

Procedure 18.2.

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PER CURIAM:

A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted the appellant, 

consistent with her pleas, of one specification each of desertion, unauthorized 

absence terminated by apprehension, willful disobedience of a lawful order of 

a noncommissioned officer, escape from custody, and larceny, in violation of 

Articles 85, 86, 91, 95, and 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 

U.S.C. §§ 885, 886, 891, 895, and 921 (2012). The military judge sentenced 

the appellant to 12 months’ confinement, reduction to pay grade E-1, and a 

bad-conduct discharge, but recommended that the convening authority (CA) 
United States v. Murray, No. 201600161

2

“consider clemency by immediately releasing the accused from confinement.”1

The CA approved the sentence and, pursuant to a pretrial agreement (PTA), 

suspended all confinement in excess of 180 days. 

In her sole assignment of error, the appellant contends that a bad-conduct 

discharge is inappropriately severe under the unique facts and circumstances 

of this case. We disagree, find no error materially prejudicial to the 

appellant’s substantial rights, and affirm the findings and sentence. Arts. 

59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ. 

I. BACKGROUND

While stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina and the subject of two 

pending investigations for larceny, the appellant commenced an 

unauthorized absence on 8 May 2006.2 When she returned to Camp Lejeune 

on 15 June 2006 to retrieve some personal items, she was quickly identified, 

apprehended, taken into custody, and ordered by her platoon sergeant to 

remain in her barracks room “until otherwise directed by the command.”3 On 

16 June 2006, the appellant took her roommate’s car keys as her roommate 

slept with the keys under her pillow for safekeeping from the appellant. She 

left her barracks room, stole her roommate’s car, and drove to New York. 

There she abandoned the vehicle and remained in a deserter status until 13 

October 2015, when she was arrested after being pulled over for a traffic 

violation. 

The appellant’s unsworn statement during presentencing alleged that she 

was hazed and treated unfairly after members of her command discovered 

she was gay.4 The appellant stated she felt like “all hope was lost” and that 

deserting the Marine Corps “was [her] only escape.”5 The appellant also 

 

1 Record at 97. The military judge merged the orders violation and the escape 

from custody specifications for sentencing, and credited appellant with 103 days in 

pretrial confinement.

2 Prosecution Exhibit 1 at 2. The investigations involved several items: two 

cellular phones and accessories, four credit/debit cards, two wallets containing 

various credit/debit cards, two social security cards, and a portable DVD player. A

search of the appellant’s person, barracks room, vehicle, and wall locker revealed the 

location of many of those items. A monthly statement from a stolen credit card also 

showed that the appellant had used the card to pay her cellular phone bill.

3 Id. at 2-3. The appellant does not contest the order to remain in her barracks 

room or the circumstances of her apprehension, and we find no error or prejudice.

4 Record at 68.

5 Id. at 70. The military judge reopened the providence inquiry and discussed the 

potential defense of duress with the appellant and her trial defense counsel before 

continuing to find the pleas provident. Both the appellant and trial defense counsel 

reiterated that nothing in the appellant’s unsworn statement amounted to any 
United States v. Murray, No. 201600161

3

presented evidence of both her and her fiancee’s medical issues, her 

employment and educational accomplishments during her desertion, and her 

role as a foster parent and mentor to troubled children. 

II. DISCUSSION

This court reviews sentence appropriateness de novo. United States v. 

Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006). “Sentence appropriateness involves the 

judicial function of assuring that justice is done and that the accused gets the 

punishment [s]he deserves.” United States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395 (C.M.A. 

1988). As part of that review, we give “‘individualized consideration’ of the 

particular accused ‘on the basis of the nature and seriousness of the offense 

and the character of the offender.’” United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 

(C.M.A. 1982) (quoting United States v. Mamaluy, 27 C.M.R. 176, 180-81 

(C.M.A. 1959)). 

We have carefully reviewed the entire record, including both the 

extenuating circumstances and the facts related to the misconduct. 

Recognizing that the appellant first began her unauthorized absence while 

under investigation for larcenies, was apprehended, escaped from custody, 

stole her roommate’s vehicle, and then deserted for nine years, we conclude 

that a bad-conduct discharge is appropriate for this particular offender and 

her offenses. See United States v. Baier, 60 M.J. 382, 384 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (“A 

Court of Criminal Appeals must determine whether it finds the sentence to 

be appropriate.”). In this case, granting any sentence relief would be to 

engage in clemency–a function reserved for the convening authority–and we 

decline to do so. Healy, 26 M.J. at 395-96.

III. CONCLUSION

The findings and the sentence as approved by the CA are affirmed.

 

justification or excuse for the crimes to which she pleaded guilty. Likewise, the 

appellant does not now argue that her pleas were improvident.

 For the Court 

 R.H. TROIDL 

 Clerk of Court